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Document 52013SC0181
COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT IMPACT ASSESSMENT Accompanying the document Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing a framework on the market access to port services and the financial transparency of ports
COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT IMPACT ASSESSMENT Accompanying the document Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing a framework on the market access to port services and the financial transparency of ports
COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT IMPACT ASSESSMENT Accompanying the document Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing a framework on the market access to port services and the financial transparency of ports
/* SWD/2013/0181 final */
COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT IMPACT ASSESSMENT Accompanying the document Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing a framework on the market access to port services and the financial transparency of ports /* SWD/2013/0181 final */
COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT IMPACT ASSESSMENT Accompanying the document Proposal for a Regulation of the
European Parliament and of the Council establishing a framework on the
market access to port services and the financial transparency of ports Table of Contents 1........... Procedural issues and
consultation of interested parties. 1 1.1........ Organisation and timing. 1 1.2........ Consultation of
stakeholders and external expertise. 1 1.3........ Revision by the Impact
Asssessment Board. 2 2........... General Context 3 2.1........ Key figures. 3 2.2........ Functioning of the port:
a chain of services. 4 2.3........ Policy context 5 2.4........ Diversity of ports in the
EU.. 7 3........... Problem definition. 8 3.1........ Description of the main
problem.. 8 3.1.1..... Structural performance gap
in ports and impacts on the hinterland and congestions. 8 3.1.2..... Need to adapt to transport
and logistics changes. 11 3.2........ Underlying drivers of the
problem.. 12 3.2.1..... Suboptimal port services and
operations in some TEN-T seaports. 13 3.2.2..... Port governance frameworks
not attractive enough for investments 18 3.2.3..... Linking the problem to its
drivers and root causes. 23 3.3........ Who is affected by the
problem?. 23 3.4........ Application of EU
horizontal instruments. 24 3.5........ How would the problem
evolve, all things being equal 25 3.6........ Does the EU have the
right to act?. 27 3.6.1..... Legal basis. 27 3.6.2..... Subsidiarity. 27 3.6.3..... Proportionality. 28 4........... Objectives. 29 4.1........ General objective. 29 4.2........ Specific objectives 29 4.3........ Operational objectives 29 4.4........ Linking the problem and
objectives. 30 5........... Policy options. 31 5.1........ Discarded policy measures. 31 5.2........ List of considered policy
measures. 32 5.2.1..... Measures to ensure optimal
port services and operation in all TEN-T seaports. 32 5.2.2..... Measures to enable a more
attractive investment climate. 35 5.3........ Policy Packages. 36 5.3.1..... Overview of measures
proposed in the policy packages. 37 5.3.2..... Policy Package 1:
“Horizontal Instruments and Transparency”. 37 5.3.3..... Policy Package 2: “Regulated
competition”. 38 5.3.4..... Policy Package 2a:
“Reinforced regulated competition and port autonomy”. 38 5.3.5..... Policy Package 3: “Full
competition and port autonomy”. 39 5.3.6..... Stakeholders view on policy
packages. 39 6........... Analysis of impacts. 39 6.1........ Economic impacts. 40 6.1.1..... Direct and indirect
transport costs. 40 6.1.2..... Investments. 42 6.1.3..... Administrative burden. 43 6.1.4..... SMEs. 44 6.1.5..... Impact on transport and
multimodality. 45 6.1.6..... International
competitiveness. 46 6.2........ Environmental impacts. 46 6.3........ Social impacts. 47 6.4........ Mapping of impacts per
stakeholder 49 6.5........ Summary of the economic,
environmental and social impacts. 50 7........... Comparing the options. 52 7.1........ Effectiveness. 52 7.2........ Efficiency. 53 7.3........ Coherence. 54 7.4........ Summary on the comparison
of policy packages. 54 8........... Conclusion: preferred
option. 55 9........... Monitoring and
evaluation. 56 Annexes Annex I Schematic overview of policy package PP2a Annex II General Context: main features of the EU
Port System Annex III Eurostat Port Statistics 2012 Annex IV 2007 Ports Policy Communication – Ex-Post
evaluation Annex V Conclusions of the public consultation, June-December
2012 Annex VI Relative performance of TEN-T core ports Annex VII Modelling of impacts: main assumptions Annex VIII Matrix maritime traffic / port throughputs 2005 / 2030 Annex IX Administrative costs Annex X Port labour issues Annex XI Ports in the new TEN-T Strategy / Connecting Europe
Facility Annex XII References Annex XIII Glossary For the purpose of this report, port services refer to one or several of the eight following categories: - Pilotage - Towage - Mooring - Dredging - Bunkering - Cargo handling - Passenger services - Waste reception facilities 1. Procedural issues and consultation of
interested parties Lead DG: Directorate General for Mobility &
Transport (DG MOVE) Agenda planning: 2013/MOVE/0161 This initiative forms part of the Single
Market Act II[1]
(Oct. 2012) and contributes to the development of fully integrated networks to
drive new growth. It was announced in the White Paper on Transport of 2011[2]. The initiative supplements and
is closely related to the proposal for a regulation on Guidelines for the
development of the trans-European transport network (TEN-T)[3] and the financial instrument
"Connecting Europe Facility (CEF)[4]"
(Oct. 2011). 1.1. Organisation and timing The preparatory work
started after the adoption of the Transport White Paper. DG MOVE established a
formal impact assessment steering group (IASG) in April 2012 in which the
following directorates-general actively participated: SG, COMP, ECFIN, EMPL, EUSTAT,
JRC, MARE, MARKT and REGIO. The IASG held five meetings, the last one on 6
February 2013. Participants were invited to different public consultation events. 1.2. Consultation of stakeholders
and external expertise Due to the nature of
the file (inter alia, issues related to performance of ports, port technical
services, hinterland connectivity, governance structures, port infrastructure
charges, funding of port investments or public service obligations in ports),
DG MOVE decided to carry out a comprehensive targeted sectoral public consultation
and not a full public consultation. For that purpose, DG
MOVE has kept an informal dialogue with the national administrations in charge
of the ports' policy (Ministries of Transport). It held meetings with the main
industry associations in the port sector, inter alia: port authorities (ESPO),
private terminal operators (FEPORT), inland ports (EFIP), ship-owners (ECSA),
pilots (EMPA), tug owners and operators (ETA), mooring operators (EBA), ship's
agents (ECASBA), shippers (ESC), dredgers (EuDA) and logistic operators
(CLECAT). DG MOVE also held meetings with the two main Unions of port workers,
the International Dockers Council (IDC) and the dock workers' section of the
European Transport Workers Federation (ETF). A sectoral dialogue committee
could not be consulted, as this is still in the process of being set up. The preparatory work
was supported by an economic study on the quality and efficiency of European
ports (PwC). The work took account of extensive research on transport
economics, ports and logistics and involved several discussions with industry
and research experts. Stakeholders were
consulted extensively through two targeted on-line surveys and an open
stakeholders' two-day conference in Brussels (25-26 Sept. 2012)[5]. Some stakeholders,
namely the two main Unions of port workers, considered that the questionnaire
designed by PwC for the on-line surveys was not appropriate, pointing out that
the questionnaire did not allow them to express their views and that some
questions were leading and even prejudged the responses. Instead of
participating in the survey, IDC and ETF sent their positions in written to DG
MOVE[6]. A final targeted[7] public hearing, presenting the
key problems and discussing policy options and their possible impacts was held
on 18 January 2013. IDC and ETF were invited and participated actively both in
the ports policy conference and in the public hearing. The main results[8] of the consultation process
(2012-2013) can be summarised as follows: 1) All stakeholders stressed the need for a
stable and fair level playing field both for inter-ports (competition between
ports) and intra-port (competition between providers of a same port service
within a port) competition in the EU. The need for legal certainty and a
business friendly environment with as less administrative burden as possible is
a priority for all stakeholders, such as Member States, port authorities,
terminal operators or the shipping sector, logistic operators and cargo
interests. 2) There is a major concern about unfair competition
between ports linked to public funding practices of port infrastructures. Member
States and port authorities request a tight control of state aid. 3) A significant part of the users of port services,
shipping companies and export-import industries, consider that port services in
many EU ports are not satisfactory in terms of price, quality and
administrative burden. In the ports of the core TEN-T network, around half of
the users surveyed (shipping lines) consider that there are specific challenges
in terms of price or quality with cargo handling (48% complain), pilotage (54%
complain) and towage (49% complain). A smaller percentage ranging from 17% to
25% sees similar problems for other services such as mooring, bunkering,
dredging, passenger services or waste management. 4) 30% of European port authorities do not consider
that the current situation is satisfactory. However, the majority of them
oppose the introduction of EU procedures limiting the capacities of public
authorities to grant contracts and permissions to operators of port services through
direct award. Applying EU concession rules to certain contracts granted in
ports is highly controversial in certain Member States. 5) Port workers' trade unions extremely oppose any EU
provision touching on the existing port labour regimes in certain Member States,
in particular in Mediterranean Member States. Representatives of pilotage
services argue that pilotage, although provided against remuneration, is not an
economic service and should be excluded from competitive pressure. 6) Most stakeholders agree that the EU port system has
to evolve and adapt to significant challenges in terms of scarce funding
resources, competitiveness vis-à-vis ports in neighbouring third countries and
other world regions, creation of added value and jobs as well as coping with environmental
impacts. They all agree on the importance to secure and, if possible, increase,
EU funding expenditure for supporting ports and maritime transport. 1.3. Revision by the Impact Asssessment Board A first version of
this impact assessment report was submitted on 20 February 2013 to the Impact
Assessment Board and discussed at a meeting convened on 20 March 2013. This impact assessment
report was comprehensively revised in the light of the opinion provided by the
Impact Assessment Board on 22 March 2013. The main changes in this new version
of the report concern: (1) a more precise description of the mains problem, i.e.
differences in port performance, links with hinterland congestion issues and internal
market restrictions, (2) a clarification of the scope for application of
horizontal instruments, i.a. EU internal market and transport policy acquis
and competition rules, in the port sector, (3) more detailed data regarding the
baseline scenario and future port capacity constraints assumptions, (4) a more
detailed subsidiarity analysis, (5) a more fine-tuned presentation of
objectives, (6) a more precise description of the links with the European
Semester exercice and Structural Funds, as well as (7) further precisions on
the impacts of the possible policy options on direct and indirect costs,
maritime traffic impacts and possible distribution across different regions. In addition, Annex
II provides now an overview of recent and on-going port reforms and
re-organisations in Member States; Annex V has been revised for better
presenting the reactions of stakeholders to the questions of the on-line
surveys; Annex VII has been revised with an extended presentation of the
balance of demand and supply model for European ports up to 2030, and a more
detailed description of the methodology underlying the assessment of impacts. Finally,
Annex III contains the more recent and comprehensive statistics on
shipping ports provided by Eurostat in March 2013. 2. General
Context[9] 2.1. Key figures Over 1.200 commercial seaports operate along some 70.000 kilometres
of the Union’s coasts. The proposal for TEN-T guidelines identified 319 TEN-T
ports, of which 83 are recognised as core network ports[10]. Europe is one of the most dense port regions worldwide. In 2011,
around 3.7 billion tonnes of cargo (more than 60 000 port calls of merchant
ships) transited through European ports. Bulk traffic represented 70% of it,
containers 18% and Ro-Ro traffic 7%, the rest being other general cargo. Figure
1 provides an overview of the main container ports and their logistical gateway
function. Ports play a crucial role for the external
trade of the EU. They handle, in volume, 74% of the goods exported or imported
to the EU and from the rest of the world. They ensure the security of supply of
the EU in energy and other basic commodities. As the
main trade bloc in the world, the EU is highly dependent on the maritime transport
system. In terms of intra-EU trade, ports handle
about 37 % of the total internal market exchanges of goods (in ton km). Short
sea shipping represents 60% of the tons handled in EU ports. The latter are key
nodal points of the EU intermodal transport chains using short sea shipping as
an alternative to saturated land transport routes or as a way to link peripheral
or island areas. Figures[11] suggest that short sea freight flows in the EU have remained
stagnant over the last decade. In terms of passengers transport, ports
service regional and local traffic to link peripheral and island areas. EU ports handled almost 385 million maritime passengers in 2011. This
marked the third successive annual decline in passenger numbers, down 2 %
compared with 2009. However, ports face growth for specialised traffic related
to cruise ships (+7.1% since 2010). Port costs account for a significant
fraction of the total costs associated with the logistics chain. Handling
cargo, port dues and port nautical services may make 40%-60% of the total
door-to-door logistic costs for typical short sea shipping. However, for
deep-sea shipping in modern ports, using capital-intensive cargo-handling
equipment and advanced IT systems, port costs can account for less than 4-5% of
the total logistic costs[12]. Figure
1: Container
ports and their logistical gateway function (Notteboom, 2010) Port activities contribute directly to
employment, inward investment and GDP growth (up to 3% in the Netherlands).
2,200 port operators currently employ around 110,000 port dockers. A much
larger labour force serves the port industry covering maintenance and operation
of maritime infrastructures, ship operations and services, land transport,
logistics activities, cargo services (e.g. freight forwarding and customs
broking) etc.. Ports represent 1.5
million direct jobs[13]. When adding indirect jobs, they represent a total of 3 million
jobs in the 22 maritime Member States (Notteboom, 2010). 2.2. Functioning
of the port: a chain of services[14] A port is a gateway through which goods and passengers are
transferred between ships and the shore. While the port as a whole can be seen
as a link in a logistics chain, the port product is itself a chain of
consecutive links[15]. The functioning of a port requires a number of services, such as:
provision of transport infrastructure, technical-nautical services (pilotage,
towage, and mooring), operational infrastructure & equipment, cargo
handling & passenger handling, waste reception facilities and ancillary (or
general) services[16]. The total EU port cost to the shipping
industry is estimated at around €11-17 billion in 2010 (PwC, 2013). An
indicative repartition of the relative weight of the different costs items of
the total port operation costs is presented in the table 1[17]. Table
1: Indicative relative weight
of port operation costs[18] || % of total costs Port dues (provision of general infrastructure) || 5%-10% Vessel technical services (pilotage, towage, mooring) Of which Pilotage || 10% - 15% 5%-6% Berthing costs || 5%-15% Cargo handling operators || 45%-60% Waste reception || 1%-5%% Others || 5%-10% 2.3. Policy
context In contrast with other transport sectors,
with exception to port waste reception facilities[19], there
is no EU legislation in the European port sector, be it on the access to the
port services market, financial transparency or infrastructure charging[20]. The first step taken by the Commission to move towards a coherent ports
policy was made in 1997, with the publication of a Green paper on that subject.
In 2001, the Commission proposed a directive on market access to port services.
This proposal was rejected by the European Parliament (EP) in 2003. In 2004,
the Commission adopted a second proposal which was subsequently turned down and
eventually withdrawn. In 2007[21] the
Commission came forward with a Communication on ports policy, announcing
"soft" measures in the form of guidelines (state aids, environment),
best practices (benchmarking, indicators) and close cooperation and dialogue
with stakeholders. The problems identified at the time related to (a) threats
on port performance and hinterland connections, (b) expanding capacity while
respecting the environment, (c) modernisation of ports, (d) absence of clarity,
for investors, operators and users and (e) issues on work in ports. An ex-post
assessment of the progress achieved since 2007 is summarised below[22]: 1) The problems last identified in 2007 remain largely
unsolved in spite of the adoption of a few of the envisaged measures. The main
development has been the adoption of the proposal for the new TEN-T Guidelines
and Connecting Europe Facility, both of which foresee substantial funding
support for ports. The Commission also issued non-binding guidelines on the
application of the birds and natural habitat directives in port areas.[23] 2) As of 2011, in the context of the European Semester
exercise, the Commission has included reforms in the port sector as a part of
the Country Specific Recommendations addressed to the Member States. In the
cases of Greece, Ireland and Portugal, measures involving important port
reforms have been undertaken in the context of the Economic Adjustment Programmes.
3) Although initially envisaged by the 2007 Communication,
the Commission does not intend anymore to adopt specific guidelines for state aid
to ports. The main reason is that the case law from the Court of Justice has
recently evolved and clarified certain issues (the case T-443/08
"Leipzig-Halle"), in particular that public financing of the
construction of (airport) infrastructure constitutes state aid. The only
exception concerns certain activities that are part of the exercise of public
powers (security, police etc.). This judgement requires careful reflections for
all sectors with heavy infrastructures such as the port sector. Moreover, the
Commission will come forward with a modernisation of its state aid rules for
all economic sectors by the end of 2013. 4) Contrary to expectations, the development of
intra-EU maritime transport connections supporting internal market exchanges
has stagnated. Inter-modality objectives have been largely missed. 5) In 2011, the Commission adopted a proposal for a
Directive on Concessions[24]. This proposal applies to concession contracts
granted in ports. Though, as there are other forms of awarding contracts in
ports (like for instance land leases or authorisations) in parallel and as
alternatives to concessions, this will lead to a situation where not all port
service contracts would be subject to the same legal regime and European
framework. A Court of Auditors report (2012)[25] has shown that investments in port facilities create limited
European value added if they are not connected as multimodal nodes to the
national and regional transport network. Therefore, the
CEF and the cohesion policy will give priority to projects concerning port
access and hinterland connections to ensure that TEN-T ports, are developed as
multimodal nodes which can clearly demonstrate, by performing a thorough cost
benefit analysis, that they are desirable from the economic and financial point
of view.[26] As far as the different Member States are
concerned, several of them have in the past years[27]
reviewed their port policy. For example, Germany (2003), Finland (2010), France
(2008) and Spain (2004) have undertaken reforms of their respective port
sectors, including their port labour market. Moreover, in the context of the
structural adjustments required by the Conditional Assistance Programme to Member
States in financial difficulties, a radical reform of the ports regulatory
regimes has been required in Greece, Portugal and Ireland[28]. Some other Member States however, have not significantly changed
their national ports framework. The differences in degree, scope and
eventual impact of the policy developments at national level involve a risk of
further fragmentation of the Internal Market, with Member States adopting
dissimilar approaches on market access conditions, transparency of public
funding and charging policies or administrative requirements[29]. TEN-T, CEF and Structural Funds support
to ports Ports and connections of ports with the
hinterland (motorways, railways and inland navigation channels) are key
transport infrastructures for economic development. Over the years, in the
context of the TEN-T and of the Structural Funds, the EU has provided constant
and substantial funding for the completion, renewal and maintenance of those
infrastructures in all maritime regions of the EU. As stated above, the EU
funding effort supporting those infrastructures will continue in the years to
come. The precise amounts to be allocated will depend on the final decision on
the multiannual financial perspectives and of the assessment made by the
Commission of the proposals submitted by Member States under the different EU
funding instruments. As recalled by the Court of Auditors, it is of extreme
importance that the EU effort sustaining ports delivers good returns in terms
of performance and overall contribution to the objectives of the European Transport
Policy. Under this policy context, the Commission
has emphasised in 2011 and 2012, in its White Paper on Transport and in the
Single Market Act II the need to review its ports policy. 2.4. Diversity
of ports in the EU[30] European
ports have historically developed in their own diverse ways, even when located
in the same country[31]. Large gateway ports, hub ports
transhipping goods from large to smaller vessels, medium-sized and smaller
ports each have specific characteristics in terms of hinterland markets served,
commodities handled and locational qualities. On
a geographical basis, one usually distinguishes the maritime coastlines of the
continent (Baltic, North Sea, Atlantic, Mediterranean, and Black Sea) or ranges
of neighbouring, competing ports (e.g. Hamburg-Le Havre range). 20% of the EU cargo
handling takes place in the ports of Rotterdam, Antwerp and Hamburg. The nine
largest ports of the Mediterranean account for 20% of the total. The port governance structure also differs.
In a significant number of ports, the government both owns the land, the
infrastructure and the equipment, and runs the entire operation of all the
services provided in the port. At the other end of the spectrum, in a number of
ports, the landlord is a private owner and private interests provide the
services. The dominant structure for port governance in Europe follows the
landlord model, with public ownership of the land and infrastructure.
Typically, port authorities finance large, long-term infrastructure investments
from public funds. At the same time, many of them organise the provision of
port services and act as referees on intra-port competition matters. Table
2: Ownership of port
authorities (ESPO, European Port Governance report 2010)[32] || Hanse || New Hanse || Anglo-Saxon || Latin || New Latin Publicly owned ports || 96.0% || 84.1% || 47.1% || 75.0% || 90.6% National Authority || 6.5% || 71.3% || 35.3% || 64.4% || 87.3% Region || 2.5% || 0.0% || 0.0% || 7.9% || 0.0% Province || 4.3% || 0.0% || 0.0% || 2.7% || 0.0% Municipality || 82.7% || 12.8% || 11.8% || 0.0% || 3.3% Privately owned ports || 4.0% || 0.0% || 8.8% || 0.7% || 0.0% Other || 0.0% || 15.9% || 44.1% || 24.3% || 9.4% Total || 100.0% || 100.0% || 100.0% || 100.0% || 100.0% Table 2 provides an overview of the
ownership structure in the different regions. The ESPO 2010 European Port
Governance report concludes that "the Hanseatic and Latin governance
traditions of municipal and state influence are clearly confirmed (the ‘other’
category for Latin port authorities includes Italian port authorities which are
de facto controlled by the state). Port authorities in Anglo-Saxon countries
are either owned by the state (Irish ports), municipalities, and financial
suitors or take the form of trust ports (UK ports). State ownership dominates
for port authorities in the new regions." It should be noted that, under all
different models of port ownership (public, private or mixed regimes), there
are cases of excellent, well performing ports and cases of ports were problems
of performance and long term decline have been reported. The TFEU rules are
neutral in respect of forms of ownership of ports in the Member States and this
impact assessment does not draw any conclusions in that regard. 3. Problem
definition 3.1. Description
of the main problem The main
problem is the structural performance gap in some TEN-T seaports. The problem
is exacerbated by the need to adapt ports to new transport and logistics
requirements at a moment of scarce public funding. This creates risks of
congestion and puts at risk an efficient, interconnected and sustainable TEN-T
and therefore the functioning of the internal market. When adopting the
proposal for new TEN-T guidelines and the CEF, the Commission set ambitious
goals to develop an efficient, interconnected and sustainable TEN-T. But
without tackling the port-related problems, achieving these goals could be at
risk. Seaports are the TEN-T interface between land and sea and their
performance determines to a large extent the fluidity of both land traffic (in
their broad hinterland areas) and of short sea traffic (in the maritime
exchanges and redistribution of cargoes to other EU ports). Structural
weaknesses on performance in certain ports lead to congestion problems and
undermine the achievement of a sustainable transport system[33]. 3.1.1. Structural
performance gap in ports and impact on the hinterland and congestions Differences in ports
performance is a normal market feature resulting from a variety factors
including specialisation and strengthening of competitive advantages. From the
perspective of the EU transport system, it could be expected that, over the
years, the trend for all EU ports is to improve progressively performance, i.e.
their capacity to adapt to the economic development requirements of the regions
they serve (hinterlands). In recent years, while some EU ports have improved
their performance by international standards, other EU ports have lagged
behind, to the extent that some Member States have expressed concern about the structural
decline of their port systems. In the context of
the European semester exercise[34],
the need for improving the contribution of ports to economic recovery and
growth, both in terms of performance and modernisation are part of the
country-specific recommendations addressed to a number of Member States[35]. EU Ports are part of
a network industry. A chain is only as strong as its weakest point. The fact
that some TEN-T seaports have a low performance reduces the transport choices.
This in turn accentuates the polarization of flows to hubs where the hinterland
is congested. It also means a lost opportunity to develop SSS as alternative to
saturated land transport routes and to better link peripheral and island areas.
Overall it means a suboptimal functioning of the TEN-T. The relative
performance of TEN-T ports by international standards has been examined by PwC
by means of a model based on data from the World Economic Forum, market shares
per cargo categories and a proxy variable for measuring inter-port rivalry.
Under the assumptions of the model a “well-performing” port is one that is
located in a country where functioning of ports obtains a high rating in terms
of users' appreciation and which achieves a high market share in circumstances
where there is a high degree of inter-port rivalry. The model has been
applied to a representative sample of 115 TEN-T ports
for the purpose of obtaining useful insight on port services performance, while
recognising that there can be other factors, such as physical geography (e.g.
distance from the sea, location of rivers) affecting performance. A
detailed presentation of the model is given in Annex VII[36]. The results show a
mixed picture: five ports are performing in the top category (25% of the
relative ranking); 23 ports perform well (a relative score between 75%-50%); 51
ports perform moderate (between 50%-25%) and 36 ports have a relative low performance
(lower than 25%). Figure 2 shows this distribution.[37] Figure
2: performance distribution of
EU ports (sample of 115 ports) (PwC, 2013) While some ports
seem underperforming and underutilised, other high performing ports have had or
will have to face capacity and connectivity problems related to the need to
rapidly evacuate from the port huge volumes of cargoes (containers trades, but
also roll-on roll-off traffics). It should be noted
that other models examining the relative performance of EU ports exists[38] and that different research
sources, including those of the World Economic Forum or the OECD referred to
above consistently show significant differences of performance in EU ports Congestion in the
port hinterlands has a high external cost in the
densely populated areas along the major TEN-T hubs. The cost of road congestion
is estimated to 1-2% of the EU GDP, i.e. EUR 122-245 billion[39] and congestion is on average
significantly higher in the broad hinterland of the major EU hubs (e.g.
Benelux). Congestion in ports
is more difficult to appreciate. Port congestion already occurred in 2004, the year
considered as the peak of globalisation in terms of
trade (see table 3). For some trades, door-to-door logistic cost for European
industries rose by 10% in 2004 because of such port congestion[40]. Although the congestion issue
has been put on hold during the recession, the baseline scenario indicates that
intra-port congestion will come back sooner or later in certain maritime ranges,
due to the growth of traffic (see section 3.4). Table 3:
North European Containers Deep Sea Ports Utilisation
2004 (Drewry Shipping Consultants & CLECAT)[41] Port || Capacity Utilisation Le Havre || 89.6% Antwerp || 92.9% Rotterdam || 92.5% Bremerhaven || 95.5% Hamburg || 93.2% Southampton || 99.3% Felixstowe || 77.1% Total average || 86.6% Major hubs ports have
developed strategies to improve their rail and inland waterway hinterland
connections, in line with the ideas of the TEN-T policy. For example, the port
of Rotterdam is developing a rail and inland shipping programme for addressing
the major road transport connectivity challenge posed by the expected growth[42]: "Where currently about 6.8 million TEU travel to and from
Rotterdam across the European continent - mainly by truck - expectations are
that this will increase to 20 million TEU by 2035. By that time, the Port of
Rotterdam Authority will bind customers to move 45 % of their hinterland
transport from the Maasvlakte by inland shipping and 20 % by rail. In the
current modal split, these percentages are respectively 39 % and 13.5 %" A complementary
strategy is to provide cargo streams with attractive multiple alternative
routes in the same catchment area, which requires that all the ports on these
alternative routes offer comparable performance levels. The performance gaps
between ports also undermine the development of short sea shipping, be it
"hub and spoke" operations[43],
Ro-Ro or other forms of short sea shipping (SSS). By avoiding additional cargo
transport in the usually saturated hinterland of the major European hubs, SSS
contributes to sustainable transport. However, SSS requires performing ports at
the two ends. SSS has a greater transport capacity than
road haulage which considerably reduces the costs per cargo. Though, several
factors affect the competitive edge of SSS. The two most commonly accepted are
the complexity of administrative formalities (including customs procedures)
which are different to what applies to the competing intra EU road transport,[44] and the low efficiency of
ports. From an EU-wide perspective, poor performance
of certain ports penalises short sea shipping and multimodal transport solutions
in ports. It also aggravates road transport congestion problems in other ports and
puts strain on long-haul road corridors in the EU (crossings of EU and non-EU
land locked regions). Hence, at several occasions, EU Member States
have stressed[45]
the necessity of more flexible and efficient port services allowing shipping
services to offer frequent sailings at any time, as well as guaranteeing
high-speed operations throughout the logistical chain and a quick turn-around
time for ships in the port: Extract from Council
Conclusion 11-12 December 2006 on Short Sea Shipping (SSS) ·
Promotion should, in
particular, continue urging market players to integrate Short Sea Shipping more
tightly into the whole transport logistics supply chain, inter alia by
developing ports, as strategic nodes, and links to the hinterland, and
services; ·
Ports, as efficient and
seamless nodal points for transhipment between the land and the sea, should
further enhance and improve their services for Short Sea Shipping; work towards
ensuring high-quality services and unrestricted and efficient access to ports from
sea and from the hinterland should continue; 3.1.2. Need to adapt to transport and logistics changes The performance
problem referred to above is compounded by the fact that new transport and
logistics requirements have emerged to which ports need
to adapt. The changes potentially make a part of the existing port capacity
obsolete or require an infrastructure upgrade. In the discussion about the
nature and extent of the problem, stakeholders identified a number of trends
and signals of change that are appearing today and that are expected to become
increasingly significant in the future. Those trends and signals of change (see
also section 3.4) are: ·
Increased size and complexity of the fleet, in
particular ultra-large container ships, but also new types of Ro-Ro ferries and
gas-carriers. The bigger ships pose a challenge of high peak capacity when
delivering more cargo/boxes or (dis)embarking a high number of passengers in a
single visit. For instance the new ship “Marco-Polo” owned by CMA in operation
since November 2012 has a capacity of 16,000 containers and a length of 396 m.
Maersk has ordered 20 ships for 2015 with a capacity of 18,000 containers. This
is the equivalent of a theoretical loaded train of 280 km (distance between
Rotterdam and Dusseldorf). ·
Deployment of bigger vessels for short sea
shipping and feeder services, with new needs in terms of energy efficiency,
alternative bunkering fuels and environmental performance (LNG, cold ironing[46]). ·
Trends in logistics and distribution systems
that attract more value added services within a port's area (relevant to the
rules for competition within the port and for charging schemes). ·
Significant changes in the energy trades, with a
shift from oil and oil refined products towards gas; need for significant
gasification facilities in ports; potential volumes of dry biomass and CO2
transport and storage; shore-side electricity supply. These changes place intense pressure in
terms of infrastructure and investments: extension of berth, quay, deepening of
basins and canals, reconfiguration to enable manoeuvring of larger ships. They
require new facilities and operational procedures: cranes, new passenger
terminals etc. However, public funding has become scarcer as a result of the
economic crisis; hence the need to focus public funds on the most efficient port
investment projects. Moreover since as a result of the recession, the return on
investments of private funding may be lower than expected[47], ports may appear as a less attractive venue for financial firms. Lastly, port capacity should ideally be
available where it is needed, including in response to changes in inland
distribution and ship call patterns that may occur. Therefore, capacity needs
to be available at a wide range of locations for matching evolving demand
needs, possibly with fluctuations of traffic between ports, creating occasional
surplus and shortages in capacities. 3.2. Underlying
drivers of the problem Three main
underlying drivers of the problem have been identified: 1) port services and operations
in some TEN-T seaports are suboptimal; 2) the current port governance framework
in some TEN-T seaports does not provide enough incentives to attract
investments and 3) inadequate connections with the hinterland, notably by rail
and inland waterways. Problem driver (3) is already addressed by the above
mentioned TEN-T and CEF proposals, and by the new cohesion policy (better
planning of interventions by cohesion and structural funds). Therefore, it is
not further analysed in this report. Other potential problem drivers such as persisting
credit restrictions, curtailing private investments, leading to a technological
standstill in the coming years, either go beyond the immediate regulatory
intervention scope of the EU or are already covered by other EU initiatives not
related to transport. They are therefore not further considered in this impact
assessment. Therefore, the section below presents
evidence for the remaining underlying drivers 1) and 2). It does not imply that
those drivers are present or have the same extent in every port. Nevertheless,
each of them can be illustrated with concrete cases. The root causes of each of
these drivers developed below are linked to typical regulatory and market
failures which explains that self-regulation cannot provide a solution. 3.2.1. Suboptimal
port services and operations in some TEN-T seaports Ports provide a chain of services.
Suboptimal port services prevent the chain from operating in an efficient way.
They prevent the network as a whole from functioning efficiently and to cope
with the expected changes in transport demand. Port capability and efficiency
can greatly influence the decision for locating a plant or distribution centre,
and often determine whether a local producer can compete globally or regionally
with other producers. The challenge is for ports to relate to the needs of
their customers and assist them in improving their competitive positions by
providing cost-efficient port services and by contributing to the sustainable
development of the transport chain. On the basis of discussions with
stakeholders, evidence collected through the business surveys (opinions of
users of port services) and academic research, the instances of suboptimal port
services can be attributed to three main root causes: (1) weak competitive
pressure in the port services market resulting from market access restrictions
(2) market abuses by port service providers with special or exclusive rights
and (3) administrative burden due to lack of coordination within ports. Table 4 below gives a stakeholder's
appreciation of the price and quality of the port services. Although the
results only reflect perceptions and do not yield general conclusion applicable
to all ports, they clearly point out a degree of dissatisfaction in certain
seaports. Table 4:
problems identified by stakeholders per type of services in EU ports (PwC, 2013) 3.2.1.1. Root cause 1: Weak competitive
pressure in the port services market resulting from
market access restrictions Competitive
pressure means that port operators have to make a constant effort to satisfy
users' needs. Such competition helps to facilitate specialisation because
competitors are competing under the same conditions. Specialisation in turn helps
to improve cost efficiencies. However, the extent of this intra-port
competition can be limited by market access restrictions: Market
access restrictions National
legislation, regulatory authorities or port authorities may limit de jure
or de facto the possibilities of market entry. It can be linked to
reasons of lack of space limiting the number of operators (e.g. terminals) or
because certain activities are considered to be public services (imposing
safety requirements e.g. pilotage). It can also be linked to state monopolies,
historical contracts with incumbent operators, and/or existence of restricted
professions. Examples known[48] from complaints or reports
from stakeholders include: ·
Monopolistic rights with a long standing
history, notably for technical-nautical services (pilotage, boatmen and towage).
In some Member States the providers of those services fall under the category
of regulated professions with long standing exclusive rights. The possibility to
create new SMEs and jobs for those services (or for innovative services closely
related) is seriously restricted or does not exist at all. ·
Discretionary decisions of a public authority to
grant or deny access to the port to a provider of port services or to impose
disproportionate requirements. In certain Member States, market access often
follows a “close door” negotiation: interested parties do not have even notice
of the market opportunity. Appeals and complaints against such unilateral
decisions are costly, take very long and often rejected because the local legislation
authorises such decisions by port authorities. ·
Denial of fair access to land in the port,
assignation of a less favoured part of the port or lack of legal certainty on
the authorisation granted by the port authority, i.e. possibility to impose unilateral
changes or revoking access decisions without appeal procedures. Table
5 gives a broad indication of the presence of legal/regulatory market access
restrictions for different ports services in EU ports. The 2012-2013 survey
indicates de jure restrictions in 32% of the cases (for bunkering) and 85%
(pilots). They also vary across Member States and even within Member State. Table 5:
Share of respondents indicating limitations to competitions by law/regulation (PwC,
2013) Degree of
competition in the market Table 6 presents the share of ports where
more than one operator provides a particular service. Figures are broken down
by type of service. Intra-port competition is low in
pilotage (only 12%) and not frequent for other technical-nautical services. By
contrast, services indicated with a higher competitive
pressure are bunkering (54%) and passenger services
(48%). On cargo handling, although some market access restrictions were
indicated (table 5), services are often provided in a competitive environment
(64% of responding ports – table 6), and inter-port competition also often
applies in this case. Annex II gives examples of the
number of operators in key major ports. Competition for the market In
the 2012 PwC Survey, port authorities were asked to describe the awarding
process for the operation of main terminals and for port services: it was
reported that the same port can have several different procedures in place to
award contracts (e.g. for different terminals, operational areas, port
services). Especially in the event where different awarding procedures are used
for terminal awarding or service contracts, this puts the level-playing field
into question and presents a possible distortion of competition. It is to be noted
that, in certain Member States, port land rental or lease contracts can be
granted by public authorities to commercial operators without following public
procurement or concession rules. Table 6:
Presence of more than one operator per type of service (PwC, 2013) Stakeholders' point of view Port authorities,
port services providers and terminal operators recognise that market entry barriers
exist. However, they reckon that for a number of services it may be justified
and that in any case the lifting of these barriers is a matter for national
competence. By contrast, shipping lines do not agree and consider that the freedom
of service principle should be introduced. 3.2.1.2. Root cause 2: Market abuses
by port service providers in monopolistic or oligopolistic positions A wide range of potential abuses of market
power can occur in ports as a result of the many instances of market access
restrictions described in the previous section and notably the exclusive rights
or special rights granted by the State or the port authorities. A notorious
abuse is the obligation to pay for pilotage services when entering the port
even if the service is not needed and/or effectively provided. Market abuses can also stem from de
facto monopolistic or oligopolistic positions facilitated and /or
reinforced by various degrees of integration between infrastructure providers
and port users[49]
and the difficulty to have access to facilities which are essential to provide
port services[50]. Some examples of market
power abuse practices[51]
are, inter alia: ·
Excessive pricing to users, i.e. charging a price which is excessive
because it has no reasonable relation to the economic value of the product
supplied (ECJ definition) ·
Refusal to supply,
i.e. refusing access to the port to an operator involved in commercial
passenger or freight shipping. ·
Favourable treatment to incumbent operators,
including subsidies: incumbent operators can
receive particularly advantageous conditions, for example lower fees for port
land lease contracts, obtain the best locations in the port or receive public
subsidies for supporting their commercial activities. In practice, this has
led to complaints and even court proceedings by the national competition
authorities or the Commission. There is substantive case law in terms of
Commission Decisions' and Court of Justice judgements' on market abuses. Some
examples: ·
Italy: cargo-handling monopoly, Port of Genova[52] ·
France: refusal of access to LNG Terminals, Port
of Fos[53] ·
Germany: refusal to supply, Port of Puttgarden[54] ·
Sweden: excessive pricing, Port of Helsingborg[55] ·
Portugal: Tug services cartel, Port of Setubal[56] However,
in many other cases, abuses linked to the exclusive or special rights of port
operators cannot be easily legally challenged. Complaints are costly and time
consuming for the potential complainants, in particular SMEs. Moreover, in
absence of secondary EU legislation implementing the principle of freedom to
provide services in the port sector cannot be used to avoid abuses of monopolistic
practices. Stakeholders'
point of view Stakeholders
recognise that, in some EU ports, market abuses by regulators, policy-makers or
port authorities can occur. On one hand, port authorities and incumbent
terminal operators consider that port service providers must keep a discretionary
power in the management of the service, including the definition of price. In
their view, competition authorities are already now well placed to intervene.
On the other hand, port service users and would-be new entrants highlight that
in absence of EU legislation, abuses cannot be easily challenged. 3.2.1.3. Root cause 3: Users face
excessive administrative burden due to lack of adequate coordination The
main causes of excessive administrative burden in ports that are usually
mentioned are: ·
the effect of cumulative regulation
(international/EU, national and local sources) touching on different aspects of
the port activity; ·
lack of harmonisation of interfaces and between
ports and ships and a lack of regulatory harmonisation at EU level; ·
conflicting goals: e.g. trade facilitation vs. law
enforcement, port revenue collection vs. available human resources, etc. and ·
a lack of coordination between different
administrations and poor interaction between the public and private sector
agents within ports. Below an
illustration[57]
of the excessive administrative burden: “The survey demonstrates that as many as 150 separate
actions may be needed to get a ship into a port, perform cargo operations and
sail to the next port, many of which must be carried out in the very short
timeframe allowed by the vessel’s schedule. Any delay in the progress of the
port call, compliance with statutory requirements or arranging the delivery or
collection of the cargo can have a significant effect on the cost of the call
(and thus on the overall voyage) and on the vessel’s subsequent employment.
There is very little consistency in the way these functions are handled – at
the international, regional and even local level”. The Commission will tackle issues related
to the further simplification of customs procedures for intra-EU freight
traffic in EU ports by means of the upcoming initiative on "Blue
Belt"[58].
The Commission is also working on issues related to the inter-connection and/or
inter-operability of port IT systems in the context of the so-called "e-maritime"
initiative[59].
However, those initiatives do not touch on
the issue of lack of coordination of different activities that are part of the
same chain of services within the port. Some EU ports make pro-active efforts
to facilitate users' needs in terms of administrative simplification,
introducing quality standards and customer care departments. However, the PwC
Survey reveals that while good practices exist (e.g. DK, NL, UK) there is
serious lack of coordination between different administrations in too many EU ports
(see table 7). To tackle similar issues in airports, EU
legislation[60]
has introduced the requirement of giving users the
possibility to exchange information and ideas and allow the concerns of
interested parties to be raised and taken into account by the airport
authorities on important decisions such as charging. Such committees provide customer orientation and a
flexible coordination instrument by means of which port authorities and administrations
listen to the users and users can interact to combine their activities to
provide a better service to final users. Costs
resulting from unnecessary administrative burden in ports are extremely
difficult to estimate. The following table summarises the overall views
resulting from the business survey (opinions of users) carried out in the
context of the public consultation> Table 7:
Users views on coordination of administrative requirements in EU ports (PwC, 2013) || North Sea || Atlantic || Baltic Sea || West Med || East Med || Black Sea Shippers / Freight forwarders || + + + || || + + || + + || + || + Shipping Companies || + + + || + || + || + + || + || + Other logistic operators || + + + || + + || + || + + || + || + + + + : “Users friendly”, i.e. good coordination, transparent procedures, customers consultation structures + + : Lack of coordination, relatively transparent procedures, occasional consultation + : Lack of coordination, uncertainty of results (time required), no consultation Stakeholders' point of view Stakeholders (users
of port services and certain port authorities) largely agree on the three
causes of administrative burden. They estimate that the administrative
complexity can be effectively addressed by improving the coordination of
services and procedures inside the port. 3.2.2. Port governance frameworks not attractive enough for
investments in all TEN-T seaports In order not to put
at risk a more efficient, interconnected and sustainable TEN-T and cope with
the expected traffic changes, ports need optimised port services (driver 1), but
also new investments (driver 2). To attract these investments, the right
governance frameworks must be in place, which does not seem to be the case for
all ports. According to
projections carried out[61], the port infrastructure required to meet future demand would
require 12% of total infrastructure investments (from € 150 to € 200 billion)
until 2030. There are regional variations, e.g. the Baltic region shows a need
for start-up investments, whilst the North Sea and Mediterranean regions
require strong investments in modernisation schemes. For the period 2015-2030,
the overall funding needs for maritime transport infrastructures could easily
exceed € 100 billion just to maintain current capacity levels. European Port Authorities
have expressed very serious concerns about the investment gap that looms in the
coming years as a result of the difficult state of public funding in the Member
States, the reductions of the funds allocated for transport infrastructures in
the EU financial perspectives 2014-2020[62] and
the consequences of the economic crisis on private funding availability. The current context
of scarce public funding imposes a higher selectivity in granting public funds
to port investments[63]. It will demand more than ever a careful scrutiny to avoid waste of
scarce resources and distortions of competition between ports arising from
public subsidies (see report of the Court of Auditors – Annexe II). The fact that
current port governance frameworks do not provide enough incentives to attract
investments in all TEN-T seaports can be explained by several "root
causes": 1) inadequate infrastructure planning and poor strategic planning
and ex-ante cost benefit analysis procedures (this cause is highlighted in the
report of the European Court of Auditors 2013[64]), 2)
market access restrictions which may deter investors (see root cause 1 above),
3) unclear financial relations between public authorities, port authorities and
port services providers and 4) weak autonomy of ports to define infrastructure
charges and non-transparent link with costs. The last two root causes are
further explained below. 3.2.2.1. Root cause 4: Unclear
financial relations between public authorities, port authorities and providers
of port services Transparency is a
necessary precondition to attract investments, even if not sufficient[65]. Transparency, together with
non-discrimination and a level playing field, is one of the key policy
requirements for a sound and stable investment environment offering a lower
degree of uncertainties on profit returns for all. Transparent information on
how port authorities use public funds is a critical determinant in the investment
decision of port services providers by contributing to a better predictability.
It is especially important for small and medium sized enterprises that tend to
face particular challenges to entering the market. In many occasions,
the Commission and others have expressed the view that the current level of
transparency in the port sector is inadequate to trace flows and uses of public
funding within port entities, which are, at the same time, engaged in both port
management and commercial activities within ports. The financial transparency
problem appears at two different levels: -
The flow of public funding from the national, regional
or local authority to the managing body of the ports: i.e. how much public
funding is received; -
The use of that funding by the managing body of
the port: i.e. allocation of public funds to support both statutory "public
authority" functions and provision of port services, i.e. possible
cross-subsidization of incumbent port service providers Use of subsidies to ensure the viability of
incumbent port service providers means a de facto market barrier for new
entrants and investors. For instance cross-subsidies can artificially decrease
the incumbent’s costs and allow the incumbent to undercut the newcomer’s
prices. More in general, the
ability to absorb losses and cross-subsidize operations within the port impacts
the balance and intensity of competition: it discourages new entrants, who have
to over-invest to be present in the market, reduces the competitive pressure to
improve efficiency of incumbent operators and leads to distortions in the
allocation of investment resources[66].
A Commission study
on the public funding of European ports[67]
concluded that, in absence of reporting and accounting obligations, it is not
possible to ascertain both the volume of funds granted to ports and the use of
those funds in the port for public functions and commercial operations. The
problem was largely confirmed by a 2011 study carried out by the European Parliament[68]. Although Directive
2006/111/EC[69]
on the transparency of financial relations between Member States and public
undertakings already imposes minimum requirements in terms of transparency, it
only applies to undertakings with an annual turnover higher than €40 million.
According to the PwC 2013 survey, only 36% of ports analysed exceed this
threshold. Even on the core network, the survey indicates that only half of
them would fall in the scope of the Directive. Further analysis indicates that
while 79% of TEN-T ports are involved in at least one port service, a
significant share has no separate account which could allow possible distortive
state aids to be identified or traced. As such, addressing the existence of
state aid and its compatibility with the EU state aid rules is rather
complicated. See table 8. Table 8: TEN-T Ports accounting practices, Source DG MOVE
based on PwC Survey (2013) & ESPO (2010) Port Accounting Practice || % of ports Ports applying the Financial Transparency Directive (€ 40 million turn-over)* || Less than 50%[70] Ports not keeping separate accounts from the Public Administration || Around 20% Ports not keeping accounts according to accounting standards || More than 40% Ports not required to audit accounting by external experts || More than 40% Ports not publishing annual accounts || More than 40% Port Authorities involved in the provision of port commercial services || More than 95% Ports not applying internal analytical accounting to activities and services || More than 40% Stakeholders’ point of view Several stakeholders,
including most port authorities, point to the lack of financial transparency.
It gives rise to suspicion and recrimination between ports, be it justified or
not, about unfair competition between ports encouraged by Member States public
funding practices. 3.2.2.2. Root cause 5: Weak autonomy
of ports to define infrastructure charges and non-transparent link with costs Efficient pricing is a prerequisite for
making efficient infrastructure investments (Winston, 1991). While public ports should aim to maximize
user welfare, given the growth in demand, they may need to evaluate their pricing
approach in order to reduce the financial burden and consider the competition
with private ports. This section highlight that current
infrastructure charges cannot always be set autonomously by port authorities
and that they rarely reflect real costs in an efficient way. Similarly, port
dues do not always send the correct price signals which incentivise users to
take into account their external costs[71].
Autonomy of port authorities in setting
port infrastructure charges There is broad academic transport research[72] suggesting that port
authorities should be allowed to have autonomy in terms of obtaining revenues
from their activity as port managers in order to use those resources in a more
pro-active management approach. Port dues form the most important source of
operating income (see table 9). A wide autonomy for setting general port dues
help port authorities to design optimised pricing policies which accommodate
both their own commercial and investment strategies. In a survey carried out on behalf of the
Commission in 2011, it was found that 34% of ports have no responsibility for
setting ship and port infrastructure charges. This for example because port
charges can be 1) unilaterally imposed by public authorities independently of
the use of infrastructure, 2) retributions, or simply prices, i.e. charges for
commercial ports. Only 48% set and approve the charges in a full autonomous
manner ("Study of the public funding of port infrastructure", NEA,
2011). Moreover, the indicative relative weight of the port dues in the total
port operation cost ranges from 5 to 10% (see table 1). Table 9: Average operating incoming profile of European port
authorities (ESPO Fact Finding report, 2011) Income source || Average % Income from general port dues || 49% Income from land lease or similar || 25% Income from services || 16% Other income || 10% Efficient
pricing of port infrastructure The
principles of port public infrastructure pricing have been extensively
discussed in transportation economics[73].
Pricing strategies, such as lowering charges (port dues or terminal handling charges or
both) in order to compete against other ports, can be used to boost port’s
competitive positions. Ultimately the pricing scheme should correspond to
market conditions and to counter competition, stimulate market growth and
improve profitability (Yap et al., 2011). There is no fundamental difference
between investments in port infrastructure and other capital-intensive
investments in industrial complexes. Therefore, there should be no reason for
adopting a completely different approach to port investments, and consequently
no reason why direct users should not bear the costs of such investments. Moreover,
the introduction of market principles in infrastructure pricing would be the
most effective remedy to avoid the risk of creating wasteful overcapacity and
possible distortions of trade flows (except in the case of pricing maritime
access and protection infrastructure). An illustrative case: In January 2013,
German port operator,
Eurogate, has confirmed that it is pushing ahead with legal action against
harbour dues at Wilhelmshaven’s JadeWeserPort, the port authority of Germany's
newest container terminal at the country's only deep sea water port. Eurogate,
complaints JadeWeserPort authority’s decision to grant allegedly up to a 70%
rebate on dues for the first 18 months, followed by a 50% rebate for the
following six years to Eurogate competitors. See: http://www.portfinanceinternational.com/categories/regulation-policy/item/663-eurogate-confirms-legal-battle-at-wilhelmshaven,-germany-s-newest-port There is no uniform model, even within Member
States. The most frequently used criteria in TEN-T ports for establishing port
charges are (a) the type, size (gross tonnage) and/or cargo capacity of the
vessel, (b) the type and volume of cargo and (c) the time in port. Other
criteria are judged to be "rather complex, un-transparent and
archaic"[74].
The evidence collected suggests that in many
ports, the criteria used to establish charges and rebates or discounts on those
charges is seen to be based on arbitrary decisions[75]. The PwC survey shows that, in
many cases, port charges appear to be fixed and altered with rebates depending
on market developments, according to variations in charges in competing ports.
This has occasioned many debates[76]
on allegedly covert subsidising, predatory pricing and possible distortion of
competition between neighbouring ports and/or operators in those ports. Lack of incentives rewarding
environmental efforts[77] The
past years have seen increasing concerns on the environmental impact of maritime
transport, in particular air pollution[78].
Ships that call at ports are a major source of air pollutants such as CO2, SO2 and NOx. The health
effects impacting the residents surrounding major ports (respiratory diseases,
cardiovascular diseases, lung cancer and premature mortality) and distorting
the natural ecosystem are well documented[79].
Traffic growth means that those external costs risk increase unless there is
significant change in ships’ fuels and propulsion technologies. An EU and
international regulatory approach has been implemented as regards the sulphur
content of fuel, the waste management[80]
and more recently the provision of LNG fuel in core ports[81]. However, economic incentives,
including by means of differentiated port dues, can be used to reward
compliance with standards/practices not binding yet or to encourage innovative
cleaner solutions. In a voluntary
manner, some European ports have set up such rewarding schemes. Discounts on
port charges of up to 10% can be granted based on participation in the
Environmental Ship Index scheme[82]
(Belgium, France, Germany and the Netherlands), of 20% based on the Green Award
certificate[83]
(Latvia, Lithuania, the Netherlands and Portugal), or 50% though rebates linked
to NOx/SOx emissions or via levying a sulphur fee
(Sweden). With few exceptions,
such practices are limited to a number of ports. Some stakeholders put forward
that, in absence of a common framework, port charges variations resulting from
those schemes can entail discrimination and/or unfair commercial practices
between ports. It was also argued that the environmental rebates are usually too
small and that there is a lack of consistent application at regional level. As
a result, environmental differentiation is more seen as part of the port
marketing strategy than an effective tool to influence the fleet composition. By contrast, port
charging encouraging short sea shipping, with rebates exceeding 50% in certain
ports (notably transhipment operations for which the market is highly volatile)[84] seems to be widely used in
large parts. They contribute to attract a high level of feeder services which
provide the fine distribution within the region. Although contributing to the
White Paper objective to develop shorts-sea shipping, those schemes - which are
based on the origin and the destination of the vessels - may raise legal
uncertainties as to their compatibility with the TFEU, notably Article 18 which
prohibits any discrimination on ground of the nationality and therefore
possibly on ground of the origin or the destination of the vessel. Stakeholders' point of view Stakeholders, both users
and providers of port services agree that greater financial autonomy of port authorities
could contribute to better use of resources and more performing, customers' oriented
ports. 3.2.3. Linking
the problem to its drivers and root causes Table 10: Links
between the main problem, its drivers and root causes General problem: Structural performance gaps in some TEN-T seaports; need to modernise ports to new transport and logistics requirements at a moment of scarce public funding. || Root causes Driver 1: Sub-optimal port services and operations in some TEN-T seaports || Root cause 1: Weak competitive pressure in the port services market resulting from market access restrictions Root cause 2: Market abuses by port service providers with exclusive or special rights Root cause 3: Users face excessive administrative burden due to a lack of coordination within ports Driver 2: Port governance frameworks not attractive enough for investments in all TEN-T seaports || Root cause 4: Unclear financial relations between public authorities, port authorities and providers of port services Root cause 5: Weak autonomy of port authorities to define infrastructure charges and non-transparent link with costs 3.3. Who
is affected by the problem? Table 11: Affected parties and their key interests Stakeholder || Description || Key interests Port Authorities || Public or private bodies that own and/or manage the ports || Developing the port in the context of a national, regional or local policy and/or maintaining profitability of the ports. A level playing field for inter-ports competition Port dependent businesses & operators || Business and operators dependent on access to the port, e.g. terminal operators, stevedoring pools || Maintaining profitability and employment; legal certainty and a fair level playing field for intra-port competition Port workers || Human resources of port authorities and port dependent business and operators || Pay and employment conditions, health and safety in the workplace, training and professional careers Shipping sector || Shipping companies providing EU and international seaborne trade & maritime passenger services || Cost-efficient and reliable port services (cargo-handling, technical nautical services, port environmental services, passenger services) Sector regulators || National, regional and local bodies regulating ports || Ensuring an efficient, effective and practical management framework that balances a wide range of stakeholder needs Freight forwarders and shipping agents || Agents and logistic companies organising or facilitating freight trade exchanges intra-EU and with world markets || Availability, cost, quality and reliability of ports services Maritime passengers || Citizens travelling by sea (ferry crossings, cruise-ships) || Availability, cost, quality and reliability of ports services EU industries || Businesses depending on maritime transportation for their supply needs and for their exports, covering a very broad range of industrial sectors || Availability, cost, quality and reliability of ports services Final consumer || Citizens benefiting from the choice, availability and prices of goods delivered by sea-borne trade || Availability, cost, quality and reliability of ports services Tax payers || Citizens indirectly providing public funding to ports || Sound use of resources, economic and social returns, opportunity costs 3.4. Application of EU horizontal
instruments (Internal market and competition rules) Over the years, the
Commission has received complaints about abusive restrictions imposed to port
operators by the national authorities (port regulatory regimes) and abuses of
dominant position by incumbent operators. In a number of cases, the Commission
has carried out an investigation to examine compliance of regulatory regimes
with the EU Internal market, transport and Competition rules (acquis in the
transport sector). However, in absence of EU port legislation implementing the
freedom to provide services; those complaints could not be systematically
followed up. This lack of reaction could have led interested parties to desist
from presenting new cases to the Commission. Moreover, throughout the consultation process a distinct aversion by
port users to declare distortions and abuses was noted. Users fear that in the
future they would be discriminated and have to suffer delays and lower quality
of service. Ports are full of situations of “delicate balance”, whereby
problems are settled by some sort of “ad-hoc facilitation” and rarely become
public. Complaints in cases of abuse require long litigation, often impossible
for SMEs for which the procedure is too long and costly. Big companies with
bargaining power can enter into bilateral agreements with port authorities,
without concerns about possible anti-trust limitations. The application of
competition rules in the port sector was examined by the OECD in 2011[85]. The OECD report shows that many of the national competition
authorities recognise the need for sector specific rules to provide legal
certainty to all operators, reduce the scope for abuses, pursue complaints and
redress situations more effectively. In 2012, the Commission
introduced a proposal regarding the granting of concessions by public authorities
in the EU. The proposal will cover concession contracts used in the port
sector. The adoption of the proposal by the European Parliament and Council and
its possible impact in the sector has been taken into account in the baseline
scenario (section 3.5) and in the analysis of options (section 6). Finally, it should be
noted that, in the current situation, there are a number of instruments, such
as the Directive on Financial Transparency of public undertakings that just do
not apply to a significant number of TEN-T ports. Similarly, the Commission's
strategy on the internalisation of external costs foresees sector-specific
instruments on infrastructure charging to be developed but no common EU
horizontal rules. In respect of State Aid, the Commission has announced its
intention to provide clarifications on the notion of State aid in the context
of public financing of infrastructures. There are no sector-specific guidelines
explaining the Commission's approach to the enforcement of State Aid rules in the
port sector. 3.5. How
would the problem evolve, all things being equal This section analyses future developments until 2030 in a scenario that
assumes a status quo of existing policies and already planned policy reforms. The
status quo involves progressive changes both at EU level and in individual
Member States, resulting inter alia, from past reforms at national level and possible
further reforms resulting from the Country Specific Recommendations (European
Semester exercise), the impact of the Directive on Concessions in ports (entry
into force year 2015) or foreseen modernisation of State aid rules. However, the
status quo assumes that those possible reforms will not lead to the establishment of
a level playing field for all TEN-T ports in respect of the problems identified
in sections 3.1 to 3.3. The assessment carried out demonstrates that all things being equal,
the expected transport growth and changes in shipping logistics, combined with
the persisting gap in the performance of ports observed today, would cause
capacity problems and aggravate the un-balanced use of the network, thereby
threatening the good functioning of the internal transport market. According to the traffic projections
updated by IHS-Fairplay in 2010[86] and by
PwC (2013)[87], the overall volumes handled in EU27 ports will grow from 3.6
billion tonnes in 2011 to 5.8 billion tonnes in 2030 in a low growth scenario[88]. EU ports would therefore have to handle 2.2 billion tonnes more
than today, which exceeds the capacity resulting from all the port expansion
projects known at this stage in the EU. These results are consistent with
research[89]. Table 12: EU 2030 port traffic by region of loading/unloading (PWC (2013) Region || Container || Dry Bulk || Liquid Bulk || RoRo || Other Cargo || Total UK/Ireland || 125.74 || 155.43 || 297.49 || 137.46 || 35.26 || 751.39 Nordic || 50.53 || 187.66 || 240.30 || 122.01 || 81.87 || 682.37 South Baltic || 19.91 || 158.09 || 88.92 || 17.68 || 39.39 || 323.98 Hamburg-France || 595.58 || 434.53 || 571.20 || 186.83 || 138.26 || 1,926.40 Iberia || 217.28 || 176.38 || 213.45 || 38.34 || 50.98 || 696.44 Italy/Malta || 179.00 || 112.67 || 261.87 || 80.05 || 64.24 || 697.83 Balkan/Aegean || 120.80 || 156.28 || 122.21 || 50.50 || 128.72 || 578.51 Black Sea || 8.22 || 69.73 || 28.90 || 1.53 || 37.81 || 146.19 Total || 1,317.06 || 1,450.77 || 1,824.34 || 634.40 || 576.53 || 5,803.11 Port Traffic in the container sector will
be higher than in the bulk sectors. When taking container capacity evolution as
a proxy for considering congestion risks in EU ports, it appears that, by 2030,
container traffic growth will exceed 85% i.e. 3.2% year on year growth. On this
basis it is plausible that capacity in EU container terminals will reach
145-155 million TEU based on existing planned developments. The changing
requirements of shipping companies will also dictate that some existing
capacity becomes obsolete. With demand at 149 million TEU in 2030 and capacity
also reaching 145-155 million TEU, it can be demonstrated that the
supply/demand utilisation rate will reach the congestion threshold of 80%
before 2030, and by 2030 the utilisation rate will exceed 95% in some regions. Uncertainty in forecasting vs. market
trends Those projections must be taken with
caution because of the multiple underlying assumptions (see Annex VII for the
detailed modelling assumptions). New developments related, for example, to the
introduction of new or raising trade barriers would have a direct negative
impact on sea-borne transport and ports' activity in the EU. Conversely,
further world trade liberalisation would entail much higher figures on demand
for port services. The baseline scenario assumes that the current state of
affairs will prevail: it does not consider sensitive analysis about possible
trade agreements Nevertheless, it can reasonably be
concluded, in consistency with other studies and common experts’ opinion,
notably the “Logistic Performance Index” (LPI) elaborated by the World Bank[90], that the trends featuring the main problem (see section 3.1)
will be aggravated: Firstly, there is a threat of port
congestion in a number of areas, in particular the North Sea and Baltic Sea
regions in the horizon 2020-2030. The congestion in their hinterland will cause
longer delays at the access links to a number of major ports. Those delays will
paradoxically increase the marginal transport costs of reaching the performing
port regions. They will have a knock-on effect on higher fuel costs and road
transport externalities while increasing the transport cost for and to
peripheral countries[91]. Secondly, the current geographical polarisation of the EU trade flows to a
limited number of major ports will be accentuated, in spite of their
hinterlands already being largely saturated. Thirdly, the congestion in the ports
reaching their limit in several geographical areas and the low performance in
others will undermine the shift of road freight transport to maritime links
which need uncongested and performing ports at both ends. This will put at risk
the broader goal of the Transport White Paper on shifting 30% of long distance
road freight transport to other modes such as rail or waterborne transport by 2030.
Fourthly, achieving the goals of the
proposed EU legislation[92] on LNG (deployment of alternative fuels infrastructure, adopted in
2013) will put additional investment pressure[93] in the
TEN-T Core network ports. Moreover, this framework could be a missed opportunity
for the economic development of certain areas. Shortcomings on ports
performance have effects on prices and supply of goods,[94]
particularly when the port in question is the source of a significant share of
global supply. As such, this could affect the
competitiveness of European industries. 3.6. Does
the EU have the right to act? 3.6.1. Legal basis The
right to act for the EU in the field of transport is set out in the Treaty on
the functioning of the European Union (TFEU). According to Article 4 TFEU, the
EU has shared competence with the Member States in the area of transport (Title
VI TFEU). Article 58 TFEU stipulates that the freedom to provide services in
the field of transport shall be governed by the provisions of
the Title relating to transport. In this respect, article 100 TFEU states that
the European Parliament and the Council, acting in accordance with the ordinary
legislative procedure, may lay down appropriate provisions for sea transport[95]. As far as
public service obligations (PSOs) are concerned, Article 14 and Protocol 26 of the
Treaty confirm the place occupied by services of general economic interest in
the shared values of the Union. Article 106(2) of the Treaty lays down that
undertakings entrusted with the operation of services of general economic
interest are subject to the rules contained in the Treaty, in particular to the
rules on competition, in so far as the application of such rules does not
obstruct the performance, in law or in fact, of the particular tasks assigned to
them. In this respect, the initiative presented will not go further than
allowed by the Treaty and will not impinge upon Member States' right to define
PSOs. At present, the Treaty, case law of the
Court of Justice and secondary multi-sectorial rules create an EU legal
framework applicable to ports, even if there is no EU transport specific
legislation regarding ports. Under these circumstances it is reasonable to
presume that sector specific measures adequately implementing the Treaty
principles in the sector and providing a more comprehensive and legally certain
framework are of genuine common interest. 3.6.2. Subsidiarity Article 5 TFEU states that,
every Union action should respect the principles of subsidiarity: Necessity
test The
legitimate rights of Member States to take actions which reflect their local,
regional or national specificities, must not unduly restrict the proper
functioning of the internal transport market. In the port sector, a level
playing field for the provision of port services is necessary taking account
that (2010 statistics) only 10% of the seaborne trade in the EU is national
(trade within a member state), compared to 26% and 63% for respectively
intra-EU trade (trade between member states) and extra-EU trade (trade with
third countries). Moreover, the main TEN-T ports play a role that goes largely
beyond national borders: 61% of the freight (tonnes) handled in EU ports has
its origin or destination in another Member State[96]. It
is therefore necessary to provide rules at Union level in order to ensure the
functioning of the internal transport market, an efficient and sustainable use
of the TEN-T and its financial instruments (CEF, Cohesion Fund). The past has proven that action at national or lower level -
even when the Commission has provided guidance in the form of recommendations
(cf. 2007 EU Ports Policy Communication) - has not been sufficient to tackle
the identified problem. Market access restrictions and market abuses continue
to exist in several European ports. Similar conclusions can be drawn for the
transparency in financial relations between public authorities, port
authorities and port service providers, and the autonomous setting of
transparent and efficient port infrastructure charges. Also in relation to
excessive administrative burden due to a lack of coordination within ports, not
all Member States have managed to tackle this issue. EU added
value test With regard to the
European added value test, it is clear that the proposed action can be better
achieved at Union level than at national level. The port sector is heavily
exposed to international competitive pressure. Therefore, Member States have
always been reluctant to induce structural changes in the functioning of their
ports' system, as to avoid undesirable reactions of the maritime industry
prompt to move assets at short notice. By acting at the EU level, this risk can
be mitigated. Moreover, the EU has the possibility to act for achieving a true
internal market for transport and an efficient TEN-T, implementing a
level-playing field for ports and port services which cannot be better achieved
at national level. Implementing adequately the Single Market rules in the
sector would ensure fair allocation of funding resources and an open business
environment promoting a dynamic of modernisation and performance based healthy
competition between ports and between ports service providers. Wide-ranging
academic studies confirm that since the 1990s EU economic integration has
involved a growing inter-dependence of European regions from sea-ports in
distant hinterlands (see, e.g. Notteboom, 2012). The multiplication of pan-EU
corridors brings about a change in the relationship between ports and their
local hinterland. The inland penetration strategy is part of maritime gateways’
objective of increasing their cargo base. On the other hand, interior regions
are recognizing that it is in their interest to establish efficient links to as
many gateways as possible[97]. This strategy not only prevents these regions from becoming captive
to one specific gateway, it also improves the location qualities of these
interior economic centres. Hence, the linking up to more gateways implies more
routing options and flexibility for shippers and logistics service providers
who want to set up business in the region. Other considerations on subsidiarity Finally, a parallel
can be drawn with other transport modes. The port sector is the only transport
sector for which there is almost no EU legislation on issues such as the access
to the market, financial transparency, infrastructure charging and coordination
issues. For example, in the case of aviation and the railway sector such a
European framework does already exist, and the need for EU action was
recognised as being in line with the subsidiarity principle. Therefore,
although the specific nature of the maritime sector and its long-lasting
history and culture is recognised, because of effects of scale and the
international dimension of the sector, the proposed initiative is in line with
the subsidiarity principle. Measures in the different policy packages The measures in the different policy packages have been
chosen in line with the subsidiarity principle. Section 5.2 examines those subsidiarity
aspects for each set of policy measures. 3.6.3. Proportionality The initiative is
focused on TEN-T seaports only. This will ensure proportionality insofar as the
TEN-T seaports deal with 90% of the traffic[98] and by
definition are essential for the international and intra-European trade
exchanges, the functioning of the whole transport network and therefore for the
European internal market and the cohesion within the EU. The scope has not been
further limited to the core ports in order not to risk creating distortions of
competition between core ports and non-core TEN-T ports. As explained in the
problem definition, an efficient functioning of the network requires contribution
from all TEN-T ports. 4. Objectives 4.1. General objective The general objective is to improve
the performance of the TEN-T seaports in order to contribute to the goal of a
more efficient, interconnected and sustainable functioning of the TEN-T. Ports must be
efficient gateways and help develop short sea shipping as part of intermodal
routes, hence contributing to sustainable transport, one of the key goals of
the Transport White Paper and contribute to the EU 2020 strategy for a resource
efficient growth to stimulate growth of trade and cargo. 4.2. Specific
objectives (SO) SO1. Modernise port services and operations in all TEN-T seaports:
by better optimising port services and operations, a number of TEN-T ports
could handle or attract more cargo and passengers with the existing
infrastructure. SO2. Optimise port governance frameworks as to enable a more
attractive investment climate: a greater financial transparency and
autonomy of ports will create a level playing field, encourage more efficient
charging, and eventually attract efficient investments. 4.3. Operational objectives
(OO) OOs linked to modernisation
of port services and operations (SO1) OO1.
Clarify and facilitate access to the port services market: to reduce access restrictions for the port services market
while avoiding the current legal uncertainties stemming from horizontal rules
from the Treaty and on public procurement OO2. Prevent market
abuse by port service providers with exclusive or special rights: to ensure that services which enjoy exclusive or special rights
are provided in a cost-efficient manner while continuing to fulfil their role
and possible their mission of public service, notably in the field of safety,
security and environment OO3. To ensure the
consultation of port users on the main decisions which affect the functioning
of the port in all (100%) TEN-T ports by the end of the implementation date of the
initiative: to facilitate trade for shippers,
logistic operators and cargo-owners, reducing the time and money required for
using the port. The coordination effort should also benefit operators
established in the port, facilitating synergies and avoiding duplication of
efforts for serving the same customers. OOs linked to creation of
framework conditions which attract investments in ports (SO2) OO4. To ensure the transparency in the financial relations between
public authorities, port authorities and port service providers in all (100%)
TEN-T ports by the end of the implementation date of the initiative: to achieve a financial transparency between public
authority functions and commercial operations so that the ports and service
providers do not hold unfair competitive advantages OO5. To ensure that
all (100%) TEN-T port authorities are free to autonomously set their port
infrastructure charges by the end of the implementation date of the initiative,
with the possibility of environmental modulation of the charges: to achieve a more efficient use of infrastructure and more
economic rationality in the planning, investment, maintenance, and operation of
port infrastructures, while enabling environmental price signals The operational
objectives defined above are specific and realistic. However, no concrete
measurable and time-dependent targets can be set for the first two operational
objectives in reason of their nature as catalysers for a more competitive
maritime transport market. Moreover, its effectiveness heavily depends on the
specific approach taken by the most directly concerned stakeholders. An example
is the definition of public service obligations taking account of the
particular circumstances of the port. Furthermore, the degree of market access
will depend on the timing of new contracts that will become operational. It is also not
possible to quantify the potential for market abuse reduction for a certain
time period, as the comparison with the current situation is difficult and
because future action on market abuses will heavily depend on the effectiveness
of the regulatory authorities. More measurable
targets such as an increase of short sea shipping have not been retained, as
these are considered to be impacts of the measures (see 6.1.5) and not as true
operational objectives. The progress towards the operational objectives will
be monitored according to the monitoring indicators (chapter 9). 4.4. Linking
the problem and objectives Table 13: links between the problem and objectives General problem: Structural performance gaps in some TEN-T seaports; need to modernise ports to new transport and logistics requirements at a moment of scarce public funding. || General objective: Improve the performance of the TEN-T seaports in order to contribute to the goal of a more efficient, interconnected and sustainable functioning of the TEN-T Driver 1: Sub-optimal port services and operations in some TEN-T seaports || Specific objective 1: Ensure optimal port services and operation in all TEN-T seaports Root cause 1: Weak competitive pressure in the port services market resulting from market access restrictions || Operational objective 1: Clarify and facilitate access to the port services market Root cause 2: Market abuses by port service providers with exclusive or special rights || Operational objective 2: Prevent market abuse by port service providers with exclusive or special rights Root cause 3: Users face excessive administrative burden due to a lack of coordination within ports || Operational objective 3: To ensure the consultation of port users on the main decisions which affect the functioning of the port Driver 2: Port governance frameworks not attractive enough for investments in all TEN-T seaports || Specific objective 2: Optimise port governance frameworks as to enable a more attractive investment climate Root cause 4: Unclear financial relations between public authorities, ports and providers of port services || Operational objective 4: To ensure the transparency in the financial relations between public authorities, port authorities and port service providers Root cause 5: Weak autonomy of port authorities to define infrastructure charges and non-transparent link with costs || Operational objective 5: To ensure that TEN-T port authorities have a degree of autonomy to set port infrastructure charges with the possibility of environmental modulation of the charges 5. Policy
options The stakeholder
consultation, the stakeholder meetings, independent research and own analysis allowed
the Commission to identify a set of individual measures having the potential to
address the root causes of the problem identified in section 3. The following
process was applied for establishing the policy packages that will be analysed
in later parts of the present report: ·
Identify the policy measures which can be
discarded on the basis of a first preliminary assessment ·
Identify a list of retained policy measures
addressing the problems and respective root causes in full ·
Combine retained measures into policy packages
constituting viable and coherent policy alternatives for achieving the
objectives. 5.1. Discarded
policy measures The Commission
services have identified several policy measures. Some measures were favoured
by some stakeholders, yet contested by other stakeholders and in some cases
contradicted by independent research. Based on a first preliminary assessment,
the Commission services have therefore decided to discard some of these
measures: Reform of the
port labour market In the context of
the public consultation, the main trade unions of port workers have made clear
their frontal opposition to any EU action in this area as it could, according
to them, create social dumping, put at risk jobs and salaries and impact
negatively on working conditions. Important social tensions exist and in the
current climate the Commission considers that such tensions can best be
addressed through the social dialogue. The Commission has already initiated the
necessary steps and a formal European Social Dialogue Committee (SDC) will
start in the first months of 2013. Issues related to exclusive port/dock labour
regimes and practices in some Member States should be discussed, as appropriate,
in the context of this SDC. In full respect of the TFEU rules[99], the working method, priority
of the discussions and possible agreements of the SDC will be discussed with
due regard for the autonomy of the social partners. The Commission will
actively support the social partners, notably through the presentation of the
fact finding study on the EU Port Labour Regimes[100], which includes a detailed
overview of the situation in ports in each of the 22 EU maritime Member States.
Progress in this field will be monitored in the context of the implementation
report referred to in Section 9 of this report. In
these circumstances, legislating in this area before leaving the possibility to
the Social Dialogue to address it would be inopportune (see also Annex X). Generalisation
of the self-handling “Self-handling”
entails companies employing personnel of their own choice to handle their cargo.
The public consultation shows that self-handling is much less an issue for port
users. It may remain an attractive option only for very specific segments like
cars and other Ro-Ro traffic and special or heavy-lift cargo. In the context of
the consultation, the trade unions have vigorously reacted against the
Commission’s alleged intention of permitting self-handling in all ports. In
practice “self-handling” is allowed in ports in several Member States[101]. In other Member States, it
is not allowed (in Belgium, France, Spain or Portugal among others). In
quantitative terms, ship´ “self-handling” practices are of marginal importance
for (most) TEN-T ports[102].
Excluding handling of specialised cargoes (heavy lift) and of vehicles,
self-handling practices would affect less than 0.01% of the operations.
Obliging Member States to allow self-handling has therefore been discarded as
it could be a disproportionate measure given the potentially strong opposition
from stakeholders. Prohibition
of exclusive rights to operate port services, or of in-house services Protocol
n°26 attached to the TFEU on Services of General Interest emphasises the wide
discretionary power left to Member States to define, organise and manage
Services of General Economic Interest. Moreover according to Article 345 TFEU,
the Treaties shall in no way prejudice the rules in Member States governing the
system of property ownership. Measures impinging on these rights would be
illegal and disproportionate. 5.2. List of considered policy
measures The stakeholders'
consultation, the targeted hearings, independent research and own analysis have
allowed the Commission services to identify a broad set of individual measures
having the potential to address the root causes of the problem and objectives
explained above. Those measures can be seen as "market enablers",
i.e. basic requirements enabling healthy competition in an open economic model.
All the proposed measures exist and apply since long time in other transport
sectors covered bu EU legislation – and are a normal practice in many other
economic sectors. Intervention
logic The intervention
logic is that, by providing a level playing field built on those measures,
market dynamics would progressively adress the main problem and its root
causes. Moreover, the intervention logic assumes the parallel implementation of
other EU instruments like the TEN-T and CEF, the support of the Structural
Funds for the development of ports, the concessions, directive, the effective
enforcement of competition law or the progress achieved on port issues through
the Social Dialogue process (cf. base line scenario presented in section 3.5). The tables below
provides a mapping between the retained policy measures and the different root causes
identified earlier in this impact assessment. 5.2.1. Measures
to ensure optimal port services and operation in
all TEN-T seaports Table 14: Root cause 1: Weak competitive pressure in the port services
market resulting from market access
restrictions Measures || Description 1. Freedom to provide services (no restrictions on market access) for "normal services", i-e services other than those linked to Public Services or space constraints || The freedom to provide services applies and relates to the free entry of any service provider established in the EU. Operators would be authorised on the basis of transparent and non-discriminatory criteria. These criteria would be determined, published and made accessible to all by the Member States. 2.Obligation of public tendering for new contracts in the case of public service obligations or space constraints (except for small contracts[103]) || Member States and the port authorities would be allowed to impose restrictions to the freedom to provide services on the grounds of objective reason of space constraint*** or public service obligations**. But in such cases, the Member State or the port authority would need to enter into a contractual arrangement with a port service provider to be selected by means of a transparent public tendering procedure[104] (except for small contracts)*. * The maximum duration of the contracts would have to be linked to the expected economic lifetime of investments. ** Public service obligations would be accepted only for reasons related to safety, security, accessibility and/or availability. *** The lack of space refers to the fact that ports are confined to a limited geographical area and the fact that for certain services it is physically impossible or otherwise disadvantageous to users to entrust more than a limited number of operators. In such a case, the market must be subject to access regulation. 3. Explain in a Commission's Communication how existing Treaty rules apply to port services || In contrast with other measures relying on binding provisions for Member States, this measure would entail a Commission's Communication to explain how the principles of non-discrimination and free establishment result in an obligation of transparency and equal treatment (Court of Justice Teleaustria ruling) and how they can be applied in practice to arrangements/contracts awarded to port service operators. Moreover, the Communication would also explain how horizontal instruments such as the concession directive, the transparency directive, or the future approach to state aid could be better enforced in the port sector. 4. In addition to measure 2, impose the obligation to have at least 2 operators for services linked to space constraints to be selected after a public tender for new contracts (except for small contracts) || In addition to measure 2, in the case of port services subject to space constraints the port authority or the Member State needs to ensure that there are at least 2 competing and independent operators. A public tendering obligation is imposed. 5. Obligation of public tendering in case of substantial changes of existing contracts linked to public service obligations or space constraints || This measure is the same as measure 2 but in addition the obligation of public tendering will also apply in case of substantial modification of existing contracts/arrangements. A substantial modification would entail a modification of a significant value of the contract/arrangement and/or a change of the nature of activity. The proposed measures are in line with the
subsidiarity principle, as the developments over the past years have shown that
member states alone are unable to sufficiently realise
the objectives of the proposed measures, and as the proposed solution can be
better achieved at Union level. This because of the European dimension of the
related problems (e.g. the efficient, interconnected and sustainable TEN-T),
the high exposure to international competitive pressure linked to market access
and market abuse, and the growing inter-dependence of
European regions from sea-ports in distant hinterlands. Table 15: Root cause 2: Market abuses by operators with exclusive/special
rights Measures || Description 6. Confinement for internal operators of port services || In the event that a port or public authority is performing (commercial) port services in-house [as a derogation to the freedom to provide service and the application of a public tendering procedure (cf measures 1,2,3 and 5)], the operation of the service shall be confined to the dedicated port, or group of ports, serviced by the port managing body or the authority, and consequently the internal provider cannot offer the service outside the port or group of ports. This will avoid cases where operators can benefit from potential cross-subsidies or enjoy unfair competitive advantages. 7. Principles of transparency, non-discrimination and proportionality for the price of port services provided by operators in monopolistic position || Derogating from the general rule of freedom to provide service (cf measure 1) could leave the service provided by internal operators or operators with exclusive/special rights with insufficient or non existing competitive pressure. To avoid price abuses, this measure would impose basic principles on pricing, namely proportionality (cost based), transparency and non-discrimination (with possibilities to apply commercial rebates if accessible to all users). The Member State will need to designate a regulatory authority (e.g. an existing competition authority) to deal with complaints by port service users. 8. Principles of transparency, non-discrimnation and proportionality for the price of port services provided by operators in monopolistic position for which no public tender is organised || The measure will be the same as measure 7 except that it would apply only to services for which no public tender applies and therefore for which the market can not be contested at the end of the contract. If the market can not be contested at the end of the contract by means of a public tender, the competitive pressure is indeed weaker. The scope is therefore more limited than measure 7 and focuses on cases where the likelihood of absence of competive pressure is higher. The
measures linked to root cause 2 are in line with the subsidiarity principles
for similar reasons as explained for the measures linked to root cause 1 (see
above). Table
16: Root cause 3: Users face
excessive administrative burden due to a lack of coordination within ports Measures || Description 9. Central Port Coordination || In a free market situation, there is a possible proliferation of port service providers. This will lead to potential conflicts between the different service providers. Therefore, the MS will be obliged to ensure a central port coordination in every port to ensure safe and efficient operations. 10. Port users' committee || A port users' committee would be set up in each port. The committee would facilitate the dialogue between all port actors (users, service providers, authorities, workers) in order to ensure a seamless logistical flow of freight (and passengers) in the port and to and from the hinterland. It would be organised by, but independent from, the port authority. Its precise competences and composition of the committee would be left over to the discretion of the MS or port authority and could include the following: · regular consultative role on the structure and level of port dues · ad-hoc consultative role (at the request of the regulatory authority of measures 7 and 8) on possible (price) abuses of port services · consultative role in the set-up of an administrative simplification plan: the plan could include performance targets (e.g. maximum duration of adminsitrative procedure) and issue recommendations on how to organise and better coordinate administrative procedures for port users. This plan should be based on existing EU legal requirements and recommendations. The measures
related to root cause 3 are in line with the subsidiarity principle as this
root cause of low performance of some ports undermines
the development of short sea shipping and “motorways of the sea” (connecting
ports in different Member States), the functioning of the TEN and therefore the
internal market. Therefore, European action is justified. The justification
for EU action in this field also follows from similar actions in the field of
aviation, where also for airports; the installation of users' committee has
been proposed[105] by the European Commission. Moreover, measure 10 on a port user's committee does not go further
than necessary and is therefore proportionate. By
giving users a consultative role in the main decisions which affect the
functioning of the port, a common practice in some of the most modern and
performing ports (e.g. in the North Sea range) will be extended to other ports
as well. The aim is to stimulate best practices for
better satisfying customer' needs. The European action does not intend to
interfere with internal operational port coordination. The rational is
to ensure that port authorities and administrations listen to the users. Port
authorities will therefore be left free to define the content, objectives and
work methods of the user consultation / coordination. As measure 9 (central
port coordination) is more prescriptive then measure 10 (port users'
committee), measure 9 is less proportionate than measure 10. 5.2.2. Measures
to optimise port governance frameworks as to enable a more attractive
investment climate Table 17: Root cause 4: Unclear financial relations between public
authorities, port authorities and providers of port services Measures || Description 11. Functional/legal separation || Ports would have to define and separate public functions from commercial functions linked to the provision of port services and attribute them to separate legal entities. Obviously, this entails also a full separation of accounts as presented in measure 12, as each of the presented activities would be in a different legal entity. 12. Separation of accounts || The measure would impose two requirements: 1. Port authorities which receive public funds (irrespective of their ownership structure -cf Art 345 TFEU) would keep an accounting system that allows the identification of any financial flow (grants, loans guarantees, equity share etc.) from public authorities to the port authority. 2. The accounting system would have to differentiate between the different types of activities carried out by the port authorities (1) port (public) functions and (2) (commercial) service activities and to differentiate between the different (commercial) services provided in order to reveal possible cross-subsidies*. The accounts will have to be kept at the disposal of the national authorities and the Commission in order to help them to ensure transparency as well as to prevent possible state aids and distortion of competion between port authorities and between port service providers. *Cross-subsidies between various services provided by a port authority would not be unauthorised but making them idenfiable would make it easier to monitor whether they lead to market distortions. 13. Financial transparency between public authorities and port authorities || This measure would impose only the first requirement of measure 12, namely that port authorities which receive public funds keep an accounting system that allows to identify any financial flow from public authorities to the port authority (similarly to Directive 2006/111/EC on the transparency of the financial relationship between public authorithies and public undertakings). The accounts will have to be kept at the disposal of the national authorities and the Commission. The measures linked to root cause 4 are in line with the
subsidiarity principle as transparent financial relations between public
authorities and port authorities and providers of port services are necessary
to ensure a level playing at European level. Unless in all Member States the
same rules on transparent financial relations apply, it will not be possible to
trace possible distortive state aids and cross-subsidisation of port services. Practice has shown that in the current situation, without a European
framework, procedures to investigate the legality of state aid in line with the
TFEU rules, are complex and involve long litigation and costs. The situation is
particularly difficult for SMEs which, often, depend on the port authority
and/or incumbent operators with a dominant position in the port for carrying
out their activity. Therefore, the compliance with European state aid rules in order to
ensure a level playing field can only be guaranteed by a European framework on financial
transparency. As measure 11 (legal/functional
separation) is more prescriptive then measure 12 and 13, measure 11 is less
proportionate. Table 18: Root cause 5: Weak autonomy of port authorities to define
infrastructure charges and non-transparent link with costs Measures || Description 14. Autonomy of the individual ports to set and collect dues || Each port managing body would be free to set the structure and level of the port dues (related to the use of the port infrastructure) as it feels appropriate, according to its own commercial and investment strategy. It should be free to collect the revenues arising from port dues. 15. Transparent, cost-based and differentiated port dues || Binding rules would be introduced to ensure that infrastructure charges respect in a transparent way the principle of proportionality to cost (long term marginal cost-based). Environmental differentiation of charges will be introduced according to objective criteria left to each Member State. 16. Encouraging discounts on port dues based on environmental performance criteria || Ports would be allowed to offer price incentives to cleaner transport (cleaner ships/propulsion/fuels, certain short sea shipping). The Commission would also establish non binding guidelines on how to apply such a variation (e.g. classificaton to be used). 17. Transparency of port due calculation || The prices and calculation methods for port infrastructure access charges related to the public access facility to a port would be made accessible to the port users and the designated authorities. The method would have to indicate the overall cost components and how the total port dues contribute to recover it. The measures linked to root cause 5 are
in line with the subsidiarity principle as the lack of autonomy of port
authorities to define their port infrastructure charges can result in indirect
cross-subsidisation of port investments, and can thus result in possible distortions
of trade flows at European level. In order to ensure a level playing field at
European level, action at Union level is therefore justified. 5.3. Policy
Packages To address the
problem and its root causes in full, four policy packages of measures have
been constructed. Each policy package is composed of a series of measures
addressing the two specific objectives and all of the five operational
objectives. The logic used to construct
the policy packages is to progressively introduce more competition in the port
service market and more autonomy for port authorities, which would also require
more transparency in flows and uses of public funding within port entities, and
in port infrastructure charging to ensure a level playing field. As a result, more
coordination would be needed as this would entail a mutiplication of providers
and port stakeholders. The more open the port market is, the more likely port
charges would reflect marginal costs if set in an autonomous way by the ports. For the sake of
clarity in the impact assessment, only a small number of policy packages has
been retained. Other combination of measures have been eliminated either
because they would have been minor variations of the retained policy packages
without a sufficient significant difference of impact to draw policy
conclusions (e.g. confinement of in-house operators in policy package PP1), or
because they would have been contradictory or inconsistent (e.g. use of soft
law to apply public tendering in combination with obligation to select at least
two operators). Policy package PP2a has been constructed on the basis of policy
package PP2 after more detailed discussions with stakeholders which revealed the
need for additional measures and of this additional combination of measures to
be considered. 5.3.1. Overview of measures proposed
in the policy packages Table 19: Overview of measures and policy packages || PP1 || PP2 || PP2a || PP3 SO1: Ensure optimal port services and operation in all TEN-T seaports OO1: Clarify and facilitate access to the port services market 1. Freedom to provide services: no restrictions on market access for "normal services" i-e services other than those linked to public service obligations or space constraints || || X || X || X 2. Obligation of public tendering for new contracts, except for small contracts, for services with public service obligations or linked to space constraints || || X || X || X 3. Explain in a Communication how existing Treaty rules apply to port services || X || || || 4. In addition to measure 2, impose the obligation to have at least 2 operators selected after public tendering for services linked to space constraints (except for small contracts) || || || || X 5. Obligation of public tendering for substantial changes to existing contracts linked to public service obligations or space constraints || || || X || X OO2: Prevent market abuses by service providers with exclusive/special rights 6. Confinement of internal (public) providers of port services || || X || X || X 7. Principles of transparency, non-discrimnation and proportionality for the price of port services if provided by operators in monopolistic position || X || X || || 8. Principles of transparency, non-discrimnation and proportionality for the price of port services if provided by operators in monopolistic position and for which no public tender applies || || || X || X OO3: To ensure the consultation of port users on the main decisions which affect the functioning of the port in all (100%) TEN-T ports by the end of the implementation date of the initiative 9. Central Port Coordination || || || || X 10. Port user committee || X || X || X || SO2: Optimise port governance frameworks as to enable a more attractive investment climate OO4: To ensure the transparency in the financial relations between public authorities, port authorities and port service providers in all (100%) TEN-T ports by the end of the implementation date of the initiative 11. Functional/legal separation || || || || X 12. Separation of accounts || || X || X || 13. Financial transparency between public and port authorities || X || || || OO5: To ensure that all (100%) TEN-T port authorities are free to autonomously set their port infrastructure charges by the end of the implementation date of the initiative, with the possibility of environmental modulation of the charges 14. Freedom for individual ports to set dues || || || X || X 15. Transparent, cost-based and differentiated dues || || X || || 16. Enabling variations based on environmental performance || || || X || 17. Transparency of port due calculation || X || || X || 5.3.2. Policy
Package 1: “Horizontal Instruments and Transparency” Policy Package 1
(PP1) combines the use of horizontal instruments, a soft measure on market
access and legally binding provisions on the financial transparency, the
intra-port coordination and port infrastructure access charges. PP1 explains
through a non binding Commission's Communication (measure 3), the existing TFEU
rules on non-discrimination and the freedom of establishment and the enforcement
of horizontal instruments such as the concession directive, the transparency
directive or the future approach to state aid in the sector[106]. The Communication would
recall that case law confirms that transparency and an equal treatment of
potential bidders must be ensured: in the case a public authority awards a
contract to a port services provider, there must be adequate publicity. PP1
would also impose some regulatory measures. Since exclusive rights may remain
frequent, the price of port services, in those cases where no competition has
been introduced, would need to be controlled in a transparent way (measure 7)
to prevent possible abuses. The transparency and good functioning would be
guaranteed and coordinated by the port managing body. The port managing body
would organise the consultation and representation of all stakeholders and service
providers in the port users’ committee (measure 10). This port users’ committee
would, amongst others, be consulted on matters relating to the simplification
of the administrative procedures in ports. To ensure the financial transparency
between public and port authorithies, accounts revealing any public funds would
have to be kept available to national and EU competition authorithies (measure
13). The port dues would be transparent and publicly available to all port
users (measure 17). 5.3.3. Policy
Package 2: “Regulated competition” Policy Package 2 (PP2) introduces the freedom to provide services
(measure 1), while leaving to Member States a discretionary margin in deciding
whether to restrict this freedom for objective and transparent reasons related
to the lack of space or reasons of public interest (safety, security,
accessibility and/or environment). In the latter case, the public or port
authority would have to enter into a contractual arrangement with a port
service via a public tendering procedure (measure 2), except in duly justified
cases (e.g. small contracts and urgencies). However the obligation of public
tendering would apply only to future contracts. The separation of accounts (measure
12) would enable the competition authorities to track possible distortive state
aids and cross-subsidies between port services. If the service is provided by
an in-house operator or an operator with exclusive/special right in
monopolistic position, a price regulatory oversight and confinement obligation
would avoid abuses (measures 6 and 7). Improved intra-port coordination would
take place thanks to a port user committee (measure 10). The charging for using
the port infrastructure will be done transparently, according to the actual
costs, and will vary according to the environmental performance of ships or
fuels used (measure 15). 5.3.4. Policy Package 2a: “Reinforced regulated competition and
port autonomy” Policy Package 2a
(PP2a) consists of PP2 with the following differences : ·
Market access would be made slightly easier: the
obligation to have recourse to public tenders in case of space restrictions of
public service obligations would apply not only to new contracts but also to
the substantial changes to existing contracts (measure 5). ·
The regulatory oversight of service providers in
monopolistic position would be more limited in scope: it would only apply to
the markets which can not be contested, i-e the markets for which no public
tender is organised (measure 8). ·
Greater autonomy would be given to ports: on
infrastructure charging, instead of imposing common charging principles, each
port would be given the right to set itself the structure and level of port
dues (measures 14), provided that the charging policy remains transparent
(measure 17). The initiative would also encourage a differentiation according
to the environmental performance of ships or fuels (measure 16). 5.3.5. Policy
Package 3: “Full competition and port autonomy” Policy package 3 (PP3) builds on PP2a by
obliging additionally at least two competing and independent operators for
every port service where the number of operators is limited as a result of
space constraint (measure 4). There would be a functional/legal separation
(measure 11). This separation would result in a multiplication of port actors:
to ensure that the port keeps functioning, strengthening the central
coordination role of the port authorities would be necessary (measure 9). As in
PP2a each port authority would be made free to determine the structure and
level of infrastrustructure charges (measure 14) according its own commercial
practices. Transparency of the charges is not
considered necessary, as the competitive environment will induce enough
pressure to keep the level of the charge at an appropriate level, in line with
the autonomy of the port authority. 5.3.6. Stakeholders
view on policy packages A vast majority of stakeholders agree on the
necessity of a level playing field ensuring the respect of all players of
obligations concerning the transparency of accounts, a fair and transparent
market access mechanism and supervision, in cases of services provided under
monopolistic or oligopolistic regimes, by an independent authority
(essentially, measures considered in packages PP2 and PP2a). Stakeholders remain sceptical about the
effectiveness of a new Communication recalling general principles and exhorting
actors – port authorities, incumbent operators – to respect those principles on
a voluntary basis (PP1). The approach to port infrastructure charging
schemes is controversial, with a significant number of stakeholders being
reluctant to a uniform system imposing cost orientation. Nevertheless, users of
port services strongly agree on the necessity of having charging systems that
are transparent and based on economic rationality principles. There are mixed views about the measure
requiring involvement of users: while the principle of consultation is widely
accepted, there are concerns by port authorities and operators about the
possible nature and attributions of "users committees in ports". Finally, there is significant opposition to
measures requiring full unbundling of activities of port authorities, imposing
a minimum number of operators in the port or a central coordination role for
ports. 6. Analysis of impacts Each policy package (PP) has been
analysed in terms of its economic, environmental and social impact against the
baseline scenario. Where
possible, quantitative estimates are given, in other cases however, because of
the non-availability of statistics, this was not possible. In these cases, a
qualitative assessment is provided and where relevant strengthened by the
opinion of stakeholders.
Because of the nature
and diversity of the EU port system, the calculations and assumptions needed to
be aggregated and sometimes generalised. Thus, while the quantified estimates
do indicate a trend-line, caution is needed in the interpretation of the exact
figures. 6.1. Economic
impacts 6.1.1. Direct and indirect transport
costs The quantification of impacts of the
different policy packages in terms of savings in total port related costs is
presented in Table 20. The main assumption underlying the calculation is that
open markets will reduce the price of port services. In cases of ports services
provided under exclusive rigths (monopolistic situation arising when free
market accees is restricted), a degree of market contestability puts pressure
on the pricing of the incumbent(s) to keep their prices at competitive levels.
Information obtained from the user surveys has been analysed in order to derive
assumptions about the scope for cost decreases. The calculation is explained in
detail in Annex VII. It assumes a range of price decrease for each individual
service ranging from 2% to 20% depending on the policy packages and the type of
service as a result of the introduction of competitive pressure. As regards the impact of the policy packages
on port charging levels, i.e. pricing of port infrastructural services established
by port authorities by means of port dues, it is assumed that PP2a will
slightly reduce port dues as a result of more autonomy and more efficient
management. Academic research suggests[107] that
in cases where ports have a degree of autonomy in the establishment of charges,
e.g. in the UK – where private ports by their own means fund their own port
general infrastructures or in other ports in the Le Havre – Hamburg range, the
level of port dues has actually decreased over the years. By contrast in PP2,
which establishes a direct link between port dues and costs, it is assumed that
the level of charge increases (however this increase is compensated by the
decrease of the cost of port services). The impact on the total port cost was
then calculated by extrapolating port tariffs data from Rotterdam[108]. The resulting changes of total port costs and
the annual savings range from € 318.15 million per year in PP1 to € 1,245.21
million per year in PP3. Caution is warranted when interpreting the results
which depend on the price assumptions. The latter have been applied in an
uniform way across all ports while the impacts on prices of port services are
likely to vary according to regions and the invidual ports. Table 20: Impacts of
the policy packages on total port related costs (PWC, 2013) || Change (%) in Total Port Related Costs || Annual Savings (€ million) PP1 || -2.0% || 318.15 PP2 || -3.0% || 481.47 PP2a || -6.8% || 1,071.37 PP3 || -7.9% || 1,245.21 A further advantage of low entry barriers
and contestability of the port services market would arise from an improved
quality of service such as velocity, reliability and predictability of delays.
The latter although not quantified in this impact assessment are usually
considered by logistics companies as critical factors which may be ranked as
important as the price. More generally an easier access to the
market will allow new entrants to implement new technologies, systems and
business models and to bring business dynamism to a market when there are
exogenous changes in demand. In that regard, an increase in competitive
pressure in the port should lead to a dynamic of modernisation of services and
improvement of performance in order to meet market needs. The following
considerations are relevant for examining the impacts of the different PPs: ·
In PP1, port costs may decrease as a result of
the regulatory supervision of prices which will mainly impact services usually
organised in monopoly, namely pilotage, towage, waste reception to the benefit
of port users. The consultation of the port user committee will introduce more
customer orientations in port service providers, although it will have no
impact on those TEN-T ports which have already established such committee. By
means of a communication, PP1 will clarify existing rules as regards the market
access, including the scope of the Concessions Directive, which will be
welcomed by stakeholders. However in view of past experience (cf. 2007
Communication on Ports' Policy), such a soft approach is unlikely to
effectively lift current market acess restrictions in the short term. ·
In both PP2 and PP2a, the direct and indirect
costs of port services will decrease. In contrast to PP1, the two PPs will
ensure a fair market access in the port sector, requiring Member States to
apply public tendering procedures where for objective reasons the market has to
be reserved to one (or few) operators. PP2 and PP2a will also generate the
positive impacts of PP1 linked to a better regulatory supervision of monopolist
positions, although questions of disproportionate administrative cost may
arise. ·
PP3 will impose a stronger competitive pressure
in the market by ensuring the presence of at least two operators. A similar
approach was used in Directive 96/76/EC on groundhandling services in airports
and in the Commission's proposal of 2001 and 2004 on ports. In theory,
efficiency gains could be higher for services using contracts with a long term
duration, typically cargo handling and passenger services. In practice, as seen
in Chapter 3 (see also table 6), providers of cargo handling and passengers
services are already exposed to competitive preassure in a significant number
of TEN-T ports. As a result, the cost impact of PP3 is likely to be higher than
in PP2 and PP2a. Table 21: port services provided by in-house (public)
operators (PWC, 2013) ·
PP2, PP2a and PP3 apply confinement rules, in
other words prohibit in-house operators with exclusive rights to compete on
other markets. 79% of TEN-T ports provide at least one of the 8 ports services
and are therefore potentially impacted. Table 21 gives an indication of the
port services provided in-house (applicable mainly to waste reception, dredging
and to a smaller extent passenger services, mooring and pilotage). However, it
seems that only a small share of these operators provide services outside their
ports or cluster of ports. It is concluded that confinement measures (which
avoid undue competitive advantages stemming from possible state aids to ports
and apply the reciprocity principle), will have overall a limited impact. 6.1.2. Investments To appreciate whether and
how the policy packages contribute to attract investments, the PPs have been
assessed against four criteria: (a) efficient allocation of public investment
resources, (b) the risk of distortive state aids, (c) opportunities for private
investments and (d) economic rationality of port charges. The main impact will
stem from the measures obliging transparency in the use of public funds in ports.
This requirement will contribute to a more rational selection of port
investment projects (a). It will also allow the Commission to address much more
effectively concerns of unfair competition between ports in reason of
non-notified (unseen) state aid (b). It will lead to a better investment
climate (c) by reducing uncertainties on the economic return of projects. Measures
clarifying and facilitating the market access will also contribute to a better
climate for private investors (c) by creating more legal certainty. Finally,
measures on port infrastructure charges can result in more economic rationality
(d) in charging and lead to more efficient investments by port authorities. Table
22 presents a summary. Table
22: Impact of the policy
packages on the investment climate || PP1 || PP2 || PP2a || PP3 Efficient allocation of public funding || + || ++ || ++ || +++ Lower risks of distortive state aid to ports || + || ++ || ++ || +++ Better climate for private investment || + || ++ || +++ || ++ Economic rationality of port charges || + || +++ || ++ || + ("+" refers to the intensity of a
positive correlation: for instance in the case of "lower risks of
distortive state aid to ports", a "+" means less risk on
distortive state aids) Regional distribution of impacts Interestingly in all PPs the impacts will vary
according to the regions. Opening up market entrance to investors in new
facilities in reason of port expansion needs would have significant impacts in
the North Sea and Baltic Regions, given the expected growth in energy trades,
in particular liquefied gas, which require important investment in terms of
reception, storage and distribution capacities. Further economic integration of
the Baltic States in the internal market and growing exchanges with Russia
would require reinforcing capacities in other port segments (Ro-Ro) in both
regions. The PPs could also have a significant
impact in the Mediterranean regions, where new ports projects would be needed
in the North Adriatic and where the potential for short sea shipping
development (modal shift road to ports, exchanges France, Italy, Spain) is especially
high (see 6.1.5). In the UK, where there is already considerable private sector
involvement, the ports would not be affected. In Spain and Italy it can be
expected that greater autonomy for port authorities will lead to better service
provision and more targeted investments. In turn this would help to counter the
competitive threat from port developments in North Africa. A more horizontal
discussion of the impacts per PPs is provided below: ·
In PP1 the main measures having an impact on
investments concern the application of the financial transparency directive to
all TEN-T ports and the requirement of transparency in respect of port charges
calculation. Enforcing financial transparency will have a positive impact on
both the efficient allocation of public resources and will reduce the risk of
distortive state aids. This will also allow attracting more private investors
as they do not risk to be confronted with unexpected surprises related to
potentially illicit state aids. Transparent port charges and supervision over
the specific port service charges will have a positive influence on setting
these charges according to economic rationality. ·
In PP2, in addition to the measures considered
in PP1, the measures with an impact on investments would be the freedom to
provide service or the systematic recourse to public tendering for new
contracts; the obligation of keeping separate accounts for statutory functions
and commercial operations of publicly owned port authorities and the
requirement for cost-based and differentiated port charges. Public tendering
ensures efficient allocation of public resources and avoids distortive state
aids by using market procedures. Separate accounts increase the transparency
and as mentioned above, transparency potentially attracts more private
investments because of risk reduction. Cost based port charges will maximise
their efficiency. ·
PP2a, in comparison with PP2, introduces a
higher recourse to public tendering (also for substantial modifications of
existing contracts). It also gives a wider autonomy to port authorities to define
their charging policy, while at the same time ensuring transparency, which
could result in an enhanced economic rationality of port charges. A greater
competitive pressure and the financial autonomy of ports will contribute to
more efficient investments. Investment flows for both infrastructure and
equipment in terminals will be higher in particular in the areas where port
businesses are expected to grow more, i.e. North Sea / Baltic regions. ·
PP3 is quite similar to PP2 and PP2a. However,
the requirement of two operators for the same type of operation in every port might
discourage investments in small and medium ports, where there is no market
prospect for two operators. The obligation to create central port coordination
and the functional/legal unbundling could also be seen as an administrative
burden by private investors. However, the functional/legal unbundling could
ensure a more efficient allocation of public funding and could lower the risks
of distortive state aids. 6.1.3. Administrative
burden The
administrative costs generated by each PP against the baseline scenario are
presented in table 23. The costs for the public sector and the costs for the
businesses have been treated separately. The elements estimated include:
average annual cost for awarding contracts with tendering procedures, average
annual cost sustained for service tariff setting and/or reviewing, recurrent
yearly costs for central port coordination, recurrent yearly costs for port
users’ committee, recurrent yearly costs for port dues calculation, one off and
recurrent annual costs to be incurred for functional/legal separation and the
one off cost for separation of accounts. The
underlying assumptions are based on estimates related to the number of ports;
of service contracts awarded to private operators; of contracts with value
above € 5 million; of port services contracts linked to PSOs, spaced
constraints and normal contracts; of port services and terminal contracts
awarded with public tendering procedures; of port services provided in-house or
awarded with exclusive rights; and unit costs such as unit labour costs and
overhead costs. The detailed calculation and assumptions are provided in annex
IX. Table 23: Additional administrative costs per policy package (PWC, 2013) || Recurrent (€ million / year) || One off (€ million) || Public sector || Businesses || Public sector || Businesses PP1 || 9.0 || 16.2 || 9.9 || 15.7 PP2 || 7.7 || 14.0 || 32.4 || 15.7 PP2a || 2.3 || 2.2 || 24.4 || 0.8 PP3 || 33.0 || 3.9 || 121.8 || 0.8
PP2a imposes the lowest administrative burden both for the public sector and
the businesses. The freedom to provide services reduces the overall need for
public tendering. This introduction of public tendering and the freedom to
provide services principle reduce the needs for a regulatory supervision of
price. Other comparative savings can be introduced by the 'user committee'
which ensures a light form of coordination which is cheaper than the central
coordination currently practiced in a number of ports and proposed in PP3. In PP2 the
results are not as positive as in PP2a because in PP2 the regulatory
supervision of price continues to be widely applied to all operators with
exclusive rights, even if selected in the framework of public tendering
procedures. PP3 entails
very significant administrative costs for the public sector (port) because of
1) the functional/legal separation which would impose to double the
accounting/management systems which are currently integrated and 2) the central
coordination to be ensured by the port authority which would be generalised to
all ports. However, PP3 will not induce high administrative cost for
undertakings as the need for a regulatory supervision of prices is reduced
since the free market access will reduce their monopolistic positions. Finally, PP1
generates a slight increase of administrative cost, in particular for
businesses because of the measure related to financial transparency and the need
to develop a regulatory supervision of price given the lack of free market
access. In contrast
to PP2 with a lower administrative cost, the soft law approach to clarify
market access rules do not suffice to generate a substantial freedom to provide
services, which would have in turn avoided public tendering or approval
procedures. 6.1.4. SMEs Providers of
port services like mooring, towage, pilotage or bunkering are typically SMEs or
microenterprises (30%-50%). It is therefore relevant to look in more details
the impact on these types of undertakings. The introduction of free market
access in PP2, PP2a and PP3 will contribute to a more business-friendly and entrepreneurial
environment and is likely to facilitate the creation/establishment of SMEs and
microenterprises. However, as seen in 6.1.3, PP2a is the policy package which
creates the smallest additional administrative costs for SMEs and
microenterprises. Port services
like towage or cargo handling are capital intensive and benefit stronger from
economies of scale and consolidation. When more transparency and open market access
apply, bigger entities are likely to reinforce their market position, which risks
pushing out the market some SMEs or microenterprises operating today in
specific markets. A level playing field based on the principles of
transparency, non-discrimination and proportionality will allow other SME or
microenterprises, especially operating supporting services like cleaning,
catering, dedicated services related to maintenance of specialised equipment to
further develop their business. Overall, none
of the PPs contains particular obligations on SMEs, i.e. public-owned SMEs are
not caught by the Transparency Directive, usually, SME are not protected by
exclusive or special rights, are not involved in the setting of port charges,
etc. As stated above, a better business environment will grant more
opportunities for creating new SMEs in the port sector, opening up investment
and job creation opportunities. 6.1.5. Impact
on transport and multimodality
All PPs, and in particular PP2a and PP3,
generate increase of maritime transport activities, notably modal shift from
land to sea transport, by decreasing port costs and improving the logistic
efficiency of ports. (PwC, 2013) carried out a detailed modelling exercise
based on direct costs (the indirect cost savings could not be quantified) (see
also table 25). The increase of total maritime transport and
port activity at EU level although modest is noticeable. A more careful look
indicates an increase of up to 1.88% for short sea shipping (15.9 billion tonne-kilometres)
and a corresponding decrease of up to 0.16% of road transport over 300 km (2.9
billion tonne-kilometres), which suggests a clear contribution of PP3 and, to a
smaller extent, of PP2a to one of the key modal shift goals of the White Paper
(Annex VII provides detailed results and an explanation of the model used). The impact would not be uniform in all
intra-EU maritime routes because of the geographical locations. Around a bay or
an inland sea - where distances are long enough to make sea transport
competitive or where there is no choice except to use sea transport – making
short sea shipping more attractive, notably than land transport, would lead to
increase of short sea shipping on certain routes to up to 6.5% (table 24
provides the potential increases for PP3). It should be noted that on saturated land
corridors even a small decrease of road freight transport generated by more
efficient short sea shipping can have a proportionate higher impact on
congestion reduction. Therefore, an important conclusion is that
although the additional waterborne traffic increases that can be expected from
the different PPs are relatively moderate, all PPs are likely to contribute to
mitigate the risk of congestion by widening modal choices, enabling more
balanced spread of traffics. Table 24: Potential changes (%) of short
sea shipping tonnage (PWC, 2013) Potential changes of short sea shipping between different coastal regions (PWC) REGION || East Med || Cent Med || West Med / Atl || UK / IRL || North Range || Scand / Balt East Med || 1.51 || 6.50 || 1.98 || 0.68 || 0.64 || 0.24 Cent Med || 8.39 || 6.12 || 6.43 || 0.25 || 2.68 || 1.19 West Med / Atl || 1.25 || 4.79 || 6.56 || 2.67 || 2.35 || 0.83 UK / IRL || 0.16 || 0.07 || 3.90 || 3.23 || 1.10 || 1.36 North Range || 0.51 || 4.54 || 1.80 || 1.54 || 4.34 || 2.59 Scand / Balt || 0.37 || 0.84 || 3.09 || 5.04 || 5.35 || 2.49 Categories cover: East Med (Greece, Black Sea EU, Slovenia); Cent Med (Italy, Malta,
French Med); West Med/Atl (Spain, Portugal, French Atlantic); UK/IRL; North
Range (Hamburg-Le Havre); Scand/Balt Some additional considerations about the impact
of the different PPs on multimodality are (see also table 25): ·
PP1: The measures in this package would only
have small impacts for enhancing the competitive advantage of maritime
transport over road transport. The main effect would come from the transparency
of port dues calculation (assuming that transparency would lead to
rationalisation of dues) and from the supervision by an independent authority
of prices of port services provided under exclusive rights. ·
PP2: This package would have a more marked
impact thanks to a more competitive provision of port services, in particular
in the Baltic, Iberian Peninsula and Mediterranean regions. However,
competitive pressure leading to more attractive port services for shippers and
cargo-owners would be limited to new contracts, i.e. port projects carried out
by new entrants. ·
PP2a: Introducing competitive tendering both for
new contracts and in case of substantial changes to existing contracts would
lead to an increase of freight volumes for short sea shipping quite higher than
in PP2. ·
PP3: The measures in this package are aimed to
ensure greater competitive pressure in ports. However, contrary to
expectations, the results are not much higher than PP2a. The prescriptive
approach of the measures, i.e. imposition of two operators per service, could
interfere with the autonomy of ports to adapt quickly to market developments
and changing users' needs. 6.1.6. International
competitiveness All PPs will improve
the international competitiveness of Southern European ports which today lose transhipment
business to North African ports and, to a smaller extent, Baltic ports having
to compete with Russian ports. Competition with non EU ports is indeed particularly
fierce on transhipment which is a very specific and highly volatile market. Today, the TEN-T ports
struggle to compete with neighbouring ports because of lower salaries in third
countries. The PPs contributing to the modernisation of services and a better
investment climate will help them to achieve productivity gains stemming e.g.
from innovation, specialisation and/or logistics performance. When the TEN-T ports
become more efficient and have their operating costs reduced, their competitive
stance will improve. As already demonstrated before, the effect of PP1 will be
limited. PP2, PP2a and PP3 all achieve meaningful efficiency gains allowing EU
ports to offer more competitive services. However, only PP2a and PP3 allow for
instance rebates of infrastructure charges for vessels used in transhipment. As
already seen PP3 would however entail more administrative burden by imposing at
least two operators for every service. Another aspect
related to competiveness is linked to the fact that the shipping and the port
related business is global. The better investment climate generated by the PPs
will attract foreign direct investments in the TEN-T ports. Caution may however
be warranted to ensure that the possible further vertical integration which may
result from it does not give rise to possible abuse of dominant positions[109] and more generally to loss of control of EU strategic interests.
Moreover, to secure the worldwide competitive position and business and
investment opportunities for EU-based global players, it may be appropriate that
reciprocal access to non-EU markets (without undue restrictions) is facilitated. 6.2. Environmental impacts All the PPs contribute to reduce the overall
environmental impact of transport insofar as they all contribute to make
maritime transport more attractive in comparison to road transport and are in
line with the objectives of the Transport White Paper (2011). Table 25 provides for
each PP an overview of the increase in short sea shipping, the decrease of road
transport over 300km (one of the goals of the White Paper) and the
corresponding gains in external costs, based on a model by PWC (2013) who used
the WORLDNET (FP6) approach to estimate multimodal routes following the
methodology used in the study “Ports and their connections within the TEN-T”
(DGMOVE, 2010). This model assigns flows to multimodal mode chains, thus
estimating port choice, and the sensitivity between land and sea options. The
calculation is made using 2010 network and flow data obtained from the ETISplus
(FP7) transport information system. The input variable used is the port cost, in
line with the modelling assumptions to calculate the savings in total port
costs as discussed in section 6.1.1. Annex VII provides more detailed
information on the assumptions and calculations. Although all PPs would result in a reduction
of external costs, the benefits are the largest for PP3, closely followed by
PP2a. Road transport over 300 km would decrease by 0.16% in PP3 and by 0.14% in
PP2a. This would generate savings of external costs of the order of
respectively € 76 and 69 million per year. Moreover, PP2a encourages port authorities to
introduce port dues which vary according to the environmental performance of
ships. The impact of such differentiation on the greening of the fleet calling
at EU ports will widely depend on the amplitude of the variation and the
classification used and the degree of coordination at regional level. A wide
geographical scope of environmental charges would be much more effective, which
is an argument for regional or EU wide coordination. Table 25: impact on short-sea shipping, modal shift and external costs (PwC,
2013) || Increase in Short Sea Shipping (%) || Change in road>300km (in billion Tonne-Km) || Change in road>300km % || External Costs (€m/pa) || Change in maritime Tonne-Km || Short sea shipping Increases || Long distance road decreases || External costs fall || billion tonne km PP1 || 0.49% || -0.833 || -0.04% || -23 || 3.603 PP2 || 0.73% || -1.249 || -0.07% || -34 || 5.404 PP2a || 1.63% || -2.634 || -0.14% || -69 || 13.311 PP3 || 1.88% || -2.972 || -0.16% || -76 || 15.942 Environmental impacts are in general for
the better of the whole society, though for some economic or social actors
these impacts come at a specific cost. In the case of PP2 and PP2a, shipping
companies risk paying increased port charges in the event port authorities
decide to apply environmental differentiated charges. This has a specific short term effect, as
on the long term this will create a level-playing field in line with the
application of the polluter pays principle and as all ship operators will
follow the incentive to operate cleaner ships. So, while all stakeholders in
the end benefit from a better environmental performance, some will have to face
specific challenges, especially when internalising the external costs. Overall, PP2 will contribute to better
environmental services in ports, including services aimed to reduce ship waste,
air and water pollution, by contributing to the correct functioning of the
market and by providing supervision by an authority in cases of complaints
related to prices and/or quality of the services. 6.3. Social
impacts In all PPs the possible productivity gains
usually associated with technological changes generated by the policy packages
could mean that job profiles need to change and labour practices to be adapted.
In the short term it may eventually lead to a reduction of the number of jobs
in some ports that, today, remain labour intensive. But in the medium and long
term, all PPs would generate additional port activities and have a net positive
impact on the creation of jobs. Long standing statistical evidence shows that
maritime traffic increases are indeed associated with new jobs creation. According to the so-called "Antwerp
rule"[110],
every additional million tonnes of port throughput creates roughly 90 new cargo
handling jobs. Cargo handling jobs are approximately 10% of total direct
employment including non-maritime employment, and 20% of direct maritime
employment. The impact of the different PPs has been accordingly estimated by PwC,
2013 assuming conservative multipliers disaggregated by type of cargo (e.g.
handling energy is less labour intensive than containers) and productivity
gains resulting from the market opening and transparency measures in the
different packages. The results reveal that the number of port workers will
increase from the present day figure of around 110,000 to 163,000 jobs
generated by the traffic growth until 2030 in the baseline scenario[111]. On top of that (see table
26), 2.537 new jobs would be created in PP3 and 658 in PP1. All PPs have
therefore a net positive impact on the creation of jobs, though modest. The
detailed calculation and assumptions are provided in annex VII. Table 26: Additional jobs compared to baseline scenario (110
000 to 163 000 new jobs by 2030) (PWC, 2013) 2030 || New jobs PP1 || 658 PP2 || 987 PP2a || 2,199 PP3 || 2,537 It should be noted that according to OECD
research (2012), higher multipliers could be used, according to which an
increase of one million tons could generate 300 jobs and in the long run 7.500 jobs,
which suggests potentially much more significant job creations. The figures
would however change depending on the multipliers of each individual port
region (in the case of, e.g. Hamburg, the multiplier is 1.71; for Rotterdam
1.13 and for Le Havre/Rouen there are estimates of 1.57)[112], and an extrapolation at EU
level is therefore difficult. The measures regulating
the market access for cargo handling services in PP2, PP2a and PP3 could be
contested by the unions of dockers in a number of Member States and
deteriorate the social climate in ports. It should be noted that the cost of
strikes and blockades can be very high because of typical daily multi-million
euro losses (in large ports) but also because of the risk for the image of the
port. "Costs of strike in port of Antwerp 1
million euro per hour" – February 2012: As a result of the strike in the
port of Antwerp expenses increased during the last few days. "Roughly
estimated this is about one million per hour for the port of Antwerp"
Johan Claes of the Belgian New Fruit Wharf tells. "Then we talk about a
direct loss and not about any consequential one." The 1 million euro per
hour cost for a strike in the port of Antwerp was confirmed by the spokesperson
of the Port of Antwerp, who also emphasised the damage to the ports'
reputation, following a strike end January 2012. Proper change
management to accommodate the transition and avoid destructive industrial
disputes can therefore be particularly useful. In this respect, it needs to be
emphasised, that in case of changes of operator after a public tender procedure
(foreseen in PP2, PP2A and PP3), Member States could be allowed to extend
Directive 2001/23/EC to the employees involved in order to safeguards their
rights. The Directive specifies the rights and obligations of employers and
employees affected. It establishes that the transfer of an undertaking is not a
ground for dismissal. This Directive applies to all types of employment
relationships, without distinction in relation to the number of working hours
and the type of employment contract (undetermined, fixed-duration, or
temporary). At various stages of the impact assessment process,
the unions called for protest actions in EU ports and adopted a declaration
announcing strikes[113].
The public hearing of 18 January 2013 could however clarify the scope of the
Commission's work on the ports policy review, of which the establishment of an
EU Social Dialogue Committee for the port sector is a corner stone (see section
5.1). Following the hearing, the unions adopted a unitary resolution welcoming
the Commission's willingness to support the Social Dialogue process and calling
off the announced strikes[114]. Taking account that measures touching on
labour regimes have been discarded and that the envisages measures take a very
careful approach regarding cargo-handling activities in ports, no particular
impact[115]
in terms of wages, labour relations and labour conditions is expected. 6.4. Mapping
of impacts per stakeholder One needs to be
aware that the impacts will be different for the distinct categories of stakeholders.
In table 27, a qualitative assessment is given. Table 27: Mapping of impacts per stakeholder Stakeholder || PP1 || PP2 || PP2a || PP3 Port Authorities || Benefits from the (modest) increased traffic while confronted with a specific and relatively limited additional administrative burden || Benefits from the increased traffic and investments while confronted with a specific and relatively limited additional administrative burden || Benefits from the increased traffic and investments while confronted with a specific and relatively limited additional administrative burden || More competition presents business opportunities. Though, the competitive framework presents significant administrative burden Port dependent businesses & operators || Benefits from the (modest) increased traffic and investment opportunities || Benefits from the increased traffic and investment opportunities || Benefits from the increased traffic and investment opportunities || More competition creates more business and investment opportunities Port workers || Benefits from the (modest) increased traffic though specific transitions in the kind of jobs and the nature of the port work needs to be accounted for || Benefits from the increased traffic though specific transitions in the kind of jobs and the nature of the port work needs to be accounted for || Benefits from the increased traffic though specific transitions in the kind of jobs and the nature of the port work needs to be accounted for || Benefits from the increased traffic though specific transitions in the kind of jobs and the nature of the port work needs to be accounted for Shipping sector || Modest benefits from the long term changes in price and service levels || Benefits from the transparency and changes in price and service levels || Benefits from the transparency and changes in price and service levels || Benefits from the competitive pressure and resulting changes in price and service levels Sector regulators || Limited impact || Modest, but specific and additional administrative tasks || Specific and additional administrative tasks || More specific and additional administrative tasks Freight forwarders and shipping agents || Benefits from the (longer term) better functioning of the ports and related business opportunities || Benefits from the better functioning of the ports and related business opportunities || Benefits from the better functioning of the ports and related business opportunities || Benefits from the better functioning of the ports and related business opportunities Maritime passengers || Benefits from the (longer term) better functioning of the ports and related business opportunities || Benefits from the better functioning of the ports and related business opportunities || Benefits from the better functioning of the ports and related business opportunities || Benefits from the better functioning of the ports and related business opportunities EU industries || Benefits from the (modest) increased performance (on the longer term) of the ports (cheaper and more reliable service) || Benefits from the increased performance of the ports (cheaper and more reliable service) || Benefits from the increased performance of the ports (cheaper and more reliable service) || Benefits strongly from the increased performance of the ports (cheaper and more reliable service) SME (in particular those active in the port) || Opportunities for supporting and secondary SME's – risks for the more capital intensive ones || Opportunities for supporting and secondary SME's – risks for the more capital intensive ones || Opportunities for supporting and secondary SME's – risks for the more capital intensive ones || Opportunities for supporting and secondary SME's – risks for the more capital intensive ones Final consumer || Better ports lead to cheaper transport and cheaper products (longer term effect) || Better ports lead to cheaper transport and cheaper products (modest to high effect) || Better ports lead to cheaper transport and cheaper products (modest to high effect) || Better ports lead to cheaper transport and cheaper products (high effect) Tax payers || Transparency leads to more efficient public investments || Better use of capacities and climate for investors reduce needs for, and encourage efficient, public funding || Better use of capacities and climate for investors reduce needs for, and encourage efficient, public funding || Better use of capacities and climate for investors reduce needs for, and encourage efficient, public funding 6.5. Summary of the economic,
environmental and social impacts Table 28: Summary of the aggregate economic, environmental and
social impacts. Impact compared to the baseline || Baseline Scenario || PP1 || PP2 || PP2a || PP3 Direct and indirect transport costs || Risk of degradation of port services Congestion costs and associated externalities [€ 0 million savings] || Small reduction of port costs [€ 318 million annual savings] But indirect costs remain (poor reliability/ efficiency of some TEN-T ports, congestion costs and associated externalities,) || Small reduction of port costs [€ 481 million annual savings] Small reduction of indirect transport costs (including road congestion) and modest increase of SSS modal shift and reduced congestion || Significant reduction of port costs[€ 1.071 annual million savings], improved reliability of ports and reduction of other indirect costs due to increase of SSS, modal shift and reduced congestion || Significant reduction of port costs[€ 1.245 annual million savings], improved reliability of ports and reduction of other indirect costs due to increase of SSS, modal shift and reduced congestion Investments || Loss of investment opportunities. Issues regarding sound use of public funds || Loss of investment opportunities. Some improvement regarding use of public funds || Opening up of market opportunities in ports; || Opening up of market opportunities in ports || Opening up of market opportunities in ports Administrative burden || Increase of complexity due to most demanding logistic procedures || Possible improvements in ports following voluntary recommendations || Burden created by price supervision but possible improvement in coordination and adaptation of ports to users' needs || Possible improvement in coordination and adaptation of ports to users' needs || Burden for smaller ports created by central coordination and heavier tendering procedures SMEs || Market foreclosure and legal uncertainty for a significant number of SME || Improvements in ports adopting thanks to voluntary action || Possibility of creation of new SMEs and jobs in ports || Possibility of creation of new SMEs and jobs in ports || Possibility of creation of new SMEs and jobs in ports Multimodality[116] || Improvements only in ports tackling road transport concerns in a voluntary basis || Some additional ports will adopt "best practices" promoting rail and inland waterways || Some additional ports will adopt "best practices" promoting rail and inland waterways || Incentives and taking account of users' needs enable ports to better contribute to multi-modal objectives || Incentives and taking account of users' needs enable ports to better contribute to multi-modal objectives Environmental impact[117] || Improvements only in ports applying environmental rewarding schemes on a voluntary basis || Small potential of improvements in ports because of the lack of incentives and guidance. Transparency will most likely not have a big effect on the internalisation. || Obligatory internalisation will lead to positive environmental performance || Improvement in the provision of cost-efficient environmental services in ports, based on best practices and a voluntary reward scheme. Linked to market incentives and green marketing, internalisation will penetrate the port business. || Less potential of improvement in the provision of cost-efficient environmental services in ports, because of the lack of guidance, though market potential remains significant. Social Impact || Structural losses of jobs in ports in decline [0 additional jobs] || Structural losses of jobs in ports in decline [658 direct jobs + indirect jobs] || Potential of new jobs linked to new investments and creation of business in ports [987 direct jobs + indirect jobs] || Potential of new jobs linked to new investments and creation of business in ports. Stability of employment and good social climate (provided that the Social Dialogue works) [2,199 additional jobs+ indirect jobs], || Potential of new jobs linked to new investments and creation of business in ports. Stability of employment and good social climate (provided that the Social Dialogue works) [2,537 additional jobs+ indirect jobs] (+ refers to a positive correlation: for instance in the case of
administrative burden, more + means less burden, in the case of environmental
impacts, more + means better taking environmental considerations into account) 7. Comparing
the options The policy
packages were assessed against the following criteria: -
Effectiveness:
the extent to which policy packages achieve the operational objectives -
Efficiency: the
extent to which policy packages can achieve the operational objectives at least
cost -
Coherence: the
extent to which policy packages are coherent with the overarching objectives of
EU policy, and the extent to which policy options are likely to limit
trade-offs across the economic, social, and environmental domain 7.1. Effectiveness PP1 will be effective in achieving OO1, but
only on a longer term. The regulatory supervision of price of port services
(OO2) in monopolistic cases should be effective although it may entail, given
the lack of free market access, a too heavy task for national administrations.
The port users' committee (OO3) will bring all the users of specific ports
together in order to avoid serious conflicts and a good operation of the port.
The financial transparency (OO4) will allow responsible authorities to verify
if state-aid is involved and on the basis of that decide if corrective
intervention is required. Transparent port dues (OO5) will not directly change
the level or application of the dues but will allow a transparent dialogue
between authorities and users, paying the dues. This can lead to more
appropriate charging practices in the long term. PP2 is effective in creating a clear
regulated market access framework (OO1) for all actors in the ports by imposing
the freedom to provide services and/or introducing public tendering procedures.
The confinement of internal operators (OO2) will prevent public funded services
to compete with privately funded services, avoiding market distortions by
public entities. Market abuses will be tackled even further by price
supervision (OO2). The port users' committee (OO3) will bring all the users of
specific ports together in order to avoid serious conflicts and a good
operation of the port. The separation of accounts (OO4) will introduce
transparency in the different operations. Binding rules on port charges will
ensure an EU-wide application of cost-based charging and the internalisation of
environmental costs (OO5). By also introducing public tendering for
substantial changes to existing contracts (OO1) PP2a will achieve an even
higher effectiveness. In PP2a, the effectiveness related to OO2 is similar to
PP2. The extended public tendering obligations should ensure correct market prices
without having to have recourse to price supervision, except in those cases
where no public tendering is applied. The freedom for port authorities to set
port infrastructure charges in combination with transparency requirements for
port infrastructure charges calculations and the possibility to differentiate
for environmental performance of ships, further increases the effectiveness
(005). PP3 will also be effective in realising OO1:
by setting clear rules and introducing minimal 2 operators for every service
provision, all ports and operators will be faced with a minimal level of
competition. The general principle of public tendering and the confinement
concept, together with a price control in those cases where public tendering
was not applied will ensure the effective implementation of OO2. Central port
coordination (OO3) will ensure effective coordination inside the port. The
functional/legal separation will install firewalls and introduce individual
entities for every service provision. This will ensure the effective
implementation of OO4. Though, the freedom for ports to set their own dues
without further guidance or rules could entail a lower effectiveness than PP2a
(OO5). 7.2. Efficiency The efficiency of the policy packages, i.e. the extent to which
policy packages can be achieved at least cost, is assessed taking into account
the potential annual savings in total port costs, external costs and the
administrative costs. As already indicated before, because of the nature and diversity of the EU
port system, the calculations and assumptions needed to be aggregated and
sometimes generalised. Therefore, while the quantified estimates do indicate a
trend-line, one needs to be prudent in the interpretation of the exact figures.
A summary is in table 29. Table
29: Net annual efficiency gains
and one off administrative costs (€ million) (PWC, 2013) || Annual savings in total port costs (1) || Annual savings in external costs (2) || Total annual savings (3) = (1) + (2) || Annual administrative costs || Net annual efficiency gains (7) = (3) – (6) || One off administrative costs Cost for public sector (4) || Cost for businesses (5) || Total annual cost (6) = (4) + (5) || Cost for public sector (8) || Cost for businesses (9) || Total one off costs (10) PP1 || 318,15 || 23 || 341.15 || 9,0 || 16,2 || 25.2 || 315,95 || 9,9 || 15,7 || 25.6 PP2 || 481,47 || 34 || 515.47 || 7,7 || 14,0 || 21.7 || 493,77 || 32,4 || 15,7 || 48.1 PP2a || 1071,37 || 69 || 1140.37 || 2,3 || 2,2 || 4.5 || 1135,87 || 24,4 || 0,8 || 25.2 PP3 || 1245,21 || 76 || 1321.21 || 33,0 || 3,9 || 36.9 || 1284,31 || 121,8 || 0,8 || 122.6 ·
Total annual savings (column 3 in table 29): PP1 has the lowest effect on total annual savings in total port
costs and external costs. PP2 performs marginally better in this respect. PP2a
more than doubles the total annual savings from PP2 and PP1. PP3 even scores
marginally better than PP2a in this respect. ·
Total annual administrative costs (column 6
in table 29): PP2a imposes the lowest
administrative burden compared to the other policy packages, both for the
public sector and the businesses. In this respect it is followed respectively
by PP2, PP1 and PP3. PP3 imposes the highest administrative burden. This is
mainly because of the burden for the public sector, as for businesses PP3
scores better than PP1 and PP2. ·
Net annual efficiency gains (column 7 in
table 29): PP3 has the highest net annual
efficiency gains, calculated by summing up the total annual savings in port
costs and external costs, after deduction of the annual administrative costs.
It is closely followed by PP2a. PP2 and PP1 are in this respect much less
effective than PP2a and PP3, as their net annual efficiency gains are more than
halved compared to PP2a and PP3. ·
One off administrative costs (column 10 in
table 29): The one off administrative costs are the
lowest for PP2a, closely followed by PP1. PP2 and PP3 are respectively almost
double or five times as costly as PP2a in this respect. It can be concluded that with regard to net annual efficiency gains
PP3 scores the best, but is very closely followed by PP2a, for which the total
one off administrative cost is almost five times as low as for PP3. PP1 and PP2
score much worse than both PP2a and PP3. 7.3. Coherence All policy packages are from the individual
perspective in line with the completion of the internal transport market and
are coherent with the EU policy objectives reflected in the Single Market Act,
the White Paper on Transport and Europe's 2020 growth strategy. In order to be able to respond appropriately
to all the objectives, the policy packages were built with a balance of
economic, environmental and social measures, to avoid that action on one pillar
would imply very negative consequences on the other. Consequently, the
different policy packages are overall built to be coherent, each one containing
measures to ensure that the social, environmental and economic impacts are
mutually counterbalanced in each package. However, because of the nature of the policy
measures related to market opening of the port services market, a certain
degree of trade-off between economic and social impacts could not be avoided.
The analysis indicates that all policy packages present a trade-off between
economic and social impacts. In PP2, PP2a and PP3 the risk of social tension in
relation with the lifting of restrictons to the market access, and more
specifically for cargo handling, cannot be neglected. In PP3 this risk is the
biggest as the degree of market opening is the highest in this policy package.
In PP1 this risk is the lowest. For PP2 and PP2a this risk can also not be
neglected, especially not for cargo-handling services. 7.4. Summary
on the comparison of policy packages Table
30: Effectiveness, efficiency
and coherence of the policy packages || PP1 || PP2 || PP2a || PP3 Effectiveness || + || ++ || +++ || +++ 001 clarify & facilitate access to the port services market || + || ++ || +++ || +++ 002 Prevent market abuse by port service providers with exclusive or special rights || + || ++ || ++ || ++ 003 To ensure the consultation of port users on the main decisions which affect the functioning of the port in all (100%) TEN-T ports by the end of the implementation date of the initiative || + || + || + || ++ 004 To ensure the transparency in the financial relations between public authorities, port authorities and port service providers in all (100%) TEN-T ports by the end of the implementation date of the initiative || + || ++ || ++ || +++ 005 To ensure that all (100%) TEN-T port authorities are free to autonomously set their port infrastructure charges by the end of the implementation date of the initiative, with the possibility of environmental modulation of the charges || + || ++ || +++ || ++ Efficiency || + || + || +++ || +++ Coherence || Minor trade-off || Limited trade-off except for cargo handling (important trade-off) || Limited trade-off except for cargo handling (important trade-off) || Important trade-off ("+" refers to the intensity of a
positive correlation, no negative or neutral correlations have been identified) 8. Conclusion:
preferred option PP2a and PP3 appear to be the most efficient and effective options,
with net annual efficiency gains over € 1 billion created by more efficient
transport services, and with a better investment and business climate for
ports. However, given the important trade-offs between social and economic
impacts in PP3, PP3 is less coherent than PP2a. Therefore, based on the
analysis performed in this report, PP2a is the preferred policy option. PP2a will generate additional short sea
shipping traffic of around 13.3 billion tonne kilometres, which will represent
a significant increase of short sea shipping on a number of routes. This will
lead to increased port activities which, according to conservative estimates,
could create more than 2000 direct extra port related jobs plus indirect jobs. However, caution is required in connection
with the measures related to market access and cargo handling[118], because of three aspects: -
There is an important trade-off with social
issues. Social tensions in the cargo handling sector are still high and
therefore a step by step approach for this sector could be more appropriate. Opening
the market of cargo handling in PP2a could trigger a sudden degradation of the
social climate at a time when important progress is being made through the
creation of the European Social Dialogue. In the future this European Social
Dialogue could pave the way for further legislative action. -
Cargo handling services are already exposed to
some competitive pressure in many ports (intra or inter port competition
between terminal operators, see table 6). -
Thirdly, a large part of cargo handling services
are undertaken typically by means of concession contracts transferring the
operational risk of operating a terminal to a private operator and are
therefore falling within the scope of the future concession Directive. Until
the time the concession Directive is adopted, the scope of the Directive will
not be fully determined. Therefore, as
regards the application of the measures related to clarification and
facilitation of market access to cargo handling services[119] the approach of PP1 (non-binding Commission's Communication) could
be equally warranted due to important trade-offs between economic and social
objectives. Indeed, it is to be noted that PP1
scores better than PP2a in terms of trade-offs. In this respect PP2 is not
recommended as an alternative to PP2a as it entails the same risk as PP2a. If this variant of PP2a[120] is eventually decided, the impacts initially estimated for PP2a
would slightly decrease in intensity but would remain overall similar in
tendency. The administrative costs would slightly decrease. A calculation using
the methodology in Annex VII was done for this 'PP2a variant' and yielded the
results presented in table 31. Table 31: Comparison PP2a and PP2a variant (excluding market access measures
for cargo handling) (PwC, 2013) || PP2a || PP2a variant Change (%) in total port costs || -6.8 || -4 Annual savings in total port costs (€ million) || 1071.37 || 635 Increase of Short Sea Shipping (%) || 1.63 || 0.97 Induced tonnes Km (billion) in EU ports || 13.311 || 7.205 Administrative costs (recurrent – public) (€ million) || 2.3 || 2.1 Administrative costs (recurrent - business) (€ million) || 2.2 || 1.7 Annual savings of external costs (€ million) || 69 || 46 The same reasoning may
hold for passenger services and a similar approach could therefore also be
envisaged. However due to unavailability of data a separate impact calculation
could not be made. 9. Monitoring
and evaluation The Commission
services will monitor the implementation and effectiveness of this initiative
through a set of core progress indicators, listed in table 32. The data will be
gathered by means of the outcome of the PPRISM[121] project and in the form of a
fact-finding survey. The Commission has also launched a research project under
FP7 to look into the practical and operational requirements for setting up a
port observatory which aims to provide data on a continuous basis. Regarding evaluation, it is
foreseen that three years after the end of the implementation date of the proposed
legislation, the Commission services will carry out an implementation report to
verify whether the objectives of the initiative have been reached. This
evaluation will be carried out inter alia based on the core progress indicators
mentioned below, and will be in line with the Commission requirements on
evaluation. Table 32: Core progress indicators for monitoring purposes in
the TEN-T ports Operational objective || Core progress indicators || Source of data OO1: Clarify and facilitate access to port services market || - the number of service providers in ports for the different categories of port services - market shares of port service providers || - fact finding survey OO2: Prevent market abuse by port service providers with exclusive or special rights || - number of new Commission infringement procedures linked to market abuse || - Commission data on infringements procedures / complaints received 003: Ensure the consultation of port users on the main decisions which affect the functioning of the port in all (100%) TEN-T ports by the end of the implementation date of the initiative || - average number of procedures needed to enter/operate in a port - the number of newly installed port user committees in TEN-T ports || - fact finding survey 004: To ensure the transparency in the financial relations between public authorities, port authorities and port service providers in all (100%) TEN-T ports by the end of the implementation date of the initiative || - number of new Commission infringement procedures linked to transparent financial relations between public authorities, port authorities and providers of port services || - Commission data on infringements procedures / complaints received 005 To ensure that all (100%) TEN-T port authorities are free to autonomously set their port infrastructure charges by the end of the implementation date of the initiative, with the possibility of environmental modulation of the charges || - number of ports with autonomous port infrastructure charging - the number of new Commission infringement procedures linked to port infrastructure charges in TEN-T ports - the number of newly installed methods for environmental modulation of port infrastructure charges in TEN-T ports || - fact finding survey [1] Single Market Act II, together for new growth
COM(2012)573 [2] White Paper on Transport: roadmap to a
Single European Transport Area – Towards a competitive and resource efficient transport system
COM/2011/144 [3] COM(2011) 650 final/2 [4] COM(2011) 665 final [5] See website of the conference: http://www.portsconference2012.eu/home.html [6] The public consultation process is
presented in Annex VII. The critical views and final position of IDC and ETF
were fully taken into account during the IA process. The links to the
communications of both organisations are given in the annex. [7] All main port industry associations, port
workers unions and transport authorities in charge of ports' policy in the
Member States were invited. [8] The detailed results of the consultation
are provided in Annex V. Moreover, the more detailed views of stakeholders are
- where relevant - reflected in the other sections of this report. [9] More information is provided in Annex II.
Technical terms are further explained in the glossary (Annex XIII). [10] The TEN-T network consists of two layers:
1) the comprehensive network will ensure full coverage of the EU and
accessibility of all regions, to be completed by 2030, and 2) the core network
that will feed into the comprehensive network and will prioritize the most
important nodes of the TEN-T, and is to be completed by 2050. Detailed TEN-T
port selection criteria can be found in the TEN-T proposal (COM (2011) 650
final/2). The final number of TEN-T ports will depend on the final outcome of
the on-going ordinary legislative procedure. [11] See Eurostat, 2010-2011 data – Statistics
in Focus series [12] See, e.g. Notteboom, Rodrigue and De Monie
(2010), "The organisational and geographical ramifications of the 2008-09
financial crisis on the maritime shipping and port industries" or HPC
Hamburg Port Consulting GMBH, "The role of ports in international
transport chains" (2011) [13] http://pprism.espo.be/
[14] A more detailed description of the chain of
services in ports can be found in Annex II. [15] Goss, R. Economic Policies and Seaports: 1.
The Economic Functions of Seaports. “Maritime Policy and Management” 17(3):
pp.207-219. (1990). [16] See e.g. International Handbook of Maritime
Economics, Cullinane and others (2010) [17] The table is indicative only since the
heterogeneity of ports and cargo-handling operations makes it extremely
difficult to present values "valid for all". [18] For a detailed presentation of the relative
weight of port operation costs see Haralambides et al (2001), “Port Financing
and Pricing in the EU: Theory, Politics and Reality and Haralambides H. (2012)
"Ports: Engines of Growth and Employment". There are huge variations
in the composition of costs from one port to another. ” [19] Directive
2000/59/EC on port reception facilities for ship-generated waste and cargo
residues [20] For instance, specific legislation exists
for airport charging, allocation of slots, and ground handling services. [21] See COM(2007)616 final [22] See Annex IV for more detailed information [23] See
http://ec.europa.eu/transport/modes/maritime/ports_en.htm [24] COM(2011)987final of 20 December 2011 [25] See http://eca.europa.eu/portal/pls/portal/docs/1/14050737.PDF [26] The Commission is currently updating the Cost Benefit Analysis Guide
(2008). [27] See Annex II – point 10 "Overview of
recent and on-going port reforms and re-organisations in selected European
countries" [28] This is an on-going process - See
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/assistance_eu_ms/index_en.htm [29] A detailed description of the situation in
different Member States is given Annex II [30]See ESPO (2010) Report "European Port
Governance" – http://www.espo.be/images/stories/Publications/studies_reports_surveys/espofactfindingreport2010.pdf#.
A more detailed analysis of Europe's port heterogeneity is to be found in Annex
II. [31] See, e.g. Verhoeven (2009, 2010, 2011) –
European Sea Ports Organisation, Fact Finding Reports [32] The categorisation made by ESPO, the
"typology of regions" includes the following Member States: 1)
"Hanse Region": Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Germany, The Netherlands
and Sweden, 2) "New Hanse": Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland, 3)
"Anglo-Saxon": Ireland and UK, 4)"Latin": Cyprus, France,
Greece, Italy, Malta, Portugal and Spain and 5) "New Latin":
Bulgaria, Romania and Slovenia. [33] For a broader presentation, see the Transport
White Paper 2011 "Roadmap to a Single European Transport Area – Towards a
competitive and resource efficient transport system" [34] See latest synthesis reports, 4 March
2013, http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/13/st06/st06754.en13.pdf [35] The port sector is mentioned in the Commission's Staff Working
Documents (SWD) on the following Member States: BE, CY, DE, DK, EST, SP, FIN,
FR, IT, MT, NL, SLO and UK [36] The model used for the purposes of the IA
benchmarks the relative performance of the ports included in the sample.
However, it has to be stressed that, like most other rankings in business, the ranking methodology is not
perfect and the results have to be interpreted with all necessary precaution.
For one, the index cannot reflect all the complexity of ports, ports services
and types of cargoes. Moreover, the data refers to a given period of time (The 2012-2013 Global Competitiveness Report of
the World Economic Forum (WEF) and the more recent Eurostat port statistics.
Those differences are not necessarily linked to the availability and/or quality
of physical infrastructures: in a number of cases, well-equipped ports perform
below average (cf PwC, 2013 / annex VII). [37] Because of potential commercial impacts on
specific ports, the Commission does not disclose the names of the ports in the
different categories; a list of the considered ports can be found in Annex VI. [38] See, e.g. Ducruet and van der Horst (2009)
"Transport Integration at European Ports: measuring the role and position
of intermediaries" or de Langen, van Meijeren and Tavasszy (2012)
"Combining Models and Commodity Chain Research for Making Long-Term
Projections of Port Throughput: an Application to the Hamburg-Le Havre Range. [39] White Paper – Roadmap to a Single European
Transport Area / Christidis, Ibanez Rivas, Measuring road congestion,
JRC Technical Notes, 2012 / CE Delft, INFRAS, Frauenhofer ISI, External
Costs of Transport in Europe, Delft, November 2011. [40] See research on congestion; e.g. EFFORT RTD
Project http://www.transport-research.info/web/projects/project_details.cfm?ID=28076,
International Transport Forum “The Extent of and Outlook for Congestion, in
Inland, Maritime and Air Transport (2007) [41] A capacity utilisation >80% entails
overtime and incapacity to absorb traffic peaks, while an index > 90%
entails heavy congestion in the port and its hinterland). [42]
http://www.portofrotterdam.com/en/Business/about-the-port/connections/Pages/Intermodaltransport.aspx [43] "hub-and-spoke" organisations are
increasingly used in modern logistics and consist in the reception,
transhipment and redistribution of cargoes to/from deep-sea exchanges to/from
short-sea exchanges. In a survey at global level, it was found that only 16% of
all country pairs are directly connected, while 62% of all country pairs
require at least one transhipment and 18.6% of all pairs require two
transhipments (International Maritime Forum 2010, Maritime Transportation: drivers
for the shipping and port industries) [44]This problem will be tackled by an upcoming
Commission initiative on "Blue Belt". Customs simplifiations already
exist for martime transport but further simplfications will be envisaged. [45] http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/trans/92120.pdf [46] Cold ironing or shore side electricity
supply: where vessels connect to share for energy supply instead of having to
use their on board generators. [47] Considering the recession and recent port
developments in the range Le Havre – Hamburg (Maasvlakte-2 in Rotterdam, London
DP World Gateway, Hamburg Eurogate or Jade Weser Port in Wilhelmshaven) some
analysts predict overcapacity until 2020. [48] Examples are based on concrete data
affecting particular ports and/or undertakings in the sector. Due to the (commercial,
legal, etc.) interests involved, names of ports, undertakings and Member States
were those practices are notorious are voluntarily omitted in this report. [49] Another frequently mentioned issue is the vertical
integration between terminal operators and shipping lines which may give rise
to abuse and distortion of competition on the shipping market (see Annex II for
a more detailed discussion) [50] See OECD "Competition in
Ports and Port Services 2011 http://www.oecd.org/regreform/liberalisationandcompetitioninterventioninregulatedsectors/48837794.pdf [51] See Competition concerns in ports
and port services, OECD / DG COMP (2011) http://ec.europa.eu/competition/international/multilateral/2011_jun_ports.pdf [52] Judgement of the
EU Court of 10 December 1991, case C-179/90 [53] Case of the Port of Fos is
COMP/39.316 – Gaz de France, decision du 3.12.2009 (case related to the LNG
Terminal) [54] Decision of the
German competition authority - Bundeskartellamt (2010), ‘Bundeskartellamt opens
up the Puttgarden-Rødby ferry route to competition’, January [55] Commission
decision of 2004 - ‘Scandlines Sverige AB v Port of Helsingborg’, Case
COMP/A.36.568/D3. [56] Decision of
Portuguese competition authority of 2007 - Autoridade da Concorrência (2007),
‘CA detect cartel operating in the Port of Setúbal and imposes fine of
€185,000’, April [57] See: Port Procedures Survey, FONASBA,
December 2012, http://www.fonasba.com/author/fonasba_admin [58] http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-12-425_en.htm [59] http://ec.europa.eu/transport/modes/maritime/e-maritime_en.htm [60] Directive on airports ground-handling. [61] See preparatory work for the Transport
White Paper by the Joint Research Centre (2011): http://ec.europa.eu/transport/themes/strategies/2011_white_paper_en.htm [62]See: "Ports urge European leaders not
to cut in Transport Infrastructure budget" http://www.espo.be/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=356:ports-urge-european-leaders-not-to-cut-in-transport-infrastructure-budget&catid=34:espo-news&Itemid=109
(February 2013) [63]
http://www.port-investor.com/espo-presentation/ reference [64] Strategic planning and sound economic
assessment of port infrastructural projects will be tackled by the new
Regulation on TEN-T Guidelines and by the new approach to Structural Funds [65] OECD report, A framework for investment
policy transparency (2003), http://www.oecd.org/daf/internationalinvestment/investmentpolicy/16793978.pdf [66] for an economic review on this question, see World Bank "The
Evolution of Ports in a competitive world, 2007", ,
http://www.ppiaf.org/sites/ppiaf.org/files/documents/toolkits/Portoolkit/Toolkit/pdf/modules/02_TOOLKIT_Module2.pdf– [67] By ISL Bremen, see
http://ec.europa.eu/transport/modes/maritime/studies/doc/2006_06_eu_seaports_study.pdf [68]
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/committees/en/tran/studiesdownload.html?file=66171 [69] Commission Directive 2006/111/EC on the
transparency of financial relations between Member States and public
undertakings as well as on financial transparency within certain
undertakings" ("Transparency Directive") [70]In around 11% of TEN-T core ports (PwC,
2013), establishing the turn-over threshold from the Transparency Directive is
problematic, precisely because of the (lack of) port accounting practices. [71] In the specific case of waste reception
facilities, basic principles on pricing have been introduced. Though, it has
been acknowledged that transparency remains a challenge in order to ensure a
cost-based approach in line with the polluter pays principle. [72] See, e.g. Haralambides, (2002, 2012) “Port
Financing and Pricing in the European Union” [73] See, e.g. http://www.ukessays.com/essays/geography/port-pricing.php#ixzz2Ef5PGRiQ e.g: http://www.ppiaf.org/sites/ppiaf.org/files/documents/toolkits/Portoolkit/Toolkit/index.html [74] See, e.g. Haralambides, Erasmus University
Rotterdam, presentation at the EU ports conference September 2012 “it is no
longer acceptable to expend public resources on the development of, principally
private, infrastructure intended to ‘steal’ cargo from each other among members
of a Union”. See: http://www.academia.edu/2096342/Ports_Engines_for_Growth_and_Employment
or see also H. Meersman, E. Van de Voorde and T. Vanelslander (Antwerp, 2002) [75] The perceptions of users of services appear in cases of
non-transparent (or very difficult to understand) charging systems. [76] E.g. in 2012, Germany’s State Ministry of
Economic Affairs, the Hamburg Port Authority and port service providers agreed
to significantly reduce the Port of Hamburg’s calling costs for large ships in
order to strengthen the port’s competitiveness, in response to the continuing
delay in deepening the channel of the River Elbe. [77] See Notteboom and others, www.porteconomics.eu/.../501-2012-iame-the-green-port-toolbox [78] The Commission is working on monitoring the
emission of greenhouse gasses from ships. For ship generated waste, agreements
have been made under MARPOL. [79] Lashof and Ahuja (1990), Bailey and Solomon
(2004), Tzannatos (2010), Villalba and Gemechu (2011), others. [80] In addition, Directive
2000/59/EC on port reception facilities for ship-generated waste and cargo
residues, requires ports to provide waste reception facilities and vessels are,
against a waste charge, obligated to make use of these facilities. The charges
are always differentiated based on the certain characteristics of the ship,
such as gross or net tonnage, engine power, or volume [81] Next to the proposed requirement for TEN-T ports, the
Commission has proposed a Clean Power for Transport legislation, obliging all
core TEN-T ports to have LNG bunkering facilities at the disposal of ships by
2020. [82] The Environmental Ship Index is based on
ship emissions of local pollutants, such as NOx, SOx,
particulate matter, and GHG. Source: http://www.wpci.nl/projects/environmental_ship_index.php [83] The Green Award certification scheme
focuses on crew, operational, environmental and managerial elements. Source: http://www.greenaward.org/greenaward/ [84] See, e.g. http://news.portdebarcelona.cat/eng/noticia.php?id=42&p=1 [85]
http://www.oecd.org/daf/competition/48837794.pdf [86] Optimar Study – see http://ec.europa.eu/transport/modes/maritime/studies/doc/2010_optimar_study.pdf [87] PwC, 2013 (Trans-tool bases estimated) –
See also: De Langen, van Meijeren, and Tavaszzy (2012) 2http://www.ejtir.tudelft.nl/issues/2012_03/pdf/2012_03_03.pdf [88] Long term average GDP growth rates in the
EU of 1.4% [89] OECD 2012, IHS Fairplay 2010,
ITF 2011 [90] See World Bank “Connecting to Compete 2012
– Trade Logistics in the Global Economy [91] See, in this regard, http://www.oecd.org/env/transportandenvironment/41612575.pdf OECD (2008) Policy Instruments to limit
negative environmental impacts from increased international transport. [92]
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2013:0018:FIN:EN:PDF [93] The Commission is proposing that LNG
refuelling stations be installed in all maritime ports of the TEN-T core
network by 2020.The total estimated cost for the proposed development of LNG
refuelling stations for waterborne transport the EU will be approximately € 2.1
billion [94] Cf Bichou (2012) Linking theory with
practice in port performance and benchmarking, International Journal of Ocean
Systems Management 2012 [95] Ports perform a land-sea interface
functions. Some activities in ports are clearly linked to maritime transport,
while some other (e.g. land-related logistic added value functions or
activities of industrial firms installed in the port area) are clearly related
to land transport needs. [96] See Annex VII [97] For example, the Czech Republic is
upgrading its trans-European travel corridors intensively (in particular, the
corridor four connecting Germany with South-Eastern Europe). [98] See TEN-T ports: http://ec.europa.eu/transport/themes/infrastructure/ten-t-policy/transport-mode/ports_en.htm [99] Article 155 (2) TFEU provides two ways to
implement EU social dialogue agreements: either by implementation via Council
Directive, or ‘in accordance with the procedures and practices specific to
management and labour and the Member States’, the so-called ‘voluntary route’. [100] Study of Prof Van Hooydonk, University of
Ghent, College of Europe, for DG MOVE (2013) – See Annex VII [101] For example, in 2009 Italian judges
confirmed the right of self-handling on quays for ship operators; in ports in
the UK, NL, DE, DK, PL or GR, self-handling can take place under the conditions
established by Port Authorities [102] Less than 3% of (small) TEN-T ports would
be concerned; self-handling is an option only for general cargoes (a declining
category) in ports that are not sufficiently equipped. Modern ships are not
fitted with gear/equipment for self-handling. An exception concerns
car-carriers, where cargo-owners (car industry) express preoccupation about the
quality of service provided by dock workers in some ports. [103] Small contracts are those contracts below a
threshold of 5 million € (over the whole contract duration). This threshold is
in line with EU and international agreements in the field of public procurement
and concessions. Given the international nature of the shipping and port
business this is considered the appropriate approach. [105] See COM(2011) 824 final [106] Cf. Modernisation exercise of State Aid rules
announced by the Commission in 2012. [107] Cf. World Bank studies on port development. See also Clark, David Dollar,
Alejandro Micco (2004) "Port efficiency, maritime transport costs and
bilateral trade", Haralambides et al. [108] In the PwC methodology, the Port of Rotterdam (PoR) is taken as a
reference for the benchmarking exercise because of the good results obtained by
the port in international benchmarking exercises over the years. Data on costs
and costs structures of the PoR have been extensively examined by academic research.
In quantitative terns, the PoR represents by itself 10% of the total EU port traffic [109] Vertical integration refers to the fact
that shipping companies also own and operate dedicated terminals: e.g. COSCO,
APMT and Maersk, Terminal Links and CMA CGM or that terminal operators are also
getting more control over the hinterland connections: e.g. Hutchison. Annex II
provides more information on this issue. [110] Dock labour and port-related employment, T.
Notteboom, 2010 [111] The baseline scenario assumes EU measures to enhance port capacity,
i.a. TEN-T. [112] See OECD (2012) papers on "The
Competitiveness of Global Port Cities" [113] See http://www.idcdockworkers.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=216&Itemid= [114] See: http://www.idcdockworkers.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=222&Itemid=1 [115] Market dynamics involve that a growing activity in ports will lead
to a growing demand for workers; however, the types of jobs and retributions
will be determined for the particular circumstances of each type of trade,
business, port, etc. [116] In addition to the modal shift impacts described in the first row
on transport costs [117] Idem [118] Measures 1, 2 and 5 [119] Operational Objective OO1 – policy measures
1, 2 and 5 [120] PP2a variant = PP2a with the only
difference: an explanatory Commission communication on how existing rules apply
to cargo handling services (measure 3) instead of proposing new legislation in
this respect (measures 1,2,5) [121] http://pprism.espo.be
Table of contents ANNEX I: Schematic
presentation of PP2a 2 ANNEX II: General context: Features of the EU Ports
system 3 ANNEX III: Maritime
ports freight and passenger statistics 25 ANNEX IV: The EU Ports Policy: an ex-post evaluation 44 ANNEX V: Public Consultation - Summary of stakeholders'
positions 49 ANNEX VI: Relative performance of TEN-T Core: efficiency
vs. competitive pressure 57 ANNEX VII: Modelling of impacts 64 ANNEX VIII: Reference forecast – NEAC Trade Model 89
ANNEX I:
Schematic
presentation of PP2a
Measures
contributing to market access (OO1) and preventing market abuses (OO2) *
Public Service Obligation ANNEX II:
General
context: Features of the EU Ports system EU – Ports – ITMMA Antwerp University – the EU
Port System "To
accommodate maritime extra-EU and intra-EU trade flows, Europe is blessed with
a long coastline reaching from the Baltic all the way to the Med and the Black Sea. The European
port system cannot be considered as a homogenous set of ports. It features
established large ports as well as a whole series of medium-sized to smaller
ports each with specific characteristics in terms of hinterland markets served,
commodities handled and location qualities. This unique
blend of different port types and sizes combined with a vast economic
hinterland shapes port competition in the region". 1.
Statistics Eurostat produces
extensive port statistics based on data collected within the framework of
the EU maritime transport statistics Directive (Directive 2009/42/EC) on
statistical returns in respect of carriage of goods and passengers by sea. EU-27 aggregates refer
to the total of 22 maritime Member States. The Czech Republic, Luxembourg, Hungary, Austria and Slovakia have no maritime ports. “Main ports” are ports handling
more than 1 million tonnes of goods annually (however, data for some smaller
ports may be included in the published results). Data are presented at level of
“statistical ports”. A statistical port consists of one or more ports, normally
controlled by a single port authority, able to record ship and cargo movements.
The table below provides an overview of some main indicators (source:
Eurostat): Seaports handle, in
volume, 74% of the goods exported or imported to the EU and from the rest of
the world. The table below gives an overview of the relative importance of
seaports in comparison to the other transport modes in terms of external trade.
EU -27 External Trade by Mode of Transport
2010 – Weight (million tonnes) (source: Eurostat) || Export || Import || Export + Import Sea || 424.8 || 77.0% || 1202.2 || 73.8% || 1627.0 || 74.6% Road || 79.8 || 14.5% || 58.0 || 3.6% || 137.7 || 6.3% Rail || 19.8 || 3.6% || 64.1 || 3.9% || 83.9 || 3.8% Inland Waterway || 9.6 || 1.7% || 12.1 || 0.7% || 21.7 || 1.0% Pipeline || 3.7 || 0.7% || 240.3 || 14.8% || 244.0 || 11.2% Air || 10.2 || 1.9% || 3.9 || 0.2% || 14.1 || 0.6% Self Propulsion || 1.3 || 0.2% || 1.5 || 0.1% || 2.8 || 0.1% Post || 0.0 || 0.0% || 0.0 || 0.0% || 0.0 || 0.0% Unknown || 2.6 || 0.5% || 46.2 || 2.8% || 48.7 || 2.2% TOTAL || 551.7 || 100.0% || 1628.3 || 100.0% || 2180.0 || 100.0% Sea-borne freight trade In terms of
cargo flows in the European seaport system, five main markets can be
distinguished: the container market, the RoRo market, the market for
conventional general cargo, the liquid bulk market and the dry bulk market.
Each market has its own dynamics: the routing of different types of
maritime freight through European ports to the hinterland is guided by complex
interactions between a large set of factors and actors. However, there are two
underlying common factors to all ports and types of trade that influence the
routing to the hinterland: the connectivity of the port to the hinterland and
the level of performance of the port itself. The following
graph[1]
summarizes sea-borne trade trends in the EU since 2005: The number of
ports active in Ro-Ro, general cargo, liquid bulk and or dry bulk handling is
in excess of 300. There are about 130 seaports handling containers of which
around 40 accommodate intercontinental container services. The normalized
HH-index for the European container port system is decreasing which means an
increasing number of European ports are present on the competitive scene. While
the European container port scene becoming more diverse in terms of number of
ports involved, a lot of cargo is concentrated in a limited number of ports.
Moreover, large differences in growth patterns can be observed among the
multi-port gateways regions. Distribution of cargo
flows For the
purpose of examining sea-trade flows, the EU is often divided into 6 maritime
regions (North West Continent region, Mediterranean Sea region, Baltic Sea
region, UK & Ireland region, Atlantic Ocean region, Black Sea region). The biggest
share in total EU seaborne freight traffic is held by North West Continent
region ports (31.7%). The "Le Havre-Hamburg" range
remains volume-wise a strong port range in Europe. However, its market share in
total European volumes differs depending on the market segment considered: • 48.4% or
40.3 million TEU in the container business • 26.8% or
269 million tons for dry bulk • 24.6% or
391 million tons for liquid bulk • 19.5% or 62
million tons for conventional general cargo • 18.3% or 82
million tons for Ro-Ro The second
biggest region is the Mediterranean Sea region (only EU ports) with a share of
28.2%. Baltic Sea ports (excluding Russian ports) account for 17.3% of the
total throughput in EU ports, followed by UK & Irish ports (15.3%). The
smallest share is held by EU ports along the Atlantic Ocean coast (5.9%) and EU
ports along the Black Sea coast (1.7%). The group of
seaports included into the TEN-T core network handle approximately 70% of the
cargo passing through all EU seaports. The greatest number of core seaports
(24) is concentrated within the Mediterranean Sea region. These seaports
account for 58.4% of the throughput of all seaports within the EU Mediterranean
Sea region. Half of those
ports are located along the coastline of Italy. This can be explained by taking
into consideration the fact that Italian seaports handle the greatest volume of
cargo within the Mediterranean Sea region (494.1 million tonnes) which accounts
for about 48.3% of the total seaports’ turnover in the region. Additionally,
Italy has the largest number of seaports that handle at least 1 million
tonnes of cargo. Spain has also a large number of core seaports along its
Mediterranean coast (7). The rest of the core seaports are located in Greece (4), France (1) and Slovenia (1). The figures below provide an overview of the main ports
connections (the main intra-EU sea borne trade): Ports connections - Main intra-EU sea-borne trade The following
figure compares the five cargo handling segments on the basis of a cumulative
market share curve for the 50 largest ports in each of the segments. It can be
observed that the concentration is the lowest in the conventional general cargo
segment and the highest in the container market. Cumulative market share
of the top 75 ports in each cargo segment (Source: ITMMA
Universiteit Antwerpen and ESPO (2009) Passenger in EU ports Eurostat statistics
shows that ports in the EU-27 handled almost 400 million maritime passengers
(ferry crossings and cruise-ships) in 2010; this marked the third successive
annual decline in passenger numbers, decreased 2.0 % in comparison with 2009,
after falls of 2.2 % in 2009 and 0.3 % in 2008. Italian and Greek ports
each handled more than twice as many passengers in 2010 than in any other Member State (accounting for 22.2 % and 21.2 % of the EU-27 total respectively). The next
busiest ports in terms of passenger numbers were in Denmark (42 million
passengers), followed by ports in Sweden, the United Kingdom, Germany and
France which each handled between 27 million and 30 million passengers in 2010;
ports in Croatia handled 25 million passengers. Relative to national
population, the importance of maritime passenger transport was particularly
high in Malta (19.5 passengers per inhabitant), followed by Denmark (7.6),
Greece (7.4) and Estonia (7.1); other than Finland, Sweden and Italy, the
number of maritime passengers per inhabitant in 2010 averaged less than 1.0 in
each of the remaining EU Member States. The table below provides an overview of
the main passenger data (source: Eurostat): 2.
Functioning
of the port: a chain of services A port is generally regarded as a gateway
through which goods and passengers are transferred between ships and the shore[2].
Different activities take place in a port such as ship arrivals and mooring,
(un)loading on docks and transit warehousing. While the port as a whole can be
seen as a link in a global logistics chain, the port product is itself a chain
of consecutive links[3].
According to a commonly accepted presentation[4], the functioning of a
port requires the combination of a number of services organised as follows: (a) Provision
of general transport infrastructure whose planning, construction,
maintenance, operation and funding are in most cases the responsibility of
local, regional or national authorities. The only notable exception is the UK case where port general infrastructure investments are privately financed on a
commercial basis. The general infrastructure includes: ● Maritime
transport infrastructure, i.e., maritime access channels, lights, buoys and
navigational aids, dikes and quays, etc. ● Ancillary
infrastructure equipment, including, inter alia, equipment for
ice-breaking, hydrological surveys, dredging and maintenance of the port and
port approaches ● Land
transport infrastructure, i.e. road, railways and/or waterways infrastructures
ensuring the hinterland connection of the port. (b) Provision
of port "technical-nautical" services, including pilotage,
towage and mooring: pilotage is a compulsory service required under national
and international regulations for ensuring maritime safety conditions. Usually,
pilotage fees are fixed by the administration and/or by the corporative body of
maritime pilots. Towage and mooring services are commercial services in many
ports, i.e. with prices fixed under market conditions. (c) Provision
of operational infrastructure and equipment, i.e. elements
required for the operation of specific facilities, such as berths, cranes,
generally linked to the provision of cargo handling and/or passenger services:
these facilities and equipment are usually provided by terminal operators (see
below). Their use is most of the time charged as a part of the service provided
to customers (shipping companies, cargo owners, logistic operators). (d) Provision
of cargo handling and passenger handling services: these services
involve marshalling services (receipt, storage, assembly and sorting of cargo
in preparation for delivery to a ship's berth) and stevedoring services
(loading and unloading of cargo from ships). Each type of cargo requires
specialised equipment and berthing facilities (passenger berths, oil, coal,
ore, grain, timber, roll-on/roll-off, containers, chemical and gas, etc.).
Cargo-handling services are mainly, but not exclusively, provided in Europe by privately owned terminal operators. For historical reasons, in many EU ports,
there is at least one cargo-handling operator owned and/or managed by the
national, regional or local authority. Where there is a degree of competitive
pressure, prices and quality of cargo-handling services are establish by the
market. The competitive pressure is especially present in container services;
for other segments, like bulk, the cargo handling is often related to local
demand, linked to localised production facilities (steel mills, chemical plants
or electricity production). (e) Ancillary
(or general) services provided in many ports include bunkering,
chandlering, ship repair, container maintenance, marine appraisals, insurance
claims inspections, banking, etc. (f) Waste
reception facilities: waste reception services are mandatory by virtue
of international law and have to be provided under the conditions of Directive
2000/59/EC, which amongst other establish common rules on charging. Below, a more
detailed description is given for some core port services: Cargo handling
operations form the core of the raison d'être of ports. The efficiency
and effectiveness with which loading and discharging activities take place in a
port are important cornerstones for the port competitiveness and its ability to
generate wider economic effects in terms of employment and value-added
creation. In terms of services, cargo handling involves marshalling services
(receipt, storage, assembly and sorting of cargo in preparation for delivery to
a ship's berth) and stevedoring services (loading and unloading of cargo from
ships). Pilotage is a service
provided by a pilot with local knowledge and skills which enable him to conduct
the navigation and manoeuvring of the vessel in and approaching the harbour.
Usually, pilotage services are provided by the State itself or by a corporation
entrusted with exclusive rights for the provision of the service. Towage is a service
provided by tug boats which move larger ships that either should not or cannot
power themselves. Usually, towage companies are private companies that operate
in the port by means of an authorisation of the port authority. In some cases,
towage operators are owned by the State. Mooring is a service
provided by specialised boatmen companies securing or confining a vessel in a
particular station, as by cables and anchors or by a line or chain run to the
wharf. Dredging involves
collecting and bringing up, fishing up or clearing away or out material and /
or any object from the bed of a river, sea, etc.; transporting it to the
relocation site and unloading the material or object. The purpose for dredging
can be maintenance of the depth or the deepening of navigation accesses or
channels; it can also be land reclamation, coastal protection, seabed
stabilisation for the offshore energy installations or the removal of
contaminated sediments Waste
reception services: in the EU, the provision of ship waste
reception facilities in ports is an obligation stemming from Directive
2000/59/EC; waste reception facilities can be operated as a commercial service
or as a public service provided by the port Passenger
services: services provided in passenger terminals in ports, of
particular importance for ferry crossings (islands' traffic, Channel and
straits crossings, North and Baltic Sea inter-city connections) Other
Ancillary (or general) services provided in many ports
include bunkering, chandlering, ship repair, container maintenance, marine
appraisals, insurance claims inspections, banking, etc. The figure[5]
below provides an overview of the maritime value chain: 3.
Competition
issues in ports The
following forms of competitive pressures can be distinguished: a) Inter-port
competition: The degree of substitutability between ports, able to
serve the same hinterland efficiently, determines the extent of competition
between ports. Ports may also compete for transhipment traffic, whereby larger
ocean-going vessels use a port hub to transfer cargo to smaller feeder vessels:
in such a circumstance the relevant geographic market is likely to be wider than
in the case where ports compete for hinterland traffic only. Rivalry between
ports is influenced by the availability of public funds to offset losses,
blurring the role of commercial forces. The issue is of
particular relevance for trades involving containers. The choice of a major
container shipping company or of a major terminal operator for a particular
port as its base for operation has huge economic implications for the port and
the port region in question. In the EU, "fair competition" (or the
lack of it) between ports serving the same hinterlands (North Sea range) and
between ports with similar features to serve as "transhipment" points
(Mediterranean Sea) has been an issue of debate for many years. b) Intra-port
competition: This concerns competition between operators established in
the same port, or in close vicinity, offering the same service to the ports'
customer. Often, it is up to the port authority to establish a level playing
field for all competitors. In terms of economic importance, the issue of
intra-port competition is particularly relevant for terminal operator companies
providing cargo-handling and other cargo-related added value services. In the
case of container terminals, many ports have more than one terminal operator,
but even in those ports that do not, the terminal operators compete fiercely
with rivals in neighbouring ports for the same hinterland. For cargo
handling and terminal operators established in ports in the same maritime
façade, there may be little difference between intra-port and inter-port
competition insofar as they offer similar competing alternatives for worldwide
logistic integrator and shipping lines – they battle for the same
hinterland. The table below gives an
example of the number of operators in key major ports: Number of service providers in major
European ports[6] Port || Pilotage || Towage || Mooring || Container || Dry bulk || Liquid bulk Algeciras || 1 || 1 || 1 || 3 || 2 || 2 Antwerp || 1 || 1 || 1 || 3 || 11 || 11 Genoa || 1 || 1 || 1 || 6 || 1 || 3 Goteborg || 1 || 1 || 1 || 1 || 5 || 2 Hamburg || 1 || 3 || 3 || 12 || NA || NA Le Havre || 1 || 1 || 1 || 6 || 10 || 8 Rotterdam || 1 || 9 || 1 || 35 || 15 || NA Tallinn || 1 || 3 || 1/2[7] || 2 || 10 || 8 c) Competition for
entering into the market: Intra-port competition takes place only when
there is more than one service provider in the port. Where there are reasons to
restrict the number of operators, like the scarcity of land or public service
considerations, the market access to the port can be granted by means of
concessions, lease contracts, administrative authorisations, licenses and other
instruments. The award of such contracts is (usually) a prerogative of port
authority and the degree of competition to enter into the market depends on the
extent to which the tender is open and transparent. 4.
Consolidation
of the market for handling containers In Europe, the top five
leading operators (HPH, PSA, APM Terminals, Eurogate and DP World) handled an
estimated 75% of the total European container throughput in 2008 compared to
less than 50% in 1998, illustrating the mature and consolidated nature of this
market. The consolidation trend in European container handling leads to some
controversy: the industry structure has become sufficiently concentrated to
raise a fundamental question about whether market forces are sufficient to
prevent the abuse of market power[8]. Cargo-handling of containers: Global Operators – Deep Sea Trade Since 2002,
global container port throughput has more than doubled, whilst the share
accounted for by Chinese ports has reached 30%. Almost one in three TEU handled
worldwide is handled in a Chinese port today. Meanwhile, on a total TEU basis,
global/international terminal operators now account for over 75% of world
throughput compared with 58% in 2002. The largest container ship in service in
2002 was just 7,000 TEU whilst today it is in excess of 15,000 TEU with 18,000
TEU ships on the way. In 2011 the big
four global container operators collectively accounted for 26.5% of world
container port throughput, slightly down compared to the previous year due to
the emergence of other large players, both international and local. Top 10 global/international
terminal operators throughput, 2011 Operator Million TEU %
share of world throughput 1 PSA
International 47.6 8.1% 2 Hutchison Port Holdings 43.4 7.4% 3 DP World 33.1 5.6% 4 APM
Terminals 32.0 5.4% 5 COSCO Group 15.4 2.6% 6 Terminal
Invest Limited (TIL) 12.1 2.1% 7 China Shipping Terminal 7.8 1.3% 8 Evergreen 6.9 1.2% 9 Eurogate 6.6 1.1% 10 HHLA 6.4 1.1% Source: Drewry
Maritime Research Examples of
terminal providers operating in core ports across the European Union[9] Terminal operator || Core ports HPH || Taranto, Gdynia, Barcelona, Stockholm, Amsterdam, Rotterdam, Felixstowe, London APTM || Zeebrugge, Aarhus, Le Havre, Bremerhaven, Gioia Tauro, Algeciras, Rotterdam PSA || Zeebrugge, Antwerp, Genoa, Venice, Sines, Rotterdam DP World || Antwerp, Le Havre, Constanta, Tarragona, Rotterdam, Southampton Cosco Pacific || Antwerp, Hamburg, Bremerhaven, Piraeus, Genoa, Naples, Livorno, La Spezia, Ancona, Algeciras, Barcelona, Valencia, Tarragona, Rotterdam MSC || Antwerp, Aarhus, Le Havre, Bremerhaven, Hamburg, all Italian ports, all Dutch ports Eurogate || Bremerhaven, Wilhelmshaven, Gioia Tauro, La Spezia, Ravenna, Lisbon Vertical Integration Incumbent
terminal operators are confronted more often with a strong competition coming
from new entrants (railways companies, investment groups, etc.). In particular,
container shipping lines have adopted vertical integration strategies in order
to increase their terminal capacity in strategic ports. While pure terminal
operators manage multi-user facilities, container shipping lines handle
vessels in terms of berthing and crane density in view of an efficient
synchronization of liner services (e.g. hub-feeder operations) and high
schedule reliability. This phenomenon of vertical
integration is highly experienced by EU ports as shown by the following
examples[10]: ·
MSC and CMA CGM, the world's second and third largest container
shipping lines, are involved in 15 and 10 container terminals respectively
within the EU. ·
Maersk Line's parent company, AP Moller-Maersk, operates a large
number of container terminals through its subsidiary APM Terminals:
"although this Netherlands-headquartered company advertises itself as an
independent company within the AP Moller-Maersk Group, with an independent
board and operating common user terminals for all container ship lines in
Europe, it currently still mainly handles traffic of sister company Maersk
Line"[11]. ·
Other shipping lines with a strong presence in the terminal
operator industry include Evergreen, Cosco (directly or via sister company
Cosco Pacific), Hanjin, APL, NYK, K-Line, Yang Ming and Hyundai. Terminal
operators usually tend to expand their network of facilities across several
TEN-T ports to maximise network's effects, optimise their hub-and-spoke
operation and widen their customers' base. 5.
Relative
cost of port services in the logistic chain Total port costs can
account for a significant fraction of the total costs associated with the
logistics chain. In traditional ports, handling general cargo, costs of ports
and ports terminal operation may exceed 30% of the total door-to-door logistic
costs. Typically, the situation concerns short sea shipping and intra-EU
maritime trade exchanges in particular. In moderns' ports for deep-sea
containers trades, using capital-intensive cargo-handling equipment and
advanced IT systems, the equivalent cost can be reduced to less than 4-5% of
the total logistic costs. European labour costs
typically represent between 40% and 75% of a general cargo terminal’s operating
costs and, even in the capital-intensive container handling industry, they can
be as high as 50% of total operating costs[12]. In many EU ports,
terminal operators rely heavily on the so-called "pools" of dock
workers for loading/unloading ships and moving cargoes around the port. These
pools have been put in place in order to cope with the irregularity of port
traffic and the ensuing fluctuations in labour demand. Temporary labour is thus
reserved for a steadily available complement ('pool') of registered workers who
enjoy unemployment benefit or similar pay when there is no work available. Even
if these arrangements take on very different shapes, today, in 16 out of 22
Member States, access to the port labour market is thus subject to
sector-specific rules which depart from general labour law. The total EU port cost
to the shipping industry is estimated at around €11-17 billion in 2010
(PWC/NEA). An indicative repartition of the relative weight of the different
costs items of the total cost port operation is presented in the following
table: Relative
weight of port services costs[13] || % of total costs, confidence interval || Charging criteria Port dues (charges for using port general infrastructure) || 5%-10% || Historic criteria, not necessarily linked to costs; rebates for attracting vessels in case of low activity are usual practice Vessel technical services (pilotage, towage, mooring) Of which pilotage || 10% - 15% 5% - 6% || Pilotage prices are unilaterally fixed, with supervision by an independent authority in some cases only. Towage and mooring services prices fixed in commercial terms in most cases Charges for using operational infrastructure ("berthing costs") || 5%-15% || Depending on type and size of vessels and nature and volume of cargo; unilateral rebates for attracting vessels and congestion charges in case of tight demand Cargo handling prices || 45%-60%* || Usually fixed under competitive market conditions; concerns of conflict of interests in cases where terminals are owned by major shipping lines Prices for other port ancillary services || 5%-10% || Usually fixed under market conditions Waste reception fees || 1%-5%- || Charges fixed by the Authority, in principle cost-oriented (see Directive ) The table is indicative only since the
heterogeneity of ports and cargo-handling operations makes it extremely difficult
to present values "valid for all". According to research, the cost of
cargo-handling can represent between 70%-80% in some traditional, labour
intensive ports. 6.
Deep
sea vs. Short sea shipping Deep sea shipping refers
to the maritime transport of goods on intercontinental routes, crossing oceans;
as opposed to short sea shipping over relatively short distances, for instance
within the EU. In the EU,
inter-continental sea trade of containers is concentrated in a relatively
limited number of major ports, e.g. Rotterdam, Hamburg, Antwerp, Le Havre or Felixstowe. Those ports are equipped with advanced, capital intensive
cargo-handling installations, able to serve very large container-ships. Large
container ships and huge cargo-handling capacities in ports lead to economies
of scale resulting in very low transportation costs per unit. Short-sea-shipping
includes traffic from "hub" ports and also freight exchanges between
European maritime regions. For long intra-EU distances, e.g. Iberian Peninsula
to the North Sea and Baltic regions, short sea is, in principle, an alternative
to land transport solutions. Low cargo volumes, smaller ships and much more
frequent port calls have a negative impact on the cost and competitiveness of
short sea services. 7.
Heterogeneity
of ports in the EU There are various ways of classifying European
ports. On a geographical basis, the most common classification is based on the
maritime coastlines of the continent (Baltic, North Sea, Atlantic,
Mediterranean, and Black Sea) or ranges of neighbouring, competing ports (e.g.
Hamburg-Le Havre range). A functional classification[14]
distinguishes large gateway ports, hub ports as well as a whole series of
medium-sized to smaller ports each with specific characteristics in terms of
hinterland markets served, commodities handled and location qualities. In terms
of ownership and operational structures, at the one end there is a significant
number of ports where the local government both owns the land, the
infrastructure and the equipment, and runs the entire operation of all the
services provided in the port. At the other end of the spectrum there are a
number of ports with a private landlord owner and a number of private interests
that provide the services, some of them in competition with each other. The table below
provides an overview of the ownership structure in the different regions. This diversity in governance seems to have an
impact on the financial autonomy of ports and their capacity to decide the
investments and pricing policies according to their own commercial strategy. In
contrast with the ports of the Hanse and Anglo-Saxon, the ports of the Latin
and New Latin often have limited or no financial autonomy. They receive funds
from the general State budget and the State regulates, sets port charges and/or
collects other port revenues. Ownership of port authorities (European Port Governance report 2010, ESPO[15])[16] || Hanse || New Hanse || Anglo-Saxon || Latin || New Latin Publicly owned ports || 96.0% || 84.1% || 47.1% || 75.0% || 90.6% National Authority || 6.5% || 71.3% || 35.3% || 64.4% || 87.3% Region || 2.5% || 0.0% || 0.0% || 7.9% || 0.0% Province || 4.3% || 0.0% || 0.0% || 2.7% || 0.0% Municipality || 82.7% || 12.8% || 11.8% || 0.0% || 3.3% Privately owned ports || 4.0% || 0.0% || 8.8% || 0.7% || 0.0% Other || 0.0% || 15.9% || 44.1% || 24.3% || 9.4% Total || 100.0% || 100.0% || 100.0% || 100.0% || 100.0% Port authorities' dual
nature of functions The extent, scope and
mandate of "port authorities" vary greatly from one Member State to another. The association of European Port Authorities Port Governance report
(ESPO, 2010) concluded as follows: "Most port authorities in the EU
have formalised objectives, but these show a great diversity of economic and
non-economic ones, which are often even mixed. The pure economic objectives are
varied as well. Maximisation of handled tonnage, maximisation of added value and
maximisation of the profit of the port authority stand out as the most
important ones. The first is more common for port authorities from the New
Hanse and New Latin regions, whereas added value occurs more often in the Hanse
and Latin regions. Profit maximisation is more common for port authorities from
the Anglo-Saxon region". The ESPO Fact Finding
Report further examines the dual nature of nearly all port authorities in the
EU, both as (a) regulatory bodies, administering the port and providing a level
playing field for port operators established in the ports and (b) operators
directly and indirectly involved in the provision of commercial services in the
port, often competing with other operators. Port governance and
funding
In terms of public vs
private sector involvement, the structures for provision of port services in
the EU underwent significant changes in recent years. Private operators took an
extremely solid and strategic role for the development of ports. Some public
authorities governing the port became more commercial oriented. Although port
authorities run a rather restrictive information policy on the funding of port
infrastructure[17],it
can be said that ports substantially rely on public funding. Except in the case
of UK, general port access infrastructures are always funded by public
resources. Funding of commercial operational infrastructures (dedicated quays
and berths, cargo-handling facilities, ancillary cargo services, etc.) is
shared both by public authorities and private operators. Port
management models – Source, World Bank Type || General port Infrastructure || Superstructure (infrastructure required for the provision of cargo-handling operations) || Cargo-handling Operations || Other functions Publicly owned, managed and operated Port || Public || Public || Public || Mainly public Public Owned Port open to private operators || Public || Public || Private || Mainly public Public Owned Port with operations privately managed || Public || Private || Private || Mainly private Privately owned and operated ports || Private || Private || Private || Mainly private 8.
Impact
of ports on local economies and jobs The impact of seaport
efficiency and productivity on economic growth and jobs is well documented in
transport economics. Some studies suggest[18] that there are about
800,000 enterprises directly linked to ports' activities in the EU which
generate, directly and indirectly, approximately 3 million jobs. Port
throughput is positively correlated to employment in port regions. OECD studies[19]
indicate that an increase of one million tonnes of port throughput is
associated with an increase in employment in the port region of 0.03%. This
means that in a region with one million employees, employment would increase by
300 units; in the long run this increase would be 7500 units. 9.
Port
development stages[20] || First generation || Second generation || Third generation || Fourth generation || Before 1960 || 1960s to 1980s || 1980s to 1990s || As of 2000s The port development position and development strategy || Conservative junction point of the sea and inland transportation || Expansionism transportation and production centre || Industrial principle international trade base chain connecting transportation system || Nodal point / key gate of sustainable transport chains, combining ocean trades and intra-EU redistribution of cargoes Activity scope || (1) Cargo handling, storage, navigation assistance-pier and || (1) + (2) Cargo type change: container handling and distribution, ship related industry - enlargement of port regions || (1)+ (2) + Cargo information, logistics integration, ferry, Ro-Ro, lo-lo deployment, Formation of the terminal and distribution centres || (1)+(2)+(3) High end activities in the port and adjacent region(s); attraction of industrial and commercial firms to the port Structure formation and specifics || Ø Everybody acts individually in the port Ø Port and its users maintain informal relations. || Ø Relations between port and its users become more close Ø Emergence of the slight correlation among port activities Ø Absent / negative cooperation relations between port authority and users community || Ø Formation of the port cooperation system Ø Trade and transportation chain concentration in the port Ø Relations between port and self-governing community become more closer Ø Planning of the port adapted to business needs || Ø Develop the EU hinterland network in cooperation with other European sea and inland ports Ø Optimization of internal port logistics Ø Efficient coordination between shippers, terminals, service providers, harbourmasters and transport companies. Character of the productivity || Ø Loading - Unloading Ø Individual supply of the simple services Ø Low value added || Ø Cargo distribution Ø Cargo processing Ø Increase of the value-added activities in the port || Ø Distribution of the cargo and information Ø Combination of the diversified services and distribution Ø Broad range of value added activities || Ø Integrated logistics Ø Reducing ecological footprint of overall logistic chain Ø Attraction of high end activities to the region. Core factors || Labour/capital || Capital || Technology and know-how || ICTs and network integration 10. Overview of
recent and on-going port reforms and re-organisations in selected European
countries[21] Belgium
(Flanders) The
legal form of port authorities is laid down in the 1999 ‘Havendecreet’ (Ports
Decree) of the Flemish government. A few years ago, government introduced the
concept of ‘Flanders Port Area’ to stimulate more intensive co-operation
between port authorities. Here, priority will be given to common initiatives
with a clear value added, without questioning the decision-making of individual
port authorities. Activities
with respect to (1) strengthening the social support for ports, (2)
acknowledging the importance of ports in logistics networks and (3) greening of
port activities will be emphasised. In order to ensure the realisation of three
sea locks in three Flemish ports, the Flemish government created the ‘NV
Vlaamse Havens’ (SA Flemish Ports). For each sea lock the ‘NV Vlaamse Havens’
will establish a subsidiary in which the NV and the involved port authority or
a selected private partner will participate. Notwithstanding the stipulations
of the Ports Decree, the Flemish government requests that port authorities
concerned make a financial contribution for the construction of these sea
locks. Bulgaria Since
Bulgaria became an open market economy, a successive series of port reforms
have occurred which basically intend to privatise operations in the country’s
two main ports, Bourgas and Varna. Port authority responsibilities are
centralised at national level and have shifted back and forth between an ‘executive
agency’ for maritime administration and an ‘infrastructure company’. The latest
change (2010) concentrates all port authority responsibilities, including
nautical responsibility, with the Bulgarian Port Infrastructure Company. Denmark In
2010, Danish government started up discussion on reform of the country’s ports
which are mostly owned by municipalities but governed by a national Ports Act.
A governmental commission is evaluating the current legislative framework from
the perspective of efficiency and competitiveness, making recommendations to
modify the Port Act where necessary. A particular question is whether certain
ports need to have a ‘national interest’ status. Finland A
2007 decision of the European Commission regarding the existence of state aid
in a Finnish so-called ‘state enterprise’ has led Finnish government to
legislate that government-owned entities must be corporatized by the beginning
of 2014. This also affects Finnish port authorities, which are mostly owned by
municipalities. Furthermore, some Finnish ports are in the process of merging,
the most concrete example being the Ports of Hamina and Kotka which merged into
one limited company on 1 May 2011. France President
Sarkozy initiated in 2008 a major reform of French ports of which the most
visible part is the completion of the port labour reform, notably the
privatisation of handling equipment and staff. The reform programme however
also modified the governance of the major ports in France, the former ‘ports
autonomes’ (autonomous ports) which have now become ‘Grands Ports Maritimes’.
The reform will be effective before the end of June 2011. The reform of the
major ports succeeds the reform of smaller national ports which has been
launched in 2004 and has put those ports mainly under regional control. Germany In close co-operation
with the ‘Bundesländer’ (Federal states), the German government published in
2009 a ‘Nationales Hafenkonzept’ which is currently in the process of
implementation. This approach is innovative and significant, because it is the
first time that the German government develops an elaborate view on ports
policy, which addresses – inter alia – capacity development and aims to
stimulate co-operation between ports. Governance of German seaports however
remains within the competence of each ‘Bundesland’. Various forms of
co-operation exist between these states and the ports themselves. One example
is the co-operation between the seaports of the Lower Elbe river (Hamburg,
Brunsbüttel, Cuxhaven, Stade) agreed in 2009 which aims to attract business
ventures, exchange know-how and develop joint marketing. The ‘Länder’ also want
to establish joint PR activities under the common label ‘German Ports’. In
addition, the regional governments of Hamburg and Bremen started in 2011 an
investigation into a more profound co-operation between their port authorities.
The results of this exercise have not yet been published. Ireland Irish government started
in September 2010 a consultation on a reform of Irish ports. Most of the commercial
ports are currently state-owned corporations. The consultation addresses four
aspects: governance (including corporate governance but also ownership and the
option of privatisation), capacity development, planning and funding,
exploiting the use of short-sea shipping, benchmarking competitiveness and
stimulating cooperation between ports. Italy The fundamentals of
Italian port governance are laid down in a 1994 Law which established port
authorities for the main Italian ports and liberalised cargo-handling services.
In recent years several proposals to amend the Law have been discussed but
without major changes so far. In September 2010 government proposed a bill
which introduces a classification of ports, deals with competences of port
authorities and harbour masters offices, faster approval procedures for port
regulatory plans and a review of concession procedures. The main wish of the
sector, i.e. to establish financial autonomy for port authorities, has however
not been realised yet. In 2009 and 2010 neighbouring port authorities in
several regions (North Adriatic, Liguria, Tuscany, Calabria) set up regional
port associations to stimulate more intensive co-operation. Malta During the last 10 years
the operation of the ports in Malta has undergone a whole reform process
whereby all port services have passed from the port authority to the private
industry either through concession contracts or service level agreements. All
port related legislation was amended to reflect these changes and allow for more
flexibility in responding to market needs and efficiency in port operations.
Likewise, new legislation establishing the port authority was adopted in 2009
to clearly reflect the change whereby its functions have changed from being an
operator of port facilities and a provider of port services to one where it has
become the regulator of port services and the facilitator of port business. Netherlands Reforms of Dutch ports
have taken place on individual basis. The most significant reform in the recent
past was the corporatisation of the Port of Rotterdam in 2004, which was
probably the most advanced corporatisation of any European, publicly-owned port
authority. With the reform, the Dutch state became co-shareholder in the
otherwise municipally-owned port authority. Zeeland Seaports, the port
authority that manages the ports of Vlissingen and Terneuzen, was corporatized
early 2011. The main difference with
Rotterdam is that the only shareholder here is the Joint Agreement Zeeland
Seaports, in which the Province of Zeeland and the municipalities of Terneuzen,
Vlissingen and Borsele participate. The Dutch state is no shareholder. The Port
of Amsterdam and Groningen Seaports, the port authority that manages the ports
of Delfzijl and Eemshaven, are both going through similar corporatisation
process at the moment. On national level, government has de facto followed a
‘mainport’ approach to the advantage of Rotterdam. Recently, an advisory body
to the government suggested to set up a port holding between Rotterdam and
Amsterdam. This has thus far not led to any concrete initiative however. Poland The 1996 ‘Act on
Seaports and Harbours’ was the basis to create three port authorities in the
ports of major importance for the national economy, i.e. the ports of Gdansk,
Gdynia and Szczecin-Swinoujscie. Since then the Act has been a few times
amended and an obligation to sell shares in port operation companies was
imposed on port authorities. Currently, there is no legislative procedure
active in this respect. The execution of certain stipulations of the Act is
still in progress, such as privatisation of port authorities’ daughter
companies involved in stevedoring. Romania In July 2010 the
government of Romania has reviewed the legal framework for the administration
of Romanian ports and the use of public port infrastructure (review of the
Governmental Ordinance 22/1999). This has concretely allowed the sub-concession
of the port domain to interested private companies and operators. Spain In August 2010 Spanish
government adopted a new Law which contains a major amendment to the 2003 ‘Law
on the Economic Regime and the Provision of Services in Ports of General
Interest’. The new Law seeks to enhance the efficiency and competitiveness of
Spanish ports and specifically regulates the financial autonomy of ports and
the provision of port services. To this end, it contains detailed provisions on
various types of port dues and port services, on the delimitation of port areas
and on port labour. Sweden In spring 2009,
Gothenburg City Council decided to divide the Port of Gothenburg into a
municipal company – Gothenburg Port Authority - and three terminal companies to
be run by external operators. The Port of Gothenburg will still operate as an
open, multi-user port and new shipping companies and cargo owners are welcome
to establish their activities. These would be overseen by the port authority
through concession agreements with new terminal operators. In April 2011, the
Swedish logistics company Logent took over operations at the car terminal. In
October 2010, an agreement was reached with DFDS and C.Ports which will be the
new,joint operator of the roro-terminal. The transfer is subject to approval by
the Swedish Competition Authority, which is standard practice for major transfers.
The process of transferring the container terminal is underway. An agreement
with a new operator is expected to be in place during autumn 2011. A similar
process of privatisating cargo handling activities took place earlier in the
Ports of Stockholm. United Kingdom A number of the largest
ports in the UK were privatised in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Other ports
remained in the hands of independent trusts or municipalities. The installation
of a conservative / liberal democrat coalition government in 2010 has again
sparked the debate about privatising the remaining major trust ports. This
debate is highly controversial as the on-going privatisation of Dover, a
process which was initiated before the government changeover, demonstrates 11. Sea port dues
in EU ports (excerpt from infrastructure charging study, 2012[22]) Charges
applied by maritime ports for ships are the fundamental way not only to obtain
payment for services provided but also to internalise costs related to local
externalities. Accordingly, all 29 ports considered in the study use port dues. Gross tonnage is
overwhelmingly common as basis for setting the charges. While some ports use
volume as proxy for capacity, there are only two ports in the sample whose
charges are not tonnage or volume based. Environmental
considerations are taken into account by 13 ports, which grant discounts based
on participation in the Environmental Ship Index scheme[1] (7 ports in Belgium, France,
Germany and the Netherlands), and/or based on the Green Award certificate[2] (5 ports in Latvia,
Lithuania, the Netherlands and Portugal), or directly though rebates linked to
NOx/SOx emissions (Port of Stockholm and Trelleborg in
Sweden) or via levying a sulphur fee (Port of Gothenburg, Sweden)[3]. The resulting variation
in port dues is shown on the following table for four types of vessel. The
study found that sea port dues diverge the greatest for
Roll-On-Roll-Off-Passenger (RoPax) vessels, because of the dissimilar charging
for passengers and passenger cars across the ports. Table 5 Sea port dues (in €) calculated for exemplary
vessels (2012)[23] Port || Aframax liquid bulk carrier || Panamax bulk carrier || Handy container vessel || RoPax vessel Port of Antwerp, Belgium || 41,500 || 24,700 || 8,800 || 18,700 Port of Zeebrugge, Belgium || 19,800 || 14,000 || 4,900 || 5,800 Port of Bourgas, Bulgaria || 30,400 || 24,500 || 9,200 || 14,400 Port of Lemesos, Cyprus || 43,500 || 17,100 || 9,200 || 16,300 Port of Copenhagen-Malmö, Denmark || 68,100 || 25,200 || 9,700 || 19,400 Port of Tallinn, Estonia || 99,000 || 32,000 || 11,900 || 11,000 Helsinki Port, Finland || 37,800 || 23,000 || 6,000 || 9,800 Grand Port Le Havre, France || 44,100 || 25,800 || 3,100 || 5,900 Grand Port Maritime de Marseille, France || 35,300 || 28,500 || 3,400 || 9,500 Ports of Bremen/Bremerhaven, Germany || 24,600 || 11,000 || 6,000 || 9,500 Port of Hamburg, Germany || 24,200 || 16,600 || 3,200 || 2,300 Port of Riga, Latvia || 54,200 || 35,800 || 7,000 || 8,800 Port of Klaipeda, Lithuania || 31,900 || 23,500 || 8,700 || 24,400 Grand Harbour of Valletta, Malta || 50,800 || 24,600 || 9,300 || 3,900 Port of Amsterdam, The Netherlands || 29,500 || 17,500 || 3,600 || 16,300 Port of Rotterdam, The Netherlands || 31,700 || 17,600 || 5,500 || 5,200 Port of Gdansk, Poland || 30,300 || 22,300 || 4,100 || 4,800 Port of Sines, Portugal || 17,000 || 11,300 || 2,700 || 8,100 Port of Constanza, Romania || 17,000 || 7,700 || 3,800 || 8,100 Port of Koper, Slovenia || 10,700 || 6,800 || 2,800 || 2,900 Port of Barcelona, Spain || 21,000 || 21,400 || 6,500 || 18,200 Port of Valencia, Spain || 21,500 || 21,800 || 6,300 || 18,400 Port of Gothenburg, Sweden || 22,800 || 16,800 || 6,200 || 5,800 Port of Stockholm, Sweden || 86,900 || 27,300 || 10,300 || 20,300 Port of Trelleborg, Sweden || 36,500 || 12,700 || 5,700 || 3,100 Ports of Grimsby & Immingham, UK || 237,600 || 140,000 || 14,300 || 159,300 Port of London, UK || 33,000 || 21,900 || 7,700 || 15,200 Ports of Tees & Hartlepool, UK || 92,200 || 67,900 || 25,100 || 67,000 12. Findings of
the European Court of Auditors on the use of Structural Funds for ports
projects The Court pointed out as
a serious problem for the allocation of funding to ports the absence of
long-term port development plans and the fact that, in the cases of ports
projects audited, no needs assessment had been carried out. Excerpts from
the report of the European Court of Auditors on performance of sea-ports (2012)[24] "Between 2000 and 2006, 2.8 billion euro from the
Structural and Cohesion Funds was allocated to seaport infrastructures."
"A lot of the investments made [N.B. supported by the EU Funds] suffer
from either ineffective links to their hinterland (‘Port 2000’ in Le Havre) or
missing links (Bari, Brindisi, Langosteira and Ferrol). Even though ‘Port
2000’, Bari and Ferrol were considered as being effective, these five projects,
representing 47,7 % of the co-financed amounts audited, are likely to need
significant further investments to become linked to their hinterlands and
operate to their capacity." "In Italy, there was neither a national nor a regional
planning strategy for seaport investments at the beginning of the 2000-06
period. A general plan for transport and logistics was approved in December
2002 and this remains in place as no subsequent plan has been established. In
2003, a working group came together to synchronise investments at national and
regional levels." "In France, decisions on co-funding
port infrastructures were embedded in a decision of the Transport Minister. In
2010, the Schéma National Infrastructures de Transport was proposed in order to
develop alternatives to road transport, linking investments to their impact on
global warming, but this proposal had not yet been adopted at the time of the
audit. " "This audit also showed that none of the regions
visited had a long-term port development plan in place and needs assessments to
support the selection of seaport infrastructure projects had not been carried
out”. ANNEX III:
Maritime ports
freight and passenger statistics From
EUROSTAT Statistics Explained This annex reproduces the latest statistical
data (20 March 2013) on freight handling and passenger traffic in ports in the
European Union. For more detailed EUROSTAT information / updates see: Statistics
Explained article "Maritime transport of goods - quarterly data" http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/statistics_explained/index.php/Maritime_transport_of_goods_-_quarterly_data Maritime port
activity in the EU27 After growing steadily between 2002 and
2007, the total weight of goods handled1 in maritime ports in the EU27
remained nearly stable at 3.9 billion tonnes in 2008. It then fell by 12% to
3.4 bn tonnes in 2009 as the result of the economic crisis. From 2010 the
weight of goods handled increased again, to reach 3.7 bn tonnes in 2011, still
below the level recorded in 2008. Compared with 2010, the weight of goods
handled increased by 2% in 2011. For sea transport of
passengers, the number of passengers embarking or disembarking1 in maritime
ports in the EU27 has fallen steadily from a peak of 414 million
passengers in 2007, to reach 385 mn in 2011. Compared with 2010, the number of
passengers decreased by 4% in 2011. These figures are published in a report2
from Eurostat, the statistical office of the European Union, on port
activity for goods and passengers in the EU3, as well as Norway,
Croatia and Turkey. The United
Kingdom, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, France and Germany represent just over
two-thirds of the total weight of goods handled The Member States with the largest total
weight of goods handled in maritime ports in 2011 were the United Kingdom (520 mn tonnes, +2% compared with 2010), Italy (500 mn tonnes,
+1%), the Netherlands (492 mn tonnes, -9%), Spain (398 mn tonnes,
+6%), France (322 mn tonnes, +3%) and Germany (296 mn tonnes,
+7%). Italy,
Greece, Denmark, Sweden and Germany account for just over two-thirds of the
total number of passengers handled In 2011, the highest numbers of
passengers embarking or disembarking in maritime ports were recorded in Italy (82 mn passengers, -7% compared with 2010), Greece (79 mn, -8%), Denmark (42 mn, -1%), Sweden (30 mn, 0%), Germany (29 mn, +2%), the United Kingdom (28 mn, -3%), France (26 mn, -6%) and Spain (22 mn, +3%). Rotterdam largest port for
goods handling, Dover for passengers Among the top ten cargo ports in terms of
tonnes of goods handled, Rotterdam (370 mn tonnes weight of goods
handled, -6% compared with 2010) was the largest port in 2011, followed by Antwerp
(169 mn tonnes, +5%), Hamburg (114 mn tonnes, +9%), Marseille (85
mn tonnes, +3%) and Algeciras (69 mn tonnes, +17%). Dover (13 mn passengers, -3% compared with
2010) was the busiest port in terms of the number of passengers disembarking or
embarking in 2011, followed by Paloukia Salaminas and Perama
(both 12 mn, -8%), Helsinki (10 mn, +5%) and Calais (10 mn, -2%). || Weight of goods handled, in million tonnes || Number of passengers embarked or disembarked, in thousands 2010 || 2011 || Growth rate 2011/2010, % || 2010 || 2011 || Growth rate 2011/2010, % EU273 || 3 645.6 || 3 706.4 || 1.7 || 399 465 || 385 402 || -3.5 Belgium || 228.2 || 232.8 || 2.0 || 829 || 824 || -0.6 Bulgaria || 22.9 || 25.2 || 9.8 || - || - || - Czech Republic || - || - || - || - || - || - Denmark || 87.1 || 92.6 || 6.4 || 41 993 || 41 527 || -1.1 Germany || 276.0 || 296.0 || 7.3 || 28 780 || 29 233 || 1.6 Estonia || 46.0 || 48.5 || 5.3 || 11 186 || 11 840 || 5.9 Ireland || 45.1 || 45.1 || 0.0 || 3 089 || 2 906 || -5.9 Greece || 129.1 || 135.3 || 4.8 || 86 189 || 79 183 || -8.1 Spain* || 376.4 || 398.3 || 5.8 || 21 215 || 21 868 || 3.1 France || 313.6 || 322.3 || 2.8 || 27 218 || 25 552 || -6.1 Italy || 494.1 || 499.9 || 1.2 || 87 658 || 81 895 || -6.6 Cyprus || 7.0 || 6.6 || -5.6 || 107 || 92 || -14.2 Latvia || 58.7 || 67.0 || 14.2 || 676 || 786 || 16.4 Lithuania || 37.9 || 42.7 || 12.7 || 251 || 281 || 12.1 Luxembourg || - || - || - || - || - || - Hungary || - || - || - || - || - || - Malta || 6.0 || 5.6 || -7.1 || 8 063 || 8 250 || 2.3 Netherlands** || 538.7 || 491.7 || -8.7 || 1 994 || 1 770 || -11.2 Austria || - || - || - || - || - || - Poland || 59.5 || 57.7 || -3.0 || 2 601 || 2 528 || -2.8 Portugal** || 66.0 || 67.5 || 2.3 || 701 || 659 || -5.9 Romania || 38.1 || 38.9 || 2.1 || - || - || - Slovenia || 14.6 || 16.2 || 11.0 || 39 || 36 || -8.9 Slovakia || - || - || - || - || - || - Finland || 109.3 || 115.5 || 5.6 || 17 867 || 18 074 || 1.2 Sweden || 179.6 || 181.6 || 1.1 || 30 185 || 30 094 || -0.3 United Kingdom || 511.9 || 519.5 || 1.5 || 28 824 || 28 002 || -2.9 Norway*** || 195.1 || 199.0 || 2.0 || 5 876 || 6 130 || 4.3 Croatia || 24.3 || 21.9 || -10.1 || 25 124 || 26 947 || 7.3 Turkey || 338.1 || 359.1 || 6.2 || 1 577 || 1 842 || 16.8 Top ten EU27 cargo
ports and passenger ports, 2011 Rank || Cargo ports || Weight of goods handled || Passenger ports || Number of passengers embarked or disembarked Millions of tonnes || Growth rate 2011/2010 (%) || Thousands || Growth rate 2011/2010 (%) 1 || NL || Rotterdam || 370.3 || -6.4 || UK || Dover || 12 918 || -3.3 2 || BE || Antwerpen || 168.5 || 5.3 || EL || Paloukia Salaminas || 11 662 || -8.2 3 || DE || Hamburg || 114.4 || 9.4 || EL || Perama || 11 662 || -8.2 4 || FR || Marseille || 84.5 || 2.5 || FI || Helsinki || 10 326 || +4.8 5 || ES || Algeciras || 68.8 || 17.4 || FR || Calais || 10 063 || -1.7 6 || FR || Le Havre || 63.4 || -3.6 || SE || Stockholm || 9 184 || +0.4 7 || NL || Amsterdam || 59.6 || -18.1 || EL || Piraeus || 9 182 || -16.1 8 || UK || Immingham || 57.2 || 5.9 || SE || Helsingborg || 8 339 || -2.4 9 || DE || Bremerhaven || 55.9 || 21.6 || DK || Helsingør (Elsinore) || 8 324 || -2.5 10 || ES || Valencia || 54.2 || 2.1 || IT || Messina || 8 060 || -25.1 1. It should be noted that these
statistics are primarily designed to measure port activity and not the sea
transport of goods and passengers. Goods and passengers travelling within the
EU are counted twice, once in the port of loading/embarkation and once in the
port of unloading/disembarkation, whether these ports are in the same or in two
different Member States. 2. Eurostat, Statistics in Focus
7/2013, "Continued recovery in volume of goods handled in EU ports".
The publication is available free of charge in PDF format on the Eurostat
website. 3. Excludes the Czech Republic, Luxembourg, Hungary, Austria and Slovakia which have no maritime ports. Main statistical findings –
March 2013 Continued recovery in volume of goods handled in
EU ports
There were continued
year-on-year increases in EU port activity in the first three quarters of 2011.
However, this recovery came to an end in the fourth quarter of 2011,
interrupting a pattern of growth which goes back to the first quarter of 2010
(Figure 1). The growth in EU port
activity in 2011 was mainly due to increased volumes in inward movement of
goods. Despite the annual increases in the gross weight of goods handled in EU
ports following the economic downturn, overall port activity in the EU was
still lower in 2011 than the level recorded 6 years earlier, in 2005 (Table 1).
Rotterdam, Antwerpen and
Hamburg maintained their positions as the three largest EU ports in 2011, both
in terms of the gross weight of goods and the volume of containers handled in the ports. The 20 largest ports
accounted for 37.0 % of the total tonnage of goods handled in the
countries reporting data in 2011. Rotterdam on its own accounted for 8.6 %
of the total tonnage (Table 3). The number of passengers
passing through EU ports is estimated at more than 385 million in 2011, a
decrease of 3.5 % compared with 2010. The main reason for this fall is a
reduction in the numbers of passengers embarking and disembarking in Italy and
Greece, the EU’s two leading countries for seaborne passenger transport (Table
6). UK: largest
maritime freight transport country in Europe Port activity grew in
most European countries in 2011. The largest increases were recorded in Latvia,
Lithuania and Slovenia, all with rises of more than 10.0 % in the tonnage
of goods handled in their ports compared with 2010 (from relatively low
levels). In contrast, decreases in port activity were recorded in the
Netherlands (-8.7 %), Malta (-7.1 %), Cyprus (-5.6 %) and Poland
(-3.0 %). Port activity in the acceding state of Croatia also decreased from 2010 to 2011
(-10.1 %). At 519 million tonnes,
the United Kingdom (UK) handled the largest volumes of seaborne goods in 2011,
reclaiming its position as the largest maritime freight transport country in
Europe. The volume of seaborne goods handled in UK ports in 2011 represented
14.0 % of the EU-27
total. The UK was followed by Italy and the Netherlands, with shares of
13.5 % and 13.3 %, respectively. Spain remained the fourth largest
maritime freight transport country in the EU in 2011 and France the fifth
largest. Ports in the candidate country Turkey handled 359 million tonnes of goods
in 2011, placing it between France and Spain. Inward movement of goods
increased by 2.8 % in 2011 and accounted for over 62 % of the total
tonnage of goods handled in EU-27 ports. Considerable inward volumes of liquid
bulk goods, such as crude oil and oil products, account for much of this inward
tonnage. In general, more
seaborne goods are unloaded than loaded in the majority of EU countries. Cyprus
had the highest share of total tonnage unloaded in 2011, followed by the
Netherlands and Malta. However, for Romania (agricultural products), the three Baltic countries (oil products) and the EEA country Norway (crude oil), outward
movement of goods prevailed. Liquid bulk
accounted for 39 % of total tonnage Liquid bulk goods
accounted for 39.0 % of the total tonnage of cargo handled in the main
EU-27 ports in 2011, followed by dry bulk goods, containerised goods and Ro-Ro
mobile units (Table 2). The largest tonnage of liquid bulk goods was handled in
UK ports (230 million tonnes), followed by the Netherlands (223 million tonnes)
and Italy (210 million tonnes). Estonia recorded the highest share of liquid
bulk goods as a percentage of the total tonnage of goods handled in the main
ports (reflecting large volumes of outward movements of oil products from
Russia). Dutch ports’ handling of dry bulk goods was by far the largest in the
EU in 2011 (140 million tonnes), but only a little higher than the candidate
country Turkey (137 million tonnes). Container transport was
the dominant type of cargo in Germany (44.0 %) and Belgium (41.0 %),
while the largest volumes of goods in containers were handled in Germany (126
million tonnes) and Spain (128 million tonnes). The share of Ro-Ro units in the
total tonnage of goods was highest for Denmark, Ireland and Sweden (all
27.0 %). However, in tonnage terms, the United Kingdom (97 million tonnes)
and Italy (93 million tonnes) had the largest quantities of goods transported
on Ro-Ro mobile units in 2011. Rotterdam,
Antwerpen and Hamburg remain top ports Rotterdam, Antwerpen and
Hamburg, all located on the North Sea coast, consolidated their positions as
Europe's top three ports in 2010, both for the gross weight of goods (Table 3)
and the volume of containers handled (Table 4). Europe’s largest port,
Rotterdam, saw a fall of 6.4 % in the gross weight of goods handled from
2010 to 2011 (mainly due to reduced volumes of liquid bulk goods), while
Antwerpen and Hamburg both reported increases in the total volume of goods
handled in the same period. Most of the cargo handling in Rotterdam involves
liquid and dry bulk goods such as oil, chemicals, coal and ores. However,
Rotterdam is also Europe’s largest container port, handling almost 15 million twenty-foot equivalent units (TEUs) in 2011, a
substantial increase compared with 2010 (Table 4). Container cargo
accounted for more than half of the total tonnage of cargo handled in the more
specialised ports of Antwerpen and Hamburg. The port of Hamburg handled a total
of 9 million TEUs in 2011, overtaking Antwerpen as the second largest container
port in Europe measured by the number of TEUs handled. After a gradual recovery
in the last years, the port of Piraeus in Greece handled more TEUs in 2011 than
before the economic downturn (Table 4). Among the top 20 cargo
ports, Bremerhaven in Germany reported the largest growth in gross weight of
goods handled in 2011 (+21.6 %), followed by Taranto in Italy
(+20.5 %) and Algeciras in Spain (+17.4 %). On the other hand,
Amsterdam saw a substantial decrease in port activity in 2011 (-18.1 %),
due to reduced tonnages of dry and liquid bulk goods (Table 3). The most specialised
among the top 20 cargo ports are Milford Haven in the UK, Bergen in Norway and
Botas in Turkey (mostly liquid bulk goods), as well as Bremerhaven in Germany
(mostly containers). While inward activity is prevalent in most of the top 20
ports, the ports of Bergen and Botas both handle substantial outward movements
of crude oil. Bremerhaven also handles slightly more outwards movements of
containerised goods than inwards movements. The 20 largest ports
accounted for 37.0 % of the total tonnage of goods handled in the
countries reporting data in 2011 (EU-27, Croatia, Norway and Turkey), about the
same as in 2010. Rotterdam alone accounted for 8.6 % of the total port
activity in the reporting countries in 2011. Nine of the 20 top ports in 2011
are located on the North Sea coast, while eight are Mediterranean ports (Map
1). The remaining three are located on the Atlantic coast (two of which are on
the Channel). The composition of the
port infrastructure will sometimes determine if a country is represented on the
top 20 list of cargo ports or not. Denmark and Greece, for instance, are two
countries with a high number of medium size ports (handling between 1 and 25
million tonnes of goods per year). However, there are no ports in these two
countries above a 25 million tonnes threshold. Increase in
seaborne transport with extra-EU partners Unlike statistics
presented earlier in this article, the figures in Table 5 do not present the
total handling of goods in ports (inwards movements plus outwards movements),
but estimate the seaborne transport of goods between main ports and their
partner ports (see data sources and availability). In 2011, 64.0 % of the
EU-27 seaborne goods were transported to or from ports outside the EU, making
maritime transport by far the most important mode for long distance transport
of goods for the EU, in tonnage terms. Map 2 illustrates the
eight largest maritime transport flows to or from the EU. As shown in the map,
all of the top eight transport flows were inward flows of goods, from the
Baltic Sea region of Russia, Brazil, Norway, the East Coast of the United
States of America (USA), Egypt, the Black Sea region of Russia, China and
Turkey, respectively. In comparison, the ninth largest seaborne transport flow
in 2011 was the outwards flow of goods from the EU to the East Coast of the
USA. In total, EU seaborne
transport grew by 1.7 % from 2010 to 2011. International extra-EU
transport grew by 3.5 % in the same period, while international intra-EU
transport decreased by 3.3 %, reversing some of the growth in intra-EU
transport seen between 2009 and 2010. National seaborne transport grew by
4.1 %. In countries with a
geography characterised by well-populated islands or long shorelines, like
Greece, Italy, Denmark and Norway, the share of national seaborne transport is
naturally high (20-30.0 %). Countries, like Ireland, Latvia, Malta,
Poland, Finland and Sweden, on the other hand, have the highest shares of
international intra-EU transport (more than 60.0 %), because their main
transport partners are found within the EU. Other countries, like Bulgaria,
Romania, Slovenia, Spain and the Netherlands, have high shares of extra-EU
transport (above 70.0 %), based either on their geographical position or
the "deep sea" nature of the transport activities prevailing in their
main ports. Continued
decrease in maritime passenger transport In contrast to the
recent developments in maritime transport of goods, seaborne transport of
passengers continued to decline in 2011 (Table 6). The total number of
passengers passing through EU-27 ports is estimated at 385 million in 2011
(inwards movements plus outwards movements), a drop of 3.5 % compared to
the previous year. Unlike goods movements (where
broadly 2/3 of goods are unloaded and 1/3 loaded), the difference between the
numbers of passengers embarking ("outwards") and disembarking
("inwards") in European ports is small. This reflects the fact that
seaborne passenger transport in Europe is mainly done by national or intra-EU
ferry connections, causing the same passengers to be counted twice in the
statistics (when they embark and when they disembark). Close to 82 million
passengers were embarked and disembarked in Italian ports in 2011, confirming
Italy as the leading seaborne passenger transport country in Europe. Italy was
followed by Greece, with 79 million passengers. However, both the main maritime
passenger countries recorded quite considerable decreases in the number of
passengers passing through their ports in 2011. While cruise passengers
represented 3.0 % of the total number of passengers in EU-27 ports, they
are important to the ports they visit. Three countries, Italy, Spain and the
UK, accounted for over 70.0 % of the total cruise passengers reported by
countries. The top 20 passenger
ports accounted for 38.0 % of the total number of passengers embarking and
disembarking in the countries reporting data in 2011 (Table 7). Dover in the
UK, situated on the Channel, remained the largest passenger port in Europe,
with close to 13 million seaborne passengers passing through the port
facilities in 2011. The Italian ports of Reggio Di Calabria and Messina and the
Greek port of Piraeus recorded the largest decreases in number of passengers in
2011, while the Spanish port of Santa Cruz de Tenerife recorded the largest
increase. The figures in Table 7
show that some ports have experienced quite substantial decreases in the number
of seaborne passengers over time. These changes are typically caused by
openings of new bridge connections and subsequent closure of ferry links.
Increased use of the Channel tunnel and rapid growth in low cost flights are
other factors having effects on the number of seaborne passengers. Most passengers
are ferried in Italy and Greece Table 8 shows the
breakdown of seaborne passenger transport (excluding cruise passengers) between
national, international intra-EU and international extra-EU transport for each
reporting country. As in Table 5, these figures are calculated on the basis of
the statistics declared by main ports vis-à-vis their partner ports. Unlike the
statistics shown in tables 6 and 7, however, these figures do not reflect the
total embarkation and disembarkation of passengers in ports, but estimate the
transport of passengers between ports (see also data sources and availability).
The volume of seaborne
passenger transport in main EU-27 ports decreased by 4.7 % from 2010 to
2011, which was about the same as between 2009 and 2010. The sustained fall in
European maritime transport of passengers in recent years has mainly been
caused by decreased transport to or from ports in a number of the largest
maritime transport countries, such as Italy, Greece, the UK and France. The number of seaborne
passengers transported to or from the main ports of Italy fell by 8.0 % to
41 million passengers in 2011, while the volume of seaborne passenger transport
with Greek ports fell by 7.1 % to 39 million passengers. The corresponding
decreases were -5.9 % in France (to about 23 million passengers) and
-3.2 % in the United Kingdom (to about 24 million passengers). In
contrast, the volume of seaborne passengers recorded in the main ports of
several other of the large maritime passenger countries increased or was relatively
stable in 2011. More than half of the
seaborne passenger transport in the EU countries is carried out between
national ports. In general, countries with busy ferry connections and
well-populated islands tend to have both a large volume of maritime passenger
transport and a high share of national passenger transport by sea. This applies to the two
leading maritime passenger transport countries, Italy and Greece, as well as
countries like Malta and Portugal. On the other hand, countries with major
regular ferry connections to other EU countries, like Ireland, the Netherlands,
Poland, Sweden, Finland and the UK, naturally have high shares of international
intra-EU transport. As in previous years,
Spain and Denmark recorded the highest shares of extra-EU passenger transport
in 2011. This is mainly due to the geographical position of the countries, with
Spain having links with Morocco and Denmark with Norway. Increased average
size of vessels calling in main EU ports The number of vessel
calls in the main EU-27 ports (excluding French ports) was just above 2 million
in 2011, about the same as in 2010 (Table 9). The corresponding gross vessel
tonnage (GT) increased by 3.0 %, however, confirming the trend towards
larger average size of vessels making port calls in recent years. The average
size of vessels calling in EU ports in 2011 was just above 7 300 GT Top 20 cargo
ports in 2010 - on the basis of gross weight of goods handled (in million
tonnes) Source:
Eurostat Gross
weight of seaborne goods handled in all ports (in million tonnes) 1997-2011 Source:
Eurostat Main European
cargo ports in 2011 by gross weight of goods handled Source:
Eurostat Top-20
container ports in 2010 - on the basis of volume of containers handled in (1
000 TEUs) Source:
Eurostat Main Extra-EU 27 partner regions in
2011 by gross weight of goods handled EU-27
Performance by mode for freight transport: 1995-2010
(source: European Commission, EU transport in
figures, statistical pocketbook 2012) Modal
split (%): 1995-2010
(source: European Commission, EU transport in figures, statistical pocketbook
2012)[25] || Road || Rail || Inland Water- ways || Pipe- lines || Sea || Air 1995 || 42.1 || 12.6 || 4.0 || 3.8 || 37.5 || 0.1 1996 || 42.1 || 12.7 || 3.9 || 3.9 || 37.5 || 0.1 1997 || 42.2 || 12.8 || 4.0 || 3.7 || 37.3 || 0.1 1998 || 42.9 || 11.9 || 4.0 || 3.8 || 37.4 || 0.1 1999 || 43.5 || 11.4 || 3.8 || 3.7 || 37.6 || 0.1 2000 || 43.4 || 11.5 || 3.8 || 3.6 || 37.5 || 0.1 2001 || 43.9 || 10.9 || 3.7 || 3.8 || 37.6 || 0.1 2002 || 44.5 || 10.6 || 3.7 || 3.6 || 37.6 || 0.1 2003 || 44.5 || 10.7 || 3.4 || 3.6 || 37.7 || 0.1 2004 || 45.2 || 10.8 || 3.5 || 3.4 || 37.0 || 0.1 2005 || 45.5 || 10.5 || 3.5 || 3.5 || 37.0 || 0.1 2006 || 45.5 || 10.7 || 3.4 || 3.3 || 37.0 || 0.1 2007 || 45.9 || 10.7 || 3.5 || 3.1 || 36.7 || 0.1 2008 || 46.0 || 10.7 || 3.6 || 3.1 || 36.6 || 0.1 2009 || 46.5 || 9.9 || 3.6 || 3.3 || 36.7 || 0.1 2010 || 45.8 || 10.2 || 3.8 || 3.1 || 36.9 || 0.1 Relevance of intra-EU transport in total maritime transport by EU country[26] - 2010 (source: European Commission, EU transport in figures, statistical pocketbook 2012) || INWARDS || OUTWARDS || TOTAL || || Total inwards || of which: from EU || Share of EU in total || Total outwards || of which: to EU || Share of EU in total || TOTAL goods transported* || of which: to/from EU || Share of EU in total || || million tonnes || (%) || million tonnes || (%) || million tonnes || (%) || BE || 125.561 || 43.266 || 34.5% || 100.798 || 33.454 || 33.2% || 226.333 || 76.695 || 33.9% || BE BG || 11.847 || 0.832 || 7.0% || 11.099 || 3.610 || 32.5% || 22.946 || 4.442 || 19.4% || BG DK || 42.919 || 30.707 || 71.5% || 35.772 || 30.711 || 85.9% || 73.648 || 56.375 || 76.5% || DK DE || 165.630 || 67.392 || 40.7% || 102.985 || 43.640 || 42.4% || 267.223 || 109.639 || 41.0% || DE EE || 10.364 || 6.956 || 67.1% || 33.257 || 18.044 || 54.3% || 43.599 || 24.979 || 57.3% || EE IE || 29.756 || 21.178 || 71.2% || 14.186 || 12.572 || 88.6% || 43.154 || 32.962 || 76.4% || IE EL || 59.741 || 26.588 || 44.5% || 41.556 || 28.267 || 68.0% || 88.284 || 41.842 || 47.4% || EL ES || 252.498 || 78.339 || 31.0% || 123.893 || 59.067 || 47.7% || 352.230 || 113.245 || 32.2% || ES FR || 211.197 || 63.407 || 30.0% || 97.042 || 54.028 || 55.7% || 301.175 || 110.372 || 36.6% || FR IT || 316.683 || 110.122 || 34.8% || 165.559 || 109.812 || 66.3% || 403.995 || 141.686 || 35.1% || IT CY** || 6.048 || 1.017 || 16.8% || 0.906 || 0.284 || 31.3% || 6.954 || 1.301 || 18.7% || CY LV || 5.060 || 3.690 || 72.9% || 52.166 || 38.899 || 74.6% || 57.060 || 42.423 || 74.3% || LV LT || 15.447 || 4.663 || 30.2% || 22.422 || 13.718 || 61.2% || 37.869 || 18.382 || 48.5% || LT MT || 3.601 || 2.588 || 71.9% || 0.193 || 0.100 || 51.9% || 3.795 || 2.689 || 70.9% || MT NL || 385.684 || 101.191 || 26.2% || 152.031 || 74.173 || 48.8% || 537.715 || 175.364 || 32.6% || NL PL || 28.459 || 15.689 || 55.1% || 30.789 || 24.890 || 80.8% || 58.881 || 40.212 || 68.3% || PL PT || 41.367 || 17.288 || 41.8% || 22.603 || 13.865 || 61.3% || 58.197 || 25.381 || 43.6% || PT RO** || 16.191 || 1.392 || 8.6% || 20.337 || 6.447 || 31.7% || 36.528 || 7.840 || 21.5% || RO SI || 10.341 || 2.835 || 27.4% || 4.250 || 1.325 || 31.2% || 14.591 || 4.160 || 28.5% || SI FI || 56.056 || 36.571 || 65.2% || 48.465 || 42.226 || 87.1% || 98.579 || 72.854 || 73.9% || FI SE || 87.679 || 62.508 || 71.3% || 77.510 || 65.972 || 85.1% || 161.007 || 124.297 || 77.2% || SE UK || 304.418 || 166.532 || 54.7% || 194.070 || 149.069 || 76.8% || 454.743 || 271.855 || 59.8% || UK *: The total goods transported data may be less than the sum of inward and outward traffic due to the double counting of tonnes moved within the same country. **: The share of intra-EU in total maritime transport may be underestimated in this table for CY and RO because a significant share of partner ports are "unknown" and hence cannot be attributed to any geographical area. Main Routes in Intra-EU Maritime
Transport[27]
- 2010 (source:
European Commission, EU transport in figures, statistical pocketbook 2012) || Country of loading port || Country of unloading port || million tonnes transported || 1 || ITALY || || ITALY || 87.227 || 2 || UNITED KINGDOM || || UNITED KINGDOM || 71.324 || 3 || UNITED KINGDOM || || NETHERLANDS || 46.347 || 4 || SPAIN || || SPAIN || 40.862 || 5 || NETHERLANDS || || UNITED KINGDOM || 30.983 || 6 || FRANCE || || UNITED KINGDOM || 25.700 || 7 || UNITED KINGDOM || || FRANCE || 25.697 || 8 || SWEDEN || || GERMANY || 22.318 || 9 || GREECE || || GREECE || 22.243 || 10 || GERMANY || || SWEDEN || 20.021 || 11 || SWEDEN || || SWEDEN || 18.336 || 12 || FRANCE || || FRANCE || 18.071 || 13 || DENMARK || || DENMARK || 14.831 || 14 || BELGIUM || || UNITED KINGDOM || 14.654 || 15 || DENMARK || || SWEDEN || 13.292 || 16 || UNITED KINGDOM || || BELGIUM || 12.968 || 17 || UNITED KINGDOM || || GERMANY || 12.698 || 18 || SWEDEN || || UNITED KINGDOM || 12.287 || 19 || ITALY || || SPAIN || 12.210 || 20 || UNITED KINGDOM || || IRELAND || 11.560 || 21 || LATVIA || || NETHERLANDS || 11.224 || 22 || SWEDEN || || FINLAND || 10.847 || 23 || NORWAY || || UNITED KINGDOM || 10.720 || 24 || FINLAND || || GERMANY || 9.395 || 25 || SPAIN || || ITALY || 8.180 || 26 || FINLAND || || FINLAND || 8.005 || 27 || NETHERLANDS || || GERMANY || 7.779 || 28 || SWEDEN || || DENMARK || 7.768 || 29 || FRANCE || || SPAIN || 7.218 || 30 || FINLAND || || SWEDEN || 7.091 The
Maritime Statistics Directive is a piece of European
Union legislation passed in December 1995 Council
Directive 96/64/EC which requires Member States to supply to the
Statistical Office of the European Communities (Eurostat) information relating
to freight traffic, vessels and passenger traffic through ports throughout the
European Union. The data collected under the directive are used by the European
Commission to assist in policy development at a European level and to monitor
the impact of European policy measures. The Annexes to this Directive specify
the data to be gathered with regard to goods, passengers, vessels and ports. The
Directive also provides the cargo classification (see below), the statistical
transport nomenclature and the geo-nomenclature to be used to identify the
maritime coastal areas and the nationality, type and size of vessels. The data
collected allows Eurostat to examine periodically the latest trends in freight
and passenger transport in European Union (EU) ports. The work is closely
related to the monitoring the EU external trade of goods, intra-EU freight
exchanges and transport services for sea passengers. Classification
of port freight traffic for the EC Directive on statistical returns in respect
of the carriage of goods and passengers by sea (2009/42/EC) ANNEX IV:
The EU Ports
Policy: an ex-post evaluation Communication
on a European Ports Policy, COM/2007/0616 final of 18 October 1.
Declared
objectives and progress achieved In 2007, after extensive
consultation with stakeholders, the Commission adopted a Communication defining
its ports policy[28].
The problems identified by the Commission at the time related to a)
threats
on port performance and hinterland connections, b)
expanding
capacity while respecting the environment, c)
modernisation
of ports, d)
absence
of clarity for investors, operators and users and e)
port
labour issues. One of the main objectives
of the Communication was to announce that the obstacles to the modernisation of
ports to improve their performance would be addressed by means of
"soft" measures, namely guidelines, and close cooperation and
dialogue with stakeholders. The Communication presented the action plan for the
Commission in that regard. In summary, the
evaluation of the Commission on the progress achieved in the last six years
(2007-2013) can be summarised as follows: The problems
last identified in 2007[29]
remain largely unsolved. Very few of the envisaged measures were adopted. The
main development has been the adoption of the proposal for the new TEN-T
Guidelines and Connecting Europe Facility, both of which foresee substantial
funding support for ports. The
Commission has not delivered two key announced measures: State Aid Guidelines
for ports (see point 3 below) and application of the Public Funding Financial
Transparency Directive to ports. The
Commission has adopted a draft Directive on Concessions, which would apply to
different economic sectors, including ports. In the particular case of ports,
the draft directive deviates from the line announced in the 2007 Communication
(see point 2 below). The European
Court of Auditors (2012) has revealed systemic problems regarding strategic
planning and allocation of public resources for ports infrastructural projects. Substantial
reforms in the port sector have required in Member States under the Conditional
Assistance Programmes (Greece, Portugal and Ireland)[30]. At the same
time, reduction of budgetary deficits, austerity measures and consequential
constraints in public funding possibilities have reduced significantly
resources for maintaining, operating an/or expanding port facilities in many
Member States. Attracting private investment to sustain the operational
capacity of the European port system is already a crucial necessity. Contrary to
expectations, the development of intra-EU maritime transport connections
supporting internal market exchanges has stagnated. Inter-modality objectives
have been largely missed. This mainly due to a lack of efficiency, high costs
and excess of bureaucracy in too many EU ports. 2.
The
issue of concession rules in the European port sector The relevant case-law of
the Court of Justice ("Telaustria", Case C-324/98) has pointed
out that, when Member States grant service concessions, public authorities are
bound by an obligation of transparency implying that their initiative is
adequately advertised, that the procedure is fair and non-discriminatory and that
it can be reviewed. Such obligation of
transparency consists in ensuring, for the benefit of any potential tenderer, a
degree of advertising sufficient to enable the concession to be opened up to
competition and the impartiality of the selection procedure to be reviewed . The obligation fully
applies to the port sector. However, as in many other sectors, concession award
regimes in the EU Port Sector are often unclear or – in case of services
concession - non-existent. In 2012, the Commission
proposed a draft directive on concessions covering all sectors, including the
port sector. The draft Directive will impose the recourse to public tendering
procedure to select companies operating work or service concessions. The draft is still being
examined in the normal legislative procedure by the European Parliament and
Council. According to the assessment made by the Commission when preparing the
proposal[31],
the absence of clear rules at EU level and in many cases at national level
governing the award of concession contracts gives rise to obstacles to the free
provision of services and causes distortions in the functioning of the Internal
Market. As a result, EU citizens
do not benefit from quality services at best prices, economic operators (in
particular SMEs) are being deprived of their rights within the Internal Market
and miss out on important business opportunities, and contracting authorities
and entities may fail to manage public resources on a sound financial basis. In the 2007 Ports Policy
Communication, the Commission considered that the obligation of transparency
applies when Member States' authorities decide to entrust a third party with a
portion of port land for the provision of cargo-handling services, i.e. public
authorities should respect it when granting lease-land contracts to commercial
operators. However, the draft
Directive on concessions would exclude lease-land contracts from its scope,
creating a de-facto legal vacuum for this type of arrangements in European
ports: public lease-land contracts in favour of particular operators in some
ports will not be affected the obligation of transparency. In fact, the draft
Directive on concessions would apply only to concessions whereby the
substantial operating risk is transferred to the concessionaire. It covers just
one particular type of concession used in European Ports. Other types of acts,
such as authorisations, licences or lease agreements of port land and
installations often practised in ports will fall outside the scope of the
Directive[32]
(see recital 6 of the draft proposal). This situation threatens to create a
double standard for European ports: certain Ports will have to use a public
tendering procedure to select port service operators while others will not and
will stay free to foreclose the market. Stakeholders expressed
criticisms against the proposal arguing that it would aggravate legal
uncertainty instead of solving it. It should be noted that similar criticisms
were expressed in 2001 and 2004 at the occasion of the "port
packages" I and II which included provisions requiring public authorities
to follow a public tendering procedure when granting authorisations, by means
of concessions or any other type of contracts" to port operators. Another
criticism is that following a tendering procedure when granting a contract to
an operator leads to increased bureaucracy. 3.
The
issue of State Aid rules in the port sector The first complaints
about unfair competition between European ports because of State funding
appeared[33]
in the late 1970s. Since then, the request for clarification on how the
Commission applies the State Aid rules to the public funding of port
infrastructures (request for publishing State Aid Guidelines) has been a
constant request of the sector. The problem of
distortion of competition because of State Aid has been largely recognised by
the Commission, in 1997 (Green Paper on seaports
and maritime infrastructure), in 2001 and 2005 (proposals for a Directive on
market access to port services) and 2007 (latest Communication on Ports
Policy). In all those occasions, the Commission declared its intention to adopt
State Aid Guidelines. To date, this commitment has not been fulfilled. For many years, the
Commission position was that public funding of general transport infrastructures
did not involve State Aid. In fact, significant funding support to the
developments of ports has been provided by the Commission itself by means of
the Structural and Cohesion Funds and by the TEN-T funds. The Connecting Europe
Facility foresees further substantial support to ports and port connections in
Europe. In 2007, the Commission
stated that "Although it cannot be said that there is competition
between all ports in all cases, competition between some of them, and
competition inside ports can be significant and calls for a level-playing
field. In this respect, one of the issues to be addressed is public financing
to ports. The Commission will establish a general legal framework as port
stakeholders are requesting. Clarity in financing will also be an incentive for
port investment"[34] Since then, the
Commission’s position has evolved and, confirmed by the Court of Justice, it is
now of the view that State aid distorting or threatening to distort competition
in the internal market, is involved in the public funding of general transport
infrastructures, including airports and seaports. For the time being, the
Commission does not intend to adopt particular guidelines for State Aid to
ports. The case law from the Court of Justice on state aid to infrastructure
has recently clarified certain issues (the case T-443/08
"Leipzig-Halle"), in particular that public financing of the
construction of (airport) infrastructure constitutes State aid. The only
exception concerns certain activities that are part of the exercise of public
powers (security, police, etc). This judgement requires careful reflections for
all sectors with heavy infrastructures like transport and which go beyond
ports. The Commission is now
working on the modernisation of State Aid rules for all economic sectors. It
will streamline procedures and better explain rules and concepts, including a
clarification of the notion of state aid for infrastructures, later on in 2013. The 2012 public
consultation has confirmed that the current state of play is unsatisfactory for
the Member States Transport administrations, port authorities and other
stakeholders. All of them require to the Commission to provide legal certainty
and a playing level field ensuring fair competition for ports in Europe. 4.
Historical
evolution of the EU ports' policy: from 1997 Green Paper to 2012 Single Market
Act II Priority The first attempt by the
Commission to move towards a coherent policy on ports and maritime
infrastructures was made in 1997, with the publication of a Green paper on that
subject. In 2001, following the
Green Paper consultation the Commission issued a Communication on reinforcing
quality service in sea-ports and proposed a Directive on market access to port
services (port package I). The Commission proposal was rejected by the European
Parliament in 2003. In 2004, the Commission
adopted a second proposal for a directive on market access to port services
(port package II). The proposal was withdrawn by the Commission in 2006. In 2007, after two years
of consultation with stakeholders, the Commission adopted a Communication on
ports policy, announcing a number of "soft" measures in the form of
guidelines (state aids, environment), best practices (benchmarking, indicators)
and close cooperation and dialogue with stakeholders. Between 2001 and 2008,
the situation of port labour in the EU Member States changed substantially:
Some Member States like Germany, Finland, France or Spain have undertaken
reforms of their respective port labour sectors (of different degree and scope
though). In 2011, in the context
of the structural adjustments required by the Conditional Assistance Programme
to Member States in financial difficulties, a radical reform of the ports
regulatory regimes, inter alia of the port labour regimes, has been implemented
in Greece and Portugal. In 2012, in the context
of the measures proposed in the Single Market Act II, the Commission identified
the need to act in ports as follows: "The Commission
therefore also works on enhancing the efficiency and overall quality of port
services, addressing questions of the obligations of Member States regarding
the sound planning of ports and hinterland connections, transparency of public
funding and port charges, and administrative simplification efforts in ports,
and reviewing restrictions on the provision of services at ports" ANNEX V:
Public
Consultation - Summary of stakeholders' positions This annex explains the
public consultation procedure and summarises the results of the 1st
and 2nd phase of the targeted stakeholder surveys together with the
input received during bilateral meetings DG MOVE has had with the individual
stakeholders. Due to the technical nature of the file (inter
alia, issues related to performance of ports, port technical services,
hinterland connectivity, governance structures, port infrastructure charges,
funding of port investments or public service obligations in ports), DG MOVE
decided to carry out an intensive targeted sectoral public consultation, and
not a full public consultation open to the wider public. Indeed, in first
instance only workers and businesses active in the port sector would be
affected by this initiative, and the broader public would only be indirectly
affected, as port economics are of a derived nature. By performing an intensive
targeted consultation, the policy discussion could be more technical in nature,
and has nevertheless in no way excluded or prevented any party concerned from
participating. A. Public
consultation procedure The milestones of the
public consultation procedure were: 3rd quarter 2011 || Informal meeting of DG MOVE with the authorities in charge of ports policy in the 22 maritime Member States: discussion of the Transport White Paper measures and possible follow-up in the port sector CommissionVice-president Siim Kallas public announcement of the COM intention to review the EU Ports Policy in 2013. 4th quarter 2011 || First round of bilateral contacts with main EU associations in the port sector 1st quarter 2012 || Launching of the procedure for the establishment of the European social dialogue committee in the port sector (ESPO, ETF Dockers, FEPORT and IDC) Launching of the Study on EU Port Labour Regimes (Porf Van Hoydoonk, University of Ghent, College of Europe) – Start of the survey addressed to the 22 EU Member States, labour unions and industry associations regarding port labour, health and safety and training and qualifications of dockers in the EU. Launching of the study supporting the impact assessment on "measures to enhance the efficiency and quality of port services in the EU (PricewaterhouseCoopers in partnership with Panteia). Start of the first public on-line survey. 2nd quarter 2012 || Data collection for the port labour study and conduct of the on-line survey on the efficiency and quality of TEN-T port services. Preparation of the conference on the future of the EU Ports Policy. Round of visits to major EU Ports and discussions with port authorities 3rd quarter 2012 || EU conference on the future of the EU Ports Policy. Presentation of results of the first survey on quality and efficiency of EU ports and of the preliminary conclusions of the Port Labour Study See: http://www.portsconference2012.eu/home.html 4rd quarter 2012 || Reception and review of comments and position papers from stakeholders Second round of bilateral contacts with EU associations in the port sector Follow up of the procedure for the establishment of the social dialogue committee Launching of the second public on-line survey for evaluation of possible policy measures and likely impacts of those measures 1st quarter 2013 || Public hearing in Brussels, with all interested parties, presenting the results of the on-line surveys and of DG MOVE preliminary views on possible policy measures. Informal contacts with social partners, industry, Member States administrations and port authorities. Finalisation of the study on port labour Pending || Presentation and discussion of the study on port labour with social partners Publication of impact assessment study Criticisms on the
on-line survey and position papers by the trade unions The preparation of the
on-line survey has involved contacts with stakeholders, including the
representatives of the trade unions. They have expressed criticism about the
questions - drafted by PwC / Panteia in collaboration with the Commission
services - regarding aspects of quality and efficiency of ports connected
(directly or indirectly) with port work issues. The participation of
national trade unions in the two on-line surveys has been low (the trade unions
rejected the approach chosen by the consultants and the Commission). Instead of
answering the questions in the survey, the trade unions at European level (IDC
and ETF dockers) have expressed their views in position papers and manifests
adopted in different ports. Both IDC and ETF participated actively in the Ports
Conference (Sept 2012) and in the Public Hearing (January 2013). The joint
press release of IDC and ETF in the consultation process can be retrieved at: http://www.itfglobal.org/etf/etf-press-area.cfm/pressdetail/8457 B. Summary of
stakeholders' positions The following
presentation follows the order of the issues proposed for discussion at the
Public Hearing (January 2013) that closed the public consultation exercise. 1.
Challenges The Commission concludes
the following for what concerns the challenges to be tackled: 1. All
stakeholders stressed the need for a stable and fair level playing field
both for inter-ports (competition between ports) and intra-port
(competition between providers of a same port service within a port) competition
in the EU. The need for legal certainty and a business friendly environment
with as less administrative burden as possible is a priority for all stakeholders,
such as Member States, port authorities, terminal operators or the shipping
sector, logistic operators and cargo interests. 2. There is a
major concern about unfair competition between ports linked to public funding
practices of port infrastructures. Member States and port authorities
request a tight control of state aid through the adoption of state aid
guidelines for the port sector and highlight that the public funding
transparency requirements of the existing Commission Directive 2006/111/EC is not
sufficient as it does not apply necessarily in the sector. 3. The European
Court of Auditors has revealed in 2012 serious problems in the use and
effectiveness of EU Regional funds for funding port infrastructures. The
root causes are systemic: lack of strategic planning and of economic
rationality criteria in the allocation of resources. 4. A majority of
the users of port services, shipping companies and export-import
industries, consider that port services in many EU ports are not
satisfactory in terms of price, quality and administrative burden. In the
ports of the core TEN-T network, around half of the users surveyed (shipping
lines) consider that there are specific challenges in terms of price or quality
with cargo handling (48% complain), pilotage (54% complain) and towage (49%
complain). A smaller percentage ranging from 17% to 25% sees similar problems
for other services such as mooring, bunkering, dredging, passenger services or
waste management. 5. 30% of
European port authorities do not consider that the current situation is
satisfactory. However, the majority of them oppose the introduction of EU
procedures limiting the capacities of public authorities for granting contracts
and permissions through direct award to operators of port services. Applying
detailed concession rules to certain contracts granted by public authorities in
ports is highly controversial in certain Member States. 6. Port workers
trade unions extremely oppose any EU provision touching on the existing port
labour regimes in certain Member States, in particular in Mediterranean
Member States. 7. Representatives
of pilotage services argue that pilotage, although provided against
remuneration, is not an economic service and should be excluded from
competitive pressure. 8. All
stakeholders agree that the EU port system has to evolve and adapt to
significant challenges in terms of scarce funding resources, competitiveness in
respect of ports in neighbouring third countries and other world regions,
creation of added value and jobs and environmental impacts. 9. All
stakeholders agree on the importance to secure and, if possible, increase, EU funding
expenditure for supporting ports and maritime transport. 2.
Results
per service (quantitative results of the questionnaire) 10. The survey shows that a
large proportion of the users of port services (shipping companies, terminal
operators and port authorities) consider that port services in many EU ports
are not satisfactory in terms of price, quality and administrative burden. In
the ports of the core TEN-T network, around half of the users surveyed
(shipping lines) consider that there are specific challenges (especially in
terms of price) with cargo handling (48% complain), pilotage (54% complain) and
towage (49% complain). A smaller percentage ranging from 17% to 25% sees
similar problems for other services such as mooring, bunkering, dredging,
passenger services or waste management. Overview of respondents
(USERS) that indicate there is a problem with a given service: CORE || Port Auth. || Terminals || Shipping L. || COMPREH || Port Auth. || Terminals || Shipping L. Pilotage || 45% || 48% || 54% || Pilotage || 21% || 17% || 25% Towage || 35% || 43% || 49% || Towage || 31% || 67% || 0% Mooring || 19% || 23% || 27% || Mooring || 21% || 17% || 0% Dredging || 29% || 29% || 24% || Dredging || 33% || 33% || 0% Bunkering || 14% || 17% || 28% || Bunkering || 25% || 17% || 25% Cargo || 20% || N/A || 48% || Cargo || 46% || N/A || 33% Passengers || 16% || N/A || 38% || Passengers || 17% || N/A || 67% Waste rec. || 18% || 18% || 15% || Waste rec. || 9% || 17% || 25% || Pilotage || Towage || Mooring || Dredging || Bunkering || Cargo || Passengers || Waste reception Core || 50% || 44% || 24% || 27% || 22% || 30% || 23% || 17% Comprehensive || 21% || 35% || 17% || 27% || 23% || 42% || 30% || 14% Total || 45% || 42% || 22% || 29% || 22% || 29% || 25% || 17% 3.
Objectives On the basis of the 2nd
phase of the targeted stakeholder consultation and the public hearing, the
Commission concludes that a majority of stakeholders did not question the
Commission's analysis of the challenges that EU ports have to face with related
to the objectives of the port initiative. These objectives have been identified
as the following: Scenario 2020-2030 11. Maritime trade and port
activities are likely to remain weak in the medium term (2014-2018), with a
possible overcapacity on certain segments. Forecasts predict return to steady
port traffic growth towards 2020, but with changes in volumes and types of
cargoes, size, design and propulsion systems of ships, cargo-handling and
logistic technologies and ICT developments having huge impact on ports. Ports
failing to modernise could be left behind. 12. Sea-trade growth is a
necessity for Europe’s economic recovery and the development of
short-sea-shipping is needed as part of intermodal transport solutions offering
alternatives to road transport and contributing to sustainable transport.
However, ports risk not fully playing their role in the supply chain because of
poor network integration, problems of congestion and decline of short sea
shipping in face of strong competition from road transport (leading to
congestion and saturated intra-EU land corridors). 13. Further developing the
efficiency of the gateway function of ports will require: (a) better
connections with the hinterland; (b) improvement of the use of existing
capacities by increasing port performance and (c) provision of new port
infrastructure. 14. In respect to (a), the
new EU guidelines for developing the TEN-T and the Connecting Europe Facility
will help Member States to improve the connections with the hinterland.
Addressing the two other challenges (b) and (c) would require a framework that
encourages the modernisation of ports procedures and services and can better
attract capital investments and human resources to ports. European
dimension 15. Those challenges are a
matter of concern for national regional and local authorities. But they are
also transnational by nature when it comes down to TEN-T ports, both the core
network ports and the comprehensive ports, as part of an efficient
hub-and-spoke system. Unfair practices in a port may harm neighbouring
competing ports and/or the business opportunities of port service operators of
other Member States. Better port performance in other Member States can further
facilitate intra-EU trade with them and reduce the negative externalities on
its own network (e.g. congestion). Modernisation
of ports, attracting investments 16. By optimising business
processes and simplifying administrative procedures, TEN-T ports could handle
more ships, cargo and/or passengers with the same infrastructure. By further
improving the reliability, flexibility and efficiency of port services, they
could also accommodate more short-sea shipping traffic. The completion of the
Single Market for ports will provide a fair level playing field thus unleashing
port modernisation dynamics. 17. This however cannot
happen with unjustified market entry barriers, unnecessary administrative
burden and unclear rules governing the provision of services, in particular
those provided under exclusive or special rights granted to particular
operators. Legal uncertainties are a source of discomfort both for incumbent
operators and for new operators willing to enter their markets. Modernisation
of ports, investment flows and creation of new businesses and employment are
therefore handicapped. 18. Investments in port
infrastructure, terminal operations and connectivity of ports are of crucial
importance to maintain EU port performance levels. Overall funding needs for
ports (infrastructures, equipment and connections) could easily exceed € 100
billion in the next 20 years. Meanwhile, public funding is drying up.
Inevitably public investments will have to be better optimised (see the report
of the European Court of Auditors 2012[35]) and private
investments encouraged (ports are part of a long-term growth sector). 19. Transparency in the use
of public funds and the need for a level playing field for inter-port
competition is a repeated concern for all stakeholders. They seem to see
transparency as a way to ensure the correct allocation of public resources and
reduce the risk of State aid incompatible with the internal market. This is not
surprising since some 30-40% of the ports of the core network do not fall in
the scope of Directive 2006/111 on the transparency of the financial relations
between public authorities and public undertakings. Moreover, without
separation of accounts (statutory vs. commercial activities) port authorities
operating specific port services can cross-subsidise the activities related to
port services in a non-transparent way and thus disrupt the level playing
field. 20. Furthermore, ports are
not always allowed to define their own infrastructure charging policy. Charges
for the use of infrastructure are not always linked to real costs and may not
contribute to an efficient allocation of resources to finance the maintenance
and/or construction of infrastructure. Lack of transparency in the setting of
charges may lead to unjustified discrimination. Price signals rarely
incentivise users to take into account their external costs (e.g. environmental
costs). Moreover, in a period of faltering economy and overcapacity in certain
market segments, there is an increased risk of unfair inter-port and intra-port
competition. 21. In addition, lack of
coordination of public investments in port capacities, even within the same
Member State, may lead to duplication of facilities, waste of funding resources
or higher uncertainties related to the social and economic returns of
investments. Such situation is also detrimental for encouraging Public-Private
Partnerships agreements. Creating new
jobs 22. Finally, port growth,
investments and jobs come together. European ports represent an opportunity to
generate employment and create new, quality jobs, both inside and outside the
port, ranging from vehicle drivers and crane operators to ICT specialists and
commercial executives. Successful ports attract industrial and commercial
firms; marine services generate high-end employment. The quality of the social
relationships, of the working environment and of the human resources policies
are key factors for the development of TEN-T ports. 4.
Measures On the basis of the 2nd
phase of the targeted stakeholder consultation and the public hearing, the
Commission draws the following conclusions related to possible interventions: Fair market
access 23. Apart from the net
position of port service providers, which is strongly adverse, stakeholders’
responses denote a shared approval towards the possibility to opening the
market up for greater competition. At least 80% of port users seem very
keen to support this measure. 40% of MSs and port authorities understand the
need for assuring that their operations are transparent and in line with the
need for port services to be provided efficiently and effectively, but are less
interested in further regulation going beyond transparency. Avoid abuses arising
from exclusive /special rights 24. Wide consensus is
found with regard to the need for port authorities to set transparent,
non-discriminatory and proportionate charges for the provided services, when
acting as service providers. 25. Stakeholders express
concerns when port services are provided in a monopolistic regime (direct
award or in-house operation). The need to set charges following
non-discrimination, proportionality and transparency principles was recognised
by all stakeholder groups as a core element for the port service market to be
enhanced. A soft approach is much preferred, as it is considered essential to
adapt the measure to local specificities and contexts. Administrative
simplification and intra-port coordination 26. An administrative
simplification action plan would comprise the centralisation of coordination
activities by port managing bodies. Port authorities/port managers (77%)
support this measure much more than port service providers (23%), who would
like to be more involved in port coordination activities; 91% of port users
also find this a good idea. 27. Coordination mechanisms
could be regarded as a weakness across EU ports. Respondents showed strong
interest in having such mechanisms improved. In particular, port users and
port service providers claim it is a core element that needs to be regulated.
Synthetically, having an entity coordinating various service providers is
required by most respondents, with the exception of terminal operators
(only 36%), who show little interest. 28. When considering the
possibility to introduce a port users’ committee, port service providers (95%)
and port users (88%) are very supportive, while MSs and ports are less
supportive (23%). It seems that port service providers would like to have a
role in coordinating activities – together with authorities, while others
(mainly port authorities and port managers) are less keen to see coordination
activities delegated, as they see these activities as being their
responsibility. Financial Transparency
of public funding 29. Port users are almost
unanimous in supporting whatever measure increases financial transparency. On the
contrary, the other stakeholders are much more sensitive and express their
distinct support or concern depending on the way transparency is to be
achieved. 30. When considering the
unbundling of the port authority dimensions – managing body and service
provider – port service providers (89%), terminal operators (71%) and port
users (94%) are very supportive. In line with expectations, only 34% of MSs and
port authorities are much less supportive, since port authorities/port managers
would be forced to limit their presence in the market, even in natural
monopolistic situations, where competition would be inefficient or cannot be
guaranteed. Port Infrastructure
Charging 31. While stakeholders where
not explicitly asked about this, this is part of the Commission's horizontal
strategy on infrastructure charging, adopted since 2008. The strategy is
designed in order to have fair intermodal competition and to ensure that all
infrastructure users are paying the correct price (at least the marginal cost –
with a possibility to also contribute to the total investment costs). This
strategy also foresees in the advice to differentiate the charge according to
environmental performance of the vehicle/vessel in line with the polluter pays
strategy. 32. Respondents have
expressed wide support for the freedom to set the price of these charges and
the need to make sure that these charges can take into account local
circumstances and considerations. 33. Respondents have
expressed their concerns about the rise of administrative costs related to the
setting up of new and more complex procedures for the calculation of charges in
line with transparency, proportionality, etc. principles. Moreover the
publication of prices and calculation methods for port access infrastructure
charges needs a certain amount of work to be done by administrative personnel,
contributing to increased administrative costs. ANNEX VI:
Relative
performance of TEN-T Core: efficiency vs. competitive pressure (a
proxy model by PWC/NEA, 2013) There are no universally
accepted benchmarks or formulae to define port or port system performance or
its attractiveness to users. Nevertheless performance gaps are perceived by
users, so this section sets out some empirical findings. In certain contexts,
performance tends to be equated with throughput or turnover, in other cases
with operational efficiency, but in a policy context it is more appropriate to
consider the relationships between investment, management, market forces and
institutional factors, analysing the extent to which any given port is
achieving its full potential. 1.
WEF
Global Competitiveness Survey One indication is given
by the World Economic Forum Global Competitiveness Report 2012-2013 which
surveys executive opinions on a range of economic development topics including
infrastructure. Survey respondents were
asked to assess port facilities in their country according to a 1-7 scale,
where 1 is extremely underdeveloped and 7 is well developed and efficient by
international standards. The global mean score is 4.3, which coincides with
the scores achieved by Greece and Turkey in 2012. At the top of the list,
scoring 6.8 are the Netherlands and Singapore. Other high scoring countries
are Hong Kong, Panama and the United Arab Emirates. There are clear
similarities between the countries in this leading cluster, in relation to
their abundance of port infrastructure and international maritime connections
relative to their own size. Looking at high scoring
countries in Europe, Belgium and Finland score 6.3, followed closely by
Germany, Sweden, UK, Denmark, Spain, Malta and Estonia. The latter all score
higher than 5.5. The lowest scoring
countries, excluding the landlocked countries who were asked to rate
accessibility rather than quality, were Bosnia and Haiti with 1.7 and 1.9
respectively. In the EU, the lowest scorers were Romania with 2.6, Poland with
3.5 and Bulgaria with 3.7, similar to countries such as Nigeria, Indonesia and
Argentina. The majority of EU countries however score more than the global
average. Overall there is a
positive relationship between GDP and infrastructure. The following graph shows
the results of a regression analysis relating the WEF score to GDP per capita,
in order to show the extent of port performance gaps that cannot be explained
by income gaps. Source: World Economic
Forum, Global Competitiveness Report 2012-2013. The solid blue trend
line indicates the score that would be expected per country based on GDP per
capita alone. The dotted lines indicate a 10% margin. Many countries are
clustered along these 10% boundaries. Countries above the
higher dotted line perform relatively well compared to their GDP/capita and
countries below the line relatively badly. The three Baltic States of Latvia
(LT), Lithuania (LI) and Estonia (EE) receive relatively high ratings, together
with Spain (ES) and the Netherlands (NL). Romania (RO), Poland (PL) and Italy
(IT) receive relatively low ratings, with Bulgaria (BG), Greece (GR), France
(FR) and Denmark (DK) all borderline. 2.
PwC/Panteia
Survey 2012 During the stakeholder
consultation taking place during the summer of 2012, port stakeholders were
asked to identify problems in relation to the performance of European ports.
Port users were asked to rate the ports they use. Ports and port operators were
asked to identify challenges they face in their own businesses. This contrasts
with the WEF analysis in which opinions were stated by businesses from all
sectors in the respective countries, and not necessarily by direct users. Quality service levels:
physical attributes of ports The responses on issues
concerning infrastructure and equipment are broadly comparable with the WEF
results. There is a high instance of port infrastructure related problems in
the Black Sea (79% of respondents find problems) and in the Central
Mediterranean (64%). Spain, France, Belgium, Netherlands and Germany have low
problem counts (around 20%). The UK and the Nordic area are slightly higher. Quality service levels:
matters related to organisation The PwC/Panteia 2012
survey also considered organisational factors. There is some degree of
correlation between the likelihood of infrastructure issues and the likelihood
of management and IT related issues. The highest problem count for management
and ICT is in the Black Sea (112%[36]),
again followed by the Central Mediterranean area (60%). However, in case, most
regions have scores higher than 40%, so the gap is not as evident. 3.
Relative
Performance (RPI) The object has been to
use available data to make a performance ranking of the major European ports.
The calculation has been done for a sample of 115 ports TEN-T ports. The term
“port performance” has no universally accepted meaning – in some contexts it
means operational efficiency, in others a user rating, in others market share
or competitiveness, and in others it means growth. Definitions The ranking applied here
is based on a national user rating, combined with indicators on competitiveness
and market share. Thus a “well-performing” port under these definitions is one
that is located in a country where there is high infrastructure rating, and which
achieves a high market share in circumstances where there is a high degree of
inter-port rivalry. The ranking is based
upon three main criteria: ·
The
WEF (World Economic Forum) Global Competitiveness Report[37], 2012-2013,
which provides a rating of port infrastructure in a given country by businesses
in the same country. Each country is allocated one score. ·
A
proximity measure, showing per port, the presence or absence of close
competitors. This is calculated with a gravity model, weighting port
throughput and distance. Thus if a port has nearby rivals carrying significant
throughput volumes, the proximity index is high. It will be low if there are
fewer or smaller nearby competitors. ·
A
market share index per traffic mode of appearance, showing the performance of
each port relative to the total market in a specific coastal range. Coastal
ranges are listed below (Table 1). Modes of appearance
are container, ro-ro, dry bulk, and liquid bulk. A share is also calculated
for total tonnes. Table 1: Set of
Coastal Ranges 1 || IRELAND 2 || CYPRUS 3 || MALTA 4 || UNITED KINGDOM 5 || SPAIN, SW FRANCE, PORTUGAL 6 || DENMARK, NORWAY, SWEDEN 7 || ESTONIA, FINLAND, LITHUANIA, LATVIA, BALTIC RUSSIA 8 || BALTIC GERMANY, POLAND 9 || HAMBURG-LE HAVRE RANGE 10 || CENTRAL AND SOUTHERN ITALY 11 || ADRIATIC INCL NE ITALY 12 || GREECE, BULGARIA, ROMANIA 13 || NW ITALY Island nations are
separated from the continental area, since there is a specific context, in
terms of which ports can be used to serve the hinterland. Cyprus and Malta
have one main port each for example. Island regions (of larger countries) such
as Mallorca or Corsica are not included in the analysis, as neither the
national WEF, nor the market share aspects are relevant. Scoring Scores are calculated
according to the following variables: VAR || Description || Weight A || WEF Rating. Converted from a 0-7 scale to a 0-1 scale. || 10 B || Rivalry: Where: Rp = Rivalry Score for Port p. Tq = Throughput of Port q. d = Distance between port p and port q. These scores are converted into a ranking, and then into a 0-1 scale. || 1 C1 || Market share of Port P in Coastline Range, Dry Bulk Tonnes (0-1 scale) || 1 C2 || Market share of Port P in Coastline Range, Liquid Bulk Tonnes (0-1 scale) || 1 C3 || Market share of Port P in Coastline Range, Container Tonnes (0-1 scale) || 5 C4 || Market share of Port P in Coastline Range, RORO Tonnes (0-1 scale) || 3 C5 || Market share of Port P in Coastline Range, Total Tonnes (0-1 scale) || 5 The score is a weighted
average, using the weights calculated above. Island ports in Cyprus,
Malta and Ireland are calculated without such a strong weighting for market
share. Essentially, these ports are not directly comparable with the others as
far as market share performance is concerned. However they each receive WEF
scores greater than 5 out of 7, indicating a high degree of satisfaction from
local businesses. The resulting
distribution is as follows: Figure 1: Port
Ranking- Distribution The distribution fits an
order 3 polynomial function, superimposed on the scores in Figure 1. We can
discern that most ports are clustered between 0.4 and 0.5, with sets of
well-performing and less-well performing at either end of the distribution. The Commission decided
not to disclose the final calculations for the list of individual ports but
only the list of ports considered in the calculations. This is done because the
calculation is done to show the existing performance gaps between European
ports without wishing to shame or blame individual ports. The Commission is
also aware that this could have potential commercial impacts on the mentioned
ports. Table 2: List
of ports ALGECIRAS || DUBLIN || KAVALA || NAPLES || SOUTHAMPTON AARHUS || DUNKIRK || KLAIPEDA || NARVIK || SPLIT AGIOI THEORDORO || ELEUSIS || KOPER || OLBIA || STOCKHOLM AMSTERDAM || FELIXSTOWE || KOTKA || OPORTO - LEIXOE || SZCZECIN ANTWERP || FORTH || LA CORUNA || OSLO || TALLINN AUGUSTA || FREDERICIA || LA ROCHELLE-PAL || OSTEND || TARANTO BARCELONA || FREDERIKSHAVN || LA SPEZIA || PATRAS || TARRAGONA BELFAST || GDANSK || LARNACA || PIOMBINO || TEESPORT BERGEN || GDYNIA || LE HAVRE || PIRAEUS || THESSALONIKI BILBAO || GENOA || LIMASSOL || PLOCE || TRELLEBORG BORDEAUX || GHENT || LISBON || PORTSMOUTH || TRIESTE BOURGAS || GIJON || LIVERPOOL || RAAHE || TURKU BREMERHAVEN || GIOIA TAURO || LIVORNO || RAFINA || VALENCIA BRINDISI || GLASGOW || LONDON || RAUMA || VARNA BRISTOL || GOTHENBURG || LUBECK || RAVENNA || VENICE CAGLIARI || HAMBURG || MALMO || RIGA || VENTSPILS CALAIS || HELSINGBORG || MARIEHAMN || RIJEKA || VLISSINGEN CARTAGENA || HELSINGOR || MARSAXLOKK || ROSTOCK || WILHELMSHAVEN CASTELLON || HELSINKI || MARSEILLES || ROTTERDAM || ZEEBRUGE CIVITAVECCHIA || HOLYHEAD || MESSINA || ROUEN || CONSTANTZA || HUELVA || MILAZZO || SAVONA-VADO || CORK || HULL || MILFORD HAVEN || SHEERNESS || DELFZIJL || IGOUMENITSA || NAANTALI || SINES || DOVER || IMMINGHAM || NANTES-ST-NAZAI || SORRENTO || ANNEX VII:
Modelling of
impacts main
assumptions[38] Quantification of Impacts This note
sets out the methods used to estimate certain quantified impacts associated
with the proposed policy packages. Five policy
packages have been considered; PP1, PP2, PP2a, PP3, and PP2a-variant. Three main
areas have been considered: ·
The
relationship between the policy packages and user costs (freight). ·
The
impact of alternative user costs on freight traffic, including modal shift. ·
The
impact of alternative freight traffic patterns on externalities of transport. Step 1: The first
step is to relate the individual policy measures contained in a policy package
to specific port services. Different measures tend to target specific elements
of the value chain e.g. infrastructure provision, technical nautical services,
etc. All the
measures were enumerated and allocated to policy packages. Each of the main
port services has been considered in turn, and a linkage has been derived
between the measure and the service. Thus, for example a measure aimed at port
infrastructure is not deemed to have an impact on a technical nautical
service. Where
linkages are deemed to exist, it is necessary then to assess what kind of
impact is likely to be negative, positive or neutral on efficiency. It is not
known which ports have the potential to improve their performance in a specific
area, nor the level of improvement: in general, each impact is only assumed to
have a modest effect e.g. a single percentage point per measure. The main
objective is therefore to identify which particular services might react to
which measures, and to ensure that combined measures are working in a cohesive
way. Port User Costs:
assumptions One of
objectives for improving the efficiency of port services is to remove
bottlenecks and ultimately to save cost. For the impact assessment it has been
necessary to consider how the policy packages might contribute on transport
costs. During the
conduct of the study, stakeholder discussions have tended to present a view of
port operations in which a range of separate services, with varying levels of
co-ordination and efficiency, also varying by port, are consumed by users. In
many cases, users pay separate fees according to different tariffs to the port
service providers, and not an “all-in” price. For cargo ships, the largest
items will be port dues, cargo handling, pilotage, towage and mooring. Part of
the cargo handling fee paid to terminal operators also covers land rents which
will be paid by terminal operators to port authorities. Although it
is very difficult to generalise about port costs and tariff structures, it is
possible using published tariffs, port accounts and stakeholder responses to
make an approximate subdivision of user costs amongst the different services.
When this cost information is combined with a set of maritime flows, it is
possible to make an estimate of total turnover in the port sector. By
segmenting the analysis into cargo types (e.g. container, ro-ro, bulk) and by
geographical areas (short sea, near sea, deep sea) it is possible to refine
this estimation somewhat. User costs,
expressed in Euros per tonne, have been applied to the maritime traffic
matrices. Port costs have been estimated using existing Port of Rotterdam
tariffs. Table Error! No text
of specified style in document.‑2: Assumed Port
Costs, 2012 Port Costs || || || || || || || Euros per tonne || || || || || || || || Port Dues || Handling || Pilotage || Towage || Mooring || Others || Total Containers || 0.70 || 7.00 || 0.30 || 0.30 || 0.10 || 0.05 || 8.45 Dry Bulk || 0.60 || 2.00 || 0.25 || 0.25 || 0.10 || 0.05 || 3.25 Liquid Bulk || 0.75 || 2.00 || 0.30 || 0.25 || 0.10 || 0.05 || 3.45 RORO || 0.85 || 0.50 || 0.00 || 0.00 || 0.00 || 0.05 || 1.40 Other || 0.60 || 5.00 || 0.50 || 0.30 || 0.10 || 0.05 || 6.55 Using the
traffic forecast, PwC / Panteia has therefore estimated that aggregate port
costs at today’s prices, but with future volumes, for EU ports would be €15,837
million in 2030. This forecast takes into consideration differential growth by
traffic type and by O/D. Table one provides forecasts of throughput and
revenue for the forecast year 2030. Note that in this table, tonnage is the
volume of maritime traffic moved. Most European maritime traffic calls at more
than one European port, and sea-to sea transshipment involves double handling,
counted as two separate cargo movements, so these forecasts translate into port
throughputs of 5.8 billion tonnes, compared to around 4 billion tonnes today. Table Error! No text
of specified style in document.‑3: Estimated
Aggregate Port Costs, 2030 2030 || Tonnage (million) || Port Revenue (€ million) || || Containers || 606.00 || 5,437.49 Dry Bulk || 844.27 || 4,151.46 Liquid Bulk || 749.78 || 4,060.60 RORO || 218.26 || 461.73 Other || 183.27 || 1,725.95 || || TOTAL || 2,601.57 || 15,837.23 Policy
Packages During
consultation, stakeholders have indicated that problems of both quality and
price can be found in European seaports – there is not a uniform level of
performance. Both physical (access and infrastructure) and organisational
factors are considered to play a part, and one of the important root causes identified
are instances of weak competition. Essentially the port packages aim to
address infrastructure requirements though measures to attract private
investment, as well as structural requirements by creating the right conditions
for enhancing competition, and creating a more business-friendly environment. For the
impact assessment it is necessary to consider how the different policy packages
contribute. A priori, it is not possible to know in detail which ports and
which services will be affected, and the margin for improvement that can be
realised. However, the packages are structured so that it is possible to infer
the relative strength of the measures contained, and to allow some indication
of which services might respond to a greater or lesser extent. For example,
because of inter-port competition, cargo handling costs are less likely to
respond to measures that open up market access. Technical nautical services on
the other hand are less exposed to inter-port competition, and in many cases
there is only limited intra-port competition for these. The approach
has therefore been to apply conservative estimates of cost changes,
differentiated per package and per service in order to permit comparison. These
are assumptions made by relating policy package descriptions to changes in user
cost. By scaling the costs up to the level of the industry it is possible to
indicate the importance of port services at the European scale for consumers
and businesses. Based on the above assumptions, the information obtained from
the user surveys has been analysed in order to derive the following parameters
for estimating the scope for cost decreases. || Port Dues || Handling || Pilotage || Towage || Mooring || Others PP1 || 1.00 || 0.98 || 0.97 || 0.95 || 0.95 || 0.95 PP2 || 1.10 || 0.95 || 0.95 || 0.90 || 0.90 || 0.90 PP2a || 0.95 || 0.94 || 0.92 || 0.85 || 0.85 || 0.85 PP3 || 0.96 || 0.93 || 0.90 || 0.80 || 0.80 || 0.80 PP2a VARIANT || 0.95 || 0.98 || 0.92 || 0.85 || 0.85 || 0.85 Step 2: In the second
step, the cost variations have been applied in a model of European maritime
traffic. Maritime flows have been analysed as O/D traffic between coastline
areas e.g. Britain to the Iberian Peninsula. Seventeen coastline areas have
been used, of which thirteen are in the EU, and four outside. Traffics are
broken down into five categories, including container, dry bulk, liquid bulk,
roll-on roll-off and other general cargo. They are forecast using the
TRANSTOOLS trade model (v2.6) to 2030. Maritime
costs, including port costs, have been estimated for this traffic set. Within
the port cost estimate, separate amounts have been estimated for the main port
services, including infrastructure, cargo handling, technical nautical services
(analysed separately) and other services. Inputs for port costs are primarily
based on 2011 Port of Rotterdam port tariffs. Port of Rotterdam figures have
been used partly because they cover almost 10% of European traffic, implying
that they have influence on competing ports, but also because tariffs for all
services are published. By combining
forecast traffic flows with estimated charges, it is possible to arrive at an
estimate of aggregate port costs in the EU. These can be expressed in
percentage terms or absolute changes. For example, in PP1, where it is assumed
that savings ranging from zero up to 5%, the net cost saving is estimated at
2.0%. (2030) Change (%) in Total Port Related Costs || Annual Savings (€ million) PP1 || -2.0% || -318.15 PP2 || -3.0% || -481.47 PP2a || -6.8% || -1,071.37 PP3 || -7.9% || -1,245.21 PP2a VARIANT || -4.0% || -635.55 Step 3: Lower user
costs act as an incentive to use maritime options in cases where sea is in
competition with land transport. For the majority of traffic flows this is not
the case; either the flows are captive for land transport or for sea, so the
relative traffic shifts are expected to be small. Nevertheless, they can be
estimated using a multimodal model. In the third step, therefore we have used
the WORLDNET (FP6) approach to estimate multimodal route, following the
methodology used in the study “Ports and their connections within the TEN-T”,
(DG-MOVE, 2010). This model assigns flows to multi-modal mode chains, thus
estimating port choice, and the sensitivity between land and sea options. The
calculation is made using 2010 network and flow data obtained from the ETISplus
(FP7) transport information system. The only
variable used in this modelling step is port cost, with the inputs coming from
the outcome of Step 2. Only EU ports are affected. || Inland Tonne-Kms(m) || Maritime Tonne-Kms(m) || Maritime Tonnes || Change in Short Sea Shipping (%) || Change in Road transport over 300Km PP1 || -1,929 || 3,603 || 4,951,830 || 0.49% || -833 PP2 || -2,894 || 5,404 || 7,427,745 || 0.73% || -1,249 PP2a || -5,996 || 13,311 || 16,550,502 || 1.63% || -2,634 PP3 || -6,713 || 15,942 || 19,099,402 || 1.88% || -2,972 PP2a variant || -3,858 || 7,205 || 9,903,660 || 0.97% || -1,666 Model results
show that inland traffic volumes fall by between 1.9 to 6.7 billion tonne
kilometres, with a corresponding shift of between 3.6 billion and 15.9 billion
tonne kilometres towards maritime transport. These figures imply an increase in
maritime tonnes of between 4.9 million and 19.1 million. Since the shifted
flows are between European ports, the increase in European seaport traffic will
be double, i.e. up to almost 40 million tonnes under PP3 assumptions. The impact on
short sea shipping volumes ranges from a 0.49% increase in PP1 to a 1.88%
increase in PP3. For inland
transport, the shift causes a decrease in road and rail modes. There is a
modest increase in inland waterway traffic because this mode is frequently used
in combination with maritime traffic. For road transport, the decrease is
mainly found in longer distance bands. For example, PP2a reduces total inland
transport by 5,996 million tonne kilometres, of which 2,634 million are shifted
from road haulage trips over 300km long. Step 4: As explained
earlier, lower user' costs act as an incentive to use maritime options in cases
where sea is in competition with land transport. The maritime traffic increase
is expected to result in new job creation. According to
our analysis every additional million tonnes (adjusted) of throughput creates
roughly 90 new cargo handling jobs. Cargo handling jobs are approximately 10%
of total direct employment including non-maritime employment, and 20% of direct
maritime employment. Therefore,
taking into consideration only the direct employment categories, we obtain the
following estimation for the baseline scenario: Table 4: Estimated
Employment Impacts, 2010 to 2030, Reference Scenario Throughput || 2010 || 2030 || Growth 30/10 || Gr% YoY EU Port Throughput (T. mln) || 3,622.43 || 5,204.44 || 44% || 1.8% Adjusted Throughput (T.mln) || 1,107.94 || 1,801.43 || 63% || 2.5% || || || || Employment || || || || Port Workers (000s) || 111.18 || 163.57 || 47% || 1.9% Other Maritime Port FTE (000s) || 101.19 || 117.27 || 16% || 0.7% Non Maritime Direct FTE (000s) || 256.45 || 256.45 || 0% || 0.0% Total Direct Employment (000s) || 468.83 || 537.29 || 15% || 0.7% It is assumed
that through a combination of public and private sector actions, including the
EC measures to enhance port capacity, that volume will increase of 44% in EU
ports by 2030. As a consequence, we estimate that the number of port workers
will increase from the present day figure of around 110,000 to around 163,000
by 2030. The ratio of
other maritime port FTEs to port workers is based on the Flemish ports ratios.
Over time it is expected that the ratio falls in line with increasing
productivity rates. Non-maritime direct employment in ports is not expected to
react to traffic volume. Total direct
employment is therefore estimated to grow by 15%, or approximately 70,000. In the policy
scenario (high case PP3), additional port volume would help to generate around
2,500 additional jobs. See below. Table 5: Estimated
Employment Impacts, 2010 to 2030, Policy Scenario Throughput || 2010 || 2030 || Growth 30/10 || Gr% YoY EU Port Throughput (T. mln) || 3,622.43 || 5,251.46 || 45% || 1.9% Adjusted Throughput (T.mln) || 1,107.94 || 1,817.71 || 64% || 2.5% || || || || Employment || || || || Port Workers (000s) || 111.18 || 165.05 || 48% || 2.0% Other Maritime Port FTE (000s) || 101.19 || 118.33 || 17% || 0.8% Non Maritime Direct FTE (000s) || 256.45 || 256.45 || 0% || 0.0% Total Direct Employment (000s) || 468.83 || 539.83 || 15% || 0.7% Difference, Policy-Reference || || +2.54 || || The major
employment impact comes from the exogenous effect of traffic growth. As shown
in table 1 total direct employment in the baseline is estimated to grow by 15%,
or approximately 70,000 from 2010 to 2030. Policy
measures contribute to this impact by setting out a more favourable structural
framework for attracting investment. In addition they directly contribute to
maritime and port employment through modal shift. Table below
summarises the number (unit) of additional jobs against the reference scenario
expected in 2030 under different PPs. 2030 || EU Port Throughput (Ton million) || Adjusted Throughput (Ton million) || New jobs PP1 || 5,216.63 || 1,805.65 || 658 PP2 || 5,222.73 || 1,807.76 || 987 PP2a || 5,245.19 || 1,815.54 || 2,199 PP3 || 5,251.46 || 1,817.71 || 2,537 PP2a VARIANT || 5,228.82 || 1,809.87 || 1,316 Step 5: In the final
step, the inland traffic reductions and the maritime traffic gains are
evaluated in terms of their externalities. The following average rates are
used per unit (a 12m lorry or a forty foot container load), covering noise,
accidents and emissions. || RAIL || ROAD || WWAY || SEA Externalities € per Unit/Km || 0.161 || 0.3893 || 0.1984 || 0.0311 Valuations
are based on a number of studies including: 1. IMPACT,
Handbook on estimation of external costs in the transport sector. Produced
within the study “Internalisation Measures and Policies for All external Cost
of Transport”, IMPACT, 2008, Maibach et al. (INFRAS, CE-Delft). 2.
Vergelijkingskader Modaliteiten 1.4b, NEA in association with STERC, TransCare,
2001 to 2004. A
study for the Ministerie van Verkeer en Waterstaat (DGG/AVV). 3. ASSET,
Assessing Sensitiveness to Transport, Alpine Crossing, ECOPLAN, 2009. This study, in
turn, uses inputs from ECOPLAN and INFRAS (2208), Externe Kosten des Verkehrs
in der Schweiz. On behalf of Swiss Federal Office for Spatial Development
and Federal Office of the Environment, Bern. By applying
these rates to the net shifts per mode, we obtain the following estimates: || External Costs (€m/pa) PP1 || -23 PP2 || -34 PP2a || -69 PP3 || -76 PP2a VARIANT || -46 Port Employment European port
employment data is described by the recent study by Dr Eric Van Hooydonk, “Port
Labour in the EU"[39]
as “scattered, indeed hardly comparable”, and of “uneven quality and
reliability”. It is therefore difficult to present an accurate overview of
port employment at a European level. The Van Hooydonk study concentrates on
the number of port workers or dockers engaged in cargo handling, as well as a
few related activities including warehousing. According to this definition,
the study estimates that there are around 110,000 port workers in the EU. At national
level or port level it is possible to extend these definitions. In the study
by ITMMA “Dock labour and port related employment[40]”
certain national case studies are presented. In the Flemish ports of Antwerp,
Zeebrugge, Ghent and Oostende, total direct port employment was recorded as
108,818 full time equivalents (FTE). However, only approximately between one
third and one half of these direct employees work in the ‘maritime cluster’.
The rest work mainly in industry located at the port complexes. In Antwerp for
example, there were 60,509 direct FTE employees in 2010[41], of
which 27,410 were employed in the maritime cluster. Of those, 14,350 were
working in cargo handling activities in 2010. By comparison, the Van Hooydonk
study shows that the number of dockers in Belgium as a whole was only 10,300,
so the categorisation offered by official statistics could be difficult to
interpret. Table 6: Employment at the port of Antwerp
(number of FTEs) || 2005 || 2008 || 2009 || 2010 Cargo Handling || 14,079 || 15,249 || 14,858 || 14,350 Shipping agents and forwarders || 6,457 || 6,940 || 6,805 || 6,808 Port Authority || 1,646 || 1,631 || 1,659 || 1,680 Other || 4,091 || 4,678 || 4,884 || 4,572 Total Maritime Cluster || 26,273 || 28,498 || 28,206 || 27,410 || || || || Total Non-Maritime Cluster || 35,443 || 35,256 || 34,376 || 33,099 || || || || Total Direct FTE || 61,716 || 63,754 || 62,582 || 60,509 || || || || Antwerp throughput (mln. Tonnes) || 160,1 || 189,4 || 157,8 || 178,2 Source:
National Bank of Belgium, 2012 Comparing
employment trends and throughput trends over this period (2005-2010), it can be
seen that throughput grows faster than employment. From 2005 to 2010, throughput
increased by 11%. Non-maritime employment fell, whereas the main maritime
categories increased between 2% and 5%. ITMMA 2010 considers a longer time
period between 2002 and 2007, and shows that while cargo in Flemish ports
increased by 32%, employment in the maritime cluster increased by 18%. During the
growth period 2002-2007, ITMMA shows that non-maritime employment fell by 1%.
They argue that this is related to a process of “de-maritimisation”, implying
that there is a shift in non-cargo handling activity from port complexes
towards the hinterland. Growth in throughput, without an equivalent expansion
of port land, implies that a higher proportion of activity within the port will
become directly related to the movement (rather than the processing) of goods.
Thus, direct port related employment may be substituted by indirect employment
in the hinterland. Over the
period 2005 to 2010, the trends in throughput and maritime employment,
including cargo handling are somewhat erratic. Non-maritime direct employment
continues to fall. Figure 2- Port
Throughput and Employment in Antwerp Source: NBB, 2012 In Rotterdam,
traffic grew by 16% in total tonnage between 2005 and 2010. Over the same
period total direct employment[42]
grew from 85,844 to 87,111 (+1.5%). Industrial employment which accounts for
around 20,000 of these employees, fell during this period but that was
compensated in other areas such as road haulage, which grew from 21,930 to
25,357, and logistics services, which grew from 10,598 to 11,449. Employment
in the activities most closely associated with cargo movement, described as
‘transhipment and warehousing’ rose from 9,021 in 2005 to a peak of 9,605 in
2008 and then fell steadily to 8,898 in 2010. It is difficult to directly
compare Rotterdam and Antwerp statistics, but the general picture of moderate
growth and static employment seems consistent. Higher
employment levels in Antwerp relative to cargo throughput (14,350 cargo
handling employees for 178 million tonnes) compared to Rotterdam (8,898
transhipment and warehousing employees for 430 million tonnes) can be partially
explained by the relative importance of more capital intensive sectors in
Rotterdam, especially liquid bulk. Employment
impacts of traffic growth in ports, Hamburg-Le Havre Range Both
Notteboom and Van Hooydonk emphasise caution in the comparison and use of port
employment statistics. However, we can derive a few tentative conclusions from
those studies. ·
Port
workers, or dockers, as defined by Van Hooydonk may represent some 10% of total
direct employment in ports. ·
Employment
in cargo handling and warehousing tends to follow the economic cycle, but does
not grow in direct proportion to throughput. ·
Throughput
has been growing faster than employment in the reviewed cases. ·
Employment
in non-maritime activities in ports does not correlate well with throughput and
a long term decline seems to occur in this category. Using the Van
Hooydonk employment data, it is possible to make a scatter plot relating port
employment per country to throughput. We have applied the ‘Antwerp rule’ as a
way of normalising the mix of traffic, given that certain traffic types e.g.
break bulk, are more labour intensive per tonne than others such as crude
petroleum. Following the review of value added methods in ITMMA (2010), we
apply the rule that 1 tonne of conventional cargo = 1 tonne of roll on roll off
= 18 tonnes of crude oil = 2 tonnes of liquid bulk (except crude oil) = 3
tonnes of containers = 5 tonnes of dry bulk. Table 7:
Assumptions for Port Traffic Value Added, the 'Antwerp Rule' || Conventional Cargo || RoRo || Crude petroleum || Other Liquid Bulk || Containers || Dry Bulk Antwerp Rule || 1 || 1 || 18 || 2 || 3 || 5 Source: ITMMA 2010. However, if we convert all the
traffic in the Hamburg-Le Havre range according to these factors into
“conventional cargo equivalent” tonnes, the trend is broadly similar to the
overall trend in tonnes. Figure 3: Growth
in "Conventional Cargo Equivalent” Tonnes according to the Antwerp Rule Over the
fifteen year term, throughput (expressed with these adjustments) has risen by
73%. During the period 2002 to 2007, it grew by 37%. Comparing this growth
phase with the employment statistics, relating to maritime clusters, in the
ITMMA (2010) study, it appears that there is approximately a 2:1 ratio between
adjusted traffic growth and employment growth. Employment
Impacts, Italy Data produced
by Assoporti in 2008[43]
shows that Italian ports accounted for 56,682 jobs in 2007, of which 27,899
were categorised as direct FTE. This compares with the employment figures
quoted by Van Hooydonk, showing that there were up to 18,000 dockers employed
in Italy. Table 8: Traffic
and Employment in Italian Ports || 2004 || 2007 || Growth 2007/2004 Employment (nr jobs) || 27,500 || 27,899 || +1.4% Annual Traffic (tonnes) || 484,877 || 537,300 || +10.8% The figures
suggest that direct employment rates per tonne of cargo moved are generally
lower than in the North European examples. Given that Italian ports
collectively handle approximately double the volume carried via Flemish ports,
direct employment levels are close to the quoted Flemish figures for the
maritime cluster, at around 30,000 FTE. This suggests that a higher proportion
of Italian direct employees are indeed dockers. The ratio of traffic growth
and employment growth is also higher, at around 8:1. In Genoa,
which carries around 50 million tonnes per annum, or around 10% of the Italian
market, the port authority shows employment levels at 37,073. However, only
4,274 are classified as working in the commercial port, with a further 6,500 in
ship-building and ship-repair, and 26,299 in port logistics and auxiliary
services. Table 9: Traffic
and Employment in Italian Ports || 2004 || 2010 Employment (nr jobs) || || 37,073 - Commercial Port || || 4,274 - Shipyard || || 6,500 - Port Logistics and Auxiliary || || 26,299 Annual Traffic (tonnes) || 57,033 || 51,952 Source:
Genoa Port Authority This
suggests, as in the cases of Antwerp and Rotterdam that employees fitting the
narrower definitions of port workers, i.e. those engaged in the operation of a
port, are in the minority, and around 10% of total port employment in these
examples. Employment
Impacts, EU27 For the wider
European picture, we rely upon the surveys conducted by Van Hooydonk (2013),
covering a narrower definition of port labour. Here we have
made a scatter plot relating converted throughput[44] (in
millions) against the number of port workers (in thousands). Figure 4: EU Port
Employment as a function of throughput The slope of
the function implies that every additional million tonnes (adjusted) of
throughput creates roughly 90 new cargo handling jobs. Given the
previous analysis showing that cargo handling jobs are approximately 10% of
total direct employment including non-maritime employment, and 20% of direct
maritime employment. Estimate of
Employment Impacts Therefore,
taking into consideration only the direct employment categories, we obtain the
following estimation: Table 10:
Estimated Employment Impacts, 2010 to 2030, Reference Scenario Throughput || 2010 || 2030 || Growth 30/10 || Gr% YoY EU Port Throughput (T. mln) || 3,622.43 || 5,204.44 || 44% || 1.8% Adjusted Throughput (T.mln) || 1,107.94 || 1,801.43 || 63% || 2.5% || || || || Employment || || || || Port Workers (000s) || 111.18 || 163.57 || 47% || 1.9% Other Maritime Port FTE (000s) || 101.19 || 117.27 || 16% || 0.7% Non Maritime Direct FTE (000s) || 256.45 || 256.45 || 0% || 0.0% Total Direct Employment (000s) || 468.83 || 537.29 || 15% || 0.7% It is assumed
that through a combination of public and private sector actions, including the
EC measures to enhance port capacity, that there is a volume increase of 44% in
EU ports by 2030. As a consequence we estimate that the number of port workers
will increase from the present day figure of around 110,000 to around 163,000
by 2030. The ratio of
other maritime port FTEs to port workers is based on the Flemish ports ratios.
Over time it is expected that the ratio falls in line with increasing productivity
rates. Non maritime direct employment in ports is not expected to react to
traffic volume. Total direct
employment is therefore estimated to grow by 15%, or approximately 70,000. In the policy
scenario (high case PP3), additional port volume would help to generate around
2,500 additional jobs. See below. Table 11:
Estimated Employment Impacts, 2010 to 2030, Policy Scenario Throughput || 2010 || 2030 || Growth 30/10 || Gr% YoY EU Port Throughput (T. mln) || 3,622.43 || 5,251.46 || 45% || 1.9% Adjusted Throughput (T.mln) || 1,107.94 || 1,817.71 || 64% || 2.5% || || || || Employment || || || || Port Workers (000s) || 111.18 || 165.05 || 48% || 2.0% Other Maritime Port FTE (000s) || 101.19 || 118.33 || 17% || 0.8% Non Maritime Direct FTE (000s) || 256.45 || 256.45 || 0% || 0.0% Total Direct Employment (000s) || 468.83 || 539.83 || 15% || 0.7% Difference, Policy-Reference || || +2.54 || || Summary
outcome The major
employment impact comes from the exogenous effect of traffic growth. As shown
in table 5 total direct employment in the baseline is estimated to grow by 15%,
or approximately 70,000 from 2010 to 2030. Policy
measures contribute to this impact by setting out a more favourable structural
framework for attracting investment. In addition they directly contribute to
maritime and port employment through modal shift. Table below
summarises the number (unit) of additional jobs against the reference scenario
expected in 2030 under different PPs. 2030 || EU Port Throughput (T. mln) || Adjusted Throughput (T.mln) || New jobs PP1 || 5.216,63 || 1.805,65 || 658 PP2 || 5.222,73 || 1.807,76 || 987 PP2a || 5.245,19 || 1.815,54 || 2,199 PP3 || 5.251,46 || 1.817,71 || 2,537 PP2a VARIANT || 5.228,82 || 1.809,87 || 1,316 Reference Forecast – Overview of Methodology and Assumptions The forecast
is based upon applying a trade growth model to a disaggregated set of traffic
flows, in which long distance trade flows are related to port traffic. This
approach uses the NEAC[45]
trade model methodology applied to a WORLDNET[46] freight-chain matrix
derived from ETISplus[47]
freight statistics. It has been updated during 2012 as a task of the Trans-Scenario[48]
project, to integrate the methodology into the newest (v2.6) TRANS-TOOLS[49]
model. Structure of
NEAC Trade Model (Source: Panteia/NEA) In order to
estimate port traffic, assumptions of economic growth up to 2030 and 2050 have
been applied to a base year traffic matrix, containing maritime flows. Assumptions
of economic growth use current (2012) estimates from PRIMES[50]/TREMOVE[51].
WORLDNET - Mode Chain estimation Origin->Port1 Port1 -> Port2 Port2 -> Destination ETISplus Database - Trade Data - Port Data - Inland Transport Data NEAC Trade Model - Forecasting - Per product - Per origin/destination The results
of the model, namely the matrixes of port to port flows of maritime traffic
(estimations 2005-2030) are given in Annex VIII. Key points: ·
The
model builds up a picture of port-related traffic using trade data and port
throughput data. ·
The
only assumptions entered into the forecasting model are economic growth rates,
based on current expectations (Trans-Scenario, 2012); ·
The
model does not shift traffic between ports – it is competition neutral; ·
Differential
growth rates according to coastline areas arise only from variations in
regional economic growth and the mix of commodities; and ·
The
model calculates unconstrained demand – without capacity ceilings for transport
infrastructure. Balance of
Demand and Supply in European Ports, up to 2030 4.1 Demand The following
forecasts are calculated using the TRANSTOOLS v2.6[52] model, based
on economic assumptions (GDP and GVA) obtained from the PRIMES[53] model.
Average growth in GDP for the EU27 as a whole is expected to be 1.4% per annum
up to 2030. Different growth rates are assumed for each EU member State and
for each trading partner. It implies
that growth will be close to 50% by 2030, with an average annual growth rate of
1.9% per annum. Table 12 - 2010 port traffic by region
of loading/unloading Region || Container || Dry Bulk || Liquid Bulk || RoRo || Other Cargo || Total UK/Ireland || 65.46 || 137.58 || 265.57 || 123.12 || 18.70 || 616.60 Nordic || 32.71 || 134.00 || 204.03 || 89.08 || 46.57 || 517.08 South Baltic || 14.61 || 68.86 || 83.81 || 13.74 || 13.86 || 194.90 Hamburg-France || 323.35 || 329.79 || 529.26 || 92.36 || 80.63 || 1,357.59 Iberia || 124.48 || 90.50 || 175.37 || 15.45 || 25.32 || 431.12 Italy/Malta || 83.22 || 67.76 || 207.01 || 85.72 || 33.45 || 482.92 Balkan/Aegean || 54.48 || 74.47 || 80.81 || 24.69 || 56.12 || 313.36 Black Sea || 6.26 || 27.42 || 20.03 || 0.30 || 6.18 || 60.19 Total || 704.56 || 930.40 || 1,565.88 || 444.46 || 280.83 || 3,973.76 Source: Eurostat/ETISplus. Table 13 - 2030 port traffic by region of
loading/unloading Region || Container || Dry Bulk || Liquid Bulk || RoRo || Other Cargo || Total UK/Ireland || 125.74 || 155.43 || 297.49 || 137.46 || 35.26 || 751.39 Nordic || 50.53 || 187.66 || 240.30 || 122.01 || 81.87 || 682.37 South Baltic || 19.91 || 158.09 || 88.92 || 17.68 || 39.39 || 323.98 Hamburg-France || 595.58 || 434.53 || 571.20 || 186.83 || 138.26 || 1,926.40 Iberia || 217.28 || 176.38 || 213.45 || 38.34 || 50.98 || 696.44 Italy/Malta || 179.00 || 112.67 || 261.87 || 80.05 || 64.24 || 697.83 Balkan/Aegean || 120.80 || 156.28 || 122.21 || 50.50 || 128.72 || 578.51 Black Sea || 8.22 || 69.73 || 28.90 || 1.53 || 37.81 || 146.19 Total || 1,317.06 || 1,450.77 || 1,824.34 || 634.40 || 576.53 || 5,803.11 Port Traffic
in the container sector will be higher than in the bulk sectors. By 2030,
container traffic growth will exceed 85% i.e. 3.2% year on year growth. These results
can be compared with other market research studies: ISL Port
Traffic Forecasts up to 2025 In the 2010
study by ISL, “Prognose des Umschlagpotenzials des Hamburger Hafens fur die
Jahre 2015, 2020 und 2025”, they show in the neutral economic forecast that
container traffic in the Hamburg-Le Havre range might increase from 39.2
million TEU in 2008 to 70.9 million by 2025 (basis-scenario, p92). That
suggests an annual rate of growth of 4.8% per annum for container traffic. For
bulk cargo they indicate a rather static picture, with volumes remaining close
to current levels. Port of
Rotterdam, Port Vision 2030 Port of
Rotterdam’s Port Vision 2030 sets out a long term strategy in which they cite
factors such as global shifts and changes in the patterns of energy demand and
supply as the driving forces for continued port traffic growth, particularly in
the inter-continental trades. When this is combined with expected changes in
the organisation of these traffic flows, and with cost and fuel savings offered
by scale economies the port expects that there will be greater specialisation
and clustering. They apply
four scenarios: ·
Low
Growth: with low economic growth and moderate environmental policy; ·
European
Trend: based on current trends and policy measures; ·
Global
Economy: with high economic growth, low fuel prices, and a low degree of
environmental policy; and ·
High
Oil Price: with moderate economic growth, high oil prices, and a higher degree
of environmental policy. From a 2010
volume of 430 million tonnes, Rotterdam forecasts increases in volume up to 750
million tonnes in 2030. Table 14 - Port of Rotterdam, Port
Vision 2030 1. Scenario || 2. 2030 prediction (tonnes) || 3. Annual growth rate 2010-2030 4. Low Growth || 5. 475 million || 6. 0.5% per annum 7. High Oil Price || 8. 575 million || 9. 1.5% per annum 10. European Trend || 11. 650 million || 12. 2.1% per annum 13. Global Economy || 14. 750 million || 15. 2.8% per annum In the
European port forecast estimated by PwC/Panteia in this document, annual
average growth rates up to 2030 are 1.9%. This lies in between the range of
the two central Rotterdam scenarios (High Oil Price and European Trend). OPTIMAR,
IHS-Fairplay, Benchmarking Strategic Options for European Shipping and for the
European Maritime Transport System in the Horizon 2008-2018, 2010 Update OPTIMAR makes medium term
forecasts for the European shipping sector. A post-crisis revision was
published in 2010. It explains the expansion in the capacity of the world
shipping fleet, and how this continued to grow throughout the period following
the first economic crisis in 2008. Port volumes are shown to have fallen in
many European coastal regions after 2008, but the report concludes that its
strategic outlook or “signals of future change” were unchanged. The study had
demonstrated that shipping-line capacity was capable of accommodating growth,
but that in some port sectors, notably containers, there would be space
constraints. One important driver in this market would be the growth of
Russian containerized volumes, and the opportunity this creates for
transshipment at EU hub ports. In the OPTIMAR SWOT analysis
of the European port system (see Annex), weaknesses are cited in relation to
capacity shortages e.g. in East Baltic dry cargo sector, and in the container
sector for most regions. Efficiency and unstable labour relations are also
highlighted. Opportunities include the
development of Motorways of the Sea, new container feedering patterns, and the
growth of Russian markets. The authors foresee a situation where excess
capacity in the shipping fleet will drive the sector forward to seek new
opportunities, especially in emerging markets. 4.2 Demand/Supply
Balance Because of
the relatively high growth in the container sector, and the heavy investment
required to build modern container terminals capable of handling the largest
container vessels, the question of port capacity and imbalances between demand
and supply is particularly important for European container flows. OECD,
Strategic Transport Infrastructure Needs to 2030 In 2011, the
OECD study “Strategic Transport Infrastructure Needs to 2030” pointed towards
“modest but sustained” growth in developed countries and “significantly higher
growth” in developing countries. Worldwide the study expected that the volume
of container transport would quadruple by 2030. Much of that
growth will be stimulated by economic and logistical changes taking place
outside Europe, but it can still be expected that the volumes in major
inter-continental gateways will increase. In the same
study, the OECD indicated that infrastructure capacity is not able to handle
even a 50% increase in demand, and therefore that the supply side will
become congested. CLECAT
(International Transport Forum, 2007) CLECAT
(European Association for Forwarding, Logistics and Customs Services) provided
examples of port congestion in Europe in 2004. These occurred during a period
of rapid growth, and they show that periods of unexpected growth can create
short to medium term capacity shortages, resulting in additional cost and delay
for shippers. It is estimated that when the supply demand ratio reaches 80%,
the user will experience congestion because there will be very limited scope to
handle peaks in demand. North European Deep Sea Ports
Utilisation 2004 – Source Drewry Shipping Consultants & European
Association for forwarding, transport, logistics and custom services (CLECAT) Port || Capacity Utilisation Le Havre || 89.6% Antwerp || 92.9% Rotterdam || 92.5% Bremerhaven || 95.5% Hamburg || 93.2% Southampton || 99.3% Felixstowe || 77.1% Others || 41.9% Total average || 86.6% Ocean Shipping Consultants, (2006)
Forecast Container Handling Supply/demand Balance up to 2015 OSC’s 2006 publication showed
that by 2015, even with large increases in capacity in many regions,
utilisation rates would reach in excess of 80%, the point at which congestion
would start to be felt by users. Supply/Demand balance by Coastal Region Source: Ocean Shipping Consultants, 2006 Ocean Shipping
Consultants (2012), North European Container Ports Market In the update study in 2012
(post crisis) OSC show that capacity utilisation in the European North
Continent , despite lower demand between 2010 and 2015, is still likely to
reach 70% by 2020 in their base case forecast. Source: North
European Container Ports Market, Ocean Shipping Consultants, 2012 The time-series shows how the
capacity utilisation has stabilised at around 65% in 2012-2013, which coincides
with the impression derived from the impact assessment consultation that
European ports have sufficient maritime capacity today. However, the outlook
shows that after a period of rapid capacity expansion lasting until around
2018, utilisation rates will start to reach 70% again by 2020. 4.3 Demand/Supply
Balance – Conclusions Market research studies (as
shown above) indicate that the supply/demand balance for container transport in
Europe has shifted from the range 70-90% in 2005, to around 60-70% in 2010,
since growth has slowed sharply between 2008 and 2010. On the supply side,
many major container investments such as the Maasvlakte II terminal in
Rotterdam and the Jade-Weser terminal in Northern Germany are starting to
become operational. While this alleviates capacity shortages today, the
planning horizon needs to be longer. Demand levels can be restored
steadily, and shipping capacity can be added at short notice, but adding port
capacity is more difficult. A.A. Pallis[54] demonstrated that port
developments in Europe have faced lengthy delays, both in the initial planning
and in the implementation. Several approved plans have never been realised,
and many others have failed to win approval. Maasvlakte II has taken over
twenty years from initial plans to realisation. Existing port terminals may
also face setbacks. In Hamburg, for example, capacity development has been
hindered by disagreements over plans to dredge the River Elbe for the first
time since 1999[55]. Without dredging, the port
would become less attractive for some carriers particularly on Far East routes,
potentially reducing choice and creating bottlenecks elsewhere. On balance, however, the OSC
(2012) study shows that these North European developments will stabilise
between 2015 and 2020, leaving utilisation rates at around 70%. By 2020 the
market is predicted to be experiencing growth in demand, but the foreseeable
investment projects will have been realised. In 2010 European container
port throughput is at a level of 81m TEU (Source ESPO). With 85% growth as
predicted for 2030, container throughput demand will increase to 149m TEU in
Europe. Current utilisation rates imply that total capacity today is around
115m TEU. Including the Maasvlakte II,
development in Rotterdam, OSC predict that North European supply will increase
by around 20m TEU. A further 10m TEU increase in other regions is likely, but
not at the same scale. For example, more typically, Barcelona is adding 2.65m
TEU at the BEST terminal. On this basis it is plausible
that capacity in EU container terminals will reach 145-155 million TEU based on
existing planned developments. The changing requirements of shipping companies
will also dictate that some existing capacity becomes obsolete. With demand at 149m TEU in
2030 and capacity also reaching 145-155m TEU, it can be demonstrated that the
supply/demand utilisation rate will reach the congestion threshold of 80%
before 2030, and by 2030 the utilisation rate will exceed 95% in some regions. ANNEX: OPTIMAR (2010)
SWOT ANALYSIS OF THE EU PORT SYTEM See: http://ec.europa.eu/transport/modes/maritime/studies/maritime_en.htm ANNEX VIII:
Reference
forecast – NEAC Trade Model
(see also
Annex VII, Section III) Port to
port flows of maritime traffic (estimations 2005-2030) Table ‑15: Maritime O/D, 2005,
Millions of Tonnes per annum Table ‑16: maritime O/D, 2030,
Millions of Tonnes per annum [1] Source: Statistics Explained article
"Maritime transport of goods - quarterly data" updated with figures
for 2012 Q1: http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/statistics_explained/index.php/Maritime_transport_of_goods_-_quarterly_data. [2] Button, K. Transport Economics. Edward Elgar, Aldershot.
(1993). [3] Goss, R. Economic Policies and Seaports: 1. The Economic
Functions of Seaports. “Maritime Policy and Management” 17(3): pp.207-219.
(1990). [4] See, e.g. International Handbook of Maritime Economics,
Cullinane and others (2010) [5] Source Oxera (taken from the ECD (2011) Report "Competition in
Ports and Port Services" [6] Based on the market analysis of the sector (DG MOVE 2012). [7] In the port of Tallinn one mooring service provider is present in
one harbour while two others operators provide mooring services in another
harbour. [8] See NOTTEBOOM, T., 2002, Consolidation and contestability in the
European container handling industry. Maritime Policy and Management, 29,
257-269 [9] Based on our analysis of terminal providers in core ports across
the EU (DG MOVE (2012).
[10] See Notteboom T., Rodrigue J.,
The Corporate Geography of Global Container Terminal Operators, "Maritime Policy & Management: The flagship
journal of international shipping and port research", v. 39, i. 3, 2012.
[11] Ibidem. [12] Source: ‘Dock labour and port-related
employment in the European seaport system’, Prof Theo Notteboom, June 2011. [13] Source: Haralambides H. (2012) "Ports: Engines of Growth and
Employment". There are huge variations in the composition of costs from
one port to another. For an academic review on port pricing issues see also
Haralambides et al (2001), “Port Financing and Pricing in the EU: Theory,
Politics and Reality” [14]See OECD (2011) Report "Competition in Ports and Port
Services" http://www.oecd.org/regreform/liberalisationandcompetitioninterventioninregulatedsectors/48837794.pdf. [15] See ESPO (2010) Report "European Port Governance": http://www.espo.be/images/stories/Publications/studies_reports_surveys/espofactfindingreport2010.pdf#. [16] The
categorisation made by ESPO, the "typology of regions" includes the
following Member States: 1) "Hanse Region":Belgium, Denmark, Finland,
Germany, The Netherlands and Sweden, 2) "New Hanse": Estonia, Latvia,
Lithuania and Poland, 3) "Anglo-Saxon":Ireland and UK,
4)"Latin":Cyprus, France, Greece, Italy, Malta, Portugal and Spain
and 5) "New Latin":Bulgaria, Romania and Slovenia. [17] In 2012, the European Parliament has conducted a study on this
issue, which includes a number of recommendations related to transparency and
state aid rules in the port sector. The study is at : http://www.europarl.europa.eu/committees/en/tran/studiesdownload.html?languageDocument=EN&file=66171. [18] ITMMA Report: Socio-Economic Impacts of EU Ports. [19]Ferrari, C., Merk, O., Bottasso, A., Conti, M., Tei, A. (2012),
“Ports and Regional Development: a European Perspective”, OECD Regional
Development Working Papers. [20] Haralambides et al. (2003) Erasmus
University Rotterdam. [21] Source: ESPO Fact Finding Report (2011) [22] http://ec.europa.eu/transport/themes/sustainable/studies/doc/2012-11-inventory-measures-internalising-external-costs.pdf [1] The Environmental Ship Index is based on ship emissions of local
pollutants, such as NOx, SOx, particulate matter, and
GHG. Source: http://www.wpci.nl/projects/environmental_ship_index.php.
[2] The Green Award certification scheme focuses on crew, operational,
environmental and managerial elements. Source: http://www.greenaward.org/greenaward/.
[3] In addition, Directive 2000/59/EC on port reception facilities for
ship-generated waste and cargo residues, requires ports to provide waste
reception facilities and vessels are, against a waste charge, obligated to make
use of these facilities. The charges are always differentiated based on the
certain characteristics of the ship, such as gross or net tonnage, engine
power, or volume. [23] Source: DG MOVE Study (2012) "An inventory of measures for
internalising external costs in transport", chapter 5 Maritime Shipping –
see footnote 22 [24] http://eca.europa.eu/portal/pls/portal/docs/1/14050737.PDF [25] Air and Sea: only domestic and intra-EU-27 transport; provisional estimates; Road: national and international haulage by vehicles registered in the EU-27 [26] Data
from main ports only (ports handling more than 1 million tonnes per
year). [27] Data from main
ports only (ports handling more than 1 million tonnes per year); the tonnes
have been calculated by taking the declarations of the unloading ports (inward
declarations) and adding those outward declarations of partner ports for which
the inward declarations were missing. [28] http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:52007DC0616:EN:HTML:NOT [29] Cf. last revision of the EU Ports Policy, COM(2007) [30] See DG ECFIN web-site and IMF reports on the Conditional Assistance
Programmes [31] See http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/publicprocurement/docs/concessions/SEC2011_1588_en.pdf [32] A "whereas" in the draft Directive clarifies this point [33] An illustrative example appears in the written question nr 1075/79
by Mr Gendebien to the Commission: coordination of the development of North Sea
Ports, OJ C 105, 28.4.1980,
p. 11 [34] COM(2007)616 Communication on a European Ports
Policy [35]See http://eca.europa.eu/portal/pls/portal/docs/1/14050737.PDF [36] The count can be greater than 100% because more than one problem
can be identified per port. The heading “Management and ICT” covers a range of
questions, including management autonomy, coordination of services, control and
monitoring, etc. [37] http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_GlobalCompetitivenessReport_2012-13.pdf [38] For a detailed presentation, see the final report of the
PwC/Panteia 2013 "Study aimed at supporting an impact assessment to
enhance the efficiency and quality of port services in the EU" [39] Dr Eric Van Hooydonk, 2013, “Port Labour in the EU”, a study
commissioned by the European Commission. [40] T. Notteboom, ITMMA, 2010, “Dock labour and port related
employment”. [41] Claude Mathys, National Bank of Belgium, 2012, “Economic Importance
of the Belgian Ports”. [42] Port of Rotterdam Statistics. Source: Erasmus University,
Rotterdam. [43] Assoporti, 2008, “La Portualità come Fattore di Sviluppo e
Modernizzazione.” Fondazione Censis. [44] According to Antwerp Rule as before. [45] See for example: NEA,
1999, Final Report, European Transport Forecast 2020, Freight Transport. [46] WORLDNET Project, 2009,
DG-MOVE, FP6, NEA, KIT, MKmetric, OSC, DEMIS, TINA. [47] ETISplus project, 2012,
DG-MOVE, Panteia/NEA(NL) et al. [48] TransScenario, 2012,
DG-MOVE, Tetraplan(DK) et al. [49] TRANS-TOOLS, DG-MOVE
reference transport model, JRC-IPTS, Spain. [50] PRIMES model, NTUA,
Greece. [51] TREMOVE model, TM-Leuven,
Belgium. [52] DG-MOVE reference transport model. [53] NTUA, Athens. Reference model for EC forecasting. [54] Pallis, A.A., (2009). “Port developments in Europe: Trends and
policies”. ODU Maritime Institute Speaker Series at the Nauticus National
Maritime Center, Norfolk Virginia, USA, March 2009 [55] De Spiegel, December 2012 Table of contents ANNEX
IX: Administrative cost calculation (PWC, 2013) 3 ANNEX X: Labour issues in EU ports 37 ANNEX XI: Ports in the new TEN-T Strategy 47 ANNEX XII: References 54 ANNEX XIII: Glossary 59
ANNEX IX:
Administrative
cost calculation (PWC, 2013) The first section of
this Annex explains the general assumptions in line with the IA Guidelines for
determining the potential administrative impact. In section two, one can find
the general appreciation related to administrative costs for the different
policy measures. Section three explains the baseline and in section four the
overall assessment is made for the different policy packages. The final and detailed
results of the administrative cost calculation comparing each of the policy
packages to the baseline can be found at the end of this annex, in tables 27
and 28, pages 29-30. General assumptions for administrative cost
calculation From an administrative
cost point of view, the situation of ports is different between Member States.
This means that reasonable assumptions on the number of stakeholders and
frequency with which they will potentially be affected need to be constructed. Number of
ports The considered policies
will apply to TEN-T ports which include Comprehensive[1]
TEN-T ports and Core TEN-T ports. Based on most recent available documents
(still under negotiation) there are 319 TEN-T ports in Europe. These include 94
Core TEN-T ports and 225 Comprehensive TEN-T ports. Nature of
ports The large majority of
European ports are publicly owned. Hence administrative burden to the port
managing body is assumed to result in administrative cost to the public sector. Number of
service providers Table 1 presents the outcome of the Survey Phase
1 on the type of operators which are responsible for providing different port
services in European ports. In case the port service
is awarded to more than one private operator, it is actually unknown the total
number of awarded contracts. However it can be reasonably assumed that in the
large majority of case the contracts are actually awarded to two operators. In
case of “Cargo handling ship-shore/stevedoring” and “Cargo handling
shore-inland transport”, we assume that the contracts are awarded to 10
operators; finally in the case of “passenger services” it is assumed that the
number of private providers is 3. Table 2 provides an estimation of the number
of service providers by category in all the TEN-T ports. Table 1 –
Port services providers by category in TEN-T ports – Survey Phase 1 Port service || Port authorities || Other Public || One private || Two or more || Other/Not specified || Total number of ports Pilotage inside port area || 39 || 39 || 86 || 11 || 26 || 197 Pilotage outside port area || 20 || 48 || 49 || 16 || 50 || 179 Towage inside port area || 19 || 1 || 77 || 68 || 7 || 172 Towage outside port area || 7 || 0 || 49 || 71 || 37 || 164 Mooring || 22 || 5 || 104 || 57 || 10 || 198 Dredging inside port area || 58 || 8 || 16 || 45 || 48 || 175 Provision of waste reception facilities || 38 || 9 || 44 || 62 || 33 || 185 Cargo handling ship-shore/stevedoring || 14 || 7 || 24 || 117 || 18 || 179 Cargo handling shore-inland transport || 7 || 5 || 20 || 122 || 27 || 181 Warehousing || 14 || 4 || 15 || 128 || 22 || 182 Passenger services || 11 || 2 || 8 || 26 || 1 || 48 Rail terminal operations || 10 || 20 || 25 || 77 || 48 || 180 Port security services || 79 || 19 || 13 || 67 || 7 || 184 Bunkering || 1 || 2 || 25 || 105 || 28 || 161 Ice-breaking || 14 || 5 || 3 || 18 || 127 || 167 Table 2 –
Assumption: Number of port services contracts by category in all TEN-T ports Port service || Port authorities || Other Public || One private || Two or more || Total number of port service contracts || Total number of ports Pilotage inside port area || 73 || 73 || 160 || 41 || 346 || 319 Pilotage outside port area || 49 || 118 || 120 || 78 || 365 || 319 Towage inside port area || 37 || 2 || 149 || 263 || 450 || 319 Towage outside port area || 18 || 0 || 123 || 357 || 497 || 319 Mooring || 37 || 8 || 176 || 193 || 416 || 319 Dredging inside port area || 146 || 20 || 40 || 226 || 432 || 319 Provision of waste reception facilities || 80 || 19 || 92 || 260 || 451 || 319 Cargo handling ship-shore/stevedoring || 28 || 14 || 48 || 2317 || 2406 || 319 Cargo handling shore-inland transport || 15 || 10 || 41 || 2527 || 2593 || 319 Warehousing || 28 || 8 || 30 || 2550 || 2616 || 319 Passenger services || 75 || 14 || 54 || 529 || 672 || 319 Rail terminal operations || 24 || 48 || 60 || 372 || 505 || 319 Number of awarded services contracts with value
above 5 Million euro For the purpose of this analysis the following
assumptions are made: ·
70%
of the service contracts present a value above 5 million Euro ·
Contracts
are assumed to have different average duration according to the type of port
services (see table below). Total number of awarded contracts in EU is
assumed to be the number of contracts which have been currently awarded to
private operators. Table 3 –
Service contracts above 5 million Euro threshold Port service || Estimation: total number of awarded contracts in EU || Estimation: number of awarded contracts in EU > 5 million Euro || Assumption: duration of contracts (years) Pilotage inside port area || 201 || 141 || 10 Pilotage outside port area || 199 || 139 || 10 Towage inside port area || 412 || 288 || 10 Towage outside port area || 480 || 336 || 10 Mooring || 370 || 259 || 5 Dredging inside port area || 266 || 186 || 5 Provision of waste reception facilities || 352 || 247 || 20 Cargo handling ship-shore/stevedoring || 2364 || 1655 || 25 Cargo handling shore-inland transport || 2569 || 1798 || 25 Warehousing || 2580 || 1806 || 25 Passenger services || 584 || 409 || 25 Rail terminal operations || 433 || 303 || 25 Port security services || 265 || 185 || 5 Bunkering || 564 || 395 || 15 Ice-breaking || 311 || 218 || 10 Services linked to PSO,
space constraints and “normal services” The definition of what
is a port services contracts linked to space constraints or a “normal service”
should be done port by port. However since this is not possible, table 3
provides an estimation based on reasonable assumptions. Table 4 – Estimation of number of port services contracts
linked to PSO, space constraints and “normal services” Port service || Assumptions || Estimation PSO || Space constraints || Normal || PSO || Space constraints || Normal Pilotage inside port area || 100% || 0% || 0% || 346 || 0 || 0 Pilotage outside port area || 100% || 0% || 0% || 365 || 0 || 0 Towage inside port area || 70% || 0% || 30% || 315 || 0 || 135 Towage outside port area || 70% || 0% || 30% || 348 || 0 || 149 Mooring || 20% || 0% || 80% || 83 || 0 || 333 Dredging inside port area || 0% || 100% || 0% || 0 || 432 || 0 Provision of waste reception facilities || 50% || 50% || 0% || 225 || 225 || 0 Cargo handling ship-shore/stevedoring || 20% || 70% || 10% || 481 || 1684 || 241 Cargo handling shore-inland transport || 20% || 70% || 10% || 519 || 1815 || 259 Warehousing || 20% || 70% || 10% || 523 || 1831 || 262 Passenger services || 20% || 70% || 10% || 134 || 470 || 67 Rail terminal operations || 0% || 100% || 0% || 0 || 505 || 0 Port security services || 0% || 100% || 0% || 0 || 441 || 0 Bunkering || 20% || 0% || 80% || 114 || 0 || 457 Ice-breaking || 90% || 0% || 10% || 416 || 0 || 46 Terminal and port
services awarded with public tendering procedures As shown in figure 1,
respondents to Survey Phase 1 reported that public tendering or competitive
bidding is widely used in ports. More precisely it can be used for awarding or
renewing a contract in the large majority of ports (86%) when a port service
contract is awarded and in almost 3 out of 4 ports (71%) when a terminal
contract is awarded. This way, an assumption on the overall number of contracts
that are currently awarded with tendering procedures and the number of
contracts that potentially will be awarded with tendering procedures in the
future can be made. Figure 1 - type of
awarding or renewal process for main terminals and port service contracts Table 5 – Estimation of number of port services contracts
currently awarded with public tendering procedures Port service || Estimation: contracts awarded with public tendering PSO || Space constraints || Normal Pilotage inside port area || 298 || 0 || 0 Pilotage outside port area || 314 || 0 || 0 Towage inside port area || 271 || 0 || 116 Towage outside port area || 299 || 0 || 128 Mooring || 72 || 0 || 286 Dredging inside port area || 0 || 372 || 0 Provision of waste reception facilities || 194 || 194 || 0 Cargo handling ship-shore/stevedoring || 342 || 1196 || 171 Cargo handling shore-inland transport || 368 || 1289 || 184 Warehousing || 371 || 1300 || 186 Passenger services || 95 || 334 || 48 Rail terminal operations || 0 || 359 || 0 Port security services || 0 || 380 || 0 Bunkering || 98 || 0 || 393 Ice-breaking || 358 || 0 || 40 Port
services provided in house and port services awarded with exclusive rights Table 6 presents the
number of port service provided in house by the port managing body in European
ports according to respondents of Survey Phase 1. Table 6 also provides the
number of port services awarded with exclusive rights to either a private or
public operator other than the port authority. In the case of cargo
handling and passenger services, it is assumed that the services directly
awarded with exclusively right are given by the total number of services
provided by private operators multiplied by the share of services not awarded
with public tendering. Unit labour
cost and overhead cost The PwC study on Public
procurement in Europe[2]
provides an estimation of the typical man-day cost for carrying out
administrative activities: the study suggests an inclusive man-day cost of 250
Euro for authorities and of 193 Euro for firms. The cost includes labour cost
and typical overhead costs. Unit cost
for public tendering Directive 2004/17/EC of
the European Parliament and of the Council of 31 March 2004 define the procurement
procedures of entities operating in the transport and other services sectors of
public interest. A recent PwC study on Public procurement in
Europe[3]
provides information on efforts and costs by authorities and firms in managing
and taking part to tendering process. A typical tender process effort by an
administration in the port sector is 24 man-days. Firms that will take part to
the tender will incur in one off costs for the submission of document(s)
related to selection criteria and exclusion criteria. Their effort is estimated
to be 16 man-days per firm. Considering that on average 5.9 firms take part at
each competition in the port sector, it can be assumed that each procurement
will involve an effort of 94.4 man-days by the private sector. Hence it can be
assumed that each service contract to be procured will generate one off costs
to the port managing body or other relevant administration of 6,000 Euro. The
overall cost to the business is estimated at 18,219 Euro. Table 6 – Estimation of number of port services provided in
house and awarded with exclusive rights Port service || Survey findings || Overall estimation Provided in house || Provided by other public entity || Provided in house || Provided by other public entity || Provided by other operator Pilotage inside port area || 39 || 39 || 73 || 73 || 201 Pilotage outside port area || 20 || 48 || 49 || 118 || 199 Towage inside port area || 19 || 1 || 37 || 2 || 412 Towage outside port area || 7 || 0 || 18 || 0 || 480 Mooring || 22 || 5 || 37 || 8 || 37 Dredging inside port area || 58 || 8 || 146 || 20 || 266 Provision of waste reception facilities || 38 || 9 || 80 || 19 || 352 Cargo handling ship-shore/stevedoring || 14 || 7 || 28 || 14 || 2124 Cargo handling shore-inland transport || 7 || 5 || 15 || 10 || 2309 Warehousing || 14 || 4 || 28 || 8 || 2318 Passenger services || 11 || 2 || 75 || 14 || 517 Rail terminal operations || 10 || 20 || 24 || 48 || 433 Port security services || 79 || 19 || 142 || 34 || 265 Bunkering || 1 || 2 || 2 || 5 || 564 Ice-breaking || 14 || 5 || 112 || 40 || 265 Unit cost
for public tendering in case of imposition of two operators For services linked to
space constraints, it has been considered to impose the obligation to have at
least 2 operators and the obligation of public tendering for new contracts
except below a certain threshold (for small contracts). In case of occurrence of
such circumstances the cost for public tendering will be doubled. Unit cost
for public tendering in case of major contract changes For the aim of the
analysis it is assumed that 1 out of 20 contracts will be re-tendered following
major changes to be considered on the value of the contracts or on the services
to be provided. On average this is expected to happen at half of the initially
stipulated duration of the contract. Hence under this measure
it is expected that both the public sector and the business will anticipate
part of the tendering procedures. On annual average this is expected to result
in an increase of 2.5% of the tendering costs for both parties. Unit cost
for port service tariff definition The process for the
price setting of each regulated service potentially involves one or more
national authorities, the port managing body, the port service provider and the
industry and users representatives. For the aim of this
analysis we consider three different situations: ·
Services
directly awarded to a private port service provider ·
Services
carried out in house by the port managing body ·
Services
carried out by another public body/entity In all cases it is
assumed that every 2 years a report which summarises the prospect of the costs
and revenues of the activity will be produced. Port managing body and other
authority are responsible for auditing these reports. Also the industry
associations are involved in the auditing of the report. All the mentioned
parties are required to attend a couple of meetings to negotiate the service
tariff. For the aim of the
analysis the recurrent effort to be sustained by who provides the service is
assumed to be 10 man-days for the preparation of the report and 2 man-days for
attending 2 meetings. The port managing body
is assumed to allocate 5 man-days as for other public authorities. Finally industry
associations and users’ representative are assumed to allocate 12 man-days for
auditing the report and attending the meetings. Hence, in the case of
direct award, the cost for occurrence to the public sector can be quantified at
2,500 Euro (recurrent every about 2 years). The overall recurrent cost to the
business is quantifiable at 4,632 Euro (recurrent every about 2 years). In case of services
provided in house or by another public entity, the cost for occurrence to the
public sector can be quantified at 5,500 Euro (recurrent every about 2 years).
The overall recurrent cost to the business is quantifiable at 2,316 Euro
(recurrent every about 2 years). In addition a one off
cost should be considered for the first year of application or modification of
the procedure for tariff definition. The one off effort is expected to be as
high as 50% of the recurrent effort sustained by all parties each time the
tariff is reviewed. Unit cost of
separation of accounts The separation of
accounts involve one off costs to the managing body for the definition of the
new accounting system and for updating the accounting IT system. These costs
will vary according to the size of the company and the number of accounting
operations to be performed. Typical cost can be assumed to be in the region of
60,000 – 90,000 Euro; on average 75,000 Euro. Recurrent costs for the
preparation of separate accounts are small or not relevant. Unit cost of
functional separation Legal separation of
public functions from commercial functions linked to the provision of port
services into independent entities will generate new administrative costs to
the port managing bodies. Expected administrative
costs mainly concern the provision set out by three different Council
directives: ·
“Second
Directive”: Incorporation of public limited liability companies and the
maintenance and alteration of their capital. ·
“Sixth
Directive”: Division of public limited liability companies. ·
“Seventh
Directive”: Consolidated accounts of limited liability companies. Indeed, the port
managing body will incur one off costs for the division of its activities and
the incorporation of the new legal entities. In addition the port managing body
will incur recurrent costs for the preparation of consolidated accounts. Findings from the EU
Project on Baseline Measurement and Reduction of Administrative Costs[4]
provide for average figures on administrative costs incurred by European firms
in responding to requirements set by the above mentioned directives. The average
administrative cost met by firms in case of division is assumed to be 36,093
Euro per occurrence. The incorporation of each new legal entity will result in
one off costs of 11,045 Euro. The functional
separation will also involve the preparation of dedicated accounts for the new
business unit. The one off cost for the definition of the new system is assumed
to be equal as for the separation of accounts (i.e. 75,000 Euro). Recurrent
costs are not expected with this regard. In addition each
managing body will incur recurrent costs for the preparation of consolidated
accounts. The recurrent average expense per port is assumed to be 3,816 Euro
per year. Finally the
implementation of a new structure of governance and management for each new
legal entity will generate substantial costs. The costs will depend on the size
of the new company and might include the appointment of an administrator and of
a board of directors. Statistics on additional cost of governance for a new
company resulting from a legal separation are not available; however these are
reasonable assumed to be on the region of 130,000 – 150,000 Euro per year. In summary each
functional separation will generate recurrent costs that for the port managing
body are quantifiable at 215,000 Euro/year. The one off costs per occurrence
are expected to be 50,954 Euro. Financial
transparency between public and port authorities The preparation of
accounts which allow for identifying any financial flow (grants, loans
guarantees, equity share etc.) from public authorities to the port authority do
not imply the adoption of a new accounting system. It is assumed that port
managing staff will allocate an extra effort of 10 man-days for comply with the
new transparency requirements. Hence the average annual cost per port is
assumed to be 2,500 Euro. Unit cost
for port dues definition The process for the
definition of port infrastructure charges or dues can involve one or more
national authority and the port managing body. Optionally, the process could
involve also port users’ representatives, nevertheless this has not been considered
in this analysis. For the aim of this
analysis we consider three different situations: ·
33%
of ports where dues are defined by the port managing body but where the
competent authority is responsible for auditing, reviewing and finally
approving the dues. ·
33%
of ports where dues are defined by the competent authority; however a relevant
effort by the port managing bodies is also expected. ·
33%
of ports where dues are defined by port managing bodies with not relevant
involvement of other parties. Under the first case,
the port managing body is required to produce every 5 years a report which
summarises the prospect of the costs and revenues of the port activity. Local
or national authorities are responsible for auditing the report provided by the
port managing body. All the mentioned parties are required to attend a number
of meetings to negotiate the port dues or charges. For the aim of the
analysis, it is assumed that the port managing body allocate 20 man-days for
the preparation of the report. The local and national authorities allocate
further 20 man-days for the auditing of the report. Finally all parties are
expected to allocate 20 man-days for attending different meetings. Hence the cost for
occurrence to the public sector can be quantified at 15,000 Euro (recurrent
every about 5 years). Under the second case it
is assumed that the effort will be shared in different ways between the parties
involved. Nevertheless the overall effort in terms of man-days and costs is as
for the first case. Finally under the third
case, the port managing body defines the port dues in autonomy. The effort is
expected to be lower if compared to the previous cases, but probably more
frequent. It is assumed that 5 man-days are allocated annually to this
activity. The recurrent cost to the public sector is thus estimated at 1,250
Euros per year. In case of modification
of the rules for the definition of the port dues it is assumed that the cost is
one-off doubled. Unit cost of
central port coordination This activity involves
regular exchange of information between port service providers and public
authorities and the attendance to a couple of meetings per year. It is assumed
that this activity is already carried out in one way or the other in all TEN-T
ports. For the aim of the analysis it is assumed that public authorities
(including the port managing body) dedicate 40 man-days per year to
coordination of port services. The private business and in particular port
service providers are assumed to allocate 2 man-days per each year. Assuming
that on overage there are 20 service providers in each port, the overall effort
is expected to be 40 man-days per year. The unit cost per port
to the public sector is expected to be 10,000 Euro/year. The unit cost per port
to the private businesses is estimated to be 7,200 Euro/year. Following the formal
appointment of the port managing body as the coordinator of the port services
in each port, it is expected that its administrative burden is slightly
increased. It is assumed that all Member States and ports have already similar
instruments in place, however, in a relevant number of cases it is expected
that the practice in use need substantial further development. For the aim of
this analysis it is assumed that on average the annual cost to the port
managing body will increase by 40%. Hence the recurrent additional
administrative cost to the public sector is expected to be 4,000 Euro per year. The businesses are
assumed not to experience any additional administrative cost compared to the
baseline scenario. Unit cost of
port users’ committee A port users’ committee
involves the participation of port service providers, shipping companies and
land transport operators. In addition also the port managing body and other
maritime authorities are involved. The activity is assumed to include the
organisation of a couple of meetings per year. It is assumed that this
activity is already currently carried out in about 50% of all TEN-T ports. For
the aim of the analysis it is assumed that public authorities (including the
port managing body) dedicate 10 man-days per year to collect claims and
suggestions from port services providers and to organise meetings. The private
business and in particular port service providers but also port users are
assumed to allocate 2 man-days per each year. Assuming that on overage there
are 20 service providers and 20 port users in each port willing to actively
participate to the works of the committee, the overall effort is expected to be
80 man-days per year. Hence the unit cost of a
port committee to the public sector is assumed to be 5,000 Euro per year. The
cost to the businesses is estimated to be 15,440 Euro per year. Policy
measures which imply variations of administrative costs Relevant policy measures
are the following: Table 7 – Preliminary assessment of administrative burden Measures || Description || Relevance of administrative costs 1. Freedom to provide services (no restrictions on market access) for "normal services", i-e services other than those linked to public service obligations or space constraints || The freedom to provide service applies and relates to the free entry of any service provider established in the EU. Operators would be authorised on the basis of transparent and non-discriminatory criteria. These criteria would be determined, published and made accessible to all by the Member States. || Small: new contracts will be awarded without public tendering. Overall administrative costs are expected to decrease for this measure. 2. Obligation of public tendering for new contracts in the case of public service obligations or space constraints (except for small contracts or urgencies) || Member States and the port authorithies would be allowed to impose restrictions to the freedom to provide service on the ground of objectives reason of space constraint *** or public service obligations**. But in such case, the Member State or the port authority would need to enter into a contractual arrangement with a port service provider to be selected by means of a transparent public tendering procedure (except for small contracts or urgencies)* || Moderate: a relevant number of contracts will be awarded with public tendering. This will involve new costs for both the ports and the port service providers. 3. Explain in a Communication from the Commission how existing Treaty rules apply in the case of port services public service obligations or with space constraints || By contrast with other measures relying on binding provisions for Member States, this measure would entail a Communication from the Commission to explain how the principle of non-discrimination and free establishment result in an obligation of transparency and equual treatment (teleaustria ruling) and how it can be applied in practices to arrangements/contracts awarded to port service operators. || Small: this is expected to affect a minority of ports. 4. Impose the obligation to have at least 2 operators for services linked to space constraints to be selected after a public tender for new contracts (except for small contracts or urgencies) || In the case of port services subject to space constraints the port authority or the Member State needs to assure that there are at least 2 competing and independent operators. A public tendering obligations is imposed. || Small / moderate: as for measure 2, public tendering involve new administrative costs. Nevertheless this should apply to a restricted number of cases. 5. Obligation of public tendering in case of substantial changes of existing contracts linked to public service obligations or space constraints || Same as measure 2 but in addition the obligation of public tendering in will apply also in case of substantial modification of existing contracts/arrangements. A substantial modification would entail a modification of at least e.g. 30% of the value of the contract/arrangement and/or a change of the nature of activity. || Small: as for measure 2, public tendering involve new administrative costs. Nevertheless this cost is only anticipated and it will apply to a limited number of cases. 6.Confinement for internal operators of port services || In the event that a port or public authority is performing (commercial) port services in-house [as a derogation to the freedom to provide service and the application of a public tendering procedure (cf measures 1,2,3 and 5)], the operation of the service shall be confined to the dedicated port, or group of ports, serviced by the port managing body or the authority, and consequently the internal provider cannot offer the service outside of the port or group of ports. This will avoid that operators which can benefit from potential cross-subsidies enjoy unfair competitive advantages. || Not relvant: no new administrative costs are envisaged 7. Rules on the price of port services provided by operators in monopolistic position || Derogating from the general rule of freedom to provide service (cf measure 1) could leave the service provided by internal operators or operators with exclusive/special rights with an insufficient (or non existing) competitive pressure. To avoid price abuses, this measure would impose basic principles on pricing, namely proportionality (cost based), transparency and non-discrimination (with possibilities to apply commercial rebates if accessible to all users). The Member State will need to designate a regulatory authority (eg an existing competition authority) to deal with the oversight and complaints by port service users. || Moderate: in all or in the large majority of ports the prices of port services are defined according to national or local rules. Redefining the prices according to common European priciples will involve minor additional costs. 8. Rules on the price of port services provided by operators in monopolistic position for which no public tender is organised || The measure will be the same as measure 7 except that it would apply only to services for which no public tender applies and therefore for which the market cannot be contested at the end of the contract. If the market cannot be contested at the end of the contract by means of a public tender, the competitive pressure is indeed weaker. The scope is therefore more limited than measure 7 and focus where the likelihood of absence of competitive pressure is higher || Small: as for measure 7, but a smaller number of cases will be considered. 9. Central Port Coordination || In a free market situation, there is a possible proliferation of port service providers. This will lead to potential conflicts between the different service providers. Therefore, the MS will be obliged to ensure a central port coordination in every port to ensure the seamless and safe operation during entry and exit of the port and inside the port. || Small/moderate: central port coordination is one of the typical functions of the port managing body. Having this measure in place will involve an higher efort on this matter for some ports. 10. Port users' committee || A port users' committee would be set up in each port. The committee would facilitate the dialogue between all port actors (users, service providers, authorities) in order to ensure a seamless logistical flow of freight (and passengers) in the port and to and from the hinterland. It would be organised by, but independent from, the port authority (ies). Its precise competences and composition of the committee would be left over to the discretion of the MS or port authority and will include at least the following: • regular consultative role on the structure and level of port dues • ad-hoc consultative role (at the request of the regulatory authority of measures 7 and 8) on possible (price) abuses of port services • recommend an administrative simplification plan. The plan would include performance targets (eg maximum duration of adminsitrative procedure) and issue recommendations on how to organise the sharing and management of data flows related to cargo for intra-port freight movements, allowing shipping lines, terminal oparators, freigth forwarders, shippers and hinterland providers (rail, truck, barge) to organise the movement of cargo (main focus on containers) in the most efficient way. || Small / moderate: a large number of ports are expected to have already a port users’ committe or similar entities. Thus the cost which is not believed to be high will actually impact a minority of ports. 11. Functional separation || Ports would have to legally separate public functions from commercial functions linked to the provision of port services into independent entities. Obviously, this entails also a full separation of accounts as presented in measure 12, as each of the presented activities would be subject of a different legal entity. || High: the cost for legal separation of business functions involve relevant administrative costs. The cost will be incurred by a relevant number of ports. 12. Separation of accounts || Port authorities which receive public funds * would keep an accounting system that allows to identify any financial flow from public authorities to the port authority. The accounting system would also differentiate between the different types of activities carried out by the port authorities (1) port (public) functions and (2) (commercial) service activities and to differentiate between the different (commercial) services provided in order to reveal possible cross-subsidies**. The accounts will have to kept at the disposal of the national and EU competition authorithies in order to help them to identify more easily possible state aids and distorsion of competion between ports and between port service providers. || Moderate / high: the cost will be significantly lower if compared to measure 11 but still relvant since it will involve a large number of ports. 13. Financial transparency between public and port authorities || Port authorities which receive public funds * would keep an accounting system that allows to identify any financial flow (grants, loans guarantees, equity share etc.) from public authorities to the port authority. The accounts will have to kept at the disposal of the national and EU competition authorities in order to help them to identify more easily possible distortive state aids. || Small: cost will be lower if compared to measure 12. 13. Autonomy of the individual ports to set dues || Each port managing body shall be free to set the structure and level of the port dues (related to the use of the port access infrastructure) as it feels appropriate, provided that the rules applicable below are respected. || Small: ports will save on the cost for setting prices according to national/local rules but will incurr new costs to define prices according to commercial rules. 14. Cost-based and differentiated port dues || Binding rules will be introduced to ensure that infrastructure charges respect the principle of proportionality to cost (long term marginal cost-based),. Environmental differentiation of charges will be introduced according to objective criteria left to the Member State. || Small: in all or in the large majority of ports the port dues are defined according to national or local rules. Redefining the port dues according to common European rules will involve small costs. 15. Enabling variations of port dues based on the environmental performance || The measure will allow price discrimination if it provides incentives to cleaner transport (cleaner ships/propulsion/fuels, certain short sea shipping). The Commission will also establish non-binding guidelines on how to apply such a variation (e.g. classification to be used). || Not relvant: this measure does not involve additional costs compared to measure 14 16. Transparency of port due calculation || The prices and calculation method for port infrastructure access charges related to the public access facility to a port will be made accessible to the port users and the authorities. The method will have to indicate the overall cost components and how the total port dues contribute to recoup it. || Not relvant: the publication of the principles for charging does not involve relevant costs. Measures which present
small, moderate or high administrative costs are to be compared against the
base line scenario. Assessment
of the administrative burden in the baseline scenario The considered policy
measures are likely to generate additional administrative costs on both the
public sector and businesses. However, these costs are likely to increase
administrative costs which already incurred by the parties. There are no one-off
costs to be considered under the baseline scenario. Freedom to provide
service for "normal services" - no public tendering Currently there are
contracts for “normal services” which are awarded with tendering procedures.
Under this measure the costs that currently are incurred for these tendering
procedure will be potentially saved. Table 8 provides an
estimation of the number of “normal contracts” which are currently awarded with
public tendering procedures. Furthermore, we provide a calculation of the
average annual costs that will be incurred to renew these contracts with public
tendering process. Table 8 – Estimation of the average annual cost currently
sustained for awarding “normal service” contracts with tendering procedures Port service || Assumptions: Number of normal contracts awarded with public tendering || Cost per occurrence (Euro) || Recurrent average cost (Euro / year) || Share of normal services to the total || Normal services || Average duration (year) || Public sector || Businesses || Public sector || Businesses Pilotage inside port area || 0% || 0 || 10 || 0 || 0 || 0 || 0 Pilotage outside port area || 0% || 0 || 10 || 0 || 0 || 0 || 0 Towage inside port area || 30% || 116 || 10 || 697.322 || 2.117.443 || 69.732 || 211.744 Towage outside port area || 30% || 128 || 10 || 769.880 || 2.337.767 || 76.988 || 233.777 Mooring || 80% || 286 || 5 || 1.716.084 || 5.210.947 || 343.217 || 1.042.189 Dredging inside port area || 0% || 0 || 5 || 0 || 0 || 0 || 0 Provision of waste reception facilities || 0% || 0 || 20 || 0 || 0 || 0 || 0 Cargo handling ship-shore/stevedoring || 10% || 171 || 25 || 1.024.899 || 3.112.140 || 40.996 || 124.486 Cargo handling shore-inland transport || 10% || 184 || 25 || 1.104.801 || 3.354.764 || 44.192 || 134.191 Passenger services || 10% || 48 || 25 || 286.245 || 869.192 || 11.450 || 34.768 Bunkering || 80% || 393 || 15 || 2.356.436 || 7.155.397 || 157.096 || 477.026 TOTAL || || || || || || 743.671 || 2.258.181 Public tendering for
services with a PSO or space constraints Table 9 reports the
estimation of number of relevant port services that have been awarded with
public tendering. It is assumed that the tendering cost is to be incurred every
time a contract will be renewed. It is assumed that each
service contract to be procured will generate one off costs to the port
managing body or other relevant administration of 6,000 Euro. The overall cost
to the business is estimated at 18,219 Euro. However, given different
assumptions on the durations of contracts, the table provides an estimation of
the annual average recurrent cost to be incurred by different parties for the
tendering procedures. Table 9 – Estimation of the average annual cost currently
sustained for awarding service contracts involving PSO and/or Space constraints
Port service || Assumption: Number of PSO and S.C. contracts awarded with public tendering || Cost per occurance (Euro) || Recurrent average cost (Euro / year) PSO and Space constraints >5 M€ || Share of tendered contracts || Average duration (years) || Public sector || Businesses || Public sector || Businesses Pilotage inside port area || 121 || 86% || 10 || 730.688 || 2.218.757 || 73.069 || 221.876 Pilotage outside port area || 120 || 86% || 10 || 722.574 || 2.194.120 || 72.257 || 219.412 Towage inside port area || 167 || 86% || 10 || 1.004.456 || 3.050.064 || 100.446 || 305.006 Towage outside port area || 199 || 86% || 10 || 1.199.122 || 3.641.175 || 119.912 || 364.117 Mooring || 22 || 86% || 5 || 139.995 || 425.100 || 27.999 || 85.020 Dredging inside port area || 160 || 86% || 5 || 966.862 || 2.935.909 || 193.372 || 587.182 Provision of waste reception facilities || 212 || 86% || 20 || 1.277.190 || 3.878.231 || 63.860 || 193.912 Cargo handling ship-shore/stevedoring || 1055 || 71% || 25 || 6.337.123 || 19.242.885 || 253.485 || 769.715 Cargo handling shore-inland transport || 1148 || 71% || 25 || 6.890.380 || 20.922.867 || 275.615 || 836.915 Passenger services || 257 || 71% || 25 || 1.544.488 || 4.689.890 || 61.780 || 187.596 Bunkering || 64 || 86% || 15 || 391.546 || 1.188.943 || 26.103 || 79.263 TOTAL || || || || || || 1.267.898 || 3.850.014 Rules on the price of
port services provided in monopolistic position Table 10 provides an
estimation of the number of contracts awarded with exclusive or special rights.
Among these contracts, it is assumed that currently only 70% of contracts for
technical nautical services include provisions on price setting and review.
100% of contracts for waste reception facilities are assumed to be price
regulated in compliance with provisions set by art. 8 of Directive 2000/59/EC[5].
All other types of service are assumed not to be price regulated. Furthermore assuming
that the service tariffs are reviewed every two years, table 9 provides for an
estimation of the annual average cost currently incurred by the public sector
and the business. Table 10 – Estimation of the average annual cost currently
sustained for service tariff setting and or reviewing Port service || Assumption: number of contracts with exclusive or special rights || Assumptions: port services which are price regulated || Recurrent average cost (Euro / year) Provided in house || Provided by other public entity || Provided by other operator || Provided in house || Provided by other public entity || Provided by other operator || Public || Businesses Pilotage inside port area || 73 || 73 || 201 || 51 || 51 || 141 || 455.017 || 443.237 Pilotage outside port area || 49 || 118 || 199 || 34 || 82 || 139 || 494.771 || 457.163 Towage inside port area || 37 || 2 || 277 || 26 || 1 || 194 || 316.511 || 479.864 Towage outside port area || 18 || 0 || 331 || 12 || 0 || 231 || 323.082 || 550.147 Mooring || 37 || 8 || 37 || 26 || 6 || 26 || 120.855 || 97.656 Dredging inside port area || 146 || 20 || 266 || 0 || 0 || 0 || 0 || 0 Provision of waste reception facilities || 80 || 19 || 352 || 80 || 19 || 352 || 711.149 || 929.711 Cargo handling ship-shore/stevedoring || 28 || 14 || 2124 || 0 || 0 || 0 || 0 || 0 Cargo handling shore-inland transport || 15 || 10 || 2309 || 0 || 0 || 0 || 0 || 0 Passenger services || 75 || 14 || 517 || 0 || 0 || 0 || 0 || 0 Bunkering || 2 || 5 || 107 || 0 || 0 || 0 || 0 || 0 TOTAL || || || || || || || 2.421.385 || 2.957.779 Central Port
Coordination The unit cost per port
to the public sector is expected to be 10,000 Euro / year. The unit cost per
port to the private businesses is estimated to be 7,720 Euro / year. Table 11 – Estimation of the recurrent yearly costs for
central port coordination || N. of ports || Cost to the Public sector (Euro) || Cost to the Businesses (Euro) Central port coordination || 319 || 3.190.000 || 2.462.680 Port users' committee It is expected that this
activity is already currently carried out in about 50% of all TEN-T ports. The
unit cost of a port committee to the public sector is assumed to be 5,000 Euro per
year. The cost to the businesses is estimated to be 15,440 Euro per year. Table 12 – Estimation of the recurrent yearly costs for port
users’ committee || N. of ports || Cost to the Public sector (Euro) || Cost to the Businesses (Euro) Port users’ committee || 160 || 400.000 || 2.470.400 Cost-based and
differentiated port dues As explained earlier,
three different cases are assumed for the calculation of the cost involved in
the definition of port dues. Table 13 provides the outcome of the calculation
based on provided assumptions. Table 13– Estimation of the recurrent yearly costs for port
dues calculation || N. of ports || Cost to the Public sector (Euro) || Cost to the Businesses (Euro) Dues are defined by the port managing body with Government approval || 106 || 319.000 || 0 Dues are defined by the Government || 106 || 319.000 || 0 Dues are autonomously defined by the port managing body || 106 || 132.917 || 0 Total || 319 || 770.917 || 0 Summary of
administrative costs under the baseline scenario Table 14 provides a
summary of the recurrent administrative costs incurred by the public sector and
the businesses under the baseline scenario. Table 14– Estimation of the recurrent yearly administrative
costs – baseline scenario (Euro / year) Measure || Cost to the Public sector (Euro) || Cost to the Businesses (Euro) 1. Freedom to provide service for "normal services" - no public tendering || 743.671 || 2.258.181 2. Public tendering for service contracts with a PSO or space constraints > 5 M€ || 1.267.898 || 3.850.014 3. Communication from the Commission on how existing Treaty rules apply in the case of port services || N/A || N/A 4. Obligation to have at least 2 operators in case of space constraints - public tendering || N/A || N/A 5. Public tendering in case of major contract changes || N/A || N/A 6. Confinement of internal (public) providers of port services || N/A || N/A 7. Rules on the price of port services provided by operators in monopolistic position || 2.421.385 || 2.957.779 8. Rules on the price of port services awarded directly to operators in monopolistic position || as M7 above || as M7 above 9. Central Port Coordination || 3.190.000 || 2.462.680 10. Port users committee || 400.000 || 2.470.400 11. Functional separation || N/A || N/A 12. Separation of accounts || N/A || N/A 13. Financial transparency between public and port authorities || N/A || N/A 14. Freedom for individual ports to set dues || as M15 below || 0 15. Cost-based and differentiated dues || 770.917 || 0 16. Enabling variations based on environmental performance || N/A || N/A 17. Transparency of port due calculation || small || small TOTAL || 8.793.870 || 13.999.053 In the baseline scenario
the cost annually incurred by the businesses are about 13.4 million Euros. The
public sector and in particular the port managing bodies face 8 million Euro of
administrative costs per year. Hence, on average every year, each port generates
slightly more than 200,000 Euro of administrative costs to the public sector. Comparison of the administrative burden for the
baseline and policy packages According to the
preliminary assessment provided in table 6 there are 16 policy measures which
imply variation of the administrative burden compared to the baseline scenario. There are both recurrent
and one off costs to be considered under the different policy packages. Freedom to provide
service for "normal services" - no public tendering Currently there are
contracts for “normal services” which are awarded with tendering procedures.
Under this measure the costs that currently are incurred for these tendering
procedure will be saved. Hence costs assumed
under the baseline scenario will not be incurred in case of application of
measure 1. Public tendering for
services contracts with a PSO or space constraints > 5 M€ Table 15 reports the
estimation of number of relevant port services that should be awarded with
public tendering. It is assumed that the tendering cost is to be incurred every
time a contract will be renewed. It is assumed that each
service contract to be procured will generate one off cost to the port managing
body or other relevant administration of 6,000 Euro. The overall cost to the
business is estimated at 18,219 Euro. However, given different
assumptions on the durations of contracts, table 14 provides an estimation of
the annual average cost to be recurrently incurred by different parties for the
tendering procedures. Table 15 – Estimation of the average annual cost to be
incurred for awarding service contracts involving PSO and/or space constraints Port service || Number of contracts awarded with public tendering || Cost per occurance (Euro) || Recurrent average cost (Euro / year) PSO and S. C. contracts || Average duration || Public sector || Businesses || Public sector || Businesses Pilotage inside port area || 141 || 10 || 843.637 || 2.561.731 || 84.364 || 256.173 Pilotage outside port area || 139 || 10 || 834.202 || 2.533.083 || 83.420 || 253.308 Towage inside port area || 194 || 10 || 1.161.972 || 3.528.367 || 116.197 || 352.837 Towage outside port area || 231 || 10 || 1.388.328 || 4.215.705 || 138.833 || 421.570 Mooring || 26 || 5 || 156.785 || 476.083 || 31.357 || 95.217 Dredging inside port area || 186 || 5 || 1.118.258 || 3.395.629 || 223.652 || 679.126 Provision of waste reception facilities || 247 || 20 || 1.479.105 || 4.491.352 || 73.955 || 224.568 Cargo handling ship-shore/stevedoring || 1487 || 25 || 8.919.525 || 27.084.435 || 356.781 || 1.083.377 Cargo handling shore-inland transport || 1616 || 25 || 9.698.760 || 29.450.608 || 387.950 || 1.178.024 Passenger services || 362 || 25 || 2.169.336 || 6.587.260 || 86.773 || 263.490 Bunkering || 75 || 15 || 449.286 || 1.364.273 || 29.952 || 90.952 TOTAL || || || || || 1.613.235 || 4.898.642 Communication from the
Commission on how existing Treaty rules apply in the case of port services For the aim of the
analysis it is assumed that 20% of ports and Member States will on voluntary
basis adopt managing practice in line with the provisions set by measures 1 and
2. Thus it is assumed that the administrative costs to be incurred are 20% of
these expected in case of adoption of measure 1 and 2. Obligation
to have at least 2 operators in case of space constraints - public tendering It has been estimated
that there are 2,826 port services involving space constraints, having a value
higher than 5 million euro. Under this option it is envisaged that in the case
of port services subject to space constraints the port managing body or the MS
needs to assure that there are at least 2 competing and independent operators.
Hence, 2,826 contracts will need to be tendered in addition to these considered
under measure 2. Both the public sector
and the business will face administrative costs for the tendering procedures
connected with the contracts to be awarded. Table 16 provides for an estimation
of the recurrent average annual costs to be incurred by the parties to award
two contracts per each port service presenting space constraints. Table 16 – Estimation of the average annual cost to be
incurred for awarding a second service contract in case of services with space
constraints Port service || Number of additional contracts to be awarded with public tendering || Cost per occurance (Euro) || Recurrent average cost (Euro / year) Space constraints || Average duration (years) || Public sector || Businesses || Public sector || Businesses Pilotage inside port area || 0 || 10 || 0 || 0 || 0 || 0 Pilotage outside port area || 0 || 10 || 0 || 0 || 0 || 0 Towage inside port area || 0 || 10 || 0 || 0 || 0 || 0 Towage outside port area || 0 || 10 || 0 || 0 || 0 || 0 Mooring || 0 || 5 || 0 || 0 || 0 || 0 Dredging inside port area || 0 || 5 || 0 || 0 || 0 || 0 Provision of waste reception facilities || 123 || 20 || 1.479.105 || 4.491.352 || 73.955 || 224.568 Cargo handling ship-shore/stevedoring || 1158 || 25 || 13.901.984 || 42.213.839 || 556.079 || 1.688.554 Cargo handling shore-inland transport || 1259 || 25 || 15.103.200 || 45.861.370 || 604.128 || 1.834.455 Passenger services || 286 || 25 || 3.432.169 || 10.421.894 || 137.287 || 416.876 Bunkering || 0 || 15 || 0 || 0 || 0 || 0 TOTAL || || || || || 1.371.449 || 4.164.452 Public
tendering in case of major contract changes Under this measure it is
expected that both the public sector and the business will anticipate the costs
for part of the tendering procedures. For the aim of the
analysis it is assumed that 1 out of 20 service contracts will need to be
retendered before the end of the contract; furthermore it is assumed that the
retendering will take place on average after 50% of time duration is elapsed. Under this assumption
the administrative costs will increase by 2.5% of the cost for tendering
assumed under measure 2. Confinement
for internal operators of port services No administrative costs
are expected under this measure. Rules on the price of
port services provided in monopolistic position Table 17 provides an
estimation of the number of contracts with exclusive and special rights awarded
to private operators or carried out internally by the port manger or other
public entity. The process for defining
and reviewing the tariffs involves administrative costs to both the public and
the private sector (see par. 1.1). Assuming that the
service tariffs are reviewed every two years, table 16 provides for an
estimation of the annual average cost and the one off costs to be incurred by
the parties. Furthermore it is assumed that one off administrative cost will be
incurred in the first year of application of new rules for the implementation
of the new practice. Table 17 – Estimation of the one off and recurrent annual
cost to be incurred for service tariff setting and or reviewing Port service || Assumption: number of contracts with exclusive or special rights || Recurrent average cost (Euro / year) || One off cost (Euro) || Provided in house || Provided by other public entity || Provided by other operator || Public || Business || Public || Business Pilotage inside port area || 73 || 73 || 201 || 650.024 || 633.196 || 650.024 || 633.196 Pilotage outside port area || 49 || 118 || 199 || 706.816 || 653.091 || 706.816 || 653.091 Towage inside port area || 37 || 2 || 277 || 452.158 || 685.521 || 452.158 || 685.521 Towage outside port area || 18 || 0 || 331 || 461.545 || 785.925 || 461.545 || 785.925 Mooring || 37 || 8 || 37 || 172.650 || 139.508 || 172.650 || 139.508 Dredging inside port area || || || || N/A || N/A || N/A || N/A Provision of waste reception facilities || 80 || 19 || 352 || 711.149 || 929.711 || 711.149 || 929.711 Cargo handling ship-shore/stevedoring || 28 || 14 || 2124 || 2.768.973 || 4.966.634 || 2.768.973 || 4.966.634 Cargo handling shore-inland transport || 15 || 10 || 2309 || 2.954.893 || 5.376.958 || 2.954.893 || 5.376.958 Passenger services || 75 || 14 || 517 || 888.279 || 1.298.409 || 888.279 || 1.298.409 Bunkering || 2 || 5 || 107 || 153.504 || 256.082 || 153.504 || 256.082 TOTAL || || || || 9.919.992 || 15.725.033 || 9.919.992 || 15.725.033 Rules on the price of
port services awarded directly to operators in monopolistic position Table 17 provides an
estimation of the number of services with exclusive and special rights carried
out internally by the port manger or other public entity. The process for defining
and reviewing the tariffs involves administrative costs to both the public and
the private sector (see par.1.1). Assuming that the
service tariffs are reviewed every two years, table 18 provides for an
estimation of the annual average cost and the one off cost to be incurred by
the parties. Furthermore it is assumed that one off administrative costs will
be incurred in the first year of application of new rules for the implementation
of the new practice. Table 18 – Estimation of the one off and recurrent annual
cost to be incurred for service tariff setting and or reviewing Port service || Services provided internaly or by other public entity || Recurrent average cost (Euro / year) || One off costs (Euro) || Public || Business || Public || Business Pilotage inside port area || 145 || 398.942 || 167.991 || 398.942 || 167.991 Pilotage outside port area || 167 || 458.542 || 193.088 || 458.542 || 193.088 Towage inside port area || 39 || 106.333 || 44.776 || 106.333 || 44.776 Towage outside port area || 18 || 48.352 || 20.361 || 48.352 || 20.361 Mooring || 46 || 125.988 || 53.052 || 125.988 || 53.052 Dredging inside port area || || N/A || N/A || N/A || N/A Provision of waste reception facilities || 99 || 270.939 || 114.090 || 270.939 || 114.090 Cargo handling ship-shore/stevedoring || 42 || 114.353 || 48.153 || 114.353 || 48.153 Cargo handling shore-inland transport || 25 || 68.357 || 28.785 || 68.357 || 28.785 Passenger services || 88 || 242.644 || 102.175 || 242.644 || 102.175 Bunkering || 7 || 19.788 || 8.332 || 19.788 || 8.332 TOTAL || || 1.854.237 || 780.802 || 1.854.237 || 780.802 Central Port
Coordination The unit cost per port
to the public sector is expected to be 14,000 Euro / year. The unit cost per
port to the private businesses is estimated to be 7,720 Euro / year. Table 19 – Estimation of the recurrent yearly costs for
central port coordination || N. of ports || Cost to the Public sector (Euro) || Cost to the Businesses (Euro) Central port coordination || 319 || 4.466.000 || 2.462.680 Port users' committee The unit cost of a port
committee to the public sector is assumed to be 5,000 Euro per year. The cost
to the businesses is estimated to be 15,440 Euro per year. Table 20 – Estimation of the recurrent yearly costs for port
users’ committee || N. of ports || Cost to the Public sector (Euro) || Cost to the Businesses (Euro) Port users’ committee || 319 || 797.500 || 4.925.360 Functional separation Table 21 provides an
estimation of the number of services which are carried out internally by the
port managing bodies. Under this measure, these activities are supposed to be
legally separated by the port managing body. All the costs will be
incurred by the port managing body and the newly created legally separated
entities which would be under the economic control of the port managing body.
The recurrent cost to the public sector is assumed to be 50,954 Euro per
occurrence; the one off cost is assumed to be 215,000 Euro. Table 21 – Estimation of the one off and recurrent annual
cost to be incurred for functional separation of in house activities Port service || Provided in house || Recurrent average cost (Euro / year) || One off cost (Euro) || Public sector || Businesses || Public sector || Businesses Pilotage inside port area || 73 || 3.695.944 || 0 || 15.595.006 || 0 Pilotage outside port area || 49 || 2.498.880 || 0 || 10.544.004 || 0 Towage inside port area || 37 || 1.871.710 || 0 || 7.897.667 || 0 Towage outside port area || 18 || 895.908 || 0 || 3.780.276 || 0 Mooring || 37 || 1.902.102 || 0 || 8.025.904 || 0 Dredging inside port area || 146 || 7.423.235 || 0 || 31.322.283 || 0 Provision of waste reception facilities || 80 || 4.058.844 || 0 || 17.126.260 || 0 Cargo handling ship-shore/stevedoring || 28 || 1.412.542 || 0 || 5.960.211 || 0 Cargo handling shore-inland transport || 15 || 738.833 || 0 || 3.117.500 || 0 Passenger services || 75 || 3.804.204 || 0 || 16.051.809 || 0 Bunkering || 2 || 122.213 || 0 || 515.677 || 0 TOTAL || || 28.424.415 || 0 || 119.936.595 || 0 Separation of accounts The one off unit cost to
the public sector for separation of accounts is assumed to be 75,000 Euro. It
is assumed that the large majority of ports will be required to comply with the
new accounting provisions (i.e. 300 out of 319 ports). The businesses will not
incur in any cost. Table 22 – Estimation of the one off cost for separation of
accounts || N. of ports || Cost to the Public sector (Euro) || Cost to the Businesses (Euro) Separation of accounts || 300 || 22.500.000 || 0 Financial transparency
between public and port authorities The unit cost to the
public sector per port is expected to be 2,500 Euro / year. The businesses will
not incur in any cost. As for measure 12, 300 ports are assumed to be required
to comply with the new provisions. Table 23 – Estimation of the recurrent yearly costs for
financial transparency || N. of ports || Cost to the Public sector (Euro / year) || Cost to the Businesses (Euro / year) Financial transparency || 300 || 750.000 || 0 Freedom for individual
ports to set dues The unit cost to the
public sector per port is expected to be 1,250 Euro / year. The businesses will
not incur in any cost. All ports are assumed to be covered by the new
provisions. Table 24 – Estimation of the recurrent yearly costs for
freedom to set port dues || N. of ports || Cost to the Public sector (Euro / year) || Cost to the Businesses (Euro / year) Freedom to set port dues || 319 || 398.750 || 0 Cost-based and
differentiated dues The unit cost to the
public sector per port is expected to be 15,000 Euro every 5 year. The
businesses will not incur in any cost. All ports are assumed to be covered by
the new provisions. Table 25 – Estimation of the recurrent yearly costs for port
dues definition according to cost based rules || N. of ports || Cost to the Public sector (Euro / year) || Cost to the Businesses (Euro / year) Cost-based and differentiated dues || 319 || 957.000 || 0 Enabling variations
based on environmental performance This measure does not
involve additional administrative costs if implemented in conjunction with
measure 14 or 15. Summary of
administrative costs under the baseline scenario Table 26 provides a
comparison of the recurrent administrative costs incurred by the public sector
and the businesses under the baseline scenario and the different policy
scenarios. Table 26 – Estimation of the administrative costs by measure
Measure || Recurrent (Euro / year) || One off (Euro) Public sector || Businesses || Public sector || Businesses 1. Freedom to provide service for "normal services" - no public tendering || -743.671 || -2.258.181 || 0 || 0 1variant. As for M1, but excluding handling operations || -647.033 || -1.964.737 || 0 || 0 2. Public tendering for service contracts with a PSO or space constraints > 5 M€ || 345.337 || 1.048.629 || 0 || 0 2variant. As for M2, but excluding handling operations || 104.712 || 317.962 || 0 || 0 3. Communication from the Commission on how existing Treaty rules apply in the case of port services || 322.647 || 979.728 || 0 || 0 4. Obligation to have at least 2 operators in case of space constraints - public tendering || 1.371.449 || 4.164.452 || 0 || 0 5. Public tendering in case of major contract changes || 40.331 || 122.466 || 0 || 0 5variant. As for M5, but excluding handling operations || 19.543 || 59.344 || 0 || 0 6. Confinement of internal (public) providers of port services || 0 || 0 || 0 || 0 7. Rules on the price of port services provided by operators in monopolistic position || 7.498.608 || 12.767.254 || 9.919.992 || 15.725.033 8. Rules on the price of port services awarded directly to operators in monopolistic position || 1.854.237 || 780.802 || 1.854.237 || 780.802 9. Central Port Coordination || 1.276.000 || 0 || 0 || 0 10. Port users committee || 397.500 || 2.454.960 || 0 || 0 11. Functional separation || 28.424.415 || 0 || 119.936.595 || 0 12. Separation of accounts || 0 || 0 || 22.500.000 || 0 13. Financial transparency between public and port authorities || 750.000 || 0 || 0 || 0 14. Freedom for individual ports to set dues || 398.750 || 0 || 0 || 0 15. Cost-based and differentiated dues || 186.083 || 0 || 0 || 0 16. Enabling variations based on environmental performance || 0 || 0 || 0 || 0 17. Transparency of port due calculation || 0 || 0 || 0 || 0 TOTAL || 41.598.910 || 18.472.680 || 154.210.825 || 16.505.836 Different policy
packages consider different measures which results in different administrative
costs to be incurred. Table 27 and 28 present
the estimations of the additional administrative costs (both recurrent and
one-off) to be incurred respectively by the public sector and the businesses.
These costs incorporate also the costs that would be incurred in case of no
action by the EU. Table 27 –
Estimation of the administrative costs to be incurred under different PPs
against the baseline scenario - Recurrent administrative costs (Euro/year) Measure || PP1 || PP2 || PP2a || PP3 || PP2a variant Public sector || Businesses || Public sector || Businesses || Public sector || Businesses || Public sector || Businesses || Public sector || Businesses 1. Freedom to provide service for "normal services" - no public tendering || 0 || 0 || -743.671 || -2.258.181 || -743.671 || -2.258.181 || -743.671 || -2.258.181 || -647.033 || -1.964.737 2. Public tendering for service contracts with a PSO or space constraints > 5 M€ || 0 || 0 || 345.337 || 1.048.629 || 345.337 || 1.048.629 || 345.337 || 1.048.629 || 104.712 || 317.962 3. Communication from the Commission on how existing Treaty rules apply in the case of port services || 322.647 || 979.728 || 0 || 0 || 0 || 0 || 0 || 0 || 0 || 0 4. Obligation to have at least 2 operators in case of space constraints - public tendering || 0 || 0 || 0 || 0 || 0 || 0 || 1.371.449 || 4.164.452 || 0 || 0 5. Public tendering in case of major contract changes || 0 || 0 || 0 || 0 || 40.331 || 122.466 || 40.331 || 122.466 || 19.543 || 59.344 6. Confinement of internal (public) providers of port services || 0 || 0 || 0 || 0 || 0 || 0 || 0 || 0 || 0 || 0 7. Rules on the price of port services provided by operators in monopolistic position || 7.498.608 || 12.767.254 || 7.498.608 || 12.767.254 || 0 || 0 || 0 || 0 || 0 || 0 8. Rules on the price of port services awarded directly to operators in monopolistic position || 0 || 0 || 0 || 0 || 1.854.237 || 780.802 || 1.854.237 || 780.802 || 1.854.237 || 780.802 9. Central Port Coordination || 0 || 0 || 0 || 0 || 0 || 0 || 1.276.000 || 0 || 0 || 0 10. Port users committee || 397.500 || 2.454.960 || 397.500 || 2.454.960 || 397.500 || 2.454.960 || 0 || 0 || 397.500 || 2.454.960 11. Functional separation || 0 || 0 || 0 || 0 || 0 || 0 || 28.424.415 || 0 || 0 || 0 12. Separation of accounts || 0 || 0 || 0 || 0 || 0 || 0 || 0 || 0 || 0 || 0 13. Financial transparency between public and port authorities || 750.000 || 0 || 0 || 0 || 0 || 0 || 0 || 0 || 0 || 0 14. Freedom for individual ports to set dues || 0 || 0 || 0 || 0 || 398.750 || 0 || 398.750 || 0 || 398.750 || 0 15. Cost-based and differentiated dues || 0 || 0 || 186.083 || 0 || 0 || 0 || 0 || 0 || 0 || 0 16. Enabling variations based on environmental performance || 0 || 0 || 0 || 0 || 0 || 0 || 0 || 0 || 0 || 0 17. Transparency of port due calculation || 0 || 0 || 0 || 0 || 0 || 0 || 0 || 0 || 0 || 0 TOTAL || 8.968.755 || 16.201.943 || 7.683.858 || 14.012.662 || 2.292.485 || 2.148.677 || 32.966.850 || 3.858.168 || 2.127.710 || 1.648.332 Expected one off costs for PP2a and PP2a variant
are the same. Table 28 –
Estimation of the administrative costs to be incurred under different PPs
against the baseline scenario – One off administrative costs (Euro) Measure || PP1 || PP2 || PP2a / PP2a variant || PP3 Public sector || Businesses || Public sector || Businesses || Public sector || Businesses || Public sector || Businesses 1. Freedom to provide service for "normal services" - no public tendering || 0 || 0 || 0 || 0 || 0 || 0 || 0 || 0 2. Public tendering for service contracts with a PSO or space constraints > 5 M€ || 0 || 0 || 0 || 0 || 0 || 0 || 0 || 0 3. Communication from the Commission on how existing Treaty rules apply in the case of port services || 0 || 0 || 0 || 0 || 0 || 0 || 0 || 0 4. Obligation to have at least 2 operators in case of space constraints - public tendering || 0 || 0 || 0 || 0 || 0 || 0 || 0 || 0 5. Public tendering in case of major contract changes || 0 || 0 || 0 || 0 || 0 || 0 || 0 || 0 6. Confinement of internal (public) providers of port services || 0 || 0 || 0 || 0 || 0 || 0 || 0 || 0 7. Rules on the price of port services provided by operators in monopolistic position || 9.919.992 || 15.725.033 || 9.919.992 || 15.725.033 || 0 || 0 || 0 || 0 8. Rules on the price of port services awarded directly to operators in monopolistic position || 0 || 0 || 0 || 0 || 1.854.237 || 780.802 || 1.854.237 || 780.802 9. Central Port Coordination || 0 || 0 || 0 || 0 || 0 || 0 || 0 || 0 10. Port users committee || 0 || 0 || 0 || 0 || 0 || 0 || 0 || 0 11. Functional separation || 0 || 0 || 0 || 0 || 0 || 0 || 119.936.595 || 0 12. Separation of accounts || 0 || 0 || 22.500.000 || 0 || 22.500.000 || 0 || 0 || 0 13. Financial transparency between public and port authorities || 0 || 0 || 0 || 0 || 0 || 0 || 0 || 0 14. Freedom for individual ports to set dues || 0 || 0 || 0 || 0 || 0 || 0 || 0 || 0 15. Cost-based and differentiated dues || 0 || 0 || 0 || 0 || 0 || 0 || 0 || 0 16. Enabling variations based on environmental performance || 0 || 0 || 0 || 0 || 0 || 0 || 0 || 0 17. Transparency of port due calculation || 0 || 0 || 0 || 0 || 0 || 0 || 0 || 0 TOTAL || 9.919.992 || 15.725.033 || 32.419.992 || 15.725.033 || 24.354.237 || 780.802 || 121.790.832 || 780.802 ANNEX X:
Labour issues
in EU ports (Excerpts from the Study on
Port Labour in the EU, Prof Dr Eric Van Hooydonk, 2013) (Excerpts from the OECD Study Ports and Regional Development: A European Perspective, 2013) 1.
Job
categories and employment figures in EU ports Dock workers 1.
In the narrow sense, port labour can be considered narrowly as the
loading or unloading of ships, or broadly, as all forms of cargo handling in a
port zone, including the stuffing and stripping of containers, the loading and
unloading of inland waterway vessels, lorries and railway wagons, the storage
and semi-industrial processing of goods in warehouses and logistics areas, etc.
In ports where port labour is governed by specific regulations or
agreements, employee organisations traditionally try to extend the notion as
widely as possible, while employers' organisations aim to restrict it. Number of port employers and port workers
in the EU by Member State, 2012 Member State || Number of employers || Number of port workers Belgium || Between 50 and 190 || 10,300 Bulgaria || 54 || 4,000 Cyprus || 58 || 342 Denmark || 100 || Between 2,000 and 5,600 Estonia || 17 || 950 Finland || 40 || 2,750 France || 100 || 4,370 Germany || Between 150 and 300 || 15,000 Greece || 30 || 2,500 Ireland || 20 || 677 Italy || Between 214 and400 || Between 11,615 and 18,000 Latvia || 58 || 1,500 Lithuania || 15 || 2,000 Malta || 8 || 1,100 Netherlands || Between 85 and 105 || 7,275 Poland || 423 || 6,000 Portugal || 21 || 796 Romania || 35 || 4,187 Slovenia || 42 || Between 758 and 902 Spain || 159 || 6,500 Sweden || 72 || Between 3,000 and 4,000 United Kingdom || Between 150 and195 || 18,000 Total EU || 1,901-2,442 || 105,620-116,749 2. The term port worker
is generally used to designate blue collar workers engaged in the handling of
goods at docks, quays, wharves or warehouses in ports. It
is a generic term which includes: ·
general
workers (operatives) working on board ship as well as those on land, and ·
specialised
workers such as operators (or drivers) of various types of machinery (also
called winchmen); signalmen (hatchmen, hatch tenders or deck hands); lashers;
tallymen (also called tally clerks or checkers); (gang) foremen, chief tallymen
and chief foremen (supervisors). In
the seaports of the 22 maritime Member States of the European Union, some 2,200
port operators currently employ around 110,000 port workers or 'dockers' who
are engaged in the loading and unloading of ships and a number of ancillary
port-based services such as warehousing and logistics. White
collar port workers 2.
In a more broad sense, since port labour is by definition carried out
within a 'port' or a 'port area', the definition of port labour has an
important geographical dimension. In some ports, all workers in the port area,
including office
staff involved in administration, sales, marketing, information technology,
legal matters, etc. (white collar employees) are considered as being "port
workers". Those
workers work for a broad range of companies established in the port for
providing shipping ancillary services, cargo-related services or logistic
related services. The employment generated by those port activities would total
some 284,000 and 300,000 jobs in the 22 maritime EU Member States (Ecotec study[6],
2006). Workers
in industries located in ports 3.
In the broadest sense, the concept covers all workers employed in
companies established in the port but not necessarily belonging to the
"transport sector". Many European ports are industrial and logistic
centres gathering a broad range of industries, including petro-chemical,
automotive, steel, energy production and distribution, paper mills, food
production companies, firms producing building materials, etc. According
to the European Sea Ports Organisation, the European port sector would
represent more than 10 million jobs in total. 2.
Port
activity as job generator The
economic significance of ports is defined in terms of added value, employment,
business establishments, business dynamics and private investments. Academic
research shows that improvement in port performance generates new jobs and
attracts industrial and commercial firms to the port, creating higher added
value and indirect jobs. Port throughput is positively correlated to employment
in port regions. For
example, OECD studies (2012) indicate that an increase of one million tons of
port throughput is associated with an increase in employment in the port region
of 0.0003%. This means that in a region with one million employees, employment
would increase by 300 units; in the long run this increase would be 7500 units[7].
The figures for indirect and induced port-related employment would be higher,
depending on the multipliers of each individual port region (in the case of
e.g. Hamburg, the multiplier is 1.71, for Rotterdam is 1.13 and for Le Havre / Rouen has been estimated at 1.57)[8].
This
impact is slightly larger on industry than on service employment. These
conclusions are based an evaluation of the impact of port activity on regional
employment in a sample of 560 regions in 10 European countries, 100 of which home
to one or more port, from 2000-06. Liquid
bulk has lower employment impacts than the other cargo categories (dry bulk,
containers, general cargo). If liquid bulk is not included in port throughput
numbers, the employment impact in the region doubles: an increase of one
million tonnes port throughput is then associated with a regional employment
increase of 600 units. This finding confirms the fact that only a few jobs are
needed to handle liquid bulk, due to loading and unloading of a large part of
this bulk by pipelines. The
number of passengers in a port is not correlated to employment in port regions.
It has a positive but not statistically significant effect on regional
employment. This is probably due to the fact that ferry industries handle large
numbers of transit passengers. Private
ports have the largest employment impacts in regions. Their impact per one
million additional tonnes of port throughput is 1000 jobs; this is 550 for
European ports with the “Latin” governance model and 170 for “Hanseatic” ports.
This is rationalised to some extent by the fact that some of these private
ports are located close to the main UK cities or are functional to some local
industries; therefore the results might be influenced by local situations
rather than caused by its governance structure 3.
Labour
and cargo-handling It
is widely accepted that both the day-to-day efficiency and the medium and
long-term dynamics of port competition are strongly influenced by the regime of
port labour. Depending on the type of terminal, port labour represents between
15 and 75 per cent of the operational terminal costs for terminal operators (15
to 20 per cent at dry bulk terminals; between 40 and 75 per cent at general
cargo terminals). Even
in the capital intensive container sector this percentage is believed to reach
50 or even 70 per cent, which explains that the labour factor also determines,
for example, investment decisions on terminal lay-out and equipment. Research
(Notteboom et al, 2010) confirms that labour arrangements can have a tremendous
impact on the proper functioning of ports and on trade flows. Source:
ITMMA 2010 – Dock Labour and port related employment in the EU Seaport System 4.
Sector
specific labour rules for Dockers Traditionally,
port work has been regarded as a low-skilled manual profession. In order to
cope with the irregularity of port traffic and the ensuing fluctuations in
labour demand, the port labour market has in many places been subject to
specific laws, regulations and collective agreements. In
most cases, these rules entail the reservation of temporary labour for a
steadily available complement ('pool') of registered workers who enjoy
unemployment benefit or similar pay when no work is available. Even
if these arrangements take on very different shapes, in 16 out of 22 Member
States (i.e. 73 per cent) access to the port labour market is restricted under
rules which depart from general labour law. In
a considerable number of ports, the specific employment rules are characterised
by restrictions on employment (including priority for registered workers or
recognised workforce suppliers, closed shop situations, strict job
demarcations, mandatory manning scales, restrictions on temporary agency work
and on self-handling) and restrictive working practices. These
restrictions impact negatively on trade, competition and/or employment.
However, the problems do not occur in every Member State or with the same
intensity in all ports. Several States have reformed port labour, while some
ports are completely restriction-free. Moreover, not every registration or pool
system is per se inefficient, and not every restriction goes per se against EU
law. However,
in many cases serious doubts about the compatibility of the national or local
port labour regime with EU law are warranted in the light of available EU and
national case law on internal market and competition rules. In
sum, restrictive pool or registration systems can only be justified under EU
rules if the general interest and especially the social protection of workers
demonstrably require such an exceptional labour market set-up, if the system is
non-discriminatory and fully compatible with human rights, if restrictions on
access to the market for the provision of workforce are proportionate and do no
got beyond what is necessary in order to attain the public interest objective
concerned, and, more specifically, if the system is kept free of any additional
restrictions on employment, restrictive working practices and abuses. Vague
references to social protection or safety objectives which do not explain why
applicable restrictions are indeed necessary will not suffice. EU law allows Member States and social partners to choose between a free and open port labour market or
an efficient and sustainable registration or pool system which is not affected
by restrictive excesses, either in the law or in practice. 5.
Training,
Health and Safety in ports Qualification
and training arrangements are very diverse across the EU. A growing number of
ports and terminals organise sophisticated training programmes but elsewhere
workers are still poorly trained. In a large number of Member States,
certification systems for port workers are in place, even if these are not
always fully operational. A number of recent best practices are available. A
majority of States have enacted specific laws and regulations on health and
safety in port work. Despite signs of considerable improvement in the past
decades, scattered data suggest that the port worker continues to have one of
the most dangerous occupations in the entire EU economy. However, specific
national accident statistics on port labour are only available in a minority of
Member States. 6.
Prospects Seen
from an EU perspective, the port labour market can be described as a market in
transition, with a trend towards the application of general labour law rather
than specific laws and regulations. Opinions on the need to maintain specific
laws and regulations for port labour diverge widely. The
current economic and financial crisis notwithstanding, expectations are that
the coming decades will see further growth in trade and port throughput,
together with a far-reaching innovation in handling technologies and a growing
demand for well-trained and versatile port workers. The
port industry will continue to function as one of the European Union's most
powerful prosperity and job generators. A summary of the
employment impact of ports is presented below, based on the Dutch ports example
during 2002 – 2007. Source: ITMMA
2010 – Dock Labour and port related employment in the EU Seaport System Synopsis of port labour regimes in the EU
(source: Van Hooydonk, 2013) SYNOPSIS OF PORT LABOUR IN EU MEMBER STATES || Prevailing port management model || Seaborne cargo in 2011 in million tonnes || No. of employers of port workers || No. of port workers || Party to ILO C137 || Party to ILO C152 || Lex specialis on employ-ment || Level of port labour- specific CBAs || Registration of port workers || Priority for pool workers || Restrictions on temporary agency work || National qualification system || Lex specialis on OHS || Availability of specific national OHS statistics BE || Landlord || 265 || 50-190 || 1,300 || No || No || Yes || National, port || Yes || Yes || Yes || Yes || Yes || Yes BG || Landlord || 26 || 54 || 4,000 || No || No || Yes || National, company || Yes || No || Yes || Yes || Yes || No CY || Tool || 7 || 58 || 342 || No || Yes || Yes || National || Yes || Yes || Yes || No || Yes || Yes DK || Landlord || 92 || 100 || 2,000-5,600 || No || Yes || No || National, port || No || Yes || Yes || Yes || Yes || No EE || Landlord || 47 || 17 || 950 || No || No || No || None || No || No || No || Yes || No || Yes || Prevailing port management model || Seaborne cargo in 2011 in million tonnes || No. of employers of port workers || No. of port workers || Party to ILO C137 || Party to ILO C152 || Lex specialis on employ-ment || Level of port labour- specific CBAs || Registration of port workers || Priority for pool workers || Restrictions on temporary agency work || National qualification system || Lex specialis on OHS || Availability of specific national OHS statistics FI || Mixed || 110 || 40 || 2,750 || Yes || Yes || No || National, company || Yes || No || Yes || No || Yes || Yes FR || Landlord || 354 || 100 || 4,370 || Yes || Yes || Yes || National, port, company || Yes || Yes || Yes || Yes || No || Yes DE || Landlord || 296 || 150-300 || 15,000 || No || Yes || Yes || National, port, company || Yes || Yes || Yes || Yes || Yes || Yes EL || Mixed || 124 || 30 || 2,500 || No || No || Yes || Company || Yes || Yes || Yes || No || No || No IE || Mixed || 45 || 20 || 677 || No || No || No || Company || No || No || No || No || Yes || Yes IT || Landlord || 478 || 214-400 || 11,615-18,000 || Yes || Yes || Yes || National, company || Yes || Yes || Yes || No || Yes || No LV || Landlord || 69 || 58 || 1,500 || No || No || No || Company || No || No || Yes || No || No || No || Prevailing port management model || Seaborne cargo in 2011 in million tonnes || No. of employers of port workers || No. of port workers || Party to ILO C137 || Party to ILO C152 || Lex specialis on employ-ment || Level of port labour- specific CBAs || Registration of port workers || Priority for pool workers || Restrictions on temporary agency work || National qualification system || Lex specialis on OHS || Availability of specific national OHS statistics LT || Landlord || 45 || 15 || 2,000 || No || No || No || Company || No || No || No || No || Yes || No MT || Landlord || 32 || 8 || 1,100 || No || No || Yes || National, company || Yes || Yes || Yes || No || Yes || No NL || Landlord || 538 || 85-105 || 7,275 || Nor || Yes || No || Company || No || Yes || Yes || No || No || No PL || Landlord || 65 || 423 || 6,000 || Yes || No || No || Company || Yes || No || No || No || No || No PT || Landlord || 67 || 21 || 796 || Yes || No || Yes) || Port || Yes || Yes || Yes || No || No || No RO || Landlord || 40 || 35 || 4,187 || Yes || No || Yes || Company || Yes || No || Yes || Yes || No || No SI || Service || 17 || 42 || 758-902 || No || No || No || Company || No || No || No || No || No || Yes || Prevailing port management model || Seaborne cargo in 2011 in million tonnes || No. of employers of port workers || No. of port workers || Party to ILO C137 || Party to ILO C152 || Lex specialis on employ-ment || Level of port labour- specific CBAs || Registration of port workers || Priority for pool workers || Restrictions on temporary agency work || National qualification system || Lex specialis on OHS || Availability of specific national OHS statistics ES || Landlord || 476 || 159 || 6,500 || Yes || Yes || Yes || National, port || Yes || Yes || Yes || Yes || No || No SE || Mixed || 145 || 72 || 3,000-4,000 || Yes || Yes || No || National, company || No || NO || Yes || No || Yes || Yes UK || Mixed || 519 || 150-195 || 18,000 || No || No || No || Company || No || No || No || Yes || No || No ANNEX XI:
Ports in the
new TEN-T Strategy 1.
New
TEN-T proposal – a multimodal corridor concept The basic aim of the
Trans-European Networks Policy is to remove the bottlenecks, upgrade
infrastructure and streamline cross border transport operations for passengers
and businesses throughout the EU. Its realization will contribute to improving
connections between different modes of transport and to realize the EU's
climate change objectives. On 19th of October 2011
the Commission adopted[9]
a new proposal for the development of the Trans-European Transport Network
(TEN-T). The aim of the new proposal is to transform the existing patchwork of
European roads, railways, airports and canals into a unified transport network
(TEN-T). The new policy concentrates on a much smaller and more tightly defined
transport network for Europe. The aim is to focus
spending on a smaller number of projects where real EU added value can be
realised. The new policy followed by a two-year consultation process assumes
that the TEN-T will be developed gradually by implementing a dual-layer
approach. It means that two layers of the TEN-T are established: a core
network and a comprehensive network. Both layers include all
transport modes: road, rail, inland waterways, air and maritime transport, as
well as intermodal platforms. The comprehensive
network constitutes the basic layer of the TEN-T. It consists of all existing
and planned infrastructure of the TEN-T. The complete comprehensive network is
planned to be in place by 31 December 2050 at the latest. It will ensure full
coverage of the EU and accessibility of all regions in the Union, including
remote and the outermost regions. The core network
overlays the comprehensive network and consists of the strategically most
important parts of the TEN-T. It constitutes the backbone of the development of
a multimodal transport network. It concentrates on those components of the
TEN-T with the highest European added value: cross border missing links, key
bottlenecks and multimodal nodes. The core network is planned to be completed
by 31 December 2030 at the latest. The core network design
process included two steps: -
In
the first step main nodes were identified: urban main nodes, comprising all
Member States' capitals and all other large urban areas or conurbations,
including the ports and airports directly belonging to the urban node. Outside
these urban main nodes, ports which exceed a certain volume threshold or fulfil
certain geographical criteria. The most relevant border crossing points: one
per mode between each Member State and each neighbouring country. -
The
second step involved connecting these main nodes via multimodal links (road,
rail, inland waterway). Some links already exist while in some cases the
problems are bottlenecks or lack of links. 2.
The
TEN-T "core network" The future core
network proposed by the EC will comprise of 83 main European ports with
rail and road links, 37 key airports with rail connections into major cities,
15,000 km of railway line upgraded to high speed, 35 cross border projects to
reduce bottlenecks. Rail, road and inland waterway connections between these
nodes will carry traffic flows of the highest strategic importance. In order to facilitate
the implementation of the core network, the ‘corridor approach’ will be used.
This instrument will help to coordinate and synchronise different projects on a
transnational basis. Within the core network, 10 corridors have been
established. Core network corridors shall involve at least three transport
modes and at least three Member States. Each Member State participates in at
least one corridor. They cover the most important cross-border long-distance
flows in the core network. In duly justified cases the core network corridor
may involve only two transport modes. If possible, core
network corridors should be connected with a maritime port. Core network
corridors should facilitate modal integration and interoperability and lead to
coordinated development and management of infrastructure. Multimodal
infrastructure within core network corridors shall be built and coordinated,
wherever needed, in a way that optimises the use of each transport mode and
their cooperation. The core network corridors shall support the comprehensive
deployment of interoperable traffic management systems. European Coordinators
will chair the corridor platforms. The European Coordinator will be designated
by the Commission, after consultation with the Member States concerned and the
European Parliament. The European Coordinator will lead the coordinated
implementation of the core network corridor. 3.
Connecting
Europe Facility: the EC’s instrument to finance the TEN-T The ‘Connecting Europe
Facility’ (CEF) is a financing tool for investing in transport, energy and ICT
infrastructure proposed by the European Commission for the budgetary period
2014-2020. For the first time, the Commission is proposing a single funding
instrument for the three network sectors. The ‘Connecting Europe Facility’ is
to finance projects which fill the missing links in Europe's energy, transport
and digital backbone. The total budget of the
Connecting Europe Facility is EUR 50 billion. EUR 31.7 billion is dedicated to
the transport sector, the digital services sector will receive EUR 9.2 billion
and the energy sector will receive EUR 9.1 billion. The funds allocated to the
transport sector include EUR 10 billion from the Cohesion Fund, set aside for
transport projects in cohesion countries; the remaining EUR 21.7 billion will
be available to all Member States for transport infrastructure investments. 80% of the money
allocated to the transport sector under the Connecting Europe Facility will be
used to support two categories of projects: core network projects and
horizontal projects. The remaining funding may be made available for ‘ad hoc’
projects, including projects on the comprehensive network. Core network
projects include priority projects along the 10 multimodal corridors on the
core network. Funding will also be available for some other projects of high
European added value on the core network. It will be up to Member
States to submit detailed proposals of investment to the Commission and the
precise level of EU funding will depend on the details of the national
proposals. No road projects will be financed by the CEF budget with the
exception of projects that create safe parking areas and road traffic
management systems. 4.
Core
and comprehensive TEN-T Ports In the new strategy for
a European TEN-T core network, seaports constitute a strategic access point for
multimodal networks. Together with other nodal points such as inland ports and
airports, seaports are put in a central position of the Trans-European
Transport Network. Seaports have a vital role to play within the TEN-T, by
increasing the efficiency of the whole European transport system. Seaports together with
adequate infrastructure connections are vital for European industry and inland
and external trade development. Furthermore, seaports’ good connections with
rail and road infrastructure can contribute to the elimination of bottlenecks
along the main transport corridors. Seaports as a connection
point for the shipment of goods and passengers between land and maritime means
of transport also play crucial a role in the development of intermodal
transport, which is an essential component of a common policy on sustainable
mobility. In sum, the new strategy
aims at the sustainable development of European seaports by promoting industry
efficiency, the reduction of the negative impact on the environment and the
integration of seaports within the entire chain of transports. The current TEN-T
proposal includes 83 ports in the core network and 236 ports in the
comprehensive network (319 ports in total). Nearly all multimodal corridors
feature connections with maritime ports. Ports which are part of
the comprehensive network shall meet at least one of the following
criteria: -
The
total annual passenger traffic volume exceeds 0.1% of the total annual
passenger traffic volume of all maritime ports of the Union. The reference
amount for this total volume is the latest available three-year average, based
on the statistics published by Eurostat. -
The
total annual cargo throughput – either for bulk or for non-bulk cargo handling
– exceeds 0.1% of EU total. The reference amount for this total volume is the
latest available three-year average, based on the statistics published by
Eurostat. -
The
maritime port is located on an island and provides the sole point of access to
a NUTS 3 region in the comprehensive network. -
The
maritime port is located in an outermost region or a peripheral area, outside a
radius of 200 km from the nearest other port in the comprehensive network. As far as the
core network is concerned, the following seaports should be included: a.
Seaports
belonging to a primary city node (e.g.: Lisbon, Naples, and Bordeaux). b.
Other
seaports with an annual throughput > 1% of the EU total. c.
The
largest seaport per each NUTS 1 region with access to the sea, for each
continuous coastline. The list of
the 83 "core ports" (Annex II.2 of the Commission's proposal
COM(2011)650 final/2 of 19.12.2011) is given in annex. Seaports included in the
comprehensive network should be connected by railway lines, road and if
possible barge; they should offer at least one terminal open to all operators
in a non-discriminatory way and have equipment to ensure environmental
performance of ships in ports (in particular port reception facilities). With respect to
seaports, attention should be paid to three vital projects: promoting short sea
shipping, including Motorways of the Sea, interconnection of seaports with
inland waterways, implementation of VTMIS and e-Maritime services. 5.
TEN-T
port statistics The 83 seaports included
into the TEN-T core network handle approximately 70% of the cargo passing
through all EU seaports. The greatest number of core seaports (24) is
concentrated within the Mediterranean Sea region. These seaports account
for 58.4% of the throughput of all seaports within the EU Mediterranean Sea
region. Half of those ports are located along the coastline of Italy. This can be explained by taking into consideration the fact that Italian seaports
handle the greatest volume of cargo within the Mediterranean Sea region (494.1
million tonnes) which accounts for about 48.3% of the total seaports’ turnover
in the region. Additionally, Italy has the largest number of seaports handling
at least 1 million tonnes of cargo. Spain has also a large number of core
seaports along its Mediterranean coast (7). The rest of the core seaports are
located in Greece (4), France (1) and Slovenia (1). Along the UK and Irish coast 17 seaports/group of seaports are included in the TEN-T core network (3 in Ireland and 14 in the UK). All of these seaports are responsible for 64% of the cargo handled in UK and Irish seaports. In the North West
Continent region (i.e. North Sea part of Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium, North Sea part of France) core seaports are distributed quite equally. The table below shows
the total seaports' throughput and of core seaports by EU region:[10] Region || EU countries included || Total seaports throughput [mln tonnes] || Share in total EU ports throughput || Number of core seaports* || Share of core seaports in total throughput of the seaports in the region North West continent region || North Sea part of Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium, North Sea part of France || 1151.5 || 31.7% || 13 || 89.7% Mediterranean Sea region || Greece, Slovenia, Italy, Malta, Cyprus, Mediterranean parts of France and Spain || 1023.9 || 28.2% || 24 || 58.4% Baltic Sea region || Baltic Sea part of Germany, Poland, Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, Finland, Denmark, Sweden || 629.4 || 17.3% || 18 || 57.8% UK & Ireland || UK and Ireland || 557.0 || 15.3% || 17 || 64.0% Atlantic Ocean region || Atlantic parts of France and Spain, Portugal || 208.3 || 5.8% || 9 || 79.3% Black Sea region || Bulgaria, Romania || 61.0 || 1.7% || 2 || 70.8% Total || All || 3631.1 || 100% || 83 || 70.5% * COM proposal Oct 2011
(Group of seaports under a single port authority are treated as one sea port) Each country has 3 to 4
core seaports/group of seaports. All of these seaports together account for
almost 90% of the total throughput of seaports in this region. Along the EU
Atlantic coast, 9 seaports are included in the TEN-T core network (4 in Spain,
3 in Portugal, 2 in France). These ports handle approximately 79% of the cargo
passing through EU Atlantic seaports. List of nodes of the core network:
Maritime ports COM(2011)650 of 19.10.2011 BELGIUM Antwerpen Gent Oostende, Zeebrugge BULGARIA Burgas DENMARK Århus Københavns Havn GERMANY Bremerhaven, Bremen Hamburg Lübeck Rostock Wilhelmshaven ESTONIA Tallinn IRELAND Cork Dublin Limerick GREECE Igoumenitsa Patras Pireus Thessaloniki SPAIN Algeciras Barcelona Bilbao Cartagena Gijón A Coruña Las Palmas Palma de Mallorca Sevilla Tarragona || Valencia FRANCE Bordeaux Calais, Dunkerque Le Havre Marseille Nantes Saint-Nazaire Rouen ITALY Ancona Bari Genova Gioia Tauro La Spezia Livorno Napoli Palermo Ravenna Taranto Trieste Venezia CYPRUS Lemesos LATVIA Rīga Ventspils LITHUANIA Klaipėda MALTA Valletta, Marsaxlokk THE NETHERLANDS Amsterdam Rotterdam Terneuzen, Vlissingen POLAND Gdánsk, Gdynia Świnoujście, Szczecin || PORTUGAL Leixões (Porto) Lisboa Sines ROMANIA Constanța SLOVENIA Koper FINLAND Helsinki Kotka, Hamina Turku SWEDEN Göteborg Luleå Malmö Stockholm Trelleborg UNITED KINGDOM Belfast Bristol Cardiff, Newport Dover Felixstowe Forth (Edinburgh) Glasgow Grimsby, Immingham Liverpool London Southampton, Portsmouth Tees and Hartlepool ANNEX XII:
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Glossary Cargo handling operations involve
marshalling services (receipt, storage, assembly and sorting of cargo in
preparation for delivery to a ship's berth) and stevedoring services (loading
and unloading of cargo from ships). Confinement means that a port authority that
decides to operate a specific service themselves (in-house) is not allowed to
offer this service outside its own port. The port authority service provision
is thus confined (limited) to the own port under its control. Deep sea shipping refers to the maritime
transport of goods in intercontinental routes, crossing oceans; Dredging involves collecting and
bringing up, fishing up or clearing away or out material and/or any object from
the bed of a river, sea, etc.; transporting it to the relocation site and
unloading the material or object. The purpose for dredging can be maintenance
of the depth or the deepening of navigation accesses or channels; it can also
be land reclamation, coastal protection, seabed stabilisation for the offshore
energy installations or the removal of contaminated sediments; Feeder Services are transport operations
in which cargoes are shipped by water in smaller vessels to/from a load-centre
port for loading to or unloading from larger ocean-going vessels. Feeder
services are usually linked to the "hub and spoke" logistic
distribution model. Hub-and-Spoke is a cargo distribution
model which drives shipping companies to consolidate shipments on the large
scale at major terminals (i.e., hub) and to redistribute the smaller scale of
shipments to their respective destinations via radial links (i.e., spoke). The
model is of particular importance for containers trades. Managing body of the port
or port authority means a body which administer and manage the port
infrastructures, and the coordination and, where appropriate, the control of
the activities of the operators present in the port or port system concerned.
It may consist of several separate bodies or be responsible for more than one
port; Mooring is a service provided
by specialised boatmen companies securing or confining a vessel in a particular
station, as by cables and anchors or by a line or chain run to the wharf. Other Ancillary (or general) services provided in
many ports include bunkering, chandlering, ship repair, container maintenance,
marine appraisals, insurance claims inspections, banking, etc.; Passenger services: services
provided in passenger terminals in ports, of particular importance for ferry
crossings (islands' traffic, Channel and straits crossings, North and Baltic
Sea inter-city connections); Pilotage services means
services to ships offered by a maritime pilot. Such services include but are
not restricted to: deep-sea pilotage; coastal pilotage; sea pilotage (from sea
to port or vice versa); shore-based pilotage; river, canal, docking and harbour
pilotage. A maritime pilot is either a deep-sea pilot or any other maritime
pilot who is authorized by the competent authority to carry out pilotage
services in a designated area, and who holds appropriate documentation issued
by the competent authority. Port dues (also referred to as port
infrastructure charges) are charges by a port
authority to a vessel for each harbour entry, usually on a per gross tonnage
basis. The usual justification of port dues is the need to cover the costs of
basic port infrastructure and marine facilities including equipment such as
buoys, beacons, and vessel traffic management system. Port system means two or more ports in the same
geographical area and managed by a single managing body; Ro-Ro means Roll-on Roll-off vessels:
these are the typical ferry vessels where cars and truck drive on and off by
means of a ramp. This is also uses for car carriers, to avoid wasting time by
having to hoist the cars, trucks, busses or other vehicles in the sips. Seaport or port means an area
of land and water made up of such works and equipment as to permit,
principally, the reception of ships, their loading and unloading, the storage
of goods, the receipt and delivery of these goods, and the embarkation and
disembarkation of passengers; Self-handling entails companies employing
personnel of their own choice for handling cargoes in ports. In several EU
Member States, handling of cargoes in ports can be done only by registered dock
workers, usually working as autonomous "pools" within the port; Short-sea shipping means the
movement of cargo and passengers by sea between ports situated in geographical
Europe or between those ports and ports situated in non-European countries
having a coastline on the enclosed seas bordering Europe. Towage is a service provided
by tug boats which move larger ships that either should not or cannot power
themselves. Usually, towage companies are private companies that operate in the
port by means of an authorisation of the port authority. In some cases, towage
operators are owned by the State; Waste reception services: in the EU,
the provision of ship waste reception facilities in ports is an obligation
stemming from Directive 2000/59/EC; waste reception facilities can be operated
as a commercial service or as a public service provided by the port. [1] Comprehensive TEN-T: The total annual passenger traffic volume
exceeds 0,1 % of the total annual passenger traffic volume of all maritime
ports of the Union and/or The total annual cargo volume – either for bulk or
for non-bulk cargo handling – exceeds 0,1% of the corresponding total annual
cargo volume handled in all maritime ports of the Union. The reference amount
for this total volume is the three-year average2008-2009-2010 based on the
statistics published by Eurostat. [2] PwC, London Economics and Ecorys, Public procurement in Europe, Cost
and effectiveness, Prepared for the European Commission, March 2011 [3] Ibidem. [4] Measurement data and analysis, Priority Area Annual
Accounts/Company Law, EU Project On Baseline Measurement and Reduction of
Administrative Costs, February 2009 [5] Directive 2000/59/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council
of 27 November 2000 on port reception facilities for ship-generated waste and
cargo residues. [6] http://ec.europa.eu/maritimeaffairs/documentation/studies/documents/summary_report_en.pdf [7] See OECD (2012) Report "Ports and Regional Development: a
European Perspective" http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/5k92z71jsrs6-en [8] See OECD (2012) papers on "The Competitiveness of Global Port
Cities" [9] For a detailed presentation of the TEN-T & Connecting Europe,
see http://ec.europe.eu/transport [10] Source: Baltic Ports
Organization Secretariat (2012) in the context of the TransBaltic project. See:
http://www.transbaltic.eu/wp-content/uploads/2012/05/New-TEN-T-guidelines-proposal-implications-for-the-port-sector-in-the-Baltic-Sea-region.pdf