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Document 52013DC0278
COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, THE COUNCIL, THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE AND THE COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS The Marco Polo programme - Results and outlook
COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, THE COUNCIL, THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE AND THE COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS The Marco Polo programme - Results and outlook
COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, THE COUNCIL, THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE AND THE COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS The Marco Polo programme - Results and outlook
/* COM/2013/0278 final */
COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, THE COUNCIL, THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE AND THE COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS The Marco Polo programme - Results and outlook /* COM/2013/0278 final */
COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO
THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, THE COUNCIL, THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL
COMMITTEE AND THE COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS The Marco Polo programme - Results and
outlook 1. Introduction Article 14 of Regulation 1692/2006[1] provides that the Commission
shall present to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic
and Social Committee and the Committee of Regions a Communication on the
results achieved by the Marco Polo programmes for the period 2003 – 2010. The performance of the programmes was
assessed in the framework of an external evaluation[2]. For the needs of the
Communication, the findings of the evaluation have subsequently been updated
with additional information, including operational data obtained up till November
2012. Further, the Communication provides a
general outlook on the next steps and the approach towards support for
innovative and sustainable freight transport services in the period covered by the
next Multi-annual Financial Framework (MFF) 2014 – 2020. Finally, the Commission Staff Working
Document accompanying this Communication presents relevant statistical data and
analysis of the specific issues mentioned in Article 14 (2a) of Regulation
1692/2006. 2. The Marco Polo programme as an instrument
supporting sustainable freight transport services at the EU level The programme was established as a result
of the White Paper on the Common Transport Policy of September 2001[3]. The White Paper paper proposed
that more intensive use of short sea shipping, rail and inland waterway transport
should be key elements in the development of intermodality as a practical and
effective means to achieve a balanced transport system. The White Paper forecasted that if no
actions were taken, road freight transport would increase by around 50 per cent
by 2010, leading to additional road infrastructure costs, an increased number
of accidents, increased congestion and increased local and global pollution.
The direct effect would be growth of the international (intra EU) road freight
traffic by about 12 billion tonne-kilometres[4]
per year. Against this background, the Marco Polo I
programme (2003 – 2006)[5]
was established. A budget of EUR 102 million was made available to support
actions aiming at shifting the forecasted increase of 48 billion
tonne-kilometres of freight from roads to short sea shipping, rail and inland
waterways or to a combination of modes of transport in which road journeys are
as short as possible. When developing the second Marco Polo
programme[6]
(2007 - 2013), the forecasts of freight transport growth were recalculated[7]. As a result, it was concluded that
in the absence of any action, international (intra EU) road freight transport
would grow by 20.5 billion tonne-kilometres per year between 2007 and 2013.
Marco Polo II was expected to shift a substantial part of this growth with a budget
of EUR 450 million. 3. Key features of the programme The Marco Polo Programme, established to
reduce road congestion and to make freight transport more efficient and sustainable,
is the only EU funding instrument defined in its legal framework as a fixed
contribution per output. The subsidy is usually calculated on the basis of achieved
modal shift expressed in millions of tonne-kilometres[8]. This modal shift can be then transformed
in monetary terms into environmental, congestion and other benefits that the Marco
Polo actions produce. Marco Polo I envisaged three types of
actions: (a)
modal shift actions: shifting as much freight as
possible from road to short sea shipping, rail and/or inland waterways; (b)
catalyst actions: changing the way non-road
freight transport operates in the EU and overcoming structural market barriers
in European freight transport through a breakthrough or highly innovative
concept; (c)
common learning actions: enhancing knowledge in
the freight logistics sector and fostering advanced methods and procedures of
co-operation in the freight market; Two more actions were added under Marco
Polo II: (d)
motorways of the sea: any innovative,
large-volume, high-frequency intermodal action which directly shifts freight
from the road to short sea shipping. This includes a combination of short sea
shipping and other modes for hinterland transport and
integrated door-to-door services in which road journeys
are as short as possible; (e)
traffic avoidance actions: any innovative action
integrating transport into production logistics to avoid a large percentage of freight
transport by road without adversely affecting production output or workforce. In addition, the overall budget was
increased from EUR 102 million to EUR 450 million and the duration of the
programme was extended from 4 to 7 years. Marco Polo II further introduced other
changes: a wider geographical scope, modified funding rules for certain types
of actions, a new definition of eligible applicants and a new approach to ancillary
infrastructure. Marco Polo II was reviewed in 2009[9] in order to facilitate
participation by small and micro enterprises and to simplify procedures. In
addition, the funding intensity was doubled from EUR 1 to EUR 2 for each 500
tonne kilometres shifted off the road. Management-wise, the implementation of the
programme was transferred from the Commission to the Executive Agency for Competitiveness
and Innovation (EACI) in 2008. 4. Results delivered by the Marco Polo
programmes Between 2003 and 2012, 172 grants were
awarded, providing financial aid to over 650 companies. Due to the unique design of Marco Polo
linking the subsidy with the actual modal shift delivered by projects, the
results of the programme can be quantified, enabling the programme's real
achievements to be assessed. –
Effectiveness The effectiveness of the programme is
measured in terms of realised modal shift/traffic avoidance[10] (in tonne-kilometres). Due to the differing nature of each of the
actions, the effectiveness can be directly measured for modal shift, catalyst,
motorways of the sea and traffic avoidance actions. Catalyst actions have
additional specific features, which will be addressed separately. Common
learning actions do not have a direct modal shift objective and therefore cannot
be evaluated based on transport shifted off the road. For Marco Polo I, the modal shift expected
by the selected projects amounted to 47.7 billion tonne – kilometres (btkm),
which is approximately equal to the overall target established for the programme
(48 btkm). Eventually, the projects achieved an actual modal shift of 21.9
btkm. This figure represents around 46 per cent of the overall modal shift
target and is the equivalent to around 1,200,000 truck trips over a distance of
1000 km with an average load of 18 tons of freight. In Marco Polo II, the volume of modal shift
expected by projects awarded in the calls between 2007 and 2011 amounts to 87.7
btkm, 17.54 btkm on average per year. At November 2012 these projects have realised
an actual modal shift of 19,5 btkm (some 5 btkm on average so far for the four
years with figures available). As Marco Polo II is still running, the figures
will increase over the programme's lifecycle[11]. Since Marco Polo projects are business services,
they are sensitive to market and economic conditions. As a result, the economic
downturn observed since 2008[12]
has an adverse impact on the uptake and effectiveness of the programme and the viability
of projects[13].
Catalyst actions, in addition to the modal
shift objective, aim to identify and overcome barriers to innovative approaches
in non-road freight transport. These barriers of a technical and – in some
cases – "psychological" nature are specific to each project. It is therefore,
difficult to provide direct collective results of all the benefits of catalyst
actions apart from those resulting from modal shift. The effectiveness of common learning
actions was assessed on a project by project basis (e.g. whether the forecasted
number of lectures took place or the forecasted number of attendees was
achieved). This is because the objectives of each action were different and no
common basis exists on which to group the results. Common learning actions have
been relatively successful in achieving their stated objectives, with a number
of projects having a success rate of 100 per cent. However, a longlasting
impact of the common learning actions on the practices of logistics companies
and on the modal split is more difficult to assess. –
Environmental benefits Improving the environmental performance of
freight transport is one of the key objectives of the Marco Polo programme. The
achieved modal shift expressed in tonne-kilometres is transformed in monetary
terms into environmental, congestion and other benefits, using an external
costs calculator[14].
The calculator produces an economic valuation for different modes and sub-modes
of transport based on external cost coefficients[15] provided for environmental
impacts (air quality, noise, climate change) and socio-economic impacts
(accidents, congestion). Based on the modal shift figures delivered
by Marco Polo I projects, the environmental benefits are estimated[16] at EUR 434 million. Comparing
this figure to the funds paid to projects with a modal shift objective (EUR 32.6
million), means that each euro invested in these actions has generated on
average EUR 13.3 in environmental benefits and other external costs savings.
These benefits include 1.5 million tons of CO2 not generated by road
traffic. As Marco Polo II is ongoing, final results are
not yet available. However the interim figures (November 2012) indicate that EUR
405 million in environmental benefits have been produced by the programme so
far. In addition to the environmental benefits
discussed above, other important indirect impacts may also be considered, for
example the effects from decreased traffic on nature protection or sensitive
areas, such as the Alps or Pyrenees, or knowledge spill-overs and networking effects
obtained through collaboration between entities involved in the Marco Polo
Programme. –
Efficiency The efficiency is measured as the ratio of
outputs (tkm achieved for projects with a modal shift objective) to inputs (the
committed or paid budget). For Marco Polo I modal shift projects
(excluding common learning and catalyst actions), when taking account of the
payments transferred to the beneficiaries, each invested euro resulted in a
shift of 597 tkm. This can be compared with the average efficiency of 743tkm per
euro of subsidy[17],
expected by projects selected under annual calls for proposals[18]. For the Marco Polo II programme, the
efficiency expected[19]
by selected projects[20]
with a modal shift objective amounted to 438tkm/euro (November 2012). Any
genuine figures representing efficiency actually achieved are not available at
present as the programme is still underway. A decrease in efficiency during the Marco
Polo II programme can be explained by changes to the rules governing projects, in
particular, doubling the funding intensity from the 2009 call (from EUR 1 to EUR
2 per 500tkm) and the new definition of freight[21]. –
Use of funds Out of EUR 102 million allocated for the
Marco Polo I, EUR 73,8 million were committed. The reasons behind this
situation is that only a limited number of project proposals complied with the
criteria and conditions established by the programme (265 proposals submitted and
55 contracts signed), leading to a lower uptake of the programme than desired. Out of this committed budget, EUR 41,8
million were paid. The fact that payment to beneficiaries is conditional on actual
achievement of results is an important aspect of the programme and demonstrates
an efficient allocation of public funds. However, this means that in case the
actually achieved modal shift figures are lower than those originally calculated
by the beneficiaries, e.g. because of the adverse effects of the financial
crisis, the budget available for the programme is not entirely used. A similar trend is forecasted for the
on-going Marco Polo II programme. In addition, as a general rule, the amounts
paid to a project may not exceed the total deficit experienced over the funding
period (see footnote 8). Therefore if a project produces profit or achieves a
break-even point earlier than foreseen in the application, the subsidy may be respectively
withdrawn or reduced. This was the case for several Marco Polo projects, and
also contributed to lower use of allocated funds. –
Sustainability Sustainability refers to whether or not the
project remains operational in some form following the end of the funding period.
According to the evaluations[22]
performed on the programmes, the majority of services are expected to continue following
the end of the Grant Agreement. This indicates that short-term funding may have
created long-term change even in the current evolving market conditions. As a
result, programmes are likely to generate additional benefits in terms of modal
shift/traffic avoidance and external costs savings after the contractual lifetime,
but which, due to non-availability of relevant data, cannot be included in
quantification of the programme's impacts. –
Competition The Marco Polo programme provides grants to
transport companies in order to finance the start-up of actions to shift freight
transport off the road. The focus on new transport services (or upgrades of
existing ones) and certain levels of saturation on intermodal routes may lead in
some cases to competition concerns even if safeguards are established to avoid
a degree of distortion which goes against the common interest (i.e. assessment
of competition in the proposals' evaluation process, possibility of terminating
or reducing the scope of contracts in case of proven competition distortion). In practice, even though a number of
complaints on distortion of competition have been lodged by competitors to
Marco Polo beneficiaries over the lifecycle of both Marco Polo programmes,
there is no clear evidence of any significant adverse competition effects[23]. –
Management With the capacity to commit more human resources,
EACI has proven to deliver added value to the implementation process of Marco
Polo. The externalisation has allowed a stepping up of communication efforts,
improving promotion of the programme, enhancing the operational controls and
providing increased assistance to applicants. –
Procedures The procedures of the programme are based
on the principle of sound financial management and were developed with the aim
of ensuring a level playing field and striking an appropriate balance between
the necessary administrative controls on the use of the public money and the
needs of businesses. However, due to the very operational nature of the
programme, in some cases these procedures may be seen as complex and may not be
fully compatible with the day-to-day practices of private companies, particularly
in the context of an ever-changing financial risk environment. Other important factors (a)
The uptake of the Marco Polo programme is
considered not entirely satisfactory. Doubling the funding intensity in 2009
has only partly solved this issue. This situation may be explained by external
reasons such as a limited target group, changing market conditions and an
adverse economic climate since 2008, but also by internal factors such as the
design of the programme, which, in order to protect public funds, transfers the
main operational risks to the beneficiaries; (b)
The introduction of complementary audit
certificates since 2010, has facilitated the verification of the quantities of
freight transported by the Marco Polo projects and has decreased the risk of miscalculation
and alleged fraud but further increased the administrative burden for the
beneficiaries; (c)
The modal shift orientation of the programme (allowing
payments almost exclusively on the basis of realised modal shift/traffic
avoidance[24])
is one of the the reasons why the beneficiaries
face difficulties in financing ancillary infrastructure[25], even though the expenditure incurred
for this type of infrastructure may also be eligible for the financial
assistance[26]; (d)
The current modal shift approach is not
attractive for certain insular Member States. This is because freight transport
links between the islands and the continent and also between islands themselves
are mainly maritime services. As a result there are limited possibilities to
generate modal shift/traffic avoidance at the levels required by the programme;
(e)
According to limited numbers of beneficiaries
surveyed on the Marco Polo[27],
it can not be excluded that there may be some deadweight in the programme, meaning
that a proportion of supported projects would have gone ahead even in the
absence of Marco Polo funds. On the other hand, the start-up aid provided
through EU grants may have mitigated the business risk to start these intermodal
operations and helped some projects to reach the break-even point earlier than it
would have been possible without funding. It is also likely that a larger scale
project was possible as a result of the subsidy being provided. Full scope of
this deadweight phenomenon is however difficult to quantify; (f)
While participation of small and medium
enterprises is not a direct objective of the programme, it is estimated that
they represent around 24 per cent[28]
of the total population of beneficiaries. Detailed figures on the performance of the
Marco Polo programmes are presented in the Commission Staff Working Document
accompanying the present Communication. 5. Conclusions on the achieved results The Marco Polo programmes were set up as
funding instruments to reduce road congestion and to improve the environmental
performance of the freight transport system. Unique and important features of
the programme are its transparency, the precision with which results can be
measured and the direct relationship between EU funding and the results
obtained. The already completed Marco Polo I programme
generated around EUR 434 million in environmental benefits, removing 21.9
billion tonne-kilometres of freight off European roads. Further significant
modal shift and related benefits are expected for the on-going Marco Polo II programme.
However, the ambitious objectives of modal
shift set by the legislator have not been fully achieved (46% of planned modal
shift for Marco Polo I). Furthermore, the programmes are considered as rather
complex, and in some cases not easy to be used by the European companies. Nonetheless, it should be highlighted that Marco
Polo is based on quantifiable results and payments are made almost exclusively
for the modal shift actually realised. What is more, market conditions and the
economic situation are important elements in determining the success of
projects. Since intermodal transport solutions are more complex and difficult
to implement than a pure road transportation system, the programme has been
particularly sensitive to the effects of the economic crisis. Hence, Marco Polo
represents a good example of efficient use of the EU funds even if the
programme's objectives have not been fully met and the allocated budget has not
been entirely spent. Provision of public funding directly to the
market raised also some competition concerns during the lifecycle of the
programme. On the other hand, there was no clear evidence about any significant
adverse competition effects of financed projects. Marco Polo is currently the only European funding
instrument focused on the improvement of efficiency of freight transport.
Therefore continued support is considered useful and appropriate. However, any
new scheme supporting sustainable freight transport services will need to reflect
on the lessons learnt from the previous programmes. 6. Next steps –
Transport policy context In March 2011, the Commission issued a
strategy for a competitive transport system that will increase mobility and
accessibility, remove major barriers in key areas and contribute to increased
growth and employment[29].
Amongst the main targets for the EU transport policy are: deployment of clean
fuels, optimisation of the performance of multimodal logistic chains and use of
more energy-efficient modes, increasing the efficiency of transport and of
infrastructure use and the development of information systems and market-based
incentives. The new Trans-European Transport Network guidelines (TEN-T)[30] adopted by the Commission in October
2011, will provide main framework to achieve the transport policy objectives as
specified in the White Paper. For the Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF)
2014 – 2020, the Commission proposed two pillars to be retained for the
provision of financial aid to EU transport policy. An infrastructure pillar will be covered
within the Connecting Europe Facility (CEF)[31].
Within its transport component, the CEF is foreseen to upgrade Europe's transport infrastructure, build missing links and remove bottlenecks. Since
funding will be concentrated on transport modes that are less polluting,
broader deployment of telematics applications and use of innovative
technologies, it will push the European transport system to become more
sustainable. An innovation pillar will be implemented by
relevant parts of the new research and innovation programme (Horizon 2020)[32]. –
Support for the innovative and sustainable freight
transport services - policy approach With the objective of improving efficiency and
sustainability of European freight transport and logistics, the Commission
proposes a new approach in support of the freight transport services in the
period 2014 – 2020. Based on the achieved results and taking
account of the evolving policy context, the Marco Polo II programme will be
discontinued in the current form. Instead, a follow-up of Marco Polo will be integrated
within the revised TEN-T programme and implemented using funding instruments
provided by the CEF. This approach will lead to a harmonised and
coordinated implementation of the European transport policy. In this context,
the follow-up of Marco Polo will contribute in particular to the efficient
management and use of the transport infrastructure, allowing deployment of innovative
and sustainable freight transport services on the multimodal core network, which
is supposed to serve the most important European traffic flows. These services should meet the needs of
their users, be economically efficient, contribute to the objectives of
low-carbon and clean transport, fuel security and environmental protection, be
safe and secure and have high quality standards. They need to promote advanced
technological and operational concepts and contribute to the improvement of
accessibility within the Union. They also should play an important role in
pushing the European economy towards sustainable growth, making the freight
transport and logistics sector as one of Europe’s growth engines, enhancing
trade and the mobility of people, creating wealth and jobs and maintaining the
competitiveness of European companies. Therefore, as
proposed by the Commission in Art 38 of the new TEN-T Guidelines, the new approach
shall include the following[33]: (g)
improve sustainable use of transport
infrastructure, including its efficient management; (h)
promote the deployment of innovative transport
services or new combinations of proven existing transport services, including
through the application of ITS and the establishment of relevant governance
structures; (i)
facilitate multi-modal transport service
operations and improve cooperation between transport service providers; (j)
stimulate resource and carbon efficiency,
notably in the fields of vehicle traction, driving/steaming, systems and
operations planning, resource sharing and cooperation; (k)
analyse, provide information on and monitor
markets, fleet characteristics and performance, administrative requirements and
human resources. In this framework,
attention will also be paid to measures supporting interconnectivity and
interoperability of freight transport information across the modes and to facilitating
deployment of Motorways of the Sea - based services. Finally, this
should lead to focussed funding, firmly integrated in policy and infrastructure
orientations, encouraging commercial undertakings to switch to more innovative
and sustainable solutions, helping them to reduce associated risks and
addressing the main failures occurring in the freight transport sector, such
as: lack of uptake of innovation, interconnectivity problems between transport
modes, difficulty of access to finance, insufficient internalisation of
external costs, inefficient use of resources and lack of cooperation in the
market. The new
approach is expected to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of the EU
financial aid. The format of the current instrument will therefore be revised
with respect to the type of actions supported, management structure and
implementation processes. Also the consistency with the operational structures
of the CEF will need to be adequately addressed. This would
possibly mean departing from the pure start up aid for modal shift as the key
element under the current Marco Polo programme. –
Measures and implementation The CEF foresees
that funding for sustainable freight transport services may be delivered in the
form of financial instruments or in the form of grants, where the amount of
Union financial aid shall not exceed 20% of the total eligible costs. This
maximum funding rate will be adequately adapted with a view of triggering
interest on the market and ensuring appropriate leverage of the public funds
allocated to the programme[34].
As far as
grants are concerned, the proposals should be selected through calls for
proposals with funding conditions, eligibility, selection and award criteria,
in line with the objectives and priorities laid down in the CEF and and in the TEN-T
guidelines. Operational
targets, pertinent indicators and delivery mechanisms of EU support will, where
relevant, take due account of the results of the performance audit on the Marco
Polo programme currently being performed by the European Court of Auditors
(ECA). [1] Regulation
(EC) No 1692/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing
the second 'Marco Polo' programme for the granting of Community financial
assistance to improve the environmental performance of the freight transport
system (Marco Polo II) and repealing Regulation (EC) No 1382/2003, as amended
by Regulation (EC) No 923/2009, OJ L 328/1, 24/10/2006 [2] Evaluation
of the Marco Polo Programme 2003 – 2010, Europe Economics, April 2011 [3] White
Paper - European transport policy for 2010: time to decide, COM(2001) 370
final, 12.09.2001 [4] "Tonne-kilometre"
(tkm) means the transport of a tonne of freight, or its volumetric equivalent,
over a distance of one kilometre; [5] Based
on Regulation
(EC) No 1382/2003 [6] Based
on Regulation 1692/2006. [7] Ex-ante
Evaluation Marco Polo II (2007-2013), Ecorys, 2004; estimations of freight
transport growth: PRIMES model and EUROSTAT statistics. [8] According
to the programme's rules, the subsidy is calculated as the lowest value out of:
(1) tonne-kilometres shifted; (2) cumulative losses over the funding period;
and (3) 35% of the eligible costs (50% for Common Learning actions). In
practice, for most of the modal shift based actions (excluding Common Learning
actions and specific objectives of Catalyst actions) the payment is limited to
the maximum of tkm achieved. [9] Regulation
(EC) No 923/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council, OJ L 266/2,
9/10/2009 [10] The
metric for evaluating traffic avoidance actions is expressed rather in vehicle
kilometres than the tonne kilometres. The vehicle kilometres (vkm) can be converted
in tonne kilometres (tkm) where 1 vkm equals 20 tkm [11] It is
foreseen last Marco Polo II projects will be operating up to 2020 [12] In the
freight transport sector there was an overall decrease of the transport
volumes. For details see the Commission Staff Working Document accompanying the
Communication. [13] 11 projects non-started or
terminated under MP I (calls 2003-2006) and 30 projects non-started or terminated
so far under MP II (calls 2007-2010) [14] Marco
Polo calculator (see more on http://ec.europa.eu/transport/marcopolo/index_en.htm) [15] The
coefficients and methodology used in the calculator were adjusted over time. The
recent versions of the calculator are based upon the "Handbook on
estimation of external costs in the transport sector" (IMPACT 2008) [16] The
values produced by the calculator can be regarded only as indicative. [17] The efficiency expected by
selected projects is measured before any payments to projects take place; hence
it is based on the funds committed [18] In
2003, 2004, 2005 and 2006 [19] Based
on funds committed [20] Concerning
projects selected under the calls for proposals: 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010 and
2011 [21] Including
the weight of empty intermodal transport and road vehicles [22] Evaluation
of the Marco Polo Programme (2003-2006), Ecorys, 2007; Evaluation of the Marco
Polo Programme 2003 – 2010, Europe Economics, 2011 [23] These
complaints were duly examined by the Commission/EACI. As a consequence a
reinforcement of the internal evaluation procedure with regard to the
competition issue has been introduced since 2011 Call for Proposals. [24] See
footnote 8 [25] The
necessary and sufficient infrastructure to achieve the goals of actions,
including freight-passenger installations [26] Only
the portion of the infrastructure's depreciation corresponding to the duration
of the action and the rate of actual use for the purposes of the action may be
taken into account as eligible cost. The eligible costs for ancillary
infrastructure shall not be higher than 20% of the total eligible costs for the
action [27] See
footnote 22 [28] This
figure represents only autonomous SMEs (not linked to other enterprises); Source: EACI
data [29] White
Paper, Roadmap to a Single European Transport Area – Towards a competitive and
resource efficient transport system, COM/2011/0144 [30] Proposal
for a Regulation on Union guidelines for the development of the trans-European
transport network, COM(2011) 650/2 [31] Proposal
for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing the
Connecting Europe Facility, COM(2011) 665/3 [32] Proposal
for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing
Horizon 2020 - The Framework Programme for Research and Innovation (2014-2020),
COM(2011) 809 [33] The
text of the TEN-T guidelines and this article are currently subject to the
legislative procedure and might therefore be amended. [34] As
explained under footnote 8, the subsidy for the current Marco Polo II programme
is calculated on the basis of: (1) tonne-kilometres shifted; (2) total losses experienced
over the funding period; and (3) the eligible costs. Based on evidence from
supported projects, the actual funding rate in the programme on average does
not exceed 10% of the total eligible costs.