1.

Is Article 85(2) and (3) of Directive 2014/59/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 May 2014 establishing a framework for the recovery and resolution of credit institutions and investment firms and amending Council Directive 82/891/EEC, and Directives 2001/24/EC, 2002/47/EC, 2004/25/EC, 2005/56/EC, 2007/36/EC, 2011/35/EU, 2012/30/EU and 2013/36/EU, and Regulations (EU) No 1093/2010 and (EU) No 648/2012, (1) of the European Parliament and of the Council (OJ 2014 L 173, p. 190, as amended), in conjunction with Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (OJ 2007 C 303, p. 1), and the second paragraph of Article 19(1) of the Treaty on European Union (Dz. U. of 2004, No 90, item 864/30, as amended), to be interpreted as meaning that, when the supervisory board of an entity undergoing restructuring brings an action before a national administrative court against a decision concerning compulsory restructuring, an effective legal remedy is deemed to be available also to persons who, in bringing an action against that decision, seek protection of their legal interest, where the court, in reviewing the contested decision, is not bound by the pleas in law and conclusions of the action or the legal basis relied on, a final judgment, given as a result of hearing that action, is effective erga omnes, and the possibility for those persons obtaining protection of their legal interest is not conditional on them bringing a separate action before an administrative court against that decision?

2.

Is Article 85(3) of Directive 2014/59/EU, which requires effective judicial review, and Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, and the second subparagraph of Article 19(1) of the Treaty on European Union, which provide for effective legal protection, to be interpreted as precluding the application of a procedural rule of a Member State which requires a national administrative court to hear jointly all actions brought before it against a decision of a resolution authority where the application of that rule, together with other national procedural requirements relating to administrative courts, makes it excessively difficult, if not impossible, to give judgment in the case within a reasonable period, in view of the large number of such actions?

3.

Is Article 3(3) of Directive 2014/59/EU be interpreted as permitting a Member State — in order to ensure operational independence and avoid conflicts of interest — not to separate structurally the functions of the resolution authority from the other functions of that authority as statutory guarantor of bank deposits or bank insolvency administrator (temporary administrator) appointed pursuant to a decision of the competent national authority for supervision for the purposes of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 (2) and Directive 2013/36/EU? (3)

4.

Is Article 3(3) of Directive 2014/59/EU to be interpreted as meaning that, where a Member State fails to fulfil its obligation to put in place adequate structural arrangements to ensure operational independence and avoid conflicts of interest between the functions of supervision under Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 and Directive 2013/36/EU or other functions of the relevant authority and the functions of the resolution authority, the condition relating operational independence and avoidance of conflicts of interest may be deemed to be satisfied if the national administrative court reviewing the decision concerning compulsory restructuring finds that the other administrative arrangements made were sufficient to achieve that effect?