16.5.2014

Jornal Oficial da União Europeia

C 147/7

Resumo da Decisão da Comissão

de 26 de fevereiro de 2014

relativa a um processo nos termos do artigo 101.o do Tratado sobre o Funcionamento da União Europeia e do artigo 53.o do Acordo EEE

(PROCESSO COMP/39398 VISA MIF)

[notificada com o número C(2014) 1199 final]

(Apenas faz fé o texto em língua inglesa)

2014/C 147/06

Em 26 de fevereiro de 2014, a Comissão adotou uma decisão relativa a um processo nos termos do artigo 101.o do Tratado sobre o Funcionamento da União Europeia e do artigo 53.o do Acordo EEE. Em conformidade com o disposto no artigo 30.o do Regulamento (CE) n.o 1/2003 do Conselho (1) , a Comissão publica os nomes das partes e o conteúdo essencial da decisão, incluindo as sanções impostas, acautelando o interesse legítimo das empresas na proteção dos seus segredos comerciais.

(1)

O processo diz respeito à fixação de comissões interbancárias acordadas a nível multilateral («CIM») pela Visa Europe Limited («Visa Europe»), aplicáveis às operações intrarregionais, a certos pontos de venda nacionais (2) e intra-Visa Europe (3) não-EEE com cartões de crédito «particulares» e cartões de débito VISA «particulares» e às regras relacionadas com a aquisição transfronteiras.

1. PREOCUPAÇÕES DE CONCORRÊNCIA IDENTIFICADAS A TÍTULO PRELIMINAR

(2)	Na sua Comunicação de objeções de 3 de abril de 2009 («Comunicação de objeções»), a Comissão chegou à conclusão provisória de que a Visa Europe tinha infringido o artigo 101.o do Tratado e o artigo 53.o do Acordo EEE ao fixar as CIM.

(3)

Em 8 de dezembro de 2010, a Comissão adotou uma decisão nos termos do artigo 9.o do Regulamento (CE) n.o 1/2003 («decisão de compromissos»). A decisão tornou juridicamente vinculativos para a Visa Europe, por quatro anos, os compromissos de i) limitar a 0,20 % a CIM média ponderada aplicável às operações de débito de «particulares» abrangidas pelo processo e ii) manter e/ou introduzir um certo número de alterações nas suas regras em matéria de rede.

(4)

Na sua Comunicação de objeções suplementar de 31 de julho de 2012 («Comunicação de objeções suplementar»), a Comissão reformulou e apurou ainda mais as suas objeções no que respeita às comissões interbancárias acordadas a nível multilateral («CIM») de cartões de crédito «particulares» Alargou igualmente o âmbito de aplicação do processo à aplicação direta das CIM inter-regionais (ou internacionais) no caso de os comerciantes estarem localizados no EEE e considerou ainda, a título preliminar, que as regras da Visa Europe em matéria de aquisição transfronteiras tinham infringido o artigo 101.o do Tratado e o artigo 53.o do Acordo EEE.

(5)

As comissões interbancárias são pagas, com efeito, pelo banco do comerciante («adquirente») ao banco do titular do cartão («emitente») por cada operação realizada num estabelecimento comercial com um cartão de pagamento. Quando os titulares de cartões utilizam um cartão de pagamento para adquirir bens ou serviços junto de um comerciante, este último desembolsa na prática uma comissão (merchant service charge - MSC) que lhe é faturada pelo seu banco adquirente. O adquirente retém parte desta comissão (que corresponde à sua margem), sendo uma outra parte transferida para o emitente (a CIM) e uma outra pequena parte ainda transferida para o operador responsável pelo sistema (no presente caso, a Visa). Na prática, uma grande parte da comissão faturada ao comerciante é determinada pela CIM.

(6)

Na apreciação preliminar, foram expressas preocupações quanto ao facto de as CIM terem como objeto e efeito uma restrição significativa da concorrência nos mercados de aquisição em detrimento dos comerciantes e, indiretamente, dos seus clientes. As CIM parecem ampliar a base de fixação das MSC pelos adquirentes mediante a criação de um importante elemento de custo comum a todos os adquirentes. De acordo com a apreciação preliminar da Comissão, as CIM da Visa Europe não são objetivamente necessárias. O efeito restritivo nos mercados adquirentes é reforçado ainda mais pelo efeito das CIM nos mercados da rede e de emissão, bem como por outras regras e práticas no âmbito da rede (nomeadamente a regra quanto à obrigação de aceitar todos os cartões (Honour All Cards Rule - HACR), a regra de não discriminação (No Discrimination Rule - NDR), a combinação (4) e a segmentação dos mercados adquirentes devido a regras que restringem a aquisição transfronteiras (5). Por outro lado, de acordo com a Comunicação de objeções e a Comunicação de objeções suplementar, as CIM não cumprem os requisitos para uma isenção nos termos do artigo 101.o, n.o 3, do TFUE, visto que os ganhos de eficiência assim obtidos não se repercutem numa proporção equitativa nos consumidores.

(7)

No sistema da Visa Europe, os adquirentes transfronteiras estão sujeitos a uma regra que impõe a aplicação das CIM aplicáveis no país da operação. De acordo com esta regra, os adquirentes transfronteiras têm de aplicar, por defeito, quer as CIM específicas de um país quer as CIM intrarregionais ou as CIM nacionais registadas. Os membros da Visa que emitem e adquirem no país da operação e os adquirentes transfronteiras podem afastar-se das CIM nacionais ou das CIM específicas de um país através da celebração de acordos bilaterais que envolvam comissões mais baixas ou não permutáveis. No entanto, os adquirentes transfronteiras são suscetíveis de estar em desvantagem se quiserem celebrar acordos bilaterais deste tipo, porque não têm provavelmente fortes ligações com os emitentes nacionais. Nos países onde há importantes acordos bilaterais envolvendo adquirentes nacionais, os adquirentes transfronteiras teriam normalmente de aplicar as CIM específicas de um país ou intrarregionais mais elevadas ou as CIM nacionais registadas. Esta regra também é considerada como uma restrição territorial e de preços por objetivo e efeito, o que impede os adquirentes em países onde as CIM são mais baixas de oferecerem os seus serviços noutros países a preços que refletem as suas CIM mais baixas. À luz do objetivo da realização de um mercado interno de pagamentos, trata-se de uma restrição muito grave que se afigura injustificada. Uma tal compartimentação artificial dos mercados de aquisição prejudica os consumidores, uma vez que os comerciantes são obrigados a pagar preços mais elevados para adquirir serviços. Por conseguinte, a Comissão considerou, a título preliminar, na Comunicação de objeções suplementar que o objetivo e o teor desta regra é manter a segmentação dos mercados nacionais, limitando a entrada e a concorrência a nível de preços entre os adquirentes transfronteiras.

2. DECISÃO EM MATÉRIA DE COMPROMISSOS

(8)	Em 10 de maio de 2013, a Visa Europe propôs compromissos nos termos do artigo 9.o do Regulamento (CE) n.o 1/2003, a fim de dirimir as preocupações em matéria de concorrência da Comissão.

(9)

Em 14 de Junho de 2013, foi publicada no Jornal Oficial da União Europeia uma comunicação nos termos do artigo 27.o, n.o 4, do Regulamento (CE) n.o 1/2003, que resumia o processo, bem como os compromissos propostos, e que convidava os terceiros interessados a apresentarem as suas observações sobre estes últimos no prazo de um mês a contar da publicação da comunicação. Em 30 de agosto de 2013, a Comissão comunicou à Visa Europe as observações recebidas dos terceiros interessados na sequência da publicação da referida comunicação. Em 5 de novembro de 2013, a Visa Europe apresentou novos compromissos.

(10)

Por decisão de 26 de fevereiro de 2014, nos termos do artigo 9.o do Regulamento (CE) n.o 1/2003, a Comissão tornou os compromissos revistos vinculativos para a Visa Europe, por um período de quatro anos. O conteúdo essencial dos compromissos é resumido a seguir:

a)	A Visa Europe compromete-se a limitar a média ponderada anual das suas CIM intra-EEE para cartões de crédito aplicáveis a operações com os seus cartões de crédito «particulares» a 0,3 % no prazo de dois meses a contar da notificação da decisão de compromissos à Visa Europe.

Este limite será também aplicável individualmente, dois anos após as notificações da decisão de compromissos, em cada um dos países do EEE em que a Visa Europe fixa de forma direta CIM nacionais específicas para os cartões de crédito «particulares» e nos países do EEE em que as CIM intra-EEE para cartões de crédito são aplicáveis na ausência de outras CIM.

A Visa Europe propõe igualmente assegurar que, a partir de 1 de janeiro de 2015,

—

o limite de 0,3 % das CIM para cartões de crédito também se aplica a todas as CIM fixadas pela Visa Europe no que respeita a operações efetuadas com comerciantes localizados no EEE através de cartões de crédito «particulares» Visa emitidos em países não-EEE pertencentes ao território da Visa Europe (6) («CIM não-EEE intra-Visa Europe para cartões de crédito») e

—

o limite de 0,2 % das CIM para cartões de débito também se aplica a todas as CIM fixadas pela Visa Europe no que respeita a operações efetuadas com comerciantes localizados no EEE através de cartões de débito «consumidores» Visa emitidos em países não-EEE pertencentes ao território da Visa Europe (CIM não-EEE intra-Visa Europe para cartões de débito).

A Visa Europe compromete-se a autorizar, a partir de 1 de janeiro de 2015, os adquirentes transfronteiras a propor quer a CIM nacional para cartões de débito quer a CIM nacional para cartões de crédito aplicáveis no lugar de estabelecimento do comerciante, ou uma taxa CIM de 0,2 % para as operações por cartão de débito «consumidores» e de 0,3 % para as operações por cartão de crédito «consumidores», sob determinadas condições.

A Visa Europe compromete-se a prosseguir a implementação de outras medidas de transparência. Em especial, a Visa Europe compromete-se a:

—

introduzir uma regra que exige que os adquirentes proponham aos comerciantes uma fixação das taxas de serviço do comerciante com base numa «CIM plus plus» contra uma comissão administrativa (por outras palavras, os adquirentes devem, se tal for solicitado, desagregar claramente nos seus contratos e faturas as MSC em três componentes, a saber, a CIM, todas as outras comissões aplicáveis do sistema de pagamento e a comissão do adquirente). A Visa Europe exigirá que os adquirentes implementem essa regra no prazo de 12 meses a contar da notificação da decisão de compromissos à Visa Europe no que respeita a todos os novos acordos e, no prazo de 18 meses, no que respeita aos contratos em vigor;

—	introduzir uma estrutura simplificada de CIM para as CIM fixadas pela Visa Europe, a fim de prever uma redução de, pelo menos, 25 % no número de categorias de comissões, a fim de aumentar a transparência e permitir a comparação entre as taxas.

(11)	A Visa Europe designará um mandatário responsável pela monitorização do cumprimento dos compromissos por ela assumidos. Antes dessa designação, a Comissão terá o poder de aprovar ou rejeitar o mandatário proposto.

(12)	Os compromissos serão válidos por um período de quatro anos a contar da data de notificação da decisão de compromissos à Visa Europe.

(13)

Os limites da média ponderada das CIM previstos nos compromissos foram apreciados por meio do MIT («teste de indiferença do comerciante»). A decisão conclui que os compromissos são adequados e necessários para dissipar as preocupações identificadas na Comunicação de objeções e na Comunicação de objeções suplementar sem serem desproporcionados.

(14)	O Comité Consultivo em matéria de acordos, decisões e práticas concertadas e de posições dominantes emitiu um parecer favorável sobre a adoção da decisão em 17 de fevereiro de 2014. Em 19 de fevereiro de 2014, o Auditor apresentou o seu relatório final.

(15)

A decisão encerrou o procedimento no que se refere às comissões interbancárias acordadas a nível multilateral intra-EEE para os cartões de crédito Visa Europe, às CIM de crédito nacionais fixadas pela Visa Europe, às CIM não-EEE intra-Visa Europe para cartões de crédito e de débito, às CIM internacionais e à regra da Visa Europe sobre as CIM aplicáveis no caso da aquisição transfronteiras.

(16)	A presente decisão não abrange, porém, as CIM fixadas pela Visa Inc. e pela Visa International Service Association em relação às quais a Comissão prosseguirá a investigação.

(1) JO L 1 de 4.1.2003, p. 1.

(2) Atualmente na Bélgica, Hungria, Islândia, Irlanda, Itália, Luxemburgo, Malta, Países Baixos, Letónia e Suécia.

(3) Trata-se de operações efetuadas com comerciantes localizados no EEE com cartões Visa «particulares» emitidos em países não-EEE no território da Visa Europe. O território da Visa Europe inclui o EEE, Andorra, Ilhas Faroé, Gronelândia, Israel, Mónaco, São Marinho, Ilhas Svalbard e Jan Mayen, Suíça, Turquia e Cidade do Vaticano.

(4) A HARC é uma regra do sistema Visa que obriga os comerciantes que acordaram em aceitar pagamentos com um determinada marca de cartão (por exemplo, VISA, VISA Electron ou V PAY) a aceitarem todos os cartões devidamente apresentados dessa marca sem discriminação e independentemente da identidade do banco emitente ou do tipo de cartão no âmbito dessa marca. A NDR é uma regra do sistema Visa que impede os comerciantes de adicionarem sobretaxas às operações com cartões de pagamento Visa, Visa Electron ou V PAY, a não ser que a legislação local requeira expressamente que um comerciante seja autorizado a impor uma sobretaxa. A combinação é uma prática segundo a qual os adquirentes cobram aos comerciantes a mesma MSC pela aceitação de diferentes cartões de pagamento do mesmo sistema de pagamento (por exemplo, Visa débito e crédito) ou pela aceitação de cartões de pagamento pertencentes a diferentes sistemas de cartões de pagamento (por exemplo, cartões de crédito VISA e MasterCard). De acordo com a apreciação preliminar, essas regras e práticas reduzem a capacidade de os comerciantes pressionarem o exercício coletivo do poder de mercado dos membros da Visa Europe através das CIM, reforçando assim os efeitos anticoncorrenciais das CIM.

(5) A aquisição transfronteiras é a atividade realizada pelos adquirentes com vista a recrutar para a aceitação comerciantes que residem num país do EEE que não aquele em que o adquirente está estabelecido.

(6) O território da Visa Europe inclui o EEE, Andorra, Ilhas Faroé, Gronelândia, Israel, Mónaco, São Marinho, Ilhas Svalbard e Jan Mayen, Suíça, Turquia e Cidade do Vaticano.

16.5.2014

Jornal Oficial da União Europeia

C 147/11

AUXÍLIO ESTATAL — REPÚBLICA DA LETÓNIA

Auxílio estatal n.o SA.36612 (2014/C) (ex 2013/NN) — Auxílio não notificado concedido pela Letónia ao Citadele e ao Parex

Convite à apresentação de observações nos termos do artigo 108.o, n.o 2, do Tratado sobre o Funcionamento da União Europeia

(Texto relevante para efeitos do EEE)

2014/C 147/07

Por carta de 16 de abril de 2014, publicada a seguir ao presente resumo na língua que faz fé, a Comissão notificou a República da Letónia da decisão de dar início ao procedimento previsto no artigo 108.o, n.o 2, do Tratado sobre o Funcionamento da União Europeia relativamente ao auxílio acima mencionado.

As partes interessadas podem apresentar as suas observações sobre o regime em relação ao qual a Comissão dá início ao procedimento no prazo de 10 dias úteis a contar da data de publicação do presente resumo e da carta que se lhe segue, enviando-as para o seguinte endereço:

Comissão Europeia

Direção-Geral da Concorrência

Registo dos Auxílios Estatais

1049 Bruxelles/Brussel

BELGIQUE/BELGIË

Fax +32 22961242

Essas observações serão comunicadas à Letónia. Qualquer interessado que apresente observações pode solicitar por escrito o tratamento confidencial da sua identidade, devendo justificar o pedido.

FICHA-RESUMO

Procedimento

Em 15 de setembro de 2010 (1), a Comissão aprovou o plano de reestruturação do AS Parex banka. O plano de reestruturação previa uma divisão do AS Parex banka no Citadele banka e no AS Reverta (2). Em 10 de agosto de 2012, a Comissão aprovou as alterações dos três compromissos incluídos na decisão de aprovação do plano de reestruturação (3).

2.	Desde então, no contexto da monitorização do plano de reestruturação e dos compromissos conexos aprovados, a Comissão identificou um auxílio concedido pela Letónia para além das medidas de auxílio já aprovadas pela Comissão.

Descrição das medidas

Com base nos documentos recebidos pela Comissão, resulta que a Letónia adotou as seguintes medidas sem qualquer notificação prévia à Comissão:

i)	em 22 de maio de 2009, a Letónia concedeu ao AS Parex banka um empréstimo subordinado, qualificado como capital de nível 2, com uma maturidade de sete anos, o que excede o limite máximo de maturidade de cinco anos aprovado pela Comissão no âmbito das regras em matéria de auxílios estatais;

ii)	em 27 de junho de 2013, a Letónia concedeu ao Citadele banka mais uma prorrogação do prazo de 18 meses relativamente ao montante remanescente do mesmo empréstimo subordinado;

iii)	desde 2011, a Letónia forneceu ao AS Reverta apoio em termos de liquidez para além do máximo aprovado pela Comissão na sua decisão de 15 de setembro de 2010.

4.	Além disso, resulta que a Letónia não cumpriu o seu compromisso de desinvestir a atividade de gestão do património do AS Citadele banka nos prazos estabelecidos.

Apreciação das medidas

5.	O AS Parex banka e subsequentemente o AS Citadele banka e o AS Reverta beneficiaram de medidas adotadas pela Letónia para além das medidas de auxílio aprovadas pela Comissão no âmbito das regras em matéria de auxílios estatais.

Tendo em conta:

a maturidade inicial de sete anos e a maturidade prorrogada da dívida subordinada, bem como o apoio acrescido em termos de liquidez, representam claramente vantagens adicionais em comparação com as medidas de auxílio aprovadas, pelo que são um auxílio adicional (uma vez que todos os outros critérios previstos no artigo 107.o, n.o 1, do Tratado ainda estão em vigor); e

ii)	a ausência de qualquer notificação à Comissão para as medidas de auxílio adicionais, a Comissão considera, por conseguinte, que estas três medidas constituem auxílios ilegais.

Com base nas informações atualmente disponíveis, a Comissão observa que a Letónia não apresentou argumentos para demonstrar a compatibilidade do auxílio resultante da maturidade inicial de sete anos dos empréstimos subordinados e a prorrogação de 18 meses adicionais da maturidade da dívida subordinada.

8.	A Comissão observa igualmente que a Letónia não apresentou argumentos para demonstrar a compatibilidade dos auxílios resultantes do apoio adicional em termos de liquidez concedido ao AS Reverta.

9.	A Letónia confirmou que a atividade de gestão do património não foi desinvestida nos prazos acordados. Tal constitui uma violação das condições da decisão final sobre o Parex e, por conseguinte, uma utilização abusiva do auxílio concedido.

10.

Com base nas informações disponíveis neste momento, a Comissão conclui, no que respeita ao auxílio ilegal acima descrito, que existem dúvidas quanto à compatibilidade com o mercado interno. Consequentemente, a Comissão decidiu dar início a um procedimento formal de investigação nos termos do artigo 13.o, n.o 1, e do artigo 4.o, n.o 4, do Regulamento (CE) n.o 659/1999.

11.

Além disso, a Comissão conclui que a violação do compromisso de desinvestir a atividade de gestão do património constitui uma utilização abusiva do auxílio. A Comissão decidiu, por conseguinte, dar início a um procedimento formal de investigação por utilização abusiva de um auxílio nos termos do artigo 16.o do Regulamento (CE) n.o 659/1999.

Em conformidade com o artigo 14.o do Regulamento (CE) n.o 659/1999 do Conselho, qualquer auxílio ilegal pode ser objeto de recuperação junto do beneficiário.

TEXTO DA CARTA

‘The Commission wishes to inform Latvia that, having examined the information supplied by your authorities on the aid referred to above, it has decided to initiate the procedure laid down in Article 108(2) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (“the Treaty”).

1. PROCEDURE

(1)

On 10 November 2008 Latvia notified to the Commission a package of State aid measures in favour of AS Parex banka (“Parex banka”), designed to support the stability of the financial system. The Commission approved those measures on 24 November 2008 (4) (“first rescue Decision”) based on Latvia’s commitment to submit a restructuring plan for Parex banka within six months.

(2)	Following requests from Latvia, the Commission approved two sets of changes to the aid measures concerning Parex banka, the first on 11 February 2009 (5) (“second rescue Decision”) and the second on 11 May 2009 (6) (“third rescue Decision”).

(3)

On 11 May 2009 Latvia notified a restructuring plan for Parex banka. By decision of 29 June 2009 (7) the Commission came to the preliminary conclusion that the notified restructuring measures constituted State aid to Parex banka and expressed its doubts that such aid could be found compatible. As a result the Commission decided to initiate the procedure laid down in Article 108(2) of the Treaty and required Latvia to provide information needed for the assessment of the compatibility of the aid.

(4)

Between 11 May 2009 and 15 September 2010, several information exchanges and discussions occurred between Latvia and the Commission concerning the restructuring plan for Parex banka. Latvia provided information and clarifications on several occasions throughout the investigation procedure, and the restructuring plan of Parex banka was also updated six times.

(5)

On 1 August 2010, some assets of Parex banka were transferred to a newly established so-called “good bank” named AS Citadele banka (“Citadele”), in line with the restructuring plan. The restructuring plan envisaged a split of Parex banka into Citadele, which would take over all core assets and some non-core assets (8), and a so-called “bad bank” (“Reverta” (9)) which kept the remaining non-core and non-performing assets.

(6)	By decision of 15 September 2010 (10) (“the Parex Final Decision”), the Commission approved the restructuring plan of Parex banka, based on a commitment paper submitted by the Latvian authorities on 3 September 2010.

(7)

On 10 August 2012, at the request of the Latvian authorities, the Commission approved amendments to three commitments included in the Parex Final Decision (“the Amendment Decision”) (11). Those amendments: 1) extended the disposal deadline for the CIS loans (12) until 31 December 2014; 2) increased the limit of minimum capital adequacy requirements allowed for Citadele at the level of the bank and the group before the asset remuneration described in the Parex Final Decision would be triggered; and 3) allowed carry-over of previous years’ unused caps on lending, whilst respecting market share caps.

(8)

On 1 October 2013 Latvia notified a requested for a further amendment of the Parex Final Decision, asking for the postponement of the divestment deadline for one of the divisions of Citadele, the Wealth Management Business (13). While analysing Latvia’s submissions in support of that amendment request, the Commission identified aid that had been granted by Latvia over and beyond the aid measures already approved by the Commission.

(9)

Between […] (14) and 4 March 2014, several information exchanges have taken place between Latvia and the Commission with regard to the additional aid measures. Latvia submitted information and documents on 30 October 2013, 31 January 2014 and 4 March 2014 (including a revised restructuring plan of Parex banka).

(10)	Since 11 November 2013, the Commission has also received monthly updates regarding Latvia’s progress in selling Citadele, a process it began in October 2013.

(11)	The Latvian authorities have informed the Commission that for reasons of urgency they exceptionally accept that this Decision is adopted in the English language.

2. DESCRIPTION

2.1. The undertaking concerned

(12)	Parex banka was the second-largest bank in Latvia with total assets of LVL 3,4 billion (EUR 4,9 billion) as of 31 December 2008. It was partially nationalised in November 2008.

(13)

In April 2009, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (“EBRD”) acquired 25 % of the share capital of Parex banka plus one share. Following the split of Parex banka into a good bank and a bad bank in 2010 along with subsequent changes in the shareholding structure, the shareholders of Citadele are now Latvia (75 %) and the EBRD (25 %), while the shareholders of Reverta are Latvia (84,15 %), the EBRD (12,74 %) and others (3,11 %).

(14)

A detailed description of Parex banka up to the time of the Parex Final Decision can be found in recitals 11 to 15 of that decision. Parex banka was authorised to receive a series of aid measures (including liquidity support, guarantees and recapitalisation and asset relief measures) which are specified in the Parex Final Decision. Those measures were approved by the Commission in the first, second and third rescue Decisions (the “Rescue Decisions”) and the Parex Final Decision.

2.2. The aid measures approved for Citadele and Reverta

(15)

The restructuring plan approved by the Commission with the Parex Final Decision provided that the rescue aid previously approved by the Commission was to be extended over the restructuring period and split between Citadele and Reverta. The Parex Final Decision also approved additional restructuring aid for Reverta and Citadele. It also laid down a utilisation mechanism for the aid which had been provisionally approved through the Rescue Decisions after Parex banka was split, in regard to:

a)	liquidity support in the form of State deposits for both Citadele and Reverta (15);

b)	State guarantees on liabilities of Citadele and Reverta (16);

c)	a State recapitalisation for Reverta and Citadele (17); and

d)	an asset relief measure for Citadele (18).

2.3. The commitments given by Latvia in the Parex Final Decision and the Amendment Decision

(16)	In order to enable the Commission to find the restructuring aid compatible with the internal market Latvia provided commitments to ensure full implementation of the restructuring plan and limit distortions of competition that result from the restructuring aid (“the commitments”).

(17)

The main commitments regarding Citadele are described in recitals 73 to 83 of the Parex Final Decision. They include: a commitment to divest the CIS loans; a commitment to divest the Wealth Management Business within fixed deadlines (one which applied to divestment by Citadele itself and another which applied to divestment under the control of a Divestment Trustee); the preservation of viability, marketability and competitiveness; a hold-separate obligation in relation to the Wealth Management Business; a commitment to sell Citadele within a fixed deadline; caps on new lending and deposits in the Baltic countries; caps on the deposits in the German and Swedish branches; no increase in the number of branches; remuneration in respect of the asset relief measure; an acquisition ban; and a ban on making new CIS loans.

(18)

The main commitments regarding Reverta are described in recitals 84 to 87 of the Parex Final Decision. They include commitments that there would be no new activities; there would be a wind-down or divestment of activities; and a cap on the total amount of capital that would be provided by Latvia in whatever form.

(19)

Recitals 88 to 93 of the Parex Final Decision describe the commitments jointly applying to Reverta and Citadele. They provide for: a dividend and coupon ban; a ban on any reference to State support in advertising; a separation between Citadele and Reverta; and the appointment of Monitoring and Divestiture Trustees.

(20)	As recalled in recital 16, the Commission subsequently amended three of the commitments applicable to Citadele under the Parex Final Decision. That approval was based on new commitments undertaken by Latvia and Citadele to compensate for any distortion of competition.

2.4. The additional measures implemented by Latvia for Parex banka, Citadele and Reverta

(21)

Based on the report submitted on 29 August 2013 by the Monitoring Trustee (19) and based on documents and information submitted by Latvia since October 2013, it appears that Latvia has put into effect the following measures without prior notification to the Commission:

(i)

on 22 May 2009, Latvia granted to Parex banka a subordinated loan of LVL 50,27 million (qualifying as Tier 2 capital) with a maturity of seven years (i.e. until 21 May 2016). The duration of that subordinated loan exceeds the maximum five-year maturity set in first rescue Decision and confirmed in the Parex Final Decision;

(ii)

on 27 June 2013, Latvia granted Citadele an additional 18-month extension of the maturity for an amount of LVL 37 million of subordinated debt (out of the total of LVL 45 million held by Latvia at that time) (20). Table 1 gives an overview of the subordinated debt maturity changes, as of 31 December 2013. Latvia did not notify the extension of the maturity of that subordinated debt to the Commission;

Table 1

Issuer	Principal (LVL million)	Maturity approved by the Parex Final Decision	Maturity date throughout the restructuring period	Extended Maturity (granted in 2013)
LPA (21)	7,87	May 2014 (five years starting from 2009)	8.8.2016	—
LPA	37,34		21.5.2016	20.12.2017
[…]	[…]		[…]	[…]
Total	50,27

(iii)

in addition, since 2011 Latvia has provided Reverta with liquidity support in excess of the maximum limit set and approved by the Commission in the Parex Final Decision, both for the base case and for the worst case scenario (presented in Table 2 (22)). The actual amounts of liquidity support from which Reverta has benefited were communicated by the Latvian authorities through the revised restructuring plan submitted in January 2014 and are reflected in Table 3:

Table 2

Liquidity caps for Reverta as reflected in the Parex Final Decision

LVL million	1.8.10	31.12.10	31.12.11	31.12.12	31.12.13
Base case	458	446	419	349	315
Best case	458	446	419	356	322
Worst case	458	446	419	344	307

Table 3

Actual amounts of liquidity from which Reverta has benefited

Outstanding of liquidity support
	1.8.10	31.12.10	31.12.11	31.12.12	31.12.13
LVL million	446,32	446,32	427,82	384,86	362,52

In light of those developments and findings, the Commission has asked Latvia to provide additional information and explanations.

(22)	Latvia has confirmed through the submissions set out in recital 9 that those additional measures have already been put into effect.

2.5. The breach of the commitment to divest the Wealth Management Business of Citadele

(23)

Latvia has failed to comply with its commitment to divest the Wealth Management Business of Citadele by 30 June 2013 without a Divestiture Trustee, or by 31 December 2013 with a Divestiture Trustee, which was recorded in the Parex Final Decision (23). Therefore that commitment to divest the Wealth Management Business by those deadlines has been breached.

3. POSITION OF THE LATVIAN AUTHORITIES

3.1. On the un-notified maturity extensions of the subordinated debt

(24)

In its submissions of information regarding the un-notified aid which are mentioned in recital 9, as well as in the revised restructuring plan, the Latvian authorities submit that the Commission had been informed of the possibility of the maturity extension of the subordinated debt on a number of occasions. In consequence, Latvia considers that the longer maturity of the subordinated debt does not entail un-notified State aid.

(25)

More specifically, Latvia expresses the view that:

(i)	the Commission had been informed of the possibility of the maturity extension of the subordinated debt on a number of occasions, as it was expressly referred to in the restructuring plan and the reports of the Monitoring Trustee;

(ii)

according to the final version of the restructuring plan, it was not planned that the subordinated debt would be fully repaid by 2017. In addition, the restructuring plan assumed when determining the eligible capital for calculating capital adequacy that the maturity of the subordinated financing would be extended to avoid suffering from a 20 % amortisation rate starting from the fifth year and until maturity;

(iii)

in line with those provisions, the Parex Final Decision provided that the subordinated loans were expected to mature in the period 2015-18, thus envisaging a prospective extension of the subordinated debt (24);

(26)	Moreover, Latvia has argued that the payment by Citadele of interest rates in excess of market conditions allays any State aid concerns that could exist.

(27)	Finally, Latvia notes that discussions […] are currently being held […].

3.2. Regarding the un-notified liquidity support granted to Reverta

(28)

Latvia explained that it provided Reverta with liquidity in excess of the support limits in the Parex Final Decision because the deposits from the State were not transformed into capital support by capitalising the principal of State treasury deposits to the extent that had been envisaged in that Decision. That transformation did not occur because after Reverta’s banking licence had been revoked the relevant Latvian legislation no longer required statutory capital to be maintained. The Parex Final Decision had mentioned capitalising LVL [40-110] million of principal in the base case, whereas in fact only LVL 12,4 million of principal was capitalised.

(29)

Latvia argues that capitalising less principal benefitted the State because:

(iv)	Latvia receives interest on liquidity aid but has no income from capital aid;

(v)	Latvia remains a senior secured creditor rather than junior equity holder, which ensures higher recoverability of funds in case of insolvency or liquidation, given that the State Treasury will have priority towards proceeds collectable within the insolvency process;

(vi)	the capital invested as Tier 1 will not be recovered by the State (25); and

(vii)

there is more burden-sharing by legacy minority stakeholders as a result of interest payments by Reverta to the State.

3.3. Regarding the breach of the commitment for Wealth Management Business divestment

(30)

Latvia states that the return of Citadele as a stand-alone entity to the private sector would have been put at risk if Citadele had divested the Wealth Management Business by 30 June 2013 as foreseen in the restructuring plan of 2010 or, in any event before Latvia had divested its stake in Citadele. Latvia claims that Citadele without the Wealth Management Business has no viable business model.

(31)	The Latvia has therefore requested the Commission to amend the Parex Final Decision in order to allow Citadele to retain the Wealth Management Business until after the entire bank passes to the private sector.

(32)	Such a request was first made in August 2012 in discussions between Latvia and the Commission before the Amendment Decision was taken. During those discussions the Latvian authorities ultimately decided not to request an extended deadline for divesting the Wealth Management Business.

4. ASSESSMENT

(33)

Pursuant to Article 13(1) in conjunction with Article 4(4) of Council Regulation (EC) No 659/1999 of 22 March 1999 laying down detailed rules for the application of Article 108 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (26) the Commission may open a formal investigation procedure if it finds that doubts are raised as to the compatibility with the internal market of an unlawful aid measure (27).

4.1. Existence of unlawful aid

(34)

Article 107(1) of the Treaty provides that, save as otherwise provided in the Treaty, any aid granted by a Member State or through State resources in any form whatsoever which distorts or threatens to distort competition by favouring certain undertakings or the production of certain goods is in so far as it affects trade between Member States, be incompatible with the internal market.

(35)	As described in recital 21, Parex banka and subsequently Citadele and Reverta have obtained measures from Latvia in addition to the aid measures examined in the Rescue Decisions and the Parex Final Decision.

(36)

With regard to the subordinated debt, the fact that such a measure contains State aid was established in the first rescue Decision, when the Commission approved the issuance of subordinated debt with five years maturity as a compatible aid measure. The Commission decided at that time that a market economy investor would not have granted subordinated debt with a five-year maturity (28).

(37)

The measure which was in fact granted by Latvia in favour of Parex banka was identical with the measure approved by the Commission except for the fact that it had a longer maturity. As such, the measure which was in fact granted would also be State aid unless the longer maturity eliminated any advantage to Parex banka. However, subordinated debt with a seven-year maturity would give the borrower a greater advantage since the risk perceived by an investor for any given investment increases as the maturity of the investment is extended. When the subordinated debt with a seven-year maturity was granted, it would have been even less likely for a market economy investor to grant the subordinated debt under those extended terms than it would for it to have done so for five years. For that reason, the longer maturity of the subordinated debt represented an additional advantage for Parex banka compared to the form of the subordinated debt that was approved in the Rescue Decisions and the Parex Final Decision.

(38)

The maturity of the subordinated debt was later further extended by an additional 18 months. As the risk perceived by an investor for any given investment increases as the maturity of the investment is extended, a market economy investor would not have granted the subordinated debt under those extended terms in the absence of any countervailing payment fully offsetting the investor’s increased risk. For that reason, the longer maturity of the subordinated debt represents an additional advantage for Citadele compared to the form of the subordinated debt that was approved in the Rescue Decisions and the Parex Final Decision.

(39)	Latvia justifies granting subordinated loans with a longer maturity than approved by claiming that the Commission had been informed of a possible maturity extension through the restructuring plan and submissions of the Monitoring Trustee.

(40)

The Commission does not accept that argument. The possible need to extend the maturity of the subordinated loan was only incidentally mentioned, for information, by the Monitoring Trustee in previous monitoring reports (e.g. that of 30 June 2012) as an option under consideration by Latvian authorities. A mention of the possibility that additional aid may be granted by a Member State does not constitute or substitute for a formal notification of aid measures, within the meaning of Article 108(3) of the Treaty.

(41)	Latvia also contends that the recital 148 of the Parex Final Decision explicitly provided that the subordinated loans were expected to mature in the period 2015-18, thus envisaging a prospective extension of the subordinated debt.

(42)	The Commission does not share that interpretation. Recital 148 of the Parex Final Decision refers to the subordinated loans by legacy shareholders in Parex, and not to the subordinated loans granted by Latvia.

(43)

With regard to the liquidity support granted to Reverta , it was initially approved as part of the compatible State aid measures approved in the first rescue Decision, in the form of State deposits. At that time, the Commission noted that Parex banka lacked liquid collateral and that Latvia had deposited the funds, taking into account the bank’s liquidity needs, when no market investor was willing to provide liquidity in view of the fragile situation of Parex banka (29).

Following the Parex Final Decision (and the split in a good and a bad bank) the liquidity aid was subsequently transferred to Citadele and Reverta. The former has already repaid in full its share of the liquidity support, whereas the latter had to limit the amounts of liquidity support it received, as set out in recital 21(iii). However, the amount of liquidity support actually granted to Reverta exceeds even the worst case scenario level approved within the Parex Final Decision. That additional liquidity support provides a supplementary advantage for Reverta compared to the aid approved by the Rescue Decisions and Parex Final Decision. None of the other features of the liquidity support apart from its quantity have been altered and so the Commission concludes that the measure constitutes State aid.

(44)	None of those three additional measures (the seven-year subordinated loan; the 18-month extension; and the additional liquidity support) had been notified to the Commission. Latvia has therefore not complied with the standstill obligation under Article 108 of the Treaty.

(45)

Based on the facts that:

—

both the longer initial maturity and the extended maturity of the subordinated debt and the increased liquidity support clearly represent additional advantages compared to the approved aid measures, and therefore are additional aid (as all of the other criteria under Article 107(1) of the Treaty are still in place), and

—	the absence of any notification to the Commission for those additional aid measures, the Commission therefore considers that the measures described in recital 21 represent unlawful aid.

4.2. Compatibility of the aid

4.2.1. The subordinated loans with extended maturity

(46)

In line with the 2008 Banking Communication (30) which was in force when the subordinated loan was initially granted and when it was subsequently extended, in order for aid to be compatible, it had to comply with several conditions:

—	appropriateness (to be well targeted to its objective, e.g. to remedy a serious disturbance in the economy, and take the most appropriate form for that purpose to remedy the disturbance),

—	necessity (to be necessary to achieve the objective, and remain at the minimum necessary to do that),

—	proportionality (the positive effects of the aid must be properly balanced against the distortions of competition, in order for the distortions to be limited to the minimum necessary to reach the measures’ objectives).

(47)

The objective of granting a subordinated loan qualifying as Tier 2 capital to Parex banka was to enable it to continue to satisfy the capital adequacy ratio and to ensure that it is sufficiently capitalised so as to better withstand potential losses, in order to avoid a serious disturbance in the Latvian economy.

(48)

In the first rescue Decision, the Commission noted that the subordinated debt for Parex banka was limited to the minimum necessary in scope and time. Among other elements, the limitation to the minimum necessary was based on the commitment of the Latvian authorities to grant subordinated debt with a maximum maturity of five years. In that regard, the Commission noted in that decision that the minimum maturity for the subordinated debt to qualify as Tier 2 capital under Latvian legislation was five years. The aid measure was therefore qualified as compatible.

(49)	The second and third rescue Decisions, the Parex Final Decision and the Amendment Decision did not alter the assessment of the first rescue Decision in that respect, concerning the limitation to the minimum necessary.

(50)	The Commission notes that Latvia has not brought forward arguments to demonstrate the compatibility of the aid stemming from the extended maturity of the subordinated loans.

(51)

Therefore, based on the information available to Commission at this time, the un-notified aid measure concerning the subordinated debt issued with a maturity of seven years instead of five years as initially approved cannot be qualified as compatible, considering that: a) the existing assessment is that a five-year maturity of the subordinated debt was what ensured limitation to the minimum necessary and b) no new arguments have been presented for justification of compatibility.

(52)

Equally, based on the information available to Commission at this time, the un-notified aid measure concerning the additional prolongation of the subordinated debt maturity by 18 months cannot be qualified as compatible, considering that: a) the existing assessment is that a five-year maturity of the subordinated debt was what ensures limitation to the minimum necessary and b) no new arguments have been presented for justification of compatibility.

(53)	The Commission invites Latvia and any interested parties to present it with additional elements relevant to whether the seven-year duration of the subordinated loan and its subsequent extension by 18 months constitutes aid which was limited to the minimum necessary.

4.2.2. The liquidity support measure

(54)

The assessment of the restructuring plan in the Parex Final Decision was based on assumptions presented at that time regarding the expected inflows of liquidity into Reverta which would allow it to start repaying the liquidity support granted in the form of State deposits, up to a certain level (31).

(55)

The amounts expected to remain unpaid, as described in the Parex Final Decision, ranged from LVL […] million (the base case scenario) to LVL […] million (the worst case scenario). As explained in recital 21, the actual amounts from which Reverta has benefited have constantly exceeded those laid out in the Parex Final Decision.

(56)	The Commission notes that Latvia has not brought forward arguments to demonstrate the compatibility of the aid stemming from the additional liquidity support.

(57)

In view of this, and considering also the fact that the revised restructuring plan presented by Latvia includes numerous other adjustments compared to the plan approved through the Parex Final Decision, the Commission is not in the position at this time to qualify the additional liquidity support as compatible with the internal market. A more in-depth assessment of the impact the revised levels of liquidity support will have to be carried out, taking into account the revised restructuring plan in its entirety.

4.3. The breach of the commitment to divest the Wealth Management Business

(58)	Pursuant to Article 16 of Regulation (EC) No 659/1999 the Commission may open a formal investigation procedure if aid is misused, i.e. if the beneficiary used aid in contravention of a decision taken pursuant to Article 7(3) of that Regulation.

(59)	In the Parex Final Decision (32) Latvia committed that Citadele would divest the Wealth Management Business by certain deadlines.

(60)

Latvia confirmed that the Wealth Management Business has not been divested within the agreed deadlines. This constitutes a breach of the terms of the Parex Final Decision and hence a misuse of the aid granted. The Commission invites Latvia and interested parties to comment on that conclusion and to present any elements which would allow the Commission to consider whether aid obtained by Citadele could be considered compatible with the internal market if the Wealth Management Business were not to be divested separately from Citadele.

5. CONCLUSION

The Commission concludes, in regard to the unlawful aid described in recital 21, that doubts are raised as to the compatibility with the internal market based on the information available at this time. The Commission therefore has decided to open a formal investigation procedure pursuant to Articles 13(1) and 4(4) of Regulation (EC) No 659/1999.

Moreover, the Commission concludes that the breach of commitment described in recital 23 constitutes misuse of aid. The Commission therefore has decided to open a formal investigation procedure also for misuse of aid pursuant to Article 16 of Regulation (EC) No 659/1999.

In the light of the foregoing considerations, the Commission, acting under the procedure laid down in Article 108(2) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, requests Latvia to submit its comments and to provide all such information as may help to assess the measures (in particular the compatibility of the un-notified aid), within ten working days of the date of receipt of this letter. It requests your authorities to forward a copy of this letter to the potential recipient of the aid immediately.

The Commission would draw your attention to Article 14 of Regulation (EC) No 659/1999, which provides that all unlawful aid may be recovered from the recipient.

The Commission warns Latvia that it will inform interested parties by publishing this letter and a meaningful summary of it in the Official Journal of the European Union. It will also inform interested parties in the EFTA countries which are signatories to the EEA Agreement, by publication of a notice in the EEA Supplement to the Official Journal of the European Union and will inform the EFTA Surveillance Authority by sending a copy of this letter. All such interested parties will be invited to submit their comments within ten working days of the date of such publication.’

(1) Decisão C 26/2009 da Comissão (JO L 163 de 23.6.2011, p. 28).

(2) O «mau banco» inicialmente conservou o nome de Parex banka após a separação dos ativos, que teve lugar em 1 de agosto de 2010, mas foi registado desde maio de 2012 sob a firma «AS Reverta».

(3) Decisão SA.34747 da Comissão (JO C 273 de 21.9.2013, p. 1).

(4) Commission Decision NN 68/2008, OJ C 147, 27.6.2009, p. 1.

(5) Commission Decision NN 3/2009, OJ C 147, 27.6.2009, p. 2.

(6) Commission Decision N 189/2009, OJ C 176, 29.7.2009, p. 3.

(7) Commission Decision C 26/2009 (ex N 189/2009), OJ C 239, 6.10.2009, p. 11.

(8) In particular, performing loans to borrowers located in the Commonwealth of Independent States, the Lithuanian subsidiary, branches in Sweden and Germany and the wealth management business, with the latter including the Swiss subsidiary.

(9) The bad bank initially kept the name of Parex banka after the split that took place on 1 August 2010, but has been registered since May 2012 under the corporate name “AS Reverta”.

(10) Commission Decision C 26/2009, OJ L 163, 23.6.2011, p. 28.

(11) Commission Decision SA.34747, OJ C 273, 21.9.2013, p. 1.

(12) Meaning loans to borrowers located in the Commonwealth of Independent States.

(13) The Wealth Management Business consists of the private capital management sector of Citadele, asset management subsidiaries and AP Anlage & Privatbank AG, Switzerland.

(14) Confidential information.

(15) Recitals 55-57 of the Parex Final Decision.

(16) Recitals 58-61 of the Parex Final Decision.

(17) Recitals 62-68 of the Parex Final Decision.

(18) Recitals 69-70 of the Parex Final Decision.

(19) The Monitoring Trustee was appointed through a Mandate signed by Reverta, Citadele and the Latvian authorities on 28 February 2011. The Monitoring Trustee has submitted bi-annual monitoring reports covering the preceding semester, starting with the one ending 31 December 2010.

(20) Following the split of Parex banka, Citadele was established on 1 August 2010. The Parex Final Decision approved the transfer to Citadele of all of the subordinated loans previously granted to Parex banka. No Tier 2 capital was provided to Parex banka by Latvia at the time of the split or could have been provided by Latvia after the split.

On 3 September 2009 the EBRD agreed to refinance part of the subordinated loan previously granted by Latvia to Parex banka. As of 31 December 2009 the subordinated loans granted by Latvia to Parex banka amounted to LVL 37 million, while the subordinated loan granted by the EBRD amounted to LVL 13 million.

At the time of the split Latvia took over LVL 8 million out of the LVL 13 million subordinated loan held by the EBRD. As of 1 August 2010, the total amount of subordinated loans held by Latvia was LVL 45 million (with different maturities), while that held by the EBRD was LVL 5 million.

(21) The Latvian Privatisation Agency, owned by Latvia.

(22) That information is contained in Table 6 of the Parex Final Decision.

(23) See recital 73 of the Parex Final Decision.

(24) In that respect, Latvia points to recital 148 of the Parex Final Decision.

(25) Recital 49 of the Parex Final Decision.

(26) OJ L 83, 27.3.1999, p. 1.

(27) Under Article 1 of Regulation (EC) No 659/1999, unlawful aid means new aid put into effect in contravention of Article 108(3) of the Treaty — i.e. without notification to the Commission of aid measures before they are put into effect.

(28) Recital 40 of the first rescue Decision.

(29) Recital 41 of the first rescue Decision.

(30) Communication on the application of State aid rules to measures taken in relation to financial institutions in the context of the current global financial crisis OJ C 270, 25.10.2008.

(31) Recital 55 of the Parex Final Decision.

(32) See recital 73 of the Parex Final Decision.

		ISSN 1977-1010
Jornal Oficial da União Europeia		C 147

Edição em língua portuguesa	Comunicações e Informações	57.° ano 16 de maio de 2014

Número de informação	Índice	Página
	II Comunicações
	COMUNICAÇÕES DAS INSTITUIÇÕES, ÓRGÃOS E ORGANISMOS DA UNIÃO EUROPEIA
	Comissão Europeia
2014/C 147/01	Início ao processo (Case M.7000 — Liberty Global/Ziggo) ( 1 )	1

2014/C 147/02	Não oposição a uma concentração notificada (Processo M.7145 — Veolia Environnement/Dalkia International) ( 1 )	2

	IV Informações
	INFORMAÇÕES DAS INSTITUIÇÕES, ÓRGÃOS E ORGANISMOS DA UNIÃO EUROPEIA
	Comissão Europeia
2014/C 147/03	Taxas de câmbio do euro	3

2014/C 147/04	Parecer do Comité Consultivo em matéria de acordos, decisões e práticas concertadas e de posições dominantes Reunião de 17 de fevereiro de 2014 relativa a um anteprojeto de decisão respeitante ao Processo C.39398 VISA MIF — Relator: Malta	4

2014/C 147/05	Relatório final do Auditor — Visa MIF (AT.39398)	5

2014/C 147/06	Resumo da Decisão da Comissão, de 26 de fevereiro de 2014, relativa a um processo nos termos do artigo 101.o do Tratado sobre o Funcionamento da União Europeia e do artigo 53.o do Acordo EEE (PROCESSO COMP/39398 VISA MIF) [notificada com o número C(2014) 1199 final]	7

	Moeda	Taxas de câmbio
USD	dólar dos Estados Unidos	1,3659
JPY	iene	139,17
DKK	coroa dinamarquesa	7,4644
GBP	libra esterlina	0,81520
SEK	coroa sueca	8,9740
CHF	franco suíço	1,2227
ISK	coroa islandesa
NOK	coroa norueguesa	8,1050
BGN	lev	1,9558
CZK	coroa checa	27,440
HUF	forint	303,62
LTL	litas	3,4528
PLN	zlóti	4,1792
RON	leu romeno	4,4328
TRY	lira turca	2,8466
AUD	dólar australiano	1,4589
CAD	dólar canadiano	1,4845
HKD	dólar de Hong Kong	10,5882
NZD	dólar neozelandês	1,5786
SGD	dólar singapurense	1,7108
KRW	won sul-coreano	1 401,78
ZAR	rand	14,1337
CNY	iuane	8,5090
HRK	kuna	7,5910
IDR	rupia indonésia	15 599,43
MYR	ringgit	4,4064
PHP	peso filipino	59,797
RUB	rublo	47,4450
THB	baht	44,333
BRL	real	3,0197
MXN	peso mexicano	17,6440
INR	rupia indiana	80,9842

	V Avisos
	PROCEDIMENTOS RELATIVOS À EXECUÇÃO DA POLÍTICA DE CONCORRÊNCIA
	Comissão Europeia
2014/C 147/07	Auxílio Estatal — República da Letónia — Auxílio estatal n.o SA.36612 (2014/C) (ex 2013/NN) — Auxílio não notificado concedido pela Letónia ao Citadele e ao Parex — Convite à apresentação de observações nos termos do artigo 108.o, n.o 2, do Tratado sobre o Funcionamento da União Europeia ( 1 )	11