| Uradni list Evropske unije | SL | Serija L | Official Journal of the European Union | EN | L series |
| 2024/2467 | 30.9.2024 | 2024/2467 | 30.9.2024 |
| SKLEP KOMISIJE (EU) 2024/2467 | COMMISSION DECISION (EU) 2024/2467 |
| z dne 13. februarja 2024 | of 13 February 2024 |
| o ukrepih državne pomoči SA.52162 (2019/C) (ex 2018/FC) – Danska in SA.52617 (2019/C) (ex 2018/FC) – Švedska, ki sta ju Danska in Švedska izvedli za konzorcij Øresundsbro Konsortiet | on the measures State aid SA.52162 (2019/C) (ex 2018/FC) – Denmark and State aid SA.52617 (2019/C) (ex 2018/FC) – Sweden implemented by Denmark and Sweden for Øresundsbro Konsortiet |
| (notificirano pod dokumentarno številko C(2024) 959) | (notified under document C(2024) 959) |
| (Besedilo v angleškem jeziku je edino verodostojno) | (Only the English text is authentic) |
| (Besedilo velja za EGP) | (Text with EEA relevance) |
| EVROPSKA KOMISIJA JE – | THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION, |
| ob upoštevanju Pogodbe o delovanju Evropske unije (PDEU) in zlasti prvega pododstavka člena 108(2) Pogodbe, | Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (‘TFEU’), and in particular the first subparagraph of Article 108(2) thereof, |
| ob upoštevanju Sporazuma o Evropskem gospodarskem prostoru in zlasti člena 62(1)(a) Sporazuma, | Having regard to the Agreement on the European Economic Area, and in particular Article 62(1)(a) thereof, |
| po pozivu vsem zainteresiranim stranem, naj predložijo pripombe v skladu z navedeno določbo (1), in ob upoštevanju teh pripomb, | Having called on interested parties to submit their comments pursuant to the provisions (1) cited and having regard to their comments, |
| ob upoštevanju naslednjega: | Whereas: |
| 1. POSTOPEK | 1. PROCEDURE |
| 1.1 Uradna pritožba | 1.1. The formal complaint |
| (1) | Družba ForSea (2) (v nadaljnjem besedilu: pritožnik) je 16. aprila 2013 pri Komisiji vložila pritožbo, v kateri je trdila, da državni poroštvi, ki sta ju Danska in Švedska (v nadaljnjem besedilu skupaj: državi) odobrili v korist konzorcija Øresundsbro Konsortiet I/S (v nadaljnjem besedilu: konzorcij) v zvezi s stalno povezavo čez ožino Øresund (v nadaljnjem besedilu: stalna povezava), pomenita nezakonito državno pomoč in da navedena državna pomoč ni združljiva z notranjim trgom (3). Pritožnik opravlja trajektne storitve med Helsingørjem na Danskem in Helsingborgom na Švedskem prek severnega in najožjega dela ožine Øresund. | (1) | On 16 April 2013, ForSea (2) (the ‘Complainant’) filed a complaint with the Commission alleging that the State guarantees granted by Denmark and Sweden (together, the ‘States’) in favour of Øresundsbro Konsortiet I/S (the ‘Consortium’) in respect of the Øresund Fixed Link (the ‘Fixed Link’) constitute unlawful State aid, and that that State aid is incompatible with the internal market. (3) The Complainant operates a ferry service between Helsingør, Denmark, and Helsingborg, Sweden across the northern, and narrowest part of the Øresund strait. |
| (2) | Komisija je 13. maja 2013 državama poslala zahtevo za informacije. Državi sta predložili skupni odgovor, evidentiran 28. junija 2013. Komisija je 15. oktobra 2013 zahtevala dodatne informacije, državi pa sta na to zahtevo odgovorili 11. decembra 2013 in 12. marca 2014. | (2) | The Commission sent a request for information to the States on 13 May 2013. The States submitted a joint reply, registered on 28 June 2013. The Commission requested additional information on 15 October 2013, to which the States replied on 11 December 2013 and 12 March 2014. |
| (3) | Pritožnik je 2. decembra 2013 predložil dodatne informacije. Z dopisom z dne 8. januarja 2014 je predložil dodatno dokumentacijo o državnih poroštvih in trdil, da konzorcij ni imel koristi samo od poroštev, ampak tudi od ugodnega sistema obdavčitve na Danskem (4). Komisija je po tem, ko je pritožnik predložil stališča, 21. februarja 2014 državama poslala zahtevo za informacije. Švedska je 11. marca 2014 Komisijo obvestila, da nima pripomb glede domnevnih davčnih ugodnosti. Danska je odgovor predložila 24. aprila 2014. | (3) | On 2 December 2013, the Complainant submitted additional information. By letter of 8 January 2014, the Complainant submitted further documentation on the State guarantees and alleged that, in addition to the guarantees, the Consortium also benefited from a favourable taxation regime in Denmark. (4) Following the Complainant’s submission, the Commission sent a request for information to the States on 21 February 2014. On 11 March 2014, Sweden informed the Commission that it had no comments on the alleged tax advantages. Denmark submitted its reply on 24 April 2014. |
| (4) | Komisija je 15. maja 2014 Danski poslala dodatno zahtevo za informacije, na katero je Danska odgovorila 13. junija 2014. | (4) | On 15 May 2014, the Commission sent another request for information to Denmark, to which it replied on 13 June 2014. |
| (5) | Pritožnik je 24. marca ter 2., 3., 24. in 28. aprila 2014 predložil dodatne informacije v obliki letnega poročila konzorcija, časopisnih člankov in obvestila o domnevnih davčnih ugodnostih. Komisija navedenih dodatnih informacij ni posredovala Danski ali Švedski. | (5) | On 24 March, and on 2, 3, 24, and 28 April 2014, the Complainant submitted additional information in the form of an annual report of the Consortium, press articles and a note on the alleged tax advantages. The Commission did not forward those submissions to Denmark or Sweden. |
| (6) | Pritožnik je 20. maja 2014 predložil dodatne informacije. Komisija je 4. junija 2014 državi pozvala, naj predložita pripombe na stališča, ki jih je pritožnik predložil 20. maja 2014. Državi sta 26. junija 2014 predložili skupen odgovor. | (6) | On 20 May 2014, the Complainant submitted further information. On 4 June 2014, the Commission invited the States to provide comments on the Complainant’s submission of 20 May 2014. The States submitted a joint reply on 26 June 2014. |
| (7) | Pritožnik je 30. maja ter 3. in 17. junija 2014 predložil dodatne informacije v zvezi s časopisnimi članki. Komisija navedenih dodatnih informacij ni posredovala Danski ali Švedski. | (7) | On 30 May, and on 3 and 17 June 2014, the Complainant submitted further information related to press articles. The Commission did not forward those submissions to Denmark or Sweden. |
| (8) | Pritožnik je 18. junija 2014 predložil dopolnilne informacije. Komisija je 30. junija 2014 navedene dopolnilne informacije posredovala državama. Državi sta 1. septembra 2014 predložili skupen odgovor. | (8) | On 18 June 2014, the Complainant submitted supplementary information. On 30 June 2014, the Commission forwarded that submission to the States. On 1 September 2014, the States submitted a joint reply. |
| (9) | Pritožnik je 27. avgusta ter ponovno 8. in 9. septembra 2014 predložil dodatne informacije v zvezi s časopisnimi članki. Komisija navedenih dodatnih informacij ni posredovala Danski ali Švedski. | (9) | On 27 August, and again on 8 and 9 September 2014, the Complainant submitted additional information related to press articles. The Commission did not forward those submissions to Denmark or Sweden. |
| (10) | Državi sta 15. septembra 2014 predložili skupno izjavo in dodatne informacije. | (10) | On 15 September 2014, the States submitted a joint statement and additional information. |
| 1.2 Sklep iz leta 2014 | 1.2. The 2014 decision |
| (11) | Komisija je 15. oktobra 2014 sprejela sklep (5) (v nadaljnjem besedilu: sklep iz leta 2014), v katerem je ugotovila, prvič, da se javno financiranje cestnih in železniških povezav med zaledjem in stalno povezavo in danski sistem skupne obdavčitve ne bi smela šteti za državno pomoč v smislu člena 107(1) PDEU. Drugič, odločila se je, da ne bo nasprotovala danskim posebnim davčnim ukrepom za amortizacijo sredstev in prenos izgub v prihodnje obdobje ter poroštvom, ki jih je Danska odobrila konzorciju, ker so bili navedeni ukrepi, čeprav pomenijo državno pomoč v smislu člena 107(1) PDEU, združljivi z notranjim trgom na podlagi člena 107(3), točka (b), PDEU. V istem sklepu je menila, da poroštvo, ki ga je konzorciju odobrila Švedska, pomeni obstoječo pomoč v smislu člena 1(b), točka (i), Uredbe Sveta (ES) št. 659/1999 (6) (v nadaljnjem besedilu: Uredba (ES) št. 659/1999) in člena 144 Akta o pristopu Norveške, Avstrije, Finske in Švedske (7) (v nadaljnjem besedilu: Akt o pristopu Avstrije, Finske in Švedske), v zvezi s katero ni bilo razloga, da se začne postopek za predlaganje ustreznih ukrepov v zvezi z obstoječimi shemami pomoči (8). Ugotovila je tudi, da bi lahko „državi in konzorcij [...] upravičeno pričakovali, da Komisija ne bo izpodbijala državnih poroštev in davčnih ukrepov na podlagi pravil o državni pomoči“. Pri tej ugotovitvi se je oprla na posebne okoliščine zadeve in splošno politiko, ki jo je sprejela, in sicer, da ukrepov financiranja za gradnjo in upravljanje infrastrukture, dokončno sprejetih pred sodbo Splošnega sodišča z dne 12. decembra 2000 v zadevi Aéroports de Paris (9) (v nadaljnjem besedilu: sodba v zadevi Aéroports de Paris), ni več mogoče izpodbijati na podlagi pravil o državni pomoči, ker so javni organi lahko upravičeno menili, da taki ukrepi ne pomenijo državne pomoči in jih zato ni treba priglasiti Komisiji (glej uvodno izjavo 504). Poleg tega je v sklepu iz leta 2014 ugotovila, da glede na to, da so „državni poroštvi in davčne ugodnosti [...] v vsakem primeru združljivi z notranjim trgom“, ni bilo treba ugotoviti, ali so navedena legitimna pričakovanja segala še v obdobje po datumu sodbe v zadevi Aéroports de Paris. | (11) | On 15 October 2014, the Commission adopted a decision (5) (the ‘2014 decision’) finding, firstly, that the public financing of the road and rail hinterland connections to the Fixed Link and the Danish ‘joint taxation regime’ should not be considered as State aid within the meaning of Article 107(1) TFEU. Secondly, the Commission decided not to raise objections against ‘the Danish special tax measures for depreciation of assets and carry-forward losses and the guarantees granted by Denmark to the Consortium’ on the ground that, although those measures constituted State aid within the meaning of Article 107(1) TFEU, they were compatible with the internal market on the basis of Article 107(3), point (b) TFEU. In the same decision, the Commission considered that ‘the guarantee granted to the Consortium by Sweden’ was existing aid within the meaning of Article 1(b), point (i) of Council Regulation (EC) No 659/1999 (6) (‘Regulation (EC) No 659/1999’) and Article 144 of the Act of Accession of Norway, Austria, Finland and Sweden (7) (‘Act of Accession of Austria, Finland and Sweden’), in relation to which there was no reason to initiate the procedure to propose appropriate measures regarding existing aid schemes (8). The Commission also found that ‘the States and the Consortium could have legitimate expectations that the Commission would not call into question the State guarantees and the tax measures on the basis of State aid rules’. The Commission based that finding on the specific circumstances of the case and on the general policy adopted by the Commission that financing measures for the construction and operation of infrastructure definitively adopted before the judgment of the General Court of 12 December 2000 in Aéroports de Paris (9) (the ‘Aéroports de Paris judgment’) can no longer be called into question on the basis of State aid rules, because public authorities could legitimately consider that such measures did not constitute State aid, and, accordingly, did not need to be notified to the Commission (see further, recital (504)) Additionally, the Commission found in the 2014 decision that, given that ‘the State guarantees and the fiscal benefits are, in any event, compatible with the internal market’, it was not necessary to determine whether those legitimate expectations extended beyond the date of the Aéroports de Paris judgment. |
| 1.3 Razglasitev delne ničnosti sklepa iz leta 2014 | 1.3. Partial annulment of the 2014 decision |
| (12) | Pritožnik je 12. februarja 2015 pri Splošnem sodišču zoper sklep iz leta 2014 vložil ničnostno tožbo v skladu s členom 263 PDEU. Splošno sodišče je s sodbo z dne 19. septembra 2018 sklep iz leta 2014 razglasilo za ničnega (v nadaljnjem besedilu: sodba v zadevi Øresund) (10) v delu, v katerem se je Komisija odločila, da ne nasprotuje državnima poroštvoma, ki sta ju državi odobrili konzorciju, ali pomoči v zvezi z amortizacijo sredstev in prenosom izgub v prihodnje obdobje, ki jo je konzorciju dodelila Danska. | (12) | On 12 February 2015, the Complainant brought an action for annulment, pursuant to Article 263 TFEU, before the General Court, against the 2014 decision. By its ruling of 19 September 2018, the General Court partially annulled the 2014 decision (the ‘Øresund judgment’) (10), insofar as the Commission decided not to raise objections with respect to the guarantees granted by the States to the Consortium or the aid relating to depreciation of assets and carrying forward of losses granted by Denmark to the Consortium. |
| (13) | Splošno sodišče je tožbo v preostalem delu zavrnilo. Zavrnilo je zlasti trditve pritožnika v zvezi z ugotovitvijo Komisije, da ukrepi za javno financiranje cestnih in železniških povezav z zaledjem ter danski sistem skupne obdavčitve ne pomenijo državne pomoči v smislu člena 107(1) PDEU. Zavrnilo je tudi trditev, da je Komisija napačno uporabila pravo, ko je menila, da bi lahko konzorcij in državi za obdobje pred sodbo v zadevi Aéroports de Paris uveljavljali legitimna pričakovanja, ki izključujejo vračilo, če bi se pomoč, dodeljena konzorciju, štela za nezdružljivo z notranjim trgom. | (13) | The General Court dismissed the action as to the remainder. In particular, it rejected the Complainant’s arguments in respect of the Commission’s finding that the measures for the public financing of the road and rail hinterland connections, and the Danish ‘joint taxation regime’, did not constitute State aid within the meaning of Article 107(1) TFEU. The General Court also rejected the argument that the Commission had erred in law by finding that the Consortium and the States could claim the benefit of legitimate expectations that precluded recovery, in the event that the aid granted to the Consortium should be considered incompatible with the internal market, for the period before the Aéroports de Paris judgment. |
| (14) | Zoper sodbo v zadevi Øresund ni bila vložena pritožba. | (14) | The Øresund judgment was not appealed. |
| 1.4 Izmenjave po sodbi v zadevi Øresund | 1.4. Exchanges following the Øresund judgment |
| (15) | Komisija je 22. oktobra 2018 državama poslala zahtevo za informacije, v kateri je zahtevala dejanske informacije in dokaze o poroštvih, zagotovljenih konzorciju, na katero sta državi odgovorili 10. decembra 2018. | (15) | On 22 October 2018, the Commission sent a request for information to the States, requesting factual information and evidence on the guarantees provided to the Consortium, to which the States replied on 10 December 2018. |
| (16) | Službe Komisije so se 10. decembra 2018 sestale s pritožnikom. | (16) | On 10 December 2018, the Commission services had a meeting with the Complainant. |
| (17) | Državi sta 11. decembra 2018 Komisiji poslali sporočilo o morebitnih posledicah sodbe v zadevi Øresund in prihodnje odločitve Komisije. | (17) | On 11 December 2018, the States provided the Commission with a note on the possible implications of the Øresund judgment and a future Commission decision. |
| (18) | Službe Komisije so se 17. decembra 2018 sestale z državama in konzorcijem, da bi razpravljale o gospodarskih in finančnih vidikih stalne povezave, v zvezi s katerimi so službe Komisije 10. decembra 2018 državama poslale pripravljalna vprašanja. | (18) | On 17 December 2018, the Commission services had a meeting with the States and the Consortium, to discuss the economic and financial aspects of the Fixed Link, in relation to which the Commission services had sent preparatory questions to the States on 10 December 2018. |
| (19) | Družbi Scandlines Danmark ApS in Scandlines Deutschland GmbH (v nadaljnjem besedilu skupaj: družbi Scandlines) sta 21. decembra 2018 Komisiji predložili dopis v zvezi s sodbo v zadevi Øresund in njeno povezavo s sodbo Splošnega sodišča z dne 13. decembra 2018 o ožini Fehmarn v zadevi Scandlines/Komisija (v nadaljnjem besedilu: sodba v zadevi Scandlines in ožina Fehmarn) (11). | (19) | Scandlines Danmark ApS and Scandlines Deutschland GmbH (together, ‘Scandlines’) submitted a letter to the Commission on 21 December 2018 in relation to the Øresund judgment and its link with the judgment of the General Court of 13 December 2018 on Fehmarn Belt, Scandlines v Commission (‘Scandlines Fehmarn Belt judgment’) (11). |
| (20) | Državi sta 21. decembra 2018 predložili dodatne informacije v zvezi s srečanjem, ki je potekalo 17. decembra 2018. Danska je dodatne informacije predložila 17. januarja 2019, državi pa sta dodatne informacije v zvezi s tem predložili 21. januarja 2019. | (20) | The States submitted additional information on 21 December 2018 to follow up on the meeting held on 17 December 2018. Denmark submitted further information on 17 January 2019, and the States provided further information on 21 January 2019 in this respect. |
| (21) | Družba Stena Line Scandinavia AB (v nadaljnjem besedilu: družba Stena Line) je 30. januarja in 1. februarja 2019 Komisiji predložila informacije v zvezi s sodbo v zadevi Øresund in njeno povezavo s sodbo Splošnega sodišča z dne 13. decembra 2018 o ožini Fehmarn v zadevi Stena Line/Komisija (v nadaljnjem besedilu: sodba v zadevi Stena Line in ožina Fehmarn) (12). | (21) | On 30 January and on 1 February 2019, Stena Line Scandinavia AB (‘Stena Line’) submitted information to the Commission in relation to the Øresund judgment and its link with the judgment of the General Court of 13 December 2018 on Fehmarn Belt, Stena Line v Commission (‘Stena Line Fehmarn Belt judgment’) (12). |
| (22) | Komisija je 6. februarja 2019 od držav zahtevala dodatne informacije v zvezi s sestankom, ki je potekal 17. decembra 2018, in informacijami, predloženimi 21. decembra 2018; te dodatne informacije so bile predložene 29. marca 2019. | (22) | On 6 February 2019, the Commission requested further information from the States in view of the meeting held on 17 December 2018 and the information provided on 21 December 2018, which was provided on 29 March 2019. |
| 1.5 Sklep o začetku postopka | 1.5. The Opening decision |
| (23) | Komisija je z dopisom z dne 28. februarja 2019 državi obvestila, da se je odločila začeti postopek iz člena 108(2) PDEU v zvezi z državnimi poroštvi, ki sta jih državi odobrili konzorciju za financiranje stalne povezave, in posebnimi davčnimi pravili o amortizaciji sredstev in prenosu izgub v prihodnje obdobje, ki jih je konzorciju odobrila Danska (v nadaljnjem besedilu: sklep o začetku postopka). | (23) | By letter dated 28 February 2019, the Commission informed the States that it had decided to initiate the procedure laid down in Article 108(2) TFEU in respect of the State guarantees granted by the States to the Consortium for the financing of the Fixed Link and the special tax rules on depreciation of assets and on carry-forward of losses that Denmark granted to the Consortium (the ‘Opening decision’). |
| (24) | Sklep o začetku postopka je bil 22. marca 2019 objavljen v Uradnem listu Evropske unije (13). Komisija je zainteresirane strani pozvala, naj v enem mesecu predložijo svoje pripombe. | (24) | The Opening decision was published in the Official Journal of the European Union on 22 March 2019 (13). The Commission invited interested parties to submit their comments within one month. |
| 1.6 Formalni postopek preiskave | 1.6. The formal investigation procedure |
| (25) | Pritožnik, družbi Scandlines in družba Stena Line so 23. aprila 2019 predložili pripombe v zvezi s sklepom o začetku postopka. Komisija je 2. in 8. maja 2019 navedene pripombe posredovala državama. Pripombe v zvezi s sklepom o začetku postopka so 17. maja 2019 predložile še tri zainteresirane strani (Föreningen Svensk Sjöfart (v nadaljnjem besedilu: združenje FSS), skupina Grimaldi Group (v nadaljnjem besedilu: skupina Grimaldi) in Trelleborg Hamn AB (v nadaljnjem besedilu: pristanišče Trelleborg)). Komisija je navedene pripombe državama posredovala 7. junija 2019. Državi sta odgovor na navedene pripombe vključili v pripombe z dne 8. julija 2019 k sklepu o začetku postopka (uvodna izjava 28). | (25) | On 23 April 2019, the Complainant, Scandlines, and Stena Line submitted comments in relation to the Opening decision. On 2 and 8 May 2019, the Commission forwarded those comments to the States. On 17 May 2019, three further interested parties (Föreningen Svensk Sjöfart (‘FSS’), Grimaldi Group (‘Grimaldi’) and Trelleborg Hamn AB (‘Trelleborg Port’)) submitted comments in relation to the Opening decision. On 7 June 2019, the Commission forwarded those comments to the States. The States included their reply to those submissions in their comments of 8 July 2019 on the Opening decision (recital (28)). |
| (26) | Državi sta 24. aprila 2019 Komisiji predložili neuradni predlog za dogovorjen časovni razpored formalnega postopka preiskave. | (26) | On 24 April 2019, the States provided an informal proposal to the Commission for a mutually agreed timetable for the formal investigation procedure. |
| (27) | Družba Stena Line je 24. junija 2019 predložila dodatne pripombe. Komisija je 25. junija 2019 navedene dodatne pripombe posredovala državama. Državi nista predložili odgovora, ki bi se posebej nanašal na navedeno predložitev. | (27) | On 24 June 2019, Stena Line submitted additional comments. On 25 June 2019, the Commission forwarded those additional comments to the States. The States did not submit a reply specifically related to that submission. |
| (28) | Državi sta 8. julija 2019 Komisiji poslale pripombe v zvezi s sklepom o začetku postopka. | (28) | On 8 July 2019, the States sent their comments to the Commission in respect of the Opening decision. |
| (29) | Službe Komisije so 28. avgusta in 9. oktobra 2019 organizirale telefonski konferenci z državama in konzorcijem. | (29) | On 28 August and 9 October 2019, the Commission services held telephone conferences with the States and the Consortium. |
| (30) | Pritožnik je 18. novembra in 9. decembra 2019 predložil dodatne informacije, ki jih je Komisija 16. decembra posredovala Danski, 20. decembra 2019 pa Švedski. Pritožnik je 20. decembra 2019 predložil dodatne informacije. Komisija je 4. februarja 2020 navedene dodatne pripombe posredovala državama. Državi nista predložili odgovora, ki bi se posebej nanašal na predložitve z dne 18. novembra, 9. decembra ali 20. decembra 2019. | (30) | On 18 November and 9 December 2019, the Complainant submitted additional information, which the Commission forwarded to Denmark on 16 December and to Sweden on 20 December 2019. On 20 December 2019, the Complainant submitted additional information. On 4 February 2020, the Commission forwarded those additional comments to the States. The States did not submit a reply specifically related to the submissions of 18 November, 9 December or 20 December 2019. |
| (31) | Državi sta 22. aprila 2020 Komisiji predložili obvestilo, na podlagi katerega so službe Komisije 23. aprila 2020 organizirale videokonferenco z državama in konzorcijem. | (31) | On 22 April 2020, the States submitted a note to the Commission on the basis of which, on 23 April 2020, the Commission services held a virtual meeting with the States and the Consortium. |
| (32) | Službe Komisije so 28. maja 2020 organizirale videokonferenco z državama in konzorcijem. Komisija je 29. maja 2020 državama predložila vprašanja, na katera sta odgovorili 2., 17. in 18. junija 2020. Državi sta 17. junija 2020 Komisiji predložili obvestilo o prihodnjih potrebah konzorcija po refinanciranju. | (32) | On 28 May 2020, the Commission services held a virtual meeting with the States and the Consortium. On 29 May 2020, the Commission submitted questions to the States, to which they replied on 2, 17 and 18 June 2020. On 17 June 2020, the States submitted a note to the Commission on the future refinancing needs of the Consortium. |
| (33) | Službe Komisije so 17. junija 2020 organizirale videokonferenco s pritožnikom. | (33) | On 17 June 2020, the Commission services held a virtual meeting with the Complainant. |
| (34) | Pritožnik je 1. julija 2020 Komisiji predložil dodatne pripombe. | (34) | On 1 July 2020, the Complainant submitted further comments to the Commission. |
| (35) | Državi sta 1. julija 2020 Komisiji predložili dodatne informacije o prihodnjem refinanciranju konzorcija. | (35) | On 1 July 2020, the States submitted further information to the Commission on the future refinancing of the Consortium. |
| (36) | Državi sta 13. julija 2020 Komisiji predložili obvestilo, na podlagi katerega so službe Komisije 17. septembra 2020 organizirale videokonferenco z državama in konzorcijem. Danska je 21. septembra 2020 predložila dodatne informacije. | (36) | On 13 July 2020, the States submitted further comments to the Commission, on the basis of which, on 17 September 2020, the Commission services held a virtual meeting with the States and the Consortium. On 21 September 2020, Denmark submitted additional information. |
| (37) | Državi sta 1. septembra 2020 Komisiji predložili dodatne informacije o prihodnjem refinanciranju konzorcija. | (37) | On 1 September 2020, the States submitted further information to the Commission on the future refinancing of the Consortium. |
| (38) | Pritožnik je 17. septembra 2020 predložil dodatne pripombe. Komisija je 18. septembra 2020 in 14. oktobra 2020 navedene dodatne pripombe in pripombe z dne 1. julija 2020 (uvodna izjava 34) posredovala državama, ki sta nanje odgovorili 11. novembra 2020. | (38) | On 17 September 2020, the Complainant submitted further comments. On 18 September 2020 and on 14 October 2020, the Commission forwarded those additional comments, and the comments of 1 July 2020 (recital (34)), to the States, to which the States replied on 11 November 2020. |
| (39) | Državi sta 28. septembra 2020 Komisiji predložili dodatne informacije. | (39) | On 28 September 2020, the States submitted further information to the Commission. |
| (40) | Komisija je 14. oktobra 2020 Danski poslala vprašanja. Danska je 16. decembra 2020 predložila odgovor na navedena vprašanja. Službe Komisije so 29. januarja 2021 od Danske zahtevale dodatna pojasnila, ki so bila obravnavana 3. februarja 2021 na videokonferenci, ki so se je udeležili službe Komisije, državi in konzorcij. Danska je 4. februarja in 7. aprila 2021 Komisiji predložila dodatne informacije. | (40) | On 14 October 2020, the Commission sent questions to Denmark. On 16 December 2020, Denmark submitted a reply to those questions. On 29 January 2021, the Commission services requested further clarifications from Denmark which were discussed on 3 February 2021 during a virtual meeting between the Commission services, the States and the Consortium. On 4 February and 7 April 2021, Denmark submitted further information to the Commission. |
| (41) | Pritožnik je 29. aprila 2021 Komisiji predložil dodatne pripombe. | (41) | On 29 April 2021, the Complainant submitted further observations to the Commission. |
| (42) | Službe Komisije so 10 maja 2021 od Danske zahtevale dodatna pojasnila, ki so bila obravnavana 27. maja 2021 na videokonferenci, ki so se je udeležili službe Komisije, Danska in konzorcij. | (42) | On 10 May 2021, the Commission services requested further clarifications from Denmark which were discussed on 27 May 2021, during a virtual meeting between the Commission services, Denmark and the Consortium. |
| (43) | Komisija je 3. junija 2021 državama poslala vprašanja, na katera sta odgovorili 16. junija 2021. Službe Komisije so 23. junija 2021 organizirale videokonferenco z državama in konzorcijem. | (43) | On 3 June 2021, the Commission sent questions to the States to which they replied on 16 June 2021. On 23 June 2021, the Commission services held a virtual meeting with the States and the Consortium. |
| (44) | Službe Komisije so 4. junija 2021 organizirale videokonferenco s pritožnikom. Pritožnik je 10. junija 2021 Komisiji predložil odgovore na vprašanja, zastavljena na videokonferenci 4. junija 2021. | (44) | On 4 June 2021, the Commission services held a virtual meeting with the Complainant. On 10 June 2021, the Complainant submitted replies to the Commission on questions raised during the virtual meeting of 4 June 2021. |
| (45) | Pritožnik je 5. oktobra 2021 Komisiji predložil informacije. | (45) | On 5 October 2021, the Complainant submitted information to the Commission. |
| (46) | Službe Komisije so 22. novembra 2021 organizirale videokonferenco z državama. | (46) | On 22 November 2021, the Commission services held a virtual meeting with the States. |
| (47) | Državi sta 25. novembra 2021 predložili dodatne informacije. | (47) | On 25 November 2021, the States provided further information. |
| (48) | Komisija je 20. februarja 2022 Danski poslala vprašanja. Danska je nanje odgovorila 28. maja 2022. | (48) | On 20 February 2022, the Commission sent questions to Denmark. On 28 May 2022, Denmark replied to those questions. |
| (49) | Službe Komisije so 28. oktobra 2022 državama poslale nekaj predhodnih ugotovitev v zvezi s formalno preiskavo Komisije, o katerih so na videokonferenci 5. decembra 2022 razpravljale službe Komisije, konzorcij in državi. Službe Komisije so 6. decembra 2022 Danski v okviru nadaljnjega ukrepanja poslale nekaj dodatnih referenčnih informacij. Državi sta 3. in 16. maja 2023 odgovorili na predhodne ugotovitve služb Komisije z dne 28. oktobra 2022. Službe Komisije so 9. junija 2023 organizirale videokonferenco z državama in konzorcijem, v zvezi s katero so službe Komisije 20. julija 2023 državama poslale dodatne predhodne ugotovitve. | (49) | On 28 October 2022, the Commission services sent some preliminary observations relating to its formal investigation to the States, which were discussed during a virtual meeting between the Commission services, the Consortium, and the States on 5 December 2022. On 6 December 2022 the Commission services sent, as follow-up, some further reference information to Denmark. On 3 and 16 May 2023, the States replied to the preliminary observations of the Commission services of 28 October 2022. On 9 June 2023, the Commission services held a virtual meeting with the States and the Consortium on which the Commission services sent further preliminary observations to the States on 20 July 2023. |
| (50) | Državi sta 3. julija 2023 Komisiji predložili informacije o morebitni zavezi glede prihodnjih državnih poroštev. | (50) | On 3 July 2023, the States submitted information to the Commission on a potential commitment with regards to the future State guarantees. |
| (51) | Službe Komisije so 22. septembra 2023 organizirale videokonferenco z državama in konzorcijem. | (51) | On 22 September 2023, the Commission services held a virtual meeting with the States and the Consortium. |
| (52) | Komisija je 2., 11. in 27. oktobra 2023 od držav zahtevala dodatne informacije, državi pa sta na zahtevo odgovorili 7. novembra 2023. | (52) | On 2, 11, and 27 October 2023, the Commission requested further information from the States, to which they replied on 7 November 2023. |
| (53) | Pristanišče Trelleborg je 3. januarja 2024 Komisiji predložilo dopis, v katerem je navedlo, da bo, če Komisija v dveh mesecih ne bo opredelila svojega stališča, pri Splošnem sodišču Evropske unije nemudoma vložilo tožbo zaradi nedelovanja Komisije. | (53) | On 3 January 2024, Trelleborg Port submitted a letter to the Commission, stating that if, within two months, the Commission had not defined its position, it would promptly bring an action against the Commission’s failure to act before the General Court of the European Union. |
| (54) | Državi sta 29. januarja 2024 predložili zavezo, da bo konzorcij financiral nov dolg in refinanciral obstoječi dolg pod tržnimi pogoji. | (54) | On 29 January 2024, the States submitted a commitment that the Consortium would finance new debt, and refinance existing debt, on market terms. |
| (55) | Državi sta se z dopisoma z dne 15. avgusta 2023 in 22. septembra 2023 izjemoma strinjali, da se odpovesta pravicam iz člena 342 PDEU v povezavi s členom 3 Uredbe št. 1/1958 (14), ter se strinjali, da se ta sklep sprejme in priglasi samo v angleškem jeziku. | (55) | By letters of 15 August 2023 and of 22 September 2023, the States exceptionally agreed to waive their rights deriving from Article 342 TFEU, in conjunction with Article 3 of Regulation 1/1958 (14), and agreed to have this decision adopted and notified in the English language, only. |
| 2. PODROBEN OPIS PROJEKTA IN DOMNEVNIH UKREPOV POMOČI | 2. DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF THE PROJECT AND ALLEGED AID MEASURES |
| 2.1 Stalna povezava | 2.1. The Fixed Link |
| (56) | Stalna povezava je 16 km dolga stalna povezava za cestni in železniški promet med švedsko obalo in danskim otokom Amager, sestavljajo pa jo most, ki se financira s cestnino, umetni otok Peberholm in potopljen predor. Zagotavlja neposredno povezavo med Københavnom na Danskem in Malmöjem na Švedskem, zgrajena pa je bila kot najdaljši most v Evropi, na katerem sta kombinirani železnica in cesta. | (56) | The Fixed Link is a 16 km long fixed link for road and railway traffic between the Swedish coast and the Danish island of Amager, and is composed of a toll-funded bridge, the artificial island of Peberholm, and an immersed tunnel. It provides a direct connection between Copenhagen, in Denmark, and Malmö, in Sweden, and was constructed as the longest combined road and rail bridge in Europe. |
| (57) | Stalna povezava je bila zgrajena med letoma 1995 in 2000, uporablja pa se od junija 2000. | (57) | The Fixed Link was constructed between 1995 and 2000 and has been in operation since July 2000. |
| (58) | Stalna povezava je bila na prvem seznamu prednostnih projektov vseevropskega prometnega omrežja (TEN-T), ki ga je Evropski svet potrdil leta 1994. Državi sta se sklicevali na analizo iz leta 2010 o prednostnih projektih TEN-T, v kateri je Komisija navedla, da je stalna povezava „prispevala k velikemu povečanju prometa in ima zelo pomemben pozitiven učinek na razvoj regij København in Scania“ (15). Stalna povezava povezuje „cestne in železniške povezave nordijskega trikotnika“ (prednostni projekt TEN-T št. 12) prek Danske in prek „ožine Fehmarn“ (prednostni projekt TEN-T št. 20) z Nemčijo in Srednjo Evropo. | (58) | The Fixed Link was on the first list of Trans-European Transport Network (‘TEN-T’) priority projects endorsed by the European Council in 1994. The States referred to an analysis from 2010 on the TEN-T priority projects, in which the Commission stated that the Fixed Link ‘has contributed to a great increase of the traffic and it has a very important positive impact on the development of the regions of Copenhagen and Scania’. (15) The Fixed Link connects the ‘Nordic Triangle road and rail links’ (TEN-T priority project 12) via Denmark and via the ‘Fehmarn Belt’ (TEN-T priority project 20) with Germany and Central Europe. |
| (59) | Cilj držav je bil s stalno povezavo vzpostaviti boljšo cestno in železniško prometno povezavo med Dansko in Švedsko ter s tem zagotoviti potrebne pogoje za intenzivnejše in obsežnejše kulturno in gospodarsko sodelovanje ter za razvoj skupnega trga dela in stanovanj v regiji Øresund v korist obeh držav. S stalno povezavo bi se bistveno izboljšala tudi dostopnost letališč København in Malmö na obeh straneh ožine Øresund. | (59) | The objective of the States, with the Fixed Link, was to create an improved road and rail traffic connection between Denmark and Sweden, and, thereby, provide the necessary conditions for more intense and extensive cultural and economic cooperation, and for the development of a common labour and housing market in the Øresund region, to the benefit of both States. The Fixed Link would also significantly improve the accessibility of the airports of Copenhagen and Malmö, located on either side of the Øresund strait. |
| (60) | Poleg tega je bilo treba v obeh državah zgraditi cestne in železniške povezave z zaledjem, da bi bila stalna povezava funkcionalna. Navedena infrastruktura v zaledju povezuje stalno povezavo in nacionalna sistema cestnega in železniškega omrežja na Danskem in Švedskem. Danska in Švedska sta se strinjali, da sta sami odgovorni za izgradnjo navedenih povezav na svojih ozemljih (16). | (60) | In addition, the construction of road and rail hinterland connections was necessary in both States to make the Fixed Link functional. That hinterland infrastructure connects the Fixed Link with the respective national road and rail network systems in Denmark and Sweden. Denmark and Sweden agreed that it was their responsibility to construct those connections on their respective territories (16). |
| 2.1.1 Pravna ureditev in naloge konzorcija | 2.1.1. Legal setup and tasks of the Consortium |
| (61) | Državi sta pravne in operativne vidike gradnje, upravljanja in obratovanja stalne povezave določili 23. marca 1991 v sporazumu z dne 23. marca 1991 med vlado Danske in vlado Švedske o stalni povezavi čez ožino Øresund (v nadaljnjem besedilu: medvladni sporazum). Medvladni sporazum kot prilogo vključuje dodatni protokol, ki določa podrobnosti o obveznosti solidarnega poroštva držav (glej uvodno izjavo 85) (v nadaljnjem besedilu: dodatni protokol k medvladnemu sporazumu). Medvladni sporazum, vključno z dodatnim protokolom k medvladnemu sporazumu, je Švedska ratificirala 8. avgusta 1991, Danska pa 24. avgusta 1991. Medvladni sporazum in dodatni protokol k medvladnemu sporazumu sta začela veljati z izmenjavo listin o ratifikaciji 24. avgusta 1991 v Stockholmu. | (61) | The States set out the legal and operational aspects of the construction, management, and operation of the Fixed Link on 23 March 1991 in the ‘Treaty of 23 March 1991 between the Government of Denmark and the Government of Sweden concerning a Fixed link across the Sound’ (the ‘Intergovernmental Agreement’). The Intergovernmental Agreement includes, as an attachment, an additional protocol determining details on the States’ joint and several guarantee obligation (see further, recital (85)) (the ‘Additional Protocol to the Intergovernmental Agreement’). The Intergovernmental Agreement, including the Additional Protocol to the Intergovernmental Agreement, was ratified by Sweden on 8 August 1991 and by Denmark on 24 August 1991. The Intergovernmental Agreement and the Additional Protocol to the Intergovernmental Agreement entered into force on exchange of the instruments of ratification in Stockholm on 24 August 1991. |
| (62) | Državi sta se z medvladnim sporazumom dogovorili, da bosta skupaj financirali, gradili in upravljali stalno povezavo. V ta namen člen 10 medvladnega sporazuma določa, da Danska in Švedska ustanovita družbi z omejeno odgovornostjo, ki sta v celoti v lasti zadevnih držav. Člen 10 medvladnega sporazuma poleg tega določa, da bi morali nato navedeni družbi ustanoviti konzorcij, ki bi bil lastnik stalne povezave in bi bil „za skupni račun kot enoten subjekt odgovoren za odgovarjal za zasnovo projekta in kakršno koli drugo pripravo stalne povezave, njeno financiranje, gradnjo in obratovanje“. Navedena ureditev je bila izbrana zato, da bi državi ostali končni lastnici zadevnih družb, torej bi jima pripadal ves dobiček, ustvarjen s stalno povezavo, in bi nosili vse izgube, nastale zaradi nje. | (62) | With the Intergovernmental Agreement, the States agreed to jointly finance, construct, and operate the Fixed Link. To that end, Article 10 of the Intergovernmental Agreement provides that it is for Denmark and Sweden to each form a limited liability company, wholly owned by the respective States. Article 10 of the Intergovernmental Agreement, further, provides that those companies should, in turn, form a consortium that would own the Fixed Link, and would be ‘responsible, on their joint account and as one entity, for the project design and any other preparations for the Fixed Link, as well as for its financing, building, and operation’. That setup was chosen so that the States would remain the ultimate owners of the companies involved, and, thus, all profits and losses generated by the Fixed Link would lie with the States. |
| (63) | Državi sta medvladni sporazum prenesli v nacionalni zakonodaji: (i) na Švedskem s predlogom zakona št. 1990/91:158 o sporazumu med Švedsko in Dansko o stalni povezavi čez ožino Øresund (v nadaljnjem besedilu: predlog zakona št. 1990/91:158) z dne 25. marca 1991, ki je bil sprejet s sklepom švedskega parlamenta z dne 12. junija 1991 (17) (v nadaljnjem besedilu: sklep švedskega parlamenta), in (ii) na Danskem z zakonom o gradnji stalne povezave čez ožino Øresund (zakon št. 590 z dne 19. avgusta 1991, v nadaljnjem besedilu: zakon o gradnji) (18). | (63) | The Intergovernmental Agreement was implemented by the States in their national laws: (i) in Sweden, through the Government bill 1990/91:158 on an agreement between Sweden and Denmark on a fixed link across Øresund (‘Government bill 1990/91:158’) of 25 March 1991 that was adopted by the Swedish Parliament decision of 12 June 1991 (17) (the ‘Swedish Parliament decision’), and (ii) in Denmark, through the ‘Act on the construction of the Øresund fixed link’ (Act No 590 of 19 August 1991) (the ‘Construction Act’) (18). |
| (64) | V členu 5 zakona o gradnji je določeno, da danski minister za promet ustanovi holding. V členu 6 zakona o gradnji je določeno, da navedeni holding ustanovi delniško družbo, odgovorno za danske cestne in železniške povezave z zaledjem. Navedena delniška družba nato sklene sporazum o konzorciju z delniško družbo, ki jo ustanovi Švedska. Družba Sund & Bælt Holding A/S (v nadaljevanju: družba Sund & Bælt) je bila 4. decembra 1991 ustanovljena kot holding v 100-odstotni lasti danske države. Družba Sund & Bælt je 9. decembra 1991 ustanovila delniško družbo A/S Øresundsforbindelsen (v nadaljnjem besedilu: družba A/S Øresund). | (64) | Section 5 of the Construction Act provides that the Danish Minister for Transport would set up a holding company. Section 6 of the Construction Act specifies that that holding company would set up a public limited liability company, responsible for the Danish road and rail hinterland connections. That limited liability company would enter into a consortium agreement with a limited liability company set up by Sweden. Sund & Bælt Holding A/S (‘Sund & Bælt’), was established as a 100 % Danish State-owned holding company on 4 December 1991. On 9 December 1991, Sund & Bælt established the limited liability company, A/S Øresundsforbindelsen (‘A/S Øresund’). |
| (65) | Oddelek 4 predloga zakona št. 1990/91:158, kot je bil sprejet s sklepom švedskega parlamenta, določa, da švedska državna uprava za ceste in švedska državna uprava za železnice (19) ustanovita švedsko družbo, ki je odgovorna za švedske cestne in železniške povezave z zaledjem, ter skleneta sporazum o konzorciju z danskim podjetjem v državni lasti. Švedska je 30. avgusta 1991 ustanovila delniško družbo Svensk-Danska Broförbindelsen AB (v nadaljnjem besedilu: družba SVEDAB), ki je prek švedske državne uprave za ceste (50 %) in švedske državne uprave za železnice (50 %) (20) v 100-odstotni lasti švedske države. | (65) | Section 4 of the Government bill 1990/91:158, as adopted by the Swedish Parliament decision, provides that the Swedish National Road Administration and the Swedish National Rail Administration (19) would set up a Swedish company to be responsible for the Swedish road and rail hinterland connections and to enter into a consortium agreement with a Danish State-owned company. On 30 August 1991, Sweden formed a limited liability company: Svensk-Danska Broförbindelsen AB (‘SVEDAB’), which is 100 % owned by the Swedish State, through the Swedish National Road Administration (50 %) and the Swedish National Rail Administration (50 %) (20). |
| (66) | Družbi A/S Øresund in SVEDAB sta s sporazumom o konzorciju in njegovim dodatnim protokolom z dne 27. januarja 1992 (v nadaljnjem besedilu: sporazum o konzorciju) ustanovili konzorcij (tj. Øresundsbro Konsortiet I/S) (21) in določili njegovo lastniško strukturo. Sporazum o konzorciju je začel veljati po odobritvi danske in švedske vlade dne 13. februarja 1992. V skladu z medvladnim sporazumom določa, da je konzorcij lastnik stalne povezave in da odgovarja za zasnovo projekta, načrtovanje, financiranje, gradnjo, obratovanje in vzdrževanje stalne povezave ter druge dejavnosti v povezavi z njo (22). Družbi A/S Øresund in SVEDAB imata v skupni lasti vsa sredstva konzorcija in vse njegove pravice, in sicer vsaka 50 % (23). Dobiček in izgube, ki izhajajo iz dejavnosti konzorcija, si partnerski družbi A/S Øresund in SVEDAB delita po enakih delih. Kar zadeva katero koli tretjo osebo, sta družbi A/S Øresund in SVEDAB solidarno odgovorni za obveznosti konzorcija (24). | (66) | Through a consortium agreement and its additional protocol dated 27 January 1992 (the ‘Consortium Agreement’), A/S Øresund and SVEDAB established the Consortium (i.e. Øresundsbro Konsortiet I/S) (21), and laid down its ownership structure. The Consortium Agreement entered into force upon approval by the Governments of Denmark and Sweden on 13 February 1992. In accordance with the Intergovernmental Agreement, the Consortium Agreement provides that, the Consortium owns and is responsible for the planning, project design, financing, construction, operation and maintenance of the Fixed Link, and other operations in association therewith (22). A/S Øresund and SVEDAB own jointly, on a fifty-fifty basis, all of the Consortium’s assets and all of its rights (23). Both the profits and the losses derived from the activities of the Consortium are shared equally by the two partner companies, A/S Øresund and SVEDAB. In relation to any third party, A/S Øresund and SVEDAB are jointly and severally liable for the Consortium’s obligations (24). |
| (67) | Konzorcij lahko opravlja samo tiste dejavnosti, ki so povezane s stalno povezavo, kot je opredeljeno v oddelku 1 sporazuma o konzorciju. Ni odgovoren za gradnjo cestnih in železniških povezav med zaledjem in stalno povezavo. Državi sta navedeno nalogo prenesli na matični družbi konzorcija, tj. A/S Øresund in SVEDAB, ki sta odgovorni za načrtovanje, zasnovo projekta, financiranje, gradnjo, obratovanje in vzdrževanje navedenih povezav v svojih državah (25). | (67) | The Consortium cannot engage in activities other than those related to the Fixed Link, as defined in Section 1 of the Consortium Agreement. The Consortium is not responsible for the construction of the road and rail hinterland connections to the Fixed Link. The States delegated that task to the parent companies of the Consortium, i.e., A/S Øresund and SVEDAB, which are responsible for the planning, project design, financing, construction, operation and maintenance of those connections in their respective countries (25). |
| (68) | Kot je že pojasnjeno v uvodni izjavi 48 sklepa o začetku postopka, se formalna preiskava in zato tudi ta sklep ne nanašata na ukrepe v korist družb A/S Øresund in SVEDAB, ki so pomembni za financiranje cestnih in železniških povezav z zaledjem. Komisija je v sklepu iz leta 2014 ugotovila, da navedeni ukrepi ne pomenijo državne pomoči v smislu člena 107(1) PDEU, Splošno sodišče pa je v sodbi v zadevi Øresund zavrnilo ničnostno tožbo, ki jo je pritožnik vložil v zvezi z navedenimi ukrepi. Komisija v zvezi s tem ugotavlja, da se pritožnik ni pritožil na sodbo v zadevi Øresund. | (68) | As already clarified at recital 48 of the Opening decision, the formal investigation, and, therefore, this decision, do not concern the measures in favour A/S Øresund and SVEDAB, relevant to the financing of the road and rail hinterland connections. The Commission found in the 2014 decision that those measures do not constitute State aid within the meaning of Article 107(1) TFEU, and, in the Øresund judgment, the General Court rejected the action for annulment brought by the Complainant as regards those measures. The Commission notes, in this respect, that the Complainant has not appealed the Øresund judgment. |
| 2.1.2 Model financiranja stalne povezave | 2.1.2. Financing model for the Fixed Link |
| (69) | Člen 1 medvladnega sporazuma se nanaša na stalno povezavo, ki se financira s cestninami. Medvladni sporazum v členu 14 določa tudi, da stroške zasnove projekta in drugih priprav za stalno povezavo ter njene izgradnje, vzdrževanja in obratovanja v celoti krije konzorcij z uporabninami. Člen 14 nadalje določa, da sta se Danska in Švedska dogovorili, da se za dejavnosti konzorcija ne bi smele dodeliti subvencije iz proračunov zadevnih držav. | (69) | Article 1 of the Intergovernmental Agreement refers to a ‘toll-financed’ Fixed Link. The Intergovernmental Agreement also specifies, in Article 14, that the costs of the project design and other preparations for the Fixed Link, as well as its construction, maintenance, and operation, shall be fully covered by the Consortium through user charges. Article 14, further, stipulates that Denmark and Sweden agreed that no subsidies should be granted for the activities of the Consortium from the budgets of the respective States. |
| (70) | Oddelek 4(6) sporazuma o konzorciju v bistvu določa, da so cestnine, ki se zaračunajo uporabnikom stalne povezave, namenjene kritju stroškov načrtovanja, zasnove projekta, gradnje, obratovanja in vzdrževanja stalne povezave. Cestnine v skladu z načeli, o katerih sta se dogovorili švedska in danska vlada, določa in pobira konzorcij. Kot je navedeno v pripravljalnih opombah k zakonu o gradnji (26) (v nadaljnjem besedilu: pripravljalne opombe k zakonu o gradnji) in v predlogu zakona št. 1990/91:158, so prihodki od cestnega in železniškega prometa, ki jih zbere konzorcij za uporabo stalne povezave, namenjeni tudi financiranju cestnih in železniških povezav z zaledjem. V praksi to pomeni, da konzorcij matičnima družbama izplača dividende. | (70) | Section 4(6) of the Consortium Agreement provides, in essence, that the toll charges to be levied on the users of the Fixed Link are intended to cover the costs of planning, project design, construction, operation, and maintenance of the Fixed Link. The Consortium is to determine and levy the toll charges, in accordance with the principles agreed by the Danish and Swedish Governments. As stated in the preparatory notes to the Construction Act (26) (‘preparatory notes to the Construction Act’), and in the Government bill 1990/91:158, the revenues from road and rail collected by the Consortium for the use of the Fixed Link are intended to finance the road and rail hinterland connections, as well. In practice, this happens through the payment of dividends by the Consortium to the parent companies. |
| (71) | Financiranje s cestninami vključuje pristojbine uporabnikov za uporabo cestninske ceste ter pristojbine, ki jih plačata Trafikverket (v nadaljnjem besedilu: švedska uprava za promet) in Banedanmark (v nadaljnjem besedilu: danska državna uprava za železnico) za uporabo železniške proge Øresund. Švedska uprava za promet in danska državna uprava za železnico konzorciju plačujeta fiksni letni znesek, določen v dodatnem protokolu k medvladnemu sporazumu, v višini 150 milijonov DKK (20,10 milijona EUR) (27) (28) , (29) za vsakega od njih, prilagojen glede na splošni razvoj cen. | (71) | The toll-financing includes fees from users for the use of the toll road, and fees paid by Trafikverket (the ‘Swedish Transport Administration’) and Banedanmark (the ‘Danish State Rail Administration’) for the use of the Øresund railway line. The Swedish Transport Administration and the Danish State Rail Administration pay a fixed annual amount to the Consortium, established in the Additional Protocol to the Intergovernmental Agreement and amounting to DKK 150 million (EUR 20.10 million (27)) (28) , (29) for each of them, adjusted with the general price evolution. |
| (72) | Pripravljalne opombe k zakonu o gradnji vključujejo oceno stroškov načrtovanja, zasnove projekta in gradnje stalne povezave ter danskih cestnih in železniških povezav z zaledjem v višini 11,7 milijarde DKK (30) (1,57 milijarde EUR) oziroma 3,2 milijarde DKK (0,43 milijarde EUR). V predlogu zakona št. 1990/91:158 je za stroške stalne povezave določen razpon od 10 do 12 milijard SEK (31) (od 1,33 do 1,60 milijarde EUR) (32), za stroške zaledja pa največ 1,9 milijarde SEK (0,25 milijarde EUR). Predlog zakona št. 1990/91:158 določa, da najnižja vrednost razpona ustreza švedski oceni, najvišja vrednost pa danski oceni. Navedenim zneskom je bilo treba prišteti stroške financiranja. Stalno povezavo je delno sofinancirala Unija z nepovratnimi sredstvi v višini 127 milijonov EUR v okviru TEN-T. Obrestni neto dolg konzorcija je po dokončanju stalne povezave leta 2000 znašal 19,6 milijarde DKK (33) (2,63 milijarde EUR). Državi sta pojasnili, da so prihodki od odprtja stalne povezave vedno presegali stroške poslovanja in da se obratovanje stalne povezave ni financiralo z dolgom. | (72) | The preparatory notes to the Construction Act include an estimate of the planning, project design, and construction costs of the Fixed Link and the Danish road and rail hinterland connections, amounting to DKK 11,7 billion (30) (EUR 1,57 billion) and DKK 3,2 billion (EUR 0,43 billion) respectively. Government bill 1990/91:158 includes a range for the costs of the Fixed Link of SEK 10 to 12 billion (31) (EUR 1,33 billion to EUR 1,60 billion) (32) and a maximum amount for the cost of the hinterland of SEK 1,9 billion (EUR 0,25 billion). The Government bill 1990/91:158 specifies that the lowest value of the range corresponds to the Swedish estimate and the highest value to the Danish estimate. To those amounts the financing costs were to be added. The Fixed Link was partially co-financed by the Union, with a grant of EUR 127 million under the TEN-T Framework. Following the completion of the Fixed Link in 2000, the Consortium’s interest-bearing net debt totalled DKK 19,6 billion (33) (EUR 2,63 billion). The States explained that, since the opening of the Fixed Link, the revenues have always exceeded operating costs and the operation of the Fixed Link has not been financed with debt. |
| (73) | Matični družbi sta konzorciju ob ustanovitvi v skladu z oddelkom 4(1) sporazuma o konzorciju in členom 11 medvladnega sporazuma zagotovili ustanovni kapital v skupni višini 50 milijonov DKK (6,70 milijona EUR). Člen 11 medvladnega sporazuma določa tudi, da konzorcij pridobi posojila za financiranje stalne povezave, člen 12 medvladnega sporazuma pa določa, da državi „solidarno jamčita za obveznosti v zvezi s posojili [konzorcija] in drugimi finančnimi instrumenti, uporabljenimi za financiranje“. To se odraža v oddelku 4(3) sporazuma o konzorciju, ki določa, da se kapitalske zahteve konzorcija „izpolnijo z najetjem posojil ali izdajo finančnih instrumentov na odprtem trgu, ki bodo zavarovana s poroštvom švedske in danske vlade“. | (73) | When founded, the Consortium was provided with initial capital by its parent companies, of a total of DKK 50 million (EUR 6,70 million), pursuant to Section 4(1) of the Consortium Agreement and as provided for by Article 11 of the Intergovernmental Agreement. Article 11 of the Intergovernmental Agreement also provides that the Consortium shall raise loans to finance the Fixed Link, and Article 12 of the Intergovernmental Agreement provides that the States shall ‘jointly and severally guarantee the obligations in respect of the [Consortium]’s loans and other financial instruments used in connection with the financing’. This is reflected in Section 4(3) of the Consortium Agreement, which provides that the capital requirements of the Consortium shall ‘be satisfied by obtaining loans or the issuance of financial instruments in the open market, with security in the form of Swedish and Danish government guarantees’. |
| (74) | Konzorcij je pridobil posojila, saj so se likvidnostne potrebe pojavile v fazi načrtovanja in gradnje. Kot sta državi pojasnili, se dolg redno refinancira, da bi se znižali skupni stroški financiranja. Konzorcij je sklenil več vrst finančnih transakcij: obveznice v okviru nekaterih programov obveznic (uvodne izjave 75 do 78), posamezna posojila (uvodna izjava 79), kreditne aranžmaje (uvodna izjava 80) in izvedene finančne instrumente (uvodne izjave 81, 82 in 83). Vsaka od navedenih transakcij ima svoj datum zapadlosti. | (74) | The Consortium raised loans as liquidity needs arose during the planning and construction phase. The debt is regularly refinanced with the purpose, as the States explained, of reducing the overall financing costs. The Consortium entered into several types of financial transactions: bonds under certain bond programmes (recitals (75) to (78)), individual loans (recital (79)), credit facilities (recital (80)), and derivatives (recitals (81) to (83)). Those transactions each have their own maturity date. |
| (75) | Konzorcij je vzpostavil dva standardna programa srednjeročnih obveznic (Medium Term Note – MTN), enega za evropski trg obveznic (v nadaljnjem besedilu: program EMTN) in drugega za švedski trg obveznic (v nadaljnjem besedilu: švedski program MTN). Konzorcij je z navedenima programoma obveznic MTN zadostil večini svojih kapitalskih potreb. Državi sta pojasnili, da je glavna prednost programov obveznic ta, da lahko konzorcij časovno in stroškovno učinkovito izda več dolžniških instrumentov v okviru istega programa. Programi obveznic zajemajo vrsto dokumentov, vključno z informacijskim memorandumom (34), ki je osrednji programski dokument. Vzpostavitev programa obveznic sama po sebi ne pomeni, da je nastal kakršen koli dolg. Tako je mogoče imeti program obveznic brez kakršnih koli osnovnih obveznic. Dolg nastane šele, ko se obveznice izdajo vlagateljem. | (75) | The Consortium has established two standard Medium Term Note (‘MTN’) bond programmes, one directed towards the European bond market (the ‘EMTN programme’) and the other directed towards the Swedish bond market (the ‘Swedish MTN programme’). Through those MTN bond programmes, the Consortium has raised the majority of its capital needs. The States explained that the main benefit of the bond programmes is that the Consortium can make several issuances of debt instruments under the same programme in a time- and cost-efficient manner. The bond programmes consist of a series of documents, including an information memorandum (34), which is the central programme document. The establishment of a bond programme does not, per se, mean that any debt has been established. As such, it is possible to have a bond programme without any underlying bonds. The debt is only established when bonds are issued to investors. |
| (76) | Prvi program obveznic konzorcija je bil program EMTN, ki je bil vzpostavljen 21. septembra 1995 in se letno posodablja. Državi sta pojasnili, da se navedene posodobitve izvajajo zato, da odražajo posodobitev dejavnikov tveganja in da se trgu zagotovijo pravilne informacije o konzorciju, njegovem upravljanju, nekaterih pomembnih dogodkih itd. Navedene posodobitve se zahtevajo v okviru stalnih obveznosti obveščanja finančnih trgov. Najvišji skupni znesek glavnice programa EMTN se je z 1 milijarde USD (0,76 milijarde EUR) (35) povečal na 2 milijardi USD (2,17 milijarde EUR) (36) leta 2000 in 3 milijarde USD (2,41 milijarde EUR) (37) leta 2004. | (76) | The Consortium’s first bond programme was a EMTN programme established on 21 September 1995, and which is updated on an annual basis. The States explained that those updates are done to reflect an update of risk factors and to supply correct information to the market on the Consortium, its management, certain important events, etc. Those updates are required as part of the ongoing information obligations to the financial markets. The maximum aggregate principal amount of the EMTN programme increased from USD 1 billion (EUR 0,76 billion) (35) to USD 2 billion (EUR 2,17 billion) (36) in 2000, and to USD 3 billion (EUR 2,41 billion) (37) in 2004. |
| (77) | Švedski program MTN, v okviru katerega bi konzorcij lahko najel posojila v švedski kroni s skupnim zneskom glavnice v višini 3 milijarde SEK (0,35 milijarde EUR) (38), je bil vzpostavljen 2. decembra 1996. Posodablja se priložnostno. Posodobitve (39) vključujejo na primer dodajanje kreditnih institucij izdajateljic v okviru programa ali pravico konzorcija do izdajanja posojil v eurih namesto v kronah. Skupni znesek glavnice švedskega programa MTN je bil posodobljen dvakrat in od leta 2000 znaša 10 milijard SEK (1,17 milijarde EUR) (40). | (77) | The Swedish MTN programme, under which the Consortium could take out loans in Swedish krona, with an aggregate principal amount of SEK 3 billion (EUR 0,35 billion) (38) was established on 2 December 1996. The Swedish MTN programme has been updated on an ad hoc basis. Updates (39) include, for example, the addition of issuing credit institutions under the programme, or an entitlement for the Consortium to issue loans in euro instead of krona. The aggregate principal amount of the Swedish MTN programme has been updated on two occasions and amounts, since 2000, to SEK 10 billion (EUR 1,17 billion) (40). |
| (78) | Konzorcij je pridobil obveznice v okviru navedenega programa EMTN in švedskega programa MTN za financiranje in refinanciranje stroškov načrtovanja in gradnje stalne povezave. Ko obveznica v okviru programa EMTN ali švedskega programa MTN zapade in jo je treba refinancirati, se začne postopek izdaje in z banko se s pogajanji sklenejo dogovori o posebnih podrobnostih navedene obveznice, ki se določijo v dokumentu o cenovnih pogojih navedene obveznice (znesek, obrestna mera, podrobnosti o plačilu itd.). | (78) | The Consortium has obtained bonds under those EMTN and Swedish MTN programmes in order to finance and refinance the costs of planning and construction of the Fixed Link. Once a bond under the EMTN programme or the Swedish MTN programme has become due and needs to be refinanced, the origination process commences and arrangements with a bank regarding the specific details of that bond are negotiated and set forth in the pricing terms document of that bond (amount, interest rate, payment details, etc). |
| (79) | Kot je navedeno v uvodni izjavi 74, je konzorcij neposredno pridobil tudi več posojil zunaj okvira navedenih programov MTN. Zlasti v fazi gradnje stalne povezave je od Evropske investicijske banke (EIB) pridobil več posojil s sklenitvijo finančnih pogodb, ki vsebujejo pogoje posojila, in posojila neposredno od zasebnih posojilodajalcev s sklenitvijo samostojnih posojilnih pogodb. | (79) | As set out at recital (74), the Consortium also directly obtained several loans, outside the context of those MTN programmes. In particular, during the construction phase of the Fixed Link, the Consortium obtained several loans from the European Investment Bank (‘EIB’), by entering into finance contracts that contain the terms and conditions of the loan, and the Consortium obtained loans directly from private lenders, entering into standalone loan agreements. |
| (80) | Poleg tega je imel konzorcij pri nekaterih bankah kreditne aranžmaje za namene plačevanja čez noč in za kratkoročne spremembe likvidnosti. Kreditni aranžmaji so bili vzpostavljeni leta 1994 in se obnavljajo vsaka štiri leta. | (80) | Furthermore, the Consortium has held credit facilities with certain banks for overnight payment purposes and for short term variations in liquidity. The credit facilities were established in 1994 and are renewed every four years. |
| (81) | Nazadnje, posojila se običajno, vendar ne nujno, kombinirajo s posli z izvedenimi finančnimi instrumenti, in sicer zaradi prerazporeditve in zmanjšanja finančnega tveganja, povezanega s posojilom (kot so obrestna izpostavljenost ali valutna tveganja), ali optimizacije celotnega portfelja finančnih transakcij. Taki instrumenti, večinoma posli zamenjave, se sklenejo med konzorcijem in zadevnimi bankami, ki ponujajo navedene finančne produkte. Posel z izvedenimi finančnimi instrumenti se običajno sklene z isto banko, ki je uredila posojilo, vendar to ni obvezno. | (81) | Finally, the loans are usually, but not necessarily, combined with a derivative transaction to re-allocate and mitigate the financial risk related to the loan (such as interest rate exposure or currency risks), or to optimise the entire portfolio of financial transactions. Such instruments, mostly swap transactions, are entered into between the Consortium and relevant banks offering those financial products. Usually, a derivative transaction is entered into with the same bank that arranged the loan, but this is not mandatory. |
| (82) | Za sklenitev takega posla se z vsako nasprotno stranko podpiše krovna pogodba Mednarodnega združenja za zamenjave in izvedene finančne instrumente (ISDA) (v nadaljnjem besedilu: krovna pogodba za poslovanje z izvedenimi finančnimi instrumenti). Krovna pogodba za poslovanje z izvedenimi finančnimi instrumenti je okvirni sporazum, ki ga je izdalo združenje ISDA. Okvirni sporazum zajema standardno osnovno dokumentacijo, ki zagotavlja, da za vse transakcije med konzorcijem in določeno nasprotno banko velja ista dokumentacija in da bodo vse transakcije predmet pobota, če katera od strank postane insolventna ali kako drugače pride do neplačila. | (82) | In order to enter into such a transaction, an International Swaps and Derivatives Association (‘ISDA’) master agreement (‘ISDA Master Agreement’) is signed with each counterparty. The ISDA Master Agreement is a framework agreement issued by the ISDA. The framework consists of standard base documentation, which ensures that all transactions between the Consortium and the particular counterparty bank are subject to the same documentation, and that all transactions will be subject to netting in case a party becomes insolvent or enters default in other ways. |
| (83) | Konzorcij je z nekaterimi bankami sklenil tudi globalne krovne pogodbe o začasni prodaji (Global Master Repurchase Agreements) z namenom sklepanja repo poslov (41), predvsem za uporabo kot zavarovanje pri poslih z izvedenimi finančnimi instrumenti. Vendar na podlagi takih sporazumov ni bil sklenjen noben posel, zato se ti sporazumi niso nikoli izkoristili. | (83) | The Consortium has also entered into Global Master Repurchase Agreements with certain banks, with the aim of entering into repurchase transactions (41), primarily for use as collateral for derivative transactions. However, no transactions have been entered into pursuant such agreements and, as such, the agreements have never been utilised. |
| 2.2 Opis domnevnih ukrepov pomoči | 2.2. Description of alleged aid measures |
| (84) | Kot je navedeno v uvodni izjavi 50 sklepa o začetku postopka, formalni postopek preiskave zajema naslednje ukrepe, sprejete za financiranje gradnje in obratovanja stalne povezave: (i) državna poroštva, ki sta jih Švedska in Danska odobrili za posojila in finančne instrumente, ki jih je najel konzorcij, (ii) danska pravila o prenosu izgub v prihodnje obdobje, ki se uporabljajo za konzorcij, in (iii) danska pravila o amortizaciji sredstev, ki se uporabljajo za konzorcij. V oddelku 2.2.1 je podrobneje pojasnjena točka (i), v oddelku 2.2.2 pa točki (ii) in (iii). Kot je navedeno v uvodni izjavi 51 sklepa o začetku postopka, formalni postopek preiskave ne zajema morebitnih drugih ukrepov, ki jih je Danska ali Švedska odobrila konzorciju, družbam A/S Øresund, SVEDAB, Sund & Bælt ali kateri koli povezani družbi. V uvodni izjavi 48 sklepa o začetku postopka je bilo pojasnjeno, da ukrepi v korist družb SVEDAB in A/S Øresund, ki so pomembni za financiranje cestnih in železniških povezav z zaledjem, ne pomenijo državne pomoči v smislu člena 107(1) PDEU. | (84) | As noted at recital 50 of the Opening decision, the formal investigation procedure covers the following measures taken to finance the construction and operation of the Fixed Link: (i) the State guarantees granted by Sweden and Denmark for loans and financial instruments taken out by the Consortium, (ii) the Danish rules applicable to the Consortium with regard to loss carry-forward and (iii) the Danish rules applicable to the Consortium with regard to the depreciation of assets. Section 2.2.1 further elaborates on point (i) and Section 2.2.2 elaborates on point (ii) and (iii). As noted at recital 51 of the Opening decision, the formal investigation procedure does not cover other possible measures granted by Denmark or Sweden to the Consortium, A/S Øresund, SVEDAB, Sund & Bælt, or any other related company. Recital 48 of the Opening decision clarified that the measures in favour of SVEDAB and A/S Øresund, relevant to the financing of the road and rail hinterland connections, do not constitute State aid within the meaning of Article 107(1) TFEU. |
| 2.2.1 Model državnega poroštva | 2.2.1. The State guarantee model |
| 2.2.1.1 Pravna vzpostavitev modela državnega poroštva | 2.2.1.1. Legal set up of the State guarantee model |
| (85) | Državi sta se v skladu s členom 12 medvladnega sporazuma zavezali, da bosta solidarno jamčili za vsa posojila in druge finančne instrumente, ki jih je konzorcij najel v zvezi s financiranjem stalne povezave. Dodatni protokol k medvladnemu sporazumu določa, da bi bilo treba navedene sporazume o poroštvu zagotoviti brez zaračunavanja poroštvene premije (42). Komisija za namene tega sklepa uporablja izraz „model državnega poroštva“ za splošno ureditev, ki zajema obveznost solidarnega državnega poroštva, ki izhaja iz člena 12 medvladnega sporazuma in se izvaja v danski in švedski zakonodaji (glej uvodne izjave 86 do 90), upravljanje navedene obveznosti s strani danske nacionalne banke in švedskega urada za javni dolg (glej uvodne izjave 91 do 102) in izvajanje navedene obveznosti s posebnimi sporazumi o poroštvu, ki se nanašajo na primer na programe obveznic in posamezna posojila (glej uvodne izjave 103 do 116). | (85) | According to Article 12 of the Intergovernmental Agreement, the States undertook to jointly and severally guarantee all loans and other financial instruments taken out by the Consortium in connection with the financing of the Fixed Link. The Additional Protocol to the Intergovernmental Agreement states that those guarantee agreements should be provided without charging a guarantee premium (42). For the purposes of this decision, the Commission uses the term ‘State guarantee model’ to refer to the overall arrangement consisting of the joint and several State guarantee obligation deriving from Article 12 of the Intergovernmental Agreement and implemented in Danish and Swedish legislation (see further, recitals (86) to (90)), the administration of that obligation by the Danish National Bank and the Swedish National Debt Office (see further, recitals (91) to (102)) and the implementation of that obligation by means of specific guarantee agreements relating, for example, to bond programmes and individual loans (see further, recitals (103) to (116)). |
| (86) | Kot je opisano v uvodni izjavi 63, je bila obveznost solidarnega državnega poroštva za posojila konzorcija, ki izhaja iz medvladnega sporazuma, prenesena v švedsko in dansko nacionalno zakonodajo leta 1991, in sicer s sklepom švedskega parlamenta in zakonom o gradnji. | (86) | As described at recital (63), the joint and several State guarantee obligation for the Consortium’s borrowing, deriving from the Intergovernmental Agreement, was implemented in Swedish and Danish national legislation in 1991, via the Swedish Parliament decision and the Construction Act. |
| (87) | Na Danskem je bila obveznost solidarnega državnega poroštva za posojila konzorcija izvedena s členom 8 zakona o gradnji. Ta je bil pozneje nadomeščen s členom 11 zakona št. 588 z dne 24. junija 2005 (43) (v nadaljnjem besedilu: zakon o družbi Sund & Bælt). Obe določbi sta vsebinsko enaki in določata, da danska država jamči za obveznosti v zvezi s posojili konzorcija in drugimi finančnimi instrumenti, uporabljenimi za financiranje stalne povezave (44). | (87) | In Denmark, the joint and several State guarantee obligation for the Consortium’s borrowing was implemented by Section 8 of the Construction Act. This was subsequently replaced by Section 11 of Act No 588 of 24 June 2005 (43) (the ‘Sund & Bælt Act’). Both provisions are substantially identical and provide that the Danish State shall guarantee the obligations relating to the Consortium’s loans and other financial instruments that are used in connection with the financing of the Fixed Link. (44) |
| (88) | V pripravljalnih opombah k zakonu o gradnji je navedeno, da danska država v skladu s členom 8 zakona o gradnji jamči za plačila obresti in glavnice ter druge obveznosti v zvezi s posojili in finančnimi instrumenti, ki jih konzorcij uporablja za financiranje stalne povezave. V navedenih pripravljalnih opombah je nadalje pojasnjeno, da je podlaga za člen 8 zakona o gradnji člen 12 medvladnega sporazuma, iz katerega izhaja, da državi solidarno jamčita za navedene obveznosti in da sta vzajemno enako odgovorni. Navedeno je tudi, da namen držav pri odločanju o organizacijski ureditvi (uvodna izjava 62) ni bil omejiti odgovornost, ki jo imata kot ekonomska poroka za financiranje stalne povezave. | (88) | The preparatory notes to the Construction Act state that Section 8 of the Construction Act entails that the Danish State guarantees the interest and principal payments and other commitments relating to loans and financial instruments that the Consortium uses for financing the Fixed Link. Those preparatory notes further clarify that the background for Section 8 of the Construction Act is Article 12 of the Intergovernmental Agreement, which entails that the States guarantee jointly and severally those obligations and that the States mutually hold equal responsibility. Those preparatory notes also state that it had not been the intention of the States, when deciding on the organisational set up (recital (62)), to limit their liability as economic guarantors for the financing of the Fixed Link. |
| (89) | Na Švedskem oddelek 7 predloga zakona št. 1990/91:158, kot je bil sprejet s sklepom švedskega parlamenta, vključuje zahtevo, da švedski parlament pooblasti vlado ali organ, ki ga določi vlada, da v imenu švedske države solidarno z dansko državo prevzame poroštvo za posojila konzorcija in druge finančne instrumente, uporabljene za financiranje načrtovanja, zasnove projekta, gradnje in obratovanja stalne povezave. Oddelek 4 predloga zakona št. 1990/91:158, kot je bil sprejet s sklepom švedskega parlamenta, vključuje predlagano organizacijsko strukturo in financiranje stalne povezave, vključno z obveznostjo poroštva. Določa, da bo konzorcij na začetku potreboval znatna finančna sredstva, ki bi jih moral pridobiti z najemanjem posojil na trgu. Za navedena posojila solidarno jamčita državi, kar pomeni, da obe državi posamično jamčita za celotni znesek, pri čemer imata druga do druge regresno pravico za polovico zneska. Oddelek 4 predloga zakona št. 1990/91:158, kot je bil sprejet s sklepom švedskega parlamenta, nadalje določa, da bi moral imeti konzorcij možnost financiranja stalne povezave pod ugodnimi pogoji. Skupne poroštvene obveznosti v zvezi s stalno povezavo so bile v času njenega dokončanja ocenjene na približno 15 milijard SEK (2,01 milijarde EUR) (45) , (46), vključevale pa so stroške gradnje in financiranja. Ugotovljeno je bilo tudi, da je pri projektih, kot je stalna povezava, z velikimi naložbami, ki se izvajajo več let, izjemno težko oceniti točen znesek, saj so stroški projekta v tekočih cenah med drugim odvisni od prihodnjih obrestnih mer in splošnega gibanja cen. Vlada je zato parlamentu nameravala predložiti poročilo o napredku projekta. Poleg tega je bilo navedeno, da bo imel konzorcij v prvih letih operativne faze negativne rezultate, saj prihodki od uporabnin ne bodo zadostovali za kritje vseh stroškov konzorcija. Navedeni primanjkljaj bi pokrila holdinga s prispevki ali konzorcij s posojili. V predlogu zakona št. 1990/91:158 je navedeno, da bi bila najboljša rešitev, če bi konzorcij sam pridobil potrebna sredstva s solidarnim poroštvom držav. V skladu s tem so bile skupne poroštvene obveznosti v zvezi s tem ocenjene na približno 1,8 milijarde SEK (0,24 milijarde EUR) (47) , (48). Vlada je v zvezi s tem nameravala parlamentu poročati o napredku projekta. | (89) | In Sweden, Section 7 of Government bill 1990/91:158, as adopted by the Swedish Parliament decision, includes a request for the Swedish parliament to authorise the Government, or the authority determined by the Government, to assume on behalf of the Swedish State, jointly and severally with the Danish State, a guarantee for the Consortium’s loans and other financial instruments that are used in connection with the financing of the planning, project design, construction and operation of the Fixed Link. Section 4 of Government bill 1990/91:158, as adopted by the Swedish Parliament decision, includes the proposed organisation structure and financing of the Fixed Link, including the guarantee obligation. It provides that the Consortium will initially need significant financial funding which the Consortium should obtain by raising loans on the market. That borrowing shall be jointly and severally guaranteed by the States, which entails that both States individually guarantee the entire amount, with a right of recourse against each other for half of the amount. Section 4 of Government bill 1990/91:158, as adopted by the Swedish Parliament decision, further provides that like this, the Consortium should be able to finance the Fixed Link on favourable terms. The total guarantee commitments related to the Fixed Link were estimated to reach approximately SEK 15 billion (EUR 2,01 billion) (45) , (46) at the time of its completion, and included construction and financing costs. It was also noted that, for projects like the Fixed Link, with large investments over several years, it was extraordinarily difficult to estimate an exact amount, since the project costs in current prices depended, inter alia, on future interest rates and general price trends. The Government therefore intended to return to the Parliament with a report on how the project would progress. Furthermore, it was stated that during the initial years of the operational phase, the Consortium would experience negative results, since revenues from user tolls would be insufficient to completely cover the Consortium’s costs. That deficit would be covered either by the holding companies, through contributions, or by the Consortium, through loans. The Government bill 1990/91:158 states that the best solution would be that the Consortium obtained the necessary funds itself, with a joint and several guarantee from the States. Correspondingly, the total guarantee commitments in this respect were estimated to reach approximately SEK 1,8 billion (EUR 0,24 billion) (47) , (48). The Government intended, in this regard, to report to the Parliament on the progress of the project. |
| (90) | V sporazumu o konzorciju se opozarja na to obveznost solidarnega državnega poroštva za posojila konzorcija. V zadevnem sporazumu je v oddelku 4(3) določeno: „Kapitalske zahteve konzorcija za načrtovanje, zasnovo projekta in gradnjo [stalne povezave], vključno s stroški servisiranja posojil in za kritje kapitalskih zahtev, ki izvirajo iz računovodske izgube, ki se predvideva za nekaj let po odprtju [stalne povezave] za promet, je treba v skladu z določbami [medvladnega sporazuma] izpolniti z najetjem posojil ali izdajo finančnih instrumentov na odprtem trgu, ki bodo zavarovana s poroštvom švedske in danske vlade“. | (90) | The Consortium Agreement recalls this joint and several State guarantee obligation for the Consortium’s borrowing. It provides, at Section 4(3): ‘The Consortium’s capital requirements for the planning, project design and construction of the [Fixed Link], including loan servicing costs, and for covering the capital requirements arising as a consequence of book losses which are expected to occur for a number of years after the [Fixed Link] has been opened to traffic, shall, in accordance with that agreed in the [Intergovernmental Agreement], be satisfied by obtaining loans or the issuance of financial instruments in the open market with security in the form of Swedish and Danish government guarantees.’ |
| 2.2.1.2 Upravljanje modela državnega poroštva | 2.2.1.2. Administration of the State guarantee model |
| (91) | Na Švedskem sta bili pristojnost in obveznost skupnega dodeljevanja poroštev za vsa finančna sredstva, ki jih konzorcij potrebuje v zvezi s stalno povezavo, preneseni na Riksgäldskontoret (v nadaljnjem besedilu: švedski urad za javni dolg)) s sklepi švedske vlade z dne 13. februarja 1992 (K91/1443/3, K92/320/3), 1. aprila 1993 (K91/1443/3, K93/202/3) in 23. junija 1994 (K91/1443/3, K94/1680/3). | (91) | In Sweden, the competence and obligation to jointly assign guarantees for all financing needed by the Consortium in relation to the Fixed Link was delegated to Riksgäldskontoret (the ‘Swedish National Debt Office’) by decisions of the Swedish Government of 13 February 1992 (K91/1443/3, K92/320/3), 1 April 1993 (K91/1443/3, K93/202/3) and 23 June 1994 (K91/1443/3, K94/1680/3). |
| (92) | Švedska vlada je s sklepom z dne 13. februarja 1992 (K91/1443/3, K92/320/3) potrdila sporazum o konzorciju. | (92) | The decision of the Swedish Government of 13 February 1992 (K91/1443/3, K92/320/3) approved the Consortium Agreement. |
| (93) | Švedska vlada je s sklepom z dne 1. aprila 1993 (K91/1443/3, K93/202/3) švedski urad za javni dolg pooblastila, da solidarno z dansko državo izda poroštva v višini 600 milijonov SEK (65,78 milijona EUR) (49) in 600 milijonov DKK (80,42 milijona EUR). To se je nanašalo na financiranje načrtovanja in zasnove projekta s strani konzorcija. | (93) | The decision of the Swedish Government of 1 April 1993 (K91/1443/3, K93/202/3) authorised the Swedish National Debt Office to issue, jointly and severally with the Danish State, guarantees in the amount of SEK 600 million (EUR 65,78 million) (49) and DKK 600 million (EUR 80,42 million). This related to financing for the Consortium’s planning and project design. |
| (94) | Švedska vlada je s sklepom z dne 23. junija 1994 (K91/1443/3, K94/1680/3) švedski urad za javni dolg pooblastila in mu naložila obveznost, da v imenu švedske države in solidarno z dansko državo upravlja in izdaja poroštva za kritje vseh finančnih potreb konzorcija zaradi stroškov, povezanih z načrtovanjem, zasnovo projekta, gradnjo in obratovanjem stalne povezave v skladu z medvladnim sporazumom. Sklep švedske vlade z dne 23. junija 1994 ni bil spremenjen. | (94) | The decision of the Swedish Government of 23 June 1994 (K91/1443/3, K94/1680/3) authorised and imposed a commitment on the Swedish National Debt Office to administer and issue guarantees on behalf of the Swedish State and jointly and severally with the Danish State to cover all of the Consortium’s financing needs for costs related to the planning, project design, construction and operation of the Fixed Link, in accordance with the Intergovernmental Agreement. The decision of the Swedish Government of 23 June 1994 has not been subject to amendments. |
| (95) | Na Danskem je bilo na Nationalbanken (v nadaljnjem besedilu: danska nacionalna banka) preneseno ustrezno pooblastilo na podlagi zakona o gradnji. Na Danskem javni dolg v imenu ministrstva za finance na podlagi pooblastila upravlja danska nacionalna banka. Ko je bilo dansko ministrstvo za finance na podlagi zakona o gradnji pooblaščeno, da v imenu danske države solidarno s švedsko državo prevzame poroštvo za financiranje stalne povezave, je bila tudi danska nacionalna banka pooblaščena za prevzem te obveznosti solidarnega državnega poroštva. | (95) | In Denmark, Nationalbanken (the ‘Danish National Bank’) received a corresponding delegation through the Construction Act. In Denmark, the government debt is managed by the Danish National Bank, on behalf of the Ministry of Finance, through a power of attorney. Therefore, when the Construction Act authorised the Danish Ministry of Finance to assume – jointly and severally with the Swedish State – a guarantee on behalf of the Danish State for the financing of the Fixed Link, it also authorised the Danish National Bank to assume this joint and several State guarantee obligation. |
| (96) | Kot je navedeno v uvodni izjavi 30 sklepa o začetku postopka, danska nacionalna banka in švedski urad za javni dolg opredelita splošni okvir za politiko financiranja konzorcija (glej uvodne izjave 97 do 102) in nadzorujeta izvajanje modela državnega poroštva, kadar konzorcij podpiše nove posojilne pogodbe ali uporabi druge finančne instrumente v zvezi s financiranjem stalne povezave (glej uvodne izjave 103 do 116). Državi sta v pripombah v odgovor na sklep o začetku postopka (50) predložili dodatne podrobnosti o navedenih elementih, ki so vključeni v pregled v nadaljevanju. | (96) | As noted at recital 30 of the Opening decision, the Danish National Bank and the Swedish National Debt Office define the general framework for the Consortium’s financing policy (see further, recitals (97) to (102)), and supervise the implementation of the State guarantee model when the Consortium signs new loan agreements or uses other financial instruments in connection with the financing of the Fixed Link (see further, recitals (103) to (116)). In their comments in response to the Opening decision (50), the States provided further details on those elements, which are included in the overview below. |
| (97) | Danska nacionalna banka in švedski urad za javni dolg (v imenu držav) ter konzorcij so 16. decembra 1997 podpisali tristranski sporazum o sodelovanju (v nadaljnjem besedilu: sporazum o sodelovanju iz leta 1997), ki ureja nekatere posle strank, vključno z regresno pravico danske nacionalne banke in švedskega urada za javni dolg zoper konzorcij ter njihovimi obveznostmi poročanja in obveščanja (glej uvodno izjavo 99). Navedeni sporazum je bil dopolnjen s sporazumom med konzorcijem in švedsko državo (prek švedskega urada za javni dolg), ki je bil sklenjen 23. oktobra 2000 (glej uvodno izjavo 100). Sporazum o sodelovanju iz leta 1997 je bil nadomeščen z novim tristranskim sporazumom o sodelovanju, sklenjenim 8. novembra 2004 (v nadaljnjem besedilu: sporazum o sodelovanju iz leta 2004) (glej uvodno izjavo 101). Navedeni sporazum je bil dopolnjen s sporazumom med konzorcijem in švedsko državo (prek švedskega urada za javni dolg), ki je bil sklenjen 14. novembra 2012 (glej uvodno izjavo 102). | (97) | On 16 December 1997, the Danish National Bank and the Swedish National Debt Office (on behalf of the States) and the Consortium signed a tripartite cooperation agreement (the ‘1997 Cooperation Agreement’) to regulate some of the parties’ dealings, including the right of recourse of the Danish National Bank and the Swedish National Debt Office against the Consortium, and the Consortium’s reporting and information obligations to them (see further, recital (99)). That agreement was supplemented by an agreement between the Consortium and the Swedish State (through the Swedish National Debt Office), concluded on 23 October 2000 (see further, recital (100)). The 1997 Cooperation Agreement was replaced by a new tripartite cooperation agreement, concluded on 8 November 2004 (the ‘2004 Cooperation Agreement’) (see further, recital (101)). That agreement was supplemented by an agreement between the Consortium and the Swedish State (through the Swedish National Debt Office), concluded on 14 November 2012 (see further, recital (102)). |
| (98) | Sporazuma o sodelovanju iz let 1997 in 2004 vsebujeta številne formalne pogoje, pravice in obveznosti pogodbenic. Državi sta pojasnili, da so bile navedene praktične upravne ureditve švedskega urada za javni dolg in danske nacionalne banke uvedene, da bi se državama omogočila spremljanje in vplivanje na politiko financiranja konzorcija ter zagotovilo, da konzorcij ne preseže svojih pooblastil in da se upošteva politika financiranja, ki zmanjšuje dolgoročno tveganje držav. Po mnenju držav se je z navedenim mehanizmom zagotavljalo tudi, da pomoč, dodeljena konzorciju, ne presega tistega, kar je potrebno. | (98) | The 1997 and 2004 Cooperation Agreements contain a number of formal terms, rights, and obligations for the parties. The States explained that those practical administrative arrangements by the Swedish National Debt Office and the Danish National Bank were introduced in order to give the States an opportunity to monitor and influence the Consortium’s financing policy, and to ensure that the Consortium does not exceed its mandate and that a financing policy is followed that minimises the States’ long-term risk. According to the States, that mechanism further ensured that the aid granted to the Consortium does not go beyond what is necessary. |
| (99) | V sporazumu o sodelovanju iz leta 1997 je navedeno, da nameravata danska nacionalna banka in švedski urad za javni dolg v primeru aktivacije poroštev svojo regresno pravico omejiti na konzorcij in je torej ne bosta uporabila proti matičnima družbama. V njem je naveden načrt odplačevanja, ki ga je mogoče občasno prilagoditi, in omejitve tveganja za likvidnostne naložbe in posle z izvedenimi finančnimi instrumenti, ki jih opravi konzorcij, določa pa tudi nekatere obveznosti obveščanja in poročanja. Prav tako določa nekatere podrobnosti o poslih najemanja posojil in poslih z izvedenimi finančnimi instrumenti, za katere jamčita državi. Konzorcij mora zato za vse svoje transakcije, kot so posojila in krovne pogodbe za poslovanje z izvedenimi finančnimi instrumenti, pridobiti odobritev danske nacionalne banke in švedskega urada za javni dolg. Z nasprotnimi strankami ne sme sklepati transakcij, ki niso prejele predhodne odobritve danske nacionalne banke in švedskega urada za javni dolg. Za vso pogodbeno dokumentacijo v zvezi z zadolževanjem konzorcija mora pridobiti odobritev danske nacionalne banke in švedskega urada za javni dolg. Danska nacionalna banka in švedski urad za javni dolg morata oceniti, ali so posamezni sporazumi pomembni ali bi lahko postali pomembni za obseg njune obveznosti solidarnega državnega poroštva, njihovo tveganje in vse druge okoliščine, ki bi lahko vplivale na obveznost poroštva ali dajalce poroštva. | (99) | The 1997 Cooperation Agreement specifies that the Danish National Bank and the Swedish National Debt Office intend to limit their right of recourse, in case of activation of guarantees, to the Consortium, and, therefore, not to use it against the parent companies. It contains a repayment plan, which can be adjusted from time to time, risk limits for liquidity investments and derivative transactions by the Consortium, and specifies certain information and reporting obligations. That agreement also provides certain details on borrowing and derivative transactions that are guaranteed by the States. As such, the Consortium shall obtain approval from the Danish National Bank and the Swedish National Debt Office for all the Consortium’s transactions, such as loans and ISDA Master Agreements. The Consortium shall not enter into transactions with counterparties that have not received the prior approval of the Danish National Bank and the Swedish National Debt Office. The Consortium shall obtain the approval of the Danish National Bank and the Swedish National Debt Office for all contract documentation in connection with the Consortium’s borrowing. The Danish National Bank and the Swedish National Debt Office will assess whether the individual agreements are, or may become, of importance for the scope of their joint and several State guarantee obligation, their risk, and all other circumstances that may affect the guarantee obligation or the guarantee providers. |
| (100) | V dodatnem sporazumu med konzorcijem in švedsko državo iz oktobra 2000 so opredeljene smernice za najemanje posojil, zavarovanih z državnim poroštvom, in upravljanje portfeljev konzorcija ter je določeno, da v primeru skladnosti konzorcija z navedenimi smernicami ni treba, da švedski urad za javni dolg odobri posamezne transakcije, preden jih sklene konzorcij. Kar zadeva transakcije, pri katerih je skladnost s smernicami morda nejasna, bi moral konzorcij najprej stopiti v stik s švedskim uradom za javni dolg in pojasniti, zakaj bi se lahko štelo, da so navedene transakcije zajete v sporazumu. | (100) | The supplemental agreement of October 2000 between the Consortium and the Swedish State defines guidelines for the Consortium’s State guaranteed borrowing and portfolio management, and specifies that, if the Consortium complies with those guidelines, individual transactions would not need to be approved by the Swedish National Debt Office before they are entered into by the Consortium. For transactions for which compliance with the guidelines might be unclear, the Consortium should first contact the Swedish National Debt Office and explain why those transactions might be considered as being covered by the agreement. |
| (101) | V sporazumu o sodelovanju iz leta 2004 so navedene nekatere obveznosti in tveganja v zvezi s finančnim poslovodenjem konzorcija. Finančna politika konzorcija vsebuje smernice in pravila za finančno poslovodenje in obvladovanje finančnih tveganj. Finančno politiko in finančno strategijo vsako leto sprejme upravni odbor konzorcija, pri čemer se upoštevajo pripombe danske nacionalne banke in švedskega urada za javni dolg. Sporazum o sodelovanju iz leta 2004 vsebuje oddelek o obveznosti obveščanja in poročanja ter opozarja na regresno pravico danske nacionalne banke in švedskega urada za javni dolg, na obveznost konzorcija, da pridobi odobritev vse pogodbene dokumentacije v zvezi z zadolževanjem in sklenitvijo krovnih pogodb za poslovanje z izvedenimi finančnimi instrumenti, ter na potrebo po pisnem soglasju danske nacionalne banke in švedskega urada za javni dolg za spremembo pogojev transakcije, zavarovane s poroštvom. Če konzorcij sklene transakcije, ki niso v skladu s smernicami iz finančne politike konzorcija, imata danska nacionalna banka in švedski urad za javni dolg skupno in ločeno pravico, da od konzorcija zahtevata, naj v okviru svojega finančnega poslovodenja prekine, zmanjša ali opusti transakcije. Konzorcij mora prav tako pripraviti in stalno posodabljati načrt za dolgoročni razvoj finančnih obveznosti konzorcija, vključno s predstavitvijo načrtovanega odplačila in dividend. | (101) | The 2004 Cooperation Agreement lists certain obligations and risks concerning the Consortium’s financial management. The Consortium shall have a financial policy containing guidelines and rules for financial management and financial risk management. The financial policy and financial strategy are adopted each year by the Consortium’s board of directors, and shall take account of comments of the Danish National Bank and the Swedish National Debt Office. The 2004 Cooperation Agreement contains a section on the information and reporting obligation, recalls the right of recourse of the Danish National Bank and the Swedish National Debt Office, recalls the obligation of the Consortium to obtain the approval of all contract documentation in connection with its borrowing and with its entering into ISDA Master Agreements, and the need for written consent from the Danish National Bank and the Swedish National Debt Office to alter terms or conditions of a guaranteed transaction. In the event that the Consortium enters into transactions falling outside the guidelines stated in the Consortium’s financial policy, the Danish National Bank and the Swedish National Debt Office have the joint and separate right to require the Consortium to cease, run down, or refrain from transactions as part of its financial management. The Consortium shall also draw up, and continuously update, the plan for the long-term development of the Consortium’s financial liabilities, including a presentation of planned repayment and dividends. |
| (102) | V dodatnem sporazumu iz novembra 2012 med konzorcijem in švedsko državo je določeno, da v primeru skladnosti konzorcija z njegovo finančno politiko v smislu sporazuma o sodelovanju iz leta 2004 ni treba, da švedski urad za javni dolg odobri posamezne transakcije, preden jih sklene konzorcij. Kar zadeva druge transakcije, ki niso v skladu s finančno politiko, bi moral konzorcij pridobiti pisno odobritev švedskega urada za javni dolg, da se zagotovi, da je posamezna transakcija krita z obveznostjo solidarnega državnega poroštva. | (102) | The supplemental agreement of November 2012 between the Consortium and the Swedish State specifies that, if the Consortium complies with its financial policy within the meaning of the 2004 Cooperation Agreement, individual transactions do not need to be approved by the Swedish National Debt Office before the Consortium enters into them. For other transactions, which do not comply with the financial policy, the Consortium should obtain the written approval of the Swedish National Debt Office to ensure that the specific transaction is covered by the joint and several State guarantee obligation. |
| 2.2.1.3 Izvajanje modela državnega poroštva | 2.2.1.3. Implementation of State guarantee model |
| (103) | Komisija bo najprej opisala izvajanje modela državnega poroštva, kot se je uporabljal do sodbe v zadevi Øresund z dne 19. septembra 2018 (glej uvodne izjave 104 do 115). V uvodni izjavi 116 so navedene nadaljnje podrobnosti za obdobje po sprejetju navedene sodbe. | (103) | The Commission will first describe the implementation of the State guarantee model as it was applied until the Øresund judgment of 19 September 2018 (see further, recital (104) to (115)). Recital (116) provides further details for the period thereafter. |
| (104) | V obdobju pred sodbo v zadevi Øresund sta za vse dolžniške instrumente (kot so obveznice), izdane v okviru programa EMTN (51), jamčili državi. To je bilo formalizirano v obliki poroštvene listine, ki sta jo državi podpisali 21. septembra 1995 v zvezi s programom EMTN, vzpostavljenim istega dne. Državi s podpisom solidarno jamčita imetnikom instrumentov, da bosta v primeru, da konzorcij iz kakršnega koli razloga ne plača katerega koli zneska, zavarovanega s poroštvom, ko zapade v plačilo, v štirih delovnih dneh po prejemu pisne zahteve imetnika, naslovljene na obe državi in konzorcij, brezpogojno plačali navedeni znesek. Poroštvena listina je bila sestavni del informacijskega memoranduma. Poroštvena listina, podpisana 21. septembra 1995, ni vsebovala neposrednega sklica na medvladni sporazum ali poznejšo izvedbeno zakonodajo, vendar je bila v programu EMTN potrjena ustanovitev konzorcija v skladu z medvladnim sporazumom. | (104) | In the period prior to the Øresund judgment, debt instruments (such as bonds) issued under the EMTN programme (51) were all guaranteed by the States. This was formalised in the form of a deed of guarantee signed by the States on 21 September 1995 in respect of the EMTN programme, established on the same day. With their signature, the States jointly and severally guaranteed to the holders of the instruments that if for any reason the Consortium fails to pay any guaranteed sum when due and payable, the States shall, within four business days of written demand by a holder upon both States and the Consortium, unconditionally pay that sum. The deed of guarantee was an integral part of the information memorandum. The deed of guarantee signed on 21 September 1995 did not include a direct reference to the Intergovernmental Agreement or subsequent implementing legislation, however, the EMTN programme acknowledged the establishment of the Consortium pursuant to the Intergovernmental Agreement. |
| (105) | Sklic na poroštveno listino z dne 21. septembra 1995 so vsebovale tudi poznejše posodobitve programa EMTN, veljavnost navedene poroštvene listine pa sta državi potrdili v dopisih z dne 10. februarja 2000. Dne 22. maja 2001je bila podpisana nova poroštvena listina v zvezi s posodobitvijo programa EMTN, ki je bila objavljena istega dne. Poroštvena listina, ki sta jo državi podpisali 22. maja 2001, je vsebovala v bistvu enake pogoje kot poroštvena listina, ki sta jo državi podpisali 21. septembra 1995. Vse poznejše letne posodobitve programa EMTN so vsebovale sklic na navedeno poroštveno listino z dne 22. maja 2001. | (105) | The subsequent EMTN programme updates also referred to the deed of guarantee of 21 September 1995, and the validity of that deed of guarantee was confirmed by the States in letters of 10 February 2000. On 22 May 2001, a new deed of guarantee was signed in respect of the EMTN programme update, published on the same date. The deed of guarantee, signed on 22 May 2001 by the States, had substantially the same conditions as the deed of guarantee signed by the States on 21 September 1995. The subsequent annual updates of the EMTN programme all referred to that deed of guarantee of 22 May 2001. |
| (106) | Vsakič, ko je konzorcij izdal obveznice v okviru programa EMTN, sta danska nacionalna banka in švedski urad za javni dolg potrdila, da za take obveznice velja poroštvena listina. Poroštvena listina z dne 21. septembra 1995 se je uporabljala za obveznice v okviru programa EMTN do leta 2000, poroštvena listina z dne 22. maja 2001 pa se je uporabljala za obveznice v okviru programa EMTN od leta 2001. | (106) | Each time the Consortium issued bonds under the EMTN programme, the Danish National Bank and the Swedish National Debt Office confirmed that such bonds were subject to the deed of guarantee. The deed of guarantee of 21 September 1995 applied to bonds under the EMTN programme until 2000, whilst the deed of guarantee of 22 May 2001 applied to bonds under the EMTN programme from 2001. |
| (107) | Državi sta pojasnili, da to pomeni, da danska nacionalna banka in švedski urad za javni dolg nista izdala posebnega poroštva za vsako posamezno obveznico, ampak sta potrdila, da že izdana poroštvena listina zajema posamezno obveznico v okviru programa EMTN, tako da sta se strinjala s cenovnimi pogoji navedenega posojila in potrdila njihovo sprejetje. | (107) | The States explained that this means that the Danish National Bank and the Swedish National Debt Office did not issue a specific guarantee for each individual bond, but confirmed that an already-issued deed of guarantee covered the individual bond under the EMTN programme, by consenting to the pricing terms of that loan and confirming their acceptance. |
| (108) | Državi sta jamčili tudi za obveznice, izdane v okviru švedskega programa MTN. Poroštvena listina je bila izdana 2. decembra 1996 v korist imetnikov dolžniških instrumentov, izdanih v okviru švedskega programa MTN. Navedeni sporazum o poroštvu je veljal za posamezne obveznice, izdane v okviru švedskega programa MTN. Švedski program MTN je vseboval sklic na medvladni sporazum. Vsakič, ko je bila posamezna obveznica izdana v okviru švedskega programa MTN, sta obveznice odobrila danska nacionalna banka in švedski urad za javni dolg, pri čemer ni bilo izrecno navedeno, da poroštvena listina zajema posamezno obveznico. | (108) | Bonds issued under the Swedish MTN programme were also subject to a guarantee from the States. A deed of guarantee was issued on 2 December 1996 in favour of the holders of debt instruments issued under the Swedish MTN programme. Individual bonds issued under the Swedish MTN programme were subject to that guarantee agreement. The Swedish MTN programme referred back to the Intergovernmental Agreement. Each time an individual bond was issued under the Swedish MTN programme, bonds were approved by the Danish National Bank and the Swedish National Debt Office, without explicitly mentioning that the deed of guarantee covered the individual bond. |
| (109) | Kar zadeva samostojne posojilne pogodbe, kot so tiste z EIB, je konzorcij z zadevno finančno institucijo podpisal finančne pogodbe. Vsaki finančni pogodbi je bil priložen dokument sporazuma o poroštvu. Navedeni sporazumi o poroštvu med državama in finančnimi institucijami so zajemali celotno posojilo v skladu z ustrezno finančno pogodbo. Sporazum o poroštvu je vseboval sklic na medvladni sporazum. Švedska in Danska sta zadnji sporazum o poroštvu v zvezi s posojili EIB sklenili 22. oktobra 2001. | (109) | For the stand-alone loan agreements, such as those from the EIB, the Consortium signed finance contracts with the financial institution. Attached to each finance contract was a guarantee agreement document. Those guarantee agreements between the States and financial institutions covered the entire loan facility pursuant to a respective finance contract. The guarantee agreement referred to the Intergovernmental Agreement. The last guarantee agreement related to EIB loans was entered into by Sweden and Denmark on 22 October 2001. |
| (110) | Konzorcij je posojila pridobil tudi neposredno od zasebnih posojilodajalcev s sklenitvijo samostojnih posojilnih pogodb. Za vsa ta posojila sta jamčili državi na podlagi posameznih sporazumov o poroštvu ter v skladu z obveznostmi iz medvladnega sporazuma in sporazuma o konzorciju. | (110) | The Consortium also obtained loans directly from private lenders, entering into stand-alone loan agreements. All of those loans were guaranteed by the States on the basis of individual guarantee agreements, and in line with the obligations in the Intergovernmental Agreement and the Consortium Agreement. |
| (111) | Kar zadeva kreditne aranžmaje, ki jih ima konzorcij pri banki za namene plačevanja čez noč in za kratkoročne spremembe likvidnosti, sta Danska in Švedska za vsako refinanciranje sklenili nov sporazum o poroštvu. Kreditni aranžmaji so bili vzpostavljeni leta 1994 in se obnavljajo vsaka štiri leta. Navedeni sporazumi o poroštvu so vsebovali sklice na medvladni sporazum, zakon o gradnji, sklep švedskega parlamenta ter sklepa vlade z dne 1. aprila 1993 (K91/1443/3, K93/202/3) in 23 junija 1994 (K91/1443/3, K94/1680/3). | (111) | As for the credit facilities held by the Consortium with a bank for overnight payment purposes and for short term variations in liquidity, Denmark and Sweden entered into a new guarantee agreement for each refinancing. The credit facilities were established in 1994 and are renewed every four years. Those guarantee agreements referred back to the Intergovernmental Agreement, the Construction Act, the Swedish Parliament Decision and the Government decisions of 1 April 1993 (K91/1443/3, K93/202/3) and 23 June 1994 (K91/1443/3, K94/1680/3). |
| (112) | Poleg tega je vsako krovno pogodbo za poslovanje z izvedenimi finančnimi instrumenti spremljal sporazum o poroštvu med švedskim uradom za javni dolg in dansko nacionalno banko ter zadevno nasprotno stranko v skladu z medvladnim sporazumom, zakonom o gradnji, sklepom švedskega parlamenta ter sklepoma vlade z dne 1. aprila 1993 (K91/1443/3, K93/202/3) in 23. junija 1994 (K91/1443/3, K94/1680/3). Navedeni sporazum o poroštvu je zajemal posamezne transakcije na podlagi krovne pogodbe za poslovanje z izvedenimi finančnimi instrumenti. Švedski urad za javni dolg in danska nacionalna banka nista izdala posameznih sporazumov o poroštvu na ravni transakcij in nista izrecno potrdila, da se uporablja poroštvo, povezano s krovno pogodbo za poslovanje z izvedenimi finančnimi instrumenti. | (112) | In addition, each ISDA Master Agreement was accompanied by a guarantee agreement between the Swedish National Debt Office and the Danish National Bank, and the respective counterparty, in implementation of the Intergovernmental Agreement, the Construction Act, the Swedish Parliament decision and the Government decisions of 1 April 1993 (K91/1443/3, K93/202/3) and 23 June 1994 (K91/1443/3, K94/1680/3). That guarantee agreement covered the individual transactions under the ISDA Master Agreement. The Swedish National Debt Office and the Danish National Bank did not issue individual guarantee agreements at transaction level, and did not specifically confirm that the guarantee associated with the ISDA Master Agreement applied. |
| (113) | Nazadnje, vsako globalno krovno pogodbo o začasni prodaji je spremljal tudi sporazum o poroštvu med švedskim uradom za javni dolg in dansko nacionalno banko ter zadevno nasprotno stranko v skladu z medvladnim sporazumom, zakonom o gradnji, sklepom švedskega parlamenta ter sklepoma vlade z dne 1. aprila 1993 (K91/1443/3, K93/202/3) in 23. junija 1994 (K91/1443/3, K94/1680/3). Kot je navedeno v uvodni izjavi 83, na podlagi takih sporazumov ni bila sklenjena nobena transakcija, torej ni bil sklenjen noben posamezni sporazum o poroštvu. | (113) | Finally, the Global Master Repurchase Agreements were also accompanied by a guarantee agreement between the Swedish National Debt Office and the Danish National Bank, and the respective counterparty, in implementation of the Intergovernmental Agreement, the Construction Act, the Swedish Parliament decision and the Government decisions of 1 April 1993 (K91/1443/3, K93/202/3) and 23 June 1994 (K91/1443/3, K94/1680/3). As mentioned at recital (83), no transactions have been entered into pursuant such agreements and, as such, no individual guarantee agreements. |
| (114) | Iz različnih sporazumov o poroštvu so izhajale neposredno veljavne in splošne obveznosti za Švedsko in Dansko, navedeni sporazumi pa so enakovredni z vsemi drugimi nezavarovanimi nepodrejenimi obveznostmi in zadolženostjo švedskega urada za javni dolg in danske nacionalne banke. Sporazumi o poroštvu so brezpogojni; vlagateljem zahtevka ni treba uveljavljati pri konzorciju, ampak lahko ob neplačilu zahtevke naslovijo neposredno na švedski urad za javni dolg in dansko nacionalno banko. | (114) | The various guarantee agreements all created directly applicable and general obligations for Sweden and Denmark, and rank pari passu with all other unsecured unsubordinated obligations and indebtedness of the Swedish National Debt Office and the Danish National Bank. The guarantee agreements are unconditional; the investors are not obliged to seek to enforce the claim from the Consortium but may address claims to the Swedish National Debt Office and the Danish National Bank directly upon default. |
| (115) | Ta poroštva so podaljšana poroštva, vendar so dejansko omejena na trajanje posojila ali transakcije, zavarovane z navedenim poroštvom. Če na podlagi krovne pogodbe ni sklenjena nobena transakcija, na primer z določeno nasprotno stranko, ta nasprotna stranka kljub obstoju poroštva nima nobenih terjatev do švedskega urada za javni dolg ali danske nacionalne banke; zato lahko poroštvo krije le dejanski dolg konzorcija, dokler navedeni dolg ni v celoti poplačan. | (115) | The guarantees are continuing guarantees, but are de facto limited to the term of the loan or transaction that the guarantee secures. In case there are no transactions under a master agreement, for example, with a certain counterparty, that counterparty has no claim against the Swedish National Debt Office or the Danish National Bank, despite the existence of a guarantee; hence the guarantee may only cover actual debt of the Consortium, until the time that debt is fully repaid. |
| (116) | Kar zadeva obdobje po sodbi v zadevi Øresund, sta državi Komisijo obvestili, da ni bil izdan noben drugi dolg, zavarovan z državnim poroštvom. Zadnje refinanciranje, zavarovano z državnim poroštvom, se je torej izvedlo 24. avgusta 2018. Upravni odbor konzorcija se je namreč odločil, da se v obdobju do končnega sklepa Komisije v največji možni meri izogne posojilom, zavarovanim z državnim poroštvom. Kar zadeva refinanciranje, ki je bilo potrebno do konca leta 2020, je konzorcij, da tako refinanciranje ne bi bilo samodejno zajeto v obstoječih sporazumih o poroštvu, junija 2020 začel spremembe letne posodobitve programa EMTN. Da bi bilo na voljo več možnosti, je zdaj v ustreznih cenovnih pogojih programa določeno, ali so instrumenti, ki bodo izdani, zavarovani s poroštvom ali ne. | (116) | With respect to the period following the Øresund judgment, the States informed the Commission that no further State guaranteed debt was issued. The last State guaranteed refinancing, therefore, occurred on 24 August 2018. This is because the Consortium’s Board of Directors decided to avoid, to the extent possible, State guaranteed borrowing in the period up to the Commission’s final decision. For the required refinancing that was needed by the end of 2020, to avoid that such refinancing would be automatically covered by the existing guarantee agreements, the Consortium initiated amendments to the annual update of the EMTN programme in June 2020. In order to keep options open, the relevant pricing terms of the programme now specify whether the instruments to be issued are guaranteed or not. |
| 2.2.2 Posebna danska pravila o prenosu izgub v prihodnje obdobje in amortizaciji | 2.2.2. The special Danish rules on loss carry-forward and depreciation |
| 2.2.2.1 Danski sistem davka od dohodkov pravnih oseb | 2.2.2.1. The Danish corporate income tax system |
| (117) | Na Danskem se davek od dohodkov pravnih oseb pobira v skladu z danskim zakonom o davku od dohodkov pravnih oseb (52). Druga pravila, pomembna za namene davka od dohodkov pravnih oseb, so navedena v drugih danskih aktih, kot so danski zakon o odmeri davka (53). danski zakon o obdavčitvi dohodka in premoženja (54) ter danski zakon o davčni amortizaciji (55). Danski zakon o odmeri davka določa pravila za uporabo davčne zakonodaje za posameznike in družbe. Danski zakon o davku od dohodkov pravnih oseb določa davčno stopnjo, ki se uporablja za družbe, in podrobna pravila, ki so posebej pomembna za obdavčitev družb. Danski zakon o davčni amortizaciji določa pravila glede amortizacije sredstev, ki se uporabljajo v komercialne namene. | (117) | In Denmark, corporate income tax is levied in accordance with the Danish Corporate Income Tax Act (52). Other rules relevant for corporate income tax purposes are to be found in other Danish acts, such as the Danish Tax Assessment Act (53), the Danish Act on the Taxation of Income and Property (54), and the Danish Tax Depreciation Act (55). The Danish Tax Assessment Act provides rules for how tax laws are applied to both individuals and companies. The Danish Corporate Income Tax Act establishes the tax rate applicable to companies, and details rules that are specifically relevant for the taxation of companies. The Danish Tax Depreciation Act provides rules regarding the depreciation of assets used for commercial purposes. |
| (118) | Pravne osebe, ki so zavezane plačilu danskega davka od dohodkov pravnih oseb, so navedene v členu 1 danskega zakona o davku od dohodkov pravnih oseb. Danski sistem davka od dohodkov pravnih oseb razlikuje med obdavčitvijo ločenih subjektov in obdavčitvijo transparentnih subjektov. Na splošno velja, da so plačilu danskega davka od dohodkov pravnih oseb zavezane samo družbe (tj. ločeni subjekti za davčne namene), saj se partnerstva za davčne namene obravnavajo kot transparentna. Družbe z omejeno odgovornostjo, kot je družba A/S Øresund, tj. danski partner v konzorciju, so navedene v členu 1 danskega zakona o davku od dohodkov pravnih oseb. Partnerstva, kot je konzorcij, niso navedena v členu 1 in se za davčne namene obravnavajo kot transparentni subjekti. To pomeni, da se danska pravila o davku od dohodkov pravnih oseb uporabljajo samo za danskega partnerja v konzorciju, tj. družbo A/S Øresund, ne pa za sam konzorcij. V oddelku 12.4 sporazuma o konzorciju je potrjeno, da morata družbi A/S Øresund in SVEDAB za davčne namene prijaviti dobiček ali izgubo konzorcija. | (118) | The legal entities that are subject to Danish corporate income tax are listed in Section 1 of the Danish Corporate Income Tax Act. The Danish corporate income tax system makes a distinction between separate entity taxation and taxation of transparent entities. As a general rule, only corporations are subject to Danish corporate income tax (i.e. separate entities for tax purposes), as partnerships are treated as transparent for tax purposes. Limited liability companies, such as A/S Øresund, the Danish partner in the Consortium, are listed at Section 1 of the Danish Corporate Income Tax Act. Partnerships, such as the Consortium, are not listed at Section 1, and are treated as transparent entities for tax purposes. This means that Danish corporate income tax rules apply only to the Danish partner in the Consortium, A/S Øresund, and not to the Consortium, itself. The Consortium Agreement, in Section 12.4, confirms that it falls upon A/S Øresund and SVEDAB to declare the profit or the loss of the Consortium, for tax purposes. |
| (119) | Kar zadeva pravne osebe, ki so zavezane plačilu danskega davka od dohodkov pravnih oseb, so pravila o prenosu izgub v prihodnje obdobje in amortizaciji določena v danskem zakonu o odmeri davka, danskem zakonu o davku od dohodkov pravnih oseb oziroma danskem zakonu o davčni amortizaciji. | (119) | For legal entities subject to Danish corporate income tax, the rules regarding loss carry-forward and depreciation are laid down, respectively, in the Danish Tax Assessment Act, the Danish Corporate Income Tax Act, and the Danish Tax Depreciation Act. |
| (120) | Kar zadeva partnerstvo med družbama A/S Øresund in SVEDAB v konzorciju, vsak partner prizna svoj 50-odstotni delež obdavčljivega dohodka ali izgube družbe. Družba A/S Øresund, ki je zavezana plačilu danskega davka od dohodkov pravnih oseb, ima sorazmerno pravico do (i) amortizacije na podlagi sredstev partnerstva ter (ii) odbitka in prenosa (za prihodnji odbitek) njenega dela izgub družbe v prihodnje obdobje za določitev obdavčljivega dohodka. | (120) | For the partnership between A/S Øresund and SVEDAB in the Consortium, each partner recognises its 50 % share of the taxable income or loss of the partnership. A/S Øresund, being subject to the Danish corporate income tax, has a proportional right to (i) depreciate on the basis of the partnership’s assets, and (ii) deduct and carry-forward (for future deduction) its part of the partnership’s losses, to determine the taxable income. |
| (121) | Kar zadeva določitev obdavčljivega dohodka (v nadaljnjem besedilu: davčna osnova), se je treba sklicevati na člen 4 danskega zakona o obdavčitvi dohodka in premoženja. V navedenem členu so naštete postavke, ki pomenijo obdavčljiv dohodek. Člen je oblikovan široko in vključuje skoraj ves dohodek, ne glede na to, ali je glavni ali dodatni ali prejet v denarju ali v vrednosti denarja. Pri izračunu obdavčljivega bruto dohodka se vsi dohodki združijo. Na splošno se za odbitek stroškov ali izravnavo izgub iz enega vira dohodka od dobička iz drugega vira dohodka ali za prenos izgub v prihodnje obdobje ne uporablja cedularna ureditev ali sistem košaric. | (121) | For the determination of the taxable income (‘tax base’), reference must be made to Section 4 of the Danish Act on the Taxation of Income and Property. That section lists the items that constitute taxable income. The section is broadly worded and includes almost all income, whether principal or accessory in nature, and whether received in money or money’s worth. In computing taxable gross income, all income is pooled. In general, no schedular system or basket system applies for purposes of deducting expenses or off-setting losses from one income source against profits from another income source, or for purposes of carrying forward losses. |
| (122) | Na splošno je izkaz poslovnega izida v letnem poročilu izhodišče za določitev obdavčljivega dohodka, čeprav je treba za davčne namene pripraviti ločen izkaz poslovnega izida. Dohodek in odhodek se običajno pripoznata na podlagi nastanka poslovnih dogodkov. Kar zadeva dohodek, to pomeni, da je obdavčljiv v letu, v katerem davčni zavezanec postane do njega upravičen. Odhodek je običajno odbiten v letu, v katerem nastane obveznost za njihovo plačilo. | (122) | In general, the profit and loss account in the annual report is the starting point for determining taxable income, although a separate profit and loss account for tax purposes must be drafted. Income and expenses are generally recognised on an accrual basis. For income, this means that income is taxable in the year in which the taxpayer becomes entitled to the income. Expenses are normally deductible in the year in which the obligation to pay them is incurred. |
| (123) | Odhodek, nastal pri pridobivanju, zavarovanju ali ohranjanju dohodka, je odbiten (člen 6(a) danskega zakona o obdavčitvi dohodka in lastnine). Pravila o davku od dohodkov pravnih oseb omogočajo prenos davčnih izgub v prihodnje obdobje. Vendar so se pogoji in omejitve pravil o prenosu izgub v prihodnje obdobje v zadevnem obdobju (1991–2016) spremenili (glej uvodne izjave 135 do 142). Prenos izgub v preteklo obdobje ni dovoljen. | (123) | Expenses incurred in acquiring, securing or maintaining income are deductible (Section 6(a) of the Danish Act on the Taxation of Income and Property). The corporate income tax rules allow the carry-forward of tax losses. However, the conditions and limits of the loss carry-forward rules have changed over the relevant period (1991-2016) (see further, recitals (135) to (142)). No loss carry-back is allowed. |
| (124) | V skladu z danskim sistemom davka od dohodkov pravnih oseb ni nujno, da je amortizacija, odbita za davčne namene, skladna z amortizacijo, prikazano v letnih računovodskih izkazih. Stopnja in metoda amortizacije za davčne namene sta odvisna od skupine sredstev, ki se amortizirajo (nepremičnine, naprave, stroji, oprema itd.). | (124) | Under the Danish corporate income tax system, depreciation deducted for tax purposes need not conform to the depreciation shown in the annual accounts. The rate and method of depreciation for tax purposes depends on the asset group being depreciated (immovable property, plant, machinery, equipment, etc). |
| (125) | Danska pravila o davčni amortizaciji ne predpisujejo obvezne zahteve za davčno amortizacijo. Namesto tega pravila danskega zakona o davčni amortizaciji določajo najvišjo dovoljeno letno amortizacijo za davčne namene. V skladu s tem lahko družbe, ki so na Danskem zavezane plačilu davka od dohodkov pravnih oseb, odložijo uporabo olajšav zaradi amortizacije za davčne namene, ne da bi izgubile pravico do amortizacije. Kar zadeva stavbe, se lahko amortizacija prvič obračuna v letu pridobitve ali v letu, v katerem je gradnja končana. Sredstva, ki se amortizirajo, se za namene amortizacije vrednotijo glede na stroške pridobitve. | (125) | The Danish tax depreciation rules do not prescribe a mandatory tax depreciation requirement. Rather, the rules of the Danish Tax Depreciation Act set out the maximum annual depreciation allowed for tax purposes. Accordingly, companies subject to corporate income tax in Denmark may delay the application of the depreciation allowances for tax purposes, without losing their right to depreciation. For buildings, depreciation may be taken for the first time in the year of acquisition or the year in which construction is finalised. Depreciable assets are valued at the acquisition cost for purposes of depreciation. |
| (126) | Na Danskem se digitalni sistem izpolnjevanja davčnih napovedi imenuje DIAS (56), izvaja pa se od leta 2014. | (126) | In Denmark, the digital tax return filing system is called DIAS (56), which has been implemented as from 2014. |
| (127) | Zaradi obveznega sistema skupne obdavčitve na Danskem je družba, ki vodi skupino za skupno obdavčitev (v nadaljnjem besedilu: družba za upravljanje), tista, ki predloži informacije o obdavčljivih dohodkih in davčnih izgubah za vse člane skupine za skupno obdavčitev. Posamezni člani skupine za skupno obdavčitev še vedno predložijo davčno napoved, ki vsebuje informacije o transakcijah med družbami. Ko družba za upravljanje vloži davčno napoved za določeno davčno leto, ki vključuje izgube enega ali več članov skupine za skupno obdavčitev, mora družba za upravljanje navesti: obdavčljiv dohodek (pozitiven ali negativen) za vsakega člana za skupno obdavčitev, kar pomeni, da se izguba evidentira v letu, v katerem nastane; uporabo izgub, prenesenih v prihodnje obdobje, za vsakega člana; izravnavo med subjekti, ki poslujejo z dobičkom, in subjekti, ki poslujejo z izgubo, za zadevno leto; uporabo izgub drugih subjektov, prenesenih v prihodnje obdobje, ki so mu na voljo, za vsakega subjekta (izgube pri skupnem obdavčevanju), in preostale davčne izgube ob koncu davčnega leta na ravni člana skupine za skupno obdavčitev in na ravni leta, v katerem je nastala davčna izguba. Za uporabo davčnih izgub obstaja načelo „prvi noter, prvi ven“ (v nadaljnjem besedilu: načelo FIFO), kar pomeni, da je treba najprej uporabiti najstarejše izgube. Davčna izguba, prenesena v prihodnje obdobje, ki se lahko uporabi v danem davčnem letu, se mora uporabiti v navedenem letu, sicer zapade (57). Uporaba izgub, prenesenih v prihodnje obdobje, v letnih davčnih napovedih družbe je torej v bistvu samodejna. | (127) | Due to the mandatory joint taxation regime in Denmark, the company that heads the joint taxation group (the management company) is the company that submits information on taxable income and tax losses for all members of the joint taxation group. The individual members of the joint taxation group still submit a tax return of their own that contains information on intercompany transactions. When the management company files a tax return for a given tax year, which includes losses for one or more members of the joint taxation group, the management company must specify: the taxable income (whether positive or negative) for each member of the joint taxation group, which means that the loss is registered in the year where it occurs; the utilisation by each member of their own carried-forward losses; the offset for the year between profit- and loss-making entities; the utilisation by each entity of carried-forward losses from other entities that are available to them (joint taxation losses); and the remaining tax losses end of the tax year specified per member of the joint taxation group and per year in which the tax loss arose. A first in, first out (‘FIFO’) principle exists for the utilisation of tax losses, meaning that the oldest losses must be utilised first. A tax loss carried-forward that can be utilised in a given tax year, must be used in that year, otherwise it will be forfeited (57). The use of losses carried forward in the annual tax returns of a company is, therefore, essentially automatic. |
| (128) | V sistemu DIAS so na voljo potrditve za zagotovitev, da so evidentirani podatki v skladu s pričakovanji sistema. | (128) | There are validations within the DIAS system to ensure that the registered data is in line with the expectations of the system. |
| (129) | Običajni rok (58) za predložitev davčne napovedi je šest mesecev po koncu davčnega leta (59). Davčni organi po vložitvi davčne napovedi izdajo odločbo o odmeri davka. Rok za izdajo odločbe o odmeri davka ni določen, saj je njena izdaja odvisna od vložitve davčne napovedi. Vendar se odmera običajno izda oktobra naslednjega leta, končna poravnava pa zapade 20. novembra. Davek, ki ga je treba plačati, je že viden v predloženi davčni napovedi. Odločba o odmeri davka je zgolj potrditev podatkov, predloženih v davčni napovedi. Odmera davka se izvede samodejno, razen če jo je mogoče naknadno spremeniti po reviziji, ki jo ročno opravijo davčni organi. | (129) | The ordinary deadline (58) for submission of a tax return is six months after the tax year ends (59). After a tax return has been filed, the tax authorities issue a tax assessment. There is no fixed deadline for the issuing of a tax assessment, as its issuance is dependent on the tax return being filed. The assessment is, however, normally issued during October of the following year, with a final settlement due on 20 November. The tax to be paid is already visible on the submitted tax return. The tax assessment is merely an acceptance of the data submitted through the tax return. The tax assessment is automatically generated, save to the extent that it may subsequently be amended following a manual audit by the tax authorities. |
| 2.2.2.2 Pravna ureditev posebnih danskih pravil o prenosu izgub v prihodnje obdobje in amortizaciji | 2.2.2.2. Legal setup of the special Danish rules on loss carry-forward and depreciation |
| (130) | Kot je navedeno v uvodni izjavi 84, formalni postopek preiskave – in s tem ta sklep – zajema posebna danska pravila, ki se uporabljajo za konzorcij v zvezi s prenosom izgub v prihodnje obdobje in amortizacijo. V tem sklepu bodo zato analizirana posebna danska pravila o prenosu izgub v prihodnje obdobje in amortizaciji zaradi položaja družbe A/S Øresund kot partnerja v konzorciju. Lastne dejavnosti družbe A/S Øresund, ki so neodvisne od njenega sodelovanja v konzorciju, se nanašajo na danske cestne in železniške povezave z zaledjem in se ne štejejo za državno pomoč (uvodna izjava 48 sklepa o začetku postopka); posebna danska pravila o prenosu izgub v prihodnje obdobje in amortizaciji, ki se uporabljajo za lastne dejavnosti družbe A/S Øresund, zato ne spadajo na področje uporabe tega sklepa. | (130) | As indicated at recital (84), the formal investigation procedure – and, therefore, this decision – covers the special Danish rules applicable to the Consortium, with regard to loss carry-forward and depreciation. As such, this decision will analyse the special Danish rules on loss carry-forward and depreciation by reason of A/S Øresund’s position as a partner in the Consortium. A/S Øresund’s own activities, independent of its participation in the Consortium, concern the Danish road and rail hinterland connections, and are not considered to constitute State aid (recital 48 of the Opening decision); the special Danish rules on loss carry-forward and depreciation, as they apply to A/S Øresund’s own activities, are, therefore, outside of the scope of this decision. |
| (131) | V uvodni izjavi 49 sklepa o začetku postopka je omenjen tudi sistem skupne obdavčitve z družbo Sund & Bælt. Komisija je v sklepu iz leta 2014 ugotovila, da navedeni ukrep ne pomeni državne pomoči, Splošno sodišče pa je v sodbi v zadevi Øresund potrdilo sklep iz leta 2014 v zvezi z navedenim ukrepom, zato sistem skupne obdavčitve ni del formalnega postopka preiskave. | (131) | The Opening decision, at recital 49, also referred to the joint taxation regime with Sund & Bælt. However, since the Commission had found in the 2014 decision that that measure does not constitute State aid, and, in the Øresund judgment, the General Court upheld the 2014 decision as regards that measure, the joint taxation regime is not part of the scope of the formal investigation procedure. |
| (132) | Ko je bila družba A/S Øresund ustanovljena, zanjo kljub temu, da je bila zavezana plačilu danskega davka od dohodka pravnih oseb, niso veljala danska pravila o prenosu izgub v prihodnje obdobje in amortizaciji na podlagi danskega zakona o odmeri davka in danskega zakona o davčni amortizaciji. Namesto tega je člen 11 zakona o gradnji določal posebno pravilo o roku, ki se uporablja za prenos izgub v prihodnje obdobje, člena 12 in 13 zakona o gradnji pa sta določala posebno pravilo o najvišjih stopnjah amortizacije. Navedena posebna pravila o prenosu izgub v prihodnje obdobje in amortizaciji so se uporabljala za obdavčljiv dohodek lastnih dejavnosti družbe A/S Øresund (ki ni zajet v tem sklepu (uvodna izjava 130)) in za obdavčljivi dohodek zaradi 50-odstotnega lastništva konzorcija. | (132) | When A/S Øresund was established, and despite being subject to Danish corporate income tax, it was not subject to the Danish rules regarding loss carry-forward and depreciation under the Danish Tax Assessment Act and the Danish Tax Depreciation Act. Rather, Section 11 of the Construction Act provided for a special rule on the applicable time period for loss carry-forward, and Sections 12 and 13 of the Construction Act provided for a special rule on the maximum rates for depreciation. Those special rules on loss carry-forward and depreciation applied both to the taxable income of A/S Øresund’s own activities (not covered by this decision (recital (130)), and to the taxable income in light of its 50 % ownership of the Consortium. |
| (133) | Zakon o gradnji, vključno s posebnimi danskimi pravili o prenosu izgub v prihodnje obdobje in amortizaciji, je bil leta 2005 vključen v zakon o družbi Sund & Bælt. Posebno pravilo o prenosu izgub v prihodnje obdobje je navedeno v členu 12 zakona o družbi Sund & Bælt, posebno pravilo o amortizaciji pa v členih 13 in 14 zakona o družbi Sund & Bælt. Obe določbi sta ostali nespremenjeni v primerjavi z določbami zakona o gradnji. | (133) | In 2005, the Construction Act, including the special Danish rules on loss carry-forward and depreciation, was incorporated into the Sund & Bælt Act. The special rule on loss carry-forward could be found in Section 12 of the Sund & Bælt Act, and the special rule on depreciation could be found in Sections 13 and 14 of the Sund & Bælt Act. Both provisions remained unchanged as compared to the provisions of the Construction Act. |
| (134) | Posebna danska pravila o prenosu izgub v prihodnje obdobje in amortizaciji so bila razveljavljena z zakonom št. 581 z dne 4. maja 2015, ki je začel veljati 1. januarja 2016 in s katerim se je spremenil zakon o družbi Sund & Bælt, tako da se za družbo A/S Øresund od 1. januarja 2016 uporablja običajen danski sistem davka od dohodkov pravnih oseb, vključno s pravili o prenosu izgub v prihodnje obdobje in amortizaciji iz danskega zakona o davku od dohodkov pravnih oseb, danskega zakona o odmeri davka in danskega zakona o davčni amortizaciji. | (134) | The special Danish rules on loss carry-forward and depreciation were repealed by Act No 581 of 4 May 2015, which entered into force on 1 January 2016, amending the Sund & Bælt Act, such that, since 1 January 2016, A/S Øresund has been subject to the normal Danish corporate income tax system, including with regard to loss carry-forward and depreciation in the Danish Corporate Income Tax Act, the Danish Tax Assessment Act, and the Danish Tax Depreciation Act. |
| 2.2.2.3 Posebna danska pravila o prenosu izgub v prihodnje obdobje | 2.2.2.3. The special Danish rules on loss carry-forward |
| (135) | Zakon o gradnji v členu 11 določa, da lahko družba A/S Øresund svoje izgube prenese naprej za obdobje 15 davčnih let, izgube, nastale pred začetkom obratovanja stalne povezave, pa za obdobje 30 davčnih let (60). Navedeno pravilo se v tem sklepu imenuje „pravilo o prenosu izgub za obdobje 1991–2001“. Kar zadeva obdobje od začetka veljavnosti zakona o gradnji leta 1991 do vključno davčnega leta 2001, je bilo v členu 15 danskega zakona o odmeri davka (61) navedeno splošno pravilo, da lahko pravne osebe, zavezane plačilu danskega davka od dohodkov pravnih oseb, izgube, ki so nastale v določenem davčnem letu, pet zaporednih let prenesejo v prihodnje obdobje in jih odbijejo od svojega obdavčljivega dohodka (62). Vendar se je lahko izguba v skladu z obema zakonoma v navedenih obdobjih prenesla v naslednje davčno leto le, če je ni bilo mogoče odbiti od obdavčljivega dohodka v prejšnjem davčnem letu. Noben od obeh zakonov ni omogočal prenosa davčnih izgub v preteklo obdobje za uporabo v prejšnjih davčnih letih. | (135) | The Construction Act established, in Section 11, that A/S Øresund could carry-forward its losses for a period of 15 tax years, and, for losses incurred before the Fixed Link was put into service, for a period of 30 tax years (60). That rule is referred to in this decision as the ‘1991-2001 LCF’. For the period from the entry into force of the Construction Act, in 1991, up to and including the tax year 2001, under Section 15 of the Danish Tax Assessment Act (61), the general rule applicable to legal entities subject to Danish corporate income tax was that they could carry-forward losses incurred during a specific tax year, and deduct them from their taxable income, for five subsequent years (62). Within the periods referred to, under both acts, the loss could, however, only be carried forward to a later tax year, if it could not be deducted from the taxable income in a previous tax year. Under both acts, tax losses could not be carried back for utilisation in previous tax years. |
| (136) | S členom 8 zakona št. 313 z dne 21. maja 2002 je bil spremenjen člen 15 danskega zakona o odmeri davka (63) in odpravljena splošno veljavna petletna omejitev prenosa izgub v prihodnje obdobje (64). S členom 14 zakona št. 313 z dne 21. maja 2002 je bil spremenjen tudi zakon o gradnji (65), in sicer je bila odpravljena 15-letna omejitev (66). Spremembe so vplivale na izgube, ki so nastale v davčnem letu 2002 ali pozneje, kot je določeno v členu 19(3) zakona št. 313 z dne 21. maja 2002. Iz tega izhajajoče pravilo prenosa izgub v prihodnje obdobje, ki se za družbo A/S Øresund uporablja od davčnega leta 2002, se v tem sklepu imenuje „pravilo o prenosu izgub za obdobje 2002–2012“. | (136) | By Section 8 of Act No 313 of 21 May 2002, Section 15 of the Danish Tax Assessment Act (63) was amended and the generally applicable five year limitation of loss carry-forward was abolished (64). By Section 14 of Act No 313 of 21 May 2002, the Construction Act (65) was also amended, to abolish the 15 year limitation (66). The amendments had an effect on losses that occurred in the tax year 2002 or later, as provided for by Section 19(3) of Act No 313 of 21 May 2002. The resulting loss carry-forward rule applicable to A/S Øresund as from the tax year 2002 is referred to in this decision as the ‘2002-2012 LCF’. |
| (137) | Pravne osebe, ki so zavezane plačilu danskega davka od dohodkov pravnih oseb, vključno z družbo A/S Øresund, bi torej lahko svoje izgube iz davčnega leta 2002 prenesle do vključno davčnega leta 2012 (67) (uvodna izjava 138) brez časovnih omejitev ali omejitev zneska. | (137) | Legal entities subject to Danish corporate income tax, including A/S Øresund, could, therefore, carry-forward their losses incurred in the tax year 2002 up to and including the tax year 2012 (67) (recital (138)) without any limits in time or amount. |
| (138) | Z zakonom št. 591 z dne 18. junija 2012 (68) je bil razveljavljen člen 15 danskega zakona o odmeri davka. Hkrati je bila z zakonom št. 591 z dne 18. junija 2012 uvedena omejitev uporabe izgub, prenesenih v prihodnje obdobje, tako da je bil danskemu zakonu o davku od dohodkov pravnih oseb dodan člen 12 (69). Člen 12 danskega zakona o davku od dohodkov pravnih oseb se je uporabljal za davčna leta, ki se začnejo 1. julija 2012 ali pozneje. | (138) | By Act No 591 of 18 June 2012 (68), Section 15 of the Danish Tax Assessment Act was repealed. At the same time, Act No 591 of 18 June 2012 introduced a limitation on the utilisation of losses carried-forward, by adding Section 12 to the Danish Corporate Income Tax Act (69). Section 12 of the Danish Corporate Income Tax Act applied to tax years starting on or after 1 July 2012. |
| (139) | Omejitev v novem členu 12 danskega zakona o davku od dohodkov pravnih oseb je določala, da lahko pravne osebe, ki so zavezane plačilu danskega davka od dohodkov pravnih oseb, v svojem prihodnjem obdavčljivem dohodku še vedno odbijejo izgube iz prejšnjih davčnih let za neomejeno časovno obdobje; vendar je bilo mogoče v določenem letu odbiti le izgubo v višini 7 500 000 DKK (1 005 311 EUR) (70) , (71), in, če je ostala dodatna izguba, znesek, ki je ustrezal največ 60 % obdavčljivega dohodka, ki presega 7 500 000 DKK (1 005 311 EUR) (72). Pravne osebe, ki so zavezane plačilu danskega davka od dohodkov pravnih oseb, torej niso smele celotnega dobička v določenem davčnem letu izravnati z izgubami. Vendar njihove izgube zaradi omejitve niso zapadle; preostale izgube so se lahko še vedno odbile v prihodnjih davčnih letih. Kar zadeva pravne osebe, ki so bile obdavčene skupinsko, je ta prag veljal za celotno skupino na konsolidirani podlagi, tj. ne za vsako pravno osebo posebej. | (139) | The limitation in the new Section 12 of the Danish Corporate Income Tax Act provided that legal entities subject to Danish corporate income tax were still allowed to deduct losses from previous tax years in their future taxable income for an unlimited period of time; however, only a loss amounting to DKK 7 500 000 (EUR 1 005 311) (70) , (71), plus, if an additional loss remained, an amount corresponding to a maximum of 60 % of the taxable income in excess of DKK 7 500 000 (EUR 1 005 311) (72), could be deducted in a given year. Hence, legal entities subject to Danish corporate income tax were not allowed to offset all their profits in a certain tax year with losses. The limitation, nonetheless, did not lead to the expiry of their losses; remaining losses could still be deducted in future tax years. For legal entities subject to group taxation, this threshold applied for the entire group on a consolidated basis, i.e. not for each entity separately. |
| (140) | Kar zadeva družbo A/S Øresund, se pravilo o prenosu izgub v prihodnje obdobje iz člena 12 zakona o družbi Sund & Bælt (73), ki je bilo spremenjeno 21. maja 2002 (uvodna izjava 136), ni spremenilo in je za družbo A/S Øresund veljalo tudi po uvedbi novega člena 12 danskega zakona o davku od dohodkov pravnih oseb (74). Navedeno pravilo se ni nanašalo na nobeno omejitev v zvezi z uporabo izgub, prenesenih v prihodnje obdobje. Prvo davčno leto družbe A/S Øresund, za katero se je uporabljalo pravilo o prenosu izgub za obdobje 2013–2015, je bilo davčno leto 2013. | (140) | With respect to A/S Øresund, the rule on loss carry-forward provided for by Section 12 of the Sund & Bælt Act (73) and amended on 21 May 2002 (recital (136)), did not change, and continued to apply to A/S Øresund even after the introduction of the new Section 12 of the Danish Corporate Income Tax Act (74).That rule did not refer to any limitation as to the utilisation of carried forward losses. The first tax year of A/S Øresund to which the 2013-2015 LCF applied was the tax year 2013. |
| (141) | Z zakonom št. 581 z dne 4. maja 2015 je bil člen 12 zakona o družbi Sund & Bælt razveljavljen z učinkom od 1. januarja 2016, za družbo A/S Øresund pa so začela veljati običajna pravila danskega zakona o davku od dohodkov pravnih oseb. | (141) | By Act No 581 of 4 May 2015, Section 12 of the Sund & Bælt Act was repealed with effect as of 1 January 2016, and A/S Øresund became subject to the normal rules of the Danish Corporate Income Tax Act. |
| (142) | Povzetek posebnih danskih pravil o prenosu izgub v prihodnje obdobje je v preglednici 1. | Preglednica 1 | Posebna danska pravila o prenosu izgub v prihodnje obdobje | Leto | Ime ukrepa | Družba A/S Øresund | Druge osebe, za katere velja danski davek od dohodkov pravnih oseb | 1991 | Pravilo o prenosu izgub za obdobje 1991–2001 | Izgube zapadejo po: | (i) | 15 letih, | (ii) | 30 letih za stroške, nastale pred začetkom obratovanja stalne povezave. | Izgube zapadejo po petih letih. | Brez omejitev glede uporabe izgub. | Brez omejitev glede uporabe izgub. | Veljavno pravilo: člen 11 zakona o gradnji. | Veljavno pravilo: člen 15 danskega zakona o odmeri davka. | 2002 | Pravilo o prenosu izgub za obdobje 2002–2012 | Izgube ne zapadejo. | Brez omejitev glede uporabe izgub. | Veljavno pravilo: Člen 11 zakona o gradnji, kakor je bil spremenjen s členom 14 zakona št. 313 z dne 21. maja 2002. | Izgube ne zapadejo. | Brez omejitev glede uporabe izgub. | Veljavno pravilo: člen 15 zakona o odmeri davka, kakor je bil spremenjen s členom 8 zakona št. 313 z dne 21. maja 2002. | 2013 | Pravilo o prenosu izgub za obdobje 2013–2015 | Brez sprememb. | Veljavno pravilo: člen 12 zakona o družbi Sund & Bælt (ki je nadomestil člen 11 zakona o gradnji). | Izgube ne zapadejo. | Omejitev glede uporabe izgub: | (i) | izguba, prenesena v prihodnje obdobje, v višini 7,5 milijona DKK se vedno lahko odbije od obdavčljivega dohodka, | (ii) | dodatne izgube ne morejo zmanjšati obdavčljivega dohodka za več kot 60 % v katerem koli naslednjem letu. | Veljavno pravilo: člen 12 danskega zakona o davku od dohodkov pravnih oseb (razveljavitev člena 15 danskega zakona o odmeri davka). | 2016 | N. r. | Izgube ne zapadejo. | Omejitev glede uporabe izgub: | (i) | izguba, prenesena v prihodnje obdobje, v višini 7,5 milijona DKK se vedno lahko odbije od obdavčljivega dohodka, | (ii) | dodatne izgube ne morejo zmanjšati obdavčljivega dohodka za več kot 60 % v katerem koli naslednjem letu. | Veljavno pravilo: razveljavitev člena 12 zakona o družbi Sund & Bælt. | Brez sprememb. | Veljavno pravilo: člen 12 danskega zakona o davku od dohodkov pravnih oseb. | (142) | A summary of the special Danish rules on loss carry-forward is set out at Table 1. | Table 1 | Special Danish rules on loss carry-forward | Year | Name of measure | A/S Øresund | Other entities subject to Danish corporate income tax | 1991 | 1991-2001 LCF | Losses expire after | (i) | 15 years | (ii) | 30 years for costs incurred prior to Fixed Link being put into service | Losses expire after five years | No limits as to the utilisation of losses | No limits as to the utilisation of losses | Applicable rule: Section 11 of the Construction Act | Applicable rule: Section 15 of the Danish Tax Assessment Act | 2002 | 2002-2012 LCF | Losses do not expire | No limits as to the utilisation of losses | Applicable rule: Section 11 of the Construction Act, as amended by Section 14 of Act No 313 of 21 May 2002 | Losses do not expire | No limits as to the utilisation of losses | Applicable rule: Section 15 of the Danish Tax Assessment Act, as amended by Section 8 of Act No 313 of 21 May 2002 | 2013 | 2013-2015 LCF | No change | Applicable rule: Section 12 of the Sund & Bælt Act (which replaced Section 11 of the Construction Act) | Losses do not expire | Limit on the utilisation of losses: | (i) | a carried forward loss of DKK 7,5 million can always be deducted from taxable income | (ii) | Additional losses cannot reduce the taxable income by more than 60 % in any subsequent year | Applicable rule: Section 12 of the Danish Corporate Income Tax Act (repeal of the above-noted Section 15 of the Danish Tax Assessment Act) | 2016 | N/A | Losses do not expire | Limit on the utilisation of losses: | (i) | a carried forward loss of DKK 7,5 million can always be deducted from taxable income | (ii) | Additional losses cannot reduce the taxable income by more than 60 % in any subsequent year | Applicable rule: repeal of Section 12 of the Sund & Bælt Act | No change | Applicable rule: Section 12 of the Danish Corporate Income Tax Act |
| 2.2.2.4 Posebna danska pravila o amortizaciji | 2.2.2.4. The special Danish rules on depreciation |
| (143) | Najvišja letna stopnja amortizacije, ki se uporablja za vsa sredstva družbe A/S Øresund, je bila v skladu s členoma 12 in 13 zakona o gradnji določena na 6 % začetnih stroškov pridobitve po metodi enakomernega časovnega amortiziranja (75). Ko je skupna amortizacija dosegla 60 % stroškov pridobitve, se je stopnja amortizacije omejila na največ 2 % stroškov pridobitve letno. Stroški pridobitve so bili opredeljeni kot skupni stroški gradnje. Posebno dansko pravilo o amortizaciji se je uporabljalo za lastna sredstva družbe A/S Øresund (76) in za njeno pravico do amortizacije 50 % sredstev konzorcija (77). Kot je navedeno v uvodni izjavi 84, je formalni postopek preiskave – in s tem ta sklep – v zvezi s tem omejen na analizo učinka pravice družbe A/S Øresund do amortizacije 50 % sredstev konzorcija (uvodna izjava 48 sklepa o začetku postopka). Amortizacija po največ 6-odstotni stopnji bi se lahko začela z davčnim letom, ko je stalna povezava začela obratovati – pred začetkom obratovanja ni bila dovoljena nobena amortizacija. | (143) | Pursuant to Sections 12 and 13 of the Construction Act, the maximum annual depreciation rate, applicable to all assets of A/S Øresund, was set at 6 % of the initial acquisition costs, on a straight-line basis (75). When the total depreciation reached 60 % of the acquisition costs, the depreciation rate would be limited to maximum 2 % of the acquisition cost, annually. The acquisition costs were defined as the total construction costs. The special Danish rule on depreciation applied both to A/S Øresund’s own assets (76) and its right to depreciation on 50 % of the Consortium’s assets (77). As noted at recital (84), the formal investigation procedure – and, therefore, this decision – is limited, in this regard, to analysing the effect of A/S Øresund’s right to depreciation on 50 % of the assets of the Consortium (recital 48 of the Opening decision). The depreciation, at a maximum rate of 6 %, could start as from the tax year the Fixed Link was put into service – no depreciation was allowed prior to the entry into service. |
| (144) | Ko je bil sprejet zakon o gradnji, je do vključno davčnega leta 1998 6-odstotna oziroma 2-odstotna stopnja ustrezala 6-odstotni oziroma 2-odstotni stopnji amortizacije in metodi enakomernega časovnega amortiziranja, ki so se uporabljale za kategorijo „stavbe in naprave“ v skladu s členom 22 danskega zakona o davčni amortizaciji (78), ki se je v navedenem obdobju uporabljal za pravne osebe, zavezane plačilu danskega davka od dohodkov pravnih oseb. Danski zakon o davčni amortizaciji določa, da morajo pravne osebe, zavezane plačilu danskega davka od dohodkov pravnih oseb, odvisno od kategorije sredstev, uporabljati posebno metodo amortizacije, vključno z najvišjimi stopnjami amortizacije (79). Za kategorijo „stavbe in naprave“ se je v skladu z danskim zakonom o davčni amortizaciji v primerjavi z drugimi kategorijami sredstev uporabljala nižja najvišja stopnja amortizacije, ki je odražala dolgo življenjsko dobo „stavb in naprav“. Vendar je bila z zakonom o gradnji določena enotna letna stopnja amortizacije v višini največ 6 % oziroma 2 % po metodi enakomernega časovnega amortiziranja, ki se uporablja za vsa sredstva družbe A/S Øresund brez razlikovanja po kategorijah sredstev. Pravilo, ki se uporablja za družbo A/S Øresund, se v tem sklepu imenuje „pravilo o amortizaciji za obdobje 1991–1998“. | (144) | When the Construction Act was established, up to and including the tax year 1998, the 6 % / 2 % rate corresponded to the depreciation rates of 6 % / 2 % and straight-line method applicable to the category ‘buildings and installations’, pursuant to Section 22 of the Danish Tax Depreciation Act (78), which applied to legal entities subject to Danish corporate income tax, during that period. The Danish Tax Depreciation Act requires legal entities subject to Danish corporate income tax to use, depending on the category of assets, a specific depreciation method, including maximum depreciation rates (79). According to the Danish Tax Depreciation Act, the category ‘buildings and installations’ had, compared to the other categories of assets, a lower maximum depreciation rate, to reflect the long lifespan of ‘buildings and installations’. The Construction Act however, established a uniform annual depreciation rate of maximum 6 % / 2 % on a straight-line basis, applying to all assets of A/S Øresund, without any differentiation by category of assets. The rule applicable to A/S Øresund is referred to in this decision as the ‘1991-1998 DEP’. |
| (145) | Kar zadeva davčna leta od leta 1999, se je običajna stopnja amortizacije za „stavbe in naprave“, določena v danskem zakonu o davčni amortizaciji, znižala na 5 % (80), za davčna leta od 1. julija 2007 pa na 4 % (81). Navedene najvišje stopnje amortizacije so se uporabljale, dokler sredstvo ni bilo v celoti amortizirano (brez omejitve na 2 % po desetih letih, kot je bilo določeno v danskem zakonu o davčni amortizaciji, ki je veljal do takrat (82)). Stopnja amortizacije za družbo A/S Øresund je ostala 6- oziroma 2-odstotna v skladu s členoma 12 in 13 zakona o gradnji ter členoma 13 in 14 zakona o družbi Sund & Bælt (83) , (84). | (145) | For tax years starting from 1999 onwards, the normal depreciation rate for ‘buildings and installations’ set in the Danish Tax Depreciation Act decreased to 5 % (80) and, for tax years starting from 1 July 2007 onwards, to 4 % (81). Those maximum depreciation rates applied until the asset was fully depreciated (no limitation to 2 % after 10 years as in the Danish Tax Depreciation Act applicable until then (82)). The depreciation rate for A/S Øresund remained at 6 % / 2 %, pursuant to Sections 12 and 13 of the Construction Act, and Sections 13 and 14 of the Sund & Bælt Act (83) , (84). |
| (146) | Amortizacija je na splošno neobvezna za pravne osebe, za katere velja danski davek od dohodkov pravnih oseb, saj za davčne namene ni treba uveljavljati olajšave zaradi amortizacije. Stopnja amortizacije se lahko po presoji davčnega zavezanca iz leta v leto spreminja v mejah določene najvišje stopnje. Ta prožnost je veljala tudi za družbo A/S Øresund. | (146) | Depreciation is generally optional for legal entities subject to the Danish corporate income tax, as there is no obligation to claim a depreciation allowance for tax purposes. The depreciation rate can vary from year to year at the taxpayer’s discretion, within the limits of the maximum rate set. This flexibility also applied for A/S Øresund. |
| (147) | Z zakonom št. 581 z dne 4. maja 2015 je bil člen 12 zakona o družbi Sund & Bælt razveljavljen z učinkom od 1. januarja 2016, za družbo A/S Øresund pa so začela veljati običajna pravila danskega zakona o davčni amortizaciji. | (147) | By Act No 581 of 4 May 2015, Section 12 of the Sund & Bælt Act was repealed with effect as of 1 January 2016, and A/S Øresund became subject to the normal rules of the Danish Tax Depreciation Act. |
| (148) | Povzetek posebnih danskih pravil o amortizaciji je v preglednici 2. | Preglednica 2 | Posebna danska pravila o amortizaciji | Leto | Ime ukrepa | Družba A/S Øresund | Druge osebe, za katere velja danski davek od dohodkov pravnih oseb | 1991 | Pravilo o amortizaciji za obdobje 1991–1998 | Vsa sredstva se amortizirajo po 6-odstotni stopnji po metodi enakomernega časovnega amortiziranja, dokler skupna vsota amortizacij ne doseže 60 % stroškov pridobitve, nato pa po 2-odstotni stopnji po metodi enakomernega časovnega amortiziranja. | Veljavno pravilo: člena 12 in 13 zakona o gradnji. | „Stavbe in naprave“ se amortizirajo po 6-odstotni stopnji po metodi enakomernega časovnega amortiziranja, dokler skupna vsota amortizacij ne doseže 60 % stroškov pridobitve, nato pa po 2-odstotni stopnji po metodi enakomernega časovnega amortiziranja. | „Stroji in oprema“ se amortizirajo po stopnji do 30 % na podlagi metode padajoče amortizacijske osnove. | Veljavno pravilo (za stavbe in naprave): člen 22 danskega zakona o davčni amortizaciji. | 1999 | Pravilo o amortizaciji za obdobje 1999–2007 | Brez sprememb. | Veljavno pravilo: člena 12 in 13 zakona o gradnji, nato člena 13 in 14 zakona o družbi Sund & Bælt. | „Stavbe in naprave“ se amortizirajo po stopnji do 5 % po metodi enakomernega časovnega amortiziranja. | „Stroji in oprema“ se amortizirajo po stopnji do 30 % na podlagi metode padajoče amortizacijske osnove (ta stopnja je bila znižana na 25 % na podlagi metode padajoče amortizacijske osnove v letu 2001). | Veljavno pravilo (za stavbe in naprave): člen 17 danskega zakona o davčni amortizaciji, kakor je bil spremenjen z zakonom št. 433 z dne 26. junija 1998. | 2007 | Pravilo o amortizaciji za obdobje 2008–2015 | Brez sprememb. | Veljavno pravilo: člena 13 in 14 zakona o družbi Sund & Bælt. | „Stavbe in naprave“ se amortizirajo po stopnji do 4 % po metodi enakomernega časovnega amortiziranja. | „Stroji in oprema, ki se uporabljajo izključno za komercialne dejavnosti“ se amortizirajo po 25-odstotni stopnji na podlagi metode padajoče amortizacijske osnove, infrastrukturne naprave (kot so železniške naprave) pa po 7-odstotni stopnji. | Veljavno pravilo (za stavbe in naprave): člen 17 danskega zakona o davčni amortizaciji, kakor je bil spremenjen z zakonom št. 540 z dne 6. junija 2007. | 2016 | N. r. | Uporabljajo se običajna pravila danskega zakona o davčni amortizaciji: | „Stavbe in naprave“ se amortizirajo po stopnji do 4 % po metodi enakomernega časovnega amortiziranja. | „Stroji in oprema, ki se uporabljajo izključno za komercialne dejavnosti“ se amortizirajo po 25-odstotni stopnji na podlagi metode padajoče amortizacijske osnove, infrastrukturne naprave (kot so železniške naprave) pa po 7-odstotni stopnji. | Veljavno pravilo (za stavbe in naprave): člen 17 danskega zakona o davčni amortizaciji, kakor je bil spremenjen z zakonom št. 540 z dne 6. junija 2007 (razveljavitev členov 13 in 14 zakona o družbi Sund & Bælt). | Brez sprememb. | (148) | A summary of the special Danish rules on depreciation is set out at Table 2. | Table 2 | Special Danish rules on depreciation | Year | Name of measure | A/S Øresund | Other entities subject to Danish corporate income tax | 1991 | 1991-1998 DEP | All assets are depreciated at a rate of up to 6 % on a straight-line basis until total sum of depreciations reaches 60 % of acquisition costs and subsequently at a rate of up to 2 % on a straight-line basis. | Applicable rule: Sections 12 and 13 of the Construction Act | ‘Buildings and installations’ are depreciated at a rate of up to 6 % on a straight-line basis until the total sum of depreciations reaches 60 % of acquisition costs and subsequently at a rate up to 2 % on a straight-line basis. | ‘Machinery and equipment’ are depreciated at a rate up to 30 % on a declining balance basis. | Applicable rule (for buildings and installations): Section 22 of the Danish Tax Depreciation Act. | 1999 | 1999-2007 DEP | No change | Applicable rule: Sections 12 and 13 of the Construction Act, then Sections 13 and 14 of the Sund & Bælt Act | ‘Buildings and installations’ are depreciated at a rate of up to 5 % on a straight-line basis. | ‘Machinery and equipment’ are depreciated at a rate up to 30 % on a declining balance basis. (This rate was reduced to 25 % on a declining balance basis in 2001). | Applicable rule (for buildings and installations): Section 17 of the Danish Tax Depreciation Act, as amended by Act No 433 of 26 June 1998 | 2007 | 2008-2015 DEP | No change | Applicable rule: Sections 13 and 14 of the Sund & Bælt Act | ‘Buildings and installations’ are depreciated at a rate of up to 4 % on a straight-line basis. | ‘Machinery and equipment exclusively used for commercial activities’ is depreciated at a rate of 25 % on a declining balance basis, infrastructure installations (such as railroad installations) at a rate of 7 %. | Applicable rule (for buildings and installations): Section 17 of the Danish Tax Depreciation Act, as amended by Act No 540 of 6 June 2007. | 2016 | N/A | The normal rules of the Danish Tax Depreciation Act apply: | ‘Buildings and installations’ are depreciated at a rate of up to 4 % on a straight-line basis. | ‘Machinery and equipment exclusively used for commercial activities’ is depreciated at a rate of 25 % on a declining balance basis, infrastructure installations (such as railroad installations) at a rate of 7 %. | Applicable rule (for buildings and installations): Section 17 of the Danish Tax Depreciation Act, as amended by Act No 540 of 6 June 2007 (repeal of Sections 13 and 14 of the Sund & Bælt Act. | No change |
| 2.3 Pretekli stiki med Komisijo in konzorcijem | 2.3. Past contacts between the Commission and the Consortium |
| (149) | Konzorcij je z dopisom z dne 1. avgusta 1995 Komisijo obvestil o modelu državnega poroštva, ki sta ga državi brezplačno odobrili v njegovo korist za financiranje stalne povezave. Komisijo je pozval, naj potrdi, da se model državnega poroštva ne bi smel šteti za državno pomoč, ali, če bi Komisija imela zadržke glede utemeljenosti navedene razlage, naj model državnega poroštva odobri kot združljivo državno pomoč. | (149) | By letter dated 1 August 1995, the Consortium informed the Commission of the State guarantee model granted free of charge by the States in its favour for the financing of the Fixed Link. The Consortium asked the Commission to confirm that the State guarantee model should not be considered as State aid, or, should the Commission have reservations as to the validity of that interpretation, to approve the State guarantee model as compatible State aid. |
| (150) | Službe Komisije (85) so z dopisoma danskim in švedskim organom z dne 27. oktobra 1995 (v nadaljnjem besedilu: dopisa iz leta 1995) potrdile, da izgradnja in obratovanje stalne povezave ne pomenita gospodarske dejavnosti in da modela državnega poroštva ni treba priglasiti kot državno pomoč (86). | (150) | By letters to the Danish and Swedish authorities of 27 October 1995 (the ‘1995 letters’), the Commission services (85) confirmed that the construction and operation of the Fixed Link did not constitute an economic activity, and that the State guarantee model did not need to be notified as State aid (86). |
| (151) | Državi po navedenih dopisih nista sprejeli nobenih nadaljnjih ukrepov za pridobitev odobritve Komisije za model financiranja stalne povezave. | (151) | Following those letters, the States did not take any further steps to obtain the Commission’s approval for the financing model of the Fixed Link. |
| 3. RAZLOGI ZA ZAČETEK POSTOPKA | 3. GROUNDS FOR INITIATING THE PROCEDURE |
| (152) | Komisija je formalni postopek preiskave začela 28. februarja 2019. V sklepu o začetku postopka, sprejetem na navedeni datum, je predložila svojo predhodno oceno ukrepov in izrazila dvome o njihovi združljivosti z notranjim trgom. | (152) | The Commission initiated the formal investigation procedure on 28 February 2019. In the Opening decision, adopted on that date, it provided its preliminary assessment of the measures, and raised doubts as to their compatibility with the internal market. |
| 3.1 Opredelitev domnevnih ukrepov pomoči | 3.1. Qualification of the alleged aid measures |
| (153) | Komisija je na podlagi predhodne preiskave predhodno ugotovila, da sta Danska in Švedska konzorciju dodelili državno pomoč v smislu člena 107(1) PDEU za financiranje stalne povezave v obliki državnih poroštev in da je Danska konzorciju dodelila dodatno državno pomoč v obliki posebnih danskih pravil o prenosu izgub v prihodnje obdobje in amortizaciji (uvodna izjava 100 sklepa o začetku postopka). | (153) | On the basis of the preliminary investigation, the Commission preliminarily concluded that Denmark and Sweden granted State aid, within the meaning of Article 107(1) TFEU, to the Consortium for the financing of the Fixed Link, in the form of State guarantees, and that Denmark granted further State aid to the Consortium, in the form of special Danish rules on loss carry-forward and depreciation (recital 100 of the Opening decision). |
| (154) | Vendar Komisija ni mogla dokončno oceniti, ali se ukrepi štejejo za individualno pomoč ali shemo pomoči, in ni mogla določiti števila ukrepov ali datumov njihove odobritve (uvodna izjava 108 sklepa o začetku postopka). | (154) | However, the Commission did not find itself in a position to make a definitive assessment as to the qualification of the measures as individual aid or as an aid scheme, and could not establish the number of measures or the date(s) on which they were granted (recital 108 of the Opening decision). |
| (155) | Natančneje, Komisija je imela pomisleke glede tega, ali bi bilo treba državna poroštva šteti za shemo pomoči, ali pa bi jih bilo treba šteti za individualno pomoč, dodeljeno ob ustanovitvi konzorcija, ali za individualno pomoč, dodeljeno vsakič, ko nacionalni organi odobrijo finančno transakcijo konzorcija (uvodna izjava 110 sklepa o začetku postopka). | (155) | More specifically, the Commission had doubts as to whether the State guarantees should be considered as an aid scheme, or whether they should be considered as individual aid granted when the Consortium was established, or as individual aid granted each time a financial transaction of the Consortium is approved by the national authorities (recital 110 of the Opening decision). |
| (156) | Kar zadeva posebna danska pravila o prenosu izgub v prihodnje obdobje in amortizaciji, je Komisija predhodno menila, da so bili navedeni ukrepi odobreni z enakim namenom in področjem uporabe kot državna poroštva, zato ni mogla sklepati o njihovi posebni naravi, številu ali datumih odobritve (uvodni izjavi 109 in 110 sklepa o začetku postopka). | (156) | As regards the special Danish rules on loss carry-forward and depreciation, the Commission preliminarily considered those measures as having been granted with the same purpose and scope as the State guarantees and, therefore, could not conclude on their specific nature, number, or granting date(s) (recitals 109 and 110 of the Opening decision). |
| (157) | Komisija je zato imela pomisleke tudi o tem, ali so vsi ali nekateri ukrepi pomenili obstoječo ali novo pomoč (uvodna izjava 117 sklepa o začetku postopka). | (157) | Consequently, the Commission also had doubts as to whether all or some of the measures constituted existing or new aid (recital 117 of the Opening decision). |
| 3.2 Ocena združljivosti | 3.2. Compatibility assessment |
| (158) | Državi sta trdili, da bi morala Komisija – če bi menila, da ukrepi pomenijo državno pomoč – oceniti njihovo združljivost na podlagi člena 107(3), točka (b), PDEU, v skladu s katerim je dovoljena pomoč za pospeševanje izvedbe pomembnega projekta skupnega evropskega interesa. Komisija je leta 2014 določila načela, v skladu s katerimi ocenjuje javno financiranje takih projektov, in sicer s sprejetjem sporočila o merilih za analizo združljivosti državne pomoči za spodbujanje izvajanja pomembnih projektov skupnega evropskega interesa z notranjim trgom (87) (v nadaljnjem besedilu: sporočilo o pomembnih projektih skupnega evropskega interesa) (88). Čeprav med predhodno preiskavo ni oblikovala sklepa o datumu odobritve ukrepov, je menila, da so bila državna poroštva in posebna danska pravila o prenosu izgub v prihodnje obdobje in amortizaciji očitno prvič uvedena pred začetkom veljavnosti sporočila o pomembnih projektih skupnega evropskega interesa. Zato je menila, da se sporočilo o pomembnih projektih skupnega evropskega interesa kot tako ne uporablja, je pa menila, da bi bila osnovna vodilna načela, določena v njem, uporabna za oceno Komisije, saj združuje prakso Komisije glede ocene združljivosti pomoči na podlagi člena 107(3), točka (b), PDEU (uvodna izjava 129 sklepa o začetku postopka). | (158) | The States had argued that, should the Commission consider the measures to constitute State aid, it should assess their compatibility on the basis of Article 107(3), point (b) TFEU, which allows aid to promote the execution of an important project of common European interest. In 2014, the Commission established the principles according to which the Commission assesses the public financing of such projects, with the adoption of the Communication for the analysis of the compatibility with the internal market of State aid to promote the execution of important projects of common European interest (87) (the ‘IPCEI Communication’) (88). Although during the preliminary investigation, the Commission did not conclude on the granting date of the measures, it considered it obvious that the State guarantees and the special Danish rules on loss carry-forward and depreciation were first put in place before the entry into force of the IPCEI Communication. The Commission, therefore, considered that the IPCEI Communication was not applicable, as such, but considered that, since it consolidates Commission practice as regards the compatibility assessment of aid on the basis of Article 107(3), point (b) TFEU, the basic guiding principles set out therein would be of use for the Commission’s assessment (recital 129 of the Opening decision). |
| (159) | Komisija je zavzela predhodno stališče, da so ukrepi namenjeni spodbujanju pomembnega projekta skupnega evropskega interesa (uvodna izjava 127 sklepa o začetku postopka). Vendar je glede na sodbo v zadevi Øresund menila, da je primerno oceniti, koliko so ukrepi vključevali samo pomoč za naložbe ali pomoč za naložbe in pomoč za tekoče poslovanje, o čemer Komisija v predhodni preiskavi ni mogla sprejeti sklepa (uvodna izjava 134 sklepa o začetku postopka). Imela je tudi pomisleke glede nujnosti (uvodna izjava 143 sklepa o začetku postopka) in sorazmernosti ukrepov (uvodna izjava 152 sklepa o začetku postopka), saj ni imela na voljo vseh informacij, potrebnih za določitev razumnih omejitev glede zneska in trajanja državnih poroštev ter posebnih danskih pravil o prenosu izgub v prihodnje obdobje in amortizaciji. Poleg tega ni mogla sprejeti dokončnega sklepa o tem, ali so ukrepi povzročili neupravičeno izkrivljanje konkurence, ki ga njihovi pozitivni učinki ne morejo odtehtati (uvodna izjava 157 sklepa o začetku postopka), in ni mogla oceniti obstoja poroštev ali pogojev za njihovo mobilizacijo (uvodna izjava 160 sklepa o začetku postopka). | (159) | The Commission took the preliminary position that the measures were intended to promote an important project of common European interest (recital 127 of the Opening decision). However, in light of the Øresund judgment, the Commission considered it appropriate to assess the extent to which the measures involved investment aid, only, or both investment aid and operating aid, a question on which the Commission could not conclude in the preliminary investigation (recital 134 of the Opening decision). Furthermore, the Commission had doubts as regards the necessity (recital 143 of the Opening decision) and proportionality (recital 152 of the Opening decision) of the measures, as it did not have all of the information necessary to determine the reasonable limits on the amount and duration of the State guarantees and the special Danish rules on loss carry-forward and depreciation. In addition, the Commission was not in a position to definitively conclude on whether the measures resulted in undue distortions of competition that cannot be outweighed by their positive effects (recital 157 of the Opening decision), and could not assess the existence, or the conditions of mobilisation of, the guarantees (recital 160 of the Opening decision). |
| 3.3 Legitimna pričakovanja | 3.3. Legitimate expectations |
| (160) | Komisija je nazadnje opozorila, da bo v okviru formalnega postopka preiskave nadalje proučila natančno obdobje, v katerem bi se lahko konzorcij, Švedska in/ali Danska sklicevali na legitimna pričakovanja, če bi bilo ugotovljeno, da ukrepi pomenijo nezdružljivo državno pomoč (uvodna izjava 181 sklepa o začetku postopka). | (160) | Finally, the Commission noted that it would further examine, in the context of the formal investigation procedure, the precise period during which the Consortium, Sweden, and/or Denmark could invoke legitimate expectations, should the measures be found to constitute incompatible State aid (recital 181 of the Opening decision). |
| 4. PRIPOMBE ZAINTERESIRANIH STRANI | 4. COMMENTS RECEIVED FROM INTERESTED PARTIES |
| (161) | V tem oddelku so povzete pripombe, ki jih je Komisiji v zvezi s sklepom o začetku postopka predložilo šest zainteresiranih strani (89). Vse navedene zainteresirane strani opravljajo dejavnosti v sektorju pomorskega prometa (operaterji trajektnih prevozov, pristanišča in združenja). Izrazile so zaskrbljenost zaradi domnevne državne pomoči v korist konzorcija. Na splošno menijo, da ukrepi pomenijo individualno in delno novo pomoč, ki ni združljiva z notranjim trgom in v zvezi s katero se državi ne moreta sklicevati na legitimna pričakovanja. | (161) | This section summarises the comments submitted to the Commission on the Opening decision by six interested parties (89). Those interested parties are all involved in the shipping industry (ferry operators, ports, and associations). They expressed concern over the alleged State aid in favour of the Consortium. Overall, they consider that the measures constitute individual and, partially, new aid that is incompatible with the internal market, for which the States cannot claim legitimate expectations. |
| (162) | Več navedenih zainteresiranih strani je trdilo, da je Splošno sodišče v sodbi v zadevi Øresund omejilo diskrecijsko pravico Komisije v zvezi z izidom formalnega postopka preiskave, ker obrazložitev Splošnega sodišča pomeni prima facie ugotovitev o nezakonitosti pomoči. Po mnenju navedenih zainteresiranih strani se navedene omejitve nanašajo na opredelitev ukrepov pomoči kot individualne pomoči ali shem in na njihovo združljivost z notranjim trgom. V zvezi s tem opozarjajo, da so sodbe Sodišča zavezujoče za Komisijo na podlagi prvega odstavka člena 266 PDEU. | (162) | Several of those interested parties submitted that the General Court, in the Øresund judgment, limited the Commission’s discretion as regards the outcome of the formal investigation procedure, because the General Court’s reasoning constitutes a prima facie finding on the unlawfulness of the aid. According to those interested parties, those restrictions relate both to the qualification of the aid measures as individual aid or schemes, as well as to their compatibility with the internal market. In that regard, they recall that the Court’s judgments are binding on the Commission pursuant to the first paragraph of Article 266 TFEU. |
| (163) | Ker menijo, da je model financiranja stalne povezave primerljiv z modelom financiranja stalne povezave prek ožine Fehmarn med Dansko in Nemčijo, več zainteresiranih strani nadalje trdi, da mora Komisija upoštevati tudi obrazložitev Splošnega sodišča v sodbi v zadevi Scandlines in ožina Fehmarn ter sodbi v zadevi Stena Line in ožina Fehmarn, saj se navedeni zadevi nanašata na ista vprašanja. | (163) | As they consider the financing model for the Fixed Link to be comparable to that of the Fehmarn Belt Fixed Link between Denmark and Germany, several interested parties further argue that the reasoning of the General Court in the Scandlines Fehmarn Belt judgment and the Stena Line Fehmarn Belt judgment must also be taken into consideration by the Commission, as those cases concern the same issues. |
| (164) | Pripombe družb Scandlines, družbe Stena Line, združenja FSS, skupine Grimaldi in pristanišča Trelleborg se v veliki meri prekrivajo. Navedene pripombe bodo zaradi lažjega sklicevanja v nadaljevanju navedene kot pripombe „družb Scandlines in drugih“. | (164) | The comments from Scandlines, Stena Line, FSS, Grimaldi Group, and Trelleborg Port, to a large extent, overlap. For ease of reference, therefore, those comments will be referred to below as comments from ‘Scandlines et al.’. |
| 4.1 Obstoj pomoči v smislu člena 107(1) PDEU | 4.1. Existence of aid within the meaning of Article 107(1) TFEU |
| (165) | Pritožnik je potrdil, da po njegovem mnenju model državnega poroštva in posebna danska pravila o prenosu izgub v prihodnje obdobje in amortizaciji pomenijo državno pomoč, saj bi bilo treba konzorcij šteti za podjetje, ukrepe je mogoče pripisati danski in/ali švedski državi (kot je ustrezno), ukrepi pa lahko vplivajo na trgovino med državami članicami, upravičencu dajejo selektivno prednost in izkrivljajo konkurenco. Zaradi jasnosti opozarja, da se finančni rezultat konzorcija obdavči na ravni njegovih dveh matičnih družb, matična družba na danski strani pa je družba A/S Øresund. | (165) | The Complainant confirmed that it considers that both the State guarantee model and the special Danish rules on loss carry-forward and depreciation constitute State aid, since the Consortium should be considered as an undertaking, the measures are imputable to the Danish and/or Swedish States (as applicable), are liable to affect trade between Member States, confer a selective advantage on the beneficiary, and distort competition. For the sake of clarity, the Complainant recalls that the taxation of the financial result of the Consortium occurs at the level of its two parent companies, which, on the Danish side, is A/S Øresund. |
| (166) | Čeprav to ni vključeno v področje uporabe sklepa o začetku postopka, je pritožnik dodal, da bi že dejstvo, da sta Danska in Švedska konzorciju neposredno dodelili vlogo edinega graditelja in upravljavca stalne povezave, ne da bi izvedli postopek javnega naročanja za podelitev koncesije za uporabo infrastrukture, samo po sebi pomenilo gospodarsko prednost in vodilo do državne pomoči. | (166) | Although not comprised in the scope of the Opening decision, the Complainant also added that already the fact that Denmark and Sweden directly assigned the Consortium as the sole constructor and operator of the Fixed Link, without running a public procurement procedure to award a concession to exploit the infrastructure, would, in and of itself, present an economic advantage, and result in State aid. |
| (167) | Poleg tega so družba Stena Line, družbi Scandlines, skupina Grimaldi in združenje FSS izrecno trdili, da konzorcij štejejo za podjetje v smislu člena 107(1) PDEU, saj družba z izvajanjem prevoznih storitev za plačilo opravlja gospodarsko dejavnost. V zvezi s tem so dodali, da po njihovem mnenju za določitev, ali konzorcij opravlja gospodarsko dejavnost, ni pomembno, da konzorcij sam določa svoje cene. | (167) | Additionally, Stena Line, Scandlines, Grimaldi and FSS explicitly argued that they consider the Consortium to be an undertaking within the meaning of Article 107(1) TFEU, as it is engaged in an economic activity by offering transport services in return for remuneration. They add, in this respect, that they consider it irrelevant, for determining whether the Consortium performs an economic activity, that the Consortium determines its own prices. |
| 4.2 Opredelitev kot shema ali individualna pomoč | 4.2. Classification as a scheme or individual aid |
| (168) | Pritožnik ter družbi Scandlines in drugi so predložili pripombe na obrazložitev iz sklepa o začetku postopka, v kateri je navedeno, da obstajajo trije možni načini za opredelitev domnevne pomoči, povezane z modelom državnega poroštva, in sicer kot (i) sheme pomoči, (ii) individualne pomoči, dodeljene ob ustanovitvi konzorcija, ali (iii) individualne pomoči, dodeljene vsakič, ko nacionalni organi odobrijo finančno transakcijo konzorcija. | (168) | The Complainant and Scandlines et al. commented upon the reasoning in the Opening decision, which considers that there are three possible ways of classifying the alleged aid related to State guarantee model, namely, as (i) an aid scheme, (ii) individual aid, granted when the Consortium was established, or (iii) individual aid, granted each time a financial transaction of the Consortium is approved by the national authorities. |
| (169) | Pritožnik ter družbi Scandlines in drugi trdijo, da model državnega poroštva in posebna danska pravila o prenosu izgub v prihodnje obdobje in amortizaciji ne štejejo za sheme pomoči v smislu člena 1(d) Uredbe Sveta (EU) 2015/1589 z dne 13. julija 2015 o določitvi podrobnih pravil za uporabo člena 108 Pogodbe o delovanju Evropske unije (90) (v nadaljnjem besedilu: Uredba (EU) 2015/1589), ker je pomoč dodeljena posebej konzorciju za določen projekt in ker poleg tega ni izpolnjen pogoj, da mora biti dodelitev pomoči mogoča „brez nadaljnjih izvedbenih ukrepov“, saj mora vsako državno poroštvo pred njegovo izdajo posebej odobriti danska ali švedska država. Pomoč bi bilo zato treba šteti za individualno pomoč (tj. ad hoc pomoč). V zvezi s tem se pritožnik ter družbi Scandlines in drugi sklicujejo na sodbo v zadevi Øresund (91), pritožnik pa ugotavlja, da je morala Komisija v skladu s točko 83 sodbe v zadevi Øresund proučiti analizo glede datuma odobritve in števila državnih poroštev ter to, ali gre za novo ali obstoječo pomoč, ne pa to, ali gre za sheme pomoči. | (169) | The Complainant and Scandlines et al. argue that the State guarantee model and the special Danish rules on loss carry-forward and depreciation do not qualify as aid schemes within the meaning of Article 1(d) of Council Regulation (EU) 2015/1589 of 13 July 2015 laying down detailed rules for the application of Article 108 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (90) (‘Regulation 2015/1589’), as the aid is granted specifically to the Consortium, for a specific project, and as, furthermore, the condition that it must be possible to grant aid awards ‘without further implementing measures being required’ is not met, given that each State guarantee has to be specifically approved by either the Danish or Swedish State prior to its issuance. Therefore, the aid should be considered as individual aid (i.e., ad hoc aid). In this respect, the Complainant and Scandlines et al. refer to the Øresund judgment (91), and the Complainant notes that paragraph 83 of the Øresund judgment ‘only referred back to the Commission, the analysis concerning the time when the State guarantees were granted, their number and whether they should be classified as new or existing aid, not whether they constituted aid schemes’. |
| (170) | Po trditvah pritožnika iz oddelka 2.1 Obvestila Komisije o uporabi členov 87 in 88 Pogodbe ES za državno pomoč v obliki poroštev (92) (v nadaljnjem besedilu: obvestilo o poroštvih iz leta 2008) izhaja, da je treba znesek državne pomoči v okviru poroštva oceniti ob njegovi izdaji, tj. v trenutku, ko država prevzame tveganje, povezano s poroštvom. Pritožnik trdi, da državi z medvladnim sporazumom ali sporazumom o konzorciju nista prevzeli nobenega tveganja, povezanega s poroštvom, da člen 12 medvladnega sporazuma ne pomeni pravno izvršljive pravice in da mora biti za to, da se poroštvo šteje za odobreno, mogoče izmeriti njegov obseg, kar pa na podlagi teh sporazumov ni mogoče, saj trajanje in znesek nista omejena (93). | (170) | The Complainant argues that Section 2.1 of the Commission Notice on the application of Articles 87 and 88 of the EC Treaty to State aid in the form of guarantees (92) (the ‘2008 Guarantee Notice’) implies that the amount of State aid in a guarantee must be assessed at the moment when it is issued, which is the moment when the risk associated with the guarantee is taken on by the State. The Complainant argues that the States did not take on any risk associated with a guarantee through the Intergovernmental Agreement or the Consortium Agreement, that Article 12 of the Intergovernmental Agreement does not constitute a legally enforceable right, and that, in order for a guarantee to be considered granted, it must be possible to measure its extent, which is not possible on the basis of those agreements, since there is no limit as regards time and amount (93). |
| (171) | Pritožnik v zvezi s tem trdi, da mora konzorcij pridobiti soglasje držav za vse pogodbene obveznosti v zvezi s posojili in posli vrednostnih papirjev, ki morajo biti krite s poroštvi, ki jih izdata državi (94). Trdi na primer, da je v programih MTN izrecno določeno, da mora konzorcij za vsako dolžniško transakcijo, dogovorjeno v okviru navedenih programov, ki naj bi bila podprta s poroštvom, pridobiti posamično odobritev vsakega od porokov za navedeno konkretno dolžniško transakcijo. Čeprav priznava, da medvladni sporazum pomeni obljubo ali zavezo s strani držav in med njima, da bosta izdali poroštva, trdi, da ta obljuba ali zaveza ni brezpogojna. Pritožnik trdi, da programi MTN določajo okvirne pogoje za izdajo poroštev, da se konzorciju olajša pridobivanje posojil, saj mu omogočajo, da potencialnim upnikom predstavi pogoje, pod katerimi se lahko izda poroštvo. Navaja tudi, da je bilo v poroštveni listini, ki sta jo državi podpisali leta 1996, določeno, da državi jamčita le za dolžniške instrumente, ki sta jih odobrili pred njihovo izdajo – take odobritve so bile podane za vsako izdajo dolžniških instrumentov v okviru švedskega programa MTN. | (171) | In this respect, the Complainant claims that the Consortium is required to obtain the consent of the States for all contractual obligations related to loan and securities’ transactions that are to be covered by guarantees issued by the States. (94) As an example, the Complainant argues that it is explicitly set out in the MTN programmes that each debt transaction agreed under those programmes, which is to be supported by a guarantee, requires the Consortium to obtain an individual approval from each of the guarantors for that specific debt transaction. As such, while the Complainant acknowledges that the Intergovernmental Agreement constitutes a pledge, or a commitment, by and between the States that they will issue guarantees, they argue that this pledge or commitment is not unconditional. The Complainant submits that the MTN programmes lay down the framework conditions for issuing guarantees in order to facilitate the Consortium obtaining loans, by allowing the Consortium to show potential creditors the conditions under which a guarantee may be issued. The Complainant, further, submits that the deed of guarantee signed by the States in 1996 set forth that the States only guarantee debt instruments which have been subject to approval by the States prior to their respective issuance – such approvals have been made in relation to each issuance of debt instruments under the Swedish MTN programme. |
| (172) | Pritožnik kot drug primer navaja, da je morala, da bi se določbe poroštvene listine z dne 22. maja 2001 uporabljale za katero koli tranšo dolžniških instrumentov, ki jih je izdal konzorcij v okviru programa EMTN, tako tranšo dolžniških instrumentov pred njeno izdajo pisno odobriti vsaka od obeh držav. | (172) | As another example, the Complainant submits that, in order for the provisions of the deed of guarantee dated 22 May 2001 to apply to any tranche of debt instruments issued by the Consortium under the EMTN programme, such tranche of debt instruments must have been approved by each of the States in writing prior to the time of issue of such tranche of debt instruments. |
| (173) | Pritožnik trdi, da sta državi do novembra 2019 izdali skoraj 250 posebnih poroštev. To vključuje 96 poroštev v okviru programa EMTN, 34 poroštev v okviru švedskega programa MTN, 44 poroštev za posojila zasebnih posojilodajalcev, 14 poroštev v zvezi s kreditnimi aranžmaji za kratkoročna posojila v komercialnih bankah, 60 poroštev za obveznosti iz krovnih pogodb za poslovanje z izvedenimi finančnimi instrumenti in eno poroštvo za globalno krovno pogodbo o začasni prodaji. Pritožnik je predložil podroben pregled različnih finančnih instrumentov in različnih državnih poroštev v zvezi z njimi. | (173) | The Complainant submits that, up until November 2019, the States had issued nearly 250 specific guarantees. This includes 96 guarantees under the EMTN programme, 34 guarantees under the Swedish MTN programme, 44 guarantees for loans from private lenders, 14 guarantees regarding credit facilities for short-term loans in commercial banks, 60 guarantees for obligations under ISDA Master Agreements, and 1 guarantee for a Global Master Repurchase Agreement. The Complainant provided a detailed overview of the various financial instruments and the various State guarantees in relation thereto. |
| (174) | Pritožnik v okviru navedenega pregleda trdi tudi, da poroštvene listine vsebujejo določbe, v skladu s katerimi lahko državi umakneta poroštvo. V zvezi s tem navaja na primer oddelek 2.3 poroštvene listine z dne 22. maja 2001, ki določa, da sta državi v določenih okoliščinah upravičeni do preklica poroštva, čeprav tak preklic držav ne odvezuje njunih obveznosti iz poroštvene listine iz leta 2001, ki so obstajale pred datumom preklica. | (174) | As part of that overview, the Complainant also submits that the deeds of guarantee contain provisions stipulating that the guarantee can be withdrawn by the States. In this respect, the Complainant mentions, for example, Section 2.3 of the deed of guarantee dated 22 May 2001, which sets out that the States are entitled to revoke the guarantee under certain circumstances, even though such revocation shall not release the States from their respective obligations under the 2001 deed of guarantee in existence prior to the date of revocation. |
| (175) | Poleg tega pritožnik trdi, da se je, če bi se štelo, da se s členom 12 medvladnega sporazuma podeljuje zakonska pravica do pomoči v obliki državnih poroštev, ta ukrep pomoči od takrat spremenil, ker so bili pogoji, povezani s poroštvi, bistveno spremenjeni. Zaradi pogojev poroštev v okviru švedskega programa MTN so se obveznosti držav v obliki sekundarnih poroštev na primer spremenile v osebna poroštva. Če bi se štelo, da se z medvladnim sporazumom konzorciju odobri državno poroštvo, bi se poroštvo v skladu s švedsko zakonodajo štelo za sekundarno, ker ni jasne podlage za to, da se razlaga kot osebno poroštvo. Splošno načelo švedskega prava je, da je treba poroštvo razlagati kot sekundarno poroštvo, razen če obstaja jasna podlaga za to, da se poroštvo razlaga kot osebno poroštvo. Opredelitev kot sekundarno poroštvo pomeni, da je odgovornost poroka subsidiarna, obveznost plačila pa nastane le, če dolžnik sam ne more izpolniti svojih obveznosti. Upnik mora torej dokazati dolžnikovo nezmožnost plačila, preden lahko vloži zahtevek pri poroku. Tudi sekundarno poroštvo se v skladu s švedsko zakonodajo na splošno ne obravnava kot ovira za stečaj. Pri osebnem poroštvu se zahteva jasna pisna ali ustna zaveza, v kateri je običajno navedeno, da je porok odgovoren za svoj dolg in je zato primarno odgovoren. Upniku ni treba dokazati dolžnikove plačilne nezmožnosti. Osebno poroštvo se v skladu s švedsko zakonodajo obravnava kot ovira za stečaj, ker pogoji, ki urejajo poroštvo, upniku prepovedujejo, da bi vložil predlog za stečaj dolžnika. Pritožnik trdi, da so poroštva, povezana s švedskim programom MTN, osebna poroštva. Če je torej Komisija ugotovila, da je bila z medvladnim sporazumom konzorciju podeljena zakonska pravica do državnega poroštva, so se pogoji za navedeno državno poroštvo s švedskim programom MTN bistveno spremenili. Poroštva, povezana s švedskim programom MTN, tako kot vsa poroštva, ki sta jih izdali državi pod tako spremenjenimi pogoji, zato pomenijo novo pomoč. | (175) | Furthermore, the Complainant submits that, should Article 12 of the Intergovernmental Agreement be considered to confer a legal right to aid in the form of State guarantees, that aid measure has since changed, because the conditions attached to the guarantees have been fundamentally altered. For example, the conditions of the guarantees under the Swedish MTN programme changed the States’ undertakings from secondary guarantees to personal guarantees. If the Intergovernmental Agreement were to be considered as granting the Consortium a State guarantee, the guarantee would be considered as a secondary guarantee according to Swedish law, because there is no clear basis for interpreting the guarantee as a personal guarantee. It is a general principle under Swedish law that a guarantee is to be interpreted as a secondary guarantee unless there is a clear basis for interpreting the guarantee as a personal guarantee. The qualification as a secondary guarantee means that the guarantor’s responsibility is subsidiary and the obligation to pay arises only when the debtor itself is unable to fulfil its obligations. The creditor must, therefore, prove the debtor’s inability to pay before it can make a claim to the guarantor. A secondary guarantee is, in general, also not considered as an impediment to bankruptcy under Swedish law. A personal guarantee requires a clear written or oral commitment in which it is normally stated that the guarantor is responsible ‘for own debt’, and, thus, has primary responsibility. A creditor does not have to prove the debtor’s inability to pay. A personal guarantee is, under Swedish law, considered an impediment to bankruptcy because the conditions governing the guarantee prohibit the creditor from filing for bankruptcy of the debtor. The Complainant submits that the guarantees related to the Swedish MTN programme are personal guarantees. Therefore, if the Commission found that the Intergovernmental Agreement conferred a legal right on the Consortium to a State guarantee, then the conditions for that State guarantee have been substantially changed through the Swedish MTN programme. Therefore, the guarantees related to the Swedish MTN programme, like all guarantees issued by the States with such changed conditions, constitute new aid. |
| (176) | Poleg tega je pritožnik po tem, ko je Komisija 20. marca 2020 sprejela končni sklep v zadevi v zvezi z ožino Fehmarn (95) (v nadaljnjem besedilu: končni sklep o ožini Fehmarn), predložil analizo posledic navedene zadeve za oceno stalne povezave. Pritožnik meni, da nacionalne ureditve, ki konzorciju dajejo pravico do državnih poroštev, nasprotno kot v zadevi v zvezi z ožino Fehrman ne zajemajo samo enega zakonodajnega besedila in enega sporazuma, temveč več različnih aktov in sporazumov, ki skupaj tvorijo pogoje, ki urejajo poroštva. Poleg tega je medvladni sporazum mednarodni sporazum med dvema dualističnima državama, ki ne priznavata neposredne uporabe mednarodnih sporazumov samih po sebi. Konzorcij tudi še ni bil ustanovljen ob sklenitvi medvladnega sporazuma 23. marca 1991 ali ob podpisu sporazuma o konzorciju 27. januarja 1992. Konzorcij je bil pri švedskem uradu za registracijo družb registriran šele 23. julija 1993. Dokler ni upravičenca, ni mogoče podeliti nobene zakonske pravice. Na podlagi nacionalnega izvajanja navedenih sporazumov tudi ni mogoče sklepati, da je bila z začetkom veljavnosti izvedbenih aktov konzorciju podeljena zakonska pravica do financiranja stalne povezave s posojili, zavarovanimi z državnim poroštvom. Pritožnik trdi tudi, da se sporazum o sodelovanju iz leta 1997 razlikuje od sporazuma z dne 29. maja 2017 med družbo Femern A/S in dansko centralno banko, ministrstvom za finance in ministrstvom za promet (96), saj vsebuje podrobne določbe (97) o odnosih med strankami v zvezi z izdajanjem poroštev. | (176) | In addition, after the Commission adopted the final decision in the Fehmarn Belt case on 20 March 2020 (95) (the ‘Fehmarn Belt final decision’), the Complainant submitted an analysis of the implications of that case for the assessment of the Fixed Link. The Complainant considers that, in contrast to the Fehmarn Belt case, the national regimes that give the Consortium a right to State guarantees do not consist of merely one legislative text and one agreement, but of several different acts and agreements, jointly forming the conditions governing the guarantees. Furthermore, the Intergovernmental Agreement is an international agreement between two dualist States, which do not recognise the direct applicability per se of international agreements. Also, the Consortium had not yet been created when the Intergovernmental Agreement was concluded on 23 March 1991, nor when the Consortium Agreement was signed on 27 January 1992. The Consortium was only registered with the Swedish Companies Registration Office on 23 July 1993. So long as there is no beneficiary, no legal right can be conferred. Nor does the national implementation of those agreements lead to the conclusion that the entry into force of the implementing acts conferred on the Consortium the legal right to finance the Fixed Link by way of State guaranteed loans. The Complainant, further, submits that the 1997 Cooperation Agreement is different from the Agreement of 29 May 2017 between Femern A/S and the Danish Central Bank, the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Transport (96) in that the former contains detailed provisions (97) on the parties’ relations regarding the issuance of guarantees. |
| (177) | Pritožnik zato meni, da vsak posamezni sporazum o državnem poroštvu pomeni ločeno ad hoc pomoč. | (177) | As such, the Complainant considers that each individual State guarantee agreement constitutes a separate ad hoc aid. |
| (178) | Po mnenju družb Scandlines in drugih Komisija ne upošteva Uredbe (EU) 2015/1589 in krši načelo prevlade prava Unije o državni pomoči nad nacionalnim pravom, ko v uvodni izjavi 107 sklepa o začetku postopka navaja, da je treba stališče pritožnika uravnotežiti s trditvijo držav, da državni organi izvajajo državna poroštva, kot so določena v medvladnem sporazumu, sporazumu o konzorciju in njunem nacionalnem pravu. Po mnenju družb Scandlines in drugih mora Komisija strogo uporabljati pravne določbe Uredbe (EU) 2015/1589. | (178) | In the opinion of Scandlines et al., the Commission is disregarding Regulation 2015/1589, and is violating the principle of supremacy of Union State aid law over national law, when it states, at recital 107 of the Opening decision, that the position of the Complainant has to be balanced against the States’ argument that the States’ authorities are giving effect to the State guarantees as set out in the Intergovernmental Agreement, the Consortium Agreement, and their national law. In the view of Scandlines et al., the Commission must apply the legal provisions of Regulation 2015/1589 strictly. |
| (179) | Poleg tega družbi Scandlines in drugi menijo, da Komisija pomoč obravnava kot pomoč, ki spada v shemo pomoči, in ne upošteva ad hoc narave pomoči, saj trdi, da bi lahko ukrepi pomoči pomenili individualno pomoč, dodeljeno v določenem trenutku, tj. leta 1992, kar je v nasprotju s členom 1(d) in (e) Uredbe (EU) 2015/1589 ter sodbo v zadevi Øresund. Po njihovem mnenju ni mogoče sprejeti dejstva, da je bilo v enem samem primeru odobrenih toliko ločenih državnih poroštev – odobrenih je bilo namreč več kot 100 za različne finančne transakcije, zneske in trajanja v obdobju več kot 25 let – katerih pogojev ali nujnosti ni bilo mogoče predvideti leta 1992. Tak sklep bi bil mogoč le na podlagi splošne določbe, ki bi dovoljevala odobritev več ukrepov pomoči, kar je po njihovem mnenju mogoče le v okviru sheme pomoči. Združenje FSS in pristanišče Trelleborg se sklicujeta tudi na stališče Sodišča v zadevi C-438/16 P (98), v kateri je Sodišče zavrnilo pojem „shema shem pomoči“. | (179) | Moreover, Scandlines et al. consider that the Commission treats the aid as falling under an aid scheme and disregards the ad hoc nature of the aid, by arguing that the aid measures could constitute individual aid granted at one point in time, in 1992, which violates Article 1(d) and 1(e) of Regulation 2015/1589 and the Øresund judgment. They consider that it cannot be accepted that so many separate State guarantees, over 100 granted for different financial transactions, amounts, and durations, over a period of more than 25 years, the terms or the necessity of which could not be foreseen in 1992, were granted in one instance. Such a conclusion would presuppose the existence of a general provision authorising the granting of multiple aid measures, which they consider could only be possible under an aid scheme. FSS and Trelleborg Port also refer to the position of the Court of Justice in case C-438/16 P (98), in which it rejected the concept of a ‘scheme of aid schemes’. |
| 4.3 Opredelitev kot nova ali obstoječa pomoč | 4.3. Classification as new aid or existing aid |
| (180) | Po mnenju pritožnika je bil zastaralni rok v zvezi z modelom državnega poroštva prekinjen 13. maja 2013, ko je Komisija po pritožbi od Danske in Švedske zahtevala informacije. Model državnega poroštva zajema več posameznih ukrepov pomoči, zato vsa poroštva, odobrena po 13. maju 2003, pomenijo novo pomoč. Pritožnik trdi, da je trenutek odobritve trenutek, ko državi prevzameta tveganje, povezano s poroštvi. Pred navedenim trenutkom ni prenosa državnih sredstev. Pritožnik zato ugotavlja, da se novo poroštvo odobri vsakič, ko državi izdata odobritev za določeno posojilo ali finančni instrument. Po navedbah pritožnika je bilo skoraj 90 navedenih odobritev (glej uvodno izjavo 173) izdanih po 13. maju 2003 in zato pomenijo novo pomoč. | (180) | According to the Complainant, the limitation period with regard to the State guarantee model was interrupted on 13 May 2013, when, following the complaint, the Commission requested information from Denmark and Sweden. Hence, as the State guarantee model consists of several individual aid measures, all guarantees granted after 13 May 2003 constitute new aid. The Complainant argues that the granting moment is the moment when the risk associated with the guarantees is taken on by the States. Before that moment there is no transfer of State resources. The Complainant, therefore, concludes that a new guarantee is granted each time the States issued an approval for a specific loan or financial instrument. According to the Complainant, nearly 90 of these approvals (see recital (173)) have been issued after 13 May 2003, and thus constitute new aid. |
| (181) | Poleg tega pomoč iz posebnih danskih pravil o prenosu izgub v prihodnje obdobje in amortizaciji, dodeljena v obdobju od 10 let pred prekinitvijo zastaralnega roka, pomeni novo pomoč. | (181) | In addition, the aid contained in the special Danish rules on loss carry-forward and depreciation, granted as from 10 years prior to the interruption of the limitation period, constitutes new aid. |
| (182) | Družba Stena Line, družbi Scandlines in skupina Grimaldi izhajajo tudi iz tega, da gre za ad hoc pomoč ob vsakem dogovoru o novem posojilu ali kreditnem aranžmaju. V zvezi s tem se sklicujejo na sodbo Sodišča v zadevi France Télécom (v nadaljnjem besedilu; sodba v zadevi France Télécom) (99), v skladu s katero se člen 15(2) Uredbe (ES) št. 659/1999 „sklicuje na dodelitev pomoči upravičencu, in ne na datum sprejetja sheme pomoči. Glede tega je treba poudariti, da se lahko določitev datuma dodelitve pomoči razlikuje glede na naravo zadevne pomoči. V primeru večletne sheme v obliki nakazil ali občasne dodelitve ugodnosti sta torej lahko datum sprejetja pravnega akta, ki je podlaga za dodelitev pomoči, in datum, ko so upravičenci dejansko deležni ugodnosti, precej narazen. V takem primeru je treba za izračun zastaralnega roka šteti, da je pomoč dodeljena upravičencu šele na datum, ko mu je dejansko dodeljena.“ Družba Stena Line, družbi Scandlines in skupina Grimaldi menijo, da navedeno načelo očitno velja tudi za ad hoc pomoč. Menijo, da se pomoč v obliki državnih poroštev dodeli na dva načina: prvič, vsakič, ko konzorcij najame posojilo, zavarovano z državnim poroštvom, in drugič, vsakič, ko konzorcij ne plača tržne premije za taka posojila. Pomoč iz posebnih danskih pravil o prenosu izgub v prihodnje obdobje in amortizaciji se dodeli vsakič, ko danski organi uporabijo posebne določbe, da na novo dodelijo ugodnosti, ki so v njih določene. Po mnenju družbe Stena Line, družb Scandlines in skupine Grimaldi zato vsa državna poroštva in ugodnosti iz posebnih danskih pravil o prenosu izgub v prihodnje obdobje in amortizaciji, dodeljene po letu 2003, pomenijo novo pomoč. | (182) | Stena Line, Scandlines, and Grimaldi also start from the position that there is ad hoc aid each time a new loan or credit facility transaction is agreed. They refer, in this context, to the judgment of the Court of Justice in France Télécom (the ‘France Télécom judgment’) (99), which states that Article 15(2) of Regulation (EC) No 659/1999 ‘refers to the grant of aid to a beneficiary, not the date on which an aid scheme was adopted. The determination of the date on which aid was granted may vary depending on the nature of the aid in question. Thus, in the case of a multi-annual scheme, entailing payments or advantages granted on a periodic basis, the date on which an act forming the legal basis of the aid is adopted and the date on which the undertakings concerned will actually be granted the aid may be a considerable period of time apart. In such a case, for the purpose of calculating the limitation period, the aid must be regarded as not having been awarded to the beneficiary until the date on which it was in fact received by the beneficiary.’ Stena Line, Scandlines and Grimaldi consider it evident that that principle also applies to ad hoc aid. They consider the aid in the form of State guarantees to be granted in two ways: first, every time the Consortium takes out a loan covered by a State guarantee, and, second, every time the Consortium does not pay the market premium for such loans. The aid contained in the special Danish rules on loss carry-forward and depreciation is granted every time the Danish authorities make use of the special provisions in order to grant anew the advantages prescribed under them. Consequently, according to Stena Line, Scandlines, and Grimaldi, all State guarantees, and the advantages contained in the special Danish rules on loss carry-forward and depreciation, granted after 2003 constitute new aid. |
| 4.4 Združljivost ukrepov pomoči | 4.4. Compatibility of the aid measures |
| 4.4.1 Opredelitev projekta glede na sporočilo o pomembnih projektih skupnega evropskega interesa | 4.4.1. Qualification of the project in light of the IPCEI Communication |
| (183) | Pritožnik ne nasprotuje temu, da bi Komisija za oceno združljivosti uporabila osnovna vodilna načela iz sporočila o pomembnih projektih skupnega evropskega interesa. Opozarja, da je treba element pomoči količinsko opredeliti, vsako pomoč za tekoče poslovanje ločiti od pomoči za naložbe, ugotoviti nujnost in sorazmernost ukrepov ter opredeliti in dokazati, da so pogoji za unovčenje zadostni. | (183) | The Complainant does not object to the Commission using the basic guiding principles set out in the IPCEI Communication for the compatibility assessment. It recalls that the aid element must be quantified, that any operating aid must be separated from investment aid, that the necessity and proportionality of the measures must be established, and that the mobilisation conditions must be identified and demonstrated as sufficient. |
| 4.4.2 Določitev elementa pomoči | 4.4.2. Determination of the aid element |
| (184) | Pritožnik poudarja, da je treba določiti element pomoči za državna poroštva in za posebna danska pravila o prenosu izgub v prihodnje obdobje in amortizaciji ter da je poznavanje tega, kako določiti element pomoči, ne da bi se zahtevala natančna končna številka, nujen predpogoj za oceno nujnosti in sorazmernosti pomoči. | (184) | The Complainant emphasises that the aid element must be determined, both for the State guarantees and the special Danish rules on loss carry-forward and depreciation, and that knowledge of how to determine the aid element, while there is no requirement for a final precise figure, is an essential prerequisite for assessing the necessity and proportionality of the aid. |
| (185) | Družba Stena Line, družbi Scandlines in skupina Grimaldi trdijo, da težko izračunajo znesek pomoči na podlagi modela državnega poroštva in posebnih danskih pravil o prenosu izgub v prihodnje obdobje in amortizaciji. Kar zadeva državna poroštva, pomoč ne bi zajemala le odsotnosti zahteve po plačilu (tržne) premije, ampak, ker je malo verjetno, da bi katera koli zasebna stranka ponudila taka poroštva zaradi zelo velikega tveganja, povezanega s projektom, tudi celoten znesek posojil, zavarovanih s poroštvom. | (185) | Stena Line, Scandlines, and Grimaldi submit that it is difficult for them to calculate the aid amount under the State guarantee model and the special Danish rules on loss carry-forward and depreciation. Concerning the State guarantees, the aid would not only consist of the absence of a requirement to pay a (market) premium, but, since it is unlikely that any private party would offer such guarantees due to the very high risk involved in the project, also of the entire amount of the guaranteed loans. |
| (186) | Pristanišče Trelleborg trdi, da zneska pomoči ni mogoče določiti, ker v sklepu iz leta 2014 ni parametrov, ki bi omogočali njegovo količinsko opredelitev. Ker so bili v času odobritve državnih poroštev obeti glede donosnosti konzorcija taki, da mu nihče ni bil pripravljen odobriti nobenega poroštva, element pomoči ne zajema le razlike med tržno premijo za poroštvo in dejansko plačano premijo, ampak tudi samo državno poroštvo. Vrednost državnega poroštva ustreza osnovni vrednosti posojila. Kar zadeva posebna danska pravila o prenosu izgub v prihodnje obdobje in amortizaciji, pristanišče Trelleborg dodaja, da element pomoči ustreza razliki med zneskom, ki bi ga konzorcij plačal, če bi se uporabljala splošna davčna pravila, in zneskom, ki ga je dejansko plačal. | (186) | Trelleborg Port submits that it is not possible to determine the aid amount, given that, in the 2014 decision, there are no parameters allowing for its quantification. Since, at the time the State guarantees were granted, the Consortium’s prospects of profitability were such that nobody was willing to grant it any guarantee at all, the aid element does not merely consist of the difference between the market premium for the guarantee and the premium actually paid, but also of the State guarantee itself. The value of the State guarantee corresponds to the underlying loan value. Trelleborg Port adds that, with regard to the special Danish rules on loss carry-forward and depreciation, the aid element corresponds to the difference between the amount that the Consortium would have paid, if the ordinary tax rules were applied, and what it has actually paid. |
| 4.4.3 Dodelitev pomoči za tekoče poslovanje | 4.4.3. The granting of operating aid |
| (187) | Pritožnik se pri zatrjevanju, da je splošno znano, da državna poroštva krijejo stroške gradnje in stroške poslovanja stalne povezave, sklicuje na sodbo v zadevi Øresund (100), člen 10 medvladnega sporazuma, člen 4(3) sporazuma o konzorciju, uvodno izjavo 50 sklepa iz leta 2014 (101) ter sporazuma o sodelovanju iz let 1997 in 2004. Pritožnik in družba Stena Line menita, da državna poroštva konzorciju omogočajo, da pri določanju cen ne upošteva stroškov (102). Pritožnik meni, da je treba pri državnih poroštvih in posebnih danskih pravilih o prenosu izgub v prihodnje obdobje in amortizaciji razlikovati med pomočjo za izgradnjo stalne povezave in pomočjo za njeno obratovanje. | (187) | The Complainant refers to the Øresund judgment (100), Article 10 of the Intergovernmental Agreement, Article 4(3) of the Consortium Agreement, recital 50 of the 2014 decision (101), and the 1997 and 2004 Cooperation Agreements, in arguing that it is common ground that the State guarantees cover both the construction costs and the operating costs of the Fixed Link. The Complainant and Stena Line consider that the State guarantees permit the Consortium to disregard costs when setting its prices (102). The Complainant considers it necessary, both for the State guarantees and the special Danish rules on loss carry-forward and depreciation, to draw a distinction between the aid for the construction of the Fixed Link and the aid for the operation of the Fixed Link. |
| (188) | Pritožnik se sklicuje tudi na sodbo v zadevi Scandlines in ožina Fehmarn (103) ter opozarja, da se lahko pomoč, dodeljena po tem, ko je znesek dolga upravičenca dosegel raven, pri kateri bo njegov dohodek verjetno presegel stroške poslovanja in odplačila dolga pod običajnimi tržnimi pogoji, torej preden je dolg v celoti odplačan, šteje za pomoč za tekoče poslovanje. Poleg tega je predložil pripombe k uvodni izjavi 124 sklepa o začetku postopka in navedel, da so bila tveganja projekta stalne povezave po začetku njenega obratovanja omejena. Meni, da državna poroštva za posojila, najeta za kritje stroškov poslovanja konzorcija, niso primerna in niso potrebna za izvedbo naložbe v stalno povezavo (zaradi česar se ta primer razlikuje od projekta Hinkley Point C (104)). Da bi bila pomoč za tekoče poslovanje upravičena, mora biti tudi časovno omejena in se mora zmanjševati. | (188) | The Complainant also refers to the Scandlines Fehmarn Belt judgment (103), in recalling that aid granted beyond the point in time when the amount of the beneficiary’s debt has reached a level at which its income is likely to exceed operating costs and debt repayments under normal market conditions, and, therefore, before the debt has been repaid in full, may be regarded as operating aid. The Complainant, further, commented on recital 124 of the Opening decision, and noted that the risks of the Fixed Link project were limited after the Fixed Link was put into service. It considers the State guarantees for loans taken out to meet the Consortium’s operating costs as inappropriate, and not necessary for the investment in the Fixed Link to be made (which differentiates this case from the Hinkley Point C (104) project). For operating aid to be justified, it must also be limited in time, and declining. |
| (189) | Družba Stena Line, družbi Scandlines in skupina Grimaldi menijo, da pomoč za tekoče poslovanje, ki je prepovedana, ni le pomoč, dodeljena v operativni fazi projekta, ampak vsa pomoč, ki se nanaša na stroške poslovanja, tudi v fazi gradnje projekta (105). To pomeni, da pomoč, dodeljena konzorciju, ne sme kriti nobenih posojil za refinanciranje, saj taka posojila v skladu z njihovo razlago odstavka 111 sodbe v zadevi Øresund pomenijo prepovedano pomoč za tekoče poslovanje. Pritožnik meni, da je treba pri državni pomoči, ki izhaja iz posebnih danskih pravil o prenosu izgub v prihodnje obdobje in amortizaciji, tako kot pri državnih poroštvih razlikovati med pomočjo za izgradnjo stalne povezave in pomočjo za njeno obratovanje. | (189) | Stena Line, Scandlines, and Grimaldi consider that operating aid, which is prohibited, is not merely aid granted during the operational phase of the project, but all aid relating to operating costs including during the construction phase of the project (105). This means that aid granted to the Consortium may not cover any refinancing loans, since such loans, in their interpretation of paragraph 111 of the Øresund judgment, constitute prohibited operating aid. The Complainant considers that, like for the State guarantees, for the State aid derived from the special Danish rules on loss carry-forward and depreciation, a distinction must be made between aid for the construction of the Fixed Link and aid for the operation of the Fixed Link. |
| (190) | Družba Stena Line, družbi Scandlines in skupina Grimaldi menijo, da infrastrukturni projekti, kot je stalna povezava, ne upravičujejo brisanja meje med pomočjo za naložbe in pomočjo za tekoče poslovanje, kot je domnevno navedeno v uvodni izjavi 131 sklepa o začetku postopka. Poleg tega zlasti obsežni projekti ne bi smeli biti upravičeni do pomoči za tekoče poslovanje (106). Navajajo tudi več argumentov, da bi dokazali, da se sodba v zadevi Hinkley Point C v obravnavani zadevi ne uporablja. Nazadnje odločno nasprotujejo predlogu Komisije iz uvodne izjave 132 sklepa o začetku postopka o morebitni enakovrednosti državnih poroštev in vnaprejšnje kapitalske injekcije. | (190) | Stena Line, Scandlines, and Grimaldi do not consider that infrastructure projects like the Fixed Link justify blurring the line between investment aid and operating aid, as allegedly suggested at recital 131 of the Opening decision. Furthermore, large scale projects, in particular, should not be allowed to benefit from operating aid (106). Stena Line, Scandlines, and Grimaldi also provide several arguments to demonstrate that the Hinkley Point C judgment is not applicable to the present case. Finally, they strongly oppose the Commission’s suggestion, at recital 132 of the Opening decision on the possible equivalence of State guarantees and an upfront capital injection. |
| (191) | Po navedbah pritožnika ekonomska ocena interne stopnje donosnosti in neto sedanje vrednosti konzorcija (107) (glej uvodno izjavo 201) kaže, da bi konzorcij lahko financiral stalno povezavo pod komercialnimi pogoji brez državnih poroštev od leta 2003, kar po mnenju pritožnika pomeni, da pomoč od takrat naprej pomeni pomoč za tekoče poslovanje. | (191) | According to the Complainant, an economic assessment of the Internal Rate of Return (‘IRR’) and the Net Present Value (‘NPV’) of the Consortium (107) (see further, recital (201)) indicates that the Consortium would have been able to finance the Fixed Link on commercial terms without the State guarantees as from 2003, which it argues also indicates that aid from that point forward constitutes operating aid. |
| 4.4.4 Nujnost pomoči | 4.4.4. Necessity of the aid |
| (192) | Pritožnik meni, da bi morala Komisija za oceno, ali je pomoč potrebna, opraviti izračun, podoben tistemu iz njenega sklepa iz leta 2015 v zvezi z ožino Fehmarn (108) , (109), ko je izračunala interno stopnjo donosnosti projekta in jo primerjala s tehtanim povprečjem stroškov kapitala (WACC). Pomoč kot taka je lahko potrebna le, če je interna stopnja donosnosti nižja od tehtanega povprečja stroškov kapitala. Pritožnik ugotavlja, da konzorcij za namene navedenega izračuna sam meni, da je življenjska doba stalne povezave vsaj 100 let. Izvesti je treba ločeno analizo potrebe po pomoči v zvezi z operativno fazo stalne povezave. Pritožnik meni, da za presojo nujnosti pomoči ni treba oceniti, ali so bili ukrepi sprejeti v času, ko je na splošno veljalo, da za javno financiranje infrastrukturnih projektov ne veljajo pravila Unije o državni pomoči. Kar zadeva vprašanje, ali bi bilo mogoče obsežen infrastrukturni projekt, kot je stalna povezava, izvesti brez javne podpore, navaja, da so razvoj, financiranje, gradnjo in obratovanje predora pod Rokavskim prelivom (110) izvajale zasebne družbe na podlagi javnega razpisa, na katerem je bila zasebnim podjetjem podeljena koncesija. | (192) | In order to assess whether the aid is necessary, the Complainant considers that the Commission should carry out a calculation similar to that included in its decision of 2015 regarding the Fehmarn Belt (108) , (109), where it calculated the IRR of the project and compared it to the weighted average cost of capital (‘WACC’). As such, aid can only be necessary if the IRR is lower than the WACC. For the purpose of that calculation, the Complainant notes that the Consortium, itself, considers the lifetime of the Fixed Link to be at least 100 years. A separate analysis of the necessity of the aid with respect to the operational phase of the Fixed Link must be carried out. In the Complainant’s opinion, it is irrelevant for the assessment of the necessity of the aid to evaluate whether or not the measures were adopted at a time when it was generally considered that the public financing of infrastructure projects was not covered by Union State aid rules. As concerns the question of whether a large-scale infrastructure project such as the Fixed Link could be carried out without public support, the Complainant indicates that the development, financing, construction, and operation of the Channel Tunnel (110) were all performed by private companies, subject to a public competition in which private companies were granted a concession. |
| (193) | Rezultati ekonomske ocene stalne povezave, ki jo je pritožnik naročil septembra 2019 (uvodna izjava 191), zlasti interne stopnje donosnosti in tehtanega povprečja stroškov kapitala konzorcija po različnih scenarijih, so povzeti v uvodnih izjavah 201 do 206. | (193) | The results of the economic assessment of the Fixed Link that the Complainant commissioned in September 2019 (recital (191)), and, in particular, of the IRR and the WACC of the Consortium under different scenarios, are summarised at recitals (201) to (206). |
| 4.4.5 Sorazmernost pomoči | 4.4.5. Proportionality of the aid |
| (194) | Pritožnik ter družbi Scandlines in drugi, ki se sklicujejo na sodbo v zadevi Øresund (111), trdijo, da pomoč ni sorazmerna, ker trajanje, znesek ali število državnih poroštev in posebnih danskih pravil o prenosu izgub v prihodnje obdobje in amortizaciji niso omejeni, prav tako pa zadevna poroštva in pravila niso povezana s specifičnimi finančnimi transakcijami. Poleg tega je obdobje odplačevanja dolga nejasno in se spreminja. | (194) | The Complainant and Scandlines et al., referring to the Øresund judgment (111), submit that the aid is not proportionate, because the State guarantees and the special Danish rules on loss carry-forward and depreciation are not limited in time, in amount, or in number, and are not linked to specific financial transactions. Moreover, the debt repayment period is unclear, and fluctuates. |
| (195) | Poleg tega je po mnenju pritožnika ter družb Scandlines in drugih pomembno navesti, da je Splošno sodišče v svoji sodbi v zadevah Scandlines in ožina Fehmarn (112) ter Stena Line in ožina Fehmarn (113) odločilo, da je pomoč lahko potrebna in sorazmerna le do takrat, „ko bi si lahko upravičenec na podlagi svojega denarnega toka brez pomoči iz državnih poroštev ali državnih posojil izposojal na konkurenčnem trgu“. Ta trenutek je običajno dosežen, ko se znesek dolga upravičenca zniža na raven, na kateri bi dohodek lahko presegel stroške poslovanja in odplačevanje dolga pod tržnimi pogoji, in torej pred popolnim poplačilom dolga. Nekatere zainteresirane strani so navedle, da se zato lahko pomoč, ki presega navedeno raven, šteje za pomoč za tekoče poslovanje, česar Komisija v izpodbijani odločbi ni utemeljila. Po mnenju zainteresiranih strani je torej očitno, da mora biti pomoč omejena na trenutek, ko lahko upravičenec sam pridobi posojila na odprtem trgu. | (195) | Furthermore, the Complainant and Scandlines et al. consider it important to note that the General Court held in its Scandlines Fehmarn Belt judgment (112) and its Stena Line Fehmarn Belt judgment (113) that aid may be necessary and proportionate only until ‘“the point in time when the beneficiary would be able, on the basis of its cash flow, to borrow on the open market without the support of State guarantees or State loans”. That point is normally reached when the amount of the beneficiary’s debt has reached a level at which its income is likely to exceed operating costs and debt repayments under normal market conditions, and therefore before the debt has been repaid in full’. Some of the interested parties add that ‘[a]id in excess of that level may, therefore, be regarded as operating aid, for which the Commission has not provided any justification in the contested decision.’ According to the interested parties, it is, therefore, evident that the aid must be limited to the point in time when the beneficiary is able to borrow on its own on the open market. |
| (196) | Pritožnik se sklicuje na ugotovitve Splošnega sodišča v sodbi v zadevi Scandlines in ožina Fehmarn (114), ko trdi, da je pomoč sorazmerna do zneska, pri katerem projekt postane donosen. Poleg tega je Splošno sodišče v sodbi v zadevi Øresund ugotovilo, da za presojo sorazmernosti ni pomembno, da bi druge oblike financiranja s strani držav bolj finančno obremenile državni proračun (115) ali da bi bolj neposredne oblike pomoči morda lahko pomenile pomembnejše pomoči (116). Pritožnik s sklicevanjem na letno poročilo družbe SVEDAB za leto 2014 nadalje trdi, da je konzorcij vsaj do leta 2012 dosegel prag dobička, ko ni imel neto dobička ali izgube, in da bi lahko konzorcij naslednje leto svojim matičnim družbam razdelil dividende ali delež v dobičku. Sklicuje se tudi na posodobitev raziskave družbe S&P Global Ratings z dne 18. novembra 2016, pri čemer navaja, da je konzorcij začel odplačevati dolg leta 2004, torej pet let prej, kot je bilo načrtovano, in da je bil od leta 2000 poslovni dobiček konzorcija pozitiven in je ostal pozitiven. Navaja, da je lastniški kapital konzorcija leta 2016 postal pozitiven in da je konzorcij po lastnih navedbah začel izplačevati dividende matičnim družbam leta 2018, ko je bila izplačana dividenda v višini 1,1 milijarde DKK (0,15 milijarde EUR) za davčno leto 2017, ter da so se matične družbe leta 2018 odločile povečati letno izplačilo dividend, zaradi česar naj bi bil dolg konzorcija nato poplačan šele leta 2050, kar je precej pozneje kot je bilo pričakovano, tj. leta 2033. Poleg tega danska država iz družbe A/S Øresund črpa denar za druge namene kot za odplačilo dolga, povezanega s stroški danskih cestnih in železniških povezav z zaledjem. Obdobje odplačevanja za konzorcij se je zato podaljšalo. Po mnenju pritožnika je na podlagi navedenih ugotovitev jasno, da je dohodek konzorcija precej visok in očitno celo zadosten za financiranje drugih projektov ter da bo verjetno presegel stroške poslovanja in odplačila dolga pod običajnimi tržnimi pogoji. | (196) | The Complainant refers to the General Court’s findings in its Scandlines Fehmarn Belt judgment (114), in claiming that aid is proportionate up to the amount at which the project becomes profitable. Furthermore, the General Court found, in the Øresund judgment, that it is not relevant for the assessment of proportionality that other forms of financing by the States would have a higher financial burden on the State budget (115), or that more direct forms of aid might have been liable to generate more significant aid (116). The Complainant, further, claims, by referring to the 2014 annual report of SVEDAB, that, at least by 2012, the Consortium reached the breakeven point, where there was no net profit or loss, and that the following year the Consortium would have been able to distribute a dividend, or share in profits, to its parent companies. The Complainant, further, refers to the Standard&Poor’s Global Ratings research update from 18 November 2016, noting that the Consortium started paying down debt in 2004, five years ahead of schedule, and that, from 2000, the operating profit of the Consortium was, and has remained, positive. The Complainant notes that the equity of the Consortium became positive in 2016 and, that, according to the Consortium, it started distributing dividends to the parent companies in 2018, when a DKK 1,1 billion (EUR 0,15 billion) dividend for the tax year 2017 was paid out, and that, in 2018, the parent companies decided to increase the annual dividend payment, with the effect that the Consortium’s debt was, thereafter, expected to be repaid only in 2050, which is substantially later than the previously expected year 2033. In addition, the Danish State takes money out of A/S Øresund for purposes other than repayment of the debt related to the costs of the Danish road and rail hinterland connections. As a consequence, the repayment period for the Consortium has been extended. On the basis of those observations, the Complainant considers it evident that the income of the Consortium is quite substantial, apparently even enough to finance other projects, and likely to exceed operating costs and debt repayments under normal market conditions. |
| (197) | Pritožnik v zvezi s tem opozarja tudi, da je med večjimi danskimi družbami v javni lasti, ki jim je danska država zagotovila poroštva, vključno s tistimi, ki so odgovorni za gradnjo in obratovanje mostu Great Belt ter za stalno povezavo prek ožine Fehmarn, konzorcij edini, ki ne plačuje nobenih premij za državna poroštva, medtem ko skoraj vse druge družbe plačajo 0,15 % na neporavnan dolg. Po mnenju pritožnika to jasno kaže, da bi se gradnja in obratovanje stalne povezave lahko dosegla z manjšo pomočjo kot 0-odstotno premijo. | (197) | In this regard, the Complainant also recalls that, among the major Danish publicly-owned companies to which the Danish State has provided guarantees, including those responsible for the construction and operation of the Great Belt bridge and for the Fehmarn Belt Fixed Link, the Consortium is the only one that does not pay any premiums for the State guarantees, while almost all others pay 0,15 % on outstanding debt. According to the Complainant, this clearly shows that the construction and operation of the Fixed Link could be achieved with less aid than a 0 % premium. |
| (198) | Pritožnik se posebej sklicuje na uvodno izjavo 150 sklepa o začetku postopka, v kateri je Komisija navedla, da se zdi, da naj bi posebna danska pravila o prenosu izgub v prihodnje obdobje in amortizaciji prispevala k izvedljivosti projekta, zaradi česar so učinki poroštev in prednost navedenih posebnih pravil medsebojno odvisni. Pritožnik meni, da je ta trditev napačna. Posebna danska pravila o prenosu izgub v prihodnje obdobje in amortizaciji pomenijo dodatne prednosti v primerjavi z državnimi poroštvi in jih za namene pravil o državni pomoči ni mogoče šteti za medsebojno odvisne. Pritožnik je Komisijo pozval, naj od konzorcija zahteva davčne napovedi, da bi pravilno izračunala obseg prednosti, ki se je z navedenimi posebnimi pravili zagotovila konzorciju. | (198) | The Complainant makes specific reference to recital 150 of the Opening decision, at which the Commission stated that it appeared that the special Danish rules on loss carry-forward and depreciation were expected to contribute to the viability of the project, thereby rendering the effects of the guarantees and the advantage of those special rules interdependent. The Complainant considers this statement to be incorrect. The special Danish rules on loss carry-forward and depreciation constitute additional advantages over the State guarantees and cannot be considered as interdependent for the purposes of State aid rules. The Complainant urged the Commission to request the tax declarations of the Consortium in order to make a correct calculation of the size of the advantage that those special rules provided to the Consortium. |
| (199) | Pritožnik je predložil pripombe tudi po tem, ko je analiziral analizo sorazmernosti iz končnega sklepa o ožini Fehmarn. Opozarja zlasti na razliko med predhodnim tveganjem (pred gradnjo) in naknadnim tveganjem (po začetku obratovanja stalne povezave), potrebo po ponovni oceni državne pomoči po gradnji in omejitve (področje uporabe omejeno na gradnjo, dajanje prednosti odplačilu posojil, ki jih subvencionira država, in provizija za poroštvo), ki so potrebne tudi za zagotovitev sorazmernosti državne pomoči za stalno povezavo. | (199) | The Complainant also submitted observations after analysing the proportionality analysis contained in the Fehmarn Belt final decision. The Complainant notes, in particular, the difference between ex ante risk (before construction) and ex post risk (after the Fixed Link entered into service), the need to re-evaluate the State aid after construction, and the restrictions (scope limited to construction, priority given to repayment of State-subsidised loans, and a guarantee fee), which are also necessary to ensure proportionality of State aid for the Fixed Link. |
| (200) | Družba Stena Line je nadalje trdila, da glede na dejstvo, da je bila stalna povezava dobičkonosna ter da so bili denarni tokovi konzorcija pozitivni in so do leta 2004 presegli njegove stroške poslovanja in odplačila dolga, državna pomoč konzorciju ni bila sorazmerna vsaj od leta 2004. | (200) | Stena Line further argued that, in view of the fact that the Fixed Link was profitable, and the Consortium had positive cash flows exceeding its operating and debt repayment costs by 2004, State aid to the Consortium has not been proportionate since at least 2004. |
| (201) | Kot je navedeno v uvodnih izjavah 191 in 193, je pritožnik naročil ekonomsko oceno interne stopnje donosnosti in tehtanega povprečja stroškov kapitala konzorcija, da bi analiziral, ali in kdaj bi konzorcij lahko financiral stalno povezavo pod tržnimi pogoji brez državnih poroštev. Pritožnik trdi, da imajo državna poroštva dva učinka na financiranje. Prvič, poroštva so konzorciju omogočila, da se je v prvih 17 letih delovanja zadolžil za več kot 100 % svojega lastniškega kapitala in dolgov (negativni lastniški kapital do leta 2016). Drugič, poroštva so konzorciju omogočila najemanje posojil z nižjimi stroški kot primerljivim družbam (konzorcij je pridobil bonitetno oceno AAA). Pritožnik dodaja, da so državna poroštva privedla do dejanske povprečne zapadlosti dolga konzorcija (skoraj pet let), ki je zelo kratka v primerjavi z ekonomsko življenjsko dobo sredstev (več kot 100 let). V oceni je bilo ugotovljeno, da bi konzorcij leta 2003 ali 2004, tj. le nekaj let po začetku obratovanja stalne povezave, lahko financiral stalno povezavo pod komercialnimi pogoji brez državnih poroštev. V vseh scenarijih (ki se nanašajo na izvedene scenarije občutljivosti) državna pomoč od leta 2009 ali 2010 ni bila več potrebna. Da bi se lahko sprejel ta sklep, je bilo v študiji opravljenih več analiz, vključno s primerjavo interne stopnje donosnosti konzorcija z izračunom tehtanega povprečja stroškov kapitala na podlagi 37 primerljivih družb, tržnimi pogoji za dolg in lastniški kapital na Danskem (glej uvodno izjavo 202) ter oceno tržne vrednosti konzorcija v obdobju 2000–2018 (glej uvodno izjavo 203). | (201) | As noted at recitals (191) and (193), the Complainant commissioned an economic assessment on the Consortium’s IRR and WACC for the purposes of analysing whether, and when, the Consortium could have financed the Fixed Link on market terms, without State guarantees. The Complainant argues that the State guarantees have two effects on the financing. First, the guarantees enabled the Consortium to get into debt above 100 % of its equity and debts during its first 17 years of operation (negative equity until 2016). Second, the guarantees enabled the Consortium to borrow at a lower cost than comparable companies (the Consortium obtained a AAA credit rating). The Complainant adds that the State guarantees have resulted in an actual average maturity (close to five years) of the Consortium’s debt, which is very short compared to the economic lifetime of the assets (more than 100 years). The assessment concludes that in 2003 or 2004, i.e., just a few years after the entry into service of the Fixed Link, the Consortium could have financed the Fixed Link on commercial terms without the State guarantees. In all scenarios, (referring to the sensitivity scenarios performed), State aid was no longer needed as from 2009 or 2010 onwards. In order to come to this conclusion, the study made several analyses, including a comparison of the IRR of the Consortium with a WACC calculation based on 37 comparable companies, market conditions for debt and equity in Denmark (see further, recital (202)), and an estimation of the market value of the Consortium during the years 2000 to 2018 (see further, recital (203)). |
| (202) | Ekonomska ocena vključuje analizo letnih poročil konzorcija, ki kaže, da je interna stopnja donosnosti konzorcija na podlagi linearne projekcije rezultatov poslovanja v 100-letnem obdobju 7,2-odstotna (pred obdavčitvijo), če je obdobje omejeno na 40 let, pa je interna stopnja donosnosti 6,2-odstotna. Tehtano povprečje stroškov kapitala primerljivih nesubvencioniranih družb je bilo v 100-letnem scenariju leta 2004 nižje od interne stopnje donosnosti konzorcija (117). Po mnenju pritožnika zato od takrat državna pomoč ni bila več potrebna (med svetovno finančno krizo je tehtano povprečje stroškov kapitala v 100-letnem scenariju začasno preseglo interno stopnjo donosnosti, vendar je bilo od leta 2009 nižje od interne stopnje donosnosti). V 40-letnem scenariju je bilo tehtano povprečje stroškov kapitala primerljivih družb od leta 2010 nižje od interne stopnje donosnosti. | (202) | The economic assessment includes an analysis of the Consortium’s annual reports, which shows that the Consortium’s IRR, based on a linear projection of the operational result over a 100-year period, is 7,2 % (before tax), and, if the period is limited to 40 years, the IRR is 6,2 %. The WACC of comparable non-subsidised companies dropped below the IRR of the Consortium in 2004 in the 100-year scenario (117). Thus, according to the Complainant, from that point in time, State aid was no longer needed (during the global financial crisis, the WACC temporarily went above the IRR in the 100-year scenario, but, since 2009, the WACC has stayed below the IRR). In the 40-year scenario, the WACC of comparable companies has stayed below the IRR since 2010. |
| (203) | Ocena tržne vrednosti konzorcija (na podlagi diskontiranih denarnih tokov) v letih od 2000 do 2018 kaže, da vrednost diskontiranih denarnih tokov presega stroške projekta od leta 2003 (izračunane s povprečno obrestno mero konzorcija na podlagi linearne projekcije rezultatov poslovanja v 100-letnem obdobju). Po trditvah pritožnika nadaljnja analiza občutljivosti kaže, da so sklepi zanesljivi za krajša in daljša obdobja denarnih tokov. Analiza kaže zlasti, da je v vseh scenarijih diskontirani znesek prihodnjih denarnih tokov višji od skupnih stroškov od leta 2009. Pritožnik na podlagi tega sklepa, da bi moral biti nakup konzorcija za komercialnega akterja privlačen od leta 2003, vsekakor pa od leta 2009. Po njegovem mnenju to pomeni, da bi konzorcij lahko financiral stalno povezavo pod tržnimi pogoji brez državnih poroštev od leta 2003 ali vsaj od leta 2009. | (203) | An estimation of the Consortium’s market value (based on discounted cash flows) during the years 2000 to 2018 shows that the value of the discounted cash flows exceeds the cost of the project as from 2003 (calculated with the Consortium’s average interest rate based on a linear projection of the operational results over a 100-year period). The Complainant submits that further sensitivity analysis shows that the conclusions are robust, both for shorter and longer periods of cash flows. In particular, the analysis shows that, in all scenarios, the discounted amount of future cash flows is higher than the total cost as from 2009. On that basis, the Complainant concludes that it should have been attractive for a commercial actor to acquire the Consortium as from 2003, or, in any event, as from 2009. In the Complainant’s view, this indicates that the Consortium would have been able to finance the Fixed Link on market terms, without the State guarantees, from 2003, or at least from 2009. |
| (204) | Pritožnik je predložil tudi analizo likvidnostne vrzeli konzorcija, ki so jo pripravili isti avtorji. Leta 1999, pred začetkom uporabe stalne povezave, je bilo tehtano povprečje stroškov kapitala primerljivih družb nekoliko višje (8,0 %) od interne stopnje donosnosti (7,2 %) projekta stalne povezave. Zaradi tega je leta 1999 nastala likvidnostna vrzel v višini 2,9 milijarde DKK (0,39 milijarde EUR), kar upravičuje omejeno državno pomoč. Pritožnik zaradi celovitosti ugotavlja, da je likvidnostna vrzel leta 2000 znašala 5,9 milijarde DKK (0,79 milijarde EUR) zaradi višjega tehtanega povprečja stroškov kapitala primerljivih podjetij (9,3 %), vendar poudarja, da so bila državna poroštva že od začetka obratovanja stalne povezave preveč velikodušna. | (204) | The Complainant also provided an analysis, by the same authors, of the Consortium’s funding gap. In 1999, prior to the Fixed Link’s entry into service, the WACC of comparable companies was slightly higher (8,0 %) than the IRR (7,2 %) of the Fixed Link project. This resulted in a funding gap of DKK 2.9 billion (EUR 0,39 billion) in 1999, justifying limited State aid. For the sake of completeness, the Complainant notes that the funding gap was DKK 5,9 billion (EUR 0,79 billion) in 2000, due to a higher WACC of comparable companies (9,3 %) but stresses that, already from the Fixed Link’s entry into service, the State guarantees were too generous. |
| (205) | Glede na analizo bi lahko konzorcij zaradi državnih poroštev svoje stroške v celoti financiral z dolgom, za katerega je obrestna mera leta 1999 znašala le 3 %, leta 2000 pa 3,5 %. To pomeni, da je tehtano povprečje stroškov kapitala konzorcija znašalo le od 3 % do 3,5 % (100-odstotno financiranje z dolgom). Interna stopnja donosnosti v višini 7,2 % je zato precej višja od tehtanega povprečja stroškov kapitala konzorcija, model državnega poroštva pa je nesorazmeren in neupravičen. Državna pomoč bi morala privesti le do zmanjšanja tehtanega povprečja stroškov kapitala za 0,8 % (z 8 % na 7,2 %), tako da bi bilo tehtano povprečje stroškov kapitala konzorcija enako interni stopnji donosnosti projekta stalne povezave. V skladu s poročilom je nesorazmerna državna pomoč v neto sedanji vrednosti, količinsko opredeljena z obrestno mero konzorcija iz leta 1999, znašala 54,3 milijarde DKK (7,28 milijarde EUR), količinsko opredeljena z obrestno mero iz leta 2000 pa 41,8 milijarde DKK (5,60 milijarde EUR). | (205) | According to the analysis, thanks to the State guarantees, the Consortium could finance its costs entirely by debt with an interest rate on that debt of only 3 % in 1999 and 3,5 % in 2000. This means that the WACC of the Consortium was only 3 % to 3,5 % (100 % debt financing). The IRR of 7,2 % is therefore considerably higher than the WACC of the Consortium, and the State guarantee model is disproportionate and unjustified. The State aid should only result in a reduction of the WACC by 0,8 % (from 8 % to 7,2 %) so that the WACC of the Consortium is equal to the IRR of the Fixed Link project. According to the report, the disproportionate State aid, in terms of NPV, amounted to DKK 54,3 billion (EUR 7,28 billion), when quantified with the interest rate of the Consortium in 1999 and to DKK 41,8 billion (EUR 5,60 billion), when quantified with the interest rate in 2000. |
| (206) | Avtorji poročila so predložili tudi dodatno analizo neto sedanje vrednosti konzorcija, ki temelji na primerjavi obrestne mere, ki se uporablja za konzorcij, in obrestne mere družbe s 100-odstotnim financiranjem z dolgom z oceno AAA. Namen analize je bil količinsko opredeliti znesek nesorazmerne državne pomoči. Analiza temelji na dejstvu, da bo imela stalna povezava, če je interna stopnja donosnosti višja od povprečne letne obrestne mere konzorcija, pozitivno neto sedanjo vrednost oziroma je donos projekta višji od stroškov. Pritožnik na tej podlagi poudarja tudi, da so bila državna poroštva preveč velikodušna in so že ob začetku obratovanja stalne povezave vodila v nesorazmerno državno pomoč. Ta sklep je nadalje podprt z analizo letnih donosov in rent. | (206) | The authors of the report also provided an additional analysis of the NPV of the Consortium, based on a comparison of the interest rate applicable to the Consortium and the interest rate of a company with 100 % AAA debt financing. The purpose of the analysis was to quantify the amount of the disproportionate State aid. The analysis is based on the fact that, if the IRR is higher than the average annual interest rate of the Consortium, the Fixed Link will have a positive NPV, or the yield of the project is higher than the costs. Also on that basis, the Complainant stresses that the State guarantees were too generous and already resulted in disproportionate State aid from the Fixed Link’s entry into service. This conclusion is further supported by an analysis of annualised returns and annuities. |
| (207) | Poleg tega je pritožnik predložil memorandum, ki se nanaša na nekatere ugotovitve Komisije iz končnega sklepa o ožini Fehmarn v zvezi s financiranjem stalne povezave, zlasti kar zadeva sorazmernost. | (207) | In addition, the Complainant provided a memorandum relating to some of the Commission’s findings in the Fehmarn Belt final decision with respect to the financing of the Fixed Link, in particular as concerns proportionality. |
| (208) | Nazadnje, pritožnik je predložil pripombe na letno poročilo konzorcija za leto 2020, saj je začel konzorcij spomladi 2020 izvajati več pobud, s katerimi je svoj dolg zaradi najemanja posojil, za katera jamčita državi, prenesel na posojila brez državnih poroštev. Pritožnik je opazil povezane bonitetne ocene in sklenil, da imajo subjekti v državni lasti že zdaj prednost zaradi dejstva, da je država lastnica, kar v očeh njihovih upnikov pomeni večje dodatno jamstvo. Pritožnik ugotavlja tudi, da znesek, pridobljen s posojili brez državnih poroštev v letu 2020, predstavlja približno 28 % bruto posojil konzorcija, kar dodatno kaže, da so bila državna poroštva nesorazmerna že v prvih letih obratovanja. | (208) | Finally, the Complainant submitted observations on the Consortium’s 2020 annual report, as, in spring 2020, the Consortium launched a number of initiatives transferring its debt from borrowing guaranteed by the States, to borrowing without State guarantees. The Complainant observed the associated credit ratings, and concluded that State-owned entities already enjoy an advantage due to the fact that the State is the owner, which, in the eyes of their creditors, implies higher collateral security. The Complainant also notes that the amount raised by loans without State guarantees in 2020 represents about 28 % of the Consortium’s gross borrowing, which further illustrates that the State guarantees were already disproportionate during the first years of operation. |
| (209) | Družba Stena Line se sklicuje na sporočilo o pomembnih projektih skupnega evropskega interesa in opozarja, da lahko izračun likvidnostne vrzeli vključuje le upravičene stroške. Glede na to, da se cestne in železniške povezave z zaledjem štejejo za ločen projekt, trdi, da stroški takih objektov niso pomembni za izračun, koliko pomoči bi lahko prejela stalna povezava. V zvezi s tem ugotavlja, da je konzorcij leta 2018 prilagodil svojo dividendno politiko, da bi se osredotočil predvsem na čim večje zmanjšanje dolga v lastniških družbah A/S Øresund in SVEDAB, ki sta odgovorni za cestne in železniške povezave z zaledjem. Družba Stena Line trdi, da je to jasen dokaz, da se z državno pomočjo konzorciju za stalno povezavo financirajo neupravičeni stroški. | (209) | Stena Line refers to the IPCEI Communication, recalling that a funding gap calculation may only include eligible costs. Given that the road and rail hinterland connections are considered to be a separate project, Stena Line argues that the costs of such facilities are irrelevant for calculating how much aid the Fixed Link may benefit from. In this regard, Stena Line notes that the Consortium adjusted its dividend policy in 2018, in order to primarily focus on maximum debt reduction in the owner companies, A/S Øresund and SVEDAB, which are in charge of the road and rail hinterland connections. Stena Line argues that this constitutes clear evidence that State aid to the Consortium for the Fixed Link finances ineligible costs. |
| 4.4.6 Preprečevanje neupravičenega izkrivljanja konkurence in test tehtanja | 4.4.6. Prevention of undue distortion of competition and balancing test |
| (210) | Po mnenju pritožnika pomoč, ki jo vsebujejo državna poroštva in posebna danska pravila o prenosu izgub v prihodnje obdobje in amortizaciji, povzroča neupravičeno izkrivljanje konkurence. | (210) | According to the Complainant, the aid contained in the State guarantees and the special Danish rules on loss carry-forward and depreciation causes undue distortion of competition. |
| (211) | Pritožnik navaja, da cilj projekta stalne povezave nikoli ni bil nadomestiti trajektnih storitev med Helsingborgom in Helsingørjem, niti se to ni štelo za nujno ali neizogibno posledico projekta. Poleg tega opozarja, da povezava med pristaniščema Helsingborg in Helsingør, ki sta del omrežja TEN-T, povezuje ceste E47, E4 in E20 v omrežju TEN-T ter s tem srednjo Evropo z nordijskimi državami. Sklicuje se na enega glavnih ciljev omrežja TEN-T, ki je prispevati k nizkim emisijam toplogrednih plinov, čistemu prometu in nizkim emisijam ogljika, ter ugotavlja, da so njegovi brezemisijski trajekti zelena alternativa stalni povezavi. Nazadnje se sklicuje na belo knjigo Komisije o načrtu za enotni evropski prometni prostor (118), v kateri je Komisija ugotovila, da so „odprava davčnih izkrivljanj in neutemeljenih subvencij ter neovirana in neizkrivljena konkurenca [...] potrebn[i] tudi za zagotovitev enakih pogojev za različne načine prevoza, ki so si v neposredni konkurenci“. Pritožnik meni, da bi bile družbeno-gospodarske posledice ukinitve njegove trajektne storitve katastrofalni. V zvezi s tem opozarja, da državna poroštva konzorciju omogočajo, da določi umetno nizke cestnine za stalno povezavo, kar konzorciju omogoča, da poveča obseg prometa in svoj tržni delež. Državna poroštva konzorciju omogočajo, da prevzame večja tveganja, pri čemer je stečaj dejansko izključen. Pritožnik opozarja tudi na drug mehanizem, ki povzroča izkrivljanje trga, ki je povezan s cilji držav, da spodbujata promet prek stalne povezave. Ker konzorcij podpirata državi, bi se tudi cilj konzorcija s strogega povečanja dobička preusmeril na povečanje obsega prometa. To je mogoče zaradi državnih poroštev. | (211) | The Complainant states that it was never the objective of the Fixed Link project to replace the ferry services between Helsingborg and Helsingør, nor was this considered a necessary or unavoidable consequence thereof. Further, they recall that the link between the ports of Helsingborg and Helsingør, which are both part of the TEN-T network, connects the TEN-T roads E47, E4 and E20, and, thus, central Europe to the Nordic countries. The Complainant refers to one of the main objectives of the TEN-T, which is to contribute to low greenhouse gas emissions, clean transport, and low carbon emissions, and notes that its zero emission ferries are a green alternative to the Fixed Link. Finally, the Complainant refers to the Commission’s White Paper on a roadmap to a Single European Transport Area (118), in which the Commission noted that ‘the elimination of tax distortions and unjustified subsidies and free and undistorted competition are […] necessary to establish a level playing field between modes which are in direct competition’. The Complainant considers that the socio-economic outcome of the disappearance of its ferry service would be disastrous. In this context, the Complainant recalls that the State guarantees allow the Consortium to set the toll charges for the Fixed Link at artificially low levels, which permits the Consortium to increase its traffic volumes and its market share. The State guarantees allow the Consortium to take higher risks, with bankruptcy, de facto, excluded. The Complainant also points to another mechanism that leads to market distortion, which is linked to the objectives of the States to foster traffic across the Fixed Link. Since the Consortium is supported by the States, the objective of the Consortium would also shift from strict profit maximisation to increasing traffic volume. This is made possible thanks to the State guarantees. |
| 4.4.7 Pogoji za unovčenje državnih poroštev | 4.4.7. Mobilisation conditions of the State guarantees |
| (212) | Pritožnik ob sklicevanju na obvestilo o poroštvih iz leta 2008 opozarja, da Komisija ne more odobriti pomoči v obliki državnih poroštev, razen če vnaprej pozna pogoje za aktivacijo navedenih poroštev. Po njegovem mnenju ni pogojev za unovčenje poroštev, določenih v posojilnih pogodbah, sklenjenih med konzorcijem in zadevnimi finančnimi institucijami, zato Komisija ne more ugotoviti, da so državna poroštva združljiva z notranjim trgom. | (212) | Referring to the 2008 Guarantee Notice, the Complainant recalls that the Commission is not entitled to authorise aid in the form of State guarantees unless the Commission knows beforehand the conditions for triggering those guarantees. According to the Complainant, there are no conditions for the mobilisation of the guarantees determined in the loan agreements concluded between the Consortium and the financial institutions concerned, and the Commission is, consequently, not in a position to find that the State guarantees are compatible with the internal market. |
| 4.5 Legitimna pričakovanja | 4.5. Legitimate expectations |
| (213) | Pritožnik ter družbi Scandlines in drugi trdijo, da je treba sodbo v zadevi Øresund razlagati tako, da so legitimna pričakovanja konzorcija in držav po sodbi v zadevi Aéroports de Paris izključena. | (213) | The Complainant and Scandlines et al. argue that the Øresund judgment should be interpreted in such a way that legitimate expectations on the part of the Consortium and the States are excluded after the Aéroports de Paris judgment. |
| (214) | Zato trdijo, da je Splošno sodišče v sodbi v zadevi Øresund (119) izrecno odločilo, da lahko legitimna pričakovanja obstajajo le za obdobje pred sodbo v zadevi Aéroports de Paris, in ne vsaj do leta 2000, kot se zdi, da je Komisija domnevala v uvodni izjavi 178 sklepa o začetku postopka. | (214) | Accordingly, they submit that, in the Øresund judgment (119), the General Court expressly held that legitimate expectations could exist only for the period before the Aéroports de Paris judgment, and not, as the Commission seems to suggest at recital 178 of the Opening decision, at least until 2000. |
| (215) | Pritožnik se sklicuje na sodno prakso, navedeno v sodbi v zadevi Øresund (120), v kateri so našteti trije kumulativni pogoji, ki morajo biti izpolnjeni za utemeljitev zahtevka za varstvo legitimnih pričakovanj: (i) organi morajo upravičencu dati natančna, brezpogojna in skladna zagotovila, ki izhajajo iz pooblaščenih in zanesljivih virov, (ii) ta zagotovila morajo biti taka, da pri subjektu, na katerega so naslovljena, ustvarijo legitimno pričakovanje, in (iii) dana zagotovila morajo biti v skladu z veljavnimi predpisi. | (215) | The Complainant refers to the case law as cited in the Øresund judgment (120), listing the three cumulative conditions that must be satisfied for a claim of entitlement to the protection of legitimate expectations to be well founded: (i) precise, unconditional and consistent assurances originating from authorised and reliable sources must have been given to the person concerned by the authorities; (ii) those assurances must be such as to give rise to a legitimate expectation on the part of the person to whom they are addressed; and (iii) the assurances given must comply with the applicable rules. |
| (216) | Pritožnik ter družbi Scandlines in drugi priznavajo obstoj legitimnih pričakovanj do sodbe v zadevi Aéroports de Paris, vendar menijo, da zagotovila, ki jih je Komisija dala v dopisih iz leta 1995, niso bila več v skladu s pravili, ki so se uporabljala po navedeni sodbi. Družbi Scandlines in drugi trdijo, da bi pravica do sklicevanja na legitimna pričakovanja v vsakem primeru prenehala veljati po koncu triletnega prehodnega obdobja, ki upravičencu omogoča, da svoje ravnanje prilagodi glede na nove pravne okoliščine (121). | (216) | While the Complainant and Scandlines et al. acknowledge the presence of legitimate expectations until the Aéroports de Paris judgment, they consider that the assurances given by the Commission in the 1995 letters were no longer in compliance with the applicable rules after that judgment. Scandlines et al. submit that, in any case, the right to rely on legitimate expectations would expire after the end of a transition period of three years that allows the beneficiary to adjust its behaviour in view of the new legal circumstances (121). |
| (217) | Poleg tega pritožnik trdi, da po sodbi v zadevi Aéroports de Paris ni dvoma, da bi razumen in preudaren gospodarski subjekt lahko predvidel, da bi Komisija lahko sprejela sklep, s katerim bi ugotovila, da za zadevne ukrepe pomoči veljajo pravila o državni pomoči. Pritožnik ter družbi Scandlines in drugi menijo, da bi morali državi in konzorcij prilagoditi svoje ravnanje v skladu s sodbo ter da je treba obdobje med sodbo v zadevi Aéroports de Paris in domnevno prekinitvijo zastaralnega roka šteti za dovolj časa za prilagoditev in priglasitev zadevnih ukrepov pomoči Komisiji. | (217) | Moreover, the Complainant argues that, after the Aéroports de Paris judgment, there can be no doubt that a prudent and alert economic operator could have foreseen that the Commission could potentially adopt a decision finding that the aid measures concerned were subject to State aid rules. The Complainant and Scandlines et al. consider that the States and the Consortium should have adjusted their behaviour in accordance with the judgment, and that the period between the Aéroports de Paris judgment and the alleged interruption of the limitation period must be considered as an ample amount of time to adjust, and to notify the aid measures concerned to the Commission. |
| (218) | Nazadnje, pritožnik trdi, da se, tudi če bi državi leta 1992 po mnenju Komisije odobrili državni poroštvi, ki pomenita individualno ad hoc pomoč, na načelo legitimnih pričakovanj očitno ni mogoče sklicevati za obdobje po 13. maju 2003. V nasprotnem primeru bi se državi lahko sklicevali na načelo legitimnega pričakovanja, da bi konzorciju še naprej zagotavljali državna poroštva brez plačila kakršne koli premije in brez omejitev glede zneskov, ki jih je treba zavarovati s poroštvom, ter časa, v katerem jih je mogoče odobriti, dokler menita, da je to potrebno. | (218) | Finally, the Complainant argues that, even if the Commission were to consider that the States granted two State guarantees in 1992, constituting individual ad hoc aid, it is clear that the principle of legitimate expectations cannot be invoked for the period after 13 May 2003. If that were not the case, the States would be allowed to invoke the principle of legitimate expectations in order to continue to provide State guarantees to the Consortium, without the payment of any premium and without any limitation as to the amounts to be guaranteed and the time during which they can be granted, for as long as they consider necessary. |
| 4.6 Vračilo pomoči | 4.6. Recovery of aid |
| (219) | Družbi Scandlines in drugi menijo, da bi bilo treba pomoč iz posebnih danskih pravil o prenosu izgub v prihodnje obdobje in amortizaciji ter državnih poroštev, odobrenih od leta 2003, vrniti. To zadeva zlasti državna poroštva za vsa posojila, najeta za refinanciranje prvotnega dolga, in pomoč za vse druge stroške poslovanja, ki se krijejo s posojili. Pristanišče Trelleborg poudarja, da je treba dejanska državna poroštva preklicati, konzorcij pa mora tudi vrniti razliko med tržno premijo in plačano premijo. Družba Stena Line je trdila, da je treba zahtevati vračilo (i) vsake pomoči, dodeljene po letu 2004 (ker bi si konzorcij vsaj od leta 2004 lahko izposojal pod tržnimi pogoji), (ii) pomoči za tekoče poslovanje, dodeljene v letih 2003 in 2004, ter (iii) za leti 2003 in 2004 razliko med cenami stalne povezave, ki temeljijo na dejanskih stroških, in cenami, določenimi nižje od stroškov, ter državnih poroštev in državnih posojil (122), s katerimi so se krili stroški poslovanja. | (219) | Scandlines et al. consider that the aid contained in the special Danish rules on loss carry-forward and depreciation and the State guarantees granted since 2003 should be recovered. This concerns, in particular, the State guarantees for all loans taken out to refinance the initial debt, and also the aid for all other operating costs covered by loans. Trelleborg Port stresses that the actual State guarantees must be revoked, in addition to having the Consortium pay back the difference between the market premium and the premium paid. Stena Line argued that recovery must be requested of (i) any aid granted after 2004 (since, at least as from 2004, the Consortium would have been able to borrow on market terms); (ii) operating aid granted between 2003 and 2004; and (iii) for 2003-2004, the difference between the Fixed Link prices based on actual costs and the below-cost based pricing, as well as of State guarantees and State loans (122) covering any operating costs. |
| (220) | Pritožnik dodaja, da tudi če bi Komisija pomoč razglasila za združljivo z notranjim trgom, to ne bi pomenilo naknadne legalizacije ukrepov, izvedenih v nasprotju s členom 108(3) PDEU, in da bi bilo treba obresti obračunati od datuma dodelitve vsake nove pomoči. | (220) | The Complainant adds that, even if the Commission were to declare the aid compatible with the internal market, this would not have the effect of regularising the measures, implemented contrary to Article 108(3) TFEU, ex post facto, and interest should be applied from the date each new aid was granted. |
| (221) | Združenje FSS, pristanišče Trelleborg in skupina Grimaldi trdijo, da državna poroštva in posebna danska pravila o prenosu izgub v prihodnje obdobje in amortizaciji niso bila priglašena Komisiji na podlagi člena 108(3) PDEU in zato pomenijo nezakonito pomoč. To vključuje državna poroštva in pomoč iz posebnih danskih pravil o prenosu izgub v prihodnje obdobje in amortizaciji, dodeljeno po sprejetju sklepa iz leta 2014, ki je bil pozneje razveljavljen. Ker ni dokazov o tem, da sta Danska in Švedska prenehali dodeljevati državna poroštva in pomoč, ki izhaja iz posebnih danskih pravil o prenosu izgub v prihodnje obdobje in amortizaciji, bi morala Komisija sprejeti sklep, s katerim bi Danski in Švedski naložila, naj prenehata dodeljevati nova poroštva, Danski pa, naj preneha dodeljevati pomoč, povezano s posebnimi danskimi pravili o prenosu izgub in amortizaciji, ter začasno ustavi obstoječa državna poroštva in ugodnosti, povezane s posebnimi danskimi pravili o prenosu izgub v prihodnje obdobje in amortizaciji, dokler Komisija ne sprejme sklepa o njihovi združljivosti z notranjim trgom. | (221) | FSS, Trelleborg Port, and Grimaldi submit that the State guarantees and the special Danish rules on loss carry-forward and depreciation have not been notified to the Commission under Article 108(3) TFEU, and, therefore, constitute unlawful aid. This includes the State guarantees and the aid contained in the special Danish rules on loss carry-forward and depreciation that was granted after the adoption of the 2014 decision, which was subsequently annulled. Since there is no evidence to suggest that Denmark and Sweden have stopped granting State guarantees and aid derived from the special Danish rules on loss carry-forward and depreciation, the Commission should adopt a decision ordering Denmark and Sweden to stop granting new guarantees and Denmark to stop granting aid related to the special Danish rules on loss carry-forward and depreciation, and to suspend existing State guarantees and advantages related to the special Danish rules on loss carry-forward and depreciation until the Commission has taken a decision on their compatibility with the internal market. |
| (222) | Pritožnik meni, da ima nesorazmerna državna pomoč konzorciju trajne posledice, ki jih je treba popraviti z ukrepi, usmerjenimi v prihodnost. Zgolj ukinitev državne pomoči s preklicem in ukinitvijo državnih poroštev ne bi zadostovala za vzpostavitev enakih konkurenčnih pogojev za stalno povezavo in trajekte. Pritožnik se v zvezi s tem sklicuje na točko 96 sodbe v zadevi Øresund, v kateri je Splošno sodišče poudarilo, da bi bila po mnenju Komisije likvidacija konzorcija glede na medvladni sporazum pravno nemogoča. V obvestilu o poroštvih iz leta 2008 je navedeno, da lahko ugodnejši pogoji financiranja, ki jih pridobijo podjetja, ki so zaradi svoje pravne oblike izvzeta iz običajnih pravil o stečaju ali drugih postopkov v primeru insolventnosti, pomenijo državno pomoč, zato bi imel konzorcij še naprej veliko prednost, tudi ko bi državi prenehali izdajati posebne sporazume o državnih poroštvih. | (222) | The Complainant considers that the disproportionate State aid to the Consortium has created lasting consequences, which have to be corrected by forward-looking measures. Simply ending the State aid by recalling and ending the State guarantees would not suffice to establish a level playing field for the Fixed Link and the ferries. In this context, the Complainant refers to paragraph 96 of the Øresund judgment, in which the General Court pointed out that the Commission had suggested that liquidation of the Consortium would be legally impossible, having regard to the Intergovernmental Agreement. Since the 2008 Guarantee Notice considers that more favourable funding terms obtained by enterprises whose legal form provides for exemption from ordinary rules on bankruptcy or other insolvency procedures may constitute State aid, the Consortium would continue to enjoy a significant advantage, even after the States cease to issue specific State guarantee agreements. |
| (223) | Pritožnik meni, da je treba s takimi ukrepi, usmerjenimi v prihodnost, ponovno vzpostaviti običajne stroške, običajne cilje in običajna poslovna tveganja upravljavca stalne povezave. Natančneje, meni, da obstajajo tri možne rešitve za ponovno vzpostavitev običajnih tržnih pogojev za promet čez ožino Øresund, in sicer privatizacija stalne povezave, ustanovitev stalne povezave kot javnega podjetja s spremenljivimi delnicami, ki kotirajo na borzah v Københavnu in/ali Stockholmu, ali podelitev koncesije neodvisnemu upravljavcu pod komercialnimi pogoji. | (223) | The Complainant considers that such forward-looking measures need to restore normal costs, normal objectives, and normal commercial risks of the Fixed Link operator. Specifically, they consider three possible solutions for restoring normal market conditions for traffic across the Øresund, namely, privatisation of the Fixed Link, incorporation of the Fixed Link as a public company with floating shares listed on the stock exchanges in Copenhagen and/or Stockholm, or granting a concession to an independent operator on commercial terms. |
| 5. PRIPOMBE DRŽAV | 5. COMMENTS RECEIVED FROM THE STATES |
| (224) | V tem oddelku so opisane pripombe držav k sklepu o začetku postopka. Navedene pripombe vsebujejo ugotovitve držav glede pripomb zainteresiranih strani, ki so bile organom držav predložene v nezaupni obliki. Ta oddelek vključuje tudi dodatne informacije, ki sta jih državi predložili v odgovor na posebna vprašanja Komisije. | (224) | This section describes the States’ comments on the Opening decision. Those comments contain the States’ remarks on the comments of the interested parties that were submitted to the States’ authorities in a non-confidential format. This section also includes further information submitted by the States in response to specific questions from the Commission. |
| 5.1 Pojasnila dejstev v zvezi s sklepom o začetku postopka | 5.1. Factual clarifications to the Opening decision |
| (225) | Državi sta predložili pojasnila dejstev v zvezi z opisnim delom sklepa o začetku postopka. | (225) | The States provided factual clarifications to the descriptive part of the Opening decision. |
| (226) | Državi sta zlasti pojasnili, da v švedskem ali danskem pravu ni pravne podlage za zagotavljanje državnih posojil konzorciju. To je pojasnilo k uvodni izjavi 31 sklepa o začetku postopka, v kateri je navedeno, da lahko konzorcij pridobi državna posojila pri danski nacionalni banki proti plačilu letne provizije v višini 0,15 % vrednosti neodplačanih posojil in ob plačilu letne obrestne mere, ki jo določi minister za finance. Državi navajata, da je razlog za to morda zamenjava med financiranjem konzorcija in financiranjem družbe A/S Øresund, tj. danske matične družbe konzorcija. Danski minister za finance je v skladu s členom 7(1) zakona o gradnji (zdaj člen 10(4) zakona Sund & Bælt) pooblaščen, da krije finančne potrebe družbe A/S Øresund z državnimi posojili, kadar je to ustrezno. | (226) | Specifically, the States clarify that there is no legal basis for providing State loans to the Consortium in either Swedish or Danish law. This is a clarification to recital 31 of the Opening decision, where it is stated that the Consortium is able to obtain State loans from the Danish National Bank against an annual fee of 0,15 % of the outstanding loan values, plus an annual interest rate set by the Minister of Finance. The States specify that this may be based on a confusion between the financing of the Consortium and the financing of A/S Øresund, the Danish parent company of the Consortium. According to Section 7(1) of the Construction Act (now Section 10(4) of the Sund & Bælt Act), when deemed appropriate, the Danish Minister of Finance is empowered to cover A/S Øresund’s funding needs through State loans. |
| (227) | Državi poudarjata, da je neposredna posledica medvladnega sporazuma, švedske in danske izvedbene zakonodaje ter sporazuma o konzorciju ta, da sta morali državi od datuma ustanovitve konzorcija jamčiti za vsa posojila in druge finančne instrumente, ki jih je konzorcij najel za financiranje stalne povezave. Švedski urad za javni dolg in danska nacionalna banka sta odgovorna za praktično upravljanje poroštev v zvezi s posebnimi posojili in načini financiranja, vendar nimata pristojnosti, da bi konzorciju zavrnila odobritev poroštev, ki jih potrebuje za financiranje projekta. | (227) | The States underline that the direct consequence of the Intergovernmental Agreement, the Swedish and Danish implementing legislation, and the Consortium Agreement is that, from the day on which the Consortium was founded, the States have been obliged to guarantee all loans and other financial instruments, taken out by the Consortium to finance the Fixed Link. While the Swedish National Debt Office and the Danish National Bank are responsible for the practical administration of the guarantees, in relation to specific loans and financing arrangements, they do not have the competence to refuse to grant the Consortium the necessary guarantees to fund the project. |
| (228) | Danska je sporazum o konzorciju odobrila 4. februarja 1992, Švedska pa 13. februarja 1992. Zato je navedeni sporazum začel veljati 13. februarja 1992. Državi sta nadalje pojasnili, da konzorcij ni registriran pri švedskem uradu za registracijo družb, kot trdi pritožnik (uvodna izjava 176), saj je edinstvena pravna oseba. Vendar je bil od 23. julija 1993 registriran za plačilo DDV in prispevkov za socialno varnost. Da bi konzorcij pridobil pravice in obveznosti, ni treba, da se registrira pri švedskem uradu za registracijo družb. | (228) | As such, the Consortium Agreement was approved by Denmark on 4 February 1992, and by Sweden on 13 February 1992. The Consortium Agreement, therefore, entered into force on 13 February 1992. The States, further, clarified that the Consortium is not registered with the Swedish Companies Registration Office, as claimed by the Complainant (recital (176)), as it has unique legal personality. It was, however, registered for VAT and social security fees as of 23 July 1993. Registration with the Swedish Companies Registration Office is not necessary in order for the Consortium to acquire rights and obligations. |
| (229) | Državi sta predložili dodatne podrobnosti o tem, kaj je določeno v sklepu švedskega parlamenta v zvezi z obveznostjo solidarnega državnega poroštva (uvodna izjava 89), in o praktičnem izvajanju obveznosti solidarnega državnega poroštva s strani švedskega urada za javni dolg (uvodne izjave 91 do 94). Kar zadeva izvajanje obveznosti državnega poroštva na Danskem, sta se državi sklicevali na oddelek 8 zakona o gradnji in na pripravljalne opombe k zakonu o gradnji, povezane s členom 8 (uvodna izjava 95). | (229) | The States provided further details on what is provided for in the Swedish Parliament decision in relation to the joint and several State guarantee obligation (recital (89)), and on the practical administration of the joint and several State guarantee obligation by the Swedish National Debt Office (recitals (91) to (94)). As for the implementation of the State guarantee obligation in Denmark, the States referred to Section 8 of the Construction Act and to the preparatory notes to the Construction Act, related to Section 8 (recital (95)). |
| (230) | Državi sta navedli, da so bile praktične upravne ureditve švedskega urada za javni dolg in danske nacionalne banke (s sporazumi o sodelovanju) uvedene, da bi se Švedski in Danski omogočilo spremljanje politike financiranja konzorcija in vplivanje nanjo. Državi lahko s tem mehanizmom zagotovita, da konzorcij ne prekorači svojega pooblastila in da se izvaja politika financiranja, ki zmanjšuje dolgoročno tveganje držav. Z njegovo pomočjo lahko torej zagotovita, da pomoč, dodeljena konzorciju, ne presega tistega, kar je potrebno. | (230) | The States specified that the practical administrative arrangements by the Swedish National Debt Office and the Danish National Bank (through the Cooperation Agreements) were introduced in order to give Sweden and Denmark an opportunity to monitor and influence the Consortium’s financing policy. The mechanism gives the States the opportunity to ensure that the Consortium does not exceed its mandate, and that a financing policy is followed that minimises the States’ long-term risk. The mechanism, thus, allows the States to ensure that the aid granted to the Consortium does not go beyond what is necessary. |
| (231) | Državi sta predložili posodobljen pregled neporavnanega dolga konzorcija. | (231) | The States provided an updated overview of the outstanding debt of the Consortium. |
| 5.2 Obstoj pomoči v smislu člena 107(1) PDEU | 5.2. Existence of aid within the meaning of Article 107(1) TFEU |
| 5.2.1 Konzorcij kot upravičenec | 5.2.1. The Consortium as beneficiary |
| (232) | Državi priznavata, da je konzorcij upravičenec modela državnega poroštva. Vendar danski organi ne priznavajo, da je konzorcij upravičenec posebnih danskih pravil o prenosu izgub v prihodnje obdobje in amortizaciji. V zvezi s tem poudarjajo, da je konzorcij partnerstvo, ki je glede na danska davčna pravila transparentno. Zato naj ne bi bil konzorcij tisti, ki bi lahko imel korist od posebnih danskih pravil o prenosu izgub v prihodnje obdobje in amortizaciji, ampak družba A/S Øresund, pa še to le za polovico dohodka in stroškov, ki jih je imel konzorcij. | (232) | The States acknowledge the Consortium as a beneficiary of the State guarantee model. The Danish authorities do not accept, however, that the Consortium is a beneficiary of the special Danish rules on loss carry-forward and depreciation. They note, in that respect, that the Consortium is a partnership that, as regards Danish tax rules, is transparent. It is, thus, not the Consortium, but A/S Øresund, only, that could possibly have benefited from the special Danish rules on loss carry-forward and depreciation, and, moreover, only as regards half of the income and costs incurred by the Consortium. |
| (233) | V skladu z dansko davčno zakonodajo so vsa partnerstva davčno transparentna. Družbi A/S Øresund zato ne koristi dejstvo, da je konzorcij davčno transparenten, ampak posebna danska pravila o prenosu izgub v prihodnje obdobje in amortizaciji. Navedena pravila so oblikovana posebej za družbo A/S Øresund kot partnerico v konzorciju. Družba A/S Øresund ne opravlja lastnih dejavnosti na konkurenčnem trgu, zato ne prejema državne pomoči v smislu člena 107(1) PDEU. Danski organi poleg tega trdijo, da je treba obravnavano zadevo razlikovati od zadeve C-128/16 P (123), v kateri je Sodišče menilo, da je davčno transparenten subjekt upravičenec na podlagi davčnih ukrepov, ker davčna transparentnost konzorcija pomeni, da vse morebitne davčne ugodnosti prejmejo njegovi lastniki. | (233) | According to Danish tax law, all partnerships are tax transparent. It is, thus, not the fact that the Consortium is tax transparent that benefits A/S Øresund; rather, it is the special Danish rules on loss carry-forward and depreciation. Those rules are created especially for A/S Øresund, in its capacity as a partner in the Consortium. A/S Øresund does not carry out any own activities in a competitive market, and, thus, A/S Øresund does not receive State aid within the meaning of Article 107(1) TFEU. The Danish authorities, further, submit that the case at hand must be distinguished from case C-128/16 P (123), in which the Court considered that a fiscally transparent entity was the beneficiary of tax measures, because the Consortium’s tax transparency means that any possible tax advantage is received by its owners. |
| (234) | Danski organi zato trdijo, da konzorcij zaradi posebnih danskih pravil o prenosu izgub v prihodnje obdobje in amortizaciji ni pridobil nobene gospodarske prednosti. | (234) | For those reasons, the Danish authorities maintain that the Consortium did not obtain any economic advantage as a result of the special Danish rules on loss carry-forward and depreciation. |
| 5.2.2 Konzorcij ne opravlja gospodarske dejavnosti | 5.2.2. No economic activity by the Consortium |
| (235) | Državi vztrajata pri svojem stališču, kot je navedeno v oddelku 4.2.1 sklepa o začetku postopka, da načrtovanja, gradnje in obratovanja stalne povezave ni mogoče šteti za gospodarsko dejavnost, ki spada na področje uporabe člena 107(1) PDEU. Po njunem mnenju sta gradnja in upravljanje stalne povezave značilna primera izvajanja javnih pooblastil za načrtovanje, ki ju člen 107(1) PDEU ne zajema in ju ne bi smel zajemati. Zato model državnega poroštva in posebna danska pravila o prenosu izgub v prihodnje obdobje in amortizaciji ne spadajo na področje uporabe pravil Unije o državni pomoči. | (235) | The States maintain their position as outlined in Section 4.2.1 of the Opening decision, that the planning, construction, and operation of the Fixed Link cannot be considered as an economic activity falling within the scope of Article 107(1) TFEU. In the States’ view, the construction and operation of the Fixed Link are classic examples of the exercise of public planning power, which are not, and ought not to be, covered by Article 107(1) TFEU. Consequently, the State guarantee model and the special Danish rules on loss carry-forward and depreciation fall outside the scope of Union State aid rules. |
| (236) | Državi se v svojem odgovoru na sklep o začetku postopka sklicujeta na svoja prejšnja stališča, predložena v okviru postopka predhodne preiskave za zadeve SA.36558, SA.38371 in SA.36559, ter potrjujeta, da vztrajata pri mnenjih iz navedenih stališč. V zvezi s tem sta državi trdili, da je Komisija do začetka 21. stoletja v skladu z dolgoletno prakso odločanja dosledno menila, da gradnja infrastrukture, ki jo opravi javni organ in je pod nediskriminatornimi pogoji na voljo vsem potencialnim uporabnikom, ni gospodarska dejavnost, ki spada na področje uporabe pravil Unije o konkurenci. Nasprotno, take dejavnosti so se štele za izvajanje javnih pooblastil (za načrtovanje), da bi se zagotovila splošna prometna infrastruktura. | (236) | In their response to the Opening decision, the States refer to their previous submissions, provided in the context of the preliminary investigation procedure for cases SA.36558, SA.38371, and SA.36559, and confirm that they maintain the positions set out therein. In that regard, the States submitted that, until the early 2000s, under a long-standing decision-making practice, the Commission had consistently held that the construction by a public authority of infrastructure, open to all potential users on non-discriminatory terms, did not constitute an economic activity falling within the scope of Union competition rules. Rather, such activities were considered to be an exercise of public (planning) power, in order to provide general transport infrastructure. |
| (237) | Državi sta trdili, da so cilji, ki sta jih želeli doseči z gradnjo stalne povezave, očitno in izključno cilji javne politike, povezani zlasti s spodbujanjem kulturnega, regionalnega in gospodarskega razvoja ter sodelovanja med državama. Trdili sta, da se sodba v zadevi Aéroports de Paris in sodba Splošnega sodišča v zadevi Leipzig Halle z dne 24. marca 2011, ki jo je Sodišče potrdilo 19. decembra 2012 (124) (v nadaljnjem besedilu: sodbi v zadevi Leipzig Halle), ne uporabljata nujno za infrastrukturne projekte, kot je stalna povezava. Običajni vlagatelji nasprotno kot pri letališčih ne morejo izvajati razvoja in upravljanja čezmejnih mostov, pri katerih je potrebna sklenitev mednarodnih sporazumov. Pri gradnji in upravljanju mostov ni prišlo do podobne liberalizacije kot v letališkem sektorju. Trdita, da položaj v primeru stalne povezave ni enak kot v sodbah v zadevi Leipzig Halle, saj namen gradnje stalne povezave nikoli ni bila širitev poslovnih dejavnosti konzorcija; konzorcij je nastal izključno zaradi izvajanja ciljev javne politike in ne zaradi opravljanja gospodarskih dejavnosti. | (237) | The States submitted that the objectives they sought to achieve by constructing the Fixed Link are clearly and exclusively public policy aims, relating, in particular, to furthering cultural, regional, and economic development and cooperation between two countries. They argued that the Aéroports de Paris judgment and the Leipzig Halle judgment of the General Court of 24 March 2011, upheld by the Court of Justice on 19 December 2012 (124) (the ‘Leipzig Halle judgments’), do not necessarily apply to infrastructure projects, such as the Fixed Link. Contrary to airports, the development and operation of cross-border bridges, which require the conclusion of international agreements, cannot be implemented by ordinary investors. The construction and operation of bridges has not undergone a liberalisation similar to the airport sector. The Fixed Link can be distinguished from the situation in the Leipzig Halle judgments, they claim, as the construction of the Fixed Link was never meant to expand the Consortium’s commercial activities; the Consortium came into existence with the sole aim of carrying out public policy aims, and not to pursue economic activities. |
| (238) | Državi poleg tega trdita, da se dejavnosti konzorcija nanašajo izključno na gradnjo in obratovanje stalne povezave, tj. na javne naloge, ki so neposredna posledica ukrepov javnega načrtovanja. Osnovni pogoji za gospodarske dejavnosti konzorcija so vnaprej določeni in rezultat izvajanja javnih pooblastil s strani držav. Konzorcij opravlja svoje javne naloge v omejenem gospodarskem krogu; zato ni tveganja, da bi se lahko njegove dejavnosti financiranja na podlagi modela državnega poroštva uporabile za navzkrižno subvencioniranje drugih dejavnosti, ki niso povezane z njegovimi javnimi nalogami. V tem smislu so dejavnosti in načini financiranja konzorcija primerljivi z dejavnostmi in načini financiranja (drugih) javnih organov, ki zaračunavajo pristojbine na podlagi stroškov za zagotavljanje posebnih javnih dobrin ali storitev svojim uporabnikom, kot so izdelava nekaterih uradnih dokumentov, na primer potnih listov in vozniških dovoljenj, ter zdravstveni pregledi in preverjanje dobrobiti živali, ki jih izvajajo veterinarske agencije. Kadar so subjekti v državni lasti izključno pooblaščeni za opravljanje takih javnih nalog v zaprtem gospodarskem krogu, je treba njihove dejavnosti šteti za izvajanje javnih pooblastil. Državi v zvezi s tem opozarjata, da je konzorcij v 100-odstotni javni lasti in da noben zasebni subjekt ne bi mogel imeti koristi od modela državnega poroštva. | (238) | The States, further, submit that the Consortium’s activities exclusively relate to the construction and operation of the Fixed Link, i.e., public duties, which are a direct consequence of public planning measures. The basic conditions for the Consortium’s economic operations are predetermined, and the result of the States’ exercise of public power. The Consortium performs its public duties in a ringfenced economic circuit; thus, there is no risk that its financing activities on the basis of the State guarantee model could be used to cross-subsidise other activities, not relating to its public tasks. In this sense, the Consortium’s activities and means of financing are comparable to those of (other) public authorities that charge a cost-based fee for providing specific public goods or services to their users, such as the production of certain official documents, for example, passports and driver licences, and health and animal welfare checks of veterinary agencies. When State-owned entities are exclusively empowered to carry out such public duties in a closed economic circuit, their activities must be considered to be an exercise of public power. The States recall that, in that respect, the Consortium is 100 % publicly owned, and no private operator could benefit from the State guarantee model. |
| (239) | Državi sta poleg tega trdili, da se za konzorcij ne more šteti, da konkurira pritožnikovim trajektnim storitvam. Cenovna politika konzorcija vpliva na poslovanje pritožnika, vendar to ni posledica konkurenčnega razmerja med dvema primerljivima akterjema, ki ponujata zamenljive storitve na istem trgu. Nasprotno, pritožnik ponuja komercialno trajektno storitev, konzorcij pa ponuja javno dobro v obliki dostopa do določenega dela cestne in železniške infrastrukture. Ko konzorcij določi ceno za to javno dobro, deluje v okviru odločitve javne politike v zvezi s financiranjem stalne povezave, vključno s cestnimi in železniškimi povezavami z zaledjem. Zato se razmerje med konzorcijem in pritožnikom bistveno razlikuje od običajnih konkurenčnih razmerij. | (239) | The States, further, submitted that the Consortium cannot be considered as competing with the Complainant’s ferry services. While the Consortium’s pricing policy may affect the Complainant’s business, that is not the consequence of a competitive relationship between two comparable actors offering substitutable services on the same market. Rather, while the Complainant offers a commercial ferry service, the Consortium offers a public good, in the form of access to a particular piece of road and rail infrastructure. When the Consortium sets the price for that public good, it acts within the framework of the public policy decision concerning the financing of the Fixed Link, including the road and rail hinterland connections. Thus, the relationship between the Consortium and the Complainant differs fundamentally from ordinary competitive relationships. |
| (240) | Državi sta kljub temu predložili dodatne argumente v zvezi z opredelitvijo modela državnega poroštva in posebnih danskih pravil o prenosu izgub v prihodnje obdobje in amortizaciji kot sheme pomoči ali individualne pomoči, o njihovi opredelitvi kot nove ali obstoječe pomoči ter o obstoju legitimnih pričakovanj. | (240) | Nevertheless, the States provided further arguments on the classification of the State guarantee model and of the special Danish rules on loss carry-forward and depreciation as aid schemes versus individual aid, on their classification as new versus existing aid, and on the existence of legitimate expectations. |
| 5.3 Opredelitev modela državnega poroštva kot sheme ali individualne pomoči | 5.3. Classification of the State guarantee model as a scheme or individual aid |
| (241) | Po mnenju držav je opredelitev modela državnega poroštva bistveno vprašanje, pri presoji pa je treba ustrezno upoštevati namen Uredbe (EU) 2015/1589 in praktične posledice te opredelitve za stalno povezavo in za druge podobne primere. | (241) | In the States’ view, the characterisation of the State guarantee model is an essential issue, and the assessment must have due regard to the purpose of Regulation 2015/1589, and to the practical consequences of this characterisation, both for the Fixed Link and for other similar cases. |
| (242) | Po mnenju držav besedilo Uredbe (EU) 2015/1589 določa, da model državnega poroštva zajema ad hoc pomoč in ne shem pomoči. Državi zato menita, da model državnega poroštva ni namenjen „podjetjem, opredeljenim v aktu na splošen in abstrakten način“, in da je poleg tega „povezan z določenim projektom“. Po njunem mnenju je to podprto z dejstvom, da je konzorcij subjekt za posebne namene z nalogami, povezanimi s stalno povezavo, in da so državna poroštva, zagotovljena konzorciju, neločljivo povezana in omejena na dejavnosti, povezane z gradnjo in obratovanjem stalne povezave. Zato trdita, da model državnega poroštva zajema individualno pomoč. | (242) | In the States’ view, the wording of Regulation 2015/1589 provides that the State guarantee model consists of ad hoc aid, and not aid schemes. As such, the States consider that the State guarantee model is not aimed at ‘undertakings defined within the act in a general and abstract manner’ and, further, that it is ‘linked to a specific project’. According to the States, this is supported by the fact that the Consortium is a special purpose vehicle with tasks associated with the Fixed Link, and that the State guarantees provided to the Consortium are inextricably linked, and restricted, to activities associated with the construction and operation of the Fixed Link. Consequently, the States submit that the State guarantee model consists of individual aid. |
| (243) | Državi menita, da se model državnega poroštva v tem primeru bistveno razlikuje od, na primer, posrednih poroštev, odobrenih javnim podjetjem v obliki nacionalne zakonodaje, ki izključuje stečaj (125). | (243) | The States consider that the State guarantee model in this case is fundamentally different from, for example, indirect guarantees granted to public undertakings in the form of national legislation ruling out bankruptcy (125). |
| (244) | Državi se v zvezi s tem sklicujeta na pravno teorijo, v kateri so navedeni primeri shem pomoči, ki spadajo v opredelitev iz drugega dela člena 1(d) Uredbe (EU) 2015/1589, vključno s shemo, v skladu s katero določeno podjetje prejme letno nadomestilo za izgube, nastale pri opravljanju storitve splošnega gospodarskega pomena (126), in davčnimi spodbudami, katerih trajanje ali znesek nista omejena in ki se dodelijo določenim podjetjem (127). Take sheme se po mnenju držav tudi po namenu in naravi bistveno razlikujejo od modela od modela državnega poroštva, odobrenega konzorciju. | (244) | The States refer, in this context, to the legal literature that provides examples of aid schemes coming within the definition in the second part of Article 1(d) of Regulation 2015/1589, including a scheme under which a specific undertaking receives annual compensation for losses incurred in providing a service of general economic interest (126) and tax incentives, unlimited in amount or time, granted to specific undertakings. (127) Such schemes are, in the States’ view, also fundamentally different in purpose and nature from the State guarantee model granted to the Consortium. |
| (245) | Poleg tega je po mnenju držav iz medvladnega sporazuma ter izvedbene zakonodaje na Švedskem in Danskem jasno razvidno, da so bila solidarna državna poroštva konzorciju leta 1992 odobrena za nedoločen čas in nepreklicno kot pravni in ekonomski predpogoj za obveznost konzorcija, da vzpostavi in upravlja stalno povezavo. Državi imata zato jasno in nedvoumno pravno obveznost druga do druge in do konzorcija, da zagotovita, da državi jamčita za poznejše finančne transakcije, ki spadajo na področje uporabe medvladnega sporazuma in izvedbene zakonodaje. Trdita, da dejstvo, da morata to obveznost nato upravljati švedski urad za javni dolg in danska nacionalna banka, ne pomeni, da imata državi možnost zavrniti poroštvo za take transakcije. | (245) | Moreover, according to the States, the Intergovernmental Agreement and the implementing legislation in Sweden and Denmark clearly show that the joint and several State guarantees were granted to the Consortium indefinitely and irrevocably in 1992, as a legal and economic precondition for the Consortium’s obligation to establish and operate the Fixed Link. As such, both States have a clear and unequivocal legal obligation vis-à-vis each other and vis-à-vis the Consortium to ensure that subsequent financial transactions falling within the scope of the Intergovernmental Agreement and the implementing legislation are guaranteed by the States. The States argue that the fact that this requires subsequent administration from the Swedish National Debt Office and the Danish National Bank does not mean that the States have any choice to refuse to guarantee such transactions. |
| (246) | Po mnenju držav bi bilo zato treba model državnega poroštva opredeliti kot model, ki zajema dve individualni ad hoc pomoči, ki sta bili dodeljeni ob ustanovitvi konzorcija 13. februarja 1992. Državi sta bili od navedenega dne pravno zavezani, da zagotovita vsa finančna sredstva, ki jih konzorcij potrebuje za vzpostavitev in začetek uporabe stalne povezave. Menita, da je ta sklep podprt s pravno ureditvijo in ekonomsko utemeljitvijo modela državnega poroštva. | (246) | Therefore, the State guarantee model should, in the opinion of the States, be characterised as consisting of two individual ad hoc aids, granted when the Consortium was established on 13 February 1992. As from that day, the States have been legally obliged to guarantee all financing required by the Consortium to establish the Fixed Link and put it into service. The States consider this conclusion supported both by the legal arrangements and the economic rationale of the State guarantee model. |
| (247) | Kar zadeva pravno ureditev, državi trdita, da sta švedski urad za javni dolg in danska nacionalna banka odgovorna za praktično upravljanje sporazumov o poroštvu v zvezi s posebnimi posojili in načini financiranja, vendar nimata pristojnosti, da bi konzorciju zavrnila poroštvo za financiranje projekta. Čeprav švedski urad za javni dolg in danska nacionalna banka občasno izdata, ponovno izdata ali potrdita prvotna poroštva za določenega posojilodajalca, to ne spremeni pravne obveznosti držav do konzorcija, da jamčita za finančne obveznosti konzorcija v zvezi s projektom. | (247) | In relation to the legal arrangements, the States argue that, while the Swedish National Debt Office and the Danish National Bank are responsible for the practical administration of the guarantee agreements in relation to specific loans and financing arrangements, they do not have any competence to refuse the Consortium the guarantee to fund the project. Further, while the Swedish National Debt Office and the Danish National Bank, from time to time, issue, reissue, or confirm the original guarantees vis-à-vis a specific lender, this does not change the States’ legal obligation, vis-à-vis the Consortium, to guarantee the Consortium’s financial commitments concerning the project. |
| (248) | Državi ugotavljata, da besedilo ustreznih določb medvladnega sporazuma, vsebina nacionalne izvedbene zakonodaje in sporazum o konzorciju od njihovega sprejetja niso bili spremenjeni. Pravna podlaga, iz katere izhaja pravica konzorcija, da je njegovo financiranje zavarovano z državnim poroštvom, ostaja nespremenjena, zato državi menita, da so bila državna poroštva konzorciju dokončno in nepreklicno odobrena takrat, ko je pridobil zakonsko pravico do financiranja, zavarovanega z državnim poroštvom, tj. od dneva njegove ustanovitve. | (248) | The States note that the wording of the relevant provisions of the Intergovernmental Agreement, the substance of the implementing national legislation, and the Consortium Agreement have not been amended since their adoption. As the legal basis from which the Consortium derives the right for its financing to be State guaranteed remains unaltered, the States consider that the State guarantees were definitively and irrevocably granted to the Consortium at the time it achieved a legal right to obtain State guaranteed funding, i.e., from the day it was founded. |
| (249) | Državi sta predložili dodatne podrobnosti o izvajanju švedske obveznosti solidarnega državnega poroštva v okviru pritožnikove trditve, da so bila švedska poroštva iz sekundarnih spremenjena v osebna poroštva (uvodna izjava 175). Trdili sta, da se prvotna obveznost solidarnega državnega poroštva ni nikoli spremenila. Obveznost državnega poroštva do konzorcija je bila določena s sklepom švedskega parlamenta na podlagi medvladnega sporazuma. Sklep švedskega parlamenta je bil pozneje izvršen s sklepom švedske vlade z dne 1. aprila 1993 (K91/1443/3, K93/202/3) in sklepom švedske vlade z dne 23. junija 1994 (K91/1443/3, K94/1680/3), s katerima je bil švedski urad za javni dolg pooblaščen za izdajo poroštev. V nobenem od navedenih sklepov ni podrobno določeno, kako je treba določiti pogoje posameznih sporazumov o poroštvih. Namesto tega naj bi o tem odločal in to izvajal švedski urad za javni dolg. Švedski parlament in švedska vlada pozneje nista sprejela nobenega sklepa, s katerim bi se spremenila obveznost državnega poroštva, določena s sklepom švedskega parlamenta. Posamezne poroštvene listine so namenjene izpolnitvi pravice, ki je bila konzorciju že dodeljena. Poroštvene listine je treba dejansko razlagati kot osebna poroštva. Vendar to ne pomeni, da gre za spremembo obveznosti poroštva, ki jo ima Švedska do konzorcija, in ne presega pravic, ki so konzorciju podeljene v medvladnem sporazumu ali sklepu švedskega parlamenta. Poleg tega državi ugotavljata, da švedski urad za javni dolg nima zakonske pristojnosti ali pooblastila za spremembo ali podaljšanje prvotne obveznosti solidarnega državnega poroštva – ali za izdajo novega poroštva – brez novega sklepa vlade. Razlike v besedilu v ponovno izdanih poroštvenih dokumentih v zvezi s posameznimi posojili je treba razlagati kot različne izpolnitve prvotne obveznosti solidarnega državnega poroštva in ne kot nova individualna poroštva. | (249) | The States provided further details on the implementation of the Swedish joint and several State guarantee obligation in the context of the Complainant’s claim that the Swedish guarantees were changed from secondary to personal guarantees (recital (175)). The States submitted that the original joint and several State guarantee obligation has never changed. The State guarantee obligation towards the Consortium was established by the Swedish Parliament decision, following up on the Intergovernmental Agreement. The Swedish Parliament decision was later implemented by the decision of the Swedish Government of 1 April 1993 (K91/1443/3, K93/202/3) and the decision of the Swedish Government of 23 June 1994 (K91/1443/3, K94/1680/3), by which the Swedish National Debt Office was commissioned to issue guarantees. None of those decisions regulate in detail how the terms of the individual guarantee agreements were to be determined. Instead, this was to be decided upon and implemented by the Swedish National Debt Office. There has been no subsequent decision by the Swedish Parliament in this context, nor any decision by the Swedish Government, which would have amended the State guarantee obligation established by the Swedish Parliament decision. The individual deeds of guarantee serve to fulfil the right already given to the Consortium. The deeds of guarantee are indeed to be interpreted as personal guarantees. This, however, does not constitute a change of the Swedish guarantee obligation to the Consortium and does not go beyond the rights given to the Consortium in the Intergovernmental Agreement or in the Swedish Parliament decision. Furthermore, the States note that the Swedish National Debt Office does not have the legal power or mandate to amend or extend the original joint and several State guarantee obligation – or to issue a new guarantee – without a new Government decision. The variations in the wording used in the reissued guarantee documents in respect of the individual loans are to be interpreted as different implementations of the original joint and several State guarantee obligation and not as new individual guarantees. |
| (250) | Kar zadeva izvajanje danske obveznosti solidarnega državnega poroštva, sta državi pojasnili, da se obveznost državnega poroštva, kot je določena v zakonu o gradnji, od začetka njegove veljavnosti ni spremenila. Pogoji za unovčenje v navedeni zakonodaji niso izrecno določeni, zato se ta obveznost poroštva obravnava kot „simpel kaution“. Dansko pravo o poroštvih razlikuje med „simpel kaution“ in „selvskyldnerkaution“. „Simpel kaution“ pomeni, da mora stranka, ki želi unovčiti poroštvo, poroku dokazati, da glavni zavezanec (dolžnik) ne more poravnati svojih obveznosti. Običajno se to dokazuje tako, (i) da se pri izvršitvi (npr. poskusu navedene stranke, da uveljavlja svojo terjatev do premoženja glavnega zavezanca) ugotovi, da glavni zavezanec ne more poravnati svojih obveznosti ob njihovi zapadlosti, ali (ii) da je glavni zavezanec v stečajnem ali podobnem insolvenčnem postopku. „Selvskyldnerkaution“ pomeni, da lahko stranka, ki želi unovčiti poroštvo, od poroka zahteva plačilo, če glavni zavezanec ni izvršil plačila v ustreznem roku. V skladu z dansko sodno prakso v zvezi s poroštvi se poroštvo običajno razlaga kot „simpel kaution“, razen če ne obstaja jasna podlaga za to, da se razlaga kot „selvskyldnerkaution“. Če torej poroštvo ni jasno opisano kot „selvskyldnerkaution“, mora stranka, želi unovčiti poroštvo, poroku dokazati, da glavni zavezanec ne more poravnati svojih obveznosti ob njihovi zapadlosti. | (250) | As regards the implementation of the Danish joint and several State guarantee obligation, the States explained that the State guarantee obligation as provided by the Construction Act has not changed since it entered into force. The mobilisation conditions are not expressly provided for in that legislation, thus, by default, this guarantee obligation will be considered as a ‘simpel kaution’. Danish law on guarantees distinguishes between ‘simpel kaution’ and ‘selvskyldnerkaution’. A ‘simpel kaution’ means that the party calling upon the guarantee must show to the guarantor that the principal (the debtor) is unable to pay its obligations. Normally this requires either (i) that it has been established during an execution (i.e., that party’s attempt to execute its claim against the principal’s assets) that the principal is unable to pay its obligations as they fall due; or (ii) that the principal has been taken under bankruptcy or similar insolvency proceedings. A ‘selvskyldnerkaution’ means that the party calling upon the guarantee can ask the guarantor to pay if the principal has failed to make payment in due time. According to Danish jurisprudence on guarantees, a guarantee is normally interpreted as a ‘simpel kaution’ unless there is a clear basis for interpreting it as a ‘selvskyldnerkaution’. Thus, unless the guarantee is clearly described as a ‘selvskyldnerkaution’, the party calling upon the guarantee will have to show to the guarantor that the principal is unable to pay its obligations as they fall due. |
| (251) | V praksi so pogoji za unovčenje podrobneje opredeljeni v sporazumih o poroštvu, izdanih v okviru različnih finančnih transakcij. Iz besedila navedenih sporazumov o poroštvu izhaja, da so ti brezpogojni, zato vlagateljem ni treba uveljavljati terjatve do konzorcija, ampak se lahko ob neizpolnitvi obveznosti obrnejo neposredno na poroke. Upniki niso dolžni začeti nobenih postopkov v primeru insolventnosti. Po drugi strani program EMTN, posojila EIB in krovne pogodbe za poslovanje z izvedenimi finančnimi instrumenti vsebujejo posebno določbo, ki ureja morebitno insolventnost. V skladu z navedeno določbo se vsi upniki zavežejo, da ne bodo pospešili priprav ali postopkov v primeru insolventnosti ali vložili ali sodelovali pri vložitvi predloga za stečaj, obnovo, upravljanje, prenehanje itd., dokler so s poroštvi krite obveznosti konzorcija. | (251) | In practice, the conditions for mobilisation are further specified in the guarantee agreements issued under the various financial transactions. It follows from the wording of those guarantee agreements that they are unconditional and, thus, the investors are not obliged to seek to enforce a claim against the Consortium, but may address the guarantors directly upon default. The creditors are not obliged to activate any insolvency steps. On the other hand, there is a specific provision in the EMTN programme, in the EIB loans, and in the ISDA Master Agreements governing a potential insolvency situation. According to that provision, all creditors undertake not to accelerate any insolvency preparations or proceedings or to activate or participate in filing for bankruptcy, reconstruction, administration, dissolution, etc., so long as the guarantees cover the obligations of the Consortium. |
| (252) | Državi sta se sklicevali tudi na končni sklep o ožini Fehmarn in zlasti opozorili na ugotovitev, da je Komisija v uvodni izjavi 253 navedenega sklepa poudarila, da zakon, ki ureja gradnjo in upravljanje stalne povezave prek ožine Fehmarn, vsebuje jasno zavezo države, da bo stroške gradnje financirala z državnimi posojili in/ali državnimi poroštvi, pri čemer lahko minister za finance odloča le o kombinaciji državnih posojil in državnih poroštev. Opozorili sta tudi na uvodno izjavo 256 končnega sklepa o ožini Fehmarn, v kateri je navedeno, da ima minister za finance le omejeno diskrecijsko pravico v zvezi z izvajanjem državnih posojil in državnih poroštev. Danska nacionalna banka in švedski urad za javni dolg sta v zadevi v zvezi z ožino Øresund odgovorna za praktično upravljanje poroštev v zvezi s posebnimi posojili in načini financiranja, pri čemer nimata pristojnosti, da bi zavrnila odobritev poroštev, ki jih konzorcij potrebuje za financiranje projekta. Državi zato trdita, da je diskrecijska pravica v zadevi v zvezi z ožino Øresund še bolj omejena kot v zadevi v zvezi z ožino Fehmarn. | (252) | The States also referred to the Fehmarn Belt final decision and, in particular, pointed to the observation that, at recital 253 of that decision, the Commission emphasised that the act governing the construction and operation of the Fehmarn Belt Fixed Link contains a clear commitment by the State to finance the construction costs by State loans and/or State guarantees, under which the Minister of Finance has authorisation to decide on the mix of State loans versus State guarantees, only. They further pointed to recital 256 of the Fehmarn Belt final decision, stating that the Minister of Finance has limited discretion, only, regarding the implementation of State loans and State guarantees. In the Øresund case, the Danish National Bank and the Swedish National Debt Office are responsible for the practical administration of the guarantees in relation to specific loans and financing arrangements, without any competence to refuse to grant the Consortium the necessary guarantees to fund the project. Thus, the States submit, in the Øresund case, the States’ discretionary power is even more limited that in the Fehmarn Belt case. |
| (253) | Državi poleg tega ugotavljata, da je Komisija poudarila, da je pomoč, dodeljena družbi Femern A/S – subjektu za posebne namene, odgovornemu za gradnjo in obratovanje stalne povezave prek ožine Fehmarn – povezana izključno s financiranjem načrtovanja in izgradnje navedene stalne povezave, pri čemer so izključeni drugi projekti in dejavnosti. Trdita, da enako velja v zadevi v zvezi z ožino Øresund. Konzorcij je „subjekt za posebne namene“, ki lahko izvaja le dejavnosti, povezane s stalno povezavo. Celovita ocena obsega poroštev, pri kateri se upošteva dejstvo, da konzorcij ne more izvajati drugih dejavnosti, bi lahko po njunem mnenju vodila le do ugotovitve, da so poroštva povezana z določenim projektom. | (253) | Furthermore, the States note that the Commission emphasised that the aid granted to Femern A/S – the special purpose vehicle responsible for the construction and operation of the Fehmarn Belt Fixed Link – is exclusively related to the financing of the planning and construction of that fixed link, to the exclusion of other projects and activities. The States submit that the same applies in the Øresund case. The Consortium is a ‘special purpose vehicle’ that must not carry out activities other than those associated with the Fixed Link. An overall assessment of the scope of the guarantees that takes account of the fact that the Consortium cannot carry out other activities could in their view only lead to the conclusion that the guarantees are linked to a specific project. |
| (254) | Državi ugotavljata, da konzorciju iz istih razlogov kot v zadevi v zvezi z ožino Fehmarn očitno ni dodeljena nova pomoč vsakič, ko se sklene nova transakcija, zavarovana s poroštvom. Končni sklep o ožini Fehmarn torej potrjuje stališče držav, da bi bilo treba državna poroštva opredeliti kot dve individualni ad hoc pomoči, ki sta bili dodeljeni ob ustanovitvi konzorcija leta 1992. | (254) | The States conclude that for the same reasons as in the Fehmarn Belt case, the Consortium is clearly not awarded new aid every time a new transaction, which is guaranteed, is entered into. The Fehmarn Belt final decision, therefore, confirms the States’ view that the State guarantees should be characterised as two individual ad hoc aids granted when the Consortium was established in 1992. |
| (255) | Ekonomska utemeljitev modela državnega poroštva je čim bolj znižati skupne stroške financiranja projekta. Navedeni cilj bi bil ogrožen, če bi vsaka država po lastni presoji odločala, ali bo v zvezi s konzorcijem izdala poseben sporazum o poroštvu. Model ne bi deloval kot mehanizem financiranja, če bi moral konzorcij državi za državno poroštvo zaprositi vsakič, ko bi moral najeti novo posojilo. Prav tako ne bi bilo tržno ekonomsko smiselno po eni strani domnevati, da ima konzorcij značilnosti podjetja, ki konkurira drugim udeležencem na trgu, po drugi strani pa domnevati, da bi to podjetje prevzelo odgovornost za financiranje stalne povezave, ne da bi najprej pridobilo jasno zakonsko pravico do financiranja svojih stroškov gradnje z državnimi poroštvi že od samega začetka. Poleg tega državi trdita, da dejstvo, da je bila pomoč dodeljena leta 1992, potrjuje tudi gospodarska stvarnost, zlasti finančni trgi. V povzetku kreditne analize konzorcija z dne 18. novembra 2016, ki jo je izvedla agencija Standard & Poor’s, je navedeno, da „[t]a poroštva v skladu z njihovim besedilom nepreklicno in brezpogojno krijejo celoten dolg družbe Øresundsbron in plačilo obresti“. Agencija Standard & Poor’s je zato bonitetno oceno dolga konzorcija povezala z dolgoročno bonitetno oceno Švedske in Danske, tj. AAA. | (255) | The economic rationale of the State guarantee model is to minimise the total financing costs of the project. That aim would be undermined if each State had discretion as to whether to issue a specific guarantee agreement vis-à-vis the Consortium. The model would not function as a financing mechanism if the Consortium needed to ‘apply’ to the States for a State guarantee each time the Consortium were to take out a new loan. Also, it would make no market economic sense to assume, on the one hand, that the Consortium has the characteristics of an ‘undertaking’, in competition with other market operators, and, on the other hand, to assume that this undertaking would have accepted responsibility for the financing of the Fixed Link, without having, first, obtained a clear legal right to finance its construction costs with State guarantees, from the outset. Moreover, the States argue that the fact that the granting occurred in 1992 is also confirmed by economic reality, in particular, by the financial markets. In the summary of Standard & Poor’s credit analysis of the Consortium of 18 November 2016, it is stated that ‘[t]hese guarantees, according to their wording, irrevocably and unconditionally cover all of Øresundsbron’s debt and interest payment’. For that reason, Standard & Poor’s links the rating on the Consortium’s debt to the long-term rating for Sweden and Denmark – i.e., AAA. |
| (256) | Državi nazadnje trdita, da splošna načela prava Unije o državni pomoči in sodna praksa potrjujejo ugotovitev, da je bila pomoč, ki izhaja iz modela državnega poroštva, dodeljena ob ustanovitvi konzorcija. Po njunem mnenju so bile zaveze, da bosta jamčili za posojila konzorcija za stalno povezavo, ob ustanovitvi konzorcija zanesljive, natančne in brezpogojne. Pomoč, ki izhaja iz modela državnega poroštva, je bila torej dodeljena leta 1992, ko je konzorcij pridobil brezpogojno in nepreklicno zakonsko pravico, da za financiranje svojih obveznosti v zvezi z določenim projektom uporabi model državnega poroštva, tudi če te prihodnje finančne ureditve še niso bile dogovorjene (tj. tudi če poroštva dejansko še niso bila izplačana). | (256) | Finally, the States argue that the general principles in Union State aid law and case-law support the conclusion that the aid derived from the State guarantee model was granted when the Consortium was established. In their view, the commitments to guarantee the Consortium’s loans for the Fixed Link were firm, precise, and unconditional when the Consortium was established. The aid derived from the State guarantee model was, thus, granted in 1992, when the Consortium obtained an unconditional and irrevocable legal right to make use of the State guarantee model to finance its commitments relating to the specific project, even if those future financial arrangements had not yet been entered into (i.e. even if the guarantees had not actually been ‘paid out’ yet). |
| 5.4 Opredelitev modela državnega poroštva kot nove ali obstoječe pomoči | 5.4. Classification of the State guarantee model as new aid or existing aid |
| (257) | Državi se sklicujeta na člen 17(2) Uredbe (EU) 2015/1589, v katerem je določeno, da desetletni zastaralni rok (za vračilo) začne teči na dan, ko je nezakonita pomoč dodeljena upravičencu kot individualna pomoč. | (257) | The States refer to Article 17(2) of Regulation 2015/1589, stating that the limitation period of ten years (for recovery) shall begin on the day on which the unlawful aid has been awarded to the beneficiary as individual aid. |
| (258) | Državi menita, da je desetletni zastaralni rok potekel 13. februarja 2002, kar je deset let po ustanovitvi konzorcija 13. februarja 1992. Vsa pomoč, povezana z modelom državnega poroštva, je zato obstoječa pomoč in je ni mogoče izterjati. | (258) | The States consider that the ten year limitation period expired on 13 February 2002, which is ten years after the Consortium was established, on 13 February 1992. All aid related to the State guarantee model is, therefore, existing aid and cannot be recovered. |
| (259) | Švedski organi poleg tega trdijo, da je bila vsaka morebitna pomoč dokončno dodeljena pred pristopom Švedske k Uniji in pred začetkom veljavnosti Sporazuma EGP (128)1. januarja 1994. Zato je solidarno državno poroštvo, ki ga je zagotovila Švedska, obstoječa pomoč v skladu s členom 1(b), točka (i), Uredbe (EU) 2015/1589 in členom 144 Akta o pristopu Avstrije, Finske in Švedske. | (259) | In addition, the Swedish authorities maintain that any possible aid was definitively granted prior to its accession to the Union, and prior to the entry into force of the EEA Agreement (128), on 1 January 1994. Accordingly, the joint and several State guarantee provided by Sweden is existing aid, in accordance with Article 1(b), point (i) of Regulation 2015/1589 and Article 144 of the Act of Accession of Austria, Finland and Sweden. |
| (260) | Po mnenju držav je namen temeljnega razlikovanja med „novo pomočjo“ in „obstoječo pomočjo“ ter med „shemo pomoči“ in „ad hoc pomočjo“ vzpostaviti ravnovesje med dvema temeljnima vidikoma: (i) učinkovitim izvrševanjem pravil o državni pomoči in (ii) pravno varnostjo za države članice, prejemnika pomoči in njegove pogodbene partnerje, ki so svoj položaj prilagodili z zanašanjem na pomoč. | (260) | In the States’ view, the fundamental distinctions between ‘new aid’ and ‘existing aid’, and between ‘aid schemes’ and ‘ad hoc aid’, aim to strike a balance between two fundamental considerations: (i) effective enforcement of the State aid rules; and (ii) legal certainty for the Member States, the aid recipient, and its contractual partners, which have adjusted their situation in reliance on the aid. |
| (261) | Državi v zvezi s tem navajata, da je bila temeljna pravna in ekonomska predpostavka za začetek projekta in nastanek izdatkov, povezanih z gradnjo stalne povezave, da sta konzorciju državna poroštva odobrili obe sodelujoči državi in da navedena državna poroštva ostanejo veljavna, dokler dolg konzorcija ne bo v celoti poplačan. | (261) | From that perspective, the States add that it was a fundamental legal and economic assumption for launching the project, and for incurring the expenditure associated with the construction of the Fixed Link, that the Consortium was granted the State guarantees from both participating States, and that those State guarantees would remain valid until the Consortium’s debt was fully repaid. |
| (262) | Državi opozarjata tudi, da bi se lahko vsaka zainteresirana stran ali potencialni konkurent pritožil Komisiji ali uveljavljal člen 108(3) PDEU neposredno pred nacionalnimi sodišči od ustanovitve konzorcija ter v ustreznih rokih v skladu s pravom Unije in nacionalnim pravom. Komisija po poteku navedenih rokov ni pristojna za odreditev izterjave ali za uvedbo ustreznih ukrepov za prihodnost. Trdita, da bi za konzorcij in državi pomenilo nesprejemljivo pravno negotovost, če bi imela Komisija to pristojnost več desetletij po začetku projekta in nastanku dolga. | (262) | The States, further, note that any interested party or potential competitor could have complained to the Commission or have invoked Article 108(3) TFEU directly before national courts as from the establishment of the Consortium, and within the respective time limits under Union and national law. After the expiration of those time limits, the Commission does not have the competence to order recovery, or to impose appropriate measures for the future. They argue that it would give rise to unacceptable legal uncertainty for the Consortium and the States if the Commission were to have this competence several decades after the project was launched and the debt had been incurred. |
| (263) | Državi navajata, da so se s prakso stalnega refinanciranja posojil zagotovili minimalni skupni stroški izposojanja in da se zaradi posojil, zavarovanih z državnim poroštvom, ki se zato najemajo sproti, konzorcij ne bi smel obravnavati drugače, kot če bi se leta 1992 odločil za zadolževanje v obliki dolgoročnih posojil z državnim poroštvom, ki jih ne bi bilo treba refinancirati. | (263) | The States add that the practice of refinancing loans on an ongoing basis has ensured minimal overall borrowing costs, and that State guaranteed loans which, as a consequence, are taken out on an ongoing basis should not lead to the Consortium being treated differently from if it had, instead, in 1992, chosen to incur debt as long-term State guaranteed loans that would not need to be refinanced. |
| (264) | Državi na podlagi navedenega trdita, da je bila pomoč, ki izhaja iz modela državnega poroštva, konzorciju dokončno in nepreklicno dodeljena 13. februarja 1992. | (264) | Based on the above arguments, the States maintain that aid deriving from the State guarantee model was definitively and irrevocably granted to the Consortium on 13 February 1992. |
| (265) | Državi sta se kljub temu in ob upoštevanju svojega stališča, da je pomoč, ki izhaja iz modela državnega poroštva, obstoječa pomoč in je zato ni mogoče izterjati, zavezali, da bosta zagotovili, da bo konzorcij financiral nov dolg in refinanciral obstoječi dolg pod tržnimi pogoji. Obstoječa pomoč konzorciju, ki izhaja iz modela državnega poroštva, bo zato postopoma odpravljena, ko prenehajo veljati neporavnani dolžniški instrumenti konzorcija. Državi sta Komisiji predložili pregled prehoda preostalega dolga na tržne pogoje in pričakovani način odplačevanja. Navedeni dolg se bo refinanciral pod tržnimi pogoji, ko bo zapadel in se bo pojavila potreba po refinanciranju. Zato se bo prihodnje financiranje pod tržnimi pogoji postopoma izvajalo, ko se bodo pojavile prihodnje potrebe po refinanciranju. Državi sta v zvezi s tem potrdili, da konzorcij od sodbe v zadevi Øresund ni pridobil nobenih novih sredstev za financiranje ali refinanciranje, zavarovanih z državnim poroštvom (uvodna izjava 116). Postopno opuščanje se je v praksi torej že začelo. | (265) | Nevertheless, and considering the States’ point of view that the aid deriving from the State guarantee model is existing aid and therefore, cannot be recovered, the States have committed to ensure that the Consortium will finance new debt, and refinance existing debt, on market terms. Therefore, the existing aid to the Consortium deriving from the State guarantee model will be phased out as the Consortium’s outstanding debt instruments expire. The States provided the Commission with an overview of the transition to market terms of the remaining debt, and the expected repayment profile. That debt will be refinanced on market terms as it matures and the need for refinancing arises. Therefore, the future financing on market terms will gradually be implemented when future refinancing needs occur. The States confirmed, in this context, that the Consortium has not obtained any new State guaranteed financing or refinancing since the Øresund judgment (recital (116)). Therefore, in practice, the phasing out has already started. |
| 5.5 Pripombe glede posebnih danskih pravil o prenosu izgub v prihodnje obdobje in amortizaciji | 5.5. Comments on the special Danish rules on loss carry-forward and depreciation |
| (266) | Kar zadeva posebna danska pravila o prenosu izgub v prihodnje obdobje in amortizaciji, Danska trdi, da bi bilo treba, če bi se zanje štelo, da spadajo na področje uporabe pravil o državni pomoči, ukrepe obravnavati predvsem kot „obstoječo pomoč“. | (266) | As to the special Danish rules on loss carry-forward and depreciation, Denmark argues that, should they need to be considered as falling under State aid rules, the measures would have to be considered mainly as ‘existing aid’. |
| (267) | Danska trdi (ob čemer se sklicuje tudi na argumente, predložene v okviru zadeve SA.38371 (2014/CP)), da je zakon o gradnji že od samega začetka in ob upoštevanju posebnih okoliščin, v katerih so stroški gradnje infrastrukture vključevali očitno potrebo po dolgoročnem načrtovanju financiranja družbe A/S Øresund, določal, da bodo za družbo A/S Øresund veljala ugodnejša pravila o prenosu izgub v prihodnje obdobje kot na podlagi splošnega danskega zakona o odmeri davka (člen 15). Zakonodajalec je tako v pripravljalnih opombah k zakonu o gradnji izrecno navedel, da je bil razlog za odobritev podaljšanega obdobja omejitve za prenos izgub v prihodnje obdobje leta 1991 ta, da družba A/S Øresund ne bi mogla izkoristiti splošno veljavnih pravil o prenosu izgub v prihodnje obdobje (s petletno omejitvijo) zaradi velikih izdatkov in neobstoja dobička v obdobju gradnje. Danska ugotavlja, da so bile izgube, nastale pred začetkom uporabe stalne povezave, v glavnem posledica obresti na posojila, ki so bila potrebna za izgradnjo stalne povezave. Stroški financiranja (obresti) niso del stroškov pridobitve, ki se lahko kapitalizirajo kot sredstvo v bilanci stanja konzorcija in na podlagi katerih se lahko uporabi amortizacija. Vendar so stroški obresti odbitni kot odhodek v skladu s splošnim pravilom o odbitku obresti iz splošnega danskega zakona o obdavčitvi dohodka in premoženja (129), zato so zaradi njih v začetni fazi projekta nastale izgube. | (267) | Denmark argues (also referring to arguments that had been submitted in the context of SA.38371 (2014/CP)) that the Construction Act established, from the outset, and in light of the specific circumstances where infrastructure construction costs entailed an obvious need for long-term planning of A/S Øresund’s financing, that A/S Øresund would be subject to more favourable loss carry-forward rules than under the general Danish Tax Assessment Act (Section 15). Thus, in the preparatory notes to the Construction Act, the legislator explicitly stated that the reason for granting an extended limitation period for loss carry-forward in 1991 was that A/S Øresund would not be able to benefit from the generally applicable rules on loss carry-forward (with a limitation of five years), due to significant expenditure, combined with a lack of profits during the construction period. Denmark notes that the losses incurred prior to the entry into service of the Fixed Link were, basically, due to interest on the loans that were necessary for the construction of the Fixed Link. Financing costs (interest) are not part of the acquisition costs that can be capitalised as an asset in the balance sheet of the Consortium, on the basis of which depreciation can be applied. Interest costs are, however, deductible as an expense according to the general rule on deduction of interest in the general Danish Act on the Taxation of Income and Property (129) and, therefore, generated losses in the initial phase of the project. |
| (268) | Danska glede posebnega danskega pravila o amortizaciji trdi, da je bila družba A/S Øresund v skladu z oddelkom 12 zakona o gradnji zajeta v ločeni pravni podlagi v zvezi z amortizacijo začetnih stroškov pridobitve projekta. Opozorila je, da so običajna pravila o amortizaciji (tj. splošno veljavna pravila) navedena v danskem zakonu o davčni amortizaciji. Danska se je v zvezi s tem sklicevala na pripravljalne opombe k zakonu o gradnji, v katerih je navedeno, da navedene določbe ustrezajo podobnim določbam, ki se uporabljajo za „stavbe in druge naprave“ na podlagi takrat veljavnega danskega zakona o davčni amortizaciji, tj. člena 22 konsolidiranega zakona št. 597 z dne 16. avgusta 1991. Pojasnila je, da je treba posebno dansko pravilo o amortizaciji obravnavati kot praktično pravilo, ki omogoča enotno ureditev za vsa sredstva, kar je prvotno kvečjemu škodilo konzorciju, saj se je za vsa sredstva uporabljala najmanj ugodna stopnja amortizacije (druge postavke, kot so stroji, bi se običajno lahko amortizirale hitreje kot pri 6- oziroma 2-odstotni stopnji, vendar je za družbo A/S Øresund veljala največ 6- oziroma 2-odstotna stopnja). | (268) | On the special Danish rule on depreciation, Denmark argues that, under Section 12 of the Construction Act, A/S Øresund was covered by a separate legal basis regarding depreciation of the initial acquisition costs of the project. Denmark noted that the normal depreciation rules (i.e., the generally applicable rules) were found in the Danish Tax Depreciation Act. Denmark referred, in this context, to the preparatory notes to the Construction Act, which state that those provisions correspond to similar provisions applicable in regard to ‘buildings and other installations’ under the Danish Tax Depreciation Act that was in force at the time, i.e., Section 22 of the consolidated Act No 597 of 16 August 1991. Denmark explained that the special Danish rule on depreciation was to be considered as a practical rule allowing a uniform regime for all assets, that was originally, if anything, detrimental to the Consortium, as the least favourable rate of depreciation was applied to all assets (other items, such as machinery, could normally be depreciated faster than at 6 % / 2 %, but for A/S Øresund, the 6 % / 2 % applied as a maximum). |
| (269) | Po mnenju danskih organov posebnih danskih pravil o prenosu izgub v prihodnje obdobje ni mogoče obravnavati kot prednosti, ki jih je treba proučiti ločeno od modela državnega poroštva. Pravila, ki se uporabljajo za družbo A/S Øresund, imajo enak cilj kot model državnega poroštva, in sicer zagotoviti financiranje stalne povezave z najnižjimi stroški. Poleg tega so zneski, ki jih vsebujejo navedene davčne ugodnosti, neločljivo povezani z modelom državnega poroštva, skupni neto učinek pa nevtralizira vsako davčno ugodnost, ki jo je družba A/S Øresund morda prejela. Zniža se zlasti skupni znesek pomoči (bruto ekvivalent nepovratnih sredstev), dodeljene na podlagi modela državnega poroštva, tako da posebna danska pravila o prenosu izgub v prihodnje obdobje pomenijo manjšo davčno obveznost in s tem manjše breme dolga za konzorcij. Nasprotno pa bi, če za družbo A/S Øresund ne bi veljala posebna pravila, konzorcij nosil večje breme dolga, zato bi bil prek modela državnega poroštva dodeljen višji znesek pomoči. Povedano drugače, osnovni cilj posebnih danskih pravil o prenosu izgub v prihodnje obdobje, ki se uporabljajo za družbo A/S Øresund, je bil izboljšati finančno trdnost projekta, in s tem zmanjšati tveganje, povezano z zagotavljanjem posojil konzorciju. | (269) | In the Danish authorities’ opinion, the special Danish rules on loss carry-forward cannot be viewed as advantages that have to be examined separately from the State guarantee model. The rules applying to A/S Øresund pursue the same aim as the State guarantee model, namely, to ensure the financing of the Fixed Link, at the least cost. Moreover, the amounts contained in those tax advantages are inextricably linked to the State guarantee model, and the combined net effect neutralises any tax benefit that A/S Øresund may have received. In particular, the total amount of aid (gross grant equivalent) granted through the State guarantee model is reduced to the extent that the special Danish rules on loss carry-forward entail a lower tax liability and, therefore, a lower debt burden for the Consortium. Conversely, had A/S Øresund not been subject to the special rules, the Consortium would have had a higher debt burden, and thus a higher amount of aid would have been granted through the State guarantee model. In other words, the special Danish rules on loss carry-forward applying to A/S Øresund had, as their basic aim, improving the financial robustness of the project, thereby lowering the risk associated with providing loans to the Consortium. |
| (270) | Danska nadalje trdi, da je, če bi morala za katero koli od posebnih danskih pravil o prenosu izgub v prihodnje obdobje veljati pravila o državni pomoči, ustrezno obdobje za upoštevanje morebitnih prednosti, ki izhajajo iz pravil o prenosu izgub v prihodnje obdobje, omejeno na obdobje od 1. januarja 2013 do 31. decembra 2015, tj. na tri leta. Kar zadeva obdobje od davčnega leta 2002 do vključno davčnega leta 2012, ni bilo nobene prednosti, saj bi lahko vse pravne osebe, ki so zavezane plačilu danskega davka od dohodkov pravnih oseb, svoje izgube brez omejitev prenesle v prihodnja davčna leta. Posebno pravilo o prenosu izgub v prihodnje obdobje, kot je veljalo pred navedenim obdobjem, bi bilo treba šteti za obstoječo pomoč, dodeljeno z začetkom veljavnosti zakona o gradnji. Danska v zvezi s tem ugotavlja, da se pravilo o prenosu izgub za obdobje 1991–2001 bistveno razlikuje od položaja, ki je veljal v sodbi v zadevi France Télécom. Zakon o gradnji je že od samega začetka in glede na posebne okoliščine družbe A/S Øresund določal, da bodo za družbo A/S Øresund zaradi dolgoročnega načrtovanja financiranja naložbe v infrastrukturo veljala ugodnejša pravila o prenosu izgub v prihodnje obdobje. Morebitno prednost bi bilo treba šteti za dodeljeno najpozneje ob nastanku izgub, dejstvo, da se izgube uporabijo pozneje, pa ni pomembno za določitev, kdaj je bila prednost dodeljena, in s tem za oceno, ali je pomoč zdaj obstoječa pomoč. Taka prednost torej ni bila določena in odvisna od letne ureditve davčnega prispevka kot v zadevi France Télécom, odpraviti pa bi jo bilo mogoče le s spremembo zakonodaje. | (270) | Denmark, further, submits that, if any of the special Danish rules on loss carry-forward should be subject to State aid rules, the relevant period to consider potential advantages as a result of the loss carry-forward rules is limited to the period from 1 January 2013 until 31 December 2015, i.e., three years. For the period starting with tax year 2002 and up to and including the tax year 2012, no advantage existed since all legal entities subject to Danish corporate income tax could carry-forward their losses without any limitation in future tax years. The special rule on loss carry-forward as it was in place before that period, should be considered as existing aid granted with the entry into force of the Construction Act. Denmark notes in this context that the 1991-2001 LCF differs significantly from the situation applicable in the France Télécom judgment. The Construction Act established, from the outset, and in light of the specific circumstances of A/S Øresund, that A/S Øresund would be subject to more favourable rules on loss carry-forward in light of the long-term planning of the financing of an infrastructure investment. The potential advantage should be considered as granted, at the latest, when the losses occurred, and the fact that the losses are utilised at a later date is irrelevant for the purpose of determining when the advantage was granted, and, thus, for the assessment of whether the aid is now existing aid. Such advantage was, therefore, not determined, and dependent, upon a yearly regulation of the tax contribution as in France Télécom, and could only be removed by amending the legislation. |
| (271) | Danska je predložila tudi dodatne podrobnosti o letnih davčnih napovedih družbe A/S Øresund, zlasti izgubah, prenesenih v prihodnje obdobje in uporabljenih od leta 1992 ter o letnih amortiziranih zneskih. Potrdila je, da so bile uporabljene izgube, ki so nastale več kot pet let prej (in bi torej v skladu z običajnimi pravili že zapadle). Poleg tega se je v obdobju 2013–2015 z izgubami, prenesenimi v prihodnje obdobje, izravnal ves dobiček, kar po običajnih pravilih obdavčitve zaradi veljavne omejitve ne bi bilo mogoče. Danska je poleg tega potrdila, da je bila prva amortizacija v zvezi s sredstvi stalne povezave obračunana za davčno leto 2004 po 6-odstotni stopnji; takrat je bila stopnja amortizacije v skladu z običajnimi pravili obdavčitve 5-odstotna. Družba A/S Øresund je izkoristila tudi možnost 6-odstotne amortizacije v obdobju, ki se je začelo z davčnim letom 2008, ko je bila stopnja amortizacije v skladu z običajnimi pravili obdavčitve 4-odstotna. Danska je potrdila tudi, da je skupni znesek nabrane amortizacije ostal pod 60 % do vključno davčnega leta 2015, po katerem so bila posebna danska pravila o prenosu izgub v prihodnje obdobje in amortizaciji razveljavljena. | (271) | Denmark also provided further details on the annual tax returns of A/S Øresund, in particular on the losses carried-forward and utilised since 1992, and on the annual depreciated amounts. Denmark confirmed that losses were utilised that occurred more than five years earlier (and, therefore, under the normal rules would have expired). Moreover, for the period 2013-2015, 100 % of the profits was offset with carried-forward losses, which would not have been possible under the normal taxation rules, due to the limit that applied. Denmark, further, confirmed that the first depreciation in relation to the Fixed Link assets occurred with regard to the tax year 2004, at a rate of 6 %; at the time, the rate of depreciation under the normal taxation rules was 5 %. A/S Øresund also made use of the possibility to depreciate at 6 % in the period starting with its tax year 2008, when the depreciation rate under the normal taxation rules was 4 %. In addition, Denmark confirmed that the total accumulated depreciation amount remained below 60 %, up to and including the tax year 2015, after which the special Danish rules on loss carry-forward and depreciation were repealed. |
| 5.6 Združljivost ukrepov pomoči | 5.6. Compatibility of the aid measures |
| (272) | Državi sta menili, da glede na njuno stališče v zvezi z obstojem državne pomoči in opredelitvijo obstoječe pomoči, kot je opisano v oddelkih 5.2 do 5.5, ni primerno ali potrebno podati podrobnih pripomb o pomislekih glede združljivosti morebitne pomoči konzorciju, izraženih v sklepu o začetku postopka. | (272) | The States did not consider it appropriate or necessary to comment in detail on the doubts raised in the Opening decision on the compatibility of any possible aid to the Consortium, in light of their position regarding the presence of State aid and the qualification as existing aid, as described in Sections 5.2 to 5.5. |
| 5.7 Legitimna pričakovanja | 5.7. Legitimate expectations |
| (273) | Splošno sodišče v sodbi v zadevi Øresund po mnenju držav ni sprejelo stališča o legitimnih pričakovanjih za obdobje po sodbi v zadevi Aéroports de Paris. Zato se državi ne strinjata z zainteresiranimi stranmi, ki so vse trdile, da je treba sodbo Splošnega sodišča razlagati tako, da so legitimna pričakovanja konzorcija in držav po 12. decembru 2000 izključena. | (273) | In the States’ view, the General Court, in the Øresund judgment, did not adopt a position on legitimate expectations for the period after the Aéroports de Paris judgment. Thus, they disagree with the interested parties, who all argued that the General Court’s judgment should be interpreted in a way that legitimate expectations are excluded for the Consortium and the States after 12 December 2000. |
| (274) | Državi zahtevata, da Komisija, če bo pri oceni državne pomoči ugotovila, da je treba določiti natančni trenutek, od katerega se državi in konzorcij ne morejo več zanašati na legitimna pričakovanja, upošteva posebne okoliščine projekta. | (274) | The States request that, if the Commission’s State aid assessment leads it to become relevant to determine the precise point in time from which the States and the Consortium could no longer rely on legitimate expectations, the Commission take the specific circumstances of the project into account. |
| (275) | Natančneje, po njunem mnenju, prvič, je treba priznati, da so konzorcij in državi imeli legitimna pričakovanja v zvezi z ukrepi pred sodbo v zadevi Aéroports de Paris in s tem v celotni fazi gradnje, med katero je nastal dolg konzorcija. Po tem so imeli državi in konzorcij le malo možnosti za spremembo modela financiranja. Državi trdita, da morajo v takem primeru legitimna pričakovanja, pridobljena pred izdajo te sodbe, učinkovati tudi po datumu izdaje sodbe, da bi bila učinkovita. Čeprav se državi in konzorcij po decembru 2000 ne morejo sklicevati na legitimna pričakovanja, so se pričakovanja konzorcija o tem, kako bo lahko financiral in refinanciral svoj dolg za gradnjo, oblikovala pred sodbo v zadevi Aéroports de Paris. Če bi konzorcij z navedeno sodbo izgubil možnost, da se (re)financira z državnimi poroštvi, bi to dejansko ogrozilo neprekinjeno poslovanje konzorcija in v praksi retroaktivno odpravilo legitimna pričakovanja držav in konzorcija pred decembrom 2000. | (275) | Specifically, they consider, first, that it must be acknowledged that the Consortium and the States did have legitimate expectations in relation to the measures before the Aéroports de Paris judgment, and, thus, throughout the entire construction phase during which the Consortium’s debt was incurred. After that, the States and the Consortium had little room to amend the financing model. The States submit that, in such a situation, in order to be effective, legitimate expectations obtained prior to that judgment must continue to produce effects beyond the date of the judgment. As such, even if the States and the Consortium cannot rely on legitimate expectations after December 2000, the Consortium’s expectations about how it would be able to finance and refinance its construction debt were formed prior to the Aéroports de Paris judgment. If that judgment removed the Consortium’s possibility to (re)finance itself with State guarantees, it would effectively threaten the Consortium’s continued operation, and, in practice, retroactively remove the States’ and the Consortium’s legitimate expectations prior to December 2000. |
| (276) | Drugič, več kot 20 let po sklenitvi sporazuma o konzorciju leta 1992 in več kot 12 let po začetku obratovanja stalne povezave se nobena od zainteresiranih strani (vključno s pritožnikom) ni pritožila glede državnih poroštev, ki so bila na voljo konzorciju, ali posebnih danskih pravil o prenosu izgub v prihodnje obdobje in amortizaciji. | (276) | Second, for more than 20 years after the Consortium Agreement in 1992, and for more than 12 years after the entry into service of the Fixed Link, none of the interested parties (including the Complainant) complained about the State guarantees available to the Consortium, or about the special Danish rules on loss carry-forward and depreciation. |
| (277) | Tretjič, sodba v zadevi Aéroports de Paris konzorciju ali državama ni dala nobenega razloga za domnevo, da za stalno povezavo veljajo pravila o državni pomoči. Sodba je bila zelo specifična in se je takrat obravnavala kot zadeva v letališkem sektorju, ki je povezana z liberalizacijo navedenega sektorja. Poleg tega, kot je navedeno v uvodni izjavi 276, Komisija ali katera koli tretja oseba konzorciju ali državama več kot 12 let po začetku obratovanja stalne povezave ni dala razloga za dvom o zakonitosti financiranja konzorcija. | (277) | Third, the Aéroports de Paris judgment did not give the Consortium or the States any reason to believe that the Fixed Link was covered by State aid rules. The judgment was very specific and was, at the time, treated as an airport sector case, linked to the liberalisation of that sector. Furthermore, as mentioned at recital (276), neither the Commission nor any third party gave the Consortium or the States reason to doubt the lawfulness of the Consortium’s financing for more than 12 years after the start of the Fixed Link’ operation. |
| (278) | Državi zato ob upoštevanju navedenih treh argumentov in posebnih okoliščin tega primera trdita, prvič, da bi morala legitimna pričakovanja veljati tudi za ukrepe pomoči v korist konzorcija po sodbi v zadevi Aéroports de Paris, in do takrat, ko bo dolg zaradi gradnje v celoti poplačan. V nasprotnem primeru bi bila legitimna pričakovanja konzorcija in držav pred decembrom 2000 brez pomena. | (278) | Therefore, in light of those three arguments, and in light of the particular circumstances of this case, the States submit, first, that aid measures benefiting the Consortium after the Aéroports de Paris judgment, and until the construction debt has been fully repaid, should also be covered by legitimate expectations. Otherwise, the Consortium’s and the States’ legitimate expectations prior to December 2000 would be meaningless. |
| (279) | Drugič, državi vsekakor menita, da so se legitimna pričakovanja nadaljevala, dokler Splošno sodišče 19. septembra 2018 ni razglasilo ničnosti sklepa iz leta 2014, saj konzorcij in državi pred tem datumom niso vedeli, da je bil pregled Komisije v sklepu iz leta 2014 nezadosten. | (279) | Second, and in any event, the States consider that legitimate expectations continued until the General Court annulled the 2014 decision on 19 September 2018, as neither the Consortium nor the States realised that the Commission’s examination in the 2014 decision had been insufficient, prior to that date. |
| (280) | Tretjič, državi vsekakor menita, da so imeli konzorcij in državi do takrat, ko je Komisija sprejela sklep iz leta 2014, ki je bil pozneje izpodbijan pred Splošnim sodiščem, legitimna pričakovanja, saj so imeli dopisi iz leta 1995 enake pravne učinke kot sklep o neobstoju pomoči. Komisija navedenega dopisa pred sklepom iz leta 2014 ni izpodbijala ali kako drugače postavila pod vprašaj, zato sta imeli državi legitimna pričakovanja. | (280) | Third, and in any event, the States consider that the Consortium and the States had legitimate expectations until the Commission adopted its 2014 decision, which was subsequently challenged before the General Court, as the 1995 letters produced the same legal effects as a no aid decision. Since that letter was not challenged, or in any other way questioned by the Commission before the 2014 decision, the States enjoyed legitimate expectations. |
| (281) | Četrtič, državi vsekakor menita, da so imeli konzorcij in državi legitimna pričakovanja vsaj do prejema dopisa Komisije z dne 13. maja 2013, s katerim je bila posredovana pritožba. | (281) | Fourth, and in any event, the States are of the view that the Consortium and the States had legitimate expectations at least until they received the Commission’s letter of 13 May 2013, with which the complaint was forwarded. |
| 5.8 Ukrepi, usmerjeni v prihodnost | 5.8. Forward-looking measures |
| (282) | Državi menita, da noben od ukrepov, usmerjenih v prihodnost, ali strukturnih ukrepov, ki jih je predlagal pritožnik, nima pravne podlage v pravu Unije o državni pomoči, zato se jih ne bi smelo upoštevati. V zvezi s tem opozarjata, da PDEU v skladu s svojim členom 345 v ničemer ne sme posegati v lastninskopravno ureditev v državah članicah. Države članice lahko v skladu s sodno prakso (130) v svojih notranjih sistemih prosto določijo lastninskopravno ureditev, vključno s tem, ali želijo ustanoviti podjetja v državni lasti. | (282) | The States consider that none of the forward-looking measures or structural remedies proposed by the Complainant have any legal basis in Union State aid law, and should, therefore, be disregarded. They note, in this context, that Article 345 TFEU provides that the TFEU shall in no way prejudice the rules in Member States governing the system of property ownership. According to case-law (130), Member States are free to determine, in their internal systems, the system of property ownership, including whether they want to establish State-owned companies. |
| (283) | Kar zadeva trditev pritožnika, da bo konzorcij zaradi izvzetja iz stečaja še naprej užival znatno prednost, tudi ko bosta državi prenehali izdajati posebna državna poroštva (uvodna izjava 222), sta državi trdili, da načeloma nič ne preprečuje, da bi za konzorcij veljali običajni stečajni postopki na podlagi danskega ali švedskega prava. To je jasno razvidno iz ugotovitve, da je v programu EMTN, posojilih EIB in krovnih pogodbah za poslovanje z izvedenimi finančnimi instrumenti izrecno omenjena možnost insolventnosti (uvodna izjava 251). | (283) | In the context of the Complainant’s claim that the Consortium would continue to enjoy a significant advantage, even after the States cease to issue specific State guarantees because of the exemption from bankruptcy (recital (222)), the States submitted that nothing prevents, as a matter of principle, the Consortium from being subject to ordinary bankruptcy procedures under Danish or Swedish law. This is clearly illustrated by the observation that there is a specific reference to a potential insolvency situation in the EMTN programme, the EIB loans, and in the ISDA Master Agreements (recital (251)). |
| 6. OCENA UKREPOV | 6. ASSESSMENT OF THE MEASURES |
| 6.1 Ocena obstoja pomoči v smislu člena 107(1) PDEU | 6.1. Assessment of the existence of aid within the meaning of Article 107(1) TFEU |
| (284) | Člen 107(1) PDEU določa, da „je vsaka pomoč, ki jo dodeli država članica, ali kakršna koli vrsta pomoči iz državnih sredstev, ki izkrivlja ali bi lahko izkrivljala konkurenco z dajanjem prednosti posameznim podjetjem ali proizvodnji posameznega blaga, nezdružljiva z notranjim trgom, kolikor prizadene trgovino med državami članicami“. | (284) | Article 107(1) TFEU lays down that ‘any aid granted by a Member State or through State resources in any form whatsoever which distorts or threatens to distort competition by favouring certain undertakings or the production of certain goods shall, in so far as it affects trade between Member States, be incompatible with the internal market’. |
| (285) | Da bi se ukrep štel za pomoč na podlagi te določbe, morajo biti torej izpolnjeni naslednji kumulativni pogoji: (i) prejemnik ukrepa je podjetje, (ii) ukrep je mogoče pripisati državi in financira se z državnimi sredstvi, (iii) prejemnikom dodeljuje prednost in (iv) ukrep izkrivlja ali bi lahko izkrivljal konkurenco in verjetno vpliva na trgovino med državami članicami. | (285) | On the basis of this provision, the qualification of a measure as State aid requires the following cumulative conditions to be met: (i) the recipient of the measure is an undertaking; (ii) the measure is imputable to the State and is financed through State resources; (iii) the measure confers a selective advantage on its recipients; and (iv) the measure distorts or threatens to distort competition and is likely to affect trade between Member States. |
| (286) | Komisija je v uvodni izjavi 100 sklepa o začetku postopka izrazila predhodno mnenje, da državna poroštva, ki sta jih državi odobrili konzorciju za financiranje stalne povezave, ter posebna danska pravila o prenosu izgub v prihodnje obdobje in amortizaciji pomenijo državno pomoč v smislu člena 107(1) PDEU. | (286) | The Opening decision expressed, at recital 100, the Commission’s preliminary view that the State guarantees granted by the States to the Consortium for the financing of the Fixed Link, as well as the special Danish rules on loss carry-forward and depreciation, constitute State aid within the meaning of Article 107(1) TFEU. |
| 6.1.1 Gospodarska dejavnost in pojem podjetja | 6.1.1. Economic activity and notion of undertaking |
| (287) | Komisija ugotavlja, da se pravila o državni pomoči uporabljajo le, kadar je prejemnik pomoči „podjetje“. Sodišče dosledno opredeljuje podjetja kot subjekte, ki opravljajo gospodarsko dejavnost, ne glede na njihov pravni status in način financiranja (131). Vsaka dejavnost, ki vključuje ponujanje blaga in/ali storitev na določenem trgu, je gospodarska dejavnost (132). Subjekt, ki opravlja gospodarske in negospodarske dejavnosti, se obravnava kot podjetje le v povezavi z gospodarskimi dejavnostmi (133). | (287) | The Commission notes that the State aid rules only apply where the recipient of an aid is an ‘undertaking’. The Court of Justice has consistently defined undertakings as entities engaged in an economic activity, regardless of their legal status and the way in which they are financed (131). Any activity consisting of offering goods and/or services in a given market is an economic activity (132). An entity that carries out both economic and non-economic activities is to be regarded as an undertaking only with regard to the former (133). |
| (288) | Poleg tega za opredelitev določene dejavnosti kot gospodarske dejavnosti ni pomembno, ali bi zasebni vlagatelj lahko opravljal isto dejavnost (134). Ko začne subjekt opravljati gospodarske dejavnosti, se ne glede na svoj pravni status ali način financiranja šteje za podjetje v smislu člena 107(1) PDEU, zato se lahko pravila o državni pomoči lahko uporabljajo za finančne prednosti, ki mu jih je dodelila država ali ki so mu bile dodeljene iz državnih sredstev (135). | (288) | In addition, for a certain activity to be classified as an economic activity, it is irrelevant whether a private investor could have carried out the same activity (134). Once an entity engages in economic activities, regardless of its legal status, or the way in which it is financed, it constitutes an undertaking within the meaning of Article 107(1) TFEU, and the State aid rules may apply to financial advantages granted by the State or through State resources to that entity (135). |
| (289) | Sodišči Unije sta poleg tega menili, da se lahko storitve, ki se običajno opravljajo za plačilo, opredelijo kot gospodarska dejavnost in da je bistvena značilnost plačila v tem, da to pomeni ekonomsko protidajatev za zadevne storitve (136). Iz tega sledi, da je narava opravljene dejavnosti tista, ki določa, ali je subjekt podjetje za namene prava o državni pomoči. | (289) | The Union Courts have, moreover, held that services normally provided for remuneration may be classified as an economic activity, and that the essential characteristic of remuneration lies in the fact that it constitutes consideration for the service in question (136). It follows that it is the nature of the activity carried out that determines whether an entity is an undertaking for the purposes of State aid law. |
| (290) | Splošno sodišče je v sodbi v zadevi Aéroports de Paris (137) odločilo, da je treba upravljanje letališča šteti za gospodarsko dejavnost. V sodbah v zvezi z letališčem Leipzig Halle je bilo nato sklenjeno, da gradnja letališke vzletno-pristajalne steze pomeni gospodarsko dejavnost, če se bo steza uporabljala za gospodarske dejavnosti, zato lahko tudi financiranje gradnje spada na področje uporabe pravil o državni pomoči. Čeprav se navedeni zadevi nanašata posebej na letališča, se zdi, da se načela, ki sta jih oblikovali sodišči Unije, uporabljajo tudi za gradnjo druge infrastrukture, ki je neločljivo povezana z gospodarsko dejavnostjo (138) , (139), kot je Splošno sodišče potrdilo sodbi o belgijskih pristaniščih (140). | (290) | In the Aéroports de Paris judgment (137), the General Court ruled that the operation of an airport had to be seen as an economic activity. Subsequently, the Leipzig Halle judgments concluded that, if an airport runway will be used for economic activities, its construction also constitutes an economic activity, and thus its funding may fall within the ambit of State aid rules. While those cases relate specifically to airports, it appears that the principles developed by the Union Courts are also applicable to the construction of other infrastructure that is indissociably linked to an economic activity (138) , (139), as confirmed by the General Court in the Belgian ports judgment (140). |
| (291) | Komisija je že v uvodnih izjavah 74, 75 in 76 sklepa o začetku postopka navedla, da bi se lahko na prvi pogled štelo, da konzorcij opravlja gospodarsko dejavnost, in da bi ga bilo treba obravnavati kot podjetje. Državi trdita, da konzorcij ni podjetje, saj ne opravlja gospodarske dejavnosti (oddelek 5.2.2). Po njunem mnenju sta gradnja in obratovanje stalne povezave klasična primera izvajanja javnih pooblastil, ki niso in ne bi smela biti zajeta s členom 107(1) PDEU. | (291) | The Commission already stated, at recitals 74 to 76 of the Opening decision, that it could be considered prima facie that the Consortium is engaged in an economic activity and should be considered as an undertaking. The States claim that the Consortium is not an undertaking, as it does not carry out an economic activity (Section 5.2.2). In the States’ view, the construction and operation of the Fixed Link are classic examples of the exercise of public powers, which are not, and ought not to be, covered by Article 107(1) TFEU. |
| (292) | Člen 107(1) PDEU se dejansko ne uporablja, kadar države „izvajajo javna pooblastila“ (141) ali kadar javni subjekti delujejo kot javni organi (142). Za subjekt se lahko šteje, da izvaja javna pooblastila, kadar je zadevna dejavnost del ključnih funkcij države ali je povezana s temi dejavnostmi po svoji naravi, namenu in pravilih, ki jih mora upoštevati (143). | (292) | It is true that Article 107(1) TFEU does not apply where States act ‘by exercising public power’ (141), or where public entities act in their capacity as public authorities (142). An entity may be deemed to act by exercising public power, where the activity in question forms part of the essential functions of the State, or is connected with those functions by its nature, its aim, and the rules to which is it subject (143). |
| (293) | Komisija meni, da je potrebna splošna ocena in da bi morala biti dejavnost konzorcija po svoji naravi, namenu in pravilih, ki jih mora upoštevati, povezana s ključnimi funkcijami države, da bi izpolnjevala pogoje za izvajanje javnih pooblastil. Samo negospodarske dejavnosti so lahko zajete s pojmom izvajanja javnih pooblastil (144). | (293) | The Commission considers that an overall assessment is necessary, and that, to qualify as acting by exercising public power, the Consortium’s activity should be connected with the essential functions of the State, by its nature, its aim, and the rules to which it is subject. Only non-economic activities may fall within the concept of the exercise of public power (144). |
| (294) | V skladu z ustaljeno sodno prakso (145) bi morala opredelitev gospodarske dejavnosti temeljiti na dejanskih elementih, in sicer ponujanju blaga ali storitev na zadevnem trgu. Konzorcij je kot lastnik in upravljavec infrastrukture stalne povezave dejaven na trgu zagotavljanja prevoznih storitev državljanom in podjetjem proti plačilu: konzorcij bo uporabnikom cestnega odseka stalne povezave zaračunaval pristojbino (cestnino) za prečkanje ožine Øresund; poleg tega švedska uprava za promet in danska državna uprava za železnico plačujeta pristojbino za uporabo železniške infrastrukture na stalni povezavi. Prihodki, ki jih bo konzorcij ustvaril s cestnim in železniškim prometom, so namenjeni financiranju skupnih stroškov načrtovanja, zasnove projekta, gradnje, vzdrževanja in upravljanja stalne povezave ter stroškov gradnje cestnih in železniških povezav z zaledjem na podlagi razdelitve dividend matični družbi (uvodna izjava 70). | (294) | According to settled case-law (145), the qualification of economic activity should be based upon factual elements, namely the provision of goods or services on a given market. The Consortium, as the owner and operator of the Fixed Link infrastructure, is active on the market of providing a transport service for remuneration to citizens and undertakings: the Consortium will charge a fee (toll) from the users of the road section of the Fixed Link for crossing the Øresund strait; in addition, the Swedish Transport Administration and the Danish State Rail Administration pay a fee for the use of the railway infrastructure on the Fixed Link. The Consortium’s revenues from road and rail are intended to finance the total cost of planning, project design, construction, maintenance and operation of the Fixed Link, and also the costs of the construction of the road and rail hinterland connections, through the distribution of dividends to the parent companies (recital (70)). |
| (295) | Opozoriti je treba, da konzorciju niso bila podeljena posebna javna pooblastila v zvezi z gradnjo in upravljanjem stalne povezave, ampak bo zgradil in upravljal infrastrukturo kot gospodarski subjekt. Gradnja in komercialno upravljanje velikih infrastrukturnih projektov v komercialne namene sama po sebi ne pomenita izvajanja javnih pooblastil, gradnjo in upravljanje stalne povezave pa ureja ekonomska logika, saj se večinoma financirata s pristojbinami uporabnikov (146). Dejavnosti konzorcija so dejansko zelo drugačne od tega, kar se je v preteklosti štelo za del dejavnosti javnih pooblastil, kot so dejavnosti vojske ali policije, varnost in nadzor zračne navigacije, varnost in nadzor pomorskega prometa, nadzor onesnaževanja, organizacija, financiranje in izvrševanje zapornih kazni, razvoj in oživitev javnih zemljišč, ki ju izvajajo javni organi, ter zbiranje podatkov, ki se uporabljajo za javne namene na podlagi zakonske obveznosti zadevnih podjetij, da jih razkrijejo (147). | (295) | It should be noted that the Consortium has not been granted specific public powers in relation to the construction and operation of the Fixed Link, but it will construct and operate the infrastructure as an economic operator. The construction and commercial operation of large infrastructure projects does not, in itself, constitute an exercise of public powers, and the construction and operation of the Fixed Link is governed by an economic logic, given that it is financed to a very large extent by user fees (146). Indeed, the activities of the Consortium are very different from what, in the past, has been held to be part of public power activities, such as the army or the police, air navigation safety and control, maritime traffic control and safety, anti-pollution surveillance, organisation, financing and enforcement of prison sentences, development and revitalisation of public land by public authorities, and the collection of data to be used for public purposes on the basis of a statutory obligation imposed on the undertakings concerned to disclose such data (147). |
| (296) | Za prečkanje ožine Øresund obstaja trg, zlasti ker je to storitev proti plačilu že opravljal obstoječi operater trajektnih prevozov, ki je zasebno podjetje, ki opravlja dejavnosti pod tržnimi pogoji. Prevozne storitve, ki jih opravlja konzorcij, torej konkurirajo prevoznim storitvam, ki jih opravljajo operaterji trajektnih prevozov. Komisija se ne strinja s trditvijo držav, povzeto v uvodni izjavi 239, da se za konzorcij ne more šteti, da konkurira trajektnim storitvam. Kot državi priznavata, lahko cenovna politika konzorcija znatno vpliva na poslovanje pritožnika. Ne glede na to, ali je bil konzorcij zasnovan zato, da bi konkuriral trajektnim storitvam ali ne (148), ponuja storitev prečkanja ožine Øresund, kar neposredno vpliva na konkurenčni položaj že uveljavljenih udeležencev na trgu. Komisija zato ugotavlja, da konzorcij pri upravljanju stalne povezave opravlja gospodarsko dejavnost. | (296) | There is a market for crossing the Øresund strait, in particular, because the service was already provided for remuneration by an existing ferry operator, which is a private undertaking operating under market conditions. Hence, the transport services provided by the Consortium are in competition with the transport services provided by ferry operators. The Commission does not accept the States’ argument, summarised at recital (239), that the Consortium cannot be considered to compete with the ferry services. As the States admit, the Consortium’s pricing policy can significantly affect the Complainant’s business. Whether the Consortium was conceived with the intention of competing with the ferry service or not (148), it is offering a service to cross the Øresund strait, which directly affects the competitive position of the already-established market operators. The Commission, therefore, concludes that the Consortium, in operating the Fixed Link, is engaged in an economic activity. |
| (297) | Komisija poleg tega ugotavlja, da dejavnost, ki vključuje ponujanje blaga ali storitev na trgu, ne pridobi značaja izvajanja javnih pooblastil samo zato, ker se je država članica odločila, da javnemu subjektu podeli monopol za ponujanje zadevnega blaga ali storitev (149). V zvezi s tem opozarja, da je lahko vprašanje, ali obstaja trg za nekatere vrste storitev, odvisno od načina organiziranosti teh storitev v zadevni državi članici, in da se lahko zaradi političnih odločitev ali gospodarskega razvoja razvrstitev neke dejavnosti sčasoma spremeni (150). Vendar zgolj dejstvo, da je javno podjetje v pristojnosti ministra, ne izključuje tega, da bi ga bilo mogoče šteti za podjetje, ki opravlja gospodarsko dejavnost (151). Poleg tega zgolj dejstvo, da je subjekt ustanovljen na podlagi mednarodnega sporazuma, ne pomeni, da dejavnost, ki jo navedeni subjekt opravlja, pomeni izvajanje javnih pooblastil; to je treba oceniti za vsak primer posebej glede na dejavnost, ki jo navedeni subjekt opravlja (152). Po mnenju Komisije je ključno vprašanje, ali konzorcij z obratovanjem stalne povezave zagotavlja blago ali storitev na trgu. Komisija ugotavlja, da to očitno drži, kot je navedeno zgoraj. | (297) | In addition, the Commission notes that an activity that consists of offering goods or services on a market does not acquire the character of the exercise of public power solely because a Member State chose to grant a public entity a monopoly to offer the goods or services in question (149). In that regard, the Commission recalls that the question of whether a market exists for certain services may depend on the way those services are organised in the Member State concerned, and that, due to political choice or economic developments, the classification of a given activity can change over time (150). The mere fact that a public company falls within the competence of a Minister, however, does not preclude it from being regarded as carrying on an economic activity (151). In addition, the mere fact that an entity is established on the basis of an international agreement does not mean that the activity carried out by that entity is the exercise of public power; this must be assessed on a case-by-case basis, in light of the activity carried out by that entity (152). The Commission considers that the crucial question is whether, by operating the Fixed Link, the Consortium is providing a good or a service on a market. The Commission notes that that is clearly the case, as set out above. |
| (298) | Komisija poleg tega ugotavlja, da tudi če bi bilo mogoče ugotoviti, da konzorcij izvaja nekatera pooblastila kot javni organ, to samo po sebi ne pomeni, da njegove druge dejavnosti niso gospodarska dejavnost. Iz ustaljene sodne prakse izhaja, da lahko subjekt vzporedno opravlja gospodarsko dejavnost in izvaja javna pooblastila (153). | (298) | The Commission notes, further, that, even if it could be found that the Consortium exercises some powers as a public authority, this does not, in itself, preclude its other strands of activity from being an economic activity. It follows from settled case-law that an entity may, in parallel, carry out an economic activity and public power (153). |
| (299) | Vsekakor je jasno, da so se organi držav odločili za uvedbo tržnega mehanizma, saj se je za stalno povezavo vedno načrtovalo, da bo delovala kot infrastruktura, ki se izkorišča v komercialne namene in se financira s cestninami (154). To je v nasprotju s trditvijo, da bi dejavnost konzorcija pomenila izvajanje javnih pooblastil. | (299) | In any event, it is clear that the States’ authorities have decided to introduce a market mechanism, as the Fixed Link was always intended to be operated as a commercially exploited, toll-funded (154) infrastructure. This goes against the argument that the activity of the Consortium would be the exercise of public power. |
| (300) | Komisija zato meni, da obratovanje stalne povezave pomeni gospodarsko dejavnost. | (300) | Therefore, the Commission considers that the operation of the Fixed Link constitutes an economic activity. |
| (301) | Glede na sodno prakso, navedeno v uvodni izjavi 290, je gospodarska dejavnost tudi gradnja infrastrukture, ki je neločljivo povezana z navedeno gospodarsko dejavnostjo. Iz medvladnega sporazuma (uvodna izjava 61) je razvidno, da izgradnje stalne povezave ni mogoče ločiti od njenega prihodnjega obratovanja. Poleg tega se v sporazumu o konzorciju (uvodna izjava 66) gradnja in obratovanje stalne povezave obravnavata kot en projekt. Komisija na podlagi tega ugotavlja, da je gradnja stalne povezave neločljivo povezana z njenim obratovanjem. Ker je obratovanje stalne povezave gospodarska dejavnost, je gospodarska dejavnost tudi njena gradnja. | (301) | In light of the case-law referred to at recital (290), the construction of infrastructure that is indissociably linked to that economic activity, also constitutes an economic activity. It is clear from the Intergovernmental Agreement (recital (61)) that the construction of the Fixed Link cannot be dissociated from its future operation. In addition, the Consortium Agreement (recital (66)) considers the construction and the operation of the Fixed Link as one project. The Commission finds, on that basis, that the construction of the Fixed Link is indissociably linked to its operation. As the operation of the Fixed Link constitutes economic activity, so, too, does its construction. |
| (302) | Komisija zato ugotavlja, da konzorcij pri gradnji in upravljanju stalne povezave opravlja gospodarske dejavnosti. Zato je treba konzorcij v zvezi z navedenimi dejavnostmi šteti za podjetje v smislu člena 107(1) PDEU. | (302) | The Commission, therefore, concludes that the Consortium, in carrying out the construction and operation of the Fixed Link, is engaged in economic activities. As a result, the Consortium must be considered as an undertaking for the purposes of Article 107(1) TFEU, with respect to those activities. |
| 6.1.2 Državna sredstva in pripisovanje državi | 6.1.2. State resources and imputability to the States |
| (303) | Kar zadeva državni izvor prednosti, ki izhajajo iz uporabe ukrepov, je pojem državne pomoči širši od pojma subvencije. Pojem namreč ne zajema le pozitivnih koristi, kot so subvencije in kapitalske injekcije, ampak tudi ukrepe, ki v različnih oblikah znižujejo stroške, ki običajno bremenijo proračun podjetja, in ki so torej, ne da bi bili subvencije v strogem smislu besede, enake narave in imajo enake učinke (155). | (303) | With regard to the State origin of the advantages resulting from the application of the measures, the concept of State aid is broader than that of a subsidy. This is because it embraces not only positive benefits, such as subsidies and capital injections, but also measures which, in various forms, mitigate the charges which are normally included in the budget of an undertaking and which, therefore, without being subsidies in the strict sense of the word, are similar in character and have the same effect (155). |
| (304) | V uvodni izjavi 79 sklepa o začetku postopka je bilo predhodno ugotovljeno, da državna poroštva, ki sta jih Danska in Švedska odobrili brez plačila pristojbine, in posebna danska pravila o prenosu izgub v prihodnje obdobje in amortizaciji, ki jih je konzorciju odobrila Danska, vključujejo državna sredstva in jih je mogoče pripisati državama. Tega ni izpodbijala nobena od držav ali zainteresiranih strani. | (304) | The Opening decision, at recital 79, preliminarily concluded that the State guarantees, granted by Denmark and Sweden without the payment of any fee, as well as the special Danish rules on loss carry-forward and depreciation granted to the Consortium by Denmark, involve State resources, and are imputable to the States. This was not disputed by the States or any of the interested parties. |
| (305) | Ukrep, s katerim javni organi nekaterim podjetjem odobrijo ugodno davčno obravnavo, čeprav ne vključuje pozitivnega prenosa sredstev, upravičencem zagotovi ugodnejši finančni položaj v primerjavi z drugimi davkoplačevalci in pomeni prenos državnih sredstev (156). | (305) | A measure by which public authorities grant certain undertakings favourable tax treatment, although not involving a positive transfer of funds, places beneficiaries in a more favourable financial situation than other taxpayers, and constitutes a transfer of State resources (156). |
| (306) | Poleg tega nastanek tveganja, da bo državi z izdajo poroštva pod pogoji, ki ne ustrezajo tržnim pogojem, v prihodnje naloženo dodatno breme, zadostuje za to, da se šteje za prenos državnih sredstev (157). Enako velja na primer, ko država članica odobri poroštva, ne da bi od upravičenca do poroštva zahtevala plačilo premije pod tržnimi pogoji. | (306) | Furthermore, the creation of a risk of imposing an additional burden on the State in the future, by constituting a guarantee on terms that do not correspond to those of the market, is sufficient to be considered a transfer of State resources (157). The same is true, for instance, when guarantees are granted by a Member State, without requiring the payment of a premium on market terms from the beneficiary of the guarantee. |
| (307) | Komisija zato ugotavlja, da ureditev modela državnega poroštva, ki državi obvezuje, da jamčita za finančne instrumente za financiranje stalne povezave brez plačila pristojbine, vključuje danska in švedska državna sredstva ter da posebna danska pravila o prenosu izgub v prihodnje obdobje in amortizaciji vključujejo danska državna sredstva. Model državnega poroštva sta vzpostavili Danska in Švedska, zato ga je mogoče pripisati državama. Podobno posebna danska pravila o prenosu izgub v prihodnje obdobje in amortizaciji izhajajo iz zakona o gradnji, tj. zakonodajnega akta, ki ga je sprejela Danska; zato jih je mogoče pripisati Danski. | (307) | The Commission, therefore, concludes that the arrangement of the State guarantee model, obliging the States to guarantee the financial instruments for the financing of the Fixed Link, without the payment of any fee, involves Danish and Swedish State resources and that the special Danish rules on loss carry-forward and depreciation involve Danish State resources. As the State guarantee model was set up by Denmark and Sweden, it is imputable to the States. Similarly, the special Danish rules on loss carry-forward and depreciation derive from the Construction Act, which is a legislative act adopted by Denmark; and are, therefore, imputable to Denmark. |
| 6.1.3 Selektivna gospodarska prednost | 6.1.3. Selective economic advantage |
| (308) | Da se določi, ali državni ukrep pomeni državno pomoč, je treba v skladu z ustaljeno sodno prakso ugotoviti, ali upravičeno podjetje pridobi gospodarsko prednost, ki je ne bi pridobilo pod običajnimi tržnimi pogoji, tj. brez posredovanja države (158). Pomemben je le učinek ukrepa na podjetje, ne pa vzrok ali cilj posredovanja države (159). To se presoja tako, da se finančno stanje podjetja po ukrepu primerja s finančnim stanjem podjetja, kot bi bilo, če ukrep ne bi bil sprejet. | (308) | According to settled case-law, in order to determine whether a State measure constitutes State aid, it is necessary to establish whether the recipient undertaking receives an economic advantage that it would not have obtained under normal market conditions, i.e., in the absence of State intervention (158). Only the effect of the measure on the undertaking is relevant; not the cause or the objective of the State intervention (159). To assess this, the financial situation of the undertaking following the measure should be compared with the financial situation in which it would have been if the measure had not been introduced. |
| (309) | Poleg tega, da bi davčni ukrep spadal na področje uporabe člena 107(1) PDEU, mora dajati prednost „posameznim podjetjem ali proizvodnji posameznega blaga“. Zato pojem pomoči ne zajema vseh ukrepov, ki dajejo prednost gospodarskim subjektom, ampak samo tiste, ki dajejo selektivno prednost posameznim podjetjem ali kategorijam podjetij ali posameznim gospodarskim sektorjem. | (309) | Furthermore, to fall within the scope of Article 107(1) TFEU, a State measure must favour ‘certain undertakings or the production of certain goods’. Hence, not all measures which favour economic operators fall under the notion of aid, but only those that grant an advantage in a selective way to certain undertakings or categories of undertakings or to certain economic sectors. |
| (310) | Komisija ugotavlja tudi, da lahko en sam ukrep pomoči zajema kombinacijo posegov, če ob upoštevanju njihove časovne razporeditve, namena in položaja podjetja ob teh posegih obstaja tako tesna povezava, da jih ni mogoče ločiti med seboj. V navedenem okviru je mogoče kombinacijo posegov opredeliti kot državno pomoč, kadar država deluje z namenom zaščite enega ali več prisotnih gospodarskih subjektov na trgu (160). | (310) | The Commission also notes that a single aid measure may consist of combined elements, if, having regard to their chronology, purpose, and the circumstances of the undertaking at the time of their intervention, they are so closely linked that they are inseparable from one another. In that context, a combination of elements may be categorised as State aid where the State acts in such a way as to protect one or more operators already on the market (160). |
| 6.1.3.1 Model državnega poroštva | 6.1.3.1. The State guarantee model |
| (311) | Posojilojemalec lahko z javnim poroštvom ali državnim posojilom, odobrenim pod ugodnejšimi pogoji, pridobi prednost, saj lahko najame posojilo po obrestni meri, ki je brez poroštva ne bi bilo mogoče pridobiti na trgu (161). Državi sta se v skladu s členom 12 medvladnega sporazuma zavezali, da bosta solidarno jamčili za vsa posojila in druge finančne instrumente, ki jih je konzorcij najel v zvezi s financiranjem stalne povezave. Konzorciju ni treba plačati letne poroštvene premije za neporavnani dolg, ki se krije z modelom državnega poroštva, kot je določeno v dodatnem protokolu k medvladnemu sporazumu (uvodna izjava 85). V sporazumu o konzorciju se opozarja na to obveznost solidarnega državnega poroštva za posojila konzorcija (uvodna izjava 90). Državi nista predložili nobenih dokazov, da je neplačilo poroštvene premije v skladu s tržnimi pogoji; niti ne trdita, da bi bilo tako. Ugodnost poroštva je, da tveganje, povezano s poroštvom, nosi porok, zato bi bil ta porok za tako prevzemanje tveganja običajno poplačan z ustrezno premijo. Jasno je, da je s poroštvi za financiranje stalne povezave povezano tveganje, zato taka poroštva ne bi bila na voljo na trgu brez zahteve po plačilu premije. Splošno sodišče je v sodbi v zadevi Øresund (162) odločilo, da lahko odobritev poroštva pod pogoji, ki niso tržni, na splošno pomeni podelitev prednosti upravičencu. Državi v tem primeru nista zgolj odobrili poroštva konzorciju pod netržnimi pogoji, ampak sta dejansko prevzeli pravno obveznost, da jamčita za vsa posojila konzorcija v zvezi s financiranjem stalne povezave, ne da bi zahtevali kakršno koli nadomestilo za to, da sta prevzeli tveganja, povezana z navedeno obveznostjo. Komisija ugotavlja, da bi imel konzorcij kot upravičenec te obveznosti takojšnjo prednost od trenutka, ko je bila ta obveznost dodeljena, saj bi imel izvršljivo pravico do državnih poroštev za vse svoje potrebe po posojilih v zvezi s financiranjem stalne povezave. Komisija zato ugotavlja, da sta državi, ko sta vzpostavili model državnega poroštva z obveznostjo zagotavljanja poroštva za finančne instrumente za financiranje stalne povezave, ne da bi zahtevali plačilo poroštvene premije pod tržnimi pogoji, konzorciju dodelili prednost v obliki nižjih stroškov financiranja. | (311) | A public guarantee, granted on preferential terms, may grant the borrower an advantage by enabling it to borrow at an interest rate that would not have been obtainable on the market without the guarantee (161). Under Article 12 of the Intergovernmental Agreement, the States undertook to jointly and severally guarantee all loans and other financial instruments taken out by the Consortium in connection with the financing of the Fixed Link. The Consortium is not required to pay an annual guarantee premium on the outstanding debt covered by the State guarantee model, as provided for by Additional Protocol to the Intergovernmental Agreement (recital (85)). The Consortium Agreement recalls that joint and several State guarantee obligation for the Consortium’s borrowing (recital (90)). The States have not provided any evidence that the absence of a guarantee premium is in line with market terms; they do not even argue that such would be the case. Since the benefit of a guarantee is that the risk associated with the guarantee is carried by the guarantor, that guarantor would normally be remunerated by an appropriate premium for such risk-carrying. There is clearly a risk associated with the guarantees for the financing of the Fixed Link and therefore such guarantees would not be available on the market without the requirement to pay a premium. In the Øresund judgment (162), the General Court held that the grant of a guarantee on terms not equivalent to market terms, is, as a rule, liable to confer an advantage on the beneficiary. In this case, the States, moreover, went beyond simply granting a guarantee to the Consortium on non-market terms, but, in fact, undertook a legal obligation to guarantee all of the Consortium’s borrowing in connection with the financing of the Fixed Link, without requiring any compensation for the States undertaking the risks associated with that obligation. The Commission notes that, as the beneficiary of that obligation, the Consortium would have enjoyed an immediate advantage, as from when that obligation was granted, insofar as it had an enforceable right to State guarantees in respect of all of its borrowing needs in connection with the financing of the Fixed Link. The Commission finds, therefore, that in setting up a State guarantee model by incurring an obligation to guarantee the financial instruments for the financing of the Fixed Link without requiring the payment of a guarantee premium on market terms, the States conferred an advantage on the Consortium in the form of lower financing costs. |
| (312) | V skladu z ustaljeno sodno prakso, kadar države članice sprejmejo ukrepe, ki koristijo specifičnim subjektom, opredelitev prednosti načeloma omogoča domnevo o njeni selektivnosti (163). Razlog za to je, da je običajno enostavno ugotoviti, da so taki ukrepi selektivni, saj zagotavljajo ugodnejšo obravnavo posameznemu podjetju ali podjetjem (164). V obravnavani zadevi se prednost nanaša posebej na konzorcij, zato model državnega poroštva pomeni selektivno prednost v korist konzorcija v smislu člena 107(1) PDEU. | (312) | According to settled case law, when Member States adopt measures benefiting specific entities, the identification of an advantage, in principle, allows its selective nature to be presumed (163). This is because it is normally easy to conclude that such measures have a selective character, as they reserve favourable treatment for one or few undertakings (164). In the present case, given that the advantage specifically concerns the Consortium, the State guarantee model constitutes a selective advantage in favour of the Consortium within the meaning of Article 107(1) TFEU. |
| 6.1.3.2 Posebna danska pravila o prenosu izgub v prihodnje obdobje in amortizaciji | 6.1.3.2. The special Danish rules on loss carry-forward and depreciation |
| (313) | Na Danskem se partnerstva, kot je konzorcij, za davčne namene obravnavajo kot transparentni subjekti. To pomeni, da se danska pravila o davku davčna pravila uporabljajo samo za danskega partnerja v konzorciju, tj. družbo A/S Øresund, ne pa za sam konzorcij (uvodna izjava 118). Komisija mora v zvezi s tem najprej oceniti, ali bi bilo treba konzorcij obravnavati kot upravičenca posebnih danskih pravil o prenosu izgub v prihodnje obdobje in amortizaciji (glej uvodne izjave 314 do 319). Drugič, Komisija mora oceniti, v kolikšni meri so navedena pravila upravičencu zagotovila selektivno prednost, ki je ne bi pridobil v skladu z običajnimi pravili obdavčitve (glej uvodne izjave 320 do 347). | (313) | In Denmark, partnerships, such as the Consortium, are treated as transparent entities for tax purposes. This means that the Danish tax rules only apply to the Danish partner of the Consortium, A/S Øresund, and not to the Consortium, itself (recital (118)). In this context, the Commission first must assess whether the Consortium should be considered as a beneficiary of the special Danish rules on loss carry-forward and depreciation (see further, recitals (314) to (319)). Second, the Commission must assess to what extent those rules conferred a selective advantage on the beneficiary that it would not have obtained under normal taxation rules (see further, recitals (320) to (347)). |
| 6.1.3.2.1 Upravičenec posebnih danskih pravil o prenosu izgub v prihodnje obdobje in amortizaciji | 6.1.3.2.1. The beneficiary of the special Danish rules on loss carry-forward and depreciation |
| (314) | Komisija ugotavlja, da se za določitev subjekta, za katerega veljajo posebna danska pravila o prenosu izgub v prihodnje obdobje in amortizaciji, za namene uporabe pravil o državni pomoči lahko šteje, da ločeni pravni subjekti tvorijo eno gospodarsko enoto v zvezi z gospodarsko dejavnostjo. Navedena gospodarska enota se nato obravnava kot upoštevno podjetje. V zvezi s tem Sodišče upošteva nadzorni delež ter druge funkcionalne, gospodarske in organizacijske povezave (165). | (314) | To establish which entity should be considered as beneficiary of the special Danish rules on loss carry-forward and depreciation, the Commission notes that, for the purposes of the application of State aid rules, separate legal entities may be considered to form one economic unit with regard to an economic activity. That economic unit is then considered to be the relevant undertaking. In this respect, the Court of Justice considers the existence of a controlling share and other functional, economic, and organic links to be relevant (165). |
| (315) | Komisija meni, da družba A/S Øresund, kolikor je vključena v navedeno gospodarsko dejavnost, in konzorcij za namene gospodarske dejavnosti stalne povezave tvorita enotno podjetje. Konzorcij je partnerstvo med družbo z omejeno odgovornostjo, ki jo je ustanovila danska država (A/S Øresund), in družbo z omejeno odgovornostjo, ki jo je ustanovila švedska država (SVEDAB) (uvodni izjavi 64 in 65). Družba A/S Øresund, ki ima v lasti 50 % delnic, je skupaj z družbo SVEDAB solidarno odgovorna tretjim osebam za vsako obveznost, ki bi lahko nastala konzorciju v zvezi z njegovimi dejavnostmi; poleg tega imenuje štiri od osmih članov upravnega odbora (166). | (315) | The Commission considers that, for the purposes of the economic activity of the Fixed Link, A/S Øresund, insofar it is involved in that economic activity, and the Consortium form a single undertaking. The Consortium is a partnership between a limited liability company set up by the Danish State (A/S Øresund) and a limited liability company set up by the Swedish State (SVEDAB) (recitals (64) and (65)). A/S Øresund, holding 50 % of its shares, is, together with SVEDAB, liable jointly and severally against third parties for any obligation which may arise for the Consortium in connection with its operations; and it nominates four of the eight board members (166). |
| (316) | Komisija opozarja, da gospodarska dejavnost stalne povezave zajema načrtovanje, zasnovo projekta, gradnjo, vzdrževanje in upravljanje stalne povezave. Stroške zasnove projekta in drugih priprav za stalno povezavo ter njene izgradnje, vzdrževanja in obratovanja v celoti krije konzorcij z uporabninami (uvodna izjava 69). Navedeni stroški stalne povezave vključujejo stroške, povezane z danskim davkom od dohodkov pravnih oseb. Kot je opisano v uvodni izjavi 118, konzorcij sam ni obdavčen, saj gre za partnerstvo, ki je davčno transparentno. Posebna danska pravila o prenosu izgub v prihodnje obdobje in amortizaciji so del zakona o gradnji (in so bila leta 2005 vključena v zakon o družbi Sund & Bælt) in se uporabljajo za obdavčljivi dohodek družbe A/S Øresund. Zaradi 50-odstotnega lastništva družbe A/S Øresund v konzorciju to vključuje 50 % obdavčljivega dohodka, ki izhaja iz dejavnosti konzorcija. Finančni model (tj. celotni finančni tokovi, vključno z vsemi stroški in prihodki) gospodarske dejavnosti stalne povezave na danski strani torej ne vključuje le konzorcija, ampak tudi družbo A/S Øresund, v kolikor je odgovorna za plačilo davkov v zvezi z navedeno gospodarsko dejavnostjo. | (316) | The Commission recalls that the economic activity of the Fixed Link consists in the planning, project design, construction, maintenance, and operation of the Fixed Link. The costs of the project design and other preparations for the Fixed Link, as well as its construction, maintenance, and operation, shall be fully covered by the Consortium through user charges (recital (69)). That cost of the Fixed Link includes a cost related to Danish corporate income tax. As described at recital (118), however, the Consortium, itself, is not subject to taxation, as it is a partnership that is tax transparent. The special Danish rules on loss carry-forward and depreciation are part of the Construction Act (and were incorporated in the Sund & Bælt Act in 2005), and apply to the taxable income of A/S Øresund. Due to A/S Øresund’s 50 % ownership of the Consortium, this includes 50 % of the taxable income deriving from the activities of the Consortium. The financial model (i.e. the entirety of financial flows, including all costs and revenues) of the economic activity of the Fixed Link, on the Danish side, therefore, involves not only the Consortium, but also A/S Øresund, insofar as A/S Øresund is responsible for the payment of taxes relating to that economic activity. |
| (317) | Komisija meni, da plačila navedenih davkov ni mogoče ločiti od gospodarske dejavnosti stalne povezave. Celotni stroški stalne povezave (ter stroški cestnih in železniških povezav z zaledjem) se namreč financirajo iz uporabnin, ki jih pobira konzorcij. Navedene uporabnine pomenijo dohodek, za katerega se na podlagi danskega zakona o davku od dohodkov pravnih oseb plačuje davek od dohodkov pravnih oseb, ki se plačuje na ravni družbe A/S Øresund. Uporabnine, ki jih konzorcij zaračuna za uporabo stalne povezave, pomenijo prihodek, je pa z njimi povezan tudi strošek v obliki povezanih plačil davkov. Organizacijska in finančna ureditev v praksi določa, da konzorcij izplača dividende matičnima družbama, ki poleg stroškov povezav z zaledjem financirata tudi davčne obveznosti, povezane s stalno povezavo. Zato vsako znižanje zneska davčne obveznosti, povezane z dejavnostjo stalne povezave, koristi podjetju, ki opravlja navedeno gospodarsko dejavnost. Posledično koristi konzorciju, saj zmanjšuje finančno breme, ki bi ga sicer moral nositi konzorcij, glede na to, da se pritok dohodka konzorcija uporablja za izpolnitev davčne obveznosti družbe A/S Øresund, ki izhaja iz dohodka, ustvarjenega s stalno povezavo. | (317) | The Commission considers that the payment of those taxes cannot be separated from the economic activity of the Fixed Link. This is because the entire cost of the Fixed Link (and costs of the road and rail hinterland connections) is to be financed by user charges, collected by the Consortium. Those charges constitute income that is subject to corporate income tax – payable at the level of A/S Øresund – on the basis of the Danish Corporate Income Tax Act. As such, while the charges that the Consortium levies for using the Fixed Link constitute revenue, they also attract a cost in the form of the related tax payments. In practice, the organisational and financial setup provides for a payment of dividends by the Consortium to the parent companies, which will not only finance the cost of the hinterland connections, but also the tax liabilities related to the Fixed Link. Therefore, any reduction in the amount of tax liability connected to the activity of the Fixed Link is of benefit to the undertaking engaged in that economic activity. As a consequence, it benefits the Consortium as it reduces a financial burden that the Consortium would otherwise have to bear, given that it is the Consortium’s income stream that is used to discharge A/S Øresund’s tax liability stemming from the income generated by the Fixed Link. |
| (318) | Danski organi so ugotovili tudi (uvodna izjava 269), da se zniža zlasti skupni znesek pomoči (bruto ekvivalent dotacije), dodeljene prek modela državnega poroštva, tako da posebna danska pravila o prenosu izgub v prihodnje obdobje in amortizaciji vodijo v manjše breme dolga za konzorcij. Iz tega izhaja, da bi konzorcij, če družbi A/S Øresund zaradi njenega 50-odstotnega lastništva konzorcija navedena posebna pravila ne bi bila odobrena, nosil večje breme dolga, zato bi bil v skladu z logiko danskih organov prek modela državnega poroštva dodeljen večji znesek pomoči. To potrjuje mnenje Komisije, da bi bilo treba konzorcij in družbo A/S Øresund šteti za enotno podjetje za namene gospodarske dejavnosti stalne povezave in da bi bilo treba navedeno podjetje šteti za upravičenca posebnih danskih pravil o prenosu izgub v prihodnje obdobje in amortizaciji, zaradi česar je tudi konzorcij upravičenec. | (318) | Moreover, the Danish authorities have observed (recital (269)), that the total amount of aid (gross grant equivalent) granted through the State guarantee model is reduced to the extent that the special Danish rules on loss carry-forward and depreciation lead to a lower debt burden for the Consortium. It follows that, conversely, had A/S Øresund, in light of its ownership of 50 % of the Consortium, not been granted those special rules, the Consortium would have had a higher debt burden, and thus, according to the logic followed by the Danish authorities, a larger amount of aid would have been granted through the State guarantee model. This confirms the Commission’s view that the Consortium and A/S Øresund should be considered to be a single undertaking for the purposes of the economic activity of the Fixed Link and that it is that single undertaking that should be considered as a beneficiary of the special Danish rules on loss carry-forward and depreciation, and, that, as a consequence, the Consortium is also a beneficiary. |
| (319) | Komisija glede na premisleke iz uvodnih izjav 314 do 318 meni, da bi bil konzorcij, če bi iz posebnih danskih pravil o prenosu izgub in amortizaciji izhajala selektivna prednost, upravičen do te prednosti. | (319) | In light of the considerations set out at recitals (314) to (318), the Commission considers that, should the special Danish rules on loss carry-forward and depreciation create a selective advantage, the Consortium would be a beneficiary of that advantage. |
| 6.1.3.2.2 Selektivna prednost | 6.1.3.2.2. Selective advantage |
| (320) | Komisija mora po ugotovitvi, da bi bilo enotno podjetje, torej tudi konzorcij, upravičeno do prednosti, ki izhaja iz posebnih danskih pravil o prenosu izgub v prihodnje obdobje in amortizaciji (uvodna izjava 319), ugotoviti, ali iz navedenih pravil izhaja taka prednost. Ker je konzorcij za danske davčne namene transparenten (uvodna izjava 118) in ker je družba A/S Øresund odgovorna za plačilo davkov v zvezi s 50 % gospodarske dejavnosti stalne povezave (uvodna izjava 120), mora Komisija proučiti davčne obveznosti družbe A/S Øresund, ki izhajajo iz dejavnosti konzorcija. Da bi ugotovili, ali iz posebnih danskih pravil o prenosu izgub in amortizaciji izhajala taka prednost, je treba davčne obveznosti v skladu z navedenimi pravili primerjati z davčnimi obveznostmi, ki bi veljale za družbo A/S Øresund v skladu z običajnimi pravili obdavčitve, tj. če teh posebnih pravil ne bi bilo. | (320) | Having established that the single undertaking, and therefore, also the Consortium, would be a beneficiary of an advantage created by the special Danish rules on loss carry-forward and depreciation (recital (319)), the Commission must establish whether those rules create such an advantage. To do so, given that the Consortium is transparent for Danish tax purposes (recital (118)), and given that A/S Øresund is responsible for the payment of the taxes relating to 50 % of the economic activity of the Fixed Link (recital (120)), the Commission must examine the tax liabilities of A/S Øresund, resulting from the activities of the Consortium. To determine whether the special Danish rules on loss carry-forward and depreciation create such an advantage, the tax liabilities under those rules must be compared with the tax liabilities to which A/S Øresund would have been subject under the normal taxation rules, i.e. in the absence of those special rules. |
| (321) | Da bi ukrep spadal na področje uporabe člena 107(1) PDEU, mora v okviru danega pravnega sistema dajati prednost „posameznim podjetjem ali proizvodnji posameznega blaga“ pred drugimi, ki so v primerljivem pravnem in dejanskem položaju glede na cilj, ki se uresničuje z referenčnim sistemom (167) (to se običajno imenuje „preskus v treh korakih“ in je podrobneje pojasnjeno v naslednji uvodni izjavi). Vendar, kot je določeno v uvodni izjavi 312, kadar države članice sprejmejo ukrepe, ki koristijo specifičnim subjektom, opredelitev prednosti načeloma omogoča domnevo o njeni selektivnosti. V obravnavani zadevi se posebna danska pravila o prenosu izgub v prihodnje obdobje in amortizaciji nanašajo posebej na družbo A/S Øresund in konzorcij, zato je, če navedena pravila pomenijo prednost, ta prednost selektivna. | (321) | For a measure to fall within the scope of Article 107(1) TFEU, it must, within the context of a particular legal system, favour ‘certain undertakings or the production of certain goods’ over others which are in a legal and factual situation that is comparable, in light of the objective pursued by the system of reference (167) (this is usually referred to as the ‘three-step test’ and further explained in the next recital). However, as set out at recital (312), when Member States adopt measures benefiting specific entities, the identification of an advantage, in principle, allows its selective nature to be presumed. In the present case, given that the special Danish rules on loss carry-forward and depreciation concern specifically A/S Øresund and the Consortium, to the extent those rules constitute an advantage, that advantage is selective. |
| (322) | Vendar je Komisija, da bi ugotovila, ali je imelo enotno podjetje selektivno prednost na podlagi posebnih danskih pravil o prenosu izgub v prihodnje obdobje in amortizaciji, navedene ukrepe ocenila na podlagi standardne analize v treh korakih, ki sta jo določili sodišči Unije (168). Najprej je treba opredeliti referenčni sistem, tj. „običajna“ pravila obdavčitve (169). Drugič, ugotoviti je treba, ali zadevni ukrep pomeni odstopanje od navedenega sistema, kolikor različno obravnava gospodarske subjekte, ki so z vidika ciljev, lastnih sistemu, v primerljivem dejanskem in pravnem položaju. Če ukrep pomeni odstopanje od referenčnega sistema in je zato selektiven prima facie, je treba v tretjem koraku preskusa ugotoviti, ali je odstopanje utemeljeno z naravo ali splošno shemo sistema. V okviru tega mora država članica dokazati, da različna davčna obravnava izhaja neposredno iz osnovnih ali vodilnih načel navedenega sistema (170). | (322) | Nevertheless, in order to determine whether the single undertaking enjoyed a selective advantage by virtue of the special Danish rules on loss carry-forward and depreciation, the Commission assessed those measures under the standard three-step analysis established by the Union Courts (168). First, the system of reference must be identified, that is, the ‘normal’ taxation rules (169). Second, it must be determined whether a given measure constitutes a derogation from that system, insofar as it differentiates between economic operators that, in light of the objective intrinsic to the system, are in a comparable factual and legal situation. If the measure constitutes a derogation from the system of reference, and, thus, is prima facie selective, it needs to be established, in the third step of the test, whether the derogation is justified by the nature or the general scheme of the system. In this context, it is for the Member State to demonstrate that the differentiated tax treatment derives directly from the basic or guiding principles of that system (170). |
| 6.1.3.2.2.1 Selektivna prednost: posebna danska pravila o prenosu izgub v prihodnje obdobje | 6.1.3.2.2.1. Selective advantage: special Danish rules on loss carry-forward |
| (323) | Kot je navedeno v uvodni izjavi 322, mora Komisija za to, da bi nacionalni davčni ukrep opredelila kot selektiven, najprej opredeliti referenčni sistem, in sicer običajno davčno ureditev, ki se uporablja v zadevni državi članici. Določitev referenčnega sistema je zlasti pomembna pri davčnih ukrepih, ker je obstoj gospodarske prednosti v smislu člena 107(1) PDEU mogoče dokazati le, če ta se primerja s tako imenovano običajno obdavčitvijo. Tako je določitev vseh podjetij, ki so v primerljivem dejanskem in pravnem položaju, odvisna od predhodne opredelitve pravne ureditve, glede na cilj katere je treba po potrebi proučiti primerljivost dejanskega in pravnega položaja podjetij, ki jim zadevni ukrep koristi, in tistih, ki jim ne. | (323) | As recalled at recital (322), in order to classify a national tax measure as ‘selective’, the Commission must begin by identifying the system of reference, that is the ‘normal’ tax system applicable in the Member State concerned. The determination of the system of reference is of particular importance in the case of tax measures, since the existence of an economic advantage for the purposes of Article 107(1) TFEU may be established only when compared with ‘normal’ taxation. Thus, determination of the set of undertakings that are in a comparable factual and legal situation depends on the prior definition of the legal regime in light of whose objective it is necessary, where applicable, to examine whether the factual and legal situation of the undertakings favoured by the measure in question is comparable with that of those which are not. |
| (324) | Kot je navedeno v uvodni izjavi 118, so v členu 1 danskega zakona o davku od dohodkov pravnih oseb navedene pravne osebe, ki so zavezane plačilu danskega davka od dohodkov pravnih oseb. Na ta seznam so vključene družbe z omejeno odgovornostjo, kot je družba A/S Øresund. Kot je navedeno v uvodnih izjavah 135 in 136, so poleg tega ustrezna pravila o prenosu izgub v prihodnje obdobje navedena v danskem zakonu o odmeri davka (člen 15) za obdobja med letoma 1991 in 2012 ter v danskem zakonu o davku od dohodkov pravnih oseb (člen 12) za naslednja obdobja (uvodni izjavi 138 in 139). V navedenih pravilih so določeni pogoje in omejitve za prenos izgube v prihodnje obdobje za davčne namene za pravne subjekte, ki so zavezani plačilu danskega davka od dohodkov pravnih oseb (vključno z družbami z omejeno odgovornostjo). Kot je bilo že pojasnjeno v uvodni izjavi 117, so v danskem zakonu o odmeri davka določena pravila za uporabo davčne zakonodaje za posameznike in podjetja, v danskem zakonu o davku od dohodkov pravnih oseb pa so določeni subjekti, ki so zavezani plačilu davka od dohodkov pravnih oseb, stopnja in druga pravila, pomembna za obdavčitev družb. | (324) | As noted at recital (118), Section 1 of the Danish Corporate Income Tax Act lists the legal entities that are subject to Danish corporate income tax. Limited liability companies, such as A/S Øresund, are included in that list. In addition, as noted at recitals (135) and (136), the relevant loss carry-forward rules can be found in the Danish Tax Assessment Act (Section 15) for the periods between 1991 and 2012, and in the Danish Corporate Income Tax Act (Section 12) for the following periods (recitals (138) and (139)). Those rules determine the conditions and limits for the carry-forward of loss for tax purposes for legal entities subject to Danish corporate income tax (including limited liability companies). As already explained at recital (117), the Danish Tax Assessment Act provides rules for how the tax laws are applied to both individuals and companies, and the Danish Corporate Income Tax Act determines the entities subject to corporate income tax, the rate and other rules relevant for the taxation of companies. |
| Pravilo o prenosu izgub za obdobje 1991–2001 | 1991-2001 LCF |
| (325) | Prvič, kot je navedla Danska (uvodna izjava 267), je bilo splošno veljavno pravilo o prenosu izgub v prihodnje obdobje, kar zadeva pravilo o prenosu izgub za obdobje 1991–2001, navedeno v členu 15 danskega zakona o odmeri davka. Navedeni zakon vključuje pravila o davku od dohodkov za posameznike in družbe ter je del sistema davka od dohodkov pravnih oseb (skupaj z ustreznimi zakoni o davku od dohodkov, zlasti danskim zakonom o davku od dohodkov pravnih oseb). V danskem zakonu o davku od dohodkov pravnih oseb kot takem je določeno, kateri subjekti morajo plačati davek od dohodkov pravnih oseb, v danskem zakonu o odmeri davka pa so določeni parametre, na podlagi katerih se določi znesek, ki ga morajo plačati. En od dejavnikov, na podlagi katerih se določi navedeni znesek, je, ali je davčni zavezanec v prihodnje obdobje prenesel kakršne koli izgube, ki jih lahko uporabi za znižanje svoje davčne osnove. V členu 15 danskega zakona o odmeri davka je bilo določeno, da se lahko izgube v obdobju veljavnosti pravila o prenosu izgub za obdobje 1991–2001 prenesejo v obdavčljivi dohodek davčnega zavezanca za naslednjih pet let (uvodna izjava 135). Petletna omejitev je bila sestavni del splošno veljavnega pravila o prenosu izgub v prihodnje obdobje (splošni ukrep, ki se brez razlikovanja uporablja za vse gospodarske subjekte) in ne izjema od širšega zakonodajnega okvira (171). V zvezi s tem je treba opozoriti, da je ta petletna omejitev neločljivo povezana s splošnim sistemom davka od dohodkov pravnih oseb, ki določa prenos davčnih izgub v prihodnje obdobje, saj so ta pravila pomembna za določitev davčne osnove. Komisija ugotavlja, da je ustrezen referenčni sistem za oceno pravila o prenosu izgub za obdobje 1991–2001 danski sistem davka od dohodkov pravnih oseb, vključno zlasti s členom 1 danskega zakona o davku od dohodkov pravnih oseb in členom 15 danskega zakona o odmeri davka, ki določa, da se lahko za namene ocene zneska davka od dohodkov pravnih oseb, ki ga mora plačati pravna oseba, zavezana plačilu navedenega davka (vključno z družbami z omejeno odgovornostjo), izgube prenesejo naprej za obdobje največ petih let. Davčne določbe, vključene v zakon o gradnji, vključno s pravilom o prenosu izgub za obdobje 1991–2001, niso del tega sistema, saj se uporabljajo samo za določen projekt. Zadevni cilj danskega sistema davka od dohodkov pravnih oseb je vzpostaviti splošni sistem obdavčitve dobička družb in, natančneje, določiti pravila v zvezi z določanjem davčne osnove, vključno s pravili, ki omogočajo prenos izgub v prihodnje obdobje (in amortizacijo sredstev), za vse družbe brez razlikovanja. Zato je treba pravilo o prenosu izgub za obdobje 1991–2001 na podlagi merila iz člena 1 danskega zakona o davku od dohodkov pravnih oseb in člena 15 danskega zakona o odmeri davka ter glede na zgoraj navedeni cilj oceniti v okviru drugega koraka tristopenjske analize (uvodni izjavi 326 in 327). | (325) | First, as noted by Denmark (recital (267)), for the 1991-2001 LCF, the generally applicable rule on the carry-forward of losses was found in Section 15 of the Danish Tax Assessment Act. That act includes income tax rules for both individuals and companies, and forms part of the corporate income tax system (together with the relevant income tax acts, in particular, the Danish Corporate Income Tax Act). As such, the Danish Corporate Income Tax Act determines which entities must pay corporate income tax, and the Danish Tax Assessment Act provides the parameters by which the amount they need to pay is determined. One of the factors that determines that amount is whether the taxable entity has any carried forward losses that it may use to reduce its taxable base. Section 15 of the Danish Tax Assessment Act established that, for the 1991-2001 LCF period, losses could be carried forward in the taxable income of the taxpayer for the five subsequent years (recital (135)). The limitation of five years was an integral part of the generally applicable loss carry-forward rule (a general measure, applicable without distinction to all economic operators), rather than an exception to a broader legislative framework (171). In this regard, it must be noted that that five-year limitation is inseparable from the general corporate income tax system, which provides for the carry-forward of tax losses, as those rules are relevant to determine the tax base. The Commission finds that the relevant system of reference for the assessment of the 1991-2001 LCF is the Danish corporate income tax system, including, in particular, Section 1 of the Danish Corporate Income Tax Act and Section 15 of the Danish Tax Assessment Act, which provided that, for the purposes of assessing the amount of corporate income tax payable by a legal entity subject to that tax (including limited liability companies), losses could be carried forward for a maximum period of five years. The tax provisions included in the Construction Act, including the 1991-2001 LCF, do not form part of that system, as they apply to one particular project, only. The relevant objective of the Danish corporate income tax system is to establish a general system of taxation for companies on their profits, and, more specifically, to provide rules relating to the determination of the tax base, including rules allowing carry-forward of losses (and depreciation of assets) for all companies, without distinction. It is, therefore, against the benchmark of both Section 1 of the Danish Corporate Income Tax Act and Section 15 of the Danish Tax Assessment Act, and, in light of the above objective, that the 1991-2001 LCF must be assessed under the second step of the three-step analysis (recitals (326) and (327)). |
| (326) | Drugič, Komisija ugotavlja, da bi lahko družba A/S Øresund v skladu s členom 11 zakona o gradnji izgube v prihodnje obdobje prenesla za 15 davčnih let, izgube, nastale pred začetkom obratovanja stalne povezave, pa za 30 davčnih let. Glede na 50-odstotno lastništvo družbe A/S Øresund je to veljalo tudi za 50 % izgub konzorcija. Če bi za družbo A/S Øresund veljala običajna pravila referenčnega sistema (vključno s členom 15 danskega zakona o odmeri davka), bi njene izgube zapadle prej, navedene izgube, ki bi zapadle, pa ne bi bile več na voljo za izravnavo dobička v davčnih napovedih družbe A/S Øresund (172). V skladu s tem je člen 11 zakona o gradnji pomenil odstopanje od referenčnega sistema, s katerim je bila družbi A/S Øresund dodeljena prednost v primerjavi z drugimi pravnimi osebami (vključno z družbami z omejeno odgovornostjo), zavezanimi plačilu danskega davka od dohodkov pravnih oseb, saj je lahko svoje izgube prenesla v prihodnje obdobje in tako zmanjšala svoje davčno breme za daljše obdobje, kot bi bilo na voljo navedenim osebam. Kot je Komisija navedla v uvodnih izjavah 314 do 319, to koristi tudi konzorciju, saj se zaradi zmanjšanja davčnega bremena družbe A/S Øresund zmanjša finančno breme konzorcija. | (326) | Second, the Commission notes that, under Section 11 of the Construction Act, A/S Øresund could carry-forward losses for 15 tax years or, for losses incurred before the Fixed Link was put into service, for 30 tax years. This also applied to 50 % of the losses of the Consortium, in light of A/S Øresund’s 50 % ownership. If A/S Øresund had been subject to the normal rules under the system of reference (including Section 15 of the Danish Tax Assessment Act), its losses would have expired earlier, and those expired losses would have no longer been available to offset profits in A/S Øresund’s tax returns (172). Accordingly, Section 11 of the Construction Act constituted a derogation to the system of reference, conferring an advantage to A/S Øresund, as compared to other legal entities (including limited liability companies) subject to Danish corporate income tax, as it could carry-forward its losses to reduce its tax burden for a longer period than would have been available to those entities. As noted by the Commission at recitals (314) to (319), this also benefits the Consortium, insofar as a reduction in A/S Øresund’s tax burden results in a reduction in the Consortium’s financial burden. |
| (327) | Komisija poleg tega ugotavlja, da bi bilo treba družbo A/S Øresund, ki za namene uporabe posebnih danskih pravil o prenosu izgub v prihodnje obdobje in amortizaciji tvori enotno podjetje s konzorcijem (uvodna izjava 315), glede na cilje referenčnega sistema obravnavati kot družbo, ki je v enakem dejanskem in pravnem položaju kot druge pravne osebe (vključno z družbami z omejeno odgovornostjo), zavezane plačilu danskega davka od dohodkov pravnih oseb. Kot je navedeno v uvodni izjavi 325, je zadevni cilj navedenega referenčnega sistema vzpostaviti splošni sistem obdavčitve dobička družb in, natančneje, določiti pravila v zvezi z določanjem davčne osnove, vključno s pravili, ki omogočajo prenos izgub v prihodnje obdobje (in amortizacijo sredstev), za vse družbe brez razlikovanja; in sicer ne glede na to, ali sodelujejo pri nekaterih projektih ali ne. Danska je potrdila, da so bila posebna danska pravila o prenosu izgub v prihodnje obdobje in amortizaciji oblikovana za družbo A/S Øresund in se uporabljajo zanjo kot partnerja v konzorciju (uvodna izjava 233). V pripravljalnih opombah k zakonu o gradnji je navedeno, da je bilo pravilo o prenosu izgub za obdobje 1991–2001 uvedeno po analogiji s pravilom, ki se uporablja za most Great Belt. Danski organi so v fazi predhodne preiskave pojasnili, da je razlog za to izredna narava gradbenega projekta, za katerega so bili značilni znatni stroški v daljšem časovnem obdobju, ki pa so bili še vedno povezani z dobrimi obeti za dolgoročno sposobnost preživetja. Vendar Komisija ugotavlja, da danski davčni sistem (vključno z običajnim pravilom o prenosu izgub v prihodnje obdobje v skladu s členom 15 danskega zakona o odmeri davka) ne razlikuje med subjekti glede na velikost projektov, ki jih izvajajo. Čeprav je res, da je družba A/S Øresund odgovorna za veliko naložbo, ni izključeno, da bi lahko druge družbe z omejeno odgovornostjo izvedle podobno pomembne naložbe ali naložbe, za katere se lahko pričakuje, da bodo izgubo prinašale več kot pet let. Obseg projekta stalne povezave zato ne spremeni dejstva, da je družba A/S Øresund glede na cilj obdavčitve dobička v enakem pravnem in dejanskem položaju kot druge pravne osebe (vključno z družbami z omejeno odgovornostjo), zavezane plačilu danskega davka od dohodka pravnih oseb. Povedano drugače, zaradi dejstva, da je družba A/S Øresund – tudi prek svojega 50-odstotnega lastništva konzorcija – odgovorna za veliko naložbo v infrastrukturo, se njen položaj za namene referenčnega sistema pravno ali dejansko ne razlikuje od drugih družb z omejeno odgovornostjo, zavezanih plačilu danskega davka od dohodka pravnih oseb. Komisija zato ugotavlja, da je pravilo o prenosu izgub za obdobje 1991–2001, kot se je uporabljalo za družbo A/S Øresund, očitno odstopalo od splošnega sistema, ki se uporablja na Danskem, saj je razlikovalo med gospodarskimi subjekti, ki so glede na cilj zadevnega davčnega sistema v primerljivem dejanskem in pravnem položaju. | (327) | The Commission finds, moreover, that A/S Øresund, which, for the purposes of the application of the special Danish rules on loss carry-forward and depreciation, is a single undertaking with the Consortium (recital (315)), should be considered as being in the same factual and legal situation as other legal entities (including limited liability companies) subject to Danish corporate income tax, in light of the objectives intrinsic to the system of reference. As noted at recital (325), the relevant objective of that system of reference is to establish a general system of taxation for companies on their profits, and, more specifically, to provide rules relating to the determination of the tax base, including rules allowing carry-forward of losses (and depreciation of assets) for all companies, without distinction; this is regardless of whether or not they engage in certain projects. Denmark confirmed that the special Danish rules on loss carry-forward and depreciation were created for A/S Øresund, and apply in its capacity as partner in the Consortium (recital (233)). The preparatory notes to the Construction Act indicate that the 1991-2001 LCF was put in place by analogy to the rule applicable to the Great Belt bridge. The Danish authorities had explained, during the preliminary investigation phase, that this was because of the extraordinary nature of the construction project characterised by considerable costs over a prolonged period of time, still coupled with reasonable prospects of long-term viability. The Commission notes, however, that the Danish tax system (including the normal loss carry-forward rule under Section 15 of the Danish Tax Assessment Act) does not distinguish between entities according to the size of the projects they undertake. While it is true that A/S Øresund is responsible for a large investment, it is not precluded that other limited liability companies could undertake similarly significant investments, or investments for which losses can be expected to extend beyond five years. The scope of the Fixed Link project, therefore, does not alter the fact that, in light of the objective of taxing profits, A/S Øresund is in the same legal and factual position as other legal entities (including limited liability companies) subject to Danish corporate income tax. In other words, the fact that A/S Øresund – including via its 50 % ownership of the Consortium – is responsible for a large infrastructure investment, does not differentiate its position, legally or factually, for the purposes of the system of reference, from other limited liability companies subject to Danish corporate income tax. Therefore, the Commission finds that the 1991-2001 LCF as it applied to A/S Øresund clearly derogated from the general system applicable in Denmark, as it differentiated between economic operators that are in a comparable factual and legal situation in light of the objective pursued by the tax system concerned. |
| (328) | Tretjič, Komisija ugotavlja, da odstopanje iz uvodne izjave 327 ni utemeljeno z naravo ali splošno shemo sistema. Opozarja, da se ukrep, ki je selektiven prima facie, vseeno lahko šteje za neselektivnega, če je utemeljen z naravo ali splošno shemo navedenega sistema. To velja, kadar ukrep izhaja neposredno iz temeljnih ali usmerjevalnih načel referenčnega sistema ali kadar je posledica mehanizmov, ki so lastni sistemu in potrebni za njegovo delovanje in učinkovitost (173). V ta namen se ni mogoče sklicevati na cilje zunanje politike, ki niso neločljivo povezani s splošnim davčnim sistemom (174). Zadevna država članica mora dokazati, da je ukrep, ki je na prvi pogled selektiven, utemeljen z naravo ali splošno shemo njenega davčnega sistema (175). | (328) | Third, the Commission finds that the derogation noted at recital (327) is not justified by the nature or the general scheme of the system. The Commission recalls that a measure, which is prima facie selective, may still be found to be non-selective if it is justified by the nature or general scheme of that system. This is the case where a measure derives directly from the intrinsic basic or guiding principles of the system of reference, or where it is the result of inherent mechanisms necessary for the functioning and effectiveness of the system (173). External policy objectives, which are not inherent to the general tax system, cannot be relied upon for that purpose (174). It is up to the Member State concerned to demonstrate that a measure, which is, at first sight, selective, is justified by the nature or general scheme of its tax system (175). |
| (329) | Komisija ugotavlja, da so danski organi med predhodno preiskavo trdili, da se lahko posebna danska pravila o prenosu izgub v prihodnje obdobje in amortizaciji lahko štejejo za utemeljena z logiko sistema zaradi izredne narave celotnega projekta stalne povezave v smislu njegove velikosti in namena, zaradi česar ga ni mogoče primerjati z nobenim drugim infrastrukturnim projektom, za katerega je treba plačati danski davek od dohodkov pravnih oseb. V zvezi s tem opozarja, da je cilj referenčnega sistema vzpostaviti splošni sistem obdavčitve dobička družb in, natančneje, določiti pravila v zvezi z določanjem davčne osnove, vključno s pravili, ki omogočajo prenos izgub v prihodnje obdobje, za vse družbe brez razlikovanja (uvodna izjava 325). Kot je navedeno v uvodni izjavi 327, referenčni sistem ne razlikuje med subjekti glede na velikost projektov, ki jih izvajajo, in ni izključeno, da bi lahko druge družbe z omejeno odgovornostjo izvedle podobno pomembne naložbe ali naložbe, za katere se lahko pričakuje, da bodo izgubo prinašale več kot pet let. Komisija v navedenih okoliščinah meni, da narava projekta stalne povezave glede na naravo in splošno shemo navedenega sistema ne upravičuje drugačne obravnave družbe A/S Øresund. Povedano drugače, meni, da taka različna obravnava ne bi bila dosledna, potrebna in sorazmerna glede na vodilna načela danskega davčnega sistema. Komisija je v uvodni izjavi 90 sklepa o začetku postopka ugotovila, da danski organi niso zadostno dokazali, zakaj in v kakšnem obsegu bi velikost in namen projekta zadostovala za utemeljitev različne davčne obravnave. Danski organi po tem, ko je bil sprejet sklep o začetku postopka, Komisiji niso predložili nobenih novih dokazov, ki bi spremenili njeno stališče, zato niso zadostili zahtevam glede dokaznega bremena iz tretjega koraka (176). Komisija zato ugotavlja, da ukrep ne pomeni upravičenega odstopanja od uporabe referenčnega sistema, ki bi neposredno izhajalo iz osnovnih ali vodilnih načel navedenega davčnega sistema. | (329) | The Commission notes that the Danish authorities had argued, in the course of the preliminary investigation, that the special Danish rules on loss carry-forward and depreciation can be regarded as justified by the logic of the system due to the extraordinary character of the entire Fixed Link project in terms of its size and purpose, making it incomparable to any other infrastructure project that has been subject to Danish corporate income tax. In that regard, the Commission recalls that the objective of the system of reference is to establish a general system of taxation for companies on their profits, and, more specifically, to provide rules relating to the determination of the tax base, including rules allowing carry-forward of losses for all companies, without distinction (recital (325)). As indicated at recital (327), the system of reference does not distinguish between entities according to the size of the projects they undertake, and it is not precluded that other limited liability companies could undertake similarly significant investments, or investments for which losses can be expected to extend beyond five years. In those circumstances, the Commission does not consider that the character of the Fixed Link project would justify a different treatment for A/S Øresund, in view of the nature and general scheme of that system. In other words, the Commission does not consider that such different treatment would be consistent, necessary, and proportionate in light of the guiding principles of the Danish tax system. At recital 90 of the Opening decision, the Commission noted that the Danish authorities had not sufficiently demonstrated why, and to what extent, the size and the purpose of a project would be sufficient to justify different tax treatment. Following the adoption of the Opening decision, the Danish authorities did not bring any new evidence to the attention of the Commission that would alter the Commission’s view, and so did not discharge the burden of proof of the third step (176). The Commission, therefore, concludes that the measure does not constitute a justified derogation to the application of the system of reference, directly resulting from the basic or guiding principles of that tax system. |
| (330) | Komisija zato ugotavlja, da je bila družbi A/S Øresund zaradi pravila o prenosu izgub za obdobje 1991–2001 dodeljena selektivna prednost, povezana z gospodarsko dejavnostjo stalne povezave. Kot je navedeno v uvodni izjavi 319, bi bil konzorcij upravičenec do kakršne koli selektivne prednosti, ki bi izhajala iz posebnih danskih pravil o prenosu izgub v prihodnje obdobje in amortizaciji, saj družba A/S Øresund in konzorcij tvorita enotno podjetje za namene gospodarske dejavnosti stalne povezave. Zato Komisija ugotavlja, da je bila konzorciju zaradi pravila o prenosu izgub za obdobje 1991–2001 dodeljena selektivna prednost. | (330) | The Commission, therefore, finds that the 1991-2001 LCF resulted in a selective advantage to A/S Øresund, connected to the economic activity of the Fixed Link. As noted at recital (319), the Consortium would be the beneficiary of any selective advantage created by the special Danish rules on loss carry-forward and depreciation, in view of the fact that both A/S Øresund and the Consortium form a single undertaking for the purpose of the economic activity of the Fixed Link. Therefore, the Commission concludes that the 1991-2001 LCF resulted in a selective advantage to the Consortium. |
| Pravilo o prenosu izgub za obdobje 2002–2012 | 2002-2012 LCF |
| (331) | Kar zadeva pravilo o prenosu izgub za obdobje 2002–2012, Komisija opozarja, da je bil, kot je navedeno v uvodni izjavi 136, danski zakon o odmeri davka (člen 15) spremenjen 21. maja 2002 in ni več omejeval možnosti prenosa izgub pravnih oseb (vključno z družbami z omejeno odgovornostjo), zavezanih plačilu danskega davka od dohodkov pravnih oseb, v prihodnje obdobje. Meni, da ta posebna zakonodajna sprememba ni vplivala na (i) področje uporabe referenčnega sistema v obdobju veljavnosti pravila o prenosu izgub za obdobje 2002–2012 v primerjavi z obdobjem veljavnosti pravila o prenosu izgub za obdobje 1991–2001 ali (ii) cilj navedenega referenčnega sistema. Komisija zato ugotavlja, da je referenčni sistem v obdobju veljavnosti pravila o prenosu izgub za obdobje 2002–2012 določal, da imajo pravne osebe (vključno z družbami z omejeno odgovornostjo), ki so zavezane plačilu danskega davka od dohodkov pravnih oseb, pravico prenesti svoje izgube v prihodnje obdobje brez kakršnih koli omejitev glede obdobja, v katerem se izgube lahko prenesejo. Zato ugotavlja, da je ustrezen referenčni sistem za oceno pravila o prenosu izgub za obdobje 2002–2012 danski sistem davka od dohodkov pravnih oseb, vključno zlasti s členom 1 danskega zakona o davku od dohodkov pravnih oseb in členom 15 danskega zakona o odmeri davka, ki določa, da se lahko za namene ocene zneska davka od dohodkov pravnih oseb, ki ga mora plačati pravna oseba, zavezana plačilu navedenega davka (vključno z družbami z omejeno odgovornostjo), izgube prenesejo naprej brez časovne omejitve. | (331) | For the 2002-2012 LCF, the Commission recalls that, as noted at recital (136), the Danish Tax Assessment Act (Section 15) was amended on 21 May 2002, and no longer imposed any limitation on the possibility for legal entities (including limited liability companies) subject to Danish corporate income tax to carry-forward their losses. The Commission does not consider that that specific legislative amendment impacted either (i) the scope of the system of reference for the 2002-2012 LCF, as compared to the 1991-2001 LCF, or (ii) the objective of that system of reference. The Commission, therefore, finds that, for the 2002-2012 LCF period, the system of reference provided that legal entities (including limited liability companies) subject to Danish corporate income tax were entitled to carry-forward their losses, without any limitation with respect to the period within which losses could be carried forward. The Commission, therefore, finds that the relevant system of reference for the assessment of the 2002-2012 LCF is the Danish corporate income tax system, including, in particular, Section 1 of the Danish Corporate Income Tax Act and Section 15 of the Danish Tax Assessment Act, which provided that, for the purposes of assessing the amount of corporate income tax payable by a legal entity subject to that tax (including limited liability companies) losses could be carried forward without time limitation. |
| (332) | Komisija opozarja, da je bil zakon o gradnji podobno kot danski zakon o odmeri davka spremenjen tako, da je bila odpravljena 15-letna omejitev, ki se je uporabljala za družbo A/S Øresund v skladu s pravilom o prenosu izgub za obdobje 1991–2001. V navedenih okoliščinah je za izgube, nastale od davčnega leta 2002, za družbo A/S Øresund veljalo enako pravilo, kot je bilo določeno v splošno veljavnih pravilih (tj. brez časovne omejitve za prenos izgub v prihodnje obdobje). Povedano drugače, za družbo A/S Øresund ni veljalo odstopanje od referenčnega sistema. | (332) | The Commission notes that, similar to the Danish Tax Assessment Act, the Construction Act was amended to remove the limitation of 15 years that had been applicable to A/S Øresund according to the 1991-2001 LCF. In those circumstances, for losses incurred as from the tax year 2002, A/S Øresund was subject to the same rule as was present in the generally applicable rules (i.e. no limitation in time to carry-forward losses). In other words, A/S Øresund was not subject to a derogation from the system of reference. |
| (333) | Komisija zato ugotavlja, da zaradi pravila o prenosu izgub za obdobje 2002–2012 družbi A/S Øresund ni bila dodeljena selektivna prednost. Posledično zaradi pravila o prenosu izgub za obdobje 2002–2012 tudi konzorciju ni bila dodeljena selektivna prednost. Pravilo o prenosu izgub za obdobje 2002–2012 zato ni pomenilo državne pomoči za družbo A/S Øresund ali konzorcij. | (333) | Consequently, the Commission concludes that the 2002-2012 LCF did not result in a selective advantage for A/S Øresund. As a result, the 2002-2012 LCF did not, either, result in a selective advantage for the Consortium. Therefore, the 2002-2012 LCF did not constitute State aid to A/S Øresund or the Consortium. |
| Pravilo o prenosu izgub za obdobje 2013–2015 | 2013-2015 LCF |
| (334) | Kar zadeva obdobje veljavnosti pravila o prenosu izgub za obdobje 2013–2015, je splošno veljavno pravilo o prenosu izgub v prihodnje obdobje navedeno v členu 12 danskega zakona o davku od dohodkov pravnih oseb. Kot je navedeno v uvodni izjavi 138, je bil z zakonom št. 591 z dne 18. junija 2012 razveljavljen člen 15 danskega zakona o odmeri davka. Hkrati je bil z zakonom št. 591 z dne 18. junija 2012 k danskemu zakonu o davku od dohodkov pravnih oseb dodan člen 12, s katerim je bila uvedena nova omejitev uporabe izgub, prenesenih v prihodnje obdobje, ki se je uporabljala za davčna leta, ki se začnejo 1. julija 2012 ali pozneje. V skladu z navedenimi spremembami lahko pravne osebe (vključno z družbami z omejeno odgovornostjo), zavezane plačilu danskega davka od dohodkov pravnih oseb, izgube prenesejo naprej za nedoločen čas. Vendar je bilo mogoče v danem davčnem letu odbiti le izgubo v višini 7 500 000 DKK (1 005 311 EUR) in, če je ostala dodatna izguba, znesek, ki je ustrezal največ 60 % obdavčljivega dohodka, ki presega 7 500 000 DKK (1 005 311 EUR) (uvodna izjava 139). Navedena omejitev je bila sestavni del splošno veljavnega pravila o prenosu izgub v prihodnje obdobje in ne izjema od širšega zakonodajnega okvira. Komisija zato ugotavlja, da je ustrezen referenčni sistem za oceno pravila o prenosu izgub za obdobje 2013–2015 danski sistem davka od dohodkov pravnih oseb, vključno zlasti s členoma 1 in 12 danskega zakona o davku od dohodkov pravnih oseb, ki določata, da se lahko za namene ocene zneska davka od dohodkov pravnih oseb, ki ga mora plačati pravna oseba (vključno z družbami z omejeno odgovornostjo), zavezana plačilu navedenega davka, izgube prenesejo naprej brez časovne omejitve, vendar se lahko uporabijo le za izravnavo dobičkov, za katere veljajo omejitve iz člena 12. Kot je bilo že pojasnjeno v uvodni izjavi 325, je cilj danskega sistema davka od dohodkov pravnih oseb vzpostaviti splošni sistem obdavčitve dobička družb in, natančneje, določiti pravila v zvezi z določanjem davčne osnove, vključno s pravili, ki omogočajo prenos izgub v prihodnje obdobje in amortizacijo sredstev (za vse družbe brez razlikovanja). | (334) | For the 2013-2015 LCF period, the generally applicable loss carry-forward rule is found in Section 12 of the Danish Corporate Income Tax Act. As noted at recital (138), Act No 591 of 18 June 2012, Section 15 of the Danish Tax Assessment Act was repealed. At the same time, Act No 591 of 18 June 2012 added Section 12 to the Danish Corporate Income Tax Act, which introduced a new limitation on the utilisation of losses carried-forward, which applied to tax years starting on or after 1 July 2012. Under those changes, legal entities (including limited liability companies) subject to Danish corporate income tax could carry-forward losses for an unlimited period. However, only a loss amounting to DKK 7 500 000 (EUR 1 005 311) plus, if an additional loss remained, an amount corresponding to a maximum of 60 % of the taxable income in excess of DKK 7 500 000 (EUR 1 005 311), could be deducted in a given tax year (recital (139)). That limitation was an integral part of the generally applicable loss carry-forward rule, rather than an exception to a broader legislative framework. The Commission, therefore, finds that the relevant system of reference for the assessment of the 2013-2015 LCF is the Danish corporate income tax system, including, in particular, Sections 1 and 12 of the Danish Corporate Income Tax Act, which provided that, for the purposes of assessing the amount of corporate income tax payable by a legal entity (including limited liability companies) subject to that tax, losses could be carried forward without limitation in time, but could only be utilised to offset profits subject to the limitations as set out in Section 12. As already explained at recital (325), the objective of the Danish corporate income tax system is to establish a general system of taxation for companies on their profits, and, more specifically, to provide rules relating to the determination of the tax base, including rules allowing carry-forward of losses and deprecation of assets (for all companies, without distinction). |
| (335) | Komisija ugotavlja, da za družbo A/S Øresund pred spremembo zakona o družbi Sund & Bælt z dne 4. maja 2015 (uvodna izjava 134) niso veljale omejitve glede zneska izgub, ki se lahko uporabijo, ki so veljale za pravne osebe, zavezane plačilu danskega davka od dohodkov pravnih oseb (vključno z družbami z omejeno odgovornostjo) na podlagi referenčnega sistema. Zato bi lahko družba A/S Øresund za davčna leta 2013, 2014 in 2015 svojo celotno osnovo za dobiček izravnala z uporabo izgub, prenesenih v prihodnje obdobje, česar ne bi mogla storiti, če bi zanjo veljala običajna pravila na podlagi referenčnega sistema. Kot je navedeno v uvodni izjavi 327, je družba A/S Øresund v podobnem dejanskem in pravnem položaju kot druge družbe z omejeno odgovornostjo, zavezane plačilu davka od dohodkov pravnih oseb. Komisija zato meni, da je bila družba A/S Øresund v obdobju veljavnosti pravila o prenosu izgub za obdobje 2013–2015 upravičena do odstopanja od običajnih pravil obdavčitve, zaradi česar je bila z vidika cilja referenčnega sistema v ugodnejšem položaju kot druga podjetja v podobnem pravnem in dejanskem položaju. Komisija v zvezi s tem ugotavlja, da zakon o družbi Sund & Bælt ni bil spremenjen, da bi odražal spremembo danskega zakona o davku od dohodkov pravnih oseb, tako kot je bil spremenjen v obdobju veljavnosti pravila o prenosu izgub za obdobje 2002–2012. Danski organi so zato, ko se niso odločili za tako spremembo, družbi A/S Øresund omogočili ugodnejši položaj kot drugim družbam z omejeno odgovornostjo, zavezanim plačilu danskega davka od dohodka pravnih oseb. Zato je treba šteti, da kombinacija spremembe danskega zakona o davku od dohodkov pravnih oseb in odsotnost ustrezne spremembe zakona o družbi Sund & Bælt pomeni odstopanje od referenčnega sistema, ki družbi A/S Øresund daje prednost v primerjavi z drugimi pravnimi osebami (vključno z družbami z omejeno odgovornostjo), zavezanimi plačilu danskega davka od dohodkov pravnih oseb, saj bi lahko zadevna družba svoje izgube uporabila za zmanjšanje svoje davčne obveznosti brez omejitev, ki so veljale za navedene druge osebe. Navedene druge osebe so bile glede na referenčni davčni sistem, katerega cilj je vzpostaviti splošni sistem obdavčitve družb in njihovega dobička, v podobnem pravnem in dejanskem položaju kot družba A/S Øresund. | (335) | The Commission notes that, prior to the amendment to the Sund & Bælt Act of 4 May 2015 (recital (134)), the limitations in terms of the amount of losses that could be utilised that applied to legal entities subject to Danish corporate income tax (including limited liability companies) by virtue of the system of reference did not apply to A/S Øresund. Therefore, in relation to the tax years 2013, 2014, and 2015, A/S Øresund could offset its entire profit base by utilising losses carried forward, which it would not be able to do if it were subject to the normal rules, under the system of reference. As noted at recital (327), A/S Øresund is in a similar factual and legal position to other limited liability companies that are subject to Danish corporate income tax. The Commission, therefore, considers that, for the 2013-2015 LCF, A/S Øresund enjoyed a derogation from the normal taxation rules, which placed it in a more advantageous position than other undertakings in a similar legal and factual situation as regards the objective of the system of reference. In that regard, the Commission notes that, unlike for the 2002-2012 LCF, no amendment was made to the Sund & Bælt Act to reflect the amendment to the Danish Corporate Income Tax Act. Therefore, by declining to make such an amendment, the Danish authorities allowed A/S Øresund to enjoy a more advantageous position than other limited liability companies subject to Danish corporate income tax. The combination of the amendment to the Danish Corporate Income Tax Act, and the absence of a corresponding amendment to the Sund & Bælt Act, therefore, must be considered as constituting a derogation to the system of reference, conferring an advantage on A/S Øresund as compared to other legal entities (including limited liability companies) subject to Danish corporate income tax, as it could use its losses to reduce its tax liability, without the limitations that applied to those other entities. Those other entities were in a similar legal and factual situation to A/S Øresund, in light of the tax system of reference, which had the objective of setting up a general system of taxation for companies and their profits. |
| (336) | Kot je navedeno v uvodni izjavi 329, so danski organi med predhodno preiskavo trdili, da se lahko posebna danska pravila o prenosu izgub v prihodnje obdobje in amortizaciji štejejo za utemeljena z logiko referenčnega sistema zaradi izredne narave projekta stalne povezave v smislu njegove velikosti in namena, zaradi česar ga ni mogoče primerjati z nobenim drugim projektom, za katerega je treba plačati danski davek od dohodkov pravnih oseb. Kot je navedeno v uvodni izjavi 329, Komisija meni, da narava projekta stalne povezave glede na naravo in splošno shemo referenčnega sistema ne upravičuje drugačne obravnave družbe A/S Øresund. Danski organi po sklepu o začetku postopka niso predložili nobenih dodatnih dokazov, ki bi spremenili stališče Komisije. Komisija zato ugotavlja, da pravilo o prenosu izgub za obdobje 2013–2015 ne pomeni upravičenega odstopanja od uporabe referenčnega sistema, ki bi neposredno izhajalo iz osnovnih ali vodilnih načel danskega sistema davka od dohodkov pravnih oseb. | (336) | As noted at recital (329), the Danish authorities had argued, during the course of the preliminary investigation, that the special Danish rules on loss carry-forward and depreciation can be regarded as justified by the logic of the system of reference due to the extraordinary character of the Fixed Link project in terms of its size and purpose, making it incomparable to any other project subject to Danish corporate income tax. As noted at recital (329), the Commission does not consider that the character of the Fixed Link project would justify a different treatment for A/S Øresund, in view of the nature and general scheme of the system of reference. Following the Opening decision, the Danish authorities did not submit any further evidence that would alter the Commission’s view. The Commission, therefore, concludes that the 2013-2015 LCF does not constitute a justified derogation to the application of the system of reference, directly resulting from the basic or guiding principles of the Danish corporate income tax system. |
| (337) | Komisija zato ugotavlja, da je bila družbi A/S Øresund zaradi pravila o prenosu izgub za obdobje 2013–2015 dodeljena selektivna prednost. Konzorcij in družba A/S Øresund tvorita enotno podjetje za namene gospodarske dejavnosti stalne povezave (uvodna izjava 315), zato je navedeno enotno podjetje upravičenec do selektivne prednosti, ki izhaja iz pravila o prenosu izgub za obdobje 2013–2015, zaradi česar je bila konzorciju zaradi pravila o prenosu izgub za obdobje 2013–2015 dodeljena selektivna prednost. | (337) | The Commission, therefore, finds that the 2013-2015 LCF resulted in a selective advantage to A/S Øresund. Since the Consortium and A/S Øresund form a single undertaking for the purpose of the economic activity of the Fixed Link (recital (315)), the single undertaking is a beneficiary of the selective advantage created by the 2013-2015 LCF, and, as a consequence, the 2013-2015 LCF resulted in a selective advantage to the Consortium. |
| (338) | Komisija opozarja, da so bila posebna danska pravila o prenosu izgub v prihodnje obdobje razveljavljena z učinkom od 1. januarja 2016, po tem pa se je za družbo A/S Øresund uporabljal običajen danski sistem davka od dohodkov pravnih oseb (uvodna izjava 134). Komisija zato ugotavlja, da družba A/S Øresund ali konzorcij od navedenega datuma, kar zadeva pravila o prenosu izgub v prihodnje obdobje, nista prejela nobene dodatne selektivne prednosti. | (338) | The Commission recalls that the special Danish rules on loss carry-forward were repealed with effect from 1 January 2016, following which A/S Øresund has been subject to the normal Danish corporate income tax system (recital (134)). The Commission, therefore, notes that no further selective advantage in favour of A/S Øresund or the Consortium, in respect of the rules on loss carry-forward, has been in place since that date. |
| 6.1.3.2.2.2 Selektivna prednost: posebna danska pravila o amortizaciji | 6.1.3.2.2.2. Selective advantage: special Danish rules on depreciation |
| (339) | Kot je navedeno v uvodni izjavi 118, so v členu 1 danskega zakona o davku od dohodkov pravnih oseb navedene pravne osebe, ki so zavezane plačilu danskega davka od dohodkov pravnih oseb. Na ta seznam so vključene družbe z omejeno odgovornostjo, kot je družba A/S Øresund. Danska je opozorila, da so za celotno obdobje, ki se ocenjuje, običajna pravila za davčno amortizacijo določena v danskem zakonu o davčni amortizaciji (uvodna izjava 268), ki določa najvišje stopnje amortizacije, metode amortizacije in morebitne omejitve za različne kategorije sredstev, ki se amortizirajo, za davčne namene za subjekte, zavezane plačilu danskega davka od dohodkov pravnih oseb. Danski zakon o davku od dohodkov pravnih oseb kot tak določa, kateri subjekti morajo plačati davek od dohodkov pravnih oseb, danski zakon o davčni amortizaciji pa določa stopnje in pragove, v skladu s katerimi lahko taki subjekti amortizirajo svoja sredstva, da se navedena amortizacija odšteje od njihove davčne osnove. | (339) | As noted at recital (118), Section 1 of the Danish Corporate Income Tax Act lists the legal entities that are subject to Danish corporate income tax. Limited liability companies, such as A/S Øresund, are included in that list. Denmark noted that, for the entire period under assessment, the normal rules for tax depreciation are found in the Danish Tax Depreciation Act (recital (268)), which sets the maximum depreciation rates, the depreciation methods, and the possible limitations for the different categories of depreciable assets, for tax purposes, by entities subject to Danish corporate income tax. As such, the Danish Corporate Income Tax Act determines which entities must pay corporate income tax, and the Danish Tax Depreciation Act sets the rates and thresholds according to which such entities may depreciate their assets, in order to offset that depreciation against their taxable base. |
| Pravilo o amortizaciji za obdobje 1991–1998 | 1991-1998 DEP |
| (340) | Kar zadeva obdobje 1991–1998, je bilo v členu 22 danskega zakona o davčni amortizaciji določeno, da običajna stopnja amortizacije za stavbe in naprave v obdobju do vključno davčnega leta 1998 (177) znaša 6 % po metodi enakomernega časovnega amortiziranja, dokler ne doseže 60 % stroškov pridobitve, nato pa je omejena na 2 % stroškov pridobitve letno (uvodna izjava 144). Komisija ugotavlja, da je referenčni sistem v obdobju veljavnosti pravila o amortizaciji za obdobje 1991–1998 danski sistem davka od dohodkov pravnih oseb, vključno zlasti s členom 1 danskega zakona o davku od dohodkov pravnih oseb, skupaj s splošno veljavnimi pravili danskega zakona o davčni amortizaciji, ki določa stopnje, metode in morebitne omejitve amortizacije osnovnih sredstev. Kar zadeva stavbe in naprave, je navedeni referenčni sistem v ustreznem obdobju določal po stopnji 6 % (z omejitvijo na 2 %, potem ko je kumulativna amortizacija dosegla 60 %). Kot je bilo že pojasnjeno v uvodni izjavi 325, je zadevni cilj danskega sistema davka od dohodkov pravnih oseb vzpostaviti splošni sistem obdavčitve dobička družb in, natančneje, določiti pravila v zvezi z določanjem davčne osnove, vključno s pravili, ki omogočajo prenos izgub v prihodnje obdobje in amortizacijo sredstev, za vse družbe brez razlikovanja. V referenčnem sistemu je bilo torej določeno, da se lahko stavbe in naprave za davčne namene amortizirajo po stopnji do 6 % (z zgoraj navedeno omejitvijo). Druge vrste sredstev so imele v navedenem referenčnem sistemu višje najvišje stopnje amortizacije v skladu z danskim zakonom o davčni amortizaciji. | (340) | For the 1991-1998 period, Section 22 of the Danish Tax Depreciation Act determined that the normal depreciation rate for buildings and installations was, for the period up to and including the tax year 1998 (177), 6 % on a straight-line basis until reaching 60 % of the acquisition costs, and, thereafter, limited to 2 % of the acquisition cost, annually (recital (144)). The Commission finds that the system of reference for the 1991-1998 DEP is the Danish corporate income tax system, including, in particular, Section 1 of the Danish Corporate Income Tax Act, combined with the generally applicable rules of the Danish Tax Depreciation Act, which provides for the rates, methods, and possible limitations for the depreciation of fixed assets. With regard to buildings and installations, that system of reference provided, during the relevant period, for depreciation at a rate of 6 % (with a limitation to 2 %, after the cumulated depreciation had reached 60 %). As already explained at recital (325), the relevant objective of the Danish corporate income tax system is to establish a general system of taxation for companies on their profits, and, more specifically, to provide rules relating to the determination of the tax base, including rules allowing carry forward of losses and depreciation of assets, for all companies, without distinction. The system of reference, therefore, provided that buildings and installations could be depreciated for tax purposes at a rate of up to 6 % (with the above-noted limitation). Other types of assets had higher maximum depreciation rates in that system of reference, in accordance with the Danish Tax Depreciation Act. |
| (341) | Kot je pojasnjeno v uvodni izjavi 143, je bila v zakonu o gradnji amortizacijska stopnja za družbo A/S Øresund določena na 6 % oziroma 2 % začetnih stroškov pridobitve, kar pomeni, da se je za vsa sredstva družbe A/S Øresund, vključno z njenim 50-odstotnim deležem v sredstvih konzorcija, uporabljalo enotno splošno pravilo o amortizaciji. Navedena stopnja je v skladu s pripravljalnimi opombami k zakonu o gradnji ustrezala primerljivim določbam, ki so se uporabljale za stavbe in naprave po takrat veljavnem danskem zakonu o davčni amortizaciji. Danska je pojasnila, da je treba pravilo, ki se uporablja za družbo A/S Øresund, obravnavati kot praktično pravilo, ki omogoča enotno ureditev za vsa sredstva, kar je prvotno kvečjemu škodilo družbi A/S Øresund, saj se je za celotni projekt uporabljala najmanj ugodna stopnja amortizacije (druge postavke, kot so stroji, bi se običajno lahko amortizirale po stopnji, višji od 6 % oziroma 2 %, vendar se je za družbo A/S Øresund uporabljala pavšalna stopnja) (uvodna izjava 268). Družba A/S Øresund bi lahko torej zaradi določb zakona o gradnji uporabila enotno pravilo o amortizaciji, vendar za nobeno od kategorij sredstev ne bi mogla amortizirati po hitrejši stopnji kot druge pravne osebe, zavezane plačilu danskega davka od dohodka pravnih oseb. | (341) | As explained at recital (143), in the Construction Act, the depreciation rate for A/S Øresund was set at 6 % / 2 % of the initial acquisition costs, which meant that a single general rule on depreciation was applied to all assets of A/S Øresund, including its 50 % share on the assets of the Consortium. According to the preparatory notes to the Construction Act, that rate corresponded to comparable provisions applicable to buildings and installations under the Danish Tax Depreciation Act, in force at the time. Denmark explained that the rule applicable to A/S Øresund was to be considered as a practical rule, allowing a uniform regime for all assets that was originally, if anything, detrimental to A/S Øresund, as the least favourable rate of depreciation was applied to the entire project (other items, such as machinery, could normally be depreciated at a higher rate than at 6 % / 2 %, but for A/S Øresund, a flat rate applied) (recital (268)). As a result of the provisions in the Construction Act, therefore, A/S Øresund could apply a single deprecation rule but could, for none of the asset categories, depreciate at a faster rate than other legal entities subject to Danish corporate income tax. |
| (342) | Komisija zato ugotavlja, da pravilo o amortizaciji za obdobje 1991–1998 ni pomenilo odstopanja, zaradi katere bi lahko bila družbi A/S Øresund ali posledično konzorciju dodeljena selektivna prednost v primerjavi z „običajno“ obdavčitvijo, določeno v referenčnem sistemu. Zato pravilo o amortizaciji za obdobje 1991–1998 ni pomenilo državne pomoči za družbo A/S Øresund ali konzorcij. | (342) | The Commission, therefore, finds, that the 1991-1998 DEP did not constitute a derogation capable of resulting in a selective advantage to A/S Øresund, or, by extension, the Consortium, as compared to the ‘normal’ taxation set out in the system of reference. Therefore, the 1991-1998 DEP did not constitute State aid to A/S Øresund or to the Consortium. |
| Pravilo o amortizaciji za obdobje 1999–2007 in pravilo o amortizaciji za obdobje 2008–2015 | 1999-2007 DEP and 2008-2015 DEP |
| (343) | Komisija ugotavlja, da je bil 26. junija 1998 spremenjen danski zakon o davčni amortizaciji, tako da se je od davčnega leta 1999 običajna stopnja amortizacije za stavbe in naprave znižala na največ 5 % (člen 17 danskega zakona o davčni amortizaciji). Hkrati je bilo odpravljeno pravilo, po katerem je po desetih letih veljala 2-odstotna stopnja amortizacije. Danski zakon o amortizaciji je bil 6. junija 2007 dodatno spremenjen, tako da se je od davčnega leta 2008 običajna stopnja amortizacije za stavbe in naprave znižala na največ 4 % (uvodna izjava 145). Komisija ugotavlja, da je referenčni sistem v obdobju veljavnosti pravila o amortizaciji za obdobje 1999–2007 danski sistem davka od dohodkov pravnih oseb, vključno zlasti s členom 1 danskega zakona o davku od dohodkov pravnih oseb, skupaj s splošno veljavnimi pravili danskega zakona o davčni amortizaciji, ki določa stopnje, metode in morebitne omejitve amortizacije osnovnih sredstev. Navedena pravila so določala, da se lahko za namene ocene zneska davka od dohodkov pravnih oseb, ki ga mora plačati pravna oseba, zavezana plačilu navedenega davka (vključno z družbami z omejeno odgovornostjo), stavbe in naprave amortizirajo po 5-odstotni stopnji v obdobju veljavnosti pravila o amortizaciji za obdobje 1999–2007, v obdobju veljavnosti pravila o amortizaciji za obdobje 2008–2015 po 4-odstotni stopnji. Komisija meni, da zakonodajne spremembe z dne 26. junija 1998 in 6. junija 2007 niso vplivale na cilj tega okvira v primerjavi z obdobjem veljavnosti pravila o amortizaciji za obdobje 1991–1998. | (343) | The Commission notes that, on 26 June 1998, the Danish Tax Depreciation Act was amended, such that, as from the tax year 1999, the normal depreciation rate for buildings and installations decreased to a maximum of 5 % (Section 17 of the Danish Tax Depreciation Act). At the same time, the rule according to which a 2 % depreciation rate applied after ten years was abolished. On 6 June 2007, the Danish Tax Depreciation Act was amended further, such that, as from the tax year 2008, the normal depreciation rate for buildings and installations decreased to maximum 4 % (recital (145)). The Commission finds that the system of reference for the 1999-2007 DEP is the Danish corporate income tax system, including, in particular, Section 1 of the Danish Corporate Income Tax Act, combined with the generally applicable rules of the Danish Tax Depreciation Act, which provides for the rates, methods, and possible limitations for the depreciation of fixed assets. Those rules provided that, for the purposes of assessing the amount of corporate income tax payable by a legal entity subject to that tax (including limited liability companies), buildings and installations could be depreciated at a rate of 5 % for the 1999-2007 DEP period, and for the 2008-2015 DEP period at a rate of 4 %. The Commission does not consider that the legislative amendments of 26 June 1998 and 6 June 2007 impacted the objective of that framework, as compared to the 1991-1998 DEP period. |
| (344) | Drugič, te spremembe se niso odražale v zakonu o gradnji (ali pozneje v zakonu o družbi Sund & Bælt), v katerem se je ohranila 6- oziroma 2-odstotna stopnja na vsa osnovna sredstva. Komisija je v zvezi s tem najprej analizirala učinek 2-odstotne stopnje, ki se uporablja za družbo A/S Øresund, ko nabrana amortizacija doseže 60 %, in učinek nediferencirane amortizacije vseh osnovnih sredstev. Komisija v zvezi s prvo točko ugotavlja, da 2-odstotna stopnja v celotnem obdobju od ustanovitve družbe A/S Øresund in konzorcija do davčnega leta 2016 ni imela nobenega praktičnega pomena, saj skupni znesek sredstev konzorcija, ki bi ga lahko amortizirala družba A/S Øresund, še ni dosegel 60 % (uvodna izjava 271). V zvezi z drugo točko ugotavlja, da se je 6-odstotna stopnja amortizacije uporabljala za vsa osnovna sredstva konzorcija, za katero so veljala danska davčna pravila (tj. za 50-odstotni delež v lasti družbe A/S Øresund), ne da bi se razlikovalo med „stavbami in napravami“ ter drugimi sredstvi, za katera bi lahko veljala ugodnejša ureditev amortizacije v skladu z danskim zakonom o davčni amortizaciji. Danski organi so se v zvezi s tem sklicevali zlasti na železniške naprave, kot so tire, signalizacija in nadzemni kabli (uvodna izjava 144 in opomba 79), ugotovili pa so tudi, da se učinek uporabe hitrejše stopnje amortizacije za navedena sredstva nikoli ni podrobno proučil ali ocenil. Komisija meni, da je družba A/S Øresund, tudi če se ugodnejše ureditve amortizacije za nekatera sredstva niso uporabljale za družbo A/S Øresund in torej za njeno amortizacijo teh posebnih sredstev (projekt, ki v bistvu zajema izgradnjo mostu in predora), lahko amortizirala po višji stopnji, kot bi jo lahko v skladu z običajnimi pravili obdavčitve. Višja stopnja amortizacije lahko privede do hitrejše amortizacije sredstva, kar omogoča intenzivnejše zmanjšanje davčne osnove v prvih letih življenjske dobe sredstva; fiskalni učinek tega na celotno življenjsko dobo sredstva bi zato lahko bil primerljiv z brezplačnim posojilom. Komisija v zvezi s tem ugotavlja, da je pomembno upoštevati le obdobje do davčnega leta 2016, saj so od tega leta za družbo A/S Øresund veljala običajna pravila. Danski organi so družbi A/S Øresund s tem, ko se niso odločili za spremembo zakona o gradnji ali zakona o družbi Sund & Bælt, da bi uvedli podobno omejitev najvišje stopnje amortizacije za družbo A/S Øresund kot z običajnimi pravili, omogočili ugoden položaj v primerjavi z drugimi pravnimi osebami, zavezanimi plačilu danskega davka od dohodkov pravnih oseb. Zato je treba kombinacijo sprememb danskega zakona o davčni amortizaciji in odsotnost ustreznih sprememb zakona o gradnji ali zakona o družbi Sund & Bælt šteti za ukrep v korist družbe A/S Øresund. Komisija meni, da se je za družbo A/S Øresund uporabljalo odstopanje od referenčnega sistema, saj sta pravilo o amortizaciji za obdobje 1999–2007 in pravilo o amortizaciji za obdobje 2008–2015 iz razlogov, pojasnjenih v uvodni izjavi 327, glede na cilj referenčnega sistema razlikovali med gospodarskimi subjekti, ki so v primerljivem dejanskem in pravnem položaju. | (344) | Second, those changes were not reflected in the Construction Act (or, later, the Sund & Bælt Act), which maintained the rate of 6 % / 2 % on the entire asset base. Inthat context, the Commission first analysed the effect of the 2 % rate applicable to A/S Øresund, once the accumulated depreciation reaches 60 % and the effect of the non-differentiated deprecation of the entire asset base. On the first point, the Commission notes that, for the entire period from the establishment of A/S Øresund and the Consortium, until the tax year 2016, the 2 % rate was not of any practical relevance, since the overall amount of the Consortium’s assets that could be depreciated by A/S Øresund had not yet reached 60 % (recital (271)). On the second point, the Commission notes that the 6 % depreciation rate applied to the Consortium’s entire asset base that was subject to Danish tax rules (that is, the 50 % owned by A/S Øresund), without differentiating between ‘buildings and installations’ and other assets that might potentially have a more favourable depreciation regime in the Danish Tax Depreciation Act. In that context, the Danish authorities, in particular, referred to railroad installations, such a tracks, signals and overhead cables (recital (144) and footnote 79), but also noted that the effect of applying a faster rate of depreciation on those assets had never been examined or estimated in detail. The Commission considers that, even if more favourable depreciation regimes on certain assets were not applicable to A/S Øresund, and therefore, to its depreciation of those specific assets, for the large majority of its assets (the project consisting of, essentially, the construction of a bridge and a tunnel), A/S Øresund was allowed to depreciate at a higher rate than it would have been able to under normal taxation rules. A higher rate of depreciation can lead to the faster depreciation of an asset, which allows the reduction of the tax base to occur more intensely in the early years of an asset’s life; the fiscal effect of this over the total lifespan of the asset, therefore, could be comparable to a free loan. The Commission notes, in this context, that it is only relevant to consider the period until the tax year 2016, since, as from that year, A/S Øresund was subject to the normal rules. By declining to amend the Construction Act, or the Sund & Bælt Act, to impose a similar limitation on the maximum rate of depreciation for A/S Øresund as under the normal rules, the Danish authorities allowed it to enjoy an advantageous position over other legal entities subject to Danish corporate income tax. The combination of the amendments to the Danish Tax Depreciation Act, and the absence of corresponding amendments to the Construction Act or the Sund & Bælt Act, therefore, must be considered as constituting a measure in favour of A/S Øresund. The Commission considers that A/S Øresund enjoyed a derogation from the system of reference, as, for the reasons explained at recital (327), the 1999-2007 DEP and 2008-2015 DEP differentiated between economic operators that are in a comparable factual and legal situation in light of the objective of the system of reference. |
| (345) | Kot je navedeno v uvodni izjavi 329, so danski organi med predhodno preiskavo trdili, da se lahko posebna danska pravila o prenosu izgub v prihodnje obdobje in amortizaciji štejejo za utemeljena z logiko referenčnega sistema zaradi izredne narave projekta stalne povezave v smislu njegove velikosti in namena, zaradi česar ga ni mogoče primerjati z nobenim drugim projektom, za katerega je treba plačati danski davek od dohodkov pravnih oseb. Kot je navedeno v uvodni izjavi 329, Komisija meni, da narava projekta stalne povezave glede na naravo in splošno shemo referenčnega sistema ne upravičuje drugačne obravnave družbe A/S Øresund. Danski organi po sklepu o začetku postopka niso predložili nobenih dodatnih dokazov, ki bi spremenili stališče Komisije. Komisija zato ugotavlja, da pravilo o prenosu izgub za obdobje 2013–2015 ne pomeni upravičenega odstopanja od uporabe referenčnega sistema, ki bi neposredno izhajalo iz osnovnih ali vodilnih načel danskega sistema davka od dohodkov pravnih oseb. | (345) | As noted at recital (329), the Danish authorities had argued, during the course of the preliminary investigation, that the special Danish rules on loss carry-forward and depreciation can be regarded as justified by the logic of the system of reference, due to the extraordinary character of the Fixed Link project in terms of its size and purpose, making it incomparable to any other project subject to Danish corporate income tax. As noted at recital (329), the Commission does not consider that the character of the Fixed Link project would justify a different treatment for A/S Øresund, in view of the nature and general scheme of the system of reference. Following the Opening decision, the Danish authorities did not submit any further evidence that would alter the Commission’s view. The Commission, therefore, concludes that the 2013-2015 LCF does not constitute a justified derogation to the application of the system of reference, directly resulting from the basic or guiding principles of the Danish corporate income tax system. |
| (346) | Komisija zato ugotavlja, da je bila družbi A/S Øresund zaradi pravila o amortizaciji za obdobje 1999–2007 in pravila o amortizaciji za obdobje 2008–2015 dodeljena selektivna prednost. Kot je navedeno v uvodni izjavi 319, bi bil konzorcij upravičenec do kakršne koli selektivne prednosti, ki bi izhajala iz posebnih danskih pravil o prenosu izgub v prihodnje obdobje in amortizaciji, saj družba A/S Øresund in konzorcij tvorita enotno podjetje za namene gospodarske dejavnosti stalne povezave. Zato Komisija ugotavlja, da je bila konzorciju zaradi pravila o amortizaciji za obdobje 1999–2007 in pravila o amortizaciji za obdobje 2008–2015 dodeljena selektivna prednost. | (346) | The Commission, therefore, concludes that the 1999-2007 DEP and the 2008-2015 DEP resulted in a selective advantage to A/S Øresund. As noted at recital (319), the Consortium would be a beneficiary of any selective advantage created by the special Danish rules on loss carry-forward and depreciation, in view of the fact that both A/S Øresund and the Consortium form a single undertaking for the purpose of the economic activity of the Fixed Link. Therefore, the Commission concludes that the 1999-2007 DEP and the 2008-2015 DEP resulted in a selective advantage to the Consortium. |
| (347) | Komisija opozarja, da so bila posebna danska pravila o amortizaciji razveljavljena z učinkom od 1. januarja 2016, po tem pa se je za družbo A/S Øresund uporabljal običajen danski sistem davka od dohodkov pravnih oseb (uvodna izjava 134). Zato ugotavlja, da družba A/S Øresund ali konzorcij od navedenega datuma, kar zadeva pravila o amortizaciji, nista prejela nobene dodatne selektivne prednosti. | (347) | The Commission recalls that the special Danish rules on depreciation were repealed with effect from 1 January 2016, following which A/S Øresund has been subject to the normal Danish corporate income tax system (recital (134)). The Commission, therefore, notes that no further selective advantage in favour of A/S Øresund or the Consortium, in respect of the rules on depreciation, has been in place since that date. |
| 6.1.4 Izkrivljanje konkurence in vpliv na trgovino med državami članicami | 6.1.4. Distortion of competition and effect on trade between the Member States |
| (348) | Če pomoč, ki jo dodeli država članica, okrepi položaj posameznega podjetja v primerjavi z drugimi konkurenčnimi podjetji v trgovini znotraj Unije, se šteje, da pomoč vpliva na trgovino med državami članicami (178). Za ukrep, ki ga dodeli država, se šteje, da izkrivlja ali bi lahko izkrivljal konkurenco, kadar bi lahko izboljšal konkurenčni položaj prejemnika v primerjavi s konkurenti. | (348) | Aid granted by a Member State that strengthens the position of an undertaking as compared to other undertakings competing in intra-Union trade must be regarded as affecting trade between Member States (178). A measure granted by the State is considered to distort or threaten to distort competition when it is liable to improve the competitive position of the recipient, compared to its competitors. |
| (349) | Komisija je v uvodni izjavi 97 sklepa o začetku postopka predhodno ugotovila, da je, ne da bi bilo treba odločiti, ali bi ukrepi lahko izkrivljali konkurenco in vplivali na trgovino med državami članicami na trgu gradnje in obratovanja (čezmejnih) mostov, jasno, da lahko dodelitev selektivne prednosti okrepi položaj konzorcija na trgu prevoznih storitev za prečkanje ožine Øresund v primerjavi z drugimi podjetji, kot so zlasti operaterji trajektnih prevozov. | (349) | At recital 97 of the Opening decision, the Commission preliminarily concluded that, without it being necessary to decide whether the measures are liable to distort competition and affect trade between Member States on the market for construction and operation of (cross-border) bridges, it is clear that the grant of a selective advantage may strengthen the position of the Consortium on the market for transport services to cross the Øresund strait, compared to other undertakings, such as, in particular, ferry operators. |
| (350) | Konzorcij je dejaven na trgu gradnje in obratovanja (179) (čezmejnih) mostov ter na trgu prevoznih storitev za prečkanje ožine Øresund. Na slednjem v trgovini med državami članicami konkurira podjetjem, ki opravljajo alternativne prevozne storitve, zlasti trajektne storitve. | (350) | The Consortium is active on the market for the construction and operation (179) of (cross border) bridges and on the market for transport services to cross the Øresund strait. On the latter, the Consortium competes in trade between Member States with undertakings providing alternative transport services, ferry services, in particular. |
| (351) | Iz pripravljalnih opomb k zakonu o gradnji je razvidno, da bi promet na stalni povezavi poleg na novo ustvarjenega prometa obsegal tudi obstoječi promet na južnih trajektnih poteh čez ožino Øresund in preusmeritev prometa z drugih trajektnih poti čez ožino Øresund ter s trajektnih poti čez Kattegat in Baltsko morje. Poleg tega je bil danski minister za promet pooblaščen, da po začetku uporabe stalne povezave ukine obstoječe trajektne storitve danske državne uprave za železnico čez ožino Øresund (razen prevozov med Helsingørjem na Danskem in Helsingborgom na Švedskem). V predlogu zakona št. 1990/91:158 je bilo navedeno, da naj bi trajektna storitev na relaciji Helsingør–Helsingborg še naprej delovala, tudi če bi se del prometa prenesel na stalno povezavo. Za vse druge trajektne storitve na območju Øresunda se je domnevalo, da se bodo prenehale izvajati. V predlogu zakona št. 1990/91:158 je bila omenjena tudi konkurenca trajektnih storitev na drugih poteh med Švedsko, Nemčijo in Jutlandijo na Danskem. | (351) | It is clear from the preparatory notes to the Construction Act that the traffic on the Fixed Link would consist, in addition to newly generated traffic, of the existing traffic on the southern ferry routes on the Øresund, the shift of traffic from other ferry routes in the Øresund, as well as from the ferry routes over the Kattegat and the Baltic Sea. In addition, the Danish Minister for Transport was authorised to close down the existing Danish State Rail Administration ferry service across the Øresund (other than the service between Helsingør, Denmark and Helsingborg, Sweden), after the Fixed Link had been put into service. Government bill 1990/91:158 noted that the Helsingør – Helsingborg ferry service was assumed to remain operating even if part of the traffic would be transferred to the Fixed Link. All other ferry services across the Øresund, however, were assumed to cease operating. Government bill 1990/91:158 also made reference to competition from ferry services on other routes between Sweden, Germany and Jutland, Denmark. |
| (352) | Poleg tega so v letnih poročilih konzorcija navedeni podatki o tržnem deležu, kar je močan pokazatelj konkurence. Letno poročilo 2005 vsebuje podatke o razvoju potniškega prometa čez ožino Øresund v obdobju 1999–2005. Podatki kažejo, da se je storitev na relaciji Dragør–Limhamn nazadnje opravljala leta 1999, koristilo pa jo je 1,6 milijona potnikov. Število potnikov, prepeljanih s hidrogliserji na relaciji København–Skåne, se je s 3,6 milijona potnikov leta 1999 zmanjšalo na 150 000 leta 2002, nato pa se je storitev prenehala izvajati. Število potnikov, ki je uporabljajo storitve pritožnika, se je s 14,3 milijona leta 1999 zmanjšalo na 13,3 milijona leta 2000 in nato na 11,5 milijona leta 2001. | (352) | Moreover, the Consortium’s annual reports provide market share figures, which, as such, is a strong indication of competition. The 2005 annual report provides data on the evolution of passenger traffic across Øresund between 1999 and 2005. The data show that the Dragør-Limhamn service had its last year of operation in 1999, with 1,6 million passengers. The number of passengers served by the ‘Hydrofoils Copenhagen – Skåne’ dropped from 3,6 million passengers in 1999 to 150 000 in 2002, after which it stopped operating. The number of passengers served by the Complainant dropped from 14.3 million in 1999 to 13,3 million in 2000, and, further, to 11,5 million in 2001. |
| (353) | Komisija meni, da ugotovitve, kot so opisane v uvodnih izjavah 351 in 352, dokazujejo potencialno konkurenco med stalno povezavo in operaterji trajektnih prevozov, ki opravljajo trajektne prevoze prek ožine Øresund. Ukrepi, ki konzorciju dajejo selektivno prednost, so lahko okrepili njegov finančni položaj in posledično izkrivljali navedeno konkurenco. Konzorcij in operaterji trajektnih prevozov delujejo na trgu opravljanja prevoznih storitev čez ožino Øresund med Dansko in Švedsko, navedena konkurenca vpliva na trgovino med državami članicami. | (353) | The Commission considers that the findings as described at recitals (351) and (352) evidence the potential competition that exists between the Fixed Link and ferry operators, operating ferry routes across the Øresund. The measures that confer a selective advantage on the Consortium were liable to strengthen the Consortium’s financial position, and, as a result, to distort that competition. Since the Consortium and the ferry operators are operating on a market providing transport services across the Øresund, between Denmark and Sweden, that competition affects trade between Member States. |
| (354) | Komisija glede na navedeno meni, da se lahko šteje, da ukrepi, ki vključujejo selektivno prednost, vplivajo na trgovino znotraj Unije in lahko izkrivljajo konkurenco. | (354) | In light of the foregoing, the Commission considers that the measures entailing a selective advantage may be considered as affecting intra-Union trade and are liable to distort competition. |
| 6.1.5 Sklepna ugotovitev glede obstoja pomoči | 6.1.5. Conclusion on the existence of aid |
| (355) | Komisija na podlagi ocene iz uvodnih izjav 287 do 354 ugotavlja, da model državnega poroštva, v skladu s katerim sta se državi trajno zavezali, da bosta jamčili za finančne instrumente za financiranje stalne povezave, ter ki sta ga Danska in Švedska odobrili konzorciju, pomeni državno pomoč v smislu člena 107(1) PDEU. Ugotavlja tudi, da pravilo o prenosu izgub za obdobje 1991–2001, pravilo o prenosu izgub za obdobje 2013–2015, pravilo o amortizaciji za obdobje 1999–2007 in pravilo o amortizaciji za obdobje 2008–2015, ki jih je Danska odobrila družbi A/S Øresund in na podlagi katerih je bila družbi A/S Øresund in s tem konzorciju kot delu enotnega podjetja za namene gospodarske dejavnosti stalne povezave (uvodna izjava 319) dodeljena selektivna prednost, pomenijo državno pomoč konzorciju v smislu člena 107(1) PDEU. Pravilo o prenosu izgub za obdobje 2002–2012 in pravilo o amortizaciji za obdobje 1991–1998 ne pomenita državne pomoči konzorciju v smislu člena 107(1) PDEU. | (355) | On the basis of its assessment at recitals (287) to (354), the Commission concludes that the State guarantee model, according to which the States provided an enduring commitment to guarantee the financial instruments for the financing of the Fixed Link, and which Denmark and Sweden granted to the Consortium, constitutes State aid within the meaning of Article 107(1) TFEU. The Commission also concludes that the 1991-2001 LCF, the 2013-2015 LCF, the 1999-2007 DEP, and the 2008-2015 DEP, which Denmark granted to A/S Øresund, and which result in an advantage to A/S Øresund and, therefore, the Consortium as part of the same single undertaking for the purpose of the economic activity of the Fixed Link (recital (319)), constitute State aid to the Consortium within the meaning of Article 107(1) TFEU. The 2002-2012 LCF and the 1991-1998 DEP do not constitute State aid to the Consortium within the meaning of Article 107(1) TFEU. |
| 6.2 Opredelitev kot shema ali individualna pomoč | 6.2. Classification as a scheme or individual aid |
| (356) | Komisija je v uvodni izjavi 108 sklepa o začetku postopka izrazila dvome o tem, ali bi bilo treba državna poroštva šteti za shemo pomoči, ali bi jih bilo treba šteti za individualno pomoč, dodeljeno ob ustanovitvi konzorcija, ali pa bi jih bilo treba šteti za individualno pomoč, dodeljeno vsakič, ko nacionalni organi odobrijo finančno transakcijo konzorcija. V uvodni izjavi 107 sklepa o začetku postopka je navedla svoje predhodno stališče, da upravljanja poroštev v zvezi z določenimi finančnimi transakcijami ni mogoče obravnavati ločeno od državnih poroštev, dodeljenih leta 1992, v uvodni izjavi 109 pa je opozorila, da bi bilo treba njeno predhodno opredelitev poroštev kot individualne pomoči uporabiti tudi za davčne ukrepe. Glede na to, da ni mogla sprejeti sklepa o vprašanju, ali podporni ukrepi pomenijo shemo ali individualne ukrepe pomoči, ni mogla sprejeti niti sklepa o datumu odobritve poroštev in davčnih ukrepov ali o njihovem številu. | (356) | In the Opening decision, at recital 108, the Commission expressed doubts as to whether the State guarantees should be considered as an aid scheme, whether they should be considered as individual aid, granted when the Consortium was established, or whether they should be considered as individual aid, granted each time a financial transaction of the Consortium is approved by the national authorities. At recital 107 of the Opening decision, the Commission stated its preliminary view that the administration of the guarantees in relation to specific financial transactions cannot be considered in isolation from the State guarantees granted in 1992, and, at recital 109, the Commission noted that its preliminary qualification of the guarantees as individual aids should also be applied to the tax measures. Given that the Commission could not conclude on the question of whether the support measures constitute a scheme or individual aid measures, it could not conclude either on the date at which the guarantees and the tax measures were granted, as well as their number. |
| (357) | Da bi Komisija ugotovila, ali ukrepi izpolnjujejo pogoje za sheme pomoči ali ukrepe individualne pomoči, mora proučiti naravo ukrepov ob upoštevanju opredelitev iz Uredbe (EU) 2015/1589. | (357) | To determine whether the aid measures qualify as aid schemes or individual aid, the Commission must examine the nature of the aid measures, in light of the definitions set out in Regulation 2015/1589. |
| (358) | V skladu s členom 1(d) Uredbe (EU) 2015/1589 „‚shema pomoči‘ pomeni vsak akt, na podlagi katerega je mogoče brez nadaljnjih izvedbenih ukrepov dodeliti individualno pomoč podjetjem, opredeljenim v aktu na splošen in abstrakten način, in kateri koli akt, na podlagi katerega je mogoče dodeliti pomoč, ki ni povezana z določenim projektom, enemu ali več podjetjem za nedoločen čas in/ali v nedoločenem znesku“. | (358) | According to Article 1(d) of Regulation 2015/1589,‘“aid scheme” means any act on the basis of which, without further implementing measures being required, individual aid awards may be made to undertakings defined within the act in a general and abstract manner and any act on the basis of which aid which is not linked to a specific project may be awarded to one or several undertakings for an indefinite period of time and/or for an indefinite amount’. |
| (359) | Nasprotno je individualna pomoč v členu 1(e) Uredbe (EU) 2015/1589 opredeljena kot „pomoč, ki ni dodeljena na podlagi sheme pomoči, in pomoč, ki jo je treba uradno prijaviti, dodeljen[a] na podlagi sheme pomoči“. | (359) | In contrast, ‘individual aid’ is defined at Article 1(e) of Regulation 2015/1589 as ‘aid that is not awarded on the basis of an aid scheme and notifiable awards of aid on the basis of an aid scheme’. |
| 6.2.1 Model državnega poroštva | 6.2.1. The State guarantee model |
| 6.2.1.1 Shema ali individualna pomoč | 6.2.1.1. Scheme or individual aid |
| (360) | Komisija je v uvodni izjavi 103 sklepa o začetku postopka menila, da za prvo situacijo iz opredelitve sheme pomoči ni mogoče šteti, da se uporablja za model državnega poroštva, saj zadevni model ni namenjen „podjetjem, opredeljenim v aktu na splošen in abstrakten način“, temveč zlasti konzorciju. Državi ali zainteresirane strani niso predložili nasprotnih argumentov. Kot je navedeno v uvodni izjavi 169, so se pritožnik ter družbi Scandlines in drugi sklicevali na sodbo v zadevi Øresund v podporo svojemu stališču, da model državnega poroštva ne more pomeniti sheme. Po mnenju pritožnika Komisija ne bi smela niti oceniti, ali bi model državnega poroštva lahko pomenil shemo (uvodna izjava 169). Vendar Komisija ugotavlja, da je taka analiza potrebna, ker je Splošno sodišče sklep iz leta 2014 razglasilo za ničnega v zvezi s posebnimi danskimi pravili o prenosu izgub v prihodnje obdobje in amortizaciji ter državnimi poroštvi, dodeljenimi konzorciju (uvodna izjava 12). Komisija je sodbo v zadevi Øresund uveljavila z začetkom formalnega postopka preiskave, v katerem je bila narava ukrepov kot individualne pomoči ali sheme izrecna podlaga za začetek navedenega postopka (uvodna izjava 155). | (360) | The Commission considered at recital 103 of the Opening decision that the first situation included in the definition of an aid scheme cannot be considered applicable to the State guarantee model as it is not aimed at ‘undertakings defined within the act in a general and abstract manner’, but at the Consortium, specifically. Neither the States, nor any interested party, submitted arguments to the contrary. As noted at recital (169), the Complainant and Scandlines et al. referred to the Øresund judgment to support their view that the State guarantee model cannot constitute a scheme. According to the Complainant, the Commission should not even assess whether the State guarantee model could constitute a scheme (recital (169)). The Commission notes, however, that such analysis is required since the General Court annulled the 2014 decision with regard to the special Danish rules on loss carry-forward and depreciation, and the State guarantees granted to the Consortium (recital (12)). The Commission gave effect to the Øresund judgment by opening the formal investigation procedure in which the nature of measures as individual aid or a scheme was an explicit ground for opening that procedure (recital (155)). |
| (361) | Komisija po formalni preiskavi ugotavlja, da državne pomoči, ki izhaja iz modela državnega poroštva, ni mogoče šteti za shemo, kot je podrobneje pojasnjeno v uvodnih izjavah 362 in 363. | (361) | Following its formal investigation, the Commission concludes that the State aid deriving from the State guarantee model cannot be considered as a scheme, as explained further at recitals (362) and (363). |
| (362) | Prvič, pomoč, ki izhaja iz modela državnega poroštva, se ne dodeli na podlagi akta, ki določa, da se individualna pomoč dodeli podjetjem, opredeljenim v aktu na splošen in abstrakten način. Zakon o gradnji določa posebno pravilo, ki se uporablja posebej za konzorcij. Model državnega poroštva zato ne izpolnjuje prvega pogoja iz opredelitve sheme pomoči iz člena 1(d) Uredbe (EU) 2015/1589. | (362) | First, the aid deriving from the State guarantee model is not granted on the basis of an act that provides for individual aid awards to be made to undertakings defined within the act in a general and abstract manner. The Construction Act provides for a special rule applicable specifically to the Consortium. The State guarantee model, therefore, does not fulfil the first condition in the definition of an aid scheme as set out at Article 1(d) of Regulation 2015/1589. |
| (363) | Drugič, v zakonu o gradnji je zadevni projekt izrecno opredeljen kot financiranje stalne povezave. Državi in zainteresirane strani menijo, da je pomoč, ki izhaja iz modela državnega poroštva, povezana z navedenim določenim projektom. Komisija ugotavlja, da člen 2 medvladnega sporazuma določa, da se stalna povezava zgradi kot kombinirana cestna in železniška povezava, ki je sestavljena iz dvotirne železniške proge in štiripasovne avtoceste, ter da poteka od umetnega polotoka na letališču Kastrup in prek ožine Øresund po potopljenem predoru do umetnega otoka, od tam pa se po kombiniranem visokem in nizkem mostu priključi Švedski južno od Linhamna. Poleg tega Priloga 1 k medvladnemu sporazumu vsebuje podroben opis tehnične zasnove stalne povezave. Projekt je bil v času, ko je bil model državnega poroštva vzpostavljen in vključen v sporazum o konzorciju, z vidika geografske lokacije in tehnične zasnove torej zelo natančno in jasno opredeljen. Poleg tega je Splošno sodišče v sodbi v zadevi Øresund izrecno menilo, da je treba za pomoč v zvezi z državnimi poroštvi šteti, da je povezana z določenim projektom (180). Komisija zato ugotavlja, da je model državnega poroštva povezan z določenim projektom in da zato ne izpolnjuje drugega pogoja iz opredelitve sheme pomoči iz člena 1(d) Uredbe (EU) 2015/1589. | (363) | Second, the Construction Act explicitly specifies the project concerned as the financing of the Fixed Link. Both the States and the interested parties consider that the aid deriving from the State guarantee model is linked to that specific project. The Commission notes that Article 2 of the Intergovernmental Agreement specifies that the Fixed Link shall be built as a combined road and rail link, consisting of a twin-track railway and a four-lane motorway, and that it shall extend from an artificial peninsula at Kastrup Airport and cross the Øresund strait via an immersed tunnel to an artificial island and from there proceed as a combined high- and low bridge to join Sweden to the south of Linhamn. In addition, Annex 1 to the Intergovernmental Agreement provides a detailed description of the technical design of the Fixed Link. Thus, at the time when the State guarantee model was set up and integrated into the Consortium Agreement, the project was, both in terms of geographical location and technical design, very specifically and clearly defined. Moreover, in the Øresund judgment, the General Court explicitly considered that the aid relating to the State guarantees must be regarded as linked to a specific project (180). The Commission, therefore, concludes that the State guarantee model is linked to a specific project and that, therefore, the State guarantee model does not fulfil the second condition in the definition of an aid scheme as set out at Article 1(d) of Regulation 2015/1589. |
| (364) | Komisija glede na navedeno ugotavlja, da pomoč, ki izhaja iz modela državnega poroštva, ne ustreza opredelitvi sheme pomoči iz člena 1(d) Uredbe (EU) 2015/1589. | (364) | In light of the foregoing the Commission concludes that aid deriving from the State guarantee model does not fulfil the definition of an aid scheme as set out at Article 1(d) of Regulation 2015/1589. |
| (365) | Pomoč, ki izhaja iz modela državnega poroštva, bi bilo zato treba opredeliti kot enega ali več individualnih ukrepov pomoči v smislu člena 1(e) Uredbe (EU) 2015/1589. | (365) | The aid deriving from the State guarantee model should, therefore, be qualified as one or more individual aid measures, within the meaning of Article 1(e) of Regulation 2015/1589. |
| 6.2.1.2 Datum dodelitve | 6.2.1.2. Granting date |
| (366) | Ugotoviti je treba še, ali model državnega poroštva zajema individualno pomoč, dodeljeno ob ustanovitvi konzorcija, ali pa zajema vrsto individualnih ukrepov pomoči, odobrenih vsakič, ko državi jamčita za finančno transakcijo konzorcija. | (366) | It remains to be determined whether the State guarantee model consists of individual aid granted when the Consortium was established, or whether it consists of a series of individual aid measures, granted each time a financial transaction of the Consortium is guaranteed by the States. |
| (367) | Na podlagi sodne prakse sodišč Unije (181) je uveljavljeni datum dodelitve pomoči datum, ko se zakonska pravica do prejema pomoči prenese na upravičenca na podlagi veljavne nacionalne ureditve. | (367) | Based on the case-law of the Union courts (181), it is well established that the aid granting date refers to the date when the legal right to receive the aid is conferred on the beneficiary under the applicable national regime. |
| (368) | Kot je navedeno v uvodni izjavi 85, je bilo solidarno poroštvo za vsa posojila in druge finančne instrumente, ki jih je konzorcij najel v zvezi s financiranjem stalne povezave, vzpostavljeno leta 1991 s členom 12 medvladnega sporazuma, ki ga je Švedska ratificirala 8. avgusta 1991, Danska pa 24. avgusta 1991 (uvodna izjava 61). Obveznost poroštva, ki izhaja iz medvladnega sporazuma, je bila v švedsko in dansko nacionalno zakonodajo prenesena leta 1991 z zakonom o gradnji in sklepom švedskega parlamenta (uvodna izjava 63). V sporazumu o konzorciju se opozarja na to obveznost poroštva, ki jo imata državi do konzorcija. Člen 4(3) sporazuma o konzorciju določa pravno podlago za financiranje stalne povezave: „Kapitalske zahteve konzorcija za načrtovanje, zasnovo projekta in gradnjo [stalne povezave], vključno s stroški servisiranja posojil in za kritje kapitalskih zahtev, ki izvirajo iz računovodske izgube, ki se predvideva za nekaj let po odprtju [stalne povezave] za promet, je treba v skladu z določbami [medvladnega sporazuma] izpolniti z najetjem posojil ali izdajo finančnih instrumentov na odprtem trgu, ki bodo zavarovana s poroštvom švedske in danske vlade“ (uvodna izjava 90). | (368) | As stated at recital (85), the joint and several guarantee of all loans and other financial instruments taken out by the Consortium in connection with the financing of the Fixed Link, was established in 1991, with Article 12 of the Intergovernmental Agreement, which was ratified by Sweden on 8 August 1991 and by Denmark on 24 August 1991 (recital (61)). The guarantee obligation deriving from the Intergovernmental Agreement was implemented in Swedish and Danish national legislation in 1991, by the Construction Act and the Swedish Parliament decision (recital (63)). The Consortium Agreement recalls the States’ guarantee obligation to the Consortium. Section 4(3) of the Consortium Agreement provides the legal basis for the financing of the Fixed Link: ‘The Consortium’s capital requirements for the planning, project design and construction of the [Fixed Link], including loan servicing costs, and for covering the capital requirements arising as a consequence of book losses which are expected to occur for a number of years after the [Fixed Link] has been opened to traffic, shall, in accordance with that agreed in the [Intergovernmental Agreement], be satisfied by obtaining loans or the issuance of financial instruments in the open market with security in the form of Swedish and Danish government guarantees’ (recital (90)). |
| (369) | Konzorcij bi lahko na podlagi določb sporazuma o konzorciju za financiranje faz načrtovanja in gradnje stalne povezave najel posojila, zavarovana z državnim poroštvom. V prvih letih po začetku obratovanja stalne povezave bi lahko svoj dolg še povečal s posojili, zavarovanimi s poroštvom. Ta določba je bila potrebna, ker se je pričakovalo, da bo stalna povezava v prvih letih ustvarjala izgubo. To pomeni, da poslovni dobiček v prvih letih konzorciju ne bi zadostoval za kritje stroškov financiranja dolga, ki bi ga ustvaril v fazi načrtovanja in gradnje. Zato bi se moral konzorcij v prvih letih dodatno zadolžiti. Vendar sporazum o konzorciju ni določal pravice do nobenih dodatnih poroštev za financiranje obratovanja stalne povezave. Državi sta v zvezi s tem potrdili, da za financiranje obratovanja stalne povezave niso bila izdana nobena državna poroštva. Iz letnih poročil konzorcija je razvidno, da so prihodki od prvega leta delovanja presegli stroške poslovanja in da je bil poslovni dobiček pozitiven. Navedeni poslovni dobiček je bil do vključno leta 2003 pozitiven, vendar je bil nižji od stroškov financiranja, zato se je dolg povečal. Od leta 2004 je zadoščal za prispevek k zmanjšanju dolga, zato se je skupni dolg vsako leto zmanjšal. | (369) | On the basis of the provisions of the Consortium Agreement, the Consortium could take out State guaranteed loans to finance the planning and construction phases of the Fixed Link. The Consortium could further increase its debt by guaranteed loans in the first years after the Fixed Link had been put into service. This provision was necessary since it was expected that the Fixed Link would be loss making for the first number of years. This means that the operating profit, in the first years, would not be sufficient for the Consortium to cover the financing costs on the debt it would have built up during the planning and construction phases. Therefore, during the first number of years, the Consortium would need to incur further debt. The Consortium Agreement, however, did not provide for a right to any further guarantees to finance the operations of the Fixed Link. In this context, the States confirmed that no State guarantees have been provided to finance the operations of the Fixed Link. It is clear from the Consortium’s annual reports that the revenues, as from the first year of operation, exceeded the operating costs and the operating profit was positive. Up to and including 2003, that operating profit was, although positive, smaller than the financing cost and therefore, the debt increased. As from 2004, the operating profit was sufficient to contribute to debt reduction, and, consequently, the overall debt was reduced, year by year. |
| (370) | Vendar bi lahko konzorcij ne glede na analizo iz uvodne izjave 369 na podlagi določb sporazuma o konzorciju državna poroštva uporabil za refinanciranje svojega dolga (v zvezi s fazo načrtovanja in gradnje) v operativni fazi. Vendar to ne pomeni, da je sporazum o konzorciju državama omogočil financiranje obratovanja stalne povezave. To je razvidno tudi iz oddelka 6 sporazuma o konzorciju, v skladu s katerim naj bi se vsi stroški načrtovanja, zasnove projekta, financiranja, gradnje, obratovanja in vzdrževanja stalne povezave krili s prihodki iz poslovanja. Z drugimi besedami, prihodki iz poslovanja ne bi smeli zadostovati le za kritje stroškov poslovanja, ampak za kritje vseh stroškov stalne povezave, vključno s stroški gradnje in s tem povezanimi stroški financiranja stalne povezave (in povezav z zaledjem). Komisija ugotavlja, da ta točka v sklepu iz leta 2014 ni bila jasna. V uvodni izjavi 50 sklepa iz leta 2014 sta bili navedeni dve državni poroštvi „za posojila, ki jih je [konzorcij] najel za financiranje gradnje in obratovanja infrastrukturnega projekta [stalne povezave]“. Na tej podlagi je Splošno sodišče v sodbi v zadevi Øresund (182) menilo, da se lahko z državnimi poroštvi krijejo stroški poslovanja, nastali v operativni fazi. Ta točka je bila dodatno pojasnjena med formalnim postopkom preiskave. | (370) | However, notwithstanding the analysis at recital (369), the Consortium could, based on the provisions of the Consortium Agreement, use the State guarantees to refinance its debt (relating to the planning and the construction phases), during the operational phase. This, however, does not mean that the Consortium Agreement provided for the possibility for the States to finance the operations of the Fixed Link. This is also clear from Section 6 of the Consortium Agreement, according to which the entire cost of planning, project design, financing, construction, operation and maintenance of the Fixed Link was to be covered by the operating revenues. In other words, the operating revenues should not only be sufficient to cover the operating costs, but should be sufficient to cover the entire cost of the Fixed Link, including the construction and related financing costs of the Fixed Link (and the hinterland connections). The Commission notes that this point was not clear in the 2014 decision. Recital 50 of the 2014 decision referred to two State guarantees ‘for loans that the Consortium had taken out in order to finance the construction and operation of the [Fixed Link] infrastructure project’. It was on this basis that the General Court, in the Øresund judgment (182), considered that the State guarantees could cover operating costs incurred during the operational phase. This point was further clarified during the formal investigation procedure. |
| (371) | Komisija glede na navedeno meni, da model državnega poroštva, vključno z osnovnimi sporazumi o poroštvih, ne zajema obratovanja stalne povezave. Namesto tega zagotavlja financiranje naložb v načrtovanje in gradnjo stalne povezave. | (371) | In light of the foregoing, the Commission considers that the State guarantee model, including the underlying guarantee agreements, does not cover the operations of the Fixed Link. Rather, it guarantees the financing for investment in the planning and construction of the Fixed Link. |
| (372) | Državi sta predložili dodatna pojasnila o upravljanju obveznosti državnega poroštva. Na Švedskem sta bili pristojnost in obveznost skupnega dodeljevanja poroštev za vsa finančna sredstva, ki jih konzorcij potrebuje v zvezi z načrtovanjem in gradnjo stalne povezave, preneseni na švedski urad za javni dolg (uvodna izjava 91). Na Danskem sta bili ta pristojnost in obveznost preneseni na dansko nacionalno banko (uvodna izjava 95). Švedski urad za javni dolg in danska nacionalna banka opredelita splošni okvir za politiko financiranja konzorcija in nadzorujeta izvajanje obveznosti državnega poroštva, kadar konzorcij podpiše nove posojilne pogodbe ali uporabi druge finančne instrumente v zvezi s financiranjem stalne povezave. Sporazum o sodelovanju iz leta 1997 in sporazum o sodelovanju iz leta 2004 (uvodne izjave 97 do 102) vsebujeta številne formalne pogoje, pravice in obveznosti pogodbenic. Sporazuma o sodelovanju državama omogočata, da spremljata in vplivata na politiko financiranja konzorcija ter zagotovita, da konzorcij ne preseže svojih pooblastil in da se upošteva politika financiranja, ki zmanjšuje dolgoročno tveganje držav. Po mnenju držav se je s tem mehanizmom državama omogočilo tudi, da zagotovita, da pomoč, dodeljena konzorciju, ne presega tistega, kar je potrebno. | (372) | The States provided further clarifications on the administration of the State guarantee obligation. In Sweden, the competence and obligation to jointly assign guarantees for all financing needed by the Consortium in relation to the planning and construction of the Fixed Link has been delegated to the Swedish National Debt Office (recital (91)). In Denmark, this competence and obligation has been delegated to the Danish National Bank (recital (95)). The Swedish National Debt Office and the Danish National Bank define the general framework for the Consortium’s financing policy and supervise the implementation of the State guarantee obligation when the Consortium signs new loan agreements or uses other financial instruments in connection with the financing of the Fixed Link. The 1997 Cooperation Agreement and 2004 Cooperation Agreement (recitals (97) to (102)) contain a number of formal terms, rights and obligations of the parties. The Cooperation Agreements give the States an opportunity to monitor and influence the Consortium’s financing policy, to ensure that the Consortium does not exceed its mandate, and to ensure that a financing policy is followed that minimises the States’ long-term risk. According to the States, this mechanism further allowed the States to ensure that the aid granted to the Consortium does not go beyond what is necessary. |
| (373) | Kot je navedeno v uvodni izjavi 74, konzorcij v praksi redno najema nova posojila za refinanciranje stroškov načrtovanja in gradnje, pogosto z izdajo obveznic v okviru predhodno vzpostavljenih programov, kot je program EMTN. Poroštva obstajajo na več ravneh. Program EMTN in švedski program MTN vključujeta poroštveno listino. Kot je opisano v uvodnih izjavah 103 do 108, je to listina v korist imetnikov (tj. vlagateljev v obveznico), s katero sta se danska nacionalna banka in švedski urad za javni dolg solidarno dogovorila, da bosta solidarno jamčila za vse zneske, ki jih je konzorcij po zakonu dolžan plačati. V uvodnih izjavah 107 in 108 je pojasnjeno, da konzorcij izda obveznice v okviru programa EMTN, danska nacionalna banka in švedski urad za javni dolg pa potrdita, da za določeno obveznico velja ustrezna poroštvena listina. V okviru švedskega programa MTN danska nacionalna banka in švedski urad za javni dolg obveznice odobrita brez potrditve ustrezne poroštvene listine (uvodna izjava 108). Kar zadeva samostojne posojilne pogodbe, kot je opisano v uvodnih izjavah 109 in 110, konzorcij s finančnimi institucijami podpiše finančne pogodbe. Vsaki finančni pogodbi je priložen dokument sporazuma o poroštvu. Poleg tega se sporazumi o poroštvu izdajo tudi za kreditne aranžmaje (uvodna izjava 111) in krovne pogodbe za poslovanje z izvedenimi finančnimi instrumenti (uvodna izjava 112). Po mnenju zainteresiranih strani bi bilo treba vsako tako poroštveno listino, potrditev, odobritev obveznice ali sporazum o poroštvu šteti za individualno pomoč, dodeljeno ob podpisu takega sporazuma o poroštvu, ker mora konzorcij pridobiti posamično odobritev porokov za določeno dolžniško transakcijo. Poleg tega poroštvene listine vsebujejo določbe, v skladu s katerimi lahko državi umakneta poroštvo. | (373) | As outlined at recital (74), in practice, the Consortium regularly takes out new loans to refinance its planning and construction costs, often through the issuance of bonds under previously established programmes such as the EMTN programme. Guarantees exist at several levels. The EMTN and the Swedish MTN programmes each include a deed of guarantee. As described at recitals (103) to (108), this is a deed in favour of the holders (i.e. the investors into the bond) under which the Danish National Bank and the Swedish National Debt Office have agreed jointly and severally to guarantee all sums the Consortium is legally liable to pay. Recitals (107) and (108) clarify that, when the Consortium issues bonds under the EMTN programme, the Danish National Bank and the Swedish National Debt Office confirm that the specific bond is subject to the respective deed of guarantee. Under the Swedish MTN programme, the bonds are approved by the Danish National Bank and the Swedish National Debt Office, without confirmation of the respective deed of guarantee (recital (108)). Concerning the stand-alone loan agreements, as described at recitals (109) and (110) the Consortium signs finance contracts with financial institutions. Attached to each finance contract is a guarantee agreement document. Furthermore, guarantee agreements are also issued for credit facilities (recital (111)) and for ISDA Master Agreements (recital (112)). According to the interested parties, each such deed of guarantee, confirmation, bond approval, or guarantee agreement should be considered as an individual aid, granted at the time such guarantee agreement is signed, because the Consortium is required to obtain an individual approval by the guarantors for a specific debt transaction. Furthermore, the deeds of guarantee contain provisions stipulating that the guarantee can be withdrawn by the States. |
| (374) | Državi sta pojasnili, da dejstvo, da mora posamezne finančne transakcije nato upravljati švedski urad za javni dolg in danska nacionalna banka, ne pomeni, da imata navedeni urad ali navedena banka ali državi možnost zavrniti poroštvo za take transakcije (glej uvodno izjavo 245). Poroštvo za posamezno posojilo ali obveznico bi se lahko zavrnilo (na primer zaradi tveganj, povezanih z navedenim posojilom ali obveznico), vendar bi morala švedski urad za javni dolg in danska nacionalna banka še vedno zagotoviti vsa potrebna poroštva za financiranje stalne povezave. V takem primeru bi morala jamčiti za drugo transakcijo, da bi konzorcij lahko pridobil potrebno financiranje, zavarovano s poroštvom. | (374) | The States clarified that the fact that individual financial transactions require subsequent administration by the Swedish National Debt Office or the Danish National Bank, however, does not mean that they or the States have any option to refuse to guarantee such transactions (see recital (245)). Although a guarantee for one specific loan or bond could be refused (for example because of risks associated with that loan or bond), the Swedish National Debt Office and the Danish National Bank would still have the obligation to provide all necessary guarantees for the financing of the Fixed Link. In such case, they would need to guarantee another transaction so that the Consortium could obtain the required guaranteed financing. |
| (375) | Komisija meni, da je za konzorcij prednost, ki izhaja iz modela državnega poroštva, zlasti v tem, da je upravičenec do solidarne obveznosti države, da zagotavlja poroštvo za njegova posojila v zvezi s projektom stalne povezave. Na podlagi besedila oddelka 4(3) sporazuma o konzorciju je bila z navedenim sporazumom konzorciju ob njegovi ustanovitvi 13. februarja 1992 podeljena zakonska pravica do financiranja načrtovanja in gradnje stalne povezave z dolžniškimi instrumenti, zavarovanimi z državnimi poroštvi. Konzorcij sta ustanovili družbi A/S Øresund in SVEDAB, ki sta v 100-odstotni lasti zadevnih držav, potem ko sta danska in švedska vlada 13. februarja 1992 odobrili sporazum o konzorciju (uvodna izjava 66). Namen organizacijske ureditve, izbrane za izvajanje poroštev, v skladu s katero morata švedski urad za javni dolg in danska nacionalna banka predhodno odobriti posamezne transakcije, ni omejiti ali bistveno spremeniti odgovornosti držav, da jamčijo za zadevne stroške financiranja, kot je podrobneje pojasnjeno v naslednjih uvodnih izjavah. | (375) | The Commission is of the view that the advantage to the Consortium deriving from the State guarantee model resides, essentially, in the fact that the Consortium is the beneficiary of the joint and several State obligation to guarantee its borrowing in respect of the Fixed Link project. Based on the wording of Section 4(3) of the Consortium Agreement, the Consortium Agreement conferred on the Consortium the legal right to finance the planning and construction of the Fixed Link by way of debt instruments benefitting from State guarantees, when the Consortium was established on 13 February 1992. It is A/S Øresund and SVEDAB, both 100 % owned by the respective States, that established the Consortium, upon approval of the Consortium Agreement by the Governments of Denmark and Sweden on 13 February 1992 (recital (66)). The organisational arrangement chosen for the implementation of the guarantees, requiring ex-ante approval of the Swedish National Debt Office and the Danish National Bank, for individual transactions, is not intended to limit or materially alter the States’ responsibility to guarantee the financing costs in question, as further explained in the following recitals. |
| (376) | Komisija zato meni, da je sporazum o konzorciju pravni akt, s katerim je bila konzorciju dokončno dodeljena pomoč v obliki državnih poroštev. Danska in Švedska sta se na podlagi medvladnega sporazuma s sporazumom o konzorciju zavezali, da bosta jamčili za posojila in finančne instrumente, ki jih je konzorcij najel za financiranje načrtovanja in gradnje stalne povezave. Konzorcij je bil uradno ustanovljen s sporazumom o konzorciju, v katerem je bilo opozorjeno na dejstvo, da ima konzorcij pravico do državnih poroštev. V navedenih okoliščinah je mogoče šteti, da je imel konzorcij zakonsko pravico do državnih poroštev od svoje ustanovitve, s čimer se je konkretizirala obveznost poroštva, ki jo imata državi in je bila določena v medvladnem sporazumu. Navedena zakonska pravica je od takrat stalno veljala, njen obseg pa se ni spremenil (glej tudi uvodno izjavo 387), zato Komisija meni, da so bila državna poroštva dokončno dodeljena 13. februarja 1992 (183). Komisija meni, da iz razlogov, navedenih v nadaljevanju, ureditev izvajanja državnih poroštev tega dejstva ne spreminja. | (376) | As such, the Commission considers that the Consortium Agreement is the legal act by which the aid in the form of State guarantees was definitively granted to the Consortium. Denmark and Sweden, based on the Intergovernmental Agreement, undertook, with the Consortium Agreement, a legal obligation to guarantee loans and financial instruments taken out by the Consortium for the purposes of financing the planning and construction of the Fixed Link. The Consortium was formally established via the Consortium Agreement, which recalled the fact that the Consortium had the right to the State guarantees. In those circumstances, it can be considered that the Consortium has enjoyed the legal right to benefit from the State guarantees as from its establishment, which crystallised the States’ guarantee obligation that was set out in the Intergovernmental Agreement. As that legal right has remained in place consistently since that time, and its scope did not change (see also recital (387), in that regard), the Commission considers that the State guarantees were definitively granted on 13 February 1992 (183). The Commission considers that, for the reasons set out below, the arrangements for implementing the State guarantees do not change this fact. |
| (377) | Državi morda lahko prek švedskega urada za javni dolg ali danske nacionalne banke zavrneta poroštvo za določeno novo dolžniško pogodbo, ki jo konzorcij želi skleniti, vendar ohranita obveznost zagotavljanja poroštev za vse sredstva, potrebna za financiranje stalne povezave (uvodna izjava 374). To velja tudi v zvezi s trditvijo pritožnika, da so poroštvene listine vsebovale določbe, da se lahko listine umaknejo (uvodna izjava 174). Komisija ugotavlja, da tudi če se lahko posamezne poroštvene listine umaknejo, to ne pomeni, da je odpravljena obveznost držav, da zagotovita sredstva, potrebna za financiranje stalne povezave. V zvezi s tem bi bilo mogoče na primer izdati še eno poroštveno listino ali pa bi se financiranje lahko zagotovilo s posameznimi, samostojnimi posojili, zavarovanimi s poroštvom. | (377) | Even though the States, through the Swedish National Debt Office or the Danish National Bank, might be able to refuse to guarantee a specific new debt contract the Consortium would like to conclude, they retain the obligation to guarantee all necessary financing for the Fixed Link (recital (374)). This also applies in relation to the Complainant’s argument that the deeds of guarantee contained provisions that the deeds could be withdrawn (recital (174)). The Commission finds that, even if individual deeds of guarantee may be withdrawn, this does not mean that the States’ obligation to guarantee the necessary financing for the Fixed Link would be lifted. Another deed of guarantee could, for example, be set up in that regard, or the financing could be guaranteed by means of individual, stand-alone guaranteed loans. |
| (378) | Komisija meni, da odobritev ali potrditev danske nacionalne banke ali švedskega urada za javni dolg (uvodna izjava 373) ni mogoče šteti za nove dodelitve pomoči, saj so te transakcije zgolj izvajanje obveznosti poroštva, ki sta jo državi sprejeli s sporazumom o konzorciju. | (378) | The Commission considers that the approvals or confirmations by the Danish National Bank or the Swedish National Debt Office (recital (373)) cannot be considered as new grants of aid, since those transactions are a mere implementation of the guarantee obligation the States undertook with the Consortium Agreement. |
| (379) | Komisija poleg tega ugotavlja, da je običajno, da vlagatelj pri večjih naložbah zahteva določeno stabilnost pri finančnem načrtovanju naložbe. Če vlagatelji ne morejo razumno oceniti finančnih pogojev, ki se bodo uporabljali za naložbo, verjetno ne bodo tvegali časa in virov, potrebnih za izvedbo projekta. Komisija v zvezi s tem ugotavlja, da je bila ekonomska utemeljitev modela državnega poroštva čim bolj znižati skupne stroške financiranja projekta (uvodna izjava 255). Model državnega poroštva je bil opisan že v medvladnem sporazumu, torej je bil opredeljen pred začetkom naložbe. Zato bi ga bilo treba obravnavati kot enega od temeljnih pogojev, ki se uporabljajo za naložbo in na podlagi katerih je bil pripravljen finančni načrt naložbe. Uporaba modela državnega poroštva je bila zato jasna od samega začetka in je bila sestavni del finančnega modela, na podlagi katerega je konzorcij izvedel pomembno naložbo. | (379) | The Commission, further, notes that, when embarking on major investments, it is customary for an investor to require a certain amount of stability in the financial planning for the investment. Without being able to make reasonable estimations concerning the financial conditions that will be applicable to an investment, investors are unlikely to risk the time and resources required to achieve the project. The Commission notes, in that regard, that the economic rationale of the State guarantee model was to minimise the total financing costs of the project (recital (255)). The State guarantee model was already described in the Intergovernmental Agreement, and, so, was defined before the investment got underway. As such, it should be considered as one of the fundamental conditions applicable to the investment, upon which the financial planning of the investment was prepared. The application of the State guarantee model, therefore, was clear from the outset, and was an inherent part of the financial model, on the basis of which the Consortium undertook a significant investment. |
| (380) | Komisija je seznanjena s trditvijo pritožnika iz uvodne izjave 170, da je treba v skladu z oddelkom 2.1 obvestila o poroštvih iz leta 2008 znesek državne pomoči v okviru poroštva oceniti v trenutku njegove izdaje. Po trditvah pritožnika to pomeni, da je treba poroštvo šteti za odobreno, ko tveganje, ki je z njim povezano, prevzame država. Pritožnik trdi, da z modelom državnega poroštva na podlagi medvladnega sporazuma in sporazuma o konzorciju ni povezano nobeno tveganje, in da člen 12 medvladnega sporazuma ne pomeni pravno izvršljive pravice. Poleg tega meni, da mora biti za to, da bi se poroštvo štelo za odobreno, mogoče izmeriti njegov obseg, kar naj ne bi bilo mogoče na podlagi medvladnega sporazuma ali sporazuma o konzorciju, saj trajanje in znesek nista omejena. Pritožnik se v podporo tej trditvi sklicuje tudi na oddelek 3.2 obvestila o poroštvih iz leta 2008. Nadalje meni, da tudi če bi se lahko štelo, da se z medvladnim sporazumom podeljuje zakonska pravica do pomoči v obliki državnih poroštev, so se pogoji teh poroštev od takrat bistveno spremenili, na primer s programi MTN, s katerimi so se obveznosti držav v obliki sekundarnih poroštev spremenile v osebna poroštva (uvodna izjava 175). | (380) | The Commission notes the Complainant’s assertion at recital (170) that, according to Section 2.1 of the 2008 Guarantee Notice, the amount of State aid in a guarantee must be assessed at the moment it is issued. The Complainant argues that this means that the guarantee must be considered as granted when the risk associated with it is taken on by the State. It argues that there is no risk associated with the State guarantee model through the Intergovernmental and Consortium Agreements, and that Article 12 of the Intergovernmental Agreement does not constitute a legally enforceable right. In addition, it considers that, in order for a guarantee to be considered granted, it must be possible to measure its extent, which is not possible on the basis of the Intergovernmental or Consortium Agreements, since there is no limit in time and amount. The Complainant also refers to Section 3.2 of the 2008 Guarantee Notice, in support of that claim. The Complainant, further, considers that, even if the Intergovernmental Agreement could be considered as conferring a legal right to aid in the form of the State guarantees, the conditions of those guarantees have since been fundamentally altered, for example, by the MTN programmes changing the States’ undertakings from secondary to personal guarantees (recital (175)). |
| (381) | Komisija se ne strinja s trditvami pritožnika. | (381) | The Commission does not agree with the Complainant’s assertions. |
| (382) | Prvič, kot je navedeno v uvodni izjavi 367, se šteje, da je državna pomoč dodeljena na datum, ko je bila upravičencu na podlagi veljavne nacionalne ureditve dodeljena brezpogojna pravica do njenega prejema. Komisija je v uvodni izjavi 376 ugotovila, da je bila navedena pravica konzorciju podeljena na datum njegove ustanovitve. | (382) | Firstly, as stated at recital (367), State aid is considered to be granted on the date when the unconditional legal right to receive it was conferred on the beneficiary under the applicable national regime. The Commission concluded, at recital (376), that that right was conferred upon the Consortium on the date of its establishment. |
| (383) | Drugič, v oddelku 2.1 obvestila o poroštvih iz leta 2008 je navedeno, da se državna pomoč, povezana s poroštvom, dodeli „v trenutku izdaje poroštva in ne v trenutku njegove uveljavitve oziroma izvršitve plačil pod pogoji poroštva“. Kot sta državi pojasnili (uvodna izjava 227), sta morali od datuma ustanovitve konzorcija jamčiti za posojila in druge finančne instrumente, ki jih je konzorcij najel za financiranje stalne povezave; švedski urad za javni dolg in danska nacionalna banka nimata pristojnosti, da bi zavrnila odobritev poroštev, ki jih konzorcij potrebuje za financiranje projekta. Zato bi bilo treba šteti, da je bilo poroštvo izdano na datum ustanovitve konzorcija. | (383) | Secondly, Section 2.1 of the 2008 Guarantee Notice states that State aid connected with a guarantee is granted ‘at the moment the guarantee is given, not when it is invoked nor when payments are made under the terms of the guarantee.’ As explained by the States (recital (227)), as from the date the Consortium was founded, the States have been obliged to guarantee the loans and other financial instruments taken out by the Consortium to finance the Fixed Link; the Swedish National Debt Office and the Danish National Bank do not have the competence to refuse to grant the Consortium the necessary guarantees to fund the project. The guarantee should, therefore, be considered as having been given on the date of the Consortium’s establishment. |
| (384) | Tretjič, Komisija ugotavlja, da pritožnik navaja, da je treba poroštvo šteti za odobreno, ko tveganje, ki je z njim povezano, prevzame država, in da z modelom državnega poroštva na podlagi medvladnega sporazuma in sporazuma o konzorciju ni povezano nobeno tveganje. V zvezi s tem je v oddelku 2.1 obvestila o poroštvih iz leta 2008 navedeno, da ugodnosti državnega poroštva izhajajo iz tega, da „tveganje, povezano s poroštvom, nosi država“. Državi sta morali zagotoviti dolžniško financiranje konzorcija v zvezi s stalno povezavo od njegove ustanovitve, zato Komisija meni, da je konzorcij užival ugodnosti, ki izhajajo iz tveganj, povezanih s to obveznostjo poroštva in njenim poznejšim izvajanjem, ki sta jih od navedenega datuma nosili državi. | (384) | Thirdly, the Commission notes that the Complainant suggests that the guarantee must be considered as granted when the risk associated with it is taken on by the State, and that there is no risk associated with the State guarantee model through the Intergovernmental and Consortium Agreements. In that regard, Section 2.1 of the 2008 Guarantee Notice states that the benefit of a State guarantee is ‘that the risk associated with the guarantee is carried by the State’. The Commission considers that, as the States have been obliged to guarantee the Consortium’s debt financing in connection with the Fixed Link since its establishment, the Consortium has enjoyed the benefit of the risks associated with that guarantee obligation and its subsequent implementation being carried by the States as from that date. |
| (385) | Četrtič, Komisija ugotavlja, da po trditvah pritožnika člen 12 medvladnega sporazuma ne pomeni pravno izvršljive pravice, zlasti zaradi dualističnih pravnih sistemov zadevnih držav (uvodna izjava 176). V dualističnem pravnem sistemu postane mednarodno pravo veljavno na nacionalni ravni šele, ko je vključeno v nacionalno pravo. Komisija ugotavlja, da po njenem mnenju pravno izvršljiva pravica ni bila ustvarjena na podlagi medvladnega sporazuma samega po sebi, ampak je konzorcij pridobil pravico do državnih poroštev z datumom sklenitve sporazuma o konzorciju (uvodna izjava 376). Poleg tega je Švedska medvladni sporazum ratificirala 8. avgusta 1991, Danska pa 24. avgusta 1991 (uvodna izjava 61). Državi sta ga prenesli v svoj nacionalni pravni red s sklepom švedskega parlamenta in zakonom o gradnji. Z navedenima nacionalnima zakonoma je bila v državah ustvarjena pravno izvršljiva pravica, na podlagi katere je skupaj s sporazumom o konzorciju nastala izvršljiva obveznost poroštva v korist konzorcija. | (385) | Fourthly, the Commission notes that the Complainant claims that Article 12 of the Intergovernmental Agreement does not constitute a legally enforceable right, in particular, due to the dualist legal systems of the States (recital (176)). In a dualist legal system, international law becomes valid at a national level only once it has been incorporated into national law. The Commission notes that it does not consider that the Intergovernmental Agreement, on a standalone basis, created a legally enforceable right but rather, that the Consortium obtained the right to the State guarantees as from the date of the Consortium Agreement (recital (376)). Furthermore, Sweden ratified the Intergovernmental Agreement on 8 August 1991 and Denmark on 24 August 1991 (recital (61)). The States implemented it into their national legal orders, through the Swedish Parliament decision and the Construction Act. Those national laws created legally enforceable rights in the States, which, along with the Consortium Agreement, gave rise to the enforceable guarantee obligation in favour of the Consortium. |
| (386) | Petič, Komisija se ne strinja s pritožnikovo trditvijo, da poroštva ni mogoče šteti za odobrenega, če ni mogoče izmeriti njegovega obsega. V oddelku 2.1 obvestila o poroštvih iz leta 2008 je navedeno: „Ali to poroštvo pomeni državno pomoč ali ne, in če jo, kolikšen je lahko znesek te pomoči, je treba oceniti v trenutku izdaje poroštva“. Komisija ugotavlja, da sta glede na strukturo tega stavka lahko (i) določitev, ali poroštvo pomeni državno pomoč, in, če je, (ii) določitev zneska navedene pomoči, dva ločena, zaporedna koraka. Ta določba obvestila o poroštvih iz leta 2008 torej določa, da mora Komisija najprej ugotoviti, ali poroštvo pomeni državno pomoč, in šele če potrdi, da pomeni, nato določiti znesek te pomoči. V navedenih okoliščinah je napačno trditi, da se pomoč lahko šteje za dodeljeno le, če je mogoče izmeriti njen obseg, saj se lahko znesek pomoči oceni šele po tem, ko je že ugotovljeno, da je bila pomoč dodeljena. Oddelek 3.2 obvestila o poroštvih iz leta 2008 te ugotovitve ne spremeni. Navedeni oddelek vsebuje seznam kumulativnih pogojev, ki, če so izpolnjeni, omogočajo izključitev obstoja državne pomoči v zvezi s posameznim državnim poroštvom. V točki (b) zadevnega oddelka je navedeno, da je eden od teh pogojev, da je „[o]bseg poroštva [...] mogoče pravilno določiti ob njegovi dodelitvi“. Vendar za obstoj pomoči ni potrebno, da je taka določitev mogoča; namesto tega lahko omogoči, da se ugotovi neobstoj pomoči. | (386) | Fifthly, the Commission does not agree with the Complainant’s claim that a guarantee cannot be considered granted unless its extent can be measured. Section 2.1 of the 2008 Guarantee Notice states that ‘[w]hether or not a guarantee constitutes State aid, and, if so, what the amount of that State aid may be, must be assessed at the moment when the guarantee is given.’ The Commission notes that the structure of this sentence indicates that (i) the determination of whether a guarantee constitutes State aid, and (ii) if so, the amount of that aid, can be two separate, consecutive steps. This provision of the 2008 Guarantee Notice, therefore, provides that the Commission should, firstly, establish whether a guarantee constitutes State aid, and, only if it confirms that it does, should it, secondly, determine the amount of that aid. In those circumstances, it is incorrect to say that aid cannot be considered to be granted unless its extent can be measured, as the assessment of the amount of the aid should only be made after it has already been established that the aid has been granted. Section 3.2 of the 2008 Guarantee Notice does not alter that conclusion. That section sets out a list of cumulative conditions, which, if fulfilled, allow the presence of State aid to be ruled out regarding an individual State guarantee. Point (b) of that section notes that one of those conditions is that the ‘extent of the guarantee can be properly measured when it is granted’. This, however, does not require such measurement to be possible in order for aid to exist; rather, it may allow for the absence of aid to be established. |
| (387) | Nazadnje, v zvezi s trditvijo pritožnika, da se je narava poroštev bistveno spremenila, Komisija ugotavlja, da je za določitev datuma, ko je bila konzorciju dodeljena državna pomoč, ki izhaja iz modela državnega poroštva konzorciju, ključno določiti datum, ko je konzorcij pridobil pravno izvršljivo pravico do te pomoči. Kot je bilo ugotovljeno v uvodni izjavi 375, ima konzorcij to pravico od svoje ustanovitve. Državi sta morali od navedenega datuma v razmerju do konzorcija jamčiti za celotne stroške financiranja stalne povezave. Kot je navedeno v uvodni izjavi 384, je prednost obveznosti poroštva za konzorcij dejstvo, da morata državi prevzeti tveganja, povezana s financiranjem načrtovanja in gradnje stalne povezave. Navedena prednost in pravica do nje se nista spremenili od njenega nastanka. Kot sta pojasnili državi (uvodna izjava 249), v pravni ureditvi z medvladnim sporazumom, sklepom švedskega parlamenta, sklepom švedske vlade z dne 1. aprila 1993 (K91/1443/3, K93/202/3) in sklepom švedske vlade z dne 23. junija 1994 (K91/1443/3, K94/1680/3) ni podrobnosti o tem, kako naj bi se določili pogoji posameznih sporazumov o poroštvu. Namesto tega naj bi o tem odločal in to izvajal švedski urad za javni dolg. Švedski parlament in švedska vlada v zvezi s tem pozneje nista sprejela nobenega sklepa, s katerim bi se spremenila obveznost državnega poroštva, določena s sklepom švedskega parlamenta. Posamezne poroštvene listine in sporazumi o poroštvu so namenjeni izpolnjevanju pravice, ki je bila konzorciju že dodeljena. Na danski strani, kot je navedeno v uvodni izjavi 250, zakon o gradnji, s katerim se izvaja medvladni sporazum, ne vsebuje podrobnosti o pogojih za unovčenje. Navedeni pogoji za unovčenje so določeni le v sporazumih o poroštvu v okviru različnih finančnih transakcij. Kot priznavata državi, je treba poroštvene listine in posamezne sporazume o poroštvu dejansko razlagati kot osebna poroštva („selvskyldnerkaution“ v danskem pravu). Vendar to ne pomeni spremembe obveznosti solidarnega poroštva in ne presega pravic, dodeljenih konzorciju v sporazumu o konzorciju, s katerim se izvaja medvladni sporazum. Komisija v vsakem primeru ugotavlja, da lahko vprašanje, ali je poroštvo osebno ali sekundarno (ali „simpelkaution“ v primerjavi s „selvskyldnerkaution“), vpliva na pravno razmerje med konzorcijem in njegovimi upniki ali med navedenimi upniki in državama, vendar to ne spremeni temeljne pravne obveznosti držav, da jamčita za dejavnosti konzorcija v zvezi s stalno povezavo. Kot je navedeno v uvodnih izjavah 311 in 375, je prednost, ki izhaja iz modela državnega poroštva za konzorcij, in s tem pomoč, ki izhaja iz njega, neločljivo povezana z navedeno pravno obveznostjo in se od ustanovitve konzorcija 13. februarja 1992 ni spremenila. | (387) | Finally, concerning the Complainant’s claim that the nature of the guarantees has been fundamentally changed, the Commission notes that, for the purposes of determining the date on which the State aid deriving from the State guarantee model was granted to the Consortium, the key issue is to identify the date on which the Consortium received a legally enforceable right to that aid. As concluded at recital (375), the Consortium has had that right as from its establishment. As from that date, the States have been obliged, vis-à-vis the Consortium, to guarantee the entire cost of financing of the Fixed Link. As noted at recital (384), the advantage for the Consortium of the guarantee obligation is the fact that the States are obliged to undertake the risks connected with the financing of the planning and construction of the Fixed Link. That advantage, and the right to it, has not been altered since it was established. As explained by the States (recital (249)), in the legal setup by means of the Intergovernmental Agreement, the Swedish Parliament decision, the decision of the Swedish Government of 1 April 1993 (K91/1443/3, K93/202/3) and the decision of the Swedish Government of 23 June 1994 (K91/1443/3, K94/1680/3), there are no details on how the terms of the individual guarantee agreements were to be determined. Instead, this was to be decided upon and implemented by the Swedish National Debt Office. There is no subsequent decision by the Swedish Parliament in this context, nor any decision by the Swedish Government, that would have amended the State guarantee obligation established by the Swedish Parliament decision. The individual deeds of guarantee and guarantee agreements serve to fulfil the right already given to the Consortium. On the Danish side, as set out at recital (250), there are no details on mobilisation conditions in the Construction Act, implementing the Intergovernmental Agreement. Those mobilisation conditions are only specified in the guarantee agreements under the various financial transactions. As the States acknowledge, the deeds of guarantee and individual guarantee agreements are indeed to be interpreted as personal guarantees (‘selvskyldnerkaution’ in Danish law). This, however, does not constitute a change of the joint and several guarantee obligation, and does not go beyond the rights given to the Consortium in the Consortium Agreement, implementing the Intergovernmental Agreement. In any event, the Commission notes that, while the question of whether a guarantee is personal or secondary (or ‘simpelkaution’ versus ‘selvskyldnerkaution’) may affect the legal relationship between the Consortium and its creditors, or those creditors and the States, it does not alter the fundamental legal obligation of the States to provide guarantees for the Consortium’s activities in relation to the Fixed Link. As noted at recitals (311) and (375), the advantage to the Consortium of the State guarantee model, and therefore, the aid deriving from it, is inherent in that legal obligation, and that has not been altered since the Consortium was established on 13 February 1992. |
| (388) | Komisija ugotavlja, da je treba državno pomoč, ki izhaja iz modela državnega poroštva, obravnavati kot eno individualno pomoč, ki sta jo državi konzorciju dodelili 13. februarja 1992. | (388) | The Commission concludes that the State aid deriving from the State guarantee model must be considered as one individual aid, granted by the two States to the Consortium on 13 February 1992. |
| 6.2.2 Posebna danska pravila o prenosu izgub v prihodnje obdobje in amortizaciji | 6.2.2. The special Danish rules on loss carry-forward and depreciation |
| (389) | Komisija je v sklepu o začetku postopka v uvodni izjavi 109 menila, da se zdi, da je opredelitev danskih davčnih ukrepov, ki se ocenjujejo, v ustreznih pravnih aktih odprta glede zneska in trajanja, vendar je bila izrecno povezana z dejavnostjo konzorcija v zvezi s projektom. Ker se je zdelo, da so bili navedeni ukrepi odobreni z enakim namenom in področjem uporabe kot državna poroštva, bi bilo treba ugotovitve Komisije iz sklepa o začetku postopka v zvezi z opredelitvijo navedenih poroštev za individualne pomoči uporabiti tudi v zvezi z davčnimi ukrepi. | (389) | In the Opening decision, the Commission considered, at recital 109, that the definition in the relevant legal acts of the Danish tax measures under assessment, seemed to be open-ended in terms of amount and duration, but that it was specifically related to the Consortium’s activity with respect to the project. As those measures seemed to have been granted with the same purpose and scope as the State guarantees, the Commission’s considerations mentioned in the Opening decision concerning the qualification of those guarantees as individual aids were also to be applied as regards the tax measures. |
| 6.2.2.1 Posebna danska pravila o prenosu izgub v prihodnje obdobje | 6.2.2.1. The special Danish rules on loss carry-forward |
| 6.2.2.1.1 Pravilo o prenosu izgub za obdobje 1991–2001 | 6.2.2.1.1. 1991-2001 LCF |
| (390) | Zakon o gradnji je od vsega začetka vseboval določbo, da bodo za družbo A/S Øresund veljala ugodnejša pravila o prenosu izgub v prihodnje obdobje kot v skladu s splošnim danskim zakonom o odmeri davka. Že leta 1991 je bilo jasno, da petletno splošno obdobje za prenos izgub v prihodnje obdobje ne bi zadostovalo za to, da se izgube, nastale pri projektu, uporabijo za izravnavo dobičkov. Zakonodajalec je v pripravljalnih opombah k zakonu o gradnji izrecno navedel, da je bil razlog za odobritev podaljšanega obdobja omejitve za prenos izgub v prihodnje obdobje leta 1991 ta, da družba A/S Øresund ne bi mogla izkoristiti splošno veljavnih pravil o prenosu izgub v prihodnje obdobje (s petletno omejitvijo) zaradi velikih izdatkov, nastalih v obdobju gradnje, skupaj z dejstvom, da družba A/S Øresund v istem obdobju ne bi mogla pridobiti dobička (uvodna izjava 267). | (390) | The Construction Act established, from the outset, that A/S Øresund would be subject to more favourable loss carry-forward rules than under the general Danish Tax Assessment Act. Already in 1991, it was clear that the general loss carry-forward period of five years would not be sufficient to utilise the losses incurred for the project to offset profits. In the preparatory notes to the Construction Act, the legislator explicitly stated that the reason for granting an extended limitation period for loss carry-forward in 1991 was that A/S Øresund would not be able to benefit from the generally applicable rules on loss carry-forward (with a limitation of five years), because of the significant expenditure sustained in the construction period, combined with the fact that A/S Øresund would not, in the same period, be able to procure any profits (recital (267)). |
| 6.2.2.1.1.1 Pravilo o prenosu izgub za obdobje 1991–2001: shema ali individualna pomoč | 6.2.2.1.1.1. 1991-2001 LCF: Scheme or individual aid |
| (391) | Komisija meni, da državne pomoči, ki izhaja iz pravila o prenosu izgub za obdobje 1991–2001, ni mogoče šteti za shemo. | (391) | The Commission considers that the State aid deriving from the 1991-2001 LCF cannot be considered as a scheme. |
| (392) | Prvič, pomoč, ki izhaja iz pravila o prenosu izgub za obdobje 1991–2001, se ne dodeli na podlagi akta, ki določa, da se individualna pomoč dodeli podjetjem, opredeljenim v aktu na splošen in abstrakten način. Namesto tega zakon o gradnji vsebuje posebno pravilo, ki se uporablja posebej za družbo A/S Øresund. | (392) | First, the aid deriving from the 1991-2001 LCF is not granted on the basis of an act that provides for individual aid awards to be made to undertakings defined within the act in a general and abstract manner. Rather, the Construction Act provides for a special rule applicable to A/S Øresund, specifically. |
| (393) | Drugič, v zakonu o gradnji je projekt, na katerega se nanaša, izrecno opredeljen kot gradnja in obratovanje stalne povezave. Komisija zato meni, da je treba za pomoč, ki izhaja iz pravila o prenosu izgub za obdobje 1991–2001, šteti, da je povezana z določenim projektom, saj je prednost, ki je neločljivo povezana s pomočjo, vezana izključno na izgube, nastale v okviru projekta stalne povezave, pri čemer so izključeni drugi projekti ali dejavnosti. Pomoč, ki izhaja iz pravila o prenosu izgub za obdobje 1991–2001, zato ne ustreza opredelitvi sheme pomoči iz člena 1(d) Uredbe (EU) 2015/1589. | (393) | Second, the Construction Act explicitly specifies the project it concerns as being the construction and operation of the Fixed Link. The Commission, therefore, considers that the aid deriving from the 1991-2001 LCF must be regarded as linked to a specific project, as the advantage inherent to the aid is linked solely to losses incurred in the context of the Fixed Link project, to the exclusion of other projects or activities. The aid deriving from the 1991-2001 LCF, therefore, does not fulfil the definition of an aid scheme as set out at Article 1(d) of Regulation 2015/1589. |
| (394) | Zato bi bilo treba pomoč, ki izhaja iz pravila o prenosu izgub za obdobje 1991–2001, opredeliti kot eno ali več individualnih pomoči v smislu člena 1(e) Uredbe (EU) 2015/1589. | (394) | The aid deriving from the 1991-2001 LCF should, therefore, be qualified as one or more individual aids, within the meaning of Article 1(e) of Regulation 2015/1589. |
| 6.2.2.1.1.2 Pravilo o prenosu izgub za obdobje 1991–2001: datum dodelitve | 6.2.2.1.1.2. 1991-2001 LCF: Granting date |
| (395) | Pravilo o prenosu izgub za obdobje 1991–2001 pomeni državno pomoč v obliki davčne ugodnosti. Komisija opozarja, da je že ugotovila, da se državna pomoč, ki izhaja iz ugodnejše davčne obravnave, dodeli na letni ravni, potem ko davčni organi sprejmejo davčno napoved upravičenca (184), ker je to trenutek, ko se prednost pri taki državni pomoči običajno uresniči. Komisija zato meni, da bi bilo treba za posebna danska pravila o prenosu izgub v prihodnje obdobje in amortizaciji šteti, da so odobrena na letni ravni, razen če obstajajo jasni razlogi za odstopanje od navedenega pristopa. | (395) | The 1991-2001 LCF constitutes State aid in the form of a tax advantage. The Commission recalls that it has previously found that State aid deriving from advantageous tax treatment is granted on an annual basis, upon the acceptance of the beneficiary’s tax declaration by the tax authorities (184), as that is the moment the advantage usually materialises for such State aid. The Commission, therefore, considers that the special Danish rules on loss carry-forward and depreciation should, similarly, be found to be granted on an annual basis, unless there are clear reasons for departing from that approach. |
| (396) | Komisija meni, da v zvezi s pravilom o prenosu izgub za obdobje 1991–2001 obstajajo jasni razlogi za odstopanje od navedenega pristopa, kot je podrobneje navedeno v uvodnih izjavah 397 do 403. | (396) | The Commission considers that, as far as the 1991-2001 LCF is concerned, there are clear reasons for departing from that approach, as set out further at recitals (397) to (403). |
| (397) | Komisija ugotavlja, da so danski organi pojasnili (uvodna izjava 267), da so bile izgube, ki jih je imel konzorcij pred začetkom obratovanja stalne povezave, zlasti posledica obresti na posojila, ki so bila potrebna za izgradnjo stalne povezave. Kot je pojasnila Danska (uvodna izjava 267), zaradi velikih izdatkov in dejstva, da stalna povezava v obdobju gradnje ni prinašala dobička, splošno veljavno pravilo o prenosu izgub v prihodnje obdobje s petletno omejitvijo ne bi zadostovalo za to, da bi se navedene izgube lahko uporabile za izravnavo dobička. Povedano drugače, da je lahko konzorcij izvedel naložbo v stalno povezavo, je moral ustvariti velike izgube, navedenih izgub pa brez uporabe posebnega pravila ne bi bilo mogoče učinkovito prenesti naprej, da bi se z njimi izravnal dobiček v prihodnjih letih. Danski zakonodajalec je zato v okviru pogojev za naložbo konzorcija v stalno povezavo in za vzpostavitev dolgoročnega načrtovanja financiranja gradnje stalne povezave uvedel pravilo o prenosu izgub za obdobje 1991–2001. | (397) | The Commission notes that the Danish authorities explained (recital (267)) that the losses incurred by the Consortium before the Fixed Link was put into service were, essentially, due to interest incurred on the loans, which were necessary for the construction of the Fixed Link. As Denmark explained (recital (267)), given the significant initial expenditure on the investment, and the lack of profits for the Fixed Link during its construction period, the generally applicable rule on loss carry-forward, with a limitation of five years, would not have been sufficient to enable those losses to be utilised to offset profits. In other words, in order to carry out the investment in the Fixed Link, the Consortium was obliged to incur significant losses, and, without application of a special rule, it would not have been possible for those losses to be usefully carried forward, so that they could offset profits in future years. As a result, as part of the conditions for the investment into the Fixed Link by the Consortium, and to establish the long-term planning of the financing of the construction of the Fixed Link, the Danish legislator established the 1991-2001 LCF. |
| (398) | Danski organi ugotavljajo, da je bilo pravilo o prenosu izgub za obdobje 1991–2001 skupaj z obveznostjo državnega poroštva vzpostavljeno na začetku, da bi se zagotovilo financiranje znatne naložbe v stalno povezavo z najnižjimi stroški (uvodna izjava 269). Pravilo o prenosu izgub za obdobje 1991–2001 je družbi A/S Øresund omogočilo, da je prihodnje dobičke izravnala z izgubami, ki še niso zapadle, s čimer se je zmanjšala njena davčna osnova. To je konzorciju prineslo prednost. Hkrati je pravilo o prenosu izgub za obdobje 1991–2001 omogočilo višjo likvidnostno osnovo, da bi se zmanjšalo breme dolga. Manjše skupno breme dolga je pomenilo tudi nižji skupni zajamčeni znesek in s tem manj državne pomoči v obliki poroštev. | (398) | The Danish authorities note that, together with the State guarantee obligation, the 1991-2001 LCF was established at the outset, in order to ensure the financing of the significant investment in the Fixed Link, at the least cost (recital (269)). The 1991-2001 LCF enabled A/S Øresund to offset future profits with non-expired losses, thereby reducing its tax base. This resulted in an advantage for the Consortium. At the same time, however, the 1991-2001 LCF allowed for a higher liquidity base, with the objective of lowering the debt burden. A lower overall debt burden, also meant a lower overall guaranteed amount, and, therefore, less State aid in the form of the guarantees. |
| (399) | Kot je navedeno v uvodni izjavi 379, je običajno, da vlagatelj pri večjih naložbah zahteva določeno stabilnost pri finančnem načrtovanju naložbe. Če vlagatelji ne morejo razumno oceniti finančnih pogojev, ki se bodo uporabljali za naložbo, verjetno ne bodo tvegali časa in virov, potrebnih za izvedbo projekta. Komisija v zvezi s tem ugotavlja, da je bilo pravilo o prenosu izgub za obdobje 1991–2001 uvedeno z namenom, da se zagotovi posebna davčna obravnava naložbe v stalno povezavo, da bi se olajšalo njeno dolgoročno finančno načrtovanje in čim bolj zmanjšali skupni stroški naložbe. Navedena davčna obravnava je bila opredeljena v zakonu o gradnji pred začetkom naložbe in bi jo bilo treba kot tako obravnavati kot enega od temeljnih pogojev, ki se uporabljajo za naložbo (skupaj z obveznostjo državnega poroštva in modelom državnega poroštva) in na podlagi katerih je bil pripravljen finančni načrt naložbe. Uporaba pravila o prenosu izgub za obdobje 1991–2001 je bila zato jasna od samega začetka in je bila sestavni del finančnega modela, na podlagi katerega je konzorcij izvedel pomembno naložbo. Komisija zlasti ugotavlja, da je bil zakonodajni namen uzakonitve pravila o prenosu izgub za obdobje 1991–2001, kot je razvidno iz pripravljalnih opomb k zakonu o gradnji, omogočiti smiselno uporabo izgub, nastalih pri gradnji stalne povezave. | (399) | As noted at recital (379), when embarking on major investments, it is customary for an investor to require a certain amount of stability in the financial planning for the investment. Without being able to make reasonable estimations concerning the financial conditions that will be applicable to an investment, investors are unlikely to risk the time and resources required to achieve the project. The Commission notes, in that regard, that the 1991-2001 LCF was established with a view to providing specific tax treatment to the Fixed Link investment, in order to facilitate its long-term financial planning and to minimise the overall cost of the investment. That tax treatment was defined by the Construction Act before the investment got underway, and, as such, should be considered as one of the fundamental conditions applicable to the investment (along with the State guarantee obligation and the State guarantee model), upon which the financial planning of the investment was prepared. As such, the application of the 1991-2001 LCF was clear from the outset, and was an inherent part of the financial model, on the basis of which the Consortium would engage to undertake a significant investment. In particular, the Commission notes that the legislative intent behind the enactment of the 1991-2001 LCF, as evidenced by the preparatory notes to the Construction Act, was to enable the meaningful utilisation of losses incurred as a result of the construction of the Fixed Link. |
| (400) | Komisija ugotavlja tudi, kot je bilo sklenjeno v uvodni izjavi 330, da je pravica družbe A/S Øresund, da svoje izgube prenese naprej za daljše obdobje, kot je dovoljeno v skladu z običajnimi danskimi pravili obdavčitve, pomenila prednost že od vzpostavitve navedene pravice. Prednost, da se lahko izgube prenesejo naprej za daljše obdobje, skupaj z dejstvom, da je bilo že od samega začetka jasno, da bodo nastale znatne izgube, da bi se zagotovila uporaba navedenega daljšega obdobja, je pomenila, da je bila prednost, povezana s pravilom o prenosu izgub za obdobje 1991–2001, očitna že od samega začetka. To je drugače kot na primer v sodbi v zadevi France Télécom (185), v kateri se je prednost, ki izhaja iz posebne davčne obravnave, lahko potrdila le na letni ravni ob določitvi stopnje davka od dohodka iz dejavnosti, ki se uporablja v skladu z običajnimi davčnimi pravili (186). | (400) | The Commission also notes, as concluded at recital (330), that the right for A/S Øresund to carry-forward its losses for a longer period than permissible under normal Danish taxation rules presented an advantage as from the establishment of that right. The advantage of being able to carry-forward losses for a longer period, coupled with the fact that it was clear from the beginning that significant losses would be incurred so as to ensure the use of that longer period, meant that the advantage associated with the 1991-2001 LCF was obvious from the outset. This is different from the situation in, for example, the France Télécom (185) judgment, where the advantage deriving from a special tax treatment could only be confirmed on an annual basis upon the establishment of the rate of business tax applicable under the normal tax rules (186). |
| (401) | S členom 11 zakona o gradnji je bilo leta 1991 uvedeno preferenčno pravilo za družbo A/S Øresund, saj je imela pravico, da svoje izgube prenese naprej za daljše obdobje kot druge pravne osebe, zavezane plačilu davka od dohodkov pravnih oseb. Danska se je s sprejetjem zakona o gradnji zavezala, da bo družbi A/S Øresund omogočila, da uživa zakonsko pravico do navedenega daljšega obdobja prenosa v prihodnje obdobje. Zakon o gradnji je v oddelku 6 določal, da mora stalno povezavo razviti konzorcij družbe z omejeno odgovornostjo, ki jo je ustanovila danska država (prek holdinga), in družbe z omejeno odgovornostjo, ki jo je ustanovila švedska država. Družba A/S Øresund je bila kot družba z omejeno odgovornostjo ustanovljena 9. decembra 1991 (uvodna izjava 64), konzorcij pa je bil s sporazumom o konzorciju ustanovljen 13. februarja 1992 (uvodna izjava 66). Komisija je ugotovila, da prednost, ki izhaja iz pravila o prenosu izgub za obdobje 1991–2001, koristi konzorciju, saj zmanjšuje davčno obveznost, ki jo je treba poravnati iz njegovih prihodkov (uvodna izjava 317). Dejstvo, da je konzorcij navedeno prednost pridobil prek pravila o prenosu izgub za obdobje 1991–2001, je bilo očitno od samega začetka (uvodna izjava 400). Zakonska pravica konzorcija do navedene prednosti je bila zakonsko določena z zakonom o gradnji, še preden je bil konzorcij ustanovljen. | (401) | Section 11 of the Construction Act established, from 1991, a preferential rule for A/S Øresund, insofar as it had the right to carry-forward its losses for a longer period than other legal entities subject to corporate income tax. In enacting the Construction Act, Denmark committed to allow A/S Øresund to enjoy the legal right to that longer carry-forward period. The Construction Act provided, at Section 6, that the Fixed Link was to be developed by a consortium between a limited liability company set up by the Danish State (via a holding company) and a limited liability company set up by the Swedish State. A/S Øresund was established as limited liability company on 9 December 1991 (recital (64)) and the Consortium was established, through the Consortium Agreement, on 13 February 1992 (recital (66)). The Commission has found that the advantage deriving from the 1991-2001 LCF benefits the Consortium, as it reduces the tax liability which its income must be used to discharge (recital (317)). The fact that that advantage would accrue to the Consortium via the 1991-2001 LCF was obvious from the outset (recital (400)). The legal right to that advantage to the Consortium was established in law, via the Construction Act, before the Consortium was even established. |
| (402) | Komisija na podlagi navedenih elementov (uvodne izjave 397 do 401) meni, da je bila prednost, ki izhaja iz pravila o prenosu izgub za obdobje 1991–2001, vzpostavljena zaradi olajšanja financiranja naložbe v stalno povezavo (naložbe, ki bi očitno povzročila znatne izgube, ki jih ne bi bilo mogoče uporabiti v petih letih) in podpore navedene naložbe. Prednost je izhajala iz samega zakona o gradnji in je bila eden od pogojev za naložbo. Pravilo o prenosu izgub za obdobje 1991–2001 je lahko od trenutka, ko je bil konzorcij ustanovljen in je imel zakonsko pravico do prednosti, določene z zakonom o gradnji, izkrivljal konkurenco in vplival na trgovino med državami članicami, saj je okrepil položaj konzorcija na trgu, ki je odprt za konkurenco in trgovino med državami članicami. Komisija v navedenih okoliščinah ugotavlja, da obstajajo jasni razlogi za ugotovitev, da pomoč, ki izhaja iz pravila o prenosu izgub za obdobje 1991–2001, ni bila dodeljena na letni ravni, temveč je bila dodeljena enkrat, ob ustanovitvi konzorcija. | (402) | On the basis of those elements (recitals (397) to (401)), the Commission considers that the advantage deriving from the 1991-2001 LCF was established in order to facilitate the financing of the Fixed Link investment (an investment that would obviously lead to significant losses being incurred, which could not be used within five years), and to support that investment. The advantage resulted from the Construction Act itself, and constituted one of the conditions for investment. From the moment the Consortium was established, and was able to enjoy the legal right to the advantage established by the Construction Act, the 1991-2001 LCF was liable to distort competition and affect trade between Member States, by strengthening the Consortium’s position on a market that is open to competition and trade between Member States. In those circumstances, the Commission concludes that there are clear reasons for finding that the aid deriving from the 1991-2001 LCF was not granted on an annual basis, but, rather, was granted at one time, upon the establishment of the Consortium. |
| (403) | Komisija poleg tega ugotavlja, da se je prednost, ki izhaja iz zakonske pravice do daljšega obdobja prenosa v prihodnje obdobje, uresničila samodejno, brez kakršne koli diskrecijske pravice družbe A/S Øresund, konzorcija ali danskih organov. Za družbo A/S Øresund se pri določanju njene letne obveznosti glede plačila davka od dobička pravnih oseb uporablja enak postopek kot za vse druge pravne osebe (vključno z družbami z omejeno odgovornostjo), zavezane plačilu danskega davka od dohodkov pravnih oseb. Kot je opisano v uvodni izjavi 127, podjetje, ki vodi skupino za skupno obdavčitev, v okviru obveznega sistema skupne obdavčitve na Danskem vsako leto predloži informacije o obdavčljivih dohodkih in davčnih izgubah za vse člane navedene skupine. V davčni napovedi so za vsakega člana skupine navedeni obdavčljivi dohodek, uporaba lastnih izgub, prenesenih v prihodnje obdobje, uporaba izgub drugih članov skupine in preostale davčne izgube. Pravni subjekti, zavezani plačilu danskega davka od dohodkov pravnih oseb, nimajo diskrecijske pravice glede uporabe izgub, prenesenih v prihodnje obdobje. Davčne izgube, prenesene v prihodnje obdobje, ki se lahko uporabijo v danem davčnem letu, se morajo skladu z danskim zakonom o odmeri davka in od 18. junija 2012 v skladu z danskim zakonom o davku od dohodkov pravnih oseb uporabiti v navedenem letu; sicer zapadejo. Davčne izgube, prenesene v prihodnje obdobje, je treba uporabiti v skladu z načelom FIFO, kar pomeni, da je treba najprej uporabiti najstarejše davčne izgube. Letna odmera davka, ki jo izda davčna uprava, se izvede samodejno. Davčni organi nato vsako leto izberejo subjekte, katerih davčne napovedi se revidirajo ročno. Komisija v navedenih okoliščinah glede na neobstoj diskrecijske pravice v trenutku, ko je upravičenec predložil davčno napoved, in glede na to, da so organi sprejeli davčno napoved, ugotavlja, da predložitev letnih davčnih napovedi ne spremeni dejstva, da je bila pomoč dodeljena že leta 1992. Predložitev davčnih napovedi je bila torej zgolj formalni korak, potreben za pridobitev že dodeljene pomoči, in ne prošnja za letno dodelitev pomoči. | (403) | The Commission, moreover, notes that the materialisation of the advantage deriving from the legal right to the longer carry-forward period occurred automatically, without any discretion on the part of A/S Øresund, the Consortium, or the Danish authorities. For the determination of its annual corporate income tax liability, A/S Øresund is subject to the same process as any other legal entity (including limited liability companies) subject to Danish corporate income tax. As described at recital (127), each year, under the mandatory joint taxation regime in Denmark, the undertaking that heads the joint taxation group submits information on taxable income and tax losses for all members of that group. The tax return states, for each member of the group, the taxable income, the utilisation of own carried-forward losses, the utilisation of losses from other members of the group, and the remaining tax losses. Legal entities subject to Danish corporate income tax do not have discretion on the use of carried forward losses. According to the Danish Tax Assessment Act, and, since 18 June 2012, according to the Danish Corporate Income Tax Act, a tax loss carried forward that can be utilised in a given tax year must be utilised in that year; otherwise, it will be forfeited. Tax losses carried forward must be utilised according to the FIFO principle, meaning that the oldest tax losses must be utilised first. The annual tax assessment, issued by the tax authorities, is automatically generated. Every year the tax authorities then select entities whose tax returns are manually audited. In those circumstances, given the absence of discretion at the moment of the beneficiary’s tax declaration and the acceptance of the tax return by the authorities, the Commission concludes that the submission of the annual tax returns does not amend the fact that the aid had already been granted in 1992. The submission of the tax returns, therefore, represented merely a formal step necessary to obtain the aid already granted, rather than a request for an annual grant of aid. |
| (404) | Komisija zato ugotavlja, da pravilo o prenosu izgub za obdobje 1991–2001 pomeni eno individualno pomoč, ki jo je Danska 13. februarja 1992 dodelila konzorciju za podporo znatne naložbe. | (404) | The Commission, therefore, concludes that the 1991-2001 LCF constitutes one individual aid, for the purposes of supporting a significant investment, which was granted to the Consortium by Denmark on 13 February 1992. |
| 6.2.2.1.2 Pravilo o prenosu izgub za obdobje 2013–2015 | 6.2.2.1.2. 2013-2015 LCF |
| (405) | Kot je navedeno v uvodni izjavi 333, je Komisija sklenila, da iz pravila o prenosu izgub za obdobje 2002–2012 ni izhajala nobena prednost za družbo A/S Øresund ali konzorcij, saj so za družbo A/S Øresund v navedenem obdobju veljala ista pravila o prenosu izgub v prihodnje obdobje kot za druga podjetja na Danskem. Zato pravilo o prenosu izgub za obdobje 2002–2012 ni pomenilo državne pomoči za družbo A/S Øresund ali posledično konzorcij (uvodni izjavi 333 in 355). | (405) | As noted at recital (333), the Commission concluded that there was no advantage to A/S Øresund or the Consortium that derived from the 2002-2012 LCF, as, for that period, A/S Øresund was subject to the same rules on loss carry-forward as other undertakings in Denmark. Therefore, the 2002-2012 LCF did not constitute State aid to A/S Øresund, or, by extension, the Consortium (recitals (333) and (355)). |
| (406) | Kot je pojasnjeno v uvodni izjavi 138, je bila z zakonom št. 591 z dne 18. junija 2012 za podjetja na Danskem uvedena omejitev dostopa do izgub, prenesenih v prihodnje obdobje. Vendar se navedena omejitev ni uporabljala za družbo A/S Øresund, saj so določbe zakona o gradnji, kakor je bil spremenjen leta 2002 in vključen v zakon o družbi Sund & Bælt, veljale do leta 2016. Šele z zakonom št. 581 z dne 4. maja 2015 je bil člen 12 zakona o družbi Sund & Bælt razveljavljen z učinkom od 1. januarja 2016, za družbo A/S Øresund pa so začela veljati običajna pravila danskega zakona o davku od dohodkov pravnih oseb. Komisija je zato v uvodni izjavi 337 ugotovila, da je pravilo o prenosu izgub za obdobje 2013–2015 pomenilo prednost za družbo A/S Øresund in s tem tudi za konzorcij. Ukrep pomoči zajema kombinacijo posegov (uvodna izjava 334), saj je družba A/S Øresund pridobila pravico do selektivne prednosti v primerjavi z drugimi podjetji v podobnem položaju, ker so pravila, ki se uporabljajo za družbo A/S Øresund, omogočala odstopanje od referenčnega sistema, kar je privedlo do selektivne prednosti. | (406) | As explained at recital (138), by Act No 591 of 18 June 2012, a limitation on the access to carry-forward losses was introduced for undertakings in Denmark. That limitation did not apply to A/S Øresund, however, as the provisions of the Construction Act, as amended in 2002, and incorporated in the Sund & Bælt Act, remained in force until 2016. It was only by Act No 581 of 4 May 2015 that Section 12 of the Sund & Bælt Act was repealed with effect of 1 January 2016, and that A/S Øresund became subject to the normal rules of the Danish Corporate Income Tax Act. The Commission, therefore, concluded, at recital (337), that the 2013-2015 LCF constituted an advantage for A/S Øresund, and, therefore, also for the Consortium. The aid measure consists of a combination of elements (recital (334)) as A/S Øresund obtained a right to a selective advantage over other undertakings in a similar situation, by virtue of the fact that the rules applicable to A/S Øresund provided for a derogation from the system of reference, leading to a selective advantage. |
| 6.2.2.1.2.1 Pravilo o prenosu izgub za obdobje 2013–2015: shema ali individualna pomoč | 6.2.2.1.2.1. 2013-2015 LCF: Scheme or individual aid |
| (407) | Komisija meni, da pomoči, ki izhaja iz pravila o prenosu izgub za obdobje 2013–2015, ni mogoče šteti za shemo. | (407) | The Commission considers that the aid deriving from the 2013-2015 LCF cannot be considered as a scheme. |
| (408) | Prvič, pomoč, ki izhaja iz pravila o prenosu izgub za obdobje 2013–2015, se ne dodeli na podlagi akta, ki določa, da se individualna pomoč dodeli podjetjem, opredeljenim v aktu na splošen in abstrakten način. Pravilo o prenosu izgub za obdobje 2013–2015 je posebno pravilo, ki se uporablja posebej za družbo A/S Øresund. Navedena pomoč zato ne izpolnjuje prvega pogoja iz opredelitve sheme pomoči iz člena 1(d) Uredbe (EU) 2015/1589. | (408) | First, the aid deriving from the 2013-2015 LCF is not granted on the basis of an act that provides for individual aid awards to be made to undertakings defined within the act in a general and abstract manner. The 2013-2015 LCF provides for a special rule applicable specifically to A/S Øresund. That aid, therefore, does not fulfil the first condition in the definition of an aid scheme, as set out at Article 1(d) of Regulation 2015/1589. |
| (409) | Drugič, v zakonu o gradnji, kot je bil spremenjen leta 2002 in vključen v zakon o družbi Sund & Bælt, je projekt, na katerega se nanaša, izrecno opredeljen kot gradnja in obratovanje stalne povezave. Komisija zato meni, da je treba za pomoč, ki izhaja iz pravila o prenosu izgub za obdobje 2013–2015, šteti, da je povezana z določenim projektom, saj je prednost, ki je neločljivo povezana s pomočjo, vezana izključno na izgube, nastale v okviru projekta stalne povezave, pri čemer so izključeni drugi projekti ali dejavnosti. Pomoč, ki izhaja iz pravila o prenosu izgub za obdobje 2013–2015, zato ne izpolnjuje drugega pogoja iz opredelitve sheme pomoči iz člena 1(d) Uredbe (EU) 2015/1589. | (409) | Second, the Construction Act, as amended in 2002, and incorporated into the Sund & Bælt Act, explicitly specifies the project it concerns as being the construction and operation of the Fixed Link. The Commission, therefore, considers that the aid deriving from the 2013-2015 LCF must be regarded as linked to a specific project, as the advantage inherent to the aid is linked solely to losses incurred in the context of the Fixed Link project, to the exclusion of other projects or activities. The aid deriving from the 2013-2015 LCF, therefore, does not fulfil the second condition in the definition of an aid scheme as set out at Article 1(d) of Regulation 2015/1589. |
| (410) | Pomoč, ki izhaja iz pravila o prenosu izgub za obdobje 2013–2015, zato ne spada v opredelitev sheme pomoči v smislu člena 1(d) Uredbe (EU) 2015/1589. Zato jo je treba opredeliti kot eno ali več individualnih pomoči v smislu člena 1(e) Uredbe (EU) 2015/1589. | (410) | The aid deriving from the 2013-2015 LCF, therefore, does not fall within the definition of an ‘aid scheme’ within the meaning of Article 1(d) of Regulation 2015/1589. It must, therefore, be qualified as one or more individual aids, within the meaning of Article 1(e) of Regulation 2015/1589. |
| 6.2.2.1.2.2 Pravilo o prenosu izgub za obdobje 2013–2015: datum dodelitve | 6.2.2.1.2.2. 2013-2015 LCF: Granting date |
| (411) | Kot je navedeno v uvodni izjavi 395, se državna pomoč, ki izhaja iz davčnih ugodnosti, običajno šteje za dodeljeno na letni ravni, razen če obstaja razlog za ugotovitev, da se je prednost, povezana z navedeno pomočjo, uresničila v drugem trenutku. Komisija meni, da v zvezi s pravilom o prenosu izgub za obdobje 2013–2015 ni jasnih razlogov za odstopanje od navedenega pristopa. Položaj v primeru pravila o prenosu izgub za obdobje 1991–2001, kot je določeno v uvodnih izjavah 396 do 404, se bistveno razlikuje od položaja v primeru pravila o prenosu izgub za obdobje 2013–2015, kot je določeno v uvodnih izjavah 412 do 417. | (411) | As noted at recital (395), State aid deriving from tax advantages is usually considered to be granted on an annual basis, unless there is reason to determine that the advantage connected to that aid materialised at a different time. The Commission does not consider that, as far as the 2013-2015 LCF is concerned, there are clear reasons for departing from that approach The situation applying to the 1991-2001 LCF as set out at recitals (396) to (404) is fundamentally different from the situation applying to the 2013-2015 LCF, as set out at recitals (412) to (417). |
| (412) | Komisija ugotavlja, da pravilo o prenosu izgub za obdobje 1991–2001 pomeni eno individualno pomoč, ki jo je Danska 13. februarja 1992 dodelila konzorciju za podporo znatne naložbe (uvodna izjava 404). Komisija je ob navedeni ugotovitvi zlasti poudatila, da je bilo pravilo o prenosu izgub za obdobje 1991–2001 vzpostavljeno, da bi se olajšalo dolgoročno načrtovanje naložbe v stalno povezavo ter da prednost izhaja iz samega zakona o gradnji in je bila en od temeljnih pogojev, na podlagi katerih je bil pripravljen finančni načrt naložbe (uvodna izjava 399). | (412) | The Commission has concluded that the 1991-2001 LCF constitutes one individual aid, for the purposes of supporting a significant investment, which was granted to the Consortium by Denmark on 13 February 1992 (recital (404)). In particular, in reaching that conclusion, the Commission noted that the 1991-2001 LCF was established with a view to facilitating the long-term planning of the Fixed Link investment, the advantage resulted from the Construction Act itself, and was one of the fundamental conditions upon which the financial planning of the investment was prepared (recital (399)). |
| (413) | Komisija najprej ugotavlja, da za pomoč, ki izhaja iz pravila o prenosu izgub za obdobje 2013–2015, ni mogoče šteti, da je bila dodeljena pred 18. junijem 2012, ko je bil spremenjen danski zakon o davku od dohodkov pravnih oseb (uvodna izjava 138), zakon o družbi Sund & Bælt pa ne. Družba A/S Øresund in konzorcij pred začetkom veljavnosti navedene spremembe nista mogla uživati nobene prednosti, ki bi iz nje izhajala. | (413) | The Commission, first, notes that the aid deriving from the 2013-2015 LCF cannot be considered as having been granted before 18 June 2012, when the Danish Corporate Income Tax Act was amended (recital (138)), and the Sund & Bælt Act was not. Before that amendment was applicable, A/S Øresund and the Consortium could not benefit from any advantage resulting from that amendment. |
| (414) | Komisija poleg tega ugotavlja, da je stalna povezava začela obratovati julija 2000. Odločitev o naložbi v stalno povezavo in finančni načrt naložbe sta bila sprejeta pred tem. | (414) | The Commission, further, notes that the Fixed Link entered into service in July 2000. The decision to invest in the Fixed Link, and the financial planning of the investment, was carried out before that time. |
| (415) | Komisija v navedenih okoliščinah meni, da je treba pravilo o prenosu izgub za obdobje 2013–2015 razlikovati od pravila o prenosu izgub za obdobje 1991–2001, v kolikor ni mogoče šteti, da se je izvedlo v podporo finančni naložbi v stalno povezavo, da je bilo pogoj za tako naložbo ali da je se je z njim zagotavljala izvedljivost dolgoročnega finančnega načrtovanja naložbe, ker je bila odločitev o naložbi sprejeta, dejanska naložba pa izvedena veliko pred začetkom uporabe pravila o prenosu izgub za obdobje 2013–2015. Komisija zato ugotavlja, da razlogi, zaradi katerih je ugotovila, da je bila prednost, povezana s pomočjo, ki izhaja iz pravila o prenosu izgub za obdobje 1991–2001, dodeljena enkrat, in ki v veliki meri temeljijo na dejstvu, da se je dolgoročno načrtovanje naložbe v stalno povezavo opiralo na pravilo o prenosu izgub za obdobje 1991–2001, na gotovosti, da je bila dodeljena, in na potrebi po zagotovitvi, da se lahko upošteva pri finančnem načrtovanju, ne veljajo za pravilo o prenosu izgub za obdobje 2013–2015. | (415) | In those circumstances, the Commission considers that the 2013-2015 LCF must be distinguished from the 1991-2001 LCF, insofar as it could not be deemed to have been implemented in order to support the financial investment into the Fixed Link, or to have been a condition for such investment, or to ensure the feasibility of the long-term financial planning of the investment, given that the decision to invest, and, indeed, the investment, had been completed long before the 2013-2015 LCF became applicable. As a result, the Commission finds that the reasons for which it determined that the advantage connected to the aid deriving from the 1991-2001 LCF was granted on one occasion, which are based significantly on the fact that the long-term investment planning of the Fixed Link relied on the 1991-2001 LCF, the certainty that it had been granted, and the need to be sure that it could be taken into account in the financial planning, do not apply to the 2013-2015 LCF. |
| (416) | Komisija poleg tega ugotavlja, da se je med pravilom o prenosu izgub za obdobje 1991–2001 in pravilom o prenosu izgub za obdobje 2013–2015 uporabljalo pravilo o prenosu izgub za obdobje 2002–2012, za katero je Komisija ugotovila, da ne pomeni državne pomoči za družbo A/S Øresund ali konzorcij (uvodni izjavi 333 in 355). Pravilo o prenosu izgub za obdobje 2013–2015 je pomenilo ponovno uvedbo ugodnejše obravnave, čeprav ni bila več potrebna za načrtovanje naložb. V zvezi s tem bi se s pravilom o prenosu izgub za obdobje 2013–2015 podpiralo tekoče poslovanje družbe A/S Øresund ali konzorcija, ne pa začetne naložbe v stalno povezavo. | (416) | Furthermore, the Commission notes that, between the 1991-2001 LCF and the 2013-2015 LCF, there was the 2002-2012 LCF, which the Commission has concluded did not constitute State aid to A/S Øresund or to the Consortium (recitals (333) and (355)). The 2013-2015 LCF represented a reintroduction of advantageous treatment, despite the fact that it was no longer required for the investment planning. In that regard, the 2013-2015 LCF would have the effect of supporting day-to-day operations of A/S Øresund or the Consortium, rather than the initial investment in the Fixed Link. |
| (417) | Komisija zato meni, da ni jasnih razlogov za odstopanje od običajnega pristopa, v skladu s katerim se davčne ugodnosti dodeljujejo na letni ravni. Iz tega sledi, da se za pomoč, ki izhaja iz pravila o prenosu izgub za obdobje 2013–2015, lahko šteje, da je bila dokončno dodeljena v trenutku, ko so davčni organi sprejeli davčne napovedi družbe A/S Øresund za davčna leta v obdobju veljavnosti pravila o prenosu izgub za obdobje 2013–2015, v katerih je bilo mogoče uporabiti višji znesek izgub. | (417) | The Commission, therefore, does not consider that there are clear reasons to depart from the usual approach that tax advantages are granted on an annual basis. It follows that the aid deriving from the 2013-2015 LCF can be considered as having been definitively granted at the moment of the acceptance by the tax authorities of A/S Øresund’s tax returns relating to the tax years in the 2013-2015 LCF period, in which a higher amount of losses could be utilised. |
| (418) | Komisija zato meni, da državna pomoč, ki izhaja iz pravila o prenosu izgub za obdobje 2013–2015, pomeni več individualnih pomoči, ki so bile dodeljene od leta 2014 (187) na letni ravni v trenutku, ko so organi sprejeli davčne napovedi družbe A/S Øresund, in do sprejetja davčne napovedi za davčno leto 2015. Pravilo o prenosu izgub za obdobje 2013–2015 je bilo razveljavljeno z zakonom št. 581 z dne 4. maja 2015, ki se je uporabljal od davčnega leta 2016. | (418) | The Commission, therefore, considers that the State aid deriving from the 2013-2015 LCF constitutes several grants of individual aid, granted from 2014 (187) onwards, on an annual basis, at the moment of the acceptance of A/S Øresund’s tax returns by the authorities, and until the acceptance of the tax return for the tax year 2015. The 2013-2015 LCF was repealed by Act No 581 of 4 May 2015, applicable as from the tax year 2016. |
| 6.2.2.2 Posebna danska pravila o amortizaciji | 6.2.2.2. Special Danish rules on depreciation |
| 6.2.2.2.1 Pravilo o amortizaciji za obdobje 1999–2007 in pravilo o amortizaciji za obdobje 2008–2015 | 6.2.2.2.1. 1999-2007 DEP and 2008-2015 DEP |
| (419) | Kot je pojasnjeno v uvodni izjavi 145, se je z zakonom št. 433 z dne 26. junija 1998 običajna najvišja stopnja amortizacije za stavbe in naprave, določena v danskem zakonu o davčni amortizaciji, znižala na 5 %, z zakonom št. 540 z dne 6. junija 2007 pa na 4 %. Vendar je stopnja amortizacije za družbo A/S Øresund ostala 6- oziroma 2-odstotna v skladu s členoma 12 in 13 zakona o gradnji ter ustreznima členoma 13 in 14 zakona o družbi Sund & Bælt, ki sta ostala veljavna do leta 2016. Kot je navedeno v uvodni izjavi 344, je danska država s tem, ko se ni odločila za spremembo pravil, ki se uporabljajo za družbo A/S Øresund, da bi se upoštevale spremembe običajnih pravil obdavčitve, družbo A/S Øresund postavila v ugodnejši položaj v primerjavi z drugimi pravnimi osebami, zavezanimi plačilu danskega davka od dohodkov pravnih oseb. Šele z zakonom št. 581 z dne 4. maja 2015, ki je začel veljati 1. januarja 2016, sta bila člena 13 in 14 zakona o družbi Sund & Bælt razveljavljena, za družbo A/S Øresund pa so začela veljati običajna pravila danskega zakona o davku od dohodkov pravnih oseb in danskega zakona o davčni amortizaciji. Ukrep pomoči zajema kombinacijo posegov (uvodna izjava 344), saj je bila družba A/S Øresund v ugodnejšem položaju v primerjavi z drugimi podjetji v podobnem položaju, ker je zakon o družbi Sund & Bælt določal ugodnejšo davčno obravnavo in je zato odstopal od spremenjenega danskega zakona o davčni amortizaciji, ki je bil bolj omejevalen in se ni uporabljal za družbo A/S Øresund, temveč za druga podjetja, ki so pravno in dejansko primerljiva. Kot je bilo ugotovljeno v uvodni izjavi 319, je vsaka prednost za družbo A/S Øresund, ki izhaja iz posebnih danskih pravil o prenosu izgub v prihodnje obdobje in amortizaciji, tudi prednost za konzorcij. | (419) | As explained at recital (145), by Act No 433 of 26 June 1998, the normal maximum depreciation rate for buildings and installations set in the Danish Tax Depreciation Act decreased to 5 %, and, by Act No 540 of 6 June 2007, to 4 %. The depreciation rate for A/S Øresund, however, remained at 6 % / 2 %, pursuant to Sections 12 and 13 of the Construction Act and the corresponding Sections 13 and 14 of the Sund & Bælt Act, which remained in force until 2016. As noted at recital (344), it was by declining to change the rules applicable to A/S Øresund to reflect the changes to the normal taxation rules that the Danish State placed A/S Øresund in a more advantageous position than other legal entities subject to Danish corporate income tax. It is only by Act No 581 of 4 May 2015, which entered into force on 1 January 2016, that Section 13 and 14 of the Sund & Baelt Act were repealed and that A/S Øresund became subject to the normal rules of the Danish Corporate Income Tax Act and the Danish Tax Depreciation Act. The aid measure consists of a combination of elements (recital (344)) as A/S Øresund was placed in a more advantageous position over other undertakings in a similar situation, by virtue of the fact that the Sund & Bælt Act provided for a more beneficial tax treatment and, therefore, derogated from the amended Danish Tax Depreciation Act, which was more restrictive and which did not apply to A/S Øresund, but to other undertakings that are legally and factually comparable. As concluded at recital (319), any advantage to A/S Øresund created by the special Danish rules on loss carry-forward and depreciation is also an advantage to the Consortium. |
| 6.2.2.2.2 Pravilo o amortizaciji za obdobje 1999–2007 in pravilo o amortizaciji za obdobje 2008–2015: shema ali individualna pomoč | 6.2.2.2.2. 1999-2007 DEP and 2008-2015 DEP: Scheme or individual aid |
| (420) | Komisija meni, da za državno pomoč, ki izhaja iz pravila o amortizaciji za obdobje 1999–2007 in pravila o amortizaciji za obdobje 2008–2015, ni mogoče šteti, da je dodeljena na podlagi sheme. | (420) | The Commission considers that the State aid deriving from the 1999-2007 DEP and the 2008-2015 DEP cannot be considered as being granted on the basis of a scheme. |
| (421) | Prvič, navedena pomoč se ne dodeli na podlagi akta, ki določa, da se individualna pomoč dodeli podjetjem, opredeljenim v aktu na splošen in abstrakten način. V zakonu o gradnji, kakor je vključen v zakon o družbi Sund & Bælt, je za družbo A/S Øresund izrecno navedeno, da je upravičena do posebnega danskega pravila o amortizaciji. Pomoč, ki izhaja iz pravila o amortizaciji za obdobje 1999–2007 in pravila o amortizaciji za obdobje 2008–2015, zato ne izpolnjuje prvega pogoja iz opredelitve sheme pomoči iz člena 1(d) Uredbe (EU) 2015/1589. | (421) | First, that aid is not granted on the basis of an act that provides for individual aid awards to be made to undertakings defined within the act in a general and abstract manner. The Construction Act, as incorporated in the Sund & Bælt Act, refers to A/S Øresund explicitly as being entitled to the special Danish rule on depreciation. The aid deriving from the 1999-2007 DEP and the 2008-2015 DEP, therefore, does not fulfil the first condition in the definition of an aid scheme, as set out at Article 1(d) of Regulation 2015/1589. |
| (422) | Drugič, za pravilo o amortizaciji za obdobje 1999–2007 in pravilo o amortizaciji za obdobje 2008–2015 je treba šteti, da sta povezani z določenim projektom, ker pomoč, ki izhaja iz navedenih ukrepov, zajema prednost, povezano z amortizacijo stroškov naložbe v stalno povezavo, pri čemer so izključeni drugi projekti ali dejavnosti. V zakonu o gradnji in v zakonu o družbi Sund & Bælt je zadevni projekt namreč izrecno opredeljen kot gradnja in obratovanje stalne povezave. Pomoč, ki izhaja iz pravila o amortizaciji za obdobje 1999–2007 in pravila o amortizaciji za obdobje 2008–2015, zato ne izpolnjuje drugega pogoja iz opredelitve sheme pomoči iz člena 1(d) Uredbe (EU) 2015/1589. | (422) | Second, the 1999-2007 DEP and the 2008-2015 DEP must be regarded as being linked to a specific project, since the aid deriving from those measures covers an advantage linked to the depreciation of the investment costs of the Fixed Link, to the exclusion of other projects or activities. This is because the Construction Act, and the Sund & Bælt Act, explicitly specify the relevant project as the construction and operation of the Fixed Link. The aid deriving from the 1999-2007 DEP and the 2008-2015 DEP, therefore, does not fulfil the second condition in the definition of an aid scheme as set out at Article 1(d) of Regulation 2015/1589. |
| (423) | Pomoč, ki izhaja iz pravila o amortizaciji za obdobje 1999–2007 in pravila o amortizaciji za obdobje 2008–2015, zato ne spada v opredelitev sheme pomoči v smislu člena 1(d) Uredbe (EU) 2015/1589. Zato jo je treba opredeliti kot eno ali več individualnih pomoči v smislu člena 1(e) Uredbe (EU) 2015/1589. | (423) | The aid deriving from the 1999-2007 DEP and the 2008-2015 DEP, therefore, does not fall within the definition of an ‘aid scheme’ within the meaning of Article 1(d) of Regulation 2015/1589. It must, therefore, be qualified as one or more individual aids, within the meaning of Article 1(e) of Regulation 2015/1589. |
| 6.2.2.2.3. Pravilo o amortizaciji za obdobje 1999–2007 in pravilo o amortizaciji za obdobje 2008–2015: datumi dodelitve | 6.2.2.2.3. 1999-2007 DEP and 2008-2015 DEP: Granting dates |
| (424) | Kot je navedeno v uvodni izjavi 395, se v primeru državne pomoči, ki izhaja iz davčnih ugodnosti, navedena prednost običajno uresniči na letni ravni, razen če obstajajo razlogi za domnevo, da je upravičeno drugačno stališče. Komisija meni, da se glede pomoči, ki izhaja iz pravila o amortizaciji za obdobje 1999–2007 in pravila o amortizaciji za obdobje 2008–2015, zdi, da se pomoč v teoriji dodeli na letni ravni. Ker je imela družba A/S Øresund diskrecijsko pravico glede tega, kdaj lahko amortizira sredstva v davčnih napovedih (uvodna izjava 125), se je prednost v praksi uresničila manj pogosto (uvodne izjave 425 do 428). | (424) | As noted at recital (395), in the case of State aid deriving from tax advantages, that advantage usually materialises on an annual basis, unless there are reasons to consider that another view is justified. The Commission considers that, as far as the aid deriving from the 1999-2007 DEP and the 2008-2015 DEP is concerned, it appears that the aid would, in theory, be granted on an annual basis. However, as A/S Øresund had discretion as to when it could depreciate its assets in its tax returns (recital (125)), in practice, the advantage materialised on a less frequent basis (recitals (425) to (428)). |
| (425) | Komisija najprej ugotavlja, da za prednost, ki je neločljivo povezana s pomočjo, ki izhaja iz pravila o amortizaciji za obdobje 1999–2007, ni mogoče šteti, da je bila dodeljena pred 26. junijem 1998, ko se je običajna stopnja amortizacije za stavbe in naprave iz danskega zakona o davčni amortizaciji znižala na 5 %, podobna sprememba pa ni veljala za pravila o amortizaciji, ki se uporabljajo za družbo A/S Øresund. Podobno za prednost, ki je neločljivo povezana s pomočjo, ki izhaja iz pravila o amortizaciji za obdobje 2008–2015, ni mogoče šteti, da je bila dodeljena pred 6. junijem 2007, ko se je običajna stopnja amortizacije za stavbe in naprave iz danskega zakona o davčni amortizaciji znižala na 4 %, podobna sprememba pa ni veljala za pravila o amortizaciji, ki se uporabljajo za družbo A/S Øresund. Zato ni mogoče trditi, da bi bilo treba, ker je bilo pravilo, ki se uporablja za družbo A/S Øresund, že samo po sebi del zakona o gradnji, tudi za pomoč šteti, da je dodeljena z zakonom o gradnji. | (425) | The Commission first notes that the advantage inherent in the aid deriving from the 1999-2007 DEP cannot be considered as having been granted before 26 June 1998, when the normal depreciation rate for buildings and installations set in the Danish Tax Depreciation Act decreased to 5 %, and a similar change was not applied to the depreciation rules applicable to A/S Øresund. Similarly, the advantage inherent in the aid deriving from the 2008-2015 DEP cannot be considered as having been granted before 6 June 2007, when the normal depreciation rate for buildings and installations set in the Danish Tax Depreciation Act decreased to 4 %, and a similar change was not applied to the depreciation rules applicable to A/S Øresund. Therefore, it cannot be argued that, because the rule applicable to A/S Øresund was, as such, already part of the Construction Act, that also the aid should be considered as being granted with the Construction Act. |
| (426) | Komisija nadalje ugotavlja, da se položaj v primeru pravila o prenosu izgub za obdobje 1991–2001, kot je določeno v uvodnih izjavah 396 do 404, bistveno razlikuje od položaja v primeru pravila o amortizaciji za obdobje 1999–2007 in pravila o amortizaciji za obdobje 2008–2015. Ko je bil 26. junija 1998 in 6. junija 2007 spremenjen danski zakon o davčni amortizaciji, je bila odločitev o naložbi v izgradnjo stalne povezave že sprejeta, stalna povezava pa je bila dejansko skoraj pripravljena za začetek obratovanja. Odločitve danske države, da družbi A/S Øresund ponudi ugodnejše pogoje davčne amortizacije kot drugim pravnim osebam, zavezanim plačilu danskega davka od dohodkov pravnih oseb, zato v nasprotju s pravilom o prenosu izgub za obdobje 1991–2001 (uvodna izjava 399) ni mogoče šteti za enega od temeljnih pogojev, na katerih temelji finančno načrtovanje naložbe. Komisija zlasti ugotavlja, da se danskim organom v času finančnega načrtovanja ni zdelo potrebno, da se družbi A/S Øresund odobri ugodnejša obravnava v primerjavi z drugimi družbami z omejeno odgovornostjo, zavezanimi plačilu davka od dohodkov pravnih oseb, kar zadeva pravila o amortizaciji sredstev – pravzaprav danski organi celo menijo, da je bilo pravilo o amortizaciji za obdobje 1991–1998 dejansko škodljivo za družbo A/S Øresund oziroma konzorcij (uvodna izjava 268). Pomoč, ki izhaja iz pravila o amortizaciji za obdobje 1999–2007 in pravilo o amortizaciji za obdobje 2008–2015, se zato ne more šteti za pomoč, dodeljeno v podporo naložbi v stalno povezavo. V navedenih okoliščinah se premisleki, na podlagi katerih je Komisija ugotovila, da je bilo pravilo o prenosu izgub za obdobje 1991–2001 ob ustanovitvi konzorcija dodeljeno kot ena individualna pomoč, zlasti zaradi potrebe po pravilu o prenosu izgub za obdobje 1991–2001 pri finančnem načrtovanju naložbe v stalno povezavo, ne uporabljajo za pravilo o amortizaciji za obdobje 1999–2007 ali pravilo o amortizaciji za obdobje 2008–2015. Komisija ugotavlja, da bi bilo pomoč, ki izhaja iz pravila o amortizaciji za obdobje 1999–2007 in pravila o amortizaciji za obdobje 2008–2015, zato ustrezneje šteti za podporo vsakodnevnemu poslovanju družbe A/S Øresund in konzorcija, ne pa za začetno naložbo v stalno povezavo. | (426) | The Commission further notes the situation applying to the 1991-2001 LCF as set out at recitals (396) to (404) is fundamentally different from the situation applying to the 1999-2007 DEP and the 2008-2015 DEP. When the Danish Tax Depreciation Act was amended on 26 June 1998 and on 6 June 2007, the decision to invest in the construction of the Fixed Link had already been taken, and, in fact, the Fixed Link was almost ready to be put into operation. As such, unlike the 1991-2001 LCF (recital (399)) the decision of the Danish State to offer A/S Øresund more advantageous tax depreciation conditions than other legal entities subject to Danish corporate income tax cannot be considered to be one of the fundamental conditions underpinning the financial planning of the investment. In particular, the Commission notes that, at the time that financial planning was being undertaken, the Danish authorities did not consider it necessary to grant A/S Øresund advantageous treatment as compared to other limited liability companies subject to corporate income tax as regards asset depreciation rules – in fact, the Danish authorities even consider that the 1991-1998 DEP was actually detrimental to A/S Øresund / the Consortium (recital (268)). The aid deriving from the 1999-2007 DEP and the 2008-2015 DEP, therefore, cannot be considered to be aid granted to support the investment in the Fixed Link. In those circumstances, the considerations that led the Commission to conclude that the 1991-2001 LCF was granted as one individual aid upon the creation of the Consortium, notably, due to the necessity of the 1991-2001 LCF for the financial planning of the Fixed Link investment, do not apply to the 1999-2007 DEP or the 2008-2015 DEP. The Commission notes that the aid deriving from the 1999-2007 DEP and the 2008-2015 DEP should, therefore, more properly be considered to support the day-to-day operations of A/S Øresund and the Consortium, rather than the initial investment into the Fixed Link. |
| (427) | Komisija ugotavlja, da bi se družba A/S Øresund pri določanju davčnih obveznosti za dano leto oprla na pravila, ki so se zanjo uporabljala v času predložitve davčnih napovedi. Za razliko od uporabe prenosa davčnih izgub, ki se samodejno uporablja (uvodna izjava 127), lahko na Danskem pravne osebe, zavezane plačilu danskega davka od dohodkov pravnih oseb, v svojih davčnih napovedih izberejo, kdaj bodo amortizirale svoja sredstva in po kakšni stopnji, v okviru omejitev, določenih z veljavno zakonodajo (uvodna izjava 125). Družba A/S Øresund je torej lahko izbrala trenutek, ko je želela amortizirati svoja sredstva po stopnji, višji od tiste, ki je določena v danskem zakonu o davčni amortizaciji. Zato se prednost, ki izhaja iz pravila o amortizaciji za obdobje 1999–2007 in pravila o amortizaciji za obdobje 2008–2015, ne bi samodejno uresničila vsako leto ob letnem sprejetju davčnih napovedi, če se ne bi uporabila stopnja amortizacije, višja od stopnje, ki je na voljo v skladu z običajnimi danskimi pravili obdavčitve. | (427) | The Commission notes that A/S Øresund would have relied on the rules applicable to it at the time of submitting its tax returns, in order to determine its tax liabilities for a given year. Unlike the utilisation of tax loss carry-forward, which is automatically applied (recital (127)), in Denmark, legal entities subject to Danish corporate income tax may choose when to depreciate their assets, and at what rate, in their tax returns, within the limits provided for by the applicable law (recital (125)). A/S Øresund could, therefore, choose the moment at which it wanted to depreciate its assets at a rate beyond that provided for in the Danish Tax Depreciation Act. As a result, the advantage deriving from the 1999-2007 DEP and the 2008-2015 DEP would not have automatically materialised each year upon the annual acceptance of the tax returns, if no depreciation beyond the rate available under normal Danish taxation rules had been applied. |
| (428) | Komisija v navedenih okoliščinah meni, da bi se prednost, povezana z višjo stopnjo amortizacije, ki je bila na voljo družbi A/S Øresund, glede na to, da pravila, ki so se zanjo uporabljala, niso bila spremenjena, da bi odražala omejitve iz splošnega prava, uresničila v trenutku, ko so bile sprejete davčne napovedi, v katerih je zadevna družba uporabila tako višjo stopnjo amortizacije (uvodna izjava 129). Ravno v tistem trenutku bi lahko državna pomoč, ki izhaja iz pravila o amortizaciji za obdobje 1999–2007 in pravila o amortizaciji za obdobje 2008–2015, izkrivljala konkurenco ali vplivala na trgovino med državami članicami. | (428) | In those circumstances, the Commission considers that the advantage associated with the higher rate of depreciation available to A/S Øresund, in light of the absence of an amendment to the rules applicable to it to reflect the limitations in the general law, would have materialised at the moment of the acceptance of the tax returns in which it applied such a higher rate of depreciation (recital (129)). It is at that moment, also, that the State aid deriving from the 1999-2007 DEP and the 2008-2015 DEP would have been able to distort competition, or affect trade between Member States. |
| (429) | Komisija zato meni, da pomoč, ki izhaja iz pravila o amortizaciji za obdobje 1999–2007 in pravila o amortizaciji za obdobje 2008–2015, pomeni več individualnih pomoči, ki jih je Danska dodelila od leta 2000 (188) v trenutku, ko so bile sprejete davčne napovedi družbe A/S Øresund, v katerih je ta uporabila stopnjo amortizacije, višjo od stopnje, določene v danskem zakonu o davčni amortizaciji, do sprejetja davčne napovedi za davčno leto 2015. Pravilo o amortizaciji za obdobje 2008–2015 je bilo razveljavljeno z učinkom od 1. januarja 2016 z zakonom št. 581 z dne 4. maja 2015, ki se je uporabljal od davčnega leta 2016. | (429) | The Commission, therefore, considers that the aid deriving from the 1999-2007 DEP and the 2008-2015 DEP constitutes a number of individual aids, granted by Denmark from 2000 (188) onwards, at the moment of the acceptance of A/S Øresund’s tax returns in which it applied a depreciation rate beyond the rate provided for in the Danish Depreciation Act, until the acceptance of the tax return for the tax year 2015. The 2008-2015 DEP was repealed with effect from 1 January 2016 by Act No 581 of 4 May 2015, applicable as from the tax year 2016. |
| 6.3 Opredelitev kot nova ali obstoječa pomoč | 6.3. Classification as new or existing aid |
| (430) | Potem ko je Komisija ugotovila, da ukrepi pomoči pomenijo individualno pomoč, ki ni bila dodeljena na podlagi sheme pomoči, in datume njihove dodelitve, mora za vsak ukrep pomoči ugotoviti, ali gre za novo ali obstoječo pomoč. | (430) | Having established that the aid measures constitute individual aid not awarded on the basis of an aid scheme, and their granting dates, the Commission must determine, for each of the aid measures, whether they constitute new or existing aid. |
| (431) | Nova pomoč je v skladu s členom 1(c) Uredbe (EU) 2015/1589 vsa pomoč, ki ni veljavna pomoč, vključno s spremembami veljavne pomoči. | (431) | New aid, pursuant to Article 1(c) of Regulation 2015/1589, is all aid that is not existing aid, including alterations to existing aid. |
| (432) | „Obstoječa pomoč“ je v členu 1(b) Uredbe (EU) 2015/1589 opredeljena na naslednji način: | „(i) | brez poseganja v člena 144 in 172 Akta o pristopu Avstrije, Finske in Švedske [...] vso pomoč, ki je obstajala pred začetkom veljavnosti PDEU v zadevnih državah članicah, to je sheme pomoči in individualno pomoč, ki se je začela izvajati pred začetkom veljavnosti PDEU in se še vedno uporablja; | (ii) | odobreno pomoč, to je sheme pomoči in individualno pomoč, ki sta jo odobrila Komisija ali Svet; | (iii) | pomoč, za katero se šteje, da je bila odobrena na podlagi člena 4(6) Uredbe (ES) št. 659/1999 ali člena 4(6) [Uredbe (EU) 2015/1589] ali pred Uredbo (ES) št. 659/1999, vendar skladno s tem postopkom; | (iv) | pomoč, za katero se šteje, da je veljavna v skladu s členom 17 [Uredbe (EU) 2015/1589]; | (v) | pomoč, za katero se šteje, da je veljavna, ker je mogoče ugotoviti, da takrat, ko se je začela izvajati, ni bila pomoč, pozneje pa je postala pomoč zaradi razvoja notranjega trga in je država članica ni spremenila. Če nekateri ukrepi postanejo pomoč zaradi liberalizacije dejavnosti po pravu Unije, se takšni ukrepi ne štejejo kot veljavna pomoč po datumu, določenem za liberalizacijo“. | (432) | ‘Existing aid’ is defined at Article 1(b) of Regulation 2015/1589, as follows: | ‘(i) | without prejudice to Articles 144 and 172 of the Act of Accession of Austria, Finland and Sweden … all aid which existed prior to the entry into force of the TFEU in the respective Member States, that is to say, aid schemes and individual aid which were put into effect before, and are still applicable after, the entry into force of the TFEU in the respective Member States; | (ii) | authorised aid, that is to say, aid schemes and individual aid which have been authorised by the Commission or by the Council; | (iii) | aid which is deemed to have been authorised pursuant to Article 4(6) of Regulation (EC) No 659/1999 or to Article 4(6) of [Regulation 2015/1589], or prior to Regulation (EC) No 659/1999 but in accordance with this procedure; | (iv) | aid which is deemed to be existing aid pursuant to Article 17 of [Regulation 2015/1589]; | (v) | aid which is deemed to be an existing aid because it can be established that at the time it was put into effect it did not constitute an aid, and subsequently became an aid due to the evolution of the internal market and without having been altered by the Member State. Where certain measures become aid following the liberalisation of an activity by Union law, such measures shall not be considered as existing aid after the date fixed for liberalisation’. |
| (433) | V členu 17(3) Uredbe (EU) 2015/1589 v povezavi s členom 1(b), točka (iv), Uredbe (EU) 2015/1589 je določeno, da se kakršna koli pomoč, pri kateri je zastaralni rok desetih let potekel, šteje kot veljavna pomoč. V členu 17(2) je določeno, da zastaralni rok začne teči na dan, ko je dodeljena nezakonita pomoč upravičencu kot individualna pomoč ali kot pomoč v okviru sheme pomoči. Kakršen koli ukrep glede nezakonite pomoči, ki ga sprejme Komisija ali država članica na zahtevo Komisije, prekine zastaralni rok Po vsaki prekinitvi začne rok teči znova. | (433) | In connection with Article 1(b), point (iv) of Regulation 2015/1589, Article 17(3) of Regulation 2015/1589 provides that any aid of which the limitation period of ten years has expired shall be deemed to be existing aid. Article 17(2) provides that the limitation period shall begin on the day on which the unlawful aid is awarded to the beneficiary either as individual aid or as aid under an aid scheme. Any action taken by the Commission or by a Member State, acting at the request of the Commission, with regard to the unlawful aid shall interrupt the limitation period. Each interruption shall start time running afresh. |
| 6.3.1 Državna poroštva: nova ali obstoječa pomoč | 6.3.1. State guarantees: new or existing aid |
| (434) | Komisija je v uvodni izjavi 388 sklenila, da je bila pomoč, ki izhaja iz modela državnega poroštva, konzorciju dokončno dodeljena s sporazumom o konzorciju in z dnem njegove ustanovitve 13. februarja 1992. Glede na navedeni sklep je treba ugotoviti, ali pomoč, ki izhaja iz modela državnega poroštva, spada v katero od opredelitev obstoječe pomoči iz člena 1(b) Uredbe (EU) 2015/1589. | (434) | The Commission concluded at recital (388) that the aid deriving from the State guarantee model was definitively granted to the Consortium by the Consortium Agreement and as from the day it was founded on 13 February 1992. In light of that conclusion, it is necessary to determine whether the aid deriving from the State guarantee model falls within any of the definitions of existing aid under Article 1(b) of Regulation 2015/1589. |
| (435) | Prvič, Komisija opozarja, da je pritožnik 16. aprila 2013 pri Komisiji vložil pritožbo, v kateri je trdil, da model državnega poroštva pomeni nezakonito državno pomoč. Komisija je 13. maja 2013 Danski in Švedski v zvezi z navedeno pritožbo poslala zahtevo za informacije. Komisija meni, da navedena zahteva za informacije pomeni ukrep Komisije v zvezi s pomočjo, ki izhaja iz modela državnega poroštva, ki bi v skladu s členom 17 Uredbe (EU) 2015/1589 prekinil zastaralni rok v zvezi s pomočjo, dodeljeno od 13. maja 2003 (tj. deset let pred zahtevo za informacije). | (435) | Firstly, the Commission recalls that the Complainant filed its complaint with the Commission on 16 April 2013, alleging that the State guarantee model constituted illegal State aid. The Commission sent a request for information to Denmark and Sweden, in respect of that complaint, on 13 May 2013. The Commission considers that that request for information constituted an action taken by the Commission with regard to the aid deriving from the State guarantee model, which, pursuant to Article 17 of Regulation 2015/1589, would have interrupted the limitation period in connection with aid granted as from 13 May 2003 (that is, ten years before the request for information). |
| (436) | Vendar Komisija ugotavlja, da je zastaralni rok, povezan s pomočjo, ki izhaja iz modela državnega poroštva, potekel 13. februarja 2002, tj. deset let po njeni dodelitvi. Navedeni zastaralni rok je torej potekel do takrat, ko bi ga lahko prekinila zahteva Komisije za informacije z dne 13. maja 2013. | (436) | The Commission notes, however, that the limitation period connected with the aid deriving from the State guarantee model expired on 13 February 2002, that is, ten years after the date it was granted. That limitation period had, therefore, expired by the time the Commission’s request for information of 13 May 2013 could have interrupted it. |
| (437) | Komisija v navedenih okoliščinah ugotavlja, da pomoč, ki izhaja iz modela državnega poroštva, ki sta jo Danska in Švedska dodelili konzorciju, pomeni obstoječo pomoč v smislu člena 1(b), točka (iv), Uredbe (EU) 2015/1589. | (437) | In those circumstances, the Commission concludes that the aid deriving from the State guarantee model, granted by Denmark and Sweden to the Consortium, constitutes existing aid within the meaning of Article 1(b), point (iv) of Regulation 2015/1589. |
| (438) | Drugič, Komisija ugotavlja, da švedski organi trdijo, da je bila vsaka morebitna pomoč, ki jo je Švedska dodelila v zvezi s stalno povezavo, dodeljena pred pristopom Švedske k Uniji in pred začetkom veljavnosti Sporazuma EGP 1. januarja 1994. | (438) | Secondly, the Commission notes that the Swedish authorities argue that any possible aid granted by Sweden in connection with the Fixed Link was granted prior to its accession to the Union, and prior to the entry into force of the EEA Agreement, on 1 January 1994. |
| (439) | Kot je navedeno v uvodni izjavi 432, se v skladu s členom 1(b), točka (i), Uredbe (EU) 2015/1589 pomoč, ki je obstajala pred začetkom veljavnosti PDEU na Švedskem, šteje za obstoječo pomoč. Vendar to ne posega v člena 144 in 172 Akta o pristopu Avstrije, Finske in Švedske. V skladu s členom 144 navedenega akta se „med pomočmi, ki so se v novih državah članicah uporabljale pred pristopom, za ‚obstoječe pomoči‘ štejejo samo tiste, ki so bile Komisiji sporočene do 30. aprila 1995“. | (439) | As noted at recital (432), under Article 1(b), point (i) of the Regulation 2015/1589, aid that existed prior to the entry into force of the TFEU in Sweden is considered existing aid. That is, however, without prejudice to Articles 144 and 172 of the Act of Accession of Austria, Finland and Sweden. According to Article 144 of that Act, ‘…among the aids applied in the new Member States prior to access only those communicated to the Commission by 30 April 1995 will be deemed to be “existing aids”…’. |
| (440) | Komisija je v uvodni izjavi 113 sklepa o začetku postopka navedla, da če bi bilo treba za pomoč, ki izhaja iz modela državnega poroštva in jo je Švedska dodelila konzorciju, šteti, da je bila dodeljena leta 1992, ker takrat ni bila sporočena Komisiji, se navedena pomoč ne more šteti za obstoječo pomoč na podlagi člena 1(b), točka (i), Uredbe (EU) 2015/1589. | (440) | At recital 113 of the Opening decision, the Commission indicated that, if the aid deriving from the State guarantee model, granted to Sweden by the Consortium, should be considered as having been granted in 1992, as it was not communicated to the Commission at the time, it could not be considered as existing aid on the basis of Article 1(b), point (i) of Regulation 2015/1589. |
| (441) | Vendar Komisija opozarja, da je bila v času, ko je Švedska uvedla model državnega poroštva, jasna praksa Komisije, da se gradnja in obratovanje prometne infrastrukture ne štejeta za gospodarsko dejavnost (189). Komisija v navedenih okoliščinah meni, da je razumljivo, da ji model državnega poroštva ni bil sporočen kot pomoč, ki je obstajala pred začetkom veljavnosti PDEU, ker se takrat za tak ukrep na splošno ni štelo, da pomeni državno pomoč. | (441) | The Commission recalls, however, that, at the time when the State guarantee model was put in place by Sweden, it was clear Commission practice to find that the construction and operation of transport infrastructure was not considered to constitute an economic activity (189). In those circumstances, the Commission considers that it is understandable that the State guarantee model was not communicated to the Commission as aid that existed prior to the entry into force of the TFEU because, at that time, such measure was not generally considered as constituting State aid. |
| (442) | Komisija v vsakem primeru ugotavlja, da je Evropski svet decembra 1994 projekt stalne povezave odobril kot enega od prednostnih projektov v okviru omrežja TEN-T (uvodna izjava 58). Preden je Svet odobril njegovo vključitev na ta seznam, sta državi Komisiji sporočili zasnovo projekta, vključno z namero, da ga bosta financirali z modelom državnega poroštva. Model državnega poroštva se pred pristopom Švedske k Uniji ni štel za državno pomoč, vendar je bil Komisiji kljub temu sporočen do 30. aprila 1995 v okviru priprave za njegovo vključitev na seznam prednostnih projektov TEN-T. | (442) | In any event, the Commission notes that the Fixed Link project was approved as one of the priority projects under TEN-T by the European Council in December 1994 (recital (58)). Prior to the Council’s approval of its inclusion in that list, the States had communicated the outline of the project, including their intention to finance it by way of the State guarantee model, to the Commission. Therefore, even though the State guarantee model did not qualify as State aid prior to Sweden’s accession to the Union, it had nevertheless been communicated to the Commission by 30 April 1995, in the context of the preparation for its inclusion in the TEN-T priority project list. |
| (443) | Komisija zato meni, da pomoč, ki izhaja iz modela državnega poroštva, ki jo je Švedska dodelila konzorciju, pomeni obstoječo pomoč v smislu člena 1(b), točka (i), Uredbe (EU) 2015/1589. | (443) | Consequently, the Commission considers that the aid deriving from the State guarantee model, granted by Sweden to the Consortium, constitutes existing aid within the meaning of Article 1(b), point (i) of Regulation 2015/1589. |
| (444) | Poleg tega, kot je navedeno v uvodni izjavi 387, je prednost modela državnega poroštva za konzorcij dejstvo, da morata državi prevzeti tveganja, povezana s financiranjem načrtovanja in gradnje stalne povezave – navedena prednost in pravica do nje se od njenega nastanka nista spremenili. Komisija ugotavlja, da nadomestitev oddelka 8 zakona o gradnji s členom 11 zakona o družbi Sund & Bælt v tem okviru ni pomembna, saj sta obe določbi vsebinsko enaki (uvodna izjava 87). | (444) | Moreover, as noted at recital (387), the advantage for the Consortium of the State guarantee model is the fact that the States are obliged to undertake the risks connected with the financing of the planning and construction of the Fixed Link – that advantage, and the right to it, has not been altered since it was established. The Commission notes that the replacement of Section 8 of the Construction Act by Section 11 of the Sund & Bælt Act is not relevant in this context since both provisions are substantially identical (recital (87)). |
| (445) | Komisija glede na premisleke iz uvodnih izjav 434 do 444 ugotavlja, da pomoč, ki izhaja iz modela državnega poroštva, ki sta jo Danska in Švedska dodelili konzorciju, pomeni obstoječo pomoč v smislu člena 1(b), točka (iv), Uredbe (EU) 2015/1589. Poleg tega Komisija ugotavlja, da navedena pomoč, ki jo je Švedska dodelila konzorciju, pomeni obstoječo pomoč v smislu člena 1(b), točka (i), Uredbe (EU) 2015/1589. | (445) | In light of the considerations set out at recitals (434) to (444), the Commission concludes that the aid deriving from the State guarantee model, granted by Denmark and Sweden to the Consortium, constitutes existing aid, within the meaning of Article 1(b), point (iv) of Regulation 2015/1589. In addition, the Commission concludes that that aid, granted by Sweden to the Consortium, constitutes existing aid within the meaning of Article 1(b), point (i) of Regulation 2015/1589. |
| 6.3.2 Posebna danska pravila o prenosu izgub v prihodnje obdobje: nova ali obstoječa pomoč | 6.3.2. The special Danish rules on loss carry-forward: new or existing aid |
| 6.3.2.1 Pravilo o prenosu izgub za obdobje 1991–2001: nova ali obstoječa pomoč | 6.3.2.1. 1991-2001 LCF: new or existing aid |
| (446) | Komisija je v uvodni izjavi 404 sklenila, da je Danska 13. februarja 1992 Konzorciju dodelila pomoč, ki izhaja iz pravila o prenosu izgub za obdobje 1991–2001. Glede na navedeni sklep je treba ugotoviti, ali pomoč, ki izhaja iz pravila o prenosu izgub za obdobje 1991–2001, spada v katero od opredelitev obstoječe pomoči iz člena 1(b) Uredbe (EU) 2015/1589. | (446) | The Commission concluded at recital (404) that the aid deriving from the 1991-2001 LCF was granted to the Consortium by Denmark on 13 February 1992. In light of that conclusion, it is necessary to determine whether the aid deriving from the 1991-2001 LCF falls within any of the definitions of existing aid under Article 1(b) of Regulation 2015/1589. |
| (447) | Prvič, kot je navedeno v uvodni izjavi 435, je pritožnik 16. aprila 2013 vložil pritožbo, v kateri je trdil, da model državnega poroštva pomeni nezakonito državno pomoč, Komisija pa je v zvezi s to pritožbo državama 13. maja 2013 poslala zahtevo za informacije. Takrat niti v pritožbi niti zahtevi Komisije za informacije niso bila omenjena posebna danska pravila o prenosu izgub v prihodnje obdobje in amortizaciji. Komisija je ugotovila, da se je z navedeno zahtevo za informacije prekinil morebitni zastaralni rok v zvezi z navedeno pomočjo, ki ni potekel do 13. maja 2003 (uvodne izjave 434 do 437). Pritožnik je 8. januarja 2014 predložil dodatno dokumentacijo, v kateri je trdil, da so za konzorcij veljala tudi posebna danska pravila o prenosu izgub v prihodnje obdobje in amortizaciji. Komisija je 21. februarja 2014 državama poslala zahtevo za informacije v zvezi s posebnimi danskimi pravili o prenosu izgub v prihodnje obdobje in amortizaciji (uvodna izjava 3). | (447) | Firstly, as noted at recital (435), the Complainant filed its complaint, alleging that the State guarantee model constituted illegal State aid, on 16 April 2013, in relation to which the Commission sent a request for information to the States on 13 May 2013. At that point in time, neither the complaint, nor the Commission’s request for information, made reference to the special Danish rules on loss carry-forward and depreciation. The Commission concluded that that request for information interrupted any limitation period in connection with that aid that had not expired by 13 May 2003 (recitals (434) to (437)). On 8 January 2014, the Complainant submitted further documentation, alleging that the Consortium also benefited from special Danish rules on loss carry-forward and depreciation. The Commission sent a request for information to the States concerning the special Danish rules on loss carry-forward and depreciation on 21 February 2014 (recital (3)). |
| (448) | Komisija meni, da zahteva za informacije z dne 21. februarja 2014 pomeni ukrep Komisije v zvezi s posebnimi danskimi pravili o prenosu izgub v prihodnje obdobje in amortizaciji, vključno s pomočjo, ki izhaja iz pravila o prenosu izgub za obdobje 1991–2001, ki bi v skladu s členom 17 Uredbe (EU) 2015/1589 prekinil zastaralni rok v zvezi s pomočjo, dodeljeno od 21. februarja 2004 (tj. deset let pred navedeno zahtevo za informacije). | (448) | The Commission considers that the request for information of 21 February 2014 constituted an action taken by the Commission with regard to the special Danish rules on loss carry-forward and depreciation, including the aid deriving from the 1991-2001 LCF, which, pursuant to Article 17 of Regulation 2015/1589, would have interrupted the limitation period in connection with aid granted as from 21 February 2004 (that is, ten years before that request for information). |
| (449) | Vendar Komisija ugotavlja, da je zastaralni rok, povezan s pomočjo, ki izhaja iz pravila o prenosu izgub za obdobje 1991–2001, potekel 13. februarja 2002, tj. deset let po njeni dodelitvi. Navedeni zastaralni rok je torej potekel do takrat, ko bi ga lahko prekinila zahteva Komisije za informacije z dne 21. februarja 2014. | (449) | The Commission notes, however, that the limitation period connected with the aid deriving from the 1991-2001 LCF expired on 13 February 2002, that is, ten years after the date it was granted. That limitation period had, therefore, expired by the time the Commission’s request for information of 21 February 2014 could have interrupted it. |
| (450) | Komisija v navedenih okoliščinah ugotavlja, da pomoč, ki izhaja iz pravila o prenosu izgub za obdobje 1991–2001 in jo je Danska dodelila konzorciju, pomeni obstoječo pomoč v smislu člena 1(b), točka (iv), Uredbe (EU) 2015/1589. | (450) | In those circumstances, the Commission concludes that the aid deriving from the 1991-2001 LCF, granted by Denmark to the Consortium, constitutes existing aid, within the meaning of Article 1(b)(iv) of Regulation 2015/1589. |
| 6.3.2.2 Pravilo o prenosu izgub za obdobje 2013–2015: nova ali obstoječa pomoč | 6.3.2.2. 2013-2015 LCF: new or existing aid |
| (451) | Komisija je v uvodni izjavi 418 sklenila, da je Danska pomoč, ki izhaja iz pravila o prenosu izgub za obdobje 2013–2015, konzorciju dodelila na letni ravni v trenutku, ko so organi sprejeli davčne napovedi družbe A/S Øresund, in do sprejetja davčne napovedi za davčno leto 2015. Glede na navedeni sklep je treba ugotoviti, ali pomoč, ki izhaja iz pravila o prenosu izgub za obdobje 2013–2015, spada v katero od opredelitev obstoječe pomoči iz člena 1(b) Uredbe (EU) 2015/1589. | (451) | The Commission concluded at recital (418) that the aid deriving from the 2013-2015 LCF was granted to the Consortium by Denmark on an annual basis, at the moment of the authorities’ acceptance of A/S Øresund’s tax returns, until the acceptance of the tax return for the tax year 2015. In light of that conclusion, it is necessary to determine whether the aid deriving from the 2013-2015 LCF falls within any of the definitions of existing aid under Article 1(b) of Regulation 2015/1589. |
| (452) | Prvič, kot je navedeno v uvodni izjavi 447, je Komisija 21. februarja 2014 državama poslala zahtevo za informacije v zvezi z domnevno pomočjo, ki izhaja iz posebnih danskih pravil o prenosu izgub v prihodnje obdobje in amortizaciji. V uvodni izjavi 448 je ugotovila, da navedena zahteva za informacije pomeni ukrep Komisije v zvezi s posebnimi danskimi pravili o prenosu izgub v prihodnje obdobje in amortizaciji. Del navedenih pravil je pravilo o prenosu izgub za obdobje 2013–2015. Zato je bila vsa pomoč, ki izhaja iz pravila o prenosu izgub za obdobje 2013-2015, dodeljena po ukrepu, ki ga je sprejela Komisija, in ne pomeni obstoječe pomoči v smislu člena 1(b), točka (iv), Uredbe (EU) 2015/1589. | (452) | Firstly, as noted at recital (447), on 21 February 2014, the Commission sent a request for information concerning the alleged aid deriving from the special Danish rules on loss carry-forward and depreciation to the States. The Commission concluded at recital (448) that that request for information constituted an ‘action taken’ by the Commission with regard to the special Danish rules on loss carry-forward and depreciation. The 2013-2015 LCF forms part of those rules. As such, all aid deriving from the 2013-2015 LCF was granted after the action taken by the Commission and, therefore, does not constitute existing aid within the meaning of Article 1(b), point (iv) of Regulation 2015/1589. |
| (453) | Drugič, Komisija ugotavlja, da pomoč, ki izhaja iz pravila o prenosu izgub za obdobje 2013–2015, ne izpolnjuje pogojev iz nobenega od drugih pododstavkov člena 1(b) Uredbe (EU) 2015/1589. | (453) | Secondly, the Commission notes that the aid deriving from the 2013-2015 LCF does not fulfil the conditions of any of the other sub-paragraphs of Article 1(b) of Regulation 2015/1589. |
| (454) | Komisija zato ugotavlja, da pomoč, ki izhaja iz pravila o prenosu izgub za obdobje 2013–2015 in jo je Danska dodelila konzorciju, pomeni novo pomoč v smislu člena 1(c) Uredbe (EU) 2015/1589. | (454) | The Commission, therefore, concludes that the aid deriving from the 2013-2015 LCF, granted by Denmark to the Consortium, constitutes new aid, within the meaning of Article 1(c) of Regulation 2015/1589. |
| 6.3.3 Posebna danska pravila o amortizaciji: nova ali obstoječa pomoč | 6.3.3. The special Danish rules on depreciation: new or existing aid |
| 6.3.3.1 Pravilo o amortizaciji za obdobje 1999–2007: nova ali obstoječa pomoč | 6.3.3.1. 1999-2007 DEP: new or existing aid |
| (455) | Komisija je v uvodni izjavi 429 sklenila, da je bila državna pomoč, ki izhaja iz pravila o amortizaciji za obdobje 1999–2007, dodeljena od leta 2000 v trenutku, ko so organi sprejeli davčne napovedi družbe A/S Øresund, v katerih je ta uporabila stopnjo amortizacije, višjo od stopnje, določene v danskem zakonu o davčni amortizaciji. Glede na navedeni sklep je treba ugotoviti, ali pomoč, ki izhaja iz pravila o amortizaciji za obdobje 1999–2007, spada v katero od opredelitev obstoječe pomoči iz člena 1(b) Uredbe (EU) 2015/1589. | (455) | The Commission concluded, at recital (429), that the State aid deriving from the 1999-2007 DEP was granted from 2000 onwards, at the moment of the authorities’ acceptance of A/S Øresund’s tax returns in which it applied a depreciation rate beyond the rate provided for in the Danish Tax Depreciation Act. In light of that conclusion, it is necessary to determine whether the aid deriving from the 1999-2007 DEP falls within any of the definitions of existing aid under Article 1(b) of Regulation 2015/1589. |
| (456) | Prvič, Komisija ugotavlja, da je, kot je bilo pojasnjeno v zvezi s pravilom o prenosu izgub za obdobje 1991–2001 (uvodna izjava 452), zahteva za informacije, ki jo je poslala 21. februarja 2014, pomenila ukrep Komisije v zvezi s posebnimi danskimi pravili o prenosu izgub v prihodnje obdobje in amortizaciji. | (456) | Firstly, the Commission notes that, as explained with respect of the 1991-2001 LCF (recital (452)), the request for information it sent on 21 February 2014 constituted an ‘action taken’ by the Commission with regard to the special Danish rules on loss carry-forward and depreciation. |
| (457) | Zastaralni rok za vsako pomoč, dodeljeno od 21. februarja 2004, je bil zato prekinjen 21. februarja 2014, navedena pomoč pa ne pomeni obstoječe pomoči v smislu člena 1(b), točka (iv), Uredbe (EU) 2015/1589. | (457) | As such, the limitation period for any aid granted as from 21 February 2004 was interrupted on 21 February 2014 and that aid, therefore, does not constitute existing aid within the meaning of Article 1(b), point (iv) of Regulation 2015/1589. |
| (458) | Vendar je zastaralni rok za vsako pomoč, dodeljeno pred 21. februarjem 2004, potekel do takrat, ko bi jo bilo mogoče prekiniti, in zato pomeni obstoječo pomoč v smislu člena 1(b), točka (iv), Uredbe (EU) 2015/1589. Komisija ugotavlja, da je Danska v uvodni izjavi 271 potrdila, da v praksi družba A/S Øresund v svojih davčnih napovedih pred 21. februarjem 2004 ni uveljavljala amortizacije, zato dejansko ni bila dodeljena nobena pomoč, ki bi jo bilo mogoče opredeliti kot obstoječo pomoč v skladu z navedenim členom. | (458) | The limitation period for any aid granted before 21 February 2004, however, expired by the time it could have been interrupted and, therefore, constitutes existing aid within the meaning of Article 1(b), point (iv) of Regulation 2015/1589. The Commission notes that Denmark confirmed at recital (271) that, in practice, A/S Øresund did not claim depreciation in its tax returns prior to 21 February 2004, so no aid that could be qualified as existing aid under that Article was, in fact, granted. |
| (459) | Drugič, Komisija ugotavlja, da pomoč, ki izhaja iz pravila o amortizaciji za obdobje 1999–2007, ne izpolnjuje pogojev iz nobenega od drugih pododstavkov člena 1(b) Uredbe (EU) 2015/1589. | (459) | Secondly, the Commission notes that the aid deriving from the 1999-2007 DEP does not fulfil the conditions of any of the other sub-paragraphs of Article 1(b) of Regulation 2015/1589. |
| (460) | Komisija zato ugotavlja, da pomoč, ki izhaja iz pravila o amortizaciji za obdobje 1999–2007 in jo je Danska dodelila konzorciju, pomeni novo pomoč v smislu člena 1(c) Uredbe (EU) 2015/1589, kolikor je bila dodeljena po 21. februarju 2004. | (460) | The Commission, therefore, concludes that the aid deriving from the 1999-2007 DEP, granted by Denmark to the Consortium, constitutes new aid, within the meaning of Article 1(c) of Regulation 2015/1589, insofar as it was granted after 21 February 2004. |
| 6.3.3.2 Pravilo o amortizaciji za obdobje 2008–2015: nova ali obstoječa pomoč | 6.3.3.2. 2008-2015 DEP: new or existing aid |
| (461) | Komisija je v uvodni izjavi 429 sklenila, da je bila državna pomoč, ki izhaja iz pravila o amortizaciji za obdobje 2008–2015, dodeljena v trenutku, ko so organi sprejeli davčne napovedi družbe A/S Øresund, v katerih je ta uporabila stopnjo amortizacije, višjo od stopnje, določene v danskem zakonu o davčni amortizaciji, do sprejetja davčne napovedi za davčno leto 2015. Glede na navedeni sklep je treba ugotoviti, ali pomoč, ki izhaja iz pravila o amortizaciji za obdobje 2008–2015, spada v katero od opredelitev obstoječe pomoči iz člena 1(b) Uredbe (EU) 2015/1589. | (461) | The Commission concluded, at recital (429), that the State aid deriving from the 2008-2015 DEP was granted at the moment of the authorities’ acceptance of A/S Øresund’s tax returns in which it applied a depreciation rate beyond the rate provided for in the Danish Tax Depreciation Act, until the acceptance of the tax return for the tax year 2015. In light of that conclusion, it is necessary to determine whether the aid deriving from the 2008-2015 DEP falls within any of the definitions of existing aid under Article 1(b) of Regulation 2015/1589. |
| (462) | Zahteva za informacije, ki jo je Komisija poslala 21. februarja 2014, je podobno kot pri pravilu o amortizaciji za obdobje 1999–2007 (uvodna izjava 456) pomenila ukrep, ki ga je sprejela Komisija, tako da bi se tudi za pravilo o amortizaciji za obdobje 2008–2015 zastaralni rok prekinil 21. februarja 2014. Zastaralni rok za vsako pomoč, dodeljeno od 21. februarja 2004, je bil zato prekinjen 21. februarja 2014, navedena pomoč pa ne pomeni obstoječe pomoči v smislu člena 1(b), točka (iv), Uredbe (EU) 2015/1589. | (462) | Similarly as for the 1999-2007 DEP (recital (456)), the request for information the Commission sent on 21 February 2014 constituted an ‘action taken’ by the Commission so that, also for the 2008-2015 DEP, the limitation period would have been interrupted on 21 February 2014. As such, the limitation period for any aid granted as from 21 February 2004 would have been interrupted on 21 February 2014 and does not constitute existing aid within the meaning of Article 1(b), point (iv) of Regulation 2015/1589. |
| (463) | Komisija v zvezi s tem ugotavlja, da je bila vsaka pomoč, ki izhaja iz pravila o amortizaciji za obdobje 2008–2015, nujno dodeljena po 21. februarju 2004 in tako ne pomeni obstoječe pomoči v smislu člena 1(b), točka (iv), Uredbe (EU) 2015/1589. | (463) | In that regard, the Commission notes that any aid deriving from the 2008-2015 DEP necessarily has been granted after 21 February 2004, and so does not constitute existing aid within the meaning of Article 1(b), point (iv) of Regulation 2015/1589. |
| (464) | Drugič, Komisija ugotavlja, da pomoč, ki izhaja iz pravila o amortizaciji za obdobje 2008–2015, ne izpolnjuje pogojev iz nobenega od drugih pododstavkov člena 1(b) Uredbe (EU) 2015/1589. | (464) | Secondly, the Commission notes that the aid deriving from the 2008-2015 DEP does not fulfil the conditions of any of the other sub-paragraphs of Article 1(b) of Regulation 2015/1589. |
| (465) | Komisija zato ugotavlja, da pomoč, ki izhaja iz pravila o amortizaciji za obdobje 2008–2015 in jo je Danska dodelila konzorciju, pomeni novo pomoč v smislu člena 1(c) Uredbe (EU) 2015/1589. | (465) | The Commission, therefore, concludes that the aid deriving from the 2008-2015 DEP, granted by Denmark to the Consortium, constitutes new aid, within the meaning of Article 1(c) of Regulation 2015/1589. |
| 6.4 Zakonitost pomoči | 6.4. Legality of the aid |
| (466) | Države članice morajo v skladu s členom 108(3) PDEU Komisijo obvestiti o vseh načrtih za dodelitev pomoči dovolj zgodaj, da lahko predloži pripombe. Poleg tega obveznost mirovanja iz istega člena državi članici prepoveduje, da bi predlagani ukrep izvedla, preden Komisija sprejme končni sklep. | (466) | Article 108(3) TFEU requires Member States to inform the Commission, in sufficient time to enable it to submit its comments, of any plans to grant aid. In addition, the standstill obligation in that Article prohibits a Member State from putting its proposed measure into effect before the Commission has adopted a final decision. |
| (467) | Člen 1(f) Uredbe (EU) 2015/1589 določa, da je nova pomoč, ki se izvaja v nasprotju s členom 108(3) PDEU, nezakonita. | (467) | Article 1(f) of Regulation 2015/1589 notes that new aid put into effect in contravention of Article 108(3) TFEU is unlawful. |
| (468) | Komisija je v uvodnih izjavah 454, 460 in 465 sklenila, da pomoč, ki izhaja iz pravila o prenosu izgub za obdobje 2013–2015, pravila o amortizaciji za obdobje 1999–2007 in pravila o amortizaciji za obdobje 2008–2015, pomeni novo pomoč. Komisija ugotavlja, da je Danska te ukrepe izvajala, ne da bi jih predhodno priglasila Komisiji in počakala na odločitev Komisije v zvezi z njimi. Danska je torej navedene nove ukrepe pomoči izvajala v nasprotju s členom 108(3) PDEU. | (468) | The Commission concluded at recitals (454), (460) and (465) that the aid deriving from the 2013-2015 LCF, the 1999-2007 DEP, and the 2008-2015 DEP constitutes new aid. The Commission notes that Denmark put those measures into effect without first notifying them to the Commission and awaiting the Commission’s decision in their regard. Denmark, therefore, put those new aid measures into effect in contravention of Article 108(3) TFEU. |
| (469) | Komisija zaradi celovitosti ugotavlja, da je konzorcij z dopisom z dne 1. avgusta 1995 Komisijo obvestil o obstoju modela državnega poroštva v zvezi s projektom stalne povezave (uvodna izjava 149). | (469) | For completeness, the Commission notes that the Consortium had informed the Commission of the existence of the State guarantee model in relation to the Fixed Link project by its letter of 1 August 1995 (recital (149)). |
| (470) | Tudi če bi bilo mogoče navedeni dopis razumeti tako, da zajema tudi posebna danska pravila o prenosu izgub v prihodnje obdobje in amortizaciji, saj so bila del zakona o gradnji iz leta 1991 (glej uvodno izjavo 504(c)), tako da bi bilo mogoče ugotoviti, da je bila Komisija obveščena o načrtih za dodelitev pomoči, ki izhajajo iz navedenih ukrepov, to ne bi spremenilo sklepa, da je Danska te ukrepe izvajala v nasprotju s členom 108(3) PDEU, saj pred tem ni počakala na prejem sklepa Komisije. | (470) | Even if that letter could possibly be understood to also cover the special Danish rules on loss carry-forward and depreciation as they were part of the Construction Act in 1991 (see further, recital (504)(c)), such that it could be determined that the Commission had been informed of the plans to grant the aid deriving from those measures, this would not alter the conclusion that Denmark put those measures into effect in contravention of Article 108(3) TFEU, given that it did not await the receipt of a Commission decision before so doing. |
| (471) | Komisija vsekakor meni, da dopisa z dne 1. avgusta 1995 ni mogoče šteti za priglasitev novih ukrepov pomoči (uvodne izjave 454, 460 in 465), ki so bili odobreni najmanj od sprejetja davčne napovedi družbe A/S Øresund za davčno leto 2004 (uvodni izjavi 418 in 429), torej skoraj deset let po tem, ko je bil Komisiji predložen dopis z dne 1. avgusta 1995. | (471) | In any event, the Commission considers that the letter of 1 August 1995 could not be considered as constituting a notification of the new aid measures (recitals (454), (460) and (465)) which were granted at the earliest, as from the acceptance of A/S Øresund’s tax return for the tax year 2004 (recitals (418) and (429)), that is, almost ten years after the letter of 1 August 1995 was submitted to the Commission. |
| (472) | Komisija zato ugotavlja, da pomoč, ki izhaja iz pravila o prenosu izgub za obdobje 2013–2015, pravila o amortizaciji za obdobje 1999–2007 in pravila o amortizaciji za obdobje 2008–2015, pomeni nezakonito pomoč. | (472) | The Commission, therefore, concludes that the aid deriving from the 2013-2015 LCF, the 1999-2007 DEP, and the 2008-2015 DEP constitutes unlawful aid. |
| 6.5 Ocena združljivosti | 6.5. Compatibility assessment |
| 6.5.1 Državna poroštva in pravilo o prenosu izgub za obdobje 1991–2001 | 6.5.1. State guarantees and 1991-2001 LCF |
| (473) | Komisija je v uvodnih izjavah 388 in 404 sklenila, da pomoč, ki izhaja iz modela državnega poroštva in pravila o prenosu izgub za obdobje 1991–2001, pomeni individualno pomoč, v uvodnih izjavah 445 in 450 pa, da pomeni obstoječo pomoč. | (473) | The Commission concluded, at recitals (388) and (404), respectively, that the aid deriving from the State guarantee model and the 1991-2001 LCF constitutes individual aid, and, at recitals (445) and (450), respectively, that it constitutes ‘existing aid’. |
| (474) | V členu 22 Uredbe (EU) 2015/1589 je določeno, da lahko Komisija zadevni državi članici predlaga ustrezne ukrepe, če ugotovi, da veljavna shema pomoči ni ali ni več združljiva z notranjim trgom. Vendar to ne velja za individualno obstoječo pomoč. Glede na to, da Komisija ne more predlagati ustreznih ukrepov v zvezi s posamezno obstoječo pomočjo, ni treba oceniti njene združljivosti z notranjim trgom. | (474) | Article 22 of Regulation 2015/1589 provides that the Commission can propose appropriate measures to the Member State concerned where the Commission has concluded that an existing aid scheme is not, or is no longer, compatible with the internal market. This does not apply, however, to individual existing aid. Therefore, given that the Commission cannot propose appropriate measures in relation to individual existing aid, it is not necessary to assess its compatibility with the internal market. |
| (475) | Komisija je zato sklenila, da ji ni treba ugotoviti, ali je pomoč, ki izhaja iz modela državnega poroštva ali pravila o prenosu izgub za obdobje 1991–2001, združljiva z notranjim trgom. | (475) | The Commission, therefore, concludes that it is not necessary for the Commission to determine whether the aid deriving from the State guarantee model or the 1991-2001 LCF is compatible with the internal market. |
| (476) | Vendar Komisija ugotavlja, da se je konzorcij strinjal, da v prihodnje svoje pravice do državnih poroštev brez trgu primerne premije ne bo izkoristil za financiranje novega dolga ali refinanciranje obstoječega dolga. V ta namen sta se državi zavezali (uvodna izjava 265), da bosta zagotovili, da bo konzorcij financiral nov dolg in refinanciral obstoječi dolg pod tržnimi pogoji. Pomoč konzorciju, ki izhaja iz modela državnega poroštva, bo zato postopoma odpravljena, ko prenehajo veljati neporavnani dolžniški instrumenti konzorcija. Državi sta Komisiji predložili pregled prehoda preostalega dolga na tržne pogoje in pričakovani način odplačevanja (uvodna izjava 265). V zvezi s tem sta potrdili, da konzorcij od sodbe v zadevi Øresund ni pridobil nobenih novih sredstev za financiranje ali refinanciranje, zavarovanih z državnim poroštvom (uvodna izjava 265). | (476) | The Commission notes, however, that, going forward, the Consortium has agreed not to avail itself of its right to State guarantees without a market conform premium, to finance new debt, or refinance existing debt. To that end, the States have committed (recital (265)) to ensure that the Consortium will finance new debt, and refinance existing debt, on market terms. Therefore, the aid to the Consortium deriving from the State guarantee model will be phased out as the Consortium’s outstanding debt instruments expire. The States provided the Commission with an overview of the transition to market terms of the remaining debt, and the expected repayment profile (recital (265)). The States confirmed, in this context, that the Consortium has not obtained any new State guaranteed financing or refinancing since the Øresund judgment (recital (265)). |
| (477) | Komisija opozarja, da lahko po trditvah pritožnika (uvodna izjava 222) ugodnejši pogoji financiranja, ki jih pridobijo podjetja, ki so zaradi svoje pravne oblike izvzeta iz običajnih pravil o stečaju ali drugih postopkov v primeru insolventnosti, pomenijo državno pomoč, zato bi imel konzorcij še naprej veliko prednost, tudi ko bi državi prenehali izdajati posebna državna poroštva. Komisija brez ugotavljanja, ali je pravilno trditi, da je konzorcij izvzet iz takih pravil ali postopkov (kar državi zanikata), opozarja, da bi bila taka izjema, prvič, neločljivo povezana z ustanovitvijo samega konzorcija in, drugič, če bi taka izjema pomenila državno pomoč, taka državna pomoč v nobenem primeru ne bi spadala na področje uporabe formalnega postopka preiskave, ki je omejen na model državnega poroštva in posebna danska pravila o prenosu izgub v prihodnje obdobje in amortizaciji. | (477) | The Commission recalls that the Complainant claims (recital (222)) that more favourable funding terms obtained by enterprises whose legal form provides for an exemption from ordinary rules on bankruptcy or other insolvency procedures may constitute State aid, such that the Consortium would continue to enjoy a significant advantage even after the States cease to issue specific State guarantees. Without determining whether it is correct to say that the Consortium is exempted from such rules or procedures (which is denied by the States), the Commission notes that such an exemption would, first, be inherent in the establishment of the Consortium itself, and second, if such exemption did constitute State aid, such State aid would, in any event, not be covered by the scope of the formal investigation procedure which is limited to the State guarantee model and the special Danish rules on loss carry-forward and depreciation. |
| 6.5.2 Pravilo o prenosu izgub za obdobje 2013–2015, pravilo o amortizaciji za obdobje 1999–2007 in pravilo o amortizaciji za obdobje 2008–2015 | 6.5.2. 2013-2015 LCF, 1999-2007 DEP and 2008-2015 DEP |
| (478) | Komisija je ugotovila, da pomoč, ki izhaja iz pravila o prenosu izgub za obdobje 2013–2015, pomeni novo pomoč (uvodna izjava 454), dodeljeno na letni ravni, ko organi sprejmejo davčne napovedi družbe A/S Øresund (uvodna izjava 418). Ugotovila je tudi, da pomoč, ki izhaja iz pravila o amortizaciji za obdobje 1999–2007 in pravila o amortizaciji za obdobje 2008–2015, pomeni novo pomoč (uvodni izjavi 460 in 465), dodeljeno po 21. februarju 2004, v trenutku, ko so organi sprejeli davčne napovedi družbe A/S Øresund, v katerih je ta uporabila stopnjo amortizacije, višjo od stopnje, določene v danskem zakonu o davčni amortizaciji, do sprejetja davčne napovedi za davčno leto 2015 (uvodna izjava 429). | (478) | The Commission concluded that the aid deriving from the 2013-2015 LCF constitutes new aid (recital (454)), granted on an annual basis, when the tax returns of A/S Øresund are accepted by the authorities (recital (418)). It also concluded that the aid deriving from the 1999-2007 DEP and the 2008-2015 DEP constitutes new aid (recitals (460) and (465)), granted after 21 February 2004 onwards, at the moment of the authorities’ acceptance of A/S Øresund’s tax returns in which it applied a depreciation rate beyond the rate provided for in the Danish Tax Depreciation Act, until acceptance of the tax return for the tax year 2015 (recital (429)). |
| (479) | Danska in Švedska sta med postopkom predhodne preiskave trdili, da bi morala Komisija, če bi menila, da podporni ukrepi pomenijo pomoč, oceniti njihovo združljivost na podlagi člena 107(3), točka (b), PDEU, v skladu s katerim je dovoljena pomoč za pospeševanje izvedbe pomembnega projekta skupnega evropskega interesa. | (479) | In the course of the preliminary investigation procedure, Denmark and Sweden had argued that, should the Commission consider the support measures to constitute aid, it should assess their compatibility on the basis of Article 107(3)(b) TFEU, which allows aid to promote the execution of an important project of common European interest. |
| (480) | Sporočilo o pomembnih projektih skupnega evropskega interesa (190) določa načela, v skladu s katerimi Komisija ocenjuje javno financiranje takih projektov. Odstavek 52 sporočila o pomembnih projektih skupnega evropskega interesa določa, da bo „Komisija v primeru nepriglašene pomoči uporabila [sporočilo o pomembnih projektih skupnega evropskega interesa], če je bila pomoč dodeljena po začetku njegove veljavnosti, v vseh drugih primerih pa pravila, veljavna v času, ko je bila pomoč dodeljena“. Sporočilo o pomembnih projektih skupnega evropskega interesa je začelo veljati 1. julija 2014. | (480) | The IPCEI Communication (190), sets out the principles according to which the Commission assesses the public financing of such projects. Paragraph 52 of the IPCEI Communication provides that ‘in the case of non-notified aid, the Commission will apply the [IPCEI] Communication if the aid was granted after its entry into force, and the rules in force at the time when the aid was granted in all other cases’. The IPCEI Communication entered into force on 1 July 2014. |
| (481) | Iz uvodne izjave 429 izhaja, da je bila pomoč, dodeljena na podlagi pravila o amortizaciji za obdobje 1999–2007, dodeljena pred 1. julijem 2014, in da je bil vsaj del pomoči, dodeljene na podlagi pravila o prenosu izgub za obdobje 2013–2015 in pravila o prenosu izgub za obdobje 2008–2015, dodeljen po navedenem datumu. Sporočilo o pomembnih projektih skupnega evropskega interesa združuje prakso Komisije glede ocene združljivosti pomoči na podlagi člena 107(3), točka (b), PDEU (191), zato lahko Komisija na podlagi osnovnih vodilnih načel, določenih v njem, oceni pomoč, dodeljeno pred začetkom njegove veljavnosti. | (481) | It follows from recital (429) that the aid granted on the basis of the 1999-2007 DEP was granted before 1 July 2014, and that at least part of the aid granted on the basis of the 2013-2015 LCF and of the 2008-2015 LCF was granted after that date. However, since the IPCEI Communication consolidates the Commission practice as regards the compatibility assessment of aid on the basis of Article 107(3)(b) TFEU (191), the basic guiding principles set out therein are also informative for the Commission’s assessment of the aid granted before its entry into force. |
| (482) | Eno od navedenih temeljnih vodilnih načel je načelo sorazmernosti, v skladu s katerim ukrepi pomoči ne smejo presegati tistega, kar je potrebno za doseganje njihovih ciljev. Če bi bilo torej mogoče izvesti načrtovanje in gradnjo stalne povezave z manj pomoči, se pomoč ne bi štela za sorazmerno. To načelo je določeno tudi v točki 28 sporočila o pomembnih projektih skupnega evropskega interesa. | (482) | One of those basic guiding principles is the principle of proportionality, which requires that aid measures do not exceed what is necessary to attain their objectives. Thus, if the construction and operation of the Fixed Link could have been achieved with less aid, then the aid would not be considered proportionate. This principle is also laid down in paragraph 28 of the IPCEI Communication. |
| (483) | Komisija je v oddelku 5.4.4 sklepa o začetku postopka izrazila pomisleke glede sorazmernosti podpornih ukrepov, vključno s posebnimi davčnimi ukrepi. Komisija je v uvodni izjavi 151 sklepa o začetku postopka navedla, da ni imela vseh elementov za določitev omejitev glede zneska in trajanja državnih poroštev ter davčnih ugodnosti, ki bi se lahko štele za razumne. Iz uvodne izjave 152 sklepa o začetku postopka je mogoče sklepati, da je bil to predpogoj za ustrezno metodo količinske opredelitve zadevne pomoči in njene omejitve. Komisija je zato izrazila pomisleke glede sorazmernosti ukrepov, ki se proučujejo. | (483) | In Section 5.4.4 of the Opening decision, the Commission expressed doubts as to the proportionality of the support measures, including the special tax measures. The Commission noted, at recital 151 of the Opening decision, that it did not have all of the elements to determine the limits on the amount and duration of the State guarantees and the tax advantages that could be considered reasonable. From recital 152 of the Opening decision, it can be deduced that this was a prerequisite to allow for a proper quantification method of the aid involved and its limitation. Therefore, the Commission expressed doubts as regards the proportionality of the measures under examination. |
| (484) | Državi v odgovoru na sklep o začetku postopka nista predložili nobenih dodatnih informacij, na podlagi katerih bi lahko Komisija določila morebitne omejitve zneska in trajanja pomoči, ki izhajajo iz pravila o prenosu izgub za obdobje 2013–2015, pravila o amortizaciji za obdobje 1999–2007 in pravila o amortizaciji za obdobje 2008–2015, ki bi se lahko štele za sorazmerne, ali količinsko opredelila zadevno pomoč. Državi zlasti nista predložile modela likvidnostne vrzeli, ki se zahteva v točki 31 sporočila o pomembnih projektih skupnega evropskega interesa, ki določa, da se bo „[n]ajvišja stopnja pomoči [...] določila glede na ugotovljeno likvidnostno vrzel v zvezi z upravičenimi stroški. Če to opravičuje analiza likvidnostne vrzeli, lahko intenzivnost pomoči doseže 100 % upravičenih stroškov. Likvidnostna vrzel se nanaša na razliko med pozitivnimi in negativnimi denarnimi tokovi v času trajanja naložbe, ki se diskontirajo na sedanjo vrednost na podlagi ustreznega diskontnega faktorja, to pa odraža stopnjo donosa, ki jo upravičenec potrebuje za izvedbo projekta, zlasti glede na tveganja projekta. Upravičeni stroški so določeni v Prilogi [...]“. | (484) | The States did not submit any further information in reply to the Opening decision that could allow the Commission to determine any limits on the amount and duration of the aid derived from the 2013-2015 LCF, the 1999-2007 DEP and the 2008-2015 DEP that could be considered as proportionate, or to quantify the aid involved. In particular, the States did not submit a funding gap model, which is required by paragraph 31 of the IPCEI Communication, which provides that ‘[t]he maximum aid level will be determined with regard to the identified funding gap in relation to the eligible costs. If justified by the funding gap analysis, the aid intensity could reach up to 100 % of the eligible costs. The funding gap refers to the difference between the positive and negative cash flows over the lifetime of the investment, discounted to their current value on the basis of an appropriate discount factor reflecting the rate of return necessary for the beneficiary to carry out the project notably in view of the risks involved. The eligible costs are those laid down in Annex […]’. |
| (485) | Državi sta trdili, da bi se pri vzpostavitvi takega modela likvidnostne vrzeli srečale z več metodološkimi izzivi, in opozorili na tveganje, da bi taki izračuni finančne vrzeli kazali na prekomerno nadomestilo za konzorcij. | (485) | The States submitted that they would encounter several methodological challenges in setting up such funding gap model and indicated a risk that such funding gap calculations would point to overcompensation of the Consortium. |
| (486) | Poleg tega se državama ni zdelo primerno ali potrebno predložiti dodatnih pripomb o združljivosti morebitne pomoči konzorciju glede na njuno stališče o opredelitvi obstoječe pomoči v modelu državnega poroštva in glede na to, da posebna danska pravila o prenosu izgub v prihodnje obdobje in amortizaciji niso opredeljena kot pomoč. Poleg tega državi nista predložili pripomb glede ekonomske ocene stalne povezave, ki jo je naročil pritožnik (uvodne izjave 191, 193 in 201 do 206) in ki je bila posredovana državama (uvodni izjavi 30 in 38). | (486) | Moreover, the States did not consider it appropriate or necessary to provide further comments on the compatibility of any possible aid to the Consortium in light of their position on the existing aid qualification of the State guarantee model and the no aid classification of the special Danish rules on loss carry-forward and depreciation. In addition, the States did not comment on the economic assessment of the Fixed Link that the Complainant commissioned (recitals (191), (193), and (201) to (206)), and which was forwarded to the States (recitals (30) and (38)). |
| (487) | Komisija na podlagi navedenega ugotavlja, da državi nista dokazali, da je bila pomoč, ki izhaja iz pravila o prenosu izgub za obdobje 2013–2015, pravila o amortizaciji za obdobje 1999–2007 in pravila o amortizaciji za obdobje 2008–2015, sorazmerna. | (487) | On that basis, the Commission finds that the States failed to demonstrate that the aid derived from the 2013-2015 LCF, the 1999-2007 DEP and the 2008-2015 DEP was proportionate. |
| (488) | Državi nista dokazali sorazmernosti pomoči, ki izhaja iz pravila o prenosu izgub za obdobje 2013–2015, pravila o amortizaciji za obdobje 1999–2007 in pravila o amortizaciji za obdobje 2008–2015, zato Komisija sklepa, da navedena pomoč ni združljiva z notranjim trgom. Glede na to ni treba ugotavljati, ali stalna povezava zadeva projekt, ki je upravičen v skladu s sporočilom o pomembnih projektih skupnega evropskega interesa, ali pa so ukrepi potrebni in ne povzročajo neupravičenega izkrivljanja konkurence, ki ga njihovi pozitivni učinki ne morejo odtehtati. | (488) | Since the States failed to establish the proportionality of the aid derived from the 2013-2015 LCF, the 1999-2007 DEP or the 2008-2015 DEP, the Commission concludes that that aid is not compatible with the internal market. In light of this, it is unnecessary to determine whether the Fixed Link concerns a project that is eligible in accordance with the IPCEI Communication or whether the measures are necessary and do not lead to undue distortions of competition that cannot be outweighed by their positive effects. |
| 7. VRAČILO | 7. RECOVERY |
| (489) | Komisija je v skladu s PDEU in ustaljeno sodno prakso sodišč Unije pristojna za odločanje, ali mora zadevna država članica spremeniti ali odpraviti pomoč, za katero je Komisija ugotovila, da ni združljiva z notranjim trgom (192). Prav tako sodišča Unije dosledno menijo, da je obveznost države članice, da odpravi pomoč, za katero Komisija meni, da ni združljiva z notranjim trgom, namenjena ponovni vzpostavitvi prejšnjega stanja (193). | (489) | In accordance with the TFEU and the established case-law of the Union Courts, the Commission is competent to decide that the Member State concerned shall alter or abolish aid when it has found that it is incompatible with the internal market (192). The Union Courts have also consistently held that the obligation on a Member State to abolish aid regarded by the Commission as being incompatible with the internal market is designed to re-establish the previously existing situation (193). |
| (490) | V zvezi s tem so sodišča Unije odločila, da je ta cilj dosežen, ko prejemnik vrne zneske, ki so bili dodeljeni z nezakonito pomočjo, in se tako odpove prednosti, ki jo je imel v primerjavi s konkurenti na notranjem trgu, ter se znova vzpostavi stanje pred plačilom pomoči (194). | (490) | In this context, the Union Courts have established that this objective is attained once the recipient has repaid the amounts granted by way of unlawful aid, thus forfeiting the advantage which it had enjoyed over its competitors on the internal market, and the situation prior to the payment of the aid is restored (194). |
| (491) | V skladu s sodno prakso člen 16(1) Uredbe (EU) 2015/1589 določa: „Če se v primerih nezakonite pomoči sprejmejo negativni sklepi, Komisija odloči, da mora zadevna država članica sprejeti vse potrebne ukrepe, da upravičenec vrne pomoč“. | (491) | In line with the case-law, Article 16(1) of Regulation 2015/1589 states that ‘where negative decisions are taken in cases of unlawful aid, the Commission shall decide that the Member State concerned shall take all necessary measures to recover the aid from the beneficiary.’ |
| (492) | Vendar je v členu 16(1) Uredbe (EU) 2015/1589 določeno tudi, da „Komisija ne zahteva vračila pomoči, če bi bilo to v nasprotju s splošnim načelom prava Unije.“ V zvezi s tem je bilo odločeno, da mora Komisija po uradni dolžnosti upoštevati izjemne okoliščine, ki v skladu s členom 16(1) upravičujejo, da ne odredi vračila nezakonito dodeljene pomoči, če je to vračilo v nasprotju s splošnim načelom prava Unije (195). Komisija mora zato, prvič, oceniti, ali so take okoliščine obstajale (oddelek 7.1), in drugič, odločiti o metodologiji za vračilo pomoči (oddelek 7.2). | (492) | Article 16(1) of Regulation 2015/1589 also provides, however, that ‘[t]he Commission shall not require recovery of the aid if this would be contrary to a general principle of Union law’. In this respect, it has been ruled that the Commission is required to take into consideration, on its own initiative, exceptional circumstances that provide justification, pursuant to Article 16(1), for it to refrain from ordering the recovery of unlawfully granted aid where such recovery is contrary to a general principle of Union law (195). The Commission, therefore, must, first, assess whether such circumstances existed (Section 7.1), and, second, decide on the methodology for recovery of aid (Section 7.2). |
| 7.1 Legitimna pričakovanja | 7.1. Legitimate expectations |
| (493) | Državi trdita, da bi bilo treba vračilo preprečiti zaradi načela legitimnih pričakovanj. Načelo varstva legitimnih pričakovanj je splošno načelo prava Unije (196), s katerim se posameznikom priznavajo pravice (197). V skladu z ustaljeno sodno prakso se ima pravico sklicevati na načelo varstva legitimnih pričakovanj vsak pravni subjekt, ki mu je institucija Unije vzbudila utemeljena pričakovanja (198). | (493) | The States argue that recovery should be prevented by the principle of legitimate expectations. The principle of protection of legitimate expectations is a general principle of Union law (196), which confers rights on individuals (197). In accordance with settled case-law, the right to rely on the principle of the protection of legitimate expectations extends to any person in a situation where a Union institution has caused him or her to have justified expectations (198). |
| (494) | Za uveljavljanje pravice do varstva legitimnih pričakovanj morajo biti izpolnjeni trije kumulativni pogoji. Prvič, upravičenec mora prejeti natančna, brezpogojna in skladna zagotovila, ki izhajajo iz pooblaščenih in zanesljivih virov. Drugič, ta zagotovila morajo biti taka, da pri subjektu, na katerega so naslovljena, ustvarijo legitimno pričakovanje. Tretjič, dana zagotovila morajo biti skladna z veljavnimi predpisi (199). | (494) | Three cumulative conditions must be satisfied for a claim of entitlement to the protection of legitimate expectations to be well founded. First, precise, unconditional, and consistent assurances originating from authorised and reliable sources must have been given to the person concerned. Second, those assurances must be such as to give rise to a legitimate expectation on the part of the person to whom they are addressed. Third, the assurances given must comply with the applicable rules (199). |
| (495) | Iz ustaljene sodne prakse Sodišča izhaja, da ima pravico do sklicevanja na načelo varstva legitimnih pričakovanj vsaka oseba, pri kateri je institucija ustvarila upravičena pričakovanja. Poleg tega je Sodišče priznalo, da lahko legitimna pričakovanja nastanejo le, če je institucija sama dala natančna zagotovila, da zadevni ukrep ne pomeni državne pomoči (200). Načeloma tudi nimajo pravice do varstva legitimnih pričakovanj prejemniki nezakonito izvršene pomoči (201). | (495) | The Court has consistently held that the right to rely on the principle of the protection of legitimate expectations extends to any person to whom an institution has given rise to justified hopes. In addition, the Court has accepted that legitimate expectations can arise only where an institution itself has given precise assurances that the measure in question does not constitute State aid (200). In principle, there is also no right to legitimate expectations on the part of recipients of aid unlawfully implemented (201). |
| (496) | Komisija opozarja, da je že ugotovila (202), da so Danska, Švedska in konzorcij – vsaj do datuma sodbe v zadevi Aéroports de Paris z dne 12. decembra 2000 – legitimno pričakovali, da ukrepi v zvezi s stalno povezavo ne pomenijo državne pomoči. To je Splošno sodišče potrdilo v sodbi v zadevi Øresund (203). | (496) | The Commission recalls that it has previously found (202) that – at least up until the date of the Aéroports de Paris judgment, of 12 December 2000 – Denmark, Sweden, and the Consortium had legitimate expectations that measures in relation to the Fixed Link did not constitute State aid. This was confirmed by the General Court in the Øresund judgment (203). |
| (497) | Komisija ugotavlja, da je stališče pritožnika ter družb Scandlines in drugih, da je bil v sodbi v zadevi Øresund tako kot v sodbi v zadevi Aéroports de Paris izključen obstoj legitimnih pričakovanj za konzorcij in države (uvodni izjavi 213 in 214). Komisija se s tem stališčem ne strinja. | (497) | The Commission notes that it is the position of the Complainant and Scandlines et al. that the Øresund judgment excluded the existence of legitimate expectations for the Consortium and the States, as from the Aéroports de Paris judgment (recitals (213) and (214)). The Commission disagrees with this position. |
| (498) | Splošno sodišče je v točki 322 sodbe v zadevi Øresund zavrnilo tožbo zoper odločbo iz leta 2014 v delu, ki se je nanašal na ugotovitev Komisije, da bi konzorcij in državi lahko uveljavljali legitimna pričakovanja za obdobje pred sodbo v zadevi Aéroports de Paris. Kar zadeva poznejše obdobje, je v točkah 327 in 328 ugotovilo, da sklep iz leta 2014 ni vseboval dokončne ugotovitve. Ugotovilo je, da se mu ni treba izreči o trditvah v zvezi s tem. | (498) | At paragraph 322 of the Øresund judgment, the General Court dismissed the action against the 2014 decision insofar as it concerned the Commission’s finding that the Consortium and the States could claim the benefit of legitimate expectations for the period before the Aéroports de Paris judgment. With respect to the period thereafter, at paragraphs 327 and 328, the General Court noted that the 2014 decision did not make a conclusive finding. The General Court found that it was not necessary for it to give a ruling on the arguments, in that regard. |
| (499) | Komisija v navedenih okoliščinah meni, da je Splošno sodišče vprašanje, do katerega trenutka je v obravnavanem primeru veljalo varstvo legitimnih pričakovanj, prepustilo v presojo Komisiji. V skladu s tem je Komisija v oddelku 6 (sklep iz sklepa o začetku postopka) navedla, da bo proučila natančno obdobje, v katerem bi se lahko upravičenec, Švedska in/ali Danska sklicevali na legitimna pričakovanja, če bi se ugotovilo, da ukrepi pomenijo nezdružljivo državno pomoč. | (499) | In those circumstances, the Commission considers that the General Court has left the question of the point until which the protection of legitimate expectations applied, in this case, to the examination of the Commission. Accordingly, in Section 6 (the conclusion of the Opening decision), the Commission noted that it would look at the precise period during which the beneficiary, Sweden and/or Denmark could invoke legitimate expectations, should the measures be found to constitute incompatible State aid. |
| (500) | Kot je navedeno v uvodnih izjavah 454, 460, 465 in 472, pomoč, ki izhaja iz pravila o prenosu izgub za obdobje 2013–2015, pravila o amortizaciji za obdobje 2008–2015 in pravila o amortizaciji za obdobje 1999–2007 pomenijo nezakonito novo državno pomoč, ki ni združljiva z notranjim trgom (uvodna izjava 488). Komisija mora zato ugotoviti, do kdaj bi se lahko zadevne strani sklicevale na legitimna pričakovanja v zvezi z navedeno pomočjo. | (500) | As found at recitals (454), (460), (465) and (472), the aid deriving from the 2013-2015 LCF, the 2008-2015 DEP and the 1999-2007 DEP constitutes unlawful, new State aid, which is incompatible with the internal market (recital (488)). The Commission must, therefore, determine until when the parties could have relied upon legitimate expectations in respect of that aid. |
| (501) | Pred sodbo v zadevi Aéroports de Paris je bila jasna praksa Komisije, da je ugotovila, da gradnja in obratovanje prometne infrastrukture ne predstavljata gospodarske dejavnosti (204). Vendar je Splošno sodišče v sodbi v zadevi Aéroports de Paris priznalo, da je upravljanje letališča mogoče šteti za gospodarsko dejavnost. | (501) | Prior to the Aéroports de Paris judgment, it was clear Commission practice to find that the construction and operation of transport infrastructure did not constitute economic activity (204). In the Aéroports de Paris judgment, however, the General Court acknowledged that the operation of an airport could be seen as an economic activity. |
| (502) | Zato se je, kot je navedeno v obvestilu o pojmu državne pomoči, s sodbo v zadevi Aéroports de Paris spremenilo tradicionalno stališče, da javno financiranje gradnje in upravljanja velikega dela infrastrukture ne spada v okvir pravil o državni pomoči. V odstavku 209 navedenega obvestila je navedeno: | „[z]aradi negotovosti, ki je obstajala pred sodbo Aéroports de Paris, so javni organi lahko legitimno trdili, da javno financiranje infrastrukture, dodeljeno pred to sodbo, ni pomenilo državne pomoči in zato takšnih ukrepov ni bilo treba priglasiti Komisiji. Iz tega sledi, da Komisija o takšnih ukrepih financiranja, ki so bili dokončno sprejeti pred sodbo Aéroports de Paris, ne more podvomiti na podlagi pravil o državni pomoči. Na podlagi tega ni mogoče izpeljati nobene predpostavke glede obstoja ali odsotnosti državne pomoči ali legitimnega pričakovanja v zvezi z ukrepi financiranja, ki niso bili dokončno sprejeti pred sodbo Aéroports de Paris, kar bo treba preveriti po posameznih primerih.“ | (502) | Therefore, as stated in the Notice on the Notion of State aid, the traditional view that the public funding of the construction and operation of much infrastructure fell outside of State aid rules changed with the Aéroports de Paris judgment. Paragraph 209 of that Notice states: | ‘[d]ue to the uncertainty that existed prior to the Aéroports de Paris judgment, public authorities could legitimately consider that the public funding of infrastructure granted prior to that judgment did not constitute State aid and that, accordingly, such measures did not need to be notified to the Commission. It follows that the Commission cannot put such funding measures definitively adopted before the Aéroports de Paris judgment into question on the basis of State aid rules. This does not imply any presumption as regards the presence or absence of State aid or legitimate expectations as regards funding measures not definitively adopted before the Aéroports de Paris judgment, which will have to be verified on a case-by-case basis.’ |
| (503) | Kot je navedeno v uvodnih izjavah 418 in 429, se pomoč, ki izhaja iz pravila o prenosu izgub za obdobje 2013–2015, pravila o amortizaciji za obdobje 1999–2007 in pravila o amortizaciji za obdobje 2008–2015, nanaša na pomoč, ki ni bila dokončno dodeljena pred 12. decembrom 2000. Zato je treba preveriti, ali so se legitimna pričakovanja Danske, Švedske in konzorcija v obravnavanem primeru segala še v obdobje po navedenem datumu. | (503) | As noted at recitals (418) and (429), the aid deriving from the 2013-2015 LCF, the 1999-2007 DEP, and the 2008-2015 DEP concerns aid that was not definitively granted before 12 December 2000. It must, therefore, be verified whether the legitimate expectations enjoyed by Denmark, Sweden, and the Consortium extended beyond that date in this case. |
| (504) | Da bi Komisija opravila to preverjanje, najprej opozarja na okoliščine, na podlagi katerih je v sklepu iz leta 2014 in sklepu o začetku postopka ugotovila, da so v tej zadevi nastala legitimna pričakovanja, kot je navedeno v uvodnih izjavah 144 do 153 sklepa iz leta 2014 in uvodnih izjavah 170 do 179 sklepa o začetku postopka: | (a) | pred sodbo v zadevi Aéroports de Paris, ko se je načrtoval in gradil projekt stalne povezave, je bilo stališče Komisije, da se javno financiranje infrastrukture obravnava kot javna dobrina in ne kot gospodarska dejavnost. To stališče je bilo jasno izraženo v različnih instrumentih mehkega prava (205)ter nekaterih sklepih Komisije (206) (glej uvodno izjavo 144 sklepa iz leta 2014 in uvodno izjavo 170 sklepa o začetku postopka); | (b) | konzorcij je 1. avgusta 1995 Komisiji poslal dopis, v katerem je zaprosil za pojasnilo, ali poroštva pomenijo državno pomoč. V zvezi s tem je Komisija, kot je navedeno v uvodni izjavi 148 sklepa iz leta 2014 in uvodni izjavi 174 sklepa o začetku postopka, menila, da je pomembno opozoriti, da je bil dopis konzorcija Komisiji predložen pred začetkom veljavnosti Uredbe (ES) št. 659/99 in Uredbe Komisije (ES) št. 794/2004 (207), s katerima so bile uvedene nove formalnosti za priglasitve državne pomoči, vključno z obrazci za priglasitev in elektronsko oddajo prek sistema SANI, ki so jih potrdila stalna predstavništva držav članic (208); | (c) | službe Komisije so z dopisoma iz leta 1995 Danski in Švedski potrdile, da gradnja stalne povezave ne spada na področje uporabe pravil o državni pomoči in da je ni treba priglasiti Komisiji. To je bilo v celoti v skladu s takratno prakso Komisije (glej sklep iz leta 2014, uvodna izjava 150, in sklep o začetku postopka, uvodna izjava 176). Čeprav se je dopis konzorcija z dne 1. avgusta 1995 nanašal le na poroštva, so zaradi odgovora nastala legitimna pričakovanja glede posebnih danskih pravil o prenosu izgub v prihodnje obdobje in amortizaciji ter operativne faze projekta, saj je šlo za celotno dejavnost konzorcija, tj. za gradnjo in obratovanje, ki ni spadala v okvir pravil o državni pomoči, ne glede na obliko državnega financiranja (sklep iz leta 2014, uvodna izjava 152, in sklep o začetku postopka, uvodna izjava 177, ki ju je Splošno sodišče potrdilo v sodbi v zadevi Øresund, točka 313); in | (d) | poleg tega je bila stalna povezava odobrena kot projekt TEN-T in je prejela finančna sredstva Unije, kar pomeni, da je bila Komisija ustrezno obveščena o izvajanju ukrepa v obliki državnih poroštev (uvodni izjavi 58 in 442; sklep iz leta 2014, uvodna izjava 151). | (504) | In order to carry out that verification, the Commission recalls, in the first place, the circumstances that led it to conclude, in the 2014 decision and in the Opening decision, that legitimate expectations arose in this case, as set out at recitals 144 to 153 of the 2014 decision and recitals 170 to 179 of the Opening decision: | (a) | prior to the Aéroports de Paris judgment, when the Fixed Link project was being planned and constructed, the Commission’s position was to consider the public financing of infrastructure as public goods, and not an economic activity. This position was clearly set out in various soft law instruments (205), as well as certain Commission decisions (206) (see recital 144 of the 2014 decision and recital 170 of the Opening decision); | (b) | on 1 August 1995, the Consortium wrote to the Commission, asking for clarification as to whether the guarantees would constitute State aid. In that context, as noted at recital 148 of the 2014 decision and recital 174 of the Opening decision, the Commission found it relevant to note that the Consortium’s letter was submitted to the Commission prior to the entry into force of Regulation 659/99 and Commission Regulation (EC) No 794/2004 (207), which introduced new formalities for State aid notifications, including notification forms, and electronic submission through the SANI system, with validation by Member States’ Permanent Representations (208); | (c) | by the 1995 letters to Denmark and Sweden, the Commission services confirmed that the construction of the Fixed Link did not fall under the scope of State aid rules, and did not need to be notified to the Commission. This was fully consistent with the Commission practice, at the time (see 2014 decision, recital 150 and Opening decision, recital 176). Even if the Consortium’s letter of 1 August 1995 only concerned the guarantees, the response gave rise to legitimate expectations with respect to the special Danish rules on loss carry-forward and depreciation and the operational phase of the project, as it was the entire activity of the Consortium, that is, both the construction and operation, which fell outside of State aid rules, independent of the form that the State financing took (2014 decision, recital 152, and Opening decision, recital 177, confirmed by the General Court in the Øresund judgment, paragraph 313); and | (d) | in addition, the Fixed Link was approved as a TEN-T project, and received Union funding, further indicating that the Commission had been duly informed that the measure in the form of State guarantees would be implemented (recitals (58) and (442)) (2014 decision, recital 151). |
| (505) | Komisija opozarja, da je bila, kot je navedeno v uvodnih izjavah 371 in 399, državna pomoč, ki izhaja iz modela državnih poroštev in pravila o prenosu izgub za obdobje 1991–2001, dodeljena za podporo naložb v načrtovanje in izgradnjo stalne povezave. Za državno pomoč, ki izhaja iz pravila o prenosu izgub za obdobje 2013–2015, pravila o amortizaciji za obdobje 1999–2007 in pravila o amortizaciji za obdobje 2008–2015, bi bilo treba šteti, da podpira obratovanje stalne povezave (uvodni izjavi 416 in 426)). | (505) | The Commission recalls that, as noted at recitals (371) and (399), the State aid deriving from the State guarantee model and the 1991-2001 LCF was granted to support the investment in the planning and construction of the Fixed Link. The State aid deriving from the 2013-2015 LCF, 1999-2007 DEP, and 2008-2015 DEP should be considered as supporting the operation of the Fixed Link (recitals (416) and (426)). |
| (506) | Komisija ugotavlja, da so razlogi, zaradi katerih je prvotno ugotovila, da so v zvezi s projektom stalne povezave nastala legitimna pričakovanja (uvodna izjava 504), izhajali iz dejstva, da je bila v dopisih iz leta 1995 izrecno potrjena takratna praksa, da infrastrukturni projekti ne spadajo na področje uporabe pravil o državni pomoči. Navedena dopisa sta bila poslana kot odgovor na dopis konzorcija Komisiji z dne 1. avgusta 1995, v katerem je konzorcij zaprosil za pojasnilo, ali se model državnega poroštva za podporo izgradnji stalne povezave šteje za državno pomoč. | (506) | The Commission notes that the reasons for which it originally found that legitimate expectations arose in relation to the Fixed Link project (recital (504)) were rooted in the fact that the 1995 letters explicitly confirmed the practice of the time of considering that infrastructure projects did not fall within the ambit of State aid rules. Those letters were sent in response to the Consortium’s letter to the Commission of 1 August 1995, requesting clarity as to whether the State guarantee model to support the construction of the Fixed Link would qualify as State aid. |
| (507) | Splošno sodišče je v sodbi v zadevi Aéroports de Paris potrdilo, da bi upravljanje javne infrastrukture lahko pomenilo državno pomoč (209). | (507) | In the Aéroports de Paris judgment, the General Court confirmed that the operation of public infrastructure could constitute State aid (209). |
| (508) | Kot je navedeno v uvodni izjavi (471), po mnenju Komisije dopisa konzorcija z dne 1. avgusta 1995 ni mogoče šteti za priglasitev novih ukrepov pomoči, ki so bili prvič odobreni skoraj deset let po tem, ko je bil navedeni dopis poslan, in za katere ni mogoče razumno domnevati, da bi jih konzorcij lahko vključil v svoj dopis, saj vsi trije ukrepi izhajajo iz prihodnje spremembe običajnih davčnih pravil, ki se za družbo A/S Øresund ni uporabljala. Podobno Komisija meni, da za dopis iz leta 1995, ki potrjuje neuporabo pravil o državni pomoči za takratno naložbo, ni mogoče šteti, da zajema tudi pomoč za vsakodnevno poslovanje, ki je bila dodeljena po sodbi v zadevi Aéroports de Paris in po zaključku gradnje. | (508) | As noted at recital (471), the Commission does not consider that the Consortium’s letter of 1 August 1995 could have been considered as constituting a notification of the new aid measures, which were first granted almost ten years after that letter was sent and for which it cannot be reasonably assumed that the Consortium could have included them in their letter, since all three measures find their origin in a future amendment of the normal tax rules, which was not applicable to A/S Øresund. Similarly, the Commission does not consider that the 1995 letter, confirming the non-application of State aid rules to the investment taken at that time, can properly be deemed to also cover aid for day-to-day operations that was granted after the Aéroports de Paris judgment, and after the construction had been completed. |
| (509) | Razen dopisov iz leta 1995 Komisiji ni znano, da bi konzorcij ali državi prejeli kakršna koli zagotovila, ki bi izpolnjevala tri kumulativne pogoje, potrebne za nastanek legitimnih pričakovanj (uvodna izjava 494). | (509) | Apart from the 1995 letters, the Commission is not aware of the Consortium or the States having received any assurances that would fulfil the three cumulative conditions necessary to give rise to legitimate expectations (recital (494)). |
| (510) | Komisija zato nima nobenega razloga za mnenje, da bi lahko pri državah ali konzorciju nastala legitimna pričakovanja, da novi ukrepi pomoči, ki zajemajo vsakodnevno poslovanje stalne povezav in so bili odobreni po sodbi v zadevi Aéroports de Paris, ne bi pomenili državne pomoči. | (510) | The Commission, therefore, does not find any reason to consider that the States or the Consortium could have held legitimate expectations that the new aid measures, covering the day-to-day operations of the Fixed Link, granted after the Aéroports de Paris judgment, would not have constituted State aid. |
| (511) | Komisija zato ugotavlja, da državi in konzorcij od 12. decembra 2000 – datuma sodbe v zadevi Aéroports de Paris – niso mogli več legitimno pričakovati, da podpora vsakodnevnemu poslovanju projekta ne pomeni državne pomoči. | (511) | The Commission, therefore, finds that, as from 12 December 2000 – the date of the Aéroports de Paris judgment – the States and the Consortium could no longer hold legitimate expectations that support for the day-to-day operations of the project did not constitute State aid. |
| (512) | Komisija ugotavlja, da položaj pomoči, ki izhaja iz modela državnega poroštva in pravila o prenosu izgub za obdobje 1991–2001, ni nujno enak položaju pomoči, ki izhaja iz pravila o prenosu izgub za obdobje 2013–2015, pravila o amortizaciji za obdobje 1999–2007 in pravila o amortizaciji za obdobje 2008–2015, saj je bila državna pomoč, ki izhaja iz modela državnega poroštva in pravila o prenosu izgub za obdobje 1991–2001, konzorciju dokončno dodeljena 13. februarja 1992, da bi se omogočila naložba v stalno povezavo (uvodni izjavi 388 in 404) ter uvodni izjavi 371 in 399), tj. preden so bili izdani dopisi iz leta 1995. Ker pa pomoč, ki izhaja iz modela državnega poroštva in pravila o prenosu izgub za obdobje 1991–2001, pomeni obstoječo pomoč, ki je ni treba vrniti (uvodne izjave 473, 474 in 475), Komisiji ni treba ugotoviti, ali bi lahko konzorcij ali državi po sodbi v zadevi Aéroports de Paris ohranili legitimna pričakovanja v zvezi s pomočjo za podporo naložbam v izgradnjo stalne povezave. | (512) | The Commission notes that the situation of the aid deriving from the State guarantee model and the 1991-2001 LCF may not necessarily be the same as that of the aid deriving from the 2013-2015 LCF, the 1999-2007 DEP, and the 2008-2015 DEP, given that the State aid deriving from the State guarantee model and the 1991-2001 LCF was definitively granted to the Consortium on 13 February 1992 to enable the investment into the Fixed Link (recitals (388) and (404), and recitals (371) and (399)), before the 1995 letters were issued. Given, however, that the aid deriving from the State guarantee model and the 1991-2001 LCF constitutes existing aid that is not subject to recovery (recitals (473) to (475)), the Commission is not required to make a determination as to whether the Consortium or the States could have maintained legitimate expectations beyond the Aéroports de Paris judgment in relation to the aid to support the investment into the construction of the Fixed Link. |
| (513) | Komisija zato ugotavlja, da nova pomoč, ki izhaja iz pravila o prenosu izgub za obdobje 2013–2015, pravila o amortizaciji za obdobje 1999–2007 in pravila o amortizaciji za obdobje 2008–2015, ker je bila dodeljena po 12. decembru 2000, ni izključena iz vračila na podlagi načela legitimnih pričakovanj. Navedeno pomoč je zato treba vrniti. | (513) | The Commission, therefore, concludes that the new aid deriving from the 2013-2015 LCF, the 1999-2007 DEP, and the 2008-2015 DEP, since it was granted after 12 December 2000, is not precluded from recovery by virtue of the application of the principle of legitimate expectations. That aid must, therefore, be recovered. |
| 7.2 Metodologija za vračilo | 7.2. Methodology for recovery |
| (514) | Kadar Komisija odredi vračilo pomoči, razglašene za nezdružljivo z notranjim trgom, bi moral njen sklep vsebovati informacije, na podlagi katerih lahko naslovnik sklepa brez večjih težav izračuna znesek pomoči, ki ga je treba vrniti (210). Da se ponovno vzpostavi stanje, ki je na notranjem trgu obstajalo pred dodelitvijo pomoči, vračilo zajema obdobje od datuma, ko je bila pomoč dana na voljo upravičencu, do datuma dejanskega vračila. Znesek, ki ga je treba vrniti, vključuje obresti do datuma dejanskega vračila. | (514) | When ordering the recovery of aid declared incompatible with the internal market, the Commission’s decision should include information that enables the addressee of the decision to calculate the amount of aid to be recovered without overmuch difficulty (210). In order to re-establish the situation that existed on the internal market prior to their granting, recovery shall cover the period starting on the date when the aid was put at the disposal of the beneficiary until effective recovery. The amount to be recovered shall bear interest until effective recovery. |
| (515) | Nezakonito pomoč, za katero je bilo ugotovljeno, da ni združljiva z notranjim trgom, je treba izterjati od prejemnikov pomoči (211). Za ponovno vzpostavitev stanja, ki je obstajalo na notranjem trgu pred dodelitvijo pomoči, mora prejemnik vrniti pomoč, da izgubi prednost, ki jo je imel pred konkurenti na trgu. Komisija je v uvodnih izjavah 314 do 319 ugotovila, da družba A/S Øresund in konzorcij za namene gospodarske dejavnosti stalne povezave tvorita enotno podjetje; da ima konzorcij kot del enotnega podjetja korist od vsake prednosti, dodeljene enotnemu podjetju za navedeno gospodarsko dejavnost, in da ima konzorcij korist od vsakega znižanja stroškov, povezanih z dejavnostjo stalne povezave, saj se za izpolnitev njegovih obveznosti uporabljajo prihodki konzorcija. Glede na navedene okoliščine in za ponovno vzpostavitev stanja, ki je obstajalo na notranjem trgu pred odobritvijo ukrepov pomoči, bi se pomoč lahko izterjala od konzorcija ali družbe A/S Øresund kot dela enotnega podjetja, saj je konzorcij tisti, ki nosi kakršno koli znižanje ali zvišanje stroškov, povezanih s stalno povezavo. | (515) | Unlawful aid found to be incompatible with the internal market must be recovered from the recipients of the aid (211). To restore the situation that existed on the internal market prior to the granting of the aid, the recipient needs to repay the aid to forfeit the advantage which it has enjoyed over its competitors on the market. The Commission noted at recitals (314) to (319) that A/S Øresund and the Consortium form a single undertaking for the purposes of the economic activity of the Fixed Link; that any advantage assigned to the single undertaking for that economic activity also benefits the Consortium as part of the undertaking; and that any reduction in the costs connected to the activity of the Fixed Link is of benefit to the Consortium, as it is the income of the Consortium that is used to discharge the liabilities of the Consortium. In light of those circumstances, and in order to re-establish the situation that existed on the internal market prior to the granting of the aid measures, the aid could be recovered either from the Consortium or from A/S Øresund, as part of the single undertaking, since it is the Consortium that bears any reduction or increase in the costs related to the Fixed Link. |
| (516) | Pomoč, ki izhaja iz pravila o prenosu izgub za obdobje 2013–2015, je bila dodeljena na letni ravni, ko so organi sprejeli davčne napovedi družbe A/S Øresund. Pomoč, ki izhaja iz pravila o amortizaciji za obdobje 1999–2007 in pravila o amortizaciji za obdobje 2008–2015, je bila dodeljena v trenutku, ko so organi sprejeli davčne napovedi družbe A/S Øresund, v katerih je ta uporabila stopnjo amortizacije, višjo od stopnje, določene v danskem zakonu o davčni amortizaciji. Za količinsko opredelitev zneska, ki ga je treba vrniti, je treba opraviti primerjavo med davkom, ki ga je družba A/S Øresund dejansko plačala, in zneskom davka, ki bi ga morala plačati, če bi se uporabila splošno veljavna pravila o prenosu izgub v prihodnje obdobje in amortizaciji, izračunana na datume, na katere bi bilo treba plačati prihranjeni davek v posameznem davčnem letu. To primerjavo med dejansko plačanim davkom in zneskom davka, ki bi ga bilo treba plačati, je treba izvesti za vsako davčno napoved, ki je bila predložena (212) in so jo davčni organi sprejeli po 21. februarju 2004. | (516) | The aid deriving from the 2013-2015 LCF was granted on an annual basis, at the time when the authorities accepted A/S Øresund’s tax returns. The aid deriving from the 1999-2007 DEP and 2008-2015 DEP was granted at the moment of the authorities’ acceptance of A/S Øresund’s tax returns, in which it applied a depreciation rate beyond the rate provided for in the Danish Tax Depreciation Act. To quantify the amount to be recovered, a comparison needs to be made between the tax A/S Øresund actually paid, and the amount of tax it should have paid if the generally applicable loss carry-forward and depreciation rules had been applied, calculated on the dates the tax saved would have been due in each tax year. This comparison, between the tax actually paid and the amount of tax that should have been paid, is required for each tax return submitted (212) and accepted by the tax authorities after 21 February 2004. |
| (517) | Komisija poleg tega ugotavlja, da učinka posebnih danskih pravil o prenosu izgub v prihodnje obdobje in posebnih danskih pravil o amortizaciji ni mogoče obravnavati ločeno, saj amortizacija vpliva na obdavčljivi dohodek davčnega zavezanca in lahko vpliva na izgube, prenesene v prihodnje obdobje. Poleg tega je treba upoštevati celotno obdobje od prvega sprejetja davčne napovedi od 21. februarja 2004 do datuma izterjave, saj lahko izgube, prenesene v prihodnje obdobje, vplivajo na dejansko plačane davke v prihodnjih letih. | (517) | The Commission, further, notes that the effect of the special Danish rules on loss carry-forward and the special Danish rules on depreciation cannot be considered in isolation, since depreciation has an impact on the taxable income of a taxpayer, and can have an impact on the losses carried forward. Moreover, the entire period, from the first acceptance of a tax return since 21 February 2004 until the date of recovery, needs to be taken into account, as losses carried forward can have an impact on the taxes actually paid in future years. |
| (518) | Kar zadeva zlasti pravilo o amortizaciji za obdobje 2008–2015, Komisija ugotavlja, da bi se lahko družba A/S Øresund z vsako davčno napovedjo odločila, ali bo del svojih sredstev amortizirala ali ne. Te dejanske izbire je treba upoštevati pri primerjavi davka, ki ga je plačala družba A/S Øresund, z davkom, ki bi ga morala plačati, če bi se uporabljala in uporabila splošna pravila o amortizaciji (v nadalnjem besedilu: hipotetična davčna napoved). Če je družba A/S Øresund v določenem letu amortizirala po višji stopnji, kot je dovoljena v skladu s splošno veljavnimi pravili, bi bilo treba to presežek amortizacije upoštevati v hipotetični davčni napovedi za prvo leto, za katero se je družba A/S Øresund odločila, da svojih sredstev stalne povezave ne bo amortizirala (ali je to storila le po stopnji, nižji od splošno veljavnega pravila), in sicer le do stopnje amortizacije, ki je dovoljena v skladu s splošno veljavnimi pravili. Vsak preostali presežek amortizacije bi bilo treba za namene izračuna upoštevati v hipotetični davčni napovedi za naslednje leto, dokler skupni amortizirani znesek v davčnih napovedih družbe A/S Øresund in v hipotetičnih davčnih napovedih nista enaka. | (518) | Regarding the 2008-2015 DEP, in particular, the Commission notes that A/S Øresund could, with each tax return, decide whether or not it would depreciate part of its assets. It is those actual choices that need to be taken into account when comparing the tax paid by A/S Øresund with the tax that it should have paid, if the general depreciation rules had been applicable and applied (‘the counterfactual tax return’). If A/S Øresund, in a certain year, depreciated at a higher rate than permitted under the generally applicable rules, that surplus depreciation should be taken into account in the counterfactual tax return of the first year for which A/S Øresund chose not to depreciate its Fixed Link assets (or only did so at a rate lower than the generally applicable rule), and only up to the depreciation rate allowed under the general rules. Each depreciation surplus remaining should, for calculation purposes, be considered in the counterfactual tax return of the following year until the cumulative depreciated amount in A/S Øresund’s tax returns and in the counterfactual tax returns are equal. |
| 8. SKLEPNE UGOTOVITVE | 8. CONCLUSION |
| (519) | Komisija ugotavlja, da model državnega poroštva, ki sta ga državi vzpostavili za posojila, ki jih je Konzorcij najel za financiranje stroškov načrtovanja in gradnje stalne povezave, pomeni državno pomoč konzorciju v smislu člena 107(1) PDEU. | (519) | The Commission concludes that the State guarantee model put in place by the States for the loans taken up by the Consortium for financing the planning and construction costs of the Fixed Link constitutes State aid, within the meaning of Article 107(1) TFEU, to the Consortium. |
| (520) | Model državnega jamstva je bil kot ena individualna ad hoc pomoč odobren 13. februarja 1992, ko je bil ustanovljen konzorcij. Navedeni ukrep pomeni obstoječo pomoč. Kljub temu Komisija ugotavlja, da sta se državi zavezali, da bosta zagotovili, da bo konzorcij financiral nov dolg in refinanciral obstoječi dolg pod tržnimi pogoji. Pomoč konzorciju, ki izhaja iz modela državnega poroštva, bo zato postopoma odpravljena, ko prenehajo veljati neporavnani dolžniški instrumenti konzorcija. | (520) | The State guarantee model was granted as one individual ad hoc aid on 13 February 1992, when the Consortium was established. That measure constitutes existing aid. Nevertheless, the Commission notes that the States committed to ensure that the Consortium will finance new debt and refinance existing debt on market terms. Therefore, the aid to the Consortium deriving from the State guarantee model will be phased out as the Consortium’s outstanding debt instruments expire. |
| (521) | Komisija ugotavlja, da pravilo o prenosu izgub za obdobje 2002–2012 in pravilo o amortizaciji za obdobje 1991–1998 ne pomenita državne pomoči v smislu člena 107(1) PDEU. | (521) | The Commission concludes that the 2002-2012 LCF and the 1991-1998 DEP do not constitute State aid, within the meaning of Article 107(1) TFEU. |
| (522) | Komisija ugotavlja, da prednosti, ki izhajajo iz pravila o prenosu izgub za obdobje 1991–2001, pravila o prenosu izgub za obdobje 2013–2015, pravila o amortizaciji za obdobje 1999–2007 in pravila o amortizaciji za obdobje 2008–2015, pomenijo državno pomoč v smislu člena 107(1) PDEU, ki jo je Danska dodelila enotnemu podjetju, ki ga tvorita družba A/S Øresund in konzorcij, ter s tem konzorciju, na individualni ad hoc podlagi. Pomoč, ki izhaja iz pravila o prenosu izgub za obdobje 1991–2001, je ena individualna ad hoc pomoč, ki se šteje za obstoječo pomoč. Pomoč, ki izhaja iz pravila o amortizaciji za obdobje 1999–2007, pomeni dodelitev individualne ad hoc pomoči, ki bi se štela za obstoječo pomoč, če bi bila dodeljena pred 21. februarjem 2004, in ki se šteje za novo, nezakonito pomoč, če je bila dodeljena po 21. februarju 2004. Pomoč, ki izhaja iz pravila o prenosu izgub za obdobje 2013–2015, in pomoč, ki izhaja iz pravila o amortizaciji za obdobje 2008–2015, sta individualni ad hoc pomoči, ki se štejeta za novo pomoč, ki jo je Danska izvajala nezakonito. Navedeni ukrepi pomoči, ki se štejejo za novo pomoč, niso združljivi z notranjim trgom. Nobena pomoč na podlagi navedenih ukrepov ni bila dodeljena pred 12. decembrom 2000, izterjava ni izključena z uporabo načela varstva legitimnih pričakovanj. Danska mora izterjati nezakonito in nezdružljivo pomoč, dodeljeno v okviru pravila o prenosu izgub za obdobje 2013–2015, pravila o amortizaciji za obdobje 1999–2007 in pravila o amortizaciji za obdobje 2008–2015 – | (522) | The Commission concludes that the advantages deriving from the 1991-2001 LCF, the 2013-2015 LCF, the 1999-2007 DEP, and the 2008-2015 DEP constitute State aid, within the meaning of Article 107(1) TFEU, granted by Denmark to the single undertaking of A/S Øresund and the Consortium, and therefore the Consortium, on an individual ad hoc basis. The aid deriving from the 1991-2001 LCF constitutes one individual ad hoc aid, which qualifies as existing aid. The aid deriving from the 1999-2007 DEP constitutes grants of individual ad hoc aid, which would qualify as existing aid if it were granted before 21 February 2004, and which qualifies as new, unlawful aid insofar as it was granted as from 21 February 2004. The aid deriving from the 2013-2015 LCF, and the aid deriving from the 2008-2015 DEP, constitute individual ad hoc aids, which qualify as new aid, which Denmark implemented unlawfully. Those aid measures that qualify as new aid are not compatible with the internal market. As no aid under those measures was granted before 12 December 2000, recovery is not precluded by the application of the principle of the protection of legitimate expectations. Denmark must recover the unlawful and incompatible aid granted under the 2013-2015 LCF, 1999-2007 DEP, and 2008-2015 DEP. |
| SPREJELA NASLEDNJI SKLEP: | HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION: |
| Člen 1 | Article 1 |
| Pravilo o prenosu izgub za obdobje 2002–2012 in pravilo o amortizaciji za obdobje 1991–1998 ne pomenita državne pomoči v smislu člena 107(1) Pogodbe o delovanju Evropske unije. | The 2002-2012 LCF and the 1991-1998 DEP do not constitute State aid, within the meaning of Article 107(1) the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. |
| Člen 2 | Article 2 |
| Model državnega poroštva, ki sta ga odobrili državi, in pravilo o prenosu izgub za obdobje 1991–2001, ki ga je odobrila Danska, pomenita državno pomoč v smislu člena 107(1) Pogodbe o delovanju Evropske unije enotnemu podjetju, ki ga tvorita družba A/S Øresund in konzorcij, ter s tem konzorciju. Navedena pomoč pomeni obstoječo pomoč. | The State guarantee model, granted by the States, as well as the 1991-2001 LCF, granted by Denmark, constitute State aid, within the meaning of Article 107(1) the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, to the single undertaking of A/S Øresund and the Consortium, and, therefore, to the Consortium. That aid constitutes existing aid. |
| Člen 3 | Article 3 |
| Prednosti, ki izhajajo iz pravila o amortizaciji za obdobje 1999–2007, ki ga je odobrila Danska, pomenijo državno pomoč v smislu člena 107(1) Pogodbe o delovanju Evropske unije enotnemu podjetju, ki ga tvorita družba A/S Øresund in konzorcij, ter s tem konzorciju. Navedena pomoč pomeni obstoječo pomoč, če je bila dodeljena pred 21. februarjem 2004. | The advantages deriving from the 1999-2007 DEP granted by Denmark constitute State aid, within the meaning of Article 107(1) the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, to the single undertaking of A/S Øresund and the Consortium, and, therefore, to the Consortium. That aid constitutes existing aid to the extent that it was granted before 21 February 2004. |
| Člen 4 | Article 4 |
| Prednosti, ki izhajajo iz pravila o amortizaciji za obdobje 1999–2007, kolikor so bile dodeljene od 21. februarja 2004, prednosti, ki izhajajo iz pravila o amortizaciji za obdobje 2008–2015, in prednosti, ki izhajajo iz pravila o prenosu izgub za obdobje 2013–2015, pomenijo državno pomoč v smislu člena 107(1) Pogodbe o delovanju Evropske unije enotnemu podjetju, ki ga tvorita družba A/S Øresund in konzorcij, ter s tem konzorciju. Navedena pomoč pomeni novo pomoč, ki jo je Danska nezakonito izvajala v nasprotju s členom 108(3) Pogodbe o delovanju Evropske unije in je nezdružljiva z notranjim trgom. | The advantages deriving from the 1999-2007 DEP, insofar as they were granted as from 21 February 2004, the advantages deriving from the 2008-2015 DEP, and the advantages deriving from the 2013-2015 LCF constitute State aid, within the meaning of Article 107(1) the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, to the single undertaking of A/S Øresund and the Consortium, and therefore to the Consortium. That aid constitutes new aid that was unlawfully put into effect by Denmark in breach of Article 108(3) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, and is incompatible with the internal market. |
| Člen 5 | Article 5 |
| (1) Danska od enotnega podjetja, ki ga tvorita družba A/S Øresund in konzorcij, izterja pomoč iz člena 4. | (1) Denmark shall recover the aid referred to in Article 4 from the single undertaking of A/S Øresund and the Consortium. |
| (2) Zneskom, ki jih je treba vrniti, se prištejejo obresti, nastale od datuma, ko so bili zadevni zneski dani na voljo enotnemu podjetju, ki ga tvorita družba A/S Øresund in konzorcij, do datuma njihovega dejanskega vračila. | (2) The sums to be recovered shall bear interest from the date on which they were put at the disposal of the single undertaking of A/S Øresund and the Consortium until their actual recovery. |
| (3) Obresti se izračunajo na podlagi obrestnoobrestnega računa v skladu s poglavjem V Uredbe (ES) št. 794/2004 in Uredbo (ES) št. 271/2008 o spremembi Uredbe (ES) št. 794/2004. | (3) The interest shall be calculated on a compound basis in accordance with Chapter V of Regulation (EC) No 794/2004 and to Regulation (EC) No 271/2008 amending Regulation (EC) No 794/2004. |
| Člen 6 | Article 6 |
| (1) Vračilo dodeljene pomoči iz člena 4 se izvede takoj in učinkovito. | (1) Recovery of the aid granted referred to in Article 4 shall be immediate and effective. |
| (2) Danska zagotovi, da se ta sklep izvede v štirih mesecih po uradnem obvestilu o tem sklepu. | (2) Denmark shall ensure that this Decision is implemented within four months following the date of notification of this Decision. |
| Člen 7 | Article 7 |
| (1) Danska v dveh mesecih od uradnega obvestila o tem sklepu predloži naslednje informacije: | (1) Within two months following notification of this Decision, Denmark shall submit the following information: |
| (a) | skupni znesek pomoči iz člena 4, ki jo je prejelo enotno podjetje, ki ga tvorita družba A/S Øresund in konzorcij; | (a) | the total amount of aid, referred to in Article 4, received by the single undertaking of A/S Øresund and the Consortium; |
| (b) | skupni znesek (glavnica in obresti), ki ga mora vrniti enotno podjetje, ki ga tvorita družba A/S Øresund in konzorcij; | (b) | the total amount (principal and recovery interest) to be recovered from the single undertaking of A/S Øresund and the Consortium; |
| (c) | podroben opis že sprejetih ali načrtovanih ukrepov za uskladitev s tem sklepom; | (c) | a detailed description of the measures already taken and planned to comply with this Decision; |
| (d) | dokumentacijo, ki dokazuje, da je bilo enotnemu podjetju, ki ga tvorita družba A/S Øresund in konzorcij, odrejeno vračilo pomoči. | (d) | documentation demonstrating that the single undertaking of A/S Øresund and the Consortium has been ordered to repay the aid. |
| (2) Danska obvešča Komisijo o napredku v zvezi z nacionalnimi ukrepi, sprejetimi za izvajanje tega sklepa, dokler dodeljena pomoč iz člena 4 ni v celoti vrnjena. Na zahtevo Komisije takoj predloži informacije o že sprejetih ali načrtovanih ukrepih za uskladitev s tem sklepom. Predloži tudi podrobne informacije o zneskih pomoči in obrestih za vračilo, ki jo je enotno podjetje, ki ga tvorita družba A/S Øresund in konzorcij, že vrnilo. | (2) Denmark shall keep the Commission informed of the progress of the national measures taken to implement this Decision until recovery of the aid granted referred to in Article 4 has been completed. It shall immediately submit, on simple request by the Commission, information on the measures already taken and planned to comply with this Decision. It shall also provide detailed information concerning the amounts of aid and recovery interest already recovered from the single undertaking of A/S Øresund and the Consortium. |
| Člen 8 | Article 8 |
| Ta sklep je naslovljen na Kraljevino Dansko in Kraljevino Švedsko. | This Decision is addressed to the Kingdom of Denmark and the Kingdom of Sweden. |
| V Bruslju, 13. februarja 2024 | Done at Brussels, 13 February 2024. |
| Za Komisijo | For the Commission |
| Margrethe VESTAGER | Margrethe VESTAGER |
| izvršna podpredsednica | Executive Vice-President |
| (1)
UL C 109, 22.3.2019, str. 46, in UL C 109, 22.3.2019, str. 72. | (1)
OJ C 109, 22.3.2019, p. 46, and OJ C 109, 22.3.2019, p. 72. |
| (2) Družba Scandlines Øresund I/S je 16. aprila 2013 pri Komisiji vložila pritožbo. Družbo Scandlines Øresund I/S je januarja 2015 kupila skupina HH Ferries Group in jo preimenovala v HH Ferries I/S. Skupina HH Ferries Group je 9. novembra 2018 sporočila, da se bo preimenovala v ForSea. | (2) It was Scandlines Øresund I/S that, on 16 April 2013, filed the complaint with the Commission. In January 2015, Scandlines Øresund I/S was bought by the HH Ferries Group and was renamed as HH Ferries I/S. On 9 November 2018, the HH Ferries Group announced that it would change its name to ForSea. |
| (3) Ta pritožba je bila evidentirana pod številko SA.36558 za Dansko in SA.36662 za Švedsko. | (3) This complaint was registered as SA.36558 for Denmark and as SA.36662 for Sweden. |
| (4) Ta del pritožbe je bil evidentiran pod številko SA.38371. | (4) This part of the complaint was registered as SA.38371. |
| (5) Sklep Komisije C(2014) 7358 final z dne 15. oktobra 2014 v zadevi SA.36558 (2014/NN) in SA.38371 (2014/NN) – Danska ter SA.36662 (2014/NN) – Švedska – Pomoč, dodeljena konzorciju Øresundsbro Konsortiet (UL C 418, 21.11.2014, str. 1, in UL C 437, 5.12.2014, str. 1). | (5) Commission decision C(2014) 7358 final of 15 October 2014 in case SA.36558 (2014/NN) and SA.38371 (2014/NN) – Denmark and SA.36662 (2014/NN) – Sweden – Aid granted to Øresundsbro Konsortiet (OJ C 418, 21.11.2014, p. 1 and OJ C 437, 5.12.2014, p. 1). |
| (6) Uredba Sveta (ES) št. 659/1999 z dne 22. marca 1999 o določitvi podrobnih pravil za uporabo člena 108 Pogodbe o delovanju Evropske unije (UL L 83, 27.3.1999, str. 1). | (6) Council Regulation (EC) No 659/1999 of 22 March 1999 laying down detailed rules for the application of Article 108 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (OJ L 83, 27.3.1999, p. 1). |
| (7) Akt o pogojih pristopa Kraljevine Norveške, Republike Avstrije, Republike Finske in Kraljevine Švedske ter o prilagoditvah pogodb, na katerih temelji Evropska unija (UL C 241, 29.8.1994, str. 21). | (7) Act concerning the conditions of accession of the Kingdom of Norway, the Republic of Austria, the Republic of Finland and the Kingdom of Sweden and the adjustments to the Treaties on which the European Union is founded (OJ C 241, 29.8.1994, p. 21). |
| (8) Člen 18 Uredbe (ES) št. 659/1999 določa: „Če Komisija, glede na podatke, ki jih je država članica predložila na podlagi člena 17, ugotovi, da veljavna shema pomoči ni ali ni več združljiva s skupnim trgom, izda priporočilo, v katerem zadevni državi članici predlaga primerne ukrepe“. | (8) Article 18 of Regulation (EC) No 659/1999 provides: ‘Where the Commission, in the light of the information submitted by the Member State pursuant to Article 17, concludes that the existing aid scheme is not, or is no longer, compatible with the common market, it shall issue a recommendation proposing appropriate measures to the Member State concerned’. |
| (9) Sodba Splošnega sodišča z dne 12. decembra 2000, Aéroports de Paris/Komisija, T-128/98, ECLI:EU:T:2000:290. | (9) Judgment of the General Court of 12 December 2000, Aéroports de Paris v Commission, T-128/98, EU:T:2000:290. |
| (10) Sodba Splošnega sodišča z dne 19. septembra 2018, HH Ferries in drugi/Komisija, T-68/15, ECLI:EU:T:2018:563. | (10) Judgment of the General Court of 19 September 2018, HH Ferries and Others v Commission, T-68/15, EU:T:2018:563. |
| (11) Sodba Splošnega sodišča z dne 13. decembra 2018, Scandlines Danmark ApS in Scandlines Deutschland GmbH/Komisija, T-630/15, ECLI:EU:T:2018:942. | (11) Judgment of the General Court of 13 December 2018, Scandlines Danmark ApS and Scandlines Deutschland GmbH v Commission, T-630/15, EU:T:2018:942. |
| (12) Sodba Splošnega sodišča z dne 13. decembra 2018, Stena Line Scandinavia AB/Komisija, T-631/15, ECLI:EU:T:2018:944. | (12) Judgment of the General Court of 13 December 2018, Stena Line Scandinavia AB v Commission, T-631/15, EU:T:2018:944. |
| (13) Glej opombo 1. | (13)
Supra, footnote 1. |
| (14) Uredba št. 1 o določitvi jezikov, ki se uporabljajo v Evropski gospodarski skupnosti (UL 17, 6.10.1958, str. 385/58). | (14) Regulation No 1 determining the languages to be used by the European Economic Community (OJ 17, 6.10.1958, p. 385/58). |
| (15) TEN-T Priority Projects – Progress Report 2010 (Prednostni projekti TEN-T – Poročilo o napredku iz leta 2010), Evropska komisija, Generalni direktorat za mobilnost in promet, 2010. | (15) TEN-T Priority Projects – Progress Report 2010, European Commission, Directorate General for Mobility and Transport, 2010. |
| (16) Člen 8 Pogodbe z dne 23. marca 1991 med vlado Danske in vlado Švedske o stalni povezavi čez ožino Øresund. | (16) Article 8 of the Treaty of 23 March 1991 between the Government of Denmark and the Government of Sweden concerning a Fixed Link across the Sound. |
| (17) Riksdagsskrivelse 1990/91:379. | (17) Riksdagsskrivelse 1990/91:379. |
| (18) Zakon o gradnji in zakon o gradnji stalne povezave čez Storebælt (zakon št. 260 z dne 4. maja 1998 (prečiščeno besedilo)) je nadomestil zakon št. 588 z dne 24. junija 2005 o družbi Sund & Bælt Holding A/S. | (18) The Construction Act, together with the Act for the Construction of a Fixed Link across Storebælt (Consolidated Act No 260 of 4 May 1998), was replaced by Act No 588 of 24 June 2005 concerning Sund & Bælt Holding A/S. |
| (19) Švedska državna uprava za ceste (Vägverket) in švedska državna uprava za železnice (Banverket) sta se leta 2010 združili v švedsko upravo za promet (Trafikverket). | (19) In 2010, the Swedish National Road Administration (Vägverket) and the Swedish National Rail Administration (Banverket) merged into Trafikverket (the Swedish Transport Administration). |
| (20) Švedska državna uprava za ceste in švedska državna uprava za železnice sta na podlagi sklepa švedske vlade pooblastilo za izvajanje lastniških pravic družbe SVEDAB prenesli na švedsko ministrstvo za podjetništvo, energijo in komunikacije z učinkom od 1. januarja 2008. | (20) With effect from 1 January 2008, following a decision by the Swedish Government, the Swedish National Road Administration and the Swedish National Rail Administration handed over the mandate to exercise the ownership rights of SVEDAB to the Swedish Ministry of Enterprise, Energy and Communications. |
| (21) Konzorcij, ki je bil ustanovljen kot „Øresundskonsortiet“, se je z januarjem 2000 preimenoval v „Øresundsbro Konsortiet“. | (21) Established as ‘Øresundskonsortiet’, it changed its name to ‘Øresundsbro Konsortiet’ with effect from January 2000. |
| (22) Člen 10 medvladnega sporazuma in oddelek 1 sporazuma o konzorciju. | (22) Article 10 of the Intergovernmental Agreement and Section 1 of the Consortium Agreement. |
| (23) Člen 11 medvladnega sporazuma in oddelek 3 sporazuma o konzorciju. | (23) Article 11 of the Intergovernmental Agreement and Section 3 of the Consortium Agreement. |
| (24) Člen 11 medvladnega sporazuma in oddelek 3 sporazuma o konzorciju. | (24) Article 11 of the Intergovernmental Agreement and Section 3 of the Consortium Agreement. |
| (25) Oddelek 2(5) sporazuma o konzorciju. | (25) Section 2(5) of the Consortium Agreement. |
| (26) Predlog zakona o gradnji stalne povezave čez ožino Øresund, LFF1990-1991.2.178, ki ga je 2. maja 1991 podal danski minister za promet. | (26) Proposal for an Act on the construction of a fixed link across the Øresund, LFF1990-1991.2.178, delivered on 2 May 1991 by the Danish Minister for Transport. |
| (27) Danska izvaja politiko fiksnega deviznega tečaja za dansko krono (DKK) glede na euro, in sicer 1 EUR = 7,46038 DKK. Ta devizni tečaj se uporablja v tem sklepu pri izračunu približne protivrednosti DKK v EUR. | (27) Denmark conducts a fixed exchange rate policy for its Danish krone (DKK) against the euro at EUR 1 = DKK 7,46038. This exchange rate is applied throughout this decision when calculating the approximate EUR equivalent of DKK. |
| (28) Raven cen 1. januarja 1991. | (28) Price level on 1 January 1991. |
| (29) Odstavek 4 dodatnega protokola k medvladnemu sporazumu. | (29) Paragraph 4 of the Additional Protocol to the Intergovernmental Agreement. |
| (30) Na ravni cen iz leta 1990. | (30) At 1990 price level. |
| (31) Na ravni cen iz leta 1990. | (31) At 1990 price level. |
| (32) Po podatkih Eurostata je leta 1990 povprečni devizni tečaj med ECU in švedsko krono znašal 1 ECU = 7,5205 SEK. Ta devizni tečaj se uporablja za izračun približne protivrednosti SEK v EUR. | (32) According to Eurostat, the average exchange rate, in 1990, between the ECU and the Swedish krona amounted to ECU 1 = SEK 7,5205. This exchange rate is applied to calculate the approximate EUR equivalent of SEK. |
| (33) Stroški gradnje in financiranja stalne povezave so prikazani kot neto dolg v cenah iz leta 2000. | (33) Construction and financing costs of the Fixed Link shown as net debt in 2000 prices. |
| (34) Informacijski memorandum vsebuje opis programa, vključno s pogoji, ki bodo veljali za dolžniške instrumente, izdane v okviru programa, in opisne informacije o izdajatelju (v tem primeru konzorciju). | (34) An information memorandum describes the programme, including the terms and conditions that will apply to the debt instruments issued under the programme, and includes descriptive information about the issuer (in this case the Consortium). |
| (35) Po podatkih Eurostata je leta 1995 povprečni menjalni tečaj med ECU in ameriškim dolarjem znašal 1 ECU = 1,3080 USD (vir: Eurostat). Ta devizni tečaj se uporablja za izračun približne protivrednosti USD v EUR. | (35) According to Eurostat, the average exchange rate, in 1995, between the ECU and the US dollar amounted to ECU 1 = USD 1,3080 (source: Eurostat). This exchange rate is applied to calculate the approximate EUR equivalent of USD. |
| (36) Po podatkih Eurostata je leta 2000 povprečni menjalni tečaj med eurom in ameriškim dolarjem znašal 1 EUR = 0,9236 USD. Ta devizni tečaj se uporablja za izračun približne protivrednosti USD v EUR. | (36) According to Eurostat, the average exchange rate, in 2000, between the Euro and the US dollar amounted to EUR 1 = USD 0,9236. This exchange rate is applied to calculate the approximate EUR equivalent of USD. |
| (37) Po podatkih Eurostata je leta 2004 povprečni menjalni tečaj med eurom in ameriškim dolarjem znašal 1 EUR = 1,2439 USD. Ta devizni tečaj se uporablja za izračun približne protivrednosti USD v EUR. | (37) According to Eurostat, the average exchange rate, in 2004, between the Euro and the US dollar amounted to EUR 1 = USD 1,2439. This exchange rate is applied to calculate the approximate EUR equivalent of USD. |
| (38) Po podatkih Eurostata je leta 1996 povprečni devizni tečaj med ECU in švedsko krono znašal 1 ECU = 8,5147 SEK. Ta devizni tečaj se uporablja za izračun približne protivrednosti SEK v EUR. | (38) According to Eurostat, the average exchange rate, in 1996, between the ECU and the Swedish krona amounted to ECU 1 = SEK 8,5147. This exchange rate is applied to calculate the approximate EUR equivalent of SEK. |
| (39) Izvedeno npr. z dodatnim sporazumom z dne 22. septembra 1998 in z dodatnim sporazumom z dne 3. februarja 2000. | (39) Implemented e.g. by supplementary agreement of 22 September 1998 and by supplementary agreement of 3 February 2000. |
| (40) Prav tako je bilo mogoče izdati posojila v eurih do ustreznega najvišjega zneska. | (40) It was also possible to issue loans in euro up to the corresponding maximum amount. |
| (41) Pogodba o začasni prodaji je vrsta finančne transakcije, pri kateri posojilojemalec posojilodajalcu proda finančno jamstvo v zameno za gotovino s hkratnim dogovorom, da ga v kratkem času odkupi nazaj. | (41) A repurchase agreement is a type of financial transaction in which a borrower sells a financial security to a lender in exchange for cash with a simultaneous agreement to buy it back in the short term. |
| (42) Odstavek 1 dodatnega protokola k medvladnemu sporazumu določa: „Danska in Švedska se strinjata, da državi ne bosta zaračunavali nobenih dajatev ali podobnega za poroštva, ki sta jih prevzeli za posojila konzorcija in druge finančne instrumente, uporabljene za financiranje.“ | (42) Paragraph 1 of the Additional Protocol to the Intergovernmental Agreement provides: ‘Denmark and Sweden are agreed that no charge or the like shall be levied by the two states for the guarantee undertakings assumed by them in respect of the consortium’s loans and other financial instruments used in connection with the financing’. |
| (43) Zakon št. 588 z dne 24. junija 2005 o družbi Sund & Bælt Holding A/S. | (43) Act No 588 of 24 June 2005 on Sund and Bælt Holding A/S. |
| (44) Izvirno besedilo člena 8 zakona o gradnji se glasi: „Den danske stat garanterer forpligtelser vedrørende konsortiets lån og andre finansielle instrumenter, som benyttes i forbindelse med finansieringen af Øresundsforbindelsen“. Besedilo člena 11 zakona o družbi Sund & Bælt se glasi: „Den danske stat garanterer forpligtelser vedrørende Øre sundsbro Konsortiet I/S’ lån og andre finansielle instrumenter, som benyttes i forbindelse med finansieringen af den faste forbindelse over Øresund.“ | (44) The original text of Section 8 of the Construction Act reads as follows: ‘Den danske stat garanterer for forpligtelser vedrørende konsortiets lån og andre finansielle instrumenter, som benyttes i forbindelse med finansieringen af Øresundsforbindelsen’. The text of Section 11 of the Sund & Bælt Act reads as follows: ‘Den danske stat garanterer for forpligtelser vedrørende Øre sundsbro Konsortiet I/S’ lån og andre finansielle instrumenter, som benyttes i forbindelse med finansieringen af den faste forbindelse over Øresund.’ |
| (45) Po podatkih Eurostata je leta 1991 povprečni devizni tečaj med ECU in švedsko krono znašal 1 ECU = 7,4793 SEK. Ta devizni tečaj se uporablja za izračun približne protivrednosti SEK v EUR. | (45) According to Eurostat, the average exchange rate, in 1991, between the ECU and the krona amounted to ECU 1 = SEK 7,4793. This exchange rate is applied to calculate the approximate EUR equivalent of SEK. |
| (46) Na ravni cen iz leta 1991. | (46) At 1991 price level. |
| (47) Glej opombo 45. | (47)
Supra, footnote 45. |
| (48) Na ravni cen iz leta 1991. | (48) At 1991 price level. |
| (49) Po podatkih Eurostata je leta 1993 povprečni devizni tečaj med ECU in švedsko krono znašal 1 ECU = 9,1215 SEK. Ta devizni tečaj se uporablja za izračun približne protivrednosti SEK v EUR. | (49) According to Eurostat, the average exchange rate, in 1993, between the ECU and the Swedish krona amounted to ECU 1 = SEK 9,1215. This exchange rate is applied to calculate the approximate EUR equivalent of SEK. |
| (50) Pripombe držav v odgovor na sklep o začetku postopka se nanašajo tudi na informacije, ki so jih švedski in danski organi predložili v zadevah SA.36558, SA.36662, SA.51262 in SA.52617, preden sta bili državi uradno obveščeni o formalnem postopku preiskave. | (50) The States’ comments in response to the Opening decision also refer to information provided by the Swedish and the Danish authorities in SA.36558, SA.36662, SA.51262 and SA.52617, prior to the notification of the formal investigation procedure to the States. |
| (51)
„Program“ pomeni program za izdajo dolžniških instrumentov, ki ga je vzpostavil konzorcij. | (51)
‘Programme’ means the programme for the issuance of debt instruments established by the Consortium. |
| (52) Danski zakon o davku od dohodkov pravnih oseb, tj. „Selskabsskatteloven“. | (52) The Danish Corporate Income Tax Act ‘Selskabsskatteloven’. |
| (53) Danski zakon o odmeri davka, tj. „Ligningsloven“. | (53) The Danish Tax Assessment Act ‘Ligningsloven’. |
| (54) Danski zakon o obdavčitvi dohodka in premoženja, tj. „Statsskatteloven“. | (54) The Danish Act on the Taxation of Income and Property ‘Statsskatteloven’. |
| (55) Danski zakon o davčni amortizaciji, tj. „Afskrivningsloven“. | (55) The Danish Tax Depreciation Act ‘Afskrivningsloven’. |
| (56) Pred letom 2014 so se davčne napovedi pripravile v papirni obliki, vendar so veljala ista načela. | (56) Prior to 2014, the tax returns were done on paper, but the same principles applied. |
| (57) V skladu s členom 12(3) danskega zakona o davku od dohodkov pravnih oseb. | (57) According to Section 12(3) of the Danish Corporate Income Tax Act. |
| (58) Če za to obstaja utemeljen razlog, je mogoče zaprositi za podaljšanje običajnega roka za vložitev. Danski davčni organi tako prošnjo individualno ocenijo in, če se razlog zdi ustrezen, odobrijo podaljšanje. Podaljšanje po 30. septembru naslednjega leta običajno ni mogoče. Danski davčni organi so v nekaterih letih odobrili splošno podaljšanje običajnega roka za vložitev za vse subjekte, na primer med pandemijo COVID-19. | (58) It is possible to apply for an extension of the ordinary filing deadline, if there is a valid reason for so doing. Such an application is individually assessed by the Danish tax authorities, and, if the reason is deemed appropriate, an extension is granted. It is normally not possible to get an extension that goes beyond 30 September of the following year. In some years, the Danish tax authorities have granted a general extension of the ordinary filing deadline for all entities, for example, during the COVID-19 pandemic. |
| (59) Rok za družbo A/S Øresund je torej 30. junij naslednjega leta. | (59) For A/S Øresund, the deadline is, therefore, 30 June of the following year. |
| (60) V uvodni izjavi 37 sklepa o začetku postopka je bilo napačno navedeno, da je lahko konzorcij na podlagi člena 11 zakona o gradnji v skupni znesek izgub, ki jih je mogoče prenesti v prihodnje obdobje, vključil izgube, ki izhajajo iz odbitka stroškov poslovanja, nastalih pred začetkom obratovanja stalne povezave. | (60) The Opening decision, at recital 37, incorrectly stated that Section 11 of the Construction Act allowed the Consortium to include, in the total amount of losses that could be carried forward, losses resulting from the deduction of operating expenses incurred prior to the start of the operation of the Fixed Link. |
| (61) Danski zakon o odmeri davka, ki se uporablja za to obdobje: zakon št. 660 z dne 19. oktobra 1989. | (61) The Danish Tax Assessment Act applicable for this period: Act No 660 of 19 October 1989. |
| (62) Člen 15 danskega zakona o odmeri davka je določal, da se lahko, „če obdavčljivi dohodek, izračunan za davčno leto, izkazuje izgubo, [...] ta izguba [...] odbije od obdavčljivega dohodka za naslednjih pet naslednjih let. Vendar se lahko v navedenem obdobju odbitek prenese v naslednje dohodkovno leto le, če ga ni mogoče vključiti v obdavčljivi dohodek predhodnega leta.“ | (62) Section 15 of the Danish Tax Assessment Act stated that ‘If the taxable income calculated for a tax year shows a loss, that loss may be deducted from the taxable income for the next five subsequent years. However, during that period, the deduction may be carried forward to a subsequent income year only if it cannot be included in the taxable income of a previous year.’ |
| (63) Zakon št. 887 z dne 8. oktobra 2001 (prečiščeno besedilo), kakor je bil nazadnje spremenjen s členom 5 zakona št. 271 z dne 8. maja 2002, v katerem je člen 15 ostal nespremenjen glede petletnega obdobja omejitve v primerjavi z zakonom št. 660 z dne 19. oktobra 1989. | (63) Consolidated Act 887 of 8 October 2001 as last amended by Section 5 of Act 271 of 8 May 2002, in which Section 15 remained unchanged with regard to the five year limitation period compared to the Act No 660 of 19 October 1989. |
| (64) V členu 8 zakona št. 313 z dne 21. maja 2002 je bilo besedilo „naslednjih pet“ nadomeščeno z „naslednjim“. | (64) Section 8 of Act No 313 of 21 May 2002 replaced the words ‘next five subsequent’ with ‘following’. |
| (65) Z zakonom št. 313 z dne 21. maja 2002 je bil spremenjen zakon št. 353 z dne 16. maja 2001, ki je bil prečiščena različica zakona o gradnji, kakor je bil spremenjen z zakonom št. 894 z dne 3. decembra 1997, zakonom št. 986 z dne 20. decembra 1999 in zakonom št. 217 z dne 28. marca 2001. Navedene spremembe se niso nanašale na člen 11. | (65) Act No 313 of 21 May 2002 amended Act No 353 of 16 May 2001, which constituted the consolidated version of the Construction Act, as amended by Act No 894 of 3 December 1997, Act No 986 of 20 December 1999, and Act No 217 of 28 March 2001. Those amendments did not concern Section 11. |
| (66) Z zakonom št. 313 z dne 21. maja 2002 ni bil spremenjen drugi stavek člena 11 v zvezi z izgubami, nastalimi pred začetkom obratovanja stalne povezave ali danskih cestnih in železniških povezav z zaledjem. | (66) Act No 313 of 21 May 2002 did not amend the second sentence of Section 11 concerning the losses incurred before the Fixed Link or the Danish road and rail hinterland connections were put into service. |
| (67) Če se je davčno leto 2012 začelo pred 1. julijem 2012. | (67) Provided the tax year 2012 started before 1 July 2012. |
| (68) Zakon o spremembah danskega zakona o davku od dohodkov pravnih oseb, zakona o davčnem odtegljaju, zakona o davčnem nadzoru, zakona o davčni upravi in različnih drugih zakonov (med drugim danskega zakona o odmeri davka). | (68) Act amending the Danish Corporate Income Tax Act, the Withholding Tax Act, the Tax Control Act, the Tax Administration Act and various other Acts (among which the Danish Tax Assessment Act). |
| (69) V členu 12(1) danskega zakona o davku od dohodkov pravnih oseb je bilo določeno: „Če obdavčljivi dohodek izkazuje izgubo, se ta izguba lahko odbije pri izračunu obdavčljivega dohodka za naslednja davčna leta v skladu s pravili iz odstavkov 2 in 3.“ | (69) Section 12(1) of the Danish Corporate Income Tax Act stated: ‘If taxable income shows a loss, that loss may be deducted when calculating the taxable income for the following tax years, in accordance with the rules laid down in paragraphs 2 and 3.’ |
| (70) Indeksirano letno. | (70) Indexed annually. |
| (71) V cenah iz leta 2012. | (71) In 2012 prices. |
| (72) V cenah iz leta 2012. | (72) In 2012 prices. |
| (73) Zakon o gradnji je bil leta 2005 nadomeščen z zakonom o družbi Sund & Bælt (uvodna izjava 87). | (73) The Construction Act was replaced by the Sund & Bælt Act in 2005 (recital (87)). |
| (74) Splošno veljavno pravilo se je 18. junija 2012 spremenilo (in je veljalo do leta 2016, kot je pojasnjeno v uvodni izjavi 141), zato bo Komisija pravilo, ki se je v navedenem obdobju uporabljalo za družbo A/S Øresund, imenovala „pravilo o prenosu izgub za obdobje 2013–2015“. | (74) Since the generally applicable rule changed on 18 June 2012 (and remained in force until 2016 as explained at recital (141), the Commission will refer to the rule applicable to A/S Øresund in that period as the ‘2013-2015 LCF’. |
| (75) Po metodi enakomernega časovnega amortiziranja se sredstva amortizirajo vsako leto za določen znesek, dokler niso v celoti amortizirana. | (75) Under the straight-line method, assets are depreciated by a fixed amount each year, until they are fully depreciated. |
| (76) Stroški gradnje danskih cestnih in železniških naprav v zaledju so v bilanci stanja družbe A/S Øresund kapitalizirani kot sredstva. | (76) Construction costs for the Danish road and rail hinterland installations are capitalised as assets in the balance sheet of A/S Øresund. |
| (77) Stroški gradnje stalne povezave so v bilanci stanja konzorcija kapitalizirani kot sredstva. | (77) Construction costs for the Fixed link are capitalised as assets in the balance sheet of the Consortium. |
| (78) Zakon št. 597 z dne 16. avgusta 1991 (prečiščeno besedilo). | (78) Consolidated Act No 597 of 16 August 1991. |
| (79) Edina druga kategorija, pomembna za stalno povezavo, je bila „stroji in oprema“. V skladu z zakonom št. 597 z dne 16. avgusta 1991 (prečiščeno besedilo) je bila najvišja stopnja amortizacije za navedeno kategorijo 30 % na podlagi metode padajoče amortizacijske osnove (znižana na 25 % od leta 2001). Po metode padajoče amortizacijske osnove se sredstva vsako leto amortizirajo z deležem njihove vrednosti brez amortizacije, kar pomeni, da se amortizacija zmanjša, ko se neto vrednost sredstva približa nič. Danski organi so nadalje pojasnili, da so se do davčnega leta 2008 železniške naprave, kot so tiri, signalizacija in nadzemni kabli, na splošno obravnavale kot „stroji in oprema“. Stopnja za železniške naprave v danskem zakonu o davčni amortizaciji je bila od dohodkovnega leta 2008 spremenjena na 7 % na podlagi metode padajoče amortizacijske osnove. | (79) The only other category relevant to the Fixed Link was ‘machinery and equipment’. According to consolidated Act No 597 of 16 August 1991, the maximum depreciation rate for that category was 30 % on a declining balance basis (reduced to 25 % from 2001). Under a declining balance method, assets are depreciated by a proportion of their value net of depreciation each year, meaning that the depreciation is reduced as the net value of the asset approaches zero. The Danish authorities further explained that until the tax year 2008, railroad installations such as tracks, signals and overhead cables were generally treated as ‘machinery and equipment’. As of the income year 2008, the rate for railroad installations in the Danish Tax Depreciation Act changed to 7 %, on a declining balance basis. |
| (80) Člen 17 zakona št. 433 z dne 26. junija 1998 o spremembi danskega zakona o davčni amortizaciji (zakon št. 932 z dne 24. oktobra 1996 (prečiščeno besedilo)). | (80) Section 17 of Act No 433 of 26 June 1998, amending the Danish Tax Depreciation Act (Consolidated Act No 932 of 24 October 1996). |
| (81) Člen 2 zakona št. 540 z dne 6. junija 2007 o spremembi danskega zakona o davčni amortizaciji (zakon št. 856 z dne 8. avgusta 2006 (prečiščeno besedilo)). | (81) Section 2 of Act No 540 of 6 June 2007, amending the Danish Tax Depreciation Act (Consolidated Act No 856 of 8 August 2006). |
| (82) Glej opombo 78. | (82) See footnote 78. |
| (83) Čeprav je najvišja stopnja amortizacije, ki se je uporabljala za družbo A/S Øresund, ostala 6-odstotna do vključno davčnega leta 2015, Komisija v tem sklepu uporablja izraz „pravilo o amortizaciji za obdobje 1999–2007“ za pravilo, ki se je uporabljalo za družbo A/S Øresund v obdobju, v katerem je bila običajna stopnja amortizacije 5-odstotna, izraz „pravilo o amortizaciji za obdobje 2008–2015“ pa za pravilo, ki se je uporabljalo za družbo A/S Øresund v obdobju, v katerem je bila običajna stopnja amortizacije 4-odstotna. | (83) Although the maximum depreciation rate applicable to A/S Øresund remained at 6 % up to and including the tax year 2015, the Commission uses, in this decision, the term ‘1999-2007 DEP’ to refer to the rule applicable to A/S Øresund in the period in which the normal depreciation rate was 5 %, and the term ‘2008-2015 DEP’ to refer to the rule applicable to A/S Øresund in the period in which the normal depreciation rate was 4 %. |
| (84) V navedenem obdobju so bile uvedene tudi nekatere spremembe za kategorijo „stroji in oprema“. Vendar so stopnje ostale višje od 6 %, ki se uporabljajo za družbo A/S Øresund. | (84) During that period, some amendments were also introduced for the category ‘machinery and equipment’. The rates however remained higher than the 6 % applicable to A/S Øresund. |
| (85) Generalni direktor Generalnega direktorata za promet. | (85) Director General of the Directorate General for Transport. |
| (86) V dopisih iz leta 1995 je bilo navedeno: | (86) The 1995 letters stated as follows: |
| „Službe Komisije po proučitvi ureditev, ki sta jih državi sprejeli v zvezi s povezavo Øresund, menijo, da je poroštvo povezano z infrastrukturnim projektom v javnem interesu, ki izboljšuje infrastrukturo in prevozne storitve zadevnih držav. Zagotavljanje naložb v javne dobrine se načeloma ne more šteti za državno pomoč v smislu člena 92.1: vlade zagotavljajo številne tovrstne dobrine in storitve, ker tržni sistem ni dovolj učinkovit, da bi te dobrine omogočal. Te dobrine so praviloma nedeljive in jih lahko proti plačilu ali brezplačno uporabljajo vsi državljani. | ‘After examining the arrangements undertaken by both [S]tates in relation to the Øresund link, the Commission’s services are of the opinion that the guarantee is attached to an infrastructure project of public interest, improving the countries’ infrastructure and transport services. Guaranteeing investment in public goods cannot, in principle, be considered as [S]tate aid in the sense of Article 92.1: governments provide many such goods and services because of the inability of the market system to provide these goods effectively. These goods tend to be indivisible and collectively consumable by all citizens whether they pay for them or not. |
| Javna dobrina, kot je sedanji infrastrukturni projekt, za katerega jamčita obe vladi, koristi vsej družbi. Ker ni zagotovljena nobenemu določenemu podjetju ali industriji, ne spada na področje uporabe člena 92.1, temveč je splošni ukrep gospodarske politike in prostorskega načrtovanja. | A public good, such as the current infrastructure project guaranteed by the two governments, benefits society in a collective manner. As it is not conferred upon any specific enterprise or industry, it does not fall within the scope of Article 92.1, but constitutes a general measure of economic policy and land planning. |
| Službe Generalnega direktorata za promet na podlagi informacij, ki jih imajo na voljo, zato menijo, da poroštvo, ki ga je vaša vlada izdala za izgradnjo povezave Øresund, ne spada na področje uporabe člena 92.1 in [ga] ni treba priglasiti Komisiji.“ | Consequently, on the basis of the information at its disposal, the services of the Directorate-General for Transport consider that the guarantee issued by your government for the construction of the Øresund link does not fall under the scope of Article 92.1, and […] should not be notified to the Commission.’ |
| (87) Sporočilo Komisije – Merila za analizo združljivosti državne pomoči za spodbujanje izvajanj (UL C 188, 20.6.2014, str. 4). | (87) Communication from the Commission – Criteria for the analysis of the compatibility with the internal market of State aid to promote the execution of important projects of common European interest (OJ C 188, 20.6.2014, p. 4). |
| (88) Nadomestilo ga je Sporočilo Komisije C(2021) 8481 z dne 25. novembra 2021. | (88) Replaced by Commission communication C(2021)8481 of 25 November 2021. |
| (89) Pritožnik, družbi Scandlines, družba Stena Line, združenje FSS, skupina Grimaldi in pristanišče Trelleborg. | (89) The Complainant, Scandlines, Stena Line, FSS, Grimaldi, and Trelleborg Port. |
| (90)
UL L 248, 24.9.2015, str. 9. | (90)
OJ L 248, 24.9.2015, p. 9. |
| (91) Točke 77, 80 in 83. | (91) Paragraphs 77, 80, and 83. |
| (92)
UL C 155, 20.6.2008, str. 10. | (92)
OJ C 155, 20.6.2008, p. 10. |
| (93) Pritožnik se v zvezi s tem sklicuje na oddelek 3.2 obvestila o poroštvih iz leta 2008. | (93) The Complainant refers, in this respect, to Section 3.2 of the 2008 Guarantee Notice. |
| (94) Pritožnik se sklicuje na sporazum o sodelovanju iz leta 1997 in poznejši sporazum o sodelovanju iz leta 2004, ki po njegovem mnenju vsebujeta tako določbo. | (94) The Complainant refers to the 1997 Cooperation Agreement and the subsequent 2004 Cooperation Agreement, which, in their opinion, both contain such a provision. |
| (95) Sklep Komisije (EU) 2020/1472 z dne 20. marca 2020 o državni pomoči SA.39078 – 2019/C (ex 2014/N), ki jo je Danska zagotovila podjetju Femern A/S (UL L 339, 15.10.2020, str. 1). | (95) Commission Decision (EU) 2020/1472 of 20 March 2020 on the State aid SA.39078 - 2019/C (ex 2014/N) which Denmark implemented for Femern A/S (OJ L 339, 15.10.2020, p.1). |
| (96) Glej uvodno izjavo 256 končnega sklepa o ožini Fehrman. | (96) See recital 256 of the Fehmarn Belt final decision. |
| (97) Pritožnik je predložil naslednje navedbe: odstavek 14: „[k]onzorcij čim prej pridobi soglasje obeh porokov za vse transakcije konzorcija, kot so posojila, vključno z bančnimi krediti, in posle z izvedenimi finančnimi instrumenti. Poroki v zvezi s tem ocenijo, ali so transakcije pomembne ali bi lahko bile pomembne za obseg obveznosti iz poroštva, tveganje poroka in vse okoliščine, ki bi lahko vplivale na poroštvo/poroke. Poroki bodo ohranili pripravljenost, potrebno za zagotovitev, da se lahko transakcija odobri pred rokom za sprejetje, razen v izjemnih okoliščinah.“ Odstavek 15: „[k]onzorcij ne sme sklepati poslov z izvedenimi finančnimi instrumenti z nasprotnimi strankami, ki jih poroki predhodno niso odobrili.“ Odstavek 16: „[k]onzorcij pridobi soglasje porokov za vso pogodbeno dokumentacijo v zvezi z njegovimi posojili in posli z izvedenimi finančnimi instrumenti.“ | (97) The Complainant provided the following quotes: Paragraph 14: ‘[t]he Consortium shall, as soon as possible, obtain the approval from both Guarantors for all the Consortium’s transactions, such as loans including bank credits and derivative transactions. The Guarantors assess in this connection whether the transactions have or could come to have an importance for the scope of the guarantee liability, the Guarantor’s risk and all circumstances that may come to affect the guarantee / the Guarantors. The Guarantors will maintain the preparedness necessary to ensure that their approval of a transaction can be given before the time-limit for acceptance, except in case of extraordinary circumstances’. Paragraph 15: ‘[t]he Consortium is not to enter into derivative transactions with counterparts that have not on beforehand been approved by the Guarantors.’ Paragraph 16: ‘[t]he Consortium shall obtain the approval from the Guarantors of all contractual documentation in relation to its loans and derivative transactions.’ |
| (98) Sodba Sodišča z dne 19. septembra 2018, Komisija/Francija in IFP Énergies nouvelles, C-438/16 P, ECLI:EU:C:2018:737, točka 71. | (98) Judgment of the Court of Justice of 19 September 2018, Commission v France and IFP Energies Nouvelles, C-438/16 P, EU:C:2018:737, paragraph 71. |
| (99) Sodba Sodišča z dne 8. decembra 2011, France Télécom SA/Evropska komisija, C-81/10 P, ECLI:EU:C:2011:811, točke 80, 81 in 82. | (99) Judgment of the Court of Justice of 8 December 2011, France Télécom SA v European Commission, Case C-81/10 P, EU:C:2011:811, paragraphs 80-82. |
| (100) Točke 108, 111 in 116. | (100) Paragraphs 108, 111, and 116. |
| (101) Pritožnik se v zvezi s tem sklicuje tudi na točko 107 sodbe v zadevi Øresund. | (101) The Complainant refers also to paragraph 107 of the Øresund judgment in this regard. |
| (102) Pritožnik na primer meni, da znižanje cen, ki ga je konzorcij uvedel 29. novembra 2019 za segment tovornega prometa, brez državnih poroštev ne bi bilo mogoče. Zadevni primer se je nanašal zlasti na vsa vozila dolžine 9 metrov ali več, za katera je bila po mnenju pritožnika cena ponoči znižana za 15 % glede na običajno ceno, in vsa vozila, daljša od 20 metrov, za katera bi se zaračunavala enaka tarifa kot za vozila, dolga od 9 do 20 metrov. Pritožnik zato trdi, da je namen znižanja cene izključno preusmeritev tovornega prometa s trajektnih storitev pritožnika na stalno povezavo. Družba Stena Line trdi, da je konzorcij kmalu po odprtju stalne povezave leta 2000 znižal svoje cestnine za avtomobile in tovornjake za 40 % oziroma 50 %. | (102) As an example, the Complainant considers that the Consortium’s price reduction to the freight segment, introduced on 29 November 2019, would not have been possible without the State guarantees. The example specifically concerned all vehicles from 9 meters length, which, according to the Complainant, had a price reduction of 15 % on the normal rate during the night, and all vehicles of more than 20 meters, which would be charged the same rate as vehicles between 9 and 20 meters. As such, they argue that the price reduction is solely aimed at diverting freight traffic from the Complainants’ ferry service to the Fixed Link. Stena Line argues that, shortly after the Fixed Link opened in 2000, the Consortium dumped its toll prices for cars and trucks by 40 % and 50 %, respectively. |
| (103) Točka 242. | (103) Paragraph 242. |
| (104) Sodba Splošnega sodišča z dne 12. julija 2018, Republika Avstrija/Evropska komisija, T-356/15, ECLI:EU:T:2018:439. | (104) Judgment of the General Court of 12 July 2018, Republic of Austria v European Commission, T-356/15, EU:T:2018:439. |
| (105) V zvezi s tem se sklicujejo na točki 106 in 108 sodbe v zadevi Øresund. | (105) In this context, they refer to paragraphs 106 and 108 of the Øresund judgment. |
| (106) Zainteresirane strani se sklicujejo zlasti na točko 14 Smernic Komisije o regionalni državni pomoči za obdobje 2014–2020 (UL C 209, 23.7.2013, str. 1), ki določa, da „[...] so velika podjetja bolj verjetno pomembni akterji na zadevnem trgu, zato lahko naložba, za katero se odobri pomoč, izkrivlja konkurenco in trgovino na notranjem trgu“. | (106) The interested parties refer specifically to paragraph 14 of the Commission Guidelines on Regional State aid for 2014-2020 (OJ C 209, 23.7.2013, p. 1.), which provide that ‘... large companies are more likely to be significant players on the market concerned and, consequently, the investment for which the aid is awarded may distort competition and trade on the internal market.’ |
| (107) Poročilo sta pripravila dr. Sten Nyberg, profesor ekonomije na Univerzi v Stockholmu in predsednik Centra za evropsko pravo in ekonomijo v Stockholmu, ter dr. Mattias Ganslandt, izredni profesor ekonomije na Visoki šoli za ekonomijo in management Univerze v Lundu ter direktor Centra za evropsko pravo in ekonomijo v Stockholmu. | (107) Report prepared by Dr. Sten Nyberg, Professor of Economics at Stockholm University and Chairman of the Center for European Law and Economics, Stockholm, and Dr. Mattias Ganslandt, Associate Professor of Economics at the School of Economics and Management, Lund University, and Director of the Center for European Law and Economics, Stockholm. |
| (108) Sklep Komisije z dne 23. julija 2015 o državni pomoči SA.39078 (2014/N) (Danska) za financiranje projekta stalne povezave prek ožine Fehmarn (C(2015) 5023 final), (UL C 325, 2.10.2015, str. 1), uvodna izjava 103, in sodba v zadevi Scandlines in ožina Fehmarn, točka 211. | (108) Commission decision of 23 July 2015 on State aid SA.39078 (2014/N) (Denmark) for the financing of the Fehmarn Belt fixed link project, (C(2015) 5023 final) (OJ C 325, 2.10.2015, p. 1), recital 103, and the Scandlines Fehmarn Belt judgment, paragraph 211. |
| (109) Pritožnik se je sprva skliceval na sklep iz opombe 108, vendar je ob sprejetju končnega sklepa v navedeni zadevi predložil dodatne pripombe (glej uvodno izjavo 199). | (109) Initially the Complainant referred to the decision referred to in footnote 108, however when the final decision was adopted in that case, the Complainant provided further observations (see further, recital (199)). |
| (110) Odločba Komisije 88/568/EGS z dne 24. oktobra 1988 o postopku v skladu s členom 85 Pogodbe EGS (IV/32.437/8 – Eurotunnel) (UL L 311, 17.11.1988, str. 36) in Odločba Komisije C(2015) 1816 final z dne 22. junija 2005 v zadevi v zvezi z državno pomočjo N 159/2005 – Združeno kraljestvo – Financiranje tovornega predora EWSI pod Rokavskim prelivom (UL C 314, 10.12.2005, str. 2). | (110) Commission Decision 88/568/EEC of 24 October 1988 relating to a proceeding under Article 85 of the EEC Treaty (IV/32.437/8 – Eurotunnel) (OJ L 311, 17.11.1988, p. 36) and Commission Decision C(2015)1816 final of 22 June 2005 in case State aid N 159/2005 – United Kingdom – EWSI Channel Tunnel Freight Support Funding (OJ C 314, 10.12.2005, p. 2). |
| (111) Točke 118–139. | (111) Paragraphs 118 to 139. |
| (112) Točka 242. | (112) Paragraph 242. |
| (113) Točka 213. | (113) Paragraph 213. |
| (114) Točka 224. | (114) Paragraph 224. |
| (115) Točki 191 in 153. | (115) Paragraph 191 and 153. |
| (116) Točka 153. | (116) Paragraph 153. |
| (117) V skladu s poročilom analiza primerljivih družb ter tržnih pogojev za dolg in lastniški kapital na Danskem kaže, da se je tehtano povprečje stroškov kapitala primerljivih družb v obdobju 2000–2018 zmanjšalo z 9,3 % na 3,0 %. Na Švedskem se je z 8,7 % zmanjšalo na 3,3 %. | (117) According to the report, the analysis of the comparable companies and market conditions for debt and equity in Denmark shows that during the period 2000-2018 the WACC of comparable companies dropped from 9,3 % to 3,0 %. For Sweden, this was respectively 8,7 % and 3,3 %. |
| (118) Bela knjiga, Načrt za enotni evropski prometni prostor – na poti h konkurenčnemu in z viri gospodarnemu prometnemu sistemu (COM(2011) 144 final), odstavek 59. | (118) White Paper, Roadmap to a Single European Transport Area – Towards a competitive and resource efficient transport system, COM(2011) 144 final, paragraph 59. |
| (119) Točka 322. | (119) Paragraph 322. |
| (120) Točka 306: sodba Splošnega sodišča z dne 30. junija 2005, Branco/Komisija, T-347/03, ECLI:EU:T:2005:265, točka 102 in navedena sodna praksa; sodba Splošnega sodišča z dne 23. februarja 2006, Cementbouw Handel & Industrie/Komisija, T-282/02, ECLI:EU:T:2006:64, točka 77; sodba Splošnega sodišča z dne 30. junija 2009, CPEM/Komisija, T-444/07, ECLI:EU:T:2009:227, točka 126. | (120) Paragraph 306: judgment of the General Court of 30 June 2005, Branco v Commission, T-347/03, EU:T:2005:265, paragraph 102 and the case-law cited; judgment of the General Court of 23 February 2006, Cementbouw Handel & Industrie v Commission, T-282/02, EU:T:2006:64, paragraph 77; judgment of the General Court 30 June 2009, CPEM v Commission, T-444/07, EU:T:2009:227, paragraph 126. |
| (121) Sklicujejo se na sodbo Splošnega sodišča z dne 16. oktobra 2014, Alcoa Trasformazioni/Komisija, T-177/10, ECLI:EU:T:2014:897, točka 72. | (121) Reference is made to the judgment of the General Court of 16 October 2014, Alcoa Trasformazioni v Commission, T-177/10, EU:T:2014:897, paragraph 72. |
| (122) Družba Stena Line ni predložila nobenih dodatnih ali posebnih informacij o tem, na katera državna posojila se sklicuje. | (122) Stena Line did not submit any further or specific information as to which State loans they are referring to. |
| (123) Sodba Sodišča z dne 25. julija 2018, Komisija/Španija in drugi, C-128/16 P, ECLI:EU:C:2018:591. | (123) Judgment of the Court of 25 July 2018, Commission v Spain and Others, C-128/16 P, EU:C:2018:591. |
| (124) Sodba Splošnega sodišča z dne 24. marca 2011, Freistaat Sachsen in Land Sachsen-Anhalt ter drugi/Komisija, združeni zadevi T-443/08 in T-455/08, ECLI:EU:T:2011:117, potrjena po pritožbi s sodbo Sodišča z dne 19. decembra 2012, Mitteldeutsche Flughafen AG in Flughafen Leipzig-Halle GmbH/Komisija, C-288/11 P, ECLI:EU:C:2012:821. | (124) Judgment of the General Court of 24 March 2011, Freistaat Sachsen and Land Sachsen-Anhalt and Others v Commission, Joined Cases T-443/08 and T-455/08, EU:T:2011:117; upheld on appeal in judgment of the Court of Justice of 19 December 2012, Mitteldeutsche Flughafen AG and Flughafen Leipzig-Halle GmbH v Commission, C-288/11 P, EU:C:2012:821. |
| (125) V zvezi s tem se sklicujeta na sodbo Sodišča z dne 3. aprila 2014, Francoska republika/Evropska komisija, C-559/12, ECLI:EU:C:2014:217. | (125) They refer in this context to the judgment of the Court of 3 April 2014, French Republic v European Commission, C-559/12, EU:C:2014:217. |
| (126) Mederer, W., Pesaresi, N., in Van Hoof, N., EU Competition Law: Volume IV, State aid, Book 1 (Konkurenčno pravo EU: zvezek IV, Državna pomoč, knjiga 1), Claeys & Casteels, 2008, str. 566. | (126) Mederer, W., Pesaresi, N. and Van Hoof, N., EU Competition law: Volume IV, State aid, Book 1, Claeys & Casteels, 2008, p. 566. |
| (127) Heidenhain, M., ur., European State Aid Law: A Handbook (Pravo Evropske unije o državni pomoči: priročnik), Beck/Hart, 2010, str. 587 in 588; in Sinnaeve, A. in Slot, P. J., „The new Regulation on State aid procedures“ (Nova uredba o postopkih državne pomoči), Common Market Law Review 36, izdaja 6, 1999, str. 1153–1194, str. 1161. | (127) Heidenhain, M., ed., European State Aid Law: A Handbook, Beck/Hart, 2010, pp 587-588; and Sinnaeve, A. and Slot, P. J., ‘The new regulation on State aid procedures’, Common Market Law Review 36, Issue 6, 1999, pp. 1153-1194, p. 1161. |
| (128) Sporazum o Evropskem gospodarskem prostoru (EGP) (UL L 1, 3.1.1994, str. 3). | (128) Agreement on the European Economic Area (EEA) (OJ L 1, 3.1.1994, p. 3). |
| (129)
„Statsskatteloven“, oddelek 6(1)(e). | (129)
‘Statsskatteloven’, Section 6(1)(e). |
| (130) Sodba Sodišča z dne 20. marca 1985, Italija/Komisija, C-41/83, ECLI:EU:C:1985:120, točka 22, in sodba Sodišča z dne 30. aprila 1974, Sacchi, C-155/73, ECLI:EU:C:1974:40, točka 14. | (130) Judgment of the Court of Justice of 20 March 1985, Italy v Commission, C-41/83, EU:C:1985:120, paragraph 22 and judgment of the Court of Justice of 30 April 1974, Sacchi, C-155/73, EU:C:1974:40, paragraph 14. |
| (131) Sodba Sodišča z dne 12. septembra 2000, Pavlov in drugi/Stichting Pensioenfonds Medische Specialisten, združene zadeve C-180/98 do C-184/98, ECLI:EU:C:2000:428, točka 74; sodba Sodišča z dne 10. januarja 2006, Ministero dell'Economia e delle Finanze/Cassa di Risparmio di Firenze SpA, Fondazione Cassa di Risparmio di San Miniato in Cassa di Risparmio di San Miniato SpA, C-222/04, ECLI:EU:C:2006:8, točka 107. | (131) Judgment of the Court of Justice of 12 September 2000, Pavlov and Others v Stichting Pensioenfonds Medische Specialisten, Joined Cases C-180/98 to C-184/98, EU:C:2000:428, paragraph 74; judgment of the Court of Justice of 10 January 2006, Ministero dell’Economia e delle Finanze v Cassa di Risparmio di Firenze SpA, Fondazione Cassa di Risparmio di San Miniato and Cassa di Risparmio di San Miniato SpA, C-222/04, EU:C:2006:8, paragraph 107. |
| (132) Sodba Sodišča z dne 16. junija 1987, Komisija/Italija, 118/85, ECLI:EU:C:1987:283, točka 7; sodba Sodišča z dne 18. junija 1998, Komisija/Italijanska republika, C-35/96, ECLI:EU:C:1998:303, točka 36, in sodba Sodišča z dne 12. septembra 2000, Pavlov in drugi/Stichting Pensioenfonds Medische Specialisten, združene zadeve C-180/98 do C-184/98, ECLI:EU:C:2000:428, točka 75. | (132) Judgment of the Court of Justice of 16 June 1987, Commission v Italy, 118/85, EU:C:1987:283, paragraph 7; judgment of the Court of Justice of 18 June 1998, Commission v Italian Republic, C-35/96 EU:C:1998:303, paragraph 36; judgment of the Court of Justice of 12 September 2000, Pavlov and Others v Stichting Pensioenfonds Medische Specialisten, Joint Cases C-180/98 to C-184/98, EU:C:2000:428, paragraph 75. |
| (133) Sodba v zadevi Aéroports de Paris, točka 108. | (133)
Aéroports de Paris judgment, paragraph 108. |
| (134) V zvezi s tem glej sodbo Sodišča z dne 19. februarja 2002, Wouters, Savelbergh in Price Waterhouse Belastingadviseurs BV/Algemene Raad van de Nederlandse Orde van Advocaten, C-309/99, ECLI:EU:C:2002:98, točka 58. | (134) See, to that effect, judgment of the Court of 19 February 2002, Wouters, Savelbergh and Price Waterhouse Belastingadviseurs BV v Algemene Raad van de Nederlandse Orde van Advocaten, C-309/99, EU:C:2002:98, paragraph 58. |
| (135) Sodba Sodišča z dne 17. februarja 1993, Christian Poucet/Assurances générales de France in Caisse mutuelle régionale du Languedoc-Roussillon ter Daniel Pistre/Cancave, združeni zadevi C-159/91 in C-160/91, ECLI:EU:C:1993:63, točka 17. | (135) Judgment of the Court of 17 February 1993, Christian Poucet v Assurances Générales de France and Caisse Mutuelle Régionale du Languedoc-Roussillon and Daniel Pistre v Cancave, Joint Cases C-159/91 and C-160/91, EU:C:1993:63, paragraph 17. |
| (136) Sodba Splošnega sodišča z dne 20. septembra 2019, Havenbedrijf Antwerpen in Maatschappij van de Brugse Zeehaven/Komisija, T-696/17, ECLI:EU:T:2019:652, točka 75. | (136) Judgment of the General Court of 20 September 2019, Havenbedrijf Antwerpen and Maatschappij van de Brugse Zeehaven v Commission, T-696/17 EU:T:2019:652, paragraph 75. |
| (137) Točka 125, potrjena s sodbo Sodišča z dne 24. oktobra 2002, Aéroports de Paris/Komisija, C-82/01 P, ECLI:EU:C:2002:617. | (137) Paragraph 125, confirmed by the Court of Justice in its judgment of 24 October 2002, Aéroports de Paris v Commission, C-82/01 P, EU:C:2002:617. |
| (138) Sodba Sodišča z dne 14. januarja 2015, Eventech/The Parking Adjudicator, C-518/13, ECLI:EU:C:2015:9, točka 42; sodba Splošnega sodišča z dne 15. marca 2018, Naviera Armas/Komisija, T-108/16, ECLI:EU:T:2018:145, točka 119. | (138) Judgment of the Court of Justice of 14 January 2015, Eventech v The Parking Adjudicator, C-518/13, EU:C:2015:9, paragraph 42; judgment of the General Court of 15 March 2018, Naviera Armas v Commission, T-108/16, EU:T:2018:145, paragraph 119. |
| (139) Glej tudi odstavek 202 Obvestila Komisije o pojmu državne pomoči po členu 107(1) Pogodbe o delovanju Evropske unije (C(2016) 2946, UL C 262, 19.7.2016, str. 1). | (139) See also paragraph 202 of the Commission Notice on the notion of State aid as referred to in Article 107(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (OJ C 262, 19.7.2016, p. 1). |
| (140) Sodba Splošnega sodišča z dne 20. septembra 2019, Havenbedrijf Antwerpen in Maatschappij van de Brugse Zeehaven/Komisija, T-696/17, ECLI:EU:T:2019:652, točke 98–107. | (140) Judgment of the General Court of 20 September 2019, Havenbedrijf Antwerpen and Maatschappij van de Brugse Zeehaven v Commission, T-696/17 EU:T:2019:652, paragraphs 98-107. |
| (141) Sodba Sodišča z dne 16. junija 1987, Komisija/Italija, 118/85, ECLI:EU:C:1987:283, točki 7 in 8. | (141) Judgment of the Court of Justice of 16 June 1987, Commission v Italy, 118/85, EU:C:1987:283, paragraphs 7 and 8. |
| (142) Sodba Sodišča z dne 4. maja 1988, Bodson, 30/87, ECLI:EU:C:1988:225, točka 18. | (142) Judgment of the Court of Justice of 4 May 1988, Bodson, 30/87, EU:C:1988:225, paragraph 18. |
| (143) Glej zlasti sodbo Sodišča z dne 19. januarja 1994, SAT Fluggesellschaft mbH/Eurocontrol, C-364/92, ECLI:EU:C:1994:7, točka 30, in sodbo Sodišča z dne 18. marca 1997, Calì & Figli, C-343/95, ECLI:EU:C:1997:160, točki 22 in 23. | (143) See, in particular, judgment of the Court of Justice of 19 January 1994, SAT Fluggesellschaft mbH v Eurocontrol, C-364/92, EU:C:1994:7, paragraph 30 and judgment of the Court of Justice of 18 March 1997, Calì & Figli, C-343/95, EU:C:1997:160, paragraphs 22 and 23. |
| (144) Sodba Sodišča z dne 26. marca 2009, Selex Sistemi Integrati SpA/Komisija, C-113/07 P, ECLI:EU:C:2009:191, točka 70. | (144) Judgment of the Court of Justice of 26 March 2009, SELEX Sistemi Integrati SpA v Commission, C-113/07 P, EU:C:2009:191, paragraph 70. |
| (145) Na primer sodba Sodišča z dne 16. junija 1987, Komisija/Italija, ECLI:EU:C:1987:283, točka 7. | (145) For example, judgment of the Court of Justice of 16 June 1987, Commission v Italy, EU:C:1987:283, paragraph 7. |
| (146) Sodba Sodišča z dne 29. oktobra 1980, Van Landewyck, združene zadeve 209/78 do 215/78 in 218/78, ECLI:EU:C:1980:248, točka 88; sodba Sodišča z dne 16. novembra 1995, FFSA in drugi, C-244/94, ECLI:EU:C:1995:392, točka 21, in sodba Sodišča z dne 1. julija 2008, MOTOE, C-49/07, ECLI:EU:C:2008:376, točki 27 in 28. | (146) Judgment of the Court of Justice of 29 October 1980, Van Landewyck, Joined Cases 209/78 to 215/78 and 218/78, EU:C:1980:248, paragraph 88; judgment of the Court of Justice of 16 November 1995, FFSA and Others, C-244/94, EU:C:1995:392, paragraph 21; judgment of the Court of Justice of 1 July 2008, MOTOE, C-49/07, EU:C:2008:376, paragraphs 27 and 28. |
| (147) Sklep Komisije z dne 7. decembra 2011 o državni pomoči SA.32820 (2011/NN) – Združeno kraljestvo – Pomoč službi forenzične znanosti (UL C 29, 2.2.2012, str. 4), odstavek 8; sodba Sodišča z dne 19. januarja 1994, SAT Fluggesellschaft mbH/Eurocontrol, C-364/92, ECLI:EU:C:1994:7, točka 27; sodba Sodišča z dne 26. marca 2009, Selex Sistemi Integrati/Komisija, C-113/07 P, ECLI:EU:C:2009:191, točka 71; Sklep Komisije z dne 16. oktobra 2002 o državni pomoči N 438/02 – Belgija – Pomoč pristaniškim upravam (UL C 284, 21.11.2002, str. 2); sodba Sodišča z dne 18. marca 1997, Calì & Figli, C-343/95, ECLI:EU:C:1997:160, točka 22; Sklep Komisije z dne 19. julija 2006 o državni pomoči N 140/06 – Litva – Dodelitev subvencij državnim podjetjem, ki delujejo v kazenskih ustanovah, (UL C 244, 11.10.2006, str. 12); Sklep Komisije z dne 27. marca 2014 o državni pomoči SA.36346 – Nemčija – Shema za razvoj zemljišč za industrijsko in poslovno uporabo za izboljšanje regionalne strukture gospodarstva (GRW) (UL C 141, 9.5.2014, str. 1); sodba Sodišča z dne 12. julija 2012, Compass-Datenbank GmbH, C-138/11, ECLI:EU:C:2012:449, točka 40. | (147) Commission Decision of 7 December 2011 on State aid SA.32820 (2011/NN) - United Kingdom - Aid to Forensic Science Services (OJ C 29, 2.2.2012, p. 4), paragraph 8; judgment of the Court of Justice of 19 January 1994, SAT Fluggesellschaft mbH v Eurocontrol, C-364/92, EU:C:1994:7, paragraph 27; judgment of the Court of Justice of 26 March 2009, Selex Sistemi Integrati v Commission, C-113/07 P, EU:C:2009:191, paragraph 71; Commission Decision of 16 October 2002 on State aid N 438/02 - Belgium - Aid to port authorities (OJ C 284, 21.11.2002, p. 2); judgment of the Court of Justice of 18 March 1997, Calì & Figli, C-343/95, EU:C:1997:160, paragraph 22; Commission Decision of 19 July 2006 on State aid N 140/06 - Lithuania - Allotment of subsidies to the State Enterprises at the Correction Houses (OJ C 244, 11.10.2006, p. 12); Commission Decision of 27 March 2014 on State aid SA.36346 - Germany - GRW land development scheme for industrial and commercial use, OJ C 141, 9.5.2014, p. 1; judgment of the Court of Justice of 12 July 2012, Compass-Datenbank GmbH, C-138/11, EU:C:2012:449, paragraph 40. |
| (148) Glej tudi sodbo Splošnega sodišča z dne 20. septembra 2019, Havenbedrijf Antwerpen in Maatschappij van de Brugse Zeehaven/Komisija, T-696/17, ECLI:EU:T:2019:652, točka 100, v kateri je Splošno sodišče zavrnilo trditev, da neobstoj konkurence pomeni, da dejavnosti ni mogoče opredeliti kot gospodarsko. | (148) See also judgment of the General Court of 20 September 2019, Havenbedrijf Antwerpen and Maatschappij van de Brugse Zeehaven v Commission, T-696/17, EU:T:2019:652, paragraph 100, where the General Court dismissed the claim that the absence of competition meant that an activity could not be classified as economic. |
| (149) V zvezi s tem glej sodbo Sodišča z dne 23. aprila 1991, Höfner in Elser/Macrotron, C-41/90, ECLI:EU:C:1991:161, točki 22 in 23. | (149) See, to that effect, judgment of the Court of Justice of 23 April 1991, Höfner and Elser v Macrotron, C-41/90, EU:C:1991:161, paragraphs 22-23. |
| (150) Obvestilo Komisije o pojmu državne pomoči po členu 107(1) Pogodbe o delovanju Evropske unije (UL C 262, 19.7.2016, str. 1), točka 13 (in navedena sodna praksa). | (150) Commission Notice on the notion of State aid as referred to in Article 107(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (OJ C 262, 19.7.2016, p. 1), paragraph 13 (and case-law cited). |
| (151) Sodba v zadevi Aéroports de Paris, točka 109. | (151)
Aéroports de Paris judgment, paragraph 109. |
| (152) V zvezi s tem glej sodbo Sodišča z dne 19. januarja 1994, SAT Fluggesellschaft mbH/Eurocontrol, C-364/92, ECLI:EU:C:1994:7, zlasti točka 19. | (152) See, to that effect, judgment of the Court of Justice of 19 January 1994, SAT Fluggesellschaft mbH v Eurocontrol, C-364/92, EU:C:1994:7, in particular paragraph 19. |
| (153) Glej sodbo Sodišča z dne 24. oktobra 2002, Aéroports de Paris/Komisija, C-82/01 P, ECLI:EU:C:2002:617, točke 76, 77 in 78, in v zvezi s tem sodbo Sodišča z dne 19. decembra 2012, Mitteldeutsche Flughafen AG in Flughafen Leipzig-Halle GmbH/Komisija, C-288/11, ECLI:EU:C:2012:821, točka 43. | (153) See judgment of the Court of Justice of 24 October 2002, Aéroports de Paris v Commission, C-82/01 P, EU:C:2002:617, paragraphs 76 to 78, and, to that effect, judgment of the Court of Justice of 19 December 2012, Mitteldeutsche Flughafen AG and Flughafen Leipzig-Halle GmbH v Commission, C-288/11, EU:C:2012:821, paragraph 43. |
| (154) Za primerjavo z brezplačno storitvijo glej sodbo Sodišča z dne 14. januarja 2015, Eventech/The Parking Adjudicator, C-518/13, ECLI:EU:C:2015:9, točka 43. | (154) In contrast to a service provided free of charge, see judgment of the Court of Justice of 14 January 2015, Eventech v The Parking Adjudicator, C-518/13, EU:C:2015:9, paragraph 43. |
| (155) Glej med drugim sodbo Sodišča z dne 8. novembra 2001, Adria-Wien Pipeline GmbH in Wietersdorfer & Peggauer Zementwerke GmbH/Finanzlandesdirektion für Kärnten, C-143/99, ECLI:EU:C:2001:598, točka 38; sodbo Sodišča z dne 15. julija 2004, Španija/Komisija, C-501/00, ECLI:EU:C:2004:438, točka 90 in navedena sodna praksa; sodbo Sodišča z dne 15. decembra 2005, Italija/Komisija, C-66/02, ECLI:EU:C:2005:768, točka 77, in sodbo Sodišča z dne 10. januarja 2006, Ministero dell'Economia e delle Finanze/Cassa di Risparmio di Firenze, C-222/04, ECLI:EU:C:2006:8, točka 131 in navedena sodna praksa. | (155) See inter alia judgment of the Court of Justice of 8 November 2001, Adria-Wien Pipeline GmbH and Wietersdorfer & Peggauer Zementwerke GmbH v Finanzlandesdirektion für Kärnten, C-143/99, EU:C:2001:598, paragraph 38; judgment of the Court of Justice of 15 July 2004, Spain v Commission, C-501/00, EU:C:2004:438, paragraph 90, and the case law cited therein; judgment of the Court of Justice of 15 December 2005, Italy v Commission, C-66/02 EU:C:2005:768, paragraph 77; judgment of the Court of Justice of 10 January 2006, Ministero dell’Economia e delle Finanze v Cassa di Risparmio di Firenze, C-222/04, EU:C:2006:8, paragraph 131, and the case law cited therein. |
| (156) Glej na primer sodbo Sodišča z dne 15. marca 1994, Banco Exterior de España, C-387/92, ECLI:EU:C:1994:100, točka 14, in sodbo Sodišča z dne 9. oktobra 2014, Ministerio de Defensa in Navantia, C-522/13, ECLI:EU:C:2014:2262. | (156) See, for example, judgment of the Court of Justice of 15 March 1994, Banco Exterior de España, C-387/92, EU:C:1994:100, paragraph 14; judgment of the Court of Justice of 9 October 2014, Ministerio de Defensa and Navantia, C-522/13, EU:C:2014:2262. |
| (157) Sodba Sodišča z dne 1. decembra 1998, Ecotrade Srl/Altiforni e Ferriere di Servola SpA (AFS), C-200/97, ECLI:EU:C:1998:579, točka 41, in sodba Sodišča z dne 19. marca 2013, Bouygues in Bouygues Télécom/Komisija in drugi, združeni zadevi C-399/10 P in C-401/10 P, ECLI:EU:C:2013:175, točke 137, 138 in 139. | (157) Judgment of the Court of Justice of 1 December 1998, Ecotrade Srl v Altiforni e Ferriere di Servola SpA (AFS), C-200/97, EU:C:1998:579, paragraph 41; judgment of the Court of Justice of 19 March 2013, Bouygues and Bouygues Télécom v Commission and Others, Joined Cases C-399/10 P and C-401/10 P, EU:C:2013:175, paragraphs 137, 138 and 139. |
| (158) Sodba Sodišča z dne 11. julija 1996, Syndicat français de l'Express international (SFEI) in drugi/La Poste in drugi, C-39/94, ECLI:EU:C:1996:285, točka 60; sodba Sodišča z dne 29. aprila 1999, Španija/Komisija, C-342/96, ECLI:EU:C:1999:210, točka 41. | (158) Judgment of the Court of Justice of 11 July 1996, Syndicat français de l’Express international (SFEI) and others v La Poste and others, C-39/94, EU:C:1996:285, paragraph 60; judgment of the Court of Justice of 29 April 1999, Spain v Commission, C-342/96, EU:C:1999:210, paragraph 41. |
| (159) Sodba Sodišča z dne 2. julija 1974, Italija/Komisija, C-173/73, ECLI:EU:C:1974:71, točka 13. | (159) Judgment of the Court of Justice of 2 July 1974, Italy v Commission, C-173/73, EU:C:1974:71, paragraph 13. |
| (160) Sodba Splošnega sodišča z dne 12. novembra 2013, MOL Magyar Olaj- és Gázipari Nyrt./Komisija, T-499/10, ECLI:EU:T:2013:592, točka 67. | (160) Judgment of the General Court of 12 November 2013, MOL Magyar Olaj- és Gázipari Nyrt. v Commission, T-499/10, EU:T:2013:592, paragraph 67. |
| (161) Sodba Sodišča z dne 8. decembra 2011, Residex Capital/Gemeente Rotterdam, C-275/10, ECLI:EU:C:2011:814, točka 39. | (161) Judgment of the Court of Justice of 8 December 2011, Residex Capital v Gemeente Rotterdam, C-275/10, EU:C:2011:814, paragraph 39. |
| (162) Točka 120. | (162) Paragraph 120. |
| (163) Sodba Splošnega sodišča z dne 13. decembra 2017, Grčija/Komisija, T-314/15, ECLI:EU:T:2017:903, točki 78 in 79. | (163) Judgment of the General Court of 13 December 2017, Hellenic Republic v. Commission, T-314/15, EU:T:2017:903, paragraphs 78 and 79. |
| (164) Sodba Sodišča z dne 4. junija 2015, Komisija/MOL, C-15/14 P, ECLI:EU:C:2015:362, točke 60 in naslednje; sklepni predlogi generalnega pravobranilca P. Mengozzija z dne 27. junija 2013, Deutsche Lufthansa, C-284/12, ECLI:EU:C:2013:442, točka 52. | (164) Judgment of the Court of Justice of 4 June 2015, Commission v MOL, C-15/14 P, EU:C:2015:362, paragraphs 60 et seq.; Opinion of Advocate General Mengozzi of 27 June 2013, Deutsche Lufthansa, C-284/12, EU:C:2013:442, paragraph 52. |
| (165) Sodba Sodišča z dne 16. decembra 2010, AceaElectrabel Produzione SpA/Komisija, C-480/09 P, ECLI:EU:C:2010:787, točke 47 do 55; sodba Sodišča z dne 10. januarja 2006, Cassa di Risparmio di Firenze SpA in drugi, C-222/04, ECLI:EU:C:2006:8, točka 112. | (165) Judgment of the Court of Justice of 16 December 2010, AceaElectrabel Produzione SpA v Commission, C-480/09 P, EU:C:2010:787, paragraphs 47 to 55; judgment of the Court of Justice of 10 January 2006, Cassa di Risparmio di Firenze SpA and Others, C-222/04, EU:C:2006:8, paragraph 112. |
| (166) Oddelki 3.1, 3.2 in 8.2 sporazuma o konzorciju. | (166) Sections 3.1, 3.2, and 8.2 of the Consortium Agreement. |
| (167) V zvezi s tem glej sodbo Sodišča z dne 5. decembra 2023, Engie/Komisija, združeni zadevi C-451/21 P in C-454/21 P, ECLI:EU:C:2023:948, točka 106, in sodba Sodišča z dne 2. februarja 2023, Španija, Lico in drugi/Komisija, združene zadeve C-649/20 P, C-658/20 P in C-662/20 P, ECLI:EU:C:2023:60, točka 46 in navedena sodna praksa; glej tudi sodbo Sodišča z dne 21. decembra 2016, Komisija/World Duty Free Group SA in drugi, C-20/15 P in C-21/15 P, ECLI:EU:C:2016:981, točka 54 in navedena sodna praksa. | (167) See, to that effect, judgment of the Court of Justice of 5 December 2023, Engie v Commission, joined cases C-451/21 P and C-454/21 P, EU:C:2023:948, paragraph 106 and judgment of the Court of Justice of 2 February 2023, Spain, Lico and Others v Commission, joined cases C-649/20 P, C-658/20 P and C-662/20 P, EU:C:2023:60, paragraph 46 and the case law cited therein; see also judgment of the Court of Justice of 21 December 2016, Commission v World Duty Free Group and Others, C-20/15 P and C-21/15 P, EU:C:2016:981, paragraph 54 and the case law cited therein. |
| (168) Sodba Sodišča z dne 8. septembra 2011, Komisija/Nizozemska, C-279/08 P, ECLI:EU:C:2011:551, točka 62; sodba Sodišča z dne 8. novembra 2001, Adria-Wien Pipeline, C-143/99, ECLI:EU:C:2001:598. | (168) Judgment of the Court of Justice of 8 September 2011, Commission v Netherlands, C-279/08 P, EU:C:2011:551, paragraph 62; judgment of the Court of Justice of 8 November 2001, Adria-Wien Pipeline, C-143/99, EU:C:2001:598. |
| (169) Sodba Sodišča z dne 28. junija 2018, C-203/16 P, Andres /Komisija, ECLI:EU:C:2018:505, točka 88. | (169) Judgment of the Court of Justice of 28 June 2018, Andres v Commission, C-203/16 P, EU:C:2018:505, paragraph 88. |
| (170) Sodba Sodišča z dne 8. septembra 2011, Paint Graphos in drugi, združene zadeve C-78/08 do C-80/08, ECLI:EU:C:2011:550, točka 49 in naslednje, sodba Sodišča z dne 29. aprila 2004, GIL Insurance, C-308/01, ECLI:EU:C:2004:252. | (170) Judgment of the Court of Justice of 8 September 2011, Paint Graphos and others, Joined Cases C-78/08 to C-80/08, EU:C:2011:550, paragraph 49 et seq.; judgment of the Court of Justice of 29 April 2004, GIL Insurance, C-308/01, EU: C:2004:252. |
| (171) Glej na primer sodbo Sodišča z dne 28. junija 2018, Andres/Komisija, C-203/16 P, ECLI:EU:C:2018:505, točki 103 in 104. | (171) See, for example, judgment of the Court of Justice of 28 June 2018, Andres v Commission, C-203/16 P, EU:C:2018:505, paragraphs 103 and 104. |
| (172) V praksi je družba Sund & Bælt tista, ki predloži napovedi za odmero davka od dohodkov pravnih oseb za člane svoje skupine. Družba Sund & Bælt poleg ločenih davčnih napovedi, vloženih za člane svoje skupine, vloži konsolidirano napoved za odmero davka od dohodkov pravnih oseb za skupino. Komisija se je zaradi lažjega branja in v okviru tega sklepa sklicevala na davčne napovedi družbe A/S Øresund in na predložitev davčnih napovedi s strani družbe A/S Øresund. | (172) In practice, it is Sund & Bælt that files the corporate income tax returns for its group members. In addition to the separate tax returns filed for its group members, Sund & Bælt files a consolidated corporate income tax return for the group. For the ease of reading and in the context of this decision, the Commission referred to the tax returns of A/S Øresund and to the submission of the tax returns by A/S Øresund. |
| (173) Sodba Sodišča z dne 8. septembra 2011, Paint Graphos in drugi, združene zadeve C-78/08 do C-80/08, ECLI:EU:C:2011:550, točka 69. | (173) Judgment of the Court of Justice of 8 September 2011, Paint Graphos and others, Joined Cases C-78/08 to C-80/08, EU:C:2011:550, paragraph 69. |
| (174) Sodba Sodišča z dne 8. septembra 2011, Paint Graphos in drugi, združene zadeve C-78/08 do C-80/08, ECLI:EU:C:2011:550, točki 69 in 70; sodba Sodišča z dne 6. septembra 2006, Portugalska/Komisija, C-88/03, ECLI:EU:C:2006:511, točka 81; sodba Sodišča z dne 8. septembra 2011, Komisija/Nizozemska, C-279/08 P, ECLI:EU:C:2011:551; sodba Sodišča z dne 22. decembra 2008, British Aggregates/Komisija, C-487/06 P, ECLI:EU:C:2008:757; sodba Sodišča z dne 18. julija 2013, P Oy, C-6/12, ECLI:EU:C:2013:525, točka 27 in naslednje. | (174) Judgment of the Court of Justice of 8 September 2011, Paint Graphos and others, Joined Cases C-78/08 to C-80/08, EU:C:2011:550, paragraphs 69 and 70; judgment of the Court of Justice of 6 September 2006, Portugal v Commission, C-88/03, EU:C:2006:511, paragraph 81; judgment of the Court of Justice of 8 September 2011, Commission v Netherlands, C-279/08 P, EU:C:2011:551; judgment of the Court of Justice of 22 December 2008, British Aggregates v Commission, C-487/06 P, EU:C:2008:757; judgment of the Court of Justice of 18 July 2013, P Oy, C-6/12, EU:C:2013:525, paragraphs 27 et seq. |
| (175) Sodba Sodišča z dne 15. novembra 2011, Komisija in Španija/Government of Gibraltar in Združeno kraljestvo, združeni zadevi C-106/09 P in C-107/09 P, ECLI:EU:C:2011:732, točka 146; sodba Sodišča z dne 29. aprila 2004, Nizozemska/Komisija, C-159/01, ECLI:EU:C:2004:246, točka 43; sodba Sodišča z dne 6. septembra 2006, Portugalska/Komisija, C-88/03, ECLI:EU:C:2006:511. | (175) Judgment of the Court of Justice of 15 November 2011, Commission and Spain v Government of Gibraltar and United Kingdom, Joined Cases C-106/09 P and C-107/09 P, EU:C:2011:732, paragraph 146; judgment of the Court of Justice of 29 April 2004, Netherlands v Commission, C-159/01, EU:C:2004:246, paragraph 43; judgment of the Court of Justice of 6 September 2006, Portugal v Commission, C-88/03, EU:C:2006:511. |
| (176) Sodba Sodišča z dne 8. septembra 2011, Paint Graphos in drugi, združene zadeve C-78/08 do C-80/08, ECLI:EU:C:2011:550, točka 65. | (176) Judgment of the Court of Justice of 8 September 2011, Paint Graphos and others, Joined Cases C-78/08 to C-80/08, EU:C:2011:550, paragraph 65. |
| (177) Vsaj od leta 1991 – obdobje pred tem ni pomembno za to oceno. | (177) At least as from 1991 - the period before is not relevant for this assessment. |
| (178) Sodba Sodišča z dne 14. januarja 2015, Eventech/The Parking Adjudicator, C-518/13, ECLI:EU:C:2015:9, točka 66; sodba Sodišča z dne 8. maja 2013, Libert in drugi, združeni zadevi C-197/11 in C-203/11, ECLI:EU:C:2013:288, točka 77; sodba Splošnega sodišča z dne 4. aprila 2001, Friuli Venezia Giulia, T-288/97, ECLI:EU:T:2001:115, točka 41. | (178) Judgment of the Court of Justice of 14 January 2015, Eventech v The Parking Adjudicator, C-518/13, EU:C:2015:9, paragraph 66; judgment of the Court of Justice of 8 May 2013, Libert and others, Joined Cases C-197/11 and C-203/11, EU:C:2013:288, paragraph 77; judgment of the General Court of 4 April 2001, Friulia Venezia Giulia, T-288/97, EU:T:2001:115, paragraph 41. |
| (179) Komisija v zvezi s tem opozarja, da je v uvodni izjavi 301 ugotovila, da izgradnje stalne povezave ni mogoče ločiti od njenega prihodnjega obratovanja. | (179) The Commission recalls in this context that it established at recital (301) that the construction of the Fixed Link cannot be dissociated from its future operation. |
| (180) Sodba v zadevi Øresund, točka 80. | (180)
Øresund judgment, paragraph 80. |
| (181) Sodba Splošnega sodišča z dne 25. januarja 2018, BSCA/Komisija, T-818/14, ECLI:EU:T:2018:33, točka 72 in navedena sodna praksa. | (181) Judgment of the General Court of 25 January 2018, BSCA v Commission, T-818/14, EU:T:2018:33, paragraph 72 and case-law cited therein. |
| (182) Sodba v zadevi Øresund, točki 107 in 108. | (182)
Øresund judgment, paragraphs 107 and 108. |
| (183) Komisija ugotavlja, da zaveza držav glede zagotavljanja, da bo konzorcij financiral nove dolgove in refinanciral obstoječe dolgove pod tržnimi pogoji (uvodna izjava 265), ne spreminja te ugotovitve. | (183) The Commission notes that the States’ commitment to ensure that the Consortium will finance new debt and refinance existing debt on market terms (recital (265)) does not alter this finding. |
| (184) Glej na primer Sklep Komisije (EU) 2018/859 z dne 4. oktobra 2017 o državni pomoči SA.38944 (2014/C) (ex 2014/NN), ki jo je Luksemburg odobril skupini Amazon (UL L 153, 15.6.2018, str. 1). Sodišči Unije sta sprejeli ta pristop – glej na primer sodbo Splošnega sodišča z dne 12. maja 2021, Luksemburg/Komisija, združeni zadevi T-816/17 in T-318/18, ECLI:EU:T:2021:252, točki 153 in 339. | (184) See, for example, Commission Decision (EU) 2018/859 of 4 October 2017 on State aid SA.38944 (2014/C) (ex 2014/NN) implemented by Luxembourg to Amazon (OJ L 153, 15.6.2018, p. 1). This approach has been accepted by Union Courts – see, for example, judgment of the General Court of 12 May 2021, Luxembourg v Commission, Joined Cases T-816/17 and T-318/18, EU:T:2021:252, paragraphs 153 and 339. |
| (185) Glej opombo 99. | (185)
Supra, footnote 99. |
| (186) Sodba Splošnega sodišča z dne 30. novembra 2009, Francija/Komisija, združeni zadevi T-427/04 in T-17/05, ECLI:EU:T:2009:474, točke 321, 322 in 323. | (186) Judgment of the General Court of 30 November 2009, France v Commission, Joined Cases T-427/04 and T-17/05, EU:T:2009:474, paragraphs 321-323. |
| (187) Davčna napoved za davčno leto 2013 se je oddala leta 2014. | (187) The tax return relating to the tax year 2013 being in 2014. |
| (188) Davčna napoved za davčno leto 1999 se je oddala leta 2000. V praksi prvi datum dodelitve ne bi nastopil pred sprejetjem davčne napovedi za davčno leto 2004, saj Danska potrjuje, da družba A/S Øresund ni uporabila amortizacije za prejšnja davčna leta (uvodna izjava 271). | (188) The tax return relating to the tax year 1999 being in 2000. In practice, the first granting date would not occur before the acceptance of the tax return of tax year 2004, since Denmark confirms that A/S Øresund did not depreciate for earlier tax years (recital (271)). |
| (189) Glej sodbo v zadevi Øresund, točka 308. | (189) See Øresund judgment, paragraph 308. |
| (190) Komisija je 25. novembra 2021 sprejela revidirano sporočilo o pravilih o državni pomoči za pomembne projekte skupnega evropskega interesa (UL C 528, 30.12.2021, str. 10). Navedeno sporočilo se je uporabljalo šele od 1. januarja 2022, zato ni relevantno za nobeno pomoč, dodeljeno pred navedenim datumom. Komisija vsekakor ugotavlja, da so določbe o oceni sorazmernosti v sporočilu o pomembnih projektih skupnega evropskega interesa iz leta 2014 in reviziji iz leta 2021 precej podobne. | (190) On 25 November 2021, the Commission adopted a revised Communication on State aid rules for Important Projects of Common European Interest (OJ C 528 of 30 December 2021, p. 10). Since that communication only applied as from 1 January 2022, it is not relevant for any aid granted before that date. In any event, the Commission notes that the provisions on proportionality assessment in the 2014 IPCEI Communication and the 2021 revision are substantially similar. |
| (191) Glej na primer Sklep Komisije z dne 13. julija 2009 v zadevi N 157/2009 – Danska – Financiranje faze načrtovanja stalne povezave prek ožine Fehmarn (UL C 202, 27.8.2009, str. 1); Odločbo Komisije 96/369/ES z dne 13. marca 1996 o davčni pomoči nemškim letalskim družbam v obliki amortizacije (UL L 146, 20.6.1996, str. 42); Odločbo Komisije z dne 22. decembra 1998, N 576/98 v zadevi N 576/98 – Združeno kraljestvo – Železniška povezava do predora pod Rokavskim prelivom (UL C 56, 26.2.1999, str. 6), in Sklep Komisije z dne 13. maja 2009 v zadevi N 420/08 – Združeno kraljestvo – Prestrukturiranje družbe London & Continental Railways (UL C 183, 5.8.2009, str. 2). | (191) See, for example, Commission decision of 17 March 2009, in case N 157/2009 – Denmark – Financing of the planning phase of the Fehmarn Belt fixed link (OJ C 202, 27.8.2009, p. 1); Commission decision of 13 March 1996 concerning fiscal aid given to German airlines in the form of a depreciation facility (OJ L 146, 20.6.1996, p. 42); Commission decision of 22 December 1998, N 576/98 in case N 576/98 – United Kingdom – Channel Tunnel Rail Link (OJ C 56, 26.2.1999, p. 6); and Commission decision of 13 May 2009 in case N 420/08 – United Kingdom – Restructuring of London & Continental Railways (OJ C 183, 5.8.2009, p. 2). |
| (192) Sodba z dne 12. julija 1973, Komisija/Nemčija, C-70/72, ECLI:EU:C:1973:87, točka 13. | (192) Judgment of 12 July 1973, Commission v Germany, C-70/72, EU:C:1973:87, paragraph 13. |
| (193) Sodba z dne 21. marca 1990, Belgija/Komisija, C-142/87, ECLI:EU:C:1990:125, točka 66; sodba z dne 15. septembra 2022, Fossil/Commissioner of Income Tax, C-705/20, ECLI:EU:C:2022:680, točka 42. | (193) Judgment of 21 March 1990, Belgium v Commission, C-142/87, EU:C:1990:125, paragraph 66; judgment of 15 September 2022, Fossil v Commissioner of Income Tax, Case-705/20, ECLI:EU:C:2022:680, paragraph 42. |
| (194) Sodba z dne 17. junija 1999, Belgija/Komisija, C-75/97, ECLI:EU:C:1999:311, točki 64 in 65, in sodba z dne 8. decembra 2011, Residex Capital IV/Gemeente Rotterdam, C-275/10, ECLI:EU:C:2011:814, točka 34. | (194) Judgment of 17 June 1999, Belgium v Commission, C-75/97, EU:C:1999:311, paragraphs 64 and 65, judgment of 8 December 2011, Residex Capital IV v Gemeente Rotterdam ,Case C-275/10, EU:C:2011:814, paragraph 34. |
| (195) Sodba Sodišča z dne 24. novembra 1987, Rijn-Schelde-Verolme (RSV) Machinefabrieken en Scheepswerven NV/Komisija, 223/85, ECLI:EU:C:1987:502. | (195) Judgment of the Court of Justice of 24 November 1987, Rijn-Schelde-Verolme (RSV) Machinefabrieken en Scheepswerven NV v Commission, 223/85, EU:C:1987:502. |
| (196) Sodba Sodišča z dne 3. maja 1978, August Töpfer & Co. GmbH/Komisija, 112/77, ECLI:EU:C:1978:94, točka 19. | (196) Judgment of the Court of Justice of 3 May 1978, August Töpfer & Co. GmbH v Commission, 112/77, EU:C:1978:94, paragraph 19. |
| (197) Sodba Sodišča z dne 19. maja 1992, Mulder in drugi/Svet in Komisija, združeni zadevi C-104/89 in C-37/90, ECLI:EU:C:1992:217, točka 15. | (197) Judgment of the Court of Justice of 19 May 1992, Mulder and Others v Council and Commission, Joint Cases C-104/89 and C-37/90, EU:C:1992:217, paragraph 15. |
| (198) Sodba Sodišča z dne 11. marca 1987, Van den Bergh en Jurgens in Van Dijk Food Products (Lopik)/Komisija Evropskih skupnosti, 265/85, ECLI:EU:C:1987:121, točka 44 in navedena sodna praksa. | (198) Judgment of the Court of Justice of 11 March 1987, Van den Bergh en Jurgens and Van Dijk Food Products (Lopik) v Commission of the European Communities, 265/85, EU:C:1987:121, paragraph 44 and the case-law cited therein. |
| (199) Sodba Splošnega sodišča z dne 30. junija 2005, Branco/Komisija, T-347/03, ECLI:EU:T:2005:265, točka 102 in navedena sodna praksa; sodba Splošnega sodišča z dne 23. februarja 2006, Cementbouw Handel & Industrie/Komisija, T-282/02, ECLI:EU:T:2006:64, točka 77; sodba Splošnega sodišča z dne 30. junija 2009, CPEM/Komisija, T-444/07, ECLI:EU:T:2009:227, točka 126. | (199) Judgment of the General Court of 30 June 2005, Branco v Commission, T-347/03, EU:T:2005:265, paragraph 102 and the case-law cited therein; judgment of the General Court of 23 February 2006, Cementbouw Handel & Industrie v Commission, T-282/02, EU:T:2006:64, paragraph 77; judgment of the General Court of 30 June 2009, CPEM v Commission, T-444/07, EU:T:2009:227, paragraph 126. |
| (200) Glej sodbo Sodišča z dne 22. junija 2006, Belgija in Forum 187 ASBL/Komisija, združeni zadevi C-182/03 in C-217/03, ECLI:EU:C:2006:416, točka 147; sodba Sodišča z dne 24. novembra 2005, Nemčija/Komisija, C-506/03, ECLI:EU:C:2005:715, točka 58. | (200) See judgment of the Court of Justice of 22 June 2006, Belgium and Forum 187 ASBL v Commission, Joint Cases C-182/03 and C-217/03, EU:C:2006:416, para 147; judgment of the Court of Justice of 24 November 2005, Germany v Commission, C-506/03, EU:C:2005:715, paragraph 58. |
| (201) Sodba Sodišča z dne 11. novembra 2004, Daewoo Electronics Manufacturing España SA (Demesa) in Territorio Histórico de Álava – Diputación Foral de Álava/Komisija, združeni zadevi C-183/02 P in C-187/02 P, ECLI:EU:C:2004:701, točki 44 in 45 ter navedena sodna praksa. | (201) Judgment of the Court of Justice of 11 November 2004, Daewoo Electronics Manufacturing España SA (Demesa) and Territorio Histórico de Álava – Diputación Foral de Álava v Commission, Joined Cases C-183/02 P and C-187/02 P, EU:C:2004:701, paragraphs 44 and 45, and the case law cited therein. |
| (202) Sklep o začetku postopka iz leta 2014, uvodne izjave 140 do 153, in sklep o začetku postopka, uvodne izjave 169 do 179. | (202) 2014 decision, recitals 140 to 153, and Opening decision, recitals 169 to 179. |
| (203) Sodba v zadevi Øresund, točke 297–328. | (203)
Øresund judgment, paragraphs 297-328. |
| (204) Glej sodbo v zadevi Øresund, točka 308. | (204) See the Øresund judgment, paragraph 308. |
| (205) Glej na primer Smernice Komisije o uporabi členov 92 in 93 Pogodbe ES in člena 61 Sporazuma EGP o državnih pomočeh v letalskem sektorju (UL C 350, 10.12.1994, str. 5). Člen 12 se izrecno nanaša na mostove: „[g]radnja ali širitev infrastrukturnih projektov (kot so letališča, avtoceste, mostovi) predstavlja ukrep splošne gospodarske politike, ki ga Komisija ne more nadzorovati na podlagi pravil o državni pomoči iz Pogodbe.“; Bela knjiga Komisije z dne 22. julija 1998 o pravičnih cenah za uporabo infrastruktur: postopni pristop k oblikovanju skupnega okvira na področju pristojbin za prometne infrastrukture v EU (COM(1998) 466 final), odstavek 43; Zelena knjiga z dne 10. decembra 1997 o morskih pristaniščih in pomorski infrastrukturi (COM(97) 678 final), odstavek 42; Sporočilo Komisije Svetu in Evropskemu parlamentu z dne 13. februarja 2001: Izboljšanje kakovosti storitev v pomorskih pristaniščih: osrednji vidik evropskega prometa (COM(2001) 35 final). | (205) See, for instance, Community guidelines on the application of Articles 92 and 93 of the EC Treaty and Article 61 of the EEA Agreement to State aids in the aviation sector (OJ C 350, 10.12.1994, p. 5). Paragraph 12 refers explicitly to bridges: ‘The construction of enlargement of infrastructure projects (such as airports, motorways, bridges, etc.) represents a general measure of economic policy which cannot be controlled by the Commission under the Treaty rules on State aid.’; Commission White Paper of 22 July 1998 on Fair payment for infrastructure use: A phased approach to a common transport infrastructure charging in the framework in the EU (COM (1998) 466 final), paragraph 43; Green Paper of 10 December 1997 on Sea Ports and Maritime Infrastructure (COM (97) 678 final), paragraph 42; Communication from the Commission to the Council and to the European Parliament of 13 February 2001: Reinforcing Quality Services in Sea Ports: A key for European transport, (COM (2001) 35 final). |
| (206) Glej odločbo Komisije z dne 14. septembra 2000 o državni pomoči N 208/2000 – Nizozemska – Shema subvencij za javne celinske terminale (SOIT) (UL C 315, 4.11.2000, str. 22); Odločba Komisije z dne 17. julija 2002 o državni pomoči N 356/2002 – Združeno kraljestvo – Network Rail (UL C 232, 28.9.2002, str. 2); Odločba Komisije z dne 20. decembra 2001 o državni pomoči N 649/2001 – Združeno kraljestvo – Nepovratna sredstva za objekte za tovor, odstavek 45 (UL C 45, 19.2.2002, str. 2); Odločba Komisije z dne 8. marca 2006 o državni pomoči N 284/2005 – Irska – Regionalni širokopasovni program: druga in tretja faza programa Metropolitan Area Network (MAN), odstavek 34 (UL C 207, 30.8.2006, str. 2); Odločba Komisije z dne 2. avgusta 2002 o državni pomoči C 42/2001 – Španija – Terra Mitica SA, odstavka 64 in 65 (UL L 91, 8.4.2003, str. 23); Odločba Komisije z dne 20. aprila 2005 o državni pomoči N 355/2004 – Belgija – Javno-zasebno partnerstvo v mednarodnem letališču Antwerpen, odstavek 34 (UL C 176, 16.7.2005, str. 11); Odločba Komisije z dne 11. decembra 2001 o državni pomoči N 550/2001 – Belgija – Partenariat public privé pour la construction d’ installationss de chargement et de déchargement et de déchargement, odstavek 24 (UL C 24, 26.1.2002, str. 2); Odločba Komisije z dne 20. decembra 2001 o državni pomoči N 649/2001 – Združeno kraljestvo – Nepovratna sredstva za objekte za tovor (UL C 45, 19.2.2002, str. 2); Glej tudi točko 201 obvestila o pojmu državne pomoči. | (206) See, Commission decisions of 14 September 2000, on State aid N 208/2000 – Netherlands – Subsidy Scheme for Public Inland Terminals (SOIT) (OJ C 315, 4.11.2000, p. 22); Commission decision of 17 July 2002, on State aid N 356/2002 – United Kingdom - Network Rail (OJ C 232, 28.9.2002, p. 2); Commission decision of 20 December 2001, on State aid N 649/2001 – United Kingdom – Freight Facilities Grant, paragraph 45 (OJ C 45, 19.02.2002, p. 2); Commission decision of 8 March 2006, on State aid N 284/2005 – Ireland – Regional Broadband Programme: Metropolitan Area Networks (‘MANs’), phases II and III, paragraph 34 (OJ C 207, 30.8.2006, p. 2); Commission decision of 2 August 2002 on State aid C 42/2001 – Spain – Terra Mitica SA, paragraphs 64 and 65 (OJ L 91, 8.4.2003, p. 23); Commission decision of 20 April 2005, on State aid N 355/2004 – Belgium – PPP Antwerp International Airport, paragraph 34 (OJ C 176, 16.7.2005, p. 11); Commission decision of 11 December 2001, on State aid N 550/2001 – Belgium - Partenariat public privé pour la construction d’installations de chargement et de déchargement, paragraph 24 (OJ C 24, 26.1.2002, p. 2); Commission decision of 20 December 2001, on State aid N 649/2001 – United Kingdom – Freight Facilities Grant (FFG) (OJ C 45, 19.2.2002, p. 2). See also paragraph 201 of the Notice on the Notion of State aid. |
| (207) Uredba Komisije (ES) št. 794/2004 z dne 21. aprila 2004 o izvajanju Uredbe Sveta (ES) št. 659/1999 o določitvi podrobnih pravil za uporabo člena 93 Pogodbe ES (UL L 140, 30.4.2004, str. 1). | (207) Commission Regulation (EC) No 794/2004 of 21 April 2004 implementing Council Regulation (EC) No 659/1999 laying down detailed rules for the application of Article 93 of the EC Treaty (OJ L 140, 30.4.2004, p. 1). |
| (208) Glej prejšnjo opombo, člena 2 in 3. | (208) Ibid., Articles 2 and 3. |
| (209) Točka 123. | (209) Paragraph 123. |
| (210) Glej v tem smislu sodbo Sodišča z dne 18. oktobra 2007, Komisija/Francija, C-441/06, ECLI:EU:C:2007:616, točka 29 in navedena sodna praksa. | (210) See, to that effect, judgment of the Court of Justice of 18 October 2007
, Commission v France, C-441/06, EU:C:2007:616, paragraph 29 and case-law cited. |
| (211) Sodba Sodišča z dne 29. aprila 2004, Nemčija/Komisija, C-277/00, ECLI:EU:C:2004:238, točka 75. | (211) Judgment of the Court of Justice of 29 April 2004, Germany v Commission, C-277/00, EU:C:2004:238, paragraph 75. |
| (212) Po potrebi bi bilo treba upoštevati popravek danske davčne uprave v okviru davčne revizije. | (212) Where applicable, a correction by the Danish tax administration in the context of a tax audit should be taken into account. |
| ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dec/2024/2467/oj | ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dec/2024/2467/oj |
| ISSN 1977-0804 (electronic edition) | ISSN 1977-0677 (electronic edition) |
