4.11.2004

Il-Ġurnal Uffiċjali ta’ l-Unjoni Ewropea

C NaN/1

RAPPORT SPEĊJALI Nru 3/2004

Rkupru ta’ pagamenti irregolari taħt il-Politika Agrikola Komuni flimkien mar-risposti tal-Kummissjoni

(skond l-artikolu 248, (4), it-tieni sottoparagrafu, KE)

WERREJ

I-IX

SOMMARJU

1-8	INTRODUZZJONI

9-68

ANALIŻI

9-15	Irregolaritajiet irrappurtati

16-20

Notifika ta’ irregolaritajiet: min jagħmel xiex?

21-27

Notifika ta’ irregolaritajiet: dewmien, nuqqasijiet u inkonsistenzi

28-29

Kontrolli fuq data: mhux sodisfaċjenti

30-32

Kwalità ta’ informazzjoni fuq pagamenti irregolari: inkomplut u inkonsistenti

33-39

Rkupru u tħassir: responsabbiltajiet ta’ pajjiżi membri u l-Kummissjoni

40-42

Rata baxxa ta’ rkupru

43-51

Deċiżjonijiet tal-Kummissjoni dwar min għandu jagħmel tajjeb għall-ispejjeż tal-pagamenti irregolari li ma nġabrux: m’hemmx prinċipji ċari

52-53

Diviżjoni ta’ responsabbiltajiet fil-Kummissjoni

54-60

Il-Kummissjoni tagħmel ftit użu mill-esperjenza tagħha fuq irregolaritajiet

61-62

Il-Black List

63-68

Reġistrazzjoni ta’ djun

69-73

KONKLUŻJONIJIET

74-80

RAKKOMANDAZZJONIJIET

Ir-Risposti tal-Kummissjoni

SOMMARJU

Il-pajjiżi membri għandhom l-obbligu li jgħarrfu l-Kummissjoni meta jiskopru pagamenti irregolari ta’ ’l fuq minn 4 000 euro mħallsin taħt il-Politika Agrikola Komuni (CAP) u jippruvaw jiġbru lura dawn it-tip ta’ pagamenti. Fejn l-irkupru mhux possibbli l-ammonti involuti huma mħassra u t-telf huwa mġarrab mill-Komunità sakemm l-irkupru ma sarx minħabba n-negliġenza tal-pajjiż membru konċernat. Hemm provvediment għall-Black List sabiex issir identifikazzjoni ta’ min jirċievi pagamenti irregolari ta’ ‘l fuq minn 100 000 euro fi kwalunkwe sena. Taħt arranġamenti separati l-pajjiżi membri jirrappurtaw lill-Komunità bid-dejn kollu li jirriżulta mill-CAP.

II.

Fl-aħħar tas-sena 2002 il-pagamenti irregolari totali rrappurtati mis-sena 1971 ammontaw għal 3,1 biljun euro. Minn dan l-ammont 537 miljun euro kienu ġew irkuprati mill-benefiċjarji u 252 miljun euro mħassra u mġarrba jew mill-Komunità jew mill-pajjiż membru konċernat. Il-bqija tas-75 % tal-pagamenti irregolari rrappurtati għadhom pendenti, la miġbura u lanqas mħassra. Ħafna mill-pagamenti irregolari rrappurtati huma konnessi ma’ l-intervent fi swieq: nefqa fis-settur tal-frott u l-ħxejjex u fuq kontijiet ta’ rifużjoni ta’ l-esportazzjoni għal aktar min-nofs it-total.

III.

Il-Qorti sabet illi l-pajjiżi membri jipprovdu informazzjoni fuq l-irregolaritajiet kif meħtieġa imma jagħmlu dan b’dewmien varju. Hemm ukoll inkonsistenzi fl-informazzjoni. Hemm diskrepanzi bejn l-informazzjoni mogħtija mill-pajjiżi membri u l-figuri fid-database maħruġa minnhom. Id-database tal-Kummissjoni fuq irregolaritajiet irrappurtati mhix kompluta u preċiża.

IV.

Ir-rata baxxa tar-rkupru ta’ pagamenti irregolari (mill-1971 ir-rata ta’ rkupru kumulattiva kienet ta’ 17 % biss) hija hekk, sa ċertu punt, minħabba dewmien u drawwiet amministrattivi nazzjonali (sospensjoni ta’ azzjoni għall-irkupru sal-konklużjoni ta’ azzjoni legali konnessa ma’ frodi, nuqqas ta’ l-istatus ta’ kreditur privileġġat għad-djun tal-CAP, l-ebda deterrent għall-appelli fiergħa) u r-riluttanza tal-Kummissjoni li taċċetta offerti li jikkonsistu fi ħlas parzjali ta’ dejn.

Mill-pagamenti irregolari rrappurtati, 10 % biss tħassru, sa ċertu punt minħabba li l-pajjiżi membri ndikaw ftit każijiet bħala telf li ma jistgħax jinġabar, u sa ċertu punt, minħabba li l-Kummissjoni damet ma ħadet azzjoni fuq pagamenti irregolari li tħallew sospiżi. Il-Kummissjoni ma kellhiex kriterji adegwati biex tiddeċiedi jekk l-ammonti mħassra għandhomx jiġu debitati lill-pajjiżi membri jew imġarrba mill-Komunità u m’għandhiex informazzjoni adegwata fuq l-applikazzjoni korretta tad-deċizjonijiet fuq taħsir.

VI.

Ir-responsabbiltajiet għall-pagamenti irregolari tal-CAP huma maqsuma bejn l-OLAF u d-Direttorat Ġenerali ta’ l-Agrikoltura: id-differenza bejn ir-responsabbiltajiet formali u effettivi joħolqu nuqqas ta’ ftehim. Il-Kummissjoni ma tagħmilx użu sistematiku ta’ l-informazzjoni li tikseb fuq l-irregolaritajiet meta tmexxi u tipproponi bidliet fil-CAP.

VII.	Il-Black List ma taħdimx.

VIII.

Il-mezzi separati li bihom il-pajjiżi membri jirrappurtaw id-djun kollu dovut lill-Komunità fir-rigward tal-CAP ittejjbu fis-snin riċenti imma xorta baqa’ numru ta’ nuqqasijiet. Mhux possibli li tirrikonċilja l-informazzjoni maħruġa ma’ dik li tikkonċerna l-pagamenti irregolari.

IX.

Il-Qorti tirrakkomanda lill-Kummissjoni biex tikkunsidra bidliet fil-mezzi tar-rappurtar, l-irkupru u t-tħassir ta’ pagamenti irregolari tal-CAP biex tipprovdi rimedju għan-nuqqasijiet msemmijin hawn fuq, u fit-tqassim tar-responsabbiltajiet bejn l-OLAF u d-Direttorat Ġenerali ta’ l-Agrikoltura u, biex tikkonsulta mal-pajjiżi membri fuq il-futur tal-Black List.

INTRODUZZJONI

L-Unjoni Ewropea tonfoq aktar minn 40 biljun euro kull sena fuq il-Politika Agrikola Komuni (CAP). Ir-responsabbiltà tal-ġestjoni ta’ din in-nefqa hija maqsuma bejn il-Kummissjoni u l-pajjiżi membri. Dan ir-rapport jeżamina aspett wieħed ta’ ġestjoni maqsuma: notifikazzjoni u rkupru ta’ somom imħallsa b’mod irregolari lil negozjanti, bdiewa u riċevituri oħrajn tan-nefqa taħt il-CAP.

Kwazi l-ħlasijiet kollha taħt il-CAP isiru minn aġenziji ta’ ħlas fil-pajjiżi membri. Il-pajjiżi membri huma meħtieġa li jikkontrollaw li l-ħlasijiet isiru b’mod xieraq; biex jinnotifikaw lill-Kummissjoni b’pagamenti irregolari li saru u dejn li jrid jitħallas, u li jiġbru somom li tħallsu b’mod ħażin.

L-ispejjeż ta’ pagamenti irregolari li pajjiżi membri ma jirkuprawx huma mġarrba mill-baġit tal-Komunità sakemm ir-riżultat ta’ nuqqas ta’ rkupru ma jkunx minħabba negliġenza mill-pajjiż membru konċernat. F’dak il-każ l-ispejjeż ta’ paġamenti irregolari jaqgħu fuq il-pajjiż membru konċernat. Illustrazzjoni 1 turi kif is-sistema taħdem.

Skond l-Uffiċċju ta’ Kontra l-Frodi tal-Kummissjoni (OLAF), fl-aħħar tas-sena 2002 it-total kumulattiv tal-pagamenti irregolari CAP innotifikati mill-pajjiżi membri lill-Kummissjoni sa mill-1971 kienu 3,1 biljun euro. Tabella 1 tagħti dettall tal-kompożizzjoni ta’ dan l-ammont u ta’ l-ammont li għadu jrid jiġi rkuprat.

Tabella 1

Analiżi ta' irregolaritajiet notifikati lill-Kummissjoni sa mis-sena 1971

(miljun euro)
Irregolaritajiet notifikati wara pagament	3 139
Ammont rkuprat minn min jagħmel it-talba	538
Ammont iddebitat lill-pajjiżi membri	142
Ammont imħassar ma’ I-EAGGF	110
Ammont li jrid jiġi rkuprat (1)	2 349
Pożizzjoni fil-31 ta' Diċembru 2002. Sors: ECR Database ECR ta' l-OLAF.

5.	Il-pajjiżi membri huma meħtieġa wkoll li jinformaw lill-Kummissjoni (OLAF) jekk kwalunkwe reċipjenti tal-flus tal-CAP irċivewx pagamenti irregolari b’total ta’ aktar minn 100 000 euro f’sena — il-“Blacklist” (2).

Il-mira ta’ din il-verifika kienet li teżamina r-rwol tal-Kummissjoni u l-Pajjżi Membri fil-ġestjoni u monitoraġġ ta’ rkupru ta’ pagamenti irregolari CAP. Din kienet tinvolvi konsiderazzjoni jekk, la darba frodi u irregolaritajiet kienu misjuba, il-pajjiżi membri nnotifikawx korrettament il-każijiet lill-Kummissjoni, stabbilewx dejn relatat u ħadux azzjoni ta’ rkupru. Il-verifika ma eżaminatx kemm l-aġenziji ta’ kontroll u investigazzjoni ta’ frodi tal-pajjiżi membri jsibu frodi u irregolaritajiet b’ mod tajjeb.

Il-Qorti eżaminat:

a)	dak li l-informazzjoni provduta turi dwar l-ammont, natura u kawżi ta’ irregolaritajiet;

b)	jekk il-pajjiżi membri u l-Kummissjoni jiħdux azzjoni xierqa biex jirkupraw jew iħassru pagamenti irregolari;

c)	jekk l-arranġamenti li jipprovdu informazzjoni dwar irregolaritajiet humiex sodisfaċjenti;

d)	jekk il-“Blacklist” taħdimx effettivament;

e)	kif l-informazzjoni fuq pagamenti irregolari tikkumpara ma’ dik fuq dejn.

8.	Il-verifika twettqet fil-Kummissjoni u f’disa’ pajjiżi membri: id-Danimarka, il-Ġermanja, il-Greċja, Spanja, Franza, l-Irlanda, l-Italja, il-Portugal u r-Renju Unit.

ANALIŻI

Irregolaritajiet irrappurtati

Fil-31 ta’ Diċembru 2002 pagamenti irregolari notifikati sa mill-1971 u rreġistrati fid-database relevanti tal-Kummissjoni (Reġistru tal-Komunikazzjonijiet Esterni (ECR)) ammontaw għal 3 139 miljun euro (3). L-ammont irreġistrat bħala “irid jinġabar” fl-istess data kien ta’ 2 349 miljun euro. Fi kliem ieħor 25 % ta’ pagamenti irregolari li saru sa mill-1971 kienu jew irkuprati mill-benifiċjarji, iddebitati lill-pajjiżi membri jew inkella mħassra mill-baġit.

10.

Tabella 2 turi l-valur tal-pagamenti irregolari notifikati u r-rata ta’ rkupru kumulattiva mill-pajjiżi membri (4). Il-figuri huma dominati, u ma jurux is-sewwa, minn dawk għall-Italja, li:

a)	irrappurtaw 55 % ta’ pagamenti irregolari konċernati (ara madanakollu paragrafu 24);

b)	għandhom l-aktar rata ta’ rkupru kumulattiva baxxa (10 % ta’ pagamenti irregolari sa mill-1971).

Tabella 2

Irregolaritajiet misjuba wara ħlas u rati ta' rkupru (1971-2002)

pajjiżi membri	Ammonti misjuba wara ħlas	Ammont irkuprat	Rata ta' rkupru kumulatti va %
IT	1 735	173	10
DE	403	40	10
ES	264	35	13
BE	100	15	15
AT	8	2	22
PT	50	13	25
SE	1	0	36
FR	159	58	36
UK	122	49	40
EL	131	54	41
NL	84	47	56
IE	39	23	58
DK	40	28	71
FI	1	1	90
LU	p.m.	p.m.	p.m.
Total	3 139	537	17
Sitwazzjoni fil-31 ta' Diċembru 2002. NB: Figuri miżjuda sa l-eqreb 1 000 000 euro. Sors: Database ECR ta' l-OLAF.

11.	Fil-31 ta’ Diċembru 2002 21 % tad-dejn mar lura għal qabel is-sena 1994 (ara lllustrazzjoni 2).

12.	Illustrazzjoni 3 turi l-linji prinċipali tal-baġit fejn irregolaritajiet rappurtati jsiru. Approssimament kwart huma fis-settur tal-frott u ħxejjex u bejn kwart u terz fir-rifużjonijiet ta’ esportazzjoni.

13.

Pagamenti rregolari huma rrappurtati relattivament b’mod infrekwenti fis-setturi ta’ nfiq soġġett għas-Sistema Integrata ta’ Amministrazzjoni u Kontroll (essenzjalment qasam ta’ għajnuna u pagamenti ta’ prijmjum ta’ annimali). Dan jirrifletti l-fatt li:

talbiet IACS huma soġġetti għal kontroll ta’ 100 % tat-talbiet kollha permezz ta’ verifikazzjoni kompjuterizzata ta’ wieħed ma’ l-ieħor u tqabbil ma’ data indipendenti u kontrolli kampjuni fuq il-post qabel ma jsiru l-pagamenti. Sejba ta’ irregolarità għalhekk tfisser li t-talbiet huma mwaqqfa qabel il-pagament;

b)	fejn, b’eċċezzjoni, irregolaritajiet huma misjuba wara pagament, ħafna drabi l-ammont ikkonċernat ser ikun inqas minn 4 000 euro u ħafna drabi l-aġenziji ta’ ħlas jistgħu jirkupraw permezz ta’ tnaqqis minn talbiet li jsiru wara, u;

c)	penalitajiet amministrattivi jinstabu fir-regolamenti, li jippermettu l-aġenziji ta’ ħlas biex jieħdu azzjoni xierqa meta jkunu identifikati talbiet foloz, mingħajr ma jirrikorru għal qorti tal-liġi.

14.	29 mill-każijiet ta’ irregolarità notifikati ammontaw għal 40 % ta’ l-ammont totali li jrid jiġi rkuprat fil-31 ta’ Diċembru 2002. Dawn huma mniżżla f’ Anness A.

15.

Huwa impossibli biex tistma preċiżament ir-rata ta’ irregolaritajiet li jolqtu l-CAP. Madanakollu fuq il-bażi ta’ informazzjoni rappurtata:

a)	Il-valur ta’ irregolaritajiet mill-1994 sa 2001 jirrappreżenta bejn 0,3 % u 1,4 % tal-baġit ta’ l-agrikoltura tal-KE għas-sena li dawn kienu notifikati. Jekk l-Italja tkun eskluża dawn jirrapreżentaw 0,5 % jew inqas (ara Tabella 3).

b)	Irregolaritajiet fil-linji tal-baġit li ntlaqtu l-aktar (frott u ħxejjex u rifużjonijiet ta’ esportazzjoni — ara Illustrazzjoni 3) jirrappreżentaw 1,7 % ta’ l-inqif fuq dawn il-linji fis-snin 1994 sa 2001.

Tabella 3

Tendenza fil-valur ta' irregolaritajiet irrappurtati

(miljun euro)
	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002
Nefqa dikjarata Garanzija EAGGF	33 593	35 654	39 062	40 884	38 857	40 726	40 411	41 594	42 711
Irregolaritajiet notifikati	461,2	227,6	251,7	154,6	263,1	224,0	467,3	104,1	198,0
Persentaġġ tal-baġit annwali	1,4	0,6	0,6	0,4	0,7	0,6	1,2	0,3	0,5
Nefqa EAGGF dikjarata eskluża l-Italja	30 000	31 285	34 631	35 559	34 708	35 709	35 874	36 124	37 022
Irregolaritajiet notifikati eskluża l-Italja	136,6	139,5	86,6	124,1	100,4	163,9	166,6	65,3	134,1
Persentaġġ tal-baġit annwali eskluża l-Italja	0,5	0,4	0,3	0,3	0,3	0,5	0,5	0,2	0,4
Sors: Tabella 4.6 tar-Rapport Annwali tal-ECA għas-sena 2002 u d-database ECR ta' l-OLAF fil-31 ta' Diċembru 2002 (li mhix konsistenti mal-figuri mogħtija fir-Rapport tal-Kummissjoni dwar il-Ġlieda kontra l-Frodi tas-sena 2002).

Notifika ta’ irregolaritajiet: min jagħmel xiex?

16.

Il-pajjiżi membri huma meħtieġa li jinnotifikaw lill-Kummissjoni kull tliet xhur (5) bil-pagamenti irregolari kollha ’l fuq minn 4 000 euro li “kienu s-suġġett ta’ sejbiet amministrattivi ewlenin jew sejbiet ġudizzjarji ta’ fatt (6)”. In-notifika għandhu jkun fiha sensiela ta’ informazzjoni kwantittativa u kwalitativa dwar il-frodi bħal l-ammont involut, il-linja tal-baġit, it-tip ta’ frodi u l-metodu ta’ sejba eċċ. Din l-informazzjoni kollha hija reġistrata fl-ECR.

17.	Il-Kummissjoni żviluppat il-kunċett tas-sejbiet amministrattivi jew ġudizzjarji fil-leġiżlazzjoni jew dokumenti ta’ ħidma. Minkejja dan, il-pajjiżi membri jinterpretaw il-kondizzjoni meħtieġa b’mod differenti.

18.	Il-pajjiżi membri għandhom jgħarrfu wkoll llil-Kummissjoni fuq bażi ta’ tlieta dwar il-passi li ħadu wara n-notifika ta’ l-irregolaritajiet inklużi ammonti rkuprati, raġunijiet ta’ abbandun ta’ rkupru eċċ (7).

19.	Fejn pajjiż membru jikkunsidra li ammont ma jistax jiġi rkuprat totalment huwa għandu jinforma lill-Kummissjoni jekk huwa jikkunsidrax li d-debitu għandux jiġi mġarrab mill-KE jew mill-pajjiż membru (8) u għaliex.

20.	OLAF jirreġistra d-data dwar in-notifika fl-ECR. Id-database ta’ l-ECR kienet ġestita b’suċċess mid-Direttorat Ġeneral ta’ l-Agrikoltura tal-Kummissjoni, l-Unità Kontra l-Frodi tal-Kummissjoni (UCLAF) u, sa mill-1995, OLAF.

Notifika ta’ irregolaritajiet: dewmien, nuqqasijiet u inkonsistenzi

21.	Il-pajjiżi membri huma meħtieġa li jirrappurtaw irregolaritajiet fi żmien xaharejn mill-aħħar ta’ kull tliet xhur; madanakollu, matul is-sena 2002, xi 65 % (2 147 komunikazzjonijiet) ma kinux irrapurtati fil-ħin (9).

22.	Il-pajjiżi membri, fuq medja, innotifikaw lill-Kummissjoni b’irregolaritajiet aktar tard minn sena wara s-sejba (10). Il-kapaċità medja ta’ notifika individwali tal-pajjiżi membri varjat minn tmien xhur (il-Portugall) għal 23 xahar (il-Lussemburgu) (ara Illustrazzjoni 4).

23.	Il-Ġermanja, Spanja u Franza nnotifikaw il-parti l-kbira tal-każijiet fis-sena 2002 imma l-Italja rrappurtat il-valur l-aktar għoli f’dik is-sena, 80 miljun euro, segwita minn Spanja b’ 59 miljun euro (ara Illustrazzjoni 5).

24.	L-Italja tinnotifika każijiet fuq il-bażi tar-rapport ta’ irregolaritajiet mill-korp ta’ kontroll jew investigazzjoni. F’ċerti każijiet dawn il-korpi ma vverifikawx li kien sar il-pagament irregolari allegat. Dan irriżulta f’dikjarazzjonijiet żejda ta’ ammonti li jridu jiġu rkuprati fl-ECR.

Aġenzija ta' investigazzjoni Taljana rrappurtat kumpanija talli bi frodi kisbet sussidji CAP għall-ipproċessar tat-tadam. L-ammont involut huwa 2,71 miljun euro. In fatti t-talbiet saru imma qatt ma tħallsu. Għaldaqstant ma hemm l-ebda dejn.

25.	Għal 91 każ fl-ECR tal-pajjiżi membri ma provdewx informazzjoni dwar l-ammonti involuti. 37 minn dawn kienu notifikati bejn l-1979 u l-1998. Il-Qorti ġibdet l-attenzjoni ta’ l-OLAF fuq dan f’Awwissu 2002. Sena wara OLAF ma talabx informazzjoni aġġornata mill-pajjiżi membri għal dawn il-każijiet.

26.

L-ECR jipprovdi biex il-penalitajiet u l-interess ikunu rreġistrati separatament (11). Xi pajjiżi membri, madanakollu, inkludew penalitajiet u interess fil-prinċipal (Spanja, l-Irlanda). Informazzjoni dwar penalitajiet u interess kienet irreġistrata f’inqas minn 4 % tal-każijiet fl-ECR. 5 % biss tal-każijiet irrappurtati jew aġġornati fis-sena 2002 kien fihom informazzjoni dwar penalitajiet.

27.

Kien hemm ukoll xi ftit inkonsistenzi sinifikanti tad-definizzjoni u r-rapporti ta’ fatti fl-informazzjoni mogħtija. Per eżempju, id-deskrizzjoni tal-prodott ma kinitx kompluta f’xi 47 % tal-każijiet notifikati għas-sena 2002 (12). F’7 % tal-każijiet it-tip ta’ irregolarità ma kinitx identifikata u f’4 % lanqas kellhom il-metodu ta’ sejba.

Kontrolli fuq data: mhux sodisfaċjenti

28.

Peress li ma kien hemm l-ebda proċedura għall-kontroll sistematiku ta’ kompletezza u preċiżjoni tad-database ECR fuq il-post ma’ informazzjoni dwar każijiet ta’ irregolarità miżmuna fil-pajjiżi membri, fl-2002 u 2003 OLAF staqsiet lill-pajjiżi membri biex jivverifikaw li d-data fl-ECR kienet preċiża. Għall-parti l-kbira l-pajjiżi membri ma indirizzawx irregolaritajiet notifikati qabel l-2002.

29.

Il-parti l-kbira tal-pajjiżi membri ġibdu l-attenzjoni għal diskrepanzi bejn data tal-pajjiżi membri u l-ECR. OLAF ma għandhiex analiżi ta’ dawn id-diskrepanzi, tar-raġunijiet tagħhom, ta’ azzjoni korrettiva jew ta’ bidliet li sarufl-ECR. OLAF lanqas ma ratx li tivverifika jekk il-pajjiżi membri nnotifikawx il-każijiet kollha li kellhom jinnotifikaw, jew għalqux każijiet b’mod mhux korrett u ħassru l-impatt ta’ l-irregolarità għalxejn.

Kwalità ta’ informazzjoni fuq pagamenti irregolari: inkompluta u inkonsistenti

30.	Għar-raġunijiet imniżżla fil-paragrafi 21 sa 29 u 31 u 32 id-database ECR (u l-figuri relatati ma’ l-irregolaritajiet u dejn CAP ippubblikati fir-Rapport tal-Kummissjoni dwar il-Ġlieda kontra l-Frodi tas-sena 2002) ma jistgħux ikunu kkunsidrati dipendibbli, kompluti u preċiżi.

31.

Minbarra l-każijiet innotifikati mill-pajjiżi membri, OLAF stess jibda’ investigazzjonijiet ta’ xi ftit każijiet ta’ irregolarità fis-settur CAP (kif f’postijiet oħra fil-baġit tal-Komunità). OLAF iżomm database tas-Sistema ta’ Ġestjoni ta’ Każ (CMS) biex jirreġistra l-progress ta’ dawn il-każijiet. Is-CMS ma turix jekk il-każ hux irreġistrat fl-ECR lanqas, kieku xieraq, jekk kinitx debitata lill-pajjiżi membri taħt il-proċedura ta’ approvazzjoni ta’ kontijiet (ara paragrafi 34 sa 37). Minn kampjun ta’ 26 każ irreġistrati fis-CMS 13 biss setgħu jinstabu sodisfaċjenti jew għal reġistrazzjoni fl-ECR jew għall-għeluq tal-każ minħabba li l-ebda irregolarità ma nstabet.

32.

Ir-Rapport tal-Kummissjoni dwar il-Ġlieda kontra l-Frodi tas-sena 2002 b’mod sinifikanti jiddikjara b’mod eċċessiv it-total kumulattiv ta’ irregolaritajiet irrappurtati kontra l-CAP. Is-sorsi tad-dikjarazzjoni eċċessiva huma:

a)	844 miljun euro relatati ma’ irregolaritajiet misjuba qabel pagament, innotifikati f’Lira Taljana kienu rreġistrati bħala l-istess ammont f’euros;

b)	mill-inqas 50 miljun euro tan-notifiki ngħaddew doppji minħabba li dawn kienu murija bħala misjuba kemm qabel u kif ukoll wara fl-ECR;

c)	mill-inqas 19 miljun euro għal ammonti rrappurtati fil-munita nazzjonali u reġistrati bħala euro mingħajr tisrif.

Rkupru u tħassir: responsabbiltajiet tal-pajjiżi membri u l-Kummissjoni

33.

Il-pajjiżi membri għandhom:

a)	jissodisfaw lilhom infushom li t-tranżazzjonijiet CAP huma mwettqa u esegwiti korrettament;

b)	jevitaw u jfittxu irregolaritajiet;

c)	jirkupraw somom mitlufa bħala riżultat ta’ irregolaritajiet jew negliġenza, f’liema każ huma jistgħu jżommu 20 % ta’ l-ammont irkuprati (13);

d)	jinnotifika lill-Kummissjoni ta’ somom li huma pendenti; u

e)	ta’ somom li hemm dubju fuq l-irkupru tagħhom.

34.	Il-Kummissjoni tiddeċiedi jekk somom li ma jistgħux jiġu rkuprati għandhomx jiġu mġarrba mill-Komunità, jew imġarrba mill-pajjiż membru kkonċernat (fuq ir-raġunijiet li l-irkupru ma jistax isir bħala konsegwenza ta’ negliġenza jew irregolarità minn dak il-pajjiż membru (14)).

35.

Fejn il-Kummissjoni tiddeċiedi li l-konsegwenzi finanzjarji ta’ nuqqas ta’ rkupru għandhom jiġu mġarrba mill-pajjiż membru kkonċernat, id-deċiżjoni hija meħuda bħala parti mill-proċedura ta’ “approvazzjoni ta’ kontijiet”. Din hija l-proċedura li fiha l-Kummissjoni tiddeċiedi jekk in-nefqa li saret mill-aġenziji ta’ ħlas twettqitx skond il-baġit tal-KE. Jekk somom ser jiġu debitati lill-pajjiżi membri l-Kummissjoni tnaqqashom mill-pagamenti ta’ kull xahar biex tiffinanzja l-CAP li hija tagħmel lill-aġenzija ta’ ħlas ikkonċernata.

36.

OLAF (li qabel kien magħruf bħala l-UCLAF) huwa responsabbli li jirrikmanda jekk l-ammonti għandhomx jitħassru mill-budget (jiġifieri mġarrba minn min iħallas it-taxxa tal-Komunità) jew f’każijiet ta’ negliġenza għandhomx ikunu debitati lill-pajjiżi membri. Id-Direttorat Ġenerali ta’ l-Agrikoltura huwa responsabbli għad-deċiżjoni tal-Kummissjoni.

37.

Il-liġi Komunitarja tħalli f’idejn il-Kummissjoni biex tiġġudika jekk nuqqas ta’ rkupru f’każ partikolari għandux jiġi attribwit minħabba negliġenza minn pajjiż membru, u l-ispejjeż tiegħu mġarrba minn min iħallas it-taxxa nazzjonali. Madanakollu hemm ġurisprudenza relevanti tal-Qorti Ewropea tal-Ġustizzja. Il-Qorti Ewropea tal-Ġustizzja fis-sena 1989 (15) iddeċidiet li l-istennija minn erbgħa sa għaxar snin qabel jibdew il-proċeduri biex jiġu rkuprati ammonti mħallsa ħażin, l-awtoritajiet Taljani ma aġixxewx bid-diliġenza neċessarja (16).

38.

F’sistema li taħdem tajjeb:

a)	il-pajjiżi membri ser jieħdu l-azzjoni kollha meħtieġa biex jirkupraw somom imħallsa b’mod irregolari;

b)	il-Kummissjoni ser tinkoraġġixxi l-pajjiżi membri biex joperaw effettivament;

c)	il-Kummissjoni ser tagħmel ġudizzji xierqa dwar jekk somom imħallsa b’mod irregolari u mhux irkuprati humiex debitati mill-baġit Komunitarju jew mill-pajjiż membru konċernat;

d)	il-Kummissjoni ser tuża informazzjoni dwar l-inċidenza ta’ irregolaritajiet għall-ġestjoni tal-CAP biex ittejjeb il-proċeduri ta’ kontroll.

39.	L-arranġamenti ma kinux sodisfaċjenti fl-erba’ aspetti kollha.

Rata baxxa ta’ rkupru

40.	Tabella 2 turi li, fl-aħħar tas-sena 2002, ir-rata ta’ rkupru kumulattiva kienet biss ta’ 17 %.

41.

Ir-raġunijiet prinċipali għal rata baxxa ta’ rkupru huma s-segwenti:

xi sistemi amministrattivi u ġudizzjarji ta’ pajjiżi membri jimxu bil-mod. Dan jippreġudika l-probabilità ta’ rkupru eventwali minnħabba li assi jisparixxu, kumpaniji jiġu likwidati, benefiċjarji individwali jisparixxu jew imutu eċċ;

Talbiet foloż għal għajnuna għall-produzzjoni ta' nbid konċentrat għandhom iwasslu għal pagamenti irregolari ta' 8,3 miljun euro.L-irregolarità kienet irrappurtata għall-ewwel darba lill-aġenzija Griega ta' ħlas fis-sena 1990.Il-Ministeru ta' l-Agrikoltura Grieg ma klassifikahiex bħala irregolarità sa Diċembru 1996.Il-każ, li kien imressaq quddiem il-qrati Griegi, għadu ma nstemax u l-ebda flus ma ġew irkuprati.

b)	l-irkupru idum aktar meta proċeduri ta’ rkupru jiġu sospiżi sakemm ir-riżultat ta’ kwalunkwe każ assoċjat ma’ frodi jiġi deċiż (per eżempju, fl-Italja). Każijiet ta’ frodi jeħtieġu prova ta’ intenzjoni qabel ma xi ħadd jista’ jinstab ħati li mhux neċessarju għall-irkupru ta’ pagament defacto;

xi pajjiżi membri ma jagħtux id-dejn CAP pożizzjoni preferenzjali (m’hemm l-ebda leġiżlazzjoni tal-KE li teħtieġ li huma jagħmlu dan);

Fil-bidu ta' l-1992 investigazzjoni konġunta ta' UCLAF/Ġermanja wriet li trab tal-ħalib xkumat minn ħażniet ta' intervent, esportati b'rifużjonijiet, ma tpoġġewx fis-suq barra l-KE. Pagamenti irregolari ta' rifużjonijiet ta' esportazzjoni ammontaw għal 24,9 miljun euro għal kumpanija Ġermaniża u 18,6 miljun euro għal oħra Belġjana.Minkejja talba mill-Kummissjoni fi Frar 1993, il-Ġermanja ma ħarġitx ordnijiet ta' rkupru sa Awwissu 1995.F'Awwissu 1996 saret offerta biex jitħallsu 5,1 miljun euro (li huwa l-valur ta' l-assi disponibbli tal-kumpanija Ġermaniza). Din kienet miċħuda mill-Kummissjoni f'April 1997.Sa Diċembru 1999 l-assi naqsu għal 1,5 miljun euro. L-ebda mis-sussidji li jammontaw għal 43,5 miljun euro ma kienu rkuprati.

hemm użu inadegwat ta’ proċeduri biex jiġi bbilanċjat dejn ma’ pagamenti CAP oħra li huma dovuti. Proċeduri ta’ bilanċjar bejn aġenziji ta’ ħlas (per eżempju fi Spanja, l-Italja jew il-Portugall) jew fl-istess aġenzija ta’ ħlas mhumiex użati minnhom minħabba li tali bilanċjar huwa prekluż taħt il-liġi nazzjonali jew minħabba mezzi inadegwati ta’ komunikazzjoni;

e)	il-leġiżlazzjoni nazzjonali f’xi pajjiżi membri ma teħtieġx li ssir garanzija, ekwivalenti għall-ammont in kwistjoni, qabel ma jsir appell (il-Qorti għamlet din l-osservazzjoni fis-sena 2000 fil-kuntest ta’ l-irregolaritajiet tal-konsum taż-żejt taż-żebbuġa (17));

f)	sa llum, il-Kummissjoni rrifjutat li tilqa’ l-offerti biex taċċetta li tħallas għal ammonti riferuti lilha mill-pajjiżi membri. Dawn huma kkalkulati fuq il-bażi ta’ assi disponibbli lid-debitur u huma inqas mid-dejn.

Madanakollu, anke jekk il-proċeduri ta’ rkupru kienu mgħaġġla aktar u l-possibilitajiet ta’ rkupru laħqu l-massimu, xi dejn għad għadu jrid jitħassar minħabba falliment, mewt, żball uffiċjali, ekwità, effettivita’ ta’ spejjeż eċċ. Mhuwiex possibli li tistma kemm għandu jitħassar għal dawn ir-raġunijiet.

42.

Il-Kummissjoni għandha poteri limitati biex tinfluwenza l-mod kif il-pajjiżi membri jwettqu r-responsabbiltajiet tagħhom taħt ir-regolament. Hija ma tistax tintervjeni fil-proċeduri amministrattivi jew ġudizzjarji tal-pajjiżi membri sabiex tgħaġġilhom. Min-naħa l-oħra:

a)	il-Kummissjoni tista’ tieħu azzjoni biex tirkupra l-valur ta’ dejn antik mill-pajjiżi membri, fuq il-bażi tad-deċiżjoni tal-Qorti Ewropea tal-Ġustizzja msemmija fil-paragrafu 37;

il-liġi Komunitarja tipprovdi inċentiv għall-pajjiżi membri biex jirkupraw flus imħallsa fejn mhux meħtieġ fejn huma jistgħu jżommu 20 % mill-ammonti rkuprati. Skond ir-rata ta’ rkupru kumullativa ta’ 17 % din l-inċentiva ma tistax tkun ikkunsidrata li kisbet il-mira tagħha. OLAF m’għandux reġistru dipendibbli ta’ ammonti.

Deċiżjonijiet tal-Kummissjoni fuq min għandu jagħmel tajjeb għall-ispejjeż tal-pagamenti irregolari li ma nġabrux: m’hemmx prinċipji ċari

43.

Skond l-ECR sa mill-1971, total ta’ 110 miljun euro kienu mħassra m l-baġit tal-KE u142 miljun euro ddebitati lill-pajjiżi membri. Dawn l-ammonti huma żgħar (10 %) meta mqabbla b’mod relattiv ma’ l-ammont totali li għandu jiġi rkuprat, parti minħabba li l-pajjiżi membri pproponew ftit każijiet għat-tħassir bħala rekuperabbli u parti minħabba li l-azzjoni tal-Kummissjoni biex japprovaw id-dejn antik ma kienx fil-ħin.

Annimali bovini ħajjin għall-qatla, esportati lejn il-Polonja b'rifużjonijiet fis-sena 1990, kienu ddikjarati b'mod ħażin bħala annimali tar-razza b'riżultat ta' pagamenti irregolari fi tlett każijiet ta' 2,6 miljun euro.Dawn il-każijiet kienu esklużi mill-korrezzjoni finanzjarja ta' l-approvazzjoni ta' kontijiet fl-1994 għal każijiet simili pendenti r-riżultat ta' azzjoni ta' rkupru.Fis-sena 1999 il-Qorti tal-Ġustizzja sostniet il-korrezzjoni finanzjarja tal-Kummissjoni. Madanakollu l-Kummissjoni minn dak iż-żmien naqset li ssegwi t-tliet każijiet.

44.	Il-Kummissjoni ma kellha l-ebda kriterja biex tagħmel rakkomandazzjonijiet għat-tħassir u lanqas dwar in-natura ta’ evidenza ta’ sostenn meħtieġa. Ma kienx hemm analiżi sistematika fil-fajls li jippreżentaw l-argumenti u evidenza ta’ sostenn tar-rakkomandazzjonijiet.

45.

Twettqu testijiet fuq għażla ta’ 30 każ irreġistrati fil- ECR, fejn il-Kummissjoni ddeċidiet li l-ispejjeż għandhom ikunu debitati lill-pajjiżi membri. L-għażla kkonċentrat fuq każijiet ta’ qabel l-1996 peress li ma kien hemm l-ebda deċiżjoni dwar approvazzjoni ta’ kontijiet fuq każijiet sa minn dik is-sena ħlief għall-eżerċizzju speċjali msemmi hawn taħt. Mit-30 każ eżaminat, tlieta biss kien fihom evidenza sodifaċjenti li l-ammonti kienu fil-fatt irkuprati mill-pajjiżi membri (18).

46.	30 każ irreġistrat bħala debitat lill-baġit kienu eżaminati wkoll. Fi tmien każijiet il-fajls ma setgħux jinstabu u fi 15-il każ kien hemm evidenza (19) insuffiċjenti li l-ammonti ma kinux rekuperabbli. Kien hemm argumenti raġunati għad-deċiżjonijiet fi ftit (20) mill-fajls eżaminati.

47.

Hemm rigward partikolari kif l-azzjonijiet ta’ tħassir mill-pajjiżi membri għandhom effett fuq l-approvazzjoni ta’ kontijiet. Taħt il-proċedura ta’ l-approvazzjoni ta’ kontijiet, il-fatt li ma tiġix permessa nefqa normalment titqies bħala “korrezzjoni b’rata fissa”: il-Kummissjoni tiġġudika li pajjiż membru naqas li jiġġestixxi xi nefqa b’mod tajjeb u tneħħi mill-iffinanzjar tal-KE (jiġifieri, effettivament tiddebita lill-pajjiżi membri) persentaġġ tan-nefqa konċernata bħala sanzjoni għall-ġestjoni fqira u bħala inċentiv għal titjib

48.

Ftit mill-pajjiżi membri ħadu l-opportunità ta’ tali korrezzjonijiet b’rata fissa biex iħassru dejn li joħroġ minn irregolaritajiet impenjati f’dak l-istess settur ta’ nefqa sal-valur tal-korrezzjoni, minflok proponew tħassir taħt il-kondizzjoni diskussa fil-paragrafi 33 sa 37. Il-Kummissjoni tikkunsidra li din il-prattika mhix konformi mad-dispożizzjonijiet legali relatati ma’ l-approvazzjoni ta’ kontijiet. La OLAF u lanqas id-Direttorat Ġenerali ta’ l-Agrikoltura ma żammew reġistri ta’ tali tħassir, u lanqas irrikonċiljawhom ma’ l-ammonti tal-korrezzjonijiet relatati ma’ l-approvazzjoni ta’ kontijiet. L-ammonti totali mħassar b’dan il-mod għaldaqstant mhux magħrufa.

49.

OLAF beda eżerċizzju speċjali f’Marzu 1999 biex jeżamina l-ammonti li jridu jinġabru ta’ qabel l-1996. Każijiet antiki kienu definiti bħala każijiet b’dewmien amministrattiv meta jaqbżu l-erba’ snin u/jew dewmien ġudizzjarju meta jaqbżu tminn snin (21). Dawk il-każijiet kollha b’ammonti pendenti ta’ aktar minn 50 000 euro kellhom jiġu eżaminati fil-fond. Dawk ta’ inqas minn 50 000 euro kellhom ikunu soġġetti għal reviżjoni inqas rigoruża.

50.

Id-Deċiżjoni tal-Kummissjoni (22) dwar dawn il-każijiet kienet ippubblikata fit-28 ta’ Ġunju 2003. 69,4 miljun euro kienu mħassra mal-baġit u 5,3 miljun debitati lill-pajjiżi membri. Każijiet Taljani, li jammontaw għal 66 % (750 miljun euro) ta’ l-ammont li jrid jinġabar għall-każijiet ta’ qabel l-1995, kienu esklużi mir-rakkomandazzjonijiet u d-deċiżjonijiet. Ma ngħatat l-ebda raġuni għal dan. Ma kinux ikkunsidrati lanqas 95 każ ta’ qabel l-1995 għall-valur totali ta’ 118,8 miljun euro.

51.	Bħal ma’ kien il-każ għal rakkomandazzjonijiet li saru taħt il-proċedura normali, ma kienx hemm analiżi sistematika fil-fajls tar-raġunijiet li wasslu għar-rakkomandazzjonijiet. Issa l-Kummissjoni waqqfet task force biex teżamina l-każijiet ta’ qabel l-1999 għal ammonti li jaqbżu l-500 000 euro.

Diviżjoni ta’ responsabbiltajiet fil-Kummissjoni

52.

Kif spjegat hawn fuq, OLAF imexxi d-database ECR. Id-Direttorat Ġenerali ta’ l-Agrikoltura huwa responsabbli għad-deċiżjonijiet ta’ approvazzjoni ta’ kontijiet. Hemm ċirkostanzi fejn din id-diviżjoni ta’ responsabbiltajiet toħloq problemi ta’ komunikazzjoni:

ma kien hemm l-ebda dispożizzjoni għad-Direttorat Ġenerali ta’ l-Agrikoltura biex jibgħat sistematikament lil OLAF kopji tad-deċiżjonijiet kollha ta’ approvazzjoni fejn pajjiżi membri kienu ngħataw responsabbiltà bil-konsegwenzi finanzjarji ta’ irregolaritajiet. Konsegwentament ma’ kien hemm l-ebda evidenza sistematika fil-fajls ta’ l-OLAF li l-ammonti reġistrati bħala debitati lill-pajjiżi membri kienu attwalment irkuprati taħt il-proċedura ta’ l-approvazzjoni ta’ kontijiet;

b)	id-deċiżjoni ta’ l-1995 (23) biex tħassar ammonti mill-baġit ma kinitx tidher fid-database ECR. Riżultat ta’ dan, kien hemm każijiet li reġgħu ġew eżaminati fis-sena 2003 u f’xi uħud minnhom id-deċiżjoni kienet kontra dik meħuda fis-sena 1995;

c)	ftit mill-pajjiżi membri ħassru ammonti fuq il-bażi tar-rakkomandazzjonijiet ta’ OLAF qabel id-Deċiżjoni tal-Kummissjoni.

Fil-qafas ta’ l-approvazzjoni ta’ kontijiet għas-sena 1993, il-Kummissjoni pproponiet li tiddebita lill-Ġermanja 8,2 million euro għal 21 każ fejn kienu kkusidrati negliġenti fl-azzjoni ta’ rkupru tagħha. Madankollu l-korrezzjoni finanzjarja ma kinitx implimentata minħabba konsultazzjoni bilaterali inadegwata.Il-każijiet kollha minbarra tnejn kienu reġgħu ġew ikkunsidrati għad-deċiżjoni tas-sena 1995 u kienu debitati lill-FAEGG.Il-Kummissjoni ma ddokumentatx ir-ragunijiet ghaliex bidlet il-proposta originali taghha.

53.	Arranġamenti kurrenti qasmu responsabbiltà nominali u effettiva għal din il-proċedura b’tali mod li tnaqqas ir-responsabbiltà. Li tirrikmanda azzjoni ta’ tħassir mhix funzjoni li tidħol tajjeb fir-rwol ta’ korp ta’ investigazzjoni ta’ frodi u ta’ koordinazzjoni.

Il-Kummissjoni tagħmel ftit użu mill-esperjenza tagħha fuq irregolaritajiet

54.	Notifiki lill-OLAF għal dħul fl-ECR kienu maħsuba, fost l-oħrajn, biex isaħħu l-kampanja kontra frodi u irregolaritajiet.

55.

F’dan il-kuntest il-Kunsill (24) talab lill-Kummissjoni biex tiżviluppa politika ta’ investigazzjoni fuq analiżijiet strateġiċi u operattivi ta’ informazzjoni fuq frodi, irregolaritajiet u rkupri rappurtati minn pajjiżi membri. Il-Parlament (25) ikkritika l-fatt li d-dejn li joħroġ minn irregolaritajiet u frodi żdied b’tali mod li mhux aċċettabbli u li l-proċeduri ta’ rkupru ma jaħdmux. Huwa sejjaħ lill-Kummissjoni biex tissottometti analiżi dettaljata tal-kawżi ta’ din il-problem u l-proposti biex tirrimedjhom. Il-Kummissjoni (26) ressqet komunikazzjoni fuq kif ittejjeb id-drittijiet Komunitarji f’Diċembru 2002. Il-Parlamenti esprima d-dubji li l-proċeduri ta’ rkupru jistgħu jittejbu mingħajr kjarifikazzjoni tad-diviżjoni ta’ responsabbiltajiet bejn l-OLAF u d-Direttorat Ġenerali ta’ l-Agrikoltura.

56.

Il-Kummissjoni ġibdet l-attenzjoni għall-informazzjoni ta’ kwalità fqira provduta minn pajjiżi membri fir-Rapport Annwali tagħha dwar il-frodi tas-sena 2002. Din tikkwota l-eżempju li f’47 % ta’ każijiet rappurtati l-prodotti involuti ma kinux identifikati, ma jiffaċilitawx l-analiżi ta’ riskju u jagħmluha aktar diffiċli biex jiġu abbozzati lezzjonijiet xierqa. Hija qed tipprova biex ittejjeb il-kwalità u l-iskadenzi ta’ notifiki bl-introduzzjoni tad-dħul dirett fl-ECR minn pajjiżi membri, flimkien ma’ programm ta’ korsijiet ta’ taħriġ u d-dispożizzjoni ta’ manwal ta’ użu ECR.

57.

Madanakollu hemm nuqqasijiet oħra li jridu jiġu indirizzati fid-disinn ta’ l-informazzjoni ECR. Hemm wisq deskrizzjonijiet għat-tip ta’ frodi u irregolaritajiet, 79 b’kollox, fejn ftit minnhom huma ambigwi (ara Tabella 4); il-linji tal-budget ma ġewx irreġistrati f’format konsistenti u hemm 46 kodiċi għall-metodu ta’ sejba, fejn ftit minnhom huma wkoll ambigwi (ara Tabella 5). Razzjonalizzazzjoni u simplifikazzjoni ta’ dawn id-deskrizzjonijiet jistgħu jiffaċilitaw interpretazzjoni xierqa.

Tabella 4

Tipi ta' Irregolarita'

Tip ta' irregolarità	Valur ta' irregolaritajiet rappurtati (miljun euro)	Persentaġġ tal-valur totali rappurtat	Persentaġġ kumulattiv
Użu jew proċessar fittizju	984	23	23
Dokumenti kummerċjali foloz jew falsifikati	379	9	32
Kwantità mhux eżatta	270	6	38
Rikjesta għal għajnuna falza jew falsifikata	208	5	43
Moviment fittizju	201	5	48
Varjazzjoni fil-kwalita' jew kontenut	169	4	52
Każijiet oħra ta' dokumenti irregolari	148	3	55
Irregolaritajiet oħra	120	3	58
Traffikar fi prodotti maħruġa jew maħżuna	97	2	60
Dokumenti tad-dwana falsifikati	91	2	62
Bidla ta' destinazzjoni	91	2	64
Ma waslux fid-destinazzjoni finali	74	2	66
Nuqqas li jiġu rispettati kondizzjonijiet oħra	71	2	68
Sitwazzjoni fil-31 ta' Diċembru 2002. Sors: Database ECR ta' l-OLAF ta' irregolaritajiet rappurtati taħt Regolament 595/91.

Tabella 5

Metodi ta' Sejba

Metodu ta' Sejba	Valur ta' irregolaritajiet rappurtati (miljun euro)	Persentaġġ tat-total rappurtat	Persentaġġ kumulattiv
Kontrolli dokumentarji	1 137	27	27
Inkjesta ġudizzjarja	950	22	49
Kontroll nazzjonali fiskali	253	6	55
Kontroll ta' rutina	237	6	60
Kontrol ta' kontabilita'	180	4	64
Inizjattiva tal-KE	153	4	68
Inkjesta ġudizzjarja	126	3	71
Kollaborazzjoni bejn is-servizzi	123	3	74
Analiżi laboratorji ta' kampjuni	92	2	76
Kontroll nazzjonali tad-dwana	90	2	78
Kontroll fil-bini tal-benefiċjaru	85	2	80
Oħra	81	2	82
Sitwazzjoni fil-31 ta' Diċembru 2002. Sors: Database ECR ta' l-OLAF ta' irregolaritajiet rappurtati taħt Regolament 595/91.

58.	Il-Qorti sabet ukoll li kien hemm żbalji sinifikanti fid-data reġistrata fl-ECR kif ukoll in-nuqqas ta’ data finanzjarja ta’ kull xorta għal 91 każ (ara paragrafu 25).

59.

L-ECR tirreġistra l-identitajiet ta’ persuni li jikkonsultaw id-database u n-numru ta’ drabi li din kienet ikkonsultata. Minn Ottubru 2001 sa Settembru 2002 kien hemm 11-il konsultazzjoni diretta minn Direttorati Ġenerali tal-Kummissjoni. Madanakollu, OLAF ma wettaqx valutazzjoni ta’ l-użu tad-data ECR biex jiddetermina jekk din provditx jew le informazzjoni utli u b’hekk ikkontribbwitx għall-ġlieda kontra l-frodi.

60.

Il-Kummissjoni hija meħtieġa li tistudja l-informazzjoni li biha hija ġiet innotifikata u li tinforma r-rappreżentanti tal-pajjiżi membri (li jiltaqgħu fil-Kumitat FAEGG (27)) bi kwalunkwe konklużjonijiet hija bi ħsiebha li toħroġ minnhom (28). Għalkemm xi informazzjoni kienet provduta lill-“Grupp ta’ Irregolaritajiet” (29) la OLAF u lanqas il-predeċessur tiegħu UCLAF għamel tali rapport lill-Kumitat FAEGG (30).

Il-Blacklist

61.

Il-pajjiżi membri huma meħtieġa li jinnotifikaw lill-Kummissjoni bl-identità ta’ l-operaturi li għamlu irregolaritajiet li jaqbżu 100 000 euro fuq perijodu ta’ sena, flimkien mad-dettalji tal-miżuri meħuda kontra dawk l-operaturi. Il-pajjiżi membri kkunsidrawha b’mod ġenerali impossibli effettivament biex jiġu esklużi entitajiet misjuba li kienu involuti fl-operazzjonijiet irregolari jew frawdolenta minn talbiet għal aktar pagamenti (eż. in-negozju jista’ jkun trasferit għal entità oħra legali bl-istess azzjonisti eċċ.).

62.

Sitt pajjiżi membri biss qatt innotifikaw kumpanija jew individwu taħt dawn l-arranġamenti (ara wkoll Rapport Speċjali Nru 8/98, paragrafi 4.12 sa 4.14 (31)). Kummenti rċevuti minn pajjiżi membri miżjura indikaw li l-aktar ostakolu għar-regolament kien il-fatt li tpoġġi kumpanija jew individwu fuq il-blacklist jista’ jwassalhom għat-taħrik u għal danni. Sakemm il-frodi jkun ippruvat f’qorti tal-liġi (ħafna drabi proċess twil ħafna) mhux ċert jekk pajjiż membru jista’ legalment jinnotifika l-ismijiet tal-kumpaniji jew ta’ l-individwi.

Reġistrazzjoni ta’ djun

63.

Sa mill-1996 l-aġenziji ta’ ħlas tal-pajjiżi membri kienu meħtieġa li jagħmlu lista ta’ djun (32) dovut lill-Komunità taħt il-CAP (“reġistru tad-debituri”). Sa mill-2000 il-pajjiżi membri kienu meħtieġa li jinformaw lill-Kummissjoni (Direttorat Ġenerali ta’ l-Agrikoltura) darbtejn fis-sena dwar is-sitwazzjoni tad-dejn u l-progress ta’ rkupri, kif irreġistrati fir-reġistru tad-debituri, f’kont magħruf bħala Tabella 05 (33). L-ammonti notifikati permezz tat-Tabella 105 huma inklużi fil-karta ta’ bilanċ konsolidata tal-Kummissjoni (34).

64.

Sa mill-1996 korpi ta’ ċertifikazzjoni (35) kellhom jivvalutaw jekk ir-reġistru tad-debituri prodott mill-aġenziji ta’ ħlas tal-CAP li huma jivverifikaw jagħtix stampa korretta u kompluta ta’ l-ammonti li jridu jinġabru, jekk il-proċeduri għal irkupru humiex effettivi, u l-ammonti humiex akkreditati korrettament lill-baġit fil-ħin.

65.

Għal dak li jikkonċerna l-materjal tat-Tabella 105, id-Direttorat Ġenerali ta’ l-Agrikoltura kkonkluda fl-1999, fuq il-bażi ta’ verifiki mwettqa f’pajjiżi membri, li kien hemm xi dubji fuq il-kompletezza u l-eżattezza tar-reġistri tad-debituri ta’ xi aġenziji ta’ ħlas u li ma kienx hemm garanzija li l-pajjiżi membri kienu konsistenti fl-approċċ tagħhom biex jirreġistraw id-dejn. Ir-rapport suċċessiv irrikmanda li s-servizzi tal-Kummissjoni, is-servizzi ta’ verifika interna ta’ l-aġenziji ta’ ħlas u korpi ta’ ċertifikazzjoni għandhom jagħmlu aktar sforzi biex itejjbu l-ġestjoni ta’ djun. Sa mill-2001 korpi ta’ ċertifikazzjoni kellhom jiċċertifikaw l-eżattezza tat-Tabella 105.

66.

Korpi ta’ ċertifikazzjoni ma jużawx informazzjoni miżmuma minn diversi korpi ta’ kontroll u investigazzjoni ta’ frodi biex jikkontrollaw il-kompletezza tar-reġistri tad-debituri. Bl-użu ta’ informazzjoni miżmuna fuq debituri fl-aġenziji ta’ ħlas, tliet korpi ta’ ċertifikazzjoni kkwalifikaw iċ-ċertifikati tagħhom u disa’ korpi ta’ ċertifikazzjoni nnotaw nuqqasijiet serji fil-proċeduri tar-reġistrazzjoni u rkupri ta’ djun (ara Anness B). Il-Qorti nnotat wkoll li, f’disa’ każijiet, l-għan tal-verifiki ta’ debituri tal-korpi ta’ ċertifikazzjoni ma laħqitx il-linji gwida tal-Kummissjoni.

67.

Il-pajjiżi membri kollha għamlu reġistri ta’ debituri u mis-sena 2000 ippreżentaw it-Tabella 105 lill-Kummissjoni li fiha l-informazzjoni meħtieġa. Il-verifika ma wriet l-ebda żbalji materjali fir-reġistrazzjoni ta’ djun ġodda. Il-ħtieġa li żżomm reġistru tad-debituri kienet introdotta b’effett mill-1996. Madanakollu, xi pajjiżi membri (id-Danimarka, il-Ġermanja, il-Greċja u r-Renju Unit) għadhom ma rreġistrawx id-djun kollha mġarrba qabel dik is-sena fir-reġistri tad-debituri. Il-pajjiżi membri ħassru wkoll ammonti bħala irrekuperabbli mingħajr Deċiżjoni tal-Kummissjoni li d-dejn ma jistax jinġabar u jekk il-baġit jew il-pajjiżi membri għandhomx iġarrbu l-ispiża. Id-dejn totali għas-sena 2002 huwa għalhekk iddikjarat b’ 43,8 miljun euro (36) inqas.

68.

L-informazzjoni provduta fit-Tabella 105 tiddistingwi bejn każijiet li huma notifikabbli fl-ECR u każijiet oħra (li ma joħorġux minn irregolarità jew li jammontaw għal inqas minn 4 000 euro). Għalkemm id-dati tar-rappurtar għaż-żewġ settijiet ta’ figuri huma differenti, jista’ jkun possibli li tgħaqqad, tidentifika u tikkorreġi d-differenzi bejniethom (l-ECR wera total ta’ 2 349 miljun euro fil-31 ta’ Diċembru 2002: il-figura ekwivalenti fit-Tabella 105 kienet 2 093 miljun euro fil-15 ta’ Ottubru 2002). Il-Kummissjoni mhix kapaċi tagħmel dan. OLAF u d-Direttorat-Ġenerali ta’ l-Agrikoltura għalhekk qed jaħdmu fuq il-bażi ta’ settijiet differenti ta’ data u għadhom ma rrikonċiljawhomx.

KONKLUŻJONIJIET

69.

L-arranġamenti għan-notifika, rkupru u tħassir ta’ pagamenti irregolari ta’ l-Unjoni Ewropea jipprovdu għal informazzjoni relevanti biex tkun irrappurtata (tip ta’ irregolarita, metodu ta’ sejba, eċċ.) u jinkoraġġixxu l-pajjiżi membri biex jieħdu azzjoni ta’ rkupru billi jipprovdu kemm inċentiva (żamma ta’ 20 % mill-ammonti rkuprati) u sanzjoni (ammonti mhux irkuprati jiġu debitati lill-pajjiżi membri f’każijiet ta’ negliġenza).

70.

Madanakollu, fil-prattika, mill-pagamenti irregolari magħmula u notifikati lill-Kummissjoni sa mill-1971, b’total ta’ 3,1 biljun euro, 537 miljun euro kienu rkuprati minn benefiċjarji CAP sa l-aħħar tas-sena 2002; 110 miljun euro kienu mħassra bl-ispiża mġarrba mill-pajjiżi membri. Tliet kwarti tal-pagamenti irregolari rappurtati jibqgħu “pendenti”, la rkuprati u lanqas imħassra.

71.

L-ebda sistema mhi ser tikseb 100 % rkupru ta’ pagamenti irregolari; u xi każijiet b’lura huma inevitabbli. Imma l-verifika tal-Qorti kixfet numru ta’ nuqqasijiet fid-disinn ta’ arranġamenti għal irreġistrar, rkupru u tħassir ta’ pagamenti irregolari taħt il-CAP u, partikolarment, kif dawn l-arranġamenti huma operati mill-Kummissjoni u l-pajjiżi membri.

a)	Il-pajjiżi membri jinterpretaw id-definizzjoni tal-punt meta huma għandhom jirrapurtaw pagamenti irregolari f’modi differenti (ara paragrafu 17). Ftit mill-ħtiġijiet tad-data fuq il-pajjiżi membri m’humiex ċari (ara paragrafi 56 u 57).

b)	Xi pajjiżi membri rrapurtaw pagamenti irregolari bil-mod aktar minn oħrajn (ara paragrafu 22). Hemm ukoll nuqqasijiet u inkonsistenzi sinifikanti fid-data li huma jagħtu (ara paragrafi 24 sa 27).

c)	Kien hemm nuqqasijiet sinifikanti fl-arranġamenti għall-irkupru ta’ pagamenti irregolari CAP tal-pajjiżi membri (ara paragrafu 41).

Deċiżjonijiet dwar jekk pagamenti irregolari għandhomx jitħassru u, jekk iva, hux għal spejjeż tal-Komunità jew nazzjonali, għandhom normalment jistennew proposta mill-pajjiż membru għal tħassir. Il-Kummissjoni għandha biss poteri limitati biex tintervjeni f’din il-proċedura. Min-naħa l-oħra ġurisprudenza tal-Qorti Ewropea tal-Ġustizzja ssostni l-azzjoni tal-Kummissjoni fil-każ ta’ dewmien mhux raġonevoli mill-pajjiżi membri. Dan huwa l-isfond għall-bidu ta’ task force diskuss f’paragrafu 51.

e)	Il-Kummissjoni ma kelliex kriterji ċari biex tiddeċiedi jekk pagamenti irregolari mhux rekuperabbli għandhomx jiġu debitati lill-pajjiżi membri konċernati jew lill-baġit tal-Komunità (ara paragrafi 43 sa 51).

f)	L-involviment kemm ta’ OLAF u kif ukoll tad-Direttorat Ġenerali ta’ l-Agrikoltura tal-Kummissjoni fid-deċiżjonijiet ta’ tħassir huma sors ta’ konfużjoni u ineffiċjenza (ara paragrafi 52 sa 55).

72.

L-arranġamenti paralleli għar-reġistri tad-debituri jipprovdu informazzjoni għal skopijiet ta’ karta ta’ bilanċ dwar sensiela wiesgħa ta’ djun taħt il-CAP. Il-pajjiżi membri kollha għamlu reġistri tad-debituri u ssottomettew id-data meħtieġa. Il-Kummissjoni wkoll provdiet linji gwida għall-korpi ta’ ċertifikazzjoni biex jivverifikaw lid-debituri. Il-Qorti madanakollu nnotat numru ta’ nuqqasijiet u, fir-rigward ta’ dejn li joħroġ minn pagamenti irregolari, ineżattezzi f’dawn ir-reġistri tad-debituri (ara paragrafi 63 sa 68).

73.	Il-“Blacklist” irriżultat li ma taħdimx. Sitt pajjiżi membri biss ikkomunikaw l-ismijiet ta’ individwi jew kumpaniji u wriet impossibilità biex timplimenta b’mod effettiv is-sanzjonijiet previsti (ara paragrafi 61 u 62).

RAKKOMANDAZZJONIJIET

74.

Il-Qorti tirrikmanda l-Kummissjoni biex tikkunsidra numru ta’ bidliet possibli fl-arranġamenti diskussi hawn fuq, sabiex:

—	ittejjeb l-informazzjoni disponibbli għall-Kummissjoni dwar il-pagamenti irregolari u djun tal-CAP;

—	ittejjeb l-irkupru mill-pajjiżi membri tas-somom imħallsa irregolarment;

—	tiċċara l-bażi fuq xiex il-Kummissjoni tiddeċiedi jekk pagamenti irregolari mħassra għandhomx jiġu mġarrba mill-pajjiżi membri jew mill-Komunità;

—	tiċċara r-responsabbiltajiet fil-Kummissjoni u ttejjeb il-komunikazzjonijiet;

—	tagħmel użu aħjar fil-ġestjoni ta’ l-informazzjoni CAP miġbura dwar il-pagamenti irregolari.

Ftit mill-bidliet suġġeriti għall-konsiderazzjoni jirrikjedu leġiżlazzjoni.

75.

Biex ittejjeb l-informazzjoni u tiffaċilita l-użu tagħha, il-Kummissjoni għandha tikkunsidra:

—	li tiżgura li l-pajjiżi membri jinterpretaw “is-sejbiet primarji amministrattivi jew ġudizzjarji tal-fatti” b’manjiera konsistenti u armonizzata meta jirrappurtaw pagamenti irregolari;

—	iżżid il-limitu ta’ 4 000 euro għar-rappurtar ta’ każijietfl-ECR;

—	tissimplifika u tnaqqas in-numru ta’ definizzjonijiet ta’ tipi ta’ frodi u metodi ta’ sejba fl-arranġamenti għar-rappurtar ta’ pagamenti irregolari CAP;

—	ittejjeb il-kontrolli tagħha fuq d-data mogħtija mill-pajjiżi membri;

—	tieħu ażżjoni biex tirrikonċilja l-figuri ECR u dawk tar-reġistri tad-debituri.

76.

Biex tinkoraġġixxi rkupru ta’ pagamenti irregolari taħt il-CAP minn pajjiżi membri, il-Kummissjoni għandha tikkunsidra:

—	tiddebita lill-pajjiżi membri b’pagamenti irregolari CAP li ilhom pendenti aktar mill-perijodu speċifikat u fir-rigward ta’ liema ebda proposta ta’ tħassir ma ġiet irċevuta;

—	tiżgura li pagamenti irregolari huma paċuti ma’ pagamenti oħra mill-KE dovuti lil min għandu jirċievi;

—	tistaqsi lill-pajjiżi membri biex jagħtu għall-inqas l-istess prijorita’ lill-irkupru ta’ djun CAP bħall-irkupru ta’ sussidji nazzjonali.

77.

Il-Kummissjoni għandha tistabbilixxi kriterji ċari biex tiddeċiedi jekk pagamenti irregolari mħassra għandhomx jiġu debitati lill-pajjiżi membri jew mġarrba mill-Komunità. Il-Kummissjoni għandha tieħu azzjoni kontra pajjiżi membri li jibbilanċjaw ammonti li jridu jinġabru ma’ korrezzjoni b’rata fissa.

78.	Il-Kummissjoni għandha tikkunsidra jekk is-sitwazzjoni preżenti ta’ qsim ta’ responsabbiltajiet għall-irregolaritajiet CAP bejn l-OLAF u d-Direttorat-Ġenerali ta’ l-Agrikoltura hix f’lokha.

79.	Il-Kummissjoni għandha tirrapporta kull sena fuq dak li tgħallmet minn data dwar irregolaritajiet u l-konklużjonijiet li waslet għalihom għall-ġestjoni tal-CAP. Tali rapport għandu jkun inkluż fir-rapport annwali dwar il-Ġlieda kontra Frodi jew fir-Rapport Annwali fuq il-CAP.

80.	Barra minn dan, il-Kummissjoni għandha tikkonsulta ma’ pajjiżi membri fuq il-futur tal-“Blacklist”.

Dan ir-rapport ġie adottat mill-Qorti ta’ l-Awdituri fil-Lussemburgu fil-laqgħa tagħha ta’ l-10 ta’ Ġunju 2004.

Għall-Qorti ta’ l-Awdituri

Juan Manuel FABRA VALLÉS

President

(1) Il-pajjiżi membri estimaw li 46 % ta' dan l-ammont kien fil-fatt rekuperabbli.

Sors: ECR Database ECR ta' l-OLAF.

(2) Regolament tal-Kunsill (KE) Nru 1469/95 tat-22 ta' Ġunju 1995 (ĠU L 145, tad-29.6.1995, p. 1).

(3) 1 144 miljun euro aktar misjuba qabel pagamenti (u mhux imħallsa) huma wkoll irreġistratifl-ECR.

(4) Dawn il-figuri għandhom ikunu kkunsidrati b'attenzjoni għar-raġunijiet dettaljati fil-paragrafi 21 sa 32.

(5) Fil-prattika OLAF.

(6) Artikolu 3 tar-Regolament tal-Kunsill (KEE) Nru 595/91 ta' l-4 ta' Marzu 1991 (ĠU L 67, ta' l-14.3.1991, p. 11).

(7) Artikolu 5(1) tar-Regolament tal-Kunsill (KEE) Nru 595/91 ta' l-4 ta' Marzu 1991.

(8) Artikolu 5(2) tar-Regolament tal-Kunsill (KEE) Nru 595/91 ta' l-4 ta' Marzu 1991.

(9) Sors: Paragrafu 10.2 tar-Rapport Annwali għas-sena 2002 dwar il-Protezzjoni ta' l-Interessi Finanzjarji tal-Komunitajiet u l-Ġlieda kontra l-Frodi.

(10) F' 17 955 minn possibilità ta' 29 311 każijiet huwa possibli li tistabbilixxi l-ħeffa li biha l-pajjiżi membri nnotifikaw pagamenti irregolari.

(11) Artikolu 3 tar-Regolament tal-Kunsill (KEE) Nru 595/91 tar-4 ta' Marzu 1991 teħtieġ li l-konsegwenzi finanzjarji ta' l-irregolarità jkunu rrappurtati u Artikolu 5 jgħid li l-proċeduri ġudizzjarji u amministrattivi istitwiti bi ħsieb… biex japplikaw is-sanzjonijiet.

(12) Sors: Paragrafu 11.2 tar-Rapport Annwali dwar il-Protezzjoni ta' l-Interessi Finanzjarji u l-Ġlieda kontra Frodi.

(13) Artikolu 8(1) tar-Regolament tal-Kunsill (KE) Nru1258/1999 tas-17 ta' Mejju 1999 (ĠU L 160, 26.6.1999, p. 103).

(14) Regolament tal-Kunsill (KEE) Nru 595/91 tar-4 ta' Marzu 1991 Artikolu 5(2).

(15) Il-Qorti tal-Ġustizzja ddeċidiet li l-pajjiżi membri għandhom jirrispettaw l-obbligu ta' diliġenza li jimplika li l-pajjiżi membri għandhom jieħdu passi biex jirrettifikaw irregolaritajiet minnufih, u iżżid li bi żmien, irkupru ta' somom imħallsa ħażin jista' jsir aktar ikkomplikat jew impossibbli minħabba raġunijiet bħal fatt li negozji jista' jkun li ma għadhomx jikkummerċjaw jew dokumenti ta' kontabilita' jista' jkun li ntilfu.

(16) Każ Ċ-34/89 tal-11 ta' Ottubru 1990, Repubblika Taljana vs il-Kummissjoni tal-Komunitajiet Ewropej.

(17) Rapport Speċjali Nru 11/2000, paragrafu 101 (ĠU Ċ 215, 27.7.2000).

(18) Ħames fajls ma setgħux jinstabu; erba' każijiet ġew trattati bħal li kieku diġa' kienu koperti mill-korrezzjonijiet b'rata fissa u f'każ minnhom l-ammont kien iddebitat lill-baġit mhux lill-pajjiż membru.

(19) E.ż. ordnijiet ta' falliment jew likwidazzjoni.

(20) Kien hemm argumenti raġunati fi tmienja minn 30 file eżaminati.

(21) Din id-definizzjoni ġejja mill-ġudizzju tal-Qorti Ewropea tal-Ġustizzja każ Nru Ċ-34/89.

(22) Deċiżjoni tal-Kummissjoni 2003/481/KE tas-27 ta' Ġunju 2003 (ĠU L 160, tat-28.6.2003, p. 83).

(23) Din kienet l-aħħar mid-deċiżjonijiet annwali li għandhom x'jaqsmu ma' każijiet rakkomandati għal tħassir mill-pajjiżi membri.

(24) Konklużjonijiet tal-Kunsill dwar protezzjoni ta' l-interessi finanzjarji tal-Komunitajiet u l-Ġlieda kontra l-Frodi 13244/1/02 REV 1 tas-6 ta' Novembru 2002.

(25) Rapport tal-Kumitat dwar il-Kontroll tal-Budget fuq ir-Rapport Annwali dwar il-Ġlieda kontra l-Frodi 2001. PE 315.805 tat-3 ta' Marzu 2003.

(26) KUMM (2002) 671 finali tat-3.12.2002.

(27) Il-Kumitat FAEGG (Fond Agrikolu Ewropew dwar Gwida u Garanzija) u l-Grupp ta' Irregolaritajiet huma korpi ta' konsulta lill-Kummissjoni. Huma preseduti minn uffiċjal tal-Kummissjoni u jikkonsistu minn rappreżentanti mill-pajjiżi membri.

(28) Artikolu 2(3) tar-Regolament tal-Kunsill (KEE) Nru 595/91 ta' l-4 ta' Marzu1991.

(29) Grupp “Irregolaritajiet u Assitenza lil xulxin, prodotti agrikolturi”, Regolamenti (KEE) Nru 595/91 tar-4 ta' Marzu 1991 (ĠU L 67, ta' l-14.3.1991, p.11) u (KE) Nru 515/97 tat-13 ta' Marzu 1997 (ĠU L 83, tal-25.3.1997, p. 1).

(30) Irregolaritajiet u Assitenza lil xulxin — Prodotti Agrikolturali, Regolamenti (KEE) Nru 595/91 and (KE) Nru 515/97.

(31) ĠU Ċ 230, tat-22.7.1998, p. 16.

(32) Inklużi irregolaritajiet u ammonti oħra dovuti e.ż. irregolaritajiet inqas minn 4 000 euro, żball uffiċjali, eċċ.

(33) Artikolu 3(6) tar-Regolament tal-Kummissjoni (KE) Nru 296/96 tas-16 ta' Frar 1996 (ĠU L 39, tas-17.2.1996, p. 5) kif emendat mir-Regolament tal-Kummissjoni (KE) Nru 2761/1999.

(34) Taħt it-titolu VII (Assi ta' terminu qasir) B. (Assi kurrenti) 2. (Avvanzi dovuti minn pajjiżi membri) a. (Garanzija FAEGG).

(35) Korpi ta' ċertifikazzjoni huma maħturin minn pajjiżi membri taħt il-proċeduri ta' approvazzjoni ta' kontijiet. Huma jivverifikaw in-nefqa CAP iddikjarata mill-aġenziji ta' ħlas tal-pajjiżi membri u jiċċertifikaw (jew jikkwalifikaw) il-kontijiet ta' tali nefqa. Il-Kummissjoni tieħu in konsiderazzjoni dawn iċ-ċertifikazzjonijiet meta tasal għad-deċiżjoni finanzjarja annwali tagħha biex tapprova n-nefqa CAP.

(36) Peress li Tabella 105 kienet imdaħħla fis-seħħ mis-sena 2000, l-ammonti mħassra inkorrettament mir-reġistri tad-debituri fis-snin ta' qabel għandhom ikunu stabbiliti mill-pajjiżi membri.

ANNESS A

LISTA TA' KAŻIJIET RAPPURTATI BIL-VALURI L-AKTAR GĦOLJA

(euro)
Pajjiż Membru	SENA	Miżura	Dejn li għad irid jitħallas
IT	2000	Miżuri ta' sostenn fis-settur taż-żerriegħa taż-żejt	170 936 471
IT	2000	Rifużjonijiet ta' esportazzjoni fuq ċereali	118 956 431
IT	1998	Għajnuna għall-konsum taż-żejt taż-żebbuġa	65 710 432
IT	1993	Rifużjonijiet ta' esportazzjoni fuq ċereali	63 933 593
IT	1994	Rifużjonijiet ta' esportazzjoni fuq ċereali	41 760 653
IT	1998	Għajnuna għall-konsum taż-żejt taż-żebbuġa	40 623 436
ES	1994	Rifużjonijiet ta' esportazzjoni fuq ċereali	32 896 221
BE	2000	Rifużjonijiet ta' esportazzjoni fuq butir	31 547 680
IT	1994	Rifużjonijiet ta' esportazzjoni fuq laħam taċ-ċanga	29 851 835
DE	1995	Rifużjonijiet ta' esportazzjoni fuq butir	24 926 886
IT	1994	Għajnuna għall-konsum taż-żejt taż-żebbuġa	19 743 900
IT	1996	Rifużjonijiet ta' esportazzjoni fuq ċereali	19 054 353
DE	1995	Rifużjonijiet ta' esportazzjoni fuq butir	18 630 965
IT	1998	Għajnuna għall-konsum taż-żejt taż-żebbuġa	17 253 375
IT	1996	Miżuri ta' sostenn fis-settur taż-żerriegħa taż-żejt	17 196 270
IT	1988	Proċessar ta' frott u ħxejjex	16 860 045
IT	1988	Proċessar ta' frott u ħxejjex	16 296 644
IT	2002	Proċessar ta' frott u ħxejjex	15 805 670
IT	1996	Għajnuna għaċ-ċereali	15 774 830
IT	1994	Rifużjonijiet ta' esportazzjoni fuq laħam taċ-ċanga	14 262 505
DE	1998	Rifużjonijet ta' esportazzjoni fuq laħam taċ-ċanga	14 023 242
IT	1988	Proċessar ta' frott u ħxejjex	13 944 336
ES	1994	Rifużjonijiet ta' esportazzjoni fuq inbid	13 334 611
IT	1996	Ħżin ta' ċereali	12 302 920
IT	2001	Proċessar ta' frott u ħxejjex	11 784 714
IT	1994	Għajnuna għall-konsun taż-żejt taż-żebbuġa	11 445 839
IT	2002	Miżuri ta' sostenn għall-frott frisk u ħxejjex	11 012 392
IT	1996	Ħażna ta' ċereali	10 949 622
BE	1994	Rifużjonijiet ta' esportazzjoni fuq laħam taċ-ċanga	10 121 398

ANNESS B

NUQQASIJIET FIL-PROĊEDURI GĦAR-REĠISTRAR U RKUPRU TA' DJUN

Kwalifikazzjoni mqajjma minn Korpi ta' Ċertifikazzjoni	Raġunijiet għal kwalifikazzjoni
OPEKEPE (EL)	Preċiżjoni/kompletezza/dispożizzjoni ta' problemi ta' djun dubjuż.
Vlaamse Gemeenschap (B)	Mhux possibli li tiġi ċertifikata l-kompletezza tat-Tabella 105.
IFADAP (P)	Mhux possibli li tiġi ċertifikata l-kompletezza tat-Tabella 106.
Nuqqasijiet sinifikanti nnotati mill-Korpi ta' Ċertifikazzjoni	Raġunijiet għal nuqqasijiet
Bayern STMLU (D)	Dewmien fl-irkupru ta' djun, l-ebda interess iddebitat fuq l-ammont kapitali tad-djun.
Brandenburg (D)	Problemi rigward aspetti ta' komplezza u preċiżjoni tat-Tabella 105.
DFFE (DK)	Djun b' lura pendenti.
CATALUÑA (E)	Dewmien twil fir-reġistrar u rkupru ta' djun, ma' kien hemm l-ebda politika konsistenti fuq debitar ta' dejn.
AGEA (I)	Problemi notati fl-irkupru ta' djun.
SEERAD (UK)	Dewmien twil fir-reġistrar u rkupru ta' djun, l-ebda rikonċiljazzjoni bejn ir-reġistri ta' kontabilita' u r-reġistri tad-debituri.
SDE (F)	Kwalifikazzjoni kienet mqajjma s-sena l-oħra, problemi ta' rkupru baqgħu jiġu nnotati din is-sena.
DAF (IRL)	Intervalli mtawwla bejn in-notifika ta' irregolaritajiet u r-reġistrar tagħhom fir-reġistru tad-debituri.
INGA (P)	Djun iddikjarat b'inqas bi 3 %.
Nuqqas ta' xogħol sodisfaċenti mwettaq minn Korpi ta' Ċertifikazzjoni fis-settur tad-debituri (1)	Raġunijiet għal xogħol mhux sodisfaċenti
FAGA (E)	L-għan tal-verifika tad-debituri tal-CB ma laħqitx il-ħtiġijiet msemmija fil-linja ta' gwida tal-Kummissjoni.
Castilla la Mancha (E)
OFIMER (F)
OFIVAL (F)
BLE (D)
Baden-Wurttemberg (D)
DLG (NL)
HPA (NL)
PZ (NL)
PVVE (NL)
Sors:Sezzjoni tad-debituri fir-rapporti tal-Korpi ta' Ċertifikazzjoni għas-sena FEOGA 2002.

(1) Konklużjonijiet huma bbażati fuq il-valutazzjoni tar-rapporti tal-CB mill-Qorti.

Sors:Sezzjoni tad-debituri fir-rapporti tal-Korpi ta' Ċertifikazzjoni għas-sena FEOGA 2002.

THE COMMISSION'S REPLIES

SUMMARY

For the protection of its financial interests, Community legislation lays down reporting requirements as regards Community fields of activity (1). The Member States must send regular reports of irregularities which have been the subject of primary administrative or judicial findings of fact. Regulation (EEC) No 595/91 organises the system of communications of irregularities in the field of the expenditure by the EAGGF — Guarantee Section (European Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee Fund).

In order to facilitate exploitation of the information notified to the Commission, Community legislation contains a detailed list of the information to be provided, in particular the provision which has been infringed, the amounts in question, the practices used to commit the irregularity, and the natural or legal persons involved (2).

Member States have the obligation to prevent and deal with irregularities and to recover amounts lost as a result of irregularities or negligence (3). Regulation (EEC) No 595/91 provides for the communication of all irregularities above EUR 4 000 to the Commission, meaning that all behaviour, intentional or not, that results in the infringement of a provision of Community law has to be communicated. The Commission has taken different initiatives in order to ensure that cases should be identified as a fraud or an irregularity.

The mutual notification and information system thus established is the concrete expression of the mutual duties of sincere cooperation arising from Article 10 of the EC Treaty (4), on which the Commission's antifraud strategy, defined in July 2000 (5), rests. This partnership between the Commission and the Member States is also the guiding principle behind the provisions of secondary legislation.

As the Council has stressed on a number of occasions, it is essential that the information supplied be consistent and of high quality if the Commission is to make the best use of it in stepping up the fight against fraud and ensuring that cases are properly followed up (6), at both national and Community level.

The experience gained and the improvements realised will contribute to increasing the efficiency of the notification system and the reliability of the data.

II.

According to the Commission Report on the Protection of the Financial Interests of the Community and Fight Against Fraud — Annual Report 2002 hereafter referred to as ‘Commission Report 2002 on the fight against fraud’, the highest amounts affected by the irregularities were reported in the fruit and vegetable sector. Member States were also informed of this trend in several meetings as Article 280 Working Group, Cocolaf and the Working Group ‘Irregularities and Mutual Assistance — Agricultural Products’.

The electronic data base storing the bulk of communications of irregularities transmitted by Member States has been subjected to a thorough quality check in 2003 by the Commission with the participation of Member States, which resulted in an improved internal consistency of the data while at the same time the figures were updated. The updated figures (see paragraph 30) outstanding at 31 December 2002 should read as follows: the total irregular payments reported since 1971 represent EUR 2 983 million. Of this sum, EUR 603 million (20 %) have been recovered and EUR 297 million have been written off (10 %). The amount still pending represents EUR 2 083 million (70 %). These figures include also the updates which the Commission received in the year 2003 and the financial impact of Commission Decision 2003/481/EC (EUR 75 million).

III.

Some Member States do not fulfil their obligation to report within two months of the end of the quarter in which an irregularity was detected and/or new information concerning an irregularity has become known (Regulation (EEC) No 595/91, Articles 3(1) and 5(1)). Among these Member States, Germany and Spain account for more than 50 % of the reported irregularities. The Commission has made Member States aware of this problem by reporting this in the Commission Report 2002 on the fight against fraud (paragraph 10.2.2) and discussing the problem in several meetings as Article 280 Working Group, Cocolaf and the Working Group ‘Irregularities and Mutual Assistance — Agricultural Products’.

As regards inconsistencies, Member States have been informed of these and were asked to update these cases by sending digital updates. In meetings of Article 280 Working group, Cocolaf and the Group ‘Irregularities and Mutual Assistance — Agricultural Products’ explanation and ‘training’ concerning the ECR (Electronic Case Registry) database were given to Member States. In general it can be said that Member States have improved the reporting of irregularities, but not all obligations of Regulation (EEC) No 595/91 are completely complied with.

As regards discrepancies, the Commission will continue its efforts to oblige Member States to respect all provisions of Regulation (EEC) No 595/91 in order to receive within the delays provided for fully reliable data which contain homogeneous information from all Member States.

IV.

The updated rate of recovery was established at 20,2 % in May 2004 (see paragraph 30).

The Commission is fully aware of the fact that the recovery rate in Member States is not optimal and has undertaken to improve it, in particular with the creation of the Task Force Recovery (see also answer to paragraph V).

Paying agencies and administrative bodies in charge of the recovery process in some Member States (Italy and Greece) have always claimed that they had to wait for the outcome of judicial criminal procedures before proceeding with the recovery, whereas the choice of a recovery process through a civil or administrative procedure is in some cases possible and does not preclude the launching of a parallel criminal judicial procedure.

Consequently, the initial choice of the Member State (administrative procedure, civil procedure, criminal procedure) will have consequences for the recovery delay. For a limited number of Member States, administrative recovery procedures can be launched only after a final decision in the criminal judicial procedure if any, bearing in mind that the latter might take 15 years or more.

In Italy, for the pre-1995 cases, 46 % were subject to a criminal procedure whereas this percentage represented 18 % only for the cases posterior to 1995, which could be explained by the Member States deciding to take the necessary administrative steps as early as possible and as soon as there was a notification of the irregularity.

In shared management, the Member State responsible is in direct contact with the debtors. The Commission is not in a position to write off debts. According to Regulation (EC) No 1258/1999 the Commission is legally obliged to exclude all expenditure from Community financing where that expenditure has not been executed in compliance with Community rules. Accepting compromise settlements and/or partial payments should be assessed on a case-by-case approach on the basis of national law and in conjunction with the criteria as laid down in Article 8 of Regulation (EC) No 1258/1999.

Following the Communication of the Commission entitled ‘Improving the recovery of Community entitlements arising from direct and shared management of Community expenditure’ of 3 December 2002 (COM(2002) 671 final), the Commission decided to set up a joint OLAF- Directorate-General for Agriculture Task Force Recovery in order to clear the burden of the past, i.e. all the irregularity cases prior to 1999 and still open in order to prepare a decision on whether the Community or the Member State bears the financial consequences.

As regards the Court's observation on the absence of adequate criteria for deciding whether sums written off should be charged to the Member States or borne by the Community, the Commission wishes to point out that it has developed, throughout time and on account of the acquired experience applied, four guiding principles and a number of procedural criteria documented in July 2002 (see also paragraph 44).

Since the creation of the Task Force Recovery in 2003, the Commission services have drawn up a list of detailed criteria with which all the cases are audited in order to have the amounts not recovered charged either to the Community or the Member State.

VI.

Following the allocation of responsibilities stated in Annex 2 to Commission Document SEC(95) 249 dated 10 February 1995, UCLAF/OLAF was to receive all communications notified by Member States under Council Regulation (EEC) No 595/91 and was responsible for the analysis and follow-up of the cases in question, including input of the data concerned into the irregularity database.

OLAF responsibility in matters of recovery action related to cases of fraud and irregularity includes the production of summary notes for each case containing a résumé of the procedures performed and the reasoning behind the proposals for possible financial correction within the clearance-of-accounts procedure undertaken under the responsibility of the Directorate-General for Agriculture as Authorising Officer. The clearance procedure is conducted by the Directorate-General for Agriculture, but throughout its different steps, this DG is assisted by OLAF. See also paragraph IX.

The Commission always draws the legal consequences for the fraud proofing and control capability of the existing CAP regulations, taking on board in particular the follow-up recommendations of the Office.

The Commission considers that the allocation of responsibilities between OLAF and the Directorate-General for Agriculture has been clearly defined: according to Annex 2 to the Communication of the Commission SEC(95) 249, OLAF is responsible in matters of recovery on reported irregularities. Any decision to write off irrecoverable amounts has to be taken by the Commission via the EAGGF clearance-of-accounts procedure that is conducted by the Directorate-General for Agriculture, in which OLAF assists throughout its different steps.

VII.

Council Regulation (EC) No 1469/95 established, in the field of EAGGF Guarantee, a system for identifying economic operators who present a high risk for the Community Budget through a communication system via the Commission. After eight years of application of this Regulation, it appears that the number of communications is rather limited if not weak.

The Commission has extensively discussed the matter in the framework of the Irregularities and Mutual Assistance/Agriculture products group and is committed to presenting a second report to the European Parliament and to the Council containing comprehensive assessment of the blacklist Regulation and suggested options for action.

VIII.

There is a difference between the amounts contained in Table 105 (receivable which is certain and not subject to any condition, receivable of fixed amount expressed precisely in cash terms, receivable due and not subject to any payment time) for the EAGGF financial exercise and the amounts embodied in the ECR database (amount of quarterly reported irregularities for one particular term, which can be at that stage mere estimates subject to subsequent refinements).

The Commission has asked the Member States to undertake a tentative reconciliation of the ECR database with data of Table 105, bearing in mind that both sets of data will never coincide. Until now, the first priority was to improve the quality of the data. The data in the ECR database has now reached a level of reliability where it will be possible to compare the data.

IX.

Member States should shift in the near future to the electronic format for reporting of irregularities. The electronic format will increase the data quality and the on time reporting of irregularities and will avoid misunderstandings and misinterpretations.

The Commission is currently assisting Member States in this respect and is also considering an increase of the threshold from EUR 4 000 to 10 000 in order to reduce dataflow and focus on the most important cases.

The Commission has undertaken to bring forward draft proposals to modify Council Regulation (EEC) No 595/91 and Council Regulation (EC) No 1258/1999 to seek to remedy the weaknesses in reporting, recovery and write off of irregular CAP payments.

Finally, regarding the suggested abolition of the black list, the Commission, while sharing the view of the Court that the system does not work well, thinks there is room for improvement of the scheme and would rather see the application of the tool by the Member States being improved, than simply abolished. There is certainly room for improvement, and the mere existence of the regulation is designed to have a preventive impact which, admittedly, diminishes if not effectively applied. In this context, it is worth pointing out that clearance of accounts started to systematically include aspects regarding the application of the black list in its audits.

INTRODUCTION

During 2003, the Commission updated the figures for the cumulative total of irregular CAP payments. The updated figures are (see paragraph 30):

—	irregularities notified after payment: EUR 2 983 million;

—	amount recovered from claimants: EUR 603 million;

—	amount written off against EAGGF: EUR 153 million;

—	amount charged to Member States: EUR 144 million;

—	amount to be recovered: EUR 2 083 million.

ANALYSIS

At the beginning of May 2004, the amount of irregular payments notified since 1971 stood at EUR 2 983 million while the amount to be recovered represented EUR 2 083 million. The updated percentage refered to by the Court represented therefore 30 %. (The quality and reliability of the data has improved during the year 2003 due to the quality checks, audits of the Task Force Recovery and feedback from Member States). This figure includes all updates of the year 2003 and the financial impact of Commission Decision 2003/481/EC.

11.	During 2003, the Commission updated its figures for debts prior to 1994. The updated percentage is 22,4 % (see paragraph 30).

13.

The latest CAP reforms have been conducted and adopted in particular with the aim of minimising the risks of fraud and other irregularities.

The IACS (Integrated Administration and Control System), which is acknowledged by the Court as having a major impact on the prevention of irregular payments, is now covering, directly or indirectly, 80 % of CAP expenditure.

15.(b)

Additional developments are to be found in the Commission Report 2002 on the fight against fraud.

17.

The Commission shares the view that Member States interpret differently the notion of primary administrative or judicial findings of facts; however, it has defined, on various occasions, in different documents and interpretative notes what is to be meant by this notion while a definition is given in the context of the black list in Commission Regulation (EC) No 745/96, Article 1(2) (7).

21.

Germany and Spain together account for more than 50 % of the reported irregularities and these two Member States seldom report on time. The Commission has informed Member States by discussing this problem in meetings as Cocolaf and Working Group ‘Irregularities and Mutual Assistance — Agricultural Products’ and by publishing the relevant figures in the Commission Report 2002 on the fight against fraud (paragraph 10.2.2).

22.

The Commission has made Member States aware of the fact that the time between the discovery and the reporting of an irregularity is too long. In annual reports and presentations in meetings of Cocolaf, Member States have been informed that the reporting time could have an impact on the determination of the negligence of a Member State (see Commission Report 2002 on the fight against fraud, point 10.5).

Almost 90 % of irregularities are notified within two years of their discovery.

24.

The Task Force Recovery (see paragraph V) in the course of its audit also found out that Italy has not yet notified the writing off of certain debts in spite of court orders establishing that there had not been any fraud committed.

The necessary corrections have been introduced in the ECR database after July 2003.

25.	OLAF has informed Member States in several meetings that some cases still had a pending financial state, i.e. amounts were still to be calculated. Member States were asked to update these cases as soon as (new) information became available (see also point 28).

26.

The Commission introduced an electronic reporting system in 2001. At the same time specific fields relating to ‘Interest’ and ‘Penalties’ were introduced. Some Member States started to use this system as from 2002. For 2003, 30 % of the cases provide information concerning penalties and/or interest.

27.

The Commission is aware of the problem of inconsistencies of definition and coverage in the information supplied and has already remarked on this problem (see Commission 2002 Report on the fight against fraud, paragraph 11.2). In addition, OLAF also informed Member States in several meetings that the non-reporting of the CN code (product description) would hinder the Commission in producing analyses.

28.

The Commission has made substantial efforts to improve the quality of information supplied by Member States in the initial communication as well as in all updates on financial impact. In the framework of the Task Force Recovery, a first attempt has been made to audit the completeness and reliability of the communications and its updates by the Member States.

29.

Efforts have been made to tackle the problem of discrepancies between Member State data and the ECR. Reasons for discrepancies can be due to the lack of human resources in order to monitor on a regular basis the constant flow of data provided by Member States. The number of staff has meanwhile been increased. The module has been translated into all languages of EU and a manual has been written.

30.

The Commission asked Member States to verify the figures of draft Commission Report 2002 on the fight against fraud. Feedback of Member States was taken into account before the final version of the Commission Report 2002 on the fight against fraud was released; therefore, the figures in this Report have the agreement of Member States.

Cases and communications have been updated during the year 2003 on the basis of:

—	quality checks by OLAF,

—	findings of Member States concerning the data in the ECR database,

—	updates of old cases by Member States,

—	Commission Decision 2003/481/EC,

—	audit findings by the Task Force Recovery,

—	audit findings by the Court of Auditors.

Figures based on the data available in the ECR database on 2 May 2004 are in line with the figures as produced for the Commission Report 2002 on the fight against fraud. However, it was already mentioned in this Report that the ‘figures must be handled with great caution’ (p. 41) as ‘there is no certainty that the total number of communications received represents the total frauds and irregularities detected by Member States’ (p. 44).

The effects of the updates during 2003 and Commission Decision 2003/481/EC (EUR 75 million) have been taken into account.

31.

The Commission recognises that there are deficiencies in the link between ECR and CMS (Case Management System). A request for a change in the ECR database was made in September 2003. An extra field will be added to the module to create a link between CMS and the ECR database, making it also possible to access the information on the financial recovery situation provided by the Member State.

32.(b) and (c)

A large number of the cases were already closed.

36.

The Commission considers that the allocation of responsibilities between OLAF and the Directorate-General for Agriculture has been clearly defined: According to Annex 2 to the Communication of the Commission SEC(95) 249, OLAF is responsible in matters of recovery on reported irregularities. Any decision to write off irrecoverable amounts has to be taken by the Commission via the EAGGF clearance-of-accounts procedure that is conducted by the Directorate-General for Agriculture, in which OLAF assists throughout its different steps.

37.

In the absence of total recovery, the financial consequences of the irregularities shall be borne by the Member State in the event of irregularities or negligence attributable to administrative authorities or other bodies of the Member States. In other cases the burden shall be borne by the Community budget. The Commission has defined as early as 1996 the following guideline (8) that the recovery procedure should be launched as soon as possible after the irregularity had been detected and should be completed within four years after the date of the first communication of fraud or irregularity. In the opposite case, the Member State may be required to show that there was no negligence.

The four-year period is extended to eight years in case of judicial procedures, on the condition that the Commission is fully informed of the recovery procedure.

39.

The Commission has identified a certain number of problems in this context. In its Communication COM(202) 671 final of 3 December 2002, the Commission recommended the initiation of corrective measures, namely:

—	setting up of the Task Force Recovery to speed up the treatment of the backlog,

—	modifying Regulation (EC) No 1258/1999 and therefore Regulation (EEC) No 595/91 to prevent new backlogs in the future.

Such provisions on writing off irrecoverable Community entitlements should provide the regulatory basis to carry out this operation prudently thanks to specific, clear-cut criteria and transparent legal procedure in particular based on:

—	annual global communications by Member States regarding the stage of their national recovery procedures,

—	attentive scrutiny of the files examined by the Task Force Recovery,

—	approved criteria to determine whether the non-recovered amounts should be charged to the Community Budget or to the Member State.

40.

During 2003, the Commission updated the cumulative recovery rate as at the end of 2002 at 20,2 % of the global financial impact of cases detected after payment (effectively recovered by the Member States).

Through the clearance-of-accounts procedure, a further EUR 144 million (4,8 %) has been charged to the Member States and EUR 153 million (5,1 %) to the EAGGF budget (see paragraph 4).

41.

The Commission agrees that the recovery rate is low but this assessment can be explained by the fact that, in matters of shared management, recovery procedures are not uniform nor harmonised in Member States and this is an unexpected effect of the assimilation principle posed by Article 280 of the Treaty which jeopardises the uniformity of implementation of Community legislation because recovery of Community monies follows the national rules.

However, the Commission has undertaken to bring forward proposals to modify Regulation (EC) No 1258/1999 and Regulation (EEC) No 595/91 in order to improve the weaknesses of the actual situation (see paragraph 39).

(a)

The case which the Court refers to was notified on 29 May 1991 and updated in 1997. The Commission wishes to point out that this case was not included in the TFR audit selection on account of the wrong amount reported in ECR.

(b)	The objective of the amendment of Regulation (EC) No 1258/1999 and Regulation (EEC) No 595/91 is, inter alia, to address the shortcomings pointed out by the Court by making Member Sates more responsible and by providing ex post controls in the clearance-of-accounts framework.

(c)

According to Article 280(2) of the EC Treaty ‘Member States shall take the same measures to counter fraud affecting the financial interests of the Community as they take to counter fraud affecting their own financial interests’. There is a constant case law of the ECJ which stipulates that the rules applicable in cases where there are violations to Community law cannot be less favourable than the rules prevailing in cases where there are violations to national law. However this does not amount to confering a preferential status on CAP debts.

(d)	As regards the outcome of the combined UCLAF/German 1992 investigation, this case will be dealt with in the clearance-of-accounts procedure.

(f)

According to Regulation (EC) No 1258/1999 the Commission is legally obliged to exclude all expenditure from Community financing where that expenditure has not been executed in compliance with Community rules. Accepting transactions or partial payments are conditions to be assessed on a case-by-case approach on the basis of national law and in conjunction with the criteria as laid down in Article 8 of Regulation (EC) No 1258/1999.

42.

The Commission has undertaken to bring forward proposals to modify Regulation (EC) No 1258/1999 and Regulation (EEC) No 595/91, inter alia, to address the shortcomings pointed out by the Court by making Member States more responsible and by providing ex post controls in the clearance-of-accounts framework.

43.

During 2003, the Commission has updated the figures on amounts written off as at the end of 2002. The updated figures are:

—	charged to Member States: EUR 144 million,

—	charged to EAGGF: EUR 153 million.

The Commission shares the concern of the Court about the management and recovery of EAGGF debt. It points to the efforts made through the reform of the clearance of accounts in 1996 together with the developments discussed in paragraphs 39 and 41 of the replies.

These cases will be dealt with in the clearance-of-accounts procedure.

44.

The Commission has applied four guiding principles and a number of procedural criteria documented in July 2002. As regards the guiding principles:

—	if the whole amount cannot be recovered for objective reasons and the Member State has done all it can to recover the amount on time without displaying any negligence, the unrecovered amounts are charged to the Community budget.

—	in all other cases, where the irregularity is attributed to the Member State or where the recovery procedures have not been conducted with all the diligence required, the amounts in question are charged to defaulting Member States.

—	the recovery procedure must be started as soon as possible after the irregularity has been detected and should be completed within four years of the fraud or irregularity first being reported. If not, the Member State must show there has been no negligence.

—	the treatment of individual cases must be discussed in detail with all the Member States concerned.

As regards the procedural criteria, the questions to be answered are:

—	Has the recovery procedure started? Can it be completed within a reasonable period?

—	Has the recovery procedure not been completed for reasons of force majeure or for other compelling reasons?

—	Was recovery not initiated because of the negligence of the Member State or its failure to take action?

Since the creation of the Task Force Recovery, the Commission services have refined the criteria and have drawn up a list of criteria upon which all files are audited in order to have a decision on whether the amounts at stake are charged to the Community budget or to the Member State. This audit concerns all outstanding files up to 31 December 1998.

48.

There is no link between the financial corrections based on a system analysis and the individual cases of fraud for which amounts have not yet been recovered. Article 8(2) of Regulation (EC) No 1258/1999 and Article 5(2) of Regulation (EEC) No 595/91 provide clear procedural rules to be followed for the treatment of specific cases of fraud and irregularities.

49.

As the Court mentioned it in an earlier report (9), the Commission undertook in 1999 a review of all the pre-1995 cases still pending in order to take a decision on whether to charge them to the Community or to the Member States. The exercise was limited to six Member States (10), on account of the poor quality of the available data and also taking into consideration the limited human resources available.

50.

Following the Commission decision mentioned by the Court, all cases involved were updated in the ECR database. This now contains the number of the Commission Decision, the authority who should bear the loss and the amounts involved.

The distribution of the costs of writes off between the Communitiy budget and Member States budget in the June 2003 decision should not be taken as a precedent for future decisions. In respect of Italy, which appeared to be the largest debtor, due to the large number of Italian cases and the poor cooperation of the Member State, it was decided in 1999 to concentrate on the cases of other Member States and to postpone the scrutiny of Italian files.

51.

The Commission set up a Task Force Recovery in 2003 in order to clear all the pending irregularity cases prior to 1999. In the framework of the audits carried out by the Task Force Recovery throughout 2003, the remaining pre-1995 files above a given threshold (EUR 500 000) were examined for nine Member States (11). In total, 443 cases were examined in the course of this audit, among which them 343 cases for Italy. The related clearance-of-accounts procedure for the bulk of examined files is ongoing.

52.(a) and (b)

The Commission has taken the necessary steps to remedy this situation. Since July 2003 the number of the Commission Decision and the amounts involved are stored in the digital file and there is a reference to the Commission Decision in the paper file. A change request has been formulated to create an extra field in the ECR database in which the Commission Decision number can be saved. Since March 2004, the ECR database contains a specific field in which the Commission decisions are listed.

The 1993 clearance-of-accounts decision was proposed in 1997, and UCLAF was responsible for the corrections proposed for inadequate follow up of irregularities. Due to the old clearance-of-accounts procedure, cases were not properly documented. However, these procedures are clear now.

(c)	The Commission informs Member States of OLAF's recommendations, which are only mere proposals at that stage, the final decision being taken by the College. It is not excluded that some Member States already ‘anticipate’ these recommendations and take them for granted.

53.

55.

The competent Commission service (OLAF's intelligence units) had to improve the quality of the data before it could be used for analyses and intelligence-driven investigations. In the year 2003 the first basic analyses on the basis of the data of ECR database have been presented to Member States in the framework of the Working Group ‘Irregularities and Mutual Assistance — Agricultural Products’.

The developments discussed in paragraphs 39 and 41 of the replies should facilitate and speed up the recovery process.

57.	The Commission endorses the Court's statement on the weaknesses of the ECR system and has performed some analyses in which the use and the frequency of codes were examined. The Commission has started a discussion with the Member States on the simplification of the reporting system.

58.	The Commission has asked Member States to update these cases the during Article 280 Working Group meeting of 12 March 2003 and Working Group ‘Irregularities and Mutual Assistance — Agricultural Products’ of 11 March 2003 (see paragraph 25).

59.

The Commission uses the data for operational and recovery follow-up purposes as well as strategic intelligence purposes. This is however done by analysts of OLAF itself, therefore no direct link between the ECR module and (other) users can be found.

Most of the time, data is prepared by OLAF staff on request of other users inside the Community services or outside in Member States such as Austria and Germany, which are using the data to prepare Regulation (EEC) No 4045/89 controls.

60.	The Commission services have presented figures and analyses of the ECR modules in several meetings with the Member States.

62.

The competent authorities of Member States are faced with some delicate legal interpretation of questions and this notwithstanding the guidance provided by the Commission for a uniform interpretation of the black list tool. Among the difficulties put forward by Member States are:

—	the concept of ‘serious negligence’ is a legal concept unknown in certain Member States in civil law, having in some Member States more affinity with the criminal process,

—	the absence of an explicit clause which regulates liability in the case of a consortium or associated operators,

—	the risk of having to pay for damages for a blacklisting that was ultimately overturned, which could have serious financial consequences for the Member State involved.

66. and 67.

Certifying Bodies have been provided with detailed instructions in the framework of an ad hoc expert meeting in 2002 focused on the checks to be made with Table 105. Table 105 aims at:

—	overseeing and control of amounts of liabilities held by Member States,

—	reflection on the level of liabilities,

—	a tentative reconciliation of the data of Table 105 and the Paying Agencies' debtors' ledgers, and Table 104 with the ECR data base managed by OLAF.

The Commission services are giving increased attention to this question through a scrutiny of the annual reports of the Certification Bodies.

67.

The Commission informs Member States of OLAF's recommendations, which are only mere proposals at that stage, the final decision being taken by the College. It is not excluded that some Member States already ‘anticipate’ these recommendations and take them for granted. During the clearance-of-accounts procedure, the Commission has very substantial powers; firstly, it is responsible for auditing and evaluating the Member State’s management of EAGGF Guarantee expenditure, and secondly, it is the institution which unilaterally decides which amounts to refuse for financing.

68.

The Commission has asked Members States to undertake a tentative reconciliation of the ECR database with the data of Table 105, bearing in mind that both sets of data will never coincide. Until now, the first priority was to improve the quality of the data. The data in the ECR database has now reached a level of reliability where it will be possible to compare the data.

CONCLUSIONS

70.

The Commission shares the concern of the Court about the management and recovery of EAGGF debt. In 2000, on the initiative of the Commission and based on the same observations as the Court, proposals were discussed with Member States to remedy the situation of the ‘pending’ cases. In 2003, following the creation of the Task Force Recovery after the Communication of the Commission of 3 December 2002, files representing more than EUR 500 000 notified before 1 January 1999 have been under scrutiny. The remaining cases will be dealt with in the near future.

See also answer to paragraphs II and 4 as regards the updated figures.

71.(a)

The requirements of the Commission services are very well known to Member States authorities; but due to national communication and cooperation problems these requirements are not reflected in the communication and updating of irregularities.

(b)	See answer to points 25. to 27. To encourage the communication of increasingly precise and up-to-date information, the Commission is redoubling its efforts regarding the gathering and analysis of data sent in by the Member States.

(c)	The Commission shares the concern of the Court about the management and recovery of EAGGF debt, but believes that things are gradually improving.

(d)	The creation of the Task Force Recovery in 2003 should enable the Commission to clear up the backlog. The Commission has undertaken to bring forward proposals to modify Regulation (EC) No 1258/1999 and Regulation (EEC) No 595/91 to prevent having a similar situation in the future.

(e)

The Commission applied four guiding principles and a number of procedural criteria documented in July 2002. They are detailed in answer to point 44. Since the creation of the Task Force Recovery, the Commission services have refined a list of criteria upon which all files are audited in order to have a decision on whether the amounts at stake are charged to the Community budget or to the Member State. This audit concerns all outstanding files up to 31 December 1998.

(f)

72.	Detailed instructions on the audit of the debtors' ledgers have been provided to the Certifying Bodies. The Commission will increase its efforts in order to reach a better understanding of the problem.

73.

The Commission has extensively discussed the application of the Black List in the framework of the Working Group ‘Irregularities and Mutual Assistance — Agricultural Products’ and is committed to presenting a second report to the European Parliament and to the Council containing a comprehensive assessment of the black list Regulation and suggested options for action.

RECOMMENDATIONS

74.

The Commission takes note of the recommendations of the Court and considers that some of these recommendations of the Court address primarily Member States. Moreover the Commission estimates that, in undertaking its tasks, it should primarily focus on the appraisal of the efficiency and adequacy of adopted and executed measures. Some of the changes welcomed by the Court are already in place.

—	The quality of the available data related to CAP irregular payments should be improved.

—	The recovery of irregulary paid amounts should be speeded up by the introduction by Member States of efficient measures. The Commission has undertaken to bring forward proposals to this effect (see paragraphs 39 and 41).

—	The Commission has undertaken to put in place criteria in order to decide on the financial consequences of irregularities as to whether to charge the Community budget or the Member State.

—

—	The Commission takes into consideration the antifraud aspect in every piece of its CAP legislation through the so-called fraud-proofing examination of the draft regulations.

75.

—	The question of the act generating the obligation to communicate (preliminary administrative or judicial report) is defined in Article 1(2) of Regulation (EC) No 745/96. and has been widely discussed with Member States (see reply to paragraph 17).

—	The Commission is currently examining the question of increasing the threshold to EUR 10 000.

—

The Commission has already performed some analyses in which the use and the frequency of codes were examined. A paper concerning the type of irregularity and the qualification by Member States has been produced and will be used in a discussion between the Commission and Member States to simplify the number of codes. The same procedure will be followed for other codes.

—	Efforts have been made to tackle the problem of discrepancies between Member State data and the ECR database.

—	The Commission has invited Member States to proceed to a tentative reconciliation of OLAF ECR/595 data and the debtors' ledgers data.

76.

—	The Commission has undertaken to bring forward a proposal of modification to Regulation (EC) No 1258/1999 which aims at enhancing the efficiency of the recovery process.

—	The offset of irregular payments against other EAGGF payments is legal and common in many Member States. The Commission will seek to promote this practice in all paying agencies.

—

The Commission would like to recall the principle of assimilation enshrined in Article 280 of the Treaty. In this context, it wishes to add that there is a constant caselaw of the ECJ which stipulates that the rules applicable in cases where there are violations to Community law cannot be less favourable than the rules applicable in cases where there are violations to national law. However this does not amount to confering a preferential status to CAP debts.

77.	The Commission applied four guiding principles and a number of procedural criteria documented in July 2002. They are detailed in answer to point 44. The Commission has foreseen to take action in this field.

78.

79.	The Commission has started this process. The Commission Report 2002 on the fight against fraud can be considered as the first report in which first steps were made on lessons learned.

80.

The Commission has extensively discussed the application of the Black List in the framework of the Working Group ‘Irregularities and Mutual Assistance — Agricultural Products’ and is committed to presenting a second report to the European Parliament and to the Council containing comprehensive assessment of the black list Regulation and suggested options for action (see also answer in paragraph IX).

(1) See in particular Article 3(1) of Council Regulation (EEC) No 595/91 (OJ L 67, 7.3.1997), Commission Regulation (EC) No 1681/94 and (EC) No 1831/94 of 26 July 1994 (OJ L 191, 27.7.1994) for expenditure, and Article 6(5) of Council Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 1150/2000 for traditional own resources.

(2) Except for Council Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 1150/2000 implementing Decision 94/728/EC, Euratom on the system of the Communities' own resources (OJ L 130, 31.5.2000), where this information is optional only.

(3) See Article 8 of Regulation (EC) No 2988/95 (OJ L 312, 23.12.1995) and Article 8 of Regulation (EC) No 1258/1999 (OJ L 160, 26.6.1999).

(4) As confirmed by the Court in the Zwartfeld and Yugoslav maize cases. Case C-2/88 [1990] ECR I-3365, 13.7.1990; Case C-68/88 Commission v Greece [1989] ECR 2965.

(5) COM(2000) 358 final of 28 June 2000 and Action Plan 2001-2003 (COM(2001) 254 final of 15 May 2001).

(6) Including the accounting and recovery aspects.

(7) ‘The preliminary administrative or judicial report shall mean the first written assessment, even if only internal, by a competent administrative or judicial authority, concluding on the basis of concrete facts that an irregularity has been committed, deliberately or through gross negligence, without prejudice to the possibility of this conclusion being revised or withdrawn subsequently on the basis of developments in the administrative or judicial procedure.’ The same definition has been provided in different working documents among which the document ‘Obligations to notify irregularities: practical arrangements’ discussed with Member States in the XIXth meeting of Cocolaf on 11 April 2002.

(8) Document VI/5330/97.

(9) Special Report No 22/2000 on evaluation of the reformed clearance-of-accounts procedure (OJ C 69, 2.3.2001).

(10) Belgium, Greece, Spain, Ireland, the Netherlands, Portugal.

(11) Belgium, Germany, Greece, France, Italy, Netherlands, Spain, Portugal, United Kingdom.

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