1.

Sustainability and Effectiveness of Support provided through previous Joint Actions and Council Decisions;

2.

Strengthening of States’ Indigenous Nuclear Security Support Infrastructures;

3.

Strengthening of States’ Legislative and Regulatory Frameworks;

4.

Strengthening of Nuclear Security Systems and Measures for Nuclear and other Radioactive Materials;

5.

Strengthening of States’ Institutional Infrastructures and Capabilities to Deal with Nuclear and Radioactive Materials out of Regulatory Control;

6.

Supporting awareness of and Strengthening States’ response and resilience to Cyber-Crime impacting Nuclear Security;

7.

Laboratory capability addressing nuclear-related cyber-crime.

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An evaluation, carried out by the IAEA, of recipient State needs to strengthen the nuclear security in the countries concerned using the methodology and criteria developed under Decision 2010/585/CFSP. Such evaluation will cover relevant criteria of all seven areas mentioned above.

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To use the results of an overall evaluation and other pertinent considerations as a basis for selecting the States in which projects will be implemented.

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Provision of an overview of the evaluation results for nuclear security support in recipient States, both at the level of the State and at individual facilities, locations, transports or other applications in which nuclear and radioactive material are used or stored including infrastructure to deal with material out of regulatory control.

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For all seven areas mentioned above, recipient States and projects will be identified and a list of proposed recipient States and recipients in reserve (second priority) to receive support under this Decision will be provided.

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To contribute to global efforts to achieve worldwide, effective security wherever nuclear or other radioactive material is in use, in storage and/or being transported, and of associated facilities by supporting States, upon request, in their efforts to establish and maintain effective nuclear security through assistance in capacity building, guidance, human resources development, sustainability and risk reduction.

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To assist with adherence to, and implementation of, international legal instruments related to nuclear security, and to strengthen international cooperation and coordination of assistance provided through bilateral programmes and other international initiatives in a manner which would also contribute to enabling the safe, secure and peaceful use of nuclear energy and such applications with radioactive substances.

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To identify recipient States by bringing together the results of evaluation missions and existing IAEA information and through discussions between the State and the IAEA.

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To ensure the sustainability, continued effectiveness and impact provided under previous Joint Actions and Council Decisions, including through technical systems, human capacity and consolidation or repatriation activities.

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Leverage of the benefits from international, regional and national support and activities to provide quality human resource, technical and scientific support through efficient use of resources.

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Evaluation of the sustainability, effectiveness and impact of tasks which were implemented through previous Joint Actions and Council Decisions.

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Development and provision of a quality assurance system including its testing and pilot implementation for States having received nuclear security support.

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Identification of further assistance that would be required to maintain or ensure sustainability of the nuclear security improvements that were intended.

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Provision of support to sustain functioning equipment and competent staff, through further assistance to institutionalise indigenous capability to maintain equipment, repair malfunctioning equipment or replace damaged components, as well as to ensure as much as possible the involvement of States in regional capacity-building efforts.

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Reliable access to competent staff through provision of training and education.

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To develop and to review, in cooperation and coordination with the appropriate State authorities and other EU initiatives, a national Integrated Nuclear Security Support Plan (INSSP), and conduct Advisory Missions as a basis of enhancing nuclear security in the State.

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To assist States in ensuring the availability of indigenous technical and scientific support, and the development of human resources which is necessary for effective, sustainable nuclear security.

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Development or review of national INSSPs tailored to the State’s specific comprehensive needs and identifying findings and recommendations to enhance security in the State.

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Coordination of activities related to the establishment of national NSSC with current and future EU CBRN Centres of Excellence and other relevant activities in the appropriate regions.

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Provision of equipment and expert services to support the establishment of national NSSCs, fostering of an appropriate nuclear security culture and facilitation of the use of lessons learned and best practices for continuous improvement and application to a broader CBRN perspective.

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To strengthen the national legislative and regulatory frameworks, as well as the capacity of States to develop regional best practice exchanges, as they apply to any authority involved in the security of nuclear and other radioactive materials either under regulatory control or out of regulatory control.

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To provide States with cost-effective means to assist them in fulfilling national, regional and international obligations, the enactment of binding and international legal instruments, including Safeguards Agreements and Additional Protocols, and a commitment to non-binding legal instruments.

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Generate an increased number of States that have embarked on the development and adoption of comprehensive and coherent legislation at the national level, covering nuclear security, safeguards, safety, and liability for nuclear damage, including those based on synergies with the actions implemented by the Union through other instruments such as the Instrument for Nuclear Safety Cooperation and the Instrument for Pre-Accession, and encourage the inclusion of nuclear security as a major consideration for States expressing an interest in launching a nuclear power programme.

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Provide expert advice through the provision of IAEA appraisal services, e.g. International Nuclear Security Service (INSServ), International Physical Protection Advisory Service (IPPAS), Integrated Nuclear Infrastructure Review Mission (INIR), Integrated Regulatory Review Service (IRRS), International SSAC Advisory Service (ISSAS) and other advisory services as well as equipment and training indicated by the documented results.

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Increase in the number of States that adhere to the CPPNM and its Amendment and/or have declared their intention to implement the international legal instruments supporting the nuclear security framework.

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Strengthened national regulatory infrastructures for radiation safety and security of radioactive materials in line with the Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources and the Guidance on the Import and Export of Radioactive Sources.

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Strengthened national legislative frameworks for the implementation of Safeguards Agreements and Additional Protocols concluded between States and the IAEA, in particular regarding the implementation of a comprehensive State System of Accounting for and Control of Nuclear Material (SSAC).

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To strengthen a State’s first line of defence in the form of security for nuclear and other radiological materials, and their associated facilities and transport systems.

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To locate and identify radioactive sources in circumstances which indicate a need to condition the sources and transport them to safe and secure places of storage in the selected countries, including repatriation to the country of origin or supplier.

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To strengthen technical and administrative systems implemented for accounting and control of nuclear materials, including the strengthening of existing SSACs, established for the implementation of Safeguards Agreements and Additional Protocols, including in States with limited nuclear programmes, and reduced reporting obligations according to so called ‘small quantities protocols’ to their safeguards agreements.

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To strengthen or, where applicable, to establish national registries of radioactive substances, materials and sources in the selected States.

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Implementation of physical protection measures with regard to nuclear materials at selected nuclear facilities and locations and to radioactive sources in non-nuclear applications (e.g. medical or industrial use, or radioactive waste), including through enhanced regional best practice exchanges, where appropriate.

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Reduction of risk from radioactive sources in vulnerable circumstances through more effective physical protection or, as appropriate, dismantling and transport to safe and secure places of storage in a State or in other selected States.

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Reduction of the number of radioactive sources in uncontrolled and unprotected circumstances through the support of national search and secure campaigns in selected States.

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Establishment and maintenance of effective technical and administrative systems to account for, and control, nuclear material security, including through establishing new and/or through strengthening existing SSACs capable of implementing Safeguards Agreements and Additional Protocols, including in States with ‘small quantities protocols’.

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Trained staff in States eligible to receive support, to increase the likelihood of implementing and sustaining an effective physical protection regime.

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Implementation of institutional infrastructure for managing material out of regulatory control.

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Development and implementation of national nuclear security detection architecture.

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Establishing an effective, indigenous radiological crime scene management capacity and identification of an efficient, cost-effective nuclear forensics option (where feasible, findings to be also made available to other countries of the respective region).

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To ensure that States have available the necessary technical support and human resource capacity to enhance national cyber security programmes against emerging threats that may have an impact on the national nuclear security, by using state of practice technologies for implementing cyber prevention, detection and recovery operations.

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To strengthen technical and administrative systems for protection from criminal cyber activities against critical infrastructure targets that include nuclear and other radioactive materials, and their associated facilities and transport activities.

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To develop national networks that promote information sharing and response assistance for cross-border issues related to cyber security.

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Establishment of effective national technical and administrative network systems for the prevention, detection, and response to cyber-attacks.

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Improvement of the regional and international information systems’ sharing of information on cyber-crime activities with regard to current and emerging threats.

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Improvement of collaboration between States in apprehension and prosecution with regard to cyber-crime events.

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Installation of instruments for the reduction of the ‘consequential cost’ of cyber-crime in States in terms of direct and indirect cost due to intellectual property compromise, response costs, and recovery costs.

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Strengthening of national nuclear security regimes through a reduction in cyber-crime activities and threats.

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Improvement of the partnership with, and between, industry partners in developing technologies and services that provide a higher level of defence and resilience against cyber-crime.