52011SC0380

EN

(...PICT...)|EUROPEAN COMMISSION|

Brussels, 4.4.2011

SEC(2011) 380 final Volume 1

COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT

IMPACT ASSESSMENT Accompanying document to the COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE COUNCIL, THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE AND THE COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS TOWARDS A SPACE STRATEGY FOR THE EUROPEAN UNION THAT BENEFITS ITS CITIZENS SEC(2011) 381 final COM(2011) 152 final

TABLE OF CONTENTS

1. Context and political background 4

1.1. Context 4

1.2. Political background 5

2. Procedural Issues and consultation of interested parties 6

2.1. Organisation and timing 6

2.2. Stakeholder consultation 6

2.3. Key issues emerging from stakeholder consultations 8

3. What are the problems? 9

3.1. Problem definition 9

3.1.1. Introduction: Member States involvement in space 9

3.1.2. Security of critical European space infrastructures is not ensured 10

3.1.2.1. Description of the security threat due to space debris, space weather and Near-Earth Objects (NEOs) 10

3.1.2.2. The current situation regarding space situational awareness 14

3.1.2.3. Estimated annualised losses due to collision and space weather 16

3.1.3. Tab 3 – Estimated loss due to collisions and space weather effects. 16

3.1.4. Europe lacks a long-term strategy and critical mass for space exploration 17

3.1.5. Space policies and investments are decided at national/intergovernmental level 20

3.1.6. National investments for dedicated space programmes cannot sufficiently address the needs of EU policies and interventions 20

3.2. EU right to act: subsidiarity and proportionality 21

4. Objectives 22

4.1. General objectives 22

4.2. Specific objectives 22

5. Policy options 23

5.1. Option 1: Baseline scenario 23

5.2. Option 2: Security in space dimension 24

5.3. Option 3: Option 2 plus limited involvement in space exploration 25

5.3.1. Participation in the ISS 25

5.3.2. Launch infrastructures 26

5.3.3. Coordination and implementation 26

5.3.4. Cost 27

5.4. Option 4: Option 3 plus substantial investment in space exploration 27

5.4.1. Fully autonomous human access to space 27

5.4.2. Mars sample return mission 28

5.4.3. Coordination and implementation 28

5.4.4. Cost 28

5.5. Cost overrun considerations for options 2 to 4 29

6. Analysis of impacts of options 29

6.1. Option 1: Baseline scenario 29

6.1.1. Economic impact 29

6.1.2. Environmental Impact 30

6.1.3. Social impact 30

6.2. Option 2 30

6.2.1. Economic Impact 30

6.2.2. Environmental impact 32

6.2.3. Social impact 32

6.3. Option 3 32

6.3.1. Economic impact 32

6.3.2. Environmental impact 33

6.3.3. Social impact 34

6.4. Option 4 36

6.4.1. Economic impact 36

6.4.2. Social impact 37

6.4.3. Environmental impact 37

7. Comparison of the options 38

8. Monitoring and evaluation 39

1. Context and political background

1.1. Context

This Impact Assessment (IA) will accompany a communication on the future involvement of the EU in space. It will look closely into the opportunities of the EU to play a future role in space policy and will set out different levels of ambition regarding thematic and financial scope for an EU Space Programme, which could come into force during the next financial perspectives from 2014-2020. The Communication does not amount to a formal proposal for the governance and funding of a European Space Programme. It will rather be the basis for a discussion that may lead to a proposal for a Regulation establishing an EU space programme to be presented alongside or including the GMES proposal Regulation referred to in the following paragraph. Any proposed Regulation would be accompanied by another impact assessment that would analyse the financial impact in a detailed manner.  

This IA follows a pragmatic approach and has been drafted along the following lines:

– While Galileo must be seen as an integral part of the European Space Policy, given its complexity and the fact that it follows a decision making path of its own Full reference documents available at http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/policies/space/documents/galileo/index_en.htm. , the present impact assessment does not deal with Galileo;[1]

Full reference documents available at http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/policies/space/documents/galileo/index_en.htm.

– Similarly, GMES is also an integral part of the European Space Policy. However, it has been the subject of several impact assessments; the last of them was carried out prior to the adoption of the 28.10.2009 Commission Communication on the challenges and next steps for the space component Commission Communication “Global Monitoring for Environment and Security (GMES) – Challenges and next steps for the Space Component”, COM (2009)589 final. and is currently the subject of an IA in view of a proposal for a GMES Regulation 2014-2020. Therefore the present impact assessment does not cover GMES;[2]

Commission Communication “Global Monitoring for Environment and Security (GMES) – Challenges and next steps for the Space Component”, COM (2009)589 final.

– The present IA contains some references to space research and innovation because they are intimately linked to the priority areas mentioned below. However, the impact assessment of space research and space and innovation will be dealt with as part of the preparatory work to be carried out for FP8 and for the possible successor of CIP CIP is the Competitiveness and Innovation Framework Programme. respectively;[3]

CIP is the Competitiveness and Innovation Framework Programme.

– Since Galileo and GMES have been clearly identified as the first priorities of the EU in space, the present IA focuses on the other priority areas identified by the 2008 Space Council Resolution 5 th Space Council Resolution, “Taking forward the European Space Policy”, 26 September 2008. on taking forward the European Space Policy, namely the space and security aspects not covered by GMES (protection of space infrastructure, otherwise referred to as Space Situational Awareness – SSA), and space exploration; like GMES, these actions will be based on the new Article 189 of the TFEU which provides the EU with a dedicated legal basis for action in the space domain.[4]

5 th Space Council Resolution, “Taking forward the European Space Policy”, 26 September 2008.

– There is no programmatic or technical dependence between the actions proposed in this IA and GMES and Galileo. Any new EU activities in space will be additional to and have no financial impact on GMES and Galileo in so far as they should only be undertaken under the condition that adequate funding for both is ensured.

1.2. Political background

The political context of the initiative is framed by the new provision of the TFEU. With Article 189 that introduces a new and clear mandate for the EU to act in space matters, space has now become an EU policy in its own right which should be developed through appropriate measures.

The concerted political will of Member States is also reflected in the Council Resolutions and orientations on the European Space Policy (ESP) jointly adopted by the EU and the European Space Agency (ESA) at the 4 th , 5 th and 6 th Space Council meetings held in 2007, 2008 and 2009 4 th Space Council Resolution, “Resolution on the European Space Policy”, 22 May 2007; 5 th Space Council Resolution, “Taking forward the European Space Policy”, 26 September 2008; 6 th Space Council Resolution, “The contribution of Space to innovation and competitiveness in the context of the European Economic Recovery Plan and further steps”, 29 May 2009. . These Resolutions put public policy objectives at the centre of the ESP and set priority areas for the future such as climate change, creating global market opportunities, contributing to the security of European citizens and the need for Europe to develop a common vision and a long-term strategic planning for space exploration. [5]

4 th Space Council Resolution, “Resolution on the European Space Policy”, 22 May 2007; 5 th Space Council Resolution, “Taking forward the European Space Policy”, 26 September 2008; 6 th Space Council Resolution, “The contribution of Space to innovation and competitiveness in the context of the European Economic Recovery Plan and further steps”, 29 May 2009.

The 2009 Resolution emphasised the contribution of space to innovation, competitiveness and economic recovery in Europe. It stressed that significant investments in space, and the technological progress it generates, must work for the whole of the European economic fabric.

In its 2008 Resolution, the European Parliament endorsed the European Space Policy and asked for concrete proposals in the four priority areas identified above European Parliament resolution on the European Space Policy, “How to bring space down to Earth”, 20 November 2008. .[6]

European Parliament resolution on the European Space Policy, “How to bring space down to Earth”, 20 November 2008.

There are strong links between the objectives and priorities in these Council Resolutions and some of the central themes of President Barroso’s political guidelines for his second mandate and with the EU2020 strategy http://ec.europa.eu/eu2020/index_en.htm. : growth and job creation, tackling climate change and the research and innovation revolution for a knowledge society.[7]

http://ec.europa.eu/eu2020/index_en.htm.

In his guidelines, President Barroso also underlines that the EU must concentrate where it can bring the most added value. As the Council Resolutions acknowledge, there is a widely shared political view that EU involvement in space activities would offer great added value “to ESA and Member States, while respecting roles and responsibilities of each of them” 5 th Space Council Resolution, “Taking forward the European Space Policy”, 26 September 2008. . [8]

5 th Space Council Resolution, “Taking forward the European Space Policy”, 26 September 2008.

President Barroso in his intervention at the conference “The ambitions of Europe in Space”, held in Brussels on 15 th October 2009, stated that space is one of the areas that “should progress at EU level” in the future and outlined avenues for future EU involvement in space. He highlighted that space is an “enabling” tool that should help Europe to face fundamental challenges, such as "fighting the economic crisis, ensuring the well being of our citizens; tackling climate change; finding ways to unleash the full potential for innovation and job creation; bringing about a true knowledge society and reinforcing our position in the world scene".

This initiative is related to the Commission Communication COM(2007)212 jointly developed by the European Commission and ESA and adopted in 2007, defining the strategic mission of a European Space Policy and covering all actors and key aspects of space activities in Europe.

This initiative builds on past achievements in space research under the R&D framework programmes. It is also closely linked to two other space flagship projects (Galileo and GMES) and will benefit other EU policies such as security and defence, environment or health.

2. Procedural Issues and consultation of interested parties

2.1. Organisation and timing

IA Steering Group

DG Enterprise and Industry set up an Impact Assessment Steering Group (IASG) to which the following Services were invited: DG SANCO, DG RTD, DG TREN, DG BUDG, DG ECFIN, DG RELEX, DG JRC, DG INFSO, DG ENV, DG EMPL, DG EAC and the Secretariat-General. The IASG met in December 2009, May 2010 and June 2010 in order to accompany the preparation of the impact assessment.

IA Board opinion

The Impact Assessment Board of the European Commission assessed a draft version of the impact assessment and issued its opinion on 16.07.2010. The impact assessment board made several comments and, in the light of those suggestions, the final impact assessment report:

– Elaborates on the present situation as regards situational awareness and space exploration, including a new annex;

– Clarifies that the suggested action would not compete for funding with Galileo and GMES;

– Clarifies that the options are incremental and therefore their final configuration depends on available funding, once funding for Galileo and GMES has been secured;

– Explains what ESA is currently doing in the fields of space situational awareness and space exploration and analyses the limits for ESA further involvement;

– Further elaborates the impact on competitiveness of EU industry, the international cooperation aspects and provides examples of spin-offs in annex;

– Clarifies further consultation of stakeholders as per the IAB recommendations.

2.2. Stakeholder consultation

DG Enterprise consulted different parties interested and involved in space affairs.

Bilateral meetings were held in 2009 with National Space Agencies of the Member States more actively involved in space activities and with the representatives of the European space industry.

Relevant target stakeholders were interviewed by an external contractor “Study on the EU Space Programme 2014-2020”, Ecorys, Draft Final Report, 18 April 2010, contract n. SI2.541751. , in the context of a study to support the preparation of the present impact assessment.[9]

“Study on the EU Space Programme 2014-2020”, Ecorys, Draft Final Report, 18 April 2010, contract n. SI2.541751.

The Space Advisory Group of the European Commission, that supports the European Commission services with strategic advice regarding the Space theme of the Framework Programme for Research, provided recommendations on Europe’s role in global strategy for space exploration For more information on the Space Advisory Group (SAG) http://ec.europa.eu/research/fp7/pdf/advisorygroups/space-members.pdf#view=fit&pagemode=none. .[10]

For more information on the Space Advisory Group (SAG) http://ec.europa.eu/research/fp7/pdf/advisorygroups/space-members.pdf#view=fit&pagemode=none.

A Eurobarometer survey on the space activities of the European Union was conducted by Gallup in July 2009 in order to examine EU citizens’ opinions and to assess: a) their awareness of space activities of Europe and the European Union, b) their perception of these activities, and c) their general attitude toward space exploration. The majority of European Union citizens regard European space activities as important from the perspective of the EU’s future global role: one in five citizens considered such activities very important (20%) and a further 43% felt that space activities are important in this respect. In total, almost two-thirds of Europeans share the view that space activities are important for the future international position of the European Union http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/newsroom/cf/itemlongdetail.cfm?lang=fr&item_id=3749. . Overall, 67% of the survey respondents consider it important to develop space based applications to improve citizens’ security and 64% support greater EU involvement in space exploration. However out of the 64% supporting space exploration, 38% of the support was not unconditional (the reply was: yes, perhaps). This means that the EU has to demonstrate the added value of such undertaking.[11]

http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/newsroom/cf/itemlongdetail.cfm?lang=fr&item_id=3749.

In October 2009 the first EU-ESA conference on human space exploration marked the beginning of an intense consultation process enabling the EU, ESA and their respective Member States to define a common political vision and role in worldwide space exploration.

In the first semester of 2010 several conferences and workshops on space exploration were organised to stimulate a debate and gather feedback from space and scientific communities, from national governments, and from national and international organizations operating in the space sector. Themes ranged from scientific and educational aspects of space exploration, to the synergies between exploration, innovation, industrial competitiveness and technological progress, to future scenarios for space exploration.

In addition, under the Spanish Presidency, a conference on space and security was held to contribute to defining the role of European Institutions and centres in security programmes.

A second Presidency conference on governance of European Space Programmes involved the EU, ESA and their Member States in a reflection on future developments of the institutional framework for Space activities in Europe. This conference revealed that governance is an issue that has multiple dimensions; the discussion was therefore a step in a process that should gradually lead to each of these dimensions being addressed and eventually settled.

A study was carried out by an external contractor (Ecorys) to examine possible space activities where the EU could be involved in the future “Study on the EU Space Programme 2014-2020”, Ecorys, Draft Final Report, 18 April 2010, contract n. SI2.541751. . This study is an input alongside others in preparing this impact assessment. The study has been particularly helpful in identifying and confirming possible impacts of EU action in space.[12]

“Study on the EU Space Programme 2014-2020”, Ecorys, Draft Final Report, 18 April 2010, contract n. SI2.541751.

The policy options presented in this IA have been built on the outcomes of these consultations. During the consultations it was made clear that Galileo and GMES are the utmost priorities in space policy. Therefore the suggested actions should not compete for funds with these flagship projects and could only be undertaken provided, inter alia, that additional funding for space is available. Stakeholders were also consulted on the order of priority of the options, i.e. on the fact that space situational awareness should be given priority over space exploration. There is a consensus in favour of this approach.

The action suggested under Option 2, i.e. Space Situational Awareness, has been discussed at length with Member States and there is widespread support for it.

As regards space exploration, Options 3 and 4 as such have not been presented to stakeholders. However, the building blocks of these options emerge from the extensive consultations referred to above.

It is important to underline that the purpose of the Communication on the future involvement of the EU in space is itself part of the wider consultation process. It aims at triggering a debate that may help the Commission in formulating concrete proposals for a possible EU space programme.

2.3. Key issues emerging from stakeholder consultations

From the bilateral meetings held with national space agencies, with Ministries in charge of space matters and with the industry association, the following considerations can be drawn:

– The European Union has a very important role to play in space matters. Together with Member States and ESA, the EU is one of the three main players in the space field, each of them having a specific and distinct role. The EU has a political role and a political responsibility and must aggregate and represent the interest of all, when deciding its involvement in space;

– The EU needs a vision for its future involvement in space, in order to elicit public and political support;

– Stakeholders agree that the most urgent priorities for the EU are the completion of the Galileo and GMES (including reinforced security and climate change dimensions) programmes, in order to start benefiting from the services they provide;

– The next priority for stakeholders, notably Member States, is the protection of our space infrastructure (as described in option 2). Our economy and the well being of our citizens is increasingly dependent on space-based applications and we need to acquire the capacity to protect it;

– As regards space exploration (covered in options 3 and 4), Members States believe it is important to define a long-term strategy that may include both robotic and human space exploration, that considers the issue of access to space and is backed up by a programme to develop the necessary enabling technologies for short, medium and long term space exploration. Space exploration is seen as a field that offers great potential for industrial development but it does not have to be developed at the detriment of other priorities. Support for the International Space Station is to be considered as part of a wider space exploration strategy and not as an end in itself;

– Stakeholders also underline the importance of public/EU funding for the space industry (delivered mainly through public procurement); the industry association emphasises the need to stimulate competitiveness of European space industry at international level and favours the introduction of accompanying measures to ensure the involvement of new Member States’ industry in public funded space procurement;

– There is also a consensus that the EU, ESA and their Member States need to work together on all of the above.

Overall there is a clear consensus among Member States in support of the development of an EU Space Situational Awareness capacity. Member States have expressed their political will and support for a stronger EU involvement in SSA in several Space Council Resolutions, particularly the one of September 2008 which asks the EU “to take an active role to set up progressively this capability and an appropriate governance structure” . There is also a positive and receptive attitude towards EU further involvement and expenditure in space exploration, as a complement to ESA’s and Member States’ activities. However, Member States final position will depend on many factors including the concrete proposals for action that the Commission will table and the funding mechanisms for such actions.

3. What are the problems?

3.1. Problem definition

3.1.1. Introduction: Member States involvement in space

It is widely acknowledged that space-based applications and services have become part of our everyday reality. Our society increasingly depends on space-based technologies. Space applications and space spin-offs play a fundamental role in improving our everyday life. As regards space applications: GPS, Internet services routed by satellite, TV broadcast by satellite. For examples of spin-offs from Space R&D activities to applications used in everyday life, consult http://www.esa.int/esaCP/GGGIPLH3KCC_Improving_0.html http://www.sti.nasa.gov/tto/Spinoff2009/pdf/spinoff2009.pdf[13]

As regards space applications: GPS, Internet services routed by satellite, TV broadcast by satellite. For examples of spin-offs from Space R&D activities to applications used in everyday life, consult http://www.esa.int/esaCP/GGGIPLH3KCC_Improving_0.html http://www.sti.nasa.gov/tto/Spinoff2009/pdf/spinoff2009.pdf

Space infrastructure and services as well as space research have become critical to EU policies Applications from Earth observation, navigation and telecommunication satellites are important for issues such as transport, agriculture, fishery, science, environment, health and security. , including the furthering of technical progress and industrial innovation and competitiveness. Still the EU and the European space sector as it stands today face a number of challenges which could hinder the fulfilment of overall EU policy objectives.[14]

Applications from Earth observation, navigation and telecommunication satellites are important for issues such as transport, agriculture, fishery, science, environment, health and security.

Space infrastructure and activities in Europe have sprung out of individual nations’ or ESA initiatives over which the EU has had limited influence up to now (with the exception of Galileo and GMES).

The space sector is heavily dependent on public funding which accounts for nearly 60% of the European space industry’s turnover and 80% in the US.

The degree and nature of involvement of EU Member States in space activities, including space situational awareness and space exploration, varies considerably. Only 18 Member States have developed space activities. Of those, seven Member States represent 91.5% of the civil space activity. This varying degree of involvement among Member States is the result of policy choices made on the basis of national strategic and economic considerations. Among Member States there is a clear difference between those that joined the EU after 2004 (EU 12) and the others. Member States not active in space belong to the first group. However, over the last decade national budgets devoted to space have grown considerably (including among some EU12 Member States) demonstrating that overall the interest in space activities remains steadily on the raise.

Much of this national investment in space has been channelled through ESA. The public budget for the civilian space sector is estimated at €5.7 billion in Europe Compared to the US space budget the gap is 1:6 for civilian programmes and even worse for military space outlays (1:20). Overall government spending on space programmes (civilian and defence combined) is rising worldwide with expenditures going up 12% in 2009. . Of this, ESA accounted for about €3.6 billion in 2009. The national programmes accounted for €2.1 billion European Space Directory, 25 th Edition. , while the EU civil public expenditure amounted to €750 million. Military space budgets are rather small (around € 1 billion per year in total) Profiles of Government Space Programmes: Analysis of 60 Countries and Agencies, Euroconsult, 2010 .[15][16][17]

Compared to the US space budget the gap is 1:6 for civilian programmes and even worse for military space outlays (1:20). Overall government spending on space programmes (civilian and defence combined) is rising worldwide with expenditures going up 12% in 2009.

European Space Directory, 25 th Edition.

Profiles of Government Space Programmes: Analysis of 60 Countries and Agencies, Euroconsult, 2010

Despite notorious European successes in space, the different degree of involvement of Member States in space and the fact that space activities respond primarily to national interests (even when conducted through ESA Most projects developed through ESA are optional, namely funded through national subscriptions and therefore responding primarily to national interests. ) have resulted in fragmentation as regards space activities in general, including space situational awareness and space exploration which is described in detail in the following sections.[18]

Most projects developed through ESA are optional, namely funded through national subscriptions and therefore responding primarily to national interests.

3.1.2. Security of critical European space infrastructures is not ensured

3.1.2.1. Description of the security threat due to space debris, space weather and Near-Earth Objects (NEOs)

The ability to protect space assets has become essential to our society. Space-based systems enable a wide spectrum of applications critical to key areas of the economy, including those related to security. This dependence is expected to grow further in the future. It also raises serious concerns because any shutdown of even a part of the space infrastructure could have significant consequences for citizens’ safety and for economic activities and would impair the organisation of emergency services For example, communication systems, electrical power grids, and financial networks all rely on satellite timing for synchronisation. The provision of satellite-based rapid mapping services is indispensible for today's crisis management . .[19]

For example, communication systems, electrical power grids, and financial networks all rely on satellite timing for synchronisation. The provision of satellite-based rapid mapping services is indispensible for today's crisis management .

During the past half century objects have been launched into space regularly, reaching a peak of 140 items per year during the Cold War. Every time a vehicle boosts a satellite into space, some debris is produced. Examples of space debris are: discarded fuel tanks, satellite components and debris from collisions On February 11 2009 about 800 pieces of debris were generated by a collision between a US and a defunct Russian satellite. A similar number of debris was generated by a Chinese anti-satellite test in 2007. Such 'accidents' can generate a chain reaction that would destroy most satellites in a given orbit, knowing that the speed of a satellite and debris is 10 km/second. . This material, orbiting the Earth at very high speed and in an uncontrolled manner, poses an ever increasing potential risk of collision for spacecraft in orbit. [20]

On February 11 2009 about 800 pieces of debris were generated by a collision between a US and a defunct Russian satellite. A similar number of debris was generated by a Chinese anti-satellite test in 2007. Such 'accidents' can generate a chain reaction that would destroy most satellites in a given orbit, knowing that the speed of a satellite and debris is 10 km/second.

There are different estimates at to the debris population. According to some estimates, there are between 12 600 objects orbiting Earth larger than 10 cm, which are catalogued and 300 000 objects larger than 1 cm, not catalogued. Furthermore, there are more than 300 million objects larger than 1 mm “Study on the EU Space Programme 2014-2020”, Ecorys, Draft Final Report, 18 April 2010, contract n. SI2.541751. .[21]

“Study on the EU Space Programme 2014-2020”, Ecorys, Draft Final Report, 18 April 2010, contract n. SI2.541751.

In terms of collisions with debris the average time for a collision between debris and an active satellite has been estimated by some sources at 3-4 years “Study on the EU Space Programme 2014-2020”, Ecorys, Draft Final Report, 18 April 2010, contract n. SI2.541751. . At a speed of 10km/s, any of these objects can cause harm to operational spacecraft, from total destruction to permanent damage to sub-systems on-board spacecraft.[22]

“Study on the EU Space Programme 2014-2020”, Ecorys, Draft Final Report, 18 April 2010, contract n. SI2.541751.

According to ESA sources, there is currently 1 collision alert per month. Without any mitigation measures, other sources estimate the probability of effective collisions at 1 every 5 years http://www.parliament.uk/documents/documents/upload/postpn355.pdf. .[23]

http://www.parliament.uk/documents/documents/upload/postpn355.pdf.

The table below provided by ESA summarises ESA's own estimates on debris and possible damage to satellites.

Category|Definition|Estimated population|Potential risk to satellites|

Traceable|Greater than 10 cm in diameter|20,000|Complete destruction|

Potentially Traceable|Greater than 1 cm in diameter|600,000|Complete to partial destruction|

Untraceable|Between 1 mm and 1 cm |More than 300 million|Degradation, loss of certain sensors or subsystems|

Tab 1 – ESA’s estimates on debris and possible damage to satellites http://www.esa.int/esaMI/Space_Debris/SEM2D7WX3RF_0.html. .[24]

http://www.esa.int/esaMI/Space_Debris/SEM2D7WX3RF_0.html.

Modelling work has suggested that close approaches will rise from 13,000 a week in 2009 to 20,000 by 2019 and more than 50,000 by 2059, meaning satellite operators will have to make five times as many avoidance manoeuvres in 2059 as in 2019. Since each manoeuvre requires fuel, this shortens the active life of satellites, or requires additional fuel to be carried into orbit thus increasing the cost of launch http://www.parliament.uk/documents/documents/upload/postpn355.pdf. . The problem is that information available on the position of the objects in question is not accurate and therefore a good number of manoeuvres may not be indispensible but have to be made as a precaution generating extra costs.[25]

http://www.parliament.uk/documents/documents/upload/postpn355.pdf.

On 1 st April 2010, 183 out of 928 satellites in orbit had EU contractors/owners (19.71%) http://www.ucsusa.org/nuclear_weapons_and_global_security/space_weapons/technical_issues/ucs-satellite-database.html. . According to Euroconsult, the average satellite price over the next decade will be $99 million and the satellite launch price is predicted to remain flat, at $51 million “ Satellites to be Built & Launched by 2018, World Market Survey”, Euroconsult, http://www.euroconsult-ec.com/research-reports/space-industry-reports/satellites-to-be-built-launched-by-2018-38-29.html. (not taking into account the effect of increased collision risk as described above). Assuming that the direct costs of losing a satellite would be the full cost of the launch and around 50% the cost of an average new satellite assuming that the satellite is destroyed when it reaches its mid-life, the loss would amount to some $100 million on average per satellite including launches. Ecorys has estimated that the prevention of collisions would amount to a direct cost reduction of €84 million on average per satellite “Study on the EU Space Programme 2014-2020”, Ecorys, Draft Final Report, 18 April 2010, contract n. SI2.541751. .[26][27][28]

http://www.ucsusa.org/nuclear_weapons_and_global_security/space_weapons/technical_issues/ucs-satellite-database.html.

“ Satellites to be Built & Launched by 2018, World Market Survey”, Euroconsult, http://www.euroconsult-ec.com/research-reports/space-industry-reports/satellites-to-be-built-launched-by-2018-38-29.html.

“Study on the EU Space Programme 2014-2020”, Ecorys, Draft Final Report, 18 April 2010, contract n. SI2.541751.

The revenue produced downstream by satellite-driven services Example of downstream services are telecommunications or TV broadcasting. is estimated to exceed $60 billion US. European industry has managed to retain a market share of about 40% of the space segment http://telecom.esa.int/telecom/www/object/index.cfm?fobjectid=456. . While there are not sufficient elements to estimate precisely the potential loss of revenue derived from the destruction of a satellite, the available figures suggest that this amount would be within the range of a hundred million Euros per satellite This amount results from calculating the EU share of revenue divided by the number of "EU" satellites. .[29][30][31]

Example of downstream services are telecommunications or TV broadcasting.

http://telecom.esa.int/telecom/www/object/index.cfm?fobjectid=456.

This amount results from calculating the EU share of revenue divided by the number of "EU" satellites.

Accurate, timely and complete space situational awareness (SSA) is instrumental for the protection of critical European infrastructures in space and for the secure and safe operation of space-based services, as well as for the protection of the population in case of re-entry events There could be significant negative economic, environmental and social impact generated if debris from spacecraft fall on the surface of the Earth, notably if the spacecraft are powered by nuclear fuel, as is the case with a small number of them today. .[32]

There could be significant negative economic, environmental and social impact generated if debris from spacecraft fall on the surface of the Earth, notably if the spacecraft are powered by nuclear fuel, as is the case with a small number of them today.

Another threat to the security and functioning of spacecraft/satellites and related ground infrastructure stems from the effects of solar activity, known as 'space weather'. The EU does not currently possess appropriate knowledge of these phenomena. The Sun goes through cycles of high and low activity that repeats approximately every 11 years. The number of dark spots on the Sun (sunspots) marks this variation; as the number of sunspots increases, so does solar activity. Sunspots are sources of flares, the most violent events in the solar system. In a matter of minutes, a large flare releases a million times more energy than the largest earthquake. Episodic solar activity has a number of effects that are of interest to us. A radiation dose from energetic particles is an occasional hazard for astronauts and for electronics on satellites. Geomagnetic field disturbances may damage power systems, disrupt communications and degrade satellite-based navigation systems on the ground http://www.swpc.noaa.gov/info/SolarEffects.html. .[33]

http://www.swpc.noaa.gov/info/SolarEffects.html.

The following table reflects the world direct satellite losses due to space weather:

Loss type|Frequency of event|Annualised loss|

Complete satellite failure|Rare (<3 per solar cycle)|~€30 to 60 million|

Service outage|Frequent (up to 60 anomalies per annum)|~ €30 million|

Shortened satellite lifetime|Rare (<10 per solar cycle)|~€5-10 million|

Tab 2 – Assessment of financial impacts on satellites due to space weather http://www.esa-spaceweather.net/spweather/esa_initiatives/spweatherstudies/ALC/WP1200MarketAnalysisfinalreport.pdf. .[34]

http://www.esa-spaceweather.net/spweather/esa_initiatives/spweatherstudies/ALC/WP1200MarketAnalysisfinalreport.pdf.

Complete satellite failure due to space weather has been reported in 11 cases in 25 years. Taking into account the number of EU satellites (183 in 2010), the cost of a satellite and the revenue from commercial satellites, the annualised costs of complete satellite failure would amount to more than €9 million. If we add to this the likely cost for the EU of service outage and shortened satellite lifetime, the total annualised loss for the EU would be greater than €16 million.

Geomagnetic storms Geomagnetic storms are temporary disturbance of the Earth’s magnetosphere caused by a disturbance in space weather, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Geomagnetic_storm. occur with a frequency of 1 every 30 to 100 years. None occurred during the 25 year period referred to above. [35]

Geomagnetic storms are temporary disturbance of the Earth’s magnetosphere caused by a disturbance in space weather, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Geomagnetic_storm.

Lacking information on space weather, European operators, including ESA and MS, have no reliable advice on when to shut down spacecraft operations in orbit and to identify the source of potential failures.

Space weather can have negative social impacts due, for example, to the disruption of electricity and telecommunication activities which may in turn disrupt daily life, possibly creating hazardous situations One example of space weather impact on satellites is the Canadian communication service provider Telesat’s experience in 1994. O n 20 January 1994, one of Telesat's satellites was disabled for about 7 hours as a result of space weather-induced damage to its control electronics. During this period, the Canadian press was unable to deliver news to 100 newspapers and 450 radio stations. In addition, telephone service to 40 communities was interrupted . . [36]

One example of space weather impact on satellites is the Canadian communication service provider Telesat’s experience in 1994. O n 20 January 1994, one of Telesat's satellites was disabled for about 7 hours as a result of space weather-induced damage to its control electronics. During this period, the Canadian press was unable to deliver news to 100 newspapers and 450 radio stations. In addition, telephone service to 40 communities was interrupted .

Finally, Near-Earth Objects (NEOs) A near-Earth object (NEO) is a Solar System object whose orbit brings it into close proximity with the Earth. They include a few thousand near-Earth asteroids (NEAs), near-Earth comets, a number of solar-orbiting spacecraft, and meteoroids large enough to be tracked in space before striking the Earth. According to some estimates, the Earth is indeed hit on average annually by an object with 5 kilotonnes equivalent energy. The atomic bomb dropped on Hiroshima (which caused between 65,000 to 200,000 deaths and more than 70,000 injured) had approximately 15 kilotonnes of TNT. See http://www.nature.com/nature/journal/v420/n6913/full/nature01238.html . , comets and asteroids whose orbits bring them close to the Earth, are a rare but dramatic danger for Earth and the population in case of impact threats. Predicting and preventing possible impact is paramount but Europe does not currently play a significant role in this international concern It is estimated that a 300m-wide asteroid colliding with the Earth would wipe out a medium-size country. . Scientists divide NEOs in several categories including Potentially Hazardous Asteroids (PHAs). PHAs are currently defined based on parameters that measure the asteroid's potential to make threateningly close approaches to the Earth http://neo.jpl.nasa.gov/neo/groups.html. . There are currently 1137 known PHAs. Europe needs a capacity to monitor NEOs and in particular these PHAs, updating their orbits as new observations become available so that we are in a position to better predict the close-approach statistics and thus their Earth-impact threat.[37][38][39]

A near-Earth object (NEO) is a Solar System object whose orbit brings it into close proximity with the Earth. They include a few thousand near-Earth asteroids (NEAs), near-Earth comets, a number of solar-orbiting spacecraft, and meteoroids large enough to be tracked in space before striking the Earth. According to some estimates, the Earth is indeed hit on average annually by an object with 5 kilotonnes equivalent energy. The atomic bomb dropped on Hiroshima (which caused between 65,000 to 200,000 deaths and more than 70,000 injured) had approximately 15 kilotonnes of TNT. See http://www.nature.com/nature/journal/v420/n6913/full/nature01238.html .

It is estimated that a 300m-wide asteroid colliding with the Earth would wipe out a medium-size country.

http://neo.jpl.nasa.gov/neo/groups.html.

The consequences of a NEO impact on the surface of the Earth are difficult to estimate precisely, but they could be catastrophic on the economy and society, including potential loss of life and serious disruption of the economy. Environmental damage can also occur. For example, the 1908 Tunguska Event The Tunguska Event, or Tunguska explosion, was a powerful explosion which occurred close to the Podkamennaya Tunguska River in Russia. It is commonly believed that the cause of the explosion was the air bust of a large meteoroid or comet fragment. is thought to have destroyed 2 000 square kilometres of Siberian forest.[40]

The Tunguska Event, or Tunguska explosion, was a powerful explosion which occurred close to the Podkamennaya Tunguska River in Russia. It is commonly believed that the cause of the explosion was the air bust of a large meteoroid or comet fragment.

Because satellites and other space-borne assets have become instrumental to many areas of economic activity (e.g. telecommunications, satellite TV, banking, weather forecasting, to name a few), the issue of space infrastructure protection is relevant to all EU Member States and not only major owners or operators of space assets.

3.1.2.2. The current situation regarding space situational awareness

The EU does not at present have full and accurate information on satellites and debris orbiting the Earth.

EU Member States possess valuable assets with potential for SSA. These include radar sensors, optical sensors (telescopes), secure data communication networks, storage and computation as well as human expertise. There is already today a certain degree of European cooperation and sharing of resources and data as exemplified by the Franco-German cooperation on the operation of the French GRAVES surveillance radar and the German TIRA tracking radar and the coordinated operation of the ESA optical space debris telescope at Tenerife and the Swiss ZIMLAT telescope at Zimmerwald. However these systems have significant shortcomings. Many sensors need to be upgraded to become operational; others are too limited in operational availability despite a high technical performance (e.g. French ARMOR radar on the naval vessel Monge).

Studies by ESA have shown that existing European resources (ground and space-based) are insufficient.

SSA is a dual-use activity by its nature. However, at present many of the existing national assets relevant for the tracking of space objects and related imagery available are under military control A synthesis of existing space tracking and surveillance assets in Europe prepared by ONERA in 2007 on behalf of ESA reveals that more than 65 % of existing sensors for the Low Earth Orbit (LEO) area are partially or fully operated by Ministries of Defence. Study on capability gaps concerning Space Situational Awareness, ONERA, 2007. . Inefficiencies and duplication result also from the fact that at present civil and military SSA requirements are not integrated and responded to by a single SSA system building on both civil and military assets and expertise.[41]

A synthesis of existing space tracking and surveillance assets in Europe prepared by ONERA in 2007 on behalf of ESA reveals that more than 65 % of existing sensors for the Low Earth Orbit (LEO) area are partially or fully operated by Ministries of Defence. Study on capability gaps concerning Space Situational Awareness, ONERA, 2007.

Since the 1980s a series of non-binding international agreements and guidelines have been agreed http://www.parliament.uk/documents/documents/upload/postpn355.pdf : "Debris mitigation principles were first put into practice by the US, starting in the 1980s. Since then, a series of voluntary, non-binding international agreements and guidelines have been agreed. The Inter-Agency Space Debris Co-ordination Committee (IADC) was founded in 1993, comprising 11 national space agencies including NASA, ESA and the British National Space Centre (BNSC). In 2002, the IADC adopted a set of recommendations for debris mitigation covering the points in the main text, which has achieved wide international recognition. The UN Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space developed these recommendations into a set of guidelines which were adopted by the UN in 2008. Several European space agencies developed a European Code of Conduct consistent with the IADC recommendations. ISO (the International Organization for Standardization) is currently transforming the recommendations into a set of International Standards, the first of which should be published in April/May 2010. BNSC chairs the ISO group responsible for developing these standards, which aim to assist the space industry in complying technically with the IADC guidelines." . The EU itself is currently working on a draft international Code of Conduct that could have a positive effect in this area.[42]

http://www.parliament.uk/documents/documents/upload/postpn355.pdf : "Debris mitigation principles were first put into practice by the US, starting in the 1980s. Since then, a series of voluntary, non-binding international agreements and guidelines have been agreed. The Inter-Agency Space Debris Co-ordination Committee (IADC) was founded in 1993, comprising 11 national space agencies including NASA, ESA and the British National Space Centre (BNSC). In 2002, the IADC adopted a set of recommendations for debris mitigation covering the points in the main text, which has achieved wide international recognition. The UN Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space developed these recommendations into a set of guidelines which were adopted by the UN in 2008. Several European space agencies developed a European Code of Conduct consistent with the IADC recommendations. ISO (the International Organization for Standardization) is currently transforming the recommendations into a set of International Standards, the first of which should be published in April/May 2010. BNSC chairs the ISO group responsible for developing these standards, which aim to assist the space industry in complying technically with the IADC guidelines."

Despite existing national capabilities and existing international arrangements, Europe is to a large extent dependent on third parties capabilities and goodwill to receive essential information on objects orbiting the Earth.

Not all data are publicly shared because they could be used to interfere with national security. Currently only the US has well established capabilities for a rather effective monitoring of these elements and provides advice to European operators on actions to take, without revealing the basis for that advice. However, these capabilities date back to the Cold War era and, it is generally acknowledged in circles where SSA is discussed that these capabilities do not perform to the standards required by present needs. The available data has not allowed avoiding satellite collisions such as the Iridium 33 and Kosmos 2251 in 2009 See footnote n. 20. .[43]

See footnote n. 20.

Recently satellites owned by ESA and the French Space Agency CNES were threatened by potential collisions with debris from other satellites. Collision was avoided thanks to information made available by a non-European space power. Should it have been decided not to share this information with the EU, European assets would have been endangered.

Europe is already active in the area of space weather and capable of producing, to some extent, space weather products. There is also longstanding international cooperation in this field notably with the US National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) Space Weather Prediction Center. However there is widespread recognition that a new, coordinated approach to developing space weather applications tailored to European user needs together with the supporting research and infrastructure is necessary and would increase our capabilities in this area http://www.esa.int/esaMI/SSA/SEMYTICKP6G_0.html .[44]

http://www.esa.int/esaMI/SSA/SEMYTICKP6G_0.html

The European Space Agency is currently implementing a Space Situational Awareness Preparatory Programme (SSA-PP) launched on 1 January 2009 which will run until 2011. The SSA Preparatory Programme (SSA-PP) is being implemented as an Optional Programme with financial participation by 13 Member States and focuses on issues such as governance and data policy definition and designing the overall architecture of the future European SSA system.

However EU and ESA Member States, as expressed in the 2008 Council Resolution on “Taking forward the European Space Policy”, consider that , taking into account the international and political nature of this capability, the European Union will take, liaising with ESA and their respective Member States, an active role to set up progressively this capability and an appropriate governance structure.

3.1.2.3. Estimated annualised losses due to collision and space weather

On the basis of available data, the table below gives only a non-exhaustive impression of quantifiable estimated loss due to collision and space weather Detailed explanation in annex[45]

Detailed explanation in annex

Loss type|Annualised loss|

Direct loss of satellite due to collision|~€4 million|

Indirect cost (loss of revenue) due to collision|~€32 million|

Satellite failure due to space weather|~€9 million|

Service outage and shortened satellite life due to space weather|~€7 million|

Indirect cost (loss of revenue) due to complete satellite failure|~€57 million|

Geomagnetic storms impact on satellites|~€223 million|

Total minimum annualised loss |~€332million|

3.1.3. Tab 3 – Estimated loss due to collisions and space weather effects.

These costs are almost certainly a small fraction of possible non-quantified consequences and costs that may result from the absence of a European Space Situational Awareness System. For example the loss of a satellite may result in the loss of critical satellite communication capacity in emergency situation resulting in loss of life. Destruction or complete failure of a satellite can result in serious disruption of economic activity (banking relies increasingly on satellite communications) and could have an impact on client business through loss of service. The loss of Earth observation capacity could also have serious consequences in emergency and non-emergency situations. The costs related to disruption of the electricity grid due to solar storms (which could occur once every solar cycle, i.e. 11 years) for all EU Member States could amount to $2160 million per year http://www.esa-spaceweather.net/spweather/esa_initiatives/spweatherstudies/ALC/wp1100_Benefits_v3.1.pdf Since a Hydro-Quebec incident may occur once every solar cycle (11 years), the annualised loss (mostly due to unsupplied energy) is about $450 M/year for the UK alone, according to the UK National Grid estimations. This figure should be multiplied by 1.5 for France, 1.5 for Germany, 0.5 for Spain and 0.3 for Portugal. Total amount for these member states would be $2160 M/year. . At present there are no reliable figures for estimating the value of such loses. Similarly, it is impossible to quantify the consequences of Near Earth Objects impacting on the Earth.[46]

http://www.esa-spaceweather.net/spweather/esa_initiatives/spweatherstudies/ALC/wp1100_Benefits_v3.1.pdf

Since a Hydro-Quebec incident may occur once every solar cycle (11 years), the annualised loss (mostly due to unsupplied energy) is about $450 M/year for the UK alone, according to the UK National Grid estimations. This figure should be multiplied by 1.5 for France, 1.5 for Germany, 0.5 for Spain and 0.3 for Portugal. Total amount for these member states would be $2160 M/year.

3.1.4. Europe lacks a long-term strategy and critical mass for space exploration

Space exploration is a highly political endeavour which gives nations that are involved in it a high political profile in the international arena. It is also a driver for technological innovation whose spin-offs have enhanced citizens’ every day life to a scale that is not often realised by the general public.

Europe through individual Member States and ESA have already made significant contributions to spaceflight and space exploration. Prominent European achievements include the Columbus laboratory of the International Space Station, the Automated Transfer Vehicle (ATV) - the largest ever automatic cargo space vehicle, and some other essential ISS elements. European scientists have contributed to the exploration of several planets in the solar system: Venus (Venus Express), Mars (Mars Express) and the Moon (Smart-1, European instruments on Chandrayaan-1). The successful Huygens mission on Titan has marked the farthest landing in the solar system so far. These European achievements are recognised internationally.

However, the prevailing perception among stakeholders is that space exploration requires a political thrust, a vision and a strategy to carry it through that Europe lacks today. This is the overarching problem. There is a growing consensus that the current lack of a more consistent and strategic approach to space exploration is detrimental to Europe from an international standpoint and also has negative economic consequences.

Up to now, ESA and its Members States have provided the main interface with international partners. ESA communicates with partners at agency level, while major partners address the exploration, and especially human exploration issues at the highest political level (usually heads of state and government). EU Member States in isolation are not as well placed to influence strategic international exploration developments as they would be if they acted in a concerted manner.

The dispersion is reflected, for example, in the European involvement in the international forum for space exploration coordination (the International Space Exploration Coordination Group): for example, four Member States and ESA are individual members of this group, other Member States are represented through ESA and the EU is altogether absent from this international forum.

At present there are not enough streamlining or synergies between EU, national and ESA exploration initiatives. Europe has neither a high visibility nor a critical mass required for the participation in international exploration programmes at a significant level. For example, ESA was not able to maintain its leadership in the search for life programme within the ExoMars http://www.esa.int/esaMI/ExoMars/SEMGB7MJ74G_0.html. project in 2013; ESA has now become dependent on US launches to place its rover on Mars in 2018.[47]

http://www.esa.int/esaMI/ExoMars/SEMGB7MJ74G_0.html.

In addition, only very few MS can afford to have a say or can be directly involved in space exploration activities. For example, only France and Germany could so far afford a significant role in non ESA-led exploration missions (e.g. DE instruments on the NASA Mars Pathfinder mission). Other Member States have also ambitions but cannot participate in non-ESA missions because they cannot financially afford to participate at a significant level. This is detrimental to European integration and international visibility. Without a high-level political commitment and a coordinated approach Europe will be unable to play any significant role at international level.

The life of the International Space Station (ISS) will be extended until 2020 and beyond. The absence of appropriate coordination mechanisms between the EU, ESA and Member States is likely to result in a inadequate representation of European interests in ISS and exploitation of the ISS as a platform for space exploration. Current arrangements prevent a good number of EU Member States from having access to the station, as only those that contribute financially individually or through ESA (8 Member States) have access to it.

At present there is no autonomous or independent transportation system to the low Earth orbit that the EU, ESA and Member States can fully rely on. Europe has not acquired the capacity to conduct autonomous manned space flight either using existing third party transportation systems or its own.

Yet, Europe has with Ariane 5 the launcher capacity to develop such transportation system. Ariane 5 was developed as a launcher for an autonomous European crew transportation system (Hermes) which was abandoned because of lack of firm European leadership to carry the project through. Today, Europe does not fully exploit the potential capacity of Ariane 5. The failure of Hermes illustrates the inadequacies of the current situation regarding space exploration.

The Automated Transfer Vehicle (ATV) which services ISS represents an extraordinary European technological achievement. Today ATV is not retrievable and burns up on re-entry. The ATV has the potential to be transformed into a retrievable vehicle and to be the basis for a future crew transportation system. The fact that such potential is not exploited is detrimental to technological progress in this field.

There is an added value in terms of innovation and competitiveness for the European economy that space exploration could bring about beyond the space sector itself and which does not fully materialise given the fragmentation of space exploration activities and their isolation from non-space sectors.

The EU can help unleash the innovative potential of the European space sector towards other, non-space areas by promoting cross-sectoral fertilisation and synergies and in this way providing a strong multiplier for the investments made.

Space exploration touches on many key space technologies of interest to other space sub-sectors such as launchers, propulsion, remote sensing, telecommunication or navigation systems. If EU does not participate in space exploration, the European industry will fail to maintain and further expand its capabilities in developing technologies that are essential to space and partly also to non-space sectors. Not taking part in large global exploration programmes will impair the competitive positions of the European space industry in the world ASD-Eurospace (2009) Space exploration position paper, 12 October 2009. .[48]

ASD-Eurospace (2009) Space exploration position paper, 12 October 2009.

As recognised in recent consultations Conclusions of the workshops “Space exploration and innovation, industrial competitiveness and technology advance” and “Science and education within space exploration”, http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/policies/space/esp/conferences_space_en.htm. the absence of a long term vision and of a strategy for securing a European role in space exploration at international level could have negative repercussions on:[49]

Conclusions of the workshops “Space exploration and innovation, industrial competitiveness and technology advance” and “Science and education within space exploration”, http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/policies/space/esp/conferences_space_en.htm.

– the scientific community: the potential for research that exploration could offer is not fully exploited; furthermore, there could be a significant “brain drain” of European scientists working abroad and contributing to foreign successes The problem of brain-drain notably towards the US is well documented. This article gives interesting US perspective of the problem: http://www.time.com/time/europe/html/040119/brain/story_4.html ; The need to enhance the attractiveness of European higher education and research is behind a number of EC initiatives such as the European Institute of Technology ( COM(2006) 77 final of 22 February 2006). On brain-drain of European researchers towards the US: ftp://repec.iza.org/RePEc/Discussionpaper/dp1310.pdf . US space programmes have attracted scientists from other countries, including those which cancelled their own programmes: http://www.thespacereview.com/article/1543/1. ;[50]

The problem of brain-drain notably towards the US is well documented. This article gives interesting US perspective of the problem: http://www.time.com/time/europe/html/040119/brain/story_4.html ; The need to enhance the attractiveness of European higher education and research is behind a number of EC initiatives such as the European Institute of Technology ( COM(2006) 77 final of 22 February 2006). On brain-drain of European researchers towards the US: ftp://repec.iza.org/RePEc/Discussionpaper/dp1310.pdf . US space programmes have attracted scientists from other countries, including those which cancelled their own programmes: http://www.thespacereview.com/article/1543/1.

– industrial competitiveness: European space industry will be confronted with less critical and less innovative tasks, while at the same time becoming more dependent on commercial markets, relative to international competitors; the competitiveness of European industry would decrease compared to other space-faring nations who engage in the challenges of space exploration;

– trans-sectoral innovation: exploration needs and non-space related needs that space exploration could bring together are disconnected and therefore opportunities for trans-sectoral innovations are lost;

– education and inspiration: the absence of significant exploration challenges deprives the EU of a powerful tool that can be used to stimulate a whole new generation to embrace science and engineering careers, thus contributing to alleviate the current negative trends of students swaying away from science A review on students’ attitudes towards science can be found here: http://eprints.ioe.ac.uk/652/1/Osborneeta2003attitudes1049.pdf . ;[51]

A review on students’ attitudes towards science can be found here: http://eprints.ioe.ac.uk/652/1/Osborneeta2003attitudes1049.pdf .

– European integration: EU participation in international exploration programmes could have a strong impact on a common European identity and the appreciation of EU citizens of what it means to be European.

3.1.5. Space policies and investments are decided at national/intergovernmental level

The space sector is largely driven by national public funding spent either directly (often in bilateral programmes) or via a contribution to ESA The big European space powers (FR, DE, IT) contribute about half of their national space budgets to ESA, most other countries consider ESA as their space agency and contribute most or all the national space budget to ESA. The overall ESA budget is over €3,5 billion; MS cumulative individual space budget is also roughly €3 billion. NASA annual budget is in the range of $18 billion. . As a consequence:[52]

The big European space powers (FR, DE, IT) contribute about half of their national space budgets to ESA, most other countries consider ESA as their space agency and contribute most or all the national space budget to ESA. The overall ESA budget is over €3,5 billion; MS cumulative individual space budget is also roughly €3 billion. NASA annual budget is in the range of $18 billion.

– Space initiatives are primarily a function of national interests and national priorities and only indirectly respond to broader European policy objectives, or to the interests of EU citizens; as an example the utilisation of the International Space Station as a research infrastructure only benefits 8 EU MS via ESA programmes and space exploration is done either at MS level or via ESA, not at EU level;

– National space policies are often aimed at the benefit of national industries. Within ESA, MS contribute to the budget in proportion to the anticipated share of contracts to be awarded to their national companies. This policy has been successful in building up a strong space industry in Europe. However, if such an approach remains the sole form of funding of European industry, in the long term it will not encourage national companies to be more competitive in the public procurement market. It would be beneficial to industry competitiveness to complement this approach, at EU level, with a public procurement approach based on best value for money. Such an approach would still recognise the specificities of the space sector but would allow at the same time for increased competition and more efficient use of European industrial competences (including SMEs and industries from Member States which are not ESA members).The absence of an EU approach could become detrimental to the competitive development of the European space industry and to its competitiveness outside Europe;

– There is a risk of overlaps, fragmentation and discontinuity of the activities in the European space sector. For example, if research efforts remain fragmented between EU, ESA and MS this may cause duplication and ineffectiveness, as investments cannot benefit from economy of scale advantages. A good example of this can be found in the field of Space Situational Awareness: there are seven radar sensors in Member States that may serve surveillance and tracking purposes; however these capacities, which have been designed to suit national needs, overlap to some extent, leave significant coverage gaps and are not connected in a way that can fully exploit their potential.

3.1.6. National investments for dedicated space programmes cannot sufficiently address the needs of EU policies and interventions

A limited number of individual MS cannot be expected to fund systems to meet the needs of Europe as a whole. Investment through ESA is primarily designed to focus on R&D, not to provide for maintenance and operations of space infrastructure and the delivery of services. Where the main markets are public sector and particularly where these are spread across many different users, the market mechanism alone does not support such costs.

The Member States’ willingness to invest through ESA relies heavily on the assurance that the original investment is returned to national industries. Projects that cannot guarantee such return to national industry may result in a decreased motivation of Member States to invest in space. At the same time, there is wide recognition that future space developments in certain areas such as security or space exploration, the exploitation of space infrastructure and space-based applications require a coordinated funding approach.

Due to the fragmentation of national decision making channels, space governance frameworks and lack of coordination of funding mechanisms, investment in certain essential space activities such as SSA or space exploration does not always acquire the necessary critical mass. The large number of, and limited coordination between the European and national public stakeholders involved in space activities (i.e. EU, ESA, EDA, Eumetsat, national space agencies, national ministries of defence, etc.) further adds to the complexity of the decision-making process and makes the design and financing of space systems more difficult.

This fragmentation affects negatively also the connection with other EU policies. Possible synergies are not always sought in a structured manner. For example, the potential of space exploration for innovation is disconnected from the EU 2020 growth strategy as space exploration is seen primarily as a scientific undertaking with not sufficient regard to economic and societal needs.

3.2. EU right to act: subsidiarity and proportionality

Article 189 TFEU introduces a right for the EU to act in drawing up a European Space Policy, while building on past achievements at the level of ESA and Member States, and gives the European Commission a clear mandate to exercise its right of initiative. Space becomes a shared competence between the EU and its Member States.

At European level, space must be addressed as a common endeavour due to the problems described above, including the lack of coordination. The EU does not seek to replace initiatives taken by Member States individually or in the framework of ESA. It seeks to complement action taken at their level and reinforce coordination where such coordination is necessary to achieve common objectives.

The EU involvement would not only be necessary to aggregate the investment required to fund certain space projects. Above all it would be necessary to aggregate demand for operational systems and space applications that meets public sector needs and ensure the long-term availability of these applications at EU level. An EU involvement would help materialise the full benefits that Space Situational Awareness and space exploration can bring about as a tool contributing to other EU policies (such as innovation and competitiveness, health or environment), in a way that Member States or ESA alone cannot achieve. The EU involvement would be necessary to federate interests and demand of users in different Member States, including where appropriate, to represent them in negotiations at international level.

A potential EU intervention would take fully into account what has already been achieved at the level of Member States and ESA and build on these achievements. The EU would fund the development of systems that do not yet exist or that complement those existing in Member States, in this way avoiding unnecessary duplication.

A stronger EU role in either SSA or space exploration would bring substantial added value because it would help design projects that are truly European as opposed to simple prolongations of national initiatives. The EU will also be in a position to speak on behalf of all Member States and ensure that Europe is represented with one voice at the highest political level in international space cooperation fora.

In SSA the EU would be able to pool its existing capabilities (civilian and military) and reinforce them with the missing links and appropriate governance framework that ensures a robust and interoperable system benefiting all relevant European stakeholders.

The EU should refrain from action if the funding available is not sufficient to ensure its successful completion .

4. Objectives

Considering the nature of this Communication, general and specific objectives will be defined. Operational objectives will be treated in the impact assessment for a possible proposal defining a future Space Programme.

4.1. General objectives

The general objectives of this initiative are the following:

(1) to promote scientific and technical progress;

(2) to promote innovation and industrial competitiveness;

(3) to ensure citizens’ well being derived from space-based applications

(4) to enhance the EU profile in space at world level.

A set of more specific objectives is defined on this general basis to address the problems identified in the previous section.

4.2. Specific objectives

The specific objectives would be as follows:

(1) Ensure the long-term availability and security of European space infrastructures and services;

(2) Ensure that the EU is in a position to fulfil the coordination role in exploration that Article 189 of the Treaty calls for and to capitalise on the space exploration potential to contribute to the objectives of the EU 2020 strategy;

(3) Ensure the conditions necessary to guarantee European access to space and on-orbit infrastructures;

(4) Ensure convergence of national and EU policies and investment in the field of SSA and space exploration as well as convergence between action in these two areas and other EU policies;

(5) Ensure a leading and strategic role for the EU in space at global level and in particular in international negotiations related to SSA and space exploration.

5. Policy options

This IA identifies four incremental policy scenarios based on different levels of EU intervention which will depend on (i) the role and level of ambition which the EU would like to assume in the space domain and (ii) the amount of available funding.

5.1. Option 1: Baseline scenario

Under the baseline scenario the EU would not invest in security of critical European space infrastructures and would not engage in any space exploration efforts.

This would not affect the implementation of the other EU flagships in space, Galileo and GMES, but their long-term security and sustainable exploitation could be affected.

The baseline scenario would mean that the situation described under the problem definition would be likely to remain.

Activities by ESA and Member States would continue. For example, some SSA activities are likely to continue at national level (e.g. France, Germany) and within ESA; collaboration with the US would be arranged but there would be no guarantee that such arrangements would result in a fully operational system and respond to global EU interests. The risk of likely losses identified under problem definition would be likely to remain. Europe would continue to depend on third parties for information and advice in a critical area of space activities.

Similarly, space exploration activities would continue without EU involvement. However, these activities would be limited in scope and the European position on the international scene is likely to remain weak. European involvement in exploration would remain largely in the realm of scientific cooperation and potential benefits of spill-over for innovative technologies and business opportunities that would result from an ambitious EU engagement in space exploration would be foregone.

In the absence of EU involvement, could ESA undertake the actions that are described under options 2 to 4?

The answer is: theoretically yes, but facts prove the contrary. The nature of the decision making process and funding mechanisms described under problem definition means that ESA is not well placed to guarantee that a fully operational European SSA system responding to global EU user needs be put in place. In particular, without EU involvement it is possible (and even likely) that that due to diverging industrial interests of Member States, the capability gaps identified for a complete SSA system may not be filled because the programmes necessary to acquire such capabilities are not subscribed (i.e. funded) by any or sufficient number of Member States. Similarly, without the EU it is likely that diverging interests on security matters among Member States and, by extension, within ESA, prevent the setting up of adequate coordination mechanisms and operating structures necessary for SSA.

Similarly, while involvement of Member States, individually and through ESA, in space exploration is likely to continue, the fragmented approach is also likely to persist depriving the EU of the full benefits of space exploration.

The impacts of adopting the baseline scenario are described in detail under section 6.1.

5.2. Option 2: Security in space dimension

This scenario addresses the issue of security in space and focuses on the protection of critical European space infrastructures from natural and man-made objects and phenomena such as spacecraft, space debris, near-earth objects (NEOs), space weather and sun activities. Currently only the US has such a service in place. Under this scenario, Europe would develop a capability of its own. The proposed European Space Situational Awareness system (ESSAS) would build on, and complement existing national capacities in Member States and on possible international cooperation. The purpose of the system would be not only to give the EU a level of autonomy in this area but also to fill existing gaps and bring added value through additional developments.

ESA is currently implementing a preparatory SSA programme with a budget of €55 million for the first phase (2009-2011), which envisages a series of studies on the overall system architecture and design, aggregation of user requirements, governance and data policy, as well as a limited infrastructure component and demonstration (pre-cursor) services . Assuming that development, deployment and initial operations costs until 2014 would be financed through the ESA Programme, the first indicative estimates for a fully deployed European Space Situational Awareness System as from 2014 are assessed at around € 130 million per year (in 2009 prices) . This envelope covers:

– the acquisition of the main components necessary to complete the European SSA system; this includes surveillance and tracking radars, telescopes; space weather and NEO instruments; data and service centres, communication networks, security layer and satellites for space weather and space surveillance; subject to a more detailed needs analysis, according to ESA estimates this would amount to some € 600 million from 2014 to 2020;

– the maintenance and operation of SSA ground systems (including radars, telescopes, space weather sensors, data centres, communications); and SSA space systems (including dedicated space weather satellites and instruments deployed on hosting platforms); according to ESA’s estimates this represents € 270 million for the above period.

The implementation of this option would require that existing mechanisms for space and security cooperation, notably the so-called “Structured Dialogue on Space and Security” between the Commission, the Council Secretariat-General, the European Defence Agency and the European Space Agency be reinforced. Such mechanism is necessary given the (former) interpillar dimension of cooperation in space and security matters and the necessity to bring in the military dimension through EDA and technical expertise through ESA.

As regards implementation, while ESA would be responsible for the development of the required additional components, the operation of the ESSAS would require an adequate operational entity to be identified. Such an entity should be able to integrate and coordinate existing and new national and European assets and ensure the provision of SSA services to both civil and military users.

International cooperation would be an important element in the implementation of this option since SSA is a global issue and activities should also be shared internationally. Dialogue and cooperation particularly with the US but also with other partners would be essential to secure international data sharing and complementarity between the systems, and allow the possibility for sharing the burden (technical, financial) between the systems. By having its autonomous capacity Europe would be able to negotiate on an equal footing with other space actors and ensure that fruitful cooperation could be sustained in the long run.

5.3. Option 3: Option 2 plus limited involvement in space exploration

The main difference to Option 2 is the addition of a space exploration dimension. Under this option the EU would extend the space exploration activities and coordination in Europe, jointly with the Member States and ESA.

Space exploration should be seen as a comprehensive global endeavour. The scientific, technical and international relations aspects of this have been addressed in detail during a series of EU-ESA workshops conducted in March–May 2010 See workshops’ conclusions in annexes. . The basic scenario for the next decade identifies the International Space Station (ISS) as a cornerstone and enabler for science and technology validation to prepare the way for future exploration steps, including access to space with cargo and crew. [53]

See workshops’ conclusions in annexes.

Option 3 foresees a role for the EU in federating space exploration objectives and coordinating the European exploration programmes (undertaken by the EU, ESA and Members States).

This scenario has two main components:

– access to on-orbit infrastructures through extended participation and utilisation of the ISS to be used as a platform for exploration, including a human spaceflight programme; and

– contributing to independent access to space (for human spaceflight, payloads to the ISS and for European robotic missions) by supporting the maintenance and upgrading of the European launch infrastructures at the Guiana Space Centre (GSC) in Kourou.

5.3.1. Participation in the ISS

Participation in the ISS as considered here goes beyond support for R&D and focuses on enhanced EU human presence in the ISS through a programme to prepare for sustainable human presence in deep space.

The programme would allow enhanced EU presence in the ISS through an EU astronaut corps and increased possibilities for missions which would be placed gradually under direct European control using existing transportation systems (as opposed to the situation today, where Europeans can only fly into space as passengers of US or Russian led missions) and, ultimately, a European crew transportation system in the longer term.

This option includes testing for sustainable human presence in space beyond low Earth orbit (LEO), including protection against radiation and life support systems (e.g. water, waste recycling, health and well-being, etc.).

This programme could be run as an autonomous module fully integrated in an ESA wider space exploration programme (including integration of both ESA’s and EU astronaut corps). It could also be easily integrated into a larger international space exploration endeavour to be negotiated in tandem by the EU and ESA with international partners.

The cost estimate for this activity is in the order of €300 million per year. This amount is an average over a seven year period. It is based on ESA estimates and would cover the astronaut programme, mission control requirements, up to a maximum of 3 launches in the second half of the financial perspectives as well as an EU human presence in ISS during that period.

5.3.2. Launch infrastructures

Access to space is a basic requirement for activities in space exploration. Today Europe has the Ariane-5 launcher as its heavy lift capability capable of launching 20 tons into Low Earth Orbit. (This mass is reduced by a factor of 10 for exploration missions which by definition need to escape from the Earth.) Such heavy lift capability is essential for deep space exploration. It is expected that the next generation of Ariane launchers may well be smaller Report on future launchers (Ariane-6) issued by the French Prime Minister, available at http://www.gouvernement.fr/premier-ministre/un-nouveau-lanceur-spatial-europeen-a-l-horizon-20202025. than Ariane-5 to fit the commercial satellite market needs. Should a future European launch system replace the Ariane-5 launcher on the commercial market around 2025, the justification to maintain the Ariane-5 beyond that date will be mainly to serve automatic deep space exploration missions and potential successors to the Automated Transfer Vehicle (ATV) http://www.esa.int/esaMI/ATV/index.html. to the ISS orbit. As a consequence, the existing Ariane-5 launch infrastructure, as well as the industrial production capacity must be maintained and further upgraded at least until 2025 and possibly beyond.[54][55]

Report on future launchers (Ariane-6) issued by the French Prime Minister, available at http://www.gouvernement.fr/premier-ministre/un-nouveau-lanceur-spatial-europeen-a-l-horizon-20202025.

http://www.esa.int/esaMI/ATV/index.html.

Option 3 thus foresees a possibility for the EU to contribute towards the adaptation of the current launch infrastructure to accommodate the evolution of the Ariane-5 launcher (e.g. Ariane-5 mid-life evolution and human rating) and the annual costs of maintaining in operational conditions related ESA-owned launch infrastructures at the Guyana Space Centre (GSC), which would amount to €3.5 billion over 6 years Data from the European Space Agency provided during a presentation to the Commission on 25 May 2010. . The adaptation of the GSC to human spaceflight alone has been estimated at €1.5 billion for the period 2015 to 2019. Considering that funding should be shared by ESA, Member States and the EU, a reasonable assumption is that a minimum EU contribution for the corresponding launch infrastructure adaptation and operational maintenance would amount to an average of €100 million per year. This amount represents a third of the total cost of the adaptation of the GSC for 2015 to 2019. The rest would have to be covered through ESA and its Member States. The precise components to be covered by EU funding will have to be negotiated with ESA.[56]

Data from the European Space Agency provided during a presentation to the Commission on 25 May 2010.

5.3.3. Coordination and implementation

ESA would continue acting as the technical implementing agency of exploration endeavours. This option would bring the EU into the space exploration arena beyond R&D. This would require stepping up coordination at European level. The EU together with ESA and in consultation with Member States would define a common European vision and strategy for space exploration, accompanied by a detailed roadmap and implementation plan, as foreseen in the conclusions of the first EU/ESA high-level conference on space exploration First EU-ESA High Level Political Conference on Human Space Exploration, 22-23 October 2009, Prague, Czech Republic. .[57]

First EU-ESA High Level Political Conference on Human Space Exploration, 22-23 October 2009, Prague, Czech Republic.

International cooperation would be a central element to this strategy. Space exploration has become an activity of interest to a growing number of countries around the world. New actors are developing capabilities leading to the internationalisation and globalisation of the space exploration context. The European strategy would have to be firmly embedded in this evolving international context. The EU and ESA in tandem would lead the dialogue with the international partner community to ensure that the European strategy is compatible with the scenarios and priorities of other major exploration partners. The complementarity between the technical and scientific expertise of ESA and the EU’s political influence would ensure that Europe could better negotiate the terms of its engagement in global exploration programmes to better suit its objectives.

5.3.4. Cost

Compared with option 2, the additional cost of this option would be € 400 million per year as explained below. Added to the €130 million of option 1, the total overall cost of option would be €530 million per year

5.4. Option 4: Option 3 plus substantial investment in space exploration

Under this scenario, the EU would be the driver of future European endeavours in space exploration and would play a leading role in defining the exploration strategy for future decades. ESA would continue playing a fundamental role in technical implementation. The EU, together with ESA, would lead robotic explorations to Mars, paving the way for future involvement in human exploration beyond LEO. A human space transportation system will be developed. As in Option 3, the EU would continue to be involved in supporting and exploiting the ISS, and supporting the launch infrastructure at GSC.

5.4.1. Fully autonomous human access to space

Under this option the European cargo transfer vehicle (ATV) would be improved to be able not only to send cargo but also return payloads safely back to Earth (i.e. Advanced Re-entry Vehicle, ARV) for better utilisation of the ISS and providing a bartering capacity The ISS partnership is based on a non-exchange of funds, therefore any contribution to the ISS is in kind providing exchange possibilities for flight opportunities, hardware and services. . In a second step the ARV would be improved and upgraded to transport crew to and back from LEO (ARV-Crew).[58]

The ISS partnership is based on a non-exchange of funds, therefore any contribution to the ISS is in kind providing exchange possibilities for flight opportunities, hardware and services.

The development costs up to the first mission have been estimated at €9.5 billion between 2011 and 2019 ESA Council document ESAC (2010)48 Exploration scenarios. . These costs would be broken down as follows:[59]

ESA Council document ESAC (2010)48 Exploration scenarios.

Item|Cost in billions of euros|Schedule|

ARV cargo|1.5|2011-2017|

ARV Crew version (including Crew Escape System)|4.5|2014-2020|

Ariane 5 adaptation to human rating|2|2014-2019|

CSG adaptation for human spaceflight|1.5|2015-2019|

Tab 4 – ESA’s estimation of development costs up to the first mission Data from the European Space Agency provided during a presentation to the Commission on 25 May 2010. .[60]

Data from the European Space Agency provided during a presentation to the Commission on 25 May 2010.

This approach builds on existing European strengths, namely the fact that Ariane 5 was initially designed for crew transportation (the original project was abandoned and Ariane 5 was subsequently modified for satellite and cargo launches so it needs “re-adaptation” for human spaceflight) and the successful experience with ATV.

Europe has so far failed to acquire autonomous crew transportation capacity. The financial intervention of the EU could guarantee that the EU does develop its own crew transportation system. The EU contribution for the adaptation of CSG for human spaceflight has been considered under option 3. The additional EU contribution has been estimated at around €800 million per year in the timeframe 2014-2020. The EU would therefore be the main contributor.

5.4.2. Mars sample return mission

A first Mars sample return mission could be launched by the middle of the next decade. Such a mission would be a technological and scientific challenge for Europe and would validate key technologies for future human missions to Mars. International cooperation would be an essential condition for such a mission in order to complement some technology gaps and share the overall costs. The total cost ESA Council document ESAC (2010)48 Exploration scenarios. is estimated in the order of €5 billion spread over 10 years. It can be assumed that 50% of these costs would be borne by international partners. The EU Member States and ESA would contribute significantly to the European costs. The remaining expenses would only occur in the 2021-2027 timeframe (amounting to about € 200 million per year, of which about half could come from ESA). It is estimated an average EU contribution of about €100 million per year would be needed in the period 2014-2020. This funding could cover the purpose-built technical facility (referred to as “curation” facility in space jargon) to which the samples would be brought back and which gives the hosting partner a highly visible and leading role in the project.[61]

ESA Council document ESAC (2010)48 Exploration scenarios.

5.4.3. Coordination and implementation

The mechanisms for coordination will be similar to those established under option 3, though the degree of EU involvement will require more intense coordination with ESA, Member States and international partners. ESA would be delegated the implementation of EU space exploration activities.

As in option 3 and for similar reasons, international cooperation is an essential dimension of this option.

5.4.4. Cost

Option 4 includes the cost of option 3 (€530 million per year) plus an additional €900 million per year. The total of Option 4 would therefore be €1.43 billion per year.

5.5. Cost overrun considerations for options 2 to 4

A risk management mechanism would be built in with the objective to minimise the probability of programme cost increases. Mitigation mechanisms would be based on better cost estimation, learning from previous experience (e.g. Galileo, GMES, others) and the implementation of an incremental/modular approach to system implementation.

Options 2, 3 and 4 could be built progressively. Should cost overruns occur due to external factors outside programme management control, they could result in certain components of the options being dropped or their deployment delayed. Yet, the incremental modular approach would guarantee that action taken would still be relevant and bring added value in comparison with the present situation.

Notwithstanding the above, option 4 does represent higher risk of programme cost increases because the modular approach cannot be applied to the ARVC development, which would be the bulk of the expense under this option. Should this option be adopted, a specific cost increase mitigation approach needs to be defined beforehand, including scenarios for project cancellation.

6. Analysis of impacts of options

6.1. Option 1: Baseline scenario

6.1.1. Economic impact

Under this option the EU would not fund either a European Space Situational Awareness System or space exploration.

Funding would be available for other initiatives but the problems connected to the absence of SSA and lack of a concerted European approach in space exploration will remain.

Without EU involvement which could guarantee an appropriate European SSA system, the risk of likely losses due to collision and space weather identified under problem definition would remain. This risk could increase exponentially if further collisions occur. Such risk could also increase if the necessary upgrades on existing capabilities are not implemented in a coordinated manner or at all. The EU would increasingly depend on third parties for information and advice in a critical area of space activities.

The problems identified in connection with the absence of the EU from space exploration will also remain. It can be argued that if funding is invested elsewhere perhaps some of the problems can be mitigated (for example in the field of innovation). However the potential of these actions to contribute to this strategy has to be weighed against the potential of space exploration to enhance the profile of the EU internationally while guaranteeing the economic impact described under the following sections.

Space exploration depends almost exclusively on public funding. The absence of EU engagement in space exploration would have a negative impact on the competitiveness of the European space manufacturing industry. Space exploration encompasses all space sub-sectors. Without the EU thrust to space exploration, all such sub-sectors would experience a negative impact. The activities proposed under space exploration have been chosen on the basis of extensive discussions with ESA, national space agencies and industries taking into consideration their potential to enhance industrial competitiveness (see for instance the recommendations of the EU-ESA Workshop on Exploration and Innovation, Industrial Competitiveness and Technological Advance. By not supporting them, industry would loose the possibility of developing key space technologies, which would have a spill-over effect into other space sub-sectors such as launchers Ariane 5 was initially developed as a launcher for European manned spacecraft (Hermes). Although the project was cancelled, Ariane 5 was transformed into a heavy lift launcher which has given Europe the competitive lead in this sector. , propulsion, remote sensing, telecommunications and navigation systems. This would have a negative impact on European industry’s competitive position on the global market and hinder its capacity to fulfil its strategic mission.[62]

Ariane 5 was initially developed as a launcher for European manned spacecraft (Hermes). Although the project was cancelled, Ariane 5 was transformed into a heavy lift launcher which has given Europe the competitive lead in this sector.

It is a well documented fact that s pace exploration generates innovation See annex on space exploration spin-offs. . In particular, human exploration is one of the most technologically complex activities and requires innovative solutions to the challenges it poses. Space exploration requires the development of new technologies and products that stimulate industrial innovation; the complexity of space exploration requires pooling of resources and capacities, which in turn generate new forms of economic cooperation and activities that create new jobs. The innovation generated by space exploration activities can be used to address societal challenges and result in spin offs in fields such as intelligent energy, waste and water recycling, health prevention and monitoring, and environmental control.[63]

See annex on space exploration spin-offs.

All of this is of critical importance during these times of economic crisis. By not engaging in space exploration, the EU will deprive itself of an important tool to stimulate short term economic recovery and to build a more robust industrial development in the long term. The EU will forgo a key instrument to improve Europe’s global economic competitive position.

6.1.2. Environmental Impact

Under this scenario the environmental threats from satellite debris and NEOs referred to in the problem definition remain.

6.1.3. Social impact

Under this option the threats with social impact referred to in the problem definition remain.

6.2. Option 2

6.2.1. Economic Impact

The implementation of option 2 will have limited direct impact on the space manufacturing industry as it will mainly lead to the procurement of non-space items (including tracking radars, telescope, data and service centres, communication networks and other ground-based capabilities).

However, the results from the intervention will significantly reduce (by 90%, according to ESA estimates) the risk of economic loss due to damage (including total destruction) of spacecraft due to collision between satellites, debris and space weather and lead to improved space security. This in turn leads to prevention of future damage and the prevention of a domino effect: since debris cannot be removed yet, any collision will increase exponentially the risks of further collisions and will render the operations in LEO increasingly difficult and launches of satellites very risky. Space debris can also endanger human crew in space (as was the case in March 2009 when space debris threatened the ISS) and citizens on Earth. Furthermore, the intervention regarding space weather could lead to benefits in other sectors, such as e.g. the aviation and electricity sectors.

Due to the fact that space systems are essential to the availability and functioning of many economic activities (e.g. banking, telecommunication, satellite TV, etc.) protecting space infrastructure will have positive repercussions on all Member States and not exclusively those that own or operate satellite infrastructure.

Significant economic impact can also be derived from supporting space weather information services. In addition to the reduction of the losses identified in the problem definition, an ESA commissioned study on the costs and benefits of these services suggests a potential market of €1 billion over 15 years for services to mitigate threats arising from STP Solar-terrestrial physics (STP) is the study of the physical processes through which the Sun affects the Earth and the general space environment in the solar system. The relevant solar emissions include electromagnetic radiation (especially at UV, EUV and X-ray wavelengths). phenomena in the ionosphere, e.g. effects on GPS and radio communications and induced currents in power grids. The analysis also identifies a smaller market for spacecraft protection – around €100 million over 15 years Solar-Terrestrial Physics in the UK. An input to the Physics Review by the UK Magnetosphere, Ionosphere and Solar-terrestrial community Mike Hapgood (2008) http://www.mist.ac.uk/stp_wakeham.pdf . .[64][65]

Solar-terrestrial physics (STP) is the study of the physical processes through which the Sun affects the Earth and the general space environment in the solar system. The relevant solar emissions include electromagnetic radiation (especially at UV, EUV and X-ray wavelengths).

Solar-Terrestrial Physics in the UK. An input to the Physics Review by the UK Magnetosphere, Ionosphere and Solar-terrestrial community Mike Hapgood (2008) http://www.mist.ac.uk/stp_wakeham.pdf .

Another study WMO, The Potential Role of WMO in Space Weather, April 2008. on mitigating measures to reduce the risks of space weather has identified additional benefits in terms of reduction in the cost of rerouting (polar) flights due to better prediction of radiation risks for passengers and crew or savings realised from minimising the loss of power failures caused by geomagnetic storms. Ecorys “Study on the EU Space Programme 2014-2020”, Ecorys, Draft Final Report, 18 April 2010, contract n. SI2.541751. has identified annual benefits derived from better space weather in the range of € 25 million.[66][67]

WMO, The Potential Role of WMO in Space Weather, April 2008.

“Study on the EU Space Programme 2014-2020”, Ecorys, Draft Final Report, 18 April 2010, contract n. SI2.541751.

|Annual benefit|

Prevention re-routing polar flights (7 major EU airlines)|€ 10 million|

Cost savings Arianespace|€ 2 million|

Loss reduction power failure|€ 13 million|

|€ 25 million|

Tab 5 – Annual benefits derived from better knowledge of space weather Ibidem. .[68]

Ibidem.

Finally, activities in the area of SSA and securing space infrastructures from threats can also impact the competitiveness of the European space industry. In addition, increased security in space is to be seen as an important condition for any robotic or human exploration missions in the future.

6.2.2. Environmental impact

Some environmental impact may arise from the intervention. In particular, better information on space weather may result in better knowledge of climate change and Earth weather.

6.2.3. Social impact

Protecting space assets ensures that important societal services, communications, search and rescue operations, emergency, etc. will keep functioning even under conditions of major disruption to terrestrial systems. This benefits equally all EU MS. In this respect, a reinforced effort in space infrastructure security would have significant political and strategic impact for Europe as a whole.

The development of technologies to detect space debris, and increased surveillance and research on space weather conditions will result in skills development in these technologies. Increased coordination and collaboration will also result in wider knowledge dissemination and building up of skills.

6.3. Option 3

6.3.1. Economic impact

The activities foreseen under option 3 will involve expenditure on a wide range of areas, including technology demonstration and hardware or processes development, such as the ISS utilisation for scientific and technical purposes related to exploration preparation (e.g. inflatable habitats technologies, life support systems, remote medical assistance), launch pads operational maintenance, ground based infrastructures, communication systems, etc. These products and services are delivered by a wide range of public and private institutions and manufacturers, which will be affected by a future space exploration effort (or the by the lack of it).

The EU expenditure on space exploration can be expected to translate directly into turnover for the space industry, as the funds will be used for contracting out innovative technology development activities. Since the value-added shares in turnover are relatively high in the space industry, it is expected that an increase in final demand for the services of the space industry would result in an increase in added value in this industry. (For example, UK data suggest a value added share of 60 percent for upstream space industries, implying that an increase in final demand of €100 million would result in an increase in value added of €60 million in the industry.)

In terms of indirect turnover impacts, Ecorys suggests a production multiplier of 2.3, implying that spending on space exploration of €100 million will result in €230 million in supplying industries and in new products. Other sources provide different estimates. For example, a study on Norway Norwegian Space Centre (2005) Annual Report, as seen at The Space Economy at a glance (OECD, 2007), http://browse.oecdbookshop.org/oecd/pdfs/browseit/0307021E.PDF. found a multiplier of 4.4 resulting from space-related spending in Norway by ESA. Similar results were found for Denmark http://en.fi.dk/publications/publications-2008/evaluation-of-danish-industrial-activities-in-the-european-space-agency-esa-2013-assessment-of-the-economic-impacts-of-the-danish-esa-membership/Evaluation%20of%20Danish%20Industrial%20Activities%20in%20ESA-pdf.pdf . , i.e. Danish spending on ESA programmes resulted in a multiplier of 4.5. In terms of sub-programmes related to space exploration, expenditures on micro-gravity resulted in a multiplier of 1.4 and expenditure on the ISS had a multiplier of 2.3.[69][70]

Norwegian Space Centre (2005) Annual Report, as seen at The Space Economy at a glance (OECD, 2007), http://browse.oecdbookshop.org/oecd/pdfs/browseit/0307021E.PDF.

http://en.fi.dk/publications/publications-2008/evaluation-of-danish-industrial-activities-in-the-european-space-agency-esa-2013-assessment-of-the-economic-impacts-of-the-danish-esa-membership/Evaluation%20of%20Danish%20Industrial%20Activities%20in%20ESA-pdf.pdf .

Recent c ost-benefit studies have been done for a number of potential spin-off technologies of space exploration which showed high net present values “ Economic Analysis to support a Study on the Options for UK Involvement in Space Exploration”, London Economics, 19 March 2009, http://www.ukspaceagency.bis.gov.uk/assets/pdf/FRER.pdf . . [71]

“ Economic Analysis to support a Study on the Options for UK Involvement in Space Exploration”, London Economics, 19 March 2009, http://www.ukspaceagency.bis.gov.uk/assets/pdf/FRER.pdf .

The most significant spill-over impact on non-space sectors is expected in the field of life support, health and wellbeing “Space exploration and innovation, industrial competitiveness and technology advance”, Workshop, 29-30 April 2010, Harwell (UK) http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/policies/space/esp/conferences_space_en.htm. . An example in the field of health/biotechnology is provided by the bioMerieux Inds. bacteriological detection system VITEC. The original patent was acquired from the US space industry (for the NASA Skylab programme) and used for the development of a commercial diagnostics device. The total sales of the device from 1972 to 1997 amounted to $ 500 million Measuring the returns to NASA life sciences research and development, H. Hertzfeld, Space Policy Institute, George Washington University, 1998. and from 1997 to 2009 to $ 455 million The Contribution of Space exploration to Innovation”, Tech nopolis, Draft Final Report, 11 June 2010, contract n. ENTR/2008/006. .[72][73][74]

“Space exploration and innovation, industrial competitiveness and technology advance”, Workshop, 29-30 April 2010, Harwell (UK) http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/policies/space/esp/conferences_space_en.htm.

Measuring the returns to NASA life sciences research and development, H. Hertzfeld, Space Policy Institute, George Washington University, 1998.

The Contribution of Space exploration to Innovation”, Tech nopolis, Draft Final Report, 11 June 2010, contract n. ENTR/2008/006.

Technopolis Ibidem. demonstrates that classical spin-offs from exploration programmes give rise to valuable benefits. This study shows that targeted expenditure in space exploration (which is different from a bottom-up approach in R&D) can be a trigger for major innovations in sectors such as health, secure access to energy and renewable energy, and access to clean water. In these fields only the estimated benefits are in the order of several hundred million over the next 5 years and a few billion euros over the long term.[75]

Ibidem.

The world market for water and wastewater amounts to $ 350 billion in 2008 http://www.hkc22.com/watermarketsworldwide.html. . Every year around $ 150 billion is spent worldwide on wastewater treatment, and this figure is expected to exceed $ 240 billion by 2016 “Water: a market of the future”, SAM study, 2007, http://www.sam-group.com/downloads/studies/waterstudy_e.pdf. . The human space exploration can trigger innovation and a technology leap in this sector http://ecls.esa.int/ecls/ . .[76][77][78]

http://www.hkc22.com/watermarketsworldwide.html.

“Water: a market of the future”, SAM study, 2007, http://www.sam-group.com/downloads/studies/waterstudy_e.pdf.

http://ecls.esa.int/ecls/ .

Overall, space exploration will contribute to the competitiveness of the European industry and to the development of the knowledge-based society in Europe, since all activities in space exploration support increasing knowledge through science and technology demonstration missions.

6.3.2. Environmental impact

Space exploration will enhance the understanding of our own environment, which in turn will result in better definition of environmental policies. In a number of areas support of mainly human space exploration will have positive environmental effects. A few examples include:

– Air quality management and regeneration; in a manned spacecraft the air must be revitalised constantly but, unlike planes, spacecraft cannot take air from the outside. Therefore advanced technologies must be developed to monitor air quality including various contaminants, regenerated (e.g. CO2 regeneration into O2) and purified. Those technologies have numerous applications.

– Energy production, storage and distribution technologies, resulting in more efficient and durable solar cells, batteries, fuel cells or fission reactors. Manned spacecrafts need an amount of energy comparable to that required by a household. Embarking chemical energy is costly and risky and the only external source is solar energy. Therefore, significant progress must be made on optimising energy production and management. Innovations in this area are essential to make the transition from a fossil-fuel based economy to one based on renewable energy and so limit the effects of climate change;

– Water must be recycled up to 100% during human spaceflight. Water for cleaning, washing and food and drinking cannot be brought for several months because of exorbitant costs for the launch (several tons would be needed). Therefore, significant progress must be made to achieve full water autonomy during future space travel by advanced recycling and quality monitoring technologies (including detection of trace contaminants). Innovations in this area offer significant potential to improve the management of Europe’s water throughout the water cycle and improve the quality and quantity of drinking water in a future where water resources may be under increased pressure from population growth, urbanisation and climate change. Grey and black water recycling processes increase the potential to manage water at a local level in large-scale commercial, domestic and public buildings (offices, hospitals, schools etc.) making organisations, communities and individuals more responsible for their own water use.

6.3.3. Social impact

An EU intervention in space exploration is expected to lead to social impact in terms of employment, labour market structure and education, and health.

In the US one study reported that the Apollo budget had an employment spin-off effect of 10 (industry and university workers) to 1 NASA worker Jerome Schnee, The Economic Impact of the US Space Programme, Rutgers University, http://er.jsc.nasa.gov/seh/economics.html. . An investigation by The Space Division of Rockwell International on the relationship between NASA's Space Shuttle program and employment in the state of California estimated that the Space Shuttle program generated an employment multiplier of 2.8; that is, direct Shuttle employment of 95,300 man-years in California produced an increase of 266,000 man-years in total employment.[79]

Jerome Schnee, The Economic Impact of the US Space Programme, Rutgers University, http://er.jsc.nasa.gov/seh/economics.html.

The space industry employs a highly qualified workforce. In the European space industry 75 percent of the employees have university level of education (53 percent 4 years and more and 22 percent up to three years) and 21 percent have vocational education. Consequently, additional spending on space exploration will have a positive impact on the demand for highly qualified workers. An inspiring endeavour like space exploration may stimulate young people’s interest in science, technology, engineering and mathematics (STEM) and motivate students to engage in science and technology careers "Science and education within space exploration", Workshop, 29-30 March 2010, Strasbourg (FR), http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/policies/space/esp/conferences_space_en.htm. . For example, it has been found that space is the second most popular factor motivating choice of physics as a degree “Bringing space into school science”, Barstow, M., Report commissioned by BNSC, 2005, http://www.stfc.ac.uk/Resources/PDF/barstow.pdf. .[80][81]

"Science and education within space exploration", Workshop, 29-30 March 2010, Strasbourg (FR), http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/policies/space/esp/conferences_space_en.htm.

“Bringing space into school science”, Barstow, M., Report commissioned by BNSC, 2005, http://www.stfc.ac.uk/Resources/PDF/barstow.pdf.

The space environment offers also possibilities to study health problems related to various diseases, ageing or immobility, since t he provision of equipment and services to manage and maintain crew health on long distance spaceflights has similar requirements. Point-of-care delivery of healthcare by intelligent and autonomous systems is essential as inter-planetary travel duration will be in the order of years and as unplanned and premature return to Earth is not an option. Furthermore, spaceflight (even short duration) creates physiological effects that are akin to accelerated ageing (reduced bone density, cardiovascular de-conditioning). Therefore improved understanding of cardiovascular and musculoskeletal systems and development of countermeasures (e.g. by specific nutrition and exercise regimens) is essential to ensure that crew remain healthy throughout a long duration mission.

Improved understanding of the conditions of ageing (osteoporosis, cardiovascular problems etc.) along with the miniaturisation of medical technologies and their integration with communications technologies will enable better and ‘smarter’ diagnosis and treatment to be delivered at the point-of-care, i.e. at home or in a local clinic, thereby reducing the cost of provision, enhancing healthcare delivery and ensuring ongoing quality of life (Technopolis).

EU investment in human exploration under option 3 will therefore generate direct benefits for citizens derived from areas related to human survivability in space. Other societal benefits will be derived in the fields of energy, health, biotechnology, environment or security.

Type of impact|Comments|

Space industry|Spending will translate in contracts with universities, R&D institutions, hardware producers. Spending of €100m will generate €60m of value added.|

Indirect effects|A multiplier of 2.3 is suggested as a conservative figure, implying that spending on space exploration of €100m will result in €230m in supplying industries and in new products.|

R&D effects|Long-term effects of spending €100m will result in €70m of European GDP per year with serendipitous spin-offs and at least an order of magnitude more if new policies are put into place to promote synergetic R&D between space and non-space sectors.|

Labour market|Increase in spending will result in increased employment. Most employment will be in terms of highly qualified jobs.|

Health|Space exploration will have important effects on the prevention and monitoring of a range of public health problems.|

Environment|The direct adverse impacts of space exploration are considered to be limited. Positive effects are related to comparative climatology, developments in the field of power generation and storage and water or waste recycling.|

Table 6: Benefits of EU spending on space exploration Jerome Schnee, The Economic Impact of the US Space Programme, Rutgers University, http://er.jsc.nasa.gov/seh/economics.html. .[82]

Jerome Schnee, The Economic Impact of the US Space Programme, Rutgers University, http://er.jsc.nasa.gov/seh/economics.html.

6.4. Option 4

Option 4 steps up considerably the investment in space exploration and places the EU at the same level as other main international players. This investment brings in substantial economic impact and will enhance the perception of the EU as a global player both within and outside the space domain.

Option 4 will give the EU a leading role in international cooperation efforts in space exploration. The EU would join the small club of nations with human space flight capability of their own. This will be a major boost to EU visibility as well as economic and political influence.

6.4.1. Economic impact

Option 4 represents an investment in the order of €1.43 billion per year. The rationale for economic impact described under option 3 applies to option 4. The potential economic impacts will therefore be commensurate to the increased funding.

The European launcher annual development and production costs are €1300 million ASD-Eurospace, European space industry facts & figures, 2009. . Today the European launcher sector has a 50% share in the international private market. As shown from the past (Ariane 5 launcher was foreseen for human spaceflight upfront http://www.astronautix.com/gallery/chermes.htm. ), space exploration programmes are an essential element in order to maintain the competitiveness of current and next generation European launchers. Without the technical challenges posed by exploration (e.g. heavy lift capability, increasing reliability of launchers, supporting institutional flights) the current leading position of Europe would fade away. [83][84]

ASD-Eurospace, European space industry facts & figures, 2009.

http://www.astronautix.com/gallery/chermes.htm.

Investment in space exploration at this scale will have significant impact on technological progress and industrial competitiveness and spill-overs to other sectors. For example, the London Economics study demonstrates that investment in advanced (reusable) launch systems could lead to profitable private businesses (e.g. space tourism), as well as to reducing the costs for satellite launches.

As regards robotic exploration, the same study “ Economic Analysis to support a Study on the Options for UK Involvement in Space Exploration”, London Economics, 19 March 2009, http://www.ukspaceagency.bis.gov.uk/assets/pdf/FRER.pdf. further shows that technologies developed for exploration, such as automated deep drilling or in-situ resources utilisation (e.g. extraction technologies applied on Earth), can have a significant positive benefit/cost ratio for the oil and mining industries respectively.[85]

“ Economic Analysis to support a Study on the Options for UK Involvement in Space Exploration”, London Economics, 19 March 2009, http://www.ukspaceagency.bis.gov.uk/assets/pdf/FRER.pdf.

Due to the various technologies needed (sample analysis, its protection, protection of personnel, of the environment and the population) a large number of high tech applications in the biotechnology and pharmaceutical industry are foreseen, e.g. bio-containment, tele-operations including remote micro-robotics, automated handling and storage systems and micro-analytical systems “Space exploration and innovation, industrial competitiveness and technology advance”, Workshop, 29-30 April 2010, Harwell (UK), http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/policies/space/esp/conferences_space_en.htm. .[86]

“Space exploration and innovation, industrial competitiveness and technology advance”, Workshop, 29-30 April 2010, Harwell (UK), http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/policies/space/esp/conferences_space_en.htm.

In addition, the profile of the EU at global level will be significantly enhanced. The EU’s capacity to influence negotiations in the space domain will be reinforced. From another angle, the capacity to undertake space exploration goes hand in hand with stronger international recognition; by being fully involved in space exploration and especially human exploration, the EU will benefit from greater political influence, which in turn may yield indirect economic gains.

6.4.2. Social impact

As space exploration is closely linked to space science, it will also contribute to developing global scientific leadership for Europe. The activities in preparation studies for human exploration, as well as the research onboard the ISS will support life and physical sciences and will also promote collaborative research programmes. Space exploration activities will foster the public interest in space science and technology, and will contribute further to attracting young people into science, technology, engineering and maths (STEM).

There will be a substantial positive impact on creating new, qualified jobs. ESA Data provided by the European Space Agency. estimates that an investment of the magnitude proposed under option 4 will lead to the creation of 3000 highly qualified direct jobs. Ecorys as well assesses the employment impact of an ambitious EU space exploration initiative in excess of 3000 direct new jobs “Study on the EU Space Programme 2014-2020”, Ecorys, Draft Final Report, 18 April 2010, contract n. SI2.541751. . A study referred to under the previous option Jerome Schnee, The Economic Impact of the US Space Programme, Rutgers University, http://er.jsc.nasa.gov/seh/economics.html. identified an employment factor of 2.8, which means that overall employment generated by this option could accrue to more than 8000 jobs.[87][88][89]

Data provided by the European Space Agency.

“Study on the EU Space Programme 2014-2020”, Ecorys, Draft Final Report, 18 April 2010, contract n. SI2.541751.

Jerome Schnee, The Economic Impact of the US Space Programme, Rutgers University, http://er.jsc.nasa.gov/seh/economics.html.

6.4.3. Environmental impact

By boosting topics such as comparative planetary climatology or Earth observation from the ISS, research related to space exploration would help understand climate change on Earth.

7. Comparison of the options

Options|Effectiveness|Efficiency|Coherence|

Option 1|Option 1 will not achieve the specific objectives of this action. The funding would be available for other initiatives.|Not applicable|This option is not consistent with the EU2020 growth strategy, which emphasises the key importance of innovation and the industrial competitiveness and refers to the development of space policy as instruments to achieve the goals of such strategy. |

Option 2|This option achieves specific objectives (1) regarding long term availability and security of European space infrastructures and services and partly objective (4) regarding the convergence of national and EU policies and investments on SSA and the connection of these and other EU policies.|Option 2 entails an expenditure of € 130 million per year . SSA An SSA system could save as a minimum over €300 million per year, although non quantified costs could be exponentially higher. This option also diminishes the risk of domino effect due to spacecraft destruction. This option has important social benefits resulting from avoiding the disruption of satellite based services, better prevention of electricity grid failure as well as the impacts of NEOs. Positive impact on environment notably by learning more from space weather.|This option is partly but not fully coherent with the EU2020 strategy growth. While SSA does represent certain potential for innovation and growth, its main purpose is the protection of space infrastructure. There is an enormous potential for innovation in space exploration, which is not addressed in this option.|

Option 3|This option achieves objectives (1), (2) and (4), but only in part objective (3) and (5). It does not fully guarantee independent access to on-orbit infrastructures. Option 3 will give EU a higher profile in space matters but not the leading and strategic role that objective 5 refers to.|Option 3 entails an additional expenditure of some € 400 million per year. The total for this option to €530 million per year . Conservative estimates put the rate of return for investment in space exploration at 2.3 and employment factor at 2.8. Other significant impacts on Europe's visibility and innovation potential, the creation of qualified high-skilled jobs and beneficial spin-off effects.|Option 3 is fully consistent with the EU2020 strategy; it will contribute to innovation and will derive spill-over benefits in many areas and EU policies including health and environment.|

Option 4|This option will achieve the five objectives identified.|The rationale described for option 3 applies to option 4. This option adds €900 million per year, the total being €1.43 billion per year . Option 4 represents an enormous technological challenge which will accelerate the pace of technological progress and multiply the spill-off and spill-over benefits for our economy and citizens.|From the coherence standpoint, this option is similar to option 3.|

8. Monitoring and evaluation

The present impact assessment will accompany a Communication on the future involvement of the EU in space and does not amount to a formal proposal for funding. The Communication could pave the way for a possible Regulation on a future European Space Programme. That Regulation will be accompanied by a follow-up Impact Assessment. Detailed provision for monitoring and evaluation will be discussed in that Impact Assessment.

As regards an evaluation, the Commission will assess the extent to which EU activities in space reach the policy objectives and the problems identified in the Communication are being tackled. The EU programme will be evaluated according to the parameters of relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, utility and sustainability.

[1] Full reference documents available at http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/policies/space/documents/galileo/index_en.htm.

[2] Commission Communication “Global Monitoring for Environment and Security (GMES) – Challenges and next steps for the Space Component”, COM (2009)589 final.

[3] CIP is the Competitiveness and Innovation Framework Programme.

[4] 5 th Space Council Resolution, “Taking forward the European Space Policy”, 26 September 2008.

[5] 4 th Space Council Resolution, “Resolution on the European Space Policy”, 22 May 2007; 5 th Space Council Resolution, “Taking forward the European Space Policy”, 26 September 2008; 6 th Space Council Resolution, “The contribution of Space to innovation and competitiveness in the context of the European Economic Recovery Plan and further steps”, 29 May 2009.

[6] European Parliament resolution on the European Space Policy, “How to bring space down to Earth”, 20 November 2008.

[7] http://ec.europa.eu/eu2020/index_en.htm.

[8] 5 th Space Council Resolution, “Taking forward the European Space Policy”, 26 September 2008.

[9] “Study on the EU Space Programme 2014-2020”, Ecorys, Draft Final Report, 18 April 2010, contract n. SI2.541751.

[10] For more information on the Space Advisory Group (SAG) http://ec.europa.eu/research/fp7/pdf/advisorygroups/space-members.pdf#view=fit&pagemode=none.

[11] http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/newsroom/cf/itemlongdetail.cfm?lang=fr&item_id=3749.

[12] “Study on the EU Space Programme 2014-2020”, Ecorys, Draft Final Report, 18 April 2010, contract n. SI2.541751.

[13] As regards space applications: GPS, Internet services routed by satellite, TV broadcast by satellite. For examples of spin-offs from Space R&D activities to applications used in everyday life, consult http://www.esa.int/esaCP/GGGIPLH3KCC_Improving_0.html http://www.sti.nasa.gov/tto/Spinoff2009/pdf/spinoff2009.pdf

[14] Applications from Earth observation, navigation and telecommunication satellites are important for issues such as transport, agriculture, fishery, science, environment, health and security.

[15] Compared to the US space budget the gap is 1:6 for civilian programmes and even worse for military space outlays (1:20). Overall government spending on space programmes (civilian and defence combined) is rising worldwide with expenditures going up 12% in 2009.

[16] European Space Directory, 25 th Edition.

[17] Profiles of Government Space Programmes: Analysis of 60 Countries and Agencies, Euroconsult, 2010

[18] Most projects developed through ESA are optional, namely funded through national subscriptions and therefore responding primarily to national interests.

[19] For example, communication systems, electrical power grids, and financial networks all rely on satellite timing for synchronisation. The provision of satellite-based rapid mapping services is indispensible for today's crisis management .

[20] On February 11 2009 about 800 pieces of debris were generated by a collision between a US and a defunct Russian satellite. A similar number of debris was generated by a Chinese anti-satellite test in 2007. Such 'accidents' can generate a chain reaction that would destroy most satellites in a given orbit, knowing that the speed of a satellite and debris is 10 km/second.

[21] “Study on the EU Space Programme 2014-2020”, Ecorys, Draft Final Report, 18 April 2010, contract n. SI2.541751.

[22] “Study on the EU Space Programme 2014-2020”, Ecorys, Draft Final Report, 18 April 2010, contract n. SI2.541751.

[23] http://www.parliament.uk/documents/documents/upload/postpn355.pdf.

[24] http://www.esa.int/esaMI/Space_Debris/SEM2D7WX3RF_0.html.

[25] http://www.parliament.uk/documents/documents/upload/postpn355.pdf.

[26] http://www.ucsusa.org/nuclear_weapons_and_global_security/space_weapons/technical_issues/ucs-satellite-database.html.

[27] “ Satellites to be Built & Launched by 2018, World Market Survey”, Euroconsult, http://www.euroconsult-ec.com/research-reports/space-industry-reports/satellites-to-be-built-launched-by-2018-38-29.html.

[28] “Study on the EU Space Programme 2014-2020”, Ecorys, Draft Final Report, 18 April 2010, contract n. SI2.541751.

[29] Example of downstream services are telecommunications or TV broadcasting.

[30] http://telecom.esa.int/telecom/www/object/index.cfm?fobjectid=456.

[31] This amount results from calculating the EU share of revenue divided by the number of "EU" satellites.

[32] There could be significant negative economic, environmental and social impact generated if debris from spacecraft fall on the surface of the Earth, notably if the spacecraft are powered by nuclear fuel, as is the case with a small number of them today.

[33] http://www.swpc.noaa.gov/info/SolarEffects.html.

[34] http://www.esa-spaceweather.net/spweather/esa_initiatives/spweatherstudies/ALC/WP1200MarketAnalysisfinalreport.pdf.

[35] Geomagnetic storms are temporary disturbance of the Earth’s magnetosphere caused by a disturbance in space weather, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Geomagnetic_storm.

[36] One example of space weather impact on satellites is the Canadian communication service provider Telesat’s experience in 1994. O n 20 January 1994, one of Telesat's satellites was disabled for about 7 hours as a result of space weather-induced damage to its control electronics. During this period, the Canadian press was unable to deliver news to 100 newspapers and 450 radio stations. In addition, telephone service to 40 communities was interrupted .

[37] A near-Earth object (NEO) is a Solar System object whose orbit brings it into close proximity with the Earth. They include a few thousand near-Earth asteroids (NEAs), near-Earth comets, a number of solar-orbiting spacecraft, and meteoroids large enough to be tracked in space before striking the Earth. According to some estimates, the Earth is indeed hit on average annually by an object with 5 kilotonnes equivalent energy. The atomic bomb dropped on Hiroshima (which caused between 65,000 to 200,000 deaths and more than 70,000 injured) had approximately 15 kilotonnes of TNT. See http://www.nature.com/nature/journal/v420/n6913/full/nature01238.html .

[38] It is estimated that a 300m-wide asteroid colliding with the Earth would wipe out a medium-size country.

[39] http://neo.jpl.nasa.gov/neo/groups.html.

[40] The Tunguska Event, or Tunguska explosion, was a powerful explosion which occurred close to the Podkamennaya Tunguska River in Russia. It is commonly believed that the cause of the explosion was the air bust of a large meteoroid or comet fragment.

[41] A synthesis of existing space tracking and surveillance assets in Europe prepared by ONERA in 2007 on behalf of ESA reveals that more than 65 % of existing sensors for the Low Earth Orbit (LEO) area are partially or fully operated by Ministries of Defence. Study on capability gaps concerning Space Situational Awareness, ONERA, 2007.

[42] http://www.parliament.uk/documents/documents/upload/postpn355.pdf : "Debris mitigation principles were first put into practice by the US, starting in the 1980s. Since then, a series of voluntary, non-binding international agreements and guidelines have been agreed. The Inter-Agency Space Debris Co-ordination Committee (IADC) was founded in 1993, comprising 11 national space agencies including NASA, ESA and the British National Space Centre (BNSC). In 2002, the IADC adopted a set of recommendations for debris mitigation covering the points in the main text, which has achieved wide international recognition. The UN Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space developed these recommendations into a set of guidelines which were adopted by the UN in 2008. Several European space agencies developed a European Code of Conduct consistent with the IADC recommendations. ISO (the International Organization for Standardization) is currently transforming the recommendations into a set of International Standards, the first of which should be published in April/May 2010. BNSC chairs the ISO group responsible for developing these standards, which aim to assist the space industry in complying technically with the IADC guidelines."

[43] See footnote n. 20.

[44] http://www.esa.int/esaMI/SSA/SEMYTICKP6G_0.html

[45] Detailed explanation in annex

[46] http://www.esa-spaceweather.net/spweather/esa_initiatives/spweatherstudies/ALC/wp1100_Benefits_v3.1.pdf Since a Hydro-Quebec incident may occur once every solar cycle (11 years), the annualised loss (mostly due to unsupplied energy) is about $450 M/year for the UK alone, according to the UK National Grid estimations. This figure should be multiplied by 1.5 for France, 1.5 for Germany, 0.5 for Spain and 0.3 for Portugal. Total amount for these member states would be $2160 M/year.

[47] http://www.esa.int/esaMI/ExoMars/SEMGB7MJ74G_0.html.

[48] ASD-Eurospace (2009) Space exploration position paper, 12 October 2009.

[49] Conclusions of the workshops “Space exploration and innovation, industrial competitiveness and technology advance” and “Science and education within space exploration”, http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/policies/space/esp/conferences_space_en.htm.

[50] The problem of brain-drain notably towards the US is well documented. This article gives interesting US perspective of the problem: http://www.time.com/time/europe/html/040119/brain/story_4.html ; The need to enhance the attractiveness of European higher education and research is behind a number of EC initiatives such as the European Institute of Technology ( COM(2006) 77 final of 22 February 2006). On brain-drain of European researchers towards the US: ftp://repec.iza.org/RePEc/Discussionpaper/dp1310.pdf . US space programmes have attracted scientists from other countries, including those which cancelled their own programmes: http://www.thespacereview.com/article/1543/1.

[51] A review on students’ attitudes towards science can be found here: http://eprints.ioe.ac.uk/652/1/Osborneeta2003attitudes1049.pdf .

[52] The big European space powers (FR, DE, IT) contribute about half of their national space budgets to ESA, most other countries consider ESA as their space agency and contribute most or all the national space budget to ESA. The overall ESA budget is over €3,5 billion; MS cumulative individual space budget is also roughly €3 billion. NASA annual budget is in the range of $18 billion.

[53] See workshops’ conclusions in annexes.

[54] Report on future launchers (Ariane-6) issued by the French Prime Minister, available at http://www.gouvernement.fr/premier-ministre/un-nouveau-lanceur-spatial-europeen-a-l-horizon-20202025.

[55] http://www.esa.int/esaMI/ATV/index.html.

[56] Data from the European Space Agency provided during a presentation to the Commission on 25 May 2010.

[57] First EU-ESA High Level Political Conference on Human Space Exploration, 22-23 October 2009, Prague, Czech Republic.

[58] The ISS partnership is based on a non-exchange of funds, therefore any contribution to the ISS is in kind providing exchange possibilities for flight opportunities, hardware and services.

[59] ESA Council document ESAC (2010)48 Exploration scenarios.

[60] Data from the European Space Agency provided during a presentation to the Commission on 25 May 2010.

[61] ESA Council document ESAC (2010)48 Exploration scenarios.

[62] Ariane 5 was initially developed as a launcher for European manned spacecraft (Hermes). Although the project was cancelled, Ariane 5 was transformed into a heavy lift launcher which has given Europe the competitive lead in this sector.

[63] See annex on space exploration spin-offs.

[64] Solar-terrestrial physics (STP) is the study of the physical processes through which the Sun affects the Earth and the general space environment in the solar system. The relevant solar emissions include electromagnetic radiation (especially at UV, EUV and X-ray wavelengths).

[65] Solar-Terrestrial Physics in the UK. An input to the Physics Review by the UK Magnetosphere, Ionosphere and Solar-terrestrial community Mike Hapgood (2008) http://www.mist.ac.uk/stp_wakeham.pdf .

[66] WMO, The Potential Role of WMO in Space Weather, April 2008.

[67] “Study on the EU Space Programme 2014-2020”, Ecorys, Draft Final Report, 18 April 2010, contract n. SI2.541751.

[68] Ibidem.

[69] Norwegian Space Centre (2005) Annual Report, as seen at The Space Economy at a glance (OECD, 2007), http://browse.oecdbookshop.org/oecd/pdfs/browseit/0307021E.PDF.

[70] http://en.fi.dk/publications/publications-2008/evaluation-of-danish-industrial-activities-in-the-european-space-agency-esa-2013-assessment-of-the-economic-impacts-of-the-danish-esa-membership/Evaluation%20of%20Danish%20Industrial%20Activities%20in%20ESA-pdf.pdf .

[71] “ Economic Analysis to support a Study on the Options for UK Involvement in Space Exploration”, London Economics, 19 March 2009, http://www.ukspaceagency.bis.gov.uk/assets/pdf/FRER.pdf .

[72] “Space exploration and innovation, industrial competitiveness and technology advance”, Workshop, 29-30 April 2010, Harwell (UK) http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/policies/space/esp/conferences_space_en.htm.

[73] Measuring the returns to NASA life sciences research and development, H. Hertzfeld, Space Policy Institute, George Washington University, 1998.

[74] The Contribution of Space exploration to Innovation”, Tech nopolis, Draft Final Report, 11 June 2010, contract n. ENTR/2008/006.

[75] Ibidem.

[76] http://www.hkc22.com/watermarketsworldwide.html.

[77] “Water: a market of the future”, SAM study, 2007, http://www.sam-group.com/downloads/studies/waterstudy_e.pdf.

[78] http://ecls.esa.int/ecls/ .

[79] Jerome Schnee, The Economic Impact of the US Space Programme, Rutgers University, http://er.jsc.nasa.gov/seh/economics.html.

[80] "Science and education within space exploration", Workshop, 29-30 March 2010, Strasbourg (FR), http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/policies/space/esp/conferences_space_en.htm.

[81] “Bringing space into school science”, Barstow, M., Report commissioned by BNSC, 2005, http://www.stfc.ac.uk/Resources/PDF/barstow.pdf.

[82] Jerome Schnee, The Economic Impact of the US Space Programme, Rutgers University, http://er.jsc.nasa.gov/seh/economics.html.

[83] ASD-Eurospace, European space industry facts & figures, 2009.

[84] http://www.astronautix.com/gallery/chermes.htm.

[85] “ Economic Analysis to support a Study on the Options for UK Involvement in Space Exploration”, London Economics, 19 March 2009, http://www.ukspaceagency.bis.gov.uk/assets/pdf/FRER.pdf.

[86] “Space exploration and innovation, industrial competitiveness and technology advance”, Workshop, 29-30 April 2010, Harwell (UK), http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/policies/space/esp/conferences_space_en.htm.

[87] Data provided by the European Space Agency.

[88] “Study on the EU Space Programme 2014-2020”, Ecorys, Draft Final Report, 18 April 2010, contract n. SI2.541751.

[89] Jerome Schnee, The Economic Impact of the US Space Programme, Rutgers University, http://er.jsc.nasa.gov/seh/economics.html.

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ANNEX 3 COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT IMPACT ASSESSMENT Accompanying document to the COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE COUNCIL, THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE AND THE COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS TOWARDS A SPACE STRATEGY FOR THE EUROPEAN UNION THAT BENEFITS ITS CITIZENS SEC(2011) 381 final COM(2011) 152 final

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ANNEX 4 COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT IMPACT ASSESSMENT Accompanying document to the COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE COUNCIL, THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE AND THE COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS TOWARDS A SPACE STRATEGY FOR THE EUROPEAN UNION THAT BENEFITS ITS CITIZENS SEC(2011) 381 final COM(2011) 152 final

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ANNEX 1 COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT IMPACT ASSESSMENT Accompanying document to the COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE COUNCIL, THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE AND THE COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS TOWARDS A SPACE STRATEGY FOR THE EUROPEAN UNION THAT BENEFITS ITS CITIZENS SEC(2011) 381 final COM(2011) 152 final

ANNEX 1

1. List of stakeholders consultations

1. Bilateral meetings held in 2009 by DG ENTR with MS actively involved in the space sector: Germany, France, UK, Spain, Italy; industry association.

2. Interviews of relevant stakeholders, conducted by Ecorys in the context of the “Study on the EU Space Programme 2014-2020” (December 2009-January 2010)

3. Eurobarometer survey on the space activities of the European Union conducted by Gallup in July 2009

4. EU-ESA workshops in spring 2010

Workshop on Science and education within Space exploration, 29-30 March 2010, International Space University, Strasbourg, France

Workshops on Space exploration and innovation, industrial competitiveness and technological advance, 29-30 April 2010, Harwell, United Kingdom

Workshop on Space exploration scenarios, 20-21 May, Cira, Capua, Italy

5. Events under Spanish Presidency

Workshop on Space and Security, 10-11 March 2010, Madrid, Spain;

Conference on governance of European Space programmes, 3-4 May 2010 Segovia, Spain.

6. Contributions and speeches of the conference “Space policy: a powerful ambition for the EU”, Brussels, 15-16 October 2009

7. Contribution and conclusions to the conference “1 st EU-ESA International conference on Human Space exploration”, Prague, 23 October 2009 (add conclusions)

8. Space Advisory Group contribution on an EU vision for space exploration.

9. ESA contribution to the definition of future EU space activities.

2. EC-ESA Workshop: Science and Education withn Space Exploration, Strasbourg, 29-30 March, 2010

2.1. General Recommendations

Europe being ready and willing to show strong ambitions in space exploration, it must now prepare a coherent long-term programme consisting of a mix of robotic and human-related activities and strive for optimal coordination between all relevant players, in particular the European Union, the European Space Agency, their Member States and international partners. To this end, a greater synergy between scientific, technological and industrial activities is needed, as well as more efficient coordination of national, ESA and other initiatives. The EU is in an ideal situation to take up such a coordination effort in close collaboration with ESA and Member States. Whether it is science enabling exploration, or science enabled by exploration both aspects need to be adequately supported and accompanied by a significant education and outreach programme.

2.2. Main findings and recommendations (from the questions in the background document)

Overall, how can space exploration best contribute to the EU and Member State research and education policies and in particular to make the European trans-disciplinary research more competitive?

An ambitious and resilient long-term European space exploration programme is needed, with clear and visible milestones. It should in particular support trans-disciplinary initiatives, including the linkage of science with technology to support European research priorities and overall competitiveness. A coordinated EU-ESA exploration programme is also needed to make space exploration an integral part of schools curricula that will motivate the young generation to study and engage in S&T careers and therefore contribute to the development of the knowledge society.

How can space exploration engage the interest of the citizens, stimulate scientific careers and be linked to societal benefits?

Europe must have a coherent space exploration programme relying on balanced robotic and human activities. Space exploration can contribute to build a European identity , as well as to inspire European youth to engage in scientific and technical studies. Benefits for citizens should be highlighted in every mission to attract the interest of both the decision-makers and the general public alike.

What could be the European view and role in the international exploration context?

Europe should strive for a role in future space exploration ventures on par with its aspirations. European activities while fulfilling short-term European goals should be embedded in a wider international context. On scientific activities linked to space exploration, Europe must push for a leadership role in instrumentation for remote and surface/sub-surface studies of planetary bodies of interest to exploration, as well as for research fostering human presence in space (e.g. habitats, life support). Europe has been the largest scientific user of the ISS up to now and should continue to show excellence in science preparing for human exploration. It has strong expertise in space flight analogues or simulations and this advantage should also be further nurtured.

What would be a specific added value of the EU in this context?

The EU should take up a leading role in close relation with ESA and Member States for European space exploration initiatives. The EU should also have a substantial role in education policy and outreach activities.

2.3. Specific issues

Exploration and Science

European Martian robotic exploration should focus on life detection, drilling capabilities, network science, and sample returns. In this context safety and planetary protection issues need to be advanced and support needs to be gathered for a European sample curation facility. European missions to Mars should look for example at bio-signatures, water reservoirs and atmospheric science.

The Moon is an important target to investigate the early Solar system history and can provide a platform for space exploration. Lunar surface activities would also provide opportunities to develop new instrumentations. Other destinations such as Near Earth Objects (NEOs) and Lagrangian points provide major scientific potential as well. In particular, NEOs are repositories of solar nebula material and could therefore be an integral part of a scientific exploration programme.

ISS is acting as a Low Earth Orbit (LEO) platform for fundamental and applied research, focused on life and physical sciences, but can also contribute to other domains such as Earth observation-based science. It is a unique tool to continue to foster international cooperation for scientific research.

Space exploration provides also a unique opportunity for synergies among scientific fields such as geology, biology, planetary science and others which need to be better exploited. Furthermore, benefits for Earth and terrestrial research stemming from exploration activities exist and should be stressed, such as a better understanding and modelling of the evolution of the Earth (e.g. climate change) that require comparative planetology as a tool. In general, a European leadership role in instrumentation concerning remote and surface/sub-surface studies of planetary bodies of interest to exploration should be sought.

Space exploration can benefit from research on terrestrial environments (e.g. instrumentations and techniques). Therefore making the best use of synergies with analogue environments on Earth (e.g. for understanding the origin of life) in order to prepare the grounds for significant exploration programmes should be reinforced. Complementary elements between planetary remote sensing and in situ research should be enhanced. Ground-based research is key to prepare for human exploration. Europe has strong expertise in simulations and analogues (e.g. bed rest studies, use of Concordia Antarctic station, physical countermeasures) and this advantage should be further nurtured.

Europe has been the largest scientific user of the ISS up to now and should continue to show excellence in science preparing for human exploration. In addition, benefits for citizens on Earth (e.g. in the sectors of health, ageing, waste recycling, life support) should be emphasised in order to attract the interest of both the decision-makers and the general public. To meet this objective, top-down calls should be issued both for ground-based and ISS research to address the most realistic short-term challenges for human exploration. Moreover, interdisciplinary teams that address new and innovative science should be promoted to fully exploit the potential of the ISS and foster user-driven research. The long-term utilisation of ISS should be optimized in cooperation with partners to sustain cutting-edge research activities and to benefit from the experience gathered by continuous human presence in LEO.

Exploration and Education

All space programmes, especially space exploration, are inspiring, but inspiration is no longer enough to justify and support those activities. Space exploration programmes must increasingly compete for the attention of the public and politicians. More public outreach must thus be done in Europe and adequate activities to promote exploration should be defined upfront. Communication must be an integral part of space exploration programmes and particularly of any related mission. Public support for space exploration needs, however, more than just increased awareness. Better and more efficient communication is as important as the science and technology (S&T) itself to sustain any long-term endeavour. The overall society has to be involved as an integral part of space exploration. There is also a necessity to engage the future generations in exploration activities (e.g. with participatory exploration) as they will enable and fund most of it.

Space exploration can help to improve Science, Technology, Engineering and Mathematics (STEM) literacy and motivate students to engage in S&T careers. It is an enabler that can be linked to many subjects and integrated with many other disciplines. School material derived from ISS utilisation and other space missions can be very useful to address diverse topics such as physics, mathematics, life sciences, international relations, humanities and social sciences. Beside governments, industry should play as well a role in education and outreach.

2.4. Conclusions

The primary goal of space exploration is to expand – for ultimate benefit of citizens – the range of human activities which requires a synergistic combination of robotic and of human exploration activities. Space exploration is driven by a combination of aspects such as science (increasing knowledge), economy (finding new opportunities), political (prestige and promoting global cooperation), education (improve the workforce and S&T literacy of society) and public engagement (raising societal support and inspiring new generations). In this context science will undoubtedly benefit as a passenger of space exploration.

There should be a common willingness for Europe and other partners to cooperate and strive toward common goals even if there might be technological and experience gaps in several areas. Moreover, stronger synergies between fundamental and applied research are needed to foster technological developments. Europe has several strengths to build on, but Europe could do more and the future European role in exploration has to be clearly identified. There is a necessity to identify the niches for European leadership.

Space exploration addresses multidisciplinary scientific questions and challenges, and to solve those, a trans-disciplinary approach must be fostered. Indeed, synergies between science and technology can allow challenges to become opportunities. Future European programmes, coordinated between ESA and the EU, should therefore encourage trans-disciplinary initiatives, including between science and technology. Future ambitious exploration missions will also require technology breakthroughs such as nuclear propulsion that will provide benefits for science.

There is a necessity to engage the general public to support space exploration, especially the younger generations. Space exploration can be a support to STEM education. The best practices throughout Europe should be shared. However, to make space exploration an integral part of schools curricula, an ambitious European space exploration programme is needed.

Space exploration can sustain the European identity. However, future major exploration ventures will be done in international cooperation as exploration is now a global project. In this global endeavour, Europe must play a key role. Indeed, Europe has the strengths and competences to become a major player in space exploration. Moreover, its experience in cooperative activities due to its very nature can be an asset for future ventures. European priorities must however be consistent and compatible with those of potential partners.

3. EC-ESA Workshop, Exploration and Innovation, Industrial Competitiveness and Technological Advance, Harwell, UK, 29-30 April 2010

3.1. General Recommendations

Europe needs a long-term vision on space exploration with clear objectives and intermediate milestones including short-term demonstration missions. Space exploration has a great potential as a technology and innovation catalyst because of its inherent complexity and the diversity of the challenges it faces. Therefore, the European Union, in close cooperation with ESA, should promote space exploration to meet the challenges of society's needs'.

Space exploration is undoubtedly a driver for innovation in the space sector but also outside, providing many tangible Earthly benefits.

Long-term goals and short-term technology missions will support the European space industry but also attract new players with value-added competences (e.g. regions, SMEs, entrepreneurs).

Europe should consider new procurement mechanisms to address specific exploration challenges and involve new players, including non-space actors.

Europe should establish new platforms and forums for ‘spin-in, spin-out and common R&D’ to reach out to non-space industry and remove existing barriers to innovation.

New financing tools need to be introduced to stimulate innovation to find answers to specific exploration goals (e.g, cash prizes to attract SMEs and commercial initiatives).

3.2. Specific issues (from the questions in the background document)

3.2.1. How can space exploration contribute to industrial competitiveness and innovation?

How can space exploration unleash the innovative potential of Europe?

This will not happen unless Europe establishes a clear long-term vision with a clear roadmap and identified targets and milestones including short-term technology demonstration missions and short-term preparatory missions. New actors including regions, SMEs, entrepreneurs, non-space actors should also be involved in exploration initiatives.

How can space exploration promote innovation for societal needs?

Earthly challenges should be used as drivers (e.g. improving citizens’ life) and dedicated platforms should be funded by the European Commission, to integrate space R&D activities into larger multidisciplinary activities.

Are there new ways of financing space exploration programmes?

To enable a resilient European space exploration programme robust and continuous financial commitments will be needed. The European Commission could promote linkages among various areas of its R&D framework programmes, for example with thematic areas such as health, information and communication technology, aeronautics, environment, or materials sciences. Different procurement schemes could be investigated (e.g. cash prizes for specific goals) to foster innovation. As well as triggering innovation, common R&D could facilitate the identification of additional financing.

How to strengthen European technology and industrial base?

To optimise R&D developments Europe should better exploit synergies with other domains (space and non-space). Furthermore, administrative simplification and a faster allocation of resources are needed to attract new firms.

How to reconcile cooperation and competition or technological advance and international cooperation?

Space exploration can undoubtedly be a boost for industrial competitiveness, but Europe should avoid unnecessary duplication of activities and a fragmentation of its research programmes. The space sector has to open itself more to other ideas and other actors; space exploration could represent a perfect opportunity to do so.

3.2.2. Space exploration at 'system' level – innovation prospects for robotic and human spaceflight

How to support and engage the European space industry in exploration activities?

Europe should have a clear and long-term commitment for exploration, which in turn would allow European space industry to maintain its capacities and competitiveness. It should also concentrate its investment in specific and selected niches of excellence to enable Europe to make critical contributions to targeted challenges. Europe should support enabling technologies and capabilities by using small missions “to derisk” technologies (reduce the risk through demonstration and validation).

What areas of technical excellence need to be nurtured or acquired?

Two main domains emerged as being important for Europe, as well as being strong domains for European industry and instrumental for the success of exploration: sustainable life technologies (including power generation), and advanced propulsion for interplanetary travel. They should be considered as priority domains along with robotic systems.

How to build on European expertise and competences and engage in new areas?

Strong support to ESA technology programmes should be maintained, but the European Commission should also increase its support as advances in technology for exploration will lead to advances in other domains, crucial for innovation in Europe.

How to identify technological priorities for Europe?

Strengths of European industries should be analysed and matched with the political wish to master some key technologies, in line with the Europe 2020 strategy.

How to support technology breakthrough and high risk research?

Many innovations are serendipitous or build on incremental technologies but Europe should encourage and support technology breakthrough and high-risk research by establishing clear, specific exploration goals for industry to work towards.

3.2.3. Space exploration technology challenges at 'sub-system' level – trans-disciplinary synergies for robotic and human spaceflight

Which domains of space exploration are most promising for synergies between space and non-space actors?

Areas of most promising synergies between space and non-space sectors are life-support (e.g. health and wellbeing, food and water security, recycling, waste recycling); power management (energy production and storage); robotics and automation (to replace or assist humans in dangerous environments).

Are new mechanisms needed to (better) engage the space community?

Knowledge exchange between the space and non-space sectors should be nurtured by creating dedicated forums and encouraging co-locations between space and non-space actors (e.g. innovations centres acting as hubs). In this context, the European Union should provide means to define common needs, and to set up adequate discussion networks: enabling in particular earlier involvement of actors (e.g. SMEs, entrepreneurs) at problem definition stage, promoting adaptability/flexibility and bridging organisations. A more aggressive and targeted communication activity to raise awareness about exploration ideas, realisations and challenges is also needed.

What are the incentives to connect space exploration-related research to other sectors?

Space exploration-related research could benefit from the expertise and capabilities residing in other sectors and the stringent exploration boundary conditions will be a clear driver for innovation (e.g. severe environmental conditions that imply complex and innovative answers to respect mass, volume and power limitation, answers which could later be adapted to Earthly issues). However, the space market is very small and not

What are the barriers to cross-sector technology developments?

There is often within non-space sectors a lack of awareness of the potential cooperation opportunities offered by the space market. Moreover, substantial differences in time-scales, attitude towards risks, levels of financing, expectations of return on investment, and working cultures exist between the space and non-space sectors.

Is space exploration an engine for disruptive/breakthrough technologies?

Space exploration challenges can be an engine for innovation stimulating disruptive/breakthrough technologies but in any case, Europe needs to continuously invest in technology to enable future benefits for the European industrial base.

3.3. Conclusions

Space has always been an innovative sector and space exploration in particular has a great potential to act as a catalyst for societal and economic progress because of its inherent complexity and the diversity of the challenges that it shares with many non-space areas such as the health sector, energy (e.g. nuclear energy), waste disposal, food security and water recycling. Space exploration and innovation are thus interlinked and exploration will drive further breakthroughs in traditional space domains as well as in new areas and will bring back innovation and foster economic growth.

Europe has all the capabilities and skills to engage fully into space exploration, the building bricks for this exist, but the need is to ‘operationalise’ the technology assets and existing capabilities to, among others, maintain the necessary know how in Europe. For this, Europe must set clear and specific goals (e.g. sustained 'human survival' in space; a robotic asteroid mission) towards which the space and non-space industry can direct their innovative talents. Combined research into solving linked exploration and terrestrial challenges could also be beneficial (e.g. climate change and low-carbon energy, remote health care for aging population, secure access to energy and to safe drinking water).

Continuous public support is needed to enable the private sector to develop cost-effective and efficient products and solutions. European regions could also play an increasing role in space exploration. However to better engage the industrial sector, including SMEs and entrepreneurs, new procurement mechanisms and financing tools such as cash-prizes could be investigated. Common ground with the non-space sector should be sought as well as pooling skills and funding. Existing identified barriers should be overcome.

4. EC-ESA Workshop, Space Exploration Scenarios, Capua, IT, 21 May 2010

4.1. Draft conclusions and recommendations

Europe has a longstanding history of successful exploration of space, conducted through projects managed by the European Space Agency and its Member States. Today, with the Lisbon Treaty , space became an EU policy in its own right. Indeed, article 189 provides that the EU shall “ coordinate the efforts needed for the exploration and exploitation of space ”.

The first space exploration conference in Prague end 2009 launched a consultation process that was followed by three thematic workshops co-organised by the European Commission and ESA; the next steps in 2010 will be a Commission Communication on space including a chapter on exploration, the second conference in Brussels on 21 October 2010 as well as the 7 th Space Council in November.

The added value of the EU involvement in space exploration is that it can connect space exploration with many other policy areas over which it has responsibility. The EU contribution to space exploration can therefore make a difference compared to past and current practices. The EU contribution must be visible and financial resources must be used for clear projects where the EU added value is most effective.

As emphasised in the first EC-ESA workshop, science will best benefit from space exploration by a trans-disciplinary approach but it has been underlined that space exploration is more than science or technology. It contributes significantly to innovation and the knowledge base and above all it has a political dimension. Space exploration will thus in turn inspire European youth in scientific and technical education and careers.

The second EC-ESA workshop concluded that space exploration generates innovation . It was acknowledged that exploration should be promoted as a challenge for societal needs to attract new players with value-added competences (e.g. non-space actors, especially SMEs) while supporting the space industry to nurture its overall competitiveness. For an optimum science and innovation return Europe must however have a coherent long-term space exploration programme of robotic and human activities with clearly identified intermediate milestones including short-term technology demonstration missions.

As shown in the third workshop, a large consensus emerged in support of the European exploration scenarios elaborated by ESA which should rest on three pillars: a solid technological programme; a use of ISS assuming its extension and including the development of a common space transportation policy; a robust complementary robotic exploration programme.

It is recognised by the participants that space exploration is a matter of global cooperation and must be carried out within a broad international partnership. The EU in close collaboration with ESA needs to promote this global approach and raise it to the political level . [ The participants of the workshop identified the need for a more political level forum to discuss space exploration as a global endeavour ].

5. Conference on Space and Security, Madrid 10 11 March

The Workshop emphasised the relevance of space to security users as a tool with the potential to address specific needs, in particular that of timely response. Being one tool of many, space can provide the most added value when seamlessly integrated with others. To achieve this, effective integration of space technologies such as Earth observation (and especially GMES), satellite communication and navigation (Galileo with its PRS) will be required. In parallel, the way the space systems interact and network with ground based and airborne platforms needs to be further looked into.

Services of the EU Council and the European Commission, the European Defence Agency (EDA) and the European Space Agency (ESA) have been working together on the identification of security related user requirements under the umbrella of the Structured Dialogue on Space and Security. The new Crisis Management and Planning Directorate of the Council offers the potential for genuine synergies between civilian and military effort, and will continue to contribute to the ongoing developments in space and security. The expertise of the EUSC in analyzing EO data and disseminating geospatial products for security applications should be taken in due account in the implementation of GMES security services.

Concerning the security dimension of GMES, workshop participants recognised the progress made to date. Recommendations have been made on how GMES should support EU border surveillance (in particular EUROSUR), while work on the identification of user requirements for GMES to support EU External Action has begun. GMES security services to be developed on the basis of these requirements will complement the support provided by GMES to Emergency Response.

The complexity of integrating both civil and military requirements has been illustrated by the cooperation on Space Situational Awareness (SSA), which is the first European space initiative to consider dual use dimensions from the outset. ESA, in the framework of its SSA preparatory programme, has been mandated to gather civilian SSA user requirements and design the technical architecture of what could become a European capacity. The European Defence Agency is currently drafting military requirements for SSA. The EU Council and European Commission, together with potential SSA contributors, will have to define the governance model and the related data policy for an operational European SSA system. The EUSC data model could be considered in this context.

Discussions on effective synergies and the governance of GMES and SSA highlighted the importance of national assets as essential components of any European Space system responding to security objectives. These national assets could be complemented by European capabilities when needed, while avoiding unnecessary duplication. As an example, Spain presented its National Earth Observation Satellite Programme consisting of an optical and a radar satellite (PAZ) that will be operated together and have been designed to serve the needs of security and non-security users both at national and international level in the context of GMES and other cooperation programmes.

The European Space Policy highlights the need for the European Union, ESA and their Member States to increase synergies between their security and defence space activities and programmes. The Structured Dialogue has started this process. The Workshop highlighted the need to increase and expand this coordination. It also suggested the setting up of an appropriate coordination platform with Member States owning relevant assets.

These issues should be further explored during a dedicated follow-up seminar planned for summer 2010 with a view to provide input for a discussion at ministerial level in an appropriate setting.

6. Conference on Governance of European Space Programmes, Segovia, Spain, 3-4 May 2010

Europe needs space. It needs strategic space capabilities and efficient space-based services to ensure the wellbeing of our citizens and as a tool to support public policies. It needs to exploit these capabilities and services to their maximum potential.

Europe needs a range of activities and organisations to meet its wide range of objectives for space. How these interact in the short- and longer-term will be the key determinant of Europe’s continuing success in space.

The Conference has recognised that the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty presents an opportunity to further develop the institutional framework for Space activities in Europe. T he Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union ( TFEU) provides a legal basis and an explicit competence in Space for the EU. This competence, which is shared with the Member States, calls upon the EU “to coordinate the effort needed for the exploitation and exploration of space” and to “establish any appropriate relations with the European Space Agency”. It then consolidates the triangle of European space actors i.e. the EU, ESA and their respective Member States.

Governance arrangements are a tool to deliver objectives. Clarity of vision and objectives must come first.

The current institutional set-up for the European Space Policy – the EC/ESA Framework Agreement which entered into force in 2004 – has provided a solid foundation for coordinating and aligning the space activities of the EU and ESA. This arrangement works well but may have to evolve at the end of the current analysis, in view of Art. 189 TFEU and in order to expand the opportunities for Space in Europe.

The Conference recognised that the existing institutional asymmetries between the two organisations (supranational v. intergovernmental) pose a number of challenges which will have to be addressed. Along with the growing EU role in space, Member States also value intergovernmental ways of working within ESA as a research and development agency. Efficient collaboration will require adaptation, including possibly through continued institutional convergence between the EU and ESA. ESA, its Member States and the EU have to explore the different scenarios for the evolution of this collaboration.

Industrial policy and technology policy are inextricably linked. The Conference recognised the importance of a coherent framework for Space Industrial policy in Europe. The peculiarities of the space sector call for a combination of measures at EU, ESA and Member States level in order to create the right environment that will nurture a competitive industry and ensure a fair and balanced participation of all industrial actors, including in particular SMEs. These measures must and will continue to evolve.

The Conference identified procurement as the major but not the only instrument driving industrial policy. Other instruments should continue to be promoted. At the EU level, examples include instruments such as FP7, CIP and structural funds, as well as EIB loans and EIF guarantees. While taking full advantage of the existing EU, ESA and Member States industrial policy instruments, other instruments could be designed as incentives for the European space industry to maintain and improve its competitiveness and develop technologies, applications and services which are innovative, sustainable, reliable, cost-effective and efficiently respond to growing societal needs in Europe.

The Conference widely recognized the technical expertise of ESA in designing and procuring European Space Programmes. Despite difficulties, the first EU flagship projects in Space, GMES and Galileo, are moving closer to fruition. Future industrial policy should allow for the development of mechanisms to enable EU-ESA cooperation in Space. Past experiences, in these programmes and also in ESA-EUMETSAT programmes, provide valuable lessons in the governance of future endeavours.

In future programmes, governance arrangements will have to be put in place, from the beginning, that should guarantee the efficiency of public investments in Space, the long-term sustainability of the programmes and their optimum utilisation as well as ensuring motivation of Member States to continue their volunteer investments in space. Continuity between the research and development and exploitation phases will have to be ensured. While it will be impossible to find ‘one-size-fit-all’ solution for all the programmes that could be conceived in the future, a degree of coherence will be necessary.

The EU identity in security and defence matters has been reinforced. Security and defence policy is in an evolutionary period. The EU has a competence in foreign and security policy, including the progressive framing of a common defence policy, in conformity with the TEU. Space actions may serve foreign and security (including defence) policy goals.

Governance of space activities related to security and defence needs will have to reflect that evolution.

7. European space budgets

Europe, through the activities of the European Space Agency (ESA) and its Member States ESA currently has 18 Member States: Austria, France, Germany, Italy, Spain, UK, Belgium, Netherlands, Luxembourg, Sweden, Finland, Denmark, Greece, Portugal, Ireland, Czech Republic, Switzerland and Norway. , most of which are also EU Member States, has built significant achievements in the space domain over the past 30 years. European scientists have contributed to the exploration of several planets in the Solar system: Venus (Venus Express), Mars (Mars Express) and the Moon (e.g. SMART-1, European instruments on Chandrayaan-1). The successful Huygens mission to Titan has marked the farthest landing in the solar system so far. Building on the experience gained with Spacelab in the 1980's, Europe has recently contributed to the success of the International Space Station (ISS) through the Columbus laboratory, the Automated Transfer Vehicle (ATV) – the largest ever automatic cargo space vehicle, and other essential ISS supplies, such as the Multi-Purpose Logistics Module (MPLM) flying in the Shuttle payload bay to bring supplies to ISS. Nearly 50% of all pressurised elements on board the ISS have been manufactured in Europe by European companies. Furthermore, Europe has gained leadership role in several segments of astronomy and astrophysics covering a broad spectrum of measurements of the universe with XMM-Newton, Integral, Corot, Hubble and the James Webb Space telescopes (the last two in cooperation with NASA). More recently, the launch of Herschel and Planck have marked a new step in this quest for the understanding of the origin and evolution of the Universe.[1]

ESA currently has 18 Member States: Austria, France, Germany, Italy, Spain, UK, Belgium, Netherlands, Luxembourg, Sweden, Finland, Denmark, Greece, Portugal, Ireland, Czech Republic, Switzerland and Norway.

In parallel Europe has created its own infrastructure for access to space through the European Spaceport in French Guiana and the Ariane family launchers which have been the commercial workhorses for the past three decades. The Ariane 5 launcher is able to lift 20 tons into Low Earth Orbit in the form of groundbreaking science missions and the ATV, as well as putting the most powerful telecommunications satellites into geostationary orbit.

The programmes of ESA and national space agencies have given rise to a strong space industry, which has managed to transform Europe’s space ambitions into concrete successes. This industry has developed a broad spectrum of space technologies and capabilities, and is today a recognised leader in the global commercial space markets for launchers and telecommunications satellites.

But the industry is relatively small in size Around 30,000 employees and consolidated turnover of €5.9bn in 2008. and dependent on public sources of funding for nearly 60% of its turnover (against 80% in the US).[2]

Around 30,000 employees and consolidated turnover of €5.9bn in 2008.

In Europe the budgets spent on space activities are divided between ESA, which accounts for nearly 2/3 of the current spending (i.e. €3.7 billion in 2010 of which €750 million are contributions from the EU) and individual Member States which together spent a total of €2.1bn in national programmes in 2009. The total European space expenditures were estimated at €6.7 billion in 2009, of which only around €1 billion in defence-related space budgets.

The US invests considerably more than Europe in space. The budget of NASA in 2009 was $17.8 billion, roughly 5 times that of ESA. The gap becomes even wider when taking into account military spending (1:20). The US has today by far the biggest space budget in the world: $48.8 billion in 2009, or 72% of the world’s total government space outlays. The new US national space policy foresees a further increase in the NASA budget of $6 billion over the next five years, specifically for space exploration enabling technologies.

Other countries, including more recently emerged space nations strongly support their domestic space industries. China and India are quickly closing their technology gap and aggressively asserting their presence on the commercial space markets. Both have increased their civilian space budgets in recent years (India spent $900 million in space programmes in 2009 and China $2bn). Russia is recovering its levels of expenditure and increasing its national space outlays by 40% on average in the past five years (total of $2.8 billion in 2009). Overall, the global trend of government spending on space programmes (both civilian and defence) is rising. It amounted to $68 billion in 2009, which represented a 12% increase over the previous year, according to Euroconsult Profiles of Government Space Programs: Analysis of 60 Countries and Agencies, Euroconsult, 2010 .[3]

Profiles of Government Space Programs: Analysis of 60 Countries and Agencies, Euroconsult, 2010

In Europe the biggest investor in space is France, followed by Germany, Italy, the UK and Spain. Countries like Belgium and the Netherlands have significant space budgets per capita as well. The following chart presents the Member States contributions to the ESA budget for 2010.

(...PICT...)

Source: European Space Agency

Outside ESA, only a few Member States have any significant national space programmes: France, Germany, Italy, Spain and the UK. These represent a mixture of national or bilateral satellite missions and programmes designed to exploit ESA missions, for example through the provision of scientific instruments. France, Italy and Spain spend more on national programmes than they contribute to ESA. Germany’s contribution to ESA exceeds its spending on national programmes. Smaller countries put most, if not all of their national space funding into ESA.

National space expenditures (in M€)|

Year|A|B|DK|FIN|F|D|I|NL|N|P|E|SE|CH|UK|Total|

2002|29.0|20|4.0|20.0|1083.0|100.0|481.0|35.0|3.8|0.5|9.0|16.1|2.1|98.7|1902.2|

2003|30.0|20|3.0|26.0|1040.0|270.0|400.0|30.0|5.5|0.5|10.1|16.0|2.0|63.8|1916.9|

2004|23.2|20|3.3|27.4|690.1|340.0|436.0|24.0|6.8|0.5|14.5|17.0|2.0|99.4|1704.2|

2005|18.8|20|5.0|26.4|681.5|415.0|421.1|23.7|6.2|0.5|226.0|16.0|2.0|99.0|1947.2|

2006|16.6|20|5.0|27.0|691.6|416.0|420.0|24.0|6.2|0.5|311.0|16.0|2.0|100.0|2054.9|

2007|17.0|25|5.0|27.0|713.2|458.0|430.0|25.0|8.0|0.5|300.0|16.0|2.0|79.9|2153.6|

2008|18.0|25|5.0|27.0|856.6|460.0|400.0|25.0|8.0|0.5|300.0|16.0|2.0|80.0|2221.1|

2009|18.0|25|5.0|27.0|703.5|460.0|430.0|25.0|8.0|0.5|300.0|16.0|2.0|80.0|2100.0|

Source: European Space Directory, 25 th Edition

Among the group of EU-12 only the Czech Republic is currently a member of ESA. Several others have cooperating states agreements with ESA (i.e. Hungary, Romania, Poland, Estonia, Slovenia). Some of these countries have had traditions in certain areas of space activity but currently lack the necessary industrial base and the means for any significant involvement. Besides, the barriers to entry in this industry are very high for newcomers. Still a few countries make their modest contributions through the ESA budget.

ESA Contributions (in M€)|

Year|A|B|DK|FIN|F|D|H|EI|I|NL|N|P|E|SE|CH|UK|CZ|L|GR|CND Cooperating countryCooperating country|Others|Total|

2001|29.5|113.1|24.3|10.5|614.6|534.9||6.6|287.4|58.9|20.7|2.7|92.2|48.3|61.3|141.3|0.3|||12.2|792.0|2847.3|

2002|27.7|140.3|27.7|14.1|680.0|680.1||7.8|444.0|70.0|26.4|6.4|117.2|59.6|57.9|127.8|0.3|2.4||17.5||2992.7|

2003|29.3|148.0|22.2|12.5|680.0|603.0|1.1|11.2|370.0|75.9|29.1|5.8|120.2|58.7|64.5|149.8|0.25|3.8|1.2|17.1||2677.1|

2004|32.5|181.1|28.0|20.6|680.0|653.0|1.1|12.3|280.0|70.0|26.0|11.1|131.2|57.1|86.3|229.9|1.36|3.8|7.2|16.5||2791.8|

2005|31.0|190.1|29.3|21.6|685.0|631.0|1.1|11.5|363.0|72.0|39.1|11.9|136.6|68.0|88.4|241.0|1.43|3.9|7.5|17.9||2926.0|

2006|33.6|149.5|24.9|16.5|685.0|555.0|1.1|11.5|344.0|64.1|28.5|12.2|128.0|51.0|89.0|202.9|1.43|5.1|10.0|22.3||3197.4|

2007|33.2|145.2|26.2|17.2|753.2|578.3|1.1|12.1|369.9|74.9|43.3|12.8|141.3|51.9|92.9|243.1|1.43|9.2|11.1|22.3||2975.3|

2008|32.8|138.4|23.9|16.4|556.4|533.4|2.0|13.3|343.0|98.0|43.9|16.6|152.8|54.6|87.1|264.9|1.43|11.1|11.4|22.3||3028.3|

2009|43.3|161.0|27.8|20.0|716.3|648.3|2.0|13.3|369.5|99.0|44.6|15.7|184.0|56.0|94.4|269.4|6.87|12.8|14.5|22.1|777.96|3591.7|

2010|50.6|160.0|30.7|18.8|618.4|625.8||15.1|370.0|95.2|60.2|18.8|195.2|53.0|91.0|254.7|10.2|10.9|16.2|20.8|968.1|3744.7|

Source: European Space Directory, 25 th Edition

8. Overview of existing SSA capabilities

8.1. European assets

Activities in the area of Space Situational Awareness (SSA) are being conducted both at European and national level. A number of Member States have developed SSA capabilities, many of which – in particularly tracking and satellite imaging facilities – are owned and operated by national defence agencies. In Europe, such facilities are available in France, Germany, Norway and the UK, the latter two being part of the US anti missile defence network. Some facilities are also operated by space agencies, e.g. optical telescopes for surveying the Geostationary orbit (GEO). An overview of existing space surveillance assets in Europe prepared by ONERA Office national d'études et recherches aérospatiales. in 2007 on behalf of ESA Study on capability gaps concerning Space Situational Awareness, ONERA, 2007. found that more than 65 % of existing sensors for the Low-Earth orbit (LEO) area are partially or fully operated by ministries of defence-related institutions.[5][6]

Office national d'études et recherches aérospatiales.

Study on capability gaps concerning Space Situational Awareness, ONERA, 2007.

Existing radar capabilities such as the GRAVES system or the Armor radar in France (see description below) are owned and operated by the Air Force. Operational since December 2005, the GRAVES radar produces surveillance and tracking data used for cataloguing space objects in the framework of a dominant military interest. More specific radars such as Armor (under the responsibility of the French Navy) have direct military uses and may contribute to the surveillance, tracking and characterisation of space objects. In Germany, the main radar equipment FGAN-TIRA is run by research teams from the High Frequency Physics and radar Techniques (FHR) Under the auspices of the Research Establishment for Applied Science – FGAN. , with a special partnership with the German Ministry of Defence, a dominant user of the radar capability for space imagery. The list attached at the end provides an overview of the main European space surveillance and tracking resources.[7]

Under the auspices of the Research Establishment for Applied Science – FGAN.

Since January 1, 2009 ESA has been implementing a preparatory SSA Programme as an optional programme with 13 participating Member States at present ( Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Switzerland, the UK) . The programme, which runs until 2011, should lay the groundwork of a future European SSA system. It focuses mainly on the definition and architectural design of the system, its governance and data policy. A small hardware component is also foreseen (i.e. a test-model of surveillance radar) and a prototype demonstrator of user-services (so-called Pre-cursor services).

8.2. The US Space Surveillance Network

The US Department of Defence established a space surveillance network as early as 1957. The system was built up progressively by networking different observation capabilities, some of which were initially developed for ballistic missile detection. Access to this database has subsequently been made available to any (registered) user. Today, the US Space Surveillance Network (SSN) represents the reference for all space surveillance information across the world. ESA, EU and ESA Member States authorities and space agencies acting as operators of space systems as well as European commercial operators today rely to a large extent on the US SSN.

However, the US system has some aging capabilities and faces new challenges with the increasing orbital population. The US recognises today the need to widen international cooperation and in the different fields covered by SSA, and looks at earmarking potential domains for increased trans-Atlantic cooperation on SSA, in support of common civil, commercial and military requirements. The new US national space policy adopted on 28.06.2010 makes specific reference to the need for international measures to promote safe and responsible operations in space through improved information collection and sharing for space object collision avoidance.

8.3. Other space surveillance activities

The Russian federation, via the Russian military space forces, operates space surveillance capabilities independent of its ballistic missile early warning (BMEW) assets. These systems have performed various military and civil roles, including the analysis of the surface impact point of the Mir Space Station and identification of space debris http://geimint.blogspot.com/2008/06/soviet-russian-space-surveillance.html . Russian companies are in a position to offer or sell space surveillance data to external entities.[8]

http://geimint.blogspot.com/2008/06/soviet-russian-space-surveillance.html

China, since joining the Inter-Agency Debris Committee (IADC) in 1995, also maintains its own catalogue of space objects. Space surveillance is an area of growth for China, which announced new investments in optical telescopes for debris monitoring in 2003. In 2005, the Chinese Academy of Sciences established a Space Object and Debris Monitoring and Research Center at Purple Mountain Observatory that employs researchers to develop a debris warning system for China’s space assets.

8.4. Space weather activities

The current working prototype of the European Space Weather data network, SWENET, supported by ESA can be considered as an embryo of the space-weather component of a future European SSA system. It is currently based on a distributed model, providing a centralised web-based access point to specialised space weather data and service products produced by several groups including SIDC (Solar Influences Data Centre of the Royal Observatory) in Belgium, SWACI (Space Weather Applications Centre - Inosphere, project of DLR) in Germany, CLS (Collecte Localisation Satellites) in France, BGS (Geomagentism Group, British Geological Survey) in the UK . A data exchange agreement has been established with the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) space weather data centre in the U.S.

8.5. International cooperation

For SSA international cooperation plays a very important role. Today international cooperation efforts in the area of space surveillance for debris monitoring and awareness are largely dominated by the existence of the US space surveillance network. This system makes non-sensitive information freely available over the internet (a subset of the US space surveillance catalogue of orbiting objects.) There is also bilateral cooperation between the US and some European states, between US agencies (NASA, NOAA) and ESA, as well as ad hoc cooperation with commercial and national satellite operators in case the US system detects a collision threat.

There is today a growing awareness of the desirability of enhanced cooperation between the US system and a future autonomous European SSA system. Both sides have expressed willingness to take the existing cooperation further during recent high-level meetings, including a recent EU-US space dialogue held in April 2010 in Washington, DC.

To facilitate such cooperation, the EU is already making funding available through the FP7 Space Theme: e.g. a number of projects have been selected in 2010 which include US partners (as well as partners from the Ukraine, South Africa and India). These projects address space weather as well as space surveillance and anti-collision issues.

At the level of space agencies, cooperation takes place in the context of the Inter-Agency Space Debris Co-ordination Committee established in 1993. IADC comprises 11 national space agencies including NASA, ESA and some of the European space agencies (CNES, BNSC, ASI, and DLR). Its primary purposes are to exchange information on space debris research activities between member space agencies, to facilitate opportunities for cooperation in space debris research, to review the progress of ongoing cooperative activities, and to identify debris mitigation options. In 2002, the IADC adopted a set of recommendations for debris mitigation, which has achieved wide international recognition ( Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines, IADC, 2002 ). The UN Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (UNCOPUOS) developed these recommendations into a set of guidelines, which were adopted by the UN in 2008. These guidelines for good conduct in space are voluntary and non-binding. At technical and commercial level, the recommendations are translated into international engineering standards, such as International Organisation for Standardisation (ISO) or European Cooperation for Space Standardisation (ESS).

In the space weather segment, international cooperation is more advanced and is currently implemented through the International Solar Energy Society (ISES), the World Meteorological Organisation (WMO) and other organisations that support the development and use of space weather service provision standards. Other major international cooperation venues include the International Space Environment Service (ISES) – a permanent service of the Federations of Astronautical and Geophysical Data Analysis Services; the International Solar Terrestrial Physics Science Initiative; the International Astronomical Union, which has a working group dedicated to international collaboration on space weather, and the Scientific and Technical sub-committee of the UN-COPUOS which also currently considers an International Space Weather Initiative.

8.6. Examples of existing European capabilities for space surveillance and tracking

8.6.1. Optical sensors Optical telescopes suitable for observation of the Geostationary (GEO) ring at 36000 km altitude and (Medium Earth Orbit) MEO at 23000 km where Galileo satellites will be placed. :[9]

Optical telescopes suitable for observation of the Geostationary (GEO) ring at 36000 km altitude and (Medium Earth Orbit) MEO at 23000 km where Galileo satellites will be placed.

Tenerife : ESA operates a space debris telescope on Tenerife that covers a sector of 120° of the GEO ring. From single observations, initial orbits can be derived which are generally adequate for re-acquisition of the object within the same night, and which can then be successively improved. The Optical Ground Station (OGS), installed in the Teide observatory 2400 m above the sea level, was built as part of ESA long-term efforts for research in the field of inter-satellite optical communications. The original purpose of the station, equipped with a telescope (1m aperture), is to perform the in-orbit test of laser telecommunications terminals on board of satellites in Low Earth Orbit and Geostationary Orbit. Since 2001, the ESA survey of Space Debris in the Geostationary Orbit and the Geostationary Transfer Orbit is also being carried out with a devoted wide field camera to determine the orbital parameters of debris objects. The Optical Ground Station was inaugurated in 1995. The Instituto de Astrofísica de Canarias participated in the integration of the station instruments and has since then been in charge of the station operation. This is the contribution of ESA to the worldwide common efforts on this task with NASA and NASDA (National Aerospace and Defense Agency of Japan).

TAROT : CNES uses observation time of the TAROT telescope (Télescope à Action Rapide pour les Objets Transitoires) in France to survey the GEO ring. TAROT’s primary mission is to detect the optical afterglow of gamma-ray bursts. A companion telescope, TAROT-S has been deployed in Chile. Since 2004, CNES observes satellites in the geostationary orbit with this network of robotic ground based fully automated telescopes. The system makes real time processing and its wide field of view is useful for detection, systematic survey and tracking both catalogued and uncatalogued objects.

Starbrook : The British National Space Centre (BNSC) has sponsored the Starbrook wide-field telescope as an experimental survey sensor since 2006. The telescope is located at Troodos/Cyprus, It can detect GEO objects down to 1.5 m sizes (visual magnitude of +14).

ZIMLAT/ZimSMART : The Astronomical Institute of the University of Bern (AIUB) operates a ZIMLAT telescope. From its location in Zimmerwald/Switzerland, the telescope covers a sector of 100° of the GEO ring. The primary applications of ZIMLAT are astrometry and laser ranging. However, up to 40% of its night-time observations are used for follow-ups of GEO objects discovered by the ESA telescope at Tenerife. ZIMLAT was complemented in 2006 by the 20 cm ZimSMART telescope (Zimmerwald Small Aperture Robotic Telescope).

SPOC and ROSACE : SPOC (Systeme Probatoire d’Observation du Ciel) is part of the French DGA network of target tracking systems. The ROSACE and TAROT telescopes are used by CNES for observation of GEO objects > 50 cm. TAROT detects the objects, ROSACE determines their orbit.

PIMS : The PIMS telescope (Passive Imaging Metric Sensor) is owned by the UK Ministry of Defence. They monitor objects in GEO > 1m. They are stationed in Gibraltar, Cyprus and Herstmonceux (East Sussex, UK).

8.6.2. Radar sensors Radar stations suited for observation of the Low Earth Orbit (LEO) region up to 2000 km. :[10]

Radar stations suited for observation of the Low Earth Orbit (LEO) region up to 2000 km.

Fylingdales : A most powerful space surveillance sensor located in Fylingdales (UK) and operated by the British/US armed forces. Most of the activities are geared to the US Space Surveillance Network (SSN) early warning and space surveillance mission.

Globus II : A second facility associated with the US SSN is the Norwegian Globus II radar. It is located in Vardø, at the northernmost tip of Norway. Due to special bilateral agreements between the US SSN and the operators of Fylingdales and Globus II, data from these sites have so far not been available for unclassified use within Europe.

GRAVES : The French GRAVES system (Grand Réseau Adapté à la Veille Spatiale) is presently the only European installation outside the US SSN that can perform space surveillance in the classical sense. GRAVES is owned by the French Ministry of Defence and operated by the French air force. GRAVES started operational tests in 2001. Routine operations started in 2005. The system produces a ‘self-starting’ catalogue which can be autonomously built up and maintained. It is limited to objects of typically 1 m size and larger in low Earth orbits (LEO) up to an altitude of 1000 km. The object catalogue contains currently about 2500 objects. Object data of GRAVES are used for target allocation of other radars.

TIRA : The German FGAN Radar belongs to the Research Establishment for Applied Science at Wachtberg (organisational arrangements are currently changed to create a legal position, to be able to use the radar operationally for SSA and not only for research). In its tracking mode, the TIRA system determines orbits from direction angles, range, and Doppler for single targets. The modes include target tracking and imaging (for identification). The detection size threshold is about 2 cm at 1000 km range, 40 cm in GEO orbit. For statistical observations this sensitivity can be enhanced to about 1 cm, when operating TIRA and the nearby Effelsberg 100 m radio telescope in a bistatic beam-park mode with TIRA as transmitter and Effelsberg as receiver.

FS Monge : DGA/DCE, the Systems Evaluation and Test Directorate of the French Ministry of Defence, is operating several radar and optical sensors throughout France. The most powerful of these systems, Armor, is located on the tracking ship Monge. The two radars are dedicated to tracking tasks, based on high resolution angular and range data.

Chilbolton : The Chilbolton radar is located in Winchester, UK, operated by the Radio Communications Research Unit (RCRU) of the Rutherford Appleton Laboratory (RAL). It is mainly used for atmospheric and ionospheric research. With a planned upgrade the radar will be able to track LEO objects down to 10 cm sizes at 600 km altitude.

8.6.3. In-situ sensors Sensors that measure flow of small objects such as micrometeriods and microdebris. Such sensors are mounted on space craft (ISS, Space shuttle, satellites)[11]

Sensors that measure flow of small objects such as micrometeriods and microdebris. Such sensors are mounted on space craft (ISS, Space shuttle, satellites)

SODAD (Orbital System for the Active Detection Of. Debris) are French space debris detectors currently in orbit (1 on ISS and 3 on satellite SAC-D) measuring the flux of micrometeriods (natural) and microorbital debris (manmade).

9. Examples of spin-offs from space exploration

Since 1976, NASA has created new technologies with direct benefit to the private sector, supporting global competition and the economy. The resulting commercialisation has contributed to over 1800 recorded developments in products and services in the fields of health and medicine, industry, consumer goods, transportation, public safety, computer technology, and environmental resources.

The following list provides some lasting and wide spread examples from the Apollo programme:

– Freeze drying technologies for food preservation have led to innovations in the food market (e.g. production of corn flakes);

– Computation for automatic checkout of space equipment has led to improvements in retail checkout and banking transactions;

– Space suit fabrics have led to development of environment-friendly building materials and fire resistant materials.

Some more recent examples include:

– Image processing used in automatic space exploration missions has led to applications in medical imagery (tele-medicine);

– Insulation of cryogenic fuel tanks has direct applications in acoustic and thermal insulation;

– Mobile communication platforms for robotic exploration have led to development of explosives detection devices.

Although ESA has invested significantly less into space exploration compared to NASA, a technology transfer programme has been successfully put in place. Pertinent ESA examples include:

– Automatic space craft docking technology (e.g. for ATV) has led to innovations in the car assembly systems;

– Smart suits technologies are now being used for medical monitoring devices;

– Aero braking algorithms are used for crisps packaging;

– Developing ISS information systems has led to applications in fire fighter emergency planning.

References:

– NASA Hits – how NASA improves our quality of life http://www.nasa.gov/externalflash/hits2_flash/hits1.pdf

– NASA SpinOff, 2009, http://www.sti.nasa.gov/tto/Spinoff2009

– Technology Transfer from Space Spin-off; ESA, NSO, NIVR, April 2010

GLOSSARY

ARV, Advanced Re-entry Vehicle

Space Transportation system for cargo, comprising two main modules: a service module, derived from the ATV spacecraft and a re-entry module. Unlike the ATV, which is destroyed during its return to Earth after supplying the International Space Station, the ARV may make a re-entry to Earth.

ATV, Automated Transfer Vehicle

Unmanned re-supply spacecraft developed by ESA and designed to supply the International Space Station with propellant, water, air, and various other payloads including experiments.

CNES, Centre Nationale d’Etudes Spatiales

The French Space Agency.

ESA, European Space Agency

Inter-governmental organisation established in 1975 to provide for and to promote, for exclusively peaceful purposes, co-operation among European States in space research and technology and their space applications. Today, 18 European Countries are ESA Member States: Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxemburg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and United Kingdom.

GMES, Global Monitoring for Environment and Security

European initiative for the implementation of information services dealing with environment and security . GMES is based on observation data received from Earth Observation satellites and ground based information. These data are coordinated, analysed and prepared for end-users. It develops a set of services for European citizens helping to improve their quality of life regarding environment and security. GMES plays a strategic role in supporting major EU policies by its services.

GSC, Guyana Space Centre in Kourou

Launch site created in 1964 by France. Since 1977, the site has been exclusively devoted to the Ariane launchers, developed by the European Space Agency and commercially operated by Arianespace. By end 2010 – early 2011 the Soyuz and Vega launchers will also make their first flight from GSC.

ISS, International Space Station

Permanently inhabited space station orbiting the Earth at 400 km altitude for peaceful purposes. Its design, development, operation and utilisation are based on the Inter Governmental Agreement signed in 1998 between the 15 International Partners. The ISS is managed by the following space agencies: ESA (Europe), NASA (USA), Roscosmos (Russia), CSA (Canada) and JAXA (Japan).

Launchers

Rocket-based systems that deliver payloads (satellites, manned vehicles, etc.) into space. They can be heavy, medium and small, according to the relative weight of payloads that a particular launcher can carry into space.

LEO, Low Earth Orbit

Generally considered to be an orbit at an altitude of 400 to 1000 km.

Meteor

Brief streak of light seen in the night sky when a speck of dust burns up as it enters the upper atmosphere. Also known as a shooting star or falling star.

Meteorite

A fragment of rock that survives its fall to Earth from space. Usually named after the place where it fell.

Meteoroid

A piece of rock or dust in space with the potential to enter Earth's atmosphere and become a meteor or meteorite.

NEO, Near Earth Objects

Asteroids or comets whose orbit brings them into close proximity with the Earth (less than 1.3 astronomical unit a unit defined by the Earth – Sun distance).

Payload

Equipment carried by a spacecraft. A product becomes a payload once it is intended to fly on board a spacecraft.

Satellite

A man-made object (such as a spacecraft) placed in orbit around the Earth, another planet or the Sun.

Soyuz Launcher

A launcher system developed by the Soviet Union now also being adapted for use as a medium-lift launcher for Europe.

Solar flare

Sudden violent explosion on the sub-surface of the Sun which occurs above complex active regions in the photosphere. They usually last only a few minutes, but their temperatures may reach hundreds of millions of degrees. Most of their radiation is emitted as X-rays, but they can also be observed in visible light and radio waves. Charged particles ejected by flares can cause aurorae when they reach the Earth a few days later.

Solar storm

Violent outburst of explosive activity on the Sun.

Solar wind

Stream of plasma, mainly electrons and protons, which flows from the Sun's corona at up to 900 km/s. It is found throughout the Solar System as far away as the heliopause.

Spacecraft

Artificial satellite. Term often used before a satellite is placed in orbit around the Earth, when it is transporting something or when it is being sent into deep space.

Space weather

The changing conditions in interplanetary space caused by fluctuations in the solar wind.

SSA, Space Situational Awareness

C omprehensive knowledge, understanding and maintained awareness of the population of space objects (spacecraft such as satellites or space debris), of the space environment, and of the existing threats/risks to space operations. SSA systems rely on ground or space based tracking and monitoring sensors.

The Space Situational Awareness (SSA) Preparatory Programme is a new initiative of ESA, accepted at the November 2008 Ministerial Conference in The Hague. SSA includes activities in three main domains: space surveillance, space weather and Near Earth Objects (NEOs).

Calculation methodology

The impact assessment provides quantitative estimates of the impact of proposed SSA activities on the basis of available data. The present note explains the methodology followed.

The parameters taken into consideration are the following:

– On 1 st April 2010, 183 out of 928 satellites in orbit had EU contractors/owners (19.71%) http://www.ucsusa.org/nuclear_weapons_and_global_security/space_weapons/technical_issues/ucs-satellite-database.html ; it is assumed that the proportion is the same for Low Earth Orbit as for Geosynchronous Orbit;[12]

http://www.ucsusa.org/nuclear_weapons_and_global_security/space_weapons/technical_issues/ucs-satellite-database.html

– There are twice as many commercial satellites in GEO (253) as there are in LEO (130) http://www.ucsusa.org/assets/documents/nwgs/quick-facts-and-analysis-4-13-09.pdf ;[13]

http://www.ucsusa.org/assets/documents/nwgs/quick-facts-and-analysis-4-13-09.pdf

– According to Euroconsult, the average satellite price over the next decade will be $99 million and the satellite launch price is predicted to remain flat, at $51 million “ Satellites to be Built & Launched by 2018, World Market Survey”, Euroconsult, http://www.euroconsult-ec.com/research-reports/space-industry-reports/satellites-to-be-built-launched-by-2018-38-29.html ;[14]

“ Satellites to be Built & Launched by 2018, World Market Survey”, Euroconsult, http://www.euroconsult-ec.com/research-reports/space-industry-reports/satellites-to-be-built-launched-by-2018-38-29.html

– The annual revenue produced downstream by satellite-driven services Example of downstream services are telecommunications or TV broadcasting is estimated to exceed $60 billion US. European industry has managed to retain a market share of about 40% of the space segment http://telecom.esa.int/telecom/www/object/index.cfm?fobjectid=456 ;[15][16]

Example of downstream services are telecommunications or TV broadcasting

http://telecom.esa.int/telecom/www/object/index.cfm?fobjectid=456

– Nowadays, around half of satellites on orbit are operated commercially and half by governments and the military http://www.parliament.uk/documents/documents/upload/postpn355.pdf ;[17]

http://www.parliament.uk/documents/documents/upload/postpn355.pdf

– The average number of catastrophic collisions during the next 40 years is one every 5 years http://www.parliament.uk/documents/documents/upload/postpn355.pdf Page 2 Chart 2 in Low Earth Orbit;[18]

http://www.parliament.uk/documents/documents/upload/postpn355.pdf Page 2 Chart 2

– The average number of catastrophic collisions at GEO is 1 every 155 years http://www.mcgill.ca/files/iasl/Session_5_William_Ailor.pdf , therefore negligible for the purpose of our calculations; the risk in Medium Earth Orbits is also considered negligible;[19]

http://www.mcgill.ca/files/iasl/Session_5_William_Ailor.pdf

– World direct satellite losses due to space weather http://www.esa-spaceweather.net/spweather/esa_initiatives/spweatherstudies/ALC/WP1200MarketAnalysisfinalreport.pdf :[20]

http://www.esa-spaceweather.net/spweather/esa_initiatives/spweatherstudies/ALC/WP1200MarketAnalysisfinalreport.pdf

Loss type|Frequency of event|Annualised loss|

Complete satellite failure|Rare (<3 per solar cycle)|~€30 to 60 million|

Service outage|Frequent (up to 60 anomalies per annum)|~ €30 million|

Shortened satellite lifetime|Rare (<10 per solar cycle)|~€5-10 million|

– Complete satellite failure due to space weather has occurred 11 times in the 25 years http://www.esa-spaceweather.net/spweather/esa_initiatives/spweatherstudies/RAL/TR110v2_1.pdf-a.pdf ;[21]

http://www.esa-spaceweather.net/spweather/esa_initiatives/spweatherstudies/RAL/TR110v2_1.pdf-a.pdf

– It is assumed that the average lifetime of a satellite is around10 years;

– For the purpose of calculation we assume that collision take place at satellite's mid life and its cost at this stage would be 50% of its average cost ($99 million), namely $49,5 million;

– For the purpose of this calculation $1 = € 1;

– Damages caused by debris smaller than 10 cm have not been considered.

Calculation of annual direct loss due to collision:

Number of collisions concerning the total satellite population over 40 years in LEO (at one collision every 5 years) = 8 collisions;

Number of EU satellites affected by collisions in the next 40 years [8 collisions x (19.71% of EU satellites over the total satellite population] = 1.57;

Annualised cost of satellite loss over a 40 year period in LEO 1.57 x (satellite cost at midlife, i.e. $49.5 million + cost of launch, i.e. $51 million)/40 years = ~$4 million.

Calculation of annual indirect (revenue) loss due to collision:

Annual revenue produced by EU satellite-driven services ($60 billion x 40%) = $24 billion;

Annual revenue loss per destroyed satellite in LEO [$24 billion / 3 (only 1/3 of commercial satellites are in LEO)] x (19,71% of the 130 commercial satellites in LEO are considered to be EU) = ~$0.32 billion;

Number of EU commercial satellites destroyed over a period of 40 years (1.57 x 50%) = ~0.8;

The total annual revenue losses: [($320 million x 0.8)/40] x 5 (assuming satellite is hit at midlife) = ~$32 million.

Calculation of annualised cost per EU satellite due to space weather

Direct cost due to complete satellite failure is calculated on the basis of the mean value according to table under point 6, which is €45 million x 19.71% EU share of world satellites = ~€9 million;

Annual cost due to Service outage ($30 million) and shortened satellite lifetime ($5 million) as per table under point 6: €35 million x 19.71% = ~€7 million;

Annual revenue loss due to complete failure: [(11 satellites destroyed / 25 years) x 19.71% EU satellites] x € 262 million x 50% commercial satellites x 5 (assuming satellite is lost at midlife) = ~€57 million.

Calculation of annualised cost for satellites due to geomagnetic storms

Severe geomagnetic storms occur at a 1 in 30 year to 1 in 100 year frequency http://www.ofcm.gov/swef/2009/Booklet%20FINAL%20for%20PDF-website%2020090522.pdf . P otential economic loss has been estimated at more than $70 billion, including lost revenue ( ~$44 billion ) and satellite replacement for GEO satellites ( ~$24 billion ) http://www.economics.noaa.gov/?goal=weather&file=events/space&view=benefits . Considering a 1 in a 100 years event, world-wide annualised losses would account for $700 million. Assuming that the EU has a 40% share of annual satellite revenue and that EU owns 19,71% of all satellites, the total annualised losses would amount to $223 million. [22][23]

http://www.ofcm.gov/swef/2009/Booklet%20FINAL%20for%20PDF-website%2020090522.pdf

http://www.economics.noaa.gov/?goal=weather&file=events/space&view=benefits

[1] ESA currently has 18 Member States: Austria, France, Germany, Italy, Spain, UK, Belgium, Netherlands, Luxembourg, Sweden, Finland, Denmark, Greece, Portugal, Ireland, Czech Republic, Switzerland and Norway.

[2] Around 30,000 employees and consolidated turnover of €5.9bn in 2008.

[3] Profiles of Government Space Programs: Analysis of 60 Countries and Agencies, Euroconsult, 2010

[4] Cooperating country

[5] Office national d'études et recherches aérospatiales.

[6] Study on capability gaps concerning Space Situational Awareness, ONERA, 2007.

[7] Under the auspices of the Research Establishment for Applied Science – FGAN.

[8] http://geimint.blogspot.com/2008/06/soviet-russian-space-surveillance.html

[9] Optical telescopes suitable for observation of the Geostationary (GEO) ring at 36000 km altitude and (Medium Earth Orbit) MEO at 23000 km where Galileo satellites will be placed.

[10] Radar stations suited for observation of the Low Earth Orbit (LEO) region up to 2000 km.

[11] Sensors that measure flow of small objects such as micrometeriods and microdebris. Such sensors are mounted on space craft (ISS, Space shuttle, satellites)

[12] http://www.ucsusa.org/nuclear_weapons_and_global_security/space_weapons/technical_issues/ucs-satellite-database.html

[13] http://www.ucsusa.org/assets/documents/nwgs/quick-facts-and-analysis-4-13-09.pdf

[14] “ Satellites to be Built & Launched by 2018, World Market Survey”, Euroconsult, http://www.euroconsult-ec.com/research-reports/space-industry-reports/satellites-to-be-built-launched-by-2018-38-29.html

[15] Example of downstream services are telecommunications or TV broadcasting

[16] http://telecom.esa.int/telecom/www/object/index.cfm?fobjectid=456

[17] http://www.parliament.uk/documents/documents/upload/postpn355.pdf

[18] http://www.parliament.uk/documents/documents/upload/postpn355.pdf Page 2 Chart 2

[19] http://www.mcgill.ca/files/iasl/Session_5_William_Ailor.pdf

[20] http://www.esa-spaceweather.net/spweather/esa_initiatives/spweatherstudies/ALC/WP1200MarketAnalysisfinalreport.pdf

[21] http://www.esa-spaceweather.net/spweather/esa_initiatives/spweatherstudies/RAL/TR110v2_1.pdf-a.pdf

[22] http://www.ofcm.gov/swef/2009/Booklet%20FINAL%20for%20PDF-website%2020090522.pdf

[23] http://www.economics.noaa.gov/?goal=weather&file=events/space&view=benefits