

# Il-Ġurnal Uffiċjali C 121

## tal-Unjoni Ewropea



Edizzjoni bil-Malti

### Informazzjoni u Avviżi

Volum 55

26 ta' April 2012

Avviż Nru

Werrej

Pagna

#### II *Komunikazzjonijiet*

KOMUNIKAZZJONIJIET MINN ISTITUZZJONIJIET, KORPI, UFFIĊĠI U AĠENZIJI TAL-UNJONI EWROPEA

#### **Il-Kummissjoni Ewropea**

2012/C 121/01	Awtorizzazzjoni għal għajnuna mill-Istat skont l-Artikoli 107 u 108 tat-TFUE – Fir-rigward ta' dawn il-każijiet il-Kummissjoni ma tqajjimx oġġezzjonijiet <sup>(1)</sup> .....	1
2012/C 121/02	Ftehim monetarju bejn l-Unjoni Ewropea u r-Repubblika ta' San Marino .....	5
2012/C 121/03	Ebda oppożizzjoni għal koncentrazzjoni notifikata (Każ COMP/M.6513 – Avenance Italy/Gemeaz Cusin) <sup>(1)</sup> .....	18
2012/C 121/04	Ebda oppożizzjoni għal koncentrazzjoni notifikata (Każ COMP/M.6479 – MNV/Rába) <sup>(1)</sup> .....	18
2012/C 121/05	Ebda oppożizzjoni għal koncentrazzjoni notifikata (Każ COMP/M.6533 – Goldman Sachs/Advent International/TransUnion Corp) <sup>(1)</sup> .....	19

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EUR 3

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(Ikompli fil-pagna li jmiss)

IV *Informazzjoni*

## INFORMAZZJONI MINN ISTITUZZJONIJIET, KORPI, UFFIĊĠI U AĠENZJI TAL-UNJONI EWROPEA

**Il-Kummissjoni Ewropea**

2012/C 121/06	Rata tal-kambju tal-euro .....	20
2012/C 121/07	Komunikazzjoni tal-Kummissjoni dwar il-proċedura stipulata fl-Artikolu 1(4) tad-Direttiva tal-Kunsill 96/67/KE .....	21

**Il-Qorti tal-Awdituri**

2012/C 121/08	Ir-Rapport Speċjali Nru 4/2012 “L-użu ta’ Fondi Strutturali u ta’ Koeżjoni għall-kofinanzjament ta’ infrastrutturi tat-trasport fil-portijiet: investment effettiv?” .....	24
---------------	----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------	----

## INFORMAZZJONI DWAR IŻ-ŻONA EKONOMIKA EWROPEA

**Awtorità ta’ Sorveljanza EFTA**

2012/C 121/09	Stedina biex jitressqu kummenti skont l-Artikolu 1(2) fil-Parti I tal-Protokoll 3 għall-Ftehim bejn l-Istati tal-EFTA dwar it-Twaqqif ta’ Awtorità ta’ Sorveljanza u Qorti tal-Ġustizzja dwar il-bejgħ tad-dritt tal-muniċipalitá ta’ Narvik għall-elettriku konċessjonarju lil Narvik Energi AS (“NEAS”) .....	25
---------------	-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------	----

V *Avviżi*

## PROĊEDURI AMMINISTRATTIVI

**L-Uffiċċju Ewropew għas-Selezzjoni tal-Persunal (EPSO)**

2012/C 121/10	Avviż ta’ kompetizzjoni ġenerali .....	38
---------------	----------------------------------------	----



## II

(Komunikazzjonijiet)

KOMUNIKAZZJONIJIET MINN ISTITUZZJONIJIET, KORPI, UFFIĊĊJI U  
AĠENZIJI TAL-UNJONI EWROPEA

## IL-KUMMISSJONI EWROPEA

**Awtorizzazzjoni għal għajjnuna mill-Istat skont l-Artikoli 107 u 108 tat-TFUE****Fir-rigward ta' dawn il-każijiet il-Kummissjoni ma tqajjimx oġġezzjonijiet**

(Test b'relevanza għaż-ŻEE)

(2012/C 121/01)

Data tal-adozzjoni tad-Deciżjoni	22.2.2012
In-numru ta' referenza tal-għajjnuna	SA.30742 (N 137/10)
Stat Membru	Il-Litwanja
Reġjun	Klaipėdos apskritis
Titolu (u/jew isem tal-benefiċjarju)	Klaipėdos keleivių ir krovinių terminalas
Il-baži legali	Komisijos sprendimas K(2007) 3740 (2007 m. liepos 30 d.), patvirtinantis veiksmų programą „Ekonomikos augimas“ dėl Bendrijos paramos iš Europos regioninės plėtros fondo ir Sanglaudos fondo pagal Konvergencijos tikslą Lietuvos Respublikoje
It-tip tal-miżura	Għajjnuna individwali
L-għan	Żvilupp settorjali, Żvilupp reġjonali
Il-forma tal-għajjnuna	Għotja diretta
L-estimi	EUR 17 900 000
L-intensità	65 %
It-tul ta' żmien	1.2.2011-31.12.2012
Setturi ekonomiċi	Trasport
Issem u indirizz tal-awtorità responsabbli mill-għajjnuna	Susisiekimo ministerija Gedimino Av. 17 LT-01505 Vilnius LIETUVA/LITHUANIA
Aktar informazzjoni	—

It-test tad-deċiżjoni fil-lingwa jew lingwi awtentika/awtentiċi, li minnu tnehhew il-partijiet kunfidenzjali kollha, jinsab fuq is-sit:

[http://ec.europa.eu/community\\_law/state\\_aids/state\\_aids\\_texts\\_mt.htm](http://ec.europa.eu/community_law/state_aids/state_aids_texts_mt.htm)

Data tal-adozzjoni tad-Deciżjoni	28.3.2012
In-numru ta' referenza tal-ghajnuna	SA.33054 (12/N)
Stat Membru	Ir-Renju Unit
Reġjun	—
Titolu (u/jew isem tal-beneficjarju)	Post Office Limited (POL): Compensation for net costs incurred to keep a non-commercially viable network for the period 2012-2015 and the continuation of a working capital facility
Il-baži legali	Post Office Network Subsidy Scheme (Amendment) Order 2011, Postal Services Act 2000, Industrial Development Act 1982
It-tip tal-miżura	Ghajnuna individwali
L-ghan	Servizzi ta' interess ekonomiku ġenerali
Il-forma tal-ghajnuna	Ghotja diretta
L-estimi	Baġit globali: GBP 1 155 miljun
L-intensità	—
It-tul ta' żmien	1.4.2012-31.3.2015
Setturi ekonomiċi	Il-posta u t-telekomunikazzjonijiet
Isem u indirizz tal-awtorità responsabbli mill-ghajnuna	Department for Business, Innovation and Skills 1 Victoria Street London SW1H 0ET UNITED KINGDOM
Aktar informazzjoni	—

It-test tad-deciżjoni fil-lingwa jew lingwi awtentika/awtentici, li minnu tnehhew il-partijiet kunfidenzjali kollha, jinsab fuq is-sit:

[http://ec.europa.eu/community\\_law/state\\_aids/state\\_aids\\_texts\\_mt.htm](http://ec.europa.eu/community_law/state_aids/state_aids_texts_mt.htm)

Data tal-adozzjoni tad-Deciżjoni	23.1.2012
In-numru ta' referenza tal-ghajnuna	SA.33868 (11/N)
Stat Membru	Il-Ġermanja
Reġjun	Thüringen
Titolu (u/jew isem tal-beneficjarju)	Staatliche Beihilfe Nr. 618/2007 — Deutschland Richtlinie des Freistaats Thüringen zur einzelbetrieblichen Technologieförderung
Il-baži legali	Richtlinie des Landes Thüringen zur einzelbetrieblichen Technologieförderung
It-tip tal-miżura	Skema ta' ghajnuna
L-ghan	Ir-riċerka u l-iżvilupp, Żvilupp reġjonali
Il-forma tal-ghajnuna	Ghotja diretta

L-estimi	Baġit annwali: EUR 34,5 miljun Baġit globali: EUR 207 miljun
L-intensità	—
It-tul ta' żmien	sal-31.12.2013
Setturi ekonomiċi	Is-setturi kollha
Isem u indirizz tal-awtorità responsabbli mill-ghajjnuna	Thüringer Aufbaubank Gorkistraße 9 99084 Erfurt DEUTSCHLAND  Postfach 90 02 44 99105 Erfurt DEUTSCHLAND
Aktar informazzjoni	—

It-test tad-deċiżjoni fil-lingwa jew lingwi awtentika/awtentici, li minnu tnehhew il-partijiet kunfidenzjali kollha, jinsab fuq is-sit:

[http://ec.europa.eu/community\\_law/state\\_aids/state\\_aids\\_texts\\_mt.htm](http://ec.europa.eu/community_law/state_aids/state_aids_texts_mt.htm)

Data tal-adozzjoni tad-Deciżjoni	22.2.2012
In-numru ta' referenza tal-ghajjnuna	SA.34088 (11/N)
Stat Membru	Il-Polonja
Reġjun	Zachodniopomorskie
Titolu (u/jew isem tal-benefiċjarju)	PKS w Świdwinie sp. z o.o.
Il-bażi legali	1) Ustawa z dnia 30 sierpnia 1996 r. o komercjalizacji i prywatyzacji – art. 56 ust. 1 pkt 2; 2) Ustawa z dnia 29 kwietnia 2010 r. o zmianie ustawy o komercjalizacji i prywatyzacji oraz ustawy, Przepisy wprowadzające ustawę, o finansach publicznych – art. 5; 3) Rozporządzenie Ministra Skarbu Państwa z dnia 6 kwietnia 2007 r. w sprawie pomocy publicznej na ratowanie i restrukturyzację przedsiębiorców.
It-tip tal-miżura	Għajjnuna individwali
L-għan	Ir-ristrutturar ta' impriži f'diffikultà
Il-forma tal-ghajjnuna	Għotja diretta
L-estimi	Baġit globali: PLN 0,4 miljun
L-intensità	50 %
It-tul ta' żmien	sal-31.12.2015
Setturi ekonomiċi	It-trasport fuq l-art u t-trasport permezz ta' pajpijiet

Isem u indirizz tal-awtorità responsabbli mill-ghajnuna	Ministerstwo Skarbu Państwa ul. Krucza 36/Wspólna 6 00-522 Warszawa POLSKA/POLAND <a href="http://www.msp.gov.pl/">http://www.msp.gov.pl/</a>
Aktar informazzjoni	—

It-test tad-deċiżjoni fil-lingwa jew lingwi awtentika/awtentici, li minnu tnehhew il-partijiet kunfidenzjali kollha, jinsab fuq is-sit:

[http://ec.europa.eu/community\\_law/state\\_aids/state\\_aids\\_texts\\_mt.htm](http://ec.europa.eu/community_law/state_aids/state_aids_texts_mt.htm)

Data tal-adozzjoni tad-Deciżjoni	27.2.2012
In-numru ta' referenza tal-ghajnuna	SA.34228 (12/N)
Stat Membru	Spanja
Reġjun	País Vasco
Titolu (u/jew isem tal-benefiċjarju)	Subvenciones destinadas a la consolidación, desarrollo y normalización de los medios de comunicación en euskera
Il-baži legali	Borrador de Orden, de 21 de diciembre de 2011, de la Consejera de Cultura, por la que se regula y convoca la concesión de subvenciones destinadas a la consolidación, desarrollo y normalización de los medios de la comunicación en euskera en el año 2012 (Convocatoria Hedabideak)
It-tip tal-miżura	Skema ta' ghajnuna
L-ghan	Kultura
Il-forma tal-ghajnuna	Ghotja diretta
L-estimi	Baġit annwali: EUR 4,875 miljun Baġit globali: EUR 4,875 miljun
L-intensità	65 %
It-tul ta' żmien	sal-31.12.2012
Setturi ekonomiċi	Il-Midja
Isem u indirizz tal-awtorità responsabbli mill-ghajnuna	Dirección de Promoción del Euskera Viceconsejería de Política Lingüística Departamento de Cultura Gobierno Vasco C/ Donostia, 1 01010 Vitoria-Gasteiz Álava, País Vasco ESPAÑA
Aktar informazzjoni	—

It-test tad-deċiżjoni fil-lingwa jew lingwi awtentika/awtentici, li minnu tnehhew il-partijiet kunfidenzjali kollha, jinsab fuq is-sit:

[http://ec.europa.eu/community\\_law/state\\_aids/state\\_aids\\_texts\\_mt.htm](http://ec.europa.eu/community_law/state_aids/state_aids_texts_mt.htm)

**FTEHIM MONETARJU**  
**bejn l-Unjoni Ewropea u r-Repubblika ta' San Marino**

(2012/C 121/02)

L-UNJONI EWROPEA,

u

R-REPUBBLIKA TA' SAN MARINO,

Billi:

- (1) Fl-1 ta' Jannar 1999, l-euro hadet post il-munita ta' kull Stat Membru li ppartecipa fit-tielet stadju tal-Unjoni Ekonomika u Monetarja, fost dawn l-Italja, f'konformità mar-Regolament tal-Kunsill (KE) Nru 974/98 <sup>(1)</sup> tat-3 ta' Mejju 1998.
- (2) Qabel l-introduzzjoni tal-euro, l-Italja u r-Repubblika ta' San Marino kienu kkonkludew arrangamenti bilaterali dwar kwistjonijiet monetarji, fejn l-aħhar wiehed kien il-*Convenzione monetaria tra la Repubblica Italiana e la Repubblica di San Marino*, li giet konkluza fil-21 ta' Diċembru 1991.
- (3) Id-Dikjarazzjoni Nru 6 annessa mal-Att Finali tat-Trattat dwar l-Unjoni Ewropea tgħid li l-Komunità għandha tiffacilita l-inneozjar mill-ġdid tal-arrangamenti eżistenti mar-Repubblika ta' San Marino skont kif jista' jkun mehtieg minhabba l-introduzzjoni tal-munita unika.
- (4) Fid-29 ta' Novembru 2000, ir-Repubblika tal-Italja kkonkludiet Ftehim Monetarju f'isem il-Komunità Ewropea mar-Repubblika ta' San Marino <sup>(2)</sup>.
- (5) Skont dan il-Ftehim Monetarju, ir-Repubblika ta' San Marino tuża l-euro bhala l-munita uffiċjali tagħha u tagħti status ta' valuta legali lill-karti u l-muniti tal-euro. Għandha tiżgura li r-regoli tal-Unjoni Ewropea (UE) dwar il-karti u l-muniti tad-denominazzjoni tal-euro – inklużi dawk marbutin mal-harsien tagħha kontra l-iffalsifikar – ikunu applikabbli fit-territorju tagħha. Ir-Repubblika ta' San Marino għandha tiehu l-miżuri kollha mehtieġa biex tiġġieled kontra l-iffalsifikar u tikkoopera mal-Kummissjoni, mal-Bank Ċentrali Ewropew (il-BĊE) u mal-Europol. Sakemm jiġi ffirmat ftehim ta' kooperazzjoni bejn l-Europol u r-Repubblika ta' San Marino, ir-Repubblika ta' San Marino għandha tikkoopera mal-Europol permezz tal-Awtoritajiet Taljani kompetenti f'dan il-qasam.
- (6) Ir-Repubblika ta' San Marino għandha tqis b'mod partikolari r-Rakkomandazzjonijiet tat-Task Force ta' Azzjoni Finanzjarja (FATF), u notevolment dawk fejn din it-Task Force tistieden lill-membri tagħha u lill-membri ta' Korpi Reġionali tat-tip FATF biex japplikaw il-kontramiżuri mehtieġa fil-ġurisdizzjonijiet identifikati bhala ta' riskju għoli. Ir-Repubblika ta' San Marino, li għandha rappreżentanza fil-Kumitat ta' Esperti dwar l-Evalwazzjoni tal-Miżuri ta' Kontra l-Hasil tal-Flus u l-Iffinanzjar tat-Terroriżmu, tqis b'mod xieraq ir-rakkomandazzjonijiet li saru jew li għad irid isiru fir-rapporti ta' evalwazzjoni reċiproka fir-rigward tar-Repubblika ta' San Marino, sabiex ittejjeb ir-rispons tagħha għal theddid ta' hasil tal-flus.
- (7) Dan il-Ftehim Monetarju ma jimponi ebda obbligu fuq il-BĊE u l-Banek Ċentrali nazzjonali li jinkludu l-istrumenti finanzjarji tar-Repubblika ta' San Marino fil-lista/i ta' titoli eliġibbli għall-operazzjonijiet ta' politika monetarja tas-Sistema Ewropea tal-Banek Ċentrali.
- (8) Ir-Repubblika ta' San Marino għandha settur bankarju li jippretendi li jaħdem aktar mill-qrib ma' dak taż-żona tal-euro. Għalhekk, sabiex jinholq ambjent ta' kundizzjonijiet ekwi, il-legiżlazzjoni bankarja u finanzjarja rilevanti tal-UE, il-legiżlazzjoni dwar il-prevenzjoni tal-hasil tal-flus, il-prevenzjoni tal-frodi u tal-falsifikazzjoni ta' mezzi ta' hłas bi flus mhux kontanti u r-rekwiziti ta' rapportar ta' statistika għandhom isiru applikabbli, b'mod gradat, għar-Repubblika ta' San Marino.
- (9) Għandu jiġi ffirmat Kumitat Kongunt magħmul minn rappreżentanti tar-Repubblika ta' San Marino, ir-Repubblika tal-Italja, il-Kummissjoni u l-BĊE sabiex jeżamina l-applikazzjoni ta' dan il-Ftehim, jiddeċiedi kemm ikun il-limitu massimu annwali għall-hruġ ta' muniti u jevalwa l-miżuri li jittiehdu mir-Repubblika ta' San Marino għall-implimentazzjoni rilevanti tal-legiżlazzjoni tal-UE.

<sup>(1)</sup> ĠU L 139, 11.5.1998, p. 1.

<sup>(2)</sup> ĠU C 209, 27.7.2001, p. 1.

- (10) Il-Qorti tal-Ġustizzja tal-Unjoni Ewropea għandha tkun il-korp ġudizzjarju inkarigat mis-soluzzjoni ta' kwalunkwe tilwim li jista' jinqala' mill-applikazzjoni tal-Ftehim.

FTIEHMU KIF ĠEJ:

#### Artikolu 1

Ir-Repubblika ta' San Marino għandha tkun intitolata tuża l-euro bħala l-munita uffiċjali tagħha skont ir-Regolament tal-Kunsill (KE) Nru 1103/97 tas-17 ta' Ġunju 1997 dwar ċerti dispożizzjonijiet li jirrigwardaw l-introduzzjoni tal-Euro<sup>(1)</sup> u r-Regolament (KE) Nru 974/98 tat-3 ta' Mejju 1998 dwar l-introduzzjoni tal-euro. Ir-Repubblika ta' San Marino għandha tagħti status ta' valuta legali lill-karti u l-muniti tal-euro.

#### Artikolu 2

Ir-Repubblika ta' San Marino ma għandha tohroġ ebda karti, muniti jew sostituti tal-flus ta' ebda tip sakemm il-kundizzjonijiet għal dan il-hruġ ma jkunux miftehma mal-Unjoni Ewropea. Il-kundizzjonijiet biex jinharġu muniti tal-euro mid-data tad-dhul fis-sehh ta' dan il-Ftehim huma stipulati fl-Artikoli li ġejjin.

#### Artikolu 3

Il-limitu massimu annwali (f'terminu ta' valur) għall-hruġ tal-muniti tal-euro mir-Repubblika ta' San Marino għandu jiġi kkal-kulat mill-Kumitat Kongunt stabbilit permezz ta' dan il-Ftehim bħala t-total ta':

- Parti fissa, li l-ammont inizjali tagħha għall-ewwel sena wara d-dhul fis-sehh ta' dan il-Ftehim huwa stabbilit għal EUR 2 600 000. Il-Kumitat Kongunt jista' jirrevedi l-parti fissa kull sena bil-għan li jqis kemm l-inflazzjoni – abbażi tal-inflazzjoni HICP tal-Italja fl-ahħar 12-il xahar li għalihom tkun disponibbli d-dejta fil-hin li jsir il-kalkolu – kif ukoll ix-xejriet sinifikanti possibbli li jaffettwaw is-suq tal-kollezzjonisti tal-muniti tal-euro;
- Parti varjabbli, li tikkorrispondi għall-valur tal-hruġ medju per capita ta' muniti tar-Repubblika tal-Italja fl-ahħar 12-il xahar li għalihom tkun disponibbli d-dejta mmultiplikata bin-numru ta' abitanti ta' San Marino.

#### Artikolu 4

1. Il-muniti tal-euro mahruġa mir-Repubblika ta' San Marino għandhom ikunu identiċi għal dawk li jinharġu mill-Istati Membri tal-Unjoni Ewropea li adottaw l-euro f'dak li jikkonċerna l-valur nominali, l-istatus ta' valuta legali, il-karatteristiċi tekniċi, il-karatteristiċi artistici tan-naħa komuni u l-karatteristiċi artistici komuni tan-naħa nazzjonali.

2. Ir-Repubblika ta' San Marino għandha tikkomunika minn qabel l-abbozzi tal-uċuħ nazzjonali tal-muniti euro tagħha lill-Kummissjoni Ewropea, li trid tivverifika l-konformità tagħhom mar-regoli tal-UE.

#### Artikolu 5

1. Il-muniti tal-euro mahruġin mir-Repubblika ta' San Marino għandhom jiġu stampati mill-Istituto Poligrafico e Zecca dello Stato tar-Repubblika tal-Italja.

2. B'deroga għall-paragrafu 1, San Marino jista' jqabbaż Zekka tal-UE biex tistampa muniti oħra tal-euro flok dik imsemmija fil-paragrafu 1, bi qbil mal-Kumitat Kongunt.

3. Mill-inqas 70 % tal-muniti tal-euro li huma maħsuba għaċ-ċirkolazzjoni għandhom jinharġu fiċ-ċirkolazzjoni bil-valur nominali sa mis-sena ta' wara d-data tad-dhul fis-sehh ta' dan il-Ftehim. Dan il-proporzjon għandu jilhaq it-80 % wara tliet snin. Għaldaqstant, il-Kumitat Kongunt se jirrevedi b'mod regolari kemm dan il-proporzjon ikun xieraq.

4. Ir-Repubblika ta' San Marino tista' tohroġ muniti tal-euro għall-kollezzjonisti. Dawn għandhom ikunu inkluzi mal-limitu massimu annwali msemmi fl-Artikolu 3. Il-hruġ ta' muniti tal-euro għall-kollezzjonisti, mir-Repubblika ta' San Marino, għandu jsir skont il-linji gwida tal-Unjoni Ewropea dwar il-muniti tal-euro għall-kollezzjonisti, li jipprovdut fost oħrajn li l-karatteristiċi tekniċi u artistici u denominazzjonijiet tal-muniti tal-euro mahruġin għall-kollezzjoni għandhom jippermettu li ssir distinzjoni bejnhom u bejn il-muniti tal-euro li jkunu maħsubin għaċ-ċirkolazzjoni.

#### Artikolu 6

1. B'konformità mal-Artikolu 128(2) tat-Trattat dwar il-Funzjonament tal-Unjoni Ewropea, il-volum tal-muniti tal-euro mahruġin mir-Repubblika ta' San Marino għandu jiżded mal-volum tal-muniti mahruġin mill-Italja għall-għan tal-approvazzjoni, mill-BĊE, tal-volum totali tal-hruġ ta' muniti mir-Repubblika tal-Italja.

2. Ir-Repubblika ta' San Marino għandha tavża lill-Kummissjoni Ewropea u lir-Repubblika tal-Italja, mhux aktar tard mill-1 ta' Settembru ta' kull sena, dwar il-volum u l-valur nominali tal-muniti tal-euro li jkun biħsiebha tohroġ fis-sena ta' wara. Għandha tinforma wkoll lill-Kummissjoni Ewropea dwar il-kundizzjonijiet previsti għall-hruġ ta' dawn il-muniti, b'mod partikolari dwar il-proporzjon ta' muniti għall-kollezzjonisti u l-arranġamenti dettaljati għall-introduzzjoni ta' muniti għaċ-ċirkolazzjoni.

3. Hekk kif jiġi ffirmat dan il-Ftehim, ir-Repubblika ta' San Marino għandha tikkomunika l-informazzjoni kif imsemmija fil-paragrafu 2 għas-sena ta' wara d-data tad-dhul fis-sehh tal-Ftehim.

(1) ĠU L 162, 19.6.1997, p. 1.



### Artikolu 7

1. Dan il-Ftehim huwa bla hsara għad-dritt tar-Repubblika ta' San Marino li tkompli tohroġ muniti tad-deheb bid-denominazzjoni ta' scudi.
2. Il-muniti għall-kollezzjonijisti u l-muniti tad-deheb bid-denominazzjoni ta' scudi li jinħarġu mir-Repubblika ta' San Marino mhux se jkollhom valuta legali fl-Unjoni Ewropea.

### Artikolu 8

1. Ir-Repubblika ta' San Marino għandha tidhol risponsabbli li tadotta l-miżuri kollha xierqa, permezz ta' traspożizzjonijiet diretti, jew possibbilment, permezz ta' azzjonijiet ekwivalenti, bil-għan li timplimenta l-atti legali u r-regoli tal-UE elenkati fl-Anness ma' dan il-Ftehim, fl-oqsma ta':

- (a) il-karti u l-muniti tal-euro;
- (b) il-liġi bankarja u finanzjarja, b'mod partikolari fir-rigward tal-attività u s-supervizzjoni tal-istituzzjonijiet ikkonċernati;
- (c) il-prevenzjoni tal-ħasil tal-flus, il-prevenzjoni tal-frodi u tal-iffalsifikar ta' mezzi ta' pagament kemm ta' flus kontanti kif ukoll mezzi oħra, ta' medalji u towkins u r-reqwiziti ta' rapportar ta' statistika. Fir-rigward tal-leġiżlazzjoni dwar il-ġbir ta' informazzjoni statistika, ir-regoli dettaljati għall-implimentazzjoni u l-adattamenti tekniċi (inkluż id-derogi xierqa fid-dawl tal-istatus speċifiku ta' San Marino) għandhom jiġu maqbuli mal-Bank Ċentrali Ewropew sa mhux aktar tard minn 18-il xahar qabel ma jkun meħtieġ li jinbada r-rapportar ta' statistika.
- (d) il-miżuri neċessarji għall-użu tal-euro bħala munita unika adottati skont l-Artikolu 133 tat-Trattat dwar il-Funzjonament tal-Unjoni Ewropea;

2. Ir-Repubblika ta' San Marino għandha timplimenta l-atti legali u r-regoli msemmija fil-paragrafu 1 sal-iskadenzi speċifikati fl-Anness, li jibdeu jghoddu hekk kif dan il-Ftehim jidhlor fis-seħh.

3. Il-limitu massimu msemmi fl-Artikolu 3:

- (a) jitnaqqas awtomatikament u temporanjament b'1/3 jekk u meta data ta' skadenza speċifikata fl-Anness ma tinzammx, sakemm l-atti legali u r-regoli tal-UE kkonċernati ma jkunux għadhom ġew adottati;
- (b) jista' jitnaqqas temporanjament b'1/2 permezz ta' deċiżjoni tal-Kunsill li jaġixxi b'maġġoranza kwalifikata fuq proposta tal-Kummissjoni u wara li jkun sema' r-rappreżentanti tar-Repubblika ta' San Marino jekk u meta r-Repubblika ta' San Marino tonqos għal aktar minn sentejn milli tikkonforma ma' wiehed jew ma' diversi mill-atti legali jew regoli tal-UE elenkati fl-Anness, li hija adottat qabel l-iskadenza stabbilita.

Il-limitu massimu għandu jittella' għal-livell normali tiegħu billi tintuża l-istess proċedura, hekk kif ir-Repubblika ta' San Marino tkun adottat il-miżuri xierqa biex tindirizza l-kwistjonijiet li jkunu wasslu għat-tnaqqis temporanju.

4. Ir-Repubblika ta' San Marino tista' titlob għall-assistenza teknika tal-entitajiet li jikkostitwixxu d-delegazzjoni tal-Unjoni Ewropea sabiex tiffacilita l-implimentazzjoni rilevanti tal-leġiżlazzjoni tal-UE.

5. L-Anness għandu jiġi emendat mill-Kummissjoni darba kull sena jew, jekk ikun xieraq aktar spiss, bil-għan li jitqiesu dejjem l-atti legali u r-regoli rilevanti godda tal-UE, kif ukoll l-emendi għal dawk li diġà jeżistu. Wara li jsir dan, il-Kumitat Kongunt għandu jiddeċiedi dwar id-dati ta' skadenza xierqa u raġonevoli għall-implimentazzjoni mir-Repubblika ta' San Marino tal-atti legali u r-regoli godda miżjudin mal-Anness.

6. Il-Kumitat Kongunt jista', f'każijiet eċċezzjonali, jirrevedi d-data ta' skadenza eżistenti speċifikata fl-Anness.

7. L-Anness aġġornat għandu jiġi ppubblikat f' *Il-Ġurnal Uffiċjali tal-Unjoni Ewropea*.

### Artikolu 9

L-istituzzjonijiet ta' kreditu u, fejn ikun xieraq, istituzzjonijiet finanzjarji oħra awtorizzati biex iwettqu l-attivitajiet tagħhom fit-territorju tar-Repubblika ta' San Marino jista' jkollhom aċċess għas-sistemi ta' sald u ħlas interbankarji u tat-titoli fiż-żona tal-euro skont termini u kundizzjonijiet xierqa li jiġu deċiżi mill-Bank tal-Italja, bi qbil mal-Bank Ċentrali Ewropew.

### Artikolu 10

1. Il-Qorti tal-Ġustizzja tal-Unjoni Ewropea għandu jkollha l-kompetenza esklussiva biex issolvi t-tilwim kollu li jista' jirrizulta bejn il-partijiet minhabba l-applikazzjoni ta' dan il-Ftehim u li ma jkunx ġie solvut fi hdan il-Kumitat Kongunt.

2. Jekk l-Unjoni Ewropea, rappreżentata mill-Kummissjoni Ewropea, filwaqt li tkun qed taġixxi fuq rakkomandazzjoni tad-delegazzjoni tal-UE fil-Kumitat Kongunt, jew ir-Repubblika ta' San Marino tikkunsidra li l-Parti l-oħra ma tkunx issodisfat xi obbligu skont dan il-Ftehim, din tista' tressaq il-kwistjoni quddiem il-Qorti tal-Ġustizzja. Is-sentenza tal-Qorti għandha torbot lill-Partijiet, li għandhom jiehdu l-miżuri meħtieġa biex jikkonformaw mas-sentenza f'perjodu ta' żmien stabbilit mill-Qorti fis-sentenza tagħha.

### Artikolu 11

1. Għandu jiġi stabbilit Kumitat Kongunt. Dan għandu jkun magħmul minn rappreżentanti tar-Repubblika ta' San Marino u tal-Unjoni Ewropea. Il-Kumitat Kongunt għandu jadotta r-Regoli ta' Proċedura tiegħu b'konsens. Id-delegazzjoni tal-Unjoni Ewropea għandha tkun magħmula minn rappreżentanti tal-Kummissjoni u tar-Repubblika tal-Italja, flimkien mar-rappreżentanti tal-Bank Ċentrali Ewropew.

2. Il-Kumitat Kongunt għandu jiltaqa' mill-inqas darba fis-sena. Il-Presidenza għandha talterna kull sena bejn rappreżentant tal-Unjoni Ewropea u rappreżentant tar-Repubblika ta' San Marino. Il-Kumitat Kongunt għandu jadotta d-deċiżjonijiet tiegħu b'vot unanimu tal-partijiet.
3. Il-Kumitat Kongunt għandu jaqsam l-opinjoni u l-informazzjoni u jadotta d-deċiżjonijiet imsemmija fl-Artikoli 3, 5 u 8. Għandu jeżamina l-miżuri li jittiehdu mir-Repubblika ta' San Marino u jagħmel hiltu biex isolvi kull tilwim li jista' jinqala' minhabba l-implimentazzjoni ta' dan il-Ftehim.
4. L-Unjoni Ewropea se tkun l-ewwel li tippresjedi fuq il-Kumitat Kongunt hekk kif dan il-Ftehim jidhol fis-seħh, kif stipulat fl-Artikolu 13.

*Artikolu 12*

Dan il-Ftehim jista' jintemm minn kull waħda mill-Partijiet permezz ta' notifika minn sena qabel.

*Artikolu 13*

Dan il-Ftehim għandu jidhol fis-seħh fl-ewwel ġurnata tax-xahar wara d-data li fiha l-Partijiet ikunu nnotifikaw lil xulxin li l-proċess tagħhom ta' ratifika, ta' konkluzjoni jew ta' adozzjoni, ikun lest skont ir-regoli applikabbli għal kull Parti.

*Artikolu 14*

Il-Ftehim Monetarju tad-29 ta' Novembru 2000 għandu jiġi rrevokat mid-data tad-dhul fis-seħh ta' dan il-Ftehim. Referenzi għall-Ftehim tad-29 ta' Novembru 2000 għandhom jiġu mifhuma li jirreferu għal dan il-Ftehim.

Magħmul fi Brussell, fis-27 ta' Marzu 2012, f'zewġ dokumenti originali bil-lingwa Ingliża.

*Għall-Unjoni Ewropea*

Olli REHN

*Il-Viċi President tal-Kummissjoni Ewropea responsabbli  
għall-Affarijiet Ekonomiċi u Monetarji u l-Ewro*

*Għar-Repubblika ta' San Marino*

Antonella MULARONI

*Ministru tal-Affarijiet Barranin*

## ANNEX

DISPOŻIZZJONIJIET LEGALI LI GHANDHOM JIĠU IMPLIMENTATI	DATA TA' SKADENZA GHALL-IMPLIMENTAZZJONI (APPLIKABBLI MID-DHUL FIS-SEHH TAL-FTEHIM)
Il-prevenzjoni tal-hasil tal-flus	
<p>Id-Direttiva 2005/60/KE tal-Parlament Ewropew u tal-Kunsill tas-26 ta' Ottubru 2005 dwar il-prevenzjoni tal-użu tas-sistema finanzjarja għall-iskop tal-hasil tal-flus u l-finanzjament tat-terroriżmu (ĠU L 309, 25.11.2005, p. 15).</p> <p>Emendata bi:</p> <p>Id-Direttiva 2007/64/KE tal-Parlament Ewropew u tal-Kunsill tat-13 ta' Novembru 2007 dwar is-servizzi ta' hlas fis-suq intern li temenda d-Direttivi 97/7/KE, 2002/65/KE, 2005/60/KE u 2006/48/KE u li thassar id-Direttiva 97/5/KE (ĠU L 319, 5.12.2007, p. 1).</p> <p>Id-Direttiva 2008/20/KE tal-Parlament Ewropew u tal-Kunsill tal-11 ta' Marzu 2008 li temenda d-Direttiva 2005/60/KE dwar il-prevenzjoni tal-użu tas-sistema finanzjarja għall-iskop tal-money laundering u l-finanzjament tat-terroriżmu, fir-rigward tas-setgħat ta' implimentazzjoni kkonferiti lill-Kummissjoni (ĠU L 76, 19.3.2008, p. 46).</p> <p>Id-Direttiva 2009/110/KE tal-Parlament Ewropew u tal-Kunsill tas-16 ta' Settembru 2009 dwar il-bidu, l-eżerċizzju u s-supervizzjoni prudenzjali tan-negozju tal-istituzzjonijiet tal-flus elettroniċi li temenda d-Direttivi 2005/60/KE u 2006/48/KE u li thassar id-Direttiva 2000/46/KE (ĠU L 267, 10.10.2009, p. 7).</p> <p>Id-Direttiva 2010/78/UE tal-Parlament Ewropew u tal-Kunsill tal-24 ta' Novembru 2010 li temenda d-Direttivi 98/26/KE, 2002/87/KE, 2003/6/KE, 2003/41/KE, 2003/71/KE, 2004/39/KE, 2004/109/KE, 2005/60/KE, 2006/48/KE, 2006/49/KE u 2009/65/KE fir-rigward tas-setgħat tal-Awtorità Supervizorja Ewropea (Awtorità Bankarja Ewropea), l-Awtorità Supervizorja Ewropea (Awtorità Ewropea tal-Assigurazzjoni u l-Pensjonijiet tax-Xogħol) u l-Awtorità Supervizorja Ewropea (Awtorità Ewropea tat-Titoli u s-Swieq) (ĠU L 331, 15.12.2010, p. 120).</p> <p>Issupplimentata bi:</p> <p>Id-Deciżjoni tal-Kunsill 2007/845/ĠAI tas-6 ta' Diċembru 2007 dwar il-kooperazzjoni bejn l-Uffiċċji għall-Irkupru tal-Assi tal-Istati Membri fil-qasam tar-rintraċċar u l-identifikazzjoni ta' rikavati mill-kriminalità, jew proprjetà oħra relatata magħha (ĠU L 332, 18.12.2007, p. 103).</p> <p>Id-Direttiva tal-Kummissjoni 2006/70/KE tal-1 ta' Awwissu 2006 li tistabbilixxi miżuri implimentattivi għad-Direttiva 2005/60/KE tal-Parlament Ewropew u tal-Kunsill dwar id-definizzjoni ta' persuni esposti politikament u l-kriterji tekniċi għal proceduri ssimplifikati tad-diligenza dovuta mal-klijent u għal eżenzjoni għal raġunijiet ta' attività finanzjarja mwettqa fuq bażi okkazjonali jew limitata ħafna (ĠU L 214, 4.8.2006, p. 29).</p> <p>Ir-Regolament (KE) Nru 1781/2006 tal-Parlament Ewropew u tal-Kunsill tal-15 ta' Novembru 2006 dwar informazzjoni dwar il-pagatur, li għandha takkumpanja t-trasferimenti ta' fondi (ĠU L 345, 8.12.2006, p. 1).</p> <p>Ir-Rettifika għar-Regolament (KE) Nru 1781/2006 tal-Parlament Ewropew u tal-Kunsill tal-15 ta' Novembru 2006 dwar informazzjoni dwar il-pagatur, li għandha takkumpanja t-trasferimenti ta' fondi, (ĠU L 345, 8.12.2006) (ĠU L 323, 8.12.2007, p. 59).</p> <p>Ir-Regolament (KE) Nru 1889/2005 tal-Parlament Ewropew u tal-Kunsill tas-26 ta' Ottubru 2005 dwar kontrolli ta' flus kontanti deħlin fil-Komunità jew heġġin mill-Komunità (ĠU L 309, 25.11.2005, p. 9).</p> <p>Id-Deciżjoni Kwadru tal-Kunsill 2001/500/ĠAI tas-26 ta' Ġunju 2001 dwar il-hasil tal-flus, l-identifikazzjoni, l-intraċċar, l-iffriżar, il-qbid u l-konfiska tal-mezzi u l-qligħ mill-kriminalità (ĠU L 182, 5.7.2001, p. 1).</p>	Sena wahda

<p>Id-Deciżjoni tal-Kunsill 2000/642/ĠAI tas-17 ta' Ottubru 2000 li tikkonċerna l-arranġamenti għall-kooperazzjoni bejn l-unitajiet tal-intelliġenża finanzjarja tal-Istati Membri fir-rigward tal-iskambju tal-informazzjoni (ĠU L 271, 24.10.2000, p. 4).</p>	Sena wahda
<p>Il-prevenzjoni tal-frodi u tal-iffalsifikar</p>	
<p>Ir-Regolament tal-Kunsill (KE) Nru 1338/2001 tat-28 ta' Ġunju 2001 li jstabbilixxi miżuri neċessarji għall-protezzjoni mill-iffalsifikar tal-euro (ĠU L 181, 4.7.2001, p. 6).</p> <p>Emendat bi:</p> <p>Ir-Regolament tal-Kunsill (KE) Nru 44/2009 tat-18 ta' Diċembru 2008 li jemenda r-Regolament (KE) Nru 1338/2001 li jstabbilixxi l-miżuri neċessarji għall-protezzjoni kontra l-iffalsifikar tal-euro (ĠU L 17, 22.1.2009, p. 1).</p>	Sena wahda
<p>Id-Deciżjoni tal-Kunsill 2003/861/KE tat-8 ta' Diċembru 2003 li tikkonċerna l-analiżi u l-kooperazzjoni fir-rigward ta' muniti foloz tal-euro (ĠU L 325, 12.12.2003, p. 44).</p>	Sena wahda
<p>Ir-Regolament tal-Kunsill (KE) Nru 2182/2004 tas-6 ta' Diċembru 2004 dwar midalji u tokens simili għall-muniti tal-euro (ĠU L 373, 21.12.2004, p. 1).</p> <p>Emendat bi:</p> <p>Ir-Regolament tal-Kunsill (KE) Nru 46/2009 tat-18 ta' Diċembru 2008 li jemenda r-Regolament (KE) Nru 2182/2004 dwar midalji u tokens simili għall-muniti tal-euro (ĠU L 17, 22.1.2009, p. 5).</p>	Sena wahda
<p>Id-Deciżjoni Qafas tal-Kunsill 2000/383/ĠAI tad-29 ta' Mejju 2000 dwar iż-żieda fil-protezzjoni permezz ta' pjeni kriminali u sanzjonijiet oħra kontra l-iffalsifikar fid-dawl tad-dhul tal-euro (traduzzjoni mhux uffiċjali) (ĠU L 140, 14.6.2000, p. 1).</p> <p>Emendat bi:</p> <p>Id-Deciżjoni Kwadru 2001/888/ĠAI tal-Kunsill tas-6 ta' Diċembru 2001 li temenda d-Deciżjoni Kwadru Nru 2000/383/ĠAI dwar iż-żieda fil-protezzjoni permezz ta' pjeni kriminali u sanzjonijiet oħra kontra l-iffalsifikar fid-dawl tad-dhul tal-euro (traduzzjoni mhux uffiċjali) (ĠU L 329, 14.12.2001, p. 3).</p>	Sena wahda
<p>Id-Deciżjoni tal-Kunsill 2001/887/ĠAI tas-6 ta' Diċembru 2001 dwar il-protezzjoni tal-euro kontra l-iffalsifikar (ĠU L 329, 14.12.2001, p. 1).</p>	Sena wahda
<p>Id-Deciżjoni Qafas tal-Kunsill 2001/413/ĠAI tat-28 ta' Mejju 2001 li tiġġieled frodi u ffalsifikar ta' mezzi ta' hlas bi flus mhux kontanti (ĠU L 149, 2.6.2001, p. 1).</p>	Sena wahda
<p>Regoli dwar il-karti u l-muniti tal-euro</p>	
<p>Ir-Regolament tal-Kunsill (KE) Nru 975/98 tat-3 ta' Mejju 1998 dwar denominazzjonijiet u speċifikazzjonijiet tekniċi tal-muniti tal-euro maħsuba għaċ-ċirkolazzjoni (ĠU L 139, 11.5.1998, p. 6).</p> <p>Emendat bi:</p> <p>Ir-Regolament tal-Kunsill (KE) Nru 423/1999 tat-22 Frar 1999 li jemenda r-Regolament (KE) Nru 975/98 dwar denominazzjonijiet u speċifikazzjonijiet tekniċi tal-muniti euro maħsuba għaċ-ċirkolazzjoni (ĠU L 52, 27.2.1999, p. 2).</p>	Sena wahda
<p>Konklużjonijiet tal-Kunsill tal-10 ta' Mejju 1999 dwar is-sistema għall-immaniġġjar tal-kwalità għall-muniti tal-euro.</p>	Sena wahda
<p>Konklużjonijiet tal-Kunsill tat-23 ta' Novembru 1998 u tal-5 ta' Novembru 2002 dwar il-muniti għall-kollezzjonisti.</p>	Sena wahda

Ir-Rakkomandazzjoni tal-Kummissjoni 2009/23/KE tad-19 ta' Diċembru 2008 dwar il-linji gwida komuni għall-uċuħ nazzjonali u l-hruġ ta' muniti tal-euro mahsuba għaċ-ċirkolazzjoni, (C(2008) 8625) (ĠU L 9, 14.1.2009, p. 52).	Sena wahda
Il-Komunikazzjoni tal-Kummissjoni 2001/C 318/03 tat-22 ta' Ottubru 2001 dwar il-protezzjoni tad-drittijiet tal-awtur tad-disinn tal-wiċċ komuni tal-muniti tal-euro (C(2001) 600 finali) (ĠU C 318, 13.11.2001, p. 3).	Sena wahda
Regolament (UE) Nru 1210/2010 tal-Parlament Ewropew u tal-Kunsill tal-15 ta' Diċembru 2010 li jikkonċerna l-awtentikazzjoni tal-muniti tal-euro u t-trattament ta' muniti tal-euro li mhumiex tajba għaċ-ċirkolazzjoni (ĠU L 339, 22.12.2010, p. 1).	Sena wahda
Il-Linja ta' gwida tal-Bank Ċentrali Ewropew BĈE/2003/5 tal-20 ta' Marzu 2003 dwar l-infurzar ta' miżuri kontra r-riproduzzjoni tal-karti tal-flus euro irregolari u dwar il-bdil u l-irtirar tal-karti tal-flus euro (ĠU L 78, 25.3.2003, p. 20).	Sena wahda
Id-Deciżjoni tal-Bank Ċentrali Ewropew BĈE/2003/4 tal-20 ta' Marzu 2003 dwar id-denominazzjonijiet, l-ispeċifikazzjonijiet, ir-riproduzzjoni, il-bdil u l-irtirar tal-karti tal-flus euro (ĠU L 78, 25.3.2003, p. 16).	Sena wahda
Ir-Regolament tal-Kunsill (KE) Nru 2532/98 tat-23 Novembru 1998 dwar il-poteri tal-Bank Ċentrali Ewropew li jimponi sanzjonijiet (ĠU L 318, 27.11.1998, p. 4-7).	Sena wahda
(BĈE/2010/14). Id-Deciżjoni tal-Bank Ċentrali Ewropew tas-16 ta' Settembru 2010 dwar il-verifika tal-awtenticità u l-kundizzjoni u r-riċirkolazzjoni tal-karti tal-flus tal-euro (ĠU L 267, 9.10.2010, p. 1).	Sena wahda
Legiżlazzjoni Bankarja u Finanzjarja	
Id-Direttiva tal-Kummissjoni 2006/73/KE tal-10 ta' Awwissu 2006 li timplimenta d-Direttiva 2004/39/KE tal-Parlament Ewropew u tal-Kunsill rigward ir-rekwiżiti organizzattivi u l-kundizzjonijiet ta' hidma tal-kumpaniji tal-investment u t-termini definiti għall-ghanijiet ta' dik id-Direttiva (ĠU L 241, 2.9.2006, p. 26-58).	6 snin
Ir-Regolament tal-Kummissjoni (KE) Nru 1287/2006 tal-10 ta' Awwissu 2006 li jimplementa d-Direttiva 2004/39/KE tal-Parlament Ewropew u tal-Kunsill dwar l-obbligi tad-ditti ta' investment li jzommu r-registri, ir-rapportaġġ tat-tranzazzjonijiet, it-trasparenza tas-suq, l-ammissjoni tal-istrumenti finanzjarji għan-negożjar, u t-termini ddefiniti għall-finijiet ta' dik id-Direttiva (ĠU L 241, 2.9.2006, p. 1-25).	6 snin
Id-Direttiva 1997/5/KE tal-Parlament Ewropew u tal-Kunsill tas-27 ta' Jannar 1997 dwar it-trasferimenti transkonfini ta' kreditu (ĠU L 43, 14.2.1997, p. 25-30).	6 snin
Id-Direttiva 2006/49/KE tal-Parlament Ewropew u tal-Kunsill tal-14 ta' Ġunju 2006 dwar l-adeqgatezza kapitali ta' ditti tal-investment u istituzzjonijiet ta' kreditu (riformulazzjoni) (ĠU L 239M, 10.9.2010, p. 201-255).	4 snin
Emendata bi:	
Id-Direttiva 2008/23/KE tal-Parlament Ewropew u tal-Kunsill tal-11 ta' Marzu 2008 li temenda d-Direttiva 2006/49/KE dwar l-adeqgatezza tal-kapital tal-kumpaniji tal-investment u istituzzjonijiet ta' kreditu, fir-rigward tas-setgħat ta' implimentazzjoni mogħtija lill-Kummissjoni (ĠU L 76, 19.3.2008, p. 54).	
Id-Direttiva 2009/27/KE tal-Kummissjoni tas-7 ta' April 2009 li temenda ċerti annessi tad-Direttiva 2006/49/KE tal-Parlament Ewropew u tal-Kunsill fir-rigward ta' dispożizzjonijiet tekniċi li għandhom x'jaqsmu mal-ġestjoni tar-riskju (ĠU L 94, 8.4.2009, p. 97).	
Id-Direttiva 2009/111/KE tal-Parlament Ewropew u tal-Kunsill tas-16 ta' Settembru 2009 li temenda d-Direttivi 2006/48/KE, 2006/49/KE u 2007/64/KE dwar banek affiljati ma' istituzzjonijiet ċentrali, ċerti elementi ta' fondi proprji, espożizzjonijiet kbar, arrangamenti supervizorji, u l-ġestjoni tal-kriżijiet (ĠU L 302, 17.11.2009, p. 97).	

Id-Direttiva 2010/76/UE tal-Parlament Ewropew u tal-Kunsill tal-24 ta' Novembru 2010 li temenda d-Direttivi 2006/48/KE u 2006/49/KE dwar ir-rekwiżiti kapitali għall-kotba tal-kummerċ u għar-rititolizzazzjonijiet, u r-reviżjoni superviżorja tal-politiki dwar ir-rimunerazzjoni (ĠU L 329, 14.12.2010, p. 3).

Id-Direttiva 2010/78/UE tal-Parlament Ewropew u tal-Kunsill tal-24 ta' Novembru 2010 li temenda d-Direttivi 98/26/KE, 2002/87/KE, 2003/6/KE, 2003/41/KE, 2003/71/KE, 2004/39/KE, 2004/109/KE, 2005/60/KE, 2006/48/KE, 2006/49/KE u 2009/65/KE fir-rigward tas-setgħat tal-Awtorità Superviżorja Ewropea (Awtorità Bankarja Ewropea), l-Awtorità Superviżorja Ewropea (Awtorità Ewropea tal-Assigurazzjoni u l-Pensjonijiet tax-Xogħol) u l-Awtorità Superviżorja Ewropea (Awtorità Ewropea tat-Titoli u s-Swieq) (ĠU L 331, 15.12.2010, p. 120).

Id-Direttiva 2006/48/KE tal-Parlament Ewropew u tal-Kunsill tal-14 ta' Ġunju 2006 rigward il-bidu u l-eżerċizzju tan-negozju tal-istituzzjonijiet ta' kreditu (tfassil mill-ġdid) (ĠU L 177, 30.6.2006, p. 1).

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Emendata bi:

Id-Direttiva tal-Kummissjoni 2007/18/KE tas-27 ta' Marzu 2007 li temenda d-Direttiva 2006/48/KE tal-Parlament Ewropew u tal-Kunsill dwar l-eskluzjoni jew l-inkluzjoni ta' ċerti istituzzjonijiet mill-ambitu tal-applikazzjoni u tat-trattament ta' esposures għall-banek ta' żvilupp multilaterali (ĠU L 87, 28.3.2007, p. 9).

Id-Direttiva 2007/44/KE tal-Parlament Ewropew u tal-Kunsill tal-5 ta' Settembru 2007 li temenda d-Direttiva tal-Kunsill 92/49/KEE u d-Direttivi 2002/83/KE, 2004/39/KE, 2005/68/KE u 2006/48/KE fir-rigward tar-regoli ta' proċedura u l-kriterji ta' evalwazzjoni għall-evalwazzjoni prudenzjali ta' akkwisti u ż-żidiet fil-holdings fis-settur finanzjarju (ĠU L 247, 21.9.2007, p. 1).

Id-Direttiva 2007/64/KE tal-Parlament Ewropew u tal-Kunsill tat-13 ta' Novembru 2007 dwar is-servizzi ta' hłas fis-suq intern li temenda d-Direttivi 97/7/KE, 2002/65/KE, 2005/60/KE u 2006/48/KE u li thassar id-Direttiva 97/5/KE (ĠU L 319, 5.12.2007, p. 1).

Id-Direttiva 2008/24/KE tal-Parlament Ewropew u tal-Kunsill tal-11 ta' Marzu 2008 li temenda d-Direttiva 2006/48/KE dwar l-istabbiliment u l-eżerċizzju tal-attività ta' istituzzjonijiet ta' kreditu, fir-rigward tas-setgħat ta' implimentazzjoni konferiti lill-Kummissjoni (ĠU L 81, 20.3.2008, p. 38).

Id-Direttiva tal-Kummissjoni 2009/83/KE tas-27 ta' Lulju 2009 li temenda ċerti annessi tad-Direttiva 2006/48/KE tal-Parlament Ewropew u tal-Kunsill fir-rigward tad-dispożizzjonijiet tekniċi li għandhom xjaqsmu mal-ġestjoni tar-riskju (ĠU L 196, 28.7.2009, p. 14).

Id-Direttiva 2009/110/KE tal-Parlament Ewropew u tal-Kunsill tas-16 ta' Settembru 2009 dwar il-bidu, l-eżerċizzju u s-superviżjoni prudenzjali tan-negozju tal-istituzzjonijiet tal-flus elettronici li temenda d-Direttivi 2005/60/KE u 2006/48/KE u li thassar id-Direttiva 2000/46/KE (ĠU L 267, 10.10.2009, p. 7).

Id-Direttiva 2009/111/KE tal-Parlament Ewropew u tal-Kunsill tas-16 ta' Settembru 2009 li temenda d-Direttivi 2006/48/KE, 2006/49/KE u 2007/64/KE dwar banek affiljati ma' istituzzjonijiet ċentrali, ċerti elementi ta' fondi proprji, espożizzjonijiet kbar, arrangamenti superviżorji u l-ġestjoni tal-krizijiet (ĠU L 302, 17.11.2009, p. 97).

Id-Direttiva tal-Kummissjoni 2010/16/UE tad-9 ta' Marzu 2010 li temenda d-Direttiva 2006/48/KE tal-Parlament Ewropew u tal-Kunsill fir-rigward tal-eskluzjoni ta' ċerta istituzzjoni mill-ambitu [kamp] tal-applikazzjoni (ĠU L 60, 10.3.2010, p. 15).

Id-Direttiva 2010/76/UE tal-Parlament Ewropew u tal-Kunsill tal-24 ta' Novembru 2010 li temenda d-Direttivi 2006/48/KE u 2006/49/KE dwar ir-rekwiżiti kapitali għall-kotba tal-kummerċ u għar-rititolizzazzjonijiet, u r-reviżjoni superviżorja tal-politiki dwar ir-remunerazzjoni (ĠU L 329, 14.12.2010, p. 3).

<p>Id-Direttiva 2010/78/UE tal-Parlament Ewropew u tal-Kunsill tal-24 ta' Novembru 2010 li temenda d-Direttivi 98/26/KE, 2002/87/KE, 2003/6/KE, 2003/41/KE, 2003/71/KE, 2004/39/KE, 2004/109/KE, 2005/60/KE, 2006/48/KE, 2006/49/KE u 2009/65/KE fir-rigward tas-setgħat tal-Awtorità Superviżorja Ewropea (Awtorità Bankarja Ewropea), l-Awtorità Superviżorja Ewropea (Awtorità Ewropea tal-Assigurazzjoni u l-Pensjonijiet tax-Xogħol) u l-Awtorità Superviżorja Ewropea (Awtorità Ewropea tat-Titoli u s-Swieq) (ĠU L 331, 15.12.2010, p. 120).</p>	
<p>Id-Direttiva 2009/110/KE tal-Parlament Ewropew u tal-Kunsill tas-16 ta' Settembru 2009 dwar il-bidu, l-eżerċizzju u s-superviżjoni prudenzjali tan-negozju tal-istituzzjonijiet tal-flus elettronici li temenda d-Direttivi 2005/60/KE u 2006/48/KE u li thassar id-Direttiva 2000/46/KE (ĠU L 267, 10.10.2009, p. 7).</p>	4 snin
<p>Id-Direttiva 2007/64/KE tal-Parlament Ewropew u tal-Kunsill tat-13 ta' Novembru 2007 dwar is-servizzi ta' hlas fis-suq intern li temenda d-Direttivi 97/7/KE, 2002/65/KE, 2005/60/KE u 2006/48/KE u li thassar id-Direttiva 97/5/KE (ĠU L 319, 5.12.2007, p. 1).</p> <p>Rettifika tad-Direttiva 2007/64/KE tal-Parlament Ewropew u tal-Kunsill tat-13 ta' Novembru 2007 dwar is-servizzi ta' hlas fis-suq intern li temenda d-Direttivi 97/7/KE, 2002/65/KE, 2005/60/KE u 2006/48/KE u li thassar id-Direttiva 97/5/KE (ĠU L 319, 5.12.2007) (ĠU L 187, 18.7.2009, p. 5).</p> <p>Emendata bi:</p> <p>Id-Direttiva 2009/111/KE tal-Parlament Ewropew u tal-Kunsill tas-16 ta' Settembru 2009 li temenda d-Direttivi 2006/48/KE, 2006/49/KE u 2007/64/KE dwar banek affiljati ma' istituzzjonijiet ċentrali, ċerti elementi ta' fondi proprji, espożizzjonijiet kbar, arranġamenti superviżorji u l-ġestjoni tal-kriżijiet (ĠU L 302, 17.11.2009, p. 97).</p>	4 snin
<p>Id-Direttiva tal-Kunsill 86/635/KEE tat-8 ta' Diċembru 1986 dwar il-kontijiet annwali u l-kontijiet konsolidati ta' banek u istituzzjonijiet finanzjarji oħrajn (ĠU L 372, 31.12.1986, p. 1).</p> <p>Rettifika tad-Direttiva tal-Kunsill 86/635/KEE tat-8 ta' Diċembru 1986 dwar il-kontijiet annwali u l-kontijiet konsolidati ta' banek u istituzzjonijiet finanzjarji oħrajn (ĠU L 60, 3.3.1987, p. 17).</p> <p>Emendata bi:</p> <p>Id-Direttiva 2001/65/KE tal-Parlament Ewropew u tal-Kunsill tas-27 ta' Settembru 2001 li temenda d-Direttivi 78/660/KEE, 83/349/KEE u 86/635/KEE fir-rigward tar-regoli ta' valutazzjoni għall-kontijiet annwali u kkonsolidati ta' ċerti tipi ta' kumpaniji kif ukoll ta' banek u istituzzjonijiet finanzjarji oħra (ĠU L 283, 27.10.2001, p. 28).</p> <p>Id-Direttiva 2003/51/KE tal-Parlament Ewropew u tal-Kunsill tat-18 ta' Ġunju 2003 li temenda d-Direttivi 78/660/KEE, 83/349/KEE, 86/635/KEE u 91/674/KEE fuq il-bilanċ ta' kontijiet annwali u konsolidati ta' ċertu kumpaniji, banek u istituzzjonijiet finanzjarji oħrajn u imprizi tal-assigurazzjoni (ĠU L 178, 17.7.2003, p. 16).</p> <p>Id-Direttiva 2006/46/KE tal-Parlament Ewropew u tal-Kunsill tal-14 ta' Ġunju 2006 li temenda d-Direttivi tal-Kunsill 78/660/KEE dwar il-kontijiet annwali ta' ċerti tipi ta' kumpaniji, 83/349/KEE dwar kontijiet konsolidati, 86/635/KEE dwar il-kontijiet annwali u l-kontijiet konsolidati ta' banek u istituzzjonijiet finanzjarji oħrajn u 91/674/KEE dwar il-kontijiet annwali u l-kontijiet konsolidati ta' intraprizi tal-assigurazzjoni (ĠU L 224, 16.8.2006, p. 1).</p>	4 snin
<p>Id-Direttiva 94/19/KE tal-Parlament Ewropew u tal-Kunsill, tat-30 ta' Mejju 1994 dwar skemi ta' garanzija għal depożiti (ĠU L 135, 31.5.1994, p. 5).</p> <p>Emendata bi:</p> <p>Id-Direttiva 2005/1/KE tal-Parlament Ewropew u tal-Kunsill tad-9 ta' Marzu 2005 li temenda d-Direttivi tal-Kunsill 73/239/KEE, 85/611/KEE, 91/675/KEE, 92/49/KEE u 93/6/KEE u d-Direttivi Nru 94/19/KE, 98/78/KE, 2000/12/KE, 2001/34/KE, 2002/83/KE u 2002/87/KE, sabiex tiġi stabbilita struttura organizzattiva ġdida għall-kumitati dwar is-servizzi finanzjarji (ĠU L 79, 24.3.2005, p. 9).</p>	4 snin

<p>Id-Direttiva 2009/14/KE tal-Parlament Ewropew u tal-Kunsill tal-11 ta' Marzu 2009 li temenda d-Direttiva 94/19/KE dwar skemi ta' garanzija għal depożiti fir-rigward tal-livell ta' kopertura u taż-żmien għar-rimborż (ĠU L 68, 13.3.2009, p. 3).</p>	
<p>Id-Direttiva 2001/24/KE tal-Parlament Ewropew u tal-Kunsill tal-4 ta' April 2001 fuq ir-rigorizzazzjoni u l-istralc ta' istituzzjonijiet ta' kreditu (ĠU L 125, 5.5.2001, p. 15).</p>	6 snin
<p>Id-Direttiva 89/117/KEE tal-Kunsill tat-13 ta' Frar 1989 dwar l-obbligi ta' fergħat stabbiliti fi Stat Membru, ta' istituzzjonijiet ta' kreditu u istituzzjonijiet finanzjarji li jkollhom l-uffiċċji ewlenin tagħhom barra dak l-Istat Membru rigward il-pubblikazzjoni ta' dokumenti tal-kontijiet annwali (ĠU L 44, 16.2.1989, p. 40).</p>	6 snin
<p>Id-Direttiva 2002/87/KE tal-Parlament Ewropew u tal-Kunsill tas-16 ta' Diċembru 2002 dwar is-supervizjoni supplimentari ta' istituzzjonijiet ta' kreditu, dwar imprizi ta' assigurazzjoni u ditti tal-investment f'konglomerat finanzjarju, u li temenda d-Direttivi tal-Kunsill Nru 73/239/KEE, 79/267/KEE, 92/49/KEE, 92/96/KEE, 93/6/KEE u 93/22/KEE u d-Direttivi 98/78/KE u 2000/12/KE tal-Parlament Ewropew u tal-Kunsill (ĠU L 35, 11.2.2003, p. 1).</p> <p>Emendata bi:</p> <p>Id-Direttiva 2005/1/KE tal-Parlament Ewropew u tal-Kunsill tad-9 ta' Marzu 2005 li temenda d-Direttivi tal-Kunsill 73/239/KEE, 85/611/KEE, 91/675/KEE, 92/49/KEE u 93/6/KEE u d-Direttivi Nru 94/19/KE, 98/78/KE, 2000/12/KE, 2001/34/KE, 2002/83/KE u 2002/87/KE, sabiex tiġi stabbilita struttura organizzattiva ġdida għall-kumitati dwar is-servizzi finanzjarji (GU L 79, 24.3.2005, p. 9).</p> <p>Id-Direttiva 2008/25/KE tal-Parlament Ewropew u tal-Kunsill tal-11 ta' Marzu 2008 li temenda d-Direttiva 2002/87/KE dwar is-supervizjoni supplimentari ta' istituzzjonijiet ta' kreditu, imprizi tal-assigurazzjoni u ditti tal-investment f'konglomerat finanzjarju, fir-rigward tas-setgħat ta' implimentazzjoni konferiti lill-Kummissjoni (GU L 81, 20.3.2008, p. 40).</p> <p>Id-Direttiva 2010/78/UE tal-Parlament Ewropew u tal-Kunsill tal-24 ta' Novembru 2010 li temenda d-Direttivi 98/26/KE, 2002/87/KE, 2003/6/KE, 2003/41/KE, 2003/71/KE, 2004/39/KE, 2004/109/KE, 2005/60/KE, 2006/48/KE, 2006/49/KE u 2009/65/KE fir-rigward tas-setgħat tal-Awtorità Supervizorja Ewropea (Awtorità Bankarja Ewropea), l-Awtorità Supervizorja Ewropea (Awtorità Ewropea tal-Assigurazzjoni u l-Pensjonijiet tax-Xogħol) u l-Awtorità Supervizorja Ewropea (Awtorità Ewropea tat-Titoli u s-Swieq) (GU L 331, 15.12.2010, p. 120).</p>	6 snin
<p>Id-Direttiva 2004/39/KE tal-Parlament Ewropew u tal-Kunsill tal-21 ta' April 2004 dwar is-swieq fl-istrumenti finanzjarji li temenda d-Direttivi tal-Kunsill Nru 85/611/KEE u 93/6/KEE u d-Direttiva 2000/12/KE tal-Parlament Ewropew u tal-Kunsill u li thassar id-Direttiva tal-Kunsill 93/22/KEE (GU L 145, 30.4.2004, p. 1).</p> <p>Rettifika tad-Direttiva 2004/39/KE tal-Parlament Ewropew u tal-Kunsill tal-21 ta' April 2004 dwar is-swieq fl-istrumenti finanzjarji li temenda d-Direttivi tal-Kunsill 85/611/KEE u 93/6/KEE u d-Direttiva 2000/12/KE tal-Parlament Ewropew u tal-Kunsill u li thassar id-Direttiva tal-Kunsill 93/22/KEE (GU L 45, 16.2.2005, p. 18).</p> <p>Emendata bi:</p> <p>Id-Direttiva 2006/31/KE tal-Parlament Ewropew u tal-Kunsill tal-5 ta' April 2006 li temenda d-Direttiva 2004/39/KE dwar is-swieq fl-istrumenti finanzjarji, fir-rigward ta' ċerti limiti ta' żmien, GU L 114, 27.4.2006, p. 60.</p> <p>Id-Direttiva 2007/44/KE tal-Parlament Ewropew u tal-Kunsill tal-5 ta' Settembru 2007 li temenda d-Direttiva tal-Kunsill 92/49/KEE u d-Direttivi 2002/83/KE, 2004/39/KE, 2005/68/KE u 2006/48/KE, fir-rigward tar-regoli ta' proċedura u l-kriterji ta' evalwazzjoni għall-evalwazzjoni prudenzjali ta' akkwisti u ziediet fil-holdings fis-settur finanzjarju (GU L 247, 21.9.2007, p. 1).</p> <p>Id-Direttiva 2008/10/KE tal-Parlament Ewropew u tal-Kunsill tal-11 ta' Marzu 2008 li temenda d-Direttiva 2004/39/KE dwar is-swieq fl-istrumenti finanzjarji, fir-rigward tas-setgħat ta' implimentazzjoni konferiti lill-Kummissjoni (GU L 76, 19.3.2008, p. 33).</p>	6 snin



<p>Id-Direttiva 2010/78/UE tal-Parlament Ewropew u tal-Kunsill li temenda d-Direttivi 98/26/KE, 2002/87/KE, 2003/6/KE, 2003/41/KE, 2003/71/KE, 2004/39/KE, 2004/109/KE, 2005/60/KE, 2006/48/KE, 2006/49/KE u 2009/65/KE fir-rigward tas-setgħat tal-Awtorità Supervizorja Ewropea (Awtorità Bankarja Ewropea), l-Awtorità Supervizorja Ewropea (Awtorità Ewropea tal-Assigurazzjoni u l-Pensjonijiet tax-Xogħol) u l-Awtorità Supervizorja Ewropea (Awtorità Ewropea tat-Titoli u s-Swieq) (ĠU L 331, 15.12.2010, p. 120).</p> <p>Issupplimentata bi:</p> <p>Id-Direttiva tal-Kummissjoni 2006/73/KE tal-10 ta' Awwissu 2006 li timplimenta d-Direttiva 2004/39/KE tal-Parlament Ewropew u tal-Kunsill rigward ir-rekwiżiti organizzattivi u l-kundizzjonijiet ta' hidma tal-kumpaniji tal-investment u t-termini definiti għall-għanjet ta' dik id-Direttiva (ĠU L 241, 2.9.2006, p. 26).</p> <p>Ir-Regolament tal-Kummissjoni (KE) Nru 1287/2006 tal-10 ta' Awwissu 2006 li jimplementa d-Direttiva 2004/39/KE tal-Parlament Ewropew u tal-Kunsill dwar l-obbligi tad-ditti ta' investment li jżommu r-reġistri, ir-rapportagġ tat-tranzazzjonijiet, it-trasparenza tas-suq, l-ammissjoni tal-istrumenti finanzjarji għan-negozjar, u t-termini ddefiniti għall-finijiet ta' dik id-Direttiva (ĠU L 322M, 2.12.2008, p. 253-277).</p>	
<p>Ir-Regolament (KE) Nru 924/2009 tal-Parlament Ewropew u tal-Kunsill tas-16 ta' Settembru 2009 dwar il-hlas transkonfinali fil-Komunità u li jhassar ir-Regolament (KE) Nru 2560/2001 (ĠU L 266, 9.10.2009, p. 11).</p>	6 snin
<p>Id-Direttiva 2002/47/KE tal-Parlament Ewropew u tal-Kunsill tas-6 ta' Ġunju 2002 dwar arrangamenti finanzjarji kollaterali (ĠU L 168, 27.6.2002, p. 43).</p> <p>Emendata bi:</p> <p>Id-Direttiva 2009/44/KE tal-Parlament Ewropew u tal-Kunsill tas-6 ta' Mejju 2009 li temenda d-Direttiva 98/26/KE dwar il-finalità ta' settlement fis-sistemi ta' settlement ta' pagamenti u titoli u d-Direttiva 2002/47/KE dwar arrangamenti finanzjarji kollaterali rigward sistemi konnessi u talbiet għal kreditu (ĠU L 146, 10.6.2009, p. 37).</p>	6 snin
<p>Ir-Rakkommandazzjoni tal-Kummissjoni 97/489/KE tat-30 ta' Lulju 1997 dwar it-transazzjonijiet permezz ta' strumenti elettronici ta' hlas u b'mod partikolari r-relazzjoni bejn min johroġ u l-pussessur (ĠU L 208, 2.8.1997, p. 52).</p>	6 snin
<p>Id-Direttiva 97/9/KE tal-Parlament Ewropew u tal-Kunsill tat-3 ta' Marzu 1997 dwar skemi ta' kumpens għall-investitur (ĠU L 84, 26.3.1997, p. 22).</p>	6 snin
<p>Id-Direttiva 98/26/KE tal-Parlament Ewropew u tal-Kunsill tad-19 ta' Mejju 1998 dwar finalità ta' settlement fis-sistemi ta' settlement ta' pagamenti u titoli (ĠU L 166, 11.6.1998, p. 45).</p> <p>Emendata bi:</p> <p>Id-Direttiva 2009/44/KE tal-Parlament Ewropew u tal-Kunsill tas-6 ta' Mejju 2009 li temenda d-Direttiva 98/26/KE dwar il-finalità ta' settlement fis-sistemi ta' settlement ta' pagamenti u titoli u d-Direttiva 2002/47/KE dwar arrangamenti finanzjarji kollaterali rigward sistemi konnessi u talbiet għal kreditu (ĠU L 146, 10.6.2009, p. 37).</p> <p>Id-Direttiva 2010/78/UE tal-Parlament Ewropew u tal-Kunsill tal-24 ta' Novembru 2010 li temenda d-Direttivi 98/26/KE, 2002/87/KE, 2003/6/KE, 2003/41/KE, 2003/71/KE, 2004/39/KE, 2004/109/KE, 2005/60/KE, 2006/48/KE, 2006/49/KE u 2009/65/KE fir-rigward tas-setgħat tal-Awtorità Supervizorja Ewropea (Awtorità Bankarja Ewropea), l-Awtorità Supervizorja Ewropea (Awtorità Ewropea tal-Assigurazzjoni u l-Pensjonijiet tax-Xogħol) u l-Awtorità Supervizorja Ewropea (Awtorità Ewropea tat-Titoli u s-Swieq) (ĠU L 331, 15.12.2010, p. 120).</p>	6 snin

<p>Id-Direttiva 2010/78/UE tal-Parlament Ewropew u tal-Kunsill tal-24 ta' Novembru 2010 li temenda d-Direttivi 98/26/KE, 2002/87/KE, 2003/6/KE, 2003/41/KE, 2003/71/KE, 2004/39/KE, 2004/109/KE, 2005/60/KE, 2006/48/KE, 2006/49/KE u 2009/65/KE fir-rigward tas-setgħat tal-Awtorità Superviżorja Ewropea (Awtorità Bankarja Ewropea), l-Awtorità Superviżorja Ewropea (Awtorità Ewropea tal-Assigurazzjoni u l-Pensjonijiet tax-Xogħol) u l-Awtorità Superviżorja Ewropea (Awtorità Ewropea tat-Titoli u s-Swieq) (ĠU L 331, 15.12.2010, p. 120).</p>	4 snin
<p>Ir-Regolament (UE) Nru 1093/2010 tal-Parlament Ewropew u tal-Kunsill tal-24 ta' Novembru 2010 li jistabbilixxi Awtorità Superviżorja Ewropea (Awtorità Bankarja Ewropea) u li jemenda d-Deciżjoni Nru 716/2009/KE u jhassar id-Deciżjoni tal-Kummissjoni 2009/78/KE (ĠU L 331, 15.12.2010, p. 12).</p>	4 snin
<p>Ir-Regolament (UE) Nru 1095/2010 tal-Parlament Ewropew u tal-Kunsill tal-24 ta' Novembru 2010 li jistabbilixxi Awtorità Superviżorja Ewropea (Awtorità Ewropea tat-Titoli u s-Swieq), u li jemenda d-Deciżjoni Nru 716/2009/KE u jhassar id-Deciżjoni tal-Kummissjoni 2009/77/KE (ĠU L 331, 15.12.2010, p. 84).</p>	4 snin
<p>Ir-Regolament (UE) Nru 1092/2010 tal-Parlament Ewropew u tal-Kunsill tal-24 ta' Novembru 2010 dwar is-sorveljanza makroprudenzjali tal-Unjoni tas-sistema finanzjarja u li jistabbilixxi Bord Ewropew dwar ir-Riskju Sistemiku (ĠU L 331, 15.12.2010, p. 1).</p>	4 snin
<p>Ir-Regolament tal-Kunsill (UE) Nru 1096/2010 tas-17 ta' Novembru 2010 li jagħti lill-Bank Ċentrali Ewropew kompiti specifici rigward il-funzjonament tal-Bord Ewropew dwar ir-Riskju Sistemiku (ĠU L 331, 15.12.2010, p. 162).</p>	4 snin
<p>Leġiżlazzjoni dwar il-għbir ta' informazzjoni statistika (l-Artikolu 6.1 tal-mandat)</p>	
<p>Ir-Regolament (KE) Nru 25/2009 tal-Bank Ċentrali Ewropew tad-19 ta' Diċembru 2008 dwar il-karta tal-bilanċ tas-settur tal-istituzzjonijiet finanzjarji monetarji (Riformulazzjoni) (BĈE/2008/32) (ĠU L 15, 20.1.2009, p. 14).</p> <p>Emendat bi:</p> <p>Ir-Regolament (UE) Nru 883/2011 tal-25 ta' Awwissu 2011 li jemenda r-Regolament (KE) Nru 25/2009 dwar il-karta tal-bilanċ tas-settur tal-istituzzjonijiet finanzjarji monetarji (Riformulazzjoni) (BĈE/2008/32) (ĠU L 228, 3.9.2011, p. 13).</p>	4 snin
<p>Ir-Regolament (KE) Nru 63/2002 tal-Bank Ċentrali Ewropew tal-20 ta' Diċembru 2001 dwar statistika fuq rati ta' imghax applikati mill-istituzzjonijiet finanzjarji monetarji għal depożiti u self għal familji u korporazzjonijiet mhux finanzjarji (BĈE/2001/18) (ĠU L 10, 12.1.2002, p. 24).</p> <p>Emendat bi:</p> <p>Ir-Regolament (UE) Nru 674/2010 tal-Bank Ċentrali Ewropew tat-23 ta' Lulju 2010 li jemenda r-Regolament (KE) Nru 63/2002 (BĈE/2001/18) dwar l-istatistika fir-rigward tar-rati tal-imghax applikati mill-istituzzjonijiet finanzjarji monetarji għal depożiti u self fil-konfront ta' households u korporazzjonijiet mhux finanzjarji (BĈE/2010/7) (ĠU L 196, 28.7.2010, p. 23).</p> <p>Ir-Regolament (KE) Nru 290/2009 tal-Bank Ċentrali Ewropew tal-31 ta' Marzu 2009 li jemenda r-Regolament (KE) Nru 63/2002 (BĈE/2009/18) dwar l-istatistika fir-rigward tar-rati tal-imghax applikati mill-istituzzjonijiet finanzjarji monetarji għal depożiti u self fil-konfront ta' households u korporazzjonijiet mhux finanzjarji (BĈE/2009/7) (ĠU L 94, 8.4.2009, p. 75).</p> <p>Ir-Regolament tal-Bank Ċentrali Ewropew Nru 2181/2004 tas-16 ta' Diċembru 2004, li jemenda r-Regolament (KE) Nru 2423/2001 (BĈE/2001/13) dwar il-karta tal-bilanċ ikkonsolidata tas-settur tal-istituzzjonijiet finanzjarji monetarji u r-Regolament (KE) Nru 63/2002 (BĈE/2001/18) dwar l-istatistika dwar ir-rati tal-imghax applikati mill-istituzzjonijiet finanzjarji monetarji fuq id-depożiti u s-self miżmuma mill-familji u l-korporazzjonijiet mhux finanzjarji (BĈE/2004/21) (ĠU L 371, 18.12.2004, p. 42).</p>	4 snin
<p>Il-Linja gwida tal-Bank Ċentrali Ewropew BĈE/2007/9 tal-1 ta' Awwissu 2007 fuq statistika monetarja, ta' istituzzjonijiet finanzjarji u tas-suq (riformulazzjoni) (ĠU L 341, 27.12.2007, p. 1).</p>	4 snin

Rettifika tal-Linja gwida tal-Bank Ċentrali Ewropew BĊE/2007/9 tal-1 ta' Awwissu 2007 fuq statistika monetarja, ta' istituzzjonijiet finanzjarji u tas-suq (riformulazzjoni) (ĠU L 84, 26.3.2008, p. 393).

Emendata bi:

Il-Linja gwida tal-Bank Ċentrali Ewropew BĊE/2008/31 tad-19 ta' Dicembru 2008 li temenda l-Linja Gwida BĊE/2007/9 fuq statistika monetarja, ta' istituzzjonijiet finanzjarji u tas-suq (riformulazzjoni) (GU L 53, 26.2.2009, p. 76).

Linja Gwida tal-Bank Ċentrali Ewropew BĊE/2009/23 tal-4 ta' Dicembru 2009 li temenda l-Linja Gwida BĊE/2007/9 fuq statistika monetarja, ta' istituzzjonijiet finanzjarji u tas-suq (ĠU L 16, 21.1.2010, p. 6).

Il-Linja gwida tal-Bank Ċentrali Ewropew BĊE/2011/13 tal-25 ta' Awwissu 2011 li temenda l-Linja Gwida BĊE/2007/9 fuq statistika monetarja, ta' istituzzjonijiet finanzjarji u tas-suq (ĠU L 228, 3.9.2011, p. 37).

Il-Linja gwida tal-Bank Ċentrali Ewropew BĊE/2007/7 tal-21 ta' Novembru 2002 dwar ir-rapporti tal-istatistika meħtieġa mill-Bank Ċentrali Ewropew fil-qasam tal-kontijiet finanzjarji għal kull kwart tas-sena (ĠU L 334, 11.12.2002, p. 24).

4 snin

Emendata bi:

Il-Linja gwida tal-Bank Ċentrali Ewropew BĊE/2005/13 tas-17 ta' Novembru 2005 li temenda l-Linja Gwida BĊE/2002/7 dwar l-obbligi ta' rappurtar tal-istatistika tal-Bank Ċentrali Ewropew fil-qasam tal-kontijiet finanzjarji trimestrali (ĠU L 30, 2.2.2006, p. 1).

Il-Linja gwida tal-Bank Ċentrali Ewropew BĊE/2006/6 tal-20 ta' April 2006 li temenda l-Linja Gwida BĊE/2002/7 dwar l-obbligi ta' rappurtar tal-istatistika tal-Bank Ċentrali Ewropew fil-qasam tal-kontijiet finanzjarji trimestrali (ĠU L 115, 28.4.2006, p. 46).

Il-Linja gwida tal-Bank Ċentrali Ewropew BĊE/2007/13 tal-15 ta' Novembru 2007 li temenda l-Linja Gwida BĊE/2002/7 dwar l-obbligi ta' rappurtar tal-istatistika tal-Bank Ċentrali Ewropew fil-qasam tal-kontijiet finanzjarji trimestrali (ĠU L 311, 29.11.2007, p. 47).

Il-Linja gwida tal-Bank Ċentrali Ewropew BĊE/2008/6 tas-26 ta' Awwissu 2008 li temenda l-Linja Gwida BĊE/2002/7 dwar l-obbligi ta' rappurtar tal-istatistika tal-Bank Ċentrali Ewropew fil-qasam tal-kontijiet finanzjarji trimestrali (ĠU L 259, 27.9.2008, p. 12).

**Ebda oppożizzjoni għal konċentrazzjoni notifikata**  
**(Każ COMP/M.6513 – Avenance Italy/Gemeaz Cusin)**

(Test b'relevanza ghaż-ŻEE)

(2012/C 121/03)

Fil-23 ta' Marzu 2012, il-Kummissjoni ddecidiet li ma topponix il-konċentrazzjoni notifikata msemmija hawn fuq u li tiddikjaraha kompatibbli mas-suq komuni. Din id-deċiżjoni hi bbażata fuq l-Artikolu 6(1)b tar-Regolament tal-Kunsill (KE) Nru 139/2004. It-test shih tad-deċiżjoni hu disponibbli biss fl-Ingliż u ser isir pubbliku wara li jitnehha kwalunkwe sigriet tan-negozju li jista' jkun fih. Dan it-test jinstab:

- Fit-taqsim tal-amalgamazzjoni tal-websajt tal-Kummissjoni dwar il-Kompetizzjoni (<http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/>). Din il-websajt tipprovdi diversi faċilitajiet li jgħinu sabiex jinstabu d-deċiżjonijiet individwali ta' amalgamazzjoni, inklużi l-kumpanija, in-numru tal-każ, id-data u l-indiċi settorjali,
- fforma elettronika fil-websajt EUR-Lex (<http://eur-lex.europa.eu/en/index.htm>) fid-dokument li jgħib in-numru 32012M6513. Il-EUR-Lex hu l-aċċess fuq l-internet għal-liġi Ewropea.

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**Ebda oppożizzjoni għal konċentrazzjoni notifikata**

**(Każ COMP/M.6479 – MNV/Rába)**

(Test b'relevanza ghaż-ŻEE)

(2012/C 121/04)

Fil-11 ta' April 2012, il-Kummissjoni ddecidiet li ma topponix il-konċentrazzjoni notifikata msemmija hawn fuq u li tiddikjaraha kompatibbli mas-suq komuni. Din id-deċiżjoni hi bbażata fuq l-Artikolu 6(1)b tar-Regolament tal-Kunsill (KE) Nru 139/2004. It-test shih tad-deċiżjoni hu disponibbli biss fl-Ingliż u ser isir pubbliku wara li jitnehha kwalunkwe sigriet tan-negozju li jista' jkun fih. Dan it-test jinstab:

- Fit-taqsim tal-amalgamazzjoni tal-websajt tal-Kummissjoni dwar il-Kompetizzjoni (<http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/>). Din il-websajt tipprovdi diversi faċilitajiet li jgħinu sabiex jinstabu d-deċiżjonijiet individwali ta' amalgamazzjoni, inklużi l-kumpanija, in-numru tal-każ, id-data u l-indiċi settorjali,
- fforma elettronika fil-websajt EUR-Lex (<http://eur-lex.europa.eu/en/index.htm>) fid-dokument li jgħib in-numru 32012M6479. Il-EUR-Lex hu l-aċċess fuq l-internet għal-liġi Ewropea.

**Ebda oppożizzjoni għal konċentrazzjoni notifikata**  
**(Każ COMP/M.6533 – Goldman Sachs/Advent International/TransUnion Corp)**

(Test b'relevanza għaż-ŻEE)

(2012/C 121/05)

Fis-17 ta' April 2012, il-Kummissjoni ddecidiet li ma topponix il-konċentrazzjoni notifikata msemmija hawn fuq u li tiddikjaraha kompatibbli mas-suq komuni. Din id-deċiżjoni hi bbażata fuq l-Artikolu 6(1)b tar-Regolament tal-Kunsill (KE) Nru 139/2004. It-test shiħ tad-deċiżjoni hu disponibbli biss fl-Ingliż u ser isir pubbliku wara li jitnehha kwalunkwe sigriet tan-negozju li jista' jkun fih. Dan it-test jinstab:

- Fit-taqsimha tal-amalgamazzjoni tal-websajt tal-Kummissjoni dwar il-Kompetizzjoni (<http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/>). Din il-websajt tipprovdi diversi faċilitajiet li jghinu sabiex jinstabu d-deċiżjonijiet individwali ta' amalgamazzjoni, inklużi l-kumpanija, in-numru tal-każ, id-data u l-indiċi settorjali,
  - fforma elettronika fil-websajt EUR-Lex (<http://eur-lex.europa.eu/en/index.htm>) fid-dokument li jgħib in-numru 32012M6533. Il-EUR-Lex hu l-aċċess fuq l-internet għal-liġi Ewropea.
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## IV

(Informazzjoni)

INFORMAZZJONI MINN ISTITUZZJONIJIET, KORPI, UFFIĊĊJI U AĠENZIJI  
TAL-UNJONI EWROPEA

## IL-KUMMISSJONI EWROPEA

Rata tal-kambju tal-euro <sup>(1)</sup>

Il-25 ta' April 2012

(2012/C 121/06)

1 euro =

Munita	Rata tal-kambju	Munita	Rata tal-kambju		
USD	Dollaru Amerikan	1,3206	AUD	Dollaru Awstraljan	1,2771
JPY	Yen Ġappuniż	107,35	CAD	Dollaru Kanadiż	1,3016
DKK	Krona Daniża	7,4399	HKD	Dollaru ta' Hong Kong	10,2468
GBP	Lira Sterlina	0,81940	NZD	Dollaru tan-New Zealand	1,6217
SEK	Krona Żvediza	8,8958	SGD	Dollaru tas-Singapor	1,6440
CHF	Frank Żvizzeru	1,2018	KRW	Won tal-Korea t'Isfel	1 506,66
ISK	Krona İzlandiża		ZAR	Rand ta' l-Afrika t'Isfel	10,2555
NOK	Krona Norveġiża	7,5625	CNY	Yuan ren-min-bi Ċiniż	8,3269
BGN	Lev Bulgaru	1,9558	HRK	Kuna Kroata	7,5325
CZK	Krona Ċeka	24,804	IDR	Rupiah Indoneżjan	12 149,96
HUF	Forint Ungeriz	287,83	MYR	Ringgit Malajżjan	4,0408
LTL	Litas Litwan	3,4528	PHP	Peso Filippin	56,314
LVL	Lats Latvjan	0,6993	RUB	Rouble Russu	38,7490
PLN	Zloty Pollakk	4,1738	THB	Baht Tajlandiż	40,859
RON	Leu Rumun	4,3765	BRL	Real Braziljan	2,4784
TRY	Lira Turka	2,3417	MXN	Peso Messikan	17,3461
			INR	Rupi Indjan	69,3910

<sup>(1)</sup> Sors: rata tal-kambju ta' referenza ppubblikata mill-Bank Ċentrali Ewropew.

**Komunikazzjoni tal-Kummissjoni dwar il-proċedura stipulata fl-Artikolu 1(4) tad-Direttiva tal-Kunsill 96/67/KE,**

(2012/C 121/07)

Skont id-dispożizzjonijiet tal-Artikolu 1(4) tad-Direttiva tal-Kunsill 96/67/KE tal-15 ta' Ottubru 1996 dwar l-aċċess ghas-suq tal-groundhandling fl-ajruporti tal-Komunità <sup>(1)</sup>, il-Kummissjoni hija meħtieġa tippubblika, għall-informazzjoni, lista tal-ajruporti msemmija fid-Direttiva.

	Ajruporti li t-traffiku annwali tagħhom jaqbeż 2 miljun moviment ta' passiġġieri jew 50 000 tunnellata ta' merkanzija fl-2010	Ajruporti oħra miftuħa għat-traffiku kummerċjali fl-2010
L-Awstrija	Wien/Schwechat	Linz, Graz, Salzburg, Klagenfurt, Innsbruck
Il-Belġju	Brussels National, Charleroi-Brussels South, Liège-Bierset, Oostende-Brugge	Antwerpen, Kortrijk-Wevelgem
Il-Bulgarija	Sofia	Varna, Burgas, Plovdiv, Gorna Oriahovitza
Ċipru	Larnaca	Paphos
Ir-Repubblika Ċeka	Praha/Ruzyně	Bmo/Tuřany, Karlovy Vary, Mnichovo Hradiště, Ostrava Mořnov, Pardubice, Olomouc, Benešov, Broumov, Břeclav, Bubovice, Česká Lípa, České Budějovice, Dvůr Králové nad Labem, Frýdlant nad Ostravicí, Havlíčkův Brod, Hodkovice nad Mohelkou, Hořice, Hosín, Hradec Králové, Hranice, Cheb, Chomutov, Chotěboř, Chrudim, Jaroměř, Jičín, Jihlava, Jindřichův Hradec, Kladno, Klatovy, Kolín, Krnov, Křižanov, Kyjov, Letkov, Letňany, Mariánské lázně, Medlánky, Mikulovice, Mladá Boleslav, Moravská Třebová, Most, Nové Město nad Metují, Panenský Týnec, Plasy, Podbořany, Policka, Příbram, Příbyslav, Rakovník, Raná, Roudnice, Sazená, Skuteč, Slaný, Soběslav, Staňkov, Strakonice, Strunkovice, Šumperk, Tábor, Točná, Toužím, Ústí nad Orlicí, Velké Pončí, Vlašim, Vrchlabí, Vysoké Mýto, Vyškov, Zábřeh, Zbraslavice, Žamberk
Id-Danimarka	Copenhagen Airport, Billund Airport	Aalborg Airport, Aarhus Airport, Esbjerg Airport, Bornholm Airport, Karup Airport, Sønderborg Airport, Thisted Airport, Roskilde Airport
L-Estonja		Lennart Meri Tallinn, Tartu, Pärnu, Kärđla, Kuressaare
Il-Finlandja	Helsinki-Vantaa	Enontekiö, Halli, Helsinki-Malmi, Ivalo, Joensuu, Jyväskylä, Kajaani, Kauhava, Kemi-Tornio, Kittilä, Kokkola-Pietarsaari, Kuopio, Kuusamo, Lappeenranta, Maarianhamina, Oulu, Pori, Savonlinna, Rovaniemi, Tampere-Pirkkala, Turku, Utti, Vaasa, Varkaus, Mikkeli, Seinäjoki
Franza	Paris-CDG, Paris-Orly, Nice-Côte d'Azur, Lyon-Saint Exupéry, Marseille-Provence, Toulouse-Blagnac, Bâle-Mulhouse, Bordeaux-Mérignac, Nantes-Atlantique, Beauvais-Tille	Pointe-à-Pitre-Le Raizet, Strasbourg Entzheim, Martinique Aimé Césaire, La Réunion Roland Garros, Montpellier-Méditerranée, Lille Lesquin, Ajaccio Napoléon Bonaparte, Bastia Poretta, Biarritz-Anglet-Bayonne, Brest-Bretagne, Pau Pyrénées, Hyères Le Palyvestre, Tarbes-Lourdes-Pyrénées, Grenoble Isère, Carcassonne, Rennes St Jacques, Perpignan-Rivesaltes, Figari Sud Corse, Cayenne Rochambeau, Clermont-Ferrand-Auvergne, Limoges, Calvi Ste Catherine, Bergerac Roumanière, Chambéry/Aix-les-Bains, Dzaoudzi Pamandzi, Metz Nancy Lorraine, St Martin Grand Case, Lorient-Lann-Bihoué,

<sup>(1)</sup> ĠU L 272, 25.10.1996, p. 36

	Ajruporti li t-traffiku annwali taghhom jaqbeż 2 miljun moviment ta' passigġieri jew 50 000 tunnellata ta' merkanzija fl-2010	Ajruporti oħra miftuha għat-traffiku kummerċjali fl-2010
		Nîmes/Arles Camargue, La Rochelle Île de Ré, St Barthélemy, Dinard-Pleurtuit-St-Malo, Rodez Marcillac, St Pierre Pierrefonds, Quimper-Cornouaille, Tours-Val de Loire, Poitiers-Biard-Futuroscope, Paris Le Bourget, Caen Carpiquet, Béziers-Vias, Deauville Normandie, Annecy-Meythet, Le Havre Octeville, St Pierre-Pointe Blanche, Lannion, Avignon Caumont, Castres Mazamet, Angoulême, Agen La Garenne, Maripasoula, Rouen-Vallée de Seine, Aurillac Tronquières, Brive Souillac, St Etienne Bouthéon, Cannes Mandelieu, Miquelon, Saint Nazaire Montoir, Dijon Bourgogne
Il-Ġermanja	Berlin-Tegel, Schönefeld, Bremen, Düsseldorf, Frankfurt-Main, Hahn, Hamburg, Hannover-Langenhagen, Köln-Bonn, Leipzig, München, Nürnberg, Stuttgart, Weeze	Augsburg, Altenburg – Nobitz, Borkum, Braunschweig, Dortmund, Dresden, Erfurt, Friedrichshafen, Heringsdorf, Hof-Plauen, Karlsruhe-Baden-Baden, Kassel-Calden, Kiel-Holtenau, Lübeck-Blankensee, Mannheim City, Memmingen, Mönchengladbach, Münster-Osnabrück, Paderborn-Lippstadt, Saarbrücken-Ensheim, Rostock-Laage, Schwerin-Parchim, Siegerland, Westerland-Sylt, Zweibrücken (!)
Il-Greċja	Athens, Iraklio, Thessaloniki, Rodos	Corfu-Kerkyra, Kos, Chania, Zante, Alexandroupoulis, Aktio, Araxos, Kalamata, Kalymnos, Kastoria, Kavala, Kozani, Aghialos, Astypalaia, Chios, Ioannina, Ikaria, Karpathos, Kasos, Kastelorizo, Kefalonia, Kithira, Leros, Limnos, Mykonos, Milos, Mytilene, Naxos, Paros, Samos, Santorini, Syros, Sitia, Skiathos, Skyros
L-Ungerija	Budapest Ferihegy	Pécs-Pogány Repülőtér, Győr-Pér Repülőtér, Fly Balaton Repülőtér Sármellék, Airport Debrecen
L-Irlanda	Dublin Airport, Cork Airport	Shannon Airport, Donegal Airport, Ireland West Airport Knock, Kerry Airport, Galway Airport, Sligo Airport, Waterford Airport
L-Italja	Roma-Fiumicino, Milano-Malpensa, Milano-Linate, Bergamo Orio al Serio, Venezia Tessera, Catania Fontanarossa, Napoli Capodichino, Bologna Borgo Panigale, Roma-Ciampino, Palermo Punta Raisi, Pisa San Giusto, Cagliari Elmas, Torino Caselle, Verona Villafranca, Bari Palese, Treviso	Firenze, Lamezia Terme, Olbia, Alghero, Genova, Brindisi, Trapani, Trieste, Forlì, Reggio Calabria, Ancona, Pescara, Rimini, Parma, Brescia, Lampedusa, Pantelleria, Cuneo, Perugia, Foggia, Crotona, Bolzano, Elba, Grosseto, Salerno, Albenga, Siena, Taranto, Tortoli
Il-Latvja	Riga International airport	Liepaja airport, Ventspils airport
Il-Litwanja		Vilnius International Airport, Palanga International Airport, Kaunas International Airport, Siauliai Military Airport
Il-Lussemburgu	Luxembourg-Findel	
Malta	Luqa-Malta International Airport	
Il-Pajjiżi l-Baxxi	Amsterdam-Schiphol, Maastricht-Aachen, Eindhoven	Groningen-Eelde, Rotterdam
Il-Polonja	Chopina w Warszawie, Kraków-Balice, Katowice-Pyrzowice, Gdańsk im. Lecha Wałęsy	Wrocław-Strachowice, Poznań-Ławica, Łódź-Lublinek, Szczecin-Goleniów, Bydgoszcz-Szwederowo, Rzeszów-Jasionka, Zielona Góra-Babimost



	Ajruporti li t-traffiku annwali tagħhom jaqbeż 2 miljun moviment ta' passigġieri jew 50 000 tunnellata ta' merkanzija fl-2010	Ajruporti oħra miftuha għat-traffiku kummerċjali fl-2010
Il-Portugall	Lisboa, Faro, Oporto, Madeira	Ponta Delgada, Porto Santo, Horta, Santa Maria, Graciosa, Pico, São Jorge, Flores, Corvo, Bragança, Vila Real, Cascais, Lajes.
Ir-Rumanija	Aeroportul Internațional Henri Coandă-București, Aeroportul Internațional București Băneasa-Aurel Vlaicu	Aeroportul Internațional Timișoara-Traian Vuia, Aeroportul Internațional Mihail Kogălniceanu-Constanța, Aeroportul Arad, Aeroportul George Enescu-Bacău, Aeroportul Baia Mare, Aeroportul Cluj-Napoca, Aeroportul Craiova, Aeroportul Iași, Aeroportul Oradea, Aeroportul Satu Mare, Aeroportul Sibiu, Aeroportul Ștefan cel Mare-Suceava, Aeroportul Târgu Mureș-Transilvania, Aeroportul Tulcea-Delta Dunării, Aeroportul Tuzla
Is-Slovakkja		Bratislava, Košice, Piešťany, Sliač, Poprad, Žilina
Is-Slovenja		Airport Jože Pučnik Ljubljana, Airport Edvard Rusjan Maribor, Airport Portorož
Spanja	Alicante, Barcelona, Bilbao, Fuerteventura, Girona, Gran Canaria, Ibiza, Lanzarote, Madrid/Barajas, Málaga, Menorca, Palma de Mallorca, Santiago de Compostela, Sevilla, Tenerife Norte, Tenerife Sur, Valencia	Asturias, Coruña (A), Jerez, Murcia/San Javier, Reus, Vigo, Vitoria, Zaragoza, Albacete, Algeciras/Helipuerto, Almería, Badajoz, Burgos, Ceuta/Helipuerto, Ciudad Real, Córdoba, Madrid/Cuatro Vientos, Madrid/Torrejón, Gomera (La), Granada, Hierro (El), Huesca-Pirineos, León, Lleida/Alguaire, Logroño, Melilla, Palma (La), Pamplona, Sabadell, Salamanca, San Sebastián, Santander, Son Bonet, Valladolid
L-Isvezja	Göteborg-Landvetter, Stockholm-Arlanda, Stockholm/Skavsta, Stockholm/Bromma	Arvidsjaur, Arvika, Borlänge, Eskilstuna, Falköping, Gällivare, Gällivare/Vassare, Gävle, Göteborg/Säve, Hagfors, Halmstad, Hemavan Tärnaby, Hultsfred-Vimmerby, Jönköping, Kalmar, Karlsborg, Karlskoga, Karlstad, Kiruna, Kiruna/Luosajärvi, Kramfors-Sollefteå, Kristianstad, Lidköping, Linköping/Malmen, Linköping/Saab, Ljungbyhed, Luleå/Kallax, Lycksele, Malmö/Sturup, Mora/Siljan, Norrköping/Kungsängen, Oskarshamn, Pajala-Ylläs, Ronneby, Skellefteå, Skövde, Stockholm/Västerås, Storuman, Strömstad/Näsinga, Sundsvall-Härnösand, Sveg, Sätenäs, Söderhamn, Torsby/Fryklanda, Trollhättan-Vänersborg, Umeå, Uppsala, Vidsel, Vilhelmina, Visby, Växjö/Kronoberg, Åre-Östersund, Ängelholm, Örebro, Örnköldsvik
Ir-Renju Unit	Heathrow, Gatwick, Stansted, Manchester, Luton, Edinburgh, Birmingham, Glasgow, Bristol, Liverpool, Newcastle, Prestwick, East Midlands International, Southampton, Belfast International, London City, Aberdeen, Belfast City, Leeds Bradford	Barra, Benbecula, Biggin Hill, Blackpool, Bournemouth, Cambridge, Campbeltown, Cardiff Wales, City of Derry, Doncaster Sheffield, Durham Tees Valley, Exeter, Farnborough, Gloucestershire, Humberside, Inverness, Islay, Isles of Scilly, Kirkwall, Lands End, Lerwick, Lydd, Manston, Newquay, Norwich, Oxford, Penzance Heliport, Plymouth, Scatsa, Shoreham, Southend, Stornoway, Sumburgh, Tiree, Wick

(<sup>1</sup>) L-ajruporti li t-traffiku annwali tagħhom jammonta għal inqas minn 10 000 passigġier fis-sena mhumiex elenkati.

## IL-QORTI TAL-AWDITURI

### **Ir-Rapport Speċjali Nru 4/2012 “L-użu ta’ Fondi Strutturali u ta’ Koeżjoni għall-kofinanzjament ta’ infrastrutturi tat-trasport fil-portijiet: investiment effettiv?”**

(2012/C 121/08)

Il-Qorti Ewropea tal-Awdituri tinfirmak li r-Rapport Speċjali Nru 4/2012 “L-użu ta’ Fondi Strutturali u ta’ Koeżjoni għall-kofinanzjament ta’ infrastrutturi tat-trasport fil-portijiet: investiment effettiv?” għadu kif gie ppubblikat.

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## INFORMAZZJONI DWAR IŻ-ŻONA EKONOMIKA EWROPEA

## AWTORITÀ TA' SORVELJANZA EFTA

**Stedina biex jittressqu kummenti skont l-Artikolu 1(2) fil-Parti I tal-Protokoll 3 għall-Ftehim bejn l-Istati tal-EFTA dwar it-Twaqqif ta' Awtorità ta' Sorveljanza u Qorti tal-Ġustizzja dwar il-bejgħ tad-dritt tal-municipalità ta' Narvik għall-elettriku konċessjonarju lil Narvik Energi AS ("NEAS")**

(2012/C 121/09)

Permezz tad-Deċiżjoni Nru 393/11/COL tal-14 ta' Diċembru 2011, riprodotta fil-lingwa awtentika fil-paġni li jsegwu dan is-sommarju, l-Awtorità tas-Sorveljanza tal-EFTA bdiet proċedimenti skont l-Artikolu 1(2) fil-Parti I tal-Protokoll 3 tal-Ftehim bejn l-Istati tal-EFTA dwar it-Twaqqif ta' Awtorità ta' Sorveljanza u ta' Qorti tal-Ġustizzja. L-awtoritajiet Norveġiżi ġew infurmati permezz ta' kopja tad-deċiżjoni.

Permezz ta' din in-notifika l-Awtorità ta' Sorveljanza tal-EFTA tavża lill-Istati tal-EFTA, lill-Istati Membri tal-UE u lill-partijiet interessati biex iressqu l-kummenti tagħhom dwar il-miżura inkwistjoni fi żmien xahar mid-data tal-pubblikazzjoni lil:

L-Awtorità ta' Sorveljanza tal-EFTA  
Reġistru  
Rue Belliard/Belliardstraat 35  
1040 Bruxelles/Brussel  
BELGIQUE/BELGIË

Il-kummenti se jkunu kkomunikati lill-awtoritajiet Norveġiżi. L-identità tal-parti interessata li tissottometti l-kummenti tista' tinżamm mistura wara talba bil-miktub li tiddikjara r-raġunijiet għat-talba.

## SOMMARJU

**Proċedura**

Permezz ta' ittra datata s-7 ta' Jannar 2009, ġie rreġistrat ilment kontra l-municipalità ta' Narvik ("il-Municipalità") rigward il-bejgħ tad-dritt tal-municipalità ta' Narvik għall-elettriku konċessjonarju lil Narvik Energi AS ("NEAS"). L-Awtorità rċeviet u rreġistrat l-ittra fl-14 ta' Jannar 2009 (Avveniment Nru 504391).

Bl-ittra tas-16 ta' Lulju 2009 (Avveniment Nru 519710), l-Awtorità talbet informazzjoni addizzjonali minghand l-awtoritajiet Norveġiżi. B'ittra datata t-2 ta' Ottubru 2009 (Avveniment Nru 532247), l-awtoritajiet Norveġiżi wiegħbu għat-talba għal aktar informazzjoni.

**Il-Valutazzjoni tal-miżura**

Il-Municipalità ta' Narvik u Narvik Energi AS għamlu kuntratt fis-16 ta' Ottubru 2000 li fuq il-bażi tiegħu l-municipalità bieghet id-drittijiet tagħha għall-elettriku konċessjonarju lil NEAS għal 50.5 sena għal NOK 126 miljun. L-Awtorità vvalutat il-probabbiltà ta' jekk it-tranzazzjoni saritx skont il-prinċipju tal-investitur f'ekonomija tas-suq, jiġifieri, jekk il-municipalità bighetx id-dritt għall-elettriku konċessjonarju għall-valur tiegħu fis-suq, u jekk il-prezzijiet u t-termini tat-tranzazzjoni kienux ikunu aċċettabbli għal investitur privat li jopera f'ekonomija tas-suq.

L-Awtorità għandha dubji fir-rigward tar-referenza sabiex jitqabbel il-kuntratt inkwistjoni. Barra minn hekk, kien hemm riskji tas-suq u regolatorji sinifikanti li setgħu affettwaw l-assunzjonijiet/varjabbli fil-mudelli tal-valutazzjoni użati biex jevalwaw il-prezz tad-dritt. Bħala riżultat, l-istimi tal-valur provduti mill-konsulenti esterni varjaw minn madwar NOK 70 miljun għal NOK 145 miljun. Il-firxa relattivament wiesgħa fil-valur tista' tindika li hemm incertezza dwar il-valur propja fis-suq tal-assi matul perjodu ta' 50 sena.

Barra minn hekk, l-Awtorità nnutat li ebda proċedura ta' sejha għall-offerti miftuħa u kompetittiva ma giet organizzata ex-ante u l-ebda klawnsoli ta' aġġustament ex-post fil-prezz ma ġew inklużi fil-kuntratt.

L-awtorità tistieden lill-awtoritajiet Norveġi biex jipprovdu biżżejjed informazzjoni biex juru li l-kuntratt dahal fis-seħh skont il-prinċipju tal-investitur f'ekonomija tas-suq u li għalhekk ma kienx jinvolvi għajjnuna mill-Istat.

### Konklużjoni

Fid-dawl tal-kunsiderazzjonijiet ta' hawn fuq, l-Awtorità għandha dubji jekk il-kuntratt bejn il-muniċipalità u n-NEAS huwiex konformi mal-prinċipju tal-investitur f'ekonomija tas-suq, u għalhekk f'dan l-istadju ma tistax teskludi li l-ftehim imsemmi hawn fuq ma kienx jinvolvi għajjnuna mill-Istat fi hdan it-tifsira tal-Artikolu 61(1) tal-Ftehim taż-ŻEE.

Għalhekk, l-Awtorità ddecidiet li tiftah proċedura ta' investigazzjoni formali skont l-Artikolu 1(2) tal-Ftehim taż-ŻEE. Il-partijiet interessati huma mistiedna jressqu l-kummenti tagħhom fi żmien xahar mill-pubblikazzjoni ta' dan l-avviż f'*Il-Ġurnal Uffiċjali tal-Unjoni Ewropea*.

## EFTA SURVEILLANCE AUTHORITY DECISION

No 393/11/COL

of 14 December 2011

**to initiate the procedure provided for in Article 1(2) of Part I of Protocol 3 to the Surveillance and Court Agreement with regard to the sale of Narvik municipality's entitlement to concession power to Narvik Energi AS**

(Norway)

THE EFTA SURVEILLANCE AUTHORITY ('the Authority'),

HAVING REGARD to the Agreement on the European Economic Area ('the EEA Agreement'), in particular to Article 61 and Protocol 26 thereof,

HAVING REGARD to Protocol 3 to the Surveillance and Court Agreement ('Protocol 3 SCA'), in particular to Article 1(2) of Part I and Articles 4(4) and 13(1) of Part II,

HAVING REGARD to the Authority's Decision of 14 July 2004 on the implementing provisions referred to under Article 27 of Part II of Protocol 3 <sup>(1)</sup>.

Whereas:

### I. FACTS

#### 1. Procedure

- (1) By letter dated 7 January 2009, a complaint was filed against Narvik municipality ('the municipality') regarding the sale of Narvik municipality's entitlement to concession power to Narvik Energi AS ('NEAS'). The letter was received and registered by the Authority on 14 January 2009 (Event No 504391).
- (2) By letter dated 16 July 2009 (Event No 519710), the Authority requested additional information from the Norwegian authorities. By letter dated 2 October 2009 (Event No 532247), the Norwegian authorities replied to the information request.

#### 2. The complaint

- (3) According to the complaint, on 16 October 2000 the municipality entered into a contract with NEAS for the sale of 128 GWh of annual concession power for a period of 50,5 years. For this, NEAS paid the municipality one upfront lump sum of NOK 126 million. The contract, that was entered into after negotiation between the contracting parties and without a competitive tender procedure, contained no index adjustment or other price adjustment clauses.

<sup>(1)</sup> Decision 195/04/COL, 14.7.2004 published in OJ C 139, 25.5.2006, p. 57 and EEA Supplement No 26, 25.5.2006, p. 1 as amended by Decision 319/05/COL, 14.12.2005 published in OJ C 286, 23.11.2006, p. 9 and EEA Supplement No 57, 23.11.2006, p. 31.

- (4) The complainant further alleges that the decision to enter into the contract was adopted by Narvik Municipal Council on the basis of incorrect and/or incomplete information. Allegedly expert reports critical of the duration of the contract and the inherent difficulty in establishing a market price for electricity were not disclosed to the Municipal Council prior to taking the decision to enter into the contract.
- (5) The complainant argues that the market price for the concession power over the contract period is significantly higher than NOK 126 million. Therefore the contract involves State aid.
- (6) The contract that forms the subject of the complaint is entitled 'Lease of concession power for a period of 50,5 years ...' <sup>(2)</sup>. However, throughout this Decision the Authority will refer to the contract as a contract of sale of Narvik municipality's entitlement to concession power. The Authority will, in its preliminary assessment, assess not only the contract but also all supplementary agreements to it, as well as any other circumstances surrounding and related to the sale.

### 3. Background

#### 3.1. Concession power regime

- (7) Any municipality which has hydropower production within its borders is entitled to receive an annual amount of concession power from concessionaires for waterfall exploitation.
- (8) The system of concession power is laid down in Section 2(12) of the Industrial Licensing Act <sup>(3)</sup> and Section 12(15) of the Waterfalls Regulation Act <sup>(4)</sup>.
- (9) Each municipality's entitlement to concession power is decided on the basis of its 'general electric power supply needs' <sup>(5)</sup> and can be up to 10 per cent of a plant's yearly production. The legal basis for the municipalities' right to concession power, referred to above, states that municipalities may dispose of the concession power as they see fit (irrespective of the fact that the amount to which they are entitled is calculated on the basis of their 'general electric power supply needs').
- (10) The price paid by the municipalities for the concession power is determined on an annual basis by the Ministry of Energy and Petroleum (MEP). The municipalities also carry the costs of feeding the concession power into the grid.
- (11) The majority of the municipality's concession power entitlements are due for assessment in 2019.

#### 3.2. Narvik municipality and the contract with Narvik Energi AS

- (12) Narvik municipality is located in the county of Nordland. NEAS is a company that is active in the production and sale of electricity. NEAS was 100 per cent owned by the municipality until 2001, when the municipality reduced its ownership stake in the company to 50,01 per cent.
- (13) In 1999, Narvik municipality had the right to purchase approximately 128 GWh of concession power annually. Approximately 10 per cent of this concession power was generated by NEAS, while the remaining 90 per cent was generated by other hydropower companies within the municipality (in which Narvik municipality had no stake).
- (14) Historically, the municipality had sold its concession power to NEAS under short- or longer-term contracts.
- (15) After the expiry of a three-year contract on 31 December 1998, the parties could not reach an agreement as to the prolongation of the contract. Until the concession power price for 1999 was published on 26 March 1999, the municipality therefore sold its concession power on a power exchange at spot prices.

<sup>(2)</sup> Event No 532254, Enclosure to the Norwegian authorities' letter of 2.10.2009, p. 1: 'Avtale mellom Narvik kommune og Narvik Energi AS om leie av konsesjonskraft for en periode av 50,5 år og om at konsesjonskraften anvendes som tinginnskudd ved aksjekapitalutvidelse i Narvik Energi AS.'

<sup>(3)</sup> [http://www.regjeringen.no/Upload/OED/Vedlegg/Lover%20og%20reglement/Act\\_No\\_16\\_of\\_14\\_-December\\_1917.pdf](http://www.regjeringen.no/Upload/OED/Vedlegg/Lover%20og%20reglement/Act_No_16_of_14_-December_1917.pdf)

<sup>(4)</sup> [http://www.regjeringen.no/Upload/OED/Vedlegg/Lover%20og%20reglement/Act\\_No\\_17%20of\\_14\\_-December\\_1917.pdf](http://www.regjeringen.no/Upload/OED/Vedlegg/Lover%20og%20reglement/Act_No_17%20of_14_-December_1917.pdf)

<sup>(5)</sup> According to the Norwegian Water Resources and Energy Directorate, this includes electric power for industry, agriculture and households, but not power for power intensive industries and wood conversion.

- (16) In March 1999, with knowledge of the concession power price for that year, the municipality arranged a tender procedure for the sale of its concession power for the remainder of 1999. On 30 March 1999, the Municipal Council sold this concession power to the highest bidder, Kraftinor, for a price of NOK 109,50/MWh. Since the municipality itself paid NOK 111,10/MWh plus feeding costs of NOK 20/MWh for the concession power, the municipality incurred a loss of approximately NOK 2,3 million under this contract (compared to a budgeted surplus of NOK 3,5 million).
- (17) According to the Norwegian authorities, electricity prices had been falling for several years and had reached their lowest point in 1998, but had picked up again in 1999. In 1999, the difference between concession power price and market price was, however, relatively small.
- (18) Due to the volatile and relatively low electricity spot prices, it was decided in a Municipal Council meeting held on 30 March 1999 that a long-term strategy for the future handling of the municipality's concession power was to be developed and presented to the Municipal Council in August 1999.
- (19) On 15 October 1999, the municipal administration proposed a strategy for the future handling of the concession power to the Municipal Council executive committee ('Executive Committee').
- (20) On 19 October 1999, the Executive Committee confirmed the proposal of the administration and recommended to the Municipal Council that the overall goal for handling the municipality's concession power should be 'to maximize return on a long-term basis in order to obtain a stable planning horizon with less uncertainty from year to year <sup>(6)</sup>.' The proposed strategy for achieving this goal had four elements:
1. Concession power is sold to the highest bidder on long-term contracts with a fixed return, however with adjustment clauses that give additional returns if the prices are substantially higher than the projected prices in the contract period;
  2. Concession power is sold under different contracts of different lengths to diversify risk;
  3. The mayor is granted power of attorney to enter into agreements according to the strategy decided by the Municipal Council; and
  4. Profits from the sale of the concession power is deposited into a fund to be dispersed according to decisions by the Municipal Council.
- (21) The strategy proposal was discussed on 25 November 1999 as Municipal Council Case 99/52 ('Strategy for handling of concession power').
- (22) The Municipal Council confirmed the recommendation of the Executive Committee with one adjustment, suggested by the mayor and confirmed by way of an amendment to the strategy: instead of the mayor being explicitly 'granted power of attorney to enter into agreements according to the strategy decided by the Municipal Council', the final decision stated that 'as a first step in executing this strategy, NEAS is invited to discuss their interest in the matter as outlined in their letter to the municipality dated 9 November <sup>(7)</sup>.'
- (23) The letter from NEAS dated 9 November questioned the proposed strategy of selling the concession power under different contracts of different lengths to spread risk. Instead, NEAS suggested one long-term contract ('for example 50 years' <sup>(8)</sup>) and was open to including a price adjustment clause in the contract with Narvik Municipality.
- (24) According to the documentation provided by the Norwegian authorities, NEAS had also proposed this type of contract earlier in the process. In a letter dated 15 April 1999, NEAS had approached the municipality stating its interest in entering into a long-term contract regarding the concession power, primarily through a purchase with an upfront lump sum payment, or alternatively as a long-term lease — suggested initially at 60 years — with annual payments to Narvik Municipality <sup>(9)</sup>.
- (25) Aside from the issue of the concession power, there were also discussions about NEAS' future role in the market, and the municipality's role as the owner of NEAS <sup>(10)</sup>.

<sup>(6)</sup> Event No 532250, Enclosure to the Norwegian authorities' letter of 2.10.2009, p. 13: 'Narvik kommunens konsesjonskraft håndteres ut fra hva som gir størst mulig avkastning på lang sikt. Målet er samtidig å gi kommunen en mer stabil planleggingshorisont gjennom å redusere usikkerheten fra år til år.'

<sup>(7)</sup> Event No 532250, Enclosure to the Norwegian authorities' letter of 2.10.2009, p. 6.

<sup>(8)</sup> Event No 532250, Enclosure to the Norwegian authorities' letter of 2.10.2009, p. 12.

<sup>(9)</sup> Event No 532249, Enclosure to the Norwegian authorities' letter of 2.10.2009, p. 7.

<sup>(10)</sup> See footnote 8.

- (26) According to the Norwegian authorities, NEAS was at the time observing extensive regional consolidation amongst power companies and the entry of national/international operators into local markets. NEAS needed to strengthen its equity base in order to acquire shares in other electricity companies, particularly Nordkraft AS. NEAS had also signed letters of intent with Hålogaland Kraft AS and Vesterålskraft AS, two local power companies, to form a regional production company and a regional energy transportation company. These changes were planned to take effect as of 1 January 2001. In order for NEAS to be able to complete these transactions with a combination of equity and borrowed capital, Narvik Municipality — NEAS' sole owner — was expected to inject additional equity into NEAS.
- (27) On 16 December 1999, the Municipal Council discussed Case 99/65 ('Sale of equity positions').
- (28) In this meeting, the Municipal Council assessed both its ownership position in NEAS and the above-mentioned capital needs of NEAS. It was decided that the municipality's ownership stake in NEAS, the capital needs of NEAS and the handling of concession power, should be assessed jointly by a negotiation team consisting of the mayor, the deputy mayor, the leader of the opposition, as well as the director, the deputy director and the head of procurement of the municipal administration ('the negotiation team'). The negotiation team was given the responsibility of implementing the decisions in Cases 99/52 and 99/65, and to make a recommendation to the Executive Committee.
- (29) During the winter and spring of 2000, both the municipality and NEAS sought external advice concerning the valuation of the concession power, the implications of the municipality injecting capital into NEAS, as well as the municipality reducing its ownership position in NEAS.
- (30) NEAS engaged Arthur Andersen ('AA') to make an assessment of the value of the concession power. AA's report was delivered on 20 May 1999. It estimated a net present value ('NPV') of the concession power transferred for 50 years to be in the range of NOK 71,4-117,4 million with a base case value of NOK 87,7 million<sup>(11)</sup>.
- (31) NEAS also commissioned a value assessment from Deloitte & Touche ('DT'). In its report dated 3 May 2000, DT estimated the NPV of the concession power, again for 50 years, to be approximately NOK 110-130 million<sup>(12)</sup>.
- (32) Narvik Municipality, on the other hand, initially asked Danske Securities ('DS') to assess whether Narvik Municipality should transfer its concession power to NEAS as a part of a restructuring process in NEAS, or if Narvik Municipality should sell the power independently. DS concluded, in a report dated 14 February 2000, that there were no economic or strategic reasons for transferring the concession power to NEAS. DS also — 'on its own initiative'<sup>(13)</sup> — made a value assessment of a 50-year contract, and concluded that such a contract had a value in the range of NOK 80-145 million.
- (33) DS was subsequently commissioned to perform a second assessment of the value of the concession power. In order to do so, it contacted three market participants — Statkraft SF, CBF Kraftmegling AS, and Norwegian Energy Brokers AS — and asked how they would value a 50-year concession power contract. Based on the responses, DS concluded, in a report dated 23 February 2000, that the NPV of the concession power was in the range of NOK 100-140 million<sup>(14)</sup>.
- (34) In addition to external advice, there were also internal assessments made by the head of procurement at the municipality.
- (35) In the first assessment presented to the Executive Committee in October 1999, he concluded that the overall risk for the municipality was high for long-term contracts defined as contracts between 10 and 40 years<sup>(15)</sup>.
- (36) In his second assessment, presented to the negotiation team on 16 March 2000, various options for handling the concession power were discussed. By this time, however, the negotiation team had narrowed the scope of his mandate<sup>(16)</sup>.

<sup>(11)</sup> Event No 532252, Enclosure to the Norwegian authorities' letter of 2.10.2009, p. 1 onwards.

<sup>(12)</sup> Event No 532252, Enclosure to the Norwegian authorities' letter of 2.10.2009, p. 38 onwards.

<sup>(13)</sup> Event No 532252, Enclosure to the Norwegian authorities' letter of 2.10.2009, p. 28.

<sup>(14)</sup> Event No 532252, Enclosure to the Norwegian authorities' letter of 2.10.2009, p. 16 onwards.

<sup>(15)</sup> Event No 532250, Enclosure to the Norwegian authorities' letter of 2.10.2009, p. 14 onwards.

<sup>(16)</sup> His mandate was narrowed to only assessing, *inter alia*, risk, time to settlement, tax implications and profit maximization for three scenarios (all involving Narvik Municipality transferring the concession power right to NEAS for a 50-year period and Narvik Municipality reducing its ownership stake in NEAS from 100 per cent to 51 per cent).

- (37) Notwithstanding this, in his second assessment, the head of procurement continued to focus on the importance of the length of the contract. His assessment of the marginal value of the entitlement to concession power over time was that '... to enter into a very long contract such as 50 years gives very little additional value for us as sellers compared to a shorter contract (for example 20 years with NOK 83 million) <sup>(17)</sup>.' After internal discussions regarding the advantages and disadvantages of a long-term contract, the negotiation team made its recommendation to the Municipal Council: it recommended a contract with a duration of 50,5 years as appropriate to reduce the municipality's risk and to provide a long-term planning horizon.
- (38) On 22 May 2000, the Municipal Council decided that the municipality should sell its entitlement to concession power to NEAS for 50,5 years and reduce its ownership in NEAS by as much as 49 percent by the end of 2000 <sup>(18)</sup>. From the information presented by the Norwegian Authorities, the above-mentioned independent expert reports were referred to in the memorandum distributed to the council members prior to taking the decision, but copies of the reports appear not to have been distributed <sup>(19)</sup>.
- (39) The contract was entered into on 16 October 2000. The municipality sold its entitlement to annual concession power to NEAS for 50,5 years for the price of NOK 126 million with all attached rights and obligations <sup>(20)</sup>. No price adjustment mechanism was included in the contract, and the price was to be paid as one upfront lump sum.
- (40) By a supplementary agreement dated 29 November 2000, the parties agreed that NOK 60 million would be paid to the municipality in cash, whereas the remaining NOK 66 million was to be injected into NEAS (at the time 100 % owned by the Municipality) as an equity contribution in kind.
- (41) In 2001, the municipality reduced its ownership in NEAS to 50,01 per cent.

### 3.3. *Comments by the Norwegian authorities*

- (42) The Norwegian Authorities are of the opinion that the contract with NEAS was concluded at market terms and that only the final arrangement regarding how the consideration was to be structured, as reflected in supplementary agreement of 29 November 2000, was influenced by the municipality's ownership interest in NEAS. The Norwegian Authorities point out that according to the decision of the Municipal Council dated 25 November 1999, it was an absolute precondition for the conclusion of any agreement with NEAS that the power would be sold on market terms <sup>(21)</sup>.
- (43) Since there was considerable uncertainty associated with price developments on both the revenue and cost side, and since there was also certain political uncertainty associated with the concession power regime in general, a long-term contract was deemed to offer the best stability in relation to future revenues.
- (44) The Norwegian Authorities further argue that it was appropriate for no price adjustment clause to be included, since the purchase price was paid as one lump sum, and not on an ongoing basis.

## II. ASSESSMENT

### 1. **The presence of State aid**

- (45) Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement reads as follows:

'Save as otherwise provided in this Agreement, any aid granted by EC Member States, EFTA States or through State resources in any form whatsoever which distorts or threatens to distort competition by favouring certain undertakings or the production of certain goods shall, in so far as it affects trade between Contracting Parties, be incompatible with the functioning of this Agreement.'

- (46) In the following, the Authority will assess the likelihood of whether the municipality has granted State aid to NEAS in connection with the sale of its entitlement to 128 GWh of annual concession power for a period of 50,5 years and at the price of NOK 126 million.

<sup>(17)</sup> Event No 532250, Enclosure to the Norwegian authorities' letter of 2.10.2009, p. 27.

<sup>(18)</sup> See footnote 11.

<sup>(19)</sup> Event No 532252, Enclosure to the Norwegian authorities' letter of 2.10.2009, p. 6.

<sup>(20)</sup> Event No 532254, Enclosure to the Norwegian authorities' letter of 2.10.2009, p. 1 onwards.

<sup>(21)</sup> Event No 532250, Enclosure to the Norwegian authorities' letter of 2.10.2009, p. 22.



### 1.1. *Economic advantage*

- (47) When governments make financial transactions and investments, the European Court of Justice has stated that in order to confirm whether a State measure constitutes aid, it is necessary to establish whether the recipient undertaking receives an economic advantage, which it would not have obtained under normal market conditions <sup>(22)</sup>. In order to assess the presence of an economic advantage, the Commission has developed the principle of a (hypothetical) market economy investor <sup>(23)</sup>.
- (48) If the transaction in question was carried out in accordance with the market economy investor principle, i.e., if the municipality sold the entitlement to concession power for its market value, and the price and terms of the transaction would have been acceptable for a prudent private investor operating in a market economy, the transaction would not confer an economic advantage on NEAS and thus not involve the grant of State aid. On the contrary, State aid could be involved if the transaction was not carried out at market price.
- (49) In making this assessment, the Authority cannot replace the municipality's commercial judgement with its own, which implies that the municipality, as the owner of the concession power right, must enjoy a wide margin of discretion. However, while the Authority fully recognises the right for public authorities to operate in the market on commercial terms, it should be assessed whether a similar agreement would have been concluded by a private market investor.
- (50) An assessment of the price and terms of the contract between the municipality and NEAS should be based on the information available to the municipality at the time of the conclusion of the contract. Generally, an informed *ex ante* assessment would be sufficient to exclude the presence of State aid, even if the assumptions used in the assessment prove to be wrong with hindsight.
- (51) In the following, the Authority will therefore assess whether a private investor would have entered into a contract to sell the entitlement to 128 GWh of concession power, every year for 50,5 years, for one upfront lump sum payment of NOK 126 million, and without a competitive tender procedure and without including any price adjustment clauses in the contract.
- (52) Throughout the preliminary assessment, the Authority will be mindful of the context in which the transaction was entered into. From the information provided by the Norwegian Authorities, the Authority understands that at the time the contract was entered into the municipality was in a situation where it needed both access to liquidity (in order to meet its loan obligations), as well as capital to inject into NEAS.

#### 1.1.1. *Contract for the sale of the municipality's entitlement to annual concession power to NEAS*

- (53) As described in section 3.1 of Part I above, the concession power regime gives the municipality the right to purchase 128 GWh of concession power annually, at a price determined by the Ministry of Energy and Petroleum. This price is meant to reflect the long-term costs of a representative power plant, and is presumed in the long run to be lower than the average market prices.
- (54) Municipalities may dispose of this concession power as they see fit, including using it for its own needs or selling the electricity in the market. Furthermore, the municipality can choose to sell the electricity in the spot market <sup>(24)</sup>, or on the basis of short- or longer-term contracts. If the municipality decides to sell the electricity on short- or longer-term contracts it is necessary, in order to exclude State aid, to sell the electricity at market terms.
- (55) A point of departure would therefore be to identify any possible market prices ('benchmark prices') to which the contract in question could have been compared. Any benchmark price should, ideally, be based on contracts of similar type and duration <sup>(25)</sup>. In this regard, the Authority observes that financial derivatives contracts <sup>(26)</sup> for the Nordic power markets, as offered by NASDAQ OMX Commodities Europe, are limited to a maximum duration of six years <sup>(27)</sup>.

<sup>(22)</sup> Case C-39/94 *SFEI v La Poste* [2006] ECR I-3547, para. 60.

<sup>(23)</sup> The market economy investor principle is described in more depth in the Authority's guidelines for State aid to public enterprises in the manufacturing sector and public authorities holdings.

<sup>(24)</sup> Spot market transactions through an electricity exchange are presumed not to include State aid because the market price is determined efficiently in a competitive market.

<sup>(25)</sup> Namely, bilateral wholesale concession power contracts entered into prior to or around the same time.

<sup>(26)</sup> Futures, forward, option and CfD.

<sup>(27)</sup> <http://www.nasdaqomxcommodities.com/about/>

- (56) Reference can also be made to long-term power contracts entered into between electricity companies and energy intensive companies. These contracts are different from financial contracts and thus are not immediately comparable, but it is important to note that the duration of these contracts normally does not exceed 25-30 years, and they usually include price adjustment mechanisms.
- (57) It is not clear from the information provided by the Norwegian authorities whether or not there is a market — and thus benchmark prices — for contracts of similar type and duration as the contract in the present case. If there are no benchmark prices, and thus no well-functioning market for contracts of comparable type and duration, this may be an indication that buyers and/or sellers of concession power find the risk of entering into contracts of this duration too high. However, the long duration of the contract is in itself insufficient to establish that the transaction was not in line with the market economy investor principle.
- (58) Therefore, the Authority must assess the risks and uncertainties involved in the contract in the present case, and ask whether or not these risks have been assessed by the municipality in a manner presumed acceptable to a market investor. In order to do so, it is appropriate to assess at least two sources of uncertainty/risk that affect the market price of the concession power entitlements: *regulatory risks* and *market risks*.

#### 1.1.1.1. Regulatory risks

- (59) According to information provided by the Norwegian authorities, the majority of the municipality's concession power entitlements are due for assessment in 2019. *A priori*, it is not possible for the Authority to determine what, if any, changes may be made to the regime. However, it is evident that any changes that are made to the entitlements — such as increasing or decreasing the volume of the municipality's concession power entitlements, changing how the concession power price is calculated or changing the structure of the right to concession power — may affect the market price of concession power entitlements.
- (60) This regulatory risk was identified by two external advisors consulted in the process leading up to the signing of the contract. The municipality instructed law firm Hjort DA ('Hjort') to assess *inter alia* the tax implications of selling the concession power entitlements. Hjort suggested that 50-year contracts are highly unusual, even for the energy sector, and argued that 'there is therefore reason to be critical about the value judgments that are/will be made, will be able to capture the long period as is suggested <sup>(28)</sup>.' Hjort also stated that the actual volume of the concession power entitlement may change over time, and pointed to the regulatory risk involved in the review of the concessions.
- (61) The same risks were also reflected in a report from Danske Securities AS ('DS'), which was commissioned by the municipality to perform a value assessment of the concession power entitlements (the second assessment referred to in section 3.2 of Part I above). DS asked three market participants to put a value on a 50-year concession power contract. It follows from the report that questions could be raised whether Statkraft SF would enter into an agreement longer than until 2019, when the majority of the municipality's concession power entitlements were due for assessment, because of the risk inherent in this process <sup>(29)</sup>.
- (62) Given that 60 per cent of the contract period in the present case is beyond 2019, the market price of a long-term contract such as the one between the municipality and NEAS is exposed to regulatory risk. It is the Authority's preliminary view that the effects of this risk are ambiguous, ultimately depending on whether or not the changes may be favourable to the beneficiaries of the concession power entitlements.

#### 1.1.1.2. Market risks

- (63) In order to establish a market value of an entitlement to 128 GWh of annual concession power, with revenue and costs occurring 50 years into the future, a market investor would normally apply a discounted cash flow analysis ('DCF') method. This method projects future cash flows (revenues and costs) and discounts them, using a weighted average cost of capital ('WACC') as a discount factor, to arrive at a net present value ('NPV') of the future cash flows. Under normal circumstances, this NPV would reflect the market price of the underlying asset.

<sup>(28)</sup> Event No 532252, Enclosure to the Norwegian authorities' letter of 2.10.2009, p. 32.

<sup>(29)</sup> Event No 532252, Enclosure to the Norwegian authorities' letter of 2.10.2009, p. 17.

- (64) In the current case, there are in particular five variables that affect the NPV of the concession power entitlement: (i) the annual concession power cost, (ii) the cost of feeding electricity into the grid, (iii) the total volume of concession power, (iv) the market price of electricity, and (v) the discount factor.

*Variables (i)-(iii) affecting the NPV of the concession power*

- (65) The first three variables — the annual concession power cost, the cost of feeding electricity into the grid and the total volume of concession power — are all exposed to the regulatory risk described above.
- (66) As regards the first variable (the price of the concession power), it appears from the information provided by the Norwegian authorities that this price is reasonably predictable. It is assumed that there will be limited, if any, real increases in the concession power price over the duration of the contract <sup>(30)</sup>.
- (67) Concerning the second variable (the cost of feeding the electricity into the grid), it is the Authority's understanding that this cost has been relatively constant over time and is predicted to remain steady in real terms over time. In addition, this cost amounts to approximately NOK 0,02 per kWh, and is thus of lesser importance relative to the other variables when calculating the net present value.
- (68) As for the third variable (the total volume of concession power available to the municipality), the municipality anticipates a continued right to 128 GWh annually for the foreseeable future, and a constant amount of electricity is also assumed in the valuation models developed by the external advisors. Concerning the volume of electricity, however, the Authority raises two specific questions:
- (i) whether the contract in question was entered into on the basis of valuations of 128 GWh or 116 GWh (the latter being only the volume of concession power not generated by NEAS itself); and
- (ii) what volume was contractually sold by the municipality to NEAS.
- (69) As regards the first question, both the AA report and the first DT value assessment used 116 GWh, being the concession power generated by electricity companies other than NEAS. The value assessment by DS also used 116 GWh, and they explicitly stated in their final report that:
- '... [w]e have assumed a volume of 116 GWh, though we cannot understand the reason why concession power delivered by NEAS itself should not be included in the calculations <sup>(31)</sup>.'
- (70) To illustrate this point, on 4 October 2000 (and thus just prior to signing the contract), NEAS had the value of the concession power reassessed by DT. By this point, DT had concluded that the value of the contract was NOK 150-170 million and not 110-130 million, as stated earlier in May 2000 <sup>(32)</sup>. It appears that this change was partly due to the minor adjustment of some of the assumptions used in the NPV calculation (amongst others the discount factor and the electricity prices), but it was also updated to reflect the value of 128 GWh of concession power and not 116 GWh. This second report was not disclosed to the municipality prior to it entering into the contract.
- (71) If incorrect assumptions about the volume have been used when determining the price of the contract, approximately 12 GWh of concession power generated each year by NEAS appear to have been transferred to NEAS without any apparent remuneration to the municipality. An economic advantage could thus have been conferred upon NEAS.
- (72) As regards the second question, the Authority finds reason to point out an apparent uncertainty as regards how the risk of future changes in the volume of concession power would be handled between the contracting parties.
- (73) Concession power is defined in the contract as the total volume of concession power to which the municipality is entitled from the three current concessionaires (Article 1) <sup>(33)</sup>. This suggests that the risk of any changes in the volume is transferred to NEAS. However, it is stipulated in Article 2 that in total the concession power is 128 GWh annually, which leaves open the question of what happens if that volume of the concession power entitlement is increased or decreased in the future.

<sup>(30)</sup> Price is only adjusted for expected inflation (CPI) To illustrate this point, in their valuation model DT adjusted the concession power price with 75 per cent of CPI over the life of the contract in their base case, and simulated results at 50 and 100 per cent of CPI respectively, to assess the sensitivity of the value assessment to changes in this assumption.

<sup>(31)</sup> See footnote 13.

<sup>(32)</sup> Event No 532253, Enclosure to the Norwegian authorities' letter of 2.10.2009, p. 1 onwards.

<sup>(33)</sup> Statkraft SF, Nordkraft AS and NEAS.

- (74) The two remaining variables — i.e. the market price of electricity and the discount factor — greatly impact the net present value of the concession power entitlement. These two variables were identified by DT as the factors to which the value estimates of the entitlement were especially sensitive to marginal adjustments.

*Variables (iv)-(v) affecting the NPV of the concession power*

- (75) The fourth variable (the market price of electricity) is considered to be highly volatile, resulting in uncertainty about future price developments, in particular over time. This is reflected in the fact that the expert reports referred to above only project future electricity prices approximately 10 years forward, beyond which electricity prices are assumed constant in real terms<sup>(34)</sup>. This uncertainty of future electricity prices is, as mentioned previously, also reflected in the fact that financial contracts on the Nordic power markets are limited to a maximum duration of six years.
- (76) The fifth variable (the discount rate) used in the present value calculations is the weighted average cost of capital, which is meant to capture the riskiness of the cash flows. The discount rate reflects both the time value of money (investors normally have a time preference and would rather have cash up front than having to wait, therefore they must be compensated for this delay), as well as a risk premium. Moreover, and similarly to the fourth variable (the market price of electricity), it may be difficult to accurately predict, for example, inflation and interest rates 50 years into the future<sup>(35)</sup>.

*Preliminary conclusion on market risks*

- (77) To illustrate the importance of the above variables in the valuation process, DT estimated that a one per cent increase in the return on capital requirement (WACC) would reduce the value of the concession power entitlement by NOK 22 million, while a one per cent reduction in the return on capital requirement would increase the value by NOK 29 million<sup>(36)</sup>. The value was also very sensitive to changes in electricity spot prices: a NOK 0,01 change in real spot prices over a 10 year period relative to the estimated prices in the model would change the value by NOK 16 million<sup>(37)</sup>.
- (78) As a result, the value estimates by the external advisors ranged from approximately NOK 70 million to NOK 145 million<sup>(38)</sup>. The relatively large range indicates uncertainty about the actual market value of the concession power entitlement over a period of 50 years.

*1.1.1.3. Competitive tender ex ante and/or price adjustment clauses ex post ('safety valves')*

- (79) In the absence of benchmark prices against which the contract in question could be compared, and in light of the uncertainty concerning key variables/assumptions in the valuation models used to assess the value of the concession power entitlement, the Authority questions whether a market investor would have taken further steps to establish the market value.
- (80) One way to increase the likelihood that the municipality sold the concession power at market prices would have been to use a competitive and unconditional tender procedure. A competitive bidding process would have allowed the market value of the concession power entitlement to be determined *ex ante*. Moreover, if the municipality allowed interested parties to make bids without stipulating a fixed duration, this would more likely have revealed the true market price of the underlying assets over the lifetime of the asset, which may have revealed whether a 50-year contract was the optimal length in order to 'maximize return on a long-term basis'<sup>(39)</sup>.
- (81) The Authority has, in that regard, taken note of the decision by the Municipal Council of 25 November 1999, in which a competitive tender procedure was expected to be part of the strategy when selling the concession power rights:

'Concession power is sold to the highest bidder on long-term contracts with a fixed return ... Concession power is sold under different contracts with different length to diversify risk.' (underlining by the Authority)

<sup>(34)</sup> Price only adjusted for expected inflation (CPI).

<sup>(35)</sup> This is reflected in the fact that both SSB and the Norwegian Central Bank only make predictions on economic indicators such as inflation and interest rates approximately 5-10 years forward, see for example: [http://www.norgesbank.no/pages/87289/Figurer\\_foredrag\\_reg\\_nett\\_11\\_11\\_2011.pdf](http://www.norgesbank.no/pages/87289/Figurer_foredrag_reg_nett_11_11_2011.pdf)

<sup>(36)</sup> Event No 532252, Enclosure to the Norwegian authorities' letter of 2.10.2009, p. 41.

<sup>(37)</sup> See footnote 32.

<sup>(38)</sup> Excluding the last study by DT, which estimated a value in the range of NOK 150-170 million.

<sup>(39)</sup> Event No 532250, Enclosure to the Norwegian authorities' letter of 2.10.2009, p. 13. This would be important because the independent advisers involved in the valuation process only assessed the value of the concession power for a period of 50 years, and did not necessarily assess how to 'maximize return on a long-term basis.'

- (82) If the municipality had sold the entitlement to the highest bidder, potentially to a company other than NEAS, it would seem that the municipality would subsequently still have capital available to inject into NEAS, which was part of the reason for selling it in the first place.
- (83) In addition to using a competitive tender process, another way to safeguard that the transaction was carried out at market terms would have been to require some form of price adjustment clause in the contract *ex-post*, to provide for potential fluctuations in electricity prices resulting in them deviating significantly from the forecasted prices used in the valuation models. This would also have been in line with the decision of 25 November 1999, that was the foundation of the transaction, in which it was stated that:

'Concession power is sold ... with adjustment clauses that gives additional returns if the prices are substantially higher than the projected prices in the contract period.' (underlining by the Authority)

- (84) Accordingly, it is the Authority's preliminary view that the lack of competitive tender procedure and/or the insertion of price adjustment clauses in the contract entails that we cannot exclude that the transaction involved State aid.

#### 1.1.1.4. Conclusion

- (85) In light of the information provided by the Norwegian authorities, the Authority is in doubt whether the terms of the contract between the municipality and NEAS concerning the sale of the entitlement to annual concession power for 50,5 years for the sum of NOK 126 million can be considered in line with the market economy investor principle. Therefore, the Authority cannot rule out that an advantage was granted to NEAS as a result of this transaction. If the entitlement was sold for a price below its market value, an economic advantage was granted to NEAS.

#### 1.2. Presence of State resources

- (86) The Authority understands that the price of NOK 126 million was paid by NEAS to the Municipality of Narvik by way of NOK 60 million paid to the municipality in cash, and NOK 66 million injected into NEAS (at the time 100 % owned by the Municipality) as an equity contribution in kind.
- (87) If the price NEAS paid for the entitlement was lower than the actual market price of the asset, the difference would represent foregone revenue for the municipality.

#### 1.3. Favouring certain undertakings or the production of certain goods

- (88) A selective economic advantage is considered to exist when it is found that a measure does not apply generally to all the undertakings in an EEA State <sup>(40)</sup>. In the present case, the aid measure appears to be selective in that it favours NEAS in comparison to other undertakings as only NEAS signed the contract with the municipality. The contract was the result of individual negotiations between the municipality and NEAS.

#### 1.4. Distortion of competition and effect on trade between Contracting Parties

- (89) The measure must distort competition and affect trade between the Contracting Parties of the EEA Agreement in order to be State aid.
- (90) A support measure granted by the State would strengthen the position of NEAS vis-à-vis other undertakings that are competitors active in the same business areas of production and sale of electricity. Any grant of aid strengthens the position of the beneficiary vis-à-vis its competitors and accordingly distorts competition within the meaning of Article 61(1) EEA. To the extent that the company is active in areas subject to intra-EEA trade, the requirements of Article 61(1) EEA for a measure to constitute State aid are fulfilled.
- (91) According to a report by the power exchange Nord Pool <sup>(41)</sup>, by the year 2000 there was a well-functioning Nordic power market. An effect on trade between the Contracting Parties as a result of the aid measure cannot, therefore, be excluded.

<sup>(40)</sup> Case C-256/97 *DM Transport SA* [1999] ECR I-3913, para. 27.

<sup>(41)</sup> Nord Pool, 'Trade at Nord Pool ASA's financial market', 8 March 2010, [http://www.nasdaqomxcommodities.com/digitalAssets/69/69445\\_tradenordpoolfinancialmarket.pdf](http://www.nasdaqomxcommodities.com/digitalAssets/69/69445_tradenordpoolfinancialmarket.pdf)

## 2. Procedural requirements

- (92) Pursuant to Article 1(3) of Part I of Protocol 3 SCA, 'the EFTA Surveillance Authority shall be informed, in sufficient time to enable it to submit its comments, of any plans to grant or alter aid. ... The State concerned shall not put its proposed measures into effect until the procedure has resulted in a final decision'.
- (93) The Norwegian authorities did not notify the contract between the municipality of Narvik and NEAS to the Authority. Therefore, the Authority concludes that if the measure constitutes State aid, the Norwegian authorities have not respected their obligations pursuant to Article 1(3) of Part I of Protocol 3 SCA.

## 3. Compatibility of the aid

- (94) Measures caught by Article 61(1) EEA are generally incompatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement, unless they qualify for a derogation under Article 61(2) or (3) EEA.
- (95) Article 61(2) EEA is not applicable to the aid in question, which is not designed to achieve any of the aims listed in this provision. Nor does Article 61(3)(a) or Article 61(3)(b) EEA apply to the present case. Furthermore, the aid does not appear to facilitate the development of certain economic activities or certain economic areas, further to Article 61(3)(c) EEA.
- (96) The Authority has so far not received any information that would indicate that the sale of concession power to NEAS is compatible with Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement. The Authority therefore doubts that the transaction under assessment can be justified under the State aid provisions of the EEA Agreement.

## 4. Conclusion

- (97) On the basis of the facts and assessment above, the Authority cannot exclude the possibility that the contract relating to the sale by Narvik municipality of its entitlement to annual concession power for 50,5 years to Narvik Energi AS, for the sum of NOK 126 million, constitutes State aid within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement. Furthermore, the Authority has doubts that this measure can be regarded as complying with Article 61(2) or (3) of the EEA Agreement. The Authority thus doubts that the measure is compatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement.
- (98) Consequently, and in accordance Article 4(4) of Part II of Protocol 3 SCA, the Authority is obliged to open the procedure provided for in Article 1(2) of Part I of Protocol 3 SCA. The decision to open proceedings is without prejudice to the final decision of the Authority, which may conclude that the measure in question is compatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement.
- (99) In light of the foregoing considerations, the Authority, acting under the procedure laid down in Article 1(2) of Part I of Protocol 3 SCA, invites the Norwegian authorities to submit their comments within one month of the date of receipt of this Decision. The Authority specifically asks the Norwegian Authorities to reply to the two questions raised in paragraphs 68 to 73 of this Decision.
- (100) In light of the foregoing considerations, the Authority requests the Norwegian authorities, within one month of receipt of this Decision, to provide all documents, information and data needed for the assessment of the compatibility of the sale of Narvik municipality's entitlement to concession power to NEAS.
- (101) The Authority invites the Norwegian authorities to forward a copy of this Decision to the potential recipient of the aid immediately.
- (102) The Authority would like to remind the Norwegian authorities that, according to the provisions of Protocol 3 SCA, any incompatible aid unlawfully put at the disposal of the beneficiary will have to be recovered, unless this recovery would be contrary to a general principle of law,

HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:

### Article 1

The formal investigation procedure, provided for in Article 1(2) of Part I of Protocol 3 to the Surveillance and Court Agreement, is initiated against Norway regarding the sale of Narvik municipality's entitlement to annual concession power for 50,5 years to Narvik Energi AS, for the sum of NOK 126 million.

*Article 2*

The Norwegian authorities are invited, pursuant to Article 6(1) of Part II of Protocol 3, to submit their comments on the opening of the formal investigation procedure within one month of the notification of this Decision.

*Article 3*

The Norwegian authorities are requested to provide, within one month of the notification of this Decision, all documents, information and data needed for the assessment of the compatibility of the aid measure.

*Article 4*

This Decision is addressed to the Kingdom of Norway.

*Article 5*

Only the English version of this Decision is authentic.

Done at Brussels, 14 December 2011.

*For the EFTA Surveillance Authority*

Oda Helen SLETNES  
*President*

Sverrir Haukur GUNNLAUGSSON  
*College Member*

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V

(Avviżi)

## PROCEDURI AMMINISTRATTIVI

L-UFFIĊĊJU EWROPEW GHAS-SELEZZJONI  
(TAL-PERSUNAL (EPSO))

## AVVIŻ TA' KOMPETIZZJONI ĠENERALI

(2012/C 121/10)

L-Uffiċċju Ewropew għall-Għażla tal-Persunal (EPSO) qed jorganizza l-kompetizzjoni ġenerali li ġejja:

EPSO/AD/232/12 – kap tal-unità (AD 12) tal-lingwa Bulgara fil-qasam tat-traduzzjoni ġuridika

L-avviż tal-kompetizzjoni huwa ppubblikat bil-Bulgaru biss fil-Ġurnal Uffiċjali C 121 A tat-26 ta' April 2012.

Għal aktar informazzjoni ikkonsulta s-sit tal-EPSO <http://eu-careers.eu>

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PROĊEDURI DWAR L-IMPLIMENTAZZJONI TAL-POLITIKA TAL-KOMPETIZZJONI

IL-KUMMISSJONI EWROPEA

**Notifika minn qabel ta' koncentrazzjoni**

**(Każ COMP/M.6557 – AGC Glass Europe/Interpane International Glas)**

**(Test b'relevanza għaż-ŻEE)**

(2012/C 121/11)

1. Fis-17 ta' April 2012, il-Kummissjoni rċeviet notifika ta' koncentrazzjoni proposta, skont l-Artikolu 4 tar-Regolament tal-Kunsill (KE) Nru 139/2004<sup>(1)</sup>, li permezz tagħha l-impriza AGC Glass Europe SA, ("AGC", il-Belġju), li hija kkontrollata minn Asahi Glass Co., Ltd ("Asahi", il-Ġappun) takkwista, skont it-tifsira tal-Artikolu 3(1)(b) tar-Regolament dwar l-Għaqdiet, il-kontroll shih b'mod kongunt tal-imprizi Interpane International Glas GmbH (il-Ġermanja) u Interpane Glass Holding AG (l-Isvizzera) (flimkien, "Interpane"), permezz tax-xiri ta' ishma.

2. L-attivitajiet kummerċjali tal-imprizi kkonċernati huma:

- għal AGC: il-produzzjoni u l-ipproċessar ta' hġieġ ċatt għall-industrija tal-bini, tal-karozzi, għall-industrija solari u industrij speċjalizzati oħrajn,
- għal Asahi: hġieġ, apparat elettroniku, skrinijiet, kimiki, ċeramika u operazzjonijiet oħrajn,
- għal Interpane: l-immanifatturar u l-ipproċessar ta' hġieġ tal-arkitettura.

3. Wara eżami preliminari, il-Kummissjoni ssib li l-operazzjoni nnotifikata tista' taq' fl-ambitu tar-Regolament tal-KE dwar l-Għaqdiet. Madanakollu, id-deċiżjoni finali dwar dan il-punt hija riżervata.

4. Il-Kummissjoni tistieden lill-partijiet terzi interessati biex jibagħtu kwalunkwe kumment li jista' jkollhom dwar l-operazzjoni proposta lill-Kummissjoni.

Il-kummenti jridu jaslu għand il-Kummissjoni mhux aktar tard minn għaxart ijiem wara d-data ta' din il-pubblikazzjoni. Il-kummenti jistgħu jintbagħtu lill-Kummissjoni bil-feks (+32 22964301), jew b'emejl lil COMP-MERGER-REGISTRY@ec.europa.eu jew bil-posta, taħt in-numru ta' referenza COMP/M.6557 – AGC Glass Europe/Interpane International Glas, fl-indirizz li ġej:

Il-Kummissjoni Ewropea  
Direttorat Generali għall-Kompetizzjoni  
Reġistru tal-Amalgamazzjonijiet  
J-70  
1049 Bruxelles/Brussel  
BELGIQUE/BELGIË

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<sup>(1)</sup> ĠU L 24, 29.1.2004, p. 1 (ir-"Regolament tal-KE dwar l-Għaqdiet").



PROCEDURI DWAR L-IMPLIMENTAZZJONI TAL-POLITIKA TAL-KOMPETIZZJONI

**Il-Kummissjoni Ewropea**

2012/C 121/11

Notifika minn qabel ta' koncentrazzjoni (Każ COMP/M.6557 – AGC Glass Europe/Interpane International Glas) <sup>(1)</sup> ..... 39



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<sup>(1)</sup> Test b'relevanza għaż-ŻEE

## PREZZ TAL-ABBONAMENT 2012 (mingħajr VAT, inklużi l-ispejjeż tal-posta b'kunsinna normali)

Il-Ġurnal Uffiċjali tal-UE, serje L + C, edizzjoni stampata biss	22 lingwa uffiċjali tal-UE	EUR 1 200 fis-sena
Il-Ġurnal Uffiċjali tal-UE, serje L + C, stampati + DVD annwali	22 lingwa uffiċjali tal-UE	EUR 1 310 fis-sena
Il-Ġurnal Uffiċjali tal-UE, serje L, edizzjoni stampata biss	22 lingwa uffiċjali tal-UE	EUR 840 fis-sena
Il-Ġurnal Uffiċjali tal-UE, serje L + C, DVD fix-xahar (kumulattiva)	22 lingwa uffiċjali tal-UE	EUR 100 fis-sena
Suppliment tal-Ġurnal Uffiċjali (serje S), Swieq Pubbliċi u Appalti, DVD, edizzjoni fil-ġimgħa	multilingwi: 23 lingwa uffiċjali tal-UE	EUR 200 fis-sena
Il-Ġurnal Uffiċjali tal-UE, serje C — Kompetizzjonijiet	Skont il-lingwa/i tal-Kompetizzjoni	EUR 50 fis-sena

L-abbonament f'*Il-Ġurnal Uffiċjali tal-Unjoni Ewropea*, li joħroġ fil-lingwi uffiċjali tal-Unjoni Ewropea, hu disponibbli fi 22 verżjoni lingwistika. Inklużi fih hemm is-serje L (Legiżlazzjoni) u C (Informazzjoni u Avviżi).

Kull verżjoni lingwistika jeħtiġilha abbonament separat.

B'konformità mar-Regolament tal-Kunsill (KE) Nru 920/2005, ippubblikat fil-Ġurnal Uffiċjali L 156 tat-18 ta' Ġunju 2005, li jstipula li l-istituzzjonijiet tal-Unjoni Ewropea mhumiex temporanjament obbligati li jiktbu l-atti kollha bl-Irlandiż u li jippubblikawhom b'din il-lingwa, il-Ġurnali Uffiċjali ppubblikati bl-Irlandiż jinbiegħu apparti.

L-abbonament tas-Suppliment tal-Ġurnal Uffiċjali (serje S — Swieq Pubbliċi u Appalti) jiġbor fih it-total tat-23 verżjoni lingwistika uffiċjali f'DVD waħdieni multilingwi.

Fuq rikjesta, l-abbonament f'*Il-Ġurnal Uffiċjali tal-Unjoni Ewropea* jaġħti d-dritt li l-abbonat jirċievi diversi annessi tal-Ġurnal Uffiċjali. L-abbonati jiġu mgħarrfa dwar il-ħruġ tal-annessi permezz ta' "Avviż lill-qarrej" inserit f'*Il-Ġurnal Uffiċjali tal-Unjoni Ewropea*.

### Bejgħ u Abbonamenti

Abbonamenti fil-perjodiċi diversi bi hlas, bħalma huwa l-abbonament f'*Il-Ġurnal Uffiċjali tal-Unjoni Ewropea*, huma disponibbli mill-uffiċini tal-bejgħ tagħna. Il-lista tal-uffiċini tal-bejgħ hi disponibbli fuq l-internet fl-indirizz li ġej:

[http://publications.europa.eu/others/agents/index\\_mt.htm](http://publications.europa.eu/others/agents/index_mt.htm)

**EUR-Lex (<http://eur-lex.europa.eu>) joffri aċċess dirett u bla hlas għal-liġijiet tal-Unjoni Ewropea. Dan is-sit jippermetti li jkun ikkonsultat *Il-Ġurnal Uffiċjali tal-Unjoni Ewropea* u jinkludi wkoll it-Trattati, il-legiżlazzjoni, il-ġurisprudenza u l-atti preparatorji tal-legiżlazzjoni.**

**Biex tkun taf aktar dwar l-Unjoni Ewropea, ikkonsulta: <http://europa.eu>**

