

# Az Európai Unió Hivatalos Lapja

# C 160 E



Magyar nyelvű kiadás

## Tájékoztatások és közlemények

56. évfolyam

2013. június 6.

<u>Közleményszám</u>	Tartalom	Oldal
	IV Tájékoztatások	
	AZ EURÓPAI UNIÓ INTÉZMÉNYEITŐL, SZERVEITŐL, HIVATALAITÓL ÉS ÜGYNÖKSÉGEITŐL SZÁRMAZÓ TÁJÉKOZTATÁSOK	
	<b>Európai Parlament</b>	
	ÍRÁSBELI VÁLASZT IGÉNYLŐ KÉRDÉSEK A VÁLASZOKKAL	
2013/C 160 E/01	Az Európai Parlament tagjai által feltett, írásbeli választ igénylő kérdések és az európai uniós intézmények által rájuk adott válaszok .....	1
	<i>(Lásd az olvasónak szóló megjegyzést)</i>	

### IV Tájékoztatások

AZ EURÓPAI UNIÓ INTÉZMÉNYEITŐL, SZERVEITŐL, HIVATALAITÓL ÉS ÜGYNÖKSÉGEITŐL SZÁRMAZÓ TÁJÉKOZTATÁSOK

#### **Európai Parlament**

#### ÍRÁSBELI VÁLASZT IGÉNYLŐ KÉRDÉSEK A VÁLASZOKKAL

*(Lásd az olvasónak szóló megjegyzést)*

**HU**

#### *Megjegyzés az olvasónak*

Ez a kiadvány az Európai Parlament tagjai által feltett, írásbeli választ igénylő kérdéseket és az európai uniós intézmények által rájuk adott válaszokat tartalmazza.

Minden kérdés és válasz esetében az eredeti nyelvi változat szerepel először az esetleges fordítások előtt.

Egyes esetekben előfordulhat, hogy a válasz más nyelven születik, mint a kérdés. Ez a válaszdásra felkért bizottság munkanyelvétől függ.

E kérdések és válaszok az Európai Parlament eljárási szabályzatának 117. cikkével összhangban kerülnek közzétételre.

Minden kérdés és válasz megtalálható az Európai Parlament weboldalán (Europarl) a „Parlamentari kérdések” cím alatt:

<http://www.europarl.europa.eu/plenary/hu/parliamentary-questions.html>

#### *KÉPVISELŐCSOPORTOK RÖVIDÍTÉSEI*

PPE	Európai Néppárt (Kereszténydemokraták) képviselőcsoport
S&D	Európai Szocialisták és Demokraták Progresszív Szövetsége képviselőcsoport
ALDE	Liberálisok és Demokraták Szövetsége Európáért képviselőcsoport
ECR	Európai Konzervatívok és Reformerek képviselőcsoport
Verts/ALE	Zöldek/Európai Szabad Szövetség képviselőcsoport
GUE/NGL	Egységes Európai Baloldal/Északi Zöld Baloldal képviselőcsoport
EFD	Szabadság és Demokrácia Európája képviselőcsoport
NI	független képviselők

**HU**

## IV

(Tájékoztatások)

AZ EURÓPAI UNIÓ INTÉZMÉNYEITŐL, SZERVEITŐL, HIVATALAITÓL ÉS  
ÜGYNÖKSÉGEITŐL SZÁRMAZÓ TÁJÉKOZTATÁSOK

## EURÓPAI PARLAMENT

## ÍRÁSBELI VÁLASZT IGÉNYLŐ KÉRDÉSEK A VÁLASZOKKAL

Az Európai Parlament tagjai által feltett, írásbeli választ igénylő kérdések és az európai  
uniós intézmények által rájuk adott válaszok

(2013/C 160 E/01)

<b>Tartalom</b>	<b>Oldal</b>
<b>P-004200/12</b> by Gabriel Mato Adrover to the Commission <i>Subject:</i> Renewal of the Protocol to the EU-Morocco Fisheries Partnership Agreement	
Versión española .....	13
English version .....	14
<b>E-004201/12</b> by Gabriel Mato Adrover to the Commission <i>Subject:</i> Renewal of the Protocol to the EU-Mauritania Fisheries Partnership Agreement	
Versión española .....	15
English version .....	16
<b>E-004202/12</b> by Graham Watson to the Commission <i>Subject:</i> Plasma arc technology	
English version .....	17
<b>E-004203/12</b> by Graham Watson to the Commission <i>Subject:</i> Protection of intensively farmed rabbits	
English version .....	18
<b>E-004204/12</b> by Graham Watson to the Commission <i>Subject:</i> VP/HR — Incarceration under Pakistan's blasphemy laws	
English version .....	19
<b>P-004208/12</b> by António Fernando Correia De Campos to the Commission <i>Subject:</i> The situation of civilians in Guinea-Bissau following the military coup	
Versão portuguesa .....	20
English version .....	22
<b>E-004421/12</b> by João Ferreira to the Commission <i>Subject:</i> The humanitarian situation in Guinea-Bissau	
Versão portuguesa .....	20
English version .....	22

<b>E-004209/12</b> by Nikolaos Salavrakos to the Commission	
<i>Subject:</i> Reduction in labour costs	
Ελληνική έκδοση .....	24
English version .....	25
<b>E-004210/12</b> by Nikolaos Salavrakos to the Commission	
<i>Subject:</i> European markets	
Ελληνική έκδοση .....	26
English version .....	27
<b>E-004211/12</b> by Nikolaos Salavrakos to the Commission	
<i>Subject:</i> VP/HR — Negative position of Turkey regarding the demilitarisation of Cyprus	
Ελληνική έκδοση .....	28
English version .....	29
<b>E-004212/12</b> by Nikolaos Salavrakos to the Commission	
<i>Subject:</i> Re-introduction of border controls	
Ελληνική έκδοση .....	30
English version .....	31
<b>E-004213/12</b> by Nikolaos Salavrakos to the Commission	
<i>Subject:</i> VP/HR — Syria peace plan failure	
Ελληνική έκδοση .....	32
English version .....	33
<b>P-004216/12</b> by Antonio Cancian to the Commission	
<i>Subject:</i> Inclusion of drug addiction prevention and treatment in the priorities of the next EU programming period (2014-2020)	
Versione italiana .....	34
English version .....	35
<b>E-004217/12</b> by Raúl Romeva i Rueda to the Commission	
<i>Subject:</i> Schengen area	
Versión española .....	36
English version .....	37
<b>E-004219/12</b> by Nikolaos Salavrakos to the Commission	
<i>Subject:</i> Use of narcotic substances	
Ελληνική έκδοση .....	38
English version .....	39
<b>E-004220/12</b> by Nigel Farage to the Commission	
<i>Subject:</i> Not a level vineyard	
English version .....	40
<b>E-004222/12</b> by Nicole Sinclair to the Commission	
<i>Subject:</i> Structural Funds	
English version .....	41
<b>E-004223/12</b> by Monica Luisa Macovei to the Commission	
<i>Subject:</i> Macroeconomic grounds justifying the current convergence criteria thresholds	
Versiunea în limba română .....	42
English version .....	43
<b>E-004224/12</b> by Sergio Paolo Francesco Silvestris to the Commission	
<i>Subject:</i> Fisheries support policies	
Versione italiana .....	44
English version .....	45
<b>E-004225/12</b> by Sergio Paolo Francesco Silvestris to the Commission	
<i>Subject:</i> New fuel for aircraft	
Versione italiana .....	46
English version .....	47

<b>E-004226/12</b> by Sergio Paolo Francesco Silvestris to the Commission	
<i>Subject:</i> Seizure in Bari and the results of efforts to combat fraud	
Versione italiana .....	48
English version .....	49
<b>E-004228/12</b> by Andreas Mölzer to the Commission	
<i>Subject:</i> Energy for developing countries	
Deutsche Fassung .....	50
English version .....	51
<b>E-004229/12</b> by Andreas Mölzer to the Commission	
<i>Subject:</i> EU employment package	
Deutsche Fassung .....	52
English version .....	54
<b>E-004230/12</b> by Andreas Mölzer to the Commission	
<i>Subject:</i> EU image-building	
Deutsche Fassung .....	55
English version .....	56
<b>E-004232/12</b> by Marina Yannakoudakis to the Commission	
<i>Subject:</i> VP/HR — China returning North Korean refugees to their homeland	
English version .....	57
<b>E-004233/12</b> by Marina Yannakoudakis to the Commission	
<i>Subject:</i> VP/HR — Ethnic, religious, economic and cultural human rights violations against Arab citizens in Al-Ahwaz, Iran	
English version .....	58
<b>E-004234/12</b> by William (The Earl of) Dartmouth to the Commission	
<i>Subject:</i> The Commission's role in the EEAS	
English version .....	59
<b>E-004235/12</b> by William (The Earl of) Dartmouth to the Commission	
<i>Subject:</i> VP/HR — Cost-effectiveness of the EEAS	
English version .....	60
<b>E-004236/12</b> by William (The Earl of) Dartmouth to the Commission	
<i>Subject:</i> VP/HR — EEAS delegation transitions	
English version .....	61
<b>E-004237/12</b> by William (The Earl of) Dartmouth to the Commission	
<i>Subject:</i> VP/HR — Commission staff in the EEAS	
English version .....	62
<b>E-004238/12</b> by William (The Earl of) Dartmouth to the Commission	
<i>Subject:</i> VP/HR — EEAS immunity	
English version .....	63
<b>E-004239/12</b> by William (The Earl of) Dartmouth to the Commission	
<i>Subject:</i> Resource neutral basis	
English version .....	64
<b>E-004240/12</b> by Erminia Mazzoni, Elisabetta Gardini, Andrea Zanoni, Debora Serracchiani, Mara Bizzotto, Paolo Bartolozzi, Sergio Paolo Francesco Silvestris, Sonia Alfano, Gabriele Albertini, Giuseppe Gargani, Gianni Pittella, Gianni Vattimo, Marco Scurria, Oreste Rossi, Carlo Fidanza, Lara Comi, Iva Zanicchi, Gianluca Susta, Clemente Mastella, Crescenzo Rivellini, Raffaele Baldassarre, Mario Mauro, Roberta Angelilli, Antonio Cancian, Salvatore Tatarella, Cristiana Muscardini, Vito Bonsignore, Luigi Ciriaco De Mita and Vincenzo Iovine to the Commission	
<i>Subject:</i> European Globalisation Adjustment Fund	
Versione italiana .....	65
English version .....	67

<b>E-004241/12</b> by Laurence J.A.J. Stassen to the Commission	
<i>Subject:</i> Unacceptability of European legislation to impose mandatory quotas for women	
Nederlandse versie .....	69
English version .....	70
<b>E-004242/12</b> by Cătălin Sorin Ivan to the Commission	
<i>Subject:</i> Higher education reform	
Versiunea în limba română .....	71
English version .....	72
<b>E-004243/12</b> by John Stuart Agnew to the Commission	
<i>Subject:</i> Car parking and gender discrimination	
English version .....	73
<b>E-004244/12</b> by John Stuart Agnew to the Commission	
<i>Subject:</i> Consumer pricing in the Netherlands	
English version .....	74
<b>E-004245/12</b> by John Stuart Agnew to the Commission	
<i>Subject:</i> Sugar market intervention rationality	
English version .....	75
<b>E-004246/12</b> by Catherine Stihler to the Commission	
<i>Subject:</i> Single farm payment in Scotland	
English version .....	76
<b>E-004247/12</b> by Dan Jørgensen to the Commission	
<i>Subject:</i> Traceability of dog and cat movements in the EU to discourage illegal trade	
Dansk udgave .....	77
English version .....	78
<b>E-004248/12</b> by Romana Jordan to the Commission	
<i>Subject:</i> Promoting research in the field of bee health	
Slovenska različica .....	79
English version .....	80
<b>E-004249/12</b> by Ramon Tremosa i Balcells to the Commission	
<i>Subject:</i> Power plant project in Lleida for generating electricity by burning biomass	
Versión española .....	81
English version .....	83
<b>E-004251/12</b> by Franz Obermayr to the Commission	
<i>Subject:</i> Changes to data protection in Europe	
Deutsche Fassung .....	84
English version .....	85
<b>E-004252/12</b> by Fiorello Provera to the Commission	
<i>Subject:</i> VP/HR — Bombings in the Lebanese city of Tyre	
Versione italiana .....	86
English version .....	87
<b>E-004253/12</b> by Fiorello Provera to the Commission	
<i>Subject:</i> VP/HR — A Palestinian sentenced to death for selling property	
Versione italiana .....	88
English version .....	89
<b>E-004257/12</b> by William (The Earl of) Dartmouth to the Commission	
<i>Subject:</i> EU staff	
English version .....	90
<b>E-004258/12</b> by William (The Earl of) Dartmouth to the Commission	
<i>Subject:</i> EU staff II	
English version .....	90

<b>E-004259/12</b> by Hans-Peter Mayer to the Commission	
<i>Subject:</i> EU rules on competition: contribution to health insurance administration costs	
Deutsche Fassung .....	91
English version .....	92
<b>P-004260/12</b> by Angelika Werthmann to the Commission	
<i>Subject:</i> European Neighbourhood Instrument (COM(2011) 839)	
Deutsche Fassung .....	93
English version .....	94
<b>E-004262/12</b> by Mara Bizzotto to the Commission	
<i>Subject:</i> Attack against Christians in Sudan	
Versione italiana .....	95
English version .....	96
<b>E-004263/12</b> by Mara Bizzotto to the Commission	
<i>Subject:</i> Additives to cut polluting emissions and reduce fuel consumption in the public sector	
Versione italiana .....	97
English version .....	98
<b>E-004264/12</b> by Mara Bizzotto to the Commission	
<i>Subject:</i> Women's rights in Indonesia	
Versione italiana .....	99
English version .....	100
<b>E-004265/12</b> by Mara Bizzotto to the Commission	
<i>Subject:</i> Relocation and road haulage	
Versione italiana .....	101
English version .....	102
<b>E-004267/12</b> by Sergio Paolo Francesco Silvestris to the Commission	
<i>Subject:</i> Explosion in bankruptcies in Italy	
Versione italiana .....	103
English version .....	104
<b>E-004268/12</b> by Sergio Paolo Francesco Silvestris to the Commission	
<i>Subject:</i> Enrolment boom at European online universities	
Versione italiana .....	105
English version .....	106
<b>E-004269/12</b> by Sergio Paolo Francesco Silvestris to the Commission	
<i>Subject:</i> Climate change in Europe	
Versione italiana .....	107
English version .....	108
<b>E-004270/12</b> by Sergio Paolo Francesco Silvestris to the Commission	
<i>Subject:</i> VP/HR — Chinese-made weapons in North Korea	
Versione italiana .....	109
English version .....	110
<b>E-004272/12</b> by Sergio Paolo Francesco Silvestris to the Commission	
<i>Subject:</i> Programme concerning education, training, culture, research and youth	
Versione italiana .....	111
English version .....	112
<b>E-004275/12</b> by Sergio Paolo Francesco Silvestris to the Commission	
<i>Subject:</i> Alzheimer's disease	
Versione italiana .....	113
English version .....	114
<b>E-004276/12</b> by Sergio Paolo Francesco Silvestris to the Commission	
<i>Subject:</i> VP/HR — Counter-terrorism	
Versione italiana .....	115
English version .....	116

<b>E-004278/12</b> by Sergio Paolo Francesco Silvestris to the Commission	
<i>Subject:</i> New study for the treatment of blindness	
Versione italiana .....	117
English version .....	118
<b>E-004279/12</b> by Sergio Paolo Francesco Silvestris to the Commission	
<i>Subject:</i> Direct funding programmes — city of Aquila	
Versione italiana .....	119
English version .....	120
<b>E-004281/12</b> by Frieda Brepoels to the Commission	
<i>Subject:</i> VP/HR — EU report on East Jerusalem 2011, legislation against the settlement policies and black lists for settlers	
Nederlandse versie .....	121
English version .....	122
<b>E-004282/12</b> by Martin Ehrenhauser to the Commission	
<i>Subject:</i> INDECT project — Europol	
Deutsche Fassung .....	123
English version .....	124
<b>E-004283/12</b> by Angelika Werthmann to the Commission	
<i>Subject:</i> European Globalisation Adjustment Fund (EGF) proposal 2014-2020 (COM(2011) 608)	
Deutsche Fassung .....	125
English version .....	126
<b>E-004286/12</b> by Nuno Teixeira to the Commission	
<i>Subject:</i> Threats to the Schengen Agreement	
Versão portuguesa .....	127
English version .....	128
<b>E-004287/12</b> by Marietta Giannakou to the Commission	
<i>Subject:</i> Creation of distance learning university course databases in Europe	
Ελληνική έκδοση .....	129
English version .....	130
<b>E-004288/12</b> by Marietta Giannakou to the Commission	
<i>Subject:</i> Preservation of Griko dialect in southern Italy	
Ελληνική έκδοση .....	131
English version .....	132
<b>E-004290/12</b> by Ana Gomes to the Commission	
<i>Subject:</i> VP/HR — Political prisoners in Ethiopia	
Versão portuguesa .....	133
English version .....	135
<b>E-004291/12</b> by Ana Gomes to the Commission	
<i>Subject:</i> VP/HR — Invitation to Omar al-Bashir to attend summit in Malawi	
Versão portuguesa .....	137
English version .....	138
<b>E-004292/12</b> by Linda McAvan to the Commission	
<i>Subject:</i> Results of investigation into higher ticket prices for non-Maltese EU citizens on Maltese public transport	
English version .....	139
<b>E-004293/12</b> by Mariya Nedelcheva to the Commission	
<i>Subject:</i> VP/HR — Security and humanitarian crisis in Mali	
българска версия .....	140
English version .....	141
<b>P-004296/12</b> by Charles Tannock to the Commission	
<i>Subject:</i> VP/HR — The case of Ilias Ali in Bangladesh	
English version .....	142



<b>E-004299/12</b> by David Casa to the Commission	
<i>Subject:</i> National strategies to improve quality and productivity at work	
Verzjoni Maltija .....	143
English version .....	144
<b>E-004301/12</b> by David Casa to the Commission	
<i>Subject:</i> Burma sanctions	
Verzjoni Maltija .....	145
English version .....	146
<b>E-004303/12</b> by Barbara Matera, Mario Mauro, Antonio Cancian, Roberta Angelilli, Paolo Bartolozzi, Lara Comi, Erminia Mazzoni, Marco Scurria, Sergio Paolo Francesco Silvestris, Aldo Patriciello and Alfredo Antoniozzi to the Commission	
<i>Subject:</i> VP/HR — Evaluation of sanctions on Myanmar after April by-elections	
Versione italiana .....	147
English version .....	148
<b>E-004304/12</b> by Fiorello Provera to the Commission	
<i>Subject:</i> VP/HR — Famine in Yemen	
Versione italiana .....	149
English version .....	150
<b>E-004305/12</b> by Christofer Fjellner to the Commission	
<i>Subject:</i> Need to initiate international collaboration on curatorship, to facilitate and enhance support for individuals under curatorship moving across borders	
Svensk version .....	151
English version .....	152
<b>E-004306/12</b> by Oreste Rossi to the Commission	
<i>Subject:</i> Rail transport and EU funds to Turkey: shades of a phantom integration process	
Versione italiana .....	153
English version .....	155
<b>E-004307/12</b> by Antolín Sánchez Presedo to the Commission	
<i>Subject:</i> ERDF funds and Fragas do Eume (Galicia, Spain)	
Versión española .....	156
English version .....	158
<b>E-004308/12</b> by Martin Ehrenhauser to the Commission	
<i>Subject:</i> Blacking out of text in answers to document requests	
Deutsche Fassung .....	159
English version .....	160
<b>P-004309/12</b> by Kathleen Van Brempt to the Commission	
<i>Subject:</i> Provision of sub-optimal care to diabetes patients	
Nederlandse versie .....	161
English version .....	162
<b>E-004310/12</b> by Franz Obermayr to the Commission	
<i>Subject:</i> Mass slaughter of small whales and dolphins on the Faroe Islands	
Deutsche Fassung .....	163
English version .....	164
<b>E-004312/12</b> by Christofer Fjellner to the Commission	
<i>Subject:</i> Nuclear safety	
Svensk version .....	165
English version .....	166
<b>E-004314/12</b> by Nikos Chrysogelos to the Commission	
<i>Subject:</i> Progress in addressing the immigration issue in Greece	
Ελληνική έκδοση .....	167
English version .....	169

<b>E-004315/12</b> by Raimon Obiols to the Commission	
<i>Subject:</i> VP/HR — Delay in EU financial aid to Egypt	
Versión española .....	171
English version .....	172
<b>E-004316/12</b> by Nadja Hirsch to the Commission	
<i>Subject:</i> Europe 2020 strategy	
Deutsche Fassung .....	173
English version .....	174
<b>E-004317/12</b> by Ulrike Rodust to the Commission	
<i>Subject:</i> EU measures to prevent containers being lost at sea	
Deutsche Fassung .....	175
English version .....	176
<b>E-004318/12</b> by Jim Higgins to the Commission	
<i>Subject:</i> eCall programme	
English version .....	177
<b>E-004319/12</b> by Daniel Hannan to the Commission	
<i>Subject:</i> Human rights in China	
English version .....	178
<b>E-004320/12</b> by Daniel Hannan to the Commission	
<i>Subject:</i> Import of live bivalve molluscs	
English version .....	179
<b>E-004321/12</b> by Daniel Hannan to the Commission	
<i>Subject:</i> Red diesel	
English version .....	180
<b>E-004322/12</b> by Andrew Henry William Brons to the Commission	
<i>Subject:</i> The Falkland Islands	
English version .....	181
<b>E-004323/12</b> by Syed Kamall to the Commission	
<i>Subject:</i> New EU proposal to outlaw cyber attacks on IT companies	
English version .....	182
<b>E-004324/12</b> by Syed Kamall to the Commission	
<i>Subject:</i> Stray dogs in Bulgaria	
English version .....	183
<b>E-004325/12</b> by Syed Kamall to the Commission	
<i>Subject:</i> Alleged breach of free movement of people and data protection by Hungarian authorities	
English version .....	184
<b>E-004326/12</b> by Diane Dodds to the Commission	
<i>Subject:</i> UK ban on pig stalls	
English version .....	185
<b>E-004328/12</b> by William (The Earl of) Dartmouth to the Commission	
<i>Subject:</i> Ending beet quotas and cane tariffs	
English version .....	186
<b>E-004329/12</b> by Nikolaos Chountis to the Commission	
<i>Subject:</i> New clauses in European Investment Bank loans	
Ελληνική έκδοση .....	187
English version .....	188
<b>E-004474/12</b> by Georgios Papanikolaou to the Commission	
<i>Subject:</i> New loan agreement between the Public Power Corporation and the European Investment Bank	
Ελληνική έκδοση .....	187
English version .....	188

<b>E-004330/12</b> by Nikolaos Chountis to the Commission	
<i>Subject:</i> Acrylamide levels in food	
Ελληνική έκδοση .....	189
English version .....	190
<b>E-004331/12</b> by Nikolaos Chountis to the Council	
<i>Subject:</i> Penalties provided for by the Accession Partnership if Turkey freezes talks with the EU	
Ελληνική έκδοση .....	191
English version .....	192
<b>E-004332/12</b> by Nikolaos Chountis to the Commission	
<i>Subject:</i> VP/HR — Penalties provided for by the Accession Partnership if Turkey freezes talks with the EU	
Ελληνική έκδοση .....	193
English version .....	195
<b>E-004333/12</b> by Nikolaos Chountis to the Commission	
<i>Subject:</i> Penalties provided for by the Accession Partnership if Turkey freezes talks with the EU	
Ελληνική έκδοση .....	193
English version .....	195
<b>P-004334/12</b> by Antigoni Papadopoulou to the Commission	
<i>Subject:</i> Violation of air traffic regulations	
Ελληνική έκδοση .....	197
English version .....	198
<b>E-004336/12</b> by Angelika Werthmann to the Commission	
<i>Subject:</i> Detecting dangerous vehicles between Munich and Salzburg	
Deutsche Fassung .....	199
English version .....	200
<b>E-004337/12</b> by Angelika Werthmann to the Commission	
<i>Subject:</i> Danger of a 'lost' generation of young people in Greece	
Deutsche Fassung .....	201
English version .....	202
<b>E-004338/12</b> by Angelika Werthmann to the Commission	
<i>Subject:</i> Increasing suicide rate in Greece	
Deutsche Fassung .....	203
English version .....	204
<b>E-004339/12</b> by Angelika Werthmann to the Commission	
<i>Subject:</i> VP/HR — New EU diplomatic presence in Burma	
Deutsche Fassung .....	205
English version .....	206
<b>E-004340/12</b> by Angelika Werthmann to the Commission	
<i>Subject:</i> Role of generic medicines in the EU	
Deutsche Fassung .....	207
English version .....	208
<b>E-004342/12</b> by Mara Bizzotto to the Commission	
<i>Subject:</i> Allocation of EU funds for local development in southern Italian regions	
Versione italiana .....	209
English version .....	210
<b>E-004343/12</b> by Sergio Paolo Francesco Silvestris to the Commission	
<i>Subject:</i> VP/HR — Attack in Algeria	
Versione italiana .....	211
English version .....	212
<b>E-004344/12</b> by Sergio Paolo Francesco Silvestris to the Commission	
<i>Subject:</i> Nutrition and public health in Europe	
Versione italiana .....	213
English version .....	214

<b>E-004345/12</b> by Sergio Paolo Francesco Silvestris to the Commission	
<i>Subject:</i> The Insieme [Together] Association	
Versione italiana .....	215
English version .....	216
<b>E-004346/12</b> by Sergio Paolo Francesco Silvestris to the Commission	
<i>Subject:</i> Energy from speed bumps	
Versione italiana .....	217
English version .....	218
<b>E-004348/12</b> by Sergio Paolo Francesco Silvestris to the Commission	
<i>Subject:</i> Italy further away from Kyoto objectives	
Versione italiana .....	219
English version .....	220
<b>E-004349/12</b> by Sergio Paolo Francesco Silvestris to the Commission	
<i>Subject:</i> New research on graphene	
Versione italiana .....	221
English version .....	223
<b>E-004465/12</b> by Oreste Rossi to the Commission	
<i>Subject:</i> Potential of graphene	
Versione italiana .....	221
English version .....	223
<b>E-004350/12</b> by Sergio Paolo Francesco Silvestris to the Commission	
<i>Subject:</i> VP/HR — Further clashes in South Sudan	
Versione italiana .....	225
English version .....	226
<b>E-004351/12</b> by Sergio Paolo Francesco Silvestris to the Commission	
<i>Subject:</i> New Unicef report	
Versione italiana .....	227
English version .....	228
<b>E-004352/12</b> by Sergio Paolo Francesco Silvestris to the Commission	
<i>Subject:</i> Spread of the Asian tiger mosquito	
Versione italiana .....	229
English version .....	230
<b>E-004353/12</b> by Esther Herranz García to the Commission	
<i>Subject:</i> US and Canadian beef imports	
Versión española .....	231
English version .....	232
<b>E-004354/12</b> by Ramon Tremosa i Balcells to the Commission	
<i>Subject:</i> NO <sub>2</sub> limit values	
Versión española .....	233
English version .....	234
<b>E-004355/12</b> by Ramon Tremosa i Balcells to the Commission	
<i>Subject:</i> Air analysis	
Versión española .....	233
English version .....	234
<b>E-004356/12</b> by Filip Kaczmarek to the Commission	
<i>Subject:</i> Underground water reserves in Africa	
Wersja polska .....	235
English version .....	236
<b>E-004358/12</b> by Filip Kaczmarek to the Commission	
<i>Subject:</i> Multiple outbreaks in Vietnam	
Wersja polska .....	237
English version .....	238

<b>E-004359/12</b> by Filip Kaczmarek to the Commission	
<i>Subject:</i> Missing civilians in Chechnya	
Wersja polska .....	239
English version .....	240
<b>E-004360/12</b> by Sergio Paolo Francesco Silvestris to the Commission	
<i>Subject:</i> New case of mad cow disease	
Versione italiana .....	241
English version .....	242
<b>E-004362/12</b> by Nuno Melo to the Commission	
<i>Subject:</i> Crisis in Spain	
Versão portuguesa .....	243
English version .....	244
<b>E-004363/12</b> by Nuno Melo to the Commission	
<i>Subject:</i> Barriers to companies and products from emerging economies	
Versão portuguesa .....	245
English version .....	246
<b>E-004364/12</b> by Nuno Melo to the Commission	
<i>Subject:</i> Measures to support job creation	
Versão portuguesa .....	247
English version .....	248
<b>E-004365/12</b> by Nuno Melo to the Commission	
<i>Subject:</i> The market for public debt in euros	
Versão portuguesa .....	249
English version .....	250
<b>E-004366/12</b> by Nuno Melo to the Commission	
<i>Subject:</i> Threats made by North Korea to South Korea	
Versão portuguesa .....	251
English version .....	252
<b>E-004367/12</b> by Nuno Melo to the Commission	
<i>Subject:</i> Criminality accounts for 7% of the world economy	
Versão portuguesa .....	253
English version .....	254
<b>E-004368/12</b> by Nuno Melo to the Commission	
<i>Subject:</i> The fight against organised crime	
Versão portuguesa .....	255
English version .....	256
<b>E-004369/12</b> by Nuno Melo to the Commission	
<i>Subject:</i> Unfair loan campaigns	
Versão portuguesa .....	257
English version .....	259
<b>E-004370/12</b> by Nuno Melo to the Commission	
<i>Subject:</i> Viral hepatitis	
Versão portuguesa .....	260
English version .....	261
<b>E-004371/12</b> by Nuno Melo to the Commission	
<i>Subject:</i> Crime against Portuguese citizens in Angola	
Versão portuguesa .....	262
English version .....	263
<b>E-004372/12</b> by Martin Ehrenhauser to the Commission	
<i>Subject:</i> VP/HR — Breakdown of documents by security classification levels	
Deutsche Fassung .....	264
English version .....	265

<b>E-004373/12</b> by Martin Ehrenhauser to the Commission	
<i>Subject:</i> Breakdown of documents supplied to and received from Europol by security classification levels	
Deutsche Fassung .....	266
English version .....	267
<b>E-004374/12</b> by Martin Ehrenhauser to the Council	
<i>Subject:</i> Breakdown of documents by security classification levels	
Deutsche Fassung .....	268
English version .....	269
<b>E-004375/12</b> by Martin Ehrenhauser to the Commission	
<i>Subject:</i> Breakdown of documents by security classification levels	
Deutsche Fassung .....	270
English version .....	272
<b>E-004377/12</b> by Martin Ehrenhauser to the Commission	
<i>Subject:</i> Security clearance for access to classified Commission information	
Deutsche Fassung .....	270
English version .....	272
<b>E-004376/12</b> by Martin Ehrenhauser to the Council	
<i>Subject:</i> Security clearance for access to classified Council information	
Deutsche Fassung .....	274
English version .....	276
<b>E-004378/12</b> by Hans-Peter Martin to the Commission	
<i>Subject:</i> The impact of heat waves on the structure and operation of nuclear power stations	
Deutsche Fassung .....	278
English version .....	279
<b>E-004379/12</b> by Angelika Werthmann to the Commission	
<i>Subject:</i> European Neighbourhood Instrument (COM(2011) 0839)	
Deutsche Fassung .....	280
English version .....	281
<b>E-004380/12</b> by Andrea Češková to the Commission	
<i>Subject:</i> Representation of women in senior positions — quotas	
České znění .....	282
English version .....	283

(Versión española)

**Pregunta con solicitud de respuesta escrita P-004200/12  
a la Comisión**

**Gabriel Mato Adrover (PPE)**

(23 de abril de 2012)

*Asunto:* Renovación del Protocolo sobre el Acuerdo pesquero de colaboración con Marruecos

El Acuerdo pesquero de colaboración con Marruecos otorga a la UE 119 licencias de pesca, de las que 100 le corresponden a España, y que se distribuyen fundamentalmente entre la flota artesanal andaluza y canaria.

Las negociaciones sobre la prolongación del Protocolo del Acuerdo pesquero siguen sin concluirse desde su expiración en diciembre del 2011. A las Islas Canarias, la falta de acuerdo pesquero le está costando 29,9 millones de euros de ganancia brutos anuales. Supone tener amarrados en puerto a 26 barcos y una pérdida de 250 puestos de trabajo directo y más de 1 000 indirectos. Actualmente, los armadores y tripulantes han empezado a recibir ayudas económicas por paralización temporal, que finalizarán en junio.

A día de hoy, nuestros pescadores no saben si podrán tener asegurado el regreso al caladero marroquí al amparo de un nuevo Protocolo de pesca que amplíe el Acuerdo de asociación.

— ¿Podría informar la Comisión de cuáles son las alternativas en caso de haber una nueva dilación sobre la prolongación el Acuerdo o, en caso de no prolongación, para paliar esta falta de posibilidades para nuestras flotas?

**Respuesta de la Sra. Damanaki en nombre de la Comisión**

(12 de junio de 2012)

La Comisión se ha comprometido a entablar lo antes posible negociaciones con vistas a celebrar un nuevo Protocolo del Acuerdo de asociación en el sector pesquero con Marruecos. Durante una reciente visita a este país, el Comisario responsable de Pesca y Asuntos Marítimos obtuvo el acuerdo de las autoridades marroquíes para entablar negociaciones. Ya se han abierto unas negociaciones exploratorias y las negociaciones propiamente dichas las llevará la Comisión ajustándose plenamente al mandato recibido del Consejo.

Mientras tanto, el Fondo Europeo de Pesca (FEP) permite la aplicación de medidas de ayuda a los buques pesqueros y a los pescadores afectados por los planes nacionales de ajuste del esfuerzo pesquero cuando impliquen una reducción importante de las posibilidades de pesca en virtud de un acuerdo internacional, como ocurre en el presente caso. En especial, España puede conceder indemnizaciones a los armadores y a los miembros de la tripulación de los buques pesqueros afectados por la terminación del Protocolo e imposibilitados de faenar, por un período de hasta 12 meses de cese temporal de la pesca al amparo del programa operativo del FEP vigente, ya que hay fondos suficientes disponibles en dicho Fondo. A este respecto, y tras celebrar consultas con el Estado miembro, la Comisión ha adoptado recientemente una Decisión que autoriza a España a aumentar el umbral aplicado normalmente a las indemnizaciones por cese temporal de las actividades pesqueras.

(English version)

**Question for written answer P-004200/12  
to the Commission**

**Gabriel Mato Adrover (PPE)**

(23 April 2012)

*Subject:* Renewal of the Protocol to the EU-Morocco Fisheries Partnership Agreement

The Fisheries Partnership Agreement with Morocco grants 119 fishing licenses to the EU, of which 100 are granted to Spain and are distributed mainly among the small-scale fleets of Andalusia and the Canary Islands.

Negotiations to extend the Protocol to the Fisheries Agreement, which expired in December 2011, have not yet been concluded. In the Canary Islands, the lack of a fisheries agreement is costing EUR 29.9 million in annual gross earnings. It means that 26 ships are tied up in port and that 250 direct jobs and over 1 000 indirect jobs are lost. Fitters and crews have now begun to receive financial aid for temporary cessation. This aid will end in June 2012.

At present, these fishermen do not know whether they can be sure of returning to Moroccan waters under a new fisheries Protocol made in extension of the Partnership Agreement.

-Can the Commission explain what the options are if the extension of the Agreement is further delayed or, if no extension is made, what options exist to remedy the lack of opportunities for these fleets?

**Answer given by Ms Damanaki on behalf of the Commission**

(12 June 2012)

The Commission is committed to start as soon as possible the negotiations for a new Protocol to the Fisheries Partnership Agreement with Morocco. During a recent visit to Morocco, the member of the Commission responsible for Fisheries and Maritime Affairs obtained the agreement of the Moroccan authorities for the opening of negotiations. Exploratory talks have already been launched, and the negotiations will be carried out by the Commission fully in line with the mandate it received from the Council.

In the meantime, the European Fisheries Fund (EFF) offers possibilities to support measures for fishing vessels and fishers affected by fishing effort adjustment plans where these form part of a substantial reduction of fishing opportunities under an international agreement, as in the present case. Compensation to the owners and crew members of fishing vessels affected by the termination of the Protocol and forced to lay idle can in particular be granted by Spain for up to 12 months of temporary cessation of fishing under the current EFF operational programme as there are sufficient EFF funds available. In this context, and after consultation of the Member State, the Commission has recently adopted a decision enabling Spain to increase the threshold which normally applies to compensation for the temporary cessation of fishing activities.

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(Versión española)

**Pregunta con solicitud de respuesta escrita E-004201/12  
a la Comisión**

**Gabriel Mato Adrover (PPE)**

(23 de abril de 2012)

*Asunto:* Renovación del Protocolo sobre el Acuerdo pesquero de colaboración con Mauritania

El próximo 31 de julio expira el Protocolo del Acuerdo pesquero de colaboración con Mauritania. Este es el acuerdo más importante para la Unión Europea en términos de contrapartida financiera y de posibilidades de pesca para la flota de la UE. Es uno de los pocos acuerdos mixtos que quedan que dan lugar a un suministro variado de productos de la pesca para nuestros mercados. El Acuerdo beneficia especialmente a España que es quien más licencias tiene, unas 60, para la flota cefalopoderas, atunera, de merluza y crustáceos.

La Comisaria Damanaki declaró el 29 de marzo que, a pesar de haber habido cinco rondas de negociaciones con el Gobierno mauritano, aún parece no haber un acuerdo y que, habida cuenta de la situación actual de las negociaciones y del proceso posterior para la adopción del protocolo por la UE, existe un riesgo de interrupción de las actividades pesqueras.

— ¿Podría informar la Comisión de cuál es el estado actual de las negociaciones y si ha habido algún avance?

— ¿Cuáles son las alternativas que prevé la Comisión en caso de no haber un acuerdo sobre la renovación del Protocolo de pesca o si hubiese un retraso en el mismo para hacer frente a la pérdida de posibilidades de pesca para la flota europea? ¿Cabría una posible prórroga del Protocolo? ¿Qué tipo de ayudas podrían recibir los pescadores afectados? ¿Podría reubicarse la flota en otros caladeros?

**Respuesta de la Sra. Damanaki en nombre de la Comisión**

(6 de julio de 2012)

El principal tema de negociación pendiente para la prórroga del Protocolo del Acuerdo de asociación en el sector pesquero es el importe de la contribución financiera abonada por el presupuesto de la UE y el de los cánones pagados por los armadores.

En las rondas oficiales de negociaciones y los contactos informales con Mauritania, la Comisión ha hecho todo lo posible por conciliar las posiciones de las dos partes y alcanzar un acuerdo satisfactorio para ambas en consonancia con el mandato del Consejo, con la antelación suficiente antes de la fecha de expiración del Protocolo vigente a fin de prevenir una interrupción de las actividades pesqueras después del 1 de agosto de 2012. La sexta ronda oficial de negociaciones se celebrará en Nuakchot los días 26 y 27 de junio.

La Comisión señala que cualquier nuevo acuerdo solo podrá aceptarse si presenta una buena relación coste-beneficio y si se basa en los mejores dictámenes científicos disponibles. En consonancia con el enfoque general en materia de celebración de acuerdos con terceros países, tal como se establece en la Comunicación de la Comisión sobre la dimensión exterior de la Política Pesquera Común <sup>(1)</sup> y confirman las conclusiones del Consejo de 19 de marzo de 2012 (7086/12), ello debería implicar una mayor participación financiera de la flota.

La Comisión sigue plenamente empeñada en alcanzar un acuerdo equilibrado y justo para ambas partes. Este es nuestro principal objetivo; si no fuera posible lograrlo, la Comisión estudiaría otros medios o vías para compensar la falta de un nuevo Protocolo con Mauritania.

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(1) COM(2011) 424 final.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-004201/12  
to the Commission**

**Gabriel Mato Adrover (PPE)**

(23 April 2012)

*Subject:* Renewal of the Protocol to the EU-Mauritania Fisheries Partnership Agreement

On 31 July 2012, the Protocol to the EU-Mauritania Fisheries Partnership Agreement will expire. This is the most important agreement for the European Union in terms of financial contribution and of fishing opportunities for the EU fleet. It is one of the few remaining mixed agreements giving rise to a varied supply of fishery products for our markets. The Agreement is especially beneficial to Spain, which has the most licences — about 60 — for its cephalopod, tuna, hake and crustacean fleets.

Commissioner Damanaki stated on 29 March that, although there have been five rounds of negotiations with the Mauritanian Government, there still seems to be no agreement and, given the current state of negotiations and the subsequent process to adopt the protocol by the EU, there is a risk of discontinuation of fishing activities.

— Can the Commission report on the current status of negotiations and whether there has been any progress?

— What alternatives does the Commission foresee in case of no agreement, or a delay to the agreement, on the renewal of the fisheries Protocol, in order to address the loss of fishing opportunities for the European fleet? Would it be possible to extend the Protocol? What kind of aid might affected fishermen receive? Could the fleet be relocated to other waters?

**Answer given by Ms Damanaki on behalf of the Commission**

(6 July 2012)

The main remaining issue in the negotiation for the renewal of the Protocol of the Fisheries Partnership Agreement is the level of financial contribution paid by the EU budget and the level of the fees paid by shipowners.

The Commission has been doing its utmost, through formal rounds of negotiations and informal contacts with the Mauritanian side, with the aim of reconciling the positions of the two parties and reaching a mutually satisfactory deal in line with the mandate from the Council, in time before the expiry of the current Protocol so as to avoid a discontinuity of fishing operations after 1 August 2012. The 6th formal round of negotiations is due to take place in Nouakchott on 26-27 June.

The Commission underlines that any new agreement can only be accepted when it is good value for money and it is based on the best available scientific advice. In line with the general approach for the conclusion of agreements with third countries, as set out in the Commission Communication on the external dimension of the CFP<sup>(1)</sup>, and confirmed by the Council conclusions of 19 March 2012 (7086/12), this should imply an increased financial participation by the fleet.

The Commission remains fully committed to reaching a balanced and fair deal for both parties. This is our main objective, but, should this not be possible, the Commission will look at other ways or avenues to compensate for the absence of a new protocol with Mauritania.

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<sup>(1)</sup> COM(2011) 424 final.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-004202/12  
to the Commission**

**Sir Graham Watson (ALDE)**

(23 April 2012)

*Subject:* Plasma arc technology

Is the Commission aware of plasma arc technology for the treatment of waste?

What benefits does the Commission see in this technology?

Is there anything the Commission can do to help its development?

**Answer given by Mr Potočník on behalf of the Commission**

(12 June 2012)

The Commission is aware of plasma arc technology for thermal treatment of waste. The main difference between plasma arc and other thermal waste treatment technologies is that in plasma arc the heat required for waste degradation is generated by the plasma arc itself and not via combustion of waste. Like other high temperature treatment technologies, plasma arc is very effective in destroying organic contaminants; moreover, the slag is melted and is usually safe for use as a construction material. The main drawbacks of this technology include high electricity consumption and a risk of significantly increased corrosion and wear of equipment due to very high temperature of waste processing resulting in the need for frequent maintenance.

Further development of plasma arc technology and demonstration activities might benefit from support from EU research and innovation programmes.

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(English version)

**Question for written answer E-004203/12  
to the Commission**

**Sir Graham Watson (ALDE)**

(23 April 2012)

*Subject:* Protection of intensively farmed rabbits

The intensive farming of rabbits in factory-farm conditions is on the increase, as witnessed by the fact that the UK imports around 3000 tonnes of rabbit meat every year. In global terms, European countries account for 85% of the world's rabbit production.

The European Union has rightly legislated to improve the conditions of intensively farmed battery hens. However, as noted in the EU's Strategy for the Protection and Welfare of Animals 2012-2015 (COM(2012)0006), there is currently no specific EU legislation covering the farming of rabbits, despite several problems highlighted by scientists and by the European Food Safety Authority (EFSA).

— Is the Commission aware that the intensive farming of rabbits is on the increase in the Union?

— Following the publication of the Union's Animal Welfare Strategy for 2012-2015, what steps is the Commission considering taking to close this lacuna with regard to the protection of farmed rabbits?

**Answer given by Mr Dalli on behalf of the Commission**

(21 June 2012)

No data are available to the Commission to conclude on rabbit production systems in the EU. The production of rabbit meat in the EU has been decreasing for several years.

The European Union strategy for the protection and welfare of animals 2012-2015 <sup>(1)</sup>, adopted on 19 January 2012, aims at developing a holistic approach so that common underlying drivers for poor welfare in the EU will be addressed as to reach all animals concerned.

Furthermore, better enforcement of the existing legislation has been identified as the main priority. This includes Directive 98/58/EC on the protection of animals kept for farming purposes <sup>(2)</sup> which contains general provisions for all farmed animals, including rabbits.

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<sup>(1)</sup> COM(2012) 6 final [http://ec.europa.eu/food/animal/welfare/actionplan/actionplan\\_en.htm](http://ec.europa.eu/food/animal/welfare/actionplan/actionplan_en.htm)

<sup>(2)</sup> OJ L 221, 8.8.1998.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-004204/12  
to the Commission (Vice-President/High Representative)  
Sir Graham Watson (ALDE)  
(23 April 2012)**

*Subject:* VP/HR — Incarceration under Pakistan's blasphemy laws

The EU has repeatedly raised the continued application of the blasphemy laws with the Government of Pakistan as part of the human rights dialogue, and I understand that officials reiterated this stance at the recent Joint Commission with Pakistan on 7 February 2012.

Pakistan's blasphemy laws in their current form appear open to abuse, and human rights groups have highlighted the fact that the laws have been used to persecute Christians. For instance, I understand that Shamim Bibi, from Bahawalnagar District in Punjab Province, has been incarcerated with her five-month-old daughter, for allegedly failing to convert to Islam.

— Is the Vice-President/High Representative aware of the case of Shamim Bibi, as well as that of Saira Khokhar, who have been held in custody under Pakistan's blasphemy laws? Will officials raise these cases with their counterparts in Pakistan?

**Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Ashton on behalf of the Commission  
(25 July 2012)**

The HR/VP thanks the Honourable Member for drawing these cases to her attention.

The HR/VP has herself raised the problems of minorities during her visit to Islamabad on 5-6 June 2012. It is the EU's view that the blasphemy laws in their present form are open to abuse. The EU has encouraged the Government of Pakistan to amend the more controversial aspects of the blasphemy legislation. Furthermore the EU maintains that total repeal of the blasphemy laws and the death penalty, should be considered by Pakistan.

The issue of religious minorities was once again referred to in the Foreign Affairs Council conclusions of 25 June 2012.

This dialogue will be intensified following the adoption of the EU-Pakistan Engagement Plan with Pakistan, and the launch of the strategic dialogue on 5 June 2012. The EU has insisted that individual and minority rights be respected. We will continue to focus on the need to fully protect every individual's right to religious freedom in Pakistan, or elsewhere, and will certainly raise these cases with the Pakistan authorities.

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(Versão portuguesa)

**Pergunta com pedido de resposta escrita P-004208/12**

**à Comissão**

**António Fernando Correia de Campos (S&D)**

(23 de abril de 2012)

*Assunto:* Situação dos civis na Guiné-Bissau na sequência do golpe militar

No dia 12 de abril, a Guiné-Bissau viveu um golpe de Estado, de que resultou a prisão do Presidente da República interino, Raimundo Pereira, do primeiro-ministro e candidato às eleições presidenciais em curso, Carlos Gomes Júnior, e do General Chefe do Estado Maior das Forças Armadas, António Indjai.

A indefinição político-militar que se vive no país, com a nomeação de um Conselho Nacional de Transição nomeado pela Junta Militar e não reconhecido pela comunidade internacional, está a deixar o país à beira do colapso e a população à mercê de uma iminente catástrofe humanitária.

O Hospital Nacional Simão Mendes, principal unidade de saúde do País, está em rutura de «stocks» de material médico-cirúrgico, alimentos, água, combustível para alimentar os geradores, medicamentos ou carvão. Sobrevive atualmente da caridade anónima e civil dos que têm aderido em massa ao apelo que foi feito por aquela unidade através das redes sociais.

As populações, inquietas com os acontecimentos, deslocam-se para fora da capital em direção ao interior do País. Os alimentos começam a escassear ou atingem preços inabarcáveis. O combustível que alimenta geradores também começa a ser difícil de encontrar. Neste contexto, afigura-se altamente provável uma degradação da situação dos direitos humanos, civis, políticos, económicos e sociais no país.

— Está a Comissão a monitorizar a situação na Guiné-Bissau e a ponderar trabalhar numa solução de apoio humanitário?

— Pondera a Comissão tomar alguma atitude no sentido de apoiar as populações da Guiné-Bissau através do serviço de ajuda humanitária da DG ECHO?

**Pergunta com pedido de resposta escrita E-004421/12**

**à Comissão**

**João Ferreira (GUE/NGL)**

(27 de abril de 2012)

*Assunto:* Situação humanitária na Guiné-Bissau

Desde o golpe realizado na Guiné-Bissau que a situação humanitária se tem vindo a degradar de forma alarmante.

O país está bloqueado, com populações em fuga, de Bissau para Bafatá, Gabú, Cacheu ou outras cidades. Inúmeros serviços públicos, comércio e serviços financeiros estão encerrados. Os hospitais debatem-se com uma preocupante escassez de meios e de pessoal médico e auxiliar. A situação, já de si precária antes do golpe, deteriora-se a cada dia. Inúmeras instituições externas (incluindo a própria UE) suspenderam pagamentos e projetos em curso. As falhas de energia constantes ameaçam a continuidade do abastecimento de água e a conservação das (parcas) reservas de alimentos armazenadas no frio.

De Bissau chegam diariamente insistentes pedidos de ajuda. Faltam alimentos, material médico-cirúrgico (como luvas, fios de sutura, anestesia, compressas esterilizadas, água oxigenada, adesivos, gesso e algodão), medicamentos, água potável e combustíveis.

Em face do exposto, solicito à Comissão que me informe sobre o seguinte:

1. Que ajuda humanitária foi até à data prestada pela UE à Guiné-Bissau desde o recente golpe?
2. Que medidas de apoio podem ser desde já tomadas para acorrer à situação de emergência vivida no terreno?
3. Pode a UE apoiar o envio urgente para a Guiné de algum ou alguns dos materiais em falta?

**Resposta conjunta dada por Kristalina Georgieva em nome da Comissão***(4 de junho de 2012)*

A Comissão acompanha a situação na Guiné-Bissau, encontrando-se em estreita ligação com as organizações não-governamentais internacionais, a Cruz Vermelha e os parceiros da ONU no terreno. A Direção-Geral da Ajuda Humanitária e da Proteção Civil (ECHO) acompanha em especial a necessidade de ajuda urgente de água, incluindo atividades de prevenção de catástrofes destinadas a reduzir a vulnerabilidade e a aumentar a capacidade de reação das organizações e das pessoas.

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(English version)

**Question for written answer P-004208/12  
to the Commission  
António Fernando Correia de Campos (S&D)  
(23 April 2012)**

*Subject:* The situation of civilians in Guinea-Bissau following the military coup

On 12 April 2012, there was a coup in Guinea-Bissau that resulted in the arrest of the interim President of the Republic, Raimundo Pereira, the Prime Minister and presidential candidate in the elections under way at the time, Carlos Gomes Júnior, and the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces, General António Indjai.

The political and military uncertainty in the country, where the military junta has appointed a National Transitional Council that has not been recognised by the international community, is bringing the country to the brink of collapse and places the population in imminent danger of a humanitarian crisis.

The Simão Mendes National Hospital, the main health facility in the country, is running out of medical and surgical supplies, food and water, fuel for generators, drugs and coal. It is currently surviving on anonymous and public donations from those who have responded en masse to an appeal made by the hospital on social networks.

The population, disturbed by what has been happening, has started to flee the capital towards the interior of the country. Food is becoming scarce or impossibly expensive. Fuel for generators is also becoming hard to find. In this context, it is highly likely that human, civil, political, economic and social rights in the country will deteriorate.

— Is the Commission monitoring the situation in Guinea-Bissau and considering providing humanitarian aid?

— Does the Commission intend to take action to support the population of Guinea-Bissau through DG ECHO's humanitarian aid department?

**Question for written answer E-004421/12  
to the Commission  
João Ferreira (GUE/NGL)  
(27 April 2012)**

*Subject:* The humanitarian situation in Guinea-Bissau

The humanitarian situation in Guinea-Bissau has been deteriorating alarmingly since the coup took place.

The country is paralysed, with people fleeing from Bissau to Bafatá, Gabú, Cacheu or other cities. Countless public and financial services and businesses have closed. The hospitals are struggling with a worrying lack of medical and support personnel and resources. The situation, which was already precarious before the coup, is deteriorating daily. Countless external institutions (including the EU) have suspended payments and halted projects that were underway. The constant power failures threaten water supplies and endanger the (meagre) refrigerated food reserves.

There are daily desperate calls for help from Bissau. There is a lack of food, medical and surgical supplies (such as gloves, sutures, anaesthetic, sterile compresses, oxygenated water, sticking plasters, plaster and cotton), drugs, potable water and fuel.

In view of this, I would like to ask the Commission:

1. What humanitarian aid has the EU so far provided to Guinea-Bissau since the recent coup?
2. What support measures can be implemented to ease the current emergency situation?
3. Is the EU able to support the urgent dispatch to Guinea-Bissau of some of the required supplies?



**Joint answer given by Mrs Georgieva on behalf of the Commission***(4 June 2012)*

The Commission is monitoring the situation in Guinea-Bissau and liaising closely with international non-governmental organisations (INGOs), Red Cross, and UN partners on the ground. Directorate-General ECHO, the Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection directorate, is looking in particular into the need of an emergency water response which would incorporate disaster preparedness activities with a view to reducing vulnerability and increasing the coping capacity of the organisations and people concerned.

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(Ελληνική έκδοση)

**Ερώτηση με αίτημα γραπτής απάντησης E-004209/12**  
**προς την Επιτροπή**  
**Nikolaos Salavrakos (EFD)**  
(23 Απριλίου 2012)

**Θέμα:** Μείωση του κόστους εργασίας

Σύμφωνα με πρόσφατη ανακοίνωση της Ευρωπαϊκής Επιτροπής που αφορά την «Ανάπτυξη για την Ελλάδα (COM(2012)0183 τελικό)», για να αποκατασταθεί η ανταγωνιστικότητα της ελληνικής οικονομίας καθίσταται αναγκαία η συνέχιση της πολιτικής της εσωτερικής υποτίμησης και, σε αυτό το πλαίσιο, το κόστος εργασίας θα πρέπει να μειωθεί κατά 15 % την περίοδο 2012-2014.

Δεδομένου ότι, κατά γενική ομολογία η πολιτική των μνημονίων στην Ελλάδα και την Πορτογαλία και των μέτρων σκληρής λιτότητας στην Ισπανία, δεν έφεραν τα επιθυμητά αποτελέσματα και, λαμβάνοντας υπόψη ότι ο βασικός μισθός στην Ελλάδα είναι μόλις 586 ευρώ ενώ η ανεργία ξεπερνά το 22 %· το μέτρο της περαιτέρω μείωσης του εργατικού κόστους και ενώ οι επιχειρήσεις, λόγω έλλειψης ρευστότητας, δεν μπορούν να αυξήσουν την ανταγωνιστικότητά τους, δημιουργεί ένα φαύλο κύκλο λήψης μέτρων για μείωση του ελλείμματος, που οδηγούν τη χώρα όλο και βαθύτερα στην ύφεση.

Ερωτάται η Επιτροπή:

1. Με ποιους τρόπους θα βοηθήσει η Επιτροπή την χώρα να ενισχύσει την ανάπτυξη της και τις επενδύσεις εις τρόπον ώστε να αυξηθεί η απασχόληση και η ανάπτυξη;
2. Έχει μελετήσει η Ευρωπαϊκή Επιτροπή κάποιο συγκεκριμένο σχέδιο δράσης σε συνεργασία με την Ευρωπαϊκή Τράπεζα Επενδύσεων και μέσω των διαρθρωτικών ταμείων για την τόνωση της οικονομία και της ανάπτυξης στην χώρα;

**Απάντηση του κ. Rehn εξ ονόματος της Επιτροπής**  
(21 Ιουνίου 2012)

Απώτερος στόχος του προγράμματος οικονομικής προσαρμογής για την Ελλάδα είναι η αποκατάσταση της βιώσιμης ανάπτυξης και της απασχόλησης μεσοπρόθεσμα. Η βιωσιμότητα του φορολογικού συστήματος, η χρηματοπιστωτική σταθερότητα και οι διαρθρωτικές μεταρρυθμίσεις είναι κείριαις σημασίας για την επίτευξη των εν λόγω στόχων.

Περιλαμβάνονται ευνοϊκές για την ανάπτυξη πολιτικές που αποσκοπούν στον εκσυγχρονισμό του δημόσιου τομέα, καθιστώντας τις αγορές προϊόντων και εργασίας αποτελεσματικές και ευέλικτες, και δημιουργώντας φιλικό επιχειρηματικό περιβάλλον για τους επενδυτές.

Συγκεκριμένα, τα διαρθρωτικά ταμεία στηρίζουν μέτρα για τη βελτίωση της ανταγωνιστικότητας, τη δημιουργία θέσεων εργασίας και την τόνωση της ανάπτυξης, κυρίως μέσω των έργων προτεραιότητας και των ομάδων δράσης για τη νεολαία στο πλαίσιο της πρωτοβουλίας «Ευκαιρίες για τους νέους». Όπως αναφέρθηκε στην πρόσφατη ανακοίνωση «Ανάπτυξη για την Ελλάδα»<sup>(1)</sup>, θα μπορούσε μέσω αναπροσανατολισμού να διατεθεί κοινοτική χρηματοδότηση ύψους περίπου 200-250 εκατομμυρίων ευρώ από το Ευρωπαϊκό Κοινωνικό Ταμείο (ΕΚΤ) στο πλαίσιο των υφιστάμενων επιχειρησιακών προγραμμάτων για τη στήριξη μέτρων που παρέχουν άμεσα αποτελέσματα προς όφελος των ατόμων που αναζητούν εργασία. Πριν από τα τέλη του 2012 πρέπει να οριστικοποιηθεί και να τεθεί σε εφαρμογή ένα σχέδιο δράσης για την προώθηση της απασχόλησης των νέων, συμπεριλαμβανομένης της κατάρτισης και της επιχειρηματικότητας.

Η Επιτροπή συνεργάζεται στενά με την ΕΤΕπ με σκοπό:

α) την αποδέσμευση ορισμένων χρηματοδοτικών μέσων (JEREMIE (κοινοί ευρωπαϊκοί πόροι για πολύ μικρές έως και μεσαίες επιχειρήσεις), ETEAN — Entrepreneurship Fund (Εθνικό Ταμείο Επιχειρηματικότητας και Ανάπτυξης — Ταμείο Επιχειρηματικότητας), PROGRESS Microfinance (κοινοτικό πρόγραμμα για την απασχόληση και την κοινωνική αλληλεγγύη — μικροχρηματοδότηση)) τα οποία στηρίζονται από τα διαρθρωτικά ταμεία με σκοπό τη διευκόλυνση της χρηματοδότησης των ΜΜΕ. Συστάθηκε Ταμείο Εγγυήσεων για τις ΜΜΕ το οποίο στηρίζεται με 500 εκατ. ευρώ (διαρθρωτικά ταμεία)· μετά την έναρξη λειτουργίας του μπορεί να παράσχει 1 δισ. ευρώ επιπλέον ρευστότητα έως τα τέλη του 2015 για περαιτέρω δανειοδότηση των ΜΜΕ, και·

β) η Επιτροπή έχει επίσης προτείνει τη δημιουργία ενός μέσου επιμερισμού του κινδύνου (ΜΕΚ) για τη στήριξη έργων μεγάλης κλίμακας. Τα δάνεια που στηρίζονται από το ΜΕΚ θα επιτρέψουν την ολοκλήρωση των υφιστάμενων επενδυτικών έργων και την υλοποίηση νέων έργων.

<sup>(1)</sup> COM(2012)183 τελικό.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-004209/12  
to the Commission  
Nikolaos Salavrakos (EFD)  
(23 April 2012)**

*Subject:* Reduction in labour costs

According to a recent communication from the European Commission entitled 'Growth for Greece' (COM(2012) 0183 final), in order to restore the competitiveness of the Greek economy, it is necessary to continue the internal depreciation policy and, to this end, reduce labour costs by 15% over the 2012-2014 period.

It is generally acknowledged that the policies of the Memoranda in Greece and Portugal and the harsh austerity measures in Spain have failed to produce the desired results; the basic wage in Greece is just EUR 586 and unemployment exceeds 22%. Therefore, a further reduction in labour costs — while businesses are unable to increase their competitiveness due to a lack of liquidity — simply creates a vicious circle of deficit-reduction measures driving the country ever deeper into recession.

In view of this:

1. How will the Commission help Greece to enhance growth and promote investment in order to increase employment and growth?
2. Has it considered any specific action plan, in cooperation with the European Investment Bank and using structural funds, to stimulate the economy and boost growth figures in Greece?

**Answer given by Mr Rehn on behalf of the Commission  
(21 June 2012)**

The ultimate objectives of the economic adjustment programme for Greece is restoring sustainable growth and jobs in the medium-run. Fiscal sustainability, financial stability and structural reforms are instrumental for those goals.

Growth-enhancing policies are included aiming at modernising the public sector, rendering product and labour markets efficient and flexible, and creating an investor's friendly business environment.

Specifically, the structural funds are supporting measures to improve competitiveness, create jobs and boost growth, notably via the priority projects and the youth action teams as part of the 'Youth Opportunities Initiative'. As discussed in the recent Communication 'Growth for Greece' <sup>(1)</sup>, a re-orientation of EU funding of around EUR 200-250 million from the ESF could be allocated under existing operational programmes to support measures delivering immediate results for job-seekers. An action plan to promote youth employment, including training and entrepreneurship, should be finalised and implemented before end-2012.

The Commission is working closely with the EIB on:

- (a) unblocking a number of financial instruments (Jeremie, Etean-Entrepreneurship Fund, Progress Microfinance) supported by the Structural Funds aiming to facilitate SMEs' financing. A Guarantee Fund for SMEs has been created backed by EUR 500 million (Structural Funds); once operational, this may provide EUR 1 billion, by the end of 2015, additional liquidity for on-lending to SMEs, and;
- (b) the Commission has also proposed to create a Risk Sharing Instrument (RSI) supporting large-scale projects. Loans backed by the RSI will allow completion of existing investment projects and establishing new projects.

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<sup>(1)</sup> COM(2012)183 final.

(Ελληνική έκδοση)

**Ερώτηση με αίτημα γραπτής απάντησης E-004210/12**  
**προς την Επιτροπή**  
**Nikolaos Salavrakos (EFD)**  
(23 Απριλίου 2012)

Θέμα: Ευρωπαϊκές Αγορές

Σύμφωνα με εκτιμήσεις τραπεζικών στελεχών (Financial Times) τα τελευταία δύο χρόνια έχουν αποσυρθεί κεφάλαια 100 δισ. ευρώ από τα κρατικά ομόλογα της Ιταλίας, της Ισπανίας και της Γαλλίας. Η απόδοση του 10ετούς ισπανικού ομολόγου υποχώρησε οριακά κάτω από το 6 %, ενώ πιέσεις εξακολουθούν να δέχονται και οι ιταλικοί τίτλοι.

Παρά τις συνεχείς διαβεβαιώσεις ευρωπαϊών αξιωματούχων για την αντιμετώπιση της κρίσης, η εμπιστοσύνη των αγορών βρίσκεται στο ναδίρ.

Ερωτάται η Επιτροπή:

1. Ποια είναι η θέση της για τον τρόπο λειτουργίας της Ευρωπαϊκής Κεντρικής Τράπεζας (ΕΚΤ) σε ό,τι αφορά την ευελιξία της στην προσφορά χρήματος;
2. Μελετάει η Επιτροπή τρόπους για μια πιο ενεργό συμμετοχή της ΕΚΤ και της Ευρωπαϊκής Τράπεζας Επενδύσεων (ΕΤΕ) για την αντιμετώπιση της κρίσης και την χρηματοδότηση μεγάλων έργων υποδομών;

**Απάντηση του κ. Rehn εξ ονόματος της Επιτροπής**  
(9 Ιουλίου 2012)

1. Η νομισματική πολιτική στη ζώνη του ευρώ ανήκει στην αποκλειστική αρμοδιότητα της ΕΚΤ, η ανεξαρτησία της οποίας κατοχυρώνεται στη Συνθήκη. Η Επιτροπή δεν επεμβαίνει στις υποχρεώσεις της ΕΚΤ που απορρέουν από τη Συνθήκη ή το καταστατικό της. Η αξιόπιστη νομισματική πολιτική έχει τεράστια σημασία για την καθήλωση των πληθωριστικών προσδοκιών και την ενίσχυση της μακροοικονομικής σταθερότητας. Εν προκειμένω, η ΕΚΤ έχει να παρουσιάσει εξαιρετικό έργο όσον αφορά τη διατήρηση της εσωτερικής και εξωτερικής αξίας του ευρώ.

2. Η ΕΤΕπ έπαιξε ανέκαθεν καίριο ρόλο στη χρηματοδότηση αναπτυξιακών επενδύσεων, όπως είναι οι επενδύσεις για έργα υποδομών για τη στήριξη της υλοποίησης βασικών πολιτικών της ΕΕ. Χορηγεί επίσης σε ευρεία κλίμακα δάνεια προς τις ΜΜΕ και άλλους σημαντικούς τομείς της οικονομίας της ΕΕ. Η συνολική ετήσια δανειοδοτική δραστηριότητα της ΕΤΕπ αυξήθηκε από 48 δισεκατ. ευρώ το 2007 σε 79 δισεκατ. ευρώ το 2009. Έκτοτε παρέμεινε σε υψηλά επίπεδα, ανερχόμενη σε 73 δισεκατ. ευρώ και 61 δισεκατ. ευρώ το 2010 και 2011, αντιστοίχως.

Παράλληλα, η ΕΤΕπ σε συνεργασία με την Επιτροπή εξέτασε τρόπους για την μεγαλύτερη εμπλοκή επενδυτών από τις κεφαλαιαγορές στην χρηματοδότηση έργων υποδομής. Για παράδειγμα, φέτος το φθινόπωρο αναμένεται να δρομολογηθεί από την ΕΤΕπ η πρωτοβουλία έκδοσης ομολόγων για τη χρηματοδότηση έργων στο πλαίσιο της στρατηγικής «Ευρώπη 2020». Στόχος είναι η προσέλκυση θεσμικών επενδυτών, όπως ασφαλιστικές επιχειρήσεις και συνταξιοδοτικά ταμεία, για την πραγματοποίηση επενδύσεων σε έργα υποδομής.

Τέλος, το Ευρωπαϊκό Συμβούλιο της 30ής Ιανουαρίου κάλεσε το Συμβούλιο, την Επιτροπή και την ΕΤΕπ να μελετήσουν πιθανές δυνατότητες ενίσχυσης της δράσης της ΕΤΕπ για τη στήριξη της ανάπτυξης και να προβούν στις ενδεδειγμένες συστάσεις, συμπεριλαμβανομένων πιθανών τρόπων μόχλευσης της ικανότητας χρηματοδότησης του ομίλου της ΕΤΕπ μέσω του προϋπολογισμού της ΕΕ, προκειμένου να ενισχυθεί η στήριξη της ΕΤΕπ προς τις ΜΜΕ και τα έργα υποδομής. Η Επιτροπή θα ανταποκριθεί στο αίτημα του Ευρωπαϊκού Συμβουλίου έως τον Ιούνιο του 2012.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-004210/12  
to the Commission**

**Nikolaos Salavrakos (EFD)**

(23 April 2012)

*Subject:* European markets

According to bank executives' estimates (*The Financial Times*), over the past two years, EUR 100 billion has been withdrawn from Italian, Spanish and French national bonds. The Spanish 10-year bond yields dropped slightly below 6%, while pressure continues to mount on the Italian bonds.

Despite continual assurances by European officials that the crisis is being addressed, market confidence has hit rock bottom.

In view of this:

1. What view does the Commission take of the functioning of the European Central Bank (ECB) regarding its flexibility in terms of money supply?
2. Is the Commission examining ways of enabling the ECB and European Investment Bank to make a more active contribution to combating the crisis and financing large infrastructure projects?

**Answer given by Mr Rehn on behalf of the Commission**

(9 July 2012)

1. Monetary policy in the euro area is the exclusive competence of the ECB, whose independence is enshrined in the Treaty. The Commission does not interfere with the ECB's Treaty or statutory obligations. Credible monetary policy is of paramount importance to anchor inflation expectations and to enhance macroeconomic stability. In this regard, the ECB has an excellent track-record of preserving both the internal and external value of the euro.

2. The EIB has historically played a key role in financing investment for growth, such as infrastructure investments to support the implementation of key EU policies. It also lends extensively to SMEs and other key sectors of the EU economy. EIB's annual total lending increased from EUR 48 billion in 2007 to EUR 79 billion 2009. It has since remained at a high level, reaching EUR 73 billion and EUR 61 billion in 2010 and 2011, respectively.

In addition, the EIB together with the Commission has assessed ways to better involve capital market investors in the financing of infrastructure projects. For example the Europe 2020 Project Bond Initiative is expected to be launched by the EIB this Autumn. The objective is to attract institutional investors, such as insurance companies and pension funds to invest in infrastructure projects.

Finally, the European Council of 30 January invited the Council, the Commission and the EIB to consider possible options to enhance EIB action to support growth and to make appropriate recommendations, including possibilities for the EU budget to leverage EIB group financing capacity, in order to strengthen EIB support for SMEs and infrastructure. The Commission will respond to the European Council's request by June 2012.

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(Ελληνική έκδοση)

**Ερώτηση με αίτημα γραπτής απάντησης E-004211/12**  
**προς την Επιτροπή (Αντιπρόεδρος/Υπατη Εκπρόσωπος)**  
**Nikolaos Salavrakos (EFD)**  
(23 Απριλίου 2012)

Θέμα: VP/HR — Αρνητική στάση της Τουρκίας για αποστρατιωτικοποίηση της Κύπρου

Σύμφωνα με πρόσφατα δημοσιεύματα, ο Πρόεδρος της Κυπριακής Δημοκρατίας, κ. Χριστόφιας δήλωσε ότι η Ευρωπαϊκή Ένωση είναι πανέτοιμη να δεχθεί αποστρατιωτικοποίηση της Κύπρου.

Ωστόσο, η στάση της Τουρκίας επί του θέματος είναι αρνητική.

Ακόμα, σύμφωνα με δηλώσεις του ίδιου, η ελληνοκυπριακή πλευρά είναι έτοιμη να συνεχίσει το διάλογο για την επίλυση του Κυπριακού στη διάρκεια της κυπριακής προεδρίας της Ευρωπαϊκής Ένωσης, σε αντίθεση με την Τουρκία που έχει δηλώσει επανειλημμένως ότι, μετά την ανάληψη της κυπριακής προεδρίας της Ευρωπαϊκής Ένωσης, θα διακόψει κάθε διπλωματική επαφή με την προεδρία του Συμβουλίου της ΕΕ.

Ενόψει των ανωτέρω, ερωτάται η Υπατη Εκπρόσωπος για την εξωτερική πολιτική της Ένωσης:

1. Πώς κρίνεται η στάση της Τουρκίας, ως χώρας που επιθυμεί μια ευρωπαϊκή πορεία, απέναντι σε χώρα μέλος της ΕΕ, καθώς και η αρνητική της στάση στο θέμα της αποστρατιωτικοποίησης;
2. Ποιες ενέργειες διπλωματικές ή άλλες προτίθεται να λάβει η Ευρωπαϊκή Ένωση για να συντονιστεί κατά το δυνατόν η εξωτερική πολιτική της Τουρκίας με αυτήν της ΕΕ;

**Απάντηση του κ. Füle εξ ονόματος της Επιτροπής**  
(22 Ιουνίου 2012)

Το ζήτημα της αποστρατιωτικοποίησης της Κύπρου αποτελεί μέρος των συνεχιζόμενων διαπραγματεύσεων για συνολική διευθέτηση του Κυπριακού υπό την αιγίδα του ΟΗΕ. Η Επιτροπή συνεχίζει να καλεί όλα τα ενδιαφερόμενα μέρη να καταβάλουν κάθε προσπάθεια για να προετοιμαστεί το έδαφος για την εξεύρεση λύσης, και είναι έτοιμη να στηρίξει κάθε προσπάθεια εξεύρεσης συνολικής διευθέτησης.

Η εξαγωγή εντατικού διαλόγου για την εξωτερική πολιτική είναι πολύ σημαντικό στοιχείο του θετικού θεματολογίου που προωθεί η ΥΕ/ΑΠ. Καθώς η ΕΕ και η Τουρκία μοιράζονται πολλούς στόχους και επιδιώξεις στην κοινή τους γειτονία, και η Τουρκία είναι ένας σημαντικός και ολοένα και πιο ενεργός εταίρος, η Επιτροπή πιστεύει πως ο στενότερος συντονισμός πολιτικών θα βοηθήσει να έρθουν ακόμα πιο κοντά η Τουρκία με την ΕΕ, και να βελτιωθούν τα αποτελέσματα των πολιτικών μας προς το κοινό μας συμφέρον.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-004211/12**  
**to the Commission (Vice-President/High Representative)**  
**Nikolaos Salavrakos (EFD)**  
(23 April 2012)

*Subject:* VP/HR — Negative position of Turkey regarding the demilitarisation of Cyprus

According to recent articles, the President of the Republic of Cyprus, Dimitris Christofias, has stated that the European Union is ready to accept the demilitarisation of Cyprus.

However, Turkey's position on the subject is negative.

Furthermore, according to statements by Mr Christofias, the Greek Cypriot side is prepared to continue the dialogue on a Cypriot settlement during the Cyprus Presidency of the European Union, as opposed to Turkey, which has repeatedly stated that, it will suspend diplomatic relations with the EU Council Presidency, when Cyprus assumes this position.

In view of the above, will the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy answer the following:

1. What view does she take of the position adopted by Turkey, a country seeking EU membership, towards an EU Member State and of its negative stance on the subject of demilitarisation?
2. What diplomatic or other action does the European Union intend to take to bring Turkish foreign policy, as far as possible, into line with that of the EU?

**Answer given by Mr Füle on behalf of the Commission**  
(22 June 2012)

The question of the demilitarisation of Cyprus is part of the ongoing negotiations on a comprehensive Cyprus settlement under the auspices of the United Nations. The Commission continues calling on all stakeholders to make every effort to pave the way towards a solution, and is ready to support all efforts to reach a comprehensive settlement.

An intensified dialogue on foreign policy is a very important element of the positive agenda, which is being taken forward by the HR/VP. As the EU and Turkey share many goals and objectives in their common neighbourhood and Turkey is a prominent and increasingly active partner, the Commission believes that closer policy coordination will help bring Turkey and the EU even closer together and improve the impact of our policies in our mutual interest.

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(Ελληνική έκδοση)

**Ερώτηση με αίτημα γραπτής απάντησης E-004212/12**  
**προς την Επιτροπή**  
**Nikolaos Salavrakos (EFD)**  
(23 Απριλίου 2012)

**Θέμα:** Επαναφορά συνοριακών ελέγχων

Σύμφωνα με το Αθηναικό Πρακτορείο Ειδήσεων, οι υπουργοί Εσωτερικών της Γαλλίας και της Γερμανίας, έστειλαν εκτές επιστολή στους Ευρωπαίους ομολόγους τους, ζητώντας να έχουν τη δυνατότητα επαναφοράς ελέγχων στα εθνικά τους σύνορα για ένα μήνα, στην περίπτωση που αποτύχει η φύλαξη των εξωτερικών συνόρων του χώρου Σένγκεν.

Ερωτάται η Επιτροπή:

1. Είναι ενήμερη γι' αυτό το περιστατικό και ποια μέτρα προτίθεται να λάβει για να αντιμετωπιστεί αποτελεσματικά το θέμα της λαθρομετανάστευσης από χώρες όπως η Ελλάδα και η Ιταλία που αποτελούν τα σύνορα της ΕΕ και πύλες εισόδου των λαθρομεταναστών από χώρες της νοτιο-ανατολικής Ασίας και της Βορείου Αφρικής.
2. Πώς θα δράσει η Επιτροπή για να ενισχυθεί η συνοχή και η αλληλεγγύη μεταξύ των κρατών-μελών της Ένωσης και να αποφευχθεί το ενδεχόμενο δημιουργίας μιας Ευρώπης δύο ταχυτήτων, αφήνοντας πίσω της χώρες του Ευρωπαϊκού Νότου;

**Απάντηση της κας Malmström εξ ονόματος της Επιτροπής**  
(7 Ιουνίου 2012)

Η Επιτροπή ανησυχεί για το ρεύμα παράνομων μεταναστών στην περιοχή της Μεσογείου, ειδικά στην Ελλάδα, και έχει θέσει σε λειτουργία μια ολοκληρωμένη πολιτική για την αντιμετώπιση του προβλήματος αυτού. Είναι σημαντικό να ενισχυθούν οι τρέχουσες δράσεις του Frontex στα ελληνοτουρκικά σύνορα και να συνεχιστεί η στήριξη της Ελλάδας για τη δημιουργία αποτελεσματικού συστήματος διαχείρισης των συνόρων, συμπεριλαμβανομένων των ενεργειών σχετικά με την επιστροφή των παράνομων μεταναστών, ενώ παράλληλα είναι σημαντικό να ενθαρρυνθούν οι τουρκικές αρχές να υπογράψουν τη συμφωνία επανεισοδοχής που έχουν διαπραγματευθεί με την ΕΕ. Η οικονομική και επιχειρησιακή βοήθεια που δίνεται στην Ελλάδα και σε άλλες μεσογειακές χώρες είναι έκφραση της αλληλεγγύης μεταξύ των κρατών μελών.

Πέραν αυτών των επιχειρησιακών μέτρων, η Επιτροπή έχει προτείνει νομοθετικές αλλαγές που στοχεύουν στην ενίσχυση της διακυβέρνησης του χώρου Σένγκεν, ιδίως για να εξασφαλιστεί η αποτελεσματικότητα των ελέγχων στα εξωτερικά σύνορα. Οι προτάσεις περιλαμβάνουν ρήτρα διασφάλισης, που πρέπει να χρησιμοποιείται μόνο σε εξαιρετικές συνθήκες και η οποία επιτρέπει την επανεισαγωγή ελέγχων στα εσωτερικά σύνορα, με συντονισμένο τρόπο, σε επίπεδο ΕΕ, με σκοπό να παρέχει τον χρόνο και το χώρο για την αντιμετώπιση επίμονων και σημαντικών αποτυχιών από ένα κράτος μέλος. Αυτό θα επέτρεπε στην ΕΕ να αντιμετωπίσει αποτελεσματικά κρίσιμες καταστάσεις που συνεπάγονται την κατάρρευση των συνοριακών ελέγχων σε ένα κράτος μέλος, ενώ παράλληλα δεν θα έδινε την ευκαιρία να υιοθετηθούν μέτρα που θα μπορούσαν να υπονομεύσουν χωρίς λόγο την ελεύθερη κυκλοφορία.

Οι προτάσεις βρίσκονται υπό συζήτηση στο Ευρωπαϊκό Κοινοβούλιο και το Συμβούλιο, κατά τη διάρκεια της οποίας τα κράτη μέλη, συμπεριλαμβανομένων της Γαλλίας και της Γερμανίας, μπορούν να εκφράσουν τη γνώμη τους.



(English version)

**Question for written answer E-004212/12  
to the Commission  
Nikolaos Salavrakos (EFD)  
(23 April 2012)**

*Subject:* Re-introduction of border controls

According to the Athens News Agency, the Interior Ministers of France and Germany sent a letter to their European counterparts yesterday requesting the authorities to reintroduce their national border controls for one month, in the event that the supervision of external border controls of the Schengen area fails.

Will the Commission answer the following:

1. Is it aware of this and what measures does it intend to take to deal effectively with the issue of illegal immigration in countries such as Greece and Italy which constitute EU borders and gateways for illegal south-east Asian and north African immigrants?
2. What action will the Commission take to strengthen cohesion and solidarity between EU Member States and to avoid creating a two-speed Europe, leaving the southern European countries behind?

**Answer given by Ms Malmström on behalf of the Commission  
(7 June 2012)**

The Commission is concerned about the flow of irregular migrants in the Mediterranean region, especially into Greece, and has put in place a comprehensive strategy to tackle this problem. It is important to enhance the current Frontex operations at the Greek/Turkish border and to continue to assist Greece in building an effective border management system, including as regards the return of irregular migrants, while at the same time encouraging the Turkish authorities to sign the readmission agreement they have negotiated with the EU. The financial and operational assistance being given to Greece and other Mediterranean countries is a practical expression of solidarity among Member States.

In addition to such operational measures, the Commission has proposed legislative changes aimed at strengthening the governance of the Schengen area, in particular to ensure the effectiveness of controls at external borders. The proposals include a safeguard clause, to be used only in exceptional circumstances, enabling some controls at internal borders to be temporarily reintroduced, in a coordinated way at the EU level, to provide the time and space for persistent and serious failures by a Member State to be remedied. This would allow the EU to deal effectively with critical situations involving a breakdown in border control in a Member State, while not opening the door to measures that could unduly undermine free movement.

The proposals are currently the subject of discussion in the European Parliament and Council, during the course of which Member States, including France and Germany, are putting forward their views.

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(Ελληνική έκδοση)

**Ερώτηση με αίτημα γραπτής απάντησης E-004213/12**  
**προς την Επιτροπή (Αντιπρόεδρος/Υπατη Εκπρόσωπος)**  
**Nikolaos Salavrakos (EFD)**  
(23 Απριλίου 2012)

Θέμα: VP/HR — Αποτυχία σχεδίου εκχειρίας στην Συρία

Η συμφωνία για εκχειρία του Σύρου Πρόεδρου Μπασάρ Άσαντ με τα Ηνωμένα Έθνη, προ δεκαήμερου, αποτυγχάνει, με αποτέλεσμα σήμερα ο αριθμός των νεκρών από την έναρξη της εξέγερσης να έχει ξεπεράσει τους 9 000.

Ερωτάται η Επιτροπή:

1. Δεδομένων των πρόσφατων εξελίξεων, η Υπατη Εκπρόσωπος για την Εξωτερική πολιτική προτίθεται να υποβάλει επίσημη ανακοίνωση και να προβεί σε δηλώσεις σχετικά με τις εξελίξεις στην Συρία;
2. Ποια μέτρα προτίθεται να λάβει η Επιτροπή για να τερματιστούν οι εχθροπραξίες και η αιματοχυσία στην Συρία;

**Απάντηση της Υπατης Εκπροσώπου/Αντιπροέδρου Ashton εξ ονόματος της Επιτροπής**  
(25 Ιουνίου 2012)

Η Υπατη Εκπρόσωπος/Αντιπρόεδρος έχει εκδώσει τρεις ανακοινώσεις σχετικά με τη Συρία από τις 12 Απριλίου. Στις 14 Απριλίου χαιρέτισε την απόφαση του Συμβουλίου ασφαλείας των ΗΕ να εγκρίνει την παρουσία στρατιωτικών παρατηρητών στη Συρία, καλώντας το καθεστώς να εκμεταλλευτεί αυτή την ευκαιρία για να αλλάξει πορεία και να συνεργαστεί πλήρως με τους παρατηρητές. Στις 27 Απριλίου, η ΥΕ/ΑΠ εξέφρασε την ανησυχία της σχετικά με τη συνεχιζόμενη βία στη Συρία και τη μη συμμόρφωση του καθεστώτος με τις υποχρεώσεις και τις δεσμεύσεις του να αποσύρει τα στρατεύματα και τον βαρύ οπλισμό από τα αστικά κέντρα. Στις 11 Μαΐου, καταδίκασε τις βομβιστικές επιθέσεις στη Δαμασκό και τη Dera'a, υπενθυμίζοντας ότι το σχέδιο έξι σημείων του κοινού ειδικού απεσταλμένου Κόφι Αννάν είναι ο μόνος τρόπος για την εξεύρεση ειρηνικής διευθέτησης της κρίσης στη Συρία.

Η ΕΕ συνεχίζει να στηρίζει πλήρως το σχέδιο έξι σημείων του Κόφι Αννάν, χαιρετίζει την πρόοδο που επιτεύχθηκε μέχρι τώρα όσον αφορά την ανάπτυξη μελών της Αποστολής Εποπτείας των ΗΕ στη Συρία (UNSMIS) και προτρέπει στη συνέχιση της γρήγορης ανάπτυξης όλης της αποστολής. Η μόνιμη τοποθέτηση παρατηρητών είχε ήδη σημειώσει θετικά αποτελέσματα σε ορισμένες περιοχές συγκρούσεων και πριν κριθεί η αποτελεσματικότητα της αποστολής πρέπει να της δοθεί χρόνος για να αξιοποιήσει πλήρως το δυναμικό της. Παρόλα αυτά, η ΕΕ έχει τονίσει ότι το σχέδιο έξι σημείων δεν αποτελεί προσφορά που ισχύει επ' αόριστον και η πλήρης εφαρμογή του σχεδίου και η ανάπτυξη της UNSMIS αποτελούν την καλύτερη ευκαιρία για τη στήριξη ειρηνικής λύσης για την κρίση. Η ΕΕ καλεί το Συμβούλιο Ασφαλείας των Ηνωμένων Εθνών (UNSC) να εξακολουθήσει να ασχολείται με το θέμα.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-004213/12**  
**to the Commission (Vice-President/High Representative)**  
**Nikolaos Salavrakos (EFD)**  
(23 April 2012)

*Subject:* VP/HR — Syria peace plan failure

The ten-day ceasefire agreement between the Syrian President, Bashar Al-Assad and the United Nations is failing, with the result that the number of dead since the start of the uprising now exceeds 9 000.

Will the Commission answer the following:

1. Given the recent events, does the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs intend to make an official statement and make her views known regarding developments in Syria?
2. What measures does the Commission intend to take to put an end to the hostilities and bloodshed in Syria?

**Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Ashton on behalf of the Commission**  
(25 June 2012)

The High Representative/Vice-President has issued three statements on Syria since 12 April. On 14 April she welcomed the UN Security Council's decision to authorise the deployment of military observers to Syria, calling on the regime to take this opportunity to change course and fully cooperate with observers. On 27 April the HR/VP expressed her concern over the continued violence in Syria and the failure of the regime to honour its obligations and commitment to withdraw troops and heavy weapons from population centres. On 11 May she condemned bomb attacks in Damascus and Dera'a, recalling that the six point plan by Special Envoy Kofi Annan is the only way forward to find a peaceful solution to the crisis in Syria.

The EU continues to fully support Kofi Annan's six point plan, welcomes the progress to date to deploy members of the UN supervision mission to Syria (UNSMIS) and urges continued prompt deployment of the full mission. The permanent positioning of observers has already had positive effects in some conflict areas and the mission needs to be given time to fully deploy before judging its effectiveness. Still, the EU has underlined that the six-point plan is not an open-ended offer and that the full implementation of the plan in its entirety and the deployment of UNSMIS constitute the best opportunity to support a peaceful solution to the crisis. It calls on the UNSC to remain seized of the matter.

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(Versione italiana)

**Interrogazione con richiesta di risposta scritta P-004216/12**  
**alla Commissione**  
**Antonio Cancian (PPE)**  
(24 aprile 2012)

**Oggetto:** Prevenzione e cura delle tossicodipendenze tra le priorità della futura programmazione europea (2014-2020)

L'Unione europea ha dimostrato negli ultimi anni la volontà di sostenere e promuovere iniziative nel campo della lotta al consumo di droghe illegali e alle tossicodipendenze. Tale attenzione nei confronti di uno dei problemi che maggiormente affliggono la società europea, e in particolare le fasce più giovani, è apprezzabile.

Si nota tuttavia che, nel quadro della futura programmazione europea 2014-2020, a questa delicata questione non è stata garantita la stessa visibilità.

A suscitare le maggiori preoccupazioni è in primo luogo l'assenza di previsioni per il proseguimento del programma «Prevenzione e informazione in materia di droga» (DPIP), per il quale il finanziamento terminerà nel 2013. Non è al momento previsto nemmeno che le attività svolte nel quadro di questo programma possano rientrare in altre iniziative.

In secondo luogo, manca un riferimento al consumo di droghe tra i temi di interesse all'interno del terzo programma pluriennale «Salute per la crescita», al contrario di quanto è finora avvenuto.

Queste assenze rischiano di compromettere i buoni risultati finora ottenuti nel contrasto alla diffusione delle droghe tra la popolazione.

Alla luce di queste considerazioni, si chiede pertanto:

1. intende la Commissione assicurarsi che la prevenzione al consumo di sostanze stupefacenti attraverso programmi europei, che permettano lo scambio di buone pratiche a livello transnazionale e un approccio coordinato alla questione da parte degli enti pubblici e privati che si impegnano in questo senso, continui a essere una priorità nell'agenda dell'Unione?
2. intende la Commissione impegnarsi affinché il Programma DPIP non termini il prossimo anno, ma sia rinnovato e possa proseguire anche nel prossimo periodo di programmazione?

**Risposta data da Viviane Reding a nome della Commissione**  
(31 maggio 2012)

Nella comunicazione al Parlamento europeo e al Consiglio dal titolo «Una più incisiva risposta europea alle sfide poste dal fenomeno della droga» <sup>(1)</sup> la Commissione ha messo in evidenza l'importanza di ridurre la domanda di droga nell'affrontare questo problema nell'Unione europea e ha presentato le iniziative che intende adottare a questo scopo nel corso dei prossimi anni. Fra di esse è compresa una proposta per fissare standard minimi di qualità nella riduzione della domanda di droghe, tesa a migliorare l'efficienza dei servizi di prevenzione, cura e riduzione dei danni legati alla droga nell'Unione europea.

Secondo la proposta della Commissione per il nuovo programma Giustizia per il 2014-2020 <sup>(2)</sup>, il programma è destinato a succedere all'attuale programma Prevenzione e informazione in materia di droga (DPIP). L'articolo 5, lettera c), della proposta di programma Giustizia stabilisce che prevenire la domanda di droga riducendone al contempo l'offerta costituirà uno degli obiettivi specifici del programma stesso. La proposta del programma «Giustizia» imposta la strategia contro la droga sotto l'aspetto della prevenzione dei reati. La proposta di programma «Salute per la crescita» <sup>(3)</sup>, pur non occupandosi esplicitamente della riduzione della domanda di droga, contempla all'articolo 3 l'obiettivo di individuare, diffondere e promuovere l'adozione di buone pratiche per misure di prevenzione efficaci sotto il profilo dei costi, affrontando i principali fattori di rischio. Questo programma potrebbe quindi occuparsi di alcuni problemi legati alla prevenzione delle droghe attraverso le azioni che propone con riguardo all'HIV/AIDS e ad altri fattori di rischio per malattie croniche come l'abuso di alcol.

Al Parlamento e al Consiglio, il processo legislativo su queste due proposte di programmi è in corso, per garantire la continuità d'azione nel campo delle droghe.

<sup>(1)</sup> COM(2011)689/2.

<sup>(2)</sup> COM(2011)759 definitivo, del 15.11.2011.

<sup>(3)</sup> COM(2011)709 definitivo, del 9.11.2011.

(English version)

**Question for written answer P-004216/12**  
**to the Commission**  
**Antonio Cancian (PPE)**  
(24 April 2012)

*Subject:* Inclusion of drug addiction prevention and treatment in the priorities of the next EU programming period (2014-2020)

In recent years the European Union has shown its willingness to support and promote initiatives to combat illegal drug consumption and drug addiction. This is a valuable focus on one of the most troublesome problems affecting European society, and young people in particular.

Nevertheless, this sensitive issue is not guaranteed the same prominence in the next EU programming period 2014-2020.

Chief among the main concerns is that there is no provision to continue the Drug Prevention and Information Programme (DPIP), funding for which will end in 2013. Nor is there currently any provision for activities conducted under this programme to continue under other initiatives.

Secondly, contrary to previous practice, there is no reference to drug consumption among the matters for concern in the third multi-annual programme Health for Growth.

These omissions risk jeopardising the good results achieved so far in fighting the spread of drugs among the population.

1. Does the Commission intend to ensure that the prevention of drug consumption through EU programmes, which enable the transnational exchange of good practices and a coordinated approach to the issue by the public and private bodies committed to it, remains a priority on the EU's agenda?
2. Does the Commission intend to take steps to ensure that the DPIP does not end next year, but that it is renewed and able to continue in the next programming period?

**Answer given by Mrs Reding on behalf of the Commission**  
(31 May 2012)

The Commission has stressed, in the communication to the European Parliament and the Council, 'Towards a stronger European response to drugs' <sup>(1)</sup>, the importance of drug-demand reduction in addressing the drugs problem in the EU. The Commission has presented, in this communication, the initiatives that it intends to take, over the following years, on drug-demand reduction. These include a proposal for minimum quality standards in drug-demand reduction, to improve the effectiveness of drug prevention, treatment and harm reduction services in the EU.

According to the Commission's Proposal for a new Justice Programme for 2014-2020 <sup>(2)</sup>, the Programme shall be the successor of the current Drug Prevention and Information Programme (DPIP). Article 5(c) of the proposed Justice Programme stipulates that one of the specific objectives of the Programme will be prevention and reduction of drug demand and supply. The draft Justice Programme proposes approaching drugs policy through the angle of crime prevention. While the proposal for a Health for Growth Programme <sup>(3)</sup> does not address drug-demand reduction explicitly, it does contain an objective in Article 3 on the identification, dissemination and promotion of best practices for cost-effective prevention measures by addressing the key risk factors. This Programme could thus cover certain issues related to drug prevention via the actions it proposes in relation to HIV/AIDS and other risk factors for chronic diseases such as alcohol.

The legislative process is ongoing in both Parliament and Council on these two proposed programmes with a view to continuity of policy action on drugs.

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<sup>(1)</sup> COM(2011) 689/2.

<sup>(2)</sup> COM(2011) 759 final, 15.11.2011.

<sup>(3)</sup> COM(2011) 709 final, 9.11.2011.

(Versión española)

**Pregunta con solicitud de respuesta escrita E-004217/12**

**a la Comisión**

**Raül Romeva i Rueda (Verts/ALE)**

(24 de abril de 2012)

*Asunto:* Espacio Schengen

El Ministerio de Interior ha hecho pública su intención de cerrar el espacio Schengen durante aproximadamente una semana, entre el 24 de abril y el 4 de mayo, en los pasos fronterizos entre España y Francia con motivo de la cumbre del Banco Central Europeo (BCE) que tendrá lugar en Barcelona del 2 al 4 de mayo. Esta medida no se adoptaba en el Estado español desde 2004, cosa que demuestra su excepcionalidad. En el Convenio de aplicación del Acuerdo de Schengen se establece que se podrán recuperar los controles fronterizos «cuando así lo exijan el orden público o la seguridad nacional», siempre que sea «previa consulta a las demás partes contratantes, que se efectúen en las fronteras interiores y durante un periodo limitado».

Esta medida se enmarca dentro de un proceso de vulneración de derechos civiles y democráticos que están liderando el Ministerio de Interior y el Conseller de Interior de la Generalitat. Con ello pretenden reducir la movilización social democrática en contra de los recortes sociales, de derechos y de libertades de sus respectivos gobiernos con estrategias de miedo y opresión.

— ¿Considera la Comisión que existe un riesgo para el orden público o la seguridad nacional en la próxima convocatoria de reunión del Banco Central Europeo en Barcelona?

— ¿Tiene constancia la Comisión de que el Gobierno del Estado español haya consultado con el resto de partes contratantes del Acuerdo de Schengen la recuperación de los controles, tal y como establece el propio Convenio?

— ¿Está al corriente la Comisión de la oleada de políticas represivas que están liderando los responsables de los departamentos de interior del Gobierno de la Generalitat y del Gobierno del Estado?

**Respuesta de la Sra. Malmström en nombre de la Comisión**

(7 de junio de 2012)

La posibilidad de que los Estados miembros restablezcan los controles en las fronteras interiores se rige por el Código de fronteras Schengen <sup>(1)</sup>. Con arreglo al artículo 23 de dicho Código, si existe una amenaza grave para el orden público o la seguridad interior, todo Estado miembro podrá restablecer, con carácter excepcional y durante un periodo limitado, en general no superior a 30 días, los controles fronterizos en sus fronteras interiores. Cuando un Estado miembro prevea restablecer esos controles se lo comunicará lo antes posible a los demás Estados miembros y a la Comisión.

El 20 de abril de 2012, la Comisión Europea (también el Consejo) recibió una carta del Ministerio del Interior español, informándole de que el Gobierno español había decidido restablecer, entre el 28 de abril y el 4 de mayo, los controles en las fronteras interiores terrestres con Francia, así como en los aeropuertos de Barcelona y Girona. De acuerdo con dicha carta, el restablecimiento se debía a que existían fundados motivos para creer que la reunión del Consejo de Gobierno del Banco Central Europeo (BCE) podría verse perturbada por graves disturbios. El 23 de abril, la Secretaría General transmitió esta información a todos los Estados miembros de la UE y a los Estados asociados de Schengen, de acuerdo con la práctica habitual en estos casos.

La Comisión reconoce la competencia de los Estados miembros en lo que atañe a la salvaguardia del orden público y la seguridad interior. La Comisión no dispone de información alguna que le haga poner en duda la verosimilitud de la amenaza esgrimida por las autoridades españolas.

Por lo que se refiere a los casos de reestablecimiento temporal de los controles en las fronteras interiores, la Comisión se remite a la Comunicación al Parlamento Europeo y al Consejo titulada «Informe semestral sobre el funcionamiento de la zona Schengen», adoptada en fecha reciente <sup>(2)</sup>.

<sup>(1)</sup> Reglamento (CE) n.º 562/2006 del Parlamento Europeo y del Consejo, de 15 de marzo de 2006, por el que se establece un Código comunitario de normas para el cruce de personas por las fronteras (Código de fronteras Schengen).

<sup>(2)</sup> COM(2012)230 de 16 de mayo de 2012.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-004217/12  
to the Commission**

**Raül Romeva i Rueda (Verts/ALE)**

(24 April 2012)

*Subject:* Schengen area

The Ministry of the Interior has announced that it intends to close the Schengen area at the border crossings between Spain and France for a period of about one week, between 24 April and 4 May, because of the European Central Bank (ECB) summit being held in Barcelona from 2 to 4 May 2012. This measure has not been taken in Spain since 2004, which demonstrates how exceptional it is. The Convention implementing the Schengen Agreement states that 'where public policy or national security so require' border controls may be restored and 'carried out at internal borders' as long as this is done 'after consulting the other Contracting Parties' and 'for a limited period'.

This measure is part of a process led by the Ministry of the Interior and the Catalan Government's Minister of the Interior in which civil and democratic rights are being violated. They are trying to use fear and oppression as strategies to limit social-democratic demonstrations against the cuts in social spending and restrictions on rights and liberties brought in by their respective governments.

— Does the Commission believe that there is a risk to public policy or national security during the forthcoming European Central Bank meeting in Barcelona?

— Does the Commission have any record of the Spanish Government having consulted the other parties to the Schengen Agreement about restoring the controls, as required under the Convention?

— Is the Commission aware of the wave of repressive policies led by the Ministries of the Interior of the Government of Catalonia and the Spanish Government?

**Answer given by Ms Malmström on behalf of the Commission**

(7 June 2012)

Member States' possibility to reintroduce control at internal borders is governed by the Schengen Borders Code <sup>(1)</sup>. Pursuant to Article 23 of this Code, a Member State may, where there is a serious threat to public policy or internal security, exceptionally reintroduce control at its internal borders for a period of, in general, no more than 30 days. Where a Member State is planning to do so, it shall as soon as possible notify the other Member States and the Commission.

The European Commission (and the Council) on 20 April 2012 received a letter from the Spanish Ministry of Interior, informing that the Spanish Government had decided to reintroduce controls between 28 April and 4 May at the internal land border to France as well as at Barcelona and Gerona airports. According to the letter, the reintroduction was due to reasonable grounds for believing that serious disturbances of public order could disrupt the meeting in Barcelona of the Governing Council of the European Central Bank (ECB). The General Secretariat of the Council on 23 April forwarded this information to all EU Member States and Schengen-associated States, following standard practice.

The Commission acknowledges Member States' competence as regards the safeguarding of public policy and internal security. It does not possess any information that has led it to question the threat assessment of the Spanish authorities.

For cases concerning temporary reintroduction of controls at the internal borders, the Commission refers to the recently adopted Communication to the European Parliament and the Council 'Biannual report on the functioning of the Schengen area' <sup>(2)</sup>.

<sup>(1)</sup> Regulation (EC) No 562/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 March 2006, establishing a Community Code on the rules governing the movement of persons across borders (Schengen Borders Code).

<sup>(2)</sup> COM(2012)230 16 May 2012.

(Ελληνική έκδοση)

**Ερώτηση με αίτημα γραπτής απάντησης E-004219/12**  
**προς την Επιτροπή**  
**Nikolaos Salavrakos (EFD)**  
(24 Απριλίου 2012)

**Θέμα:** Χρήση ναρκωτικών ουσιών

Σύμφωνα με τα πορίσματα της έρευνας ESPAD 2011, που διεξήγαγε το Ελληνικό Ερευνητικό Πανεπιστημιακό Ινστιτούτο Ψυχικής Υγείας, παρατηρείται υπερδιπλασιασμός των ατόμων ηλικίας 15 έως 19 ετών με εμπειρία χρήσης ναρκωτικών ουσιών, που καταγράφεται κατά την τελευταία 25ετία στην Ελλάδα.

Συγκεκριμένα, ένας στους επτά νέους ηλικίας από 15 έως 19 ετών (ποσοστό 15,2 %) δηλώνει ότι έχει κάνει χρήση, έστω και μια φορά στη διάρκεια της ζωής του, κάποιας παράνομης ουσίας, κυρίως κάνναβης. Το αντίστοιχο ποσοστό το 1984 δεν ξεπερνούσε το 6 %. Παράλληλα, αυξητική τάση καταγράφεται και στη συστηματική χρήση παράνομων ουσιών στα άτομα αυτής της ηλικίας.

Ερωτάται η Επιτροπή:

- Ποιες δράσεις έχει αναλάβει για την καταπολέμηση ή την μείωση της χρήσης ναρκωτικών ουσιών, ειδικότερα από τους νέους που φαίνεται να αυξάνει τα τελευταία χρόνια;

**Απάντηση της κας Reding εξ ονόματος της Επιτροπής**  
(7 Ιουνίου 2012)

Τα κράτη μέλη είναι αρμόδια να αναπτύξουν και να εφαρμόσουν πολιτικές σχετικά με την πρόληψη της τοξικομανίας, τη θεραπεία και τον περιορισμό των βλαβών, οι οποίες να λειτουργούν καλύτερα στο κοινωνικοοικονομικό και πολιτιστικό τους πλαίσιο. Η Ευρωπαϊκή Επιτροπή υποστηρίζει και συμπληρώνει τις δράσεις των κρατών μελών για τη μείωση της ζήτησης των ναρκωτικών, προωθώντας την ανάπτυξη αποτελεσματικών και καινοτόμων προσεγγίσεων, και διαδίδοντας τις καλύτερες πρακτικές στον τομέα αυτό μέσω των οικονομικών προγραμμάτων της ΕΕ, του προγράμματος «πρόληψη των ναρκωτικών και σχετική ενημέρωση»<sup>(1)</sup> και του προγράμματος δημόσιας υγείας<sup>(2)</sup>.

Η δράση της ΕΕ σχετικά με τα ναρκωτικά κατευθύνεται από τη στρατηγική της ΕΕ για τα ναρκωτικά 2005-2012<sup>(3)</sup>, η οποία προσδιορίζει τη μείωση της ζήτησης ναρκωτικών ως έναν από τους βασικούς πυλώνες της στρατηγικής της ΕΕ για τα ναρκωτικά. Η Ευρωπαϊκή Επιτροπή παρήγγειλε εξωτερική αξιολόγηση της εφαρμογής της στρατηγικής της ΕΕ για τα ναρκωτικά 2005-2012, την οποία διεξήγαγε η RAND Europe. Η έκθεση αξιολόγησης, που παραδόθηκε το Μάρτιο του 2012, τονίζει σημαντικό αριθμό επιτευγμάτων στο τομέα της μείωσης της ζήτησης ναρκωτικών. Η Επιτροπή έχει στείλει την έκθεση αξιολόγησης στις γραμματείες του ENVI και της LIBE.

Τον Οκτώβριο του 2011, η Επιτροπή παρουσίασε την ανακοίνωση «Για μια ισχυρότερη αντίδραση της Ευρώπης στα ναρκωτικά»<sup>(4)</sup> εξαγγέλλοντας μια σειρά πρωτοβουλιών που θα λάβει μέσα στα επόμενα χρόνια για την αντιμετώπιση του προβλήματος των ναρκωτικών. Αυτές περιλαμβάνουν μέτρα για το ελάχιστο πρότυπα ποιότητας σχετικά με την πρόληψη, τη θεραπεία και τον περιορισμό των βλαβών προκειμένου να βελτιωθεί η ποιότητα των υπηρεσιών που σχετίζονται με τα ναρκωτικά σε όλη την ΕΕ.

(1) COM(2011)246.

(2) Απόφαση αριθ. 1350/2007/ΕΚ του Ευρωπαϊκού Κοινοβουλίου και του Συμβουλίου, της 23ης Οκτωβρίου 2007, για τη θέσπιση δεύτερου προγράμματος κοινοτικής δράσης στον τομέα της υγείας (2008-2013), ΕΕ L 301 της 20.11.2007.

(3) CORDROGUE 77, 22.11.2004.

(4) COM(2011)689 τελικό, της 25.10.2011.



(English version)

**Question for written answer E-004219/12  
to the Commission**

**Nikolaos Salavrakos (EFD)**

(24 April 2012)

*Subject:* Use of narcotic substances

According to the results of the 2011 ESPAD survey carried out by the Greek University Mental Health Research Institute, the number of people aged between 15 and 19 who have used drugs has more than doubled over the last 25 years in Greece.

Specifically, one in seven young people aged between 15 and 19 (15.2%) state that they have used an illegal substance, mainly cannabis, at least once in their lifetime. The same percentage in 1984 was no more than 6%. At the same time, an increasing tendency for such systematic use of illegal substances by people in this age group has also been recorded.

In view of this:

- What actions has the Commission taken to combat or reduce the use of drugs, specifically among young people, which seems to have increased over the last few years?

**Answer given by Mrs Reding on behalf of the Commission**

(7 June 2012)

Member States are competent for developing and implementing policies on drug prevention, treatment and harm reduction that work best in their socioeconomic and cultural contexts. The European Commission supports and complements Member States' action on drug-demand reduction, by promoting the development of effective and innovative approaches and the sharing of best-practice in this area through the EU financial programmes, the Drug Prevention and Information Programme <sup>(1)</sup> and the Public Health Programme <sup>(2)</sup>.

The EU action on drugs is guided by the EU Drugs Strategy 2005-2012 <sup>(3)</sup>, which identifies drug-demand reduction as one of the main pillars of EU drugs policy. The European Commission has commissioned an external evaluation of the implementation of the EU Drugs Strategy 2005-2012, which was conducted by RAND Europe. The evaluation report, delivered in March 2012, highlights a number of achievements in the area of demand reduction. The Commission has sent the evaluation report to the ENVI and LIBE secretariats.

In October 2011, the Commission presented its communication 'Towards a stronger European response to drugs' <sup>(4)</sup>, announcing a number of initiatives that it will take over the next years to address the drugs problem. These include measures for EU minimum quality standards in prevention, treatment and harm reduction, to improve the quality of drug-related services across the EU.

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<sup>(1)</sup> COM(2011)246.

<sup>(2)</sup> Decision No 1350/2007/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 October 2007 establishing a second programme of Community action in the field of health (2008-2013), OJ L 301, 20.11.2007.

<sup>(3)</sup> CORDROGUE 77, 22.11.2004.

<sup>(4)</sup> COM(2011) 689 final, 25.10.2011.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-004220/12  
to the Commission  
Nigel Farage (EFD)  
(24 April 2012)**

*Subject:* Not a level vineyard

Why is it legal for Moldovan grapes or grape must to be exported to Belarus (the climate of which precludes grape cultivation) for processing into wine, which is then sold within the EU as wine from Belarus, when it is prohibited for Argentinian grapes to be brought to south-east England for processing and then sold as wine from Britain?

**Answer given by Mr Ciolos on behalf of the Commission  
(16 May 2012)**

EU wine legislation only specifies the conditions according to which a wine can be produced on the territory of the Union and therefore does not apply to wines produced in third countries as Moldova and Belarus.

For wines produced in a third country from grapes harvested in another third country, according to Article 55(1)(a) (iii), second subparagraph of Commission regulation (EC) No 607/2009 of 14 July 2009 laying down certain detailed rules for the implementation of Council Regulation (EC) No 479/2008 as regards protected designations of origin and geographical indications, traditional terms, labelling and presentation of certain wine sector products <sup>(1)</sup>the indication of provenance indicated on labels shall be: 'wine obtained in (...) from grapes harvested in (...)'.

However, according to Point B(5) of Annex XV(b) to Regulation (EC) No 1234/2007 'Unless otherwise decided by the Council in accordance with the international obligations of the Community, fresh grapes, grape must, grape must in fermentation, concentrated grape must, rectified concentrated grape must, grape must with fermentation arrested by the addition of alcohol, grape juice, concentrated grape juice and wine, or mixtures of those products, originating in third countries, may not be turned into products referred to in Annex XIb or added to such products in the territory of the Community' <sup>(2)</sup>.

Up to date, the Council has never envisaged any particular measure in this field and it is thus not possible to market on the territory of the EU a wine which would have been produced in the Union with grapes harvested in a third country.

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<sup>(1)</sup> OJ L 193, 24.7.2009, p. 60.

<sup>(2)</sup> OJ L 299, 16.11.2007, p. 1.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-004222/12  
to the Commission  
Nicole Sinclaire (NI)  
(24 April 2012)**

*Subject:* Structural Funds

How does the Commission envisage allocating the remainder amount of EUR 82 billion in the structural funds, given the short time until the conclusion of the budgetary term? Does the Commission accept that this proves its negligence in administering the budget correctly?

**Answer given by Mr Hahn on behalf of the Commission  
(18 June 2012)**

From 2008 on, the Commission has taken decisions on the annual cohesion policy financial allocations for each Member State with respect to the 2007-2013 period. All cohesion policy funding for 2007-2013 has been allocated by the Commission.

A clear distinction needs to be made between the allocations by the Commission and the adoption of the agreed financing plans (which then lead to annual EU budgetary commitments) and the use of the money by Member States and regions. Within the framework of the shared management principle, the managing authorities agree with the Commission on their priorities for the use of the decided EU funds. The managing authorities and programmes then run selection processes which lead to the allocation of funding to specific projects in line with agreed priorities. In a multi-annual programme, it is not unusual that project selection takes place progressively. Therefore, based on information from the Member States, the Commission estimated that EUR 82 billion (24%) was still left to be allocated by the programme authorities by the end of 2011. As money can be spent up to the end of 2015, this rate of execution is more than reasonable.

The Commission therefore considers it is fulfilling its role in the management of the funds, also in drawing attention to the funds still available for allocation to specific projects, permitting a refocusing of this money on youth employment and SME support.

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(Versiunea în limba română)

**Întrebarea cu solicitare de răspuns scris E-004223/12**  
**adresată Comisiei**  
**Monica Luisa Macovei (PPE)**  
(24 aprilie 2012)

*Subiect:* Motive de ordin macroeconomic care justifică actualele praguri ale criteriilor de convergență

Negocierile recente cu privire la modelele propuse pentru guvernanța economică au stimulat dezbateri aprinse.

În timp ce „pachetul de șase” a fost proiectat pentru consolidarea Pactului de stabilitate și de creștere, neglijat adesea, Tratatul privind stabilitatea, coordonarea și guvernanța este menit să consolideze guvernanța economică și prevede anumite măsuri care sunt chiar mai stricte decât celea din „pachetul de șase”. Tratatul privind stabilitatea, coordonarea și guvernanța a fost semnat în cele din urmă de toate statele membre, cu excepția a două state. Se așteaptă ca semnatarii să includă aceste norme în propria legislație națională, prin dispoziții „cu caracter obligatoriu și permanent, de preferință constituțional”.

Cele mai importante criterii de convergență, limita superioară de 3 % privind deficitul public general și limita superioară de 60 % privind datoria publică, nu s-au schimbat de la semnarea inițială a Pactului de stabilitate și de creștere în 1997 și sunt în conformitate cu criteriile de convergență de la Maastricht pe care trebuie să le îndeplinească statele membre înainte de a adopta euro ca monedă. Tratatul privind stabilitatea, coordonarea și guvernanța adaugă o limită inferioară acestor obiective pe termen mediu specifice fiecărei țări, sub forma unui deficit structural de 0,5 % sau, în anumite condiții, de 1 % din PIB.

De la stabilirea acestor praguri, s-au schimbat în mod semnificativ structura și contextul economiei UE.

Economiile naționale care constituie economia UE sunt eterogene în ceea ce privește capacitatea, scara, dinamismul și stabilitatea.

1. Comisia poate explica argumentele economice aflate în spatele valorii procentuale specifice a datoriei publice și dacă această valoare este optimă pentru dezvoltarea fiecărei economii naționale care constituie economia UE?
2. Există studii de referință recente care indică faptul că valorile procentuale ale criteriilor de convergență sunt încă adecvate în prezent, având în vedere starea actuală a economiei UE în ansamblu, precum și a economiilor naționale ale UE?

**Răspuns dat de dl Rehn în numele Comisiei**  
(21 iunie 2012)

Valorile de referință de 60 % și 3 % din PIB au fost stabilite în protocolul anexat la tratate întrucât acestea au fost considerate compatibile cu garantarea sustenabilității fiscale având în vedere contextul macroeconomic predominant la momentul respectiv. Nerespectarea acestor valori este urmată întotdeauna de o analiză a diferiților factori specifici fiecărei țări, inclusiv a condițiilor ciclice, în vederea evaluării gravității situației și a posibilelor consecințe.

Trebuie remarcat că, în ceea ce privește poziția statelor membre care beneficiază de o derogare, criteriul sustenabilității poziției financiare guvernamentale reprezintă doar unul dintre criteriile de convergență, care includ, de asemenea, atingerea unui grad ridicat de stabilitate a prețurilor, respectarea marjelor normale de fluctuație prevăzute de MCS II și caracterul sustenabil al convergenței atinse. Așadar, sustenabilitatea globală a procesului de convergență este esențială pentru îndeplinirea obligațiilor statelor membre în cauză.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-004223/12  
to the Commission**

**Monica Luisa Macovei (PPE)**

(24 April 2012)

*Subject:* Macroeconomic grounds justifying the current convergence criteria thresholds

The recent negotiations on the proposed models for economic governance have spurred heated debates.

While the 'six-pack' was designed to strengthen the often neglected Stability and Growth Pact (SGP), the Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance (TSCG) is meant to reinforce economic governance and provides for some measures that are even more stringent than those of the 'six-pack'. The TSCG was eventually signed by all but two EU Member States. The signatories are expected to incorporate these rules in their national legislation through provisions 'of binding force and permanent character, preferably constitutional'.

The most prominent convergence criteria, the 3% upper limit on general government deficit and the 60% upper limit on public debt, have been kept unchanged since the original SGP was signed in 1997 and are in line with the Maastricht convergence criteria which the Member States have to meet before adopting the euro as currency. To these country-specific medium-term objectives, the TSCG adds a lower limit in the form of a structural deficit of 0.5% or, under certain conditions, 1% of GDP.

Since these thresholds were set, the structure and context of the EU's economy have changed significantly.

The national economies making up the EU economy are heterogeneous in terms of capacity, scale, dynamism and stability.

1. Can the Commission explain the economic considerations that lay behind the specific percentage value for public debt and whether this value is optimal for the development of each and every national economy that makes up the EU economy?
2. Are there any recent reference studies that indicate that the percentage values for the convergence criteria are still adequate today, given the current state of the EU economy as a whole and of the national economies of the EU?

**Answer given by Mr Rehn on behalf of the Commission**

(21 June 2012)

The reference values of 60% and 3% of GDP have been set in the Protocol annexed to the Treaties as they were considered to be compatible with ensuring fiscal sustainability given the prevailing macroeconomic environment at the time. Non-compliance with these values is always followed up by an analysis of different country-specific factors including cyclical circumstances, in order to assess the seriousness of the situation and possible consequences.

Regarding the position of the Member States with a derogation, it should be noted that the sustainability of the governmental financial position criterion is only one of several convergence criteria, which also include the achievement of a high degree of price stability, the observance of the normal fluctuation margins provided for by the ERM II and the durability of convergence achieved. It is thus the overall sustainability of the convergence process which is key for fulfilling the obligations of the Member States concerned.

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(Versione italiana)

**Interrogazione con richiesta di risposta scritta E-004224/12  
alla Commissione**

**Sergio Paolo Frances Silvestris (PPE)**

(24 aprile 2012)

Oggetto: Politiche a sostegno della pesca

L'Italia dipende ufficialmente dalle importazioni di pesce. È quanto annuncia un'influente associazione di categoria alla luce del rapporto «Fish Dependence: the increasing reliance of the EU in fish from elsewhere» elaborato dalla New Economics Foundation (NEF) e da Ocean2012. Il problema, però, non si limita a questo. Data infatti l'abbondanza di pesce proveniente dall'estero sui banchi italiani, il rischio che si possa tentare di frodare il consumatore, spacciando per italiano ciò che di fatto non lo è, risulta sempre più elevato.

Infatti, secondo le stime contenute nel rapporto, dal 21 aprile, proclamato «fish dependence day» italiano, il Belpaese entra ufficialmente nell'elenco delle nazioni che vivono, quanto a pesce, più di importazioni estere che di produzione nazionale. Attualmente, più di due pesci su tre provengono dall'estero, con un'autosufficienza che si attesta attorno al 30 % rispetto alla media europea del 51 %. La crisi in atto, inoltre, potrebbe aggravare ulteriormente la situazione italiana, che vede un abbassamento dei prezzi di vendita a fronte di un aumento dei costi di produzione, per i quali il continuo aumento del costo del gasolio incide per un buon 50 %. L'associazione, quindi, mette in guardia tutti i consumatori, invitandoli a controllare che sia indicata la provenienza del pesce esposto nei supermercati o nelle pescherie, scegliendo la «zona Fao 37» per ottenere un prodotto pescato, quanto meno, nel Mediterraneo.

Alla luce di quanto sopra esposto, può la Commissione comunicare:

1. se è a conoscenza del rapporto «Fish Dependence: the increasing reliance of the EU in fish from elsewhere»,
2. con quali politiche intende sostenere il comparto della pesca italiano nell'ambito del Fondo europeo per gli affari marittimi e la pesca per il periodo 2014-2020,
3. come intende contrastare le frodi volte all'utilizzo del marchio *Made in* per prodotti in realtà importati dall'estero?

**Risposta di Maria Damanaki a nome della Commissione**

(15 giugno 2012)

La Commissione è consapevole dell'esistenza del rapporto menzionato.

La proposta di regolamento sul Fondo europeo per gli affari marittimi e la pesca mira al raggiungimento degli obiettivi stabiliti nella riforma della politica comune della pesca attraverso, in particolare, la promozione di attività di pesca ed acquacoltura sostenibili e competitive e la promozione di uno sviluppo territoriale equilibrato e inclusivo delle zone di pesca (compresa l'acquacoltura e la pesca nelle acque interne).

La lotta contro attività fraudolente che spacciano prodotti importati per prodotti dell'UE è compito delle autorità competenti di ciascuno Stato membro. Oltre ai regolamenti sui dazi doganali e alla normativa UE in materia di igiene alimentare, esistono specifici requisiti di tracciabilità per i prodotti della pesca stabiliti dalla legislazione alimentare generale e dal regolamento sui controlli, in vigore dal 1° gennaio 2011. Ai sensi di tali norme, tutti i prodotti della pesca e dell'acquacoltura devono essere tracciabili durante tutte le fasi della loro produzione, lavorazione e distribuzione.

Inoltre, l'attuale proposta della Commissione di riforma dell'Organizzazione comune dei mercati per i prodotti della pesca e dell'acquacoltura prevede l'estensione a tutti i prodotti, inclusi quelli in scatola e quelli lavorati, dei requisiti obbligatori in materia di etichettatura. Tale principio si applica a tutti i prodotti venduti nell'UE, a prescindere dalla loro provenienza.

Infine, dal 1° gennaio 2010, in linea con le disposizioni del Regolamento (CE) n. 1005/2008 del Consiglio (regolamento INN), i prodotti della pesca importati nell'UE devono essere accompagnati da un certificato di cattura che confermi, tra le altre cose, la legalità delle catture praticate dal peschereccio. La gestione di questo sistema, il controllo e l'applicazione di detti requisiti spetta alle autorità competenti degli Stati membri.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-004224/12  
to the Commission**

**Sergio Paolo Frances Silvestris (PPE)**

(24 April 2012)

*Subject:* Fisheries support policies

Italy officially depends on fish imports. That is the message from a leading organisation in this field in view of the report 'Fish Dependence: the increasing reliance of the EU on fish from elsewhere', published by the New Economics Foundation (NEF) and OCEAN2012. However, this is not the only problem: due to the abundance of foreign fish on the Italian market, the risk of temptation to cheat the consumer, in passing it off as Italian produce when it is not, becomes even greater.

According to estimates contained in the report, from 21 April, dubbed Italy's 'fish dependence day', Italy will officially join the list of nations that use, in terms of fish, more foreign imports than national produce. Currently, more than two fish in three come from abroad, and the level of self-sufficiency is approximately 30%, as compared to the European average of 51%. Furthermore, the current crisis could further exacerbate the Italian position as sale prices are falling just as production costs are rising; the continued increase in fuel prices accounts for a good 50% of this rise. Therefore, the organisation aims to alert consumers to this, calls upon them to check whether the provenance of fish on sale in supermarkets or fishmonger shops is displayed, and urges them to buy 'FAO Area 37' fish, which has at least been caught in the Mediterranean.

In view of this, could the Commission state:

1. whether it is aware of the report entitled 'Fish Dependence: the increasing reliance of the EU on fish from elsewhere';
2. what policies it intends to adopt to support the Italian fisheries sector under the European Maritime and Fisheries Fund for the period 2014-2020;
3. how it intends to combat fraudulent activity that passes off as national products ones that actually originate from abroad?

**Answer given by Ms Damanaki on behalf of the Commission**

(15 June 2012)

The Commission is aware of the existence of the mentioned report.

The proposal for the regulation on European Maritime and Fisheries Fund aims at achieving the objectives of the reformed Common Fisheries Policies with in particular the promotion of sustainable and competitive fisheries and aquaculture, promotion of balanced and inclusive territorial development of fisheries areas (including aquaculture and inland fishing).

Combating fraudulent activities that pass off imported products as EU ones is the responsibility of the competent authorities of EU Member States. In addition to the rules on customs duties and the EU food hygiene legislation, specific traceability requirements exist for fishery products under the general food law and the Control Regulation, applicable as from 1 January 2011. Under these rules, all fisheries and aquaculture products must be traceable at all stages of production, processing and distribution.

In addition, the current Commission proposal for the Reform of the Common Organisation of the Markets for fisheries and aquaculture products envisages the extension of mandatory labelling requirements to all products including canned and processed products. This applies to any products sold in the EU irrespective of their provenance.

Finally, as from 1 January 2010, in line with the provisions of Council Regulation (EC) No 1005/2008 (IUU Regulation), fisheries products imported to the EU need to be accompanied by a catch certificate confirming, *inter alia*, the legality of catches. Competent authorities of Member States are responsible for the management of this system and the control and enforcement of these requirements.

(Versione italiana)

**Interrogazione con richiesta di risposta scritta E-004225/12  
alla Commissione**

**Sergio Paolo Frances Silvestris (PPE)**

(24 aprile 2012)

Oggetto: Nuovo carburante per l'alimentazione dei velivoli

Insieme al tradizionale cherosene, un aereo di una compagnia aerea australiana ha utilizzato olio da cucina raffinato che proveniva direttamente dalle cucine di una catena americana. La compagnia ha così alimentato i motori del velivolo, coprendo in maniera straordinariamente efficace i 1 400 chilometri che separano Sydney da Adelaide. Il velivolo, con tanto di passeggeri a bordo, è decollato alle 10.20 da Sydney.

Ora, grazie a un contributo economico di 500 000 dollari versati dal governo australiano, si intende finanziare uno studio sui biocarburanti alternativi nel settore dell'aviazione. Le emissioni di carbonio e il tasso di inquinamento provocato dalla tratta aerea sono stati minimi: si è parlato di una riduzione del 60 % rispetto ai valori che si registrano in seguito all'uso di carburante tradizionale. Altro elemento a favore del biocarburante è la funzionalità: non sono stati registrati impatti negativi sul funzionamento del velivolo. Questo cambiamento è necessario per le sfide che l'ecologia impone di affrontare e poiché in futuro non sarà possibile continuare a puntare esclusivamente sul carburante tradizionale.

Alla luce di quanto sopra esposto, può la Commissione comunicare:

1. se è a conoscenza della sperimentazione della compagnia australiana,
2. se ritiene che questa possa essere un'ulteriore soluzione da prendere in considerazione per ridurre il tasso di inquinamento e migliorare la qualità dell'aria?

**Risposta di Siim Kallas a nome della Commissione**

(7 giugno 2012)

La Commissione è a conoscenza del volo commerciale, cui fa riferimento l'onorevole parlamentare, che ha utilizzato una miscela di olio da cucina raffinato, nonché dello studio di fattibilità che sarà realizzato da Quantas sull'uso dei biocarburanti per il trasporto aereo.

La Commissione ritiene che i vantaggi dell'uso dei biocarburanti sostenibili per l'ambiente possano essere considerevoli. Negli ultimi tre anni il settore del trasporto aereo ha avviato dei test su voli commerciali di linea che utilizzano, in parte, i biocarburanti, conformemente al Libro bianco dell'UE sui trasporti che prevede che i trasporti aerei dell'UE riducano le emissioni di CO<sub>2</sub> del 40 % entro il 2050; inoltre la direttiva sulle energie rinnovabili sta ponendo le premesse per la diffusione dei biocarburanti (con il 10 % del settore dei trasporti, compreso il trasporto aereo, alimentato a biocarburanti entro il 2020).

Inoltre in base ai risultati dello studio SWAFEA 2009-2011 (*Sustainable Ways for Alternative Fuels and Energy for Aviation*, Modalità sostenibili per l'energia e i carburanti alternativi nel settore del trasporto aereo), la Commissione nel giugno 2011 ha lanciato, in collaborazione con il settore, l'iniziativa *Biofuels Flight Path* (Traiettoria di volo per i biocarburanti) nell'ambito del piano strategico europeo per le tecnologie energetiche (piano SET). La tabella di marcia prevede l'utilizzo di 2 milioni di tonnellate di biocarburanti avanzati e sostenibili nel settore del trasporto aereo in Europa e sta per essere avviata una serie di seminari che affrontano problemi e tappe fondamentali del percorso verso la diffusione dei biocarburanti.

Infine il successo dei biocarburanti non può essere separato da una strategia di ricerca e d'innovazione efficace che riguardi tutta la catena del valore dei biocarburanti. Pertanto la Commissione europea ha attribuito alla questione dei biocarburanti una priorità elevata nell'ambito dell'attuale programma di ricerca e sviluppo (Settimo programma quadro, 7° PQ) come pure all'interno di Orizzonte 2020, nel cui ambito si affrontano attività di dimostrazione (evidenziando le strade percorribili, le lacune tecnologiche, i tassi di miscelazione, gli ostacoli...).



(English version)

**Question for written answer E-004225/12  
to the Commission**

**Sergio Paolo Frances Silvestris (PPE)**

(24 April 2012)

*Subject:* New fuel for aircraft

A plane from an Australian airline has used a mix of traditional kerosene and refined cooking oil that came directly from the kitchens of an American chain. In this way, the company has powered the engines of the aircraft so that it was able to cover the 1 400 kilometres between Sydney and Adelaide in an extremely efficient manner. The aircraft had a large number of passengers on board and took off from Sydney at 10.20.

Now, thanks to a grant of AUD 500 000 from the Australian Government, a study is to be funded into the feasibility of alternative aviation biofuels. Carbon emissions and pollution from the air route have been minimal: apparently, there is a 60% reduction as compared with the levels recorded when standard fuel is used. Another point in favour of biofuels is functionality: no negative effects were recorded on the functioning of the aircraft. This change is needed due to the challenges that we must tackle in relation to the environment, and because in future we will not be able to continue to rely exclusively on traditional fuel.

In view of this:

1. Is the Commission aware of the Australian company's experiment?
2. Does it believe this could be a further solution to consider in order to reduce pollution and improve air quality?

**Answer given by Mr Kallas on behalf of the Commission**

(7 June 2012)

The Commission is aware of the commercial flight using a mixture of refined cooking oil referred to by the Honourable Member and the feasibility study that will be conducted by Qantas into the use of biofuels in aviation.

It believes that the environmental benefits from sustainable biofuel use are potentially significant. In the past three years, airline industry is starting to conduct regular commercial flights tests that rely in part on biofuels, this is in line with the EU Transport White Paper where aviation is targeted to reduce carbon emission by 40% by 2050 and the Renewable Energy directive is paving the way for biofuels take-up (10% share from transport sector including aviation by 2020).

Moreover, building on the results of the SWAFEA study (Sustainable Ways for Alternative Fuels and Energy for Aviation, 2009-2011), the Commission has launched the Biofuels Flight Path initiative together with industry under the European Strategic Energy Technology Plan (SET Plan) in June 2011. This roadmap aims at the use of 2 million tons of advanced and sustainable biofuels in aviation in Europe and is under way with a series of workshops which address key issues and milestones on the way towards biofuels deployment.

Finally, the success story of biofuels cannot be dissociated with an effective Research and Innovation strategy addressing the full value chain of biofuels. Therefore, the European Commission has earmarked this topic as having a high priority under the current Research and Development Programme (Seventh Framework Programme — FP7) as well as within Horizon 2020 within which demonstration activities are addressed (identification of possible pathways, technology gaps, blending rates, barriers...).

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(Versione italiana)

**Interrogazione con richiesta di risposta scritta E-004226/12  
alla Commissione**

**Sergio Paolo Frances Silvestris (PPE)**

(24 aprile 2012)

Oggetto: Sequestro a Bari e risultati della lotta antifrode

Gli agenti della Guardia di Finanza, in collaborazione con gli uomini dell'agenzia delle dogane, hanno sequestrato tre tonnellate di sigarette di contrabbando, 7,5 chili di marijuana e tratto in arresto tre uomini di nazionalità bulgara. Per loro l'accusa è di contrabbando aggravato di tabacchi lavorati esteri.

L'operazione è avvenuta nel porto di Bari. Le sigarette si trovavano nascoste sotto alcuni sacchi di riso che costituivano il carico dei tir sbarcato poco prima da una motonave proveniente dalla Grecia. La marijuana, invece, è stata trovata a bordo della vettura di uno dei tre uomini finiti in manette e più precisamente all'interno di un vano ricavato nel serbatoio.

Insomma, la Puglia si conferma ancora una volta il cuore del traffico di sostanze stupefacenti nel Mediterraneo.

Alla luce di quanto sopraesposto, può la Commissione far sapere:

1. se è a conoscenza dell'operazione antidroga condotta dai carabinieri in Puglia;
2. quali sono i risultati dell'accordo pluriennale firmato dall'UE con la Imperial Tobacco Limited (ITL) per lottare insieme contro il traffico illecito di prodotti del tabacco a quasi due anni dalla stipula?

**Risposta di Algirdas Šemeta a nome della Commissione**

(15 giugno 2012)

1. L'Ufficio europeo per la lotta antifrode (OLAF) è stato informato del sequestro di 2,88 tonnellate di sigarette di contrabbando avvenuto a Bari il 19 aprile 2012.

Dal 1997 gli Stati membri comunicano all'OLAF, su base trimestrale, la quantità totale di sigarette e mezzi di trasporto sequestrati per contrabbando. Dal 2003 inviano inoltre informazioni sui sequestri di sigarette superiori a un determinato limite. L'OLAF coordina le operazioni doganali congiunte (ODC) e, se necessario, lo svolgimento di indagini sul contrabbando di sigarette su larga scala condotte dalle autorità di contrasto nazionali. Tali attività sono riportate nella relazione annuale dell'OLAF per il 2010 <sup>(1)</sup>.

2. Il 27 settembre 2010, la Commissione europea e 26 Stati membri hanno firmato un accordo di cooperazione con Imperial Tobacco Limited (ITL) <sup>(2)</sup>. Tutti gli obblighi derivanti dall'accordo sono stati attuati, con soddisfazione di tutti i firmatari. L'accordo ha permesso un'eccellente collaborazione tra l'OLAF, gli Stati membri partecipanti e ITL, impegnati a combattere il contrabbando e la contraffazione del tabacco, contribuendo a uno sviluppo significativo dell'intelligence in questo campo.

<sup>(1)</sup> [http://ec.europa.eu/anti\\_fraud/documents/reports-olaf/rep\\_olaf\\_2010\\_it.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/anti_fraud/documents/reports-olaf/rep_olaf_2010_it.pdf)

<sup>(2)</sup> Per motivi costituzionali la Svezia non ha ancora firmato l'accordo.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-004226/12  
to the Commission**

**Sergio Paolo Frances Silvestris (PPE)**

(24 April 2012)

*Subject:* Seizure in Bari and the results of efforts to combat fraud

Officers from the *Guardia di Finanza* (Italian serious fraud police), in collaboration with agents from the Italian customs agency, have seized 3 tonnes of smuggled cigarettes and 7.5 kilos of marijuana and have arrested three Bulgarian men. They have been charged with the aggravated smuggling of foreign-made tobacco products.

The operation took place at the port of Bari. The cigarettes were found hidden under several bags of rice that had been loaded onto heavy goods vehicles which had just disembarked from a ship that had come from Greece. The marijuana was found in the car of one of the three arrested men, hidden in a section carved out of the fuel tank.

In short, Apulia has once again been confirmed as the centre of illegal drug trafficking in the Mediterranean.

1. Is the Commission aware of the police operation to combat drugs in Apulia?
2. What are the results of the multiannual agreement signed nearly two years ago by the European Union and Imperial Tobacco Limited with a view to working together to combat the illegal trade in tobacco products?

**Answer given by Mr Šemeta on behalf of the Commission**

(15 June 2012)

1. The European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) has been informed about the seizure of 2.88 tonnes of smuggled cigarettes in Bari on 19.4.2012.

Since 1997 Member States have informed OLAF on a quarterly basis of the total amount of cigarettes and means of transport seized for smuggling. Since 2003, they have provided OLAF with information on seizures of cigarettes above a certain threshold. OLAF coordinates Joint Customs Operations (JCOs) and, where appropriate, coordinates investigations into large scale cigarette smuggling conducted by the national law enforcement authorities. These activities are reflected in OLAF's annual operational report for the year 2010 <sup>(1)</sup>.

2. On 27 September 2010, the European Commission and 26 Member States signed a cooperation agreement with Imperial Tobacco Limited (ITL) <sup>(2)</sup>. All obligations under the Agreement have been implemented to the satisfaction of all the signatories to the Agreement. The Agreement has facilitated an excellent working relationship between OLAF, the participating Member States and ITL in combating smuggling and counterfeiting and this has led to the development of significant intelligence in this area.

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<sup>(1)</sup> [http://ec.europa.eu/anti\\_fraud/documents/reports-olaf/rep\\_olaf\\_2010\\_en.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/anti_fraud/documents/reports-olaf/rep_olaf_2010_en.pdf)

<sup>(2)</sup> For constitutional reasons Sweden has not yet signed this Agreement.

(Deutsche Fassung)

**Anfrage zur schriftlichen Beantwortung E-004228/12**  
**an die Kommission**  
**Andreas Mölzer (NI)**  
(24. April 2012)

*Betrifft:* Energie für Entwicklungsländer

EU-Kommissionspräsident Barroso will bis 2030 für 500 Millionen Menschen in Entwicklungsländern den Zugang zu Energie sichern. Dies wird die EU und ihre Mitgliedstaaten „mehrere Hundert Millionen Euro“ kosten, sagt Barroso.

1. Dass sich die EU für Entwicklungshilfe bereit erklärt ist nachvollziehbar. Wie aber wird dieses Projekt speziell finanziert? Welche Töpfe werden in Anspruch genommen?
2. Gibt es einen Plan B, sollte dieses Projekt scheitern? Falls ja, wie sieht der aus? Falls nein, warum bedenkt man so etwas nicht, wenn es um solche Summen geht?
3. Kann man die Kosten dieses Projekts genauer beziffern, denn „mehrere Hundert Millionen Euro“ lassen einen sehr großen Spielraum zu? Muss/Kann man eine Höchstsumme festsetzen?
4. Jeder Mitgliedstaat muss sparen bzw. ist zum Sparen gezwungen und dann werden solche Summen investiert. Wie rechtfertigt man diese Unsumme an Steuergeldern bei der Sparpolitik, die von der EU ausgegeben wird?
5. Was verspricht sich die EU von dieser Hilfe? Was kann der Unionsbürger von diesem Projekt erwarten?
6. Wie soll der Zugang zur Energie generell aussehen?

**Antwort von Herrn Piebalgs im Namen der Kommission**  
(20. Juni 2012)

Auf dem EU-Gipfel „Nachhaltige Energie für alle“ vom 16. April 2012 erklärte Kommissionspräsident Barroso, die EU solle alle Entwicklungsländer unterstützen, die sich der Initiative anschließen, mit der 500 Millionen Menschen bis 2030 Zugang zu nachhaltigen Energiedienstleistungen verschafft werden soll.

1. Die Finanzierung der Maßnahmen erfolgt im Rahmen der bestehenden Finanzierungsinstrumente <sup>(1)</sup> und wird, falls Finanzierungslücken auftreten, durch zusätzliche Mittel ergänzt. Die EU-Mittel werden nicht die Grenzen der von den Mitgliedstaaten genehmigten finanziellen Vorausschau überschreiten. Die EU-Maßnahmen werden mit den bilateralen Programmen der Mitgliedstaaten koordiniert. Außerdem sollen Möglichkeiten des Rückgriffs auf innovative Finanzierungsmechanismen geprüft werden, um private Investoren zu gewinnen.
2. Im Rahmen eines Politikdialogs mit dem Partnerland wird ermittelt, welche Reformen zur Mobilisierung der erforderlichen privaten Investitionen durchzuführen sind. Nur wenn diese Reformen tatsächlich umgesetzt werden, ist die Voraussetzung für die Bereitstellung von EU-Mitteln im Rahmen dieser Initiative gegeben.
3. Die Kosten für den Zugang zu Energie richten sich nach dem spezifischen Bedarf und den lokalen Rahmenbedingungen in den einzelnen Ländern. Der Erfolg der Initiative wird davon abhängen, ob es gelingt, private Investitionen anzuziehen.
4. Die Initiative steht im Einklang mit den Prioritäten des europäischen Konsens über die Entwicklungspolitik und der „Agenda für den Wandel“, die am 14. Mai 2012 von den Mitgliedstaaten gebilligt wurde.
5. Durch die Schaffung des Zugangs zu Energie können Beschäftigung und Bildung gefördert und so die Armut gemindert werden. Wenn wir den wachsenden Volkswirtschaften unsere fähigsten Experten zur Verfügung stellen, kann dies unsere Handelsbeziehungen stärken und der europäischen Industrie neue Absatzmärkte erschließen.
6. Die Bereitstellung des Zugangs zu Energie erfordert technische Hilfe und Investitionen. Nach Maßgabe des spezifischen Bedarfs und der jeweiligen örtlichen Gegebenheiten sollten auch die Förderung erneuerbarer Energien, die Erhöhung der Energieeffizienz und/oder die Ausstattung mit verbesserten Kochherden vorgesehen werden.

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<sup>(1)</sup> U. a. der 10. EEF, das thematische Programm für Umwelt und das thematische Programm für Umwelt und nachhaltige Bewirtschaftung natürlicher Ressourcen einschließlich Energie, die Energieeffizienz und der Infrastruktur-Treuhandfonds.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-004228/12**  
**to the Commission**  
**Andreas Mölzer (NI)**  
(24 April 2012)

*Subject:* Energy for developing countries

Mr Barroso, President of the European Commission, wants to secure access to energy for 500 million people in developing countries by 2030. Mr Barroso says that this will cost the EU and its Member States 'several hundred million euros'.

1. The EU's readiness to provide development assistance is understandable. However, how will this project specifically be financed? Which budgets will be used?
2. Is there a backup plan, should the project fail? If so, what is the backup plan? If not, why has something like this not been considered when such amounts are involved?
3. Since 'several hundred million euros' leaves quite a large margin open, is it possible to determine the costs of this project more precisely? Is it necessary or possible to establish a maximum amount?
4. While each Member State is required — or forced — to save, these amounts of money are then invested. In view of the austerity policy, what justifies these large amounts of tax revenue being spent by the EU?
5. What is the EU hoping to gain from this assistance? What can EU citizens expect from this project?
6. What will the abovementioned access to energy consist of in general?

**Answer given by Mr Piebalgs on behalf of the Commission**  
(20 June 2012)

At the EU Sustainable Energy for All Summit of 16 April 2012, President Barroso announced that the EU should seek to provide support to developing countries committing to the initiative, with the aim of providing access to sustainable energy services for 500 million people by 2030.

1. Actions will be financed through existing funding instruments <sup>(1)</sup> only to be complement where gaps exist. EU funding will remain within the limits of the financial perspectives approved by the Member States. EU action will be coordinated with Member States' bilateral programmes and innovative financing mechanisms leveraging private funding will be explored.
2. A policy dialogue with the partner country will clarify the reforms needed to attract the necessary private investment. Only when and if these reforms are made EU funding in the framework of this initiative may become available.
3. Costs for access will vary per country as they depend on specific needs and local circumstances. The success of the initiative will be determined by the ability to attract private sector investment.
4. The initiative is in line with the priorities of the European Consensus on Development and the Agenda for Change, the latter being endorsed by the Member States on 14 May 2012.
5. Providing energy access can enhance job creation, stimulate education, and thus alleviate poverty. Sharing our best experts with growing economies can enhance our trade relations and can provide new markets for European industry.
6. Providing access will require technical assistance and investment. Depending on specific needs and local circumstances, it should include the promotion of renewable electricity, energy efficiency activities and/or improved cooking stoves.

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<sup>(1)</sup> Such as the 10th European Development Fund, the thematic programme for Environment and Sustainable Management of Natural Resources including Energy, the Energy Facility and the Infrastructure Trust Fund.

(Deutsche Fassung)

**Anfrage zur schriftlichen Beantwortung E-004229/12**  
**an die Kommission**  
**Andreas Mölzer (NI)**  
(24. April 2012)

*Betrifft:* EU-Beschäftigungspaket

László Andor (EU-Kommissar) will ein neues Beschäftigungspaket präsentieren, welches sich als Ziel gesetzt hat, den europäischen Arbeitsmarkt für Rumänen und Bulgaren völlig zu öffnen. Hierzu sollen mindestens 84 Mio. EUR aus dem Sozialfonds bereitgestellt werden. Weiters sollen auch Stellen im öffentlichen Dienst mit diesen Bevölkerungsgruppen besetzt werden. In Spanien z. B. lag die Arbeitslosenquote Ende 2011 bei 22,9 %<sup>(1)</sup>. In Griechenland lag sie im Januar 2012 bei 21,8 %<sup>(2)</sup>. Die Arbeitslosenquote im gesamten EU Raum lag im Februar bei 10,2 %.

1. Zwar haben es einige Mitgliedstaaten geschafft, ihre Arbeitslosenquote zu reduzieren, doch sind die Zahlen der Arbeitslosen trotzdem im Vergleich zu anderen Jahren um ein Vielfaches höher. Warum will die Kommission durch die schrankenlose Öffnung des Arbeitsmarktes die Arbeitsmärkte der anderen EU-Staaten noch mehr unter Druck bringen? Wie will man einem möglichen Ansturm von billigen und unqualifizierten Arbeitskräften aus Rumänien oder Bulgarien standhalten?
2. Warum will die EU-Kommission überhaupt einen „europäischen Arbeitsmarkt“ schaffen? Will man damit jene Länder, die bisher gut gewirtschaftet und eine gute Arbeitsmarktpolitik betrieben haben, durch die Übernahme von ausländischen Arbeitslosen bestrafen?
3. Welche Mehrkosten werden sich aufgrund dieser geplanten Maßnahmen für Österreich ergeben?
4. Ist es nicht sinnvoll, dass in öffentlichen Ämtern weiterhin nur Staatsbürger arbeiten? Die Loyalität bzw. die Heimatverbundenheit ist bei einem Staatsbürger doch viel eher gegeben als bei Bürgern anderer Staaten.

**Antwort von Herrn Andor im Namen der Kommission**  
(20. Juni 2012)

Die Kommission hat in ihrer Mitteilung zum Beschäftigungspaket<sup>(3)</sup> festgestellt, dass die Arbeitskräftemobilität in Europa — gemessen an der Größe der EU-Arbeitsmärkte — zu gering ist. Dadurch werden Anpassungen bei der Ressourcenverteilung behindert, die das Wirtschafts- und Beschäftigungswachstum stärken könnten. Zahlreiche Stellen bleiben unbesetzt, selbst in Mitgliedstaaten mit steigender Arbeitslosigkeit. Eine stärkere Integration des europäischen Arbeitsmarkts ist von entscheidender Bedeutung, damit alle Beschäftigungsmöglichkeiten ausgeschöpft werden können. In dem Paket werden daher praktische Vorschläge zur Förderung der Schaffung von Arbeitsplätzen sowie zur Verbesserung der Funktionsweise der EU-Arbeitsmärkte unterbreitet.

Im Rahmen ihrer Empfehlungen zur Erleichterung der Arbeitskräftemobilität ersucht die Kommission jene neun Mitgliedstaaten, die den Arbeitsmarktzugang für bulgarische und rumänische Staatsbürgerinnen und Staatsbürger noch beschränken, dringend um Prüfung, ob die Beschränkungen bis zum 31. Dezember 2013 aufrechterhalten werden müssen; denn es ist wichtig, die vollumfängliche Anwendung des EU-Rechts zur Arbeitnehmerfreizügigkeit stufenweise vorzubereiten.

Aus mehreren Berichten und Studien der Kommission geht hervor, dass sich die Mobilität von Arbeitskräften nach der Erweiterung generell positiv auf die Volkswirtschaften und somit auch auf die Arbeitsmärkte der Mitgliedstaaten ausgewirkt hat, die ihre Arbeitsmärkte geöffnet haben. Die Beschäftigungsquote neu zugewanderter EU-Bürgerinnen und -Bürger ist im Durchschnitt höher als die der Erwerbsbevölkerung im Herkunfts- und Aufnahmeland<sup>(4)</sup>.

<sup>(1)</sup> <http://derstandard.at/1333185133216/229-Prozent-ohne-Job-Arbeitslosigkeit-in-Spanien-steigt-weiter>.

<sup>(2)</sup> <http://www.finanznachrichten.de/nachrichten-2012-04/23236327-griechenland-arbeitslosenquote-steigt-weiter-009.htm>

<sup>(3)</sup> „Einen arbeitsplatzintensiven Aufschwung gestalten“, KOM(2012)173 endg. vom 18. April 2012.

<sup>(4)</sup> Zusammenfassung in Kapitel 6 (Arbeitskräftemobilität innerhalb der EU und Auswirkungen der Erweiterung), Kommissionsbericht Employment and Social developments in Europe 2011 (Entwicklungen in den Bereichen Beschäftigung und Soziales in Europa im Jahr 2011).

Der Gerichtshof <sup>(5)</sup> hat festgehalten, dass bestimmte Stellen in der öffentlichen Verwaltung ein Verhältnis besonderer Verbundenheit zum betreffenden Staat voraussetzen. Stellen, die eine unmittelbare oder mittelbare Teilnahme an der Ausübung hoheitlicher Befugnisse und an der Wahrnehmung solcher Aufgaben mit sich bringen, die auf die Wahrung der allgemeinen Belange des Staates gerichtet sind, dürfen daher von den Mitgliedstaaten ihren jeweiligen Staatsangehörigen vorbehalten werden. Alle anderen Stellen in der öffentlichen Verwaltung müssen EU-Wanderarbeitnehmerinnen und -Wanderarbeitnehmern offenstehen. Die Erfahrung zeigt, dass sie loyale Dienste leisten, etwa als Lehrkräfte, Ärztinnen/Ärzte oder Krankenschwestern/-pfleger.

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<sup>(5)</sup> Rechtssache 149/79, Kommission der Europäischen Gemeinschaften gegen Königreich Belgien, Slg. 1980, S. 3881.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-004229/12  
to the Commission  
Andreas Mölzer (NI)  
(24 April 2012)**

*Subject:* EU employment package

Commissioner László Andor intends presenting a new employment package that aims to permit Romania and Bulgaria to participate fully in the European labour market. At least EUR 84 million is to be made available from the European Social Fund for this purpose. In addition, civil service vacancies are also to be filled with members of these national groups. In Spain, for example, unemployment stood at 22.9% at the end of 2011 <sup>(1)</sup>. The figure for Greece in January 2012 was 21.8% <sup>(2)</sup>. The unemployment rate for the EU as a whole in February was 10.2%.

1. Although some Member States have managed to reduce their unemployment levels, the numbers of unemployed are still several times higher than in other years. Why does the Commission want to put even more pressure on the labour markets of the other EU Member States by removing all barriers within the labour market? How are we to cope with a possible flood of cheap, poorly qualified workers from Romania and Bulgaria?
2. Why is it that the EU Commission wants to establish a 'European labour market' in the first place? Does it wish in this way to punish those countries who have managed their affairs well so far and who have operated successful labour market policies by forcing them to take on responsibility for the unemployed from other countries?
3. What will be the added costs for Austria as a result of these planned measures?
4. Does it not make sense that only citizens of Member States should be permitted to work in the civil service? After all, the loyalty and patriotism among citizens of Member States is bound to be greater than among citizens from third countries.

**Answer given by Mr Andor on behalf of the Commission  
(20 June 2012)**

The Commission communication <sup>(3)</sup> on the Employment Package states that labour mobility across Europe is too low compared to the overall size of the EU labour markets. This hinders adjustments in allocating resources that could support economic and employment growth. Substantial numbers of jobs remain vacant even in Member States where unemployment is on the rise. Deepening European labour market integration is crucial to enable all employment opportunities to be exploited. The Package therefore sets out practical proposals to support job creation and improve the way the EU labour markets function.

Among the measures recommended to facilitate labour mobility, the Commission urges the nine Member States that still restrict labour market access by Bulgarian and Romanian workers to reconsider whether they need to maintain restrictions until 31 December 2013, since it is important to prepare gradually for the full application of EC law on free movement of workers.

Several Commission reports and studies have found that post-enlargement mobility has generally had a positive effect on the economies, and thus the labour markets, of Member States that opened up their labour markets. The employment rate of recently arrived EU mobile citizens is higher on average than that of the active population in both the countries of origin and those of destination <sup>(4)</sup>.

The Court of Justice <sup>(5)</sup> recognises that certain civil service posts presume a special relationship of allegiance to the State. Posts which involve direct or indirect participation in the exercise of powers conferred by public law and duties designed to safeguard the general interests of the State may therefore be reserved to a Member State's own nationals. All other civil service posts must be open to EU migrant workers. Experience shows that they contribute loyally, for example as teachers, doctors and nurses.

<sup>(1)</sup> <http://derstandard.at/1333185133216/229-Prozent-ohne-Job-Arbeitslosigkeit-in-Spanien-steigt-weiter>.

<sup>(2)</sup> <http://www.finanznachrichten.de/nachrichten-2012-04/23236327-griechenland-arbeitslosenquote-steigt-weiter-009.htm>

<sup>(3)</sup> 'Towards a job-rich recovery' (COM(2012) 173 final of 18 April 2012).

<sup>(4)</sup> Summary in Chapter 6 (Intra-EU labour mobility and the impact of enlargement), European Commission's Employment and Social developments in Europe 2011.

<sup>(5)</sup> Case 149/79 Commission v Belgium [1980] ECR-3881.



(Deutsche Fassung)

**Anfrage zur schriftlichen Beantwortung E-004230/12**  
**an die Kommission**  
**Andreas Mölzer (NI)**  
(24. April 2012)

*Betrifft:* EU-Imagepflege

Die EU hat eindeutig ein Imageproblem, denn in Österreich gingen 2009 nur 46 % der Wahlberechtigten zur Wahl. In Deutschland waren es sogar nur 43 %. Man kann daher nicht von einer präsenten EU sprechen. Um die EU den Bürgern näher zu bringen plant die EU eine Imagepflege im Rahmen ihres Programms „Kultur 2007-2013“. Bestimmte Maßnahmen sind auch schon in Gange.

So flossen beispielsweise 50 000 EUR für ein „Europäisches Hip-Hop-Laboratorium“, um die Zusammenarbeit der Hip-Hopper im professionellen Bereich und im Amateurbereich zu fördern. 56 970 EUR gingen an ein Joystick-Orchester, das Joystick-Musiker und Komponisten von Computermusik zusammenbringen und die Europäer an diese Kunst heranführen soll.

1. Was konkret will die Kommission mit solchen Maßnahmen bewirken?
2. Was versprach sich die EU von diesem Vorhaben? Über 100 000 EUR wurden ausgegeben und die Masse der Unionsbevölkerung bekam so gut wie nichts davon mit. Hätte man dieses Geld nicht besser anders investiert?
3. Wie hat die EU vor ihr Imageproblem zu verbessern? Welche konkreten Maßnahmen plant die EU, um die Wahlbeteiligung bei der EU-Wahl 2014 wieder zu erhöhen?
4. Welche konkreten Maßnahmen kann der einzelne Bürger von der EU in Zukunft erwarten? Wie plant die EU diese Maßnahmen umzusetzen?

**Antwort von Frau Vassiliou im Namen der Kommission**  
(27. Juni 2012)

Die Projekte im Rahmen des Programms „Kultur“ werden auf der Grundlage ihres Nutzens gefördert. Sie werden von einem unabhängigen Ausschuss mit externen Sachverständigen in einem transparenten, strengen Verfahren ausgewählt. Sowohl der Rat als auch das Parlament haben den für das Programm festgelegten Verfahren und Zielen zugestimmt.

Die beiden angesprochenen Projekte richten sich an junge Menschen, u. a. aus benachteiligten sozioökonomischen Gruppen, und dienen dazu, ihr Interesse für Musik und Tanz zu wecken. Übergeordnete Ziele der Projekte sind die länderübergreifende Verbreitung der genannten Künste, die Schulung von Kulturakteurinnen und -akteuren sowie die Förderung des interkulturellen Dialogs. Mit mehreren Tausend Zuschauern bzw. Zuhörern konnte eine breite Öffentlichkeit erreicht werden. Die Ausstrahlungskraft dürfte weit über das Ende der Projekte hinausreichen.

Im Jahr 2013 wird die EU im Rahmen des Europäischen Jahres der Bürgerinnen und Bürger das Bewusstsein der breiten Öffentlichkeit für ihre Rechte als EU-Bürgerinnen und -Bürger schärfen. In einer Eurobarometer-Umfrage aus dem Jahr 2010 (Flash Eurobarometer 294) gaben lediglich 32 % der Bürgerinnen und Bürger an, gut mit ihren Rechten vertraut zu sein. Ein besseres Verständnis hierfür ist Voraussetzung dafür, dass sich die Bürgerinnen und Bürger gesellschaftlich engagieren und erkennen, wie wichtig ihre Teilnahme an der Europawahl ist. Das Europäische Themenjahr 2013 ist eine der 25 konkreten Maßnahmen, die die Kommission in ihrem Bericht über die Unionsbürgerschaft 2010 vorgeschlagen hatte. Ziel ist es, die Hindernisse zu beseitigen, mit denen die EU-Bürgerinnen und -Bürger im täglichen Leben bei der Ausübung ihrer Rechte nach wie vor konfrontiert sind.

Eines der konkreten Ziele des Europäischen Jahres der Bürgerinnen und Bürger 2013 ist die Vorlage des nächsten Berichts über die Unionsbürgerschaft. In diesem Bericht wird die Kommission den Sachstand in Bezug auf die 2010 beschlossenen 25 Maßnahmen prüfen und weitere Vorschläge dazu unterbreiten, wie noch bestehende Hindernisse beseitigt werden können. Im Hinblick auf diesen Bericht hat die Kommission am 9. Mai 2012 eine breit angelegte öffentliche Online-Konsultation in allen EU-Amtssprachen eingeleitet, die bis zum 9. September 2012 läuft ([http://ec.europa.eu/justice/opinion/your-rights-your-future/index\\_de.htm](http://ec.europa.eu/justice/opinion/your-rights-your-future/index_de.htm)).

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-004230/12  
to the Commission  
Andreas Mölzer (NI)  
(24 April 2012)**

*Subject:* EU image-building

The EU clearly has an image problem, because in Austria only 46% of the electorate voted in 2009. In Germany it was 43%. The EU cannot therefore be said to be making its presence felt. To bring itself closer to its citizens, the EU is planning an image-building campaign within the framework of its 'Culture Programme 2007-2013'. Certain measures are already under way.

For example, EUR 50 000 were spent on a 'European Hip Hop Laboratory' to encourage the cooperation of hip hop dancers in both the professional and the amateur sectors. Meanwhile, EUR 56 970 went to a joystick orchestra which brings together joystick musicians and composers of computer music and is supposed to attract Europeans to this art.

1. What specifically does the Commission wish to achieve with such measures?
2. What was the EU hoping to gain from this project? More than EUR 100 000 have been spent and the bulk of the Union's population has got virtually nothing out of it. Would this money not have been better invested in something else?
3. How does the EU propose to improve its image? What specific measures is the EU planning to take to increase the electorate's participation in the 2014 EU elections?
4. What specific measures can individual citizens expect from the EU in the future? How is the EU planning to implement these measures?

**Answer given by Ms Vassiliou on behalf of the Commission  
(27 June 2012)**

Under the Culture Programme, projects are funded on merit, further to a transparent and rigorous selection process undertaken by independent external experts. The procedures and objectives of the Programme were approved by both the Council and the Parliament.

Both projects aim to stimulate young people, including from disadvantaged economic and social backgrounds, to take an interest in music and dance. They promote cross-border circulation of these arts, train cultural operators and stimulate intercultural dialogue. Audiences of several thousand people were reached. Their impact can be expected to continue beyond the duration of the projects.

The European Year of Citizens 2013 will raise awareness among the general public of their rights as EU citizens. Recent Eurobarometer results (Flash Eurobarometer 294, 2010) indicate that only 32% consider themselves well informed about these rights. Improved understanding is necessary for people to engage as EU citizens and to appreciate the importance of voting in European Parliament elections. Having such a European Year was one of the 25 actions the Commission proposed in its 2010 EU Citizenship Report to remove obstacles EU citizens encounter in their daily lives when exercising their EU rights.

One of the concrete deliverables of the European Year of Citizens in 2013 will be the next EU Citizenship Report. In this 2013 report the Commission will assess progress made on the 25 actions put forward in 2010 and propose further actions to remove persistent obstacles. In view of this Report, the Commission launched, on 9 May 2012, a wide-reaching online public consultation in all official EU languages (<http://ec.europa.eu/justice/opinion/your-rights-your-future/> — open until 9 September 2012).

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-004232/12**  
**to the Commission (Vice-President/High Representative)**  
**Marina Yannakoudakis (ECR)**  
(24 April 2012)

*Subject:* VP/HR — China returning North Korean refugees to their homeland

I have been contacted by one of my London constituents who has enquired what political pressure can be exerted on the Chinese authorities to help prevent the widespread practice of returning North Korean refugees to their homeland.

Would the European External Action Service (EEAS) agree that forced Chinese deportations back to North Korea have resulted in interrogation, torture, horrific labour camps and even execution for those individuals unfortunate enough to have been caught? DPRK law stipulates a sentence of up to two years' 'labour correction' for the crime of illegally crossing the border.

In responding would the EEAS please take into account the following important points:

- China has committed itself to UN standards on refugees.
- Thousands of North Koreans undertake this dangerous journey to escape life under the grip of one of the world's most brutal and repressive regimes.
- China does not see these people as refugees or asylum-seekers, but as economic migrants.
- On the death of dictator Kim Jong-Il, you issued a statement declaring that: 'In its dealings with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, the well-being of the people of that country has always been of paramount importance for the EU'.

**Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Ashton on behalf of the Commission**  
(21 June 2012)

The EU has raised the issue of North Korean asylum-seekers and refugees with China, in particular in the framework of the EU-China Human rights dialogue. All countries should as a matter of principle fulfil their commitments under the 1951 Convention related to the status of refugees and its 1967 Protocol by refraining from refouling people to their country of origin where they might face the death penalty or other human rights abuses. The Chinese position has remained unchanged until now. It does not recognise North Korean refugees and regards them as economic migrants. We will continue to follow closely the situation of North Korean refugees and to engage China on this issue.

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(English version)

**Question for written answer E-004233/12  
to the Commission (Vice-President/High Representative)  
Marina Yannakoudakis (ECR)  
(24 April 2012)**

*Subject:* VP/HR — Ethnic, religious, economic and cultural human rights violations against Arab citizens in Al-Ahwaz, Iran

I have been contacted by one of my London constituents who has enquired whether political pressure can be exerted by the European External Action Service (EEAS) on Iran to bring an immediate end to ethnic, religious, economic and cultural human rights violations faced by its own Arab citizens in Al-Ahwaz (which Tehran calls Khuzestan).

In replying, would the EEAS please consider the following:

- the alleged abuses, which include unfair trials, torture, forced confessions and executions, have been well documented by Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch;
- whether there is a need for the EEAS to contact the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Navi Pillay, to request a UN fact-finding mission to Al-Ahwaz/Khuzestan to investigate these disturbing claims?

**Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Ashton on behalf of the Commission  
(12 June 2012)**

The EU and VP/HR Ashton are well aware of the systematic human rights oppression in Iran, including that of ethnic and religious minorities. The EU has therefore called on the Islamic Republic of Iran to live up to the international human rights obligations that it has itself signed up to, including the obligations that relate to these matters. In 2011 and 2012, the EU decided to apply restrictive measures on 78 Iranians for grave human rights violations. These measures still stand.

As for the work of the UN, the EU has supported the setting up of a UN Special Rapporteur on human rights in Iran. The EU supports a visit by the Special Rapporteur to Iran, as requested by the Rapporteur himself vis-avis the Iranian authorities. The human rights situation relating to that of ethnic and religious minorities, also in Al-Ahwaz/Khuzestan, would be an obvious matter for the UN Special Rapporteur to assess during such a visit.

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(English version)

**Question for written answer E-004234/12  
to the Commission**

**William (The Earl of) Dartmouth (EFD)**

(24 April 2012)

*Subject:* The Commission's role in the EEAS

In a December 2011 report entitled 'More Action, Better Service: How to Strengthen the European External Action Service' published by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace<sup>(1)</sup>, the author states: 'While taking a restrictive approach to the EEAS, the Commission — somewhat paradoxically — was at the same time very successful in ensuring that the greater majority of management positions in the new service were given to Commission officials'.

Can the Commission please respond to this statement?

**Answer given by Mr Šefčovič on behalf of the Commission**

(30 May 2012)

The Commission does not comment on statements made by a contributor of a report.

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<sup>(1)</sup> <http://carnegieendowment.org/2011/12/16/more-action-better-service-how-to-strengthen-european-external-action-service/8kz4>.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-004235/12  
to the Commission (Vice-President/High Representative)  
William (The Earl of) Dartmouth (EFD)  
(24 April 2012)**

*Subject:* VP/HR — Cost-effectiveness of the EEAS

In a December 2011 report by the Vice-President/High Representative it was stated that the EEAS is 'not about replacing national diplomatic services, but in making a more effective and cost efficient use of resources'.

Since the budget for the EEAS continues to grow, can the Vice-President/High Representative state whether efficiency and cost-effectiveness is still the primary goal of the EEAS?

If so, how does the Vice-President/High Representative plan to accomplish this goal?

**Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Ashton on behalf of the Commission  
(20 June 2012)**

The European External Action Service's (EEAS) primary goal as defined in Article 27 of the Treaty on EU is to assist the High Representative in fulfilling her mandate. Within that perspective, the EEAS is making its best effort to increase its efficiency and cost-effectiveness.

In 2011, thanks to the elimination of duplications, synergies and savings from more modern working methods, the EEAS has managed to cover through substantial staff redeployments the chairing of the Political and Security Committee and working groups, to reinforce priority areas for Parliament (development policy and crisis management, peacekeeping) and to provide for new functions to support the High Representative and the Corporate Board, including policy coordination, strategic communication, strategic planning and a legal service. The EEAS has opened new delegations in South Sudan and in Libya within its existing appropriations.

In 2012, the EEAS has cut its appropriations for missions by 10% and for representation by 5%. It is redeploying 20 AD staff to delegations, the equivalent of more than 3% of headquarters' AD staff.

For 2013, the EEAS has cut fitting-out, removal and installation costs, furniture and transport equipment in delegations by EUR 6.1 million or 1.3% of its 2012 budget. It proposes to freeze appropriations for missions, representation and training at headquarters and in delegations, transport and technical equipment, public information and public events at headquarters, at their 2012 level in nominal terms.

The EEAS building policy is geared towards promoting synergies wherever possible with other EU institutions and Member States through sharing of premises and pooling of services. This should gradually result in savings for Member States' diplomatic services and greater efficiency on the ground.

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*(English version)*

**Question for written answer E-004236/12  
to the Commission (Vice-President/High Representative)  
William (The Earl of) Dartmouth (EFD)**

*(24 April 2012)*

*Subject:* VP/HR — EEAS delegation transitions

In a December 2011 report by the High Representative, it was stated that ‘many delegations [in the EEAS] have managed the transition without any additional resources’.

Could the Vice-President/High Representative please specify which delegations managed the transition cost-effectively?

**Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Ashton on behalf of the Commission**

*(20 June 2012)*

The creation of the EEAS and the transition by EU delegations in taking over the previous tasks of the rotating presidency has taken place against the background of acute budget constraints. The limited extra resources available have been allocated to delegations according to a rigorous assessment of political priorities and workload, fully consistent with the principles of cost-efficiency and effectiveness. The success of this process has been generally welcomed by Member States and the authorities of third countries. The EEAS is grateful for the support of the European Parliament in the budget procedures for 2011 and 2012.

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(English version)

**Question for written answer E-004237/12  
to the Commission (Vice-President/High Representative)  
William (The Earl of) Dartmouth (EFD)**

(24 April 2012)

*Subject:* VP/HR — Commission staff in the EEAS

In a December 2011 report by the High Representative, it was stated that ‘...operational budgets remain under the responsibility of Commission staff. It also means that Commission staff in delegations remain the responsibility of the Commission for matters like promotions and appointments’.

Can the Vice-President/High Representative please explain why former Commission staff are still under the jurisdiction of the Commission when they are now employed by the EEAS, which is an institution that is supposed to be distinctly separate from the Commission?

**Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Ashton on behalf of the Commission**

(19 June 2012)

Commission staff based in EU Delegations remain Commission staff. Therefore the Commission remains the Appointing Authority for them. Nevertheless, Article 5 of Council Decision 2010/427<sup>(1)</sup> establishing the organisation and functioning of the EEAS provides that the Head of Delegation who is an EEAS official shall have authority over all staff in the delegation, whatever their status, and for all its activities.

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<sup>(1)</sup> <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2010:201:0030:0040:EN:PDF>.



(English version)

**Question for written answer E-004238/12  
to the Commission (Vice-President/High Representative)  
William (The Earl of) Dartmouth (EFD)  
(24 April 2012)**

*Subject:* VP/HR — EEAS immunity

Do EEAS staff enjoy diplomatic immunity?

If so, are any EEAS staff not covered by diplomatic immunity?

**Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Ashton on behalf of the Commission  
(20 June 2012)**

The EU Delegations in third countries and at international organisations, their staff and their property, have been granted privileges and immunities equivalent to those referred to in the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations of 18 April 1961, by agreements or arrangements with the host country, international organisation or third country concerned.

Within the EU, Protocol No 7 on the privileges and immunities of the European Union is also applicable on the EEAS and its staff.

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(English version)

**Question for written answer E-004239/12  
to the Commission**

**William (The Earl of) Dartmouth (EFD)**

(24 April 2012)

*Subject:* Resource neutral basis

Point 20 of the document entitled 'Report by the High Representative to the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission' of 22 December 2011 refers to 'a resource neutral basis'.

Could the Commission please explain the meaning of this term?

**Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Ashton on behalf of the Commission**

(19 June 2012)

The EEAS was set up on 1 January 2011 through transfers of staff and budgetary resources from the Commission and the Council. Such transfers, carried out on a pro-rata basis, left a certain number of gaps. In addition, the role of EU Delegations has to evolve to take into account the changes introduced by the Lisbon Treaty. The Budgetary Authority accepted to grant the EEAS, for 2012, an increased budget, essentially to fill initial these gaps and to undertake these changes.

For 2013, the EEAS is proposing in its draft budget savings amounting to EUR 6.1 million, or 1.3% of its current budget. In addition, the EEAS is freezing mission and representation costs (which have already been cut by 10% and 5% respectively in 2012) and training across the institution, transport, technical equipment, public information and public events at headquarters. The EEAS draft budget also includes a proposal to close two Delegations. However, the EEAS has to face increasing security needs in Delegations, notably in Iraq and Afghanistan where it must also meet legal obligations.

Many of the increases in the EEAS budget are offset by savings in the Commission's and the Council's budgets. Thanks to efforts made across the board, when the EEAS has achieved its transition towards adapting fully to the tasks introduced by the Lisbon Treaty, the process should be cost neutral to the EU as a whole.

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(Versione italiana)

**Interrogazione con richiesta di risposta scritta E-004240/12  
alla Commissione**

**Erminia Mazzoni (PPE), Elisabetta Gardini (PPE), Andrea Zanoni (ALDE), Debora Serracchiani (S&D), Mara Bizzotto (EFD), Paolo Bartolozzi (PPE), Sergio Paolo Frances Silvestris (PPE), Sonia Alfano (ALDE), Gabriele Albertini (PPE), Giuseppe Gargani (PPE), Gianni Pittella (S&D), Gianni Vattimo (ALDE), Marco Scurria (PPE), Oreste Rossi (EFD), Carlo Fidanza (PPE), Lara Comi (PPE), Iva Zanicchi (PPE), Gianluca Susta (S&D), Clemente Mastella (PPE), Crescenzo Rivellini (PPE), Raffaele Baldassarre (PPE), Mario Mauro (PPE), Roberta Angelilli (PPE), Antonio Cancian (PPE), Salvatore Tatarella (PPE), Cristiana Muscardini (PPE), Vito Bonsignore (PPE), Luigi Ciriaco De Mita (PPE) e Vincenzo Iovine (ALDE)**  
(24 aprile 2012)

Oggetto: Fondo europeo di adeguamento alla globalizzazione

Visto il regolamento (CE) n. 1927/2006 del Parlamento europeo e del Consiglio, che istituisce un Fondo europeo di adeguamento alla globalizzazione,

considerando che il citato regolamento già prevede, tra l'altro, che in circostanze eccezionali il FEG può intervenire anche se le condizioni di intervento non sono interamente soddisfatte, qualora i licenziamenti abbiano un'incidenza grave sull'occupazione e sull'economia locale, e che l'importo cumulato dei contributi a titolo di dette circostanze eccezionali non può eccedere il 15 % delle spese massime del FEG in un anno;

prendendo atto:

- che quasi mai la Commissione ha dichiarato applicabile tale procedura eccezionale, mostrando un basso grado di flessibilità;
- che le condizioni previste dal regolamento, troppo complesse in relazione alle esigenze di urgenza prospettate dai casi cui dovrebbe applicarsi, hanno portato a un utilizzo parziale del Fondo nonostante il dilagare di crisi aziendali e l'aumento del numero di lavoratori che escono dal mercato del lavoro;
- che casi come quello degli 800 lavoratori della Servirail (ex Wagon Lits) operanti in tutta Italia, dei 700 lavoratori della Irisbus di Valle Ufita, dei 400 lavoratori della Benefil e della Tessival del polo tessile di Airola, dei 300 lavoratori della Itierre in Molise e dei 300 lavoratori del sito produttivo Fiat di Pomigliano D'Arco non hanno ricevuto il sostegno del FEG;

si chiede alla Commissione:

- se intenda anticipare i tempi di revisione del regolamento per migliorare l'efficienza del Fondo a breve termine, semplificandone le procedure, aumentandone la visibilità e favorendo gli scambi di esperienze;
- se preveda la possibilità di rafforzare l'impatto del FEG relativamente alla creazione di posti di lavoro e alla formazione di lavoratori europei;
- se ritenga che il FEG potrebbe essere utilizzato anche per incoraggiare la mobilità dei lavoratori e per analizzare e prevedere meglio l'evoluzione della congiuntura economica.

**Risposta di László Andor a nome della Commissione**

(13 giugno 2012)

Le disposizioni che autorizzano a far intervenire il Fondo europeo di adeguamento alla globalizzazione (FEG) in circostanze eccezionali sono sufficientemente flessibili. Delle 98 domande finora ricevute nove (compresa una proveniente dall'Italia) sono state presentate nel quadro di tale disposizione, e sette di esse sono state già approvate dal Parlamento europeo e dal Consiglio. Nessuna è stata respinta.

Dato che le domande di finanziamento FEG sono presentate dagli Stati membri, la Commissione invita gli onorevoli parlamentari a chiedere alla persona di contatto del FEG per l'Italia il motivo per il quale non sono state presentate domande a sostegno dei lavoratori in esubero citati nella loro interrogazione.

Il FEG si è dimostrato una parte importante della risposta dell'UE alla crisi finanziaria ed economica globale degli ultimi tre anni, come illustrato dalla Commissione nella sua risposta all'interrogazione E-2092/2012. A tale riguardo la Commissione deplora che una minoranza di blocco in seno al Consiglio abbia impedito di prorogare la deroga legata alla crisi.

La proposta della Commissione <sup>(1)</sup> per quanto riguarda il futuro del FEG è già all'esame del Parlamento. Essa intende semplificare e migliorare il fondo, in particolare dando un marcato rilievo alle politiche più specificamente attive a favore del mercato del lavoro, inclusi incentivi alla mobilità, formazione e promozione dell'imprenditorialità. Il compito primario del FEG non è quello di aiutare ad anticipare le tendenze economiche. Questa funzione è svolta piuttosto dai fondi strutturali dell'UE, in particolare dall'FSE.

I servizi della Commissione svolgono già attività finalizzate ad aumentare la visibilità del fondo e gli scambi delle migliori pratiche. Per maggiori dettagli si rinviano gli onorevoli parlamentari al sito web del FEG (in particolare le sezioni «Eventi» e «Pubblicazioni» <sup>(2)</sup>).

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<sup>(1)</sup> COM(2011)608 def. Proposta di regolamento del Parlamento europeo e del Consiglio relativa al Fondo europeo di adeguamento alla globalizzazione (FEG) per il periodo 2014-2020.

<sup>(2)</sup> Rispettivamente <http://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?langId=it&catId=326&furtherEvents=yes&limit=no> and <http://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?catId=326&langId=it&furtherPubs=yes>.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-004240/12  
to the Commission**

**Erminia Mazzoni (PPE), Elisabetta Gardini (PPE), Andrea Zanoni (ALDE), Debora Serracchiani (S&D), Mara Bizzotto (EFD), Paolo Bartolozzi (PPE), Sergio Paolo Frances Silvestris (PPE), Sonia Alfano (ALDE), Gabriele Albertini (PPE), Giuseppe Gargani (PPE), Gianni Pittella (S&D), Gianni Vattimo (ALDE), Marco Scurria (PPE), Oreste Rossi (EFD), Carlo Fidanza (PPE), Lara Comi (PPE), Iva Zanicchi (PPE), Gianluca Susta (S&D), Clemente Mastella (PPE), Crescenzo Rivellini (PPE), Raffaele Baldassarre (PPE), Mario Mauro (PPE), Roberta Angelilli (PPE), Antonio Cancian (PPE), Salvatore Tatarella (PPE), Cristiana Muscardini (PPE), Vito Bonsignore (PPE), Luigi Ciriaco De Mita (PPE) and Vincenzo Iovine (ALDE)**  
(24 April 2012)

*Subject:* European Globalisation Adjustment Fund

Regulation (EC) No 1927/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council on establishing the European Globalisation Adjustment Fund (EGF) already provides, amongst other things, that in exceptional circumstances the EGF may intervene even if the intervention conditions are not entirely met, when redundancies have a serious impact on employment and the local economy. It also stipulates that the aggregated amount of contributions for exceptional circumstances may not exceed 15% of the EGF each year.

Taking into account the fact that:

- the Commission has almost never declared such an exceptional procedure to be applicable, showing a low level of flexibility;
- the conditions laid down in the regulation, which are too complex in relation to the urgent requirements presented by cases to which it should be applied, have meant that the fund has only been partially used despite the increasing numbers of companies in crisis and of workers who are leaving the job market;
- cases such as the 800 workers from Servirail (formerly Wagon Lits) based across Italy, the 700 employees of Irisbus in Valle Ufita, the 400 workers from Benefil and Tessival from the textiles centre in Airola, the 300 employees of Iterre in Molise and the 300 workers from the Fiat production plant in Pomigliano D'Arco have not received EGF support,

could the Commission answer the following questions:

- Does it intend to bring forward the review of the regulation to improve the fund's efficiency in the short term, by simplifying its procedures, increasing its visibility and encouraging the sharing of experience?
- Does it anticipate the possibility of strengthening the EGF's impact with regard to the creation of jobs and training for European workers?
- Does it believe that the EGF could also be used to facilitate the mobility of workers and to analyse and better anticipate changing economic trends?

**Answer given by Mr Andor on behalf of the Commission**

(13 June 2012)

The provisions allowing the European Globalisation Adjustment Fund (EGF) to be mobilised under exceptional circumstances are sufficiently flexible. Out of the 98 applications so far received, nine (including one from Italy) were submitted under this provision, and seven of these have already been approved by the European Parliament and the Council. None have been rejected.

As applications for EGF funding are submitted by Member States, the Commission invites the Honourable Members to ask the EGF Contact Person for Italy why applications were not submitted to support the redundant workers referred to in their question.

The EGF proved to be a significant part of the EU response to the global financial and economic crisis over the past three years, as explained by the Commission in its reply to Question E-2092/2012. In this regard the Commission deplores that a blocking minority in Council prevented the extension of the so-called crisis derogation.

The Commission proposal <sup>(1)</sup> concerning the future EGF is already with the Parliament. It aims at simplifying and improving the Fund, in particular through a strong emphasis on genuinely active labour market policy measures, including training, entrepreneurship promotion and mobility incentives. The EGF's primary role is not to help to anticipate economic trends. This function is notably fulfilled by the EU Structural Funds and in particular the ESF.

The Commission services are already carrying out activities to increase the visibility of the Fund and the exchanges of best practices. The Honourable Members are invited to consult the EGF website (in particular its 'Events' and 'Publications' sections <sup>(2)</sup>) for more details.

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<sup>(1)</sup> COM(2011) 608 final, Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the European Globalisation Adjustment Fund (EGF) 2014-2020.

<sup>(2)</sup> Respectively <http://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?langId=it&catId=326&furtherEvents=yes&limit=no> and <http://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?catId=326&langId=it&furtherPubs=yes>

(Nederlandse versie)

**Vraag met verzoek om schriftelijk antwoord E-004241/12**  
**aan de Commissie**  
**Laurence J. A. J. Stassen (NI)**  
(24 april 2012)

*Betref:* Afdwingen vrouwenquota d.m.v. Europese wetgeving onbespreekbaar

De Commissie heeft 16 april jl. een voortgangsrapport uitgebracht m.b.t. de strategie voor gelijkheid tussen vrouwen en mannen. Naar aanleiding hiervan heb ik de onderstaande vragen.

1. Is de Commissie het met de PVV eens dat de term „gelijkheid” ongelukkig gekozen is, aangezien het moet gaan om gelijkwaardigheid en gelijke kansen voor mannen en vrouwen? Zo neen, waarom niet?
2. Is de Commissie het met de PVV eens dat emancipatiebeleid en de bevordering van gelijkwaardigheid tussen vrouwen en mannen primair een nationale aangelegenheid is, en de EU zich hier niet met wetgeving mee dient te bemoeien? Zo neen, waarom niet?
3. Is de Commissie het met de PVV eens dat de doelstelling om meer topposities te laten bekleden door vrouwen in geen geval mag betekenen dat de EU d.m.v. Europese wetgeving vrouwenquota aan bedrijven en lidstaten opdringt? Zo neen, waarom niet?

**Antwoord van mevrouw Reding namens de Commissie**  
(7 juni 2012)

1. „De Unie (...) bevordert (...) de gelijkheid van vrouwen en mannen”. Dit is bepaald in artikel 3, lid 3, van het Verdrag betreffende de Europese Unie. Artikel 23 van het Handvest van de grondrechten stelt dat „de gelijkheid van vrouwen en mannen moet worden gewaarborgd op alle gebieden, met inbegrip van werkgelegenheid, beroep en beloning”. Deze bepalingen verklaren en rechtvaardigen het gebruik van de term „gelijkheid” in de strategie voor gelijkheid tussen vrouwen en mannen en in het voortgangsrapport.
2. In artikel 157, lid 3, van het Verdrag betreffende de werking van de Europese Unie is vastgelegd dat de Unie een wetgevende bevoegdheid heeft op het gebied van gelijke kansen en gelijke behandeling van vrouwen en mannen. De EU heeft deze bevoegdheid uitgeoefend met inachtneming van het subsidiariteits- en het evenredigheidsbeginsel, overeenkomstig artikel 5 van het Verdrag betreffende de Europese Unie, en verschillende richtlijnen op dit gebied vastgesteld.
3. Zoals aangekondigd in het voortgangsrapport „Vrouwen in de economische besluitvorming in de EU”, dat op 5 maart 2012 <sup>(1)</sup> door vicevoorzitter Viviane Reding is gepresenteerd, onderzoekt de Commissie momenteel beleidsopties om met gerichte maatregelen de deelname van vrouwen aan de economische besluitvorming op EU-niveau te vergroten. De publicatie van het voortgangsrapport viel samen met de start van een openbare raadpleging die moet helpen het effect van mogelijke EU-maatregelen ter correctie van de huidige situatie te beoordelen. Na een volledige effectbeoordeling zal de Commissie later dit jaar een beslissing nemen over de aard en de reikwijdte van mogelijke maatregelen.

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<sup>(1)</sup> [http://ec.europa.eu/justice/gender-equality/files/women-on-boards\\_en.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/justice/gender-equality/files/women-on-boards_en.pdf)

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-004241/12  
to the Commission**

**Laurence J.A.J. Stassen (NI)**

(24 April 2012)

*Subject:* Unacceptability of European legislation to impose mandatory quotas for women

On 16 April 2012 the Commission published a progress report on the strategy for equality between women and men. This gives rise to the following questions.

1. Does the Commission agree with the People for Freedom (PVV) that the term 'equality' is an unfortunate choice, given that the aim should be parity and equal opportunities for men and women? If not, why not?
2. Does the Commission agree with the PVV that emancipation policy and the promotion of parity between women and men is primarily a national matter, and the EU should not be legislating in this area? If not, why not?
3. Does the Commission agree with the PVV that the goal of having women occupy more top positions may under no circumstances mean that the EU should use European legislation to impose a quota for women on companies and Member States? If not, why not?

**Answer given by Mrs Reding on behalf of the Commission**

(7 June 2012)

1. Article 3(3) of the Treaty on the European Union provides that the Union 'shall promote (...) equality between women and men'. The Charter of Fundamental Rights states in its Article 23, that 'Equality between women and men must be ensured in all areas, including employment, work and pay'. These provisions explain and justify the reference to 'equality' in the strategy for equality between women and men and in the progress report.
2. The European Union has a legislative competence in the field of equal opportunities and equal treatment of women and men, set out in Article 157(3) TFEU. The EU has exercised that competence in accordance with principles of subsidiarity and proportionality, as required by Article 5 TEU, and enacted a number of directives in this field.
3. As set out in the progress report 'Women in economic decision-making in the EU', announced by Vice-President Reding on 5 March 2012 <sup>(1)</sup>, the Commission is currently exploring policy options for targeted measures, to enhance female participation in economic decision-making at the European level. In parallel to the publication of the progress report, the Commission has launched a public consultation that will contribute to assessing the impact of possible EU measures to redress the current situation. A decision on possible measures, including on their nature and scope, will be taken by the Commission later this year, after a full impact assessment.

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<sup>(1)</sup> [http://ec.europa.eu/justice/gender-equality/files/women-on-boards\\_en.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/justice/gender-equality/files/women-on-boards_en.pdf)



(Versiunea în limba română)

**Întrebarea cu solicitare de răspuns scris E-004242/12**  
**adresată Comisiei**  
**Cătălin Sorin Ivan (S&D)**  
(24 aprilie 2012)

*Subiect:* Reformarea învățământului superior

Observăm că numărul universităților din Europa este în creștere. După cum susține și Comisia, 35% din locurile de muncă cerute pe piața europeană vor necesita studii superioare. Tot Comisia susține că doar 26% din lucrători sunt absolvenți de universitate, mult sub nivelurile înregistrate în SUA, Japonia și Canada.

În noua strategie de modernizare a învățământului superior, Comisia identifică reformele pe care trebuie să le adopte guvernele naționale pentru a avea absolvenți în măsură să contribuie, prin competențele lor, la crearea de locuri de muncă, la creșterea economică și la inovare. Cele mai importante obiective sunt îmbunătățirea calității învățământului și creșterea numărului studenților.

Sistemele de învățământ superior sunt însă diferite de la o țară la alta, unele fiind mai performante, altele mai puțin. În România, nu creșterea numărului studenților este prioritatea numărul unu, ci îmbunătățirea calității învățământului și adaptarea la cerințele pieței muncii. România ar trebui să aspire la un învățământ superior european.

Cum va putea noua strategie de modernizare a învățământului superior să elimine această discrepanță dintre sistemele universitare performante și cele care aspiră la un astfel de statut, cum e cel din România?

**Răspuns dat de dna Vassiliou în numele Comisiei**  
(22 iunie 2012)

Agenda Comisiei de modernizare a învățământului superior <sup>(1)</sup> stabilește o strategie de reforme pentru a spori numărul de absolvenți, a îmbunătăți calitatea activității de predare și a maximiza contribuția învățământului superior la sprijinirea economiei UE cu scopul de a depăși criza actuală.

Responsabilitatea principală pentru realizarea reformelor în învățământul superior revine statelor membre și instituțiilor de învățământ. În acest sens, agenda identifică domeniile vizate de reformă în care acțiunile statelor membre — adaptate în funcție de situația lor proprie națională — pot îmbunătăți calitatea crescând, în același timp, nivelul de promovare a învățământului superior. Aceasta descrie, de asemenea, modul în care Uniunea Europeană poate sprijini politicile lor de modernizare prin cooperarea în domeniul politicilor și prin exploatarea programelor de finanțare ale UE.

Comisia încurajează România să își continue reformele în domeniul învățământului superior. În cadrul politicilor nu se poate face niciun compromis cu scopul de a crește numărul de absolvenți și a îmbunătăți calitatea. De fapt, consolidarea calității învățământului superior și creșterea încrederii publice în calificări sunt esențiale pentru creșterea participării și a gradului de promovare. Fondurile structurale finanțează în prezent eforturile de îmbunătățire a gradului de aliniere a ofertei în domeniul învățământului superior la nevoile pieței muncii și de creștere a calității învățământului superior și a cercetării. Noi reforme pentru a extinde accesul la învățământul superior ar putea contribui la dezvoltarea unei baze de competențe de înaltă calificare menită să genereze creștere economică. Acesta este scopul țintei referitoare la promovarea învățământului superior din cadrul strategiei Europa 2020 și al țintelor naționale privind gradul de promovare stabilite de statele membre.

Participarea la programele Erasmus și PC7 și la programele viitoare care le vor succeda — Erasmus pentru toți și Orizont 2020 — sunt, de asemenea, elemente vitale pentru îmbunătățirea calității sistemului de învățământ superior din România, prin colaborare și schimb de experiențe.

<sup>(1)</sup> COM(2011) 567 final.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-004242/12  
to the Commission**

**Cătălin Sorin Ivan (S&D)**

(24 April 2012)

*Subject:* Higher education reform

We note that the number of universities in Europe is growing. According to the Commission, 35% of jobs sought in the European market require higher education. Furthermore, the Commission maintains that only 26% of workers are university graduates, well below the corresponding levels in the United States, Japan and Canada.

In its new strategy for modernising higher education, the Commission identifies reforms that need to be adopted by national governments to create skilled graduates who are able to contribute to job creation, economic growth and innovation. The most important objectives are to improve the quality of education and increase the number of students.

However, higher education systems differ from country to country — and some produce better results than others. In Romania, the top priority is not to increase the number of students but to improve the quality of education and adapt to the needs of the labour market. Romania should aspire to a European higher education.

Can the Commission state how the new strategy for modernising higher education will succeed in eliminating the gap between high-performing university systems and those, like Romania, aspiring to such a status?

**Answer given by Ms Vassiliou on behalf of the Commission**

(22 June 2012)

The Commission's Modernisation Agenda for Higher Education <sup>(1)</sup> sets out a reform strategy to boost graduate numbers, improve teaching quality and maximise what higher education can do to help the EU economy emerge stronger from the crisis.

The main responsibility for delivering reforms in higher education rests with Member States and education institutions themselves. Thus the Agenda identifies areas for reform where action by Member States — geared to their own national situation — can improve quality while increasing higher education attainment. It also details how the European Union can support their modernisation policies through policy cooperation and by harnessing EU funding programmes.

The Commission would encourage Romania to continue its higher education reforms. There is no trade-off between policies to increase graduate numbers and to raise quality. In fact, strengthening the quality of higher education and increasing public trust in qualifications is key to increasing participation and attainment. Structural funds are currently financing efforts to better align the higher education offer to labour market needs and to increase quality in higher education and research. Further reforms to broaden access to higher education would help develop a highly qualified skills base from which to create growth. This is the objective of the Europe 2020 higher education attainment target and the national attainment targets set by Member States.

Participation in the Erasmus and FP7 programmes, and in their future successors Erasmus for All and Horizon 2020, are also vital elements in enhancing the quality of Romania's higher education system, through collaboration and exchange.

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<sup>(1)</sup> COM(2011) 567 final.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-004243/12  
to the Commission**

**John Stuart Agnew (EFD)**

(24 April 2012)

*Subject:* Car parking and gender discrimination

Is it discriminatory under EC law to have public car parking spaces marked as 'women only'?

**Answer given by Mrs Reding on behalf of the Commission**

(7 June 2012)

Under EU equal treatment legislation, discrimination on grounds of gender in access to goods and services <sup>(1)</sup> is currently prohibited. In general, differences in treatment are allowed only under specific conditions. The difference in access to certain services — as here to public parking spaces marked 'women only' — may be accepted if the measure is justified by a legitimate aim.

A legitimate aim may, for example, be the protection of women against violence. However, it has to be established under national law whether a legitimate aim justifies the measure.

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<sup>(1)</sup> Council Directive 2004/113 implementing the principle of equal treatment between men and women in the access to and supply of goods and services, OJ L 373/37.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-004244/12  
to the Commission**

**John Stuart Agnew (EFD)**

(24 April 2012)

*Subject:* Consumer pricing in the Netherlands

In the Netherlands it is apparently common practice to price goods to the consumer at a sum ending in 99 or 49 cents, but to require the customer to pay the 'extra' cent even when the customer offers the exact sum. Is this 'lying' about the price permitted under EC law and, if so, are there any limits to the amount about which the retailer can mislead the consumer?

**Answer given by Mr John Dalli on behalf of the Commission**

(22 June 2012)

Directive 98/6/EC on Price Indication and Unfair Commercial Practices Directive (2005/29/EC) requires price information to be clearly communicated to the consumer and that the price be final from the first moment the trader offers the product to consumers. The directive also requires that the price information must be unambiguous, clearly legible and easily identifiable. Based on Directive 2005/29/EC, if the price is subject to additional charges based on the means of payment used, this should also be clearly communicated by the trader when the initial offer is made.

National authorities are primarily responsible for enforcing EU consumer legislation. Therefore consumers in the Netherlands should bring this practice to the attention of the enforcement authorities.

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(English version)

**Question for written answer E-004245/12  
to the Commission  
John Stuart Agnew (EFD)  
(24 April 2012)**

*Subject:* Sugar market intervention rationality

On 30 November 2011, the Commission, recognising an EU supply shortfall, allowed 400 000 tonnes of out-of-quota beet sugar and 21 000 tonnes of isoglucose to be released onto the EU market at a reduced surplus levy of EUR 85/tonne, and issued seven import tenders to run in the period December 2011 to February 2012 and three import tenders in June and July 2012.

On 23 January 2012, after accepting import tenders up to the value of EUR 271/tonne for 191 000 tonnes, the Commission implemented a new regulation suspending the three remaining import tenders in January and February, explaining that 'the availability of supply on the Union sugar market has improved'.

On 12 April 2012, the Commission proposed two new regulations 'to improve the supply situation on the Union sugar market': to allow the release of 250 000 tonnes of out-of-quota beet sugar and 13 000 tonnes of isoglucose onto the EU market at a reduced surplus levy of EUR 211/tonne, and proposed that the three remaining invitations to tender for imports be brought forward to May and June 2012.

1. Can the Commission please explain the rationale for the difference in the levy charged between the regulations in December and April?
2. Can the Commission state why the three import tenders planned for January and February were cancelled and what new information justified additional market supplies of out-of-quota beet sugar and isoglucose in April?
3. Can the Commission explain why two different mechanisms are used for releasing beet and cane sugar to the market?

**Answer given by Mr Ciolos on behalf of the Commission  
(5 June 2012)**

The Commission has continued to monitor very closely the sugar market and in January and April 2012 has adopted several measures, in accordance with evolution of the market.

1. The reduced surplus levy to release out-of-quota sugar is based on the difference between the most recent publicly available average EU price and the world price: in November this variation resulted at EUR 85/tonne and in April 2012 at EUR 211/tonne.
2. In January 2012 the Commission revised the balance sheet for the 2011/2012 campaign. This pointed to a significant increase on supply in the EU, and therefore import tenders were suspended. However, more recently, the evolution of prices in the EU and lower than expected ACP/EBA imports motivated the decision to advance the suspended tenders.
3. Quotas currently limit the market opportunities for sugar beet producers, while sugar refiners source year round raw sugar on the world market where prices are typically below the Union prices. Moreover, cane sugar can be sourced from ACP countries and Least Developed Countries' (LDC's) suppliers that have duty free, quota free access to the EU.

Having a reduced surplus levy for beet sugar and a tendered reduced duty for cane sugar refiners only reflects the differences between the two origins of sugar.

These different systems also mean that if as a refiner you are successful in your bid, you may receive the full volume you have requested, and there is no pre-defined ceiling limiting the volume of the refiners' bid. A refiner may therefore come away from a tender with a much higher volume that would be allocated under the out of quota beet sugar system.

Given the transport and logistical costs for imported sugar, this clearly militates in favour of allocating sufficient volumes for refiners, and this is what the tendered duty system in place delivers to those refiners proposing the most competitive bid.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-004246/12  
to the Commission  
Catherine Stihler (S&D)  
(24 April 2012)**

*Subject:* Single farm payment in Scotland

In Scotland, it is common practice for livestock to graze on heather, especially in the highlands and islands and during winter, given the large proportion of the land it covers. The Commission has narrowed the definition for eligibility for single farm payments to 'herbaceous' plants, which excludes heather.

— Will the Commission reconsider the definition to protect the hundreds of hill farmers and crofters in Scotland who depend on the single farm payment?

— What meetings has the Commission had with the Scottish Government to rectify the situation?

**Answer given by Mr Ciolos on behalf of the Commission  
(13 June 2012)**

Article 4(1)(h) of the reform proposal for direct payments provides for the following definition: 'permanent grassland' means land used to grow grasses or other herbaceous forage naturally (self-seeded) or through cultivation (sown) and that has not been included in the crop rotation of the holding for five years or longer; it may include other species suitable for grazing provided that the grasses and other herbaceous forage remain predominant.

The proposed definition is already broader than the definition of 'permanent pasture' currently applicable to direct payments, which is limited to 'grasses or other herbaceous forage'.

Taking into account the ongoing discussions in the European Parliament and the Council, but also with regional authorities and stakeholders, the Commission has presented a 'Concept Paper' on Greening during the agricultural Council meeting of May 2012 considering the possibility to complement the definition by including areas where grasses and other herbaceous forage are traditionally not predominant but still suitable for grazing and that form part of traditional agricultural systems. To a large extent this could meet the Honourable Member's concern.

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(Dansk udgave)

**Forespørgsel til skriftlig besvarelse E-004247/12**  
**til Kommissionen**  
**Dan Jørgensen (S&D)**  
(24. april 2012)

Om: Sporbarhed for transport af hunde og katte i EU for at bekæmpe illegal handel

Mit spørgsmål er foranlediget af artikel 13 i Lissabontraktaten og skriftlig erklæring om styring af hundebestanden, vedtaget den 13. oktober 2011.

Transport i kommercielt øjemed af hvalpe og killinger i EU reguleres ved direktiver og forordninger — hvoraf de fleste primært har til formål at dække dyr, der opdrættes med henblik på konsum — som har vist sig at være ineffektive med hensyn til kontrol af den illegale handel og etablering af sporbarhed for hvalpe og killinger.

Konsekvensen er, at ca. 700 000 hvalpe hvert år opdrættes og handles illegalt blandt medlemsstaterne, og at ca. 150 000 dør under processen. Der er endvidere deraf følgende risici for dårlig behandling, spredning af sygdomme, urimelige konkurrencevilkår og vildledning af forbrugere.

Da transporten foregår inden for Schengenområdet, kan mistanke om dårlig behandling kun bekræftes, hvis det er muligt at spore oprindelsen og de forskellige indehavere af de pågældende dyr.

Der findes et alternativt system, hvormed oprindelsen og de forskellige indehavere kan spores med det formål at forhindre illegal handel. Det er baseret på identifikation af hvalpe og killinger og registrering ved hjælp af en lokal database, der er forbundet med et centralt informationssystem. Systemet fungerer nu som et europæisk hittegodssystem. Systemet kan udvides til at omfatte al transport af hunde og katte. Da transport af hvalpe og killinger nu er forbundet med krav om identifikation og pas for hver enkelt dyr, som de fleste opdrættere opfylder, vil sporbarhed blot kræve, at identifikationen i opdrætslandet registreres i en database, der er forbundet med det centrale europæiske informationssystem.

Vil Kommissionen overveje at ændre den eksisterende lovgivning i henhold hertil?

**Svar afgivet på Kommissionens vegne af John Dalli**  
(21. juni 2012)

Hvad angår spørgsmålet om ulovlig handel med selskabsdyr og identifikation og registrering af hunde og katte, henvises det ærede medlem til Kommissionens svar på skriftlig forespørgsel E-008449/2010 <sup>(1)</sup>.

Inden for rammerne af EU's strategi for dyreskyttelse og dyrevelfærd (2012-2015) — KOM(2012)0006 endelig — vil Kommissionen i 2014 gennemføre en undersøgelse vedrørende hundenes og kattens velfærd, når de er genstand for handel.

På grundlag af resultaterne af denne undersøgelse vil Kommissionen overveje, om yderligere tiltag på dette område er nødvendige under hensyntagen til proportionalitets- og nærhedsprincippet.

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<sup>(1)</sup> <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/QP-WEB>.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-004247/12**  
**to the Commission**  
**Dan Jørgensen (S&D)**  
(24 April 2012)

*Subject:* Traceability of dog and cat movements in the EU to discourage illegal trade

My question is prompted by Article 13 of the Lisbon Treaty and by the Written Declaration on dog population management adopted on 13 October 2011.

Commercial movements of puppies and kittens in the EU are regulated by directives and regulations — most of them primarily intended to cover animals reared for food — which have proved ineffective in controlling the illegal trade and establishing traceability for puppies and kittens <sup>(1)</sup>.

The consequence is that every year an estimated 700 000 puppies are illegally bred and traded among Member States and an estimated 150 000 die in the process. There are also associated risks of mistreatment, spread of disease, unfair competition and misleading of consumers.

Since transportation takes place within the Schengen area, suspicions of ill-treatment can be substantiated only where it is possible to trace the origin and successive holders of the animals concerned.

An alternative system exists which is likely to provide effective traceability of origin and of successive holders so as to dissuade illegal traders. It is based on identification of puppies and kittens and on registration with a local database linked to a central information system. It now serves as a Europe-wide 'lost and found' system. It could be extended to cover all movements of dogs and cats. Since movements of puppies and kittens now require identification and a passport for every animal, which most breeders comply with, traceability would only need identifications made in the breeding country to be registered on a database linked to the central European information system.

Would the Commission consider amending the existing legislation accordingly?

**Answer given by Mr Dalli on behalf of the Commission**  
(21 June 2012)

As regard the issues of illegal trade in pet animals and the identification and registration of dogs and cats, the Honourable Member is invited to refer to the Commission's reply to Written Question E-008449/2010 <sup>(2)</sup>.

Furthermore, in the framework of the EU strategy for the protection and welfare of animals 2012-2015 — COM(2012)6 final, the Commission will perform in 2014 a study on the welfare of dogs and cats involved in commercial practices.

In the light of the results of this study, the Commission will consider if further actions are necessary in this field with due regard to the principles of proportionality and subsidiarity.

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<sup>(1)</sup> Regulation (EC) No 998/2003, Regulation (EU) No 388/2010, Directive 92/65/EEC and Directive 90/425/EEC.  
<sup>(2)</sup> <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/QP-WEB>.



(Slovenska različica)

**Vprašanje za pisni odgovor E-004248/12**  
**za Komisijo**  
**Romana Jordan (PPE)**  
(24. april 2012)

*Zadeva:* Spodbujanje raziskav na področju zdravja čebel

Čebelarji se spopadajo z naraščajočim odmiranjem čebel. V Sloveniji je po navedbah Čebelarske zveze Slovenije v zadnjih letih v zimskem času propadlo od 15 % do 25 % čebel, pozimi 2011-2012 pa kar od 25 % do 35 % čebel, na nekaterih področjih preko 50 % čebel. Med najpomembnejšimi vzroki odmiranja čebel, ki so zapleteni in raznovrstni, se omenjajo bakterijski, virusni in zajedavski dejavniki, pa tudi podnebne spremembe in izguba biotske raznovrstnosti.

Eden izmed vodilnih povzročiteljev odmiranja čebel je parazit varoa, zato bo še posebej pomembno razviti sredstva za njegovo zatiranje, ki bodo v skladu z načeli trajnostnega kmetovanja. Z vsakim vstavljanjem kemičnih sredstev namreč tvegamo njihovo širjenje v panju in na čebelje pridelke, kot so med, deviški vosek in propolis.

Zdravje čebel je področje, kjer imajo raziskave in inovacije na evropski ravni velik pomen. Trenutno je v veljavi sedmi okvirni program za raziskave, ki se bo iztekel leta 2013. Za obdobje 2013-2020 je Komisija predlagala nov program za raziskave in inovacije Obzorje 2020.

— Na kakšen način Komisija vključuje preprečevanje in zdravljenje varoj v trenutno veljavnem sedmem okvirnem programu za raziskave?

— Kolikšen delež v okviru novega programa Obzorje 2020 bo namenjen raziskavam za razvoj učinkovitih in sonaravnih sredstev za zatiranje škodljivcev pri čebelah?

**Odgovor komisarke Geoghegan-Quinn v imenu Komisije**  
(22. junij 2012)

Komisija podpira raziskovalne projekte s ciljem izboljšati zdravstveno varstvo čebel in bo v prihodnjih letih še naprej dajala poudarek inovativnim pristopom k obravnavi vprašanj zdravstvenega stanja čebel, vključno z morebitnimi vzroki za povečano umrljivost čebel, ter nadzoru parazita *varroa*. Ta zadnji vidik bo posebej obravnavan v zadnjem razpisu Sedmega okvirnega programa za raziskave in tehnološki razvoj (7OP, 2007-2013), tema 2 (prehrana, kmetijstvo in ribištvo, biotehnologija). Razpis bo objavljen julija 2012 <sup>(1)</sup>. Projekt BEE DOC <sup>(2)</sup>, ki se trenutno izvaja, obravnava škodljive organizme in bolezni domačih čebel ter meri vplive parazitov, patogenov in pesticidov na čebeljo umrljivost. Projekt posebej obravnava subletalno in kronično izpostavljenost pesticidom ter preučuje, kako apikulturene prakse vplivajo na zdravje kolonij.

Program Obzorje 2020 (Horizon 2020) bo po pričakovanjih še naprej preučeval pomembne vidike trajnostnega kmetijstva, vključno z vprašanji o zdravju živali. Vendar na tej stopnji ni mogoče vedeti, kolikšen delež proračuna bi se lahko uporabil za razvoj trajnostnih načinov nadzora škodljivih organizmov pri čebelah.

<sup>(1)</sup> <https://ec.europa.eu/research/participants/portal/page/home>.

<sup>(2)</sup> <http://www.bee-doc.eu/>.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-004248/12  
to the Commission  
Romana Jordan (PPE)  
(24 April 2012)**

*Subject:* Promoting research in the field of bee health

Bee-keepers are facing the problem of mounting bee deaths. In Slovenia, according to the Slovenian Bee-keepers' Association, bee numbers have declined in recent winters by between 15% and 25%; during the winter of 2011-2012 they fell by as much as 25% to 35%, and in some areas by more than 50%. Among the major causes of bee death are a variety of complex bacterial, virus-related and parasitical factors, along with climate change and the loss of biodiversity.

One of the main causes of bee death is the parasitic varroa mite, and it is therefore essential to develop means of control compatible with the principles of sustainable agriculture. Whenever chemicals are used, there is a risk that they will spread through hives and into bee products such as honey, beeswax and propolis.

Bee health is an area in which research and innovation at European level are of great importance. The current seventh research framework programme will end in 2013, and the Commission has already proposed a new research and innovation programme, Horizon 2020, to cover the 2013-2020 period.

— How does the Commission plan to include the prevention and treatment of varroa mite infection under the current seventh research framework programme?

— What proportion of the new Horizon 2020 programme will be given over to research aimed at developing effective and sustainable means of controlling bee pests?

**Answer given by Ms Geoghegan-Quinn on behalf of the Commission  
(22 June 2012)**

The Commission is supporting research projects with the objective to improve bee health and will continue in the coming years to put emphasis on innovative approaches to address bee health issues, including the potential causes of increased bee mortality, and *Varroa* control. This latter aspect will be addressed specifically in the last call of the Seventh Framework Programme for Research and Technological Development (FP7, 2007-2013), in Theme 2 (Food, Agriculture and Fisheries, Bio-technology). The call will be published in July 2012 <sup>(1)</sup>. The currently running BEE DOC project <sup>(2)</sup> is looking at honeybee pests and diseases and quantifying the impact of interactions between parasites, pathogens and pesticides on honeybee mortality. The project specifically addresses sub-lethal and chronic exposure to pesticides and screens how apicultural practices affect colony health.

The Horizon 2020 programme is expected to continue to cover important aspects of sustainable agriculture including animal health issues. However, it is not possible at this stage to know which share of the budget could be spent to develop sustainable means of pest control in bees.

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<sup>(1)</sup> <https://ec.europa.eu/research/participants/portal/page/home>.

<sup>(2)</sup> <http://www.bee-doc.eu/>.

(Versión española)

**Pregunta con solicitud de respuesta escrita E-004249/12**

**a la Comisión**

**Ramon Tremosa i Balcells (ALDE)**

(24 de abril de 2012)

*Asunto:* Proyecto de planta de producción de energía eléctrica mediante quema de biomasa en Lleida

En el Palau d'Anglesola (Lleida) una empresa proyecta la construcción de una planta de producción de energía eléctrica de 14 Mw mediante quema de biomasa. Se pretende quemar enormes cantidades de materiales forestales, residuos agrícolas, incluidos cultivos energéticos. La zona que acogería la planta es agrícola de regadío, con poblaciones pequeñas y cercanas entre sí.

Los materiales forestales para abastecer la instalación deben transportarse desde una media de 100 km hasta la planta. Los principales residuos agrícolas de la zona son los restos de la planta de maíz después de cosechada. Para obtener cultivos energéticos hay que desplazar a los ya existentes, entre los que domina el maíz.

Según el Dictamen de 15.9.2011 del Comité Científico de la Agencia Europea del Medio Ambiente, hasta ahora se han cometido graves errores en la contabilización del CO<sub>2</sub> emitido en la producción de bioenergía. En ella se recomienda no sustituir cultivos alimentarios por energéticos y quemar solamente aquellos residuos de los cultivos que no sean necesarios para mantener la fertilidad del suelo. Hay que tener en cuenta que la Unión Europea ha emitido en fecha reciente varias alarmas sobre la degradación de los suelos europeos. En la zona afectada la extracción de los residuos del maíz es ya superior a lo recomendado: lo único que podría tener sentido sería quemar los residuos forestales, pero cerca del punto de producción. No es el caso de esta planta.

Hay que tener en cuenta que España es altamente deficitaria en maíz y trigo, pero excedentaria en producción eléctrica. Si en Catalunya se construyen (como está previsto) una gran cantidad (los periódicos hablan de 40) de plantas de quema de biomasa las consecuencias serán muy negativas para el balance de CO<sub>2</sub>, para la calidad de los suelos y para la producción de cereales en España.

— ¿Qué piensa la Comisión sobre la idoneidad ambiental de la planta proyectada en el Palau d'Anglesola?

— Dado que existen muchos científicos de reconocido prestigio que afirman que las emisiones de estas instalaciones perjudican la salud de las poblaciones cercanas, con especial incidencia en niños, ancianos y mujeres embarazadas, y que esta planta estaría muy cerca de núcleos de población, ¿no cree la Comisión que en este caso debería aplicarse el principio de precaución?

**Respuesta del Sr. Potočnik en nombre de la Comisión**

(25 de junio de 2012)

La Comisión no conoce los pormenores del proyecto de central eléctrica a que se refiere Su Señoría. La producción de electricidad a partir de fuentes renovables, como la biomasa, es una de las soluciones encontradas por los Estados miembros para cumplir los requisitos y objetivos de la Directiva sobre fuentes de energía renovables (2009/28/CE <sup>(1)</sup>) y de la Directiva sobre el comercio de derechos de emisión (2003/87/CE <sup>(2)</sup>). La Comisión, en su informe de 2010 sobre la sostenibilidad de la biomasa <sup>(3)</sup>, hizo recomendaciones a los Estados miembros en relación con los criterios de sostenibilidad de la biomasa sólida utilizada para producir electricidad. La Comisión está analizando en estos momentos si los regímenes nacionales han tenido suficientemente en cuenta esa sostenibilidad y valorando si deben tomarse medidas adicionales, habida cuenta de las actividades descritas en su estrategia sobre bioeconomía <sup>(4)</sup>. La Comisión proyecta presentar un informe al respecto en el momento oportuno.

<sup>(1)</sup> DO L 140 de 5.6.2009.

<sup>(2)</sup> DO L 275 de 25.10.2003.

<sup>(3)</sup> Informe de la Comisión al Consejo y al Parlamento Europeo relativo a los requisitos de sostenibilidad para el uso de fuentes de biomasa sólida y gaseosa en los sectores de la electricidad, la calefacción y la refrigeración (SEC(2010) 65) (<http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2010:0011:FIN:ES:PDF>).

<sup>(4)</sup> [http://ec.europa.eu/research/bioeconomy/pdf/201202\\_innovating\\_sustainable\\_growth\\_es.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/research/bioeconomy/pdf/201202_innovating_sustainable_growth_es.pdf)

La Comisión conoce el dictamen citado por Su Señoría, pero no lo considera pertinente en lo que se refiere a los efectos de las plantas de biomasa sólida para la salud a nivel local y regional. Aunque la quema de biomasa sólida entraña la emisión de contaminantes atmosféricos (especialmente partículas) que pueden tener efectos perjudiciales para la salud, la Comisión observa que las fuentes fósiles de energía que la biomasa pretende sustituir dan lugar a emisiones similares. La Directiva sobre las grandes instalaciones de combustión (2001/80/CE <sup>(5)</sup>), leída en conexión con la Directiva relativa a la prevención y al control integrados de la contaminación (2008/1/CE <sup>(6)</sup>), establece medidas encaminadas, entre otras cosas, a regular las emisiones de contaminantes atmosféricos generados por centrales eléctricas que tienen una potencia térmica nominal de, como mínimo, 50 MW. Los valores límite de emisión aplicables a los contaminantes atmosféricos emitidos por centrales o instalaciones más pequeñas deben regularse pues según el Derecho nacional.

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<sup>(5)</sup> DO L 309 de 27.11.2001.  
<sup>(6)</sup> DO L 24 de 29.1.2008.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-004249/12**  
**to the Commission**  
**Ramon Tremosa i Balcells (ALDE)**  
 (24 April 2012)

*Subject:* Power plant project in Lleida for generating electricity by burning biomass

A company is planning to build a 14 MW power plant in El Palau d'Anglesola (Lleida), which will generate electricity by burning biomass. It will burn huge amounts of forest material, crop residues and bioenergy crops. The area in which the plant will be built contains irrigated farmland, with small villages nearby.

The forest material used to feed the plant will have to be transported over an average distance of 100 km to the plant. The main crop residues in the area are the remains of corn plants after harvest. Obtaining bioenergy crops means replacing the existing crops, where corn predominates.

According to the opinion issued on 15 September 2011 by the European Environment Agency Scientific Committee, serious mistakes have been made previously when measuring CO<sub>2</sub> emissions from bioenergy production. In its opinion, the Committee recommends that replacing food crops with bioenergy crops should be avoided and that only waste from crops not needed to fertilise the soil should be burnt. The fact that the European Union has recently issued a number of alerts concerning the deteriorating quality of European soil must be taken into account. In the area concerned, removal of corn waste is already above the recommended level, and the only measure that would make sense would be to burn forest waste, but this should be done near its point of production. This is not the case with this plant.

The fact that production of corn and wheat in Spain is very low whilst production of electricity is very high must be taken into account. If a large number of biomass plants (the newspapers say 40) are built in Catalonia (as planned) the results will be very bad for CO<sub>2</sub> levels, for soil quality and for the production of cereals in Spain.

— What does the Commission think of the environmental suitability of the planned El Palau d'Anglesola plant?

— Given that many highly regarded scientists state that emissions from these plants endanger the health of those living nearby, particularly children, the elderly and pregnant women, and that this plant would be very close to population centres, does the Commission not think that the precautionary principle should be applied in this case?

**Answer given by Mr Potočník on behalf of the Commission**  
 (25 June 2012)

The Commission is not aware of the details of the planned power plant mentioned in the question. Renewable electricity generation, including through biomass combustion, is one of the solutions identified by Member States to meet the requirements and objectives of the Renewable Energy Directive (2009/28/EC <sup>(1)</sup>) and the Emissions Trading Directive (2003/87/EC <sup>(2)</sup>). In its 2010 Report on biomass sustainability <sup>(3)</sup>, the Commission made recommendations to Member States on sustainability criteria for solid biomass used in electricity. The Commission is currently assessing whether national schemes have sufficiently addressed the sustainability of biomass and is considering whether additional measures would be appropriate, taking into account activities described in the context of its bio economy strategy <sup>(4)</sup>. The Commission is planning to report on this in due course.

The Commission is aware of the opinion referred to by the Honourable Member, but does not consider it relevant to local and regional health effects of solid biomass plants. While the combustion of solid biomass involves the emissions of certain air pollutants (most notably particulate matter) that can adversely affect health, the Commission notes that fossil energy sources that biomass is aiming to replace involve similar emissions. The Large Combustion Plant Directive (2001/80/EC <sup>(5)</sup>) read in combination with the Integrated Pollution Prevention and Control Directive (2008/1/EC <sup>(6)</sup>), set measures that aim, *inter alia*, at regulating emissions of air pollutants generated by power plants that have a rated thermal input of at least 50 MW. Emission limit values applicable to air pollutants emitted by smaller plants or installations should therefore be regulated according to national law.

<sup>(1)</sup> OJ L 140, 5.6.2009.

<sup>(2)</sup> OJ L 275, 25.10.2003.

<sup>(3)</sup> SEC(2010) 65: Report from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament on sustainability requirements for the use of solid and gaseous biomass sources in electricity, heating and cooling <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2010:0011:FIN:EN:PDF>

<sup>(4)</sup> [http://ec.europa.eu/research/bioeconomy/pdf/201202\\_innovating\\_sustainable\\_growth\\_en.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/research/bioeconomy/pdf/201202_innovating_sustainable_growth_en.pdf)

<sup>(5)</sup> OJ L 309, 27.11.2001.

<sup>(6)</sup> OJ L 24, 29.1.2008.

(Deutsche Fassung)

**Anfrage zur schriftlichen Beantwortung E-004251/12**  
**an die Kommission**  
**Franz Obermayr (NI)**  
(24. April 2012)

*Betrifft:* Neuregelung des Datenschutzes in Europa

Seit einigen Wochen liegt der Vorschlag der EU-Kommission für eine Neuregelung des europäischen Datenschutzes vor. Experten kritisieren jetzt Medienberichten zufolge den Entwurf vor allem aus Arbeitnehmersicht. Es wird beanstandet, dass auf das Gefährdungspotenzial für Daten, die rund um Dienstverhältnisse anfallen, nicht angemessen eingegangen wird und die geplante Verordnung noch zu viele Unklarheiten beinhaltet. Sie vermissen eine Rücksichtnahme auf vernünftigen Arbeitnehmer-Datenschutz. Arbeitnehmervertreter sehen in den geplanten Vorhaben deutliche Verschlechterungen. So sehe der Entwurf auch vor, dass einseitig durch den Arbeitgeber erlassene Richtlinien in Zukunft die Datenübermittlung im Konzern erleichtern sollen.

Das österreichische wie auch das europäische Datenschutzrecht enthalten bisher kaum Vorschriften, die auf das besondere Schutzbedürfnis der Beschäftigten im Arbeitsverhältnis Bedacht nehmen. Experten fordern daher adäquate Datenschutzbestimmungen für Arbeitnehmer und eine effizientere Rechtsdurchsetzung zum Schutz von Beschäftigungsdaten, vor allem im betrieblichen Kontext. Daraus ergeben sich folgende Fragen:

1. Wie will die Kommission klarstellen, dass europäische Datenschutzregelungen nicht die nationalen Arbeitsverfassungen in ihrer Gültigkeit beschränken?
2. Welche konkreten Schritte sind geplant, um sicherzustellen, dass Arbeiterkammern und Gewerkschaften zu den klageberechtigten Einrichtungen, Organisationen und Verbänden gehören?
3. Wie will die Kommission die Wahrung der Publizität und die Informationsrechte der Betroffenen durch die verpflichtende Meldung an das Datenverarbeitungsregister sicherstellen?
4. Wie soll nach der Neuregelung eine nationale Datenschutzbehörde gewährleistet werden, um eine effiziente Rechtsdurchsetzung zu garantieren?

**Antwort von Frau Reding im Namen der Kommission**  
(20. Juni 2012)

Artikel 82 der am 25. Januar 2012 von der Kommission vorgeschlagenen Datenschutz-Grundverordnung<sup>(1)</sup> sieht ausdrücklich vor, dass die Mitgliedstaaten per Gesetz die Verarbeitung personenbezogener Arbeitnehmerdaten im Beschäftigungskontext regeln. Es obliegt daneben den Mitgliedstaaten zu regeln, ob Arbeitnehmerverbände wie z. B. Gewerkschaften gemäß Artikel 73 Absatz 2 und 76 Absatz 1 auch klageberechtigt sein können.

Gleichzeitig stärkt die Verordnung die Rechte der Betroffenen merklich, insbesondere durch eine Vorschrift zur Einwilligung der betroffenen Person bei einem erheblichen Ungleichgewicht zwischen ihr und dem für die Verarbeitung Verantwortlichen (typischerweise im Rahmen von Beschäftigungsverhältnissen) (Artikel 7 Absatz 4 in Verbindung mit Erwägungsgrund 34), die Verpflichtung des für die Verarbeitung Verantwortlichen auf eine transparente und nachvollziehbare Verarbeitung (Artikel 11) und erweiterte Informationspflichten (Artikel 14) sowie die Bestellung eines Datenschutzbeauftragten in Unternehmen mit mehr als 250 Beschäftigten (Artikel 35).

Um eine effiziente und einheitliche Rechtsdurchsetzung zu gewährleisten wird darüber hinaus die Unabhängigkeit der nationalen Datenschutzaufsichtsbehörden gestärkt und deren Befugnisse ausgebaut, damit sie Ermittlungen vornehmen, verbindliche Beschlüsse fassen und wirksame abschreckende Sanktionen erlassen können. Die Mitgliedstaaten werden verpflichtet, die Datenschutzaufsichtsbehörden mit ausreichenden Ressourcen auszustatten.

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<sup>(1)</sup> Vorschlag für Verordnung des Europäischen Parlaments und des Rates zum Schutz natürlicher Personen bei der Verarbeitung personenbezogener Daten und zum freien Datenverkehr (Datenschutz-Grundverordnung), KOM(2012)11 endg.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-004251/12  
to the Commission  
Franz Obermayr (NI)  
(24 April 2012)**

*Subject:* Changes to data protection in Europe

The EU Commission proposal for changes to European data protection has been on the table for some weeks. According to reports in the media, experts are now critical of the draft proposal, particularly as seen from the perspective of employees. They complain that insufficient attention is paid to the potential threat to data concerning employment conditions and that the proposed regulation contains too many grey areas. They see a lack of attention to reasonable protection of employee data. Workers' representatives believe that the planned changes will bring about a significant deterioration in the situation. According to the draft, guidelines issued unilaterally by employers should simplify the communication of information within companies in the future.

Austrian and European data protection laws contain few provisions that consider the particular protection needs of employees. For this reason, experts are calling for adequate data protection provisions for employees, as well as more efficient law enforcement to protect employment data, particularly at company level. This gives rise to the following questions:

1. How does the Commission intend to make it clear that European data protection rules do not reduce the validity of national labour relations?
2. What specific steps are planned to ensure that workers' organisations and trade unions are entitled to take legal action in these matters?
3. How does the Commission intend to ensure that privacy protection and the information rights of those concerned are upheld through mandatory reporting to the Data Processing Register?
4. How will a national data protection authority operate under the new changes, so that efficient law enforcement is guaranteed?

**Answer given by Mrs Reding on behalf of the Commission  
(20 June 2012)**

Article 82 of the General Data Protection Regulation proposed by the Commission on 25 January 2012 <sup>(1)</sup> expressly provides for Member States adopting by law specific rules regulating the processing of employees' personal data in the employment context. Furthermore it is the responsibility of the Member States to regulate whether employee associations such as trade unions may also institute proceedings under Articles 73(2) and 76(1).

At the same time, the regulation distinctly strengthens the rights of data subjects, in particular through a provision on the consent of the data subject in the case of a significant imbalance between him and the data controller (typically in the employment context) (Article 7(4) in conjunction with Recital 34), the obligation on the controller to process data in a transparent and understandable manner (Article 11) and to meet extended obligations to provide information (Article 14), and the designation of a data protection officer in companies with over 250 employees (Article 35).

Moreover, in order to ensure efficient and uniform law enforcement, the autonomy of national data protection supervisory authorities and their powers are reinforced so that they can carry out investigations, take binding decisions and impose effective dissuasive penalties. The Member States will be obliged to provide the data supervisory authorities with sufficient resources.

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<sup>(1)</sup> Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data (General Data Protection Regulation), COM(2012) 11 final.

(Versione italiana)

**Interrogazione con richiesta di risposta scritta E-004252/12  
alla Commissione (Vicepresidente/Alto Rappresentante)**

**Fiorello Provera (EFD)**

(24 aprile 2012)

Oggetto: VP/HR — Attentati con esplosivi nella città libanese di Tiro

Il 23 aprile cinque persone sono rimaste ferite in seguito all'esplosione di una bomba davanti a un ristorante nella città di Tiro, nel Libano meridionale. I dipendenti del ristorante sono stati colpiti dall'esplosione mentre chiudevano il locale. Il ristorante è noto per servire bevande alcoliche e permettere il ballo, e molti ritengono che questa sia la principale motivazione dell'attacco, poiché vi è stata tutta una serie di esplosioni che hanno colpito locali che vendono alcolici in questa città a maggioranza musulmana e nelle aree limitrofe. A novembre due bombe sono esplose in un locale notturno e presso una rivendita di bevande alcoliche, mentre a dicembre ha subito un attentato un altro ristorante in cui si servivano bevande alcoliche. La maggioranza degli abitanti di Tiro sono sciiti, ma la città è frequentata da molti turisti e da membri delle truppe ONU in Libano (UNIFIL).

1. È il Vicepresidente/Alto Rappresentante al corrente di quest'ultimo attentato nella città di Tiro? Ritengono i funzionari del SEAE che esso s'inquadri nel movimento di crescente opposizione al laicismo che si sta sviluppando in Libano?
2. In che misura tali attentati costituiscono un rischio per la sicurezza dei cittadini dell'UE in Libano?
3. Quali azioni efficaci stanno intraprendendo le autorità libanesi per debellare i responsabili degli attentati?
4. Ritengono i funzionari della sicurezza che possano essere coinvolti gruppi come Hezbollah?

**Risposta dell'Alta Rappresentante/Vicepresidente Catherine Ashton a nome della Commissione**

(27 giugno 2012)

L'Alta Rappresentante/Vicepresidente e i suoi servizi, in particolare la delegazione dell'Unione europea a Beirut, seguono attentamente la situazione in tutto il Libano. Se gli attacchi terroristici sono caratterizzati per definizione da una violenza indiscriminata, anche gli attacchi mirati a luoghi specifici possono mettere in pericolo il pubblico in generale, compresi i cittadini dell'Unione che vivono o viaggiano in Libano. In tale contesto gli Stati membri dell'UE o i relativi ministeri degli Affari esteri forniscono informazioni utili tramite i consigli per i viaggiatori. L'Unione europea condanna in modo inequivocabile ogni forma di violenza illegale. Qualsiasi attacco del tipo a cui si riferisce l'onorevole parlamentare dovrebbe essere oggetto di un'accurata indagine penale e i responsabili dovrebbero essere processati. L'UE confida nel fatto che le forze di polizia e le autorità giudiziarie libanesi siano in grado di seguire adeguatamente tali casi e determinate a farlo. Spetta a queste autorità appurare l'identità dei responsabili e verificare se appartengano o meno a gruppi o partiti specifici. L'Unione europea partecipa attivamente alla riforma e al potenziamento del settore della sicurezza in Libano tramite specifici programmi di cooperazione, che dovrebbero proseguire nei prossimi anni.



(English version)

**Question for written answer E-004252/12  
to the Commission (Vice-President/High Representative)**

**Fiorello Provera (EFD)**

(24 April 2012)

*Subject:* VP/HR — Bombings in the Lebanese city of Tyre

On 23 April, five people were wounded after a bomb exploded outside a restaurant in the southern Lebanese city of Tyre. Employees at the restaurant were caught in the blast as they were closing the premises. The restaurant is known to serve alcohol and allow dancing, and many think this was the prime motivation for the attack, as there has been a spate of bombings targeting establishments selling alcohol in this predominantly Muslim city and its surrounding areas. In November, two bombs detonated in a nightclub and a liquor store, while in December another restaurant, which also sold alcohol, was bombed. The majority of residents in Tyre are Shi'ite, but many tourists visit the city, as well as members of the UN force in Lebanon (Unifil).

1. Is the Vice-President/High Representative aware of this latest attack in the city of Tyre, and do EEAS officials believe that this is part of an anti-secularist trend forming within Lebanon?
2. How great a security risk do these attacks pose for EU citizens inside Lebanon?
3. What effective steps are the Lebanese authorities taking to root out the individuals responsible for the attacks?
4. Do security officials believe groups such as Hezbollah may be involved?

**Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Ashton on behalf of the Commission**

(27 June 2012)

Developments in the whole of Lebanon are closely followed by the High Representative/Vice-President and her services, in particular the EU Delegation in Beirut. While terrorist attacks use indiscriminate violence by definition, targeted attacks against specific establishments can pose threats to the general public as well, including EU citizens living in Lebanon or travelling there. In this context travel advice by EU Member States/Ministry of Foreign Affairs provide relevant information. The EU unequivocally condemns the use of all illegal violence. All attacks such as those mentioned should be thoroughly investigated as a criminal matter and their perpetrators prosecuted. The EU trusts that the Lebanese law enforcement authorities will be able and determined to follow the cases appropriately. It is the role of these authorities to establish the identity of the perpetrators and whether or not they belong to a specific group or party. The EU is actively involved in the reform and strengthening of Lebanon's security sector through special cooperation programs, which are foreseen to continue in the coming years.

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(Versione italiana)

**Interrogazione con richiesta di risposta scritta E-004253/12  
alla Commissione (Vicepresidente/Alto Rappresentante)**

**Fiorello Provera (EFD)**

(24 aprile 2012)

Oggetto: VP/HR — Palestinese condannato a morte per avere venduto la sua proprietà

Il 23 aprile 2012 la rivista *The Weekly Standard* ha riferito che un ex funzionario dell'intelligence palestinese, Muhammad Abu Shahala, è stato condannato a morte per aver venduto una casa ad ebrei residenti nella città di Hebron, in Cisgiordania. Diverse agenzie di stampa hanno riferito che la condanna è stata emessa a conclusione di un processo frettoloso. Il suo reato è consistito semplicemente nel vendere una proprietà immobiliare a degli ebrei. Membri della comunità ebraica di Hebron hanno scritto una lettera aperta a importanti personalità, tra cui il primo ministro israeliano Benjamin Netanyahu, il Segretario di Stato statunitense Hillary Clinton e il Segretario generale delle Nazioni Unite Ban Ki-moon, esortandoli ad agire. Si ritiene che la confessione rilasciata da Abu Shahala sia stata estorta con la tortura. La condanna verrà eseguita soltanto se il presidente Mahmoud Abbas firmerà il mandato di esecuzione. Molti palestinesi sono stati bersaglio di esecuzioni extragiudiziali per aver commesso il «crimine» di avere venduto una proprietà ad ebrei. In seguito alla creazione dell'Autorità palestinese, una delle prime leggi adottate è stata quella che ha stabilito che la vendita di terreni agli ebrei costituisce un reato punibile con la pena di morte.

1. È il Vicepresidente/Alto Rappresentante a conoscenza della condanna a morte nei confronti di Muhammad Abu Shahala?
2. È disposto a discutere della questione con il Presidente Mahmoud Abbas e a chiedere che la pena sia commutata?
3. Ha già sollevato in passato presso le autorità palestinesi la questione delle esecuzioni extragiudiziali? In caso affermativo, con quali risultati?

**Risposta dell'Alta Rappresentante/Vicepresidente Catherine Ashton a nome della Commissione**

(6 luglio 2012)

Dalle informazioni a sua disposizione, l'Alta Rappresentante/Vicepresidente evince che Muhamad Abu Shahala non è stato accusato di un reato passibile di pena capitale. Inoltre, non è stata ancora emessa alcuna sentenza su questo caso.

L'Unione europea ribadisce il suo impegno, ampio e globale, a monitorare gli sviluppi in materia di diritti umani nelle regioni della Cisgiordania sotto il controllo dell'Autorità palestinese. L'UE sostiene l'applicazione del principio del giusto processo in tutti i procedimenti giudiziari palestinesi senza eccezioni e ha espresso questa posizione ai rappresentanti palestinesi in diverse occasioni. L'UE ricorda che dal 2007 è in vigore in Cisgiordania una moratoria de facto sull'esecuzione delle sentenze di pena di morte.

Si ricorda inoltre che l'Unione europea resta contraria alla pena di morte in qualsiasi circostanza.

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(English version)

**Question for written answer E-004253/12**  
**to the Commission (Vice-President/High Representative)**  
**Fiorello Provera (EFD)**  
(24 April 2012)

*Subject:* VP/HR — A Palestinian sentenced to death for selling property

On 23 April 2012, *The Weekly Standard* magazine reported that a former Palestinian intelligence official, Muhammad Abu Shahala, had been sentenced to death for selling a house to Jewish residents in the West Bank town of Hebron. A number of news agencies have said he was sentenced following a rushed trial. His crime was simply to sell property to Jews. Members of the Jewish community in Hebron have written an open letter to prominent individuals, including Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, urging them to take action. Abu Shahala's reported confession was believed to have been induced through torture. The sentence will only be carried out if President Mahmoud Abbas signs his death warrant. Many Palestinians have been targeted for extrajudicial killings for the 'crime' of selling property to Jews. Following the creation of the Palestinian Authority, one of the first laws to be adopted was to make it a capital offence to sell land to Jews.

1. Is the Vice-President/High Representative aware of the sentencing to death of Muhammad Abu Shahala?
2. Is the Vice-President/High Representative prepared to discuss this issue with President Mahmoud Abbas and to call for the sentence to be commuted?
3. Has the Vice-President/High Representative raised the issue of extrajudicial killings with the Palestinian authorities in the past? If so, what was the outcome?

**Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Ashton on behalf of the Commission**  
(6 July 2012)

According to the information at her disposal, the High Representative/Vice-President understands that Muhamad Abu Shahala has not been charged with a capital offence. Furthermore, no judgment has yet been rendered in this case.

The EU remains committed to a broad and comprehensive effort to monitor human rights developments in the West Bank areas under Palestinian Authority control. The EU supports the application of due process in all Palestinian proceedings without exception and has made this point to Palestinian representatives on a number of separate occasions. The EU recalls that a de facto moratorium on the carrying out of death penalty sentences has been in place in the West Bank since 2007.

It is recalled that the EU remains opposed to the death penalty under any circumstances.

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(English version)

**Question for written answer E-004257/12  
to the Commission**

**William (The Earl of) Dartmouth (EFD)**

(24 April 2012)

*Subject:* EU staff

Can the Commission provide a breakdown of the number of staff employed in the Commission?

**Question for written answer E-004258/12  
to the Commission**

**William (The Earl of) Dartmouth (EFD)**

(24 April 2012)

*Subject:* EU staff II

Can the Commission provide a breakdown of staff grades in the Commission?

**Joint answer given by Mr Šefčovič on behalf of the Commission**

(25 May 2012)

The Honourable Member will find a breakdown of the number of staff per grade employed in the Commission at the following link: [http://ec.europa.eu/civil\\_service/about/figures/index\\_en.htm](http://ec.europa.eu/civil_service/about/figures/index_en.htm)

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(Deutsche Fassung)

**Anfrage zur schriftlichen Beantwortung E-004259/12  
an die Kommission**

**Hans-Peter Mayer (PPE)**

(24. April 2012)

*Betrifft:* EU-Wettbewerbsregeln: Verwaltungskostenbeitrag von Krankenkassen

Ein Bürger aus meinem Wahlkreis hat am 22. September 2011 eine Anfrage bzgl. der Rechtmäßigkeit von Verwaltungskostenbeiträgen an die Kommission gestellt. Am 12. Dezember 2011 bekam er die Antwort, dass die E-Mail an die Abteilung D2 der GD Gesundheit und Verbraucherschutz weitergeleitet wurde. Bis zum 3. April 2012 wurde die Frage nicht beantwortet. Das sind über 6 Monate.

1. Warum dauert die Beantwortung der Anfrage so lange?
2. Wann ist mit einer Antwort zu rechnen?

Der Sachverhalt: Dem Bürger wird eine ambulante Kur von seiner deutschen Krankenkasse in Tschechien (Marienbad) gewährt. Im Nachhinein verlangt die Krankenkasse für die Abrechnung mit dem tschechischen Anbieter einen Verwaltungskostenbeitrag für „Verwaltungskosten und fehlende Wirtschaftlichkeitsprüfung“.

3. Ist der von der Krankenkasse geforderte Verwaltungskostenbeitrag nach EU-Recht gerechtfertigt?

**Antwort von Herrn Dalli im Namen der Kommission**

(26. Juni 2012)

Die Kommission dankt dem Herrn Abgeordneten dafür, dass er sie auf die Verzögerung bei der Beantwortung einer E-Mail aufmerksam gemacht hat, und teilt mit, dass die Kommission am 16. Mai 2012 die Fragen des betreffenden Bürgers schriftlich beantwortet hat.

Zur Rechtfertigung eines Verwaltungskostenbeitrags nach EU-Recht ist zu sagen, dass ein solcher Beitrag grundsätzlich erhoben werden könnte, sofern für dieselbe Kur auch innerhalb des Versicherungsmitgliedstaats derselbe Beitrag verlangt würde. Laut Artikel 13 des deutschen Sozialgesetzbuchs V kann vom Erstattungsbetrag ein Abschlag für Verwaltungskosten und fehlende Wirtschaftlichkeitsprüfung in Abzug gebracht werden. Diese Kosten fallen unabhängig davon an, ob die versicherte Person die Leistungen in Deutschland oder in einem anderen Mitgliedstaat erhalten hat.

Nach Ansicht der Kommission könnte es sich in der Praxis um eine Maßnahme handeln, die die Dienstleistungsfreiheit nach den Artikeln 56 und 57 AEUV einschränkt, wenn der Abzug für Verwaltungskosten oder die fehlende Wirtschaftlichkeitsprüfung sich so auswirkt, dass dadurch die Gesundheitsversorgung in einem anderen Mitgliedstaat weniger attraktiv ist als in Deutschland. Die Kommission erörtert im Zuge des Verfahrens zur Umsetzung der Richtlinie 2011/24/EU über die Ausübung der Patientenrechte in der grenzüberschreitenden Gesundheitsversorgung<sup>(1)</sup>, die bis 25. Oktober 2013 umgesetzt werden muss, auch diese Frage mit den deutschen Behörden.

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<sup>(1)</sup> ABl. L 88 vom 4.4.2011.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-004259/12  
to the Commission**

**Hans-Peter Mayer (PPE)**

(24 April 2012)

*Subject:* EU rules on competition: contribution to health insurance administration costs

On 22 September 2011 a citizen from my constituency put a question to the Commission concerning the legality of contributions to health insurance administration costs. On 12 December 2011 he was told that the e-mail had been forwarded to Department D2 of the Directorates General for Health and Consumers. The question had still not been answered on 3 April 2012, which is more than six months after the initial query.

1. Why is it taking so long to answer the citizen's question?
2. When is an answer to be expected?

The citizen is currently being treated as an outpatient in the Czech Republic (Marienbad) using his German health insurance. However, the health insurance company is now demanding a contribution for 'administration costs and the lack of a cost/benefit analysis' for settlement with the Czech provider.

3. Is the administration cost contribution demanded by the German health insurance provider justified according to EC law?

**Answer given by Mr Dalli on behalf of the Commission**

(26 June 2012)

The Commission would like to thank the Honourable Member for bringing to its attention this failure to respond promptly to an e-mail and to inform that, on 16 May, the Commission responded in writing to the questions of the constituent in question.

With regard to whether or not the deduction of administrative costs is justified within EC law, such a deduction could in principle be justified provided that the same amount would also be deducted for the same care received within the Member State of affiliation. Article 13 of the German Social Security Code V stipulates that a deduction for administrative costs and for lack of efficiency should be deducted from the amount reimbursed. These costs are requested regardless of whether or not the insured persons receive healthcare in Germany or in another Member State.

The Commission's view is that if, in practice, the deduction of administrative costs or a deduction based on the requirement for an efficiency audit has the effect of making healthcare in another Member State less attractive than that in Germany, then it could amount to a measure equivalent to a restriction on the freedom to provide services as enshrined in Articles 56 and 57 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. The Commission is in discussion with the German authorities on this issue as part of the transposition process of Directive 2011/24/EU <sup>(1)</sup> on the application of patients' rights in cross-border healthcare, due to be transposed by Member States by 25 October 2013.

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<sup>(1)</sup> OJ L 88, 4.4.2011.

(Deutsche Fassung)

**Anfrage zur schriftlichen Beantwortung P-004260/12**  
**an die Kommission**  
**Angelika Werthmann (NI)**  
(25. April 2012)

*Betrifft:* Europäisches Nachbarschaftsinstrument (KOM(2011)0839)

In dem Vorschlag für eine Verordnung des Europäischen Parlamentes und des Rates zur Schaffung eines Europäischen Nachbarschaftsinstrumentes heißt es in Erwägung 19:

„Zwar wächst der Finanzierungsbedarf im Bereich des auswärtigen Handelns der Union, die für diese Hilfe zur Verfügung stehenden Mittel sind jedoch angesichts der Wirtschafts- und Haushaltslage der Union begrenzt. Die Kommission muss sich daher bemühen, die verfügbaren Ressourcen durch den Einsatz von Finanzierungsinstrumenten, die eine Hebelwirkung haben, so effizient wie möglich zu nutzen. Diese Hebelwirkung sollte dadurch verstärkt werden, dass die mit diesen Finanzierungsinstrumenten investierten und erwirtschafteten Mittel verwendet und wiederverwendet werden dürfen.“

Kann die Kommission dazu folgende Fragen beantworten:

1. Welche Art von Finanzierungsinstrumenten ist diesbezüglich gemeint?
2. Kommen diese Finanzierungsinstrumente bereits in anderen EU-Programmen zur Anwendung?
3. Wie ist die genannte „Hebelwirkung“ zu verstehen?
4. Inwieweit unterliegen diese Finanzierungsmittel einer Kontrolle durch das Europäische Parlament?
5. Verwendung und Wiederverwendung der Mittel: Inwieweit ist das Europäische Parlament in die einschlägigen Beschlussfassungsprozesse eingebunden? Wie wird es informiert? Wo erscheinen diese Mittel im EU-Haushalt?

**Antwort von Herrn Füle im Namen der Kommission**  
(28. Juni 2012)

1. Im Bereich der Europäischen Nachbarschaftspolitik gibt es Finanzierungsinstrumente zur Unterstützung von Risikokapital- und Garantietransaktionen zugunsten kleiner und mittlerer Unternehmen. So werden die Investitions- und Partnerschaftsfazilität Europa-Mittelmeer der Europäischen Investitionsbank und die Nachbarschafts-Investitionsfazilität (NIF) sowie von der NIF unterstützte Instrumente wie der Europäische Nachbarschaftsfonds — unter der Führung der KfW — in der östlichen Nachbarschaft und der (auf Initiative der KfW eingerichtete) SANAD-Fonds in der südlichen Nachbarschaft unterstützt.
2. Ähnliche Instrumente kommen in anderen EU-Programmen, die im Rahmen des Instruments für Heranführungshilfe, des Finanzierungsinstruments für die Entwicklungszusammenarbeit und des Europäischen Entwicklungsfonds finanziert werden, zur Anwendung.
3. Unter der „Hebelwirkung“ versteht man den Effekt, durch den begrenzte EU-Mittel eine größere Intervention von Finanzinstituten ermöglichen, wodurch das Gesamtvolumen der für die Endempfänger verfügbaren finanziellen Unterstützung erhöht wird.
4. Die neue Haushaltsordnung sieht eine Stärkung der Rolle des Parlaments bei der Programmgestaltung, dem Haushaltsverfahren, der Umsetzung und Abwicklung von Finanzierungsinstrumenten vor. Insbesondere werden durch detaillierte Berichterstattungsvorschriften vollständige Transparenz und die Kontrolle des Parlaments sowohl im Rahmen des Haushalts- als auch des Entlastungsverfahrens sichergestellt.
5. Rückflüsse sind Einnahmen (einschließlich Dividenden, Kapitalgewinne, Garantiegebühren und Zinsen auf Darlehen und auf Treuhandkontoguthaben) und Rückzahlungen (einschließlich Kapitalrückzahlungen, freigegebene Garantien und Rückzahlungen von Kapitalbeträgen von Darlehen), die an die Kommission oder auf für Finanzierungsinstrumente eröffnete Treuhandkonten zurückgezahlt werden und den Mitteln zuzurechnen sind, die aus dem EU-Haushalt für ein Finanzierungsinstrument bereitgestellt werden. Derzeit bestehen zwar keine horizontalen Vorschriften für die Wiederverwendung der Rückflüsse, aber die überarbeitete Haushaltsordnung wird allgemeine Bestimmungen für diese Wiederverwendung enthalten.

(English version)

**Question for written answer P-004260/12  
to the Commission**

**Angelika Werthmann (NI)**

(25 April 2012)

*Subject:* European Neighbourhood Instrument (COM(2011) 839)

Recital 19 of the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing a European Neighbourhood Instrument states:

'European Union external support has increasing financing needs but the economic and budgetary situation of the Union limits the resources available for such support. The Commission must therefore seek the most efficient use of available resources by using financial instruments with leverage effect. Such effect could be increased by enabling the use and re-use of funds invested and generated by financial instruments.'

1. Which types of financial instrument are being referred to here?
2. Are these financial instruments already in use in other EU programmes?
3. How are we to understand the 'leverage effect'?
4. To what extent are these funds subject to control by the European Parliament?
5. Use and re-use of funds: to what extent is the European Parliament involved in the relevant decision-making processes? How is it kept informed? Where are these funds shown in the EU budget?

**Answer given by Mr Füle on behalf of the Commission**

(28 June 2012)

1. In the field of European Neighbourhood Policy, financial instruments provide support to risk-capital and guarantee operations in favour of small and medium sized enterprises, such as support to the European Investment Bank's Facility for Euro-Mediterranean Partnership or the Neighbourhood Investment Facility (NIF) and to instruments supported through NIF such as the European Neighbourhood Fund — promoted by KfW — in the Eastern Neighbourhood and the SANAD fund (initiated by KfW) in the Southern Neighbourhood.
  2. Similar instruments are used in other EU programmes financed under the Instrument for Pre-Accession, the Development Cooperation Instrument and the European Development Fund.
  3. The 'leverage effect' is the effect by which a limited amount of EU funding can enable a larger intervention by Financial Institutions, thereby increasing the overall financial support to final recipients.
  4. The new Financial Regulation foresees an increased role of the Parliament in the programme design, budgetary process, implementation and unwinding of financial instruments. In particular, detailed reporting requirements will ensure full transparency and control for the Parliament both in the context of the budgetary and the discharge procedure.
  5. Reflows are revenues (including dividends, capital gains, guarantee fees and interest on loans and on amounts on fiduciary accounts) and repayments (including capital repayments, guarantees released, and repayments of the principal of loans) paid back to the Commission or fiduciary accounts opened for financial instruments and attributable to the support from the Union budget under a financial instrument. While currently no horizontal rules for the reuse of reflows exist the revised Financial Regulation will contain general provisions for such reuse.
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(Versione italiana)

**Interrogazione con richiesta di risposta scritta E-004262/12  
alla Commissione  
Mara Bizzotto (EFD)  
(25 aprile 2012)**

**Oggetto:** Attacco contro i Cristiani nel Sudan

Nella capitale del Sudan, Khartoum, il 22 aprile un gruppo di integralisti islamici ha attaccato una chiesa protestante e l'annesso centro studi, ma per fortuna non ci sono state vittime. Il tutto è avvenuto in concomitanza con l'annuncio della riconquista della regione dell'Heglig, ricca zona petrolifera, da anni contesa fra Sud Sudan e Sudan e in questo mese teatro di fortissimi scontri.

La Commissione ne è a conoscenza? Sono in essere rapporti diplomatici di mediazione da parte dell'UE per assicurare la pace fra i 2 stati e per tutelare i diritti dei Cristiani nella Regione? Fra i fondi stanziati per il Sudan del FES (Fondo europeo di sviluppo) ve ne sono di previsti per sostenere le comunità cristiane del Sudan?

**Risposta di Andris Piebalgs a nome della Commissione  
(19 giugno 2012)**

La Commissione ha preso nota con preoccupazione dell'attacco ad una chiesa cristiana verificatosi a Khartoum il 22 aprile 2012. La libertà di religione e di credo è un diritto umano universale da tutelare ovunque e per chiunque. È dovere fondamentale degli Stati proteggere i propri cittadini e le persone che vivono sotto la loro giurisdizione, nonché tutelarne i diritti.

L'UE segue da vicino il recente peggioramento dei rapporti tra Sudan e Sud Sudan. L'11 aprile 2012, l'Alta Rappresentante/Vicepresidente ha espresso preoccupazione per l'acuirsi del conflitto armato tra i due paesi e li ha esortati a cessare le ostilità e a rispettare la reciproca integrità territoriale. Il 26 aprile 2012 ha accolto con favore l'adozione da parte del Consiglio per la pace e la sicurezza dell'Unione africana di una tabella di marcia per porre fine alle tensioni e ricondurre i paesi ai negoziati. Già il 23 aprile 2012, il Consiglio «Affari esteri» si era dichiarato in sostegno di tale iniziativa. Infine, il 5 maggio 2012, l'Alta Rappresentante/Vicepresidente ha accolto con favore la risoluzione del Consiglio di sicurezza delle Nazioni Unite del 2 maggio 2012 in sostegno della tabella di marcia del Consiglio per la pace e la sicurezza dell'UA, che sollecitava entrambi i paesi ad attuare tale tabella.

L'UE sta seguendo da vicino la situazione dei diritti umani in Sudan, con particolare riguardo della libertà di religione e di credo. Le problematiche legate ai diritti umani sono costantemente presenti nell'agenda politica riguardante il governo sudanese. L'UE ha avviato un dialogo sulla libertà di culto con il consiglio consultivo sudanese per i diritti dell'uomo e con le autorità cristiane del paese. Gli attuali stanziamenti del Fondo europeo di sviluppo sono principalmente destinati ad agricoltura, sanità e istruzione. Tuttavia, l'impegno dell'Unione con la società civile sudanese continua a essere forte grazie ai fondi dello strumento europeo per la democrazia e i diritti umani, che aumenteranno da 0,6 milioni di EUR a 0,8 milioni nel 2013.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-004262/12  
to the Commission  
Mara Bizzotto (EFD)  
(25 April 2012)**

*Subject:* Attack against Christians in Sudan

On 22 April 2012, in Sudan's capital Khartoum, a group of Islamic fundamentalists attacked a Protestant church and the study centre attached to it. Fortunately, there were no victims. The event occurred at the same time as the announcement of the retaking of the Heglig region, which is rich in oil and has been contested for years by Sudan and South Sudan, and which in recent months has seen fierce fighting.

Is the Commission aware of this fact? Is the EU undertaking diplomatic dialogue as a mediator to ensure peace between the two states and to protect the rights of Christians in the region? Of the funds allocated to Sudan by the European Development Fund, will any be used to support the Christian communities in the country?

**Answer given by Mr Piebalgs on behalf of the Commission  
(19 June 2012)**

The Commission noted with concern the attack on a Christian church on 22 April 2012 in Khartoum. Freedom of religion or belief is a universal human right which must be protected everywhere and for everyone. It is the primary duty of States to protect their citizens, as well as all people living in their jurisdiction, and to safeguard their rights.

The EU follows closely the recent deterioration of relations between Sudan and South Sudan. On 11 April 2012, the HR/VP expressed her concern about the escalation of the armed conflict between the two countries, and called on them to cease hostilities and respect each other's territorial integrity. On 26 April 2012, she welcomed the adoption by the African Union Peace and Security Council (AU PSC) of a Roadmap to end tensions and bring the countries back to negotiations. Already on 23 April 2012, the EU Foreign Affairs Council had expressed support for such steps. Finally, on 5 May 2012, the HR/VP welcomed the UN Security Council resolution of 2 May 2012 backing the AU PSC Roadmap, and urging both countries to implement it.

The EU is closely watching the human rights situation in Sudan, in particular freedom of religion and belief. Human rights issues are constantly on the political agenda with the Government of Sudan. The EU has established a dialogue on religious freedom with the Sudanese Advisory Council for Human Rights, and with the Christian authorities in the country. Current EDF allocations focus on agriculture, health and education. However, the EU's engagement with Sudanese civil society continues to be strong through the European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights, whose allocations for Sudan will increase from EUR 0.6 million in 2012 to EUR 0.8 million in 2013.

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(Versione italiana)

**Interrogazione con richiesta di risposta scritta E-004263/12**  
**alla Commissione**  
**Mara Bizzotto (EFD)**  
(25 aprile 2012)

**Oggetto:** Additivi per abbattere le emissioni inquinanti e ridurre i consumi di carburante nel comparto pubblico

Sono stati presentati lunedì 23 aprile a Venezia i risultati del progetto «Clean Venice», iniziativa della Regione Veneto che prevedeva un test di tre anni durante il quale su 80 autobus pubblici della ACTV si è sperimentato il «Magigas D7» additivo dell'omonima azienda pistoiese in grado di abbattere consumi e particolati inquinanti prodotti dai motori a gasolio di vecchia generazione euro 2 ed euro 3. Su un percorso di 2 milioni di km, si è riscontrata una riduzione di emissioni inquinanti pari a —326kg di PM10, —200 tonnellate di CO<sub>2</sub> con un risparmio di circa 15 000 euro per milione di litri. I dati sono stati certificati dal Centro comune di ricerca della Comunità europea. Tale additivo dà i risultati maggiori in termini di abbattimento di emissioni inquinanti sui motori più datati, il che permetterebbe di reinvestire il risparmio, ad esempio nell'acquisto di nuovi mezzi.

La Commissione è a conoscenza di tale sperimentazione e dei risultati conseguiti? Considerati i dati forniti dallo studio, la Commissione ritiene che sarebbe utile estendere l'utilizzo tali additivi a tutto il comparto del trasporto pubblico e non solo a scelte di singole amministrazioni o aziende?

**Risposta di Máire Geoghegan-Quinn a nome della Commissione**  
(27 giugno 2012)

La Commissione è al corrente del fatto che i carburanti riformulati/modificati (attraverso additivi, per esempio) possono comportare significative riduzioni delle emissioni dei veicoli. È anche noto che la portata degli effetti (negativi o positivi) dipende in larga parte dalla tecnologia del motore e dalle condizioni operative e ambientali. Tutto questo è stato accuratamente illustrato nello studio del centro di ricerca comune della Commissione cui l'onorevole parlamentare accenna. Naturalmente non è possibile generalizzare sulle conclusioni. Inoltre, il prodotto specifico menzionato è solo una delle eventuali opzioni commercialmente disponibili sul mercato, che possono essere usate per ridurre le emissioni degli attuali parchi veicoli; tra le altre opzioni vi sono l'uso di altri additivi/componenti dei carburanti, i carburanti alternativi (ad esempio il gas naturale compresso) e i dispositivi di installazione successiva come i filtri del particolato. Ciascuna di queste opzioni presenta vantaggi ed inconvenienti che vanno attentamente valutati in termini di conseguenze sulla qualità dell'aria a livello locale. La valutazione, che necessariamente deve procedere caso per caso, dovrà anche tener conto di altri aspetti essenziali, come la compatibilità dell'additivo/componente con il motore e con i dispositivi post-trattamento, eventuali questioni di sicurezza e ambientali relative alla produzione e al trattamento del prodotto e il rapporto costi/benefici.

La direttiva 2009/33/CE<sup>(1)</sup> relativa alla promozione di veicoli puliti e a basso consumo energetico nel trasporto su strada indica una metodologia tecnologicamente neutrale per valutare l'efficienza energetica e le economie in termini di gas a effetto serra e di emissioni di sostanze inquinanti su base economica.

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<sup>(1)</sup> <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2009:120:0005:0012:it:PDF>.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-004263/12  
to the Commission  
Mara Bizzotto (EFD)  
(25 April 2012)**

*Subject:* Additives to cut polluting emissions and reduce fuel consumption in the public sector

On Monday 23 April 2012, the results of the 'Clean Venice' project were presented in the city. The project launched by the Veneto Region entailed a three-year experiment during which 80 ACTV public buses tested the 'Magigas D7' additive, manufactured by the eponymous company from Pistoia. This additive aims to cut consumption and polluting particulates produced by older Euro II and III diesel engines. Over a distance of 2 million kilometres, it resulted in a polluting-emission reduction of 326 kilograms of PM10 and 200 tonnes of CO<sub>2</sub>, with a saving of around EUR 15 000 per million litres. The data have been certified by the Joint Research Centre of the European Commission. This additive yields its best results in terms of cutting polluting emissions in older engines, which enables the savings to be reinvested, for example, in the purchase of new vehicles.

Is the Commission aware of this experiment and of the results obtained? Given the data supplied by the study, does the Commission not agree that it would be useful to extend the use of these additives to the public transport sector as a whole, and not only to individual administrations or companies who choose to use them?

**Answer given by Ms Geoghegan-Quinn on behalf of the Commission  
(27 June 2012)**

The Commission is well aware that reformulated/modified fuels (via additives for example) can result in significant reductions of emissions from vehicles. Further it is also well known that the magnitude of the effects (positive or negative) can largely depend on the engine technology as well as on the operating and environmental conditions. This has been demonstrated in the specific study of the Commission's Joint Research Centre mentioned by the Honourable Member. Needless to say conclusions cannot be generalised. Moreover the specific product mentioned is just one of the possible commercially available options that can be used to reduce emissions from existing vehicle fleets. Other options include the use of other fuel additives/components, alternative fuels (e.g. compressed natural gas) and retrofit devices such as particulate filters. Each of these options presents advantages and drawbacks that have to be thoroughly assessed in terms of their consequences on air quality at local level. This assessment, that necessarily has to be carried out on a case-by-case basis, should also address other essential aspects such as the compatibility of the additive/component used with the engine and after-treatment devices, potential safety and environmental issues related to the production and handling of the product and the cost/benefit ratio.

Directive 2009/33/EC<sup>(1)</sup> on the promotion of clean and energy-efficient road transport vehicles provides a technology-neutral methodology to assess energy efficiency and saving of greenhouse gas and pollutant emissions on an economic basis.

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<sup>(1)</sup> <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2009:120:0005:0012:en:pdf>.

(Versione italiana)

**Interrogazione con richiesta di risposta scritta E-004264/12**

**alla Commissione**

**Mara Bizzotto (EFD)**

(25 aprile 2012)

Oggetto: Diritti delle donne in Indonesia

In Indonesia continua la discriminazione contro le donne. L'ultima mossa dell'attuale governo in carica è quella di criminalizzare l'abbigliamento femminile, in particolare quello considerato «succinto», proponendo un emendamento alla legge «antipornografia» del 2008, per mettere al bando le gonne corte.

Come sostengono molte associazioni per i diritti dell'uomo e delle donne nel Paese, quest'ultima proposta di modifica della legge «antipornografia», anziché tutelare le donne, le criminalizza. Infatti sempre più spesso l'atteggiamento della politica conservatrice e anche delle forze dell'ordine non colpevolizza i criminali che si macchiano delle violenze contro le donne, colpevolizza invece le donne come se ne fossero indirettamente responsabili a causa della mancanza di rigore nei costumi.

La Commissione è al corrente di questa situazione? Come procedono i lavori della delegazione europea in Indonesia sul fronte dei diritti dell'uomo? La Commissione ha intenzione di prendere posizione per sostenere i diritti delle donne in Indonesia?

**Risposta dell'Alta Rappresentante/Vicepresidente Catherine Ashton a nome della Commissione**

(18 giugno 2012)

Negli ultimi anni, l'Indonesia ha compiuto alcuni progressi in materia di protezione e promozione dei diritti delle donne. Tra gli esempi sono annoverate la legge sulla violenza domestica, adottata nel 2004, e la legge sulla tratta delle donne, adottata nel 2007. Il governo ha integrato una serie di iniziative collegate al tema dei diritti delle donne nel terzo piano d'azione annuale sui diritti umani per il 2011-2014, tra cui figura la progressiva applicazione della convenzione sull'eliminazione di tutte le forme di discriminazione delle donne e del relativo protocollo opzionale. Il governo ha inoltre riconosciuto la necessità di migliorare la protezione dei lavoratori migranti e non che, per la maggior parte, sono donne.

Tuttavia, come illustra l'esempio citato dall'onorevole parlamentare riguardo alla proposta di un emendamento volto a mettere al bando le gonne corte, occorrono ulteriori miglioramenti nel campo dei diritti delle donne.

Il 2 maggio 2012 a Giacarta si è tenuta la terza sessione del dialogo sui diritti umani tra l'UE e l'Indonesia. Le discussioni su svariate questioni sui diritti umani di interesse comune, compresa quella relativa ai diritti delle donne, sono state aperte e costruttive. Le sessioni tenutesi finora hanno offerto una preziosa opportunità di affrontare le preoccupazioni relative ai diritti delle donne, comprese questioni come la tratta delle donne, la mutilazione genitale e l'impatto delle prescrizioni della sharia locale sui diritti delle donne.

L'UE, in particolare attraverso la sua delegazione a Giacarta, continuerà a seguire e ad affrontare le questioni relative ai diritti delle donne e a sostenere progetti nell'ambito dei diritti umani in Indonesia, segnatamente per mezzo dello Strumento europeo per la democrazia e i diritti umani.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-004264/12  
to the Commission  
Mara Bizzotto (EFD)  
(25 April 2012)**

*Subject:* Women's rights in Indonesia

There is continuing discrimination against women in Indonesia. The latest move by the ruling government is to criminalise women's clothing, particularly that considered to be 'scanty', by proposing an amendment to the 2008 'anti-pornography' law to ban short skirts.

Many Indonesian human rights and women's rights organisations claim that this latest proposal to amend the 'anti-pornography' law portrays women as criminals rather than protecting them. In fact, conservative policies and the police are increasingly failing to criminalise men who perpetrate acts of violence against women; instead they portray women as being indirectly responsible, through a lack of discipline in the way they dress.

Is the Commission aware of this situation? How is the work of the EU delegation in Indonesia progressing with regard to human rights? Does the Commission intend to take a stance in support of women's rights in Indonesia?

**Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Ashton on behalf of the Commission  
(18 June 2012)**

Indonesia has made some progress on protecting and promoting women's rights in recent years. Examples in this regard include the law on domestic violence adopted in 2004 and on trafficking in 2007. The Government has incorporated a range of initiatives relating to women's rights in the third Annual Action Plan on human rights for 2011-2014, including work towards the implementation of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women and its optional protocol. The Government has also acknowledged the need to improve the protection of domestic and migrant workers, who are mainly female.

However, further improvement is necessary on women's rights as the example mentioned by the Honourable Member of Parliament about a proposed amendment to ban short skirts illustrates.

The EU and Indonesia held their third annual dialogue on human rights on 2 May 2012 in Jakarta. The discussions on a wide range of human rights issues of mutual interest, including women rights, were open and constructive. The previous dialogues held to date have provided a valuable opportunity to address concerns relating to women rights including trafficking, female genital mutilation and the impact of local sharia regulations on women's rights.

The EU, in particular through its Delegation in Jakarta, will continue to monitor and address human rights issues and to support human rights projects in Indonesia notably through the European Instrument for Democracy and Human rights.

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(Versione italiana)

**Interrogazione con richiesta di risposta scritta E-004265/12**  
**alla Commissione**  
**Mara Bizzotto (EFD)**  
(25 aprile 2012)

Oggetto: Delocalizzazione e autotrasporti

Di recente la FIAP, associazione del settore dei trasporti, ha denunciato la presenza diffusa di trasportatori che lavorano per soli 0,81 euro a km, quando le tariffe di legge fissano il limite minimo a 1,25 euro a km, con margini già strettissimi per gli autotrasportatori.

La Commissione come spiega il fenomeno per il quale se per un'impresa italiana un autista impegnato in trasporti internazionali costa mediamente quattromila euro al mese in Europa qualcuno è disposto a circolare per meno di un decimo?

La Commissione è a conoscenza del comportamento di alcuni imprenditori che per assicurarsi grandi profitti delocalizzano la sede dell'azienda all'estero, in paesi (come quelli dell'est) dove ci sono ben altri costi di lavoro, di gran lunga inferiori a quelli in vigore in Italia, con uno stratagemma che permette loro di offrire servizi di trasporto sottocosto a danno dei camionisti onesti?

Se la sicurezza ha un costo che significa limiti di velocità, tempi di guida, niente sovraccarico, la Commissione non intende indagare su quanto sta accadendo ai danni della sicurezza di tutti i cittadini europei?

**Risposta data da Siim Kallas a nome della Commissione**  
(4 giugno 2012)

A norma dell'articolo 153, paragrafo 5, del TFUE, le questioni relative alla retribuzione non rientrano nella sfera di competenza dell'Unione europea. Gli Stati membri hanno competenza esclusiva in quest'ambito. Pertanto la Commissione non può adottare disposizioni in materia di definizione delle retribuzioni. Se un lavoratore è temporaneamente distaccato per lavorare in un altro Stato membro, l'articolo 3 della direttiva 96/71/CE, relativa al distacco dei lavoratori nell'ambito di una prestazione di servizi <sup>(1)</sup>, prevede che al lavoratore distaccato si applichino le condizioni di base obbligatorie nello Stato membro ospitante, fra le quali le tariffe salariali minime definite dalla legislazione e/o dalla prassi nazionale dello Stato membro nel cui territorio il lavoratore è distaccato.

Come tutela ulteriore, l'articolo 10 del regolamento (CE) n. 561/2006, relativo all'armonizzazione di alcune disposizioni in materia sociale nel settore dei trasporti su strada, vieta alle imprese di trasporto di corrispondere ai conducenti salariati, o messi a loro disposizione, retribuzioni sotto qualsiasi forma in base alle distanze percorse o al volume delle merci trasportate, se tali retribuzioni sono di natura tale da mettere in pericolo la sicurezza stradale.

Inoltre l'articolo 6 del regolamento (CE) n. 1071/2009, che stabilisce norme comuni sulle condizioni da rispettare per esercitare l'attività di trasportatore su strada <sup>(2)</sup>, prevede che un'impresa di trasporti possa perdere la licenza comunitaria in caso di infrazione alle norme relative ai tempi di guida, stabilite dal regolamento (CE) n. 561/2006, o se viola le norme nazionali in materia di condizioni di retribuzione e di lavoro della professione.

Qualora la Commissione fosse informata di eventuali violazioni da parte di un'impresa alle disposizioni citate, procederebbe ad ulteriori indagini.

<sup>(1)</sup> GUL 18 del 21.1.1997, pagg. 1-6.

<sup>(2)</sup> GUL 300 del 14.11.2009, pagg. 51-71.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-004265/12  
to the Commission  
Mara Bizzotto (EFD)  
(25 April 2012)**

*Subject:* Relocation and road haulage

Transport industry association FIAP recently reported the widespread presence of hauliers who work for just EUR 0.81 per km, when legal rates set the minimum at EUR 1.25 per km and when the margins of road hauliers are already being squeezed.

Can the Commission explain why, when a driver employed in international haulage by an Italian company costs an average of EUR 4 000 a month, there are people in Europe who are prepared to drive for less than a tenth of that?

Is the Commission aware of the behaviour of some businesses, which, in order to ensure high profits, relocate the company's registered office abroad, to countries (like those in the East), where labour costs are quite different and well below those in force in Italy, adopting a strategy that allows them to offer services below cost price, to the detriment of honest truck drivers?

Given the cost of safety, in terms of speed limits, driving hours, no excess loading, does the Commission intend to investigate what is happening to the detriment of the safety of all European citizens?

**Answer given by Mr Kallas on behalf of the Commission  
(4 June 2012)**

According to Article 153(5) TFEU, the matter of pay does not fall within the EU's remit. The Member States have alone competence in this field. Therefore, the Commission cannot take any measures as regards wage setting. If a worker is posted to work temporarily in another Member State, Article 3 of Directive 96/71/EC concerning the posting of workers in the framework of the provision of services<sup>(1)</sup> provides that a core of mandatory working conditions of the host Member State applies to the posted worker, including minimum rates of pay defined by the national law and/or practice of the Member State to whose territory the worker is posted.

As an additional protection, Article 10 of Regulation (EC) No 561/2006 on the harmonisation of certain social legislation relating to road transport forbids a transport undertaking to give drivers it employs or who are put at its disposal any payment in any form, which is related to distances travelled or the amount of goods carried if that payment is of such a kind as to endanger road safety.

Moreover, Article 6 of Regulation (EC) No 1071/2009 establishing common rules concerning the conditions to be complied with to pursue the occupation of road transport operator<sup>(2)</sup> provides that a transport undertaking may lose its Community licence if it infringes the driving times rules established by Regulation (EC) No 561/2006, or violates the national rules in the field of pay and employment conditions in the profession.

Should the Commission be notified of any breaches to the abovementioned provisions by undertakings, it would investigate the matter further.

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<sup>(1)</sup> OJ L 18, 21.1.1997, p. 1-6.

<sup>(2)</sup> OJ L 300, 14.11.2009, p. 51-71.



(Versione italiana)

**Interrogazione con richiesta di risposta scritta E-004267/12  
alla Commissione**

**Sergio Paolo Frances Silvestris (PPE)**

(25 aprile 2012)

Oggetto: Boom di fallimenti in Italia

Nel primo trimestre 2012, in Italia si sono registrati 3 001 fallimenti, quasi 33 ogni giorno. Tale dato evidenzia un incremento del +0,4 % rispetto al corrispondente periodo del 2011 ma, soprattutto, un drammatico +36,6 % rispetto ai primi tre mesi del 2009, quando la crisi economica aveva da poco iniziato a far sentire i suoi effetti. Dal 2009 al 2012 il trend dei fallimenti nella penisola mostra un evidente e costante aumento: dalle 2 202 chiusure registrate nel primo trimestre 2009, infatti, si è passati ai 2 825 casi del primo trimestre 2010, ai 2 988 del primo trimestre 2011, fino ai 3 001 rilevati al 31 marzo scorso. Dal 1° gennaio 2009 alla rilevazione attuale, in Italia sono state complessivamente 35 839 le imprese che hanno portato i libri in tribunale dichiarando fallimento.

La situazione non è omogenea lungo lo stivale. In alcune zone il problema è più stringente che altrove. In termini assoluti è la Lombardia a lamentare il numero più alto di fallimenti, ma solo perché è lì che si concentrano le aziende in generale.

1. Alla luce di quanto sopraesposto, può la Commissione far sapere se è in possesso di dati inerenti al numero delle imprese europee fallite nel primo trimestre del 2012?
2. Quali sono i programmi a favore delle imprese e dei lavoratori inseriti nell'Agenda per nuove competenze e per l'occupazione?

**Risposta di László Andor a nome della Commissione**

(15 giugno 2012)

1. La Commissione non è in condizione di fornire informazioni sul numero di imprese europee che sono fallite nel primo trimestre del 2012.

I dati relativi alla mortalità delle imprese sono raccolti nel quadro della demografia delle imprese, ma soltanto su base annuale <sup>(1)</sup> e tali dati non sono ripartiti in base alla causa della cessazione (ad esempio bancarotta).

2. La Commissione è consapevole delle conseguenze negative che le ristrutturazioni aziendali possono avere sui lavoratori interessati, le loro famiglie e le regioni. Essa ribadisce la necessità di preparare e gestire in modo proattivo, con quanto più anticipo possibile, le operazioni di ristrutturazione.

Come indicato nell'Agenda per nuove competenze per l'occupazione, la Commissione ha indetto una consultazione pubblica — conclusasi il 30 marzo — per il tramite di un Libro verde su «Ristrutturare e anticipare i mutamenti: quali insegnamenti trarre dall'esperienza recente <sup>(2)</sup>» volto a identificare le prassi e le politiche rivelatesi efficaci in tale ambito.

Nella recente comunicazione «Verso una ripresa forte di occupazione» <sup>(3)</sup>, la Commissione propone di prendere le mosse dalle risposte al suo Libro verde in modo da assicurare un'implementazione più efficace delle buone pratiche in tema di gestione proattiva, preparazione e amministrazione delle ristrutturazioni di imprese nell'UE.

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<sup>(1)</sup> La cessazione di un'impresa è così definita nel manuale di riferimento (Eurostat-OECD Manual on Business Demography Statistics — Manuale Eurostat-OCSE sulle statistiche relative alla demografia delle imprese): «S'intende per cessazione di un'impresa la dissoluzione di una combinazione di fattori produttivi, purché si tratti di un evento in cui non intervengano altre imprese. Non sono comprese le uscite dalla popolazione dovute a fusioni, acquisizioni, dissoluzioni o ristrutturazioni di un gruppo di imprese. Non sono comprese le uscite da una sottopopolazione risultanti unicamente da un cambiamento di attività. Un'impresa è inclusa nel conteggio delle cessazioni soltanto se non viene riattivata entro due anni».

<sup>(2)</sup> <http://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?langId=en&catId=89&newsId=1166&furtherNews=yes>.

<sup>(3)</sup> COM(2012)173.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-004267/12  
to the Commission**

**Sergio Paolo Frances Silvestris (PPE)**

(25 April 2012)

*Subject:* Explosion in bankruptcies in Italy

In the first quarter of 2012, there were 3 001 bankruptcies — nearly 33 a day — in Italy. The figure is 0.4% higher than in the same period in 2011 and, most strikingly, has shot up by 36.6% compared with the first three months of 2009, when the economic crisis had just started to make itself felt. Since 2009 the bankruptcy trend on the Italian mainland has been moving clearly and constantly upwards: from the 2 202 closures in the first quarter of 2009, the number rose to 2 825 in the first quarter of 2010, 2 988 in the first quarter of 2011 and 3 001 on 31 March 2012. Between 1 January 2009 and the current survey, a total of 35 839 companies in Italy filed for bankruptcy in court.

The situation is not the same across the board. The problem is more serious in some areas than in others. In absolute terms, Lombardy has suffered the highest number of bankruptcies, but only because companies are generally concentrated there.

1. In view of the above, does the Commission have information on the number of European companies that went bankrupt in the first quarter of 2012?
2. What programmes are included in the Agenda for New Skills and Jobs to assist companies and employees?

**Answer given by M. Andor on behalf of the Commission**

(15 June 2012)

1. The Commission is not able to provide information on the number of European companies that went bankrupt in the first quarter of 2012.

The data on enterprises deaths are collected within the business demography framework, but on an annual basis only <sup>(1)</sup> and those data are not broken down by the cause of the dissolution (e.g. bankruptcy)

2. The Commission is aware of the negative consequences that company restructuring may have on concerned workers, their families and regions. It reaffirms the need to anticipate and prepare as far in advance as possible any restructuring operation.

As indicated in the Agenda for New Skills and Jobs, the Commission launched a public consultation — closed on 30 March — through a Green Paper on 'Restructuring and anticipation of change: lessons from recent experience' <sup>(2)</sup> aimed at identifying successful practices and policies in this field.

In the recent Communication 'Towards a job-rich recovery' <sup>(3)</sup>, the Commission proposes to build on the response to its Green Paper so as to bring about a more efficient implementation of good practices related to the anticipation, preparation and management of enterprise restructuring across the EU

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<sup>(1)</sup> An enterprise death is defined in the reference manual Eurostat-OECD Manual on Business Demography Statistics, 'A death amounts to the dissolution of a combination of production factors with the restriction that no other enterprises are involved in the event. Deaths do not include exits from the population due to mergers, take-overs, break-ups or restructuring of a set of enterprises. It does not include exits from a sub-population resulting only from a change of activity. An enterprise is included in the count of deaths only if it is not reactivated within two years'.

<sup>(2)</sup> <http://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?langId=en&catId=89&newsId=1166&furtherNews=yes>.

<sup>(3)</sup> COM(2012) 173.

(Versione italiana)

**Interrogazione con richiesta di risposta scritta E-004268/12  
alla Commissione**

**Sergio Paolo Frances Silvestris (PPE)**

(25 aprile 2012)

**Oggetto:** Boom di iscritti negli atenei europei online

Una laurea per tutti: online questo è possibile. Sembra questo il «fil rouge» che spiega il successo delle università telematiche, i cui iscritti in Italia sono passati dai 29.000 del 2009/2010 ai 42.000 del 2010/2011, con un aumento del 41 %. Si tratta di un autentico boom, spinto soprattutto dalla volontà di ottenere il titolo accademico anche più avanti dell'età «canonica» e mentre si lavora. Un trend che è testimoniato dai molti accordi siglati dagli undici atenei online con aziende private e istituzioni. L'impresa favorisce i dipendenti pagando per loro parte delle tasse, mentre l'università aumenta il bacino d'utenza fornendo pacchetti di iscrizioni a costi più contenuti.

Se è vero che le università telematiche offrono una chance in più, non sempre l'alloro accademico è sfolgorante. Nonostante l'attrazione «fatale» che ha fatto quadruplicare gli iscritti in quattro anni, restano molte zone opache di questo sistema varato nel 2003. Il sistema degli atenei online permette la formazione universitaria anche a chi non può o non vuole frequentare, ma è abbandonato senza controlli sulla qualità dei servizi erogati, anche se in alcuni casi la qualità è buona.

1. Alla luce di quanto sopraesposto, e tenendo conto che un'istruzione e una formazione professionale di elevata qualità sono fondamentali per consentire all'Europa di affermarsi come società della conoscenza e di competere in maniera efficace nell'economia globalizzata, può la Commissione far sapere se è in possesso di dati inerenti al numero di studenti iscritti ad atenei europei online?
2. Può indicare se una laurea conseguita in uno degli atenei online potrà essere equiparata alle lauree tradizionali, tenendo conto dell'impegno dell'UE a rendere più comparabili i diversi sistemi di istruzione nazionali attraverso un Quadro europeo delle qualifiche (QEF) e tenendo conto del fatto che, entro la fine del 2012, ogni nuova qualifica introdotta nell'UE avrà un chiaro riferimento a uno degli otto livelli previsti da tale quadro?

**Risposta di Androulla Vassiliou a nome della Commissione**

(22 giugno 2012)

1. I dati di Eurostat sugli studenti universitari nella UE non distinguono fra istituti universitari online e istituti d'altro tipo. È comunque evidente che l'istruzione online è in continua crescita. Come sottolineato dal programma di modernizzazione della UE, le università hanno la necessità di sviluppare approcci all'apprendimento e metodi didattici flessibili e innovativi: un uso efficace delle TIC può contribuire a personalizzare l'apprendimento per diversi gruppi di studenti fornire loro gli strumenti necessari per la società della conoscenza. Combinare l'insegnamento impartito nelle aule a quello online o rendere il materiale didattico liberamente accessibile («risorse educative aperte»), può aiutare gli interessati a conciliare studio e lavoro e agevolare l'apprendimento permanente. Le università online sono quindi un aspetto dell'uso crescente delle TIC nell'insegnamento superiore e sarà opportuno tenerle sotto osservazione ed effettuare su di esse gli stessi controlli di qualità di ogni altra istituzione. Si tratta di una questione che impegna sempre più le agenzie di certificazione della qualità. Anche la revisione delle *Norme e orientamenti europei per la certificazione della qualità* concordate dai ministri delle università del processo Bologna sarà l'occasione per adeguare le modalità di certificazione della qualità.
2. Occorre verificare se la qualifica conseguita presso l'università online è compresa in un elenco nazionale di qualifiche (ENQ) riconosciute e se il paese interessato ha correlato tale elenco al suo omologo a livello europeo (EEQ). In caso affermativo, la qualifica si riferirà, per legge, a un determinato livello dell'EEQ. Dato che l'EEQ si fonda sui risultati dell'apprendimento, tutti i tipi e i livelli di qualifiche, che sono definiti in termini di conoscenze, abilità e competenze acquisite, possono essere correlati all'EEQ attraverso un ENQ; non valgono come criteri né la durata del corso né l'identità dell'istituto in questione. L'ambito di applicazione e il numero di qualifiche esistenti in un ENQ dipende solo dalle scelte di ciascun paese.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-004268/12  
to the Commission**

**Sergio Paolo Frances Silvestris (PPE)**

(25 April 2012)

*Subject:* Enrolment boom at European online universities

A degree for everyone: this is possible online. That seems to be the common thread in, and the reason for, the success of distance learning universities. In Italy, enrolments at these establishments rose from 29 000 in 2009/2010 to 42 000 in 2010/2011, an increase of 41%. This is nothing short of a boom, driven mainly by the desire to graduate before the 'proper' age, and while working. This trend is illustrated by the many agreements signed by the 11 online universities with private companies and institutions. The company encourages employees by paying part of their fees, and the university widens its target group by providing cheaper enrolment packages.

While it is true that the distance learning universities offer an extra chance, the academic distinction conferred is not always outstanding. Notwithstanding the 'fatal' attraction which has quadrupled the number of enrolments in four years, many areas of this system, launched in 2003, remain opaque. The online university system provides a university education to those who cannot or do not wish to attend university in person, but there are no quality checks on the services provided, even though, in some cases, standards might be high.

1. In view of the above, and bearing in mind that high standards of education and vocational training are essential if Europe is to establish itself as a knowledge-based society and compete effectively in the globalised economy, does the Commission have information on the number of students enrolled at European online universities?
2. Can it say whether a degree obtained at an online university can be considered equivalent to traditional degrees, taking into account the EU's undertaking to make the different national education systems more comparable through a European Qualifications Framework (EQF) and also bearing in mind the fact that, by the end of 2012, every new qualification introduced in the EU will have a clear reference to one of the eight levels laid down under that framework?

**Answer given by Ms Androulla Vassiliou on behalf of the Commission**

(22 June 2012)

1. Eurostat figures on higher education students in the EU do not distinguish between online and other higher education institutions. However, it is clear that online provision is growing. As the EU's modernisation agenda underlines, higher education systems need to develop flexible, innovative learning approaches and delivery methods: effective use of ICT can help to personalise learning for different learner groups and equip students for the knowledge society. Combining class-based with online learning, or making teaching material freely available ('open educational resources'), can also help people combine work and study and facilitate lifelong learning. Online universities are thus one facet of a growing use of ICT in higher education. They should be screened and subject to the same quality control as any other institution. This is an issue that Quality Assurance Agencies are increasingly engaging with, and the revision of the European Standards and Guidelines for Quality Assurance agreed by Bologna higher education ministers will be an opportunity to adapt quality practices accordingly.
2. This depends on whether a qualification awarded by an online university is included in a national qualifications framework (NQF) and whether this NQF has been related to the EQF by the country concerned. If so, this qualification will, by law, bear a reference to an EQF reference level. Since the EQF is based on learning outcomes, all types and levels of qualifications which are defined in terms of the acquired knowledge, skills and competences can be related to the EQF via an NQF — the length of the course or identity of the institution involved are not used as criteria. The scope and number of qualifications in an NQF is a national choice.

(Versione italiana)

**Interrogazione con richiesta di risposta scritta E-004269/12  
alla Commissione**

**Sergio Paolo Frances Silvestris (PPE)**

(25 aprile 2012)

Oggetto: Cambiamenti climatici in Europa

Dopo il ciclone Lucy e il ciclone Maddalena, arriverà l'anticiclone africano Hannibal a salvare l'Italia dal maltempo e dal freddo che hanno caratterizzato un mese di aprile fuori dalla norma. Il tempo instabile ci accompagnerà fino al 24 aprile, quando addirittura giungerà una forte e violenta perturbazione al nord e sulla Toscana, portando anche la grandine e raffiche di vento. Poi le temperature saliranno e rimarranno elevate.

Tuttavia, secondo gli esperti, a partire dal 25 aprile si innalzerà dall'Africa Hannibal, l'anticiclone africano che spingerà aria calda dall'Africa prima verso la Sardegna e la Sicilia, poi al Sud e, infine, su tutte le regioni, e ci accompagnerà almeno fino a fine mese in un breve assaggio d'estate, con temperature sopra la norma di ben 10 gradi.

1. Alla luce dei fatti sopraesposti, può la Commissione far sapere se è a conoscenza dello sbalzo climatico che si sta verificando in Italia e in Europa nel corso dei primi mesi dell'anno?
2. Come si sta impegnando per monitorare i cambiamenti climatici?
3. Quali politiche sta attuando per evitare gli effetti negativi per il territorio dovuti ai repentini cambiamenti climatici?

**Risposta di Connie Hedegaard a nome della Commissione**

(15 giugno 2012)

Le tendenze pertinenti ai cambiamenti climatici si evincono da rilevazioni atmosferiche effettuate a lungo termine la cui raccolta dura, di solito, decenni. Questo perché, in intervalli di tempo più brevi, esse tendono a mostrare una certa instabilità che è parte della naturale variabilità del sistema climatico. È molto probabile, quindi, che le temporanee condizioni atmosferiche extrastagionali verificatesi in Italia nel periodo indicato dall'onorevole parlamentare, siano legate a tale variabilità naturale.

Le politiche climatiche adottate dalla Commissione si basano su dati scientifici aggiornati e affidabili e sul consenso scientifico di esperti nel settore dei cambiamenti climatici. In questo ambito disciplinare il consenso della comunità scientifica è rappresentato dal Gruppo intergovernativo sui cambiamenti climatici (IPCC), di cui fanno parte migliaia di esperti del settore provenienti da tutto il mondo. Condizioni atmosferiche extrastagionali rilevanti o persistenti rappresentano un aspetto chiave dei dati scientifici attualmente sotto esame dell'IPCC, nell'ambito della quinta relazione di valutazione. Inoltre, lo stesso aspetto è confermato nella relazione speciale sulla gestione dei rischi derivanti da eventi estremi e catastrofi in vista di un migliore adattamento ai cambiamenti climatici (SREX), pubblicata il 28 marzo 2012 <sup>(1)</sup>.

Per affrontare i rischi che scaturiscono dai cambiamenti climatici è necessario essere in possesso di osservazioni attendibili sul sistema climatico. Il programma GMES (Monitoraggio globale per l'ambiente e la sicurezza, [www.gmes.info](http://www.gmes.info)), guidato dall'UE, migliorerà il sistema europeo di rilevazione delle condizioni atmosferiche, fornendo un metodo sistematico di monitoraggio e di previsione dello stato climatico e ambientale della Terra.

A integrazione delle politiche globali di attenuazione dei cambiamenti climatici, la prossima strategia di adeguamento dell'UE, la cui adozione è prevista per il 2013, cercherà di fare in modo che l'Unione sia preparata ad affrontare gli effetti negativi dei cambiamenti climatici previsti.

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<sup>(1)</sup> <http://ipcc-wg2.gov/SREX/>.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-004269/12  
to the Commission**

**Sergio Paolo Frances Silvestris (PPE)**

(25 April 2012)

*Subject:* Climate change in Europe

After Cyclone Lucy and Cyclone Magdalena, the African Anticyclone Hannibal is set to rescue Italy from an uncharacteristically wet and cold April. The unstable weather will continue until 24 April, when a strong disturbance will affect the north and Tuscany, bringing with it hail and gale-force winds, following which temperatures will rise and remain high.

However, according to experts, from 25 April, African Anticyclone Hannibal will push hot air from Africa first towards Sardinia and Sicily and then to the south of Italy and, finally, to the whole country, continuing at least until the end of the month and giving a brief taste of summer, with temperatures some 10 degrees above normal.

1. In view of the above facts, can the Commission state whether it is aware of the sudden climatic changes that have been occurring in Italy and in Europe during the first months of the year?
2. What is it doing to monitor climate change?
3. What policies is it pursuing to prevent the adverse effects on the land of sudden climate changes?

**Answer given by Ms Hedegaard on behalf of the Commission**

(15 June 2012)

Climate change trends are derived from long-term records (usually collected over decades). This is because weather records often show numerous fluctuations on shorter timescales, which are part of the natural variability of the climate system. It is highly likely that the temporarily unseasonal weather in Italy over the period indicated by the Honourable Member is part of this natural variability.

The Commission bases its climate policies on the best available current science and on the scientific consensus of experts in the field of climate change. The scientific consensus view is presented in this subject area by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), which involves thousands of climate change scientists from around the globe. Severe or persistent unseasonal weather patterns are a key part of the evidence being examined by the IPCC as part of its 5th Assessment Report and its Special Report on Managing the Risks of Extreme Events and Disasters to Advance Climate Change Adaptation (SREX), published 28 March 2012, has assessed this evidence <sup>(1)</sup>.

Reliable observations of the climate system are key to addressing the threats posed by climate change. The EU-led GMES (Global Monitoring for the Environment and Security, [www.gmes.info](http://www.gmes.info)) will greatly enhance Europe's observational capabilities, providing a systematic monitoring and forecasting of the state of the Earth's environment and climate.

As a complement to its comprehensive climate change mitigation policies, the forthcoming EU Adaptation Strategy, foreseen for adoption in 2013, will seek to ensure that the EU is prepared for the expected adverse impacts of climate change.

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<sup>(1)</sup> <http://ipcc-wg2.gov/SREX/>.

(Versione italiana)

**Interrogazione con richiesta di risposta scritta E-004270/12  
alla Commissione (Vicepresidente/Alto Rappresentante)**

**Sergio Paolo Frances Silvestris (PPE)**

(25 aprile 2012)

Oggetto: VP/HR — Armi «made in China» nella Corea del Nord

La parata militare per celebrare il centenario dalla nascita del «Presidente eterno» Kim Il-sung ha centrato l'obiettivo: attirare l'attenzione internazionale sugli armamenti nordcoreani. Sotto la lente degli esperti, tra i mezzi che sono sfilati sotto gli occhi del giovane leader Kim Jong-un, è finito un lanciatore mobile a sedici ruote per il trasporto di missili a medio raggio. Perché se il veicolo fosse *made in China*, come sembra, allora Pechino avrebbe violato le sanzioni contro Pyongyang dopo i test missilistici e nucleari del 2006 e 2009.

Secondo quanto riferito da un settimanale, che cita fonti vicine al Consiglio di sicurezza (di cui Pechino è membro permanente) sarebbe già stata aperta un'indagine sui presunti aiuti cinesi al programma missilistico nordcoreano. Di contro il Dipartimento di Stato ha rimarcato la propria fiducia nelle rassicurazioni cinesi di agire in conformità con quanto stabilito dalle risoluzioni ONU, smentendo inoltre di essere a conoscenza di una qualche inchiesta.

Alla luce di quanto sopraesposto, può il Vicepresidente/Alto Rappresentante comunicare quanto segue:

1. È a conoscenza della vicenda e sono state avviate indagini al fine di garantire il rispetto delle disposizioni internazionali?

**Risposta dell'Alta Rappresentante/Vicepresidente Catherine Ashton a nome della Commissione**

(26 giugno 2012)

Le Nazioni Unite hanno predisposto un sistema per garantire l'efficace applicazione delle sanzioni nei confronti della Repubblica popolare democratica di Corea (RPDC).

Il 14 ottobre 2006, ai sensi della Risoluzione 1718 del Consiglio di Sicurezza dell'ONU, è stato creato un apposito Comitato per controllare le misure adottate nei confronti della RPDC. Uno degli specifici compiti del Comitato è esaminare e intraprendere azioni appropriate riguardo a informazioni inerenti a presunte violazioni delle disposizioni previste dalla Risoluzione. Il Comitato deve riferire ogni 90 giorni al Consiglio di Sicurezza presentando osservazioni e suggerimenti, in particolare sulle modalità per rafforzare l'efficacia delle disposizioni. Con la Risoluzione 1874, adottata dal Consiglio di Sicurezza nel 2009 dopo il secondo test nucleare della RPDC, è stato inoltre costituito un gruppo di esperti per assistere il Comitato nello svolgimento dei suoi compiti.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-004270/12  
to the Commission (Vice-President/High Representative)**

**Sergio Paolo Frances Silvestris (PPE)**

(25 April 2012)

*Subject:* VP/HR — Chinese-made weapons in North Korea

The military parade celebrating the centenary of the birth of the 'eternal President' Kim Jong-Il served its purpose, by drawing international attention to the weapons situation in North Korea. Watching experts could see a sixteen-wheel mobile medium-range missile launcher among the vehicles filing past the eyes of the young leader Kim Jong-Un. If, as it would seem, the vehicle was made in China, then Beijing will have violated the sanctions imposed on Pyongyang after the missile and nuclear tests of 2006 and 2009.

According to a report by a weekly newspaper, which cites sources close to the Security Council (of which China is a permanent member), an investigation has already begun into alleged Chinese assistance in the North Korean missile programme. The State Department has however expressed its confidence in China's reassurances that it has acted in accordance with the terms of the UN resolution, and has denied knowledge of any investigation.

In view of the above, can the Vice-President/High Representative please state:

1. Whether she is aware of these events and whether investigations have been launched to ensure compliance with international rules?

**Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Ashton on behalf of the Commission**

(26 June 2012)

The UN has in place its own system to ensure effective implementation of sanction measures relating to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK).

A special Committee was established on 14 October 2006 to oversee the measures taken with regard to the DPRK under United Nations Security Council Resolution 1718. One of the specific tasks of the Committee is to examine and take appropriate action on information regarding alleged violations of measures foreseen under the Resolution. The Committee has to report every 90 days to the Security Council and to present its observations and recommendations, in particular on ways to strengthen the effectiveness of the measures. Under Resolution 1874, adopted by the Security Council in 2009 after the second nuclear test by the DPRK, a Panel of Experts was also created to assist the Committee in carrying out its task.

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(Versione italiana)

**Interrogazione con richiesta di risposta scritta E-004272/12  
alla Commissione**

**Sergio Paolo Frances Silvestris (PPE)**

(25 aprile 2012)

Oggetto: Programma relativo a istruzione, formazione, cultura, ricerca e gioventù

L'UE desidera assicurare ai propri cittadini maggiori possibilità tramite l'offerta di nuove opportunità di apprendimento: i programmi relativi a istruzione, formazione, cultura, ricerca e gioventù rivestono dunque un ruolo essenziale nell'ambito di tale strategia.

Tra le opportunità comunitarie nel settore istruzione, cultura e gioventù c'è il programma cooperazione con i paesi industrializzati.

I suoi obiettivi consistono nel potenziare la qualità dei sistemi di istruzione e formazione e nel promuovere la comprensione interculturale tramite il dialogo internazionale, il confronto e la competizione con i paesi più industrializzati del mondo. L'attività sostiene i programmi di studio congiunti con altri paesi industrializzati, in particolare con l'America del Nord e la regione Asia-Pacifico. Questa attività è rivolta a gruppi di istituti di istruzione superiore dell'UE e di un paese partner e agli studenti e alle facoltà che ne fanno parte. Per quanto concerne i progetti orientati alla politica (solo USA), possono partecipare anche altre organizzazioni, quali le agenzie di certificazione, le organizzazioni o le agenzie operanti nel campo dell'istruzione, le aziende private, i gruppi settoriali o aziendali, le organizzazioni non governative, gli istituti di ricerca e le associazioni professionali.

Possono aderire Stati Uniti, Canada, Australia, Giappone, Nuova Zelanda e Corea del Sud.

Alla luce di quanto sopraesposto, può la Commissione precisare quanto segue:

1. Quali sono stati i casi di eccellenza risultanti dallo strumento summenzionato?
2. Nel quadro delle prospettive finanziarie 2014-2020, intende la Commissione disporre che il bilancio stanziato per questo programma sia aumentato al fine di incrementare il numero di partecipanti e quindi la possibilità di incidenza sul lungo termine?

**Risposta di Androulla Vassiliou a nome della Commissione**

(27 giugno 2012)

Nell'ambito del programma Cooperazione con i paesi industrializzati l'agenzia esecutiva che gestisce tale attività ha identificato tutta una serie di pratiche ottimali. Esempi nel merito sono riportati in un opuscolo intitolato «Good Practices: EU Cooperation with US, Canada, Australia, Japan and New Zealand in Higher Education and Training» (Buone pratiche: la cooperazione UE con gli USA, il Canada, l'Australia, il Giappone e la Nuova Zelanda nell'istruzione e nella formazione superiori) che può essere scaricato dal sito web EUROPA al seguente indirizzo:

[http://ec.europa.eu/education/external-relation-programmes/doc/goodpractices\\_en.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/education/external-relation-programmes/doc/goodpractices_en.pdf)

In relazione al bilancio futuro per un programma di avvicendamento nell'ambito del prossimo quadro finanziario, la Commissione, nella propria proposta «Erasmus per tutti» per il periodo 2014-2020 ha proposto di includere tutte le attività di cooperazione internazionale nel campo dell'istruzione superiore con i paesi extraunionali, compresi i paesi industrializzati, in un programma unico. La proposta della Commissione comprende disposizioni relative a bandi di gara congiunti modellati sull'attuale programma Cooperazione con i paesi industrializzati. Al momento attuale la Commissione non ha ancora determinato un bilancio per la cooperazione con questo particolare sottogruppo di paesi. Inoltre, gli appalti summenzionati sono finanziati congiuntamente e dipendono pertanto dalla disponibilità di finanziamenti da parte dei paesi partecipanti ad integrazione dei contributi UE.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-004272/12  
to the Commission**

**Sergio Paolo Frances Silvestris (PPE)**

(25 April 2012)

*Subject:* Programme concerning education, training, culture, research and youth

The EU wants to provide its citizens with greater opportunities by offering new learning opportunities. Programmes concerning education, training, culture, research and youth therefore play a key role within this strategy.

European opportunities in the education, culture and youth sector include the Industrialised Countries Cooperation Programme.

This aims to improve the quality of education and training systems and promote intercultural understanding through international dialogue, engagement and competition with the most industrialised countries of the world. The activity supports joint study programmes with other industrialised countries, in particular with North America and the Asia-Pacific region. It is aimed at groups of higher-education institutions in the EU and in other partner countries, and the students and faculties of those institutions. With regard to politically-orientated projects (United States only), other organisations such as certification agencies, organisations or agencies operating in the educational field, private companies, sectoral groups or companies, non-governmental organisations, research institutions and professional associations can also take part.

The programme is open to the United States, Canada, Australia, Japan, New Zealand and South Korea.

In view of the above, can the Commission specify the following:

1. What cases of excellence have resulted from the abovementioned instrument?
2. In the context of the Financial Perspective 2014-2020, does the Commission intend to provide a budget increase for this programme in order to boost the number of participants and consequently the likelihood of a long-term effect?

**Answer given by Ms Vassiliou on behalf of the Commission**

(27 June 2012)

A variety of best practices have been identified within the Industrialised Countries Cooperation Programme by the Education, Audiovisual and Culture Executive Agency who manage this activity. Examples are set out in a brochure entitled 'Good Practices: EU Cooperation with US, Canada, Australia, Japan and New Zealand in Higher Education and Training' which can be downloaded from the Europa website at the following address: [http://ec.europa.eu/education/external-relation-programmes/doc/goodpractices\\_en.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/education/external-relation-programmes/doc/goodpractices_en.pdf)

In relation to the future budget for a successor programme in the next Financial Framework, in its 'Erasmus for All' proposal for the 2014-2020 period, the Commission proposes to include all international cooperation activities in the area of higher education with non-EU countries, including the industrialised countries, in a single programme. The Commission's proposal includes provision for joint calls, modelled on the current Industrialised Countries Cooperation Programme. At this stage the Commission has not yet determined a budget for cooperation with this particular subset of countries. In addition, these calls are jointly funded and therefore dependent on the availability of budgets from the participating countries to match the EU contributions.

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(Versione italiana)

**Interrogazione con richiesta di risposta scritta E-004275/12  
alla Commissione**

**Sergio Paolo Frances Silvestris (PPE)**

(25 aprile 2012)

Oggetto: Morbo di Alzheimer

Il morbo di Alzheimer, detta anche demenza senile di tipo Alzheimer, demenza degenerativa primaria di tipo Alzheimer o semplicemente di Alzheimer, è la forma più comune di demenza degenerativa invalidante ad esordio prevalentemente senile (oltre i 65 anni, ma può manifestarsi anche in epoca presenile — prima dei 65 anni).

I limiti rappresentati dal trattamento con inibitori dell'acetilcolinesterasi hanno portato la ricerca a orientarsi verso approcci terapeutici alternativi. Con una nuova ricerca si è constatato come una sorta di «vaccino», basato sulla somministrazione di anticorpi a lento rilascio, può rallentare l'esordio dei sintomi del morbo di Alzheimer e forse rallentarne il decorso. È il risultato di studi condotti da un ricercatore italiano presso un'università di New York. Il ricercatore ha accertato che il lento rilascio di anticorpi per via intravenosa protegge il cervello, aumentandone la plasticità e ritardando l'esordio della malattia.

Alla luce di quanto sopraesposto, si interroga la Commissione per sapere:

1. se è a conoscenza della nuova ricerca nel campo della lotta al morbo di Alzheimer;
2. se nella proposta legislativa riguardante il terzo programma pluriennale «Salute per la crescita (2014-2020)» sono previsti programmi a favore della malattia summenzionata.

**Risposta di John Dalli a nome della Commissione**

(21 giugno 2012)

La Commissione è al corrente degli studi portati avanti presso la Mount Sinai School of Medicine di New York nell'intento di sviluppare una terapia con immunoglobuline umane per via endovenosa nella lotta al morbo di Alzheimer. La ricerca sulle patologie neurodegenerative in generale costituisce una priorità del 7° programma quadro per la ricerca e lo sviluppo tecnologico (2007-2013) che ha destinato circa EUR 320 milioni a tale settore, di cui circa EUR 115 milioni più specificamente alla ricerca sul morbo di Alzheimer.

La proposta legislativa della Commissione del terzo programma pluriennale «Salute per la crescita (2014-2020)» permetterà di continuare ad approfondire talune questioni legate al morbo di Alzheimer e ad altre malattie neurodegenerative.

La proposta è incentrata su obiettivi che sono importanti per la ricerca in questo settore, come facilitare l'adozione dell'innovazione nell'assistenza sanitaria al fine di contribuire a sistemi sanitari innovativi e sostenibili e migliorare l'accesso alle competenze mediche e alle informazioni concernenti patologie specifiche allo scopo di migliorare l'accesso a un'assistenza sanitaria migliore e più sicura per i cittadini europei.

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(English version)

**Question for written answer E-004275/12  
to the Commission**

**Sergio Paolo Frances Silvestris (PPE)**

(25 April 2012)

*Subject:* Alzheimer's disease

Alzheimer's disease, also known as senile dementia of the Alzheimer type (SDAT), primary degenerative dementia of the Alzheimer type, or simply Alzheimer's, is the most common form of predominantly senile onset debilitating degenerative dementia (over the age of 65, but can also occur in pre-senile age, before the age of 65).

The limitations of treatment with acetylcholinesterase inhibitors have led research to focus on alternative therapeutic approaches. New research has found how a kind of 'vaccine', based on the administration of slow-release antibodies, can slow down the onset of Alzheimer's symptoms and perhaps slow down its course. This is the result of studies conducted by an Italian research scientist at a New York university. This research scientist has found that the slow release of antibodies intravenously protects the brain by increasing its plasticity and delaying the onset of the disease.

In view of the above, can the Commission state:

1. whether it is aware of the new research in the fight against Alzheimer's;
2. whether the legislative proposal concerning the third multi-annual 'Health for Growth (2014-2020)' Programme includes programmes aimed at the abovementioned disease?

**Answer given by Mr Dalli on behalf of the Commission**

(21 June 2012)

The Commission is aware of research at the Mount Sinai School of Medicine in New York for the development of intravenous human immunoglobulin treatment against Alzheimer's disease. Research on neurodegenerative diseases in general is a priority in the 7th Framework Programme for Research and Technological Development (FP7, 2007-2013) with about EUR 320 million dedicated to this area, including some EUR 115 million more specifically dedicated to research on Alzheimer's disease.

The Commission's legislative proposal for the third multiannual programme 'Health for Growth (2014-2020)' would allow for a continued effort on certain issues related to Alzheimer's and other neurodegenerative diseases.

The proposal focuses on objectives of relevance to work in this area, such as facilitating the up-take of innovation in healthcare to contribute to innovative and sustainable health systems; and to increase access to medical expertise and information for specific conditions to improve access to better and safer healthcare for EU citizens.

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(Versione italiana)

**Interrogazione con richiesta di risposta scritta E-004276/12  
alla Commissione (Vicepresidente/Alto Rappresentante)**

**Sergio Paolo Frances Silvestris (PPE)**

(25 aprile 2012)

Oggetto: VP/HR — Lotta antiterrorismo

Un italiano è stato arrestato nel corso di un'operazione antiterrorismo della Digos di Cagliari che ha visto coinvolti una decina di indagati, sottoposti anche a perquisizioni domiciliari. È stato arrestato all'alba con l'accusa di addestramento ad attività con finalità di terrorismo anche internazionale. Tra gli indagati vi è anche un docente precario di lettere di un liceo cagliaritano.

Il giovane fermato si era convertito all'islam e, secondo gli inquirenti, era pronto a scappare a Rabat, in Marocco. L'uomo aveva cambiato nome ed aveva in tasca un biglietto di sola andata per il paese nordafricano, verso il quale sarebbe partito tra due giorni, secondo quanto riferito dal titolare dell'indagine. L'operazione è stata denominata «Nirya», dal nomignolo che il giovane usava sul web per acquisire e diffondere testi importanti, di natura jahidista e quaedista, per portare avanti il progetto di terrorismo islamico insieme al docente cagliaritano.

I due indagati avevano tra loro una conoscenza virtuale costruita sul sito islamista *minbar-sos.com*, oscurato tre anni fa, e considerato uno dei più importanti d'Europa. In queste ore si stanno concludendo diverse perquisizioni con l'acquisizione di materiale ritenuto molto importante.

Alla luce di quanto sopraesposto, si interroga il Vicepresidente/Alto Rappresentante per sapere:

1. se è a conoscenza dell'operazione antiterrorismo denominata «Nirya»;
2. quali sono i piani di azione adottati negli ultimi anni dalla Comunità europea per far fronte ai reati terroristici.

**Risposta di Cecilia Malmström a nome della Commissione**

(18 giugno 2012)

Come spiegato nella risposta alle interrogazioni scritte E-003294/2012, E-009410/2011 e E-0011087/2011, la Commissione non è un organismo di contrasto, non controlla perciò le operazioni antiterrorismo effettuate dagli Stati membri sul loro territorio né vi partecipa. Il lavoro operativo, quale raccogliere informazioni, svolgere controlli e perseguire i sospetti, incombe alle autorità competenti degli Stati membri. Dal canto suo, la Commissione si basa su strumenti disponibili a livello UE, come la relazione sulla situazione e sulle tendenze del terrorismo nell'UE (*EU Terrorism Situation and Trend Report*) elaborata da Europol a partire dalle informazioni fornite e verificate dalle autorità competenti degli Stati membri. La Commissione non può quindi pronunciarsi sull'operazione «Nirya».

Per quanto riguarda i reati terroristici, le passate iniziative della Commissione sono state ampiamente descritte nelle risposte alle interrogazioni scritte E-005494/2010, E-004510/2010 e E-004249/2010. Inoltre, come indicato nella risposta all'interrogazione scritta 3102/12, la corretta attuazione della decisione quadro 2008/919/GAI <sup>(1)</sup> sulla lotta contro il terrorismo amplia la definizione dei reati connessi alle attività terroristiche al fine di includervi aspetti della radicalizzazione quali la pubblica provocazione e l'istigazione a commettere reati di terrorismo, il reclutamento e l'addestramento a fini terroristici, anche attraverso Internet.

<sup>(1)</sup> Decisione quadro 2008/919/GAI del Consiglio, del 28 novembre 2008, che modifica la decisione quadro 2002/475/GAI sulla lotta contro il terrorismo (G.U.L. 330 del 9.12.2008).

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-004276/12  
to the Commission (Vice-President/High Representative)  
Sergio Paolo Frances Silvestris (PPE)  
(25 April 2012)**

*Subject:* VP/HR — Counter-terrorism

An Italian has been arrested in Cagliari during a counter-terrorism operation conducted by the national General Investigations and Special Operations Division (DIGOS) involving about ten suspects, whose homes were also searched. The man, who was suspected of setting up training for international terrorism, was arrested at dawn. Other suspects include a temporary literature teacher at a Cagliari secondary school.

The arrested youth had converted to Islam and, according to investigators, was ready to escape to Rabat in Morocco. He had changed his name and was carrying a one-way ticket to the North African country, to which he had intended to travel two days later, according to a statement by the chief investigator. The operation was code-named 'Nirya', after the nickname being used by the young man on the Internet to acquire and disseminate important jihadist and pro-al-Qa'ida texts in order to pursue his Islamic terrorism plans together with the Cagliari teacher.

The two suspects had developed a virtual friendship on the Islamist *minbar-sos.com* website, blacked out three years ago and considered one of the main sites of its kind in Europe. As regards the current state of play, several searches in the process of being concluded have yielded material thought to be very important.

1. Is the Vice-President/High Representative aware of the 'Nirya' counter-terrorism operation?
2. What plans of action have been adopted in recent years by the EU to deal with terrorism offences?

**Answer given by Ms Malmström on behalf of the Commission  
(18 June 2012)**

As explained in response to Written Questions E-003294/2012, E-009410/2011, and E-0011087/2011, the Commission is not a law enforcement agency and therefore it is not involved in nor does it monitor counter-terrorism operations carried out by Member State on their territory. Operational work, such as gathering intelligence, policing and prosecuting suspected individuals, is carried out by the competent authorities of the Member States. For its part, the Commission relies on tools available at the EU level, such as the EU Terrorism Situation and Trend Report produced by Europol on the basis of information provided and verified by the competent authorities of the Member States. Therefore, concerning operation 'Nirya', the Commission is not in a position to comment on it.

As regard to terrorist offences, the past initiatives from the Commission were extensively described in its answers to Written Questions E-005494/2010, E-004510/2010 and E-004249/2010. In addition, as answered in Written Question 3102/12, the correct implementation of the FD 2008/919/JHA<sup>(1)</sup> on combating terrorism widens the definition of offences linked to terrorist activities so to cover aspects of radicalisation such as public provocation or incitement to commit terrorist offenses, recruitment and training for terrorism also when committed through the Internet.

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<sup>(1)</sup> Council Framework Decision 2008/919/JHA of 28 November 2008 amending Framework Decision 2002/475/JHA on combating terrorism, OJ L 330/21 of 9.12.2008.

(Versione italiana)

**Interrogazione con richiesta di risposta scritta E-004278/12  
alla Commissione**

**Sergio Paolo Frances Silvestris (PPE)**

(25 aprile 2012)

Oggetto: Nuovo studio per la cura della cecità

Una piccola puntura e ai topi di laboratorio è tornata la vista. Nella retina dei roditori malati sono state trapiantate cellule fotosensibili alla luce. L'esperimento, che è stato condotto da un gruppo di ricercatori londinesi, apre nuove speranze nella cura della cecità e delle malattie degenerative degli occhi anche nell'uomo. Iniettando nella retina cellule progenitrici dei bastoncelli, che insieme ai cono sono i fotorecettori chiave della vista, l'équipe è riuscita per la prima volta a guarire topi ciechi. Il bastoncello è una cellula fotosensibile della retina, un cosiddetto fotorecettore, e permette di vedere in condizioni di scarsa luminosità.

Per l'esperimento, i ricercatori hanno utilizzato bastoncelli immaturi prelevati da giovani topi sani, che dopo 4-6 settimane hanno iniziato a funzionare come cellule «originali», attivando anche le connessioni necessarie a trasmettere gli impulsi visivi al cervello. Dopo sei settimane una cellula «trapiantata» su sei era riuscita a ricostruire le informazioni necessarie alla guarigione. Nonostante ci siano numerosi passi prima di arrivare a un'eventuale terapia per i pazienti, in futuro potrebbero beneficiarne migliaia di persone che hanno perso la vista a causa di una malattia degenerativa.

Alla luce di quanto sopraesposto, si interroga la Commissione per sapere:

1. Se è a conoscenza del nuovo studio dei ricercatori londinesi.
2. Se, visto l'impegno dell'UE nel campo della salute attraverso l'elaborazione della strategia sanitaria e del programma per la salute, non ritiene che lo studio possa essere finanziato tramite il settimo programma quadro (7° PQ) oppure tramite il programma quadro per la competitività e l'innovazione.

**Risposta di Máire Geoghegan-Quinn a nome della Commissione**

(22 giugno 2012)

La Commissione è a conoscenza dei promettenti risultati della ricerca presentati nell'articolo di *Nature*, riguardanti il recupero della vista da parte di topi ciechi in seguito ad un trapianto di cellule fotosensibili (fotorecettori).

Nel corso del Settimo programma quadro di ricerca e di sviluppo tecnologico (7° PQ), il programma di lavoro 2012 nell'area tematica «Salute» <sup>(1)</sup> ha pubblicato un fascicolo specifico in materia di menomazioni sensoriali e disabilità della vista (Health.2012.2.4.5-1) <sup>(2)</sup>. È pervenuto un numero di proposte elevato e, in seguito ad una procedura di valutazione in due fasi, le proposte selezionate sono attualmente in fase di negoziato. Il programma «Salute» sostiene anche un'azione di coordinamento «EurovisionNet» <sup>(3)</sup> volta a collegare le attività e le politiche di ricerca della comunità di ricercatori europei della vista e, pertanto, a superare la frammentazione nazionale.

La proposta di future attività di ricerca sulla salute rientra nelle sfide per la società dal titolo «Salute, evoluzione demografica e benessere» di cui nelle proposte Orizzonte 2020, adottate dalla Commissione nel novembre 2011. Poiché le discussioni sulle attività future sono appena iniziate, qualsiasi affermazione riguardante i settori di ricerca specifici che saranno affrontati dai futuri programmi di ricerca della Commissione è prematura.

Conformemente alla decisione relativa al programma quadro per la competitività e l'innovazione, questo programma non sostiene alcun tipo di ricerca.

<sup>(1)</sup> [http://cordis.europa.eu/fp7/health/home\\_en.html](http://cordis.europa.eu/fp7/health/home_en.html)

<sup>(2)</sup> <https://ec.europa.eu/research/participants/portal/page/cooperation?callIdentifier=FP7-HEALTH-2012-INNOVATION-2>.

<sup>(3)</sup> <http://www.eurovisionnet.eu/>.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-004278/12  
to the Commission**

**Sergio Paolo Frances Silvestris (PPE)**

(25 April 2012)

*Subject:* New study for the treatment of blindness

A small injection and the lab mice were able to see again. Photosensitive cells have been transplanted into the retina of diseased rodents. The experiment, conducted by a group of researchers from London, also brings new hope for the treatment of humans suffering from blindness and degenerative eye diseases. By injecting rod progenitor cells into the retina, which together with the cones are the key photoreceptors for vision, the team managed to cure blind mice for the first time. The rod is a photosensitive cell in the retina, known as a photoreceptor, which enables us to see in low light conditions.

For the experiment, the researchers used immature rods taken from young healthy mice, which after 4-6 weeks began to function like 'original' cells, even activating the necessary connections to transmit visual impulses to the brain. After six weeks, one transplanted cell out of six was able to reconstruct the information necessary for recovery. Although many steps need to be taken before a possible treatment for patients can be achieved, thousands of people who have lost their sight due to a degenerative disease could benefit from this in future.

In view of the above, can the Commission state:

1. whether it is aware of the new study by researchers in London;
2. whether, in view of the EU's work in the field of healthcare through the development of Healthcare Strategy and the Healthcare Programme, it agrees that the study could be funded through the Seventh Framework Programme (FP7) or the Competitiveness and Innovation Framework Programme?

**Answer given by Ms Geoghegan-Quinn on behalf of the Commission**

(22 June 2012)

The Commission is aware of the breakthrough research results presented in the article in Nature, with regards to the restoration of vision in blind mice following the transplantation of photoreceptor cells.

During the Seventh Framework Programme for Research and Technological Development (FP7), the Health Work Programme 2012 <sup>(1)</sup> has published a specific topic on sensory impairment and vision disabilities (Health.2012.2.4.5-1) <sup>(2)</sup>. A high number of proposals have been submitted and after a two-stage evaluation procedure, successful proposals are now under negotiation. The Health Programme also supports a coordination action 'EuroVisionNet' <sup>(3)</sup> which aims to link the research activities and policies of the European vision research community and to overcome the national fragmentation.

The proposal for future health research activities is included in the societal challenges entitled 'Health, demographic change and wellbeing' in the Horizon 2020 proposals adopted by the Commission in November 2011. As the current discussions for future activities have just started, it is premature to be certain about specific research areas to be addressed in future Commission research programmes.

In line with the decision on the Competitiveness and Innovation Framework Programme, this programme does not support any kind of research.

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<sup>(1)</sup> [http://cordis.europa.eu/fp7/health/home\\_en.html](http://cordis.europa.eu/fp7/health/home_en.html)

<sup>(2)</sup> <https://ec.europa.eu/research/participants/portal/page/cooperation?callIdentifier=FP7-HEALTH-2012-INNOVATION-2>.

<sup>(3)</sup> <http://www.eurovisionnet.eu/>.



(Versione italiana)

**Interrogazione con richiesta di risposta scritta E-004279/12  
alla Commissione**

**Sergio Paolo Frances Silvestris (PPE)**

(25 aprile 2012)

Oggetto: Programmi per fondi diretti, città dell'Aquila

Gli enti territoriali, quali comuni e province, sono tra i primi possibili beneficiari dei fondi diretti programmati ed erogati dalle direzioni generali della Commissione europea. Tra i fondi disponibili ci sono ad esempio quelli concernenti il programma cultura, il programma per l'occupazione e la solidarietà sociale Progress, il programma cittadinanza (Europa per i cittadini), quello per l'ambiente Life +, quello per gestire i flussi migratori (programma Gestione dei flussi migratori), quello dedicato alle risorse umane (programma Investire nelle persone) e tanti altri.

In merito a questi e ad altri programmi disponibili, può la Commissione rispondere ai seguenti quesiti:

1. Ci sono programmi per i quali la città dell'Aquila ha fatto richiesta?
2. In caso affermativo, quali sono i progetti che hanno avuto accesso a fondi europei e con quali risultati i suddetti programmi sono stati portati a termine?

**Risposta di Janusz Lewandowski a nome della Commissione**

(21 giugno 2012)

Le richieste di fondi diretti presentate dalla città dell'Aquila alla Commissione sono riportate nell'allegato, inviato direttamente all'onorevole parlamentare e al segretariato generale del Parlamento.

La Commissione nota che l'onorevole parlamentare è interessato ai finanziamenti concessi direttamente a città italiane nell'ambito di programmi specifici dell'UE gestiti dalla Commissione. Qualora l'onorevole parlamentare lo desiderasse, la Commissione potrebbe preparare una tabella contenente tali informazioni per le principali città italiane che potrebbero partecipare a questi programmi. La Commissione potrebbe in tal modo risparmiare il tempo impiegato per rispondere ad ogni singola interrogazione e fornire all'onorevole parlamentare un unico insieme di dati esaustivi.

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(English version)

**Question for written answer E-004279/12  
to the Commission**

**Sergio Paolo Frances Silvestris (PPE)**

(25 April 2012)

*Subject:* Direct funding programmes — city of Aquila

Local and regional government units, such as municipalities and provinces, are among the main potential recipients of the direct funding programmed and granted by Commission directorates-general. Funds are available under, for example, the Culture programme, the Progress programme for employment and social solidarity, the citizenship programme (Europe for Citizens), the Life+ environmental programme, the migration management programme (Solidarity and the Management of Migration Flows), the human resources programme (Investing in People) and many other programmes besides.

With regard to these and other programmes available:

1. Are there programmes under which the city of Aquila has applied?
2. If so, which projects have had access to European funds, and what results have the above programmes achieved?

**Answer given by Mr Lewandowski on behalf of the Commission**

(21 June 2012)

The requests for direct funding submitted by the City of L'Aquila to the Commission are presented in Annex, sent directly to the Honourable Member and to Parliament's Secretariat.

The Commission notes that the Honourable Member is interested in the funding granted directly to Italian cities from specific EU programmes managed by the Commission. Should the Honourable Member so wish, the Commission could prepare a table providing this information for the major Italian cities likely to take part in these programmes. This would save the Commission time needed to reply to each individual question and provide the Honourable Member with one single set of comprehensive data.

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(Nederlandse versie)

**Vraag met verzoek om schriftelijk antwoord E-004281/12**  
**aan de Commissie (Vicevoorzitter — Hoge Vertegenwoordiger)**  
**Frieda Brepoels (Verts/ALE)**  
(25 april 2012)

*Betreft:* VP/HR — EU rapport Oost Jeruzalem 2011, wetgeving tegen nederzettingenpolitiek en zwarte lijsten voor kolonisten

In haar antwoord op mijn vraag E-000941/2012 acht de Hoge Vertegenwoordiger het niet opportuun opmerkingen te maken over de inhoud en aanbevelingen van het verslag over Oost-Jeruzalem van 2011 van de missieleiders van de EU in Tel Aviv en Ramallah omdat dit verslag vertrouwelijk zou zijn. Omdat dit verslag ondertussen in de pers is verschenen en dus niet langer vertrouwelijk is <sup>(1)</sup>, acht ik het opportuun de eerder gestelde vragen opnieuw te stellen en een antwoord te vragen:

In het door de missieleiders van de EU in Tel Aviv en Ramallah opgemaakte rapport over Oost-Jeruzalem van 2011 wordt vermeld dat de situatie in Oost-Jeruzalem achteruit gaat, en de nederzettingen toename de kans op een tweestatenoplossing ondermijnt. Volgens het rapport volgt Israël een beleid van het verplaatsen van de Joodse bevolking naar bezet Palestijns gebied in tegenspraak met de 4de Geneefse Conventie en internationaal humanitair recht. Israël ondermijnt ook systematisch de Palestijnse aanwezigheid in Oost-Jeruzalem, bv. door strikte bouwvoorschriften in Palestijnse buurten op te leggen en Palestijnse woonvergunningen in te trekken of te weigeren. Concrete actie is daarom nodig. Zo zou er wetgeving moeten komen om financiële transacties in steun van de nederzettingen te vermijden en Europese bedrijven te verhinderen of te ontmoedigen handelsactiviteiten te ontplooiën die de illegale nederzettingenpolitiek van Israël zouden ondersteunen. Dit zou beter werken dan een politieke boycot. Een tweede suggestie in het rapport is dat gewelddadige kolonisten die zich Oost-Jeruzalem hebben gevestigd, geïdentificeerd moeten worden en op een EU zwarte lijst moeten komen te staan om hen de toegang tot de EU te ontzeggen.

Dit rapport komt bovenop gelijkaardige EU-rapporten over Oost-Jeruzalem van vorige jaren, en een ander recent in de pers bekendgemaakt intern EU rapport van juli 2011 over Area C, het gebied van de Westelijke Jordaanoever dat voor 62 % onder Israëlische controle staat. In dat rapport wordt gezegd dat ook de nederzettingen daar een tweestatenoplossing onmogelijk maakt.

— Zal de Hoge Vertegenwoordiger beide concrete suggesties van de missieleiders in Tel Aviv en Ramallah ter harte nemen en ze actief bepleiten?

— Hoe zal de EU concreet de Israëlische nederzettingproblematiek helpen doorbreken?

**Antwoord van hoge vertegenwoordiger/vicevoorzitter Ashton namens de Commissie**  
(19 juli 2012)

De EU heeft herhaaldelijk haar standpunt uitgedrukt over de nederzettingen en Area C, laatstelijk in de conclusies van de Raad Buitenlandse Zaken van 14 mei 2012.

De EU heeft uiting gegeven aan haar grote bezorgdheid over de ontwikkelingen op het terrein, die een tweestatenoplossing onmogelijk dreigen te maken, meer bepaald wat de nederzettingen betreft.

De EU heeft zich zeer bezorgd getoond over het extremisme van kolonisten en opruiing door kolonisten op de Westelijke Jordaanoever. Zij heeft de Israëlische regering opgeroepen om de schuldigen voor het gerecht te brengen en de verplichtingen van internationaal recht na te komen.

De nederzettingen blijven illegaal vanuit het oogpunt van het internationaal recht, ongeacht recente besluiten van de regering van Israël. De EU heeft herhaaldelijk verklaard dat zij geen wijzigingen zal aanvaarden aan de grenzen van vóór 1967, met inbegrip van Jeruzalem, tenzij beide partijen het daarvoor eens worden. De EU en haar lidstaten bevestigden tevens hun engagement om de bestaande EU-wetgeving en de bilaterale overeenkomsten betreffende producten uit de nederzettingen volledig en doeltreffend ten uitvoer te leggen.

(1) <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-12150792>.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-004281/12  
to the Commission (Vice-President/High Representative)  
Frieda Brepoels (Verts/ALE)  
(25 April 2012)**

*Subject:* VP/HR — EU report on East Jerusalem 2011, legislation against the settlement policies and black lists for settlers

In her answer to my Question E-000941/2012, the High Representative did not consider it appropriate to comment on the contents or the recommendations of the report on East Jerusalem 2011 by the EU Heads of Mission in Tel Aviv and Ramallah because that report was considered confidential. Since the report has in the meantime appeared in the press and is no longer confidential<sup>(1)</sup>, I consider it appropriate to ask my earlier questions again and to request an answer:

The report on East Jerusalem 2011 drawn up by the EU Heads of Mission in Tel Aviv and Ramallah states that the situation in East Jerusalem is deteriorating and the increase in settlements is undermining the prospects for a two-state solution. According to the report, Israel is pursuing a policy of transferring members of the Jewish population to the occupied Palestinian territory in violation of the Fourth Geneva Convention and international humanitarian law. Israel is also systematically undermining the Palestinian presence in East Jerusalem, for instance by imposing restrictive building regulations in Palestinian neighbourhoods and by revoking or refusing Palestinian residence permits. Effective action is therefore needed. Legislation is required to prevent financial transactions in support of settlements and to prevent or discourage European companies from engaging in commercial activities supporting Israel's illegal settlement policy. This would be more effective than a political boycott. The second recommendation in the report is that violent settlers who have moved to East Jerusalem should be identified and included in an EU black list in order to deny them entry to the EU.

This report comes in the wake of similar EU reports on East Jerusalem from previous years, and another internal EU report of July 2011, recently highlighted in the press, about Israeli-run Area C, which makes up 62% of the West Bank. This report notes that the settlements there are also making a two-state solution impossible.

— Will the High Representative heed the two recommendations by the Heads of Mission in Tel Aviv and Ramallah and actively advocate them?

— What specific action will the EU take to help to resolve the Israeli settlement problem?

**Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Ashton on behalf of the Commission  
(19 July 2012)**

The EU has repeatedly stated its position on settlements and area C, most recently in the Foreign Affairs Council conclusions of 14 May 2012.

The EU expressed deep concern about developments on the ground, which threaten to make a two-state solution impossible, in particular regarding settlements.

The EU expressed deep concern regarding settler extremism and incitement by settlers in the West Bank. It called on the Government of Israel to bring the perpetrators to justice and to comply with its obligations under international law.

Settlements remain illegal under international law, irrespective of recent decisions by the Government of Israel. The EU reiterated that it will not recognise any changes to the pre-1967 borders including with regard to Jerusalem, other than those agreed by the parties. The EU and its Member States also reaffirmed their commitment to fully and effectively implement existing EU legislation and the bilateral arrangements applicable to settlement products.

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<sup>(1)</sup> <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-12150792>.

(Deutsche Fassung)

**Anfrage zur schriftlichen Beantwortung E-004282/12  
an die Kommission  
Martin Ehrenhauser (NI)  
(25. April 2012)**

*Betrifft:* Projekt Indect — Europol

Berichten zufolge interessieren sich Europol und die Polizei in Spanien, Malta, Lettland und Rumänien für die Forschungsergebnisse, die das Projekt Indect liefert.

1. Kann die Kommission dieses Interesse der genannten Polizeibehörden sowie das Interesse von Europol bestätigen?
2. Ist der Kommission bekannt, ob weitere Behörden Interesse an den Forschungsergebnissen haben? Wenn ja, welche?
3. Kann die Kommission Auskunft darüber geben, an welchen Ergebnissen von Indect Europol interessiert ist?
4. Kann die Kommission Auskunft darüber erteilen, auf welchen Gebieten Europol die Forschung von Indect als besonders wichtig für Europol einstuft?
5. Wird Europol im Falle eines Interesses an bestimmten Ergebnissen des Indect-Projekts Zahlungen an Projektteilnehmer leisten müssen, um auf bestimmte im Rahmen von Indect erforschte Ergebnisse zugreifen zu können, beispielsweise spezielle Algorithmen oder technische Lösungen?

**Antwort von Frau Malmström im Namen der Kommission  
(18. Juni 2012)**

Über offizielle Kontakte zwischen dem Indect-Projekt und den spanischen, maltesischen, lettischen und rumänischen Polizeibehörden ist der Kommission nichts bekannt.

Europol ist nicht am Indect Projekt beteiligt und plant auch keine solche Beteiligung.

Im April 2012 wurde auf Anregung des Indect-Projektkoordinators das Indect-Projekt bei Europol vorgestellt. Dabei verpflichtete sich Europol zu keiner wie auch immer gearteten Zusammenarbeit mit dem Indect-Projekt.

Europol hat zu keiner Zeit Interesse an den Forschungsergebnissen des Indect-Projekts geäußert, und es wurden auch keine konkreten Ergebnisse vorgestellt, da das Forschungsprojekt noch läuft. Europol begrüßte die Vorstellung des Projekts aufgrund der Tatsache, dass es sich um ein von der EU im Rahmen des 7. Forschungsrahmenprogramms finanziertes Forschungsprojekt handelt.

Über Kosten und andere finanzielle Aspekte des Indect-Projekts wurde nicht gesprochen, da Europol kein Projektteilnehmer ist.

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(English version)

**Question for written answer E-004282/12  
to the Commission  
Martin Ehrenhauser (NI)  
(25 April 2012)**

*Subject:* INDECT project — Europol

According to reports, Europol and the police forces in Spain, Malta, Latvia and Romania are interested in the INDECT project research results.

1. Can the Commission confirm this interest by these police authorities and Europol?
2. Is the Commission aware of whether any other authorities are interested in the research findings? If so, which ones?
3. Can the Commission provide information about the INDECT findings in which Europol is interested?
4. Can the Commission provide information about the areas in which Europol considers the INDECT research to be of particular importance?
5. If it is interested in specific findings of the INDECT project, will Europol have to pay participants in the project to gain access to research results such as, for example, special algorithms or technical solutions?

**Answer given by Ms Malmström on behalf of the Commission  
(18 June 2012)**

The Commission is not informed about any formal contacts of Indect with police authorities in Spain, Malta, Latvia and Romania.

Europol is not participating and does not intend to participate to the Indect Project.

Following the offer of the Indect Project Coordinator to present the Indect Project to Europol, a presentation was given at Europol in April 2012. During the presentation, Europol did not commit itself to any kind of cooperation with the Indect project.

Europol has never expressed any interest in the results of the Indect project and since the research project is still ongoing no concrete results were yet presented. Europol welcomed the presentation of the Indect project based on the fact that it is an EU-funded Security Research Project of the 7th Framework Programme.

There has been no discussion between Europol and Indect project coordinators about costs or any other financial implications, as Europol is not participating in the project.

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(Deutsche Fassung)

**Anfrage zur schriftlichen Beantwortung E-004283/12**  
**an die Kommission**  
**Angelika Werthmann (NI)**  
(25. April 2012)

Betrifft: EGF-Vorschlag 2014-2020 — COM(2011)0608

In dem Kommissionsvorschlag für eine Verordnung des Europäischen Parlamentes und des Rates über den Europäischen Fonds für die Anpassung an die Globalisierung (2014-2020) heißt es:

„Im Einklang mit der Mitteilung ‚Ein Haushalt für Europa 2020‘ sollte der Anwendungsbereich des EGF erweitert werden, damit Landwirten die Anpassung an eine neue Marktlage erleichtert werden kann, die sich aus internationalen Handelsabkommen im landwirtschaftlichen Sektor ergibt und die zu einem Wandel oder einer wesentlichen Anpassung der landwirtschaftlichen Tätigkeiten der betroffenen Landwirte führt, so dass sie strukturell wettbewerbsfähiger werden oder ihnen der Übergang zu nicht-landwirtschaftlichen Tätigkeiten erleichtert wird“.

1. Kann die Kommission bitte detailliert erläutern, warum sie beabsichtigt, auch Landwirte in die EGF-Förderung aufzunehmen?
2. Wie umfangreich schätzt die Kommission aktuell die Zahl der Landwirte (potentiell abgerufenes Volumen), die nach Inkrafttreten des neuen EGF 2014-2020 möglicherweise unter seine Regelung fallen werden?
3. Bisher unterstützte der EGF nur Arbeitnehmer, die arbeitslos geworden sind. Welche Gründe haben die Kommission bewogen, nun auch Wandel und Anpassung in der Landwirtschaft zu unterstützen?
4. Wäre es nicht wesentlich sinnvoller, schneller und effizienter, für Landwirte einen eigenen Fonds zu initiieren, bei dem die betroffenen Landwirte direkt um Unterstützung ersuchen können?

**Antwort von Herrn Ciolos im Namen der Kommission**  
(20. Juni 2012)

1. Im Vorschlag der Kommission zum mehrjährigen Finanzrahmen 2014-2020 <sup>(1)</sup> heißt es eindeutig: „Die Landwirtschaft in Europa steht vor zahlreichen Herausforderungen und muss insbesondere auf unvorhersehbare Ereignisse reagieren können und die Anpassungen, die infolge internationaler Handelsabkommen notwendig werden, leichter machen“. Daher wurde vorgeschlagen, den Geltungsbereich des Europäischen Fonds für die Anpassung an die Globalisierung (EGF) auf die Landwirtschaft auszuweiten.

2. Der EGF ist für Notfälle gedacht. Eingesetzt wurde er in bestimmten, genau definierten Situationen im Zusammenhang mit Arbeitnehmern, die von Veränderungen im Welthandelsgefüge sowie deren Auswirkungen auf den europäischen Arbeitsmarkt in den letzten Jahren betroffen waren.

Der Vorschlag für den Zeitraum 2014-2020 wird auf von Handelsabkommen und Globalisierung betroffene Landwirte ausgeweitet. Der EGF greift weiterhin im Notfall, und seine Mittelausstattung soll gemäß dem Vorschlag außerhalb des mehrjährigen Finanzrahmens liegen.

3. Die Gründe für den Kommissionsvorschlag sind in dem Vorschlag selbst enthalten <sup>(2)</sup>. Der Vorschlag zielt darauf ab, auf EU-Ebene Solidarität mit von außergewöhnlichen Umständen betroffenen entlassenen Arbeitnehmern oder mit von bestimmten Handelsabkommen und Globalisierung betroffenen Landwirten zu zeigen und sie gemäß den Zielen der Strategie Europa 2020 dabei zu unterstützen, auf ihre rasche Wiedereingliederung in die Beschäftigung bzw. die Anpassung ihrer landwirtschaftlichen Tätigkeit hinzuwirken.

4. Die Kommission hat vorgeschlagen, den EGF als nicht in den MFR einbezogenen Fonds beizubehalten. Die Einrichtung von verschiedenen Fonds der gleichen Art, die sich lediglich durch die Art der jeweiligen Begünstigten unterscheiden, ist nicht Teil der von der Kommission unterstützten Vereinfachung der Rechtsvorschriften.

<sup>(1)</sup> Siehe KOM(2011)500 endg. vom 29.6.2011.

<sup>(2)</sup> Siehe KOM(2011)608 endg. vom 6.10.2011.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-004283/12**  
**to the Commission**  
**Angelika Werthmann (NI)**  
(25 April 2012)

*Subject:* European Globalisation Adjustment Fund (EGF) proposal 2014-2020 (COM(2011) 608)

The Commission proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the European Globalisation Adjustment Fund (2014-2020) states:

'In compliance with the communication on "A Budget for Europe 2020", the scope of the EGF should be broadened to facilitate the adaptation of farmers to a new market situation resulting from international trade agreements in the agricultural sector and leading to a change or a significant adjustment in the agricultural activities of the affected farmers so as to assist them to become structurally more competitive or to facilitate their transition to non-agricultural activities.'

1. Can the Commission please explain in detail why it intends to broaden EGF assistance to include farmers?
2. In the Commission's estimation, how many farmers (potential volume) could come under the regulation once the new EGF 2014-2020 comes into force?
3. Until now the EGF has only been used to support workers who have lost their jobs. What has now moved the Commission to support change and adaptation in agriculture?
4. Would it not make more sense, as well as being faster and more efficient, to set up a separate fund for farmers that would enable the affected farmers to apply for support directly?

**Answer given by Mr Ciolos on behalf of the Commission**  
(20 June 2012)

1. The Commission's proposal on the MFF 2014-2020 <sup>(1)</sup> clearly states that the 'European agriculture faces a variety of challenges, in particular the need to react to unforeseeable circumstances or to facilitate the adaptations required by international trade agreements'. Therefore, an extended scope for the European Globalisation Fund (EGF) covering agriculture has been proposed.

2. The EGF has an emergency character. It has been used in specific, well-defined situations related to workers affected by changes in world trade patterns and by their impact on Europe's labour market during the last years.

The proposal for 2014-2020 is extended to include farmers that have been affected by trade agreements and globalisation. The EGF maintains its emergency character and its budget is proposed to be outside the MFF.

3. The reasons behind the Commission's proposal are contained in the proposal itself <sup>(2)</sup>. The proposal aims to demonstrate solidarity at Union level with redundant workers affected by exceptional circumstances or with farmers affected by a relevant trade agreement and globalisation, and to provide support, respectively, towards their rapid reintegration into employment and/or adjusting their farming activity, in line with the objectives of the Europe 2020 strategy.

4. The Commission has proposed to maintain the EGF as a fund operating outside the MFF. The setting-up of different funds of same nature, based only on the different type of beneficiary, is not part of the legal simplification process, which the Commission is supporting.

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<sup>(1)</sup> See COM(2011) 500 final of 29.6.2011.

<sup>(2)</sup> See COM(2011) 608 final of 6.10.2011.



(Versão portuguesa)

**Pergunta com pedido de resposta escrita E-004286/12**

**à Comissão**

**Nuno Teixeira (PPE)**

(25 de abril de 2012)

Assunto: Ameaças ao Acordo Schengen

Tendo em conta que:

- O debate sobre o estabelecimento de regras comuns sobre a reintrodução temporária do controlo nas fronteiras internas em circunstâncias excecionais continua a decorrer no Parlamento e que as últimas notícias tem abalado os alicerces da cooperação de Schengen;
- A Suíça reintroduziu diferenciadamente quotas para oito países europeus, nomeadamente para cidadãos da Europa Central e do Leste, violando o Acordo Schengen, tal como expresso por fontes da Comissão Europeia na Euronews <sup>(1)</sup>;
- Os governos de Paris e de Berlim enviaram uma carta à presidência dinamarquesa, exigindo que seja possível a reposição das fronteiras nacionais unilateralmente durante um mês, contrariando a proposta da Comissão Europeia (2011/0242), segundo a qual deveria ser esta instituição a validar a reposição temporária;

Pergunta-se à Comissão:

1. Que ações pretende tomar face à decisão unilateral da Suíça de reintroduzir quotas diferenciadas? A cláusula de salvaguarda do acordo livre de circulação com que as autoridades suíças justificam a sua ação permite que os Estados fora da UE possam impor quotas unilaterais e diferenciadas a um ou mais países específicos? Se a resposta for afirmativa, não considera a Comissão importante que lhe seja dada informação antecipadamente e que, caso sejam impostas quotas, elas digam respeito à UE como um bloco, e não a um determinado país?
2. Que medidas pretende tomar face às exigências da Alemanha e da França em carta aberta à presidência dinamarquesa, uma vez que o debate sobre o assunto continua a decorrer no Parlamento Europeu e que há uma forte oposição quanto à imposição unilateral das fronteiras?

**Resposta dada por Cecilia Malmström em nome da Comissão**

(21 de junho de 2012)

1. A Comissão considera que a recente reintrodução, por parte da Suíça, de quotas relativamente a nacionais de oito Estados-Membros da UE, que requeriam uma autorização de residência na Suíça por um período igual ou superior a um ano, viola o acordo sobre a livre circulação de pessoas, que não prevê um tratamento diferenciado dos Estados-Membros. Esta medida não se justifica economicamente pela situação do mercado de trabalho nem pelo número de cidadãos da UE que requerem autorização de residência na Suíça. A Comissão considera que a Suíça deveria ter fornecido todas as informações pertinentes ao abrigo da obrigação geral de intercâmbio regular de informações para efeitos da correta execução do acordo.

A Comissão tenciona abordar este assunto na próxima reunião do Comité Misto, o único mecanismo previsto pelo acordo para a resolução de litígios.

2. A Comissão propôs alterações legislativas para reforçar a governação do Espaço Schengen, em especial para assegurar a eficácia dos controlos nas fronteiras externas. As propostas incluem uma cláusula de salvaguarda, que apenas deverá ser utilizada em circunstâncias excecionais, e que prevê a reintrodução temporária de alguns controlos nas fronteiras internas, coordenada a nível da UE, a fim de dar tempo e espaço para resolver problemas graves e persistentes por parte de um Estado-Membro. Tal permitiria à UE dar uma resposta eficaz a situações graves resultantes de uma falha no controlo das fronteiras, sem dar azo a medidas que poderiam subverter a livre circulação.

As propostas estão atualmente a ser debatidas no Parlamento Europeu e no Conselho e os Estados-Membros, incluindo a França e a Alemanha, estão a apresentar as suas observações.

(<sup>1</sup>) (<http://pt.euronews.com/2012/04/19/suica-reintroduz-quotas-de-imigracao-para-oito-paises-europeus/>).

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-004286/12**  
**to the Commission**  
**Nuno Teixeira (PPE)**  
(25 April 2012)

*Subject:* Threats to the Schengen Agreement

The debate about establishing common rules on the temporary reintroduction of border controls at internal borders in exceptional circumstances continues in Parliament, and the foundations of Schengen cooperation have been shaken by recent news. Switzerland has reintroduced different quotas for eight European countries, specifically for citizens of Central and Eastern European countries, violating the Schengen Agreement, according to European Commission sources quoted in Euronews <sup>(1)</sup>. Moreover, the Governments in Paris and Berlin have sent a letter to the Danish Presidency demanding the possibility of unilaterally reintroducing national border controls for a month, contrary to the Commission proposal (2011/0242(COD)), under which it should be for the Commission to approve the reintroduction of temporary controls.

Can the Commission answer the following questions:

1. What action does it intend to take in response to Switzerland's unilateral decision to reintroduce different quotas for different Member States? Does the safeguard clause of the free movement agreement by which the Swiss authorities justify their action allow states outside the EU to impose unilateral and different quotas on one or more specific countries? If so, does the Commission believe it is important that it should be informed in advance and that, if quotas are imposed, they should relate to the EU as a bloc, and not to a specific country?
2. What measures does it intend to take regarding the demands made by Germany and France in their open letter to the Danish Presidency, bearing in mind that the debate on this subject continues in the European Parliament and there is strong opposition to the unilateral imposition of border controls?

**Answer given by Ms Malmström on behalf of the Commission**  
(21 June 2012)

1. The Commission considers that the recent re establishment by Switzerland of quantitative restrictions for nationals of eight EU Member States seeking residence for a period of one year or longer in Switzerland is in breach of the Agreement on the Free Movement of Persons, which does not allow for such a differentiation between Member States. This measure is neither economically justified by the labour market situation nor by the number of EU citizens seeking residence in Switzerland. The Commission believes that Switzerland should have provided all the relevant information under the general obligation to regularly exchange information for the purposes of the proper implementation of the Agreement.

The Commission has the intention to raise this issue at the next meeting of the Joint Committee, only mechanism established by the Agreement for the settlement of disputes.

2. The Commission has proposed legislative changes aimed at strengthening the governance of the Schengen area, in particular to ensure the effectiveness of controls at external borders. The proposals include a safeguard clause, to be used only in exceptional circumstances, enabling some controls at internal borders to be temporarily reintroduced, in a coordinated way at EU level, to provide the time and space for persistent and serious failures by a Member State to be remedied. This would allow the EU to deal effectively with critical situations involving a breakdown in border control, while not opening the door to measures that could unduly undermine free movement.

The proposals are currently the subject of discussion in the European Parliament and Council, during the course of which Member States, including France and Germany, are putting forward their views.

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<sup>(1)</sup> <http://pt.euronews.com/2012/04/19/suica-reintroduz-quotas-de-imigracao-para-oito-paises-europeus/>.

(Ελληνική έκδοση)

**Ερώτηση με αίτημα γραπτής απάντησης E-004287/12**  
**προς την Επιτροπή**  
**Marietta Giannakou (PPE)**  
(25 Απριλίου 2012)

**Θέμα:** Δημιουργία βάσης δεδομένων των εξ αποστάσεως προγραμμάτων σπουδών (distance learning) πανεπιστημιακού επιπέδου στην Ευρώπη

Τα τελευταία χρόνια η εξ αποστάσεως εκπαίδευση κερδίζει συνεχώς έδαφος στην συνείδηση χιλιάδων ευρωπαϊών πολιτών, καθώς αποτελεί έναν σύγχρονο και αποτελεσματικό τρόπο απόκτησης προπτυχιακού ή μεταπτυχιακού τίτλου σπουδών πανεπιστημιακού επιπέδου. Αρχικά, τα εξ αποστάσεως πτυχία υπήρξαν ιδιαίτερα δημοφιλή σε ανθρώπους μεγαλύτερης ηλικίας, όμως πλέον παρατηρείται εντονότερο ενδιαφέρον και από άτομα μικρότερης ηλικίας ανθρώπων, προσθέτοντας μια επιπλέον παράμετρο στην ραγδαία ανάπτυξη της εξ αποστάσεως εκπαίδευσης. Παρόλα αυτά, η αυξημένη αυτή ζήτηση έχει οδηγήσει σε μια υπερπροσφορά προγραμμάτων σπουδών από διάφορους αμφιβόλου προελεύσεως εκπαιδευτικούς φορείς, οι οποίοι φέρονται να απονέμουν ακαδημαϊκούς τίτλους, παραπλανώντας ουσιαστικά τους υποψήφιους σπουδαστές σχετικά με την πιστοποίηση-αναγνώριση των προγραμμάτων σπουδών τους στην ΕΕ.

Λαμβάνοντας υπόψη, ότι το σημερινό στρατηγικό πλαίσιο για την ευρωπαϊκή συνεργασία «Εκπαίδευση και επαγγελματική κατάρτιση 2020», ως τμήμα της στρατηγικής «Ευρώπη 2020», αναφέρεται ρητά στον ρόλο των ΤΠΕ για την προαγωγή της δημιουργικότητας και της καινοτομίας,

Πως θα έκρινε η Επιτροπή την ιδέα της δημιουργίας, υπό την αιγίδα της Ευρωπαϊκής Επιτροπής, μιας βάσης δεδομένων όπου θα παρατίθενται όλα τα ακαδημαϊκά και επαγγελματικά αναγνωρισμένα εξ αποστάσεως προγράμματα σπουδών πανεπιστημιακού επιπέδου που προσφέρονται από τα ευρωπαϊκά ακαδημαϊκά ιδρύματα;

**Απάντηση της κας Βασιλείου εξ ονόματος της Επιτροπής**  
(22 Ιουνίου 2012)

Η ανακοίνωση της Επιτροπής σχετικά με τον εκσυγχρονισμό των συστημάτων τριτοβάθμιας εκπαίδευσης της Ευρώπης, που εγκρίθηκε τον Σεπτέμβριο του 2011, ενθαρρύνει την καλύτερη αξιοποίηση της επικοινωνίας και της πληροφορίας και άλλων τεχνολογιών με σκοπό τον εμπλουτισμό της διδασκαλίας, τη βελτίωση των μαθησιακών εμπειριών, την υποστήριξη της εξατομικευμένης μάθησης και τη διευκόλυνση της πρόσβασης μέσω της εξ αποστάσεως μάθησης και της εικονικής κινητικότητας. Είναι ζωτικής σημασίας η προώθηση ευέλικτων και καινοτομικών μαθησιακών προσεγγίσεων και διδακτικών μεθόδων προκειμένου να βελτιωθούν η ποιότητα και η συνάφεια της τριτοβάθμιας εκπαίδευσης, διευρύνοντας παράλληλα τον αριθμό των σπουδαστών και τη συμμετοχή σε διαφορετικές ομάδες μαθητών. Για το σκοπό αυτό, τα ευρωπαϊκά προγράμματα για την εκπαίδευση και την κατάρτιση έχουν υποστηρίξει την εξέλιξη της καινοτομικής εκπαίδευσης που βασίζεται σε ΤΠΕ, σε τομείς, μεταξύ άλλων, όπως η εξ αποστάσεως μάθηση και οι εικονικές πανεπιστημιούπολεις, ιδίως μέσω των συνοδευτικών μέτρων του Erasmus και των πολυμερών σχεδίων. Αυτή η τάση θα ενισχυθεί στα νέα πρόγραμμα για την εκπαίδευση και την κατάρτιση «Erasmus για όλους».

Είναι επίσης σημαντικό να βελτιωθεί η διαφάνεια της παροχής «εξ αποστάσεως» μαθημάτων. Η Ευρωπαϊκή Ένωση υποστηρίζει σχέδια στον τομέα αυτό, όπως το σχέδιο «Ευρωπαϊκός χώρος εξ αποστάσεως εκπαίδευσης: πύλη πληροφόρησης και πρωτοβουλία ευαισθητοποίησης»<sup>(1)</sup>, το οποίο χρηματοδοτείται στο πλαίσιο του προγράμματος Erasmus. Το σχέδιο αυτό αποσκοπεί να δημιουργήσει μία πύλη για την παροχή πληροφοριών για όλα τα είδη της εξ αποστάσεως μάθησης (επιγραμμική μάθηση, συνδυασμός μαθησιακών μεθόδων· προγράμματα για πτυχία ή ακαδημαϊκές μονάδες· όχι μόνο από ειδικευμένα ινστιτούτα στην εξ αποστάσεως μάθηση, αλλά όλο και περισσότερο από παραδοσιακά ακαδημαϊκά ιδρύματα της τριτοβάθμιας εκπαίδευσης).

(1) Βλέπε <http://www.studyportals.eu/odlsurvey/>.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-004287/12  
to the Commission**

**Marietta Giannakou (PPE)**

(25 April 2012)

*Subject:* Creation of distance learning university course databases in Europe

Over the last few years, thousands of EU citizens are becoming more familiar with distance learning, as it is a modern and effective way of obtaining an undergraduate or postgraduate university degree. Initially, distance learning degree courses were particularly popular with older people. However, an increased interest among younger people has also been observed, bringing another dimension to the rapid development of distance learning. Nevertheless, this increased demand has led to an excessive amount of courses being offered by a variety of dubious educational providers which claim to award academic degrees, effectively misleading candidates about the accreditation/recognition of their study programmes in the EU.

Given that the current strategic framework for European cooperation 'Vocational education and training 2020' as part of the Europe 2020 strategy, specifically refers to the role of ICT in promoting creativity and innovation:

What is the Commission's view on the idea of creating a database, under its own auspices, listing all academically and professionally recognised distance learning university courses provided by European academic institutions?

**Answer given by Ms Vassiliou on behalf of the Commission**

(22 June 2012)

The communication on the modernisation of Europe's higher education systems, adopted in September 2011, encourages a better exploitation of Information and Communication and other technologies to enrich teaching, improve learning experiences, support personalised learning and facilitate access through distance learning and virtual mobility. It is crucial to promote flexible, innovative learning approaches and delivery methods if higher education is to improve quality and relevance while expanding student numbers and widening participation to diverse group of learners. To this end, the European programmes for education and training have supported the evolution of innovative ICT based education from open distance learning to virtual campus, in particular through the Erasmus accompanying measures and multilateral projects. This will be reinforced in the new education and training programme 'Erasmus for all'.

It is also important to improve the transparency of the supply of 'distance learning' courses. The European Union supports projects in this area, such as the 'European Distance Education Area: info portal and awareness initiative' project<sup>(1)</sup>, funded under the Erasmus programme. This project aims to set up a portal that provides information about all types of distance learning (Online, Blended learning; degree or credit programmes; by specialist distance learning institutes but also increasingly by traditional academic higher education institutions).

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<sup>(1)</sup> See <http://www.studyportals.eu/odlsurvey/>.

(Ελληνική έκδοση)

**Ερώτηση με αίτημα γραπτής απάντησης E-004288/12**  
**προς την Επιτροπή**  
**Marietta Giannakou (PPE)**  
(25 Απριλίου 2012)

**Θέμα:** Διάσωση της γκρεκάνικης διαλέκτου στη Νότια Ιταλία

Τα Γκρεκάνικα (Grecaṅni/Griko) είναι μια αρχαία διάλεκτος της ελληνικής που περιλαμβάνει ιταλικά στοιχεία και ομιλείται στην περιοχή της Νότιας Ιταλίας (Magna Grecia). Τη διάλεκτο μιλούν κυρίως οι κάτοικοι στις Γκρεκάνικες κοινότητες στη νότια άκρη της Καλαβρίας και στην περιοχή Σαλέντο της Απουλίας, κοντά στην πόλη Λέτσε και αποτελεί μέρος μιας ιδιαίτερης πολιτισμικής ταυτότητας με ιστορία χιλιάδων ετών. Δυστυχώς, η υποχώρηση της γκρεκάνικης διαλέκτου, ιδίως μετά το Β' παγκόσμιο πόλεμο και η συνεχής συρρίκνωση του αριθμού των ενεργών ομιλητών της, απειλούν να μετατρέψουν τα Γκρεκάνικα σε «νεκρή» ιστορική διάλεκτο.

Λαμβάνοντας υπόψη ότι ο σεβασμός της γλωσσικής και της πολιτιστικής πολυμορφίας αποτελεί μία από τις θεμελιώδεις αρχές της ΕΕ και κατοχυρώνεται με το άρθρο 22 του Χάρτη των Θεμελιωδών Δικαιωμάτων της ΕΕ,

Ερωτάται η Ευρωπαϊκή Επιτροπή:

1. Σκοπεύει να αναλάβει στοχευμένες δράσεις για την διατήρηση της γκρεκάνικης διαλέκτου;
2. Ποια είναι τα ευρωπαϊκά χρηματοδοτικά μέσα που θα μπορούσαν να χρηματοδοτήσουν δράσεις προς αυτήν την κατεύθυνση;

**Απάντηση της κας Βασιλείου εξ ονόματος της Επιτροπής**  
(22 Ιουνίου 2012)

Η Επιτροπή θεωρεί τη γλωσσική πολυμορφία σημαντικό πλεονέκτημα και, στους τομείς που υπάγονται στην αρμοδιότητά της, υποστηρίζει τη διάσωση των λιγότερο διαδεδομένων ευρωπαϊκών γλωσσών.

Ωστόσο, σύμφωνα με την αρχή της επικουρικότητας, όπως ορίζεται στο άρθρο 5 της Συνθήκης για την Ευρωπαϊκή Ένωση, «η Ένωση παρεμβαίνει μόνο εφόσον και κατά τον βαθμό που οι στόχοι της προβλεπόμενης δράσης δεν μπορούν να επιτευχθούν επαρκώς από τα κράτη μέλη.»

Η Επιτροπή προωθεί, μέσω ευρωπαϊκών προγραμμάτων, δράσεις σε ευρωπαϊκό επίπεδο με σκοπό να διατηρηθεί η γλωσσική πολυμορφία και να επιβιώσουν οι γλώσσες που κινδυνεύουν να εξαφανιστούν.

Τα προγράμματα που αφορούν την εκπαίδευση και την κατάρτιση, τον πολιτισμό και τη νεολαία, είναι εκείνα που υποστηρίζουν ειδικά τα έργα σχετικά με τις περιφερειακές και μειονοτικές γλώσσες. Το πρόγραμμα διά βίου μάθησης χρηματοδοτεί έργα για την πρόωθηση της εκμάθησης γλωσσών και της γλωσσικής πολυμορφίας, είτε μέσω των διαφόρων υποπρογραμμάτων (Comenius, Erasmus, Leonardo da Vinci ή Grundtvig) είτε μέσω του εγκάρσιου προγράμματός του (Κύρια Δραστηριότητα 2 — Γλώσσες).

Σε πολλά δίκτυα και έργα που υποστηρίζονται από προγράμματα της ΕΕ περιλαμβάνονται μεταξύ των δικαιούχων κοινότητες που ομιλούν περιφερειακές και μειονοτικές γλώσσες.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-004288/12  
to the Commission**

**Marietta Giannakou (PPE)**

(25 April 2012)

*Subject:* Preservation of Griko dialect in southern Italy

Grecani/Griko is an ancient Greek dialect with elements of Italian spoken in southern Italy (Magna Grecia). The dialect is mainly spoken by members of the Griko community on the southern edge of Calabria in the region of Salento, Apulia, near Lecce and reflects a special cultural identity and a history spanning thousands of years. Unfortunately, the retreat of the dialect, particularly after the Second World War, and the reduction in the number of its active speakers threaten to make Grecani/Griko a 'dead' historical dialect.

Given that respect for linguistic and cultural diversity is one of the fundamental principles of the EU and is enshrined in Article 22 of its Charter of Fundamental Rights:

1. Does the Commission intend to take targeted action to preserve the Grecani/Griko dialect?
2. What European financial instruments could be used to fund these actions?

**Answer given by Ms Vassiliou on behalf of the Commission**

(22 June 2012)

The Commission considers language diversity an important asset and supports the preservation of less widely used European languages within the scope of its competences.

According to the principle of subsidiarity, as stated in Article 5 of the Treaty on European Union, however, 'the Union shall act only if and in so far as the objectives of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States'.

The Commission promotes action at European level in order to preserve linguistic diversity and the survival of endangered languages through European programmes.

In particular those programmes concerning education and training, culture and youth, support projects related to regional and minority languages. The Lifelong Learning Programme (LLP) finances projects to promote language learning and linguistic diversity, either through the different sub-programmes (Comenius, Erasmus, Leonardo da Vinci or Grundtvig) or through its transversal programme (key activity 2 'Languages').

Several networks and projects supported by EU programmes include among their beneficiaries communities speaking regional and minority languages.

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(Versão portuguesa)

**Pergunta com pedido de resposta escrita E-004290/12**  
**à Comissão (Vice-Presidente / Alta Representante)**

**Ana Gomes (S&D)**

(25 de abril de 2012)

Assunto: VP/HR — Presos políticos na Etiópia

Em março de 2012, 24 arguidos, incluindo os jornalistas Woubshet Taye, Reeyot Alemu e Eskinder Nega, foram acusados, ao abrigo de uma lei etíope de 2009, de cometerem atos terroristas. Essa lei antiterrorista criminaliza todas as informações que as autoridades considerem que «incentivem» ou «deem apoio moral» a organizações ou a causas que o governo qualifique de «terroristas». Segundo foi noticiado, um tribunal da capital do país, Addis Ababa, já condenara Reeyot Alemu, um colunista do semanário independente *Feteh* <sup>(1)</sup>, e Woubshet Taye, editor adjunto do agora extinto semanário *Awramba Times*, a 14 anos de prisão e ao pagamento de uma multa de 33 000 ETB (1 500 USD) <sup>(2)</sup>. Além disso, Eskinder Nega, um destacado defensor da liberdade de imprensa e de expressão na Etiópia, foi detido em 14 de setembro de 2011 e está também a ser julgado ao abrigo da legislação antiterrorista. Pouco antes da detenção, Eskinder Nega tinha publicado uma coluna em linha, criticando o uso da lei sobre o terrorismo para silenciar a dissidência e apelando ao Governo etíope para que respeite a liberdade de expressão e acabe com a tortura nas prisões do país. Se for condenado, pode incorrer na pena de morte.

Segundo o Comité para a Proteção dos Jornalistas, no julgamento de Woubshet Taye e Reeyot Alemu, o Ministério Público apresentou como provas e-mails e chamadas telefónicas intercetados entre os jornalistas, bem como mais de 25 artigos <sup>(3)</sup> da *Ethiopian Review* sobre as atividades de organizações da oposição <sup>(4)</sup>.

As organizações para a defesa dos direitos humanos e da liberdade de imprensa criticaram a lei antiterrorista etíope, afirmando que esta lei viola a Constituição do país e inibe a liberdade política devido à definição excessivamente ampla de terrorismo nela prevista. No início deste ano, as Nações Unidas criticaram o uso da lei antiterrorista pelo Governo da Etiópia para restringir a liberdade de expressão, através da detenção dos políticos da oposição e dos jornalistas que sejam críticos em relação ao Estado <sup>(5)</sup>.

À luz do exposto acima:

1. Os representantes da UE foram visitar os jornalistas na prisão e falaram com eles? Em que condições se encontram detidos?
2. Os representantes da UE acompanharam o julgamento de Woubshet Taye e Reeyot Alemu? O julgamento respeitou as normas internacionais em matéria de julgamentos justos? Nomeadamente, os jornalistas tiveram acesso a um advogado e tiveram a possibilidade de replicar às acusações e às provas contra eles recolhidas?
3. Os jornalistas terão a possibilidade de recorrer da decisão do juiz? Poderão, nomeadamente, contestar judicialmente a constitucionalidade das disposições que permitiram a sua detenção e condenação?
4. Os representantes da UE estão a acompanhar o julgamento de Eskinder Nega e a dar apoio ao arguido?
5. A Alta Representante condenará publicamente a detenção e a condenação dos jornalistas e exercerá pressão sobre as autoridades etíopes para que a lei antiterrorista seja alterada de modo a respeitar as normas internacionais relativas aos direitos humanos?

<sup>(1)</sup> (<http://www.cpj.org/reports/2006/04/ethiopia-da-spring-06.php>).

<sup>(2)</sup> (<http://www.cpj.org/2012/01/ethiopia-sentences-blogger-to-death-2-journalists.php>).

<sup>(3)</sup> (<http://www.ethiopianreview.com/content/33587>).

<sup>(4)</sup> (<http://www.cpj.org/2012/01/ethiopia-sentences-blogger-to-death-2-journalists.php>).

<sup>(5)</sup> ([http://mobile.bloomberg.com/news/2012-02-03/united-nations-rights-advocates-criticise-ethiopian-use-of-anti-terror-law?category=&BB\\_NAVI\\_DISABLE=BIZ](http://mobile.bloomberg.com/news/2012-02-03/united-nations-rights-advocates-criticise-ethiopian-use-of-anti-terror-law?category=&BB_NAVI_DISABLE=BIZ)).

**Resposta dada pela Alta Representante/Vice-Presidente Catherine Ashton em nome da Comissão***(26 de junho de 2012)*

1. Os representantes da União Europeia não conseguiram visitar os jornalistas, uma vez que a Etiópia não permite às organizações internacionais o acesso às prisões. Os observadores da UE na Etiópia estão a acompanhar de perto todos os julgamentos. A UE é regularmente informada pelos partidos da oposição da Etiópia sobre as condições de detenção a que estão sujeitos membros dos partidos. A partir das informações recebidas e da observação dos julgamentos, aparentemente os jornalistas presos estão detidos em condições similares às dos outros prisioneiros.
  2. Os representantes da UE assistiram ao julgamento de Woubshet Taye e de Reeyot Alemu. Os arguidos foram representados por advogados por si escolhidos. Os arguidos e os seus advogados alegaram que existiam irregularidades. Segundo a nossa avaliação, a principal preocupação durante o julgamento foi a interpretação da lei antiterrorismo e os elementos de prova apresentados em tribunal em apoio da condenação e das penas relacionadas com a acusação de terrorismo.
  3. Os jornalistas têm a possibilidade de interpor recurso contra a decisão do tribunal. Reeyot Alemu apresentou recurso, enquanto os outros arguidos decidiram pedir a clemência do tribunal.
  4. Os representantes da UE têm assistido ao julgamento de Eskinder Nega e continuarão a fazê-lo.
  5. As preocupações da União Europeia relativas à interpretação extensiva da lei antiterrorismo e ao seu impacto negativo sobre a liberdade de imprensa e a liberdade de expressão na Etiópia, foram transmitidos ao Governo da Etiópia durante um diálogo oficial, a 13 de março de 2012, com o Ministro da Justiça sobre o artigo 8.º relativo aos direitos humanos. As sugestões da UE no sentido de iniciar uma discussão mais aprofundada sobre a execução da lei antiterrorismo e a partilha de experiências em matéria de legislação antiterrorista foram acolhidas favoravelmente pelo Governo etíope. A UE continuará a suscitar as questões que a preocupam em todas as ocasiões apropriadas.
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(English version)

**Question for written answer E-004290/12  
to the Commission (Vice-President/High Representative)**

**Ana Gomes (S&D)**

(25 April 2012)

*Subject:* VP/HR — Political prisoners in Ethiopia

In March 2012, 24 defendants, including journalists Woubshet Taye, Reeyot Alemu and Eskinder Nega, were charged with committing terrorist acts under a 2009 Ethiopian law. This anti-terrorism law criminalises any reporting authorities deem to 'encourage' or 'provide moral support' to groups and causes the government labels as 'terrorists'. According to news reports, a court in the capital, Addis Ababa, had already sentenced Reeyot Alemu, a columnist with the independent weekly *Feteh* <sup>(1)</sup>, and Woubshet Taye, deputy editor of the now-defunct weekly *Awramba Times*, to 14 years in prison and a fine of ETB 33 000 (USD 1 500) <sup>(2)</sup>. Furthermore, Eskinder Nega, a leading advocate for press freedom and freedom of expression in Ethiopia, was arrested on 14 September 2011, and is also being tried under the anti-terror legislation. Just prior to his arrest, Mr Nega had published an online column critical of the use of the terrorism law to silence dissent and calling for the Ethiopian Government to respect freedom of expression and end torture in the country's prisons. He could face the death penalty if convicted.

According to the Committee to Protect Journalists, in the trial of Mr Taye and Ms Alemu, government prosecutors presented as evidence intercepted emails and phone calls between the journalists, as well as more than 25 *Ethiopian Review* articles <sup>(3)</sup> on the activities of opposition groups <sup>(4)</sup>.

Human rights and press freedom groups have criticised the Ethiopian anti-terrorism law, saying it violates the country's constitution and inhibits political freedom due to its overbroad definition of terrorism. Early this year, the United Nations criticised the Ethiopian Government's use of its anti-terrorism law to curb freedom of expression by jailing opposition politicians and reporters critical of the state <sup>(5)</sup>.

In view of the above:

1. Have EU representatives visited the journalists in prison and talked to them? In what conditions are they being detained?
2. Have EU representatives followed the trial of Mr Taye and Ms Alemu? Did it meet international standards on fair trials? Namely, did the journalists have due access to a lawyer and were they given the opportunity to rebut the allegations and evidence collected against them?
3. Will the journalists have the opportunity to appeal against the judge's decision? Namely, will they be able to judicially challenge the constitutional legality of the provisions which enabled their arrest and conviction?
4. Are EU representatives following the trial of Mr Nega and providing support to him?
5. Will the High Representative publicly condemn the imprisonment and conviction of the journalists and press the Ethiopian authorities to amend the anti-terrorism law so as to fulfil international human rights standards?

<sup>(1)</sup> <http://www.cpj.org/reports/2006/04/ethiopia-da-spring-06.php>

<sup>(2)</sup> <http://www.cpj.org/2012/01/ethiopia-sentences-blogger-to-death-2-journalists.php>

<sup>(3)</sup> <http://www.ethiopianreview.com/content/33587>

<sup>(4)</sup> <http://www.cpj.org/2012/01/ethiopia-sentences-blogger-to-death-2-journalists.php>

<sup>(5)</sup> [http://mobile.bloomberg.com/news/2012-02-03/united-nations-rights-advocates-criticise-ethiopian-use-of-anti-terror-law?category=&BB\\_NAVI\\_DISABLE=BIZ](http://mobile.bloomberg.com/news/2012-02-03/united-nations-rights-advocates-criticise-ethiopian-use-of-anti-terror-law?category=&BB_NAVI_DISABLE=BIZ)

**Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Ashton on behalf of the Commission***(26 June 2012)*

1. EU representatives were unable to visit the journalists, as Ethiopia does not grant access to prisons to international organisations. The EU in Ethiopia is closely following all trials. The EU is regularly informed by Ethiopian opposition parties about the conditions of imprisoned party members. It appears from the trial observation and the information received that the imprisoned journalists are being detained in similar conditions as other prisoners.
  2. EU representatives have attended the trial of Mr Taye and Ms Alemu. The defendants were represented by counsels of their choice. The defendants and their attorneys alleged that irregularities existed. In our assessment, the main concern during the trial was the interpretation of the Anti-terrorism Proclamation (ATP) and the evidence brought forward in court leading to a conviction and sentencing on terrorism related charges.
  3. The journalists have the possibility to appeal against the decision of the court. Ms Alemu has submitted an appeal; other defendants have made the decision to ask for clemency.
  4. EU representatives have been attending the trial of Mr Nega and will continue to do so.
  5. The EU's concerns regarding the broad interpretation of the ATP and the negative impact it has on press freedom and freedom of expression in Ethiopia, have been brought to the attention of the Government of Ethiopia during an official Art.8 dialogue on Human Rights with the Minister for Justice on 13 March 2012. Suggestions from the EU to engage in a more in-depth discussion on the implementation of the ATP and experience sharing of anti-terrorism legislation were welcomed by the Ethiopian Government. The EU will continue to raise its concerns on all appropriate occasions.
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*(Versão portuguesa)*

**Pergunta com pedido de resposta escrita E-004291/12  
à Comissão (Vice-Presidente / Alta Representante)**

**Ana Gomes (S&D)**

*(25 de abril de 2012)*

*Assunto:* VP/HR — Convite a Omar al-Bashir para participar na cimeira do Maláui

O Governo do Maláui endereçou mais uma vez um convite ao presidente sudanês, Omar al-Bashir, para participar na próxima Cimeira da União Africana em junho, apesar da forte oposição do Tribunal Penal Internacional (TPI) e de algumas organizações de defesa dos Direitos Humanos.

Os Estados Unidos terão alegadamente suspenso o envio de 350 milhões de dólares atribuídos ao Maláui através da «Millennium Challenge Corporation» (MCC), invocando a deterioração dos Direitos Humanos no país. A Agência para o Desenvolvimento Internacional dos Estados Unidos da América (USAID), presidida pela Secretária de Estado Hillary Clinton, afirmou que o convite do Maláui ao Presidente sudanês, Omer Hassan al-Bashir, foi um dos fatores adicionais a pesar na decisão do congelamento da ajuda.

À luz do que ficou exposto,

1. Tenciona a Alta Representante condenar publicamente a decisão do Maláui de acolher o Presidente al-Bashir?
2. De que forma se propõe a Alta Representante pressionar o Maláui a retirar o convite e a prender, ou a cooperar na detenção, do Presidente al-Bashir?

**Resposta dada pela Alta Representante/Vice-Presidente Catherine Ashton em nome da Comissão**

*(27 de junho de 2012)*

Tanto quanto sabemos, o Governo do Malawi não endereçou um convite ao Presidente Omar al Bashir. O Chefe da Delegação da UE encontrou-se com a Presidente Joyce Banda e informou-a sobre a posição da UE nesta matéria. A Presidente do Malawi já tinha indicado publicamente que o Presidente Al Bashir não deveria participar na próxima Cimeira da UA em Lilongwe.

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(English version)

**Question for written answer E-004291/12  
to the Commission (Vice-President/High Representative)**

**Ana Gomes (S&D)**

(25 April 2012)

*Subject:* VP/HR — Invitation to Omar al-Bashir to attend summit in Malawi

The government of Malawi has once again extended an invitation to the Sudanese President, Omar Hassan al-Bashir, this time to attend the forthcoming African Union summit in June, despite strong opposition from the International Criminal Court (ICC) and a number of human rights organisations.

It is reported that the US is freezing a sum of USD 350 million allocated to Malawi through the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC), citing deteriorating human rights in the country. The US Aid Agency, chaired by Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, has said that Malawi's invitation to President al-Bashir was an additional factor in the decision to freeze the aid.

In view of the above:

1. Will the High Representative publicly condemn Malawi's decision to host President al-Bashir?
2. What steps will the High Representative take to urge the President of Malawi to withdraw the invitation and arrest or cooperate in the arrest of President al-Bashir?

**Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Ashton on behalf of the Commission**

(27 June 2012)

To our knowledge, the Government of Malawi has not issued an invitation to President al Bashir. The EU Head of Delegation met President J. Banda and informed her about the EU position on this issue. The Malawian President had already indicated publicly that President al Bashir should not attend the next AU summit in Lilongwe.

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(English version)

**Question for written answer E-004292/12  
to the Commission  
Linda McAvan (S&D)  
(25 April 2012)**

*Subject:* Results of investigation into higher ticket prices for non-Maltese EU citizens on Maltese public transport

Following on from my Question E-005129/2011, I understand that the above charges are now in force in Malta and that non-residents are being charged higher ticket prices than registered residents.

The Commission has previously indicated that its intention is to ensure that the bus fare scheme is non-discriminatory and proportionate, in line with the principles of the Treaty and of ECJ case-law.

Can the Commission indicate the current status of any bilateral discussions with the Maltese authorities on this subject? Can it provide information on the results and findings of its assessment and analysis in 2011? What action does it plan to take in this regard?

**Answer given by Mr Kallas on behalf of the Commission  
(8 June 2012)**

The Commission is still investigating the issue of the differentiated charges for bus tickets in Malta. As regards the bilateral discussions carried out, the Commission would refer the Honourable Member to its answer to Written Question by Mrs Angelilli <sup>(1)</sup>. The last reply from Malta was received in March 2012. The Commission is analysing the information received from Malta.

The Commission is currently gathering information on public transport policy tariffs with regards to existing differentiated pricing in the EU. This information should allow the Commission to take a coherent approach across the EU on this issue.

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<sup>(1)</sup> Available at <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/QP-WEB/application/search.do>.

(българска версия)

**Въпрос с искане за писмен отговор E-004293/12**  
**до Комисията (Заместник-председател/Върховен представител)**  
**Мария Неделчева (PPE)**  
(26 април 2012 г.)

Относно: ЗП/ВП — Криза на сигурността и хуманитарна криза в Мали

Положението в Мали е изключително опасно и с всеки изминал ден става по-лошо. Жестоките нападения на Националното движение за освобождение на Азауад (НЦОА) — група въстаници туареги, свързани с елементи от „Ал Кайда“ в ислямския Магреб като въоръжената ислямистка групировка Ансар дин, както и неспособността на местната хунта — свалила от власт президента Амаду Тумани Туре под претекст, че не е успял да потуши въстанието на туарегите — да се справи с въстаниците туареги, предизвикаха изостряне на насилието в цялата северна част на Мали. Към това се прибавят и разпространението на оръжия и муниции и радикализирането на групировките. Влошаването на обстановката със сигурността налага северната част на Мали да бъде обявена за територия извън правото, което още повече усложнява хуманитарната и продоволствената криза в Мали. По този начин целият регион на Сахел е дестабилизиран и отслабен.

Икономическата общност на държавите от Западна Африка (CEDEAO), чрез президента на Кот д'Ивоар Аласан Уатара, заяви, че ако военната хунта не възстанови в най-кратки срокове правовата държава и конституцията, на Мали ще бъде наложено пълно ембарго. На 2 април 2012 г. държавите — членки на CEDEAO, решиха да наложат незабавно дипломатически, търговски и финансови санкции, които включват например дипломатическа изолация на страната и замразяване на нейните финансови средства в Централната банка на държавите от Западна Африка (BCEAO). Успоредно с това CEDEAO реши незабавно да постави на разположение своите военни сили, които от известно време са в бойна готовност.

Във връзка с това Комисията може ли да отговори на следните въпроси:

ЕС ще подкрепи ли усилията на CEDEAO? Ако отговорът е утвърдителен, по какъв начин?

**Отговор, даден от Върховния представител/Заместник-председателя Аштън от името на Комисията**  
(26 юни 2012 г.)

От извършването на държавния преврат в Мали на 21 март 2012 г. досега ЕС подкрепя усилията на Икономическата общност на Западноафриканските държави (ECOWAS) за възстановяване на гражданското управление — в партньорство с Африканския съюз (АС), Организацията на обединените нации (ООН) и четирите страни от региона (Алжир, Мали, Мавритания и Нигер).

ЕС може да разгледа някои конкретни предложения за оказване на подкрепа на ECOWAS веднага след изясняване на параметрите на планираната от ECOWAS операция (мандат, логистика, искане от страна на властите на Мали). Ако в крайна сметка за възстановяването на реда се изисква използването на сила, ЕС би желал, преди да окаже подкрепа, да разгледа и обсъди състава и мандата на въпросната военна сила, като се вземе предвид, че финансовите му средства са ограничени. Все пак предпочитаната от ЕС опция е политическо решение посредством мирен диалог. Самата ECOWAS е изразила предпочитанието си за такова решение, като до употреба на сила следва да се стигне само в краен случай и след искане за намеса, отправено от Мали.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-004293/12  
to the Commission (Vice-President/High Representative)**

**Mariya Nedelcheva (PPE)**

(26 April 2012)

*Subject:* VP/HR — Security and humanitarian crisis in Mali

The situation in Mali is extremely dangerous and is deteriorating day by day. Violent attacks by the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA) — a Tuareg rebel group — together with elements of Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) such as the Islamist armed group Ansar Dine, and the inability to deal with Tuareg rebels on the part of the current junta, which overthrew President Amadou Toumani Touré claiming he failed to stop the Tuareg rebellion, have led to increasing violence throughout northern Mali. On top of this, the country is awash with weapons and ammunition and groups are becoming radicalised. The deteriorating security situation has led to lawlessness in northern Mali, exacerbating the humanitarian and food crisis already faced by the country. The entire Sahel region has thus been destabilised and weakened.

On behalf of the Economic Community of West African States (Ecowas), the President of Côte d'Ivoire, Alassane Ouattara, had announced that a total embargo would be imposed on Mali unless the military junta restored the rule of law and the constitution as soon as possible. On 2 April 2012, the Ecowas Member States decided to impose immediate diplomatic, trade and financial sanctions, leading to, *inter alia*, the country's diplomatic isolation and the freezing of its funds held in the Central Bank of West African States (BCEAO). At the same time, Ecowas resolved to immediately deploy its military force, which had already been on the alert for several days.

In view of this, could the Commission say whether the EU will support the efforts of Ecowas? If so, how?

**Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Ashton on behalf of the Commission**

(26 June 2012)

Since the coup d'état on 21 March 2012 in Mali, the EU has supported Ecowas' efforts to restore civilian rule in partnership with the African Union (AU), the United Nations (UN) and the 'pays du champ' (Algeria, Mali, Mauritania and Niger).

The EU may consider some concrete proposals to support Ecowas as soon as the planned Ecowas operation's parameters (mandate, logistics, request from the Malian authorities) are clarified. If restoring order in the end requires the use of force, the EU would want to examine and discuss the composition and the mandate of this force before providing support, taking into consideration that the EU's funds are limited. However, the EU's first option is a political solution through peaceful dialogue. Ecowas itself has expressed its preference for this solution, with force only as a last resort and subject to a request for intervention by Mali.

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(English version)

**Question for written answer P-004296/12  
to the Commission (Vice-President/High Representative)**

**Charles Tannock (ECR)**

(25 April 2012)

*Subject:* VP/HR — The case of Ilias Ali in Bangladesh

Ilias Ali is a Bangladeshi national, a former member of parliament and, currently, a political activist working for the Bangladesh National Party, which is in opposition to the government in that country. It is claimed that Mr Ali was 'abducted' from his home in Dhaka on 17 April 2012 by an unidentified group, and his whereabouts currently remain unknown. BNP activists and European press articles have suggested that the ruling party in Bangladesh, the Awami League, could have been responsible for Mr Ali's disappearance, although these allegations cannot in any way be verified.

Is the Vice-President/High Representative aware of Mr Ali's case? Can she, through the EU delegation in Dhaka, raise the matter with the government of Bangladesh and request that a full investigation of his disappearance be carried out by the law enforcement authorities?

**Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Ashton on behalf of the Commission**

(15 June 2012)

The HR/VP is aware of the disappearance of Mr Ilias Ali and his driver, Mr Ansar Ali, and of the political unrest that this has caused. The EU's concern has been widely reported by the Bangladeshi media, and the EU Delegation has also called for a full investigation of this case and urged all political actors to exercise restraint.

In this regard, the HR/VP reiterates the recent statement by the Chairman of Bangladesh's National Human Rights Commission, who, while calling on the Government to carry out a full investigation of the disappearance of Mr Ilias Ali, recalled that it is the state which has the ultimate responsibility to find persons who have disappeared, irrespective of their political or other identity.

In the context of a meeting held on 3 May 2012 with Ms Tahsina Rushdir Luna, Mr Ilias Ali's wife, Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina assured Mr Ali's family members that law enforcement agencies have been trying their best to trace him, and requested them to assist the authorities in the search.

The circumstances surrounding this case are still to be clarified and the EU will continue to monitor developments closely.

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(Verzjoni Maltija)

**Mistoqsija ghal twegiba bil-miktub E-004299/12**  
**lill-Kummissjoni**  
**David Casa (PPE)**  
(25 ta' April 2012)

**Suggett:** Strategiji nazzjonali ghat-titjib tal-kwalità u l-produttività fuq il-post tax-xoghol

Fil-komunikazzjoni taghha "Intejbu l-kwalità u l-produttività fuq il-post tax-xoghol: strategija Komunitarja 2007-2012 ghas-sahha u s-sigurtà fuq il-post tax-xoghol" tal-21 ta' Frar 2007, il-Kummissjoni tiddiskuti dwar kif ghandha theggeg l-izvilupp u l-implimentazzjoni ta' strategiji nazzjonali ghat-titjib tal-kwalità tal-hajja fuq il-post tax-xoghol. F'din id-diskussjoni, il-Kummissjoni tindirizza l-prevenzjoni u s-sorveljanza tas-sahha, ir-riabilitazzjoni u r-riintegrazzjoni tal-haddiema, ir-reazzjonijiet ghat-tibdil soċjali u demografiku, il-koordinazzjoni ta' politiki dwar is-sahha u s-sigurtà u x-xoghol ma' politiki dwar is-sahha pubblika, l-izvilupp reġjonali u l-koeżjoni soċjali, l-akkwist pubbliku u r-ristrutturar tal-impjeggi.

Issa li waslet is-sena 2012 u l-istrategija msemija f'din il-komunikazzjoni se tasal fi tmiemha, x'tista' tirrapporta l-Kummissjoni dwar is-successi fl-oqsma fil-mira tal-istrategiji nazzjonali? Il-Kummissjoni kif qiegħda tippjana li tkompli taħdem fuq din il-kwistjoni prijoritarja importanti wara tmiem din is-sena?

**Twegiba mogħtija mis-Sur Andor Físem il-Kummissjoni**  
(12 ta' Ġunju 2012)

F'April 2011, il-Kummissjoni ppubblikat revizjoni ta' nofs it-terminu tal-Istrategija tal-UE dwar is-Sahha u s-Sigurtà fuq il-Post tax-Xoghol 2007-2012 <sup>(1)</sup>, wara konsultazzjoni estensiva fl-2010.

Bhalissa, hemm konsulent estern li qed jaħdem fuq l-evalwazzjoni finali tal-Istrategija, li għandha tgħin biex jiġu identifikati l-prijoritajiet għal azzjoni politika futura f'dan il-qasam.

Il-Kummissjoni behsiebha tippreżenta r-rizultati tal-evalwazzjoni finali sa tmiem l-2012, billi tqis il-progress fl-oqsma li jiffokaw fuqhom l-istrategiji nazzjonali. Fuq il-bażi ta' dawk ir-rizultati u wara konsultazzjoni estensiva tal-partijiet interessati, hija ser tressaq prijoritajiet għas-sahha u s-sigurtà fuq il-post tax-xoghol għall-perjodu li jmiss.

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<sup>(1)</sup> Dokument ta' Hidma tal-Persunal tal-Kummissjoni "Revizjoni ta' nofs it-terminu tal-Istrategija Ewropea 2007-2012 dwar is-sahha u s-sigurtà fuq il-post tax-xoghol" (SEC(2011) 547 finali tas-27 ta' April 2011).

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-004299/12  
to the Commission  
David Casa (PPE)  
(25 April 2012)**

*Subject:* National strategies to improve quality and productivity at work

In its communication on 'Improving quality and productivity at work: Community strategy 2007-2012 on health and safety at work' of 21 February 2007, the Commission discusses encouraging the development and implementation of national strategies for improving quality of life in the workplace. In this discussion, the Commission addresses prevention and health surveillance, rehabilitation and reintegration of workers, responses to social and demographic change, coordination of policies on health and safety and work with policies on public health, regional development and social cohesion, public procurement and employment restructuring.

Now that 2012 has arrived and the strategy referred to in this communication is coming to an end, what can the Commission report on the successes in the areas targeted by national strategies? How does the Commission plan to continue work on this important priority issue topic after the end of this year?

**Answer given by Mr Andor on behalf of the Commission  
(12 June 2012)**

In April 2011 the Commission published a mid-term review of the EU Strategy on Health and Safety at Work 2007-2012 <sup>(1)</sup>, following a broad consultation in 2010.

An external consultant is currently working on the final evaluation of the strategy, which should help identify the priorities for future policy action in this field.

The Commission intends to present the results of the final evaluation by the end of 2012, taking account of progress in the areas on which national strategies focus. On the basis of those results and after a wide consultation of the stakeholders, it will put forward priorities for health and safety at work for the forthcoming period.

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<sup>(1)</sup> Commission Staff Working Paper 'Mid-term review of the European strategy 2007-2012 on health and safety at work' (SEC(2011) 547 final of 27 April 2011).

(Verzjoni Maltija)

**Mistoqsija ghal tweġiba bil-miktub E-004301/12**  
**lill-Kummissjoni**  
**David Casa (PPE)**  
(25 ta' April 2012)

Suġġett: Sanzjonijiet kontra l-Burma

Il-Kummissjoni ghamlet pjanijiet sabiex tneħhi tal-inqas xi whud mis-sanzjonijiet li ilhom imwaqfa 16-il sena kontra l-Burma minhabba l-konferma tal-elezzjonijiet hielsa u ġusti li saru hemmhekk f'April. Il-Kummissjoni kif qed tippjana li timmonitorja s-sitwazzjoni fil-Burma sabiex tintegra mill-ġdid b'suċċess lill-Burma fix-xena ekonomika globali jekk fil-fatt tkompli tagħmel passi kbar lejn id-demokrazija?

**Tweġiba mogħtija mir-Rappreżentant Għoli/il-Viċi President Ashton f'isem il-Kummissjoni**  
(19 ta' Ġunju 2012)

L-UE laqgħet bil-herqa l-bidliet li saru f'Burma/il-Mjanmar u tat ir-rispons tagħha fil-konklużjonijiet tal-Kunsill tat-23 ta' Marzu 2012. Dawn il-konklużjonijiet <sup>(1)</sup> jipprevedu sospensjoni tal-miżuri restrittivi kollha, minbarra tal-embargo fuq l-armi.

L-UE issa se tidhol f'kollaborazzjoni attiva mal-pajjiż, fil-livelli kollha, bil-għan li tkun ta' għajjnuna u ta' appoġġ għall-proċess ta' riforma u biex tikkontribwixxi għall-iżvilupp ekonomiku, politiku u soċjali. Qed jithejja pakkett ta' għajjnuna li jammonta għal EUR 150 miljun għall-2012 u għall-2013 biex jingħata appoġġ lil dawn ir-riformi. L-Uffiċċju tal-UE f'Yangon li ġie inawgurat fit-28 ta' April 2012 mir-Rappreżentant Għoli/il-Viċi President, se jiffacilita djalogu intensifikat u se jgħin fil-monitoraġġ u s-sorveljanza tal-programmi tal-UE. Meta jiġu sodisfatti l-kundizzjonijiet meħtieġa, l-UE se terġa' tintroduci l-preferenzi għal dan il-pajjiż skont is-Sistema Ġeneralizzata ta' Preferenzi, jiġifieri l-aċċess bla dazju u bla kwoti tal-prodotti tiegħu għas-suq Ewropew.

<sup>(1)</sup> [http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms\\_Data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/129703.pdf](http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/129703.pdf)

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-004301/12  
to the Commission**

**David Casa (PPE)**

(25 April 2012)

*Subject:* Burma sanctions

The Commission has made plans to lift at least some of the 16-year-old sanctions on Burma given the confirmed free and fair elections that took place there in April. How does the Commission plan to monitor the situation in Burma in order to successfully reintegrate Burma into the global economic arena if it does in fact continue to take major strides towards democracy?

**Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Ashton on behalf of the Commission**

(19 June 2012)

The EU has welcomed the changes in Burma/Myanmar and gave its response in Council conclusions on 23 March 2012. These conclusions <sup>(1)</sup> foresee a suspension of all restrictive measures, excluding the arms embargo.

The EU will now enter into an active collaboration with the country at all levels, in order to assist and support the reform process and to contribute to economic, political and social development. A package of assistance of EUR 150 million is being prepared for the 2012 and 2013 to support these reforms. The EU Office in Yangon which the High Representative/Vice-President has inaugurated on 28 April 2012, will facilitate intensified dialogue and help with monitoring and overseeing EU programmes. When the required conditions are met, the EU will reinstate the preferences for the country under the Generalised System of Preferences, namely duty free and quota free access for its products to the European market.

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(1) [http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms\\_Data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/129703.pdf](http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/129703.pdf)

(Versione italiana)

**Interrogazione con richiesta di risposta scritta E-004303/12  
alla Commissione (Vicepresidente/Alto Rappresentante)  
Barbara Matera (PPE), Mario Mauro (PPE), Antonio Cancian (PPE), Roberta Angelilli (PPE),  
Paolo Bartolozzi (PPE), Lara Comi (PPE), Erminia Mazzoni (PPE), Marco Scurria (PPE),  
Sergio Paolo Frances Silvestris (PPE), Aldo Patriciello (PPE) e Alfredo Antoniozzi (PPE)  
(25 aprile 2012)**

Oggetto: VP/HR — Valutazione delle sanzioni contro il Myanmar in seguito alle elezioni suppletive di aprile

Il Myanmar (Birmania) ha vissuto un felice cambiamento rispetto a decenni di regime autoritario. Il 1° aprile 2012 si sono svolte nel paese le prime elezioni libere e corrette, e confermate tali. In seguito alle elezioni legislative, Aung San Suu Kyi, personalità politica dell'opposizione in Myanmar, è stata eletta al parlamento dopo dieci anni di arresti domiciliari. Si tratta di un risultato eccezionale per il Myanmar, che ha vissuto quasi mezzo secolo di corruzione, violazioni dei diritti umani e governo autoritario.

Dal 1996 l'UE ha adottato sanzioni contro la Birmania/Myanmar in risposta alle violazioni dei diritti umani e al regime antidemocratico al potere nel paese. Il governo del Myanmar si è impegnato a compiere riforme, e quest'anno l'Alto Rappresentante Catherine Ashton ha salutato con soddisfazione l'accesso senza precedenti che la comunità internazionale ha potuto avere alle elezioni suppletive. L'UE ha risposto all'invito del governo a essere presente il giorno delle elezioni inviando una delegazione ufficiale incaricata di verificare che le elezioni rispettassero gli standard accettati a livello internazionale.

L'UE ha sottolineato che il modo in cui si sono svolte queste elezioni suppletive costituirà un elemento importante del riesame della politica dell'UE nei confronti della Birmania/Myanmar, che sarà oggetto di dibattito nel corso del Consiglio «Affari esteri» di aprile.

1. Mentre le riforme intraprese in Myanmar continuano, come svilupperà l'UE una relazione nuova e di cooperazione col paese? Su quali aspetti della politica dell'UE nei confronti del Myanmar si concentrerà il Consiglio?
2. Se le sanzioni contro la Birmania/Myanmar saranno attenuate, come assicurerà il Consiglio che le disposizioni adottate premiano le riforme fatte continuando però a incoraggiare maggiori cambiamenti democratici?

**Risposta dell'Alta Rappresentante/Vicepresidente Catherine Ashton a nome della Commissione  
(6 luglio 2012)**

L'UE ha salutato con viva soddisfazione i cambiamenti intervenuti in Birmania/Myanmar, compreso l'esito delle elezioni suppletive, e ha espresso la sua reazione nelle conclusioni del Consiglio del 23 aprile 2012: [http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms\\_Data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/129703.pdf](http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/129703.pdf).

Tali conclusioni prevedono la sospensione di tutte le misure restrittive tranne l'embargo sulle armi. L'UE instaurerà inoltre una collaborazione attiva con il paese, per sostenere il processo di riforma e contribuire allo sviluppo politico, economico e sociale.

L'UE ha già annunciato nuova assistenza per 150 milioni di EUR. Il rafforzamento della capacità della pubblica amministrazione di elaborare e attuare le riforme costituirà un nuovo ambito di cooperazione, che va ad aggiungersi alle attività di assistenza in corso finalizzate alla riduzione della povertà e al rafforzamento della società civile.

L'UE solleciterà inoltre l'impegno delle autorità su un'ampia gamma di tematiche, ad esempio i diritti umani, la cooperazione allo sviluppo, il commercio e gli investimenti responsabili, la biodiversità e la deforestazione, nonché la salute e l'istruzione, al fine di incoraggiare maggiori riforme.

L'ufficio di rappresentanza dell'UE inaugurato dall'Alta Rappresentante/Vicepresidente il 28 aprile svolgerà un ruolo importante per far progredire tale cooperazione.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-004303/12**  
**to the Commission (Vice-President/High Representative)**  
**Barbara Matera (PPE), Mario Mauro (PPE), Antonio Cancian (PPE), Roberta Angelilli (PPE),**  
**Paolo Bartolozzi (PPE), Lara Comi (PPE), Erminia Mazzoni (PPE), Marco Scurria (PPE),**  
**Sergio Paolo Frances Silvestris (PPE), Aldo Patriciello (PPE) and Alfredo Antoniozzi (PPE)**  
(25 April 2012)

*Subject:* VP/HR — Evaluation of sanctions on Myanmar after April by-elections

Myanmar (Burma) has seen a commendable break with decades of authoritarian rule. On 1 April 2012, the first confirmed free and fair election took place in Myanmar. After the legislative elections, Aung San Suu Kyi, a Myanmar opposition politician who was held in house arrest for 10 years, was elected to parliament. This is an exceptional accomplishment for Myanmar, which has seen almost half a century of corruption, human rights violations, and authoritarian rule.

Since 1996, the EU has adopted sanctions on Myanmar in response to human rights violations and the anti-democratic regime in that country. The Myanmar Government has committed itself to reforms and this year the High Representative, Catherine Ashton, welcomed the unprecedented access by the international community to the by-elections. The EU responded to the Government's invitation to be present on election day by sending an official delegation to oversee that the elections upheld internationally accepted standards.

The EU has emphasised that the performance of these by-elections will form an important element of the review of EU policy vis-à-vis Myanmar which is to be discussed at the April Foreign Affairs Council.

1. As the ongoing reforms in Myanmar continue, how will the EU develop a new and cooperative relationship with the country? What aspects of EU policy vis-à-vis Myanmar will the Council focus on?
2. If sanctions on Myanmar are eased, how will the Council ensure that regulations will reward the reforms made but still continue to encourage more democratic change?

**Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Ashton on behalf of the Commission**  
(6 July 2012)

The EU has given a strong welcome to the changes in Burma/Myanmar including the outcome of the by-elections and has set out its response in Council conclusions adopted on 23 April 2012:  
[http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms\\_Data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/129703.pdf](http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/129703.pdf)

These conclusions foresee a suspension of all restrictive measures excluding the arms embargo. The EU will also enter into an active collaboration with the country, in order to assist the reform process and to contribute to political, economic and social development.

The EU has already announced EUR 150 million in new assistance. Strengthening the capacity of the public service to design and implement reforms will be a new area of cooperation, in addition to existing assistance activities related to poverty reduction and strengthening civil society.

The EU will also engage the authorities on a broad range of topics, e.g. human rights, development cooperation, trade and responsible investment, biodiversity and deforestation, as well as health and education, in order to encourage more reform.

The EU Office opened by High Representative/Vice-President Ashton on 28 April will play an important role in advancing this cooperation.

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(Versione italiana)

**Interrogazione con richiesta di risposta scritta E-004304/12  
alla Commissione (Vicepresidente/Alto Rappresentante)  
Fiorello Provera (EFD)  
(25 aprile 2012)**

Oggetto: VP/HR — Carestia in Yemen

*The Economist* ha riferito alla fine di aprile che nella provincia costiera yemenita di Hodeida l'agricoltura è stata danneggiata da periodi di siccità e dall'aumento dei prezzi del carburante. In Yemen l'acqua viene estratta dal suolo utilizzando pompe diesel e trasportata in tutto il paese, ma da quando è in corso la crisi politica le strade, le forniture e l'elettricità subiscono interruzioni. Di conseguenza, il prezzo dei generi alimentari di base è aumentato, molte attività commerciali hanno chiuso i battenti e la disoccupazione si attesta attualmente al 50 %. Per sbarcare il lunario, molte persone hanno iniziato a comprare cibo e acqua a credito, il che significa che per un gran numero di yemeniti che vivono in condizioni precarie il debito familiare è aumentato.

Il Programma alimentare mondiale delle Nazioni Unite ha riferito che i livelli di insicurezza alimentare in Yemen sono raddoppiati a partire dal 2009. Almeno cinque milioni di persone restano frequentemente senza cibo. Si ritiene che a Hodeida il 30 % dei bambini sia denutrito, e quasi il 60 % dei bambini yemeniti presenta un rallentamento della crescita e una riduzione delle potenzialità mentali e fisiche.

L'altra grande questione che affligge lo Yemen è il problema endemico della masticazione della *qat*. Secondo la Banca mondiale, il 72 % degli uomini yemeniti mastica la pianta e spende una parte significativa del proprio stipendio per questa abitudine. Le piantagioni di *qat* inoltre assorbono preziose risorse idriche e terreni fertili sono spesso destinati alla coltivazione di questa pianta narcotica invece che di piante alimentari.

L'Assistente Segretario generale delle Nazioni Unite Catherine Bragg ha dichiarato che l'ONU è pronta a offrire ogni tipo di aiuto allo Yemen per affrontare la crisi economica e umanitaria in corso nel paese.

1. È l'AR/VP al corrente delle dimensioni del problema della denutrizione infantile in Yemen?
2. Qual è la risposta attuale dell'UE a tale crisi?
3. Ritiene il SEAE che l'insicurezza alimentare in Yemen potrebbe causare una grave instabilità interna suscettibile di estendersi ai paesi vicini?

**Risposta di Andris Piebalgs a nome della Commissione  
(8 giugno 2012)**

1. L'UE è perfettamente al corrente del problema della malnutrizione in Yemen, segue i risultati dei più recenti studi che confermano l'allarmante tasso di malnutrizione e sta valutando misure appropriate per far fronte ad una situazione complessa. Le ultime indagini condotte dal Programma alimentare mondiale e dall'UNICEF rilevano un peggioramento significativo dell'insicurezza alimentare e della malnutrizione nei governatorati occidentali dello Yemen. Oltre 5 milioni di yemeniti sono colpiti duramente dall'insicurezza alimentare e almeno 4 governatorati presentano un livello globale di denutrizione acuta pari o superiore alla soglia d'emergenza del 15 %.

2. Dall'inizio del 2011 la Commissione ha mobilitato 45 milioni di EUR in aiuti umanitari. Tale sostegno finanziario viene utilizzato principalmente per fornire aiuti d'emergenza alle popolazioni colpite da alti livelli di malnutrizione.

Riguardo ai programmi di sviluppo a lungo termine, il sostegno dell'UE si estende a tutti gli aspetti fondamentali della sicurezza alimentare: i mezzi di sussistenza dei piccoli produttori/delle piccole comunità rurali e il miglioramento della gestione dei sistemi idrici, il sostegno ai sistemi di sicurezza sociale, l'attuazione della strategia nazionale di sicurezza alimentare e l'istituzione di un sistema nazionale d'informazione sulla sicurezza alimentare. L'UE è inoltre attiva in due settori strettamente legati alla sicurezza alimentare e alla malnutrizione: l'assistenza sanitaria di base e la creazione di posti di lavoro attraverso il sostegno alle micro, piccole e medie imprese.

3. La sicurezza alimentare è un problema permanente in Yemen e nonostante sia stata aggravata dalla recente crisi non è considerata il fattore principale dell'instabilità del paese. Altri fattori di instabilità comprendono le tradizionali fonti di divisione all'interno del paese aggravate dall'accesso impari ai posti di lavoro; disegualianze nello sviluppo e nell'accesso ai servizi tra le aree urbane e le aree rurali; aumento dei prezzi per energia e alimenti.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-004304/12  
to the Commission (Vice-President/High Representative)**

**Fiorello Provera (EFD)**

(25 April 2012)

*Subject:* VP/HR — Famine in Yemen

The *Economist* reported in late April that in the Yemeni coastal province of Hodeida, farming has been affected by droughts and rising fuel prices. In Yemen water is drawn from the ground using diesel-powered pumps and transported across the country, but throughout the political crisis roads, supplies and electricity have been cut. As a result, the price of basic foodstuffs has risen, many businesses have shut and unemployment currently stands at 50%. To make ends meet, many people have taken to buying food and water on credit, which means increased household debt for dozens of vulnerable Yemenis.

The United Nations World Food Programme has reported that levels of food insecurity inside Yemen have doubled since 2009. At least five million people frequently go without food. In Hodeida, 30% of children are believed to be malnourished, and almost 60% of Yemeni children have stunted growth and reduced mental and physical potential.

The other important issue in Yemen is the endemic problem of *qat* chewing. According to the World Bank, 72% of Yemeni men chew the plant and many spend a substantial portion of their salary on the habit. The crop also uses up precious water resources, and fertile land is often diverted for the purpose of growing this narcotic plant instead of food.

The United Nations Assistant Secretary General Catherine Bragg has said that the UN is ready to offer any kind of help to Yemen in order to address the economic and humanitarian crises in the country.

1. Is the HR/VP aware of the extent of the problem of malnutrition amongst children in Yemen?
2. What is the EU's current response to this crisis?
3. Does the EEAS believe that food insecurity inside Yemen could trigger serious internal instability that could spill over into neighbouring countries?

**Answer given by Mr Piebalgs on behalf of the Commission**

(8 June 2012)

1. The EU is fully aware of the malnutrition problem in Yemen. It is following the outcome of the most recent studies confirming the alarming malnutrition rates and is considering adequate responses to a complex situation. WFP's and Unicef's latest surveys show a significant deterioration of the food insecurity and malnutrition in the Western governorates in Yemen. Over 5 million Yemenis are severely food insecure and at least 4 governorates present Global Acute Malnutrition (GAM) equal or higher than the emergency threshold of 15%.

2. The Commission has mobilised humanitarian funding for a total amount of EUR 45 million since the beginning of 2011. This funding is mainly used to provide emergency relief to the most vulnerable population affected by high level of malnutrition.

Concerning its longer-term development programmes, the EU support extends to all key aspects of food security: livelihoods of small producers/rural communities and the improvement of water management systems, support to social safety nets, the development of the National Food Security Strategy and the setting up of a National Food Security Information System. The EU is also active in the primary health sectors and is involved in job creation through support to micro, small and medium enterprises, both sectors being closely related to food security and nutrition.

3. Food security is a chronic problem in Yemen and is not seen as the main factor of recent instability in the country — even though the food insecurity was aggravated by the recent crisis. Other factors of instability include traditional sources of division in the country aggravated by unequal access to employment; inequalities in development and access to services between urban and rural areas; increase in prices — both for energy and food.



(Svensk version)

**Frågor för skriftligt besvarande E-004305/12  
till kommissionen**

**Christofer Fjellner (PPE)**

(25 april 2012)

*Angående:* Behovet av att inleda ett internationellt samarbete kring godmanskap för att underlätta och öka stödet till personer som står under godmanskap och som rör sig över gränserna

Ett relativt stort antal personer i medlemsstaterna har behov av någon form av förmyndare. På nationell nivå skulle dessa personer kunna få berättigat skydd och hjälp. En person som behöver en förmyndare, särskilt om personen står under godmanskap, och som reser över gränserna och vistas utomlands under en längre period, förlorar emellertid i dagsläget i hög grad sitt skydd. Det är därför svårt för staten i deras hemland att hålla reda på dem och hjälpa dem när de är utomlands.

Det är tydligt att ett internationellt samarbete i den här frågan är lämpligt och nödvändigt för att dessa personer ska kunna röra sig över gränserna och samtidigt behålla det stöd som de får i sitt hemland. Principen om fri rörlighet är en grundläggande rättighet inom EU. Alla berörda har i dagsläget inte samma rättigheter, vilket tydligt visar att denna fråga är relevant.

Känner kommissionen till de svårigheter som uppstår?

Hur hanterar kommissionen detta problem?

**Svar från Viviane Reding på kommissionens vägnar**

(7 juni 2012)

Parlamentsledamoten påpekar att det inte finns något EU-instrument för skydd av utsatta vuxna. Kommissionen ber att få hänvisa till sitt svar på den skriftliga frågan E-001733/2010.

I svaret uttryckte kommissionen sitt engagemang för att noga övervaka tillämpningen av Haagkonventionen av den 13 januari 2000 om det internationella skyddet av vuxna, i syfte att identifiera eventuella förbättringar. Utöver Tyskland, Frankrike, Förenade kungariket (endast Skottland) och Schweiz har denna konvention även trätt i kraft i Estland och Finland, och ska snart träda i kraft i Tjeckien.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-004305/12  
to the Commission**

**Christofer Fjellner (PPE)**

(25 April 2012)

*Subject:* Need to initiate international collaboration on curatorship, to facilitate and enhance support for individuals under curatorship moving across borders

A relatively high number of individuals in the Member States have need of some form of legal guardian. At national level, these individuals may be considered to receive legitimate protection and aid. However, at present, when an individual in need of a guardian, especially one who is under curatorship, travels across borders, and while such a person stays in a foreign country for a prolonged period, his or her protection is essentially lost. It is therefore difficult for the government of their native country to keep track of them and assist them while they are abroad.

It appears clear that international collaboration on this issue is appropriate and necessary in order to enable these individuals to have mobility across borders while allowing them to retain the support provided in their home country. The principle of free movement is a fundamental right within the Union. In the present situation, this right is not equal for all those concerned, which underlines the relevance of this inquiry.

Is the Commission aware of the difficulties that arise?

How is the Commission addressing the issue?

**Answer given by Mrs Reding on behalf of the Commission**

(7 June 2012)

The Honourable Member points out that there is no existing EU instrument on the protection of vulnerable adults. The Commission would refer the Honourable Member to its answer to Written Question E-001733/2010.

In its answer, the Commission stated its commitment to closely monitor the implementation of the Hague Convention of 13 January 2000 on the international protection of adults, with a view to identifying possible improvements. In addition to Germany, France, the United Kingdom (Scotland only) and Switzerland, this Convention has entered into force in Estonia, Finland and will soon enter into force in Czech Republic.

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(Versione italiana)

**Interrogazione con richiesta di risposta scritta E-004306/12**  
**alla Commissione**  
**Oreste Rossi (EFD)**  
(25 aprile 2012)

**Oggetto:** Trasporti ferroviari e fondi UE alla Turchia: le ombre di un fantomatico processo di integrazione

A pochi mesi dalla firma del contratto per la tratta ferroviaria Köseköy-Gebze, nel corridoio ad alta velocità Ankara-Istanbul, il Ministero turco dello Sviluppo ha annunciato il programma d'investimenti pubblici previsti nel 2012, enumerando più di 2 600 progetti con uno stanziamento per l'anno in corso di 16,6 miliardi di euro su valore complessivo delle opere da realizzare pari a 1 54 miliardi di euro. Tale progetto comprende la ricostruzione di 56 km della linea ferroviaria a doppio binario che collega le due «capitali» del Paese, nonché la costruzione della sovrastruttura ferroviaria e lavorazioni elettromeccaniche, tra cui elettrificazione, segnalamento e telecomunicazione. Il valore del progetto è di circa 147 milioni euro e sarà finanziato mediante i fondi dell'Unione europea. Si tratta di un *business* con ampie prospettive di crescita, poiché il settore delle infrastrutture turco attrae sempre più investitori, specialmente nell'ambito delle attività a lungo termine. Il settore delle costruzioni e dei trasporti in Turchia ha un volume d'affari di 130 miliardi di dollari. Di fronte a questo massiccio «programma», che non ha «rivali» in Europa, le imprese europee iniziano la corsa per rastrellare uno dei pacchetti economici più consistenti di privatizzazioni.

Ancora una volta, però, sono evidenti i dubbi circa l'efficacia dei fondi dell'Unione sul processo di ripresa economica, che spinge agli investimenti al di fuori dell'UE, dal momento che la Turchia è un paese «in Europa» — che non fa parte dell'Unione europea e che quindi non è tenuto a sottostare al patto di stabilità, ha il pieno controllo della politica monetaria e fiscale e la cui economia «va a gonfie vele». Il Paese è in pieno boom economico; il suo PIL è cresciuto nel 2011 del 7,5 % e per l'anno in corso sfiorerà l'8 %, il che porta la Turchia ad essere la quinta economia al mondo per crescita. Gli investimenti esteri aumentano, anche attratti dal differenziale del costo del lavoro e della pressione fiscale. Un quadro ben diverso da quello dell'economia europea.

Chiedo pertanto alla Commissione, alla luce dei finanziamenti concessi nel settore in questione, mediante accesso ai fondi dell'Unione europea:

- di indicare le norme che fanno da sfondo alla realizzazione delle infrastrutture e regolano l'affidamento degli appalti pubblici, nonché gli strumenti che garantiscono l'ottimizzazione dei costi e la trasparenza nelle procedure ad evidenza pubblica in un paese fuori dall'Unione europea;
- di verificare se l'accesso ai fondi comunitari per la realizzazione di tali progetti in Turchia non comporti una violazione dei principi comunitari di libera concorrenza e di non discriminazione, a discapito dell'economia europea.

**Risposta di Johannes Hahn a nome della Commissione**  
(12 giugno 2012)

L'assistenza finanziaria dell'UE alla Turchia è disciplinata dal regolamento del Consiglio che istituisce uno strumento di assistenza preadesione <sup>(1)</sup>. Disposizioni dettagliate per l'erogazione dell'assistenza nel settore sono stabilite nel Programma operativo per il trasporti <sup>(2)</sup>. L'attuazione del programma è in linea con i negoziati tecnici in virtù del capitolo 21 dell'acquis, in particolare la Rete transeuropea di trasporto TEN-T che è estesa alla Turchia.

Il processo d'appalto e di attribuzione dei contratti in Turchia è conforme al regolamento finanziario che si applica al bilancio dell'UE e alla Guida pratica della Commissione <sup>(3)</sup> per assicurare l'efficacia dei costi e salvaguardare la trasparenza delle procedure pubbliche. La Guida pratica per i contratti di aiuti esterni dell'UE è applicata alla Turchia e ciascuna fase della procedura d'appalto e di aggiudicazione è esaminata in loco e approvata previamente dalla delegazione dell'Unione europea in Turchia.

<sup>(1)</sup> Regolamento (CE) n. 1085/2006 del Consiglio del 17 luglio 2006.

<sup>(2)</sup> Decisione della Commissione n. C(2007)6053 del 7 dicembre 2007.

<sup>(3)</sup> La Guida pratica è uno strumento di lavoro che spiega la procedura di attribuzione dei contratti che si applica a tutti i contratti di aiuti esterni finanziati a partire dal bilancio generale dell'Unione europea e dal decimo Fondo europeo di sviluppo (FES). ([http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/work/procedures/implementation/index\\_en.htm](http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/work/procedures/implementation/index_en.htm))

La Commissione desidera rassicurare l'onorevole deputato quanto al fatto che l'accesso ai finanziamenti dell'UE per la realizzazione di progetti nel settore dei trasporti in Turchia è aperto alle imprese europee specializzate nel settore dei trasporti attraverso la pubblicazione di bandi di gara. La delegazione dell'Unione europea presso la Turchia e la Commissione seguono la procedura per assicurare il rispetto dei principi UE in tema di libera concorrenza e non discriminazione.

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(English version)

**Question for written answer E-004306/12**  
**to the Commission**  
**Oreste Rossi (EFD)**  
(25 April 2012)

*Subject:* Rail transport and EU funds to Turkey: shades of a phantom integration process

A few months since the signing of the contract for the Köseköy-Gebze railway section, on the Ankara-Istanbul high-speed corridor, the Turkish Minister for Development has announced the public investment programme planned for 2012, listing more than 2 600 projects with an investment value for the current year of EUR 16.6 billion out of a total value of the works to be carried out of EUR 154 billion. This project includes the reconstruction of 56 km of the twin-track railway line that connects the country's two 'capitals' and the construction of the railway superstructure and electrical engineering works, including electrification, signalling and telecommunications. The value of the project is approximately EUR 147 million and will be financed via European Union funds. This is a business with ample growth prospects, because the Turkish infrastructure sector is attracting more and more investors, particularly in long-term projects. The Turkish construction and transport sector has a turnover of USD 130 billion. In the face of this massive 'programme', which has no 'rivals' in Europe, European companies are joining the race to take advantage of one of the most substantial privatisation packages.

However, once again there are doubts about the effectiveness of European Union funds on the economic recovery process, which is pushing investments outside the EU. Given that Turkey is in Europe but not in the European Union, it is not obliged to conform to the stability pact, has complete control over its monetary and fiscal policy and its economy is steaming ahead. The country is enjoying an economic boom; its GDP grew by 7.5% in 2011 and will reach 8% in the current year, which makes Turkey the fifth world economy in terms of growth. Foreign investments are growing, also attracted by the difference in labour costs and fiscal pressures. A very different picture from that of the EU economy.

Therefore, in view of the EU funding granted to the sector in question, can the Commission:

- state which laws form the basis for the building of infrastructure and regulate the awarding of public contracts and the instruments that guarantee the optimisation of costs and transparency of public procedures in a country outside the European Union;
- verify that access to Community funds for the implementation of such projects in Turkey does not breach the Community principles of free competition and non-discrimination, to the detriment of the EU economy?

**Answer given by Mr Hahn on behalf of the Commission**  
(12 June 2012)

EU financial assistance to Turkey is governed by the Council Regulation establishing an instrument for pre-accession assistance<sup>(1)</sup>. Detailed provisions for the delivery of the assistance in the sector are established in the operational programme for Transport<sup>(2)</sup>. The implementation of the programme is in line with the technical negotiations under Chapter 21 of the *acquis*, in particular the Trans European Networks TEN-T which extends to Turkey.

The tendering process and awarding of contracts in Turkey comply with the Financial Regulation applicable to the EU budget and the Commission's Practical Guide<sup>(3)</sup> rules to ensure cost effectiveness and safeguard transparency of public procedures. The Practical Guide for EU external aid contracts is applied in Turkey and each step of the tendering and awarding process is scrutinised locally and approved in advance by the European Union Delegation to Turkey.

The Commission wishes to reassure the Honourable Member that access to EU funds for the implementation of transport projects in Turkey is open to European enterprises specialised in the transport domain through the publication of tenders. The European Union Delegation to Turkey and the Commission monitor the process to ensure compliance with EU principles of free competition and non-discrimination.

<sup>(1)</sup> Council Regulation (EC) No 1085/2006 of 17 July 2006.

<sup>(2)</sup> Commission Decision No C(2007)6053 of 7 December 2007.

<sup>(3)</sup> The Practical Guide is a working tool, which explains the contracting procedures applying to all external aid contracts financed from the European Union general budget and the 10th European Development Fund (EDF) ([http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/work/procedures/implementation/index\\_en.htm](http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/work/procedures/implementation/index_en.htm)).

(Versión española)

**Pregunta con solicitud de respuesta escrita E-004307/12**

**a la Comisión**

**Antolín Sánchez Presedo (S&D)**

(25 de abril de 2012)

*Asunto:* Fondos FEADER y Fragas do Eume (Galicia, España)

Aunque la densidad de los hábitats de Galicia duplica la media española, es de las Comunidades Autónomas que tienen menos territorio cubierto por la Red Natura 2000 (menos de un 12 %). De hecho (véase mi pregunta E-006149/2011 y su correspondiente respuesta), la Comisión ha admitido que existe un retraso en la designación de nuevos espacios conforme a la Directiva 92/43/CEE (Directiva sobre Hábitats), por lo que ha planteado ya la obligación de proceder a su ampliación.

Desgraciadamente, los incendios han afectado recientemente a algunos espacios naturales gallegos. En octubre del año pasado dañaron al macizo central ourensán y a finales del mes pasado afectaron a las Fragas do Eume, la única reserva de bosque atlántico existente en Europa.

Las Fragas do Eume carecen de un plan rector de su uso y gestión que conjugue los intereses generales de la protección ambiental con los intereses de los propietarios privados. Tampoco ha sido objeto, hasta la fecha, de la redacción de un proyecto para su regeneración integral que pueda ser propuesto en las convocatorias del Programa LIFE. Ni siquiera, tras los incendios, se tiene noticia de que la Xunta de Galicia haya promovido medidas urgentes de restauración ambiental susceptibles de acogerse a los fondos europeos correspondientes al pilar de desarrollo rural. El Feader, en particular, tiene un eje de actuación en medidas de carácter ambiental por el que se obliga a utilizar al menos un 12 % del total de los fondos ejecutados en ese programa (unos 100 millones en el caso de Galicia).

— ¿Puede confirmar la Comisión si la Xunta de Galicia está dando cumplimiento al requisito de que el 12 % del Feader se destine a actividades de tipo medioambiental?

— ¿Cuál es la situación en estos momentos?

— ¿Ha presentado algún proyecto para la restauración de las Fragas do Eume susceptible de financiarse con el Programa LIFE, con fondos de desarrollo rural o con otros fondos europeos?

**Respuesta del Sr. Potočnik en nombre de la Comisión**

(29 de junio de 2012)

La Comisión se mantiene en contacto con las autoridades españolas, ya que es necesario que estas subsanen las lagunas detectadas y completen la red Natura 2000 en Galicia y otras regiones, lo que incluye la designación oficial de los espacios en virtud de la Directiva de hábitats<sup>(1)</sup>. Esto pondrá en marcha oficialmente las medidas de gestión dinámica y recuperación de los espacios. La Comisión ha invitado a todos los Estados miembros a que expongan sus necesidades de cofinanciación de la UE para Natura 2000 mediante el establecimiento de «marcos de acción prioritaria» teniendo en cuenta las posibilidades de cofinanciación de la UE presentadas en las propuestas de financiación de la Comisión para el próximo marco financiero plurianual. El marco propuesto para la futura cofinanciación de Natura 2000 por la UE se explica en el reciente documento de trabajo de los servicios de la Comisión sobre la financiación de Natura 2000<sup>(2)</sup>.

El Reglamento (CE) n° 1698/2005 del Consejo<sup>(3)</sup>, relativo a la ayuda al desarrollo rural a través del Fondo Europeo Agrícola de Desarrollo Rural (Feader), solo menciona un porcentaje mínimo de contribución total del Feader por eje para garantizar un equilibrio entre los objetivos (artículo 17). Sin embargo, no hay una referencia jurídica a un 12 % destinado a medidas medioambientales. El Programa de Desarrollo Rural de Galicia prevé actualmente un gasto total de 145 millones de euros para recuperar el potencial forestal y aplicar medidas preventivas en bosques dañados por desastres naturales, incluidos los incendios forestales. La selección de los proyectos concretos incumbe al gobierno autónomo de Galicia.

<sup>(1)</sup> DO L 206 de 22.7.1992.

<sup>(2)</sup> SEC(2011) 1573 final.

<sup>(3)</sup> DO L 277 de 21.10.2005.

La Comisión puede confirmar que aún no ha recibido ninguna solicitud de financiación al amparo del programa LIFE+ para trabajos de recuperación de las «Fragas do Eume». Hasta ahora, no se ha utilizado ninguna financiación del Fondo Europeo de Desarrollo para los trabajos de recuperación señalados <sup>(4)</sup>.

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<sup>(4)</sup> Para más información sobre los fondos del FEDER, sírvase ponerse en contacto con la autoridad de gestión en España, cuya dirección es la siguiente: Anatolio Alonso Pardo, Subdirector General de Administración del FEDER, Ministerio de Hacienda y Administraciones Públicas, Paseo de la Castellana, 162, E-28071 Madrid.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-004307/12**  
**to the Commission**  
**Antolín Sánchez Presedo (S&D)**  
(25 April 2012)

*Subject:* ERDF funds and Fragas do Eume (Galicia, Spain)

Although Galicia's habitat density is double the average in Spain, it is one of the Autonomous Communities with least territory covered by the Natura 2000 network (less than 12%). In fact (see my Question E-006149/2011 and the corresponding answer), the Commission has acknowledged a delay in the designation of new areas under Directive 92/43/EEC (Habitats Directive) and has, therefore, suggested that there is an obligation to expand it.

Unfortunately, fires have recently affected some of Galicia's natural areas. In October 2011 they damaged the central massif of Ourense, and at the end of last month they affected Fragas do Eume, the only Atlantic forest reserve in Europe.

Fragas do Eume lacks a master plan for its use and management, combining the general interests of environmental protection with the interests of private landowners. Nor has it yet had a comprehensive regeneration project drawn up for it, which could be submitted in calls for proposals for the LIFE Programme. Even after the fires, there is no news of the Regional Government of Galicia promoting urgent environmental restoration measures that are eligible for European funds corresponding to the rural development pillar. The EAFRD, in particular, has a line of action on environmental measures, for which at least 12% of the total funds implemented in this programme (about EUR 100 million in the case of Galicia) must be used.

— Can the Commission confirm that the Regional Government of Galicia is complying with the requirement for 12% of EAFRD funds to be allocated to environmental actions?

— What is the situation at the present time?

— Has it submitted any project for the restoration of Fragas do Eume that is eligible for financing from the LIFE Programme, with rural development funds or other European funds?

**Answer given by Mr Potočník on behalf of the Commission**  
(29 June 2012)

The Commission is in contact with the Spanish authorities in relation to the need for them to correct identified gaps and complete the Natura 2000 network for Galicia and other regions, including the formal designation of the sites under the Habitats Directive <sup>(1)</sup>. This will formally trigger the pro-active management and restoration measures for the sites. The Commission has invited all Member States to set out their EU co-financing needs for Natura 2000 by developing 'prioritised action frameworks' having regard to the EU co-financing opportunities presented in Commission funding proposals for the next multi-annual financing framework. The proposed framework for future EU co-financing of Natura 2000 is explained in the recent Commission staff working paper on financing Natura 2000 <sup>(2)</sup>.

Council regulation (EC) No 1698/2005 <sup>(3)</sup> on support for rural development by the European Agriculture Fund for Rural Development (EAFRD) only mentions a minimum percentage of EAFRD total contribution per axis to ensure balance between objectives (Article 17). However, there is no legal reference to 12% allocated to environmental actions. The Rural Development Programme of Galicia currently foresees a total expenditure of EUR 145 million for restoring forestry potential and introducing prevention actions in forests damaged by natural disasters, including forest fires. The selection of the specific projects falls under the responsibility of the Regional Government of Galicia.

The Commission can confirm that it has not yet received any application for funding under the LIFE+ programme for restoration works at Fragas do Eume. Up to now, no European Regional Development funding is being used for the mentioned restoration works <sup>(4)</sup>.

<sup>(1)</sup> OJ L 206, 22.7.1992.

<sup>(2)</sup> SEC(2011) 1573 final.

<sup>(3)</sup> OJ L 277, 21.10.2005.

<sup>(4)</sup> For more information on the ERDF funds please contact the managing authority in Spain at the following address: Anatolio Alonso Pardo, Subdirector General de Administración del FEDER, Ministerio de Hacienda y Administraciones públicas, Paseo de la Castellana, 162, E-28071 Madrid.



(Deutsche Fassung)

**Anfrage zur schriftlichen Beantwortung E-004308/12**  
**an die Kommission**  
**Martin Ehrenhauser (NI)**  
(25. April 2012)

*Betrifft:* Schwärzungen in Antworten auf Dokumentenanfragen

In dem Bericht der Kommission über die Durchführung der Verordnung (EG) Nr. 1049/2001 über den Zugang der Öffentlichkeit zu Dokumenten des Europäischen Parlaments, des Rates und der Kommission im Jahr 2010 wird detailliert aufgelistet, wie viele Dokumentenanfragen es in den Jahren 2008, 2009 und 2010 gab und wie sie beantwortet wurden.

1. Kann die Kommission Angaben machen, wie viele dieser Anfragen sich auf vollständige Dokumente bezogen, aufgeschlüsselt jeweils nach Anfragen an die Kommission, den Rat und das Europäische Parlament? Wenn nicht, warum nicht?
2. Kann die Kommission Angaben machen, über wie viele Dokumentenanfragen positiv entschieden wurde, aufgeschlüsselt jeweils nach vollständig freien, teilweise geschwärzten und überwiegend geschwärzten Antworten? Wenn nicht, warum nicht?
3. Kann die Kommission Angaben machen, wie hoch der durchschnittliche Prozentsatz der Schwärzungen in den Antworten auf positiv entschiedene Dokumentenanfragen ist?

**Antwort von Herrn Barroso im Namen der Kommission**  
(4. Juni 2012)

1. Der Kommission liegen keine Angaben zu Dokumentenanfragen gemäß der Verordnung (EG) Nr. 1049/2001 vor, die an das Europäische Parlament und den Rat gestellt wurden. Jedes der drei Organe ist für seinen eigenen Bericht verantwortlich.
  2. Die Angaben in der Tabelle im Anhang des Berichts beziehen sich auf Anträge, nicht auf einzelne Dokumente. Wenn angegeben ist, dass Zugang gewährt wurde, heißt das, dass alle beantragten Dokumente vollständig eingesehen werden konnten. Die Tabelle zeigt, dass dies bei mehr als 80 % der Anträge der Fall war.
  3. Der teilweise Zugang kann von ganz geringfügigen Streichungen bis zu massiven Schwärzungen gehen. In Fällen, in denen die Einsichtnahme wegen solcher Schwärzungen keinen Sinn macht, wird das Dokument im Prinzip gar nicht vorgelegt. Einer der häufigsten Gründe für die Unkenntlichmachung von Informationen in Dokumenten ist der Datenschutz. Die Kommission kann keine Angaben zum durchschnittlichen Prozentsatz der Schwärzungen in teilweise offengelegten Dokumenten machen, da dann Textteile in sehr vielen Dokumenten quantifiziert werden müssten.
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(English version)

**Question for written answer E-004308/12  
to the Commission  
Martin Ehrenhauser (NI)  
(25 April 2012)**

*Subject:* Blacking out of text in answers to document requests

The Commission's 2010 report on the implementation of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001 regarding public access to European Parliament, Council and Commission documents contains a detailed list of the number of document requests in 2008, 2009 and 2010 and how these were answered.

1. Can the Commission indicate how many of these requests related to complete documents, broken down into requests to the Commission, the Council and the European Parliament? If not, why not?
2. Can the Commission indicate how many of these document requests received a positive response, broken down into fully disclosed, partially blacked-out and mostly blacked-out answers? If not, why not?
3. Can the Commission indicate the average percentage of blacked-out text in the answers to document requests that received a positive response?

**Answer given by Mr Barroso on behalf of the Commission  
(4 June 2012)**

1. The Commission does not hold information on requests for access to documents under Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001 handled by the European Parliament and by the Council. Each of the three institutions has to publish its own report.
  2. The table in the annex to the report refers to requests, not to individual documents. Where it is indicated that access was granted, this means that full access was granted to all documents covered by the request. It appears from this table that, in more than 80% of requests, full access is granted to all documents.
  3. Where partial access is granted to a document, this can range from very limited deletions to substantial parts being expunged. However, if no meaningful partial access can be granted, the document will, in principle, not be disclosed. One of the more frequent reasons for expunging documents relates to the protection of personal data. The Commission cannot indicate the average percentage of blacked-out text in the documents which are partially disclosed as this would require a quantification of parts of texts in a considerable amount of documents.
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(Nederlandse versie)

**Vraag met verzoek om schriftelijk antwoord P-004309/12**  
**aan de Commissie**  
**Kathleen Van Brempt (S&D)**  
(25 april 2012)

*Betreft:* Verstrekken van suboptimale zorg aan diabetes patiënten

Gisteren verschenen er berichten in de Belgische pers dat Hongarije nieuwe regelgeving introduceert voor diabetici. Patiënten die aan diabetes lijden worden verplicht om trimesteriel een bloedonderzoek te ondergaan om hun glucosewaarden te laten controleren. Indien de glucosewaarde twee maal per jaar hoger ligt dan de maximumwaarde die in het ministerieel decreet is vastgelegd, zullen deze patiënten niet langer de beste behandeling krijgen met analoge insuline, maar moet de arts hen een goedkopere en minder efficiënte behandeling voorschrijven, met name met menselijke insuline. De patiënten zullen ook een groter deel van de behandeling zelf moeten betalen.

Heeft de commissie weet van deze nieuwe regelgeving? Hoe verhoudt zich dit ten opzichte van de „best practices” inzake diabetes behandeling in de EU? Is het bewust verstrekken van suboptimale zorg aan burgers volgens de commissie in tegenstrijd met de basisrechten van de Unie en/of de fundamentele rechten? Is dergelijk beleid te verzoenen met artikel 168 (1) van het Verdrag dat een hoge bescherming van de menselijke gezondheid voorop stelt?

**Antwoord van de heer Dalli namens de Commissie**  
(29 mei 2012)

De Europese Commissie is gehouden bij de bepaling en uitvoering van elk beleid en elk optreden van de Unie een hoog niveau van bescherming van de menselijke gezondheid te verzekeren.

In overeenstemming met het Verdrag betreffende de werking van de Europese Unie zijn de afzonderlijke lidstaten evenwel verantwoordelijk voor de bepaling van het gezondheidsbeleid, alsmede voor de organisatie en de verstrekking van gezondheidsdiensten en geneeskundige verzorging (artikel 168). In datzelfde artikel staat ook dat het optreden van de Unie die verantwoordelijkheden van de lidstaten moet eerbiedigen. De Commissie heeft derhalve geen mandaat om op te treden in verband met de keuze van behandeling voor diabetespatiënten in Hongarije.

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(English version)

**Question for written answer P-004309/12  
to the Commission**

**Kathleen Van Brempt (S&D)**

(25 April 2012)

*Subject:* Provision of sub-optimal care to diabetes patients

Yesterday, the Belgian press reported that Hungary is introducing new rules for diabetics. Patients with diabetes will be obliged to undergo a quarterly blood test to check their blood-sugar levels. If, twice in a year, their blood-sugar value is higher than the maximum value stipulated in the ministerial decree, these patients will stop receiving the best treatment with analogue insulin, and doctors will have to prescribe a cheaper, less effective treatment using human insulin. In addition, patients will have to pay for a higher proportion of the treatment themselves.

Is the Commission aware of these new rules? How does this relate to best practices for diabetes treatment in the EU? Does the Commission think that the deliberate provision of sub-optimal care to citizens is at variance with the basic human rights and/or fundamental rights of the European Union? Is such a policy compatible with Article 168(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, which states that a high level of human health protection is to be ensured?

**Answer given by Mr Dalli on behalf of the Commission**

(29 May 2012)

The European Commission is committed to ensuring a high level of human health protection in the definition and implementation of all Union policies and activities.

According to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, however, the definition of health policies and the organisation and delivery of health services and medical care is the responsibility of individual Member States (Article 168). The same article stipulates that any action at Union level must respect such national responsibility. In this framework, the Commission has no mandate to take action on the choice of treatment provided to patients with diabetes in Hungary.

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(Deutsche Fassung)

**Anfrage zur schriftlichen Beantwortung E-004310/12**  
**an die Kommission**  
**Franz Obermayr (NI)**  
(25. April 2012)

*Betrifft:* Massenmord an Kleinwalen und Delfinen auf den Färöer-Inseln

Alljährlich wird auf den Färöer-Inseln ein traditionelles Massenschlachten von Meeressäugern wie etwa dem Grindwal und anderen Delfinarten veranstaltet. Etwa 1 000 Tiere werden jährlich in eine Bucht getrieben, um dort mittels Metallhaken abgeschlachtet zu werden. Da die Tiere im Regelfall durch die Verletzungen mit den Metallhaken nicht sofort sterben, sondern nur schwer verletzt sind und auch über Wasser längere Zeit überleben können, verbluten sie bei vollem Bewusstsein. Es werden bei dieser Treibjagd rücksichtslos auch trächtige Tiere und Walkälber erschlagen.

Kann die Kommission dazu folgende Fragen beantworten:

1. Sind der Kommission diese Vorgänge bekannt?
2. Wird mit dem Massenschlachten gegen geltende EU-Normen verstoßen? Wenn ja, gegen welche?
3. Sieht die Kommission Möglichkeiten, das sinnlose Massenschlachten auf den Färöern zu unterbinden?
4. Bezieht die Kommission dieses Thema in Gespräche mit Dänemark ein?
5. Gibt es Möglichkeiten, Dänemark zum Eingreifen zu bewegen, obwohl den Färöer-Inseln ein Autonomiestatus gewährt wurde?
6. Erhalten die Färöer-Inseln Förderungen aus EU-Mitteln? Wenn ja, aus welchen Töpfen und in welcher Höhe?
7. Werden diese Förderungen an Tierschutzaufgaben gebunden?

**Antwort von Herrn Potočnik im Namen der Kommission**  
(15. Juni 2012)

In Bezug auf die vom Herrn Abgeordneten aufgeworfenen Fragen zur Bejagung von Kleinwalen und Delfinen auf den Färöer-Inseln verweist die Kommission auf ihre früheren Antworten auf die schriftlichen Anfragen E-00257/2011 von Angelika Niebler, E-10500/2010 von Jarosław Leszek Wałęsa, E-3900/2009 von Sajjad Haider Karim, E-3779/2009 von Syed Salah Kamall und E-1531/2009 von Marios Matsakis. Die Kommission möchte diese Antwortschreiben ergänzen und hinzufügen, dass es der Internationalen Walfang-Kommission (IWC) bislang nicht gelungen ist, die Frage der Bejagung kleiner Walartiger zu regeln, und dass die Färöer-Inseln keinerlei Zuschüsse aus EU-Mitteln erhalten. Es besteht jedoch ein Fischereiabkommen zwischen den Färöer-Inseln und der EU, und die Inseln zahlen für die Teilnahme am Siebten Rahmenprogramm, in dessen Rahmen Teilnehmer von den Färöer-Inseln an sechs Forschungsprojekten mitwirken, die den Tierschutz zwar nicht unmittelbar voraussetzen, jedoch mit den tierschutzbezogenen Bestimmungen des Beschlusses Nr. 1982/2006/EG des Europäischen Parlaments und des Rates vom 18. Dezember 2006 über das Siebte Rahmenprogramm der Europäischen Gemeinschaft für Forschung, technologische Entwicklung und Demonstration (2007-2013) <sup>(1)</sup> vereinbar sind. Siehe Link zum Beschluss: <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2006:412:0001:0041:DE:PDF>

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(<sup>1</sup>) ABL L 412 vom 30.12.2006.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-004310/12  
to the Commission  
Franz Obermayr (NI)  
(25 April 2012)**

*Subject:* Mass slaughter of small whales and dolphins on the Faroe Islands

Every year a traditional mass slaughter of marine mammals such as the pilot whale and other species of dolphin takes place on the Faroe Islands. Annually about 1 000 animals are driven into a bay to be slaughtered with metal hooks. As the animals do not die usually immediately from the injuries inflicted by the metal hooks, but are just severely wounded and also able to survive for quite a long time out of water, they bleed to death while fully conscious. Pregnant animals and whale calves are also slaughtered ruthlessly in this hunt.

1. Is the Commission aware of these events?
2. Does the mass slaughter constitute a violation of accepted EU standards? If so, which ones?
3. Does the Commission see any scope for preventing the senseless mass slaughter on the Faroe Islands?
4. Is the Commission including this topic in discussions with Denmark?
5. Would it be possible to encourage Denmark to intervene, although the Faroe Islands have been given autonomous status?
6. Do the Faroe Islands receive any grants from EU funds? If so, from which budget allocations and for what amount?
7. Are these grants tied to animal protection?

**Answer given by Mr Potočník on behalf of the Commission  
(15 June 2012)**

In response to the questions raised by the Honourable Member as regards the hunting of small whales and dolphins on the Faroe Islands, the Commission would like to refer him to the previous answer given to Written Questions E-00257/2011 by Angelika Niebler, E-10500/2010 by Jarosław Leszek Wałęsa, E-3900/2009 by Sajjad Haider Karim, E-3779/2009 by Syed Salah Kamall and E-1531/2009 by Marios Matsakis. The Commission would like to complete these answers by adding that the International Whaling Commission (IWC) has not yet been able to address issues related to the hunting of small cetaceans and that the Faroe Islands do not receive any grants from EU funds. However, the Faroe Islands have a fishing agreement with the EU and are paying for access to the 7th Framework Programme. In the context of the 7th Framework Programme participants from the Faroe Islands are involved in 6 research projects which are not directly tied to animal protection but are in line with the animal welfare related provisions of Decision No 1982/2006/EC <sup>(1)</sup> of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 December 2006 concerning the Seventh Framework Programme of the European Community for research, technological development and demonstration activities (2007-2013). Please see the link to this decision: <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2006:412:0001:0041:EN:PDF>

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<sup>(1)</sup> OJ L 412, 30.12.2006.

(Svensk version)

**Frågor för skriftligt besvarande E-004312/12  
till kommissionen**

**Christofer Fjellner (PPE)**

(25 april 2012)

Angående: Kärnsäkerhet

Litauen har för avsikt att bygga ett nytt kärnkraftverk i Visaginas, möjligen i samverkan med Lettland och Estland. Det japanska företaget Hitachi har valts till strategisk investerare och leverantör av ABWR-teknik (avancerad kokvattenreaktor). Kommissionen underrättades om projektet i oktober 2011, i enlighet med artikel 41 i Euratomfördraget <sup>(1)</sup>. Efter detta förfarande måste kommissionen redogöra för sin uppfattning om projektet. Även Finland överväger ABWR-teknik men med andra och högre säkerhetsstandarder.

Kan kommissionen svara på följande frågor om de olika former av ABWR-teknik som föreslagits i Litauen och Finland:

1. Tänker kommissionen garantera likadana högsta säkerhetsnormer för liknande projekt?
2. Tänker kommissionen arbeta för att få den litauiska regeringen och dess samarbetspartner att överväga alternativa energilösningar för att tillgodose de nuvarande och framtida energibehoven?

**Svar från Günther Oettinger på kommissionens vägnar**

(30 maj 2012)

1. Kommissionen har inte mottagit någon anmälan om ett aktuellt investeringsprojekt i Finland som skulle använda sig av ABWR-teknik. Kärnsäkerhet är en av EU:s prioriteringar, vilket speglas i varje ståndpunkt som kommissionen har meddelat i enlighet med artiklarna 41 till 43 i Euratomfördraget.
2. Europeiska unionen har åtagit sig att se till att den andel av dess energiförbrukning som kommer från förnybara energikällor ska uppgå till minst 20 % år 2020. Detta åtagande har översatts till bindande nationella mål för förnybar energi för varje medlemsstat vilka fastställs i direktivet om förnybara energikällor (direktiv 2009/28/EG) <sup>(2)</sup>.

<sup>(1)</sup> <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2010:084:0001:0112:SV:PDF>.

<sup>(2)</sup> [http://ec.europa.eu/energy/renewables/targets\\_en.htm](http://ec.europa.eu/energy/renewables/targets_en.htm)

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-004312/12  
to the Commission  
Christofer Fjellner (PPE)  
(25 April 2012)**

*Subject:* Nuclear safety

Lithuania, possibly with the participation of Latvia and Estonia, is intending to build a new nuclear power plant in Visaginas, and has selected the Japanese company Hitachi as a strategic investor and provider of the ABWR technology. In accordance with Article 41 of the Euratom Treaty <sup>(1)</sup>, the project was submitted to the Commission in October 2011. Following this procedure, the Commission will have to present its views on the project. Finland is also considering ABWR technology, but with different and higher safety standards.

With regard to the different ABWR technologies proposed in Lithuania and Finland:

1. Does the Commission intend to ensure equal highest safety standards in similar projects?
2. Does the Commission intend to work to engage the Lithuanian Government and its partners on alternative energy solutions to meet current and future energy demand?

**Answer given by Mr Oettinger on behalf of the Commission  
(30 May 2012)**

1. The Commission has not received notification of any recent investment project in Finland which would use ABWR technology. Nuclear safety is an EU priority, which is reflected in every viewpoint issued by the Commission in accordance with Articles 41 to 43 of the Euratom Treaty.
2. The European Union has committed to reaching a share of at least 20% of its final energy consumption from the renewable energy sources by 2020. This commitment has been translated into binding national renewable energy targets for each of the Member States which are laid down in the Renewable Energy Directive (Directive 2009/28/EC) <sup>(2)</sup>.

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<sup>(1)</sup> <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2010:084:0001:0112:EN:PDF>.

<sup>(2)</sup> [http://ec.europa.eu/energy/renewables/targets\\_en.htm](http://ec.europa.eu/energy/renewables/targets_en.htm)



(Ελληνική έκδοση)

**Ερώτηση με αίτημα γραπτής απάντησης E-004314/12**  
**προς την Επιτροπή**  
**Nikos Chrysogelos (Verts/ALE)**  
(25 Απριλίου 2012)

**Θέμα:** Πρόσδος στην αντιμετώπιση του μεταναστευτικού ζητήματος στην Ελλάδα

Η Ελλάδα αποτελεί την πύλη εισόδου για μεγάλο ποσοστό των μεταναστών της Ευρώπης. Η πρόσφατη απόφαση του ΕΔΑΔ (¹) για εξαίρεση της Ελλάδας από την εφαρμογή της Συνθήκης Δουβλίνο II (²) αποδεικνύει την αναποτελεσματικότητα της Συνθήκης αυτής αλλά και την ανάγκη για μια δομικά κοινή ευρωπαϊκή μεταναστευτική πολιτική. Παρά τις ενέργειες της Επιτροπής για παροχή βοήθειας προς την Ελλάδα, οι Υπηρεσίες Ασύλου και Πρώτης Υποδοχής, που θεσπίστηκαν πριν από 1,5 χρόνο, δεν έχουν ακόμη ξεκινήσει να λειτουργούν. Έτσι, το σύστημα χορήγησης ασύλου παραμένει αναποτελεσματικό και απάνθρωπο για τους πρόσφυγες (³), οι συνθήκες υποδοχής των μεταναστών παραμένουν άθλιες, ενώ πληθαίνουν οι ακραίες φωνές που κάνουν σκληρές και ανεδαφικές προτάσεις για κατασκευή φράκτη στον Έβρο, συγκέντρωση των μεταναστών σε στρατόπεδα κράτησης ή μαζική απελάση τους. Ερωτάται η Επιτροπή:

1. Θα χρηματοδοτούσε στρατόπεδα κράτησης ή μαζικές απελάσεις μεταναστών; Συνάδουν με τις ευρωπαϊκές αξίες τέτοια μέτρα;
2. Πόσα από τα 309 εκατ. ευρώ, που έχουν δεσμευτεί μέσω του προγράμματος αλληλεγγύης και διαχείρισης της ροής μεταναστών και τα 3,75 εκατ. ευρώ που διατίθενται από το Ευρωπαϊκό Ταμείο Προσφύγων για έκτακτες ανάγκες, έχει απορροφήσει μέχρι σήμερα η Ελλάδα;
3. Πόσα κέντρα πρώτης υποδοχής για την καταγραφή και τον διαχωρισμό των μεταναστών/προσφύγων έχουν ολοκληρωθεί στην Ελλάδα με ευρωπαϊκούς πόρους;
4. Πόσα από τα αιτήματα εθελοντικού επαναπατρισμού, που έχουν κατατεθεί από μετανάστες, έχουν εξεταστεί και απαντηθεί από τις ελληνικές αρχές;
5. Τι ποσοστό χορήγησης ασύλου σε σχέση με τις κατατεθειμένες αιτήσεις έχει η Ελλάδα και ποιος είναι ο μέσος χρόνος εξέτασης των αιτημάτων τα τελευταία 5 χρόνια;
6. Ποια άμεσα μέτρα σκοπεύει να λάβει για τη συνεχιζόμενη αδυναμία της Ελλάδας να προστατεύσει αποτελεσματικά τα δικαιώματα των αιτούντων διεθνή προστασία;
7. Ποιες άλλες δράσεις θα μπορούσε να χρηματοδοτήσει και σε τι συνολικό ύψος, με έμφαση στην πρόληψη, την προστασία των ανθρωπίνων δικαιωμάτων και της δημόσιας υγείας, την ενίσχυση της κοινωνικής συνοχής και την ένταξη των μεταναστών;

**Απάντηση της κας Malmström εξ ονόματος της Επιτροπής**  
(20 Ιουνίου 2012)

Η Ελλάδα, έλαβε διεθνή προστασία, σε πρώτο βαθμό, για το 3,04 % των αιτήσεων ασύλου το 2010 και για το 2,08 % το 2011.

Περίπου 4 200 παράνομοι μετανάστες απομακρύνθηκαν το 2010 και περίπου 6 150 το 2011. Η Επιτροπή δεν συγκεντρώνει συγκεκριμένα δεδομένα σχετικά με το χρονικό πλαίσιο επεξεργασίας των αιτήσεων ασύλου ή σχετικά με τις αιτήσεις εθελοντικού επαναπατρισμού.

Η διαδικασία επί παραβάσει που ξεκίνησε κατά της Ελλάδας το 2010, αφορούσε τη χαμηλή ποιότητα της διαδικασίας εξέτασης των αιτήσεων ασύλου στην Ελλάδα. Το 2010, η Ελλάδα έστειλε στην Επιτροπή ένα εθνικό σχέδιο δράσης με στόχο τη μεταρρύθμιση των πολιτικών της σχετικά με το άσυλο. Έχουν σημειωθεί ορισμένες θετικές εξελίξεις έκτοτε, όπως η υιοθέτηση νέων νόμων για το άσυλο και η δημιουργία μιας νέας ανεξάρτητης υπηρεσίας ασύλου. Το ποσοστό αναγνώρισης σε δεύτερο βαθμό αυξήθηκε από περίπου 0 % το 2010 σε 12 % το 2012. Απαιτούνται περισσότερες προσπάθειες από την Ελλάδα, για παράδειγμα σε σχέση με την ανθρωπιστική κατάσταση στον Έβρο. Η Επιτροπή συνεχίζει να στηρίζει την Ελλάδα και να παρακολουθεί την κατάσταση με σκοπό να διασφαλίσει τον πλήρη σεβασμό των θεμελιωδών δικαιωμάτων.

(¹) Ευρωπαϊκό Δικαστήριο Ανθρωπίνων Δικαιωμάτων του Συμβουλίου της Ευρώπης.

(²) <http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4d39bc7f2.html>.

(³) <http://www.unhcr.gr/nea/artikel/78c1a782450391300ab7bfd323186868/dekades-stin-oyra-g.html>.

Τα ελληνικά ετήσια προγράμματα που χρηματοδοτούνται από το γενικό πρόγραμμα «Αλληλεγγύη και διαχείριση των μεταναστευτικών ροών» καλύπτει μεγάλο εύρος δραστηριοτήτων που περιγράφονται στις απαντήσεις της Επιτροπής στις γραπτές ερωτήσεις E-010318/2010 και E-000095/2012 <sup>(4)</sup>. Πληροφορίες σχετικά με τα κονδύλια που είναι ακόμα διαθέσιμα για την Ελλάδα, παρέχονται στην απάντηση της Επιτροπής στη γραπτή ερώτηση E-002742/2012 <sup>(5)</sup>.

Για λεπτομερείς πληροφορίες σχετικά με τα συγχρηματοδοτούμενα έργα και την πραγματική εφαρμογή των προγραμμάτων στην Ελλάδα, η Επιτροπή θα ήθελε να παραπέμψει το Αξιότιμο Μέλος στις απαντήσεις της στις γραπτές ερωτήσεις E-010361/2011 και E-002333/2012 <sup>(6)</sup>.

Σχετικά με τα κέντρα κράτησης και διαχωρισμού, πληροφορίες παρέχονται στην απάντηση της Επιτροπής στις γραπτές ερωτήσεις E-003504/2012 και E-008720/2011 <sup>(7)</sup>.

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<sup>(4)</sup> <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/QP-WEB>.

<sup>(5)</sup> Αυτόδι.

<sup>(6)</sup> Αυτόδι.

<sup>(7)</sup> Αυτόδι.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-004314/12**  
**to the Commission**  
**Nikos Chrysogelos (Verts/ALE)**  
(25 April 2012)

*Subject:* Progress in addressing the immigration issue in Greece

Greece is the gateway for large numbers of immigrants entering Europe. The recent decision by the ECHR <sup>(1)</sup> to exempt Greece from the implementation of the Dublin II Regulation <sup>(2)</sup> demonstrates the regulation's ineffectiveness and the need for an organised common European immigration policy. Despite the Commission's actions to supply help to Greece, the Asylum Agency and the First Reception Centres established one-and-a-half years ago have yet to start operation. The asylum system is therefore still ineffective and inhumane for refugees <sup>(3)</sup>, the reception conditions for immigrants are still squalid, while shrill voices are making harsh and unrealistic proposals to build a wall in Evros, concentrate immigrants in detention centres or expel them *en masse*.

In view of this:

1. Will the Commission provide funding for detention centres or the mass expulsion of immigrants? Do such measures comply with European values?
2. How much of the EUR 309 million committed under the general programme 'Solidarity and management of immigration flows' and the EUR 3.75 million made available by the European Refugee Fund for urgent measures has been utilised by Greece so far?
3. How many reception centres for recording and sorting immigrants/refugees have been completed in Greece using European funding?
4. How many voluntary repatriation requests submitted by immigrants have been processed and answered by the Greek authorities?
5. What percentage of asylum requests has been granted by Greece and what is the average processing time for applications over the last five years?
6. What immediate measures does the Commission intend to take regarding Greece's continued inability to effectively protect the rights of persons requesting international protection?
7. What other actions could it finance and what total funding could it provide, with an emphasis on prevention, the protection of human rights a public health, greater social cohesion and the integration of immigrants?

**Answer given by Ms Malmström on behalf of the Commission**  
(20 June 2012)

In Greece in 2010 3.04% of asylum applications and 2.08% in 2011 received international protection at first instance.

In 2010, about 4 200 irregular migrants were removed and in 2011 approximately 6150. The Commission does not compile specific data on the timeframe for processing asylum applications or on the number of voluntary repatriation requests.

The infringement procedure launched against Greece in 2010 concerned the low quality of the asylum examination procedure in Greece. In 2010, Greece sent the Commission a national Action Plan aiming to reform its asylum policies. Some positive developments have been noted since, such as the adoption of new asylum laws and the establishment of a new independent asylum service. The recognition rate at second instance increased from approx. 0% in 2010 to 12% in 2012. More efforts are required by Greece, for example in relation to the humanitarian situation in Evros. The Commission continue to support Greece and monitor the situation with a view to ensure the fundamental rights are fully respected.

<sup>(1)</sup> European Court of Human Rights of Council of Europe.

<sup>(2)</sup> <http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4d39bc7f2.html>

<sup>(3)</sup> <http://www.unhcr.gr/nea/artikel/78c1a782450391300ab7bfd323186868/dekades-stin-oyra-g.html>

The Greek annual programmes under the funds of the General programme 'Solidarity and Management of Migration Flows' cover a wide range of activities described in the Commission replies to written questions E-010318/2010 and E-000095/2012 <sup>(4)</sup>. Information on the funding still available for Greece is provided in the Commission reply to Written Question E-002742/2012 <sup>(5)</sup>.

For detailed information on co-financed projects and on the actual implementation of the programmes in Greece, the Commission would refer the Honourable Member to its replies to Written Questions E-010361/2011 and E-002333/2012 <sup>(6)</sup>.

On detention and screening centres, information is provided in the Commission's reply to Written Questions E-003504/2012 and E-008720/2011 <sup>(7)</sup>.

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<sup>(4)</sup> <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/QP-WEB>.  
<sup>(5)</sup> Ibidem.  
<sup>(6)</sup> Ibidem.  
<sup>(7)</sup> Ibidem.

(Versión española)

**Pregunta con solicitud de respuesta escrita E-004315/12  
a la Comisión (Vicepresidenta/Alta Representante)**

**Raimon Obiols (S&D)**

(25 de abril de 2012)

*Asunto:* VP/HR — Retraso en la ayuda financiera de la UE a Egipto

Egipto se encuentra desde el pasado año en un proceso de transición hacia la democracia después de las movilizaciones populares que pusieron fin al régimen de Mubarak. Desde entonces el país está realizando importantes reformas políticas, ha celebrado elecciones legislativas, se ha creado una asamblea constituyente para aprobar una nueva constitución y, en las próximas semanas, tendrán lugar los comicios para elegir a un nuevo presidente.

Todos estos cambios han coincidido con la revisión estratégica de la Política Europea de Vecindad por parte de la UE, quién también ha aprobado dos comunicaciones en el pasado año para dar respuesta a la nueva situación no sólo en Egipto, sino en otros países de la región del sur del Mediterráneo.

En este nuevo contexto, la Unión Europea ha anunciado paquetes de ayuda a los países en proceso de democratización, aunque en algunos casos, se está retrasando su implementación. Mientras, la situación en estos países, como en Egipto, requiere respuestas urgentes.

En febrero de 2012 se hacía pública la voluntad de la Unión Europea junto al Fondo Monetario Internacional de proveer 500 millones de euros a Egipto para estimular la maltrecha economía del país.

— ¿Puede confirmarnos la Vicepresidenta/Alta Representante si Egipto podrá disponer de estos fondos y cuándo los recibirían?

— ¿Considera la Vicepresidenta/Alta Representante que los fondos destinados son suficientes?

— ¿Dada la situación, cree posible ampliar este paquete de ayuda?

**Respuesta del Sr. Rehn en nombre de la Comisión**

(27 de junio de 2012)

La Comisión es sabedora de los desafíos económicos que tiene Egipto y, a ese respecto, recibió una solicitud de ayuda macrofinanciera de las autoridades egipcias en febrero de 2012.

La Comisión podría tomar en consideración la idea de proponer al Consejo de la UE y al Parlamento Europeo un paquete de ayuda macrofinanciera de 500 millones de euros, que incluiría un elemento de subvención de 50 millones de euros, reflejo de la renta per cápita relativamente baja de Egipto y del elevado endeudamiento público de este país. Este paquete de ayuda macrofinanciera sería una de las operaciones más importantes de ese tipo de la Unión Europea con un tercer país. El monto total que se proponga dependerá, no obstante, de la evaluación final que se haga del déficit de financiación de la balanza de pagos.

Debido al retraso en la celebración de un acuerdo de derechos de giro con el Fondo Monetario Internacional (FMI), básicamente como consecuencia de la falta de un compromiso claro y público por parte de los principales partidos políticos egipcios con el programa propuesto, es posible que también se retrase la propuesta de ayuda macrofinanciera de la Comisión. La Comisión se mantiene en estrecho contacto con el FMI, a la espera de que la comunidad internacional, incluidos los países del Consejo de Cooperación del Golfo, asuma compromisos financieros adicionales.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-004315/12**  
**to the Commission (Vice-President/High Representative)**  
**Raimon Obiols (S&D)**  
(25 April 2012)

*Subject:* VP/HR — Delay in EU financial aid to Egypt

Since last year, Egypt has been in a process of transition to democracy, following the popular movements that ended the Mubarak regime. Since then, the country has been carrying out significant political reforms, has held legislative elections, has created a constitutional assembly to approve a new constitution and, in the coming weeks, will hold elections for a new president.

All these changes have coincided with the strategic review of the European Neighbourhood Policy carried out by the EU, which has also adopted two communications in the past year responding to the new situation that prevails not only in Egypt, but in other countries in the southern Mediterranean region.

In this new context, the EU announced aid packages to the countries in the process of transition to democracy, although, in some cases, their implementation is being delayed. Meanwhile, the situation in these countries, such as Egypt, requires urgent responses.

In February 2012, it was announced that the European Union, together with the International Monetary Fund, intended to provide EUR 500 million to stimulate the ailing Egyptian economy.

— Can the Vice-President/High Representative confirm whether Egypt will have these funds made available to it and when it will receive them?

— Does the Vice-President/High Representative consider the funds allocated to be sufficient?

— Given the situation, does she consider it possible to increase this aid package?

**Answer given by Mr Rehn on behalf of the Commission**  
(27 June 2012)

The Commission acknowledges the economic challenges facing Egypt. In this sense, the Commission received a request for Macro-Financial Assistance (MFA) from the Egyptian authorities in February 2012.

The Commission could take into consideration the idea to propose to the EU Council and Parliament an MFA package of EUR 500 million, which could include a grant component of up to EUR 50 million reflecting Egypt's relatively low per capita income and high level of government indebtedness. This amount would make this package one of the largest MFA operations ever conducted by the European Union with a third country. The total amount to be proposed remains, however, to be determined in the light of a final assessment of the balance of payments financing gap.

Due to delays in concluding a Stand-By-Arrangement (SBA) with the International Monetary Fund (IMF), relating principally to the lack of a clear and public commitment to the proposed program by the major political parties in Egypt, a possible Commission MFA proposal could also be delayed. However, the Commission remains in close contact with the IMF, waiting for additional financial commitments from the international community, including the Gulf Cooperation Council countries.

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(Deutsche Fassung)

**Anfrage zur schriftlichen Beantwortung E-004316/12**  
**an die Kommission**  
**Nadja Hirsch (ALDE)**  
(25. April 2012)

*Betrifft:* Strategie Europa 2020

Das Europäische Parlament, die Kommission und der Rat haben sich auf die Strategie Europa 2020 geeinigt. Die einzelnen Mitgliedstaaten sind nun aufgefordert, nationale Aktionspläne zur Erreichung der Ziele zu erstellen und umzusetzen. Drei zentrale Ziele sind die Bekämpfung der Armut, die Verringerung der Schulabbrecherquote und die Steigerung der Zahl der Menschen, die in Arbeit stehen. Deutschland diskutiert gerade die Einführung eines Betreuungsgeldes, das für einen Elternteil gilt, der sein zwei- bis dreijähriges Kind nicht in eine institutionelle Kinderbetreuung gibt, und das nicht mit Rentenansprüchen verbunden ist.

1. Wie beurteilt die Kommission die geplante Einführung eines Betreuungsgeldes in Deutschland hinsichtlich der Erreichung des Zieles der Armutsbekämpfung in der Strategie Europa 2020?
2. Wie beurteilt die Kommission die geplante Einführung eines Betreuungsgeldes in Deutschland hinsichtlich der Erreichung des Zieles der Verringerung der Schulabbrecherquote in der Strategie Europa 2020?
3. Wie beurteilt die Kommission die geplante Einführung eines Betreuungsgeldes in Deutschland hinsichtlich der Erreichung des Zieles in der Strategie Europa 2020, mehr Bürgerinnen und Bürger in Arbeit zu bringen?
4. Sieht die Kommission Auswirkungen auf die Rentenansprüche derjenigen Person, die zu Hause bleibt und das Betreuungsgeld erhält. Wenn ja, welche? Wie bewertet sie diese?
5. Ist es richtig, dass die Kommission den geschlechtsbedingten Unterschied bei Renten mit Sorge betrachtet und ein Grund dafür die nicht rentenversicherte Erziehungsarbeit bei Müttern ist?
6. Ist es richtig, dass die Kommission Erkenntnisse darüber hat, dass ein frühzeitiger Besuch einer Kindertageseinrichtung Bildungskarrieren positiv beeinflussen kann?

**Antwort von Herrn Andor im Namen der Kommission**  
(19. Juni 2012)

Es gibt signifikante Belege dafür, dass eine hochqualifizierte frühkindliche Betreuung, Bildung und Erziehung die spätere Lernfähigkeit und soziale Integration nachhaltig positiv beeinflussen. Die einschlägigen Forschungsergebnisse werden in der Mitteilung der Kommission über frühkindliche Betreuung, Bildung und Erziehung <sup>(1)</sup> detailliert beschrieben.

Das gegenwärtig in Deutschland diskutierte Betreuungsgeld kann dazu führen, dass mehr Kinder aus benachteiligten Familien (mit geringerem Einkommen) keine angemessene frühkindliche Betreuung, Bildung und Erziehung erhalten. Dies kann bewirken, dass das Niveau ihrer Schulbildung sinkt (und die Rate der Schulabbrecher steigt) und dass sich die Beschäftigungsaussichten der Betroffenen entsprechend verringern, so dass sie möglicherweise stärker von Arbeitslosigkeit und Armut bedroht sein werden.

Das Betreuungsgeld kann für Eltern von Kindern ferner ein Signal sein, keiner Beschäftigung nachzugehen, und dies zu einem Zeitpunkt, zu dem es angesichts eines Fachkräftemangels in Deutschland ganz entscheidend ist, dass das Land sein Arbeitskräftepotenzial in vollem Umfang ausschöpft. Ein Anreiz, mit dem Eltern de facto aufgefordert werden, zu Hause zu bleiben, würde sich auf die Beschäftigung und die künftigen Rentenansprüche nachteilig auswirken.

Die geschlechtsbedingten Unterschiede sind ein wichtiges Thema bei den Renten, da Frauen im Rentenalter eher in Armut geraten als Männer. In ihrem Weißbuch über Renten <sup>(2)</sup> erläutert die Kommission die Hintergründe hierfür und die erforderlichen Abhilfemaßnahmen.

Im Rahmen des Europäischen Semesters 2012 hat die Kommission eine Empfehlung für eine Empfehlung des Rates zum deutschen NRP verabschiedet, in der sie hervorhebt, dass das Angebot an Ganztagsbetreuungseinrichtungen für Kinder und Ganztagschulen erweitert werden muss.

<sup>(1)</sup> Frühkindliche Betreuung, Bildung und Erziehung: der bestmögliche Start für alle unsere Kinder in die Welt von morgen (KOM(2011)0066 endg. vom 17. Februar 2011).

<sup>(2)</sup> Eine Agenda für angemessene, sichere und nachhaltige Pensionen und Renten (KOM(2012)55 endg. vom 16. Februar 2012), abrufbar unter folgender Adresse: <http://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?catId=752&langId=de>.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-004316/12**  
**to the Commission**  
**Nadja Hirsch (ALDE)**  
(25 April 2012)

*Subject:* Europe 2020 strategy

The European Parliament, the Commission and the Council have agreed on the Europe 2020 strategy. Individual Member States are now required to draw up and implement national action plans to achieve its targets. Three central aims are: combating poverty, reducing school drop-out rates and increasing employment figures. Germany is currently discussing introducing childcare benefits for parents who do not use state-sponsored nurseries for two- to three-year-olds. This grant would not affect pension entitlements.

1. What is the Commission's opinion of the planned introduction of childcare benefits in Germany to combat poverty under the Europe 2020 strategy?
2. What is the Commission's opinion of the planned introduction of childcare benefits in Germany to reduce school drop-out rates under the Europe 2020 strategy?
3. What is the Commission's opinion of the planned introduction of childcare benefits in Germany with a view to fulfilling the Europe 2020 strategy for raising employment figures?
4. Does the Commission envisage any effects on the pension entitlements of people who remain at home and utilise childcare benefits? If so, what effects? What is its assessment of these effects?
5. Does the Commission consider that the difference between male and female pensions is a cause for concern, and that one reason is that the mother's job of child rearing is not included in any pension scheme?
6. Is the Commission aware of findings that nursery attendance from an early age can have a positive influence on education?

**Answer given by Mr Andor on behalf of the Commission**  
(19 June 2012)

There is significant evidence that accessible, high-quality early-childhood education and care has lasting benefit for later learning ability and social integration. The evidence is set out in detail in the Commission communication on early childhood education and care <sup>(1)</sup>.

The childcare allowance currently under discussion in Germany may mean more children from disadvantaged (and low-income) families are not able to enjoy early childhood education and care. This may lower their level of educational achievement (and raise their school drop-out rate) and hence reduce their employment opportunities, which may increase their risk of unemployment and poverty.

It may also create a work disincentive for parents with children, at a time when utilising the German labour market's full potential is vital, given the shortage of skilled labour. A *de facto* incentive for parents to stay at home would adversely affect employment and future pension rights.

Gender is an important issue in pensions, since women are more likely to be poor than men in retirement. The Commission White Paper on pensions <sup>(2)</sup> outlines the background and measures to tackle it.

Under the 2012 European Semester, the Commission adopted a recommendation for a Council recommendation on Germany NRP where it stresses the need of increasing the availability of fulltime children facilities and all-day schools.

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<sup>(1)</sup> 'Early Childhood Education and Care: Providing all our children with the best start for the world of tomorrow' (COM(2011) 66 final of 17 February 2011).

<sup>(2)</sup> 'An Agenda for Adequate, Safe and Sustainable Pensions' (COM(2012) 55 final of 16 February 2012), at: <http://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?catId=752&langId=en>



(Deutsche Fassung)

**Anfrage zur schriftlichen Beantwortung E-004317/12**  
**an die Kommission**  
**Ulrike Rodust (S&D)**  
(25. April 2012)

*Betrifft:* EU-Maßnahmen gegen auf See verloren gegangene Container

Jährlich gehen etwa ca. 2 000 Container durch Überbordfallen in EU-Gewässern verloren. Dadurch entsteht ein erhebliches Gefahrenpotenzial für die Schifffahrt. Diese Container stellen eine Gefahr für die Schifffahrt dar, da sie nicht unbedingt sinken, sondern schwer sichtbar an der Wasseroberfläche treiben. Sie könnten die Meere mit sowohl toxischen als auch nicht toxischen Materialien verunreinigen, und den örtlichen Behörden entstehen hohe Kosten für die Beseitigung. Außerdem gefährden die verloren gegangenen Container unter Umständen Menschenleben.

Vor dem Hintergrund der Zunahme des Frachtaufkommens und der enger werdenden Räume für die Schifffahrt durch die Ausweitung von Hochseewindparks ist es umso wichtiger, die Sicherheit der Schifffahrt zu gewährleisten und für den Havariefall vorzusorgen.

In einer Untersuchung von KIMO International im Rotterdamer Hafen wurde festgestellt, dass 43 % der untersuchten Schiffe nicht den Vorschriften für die Technik zum Festzurren der Ladung entsprachen.

— Hat die EU-Kommission seit der mündlichen Anfrage vom 21. Oktober 2010 (O-0115/2010<sup>(1)</sup>) Maßnahmen ergriffen, um in diesem Problemfeld für Sicherheit auf See zu sorgen?

— Gibt es EU-Regelungen und Bemühungen, die weltweiten Sicherheitsnormen für die Sicherung der Ladung auf Containerschiffen zu verbessern?

— Wurde etwas unternommen, um ein Schadenersatzabkommen über nicht giftige Substanzen abzuschließen, damit Mitgliedstaaten und Küstengemeinden nicht die unter Umständen unerschwinglichen Kosten auf sich nehmen müssen, um auf dem Rechtsweg Schadenersatz für Reinigungsmaßnahmen zu erkämpfen?

**Antwort von Herrn Kallas im Namen der Kommission**  
(4. Juni 2012)

Die Kommission verweist die Frau Abgeordnete auf ihre Antwort auf die schriftlichen Anfragen P-002937/2012 und E-002321/2012<sup>(2)</sup>.

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<sup>(1)</sup> <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=QQ&reference=O-2010-0115&language=DE>.

<sup>(2)</sup> Abrufbar unter: <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/QP-WEB/application/search.do>.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-004317/12  
to the Commission  
Ulrike Rodust (S&D)  
(25 April 2012)**

*Subject:* EU measures to prevent containers being lost at sea

Every year around 2 000 containers are lost overboard in EU waters. This is a significant potential risk for shipping. These containers are a danger to shipping because they do not necessarily sink, but may float near the surface, where they can be difficult to spot. They have the potential to pollute the sea with both toxic and non-toxic materials and local authorities face high costs in removing them. In addition, the lost containers can, under certain circumstances, pose a threat to human lives.

In view of the growing volume of freight traffic and the diminishing space available to shipping as a result of the spread of maritime wind farms, it is becoming increasingly important to ensure the safety of shipping and to provide for accidents and emergencies.

An investigation by KIMO International in the port of Rotterdam showed that 43% of the ships inspected did not meet the technical requirements for securing their cargo.

— Has the European Commission taken any steps to ensure safety at sea in this problematic area since the oral question dated 21 October 2010 (O-0115/2010 <sup>(1)</sup>)?

— Are EU rules and efforts in place to improve the worldwide standards for securing cargo on container ships?

— Has anything been done to conclude a compensation agreement for non-toxic substances, so that Member States and coastal communities do not have to absorb the possibly exorbitant costs of pursuing compensation for clean-up operations through the courts?

**Answer given by Mr Kallas on behalf of the Commission  
(4 June 2012)**

The Commission would refer the Honourable Member to its answers to Written Questions P-002937/2012 and E-002321/2012 <sup>(2)</sup>.

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<sup>(1)</sup> <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=OQ&reference=O-2010-0115&language=EN>  
<sup>(2)</sup> Available at <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/QP-WEB/application/search.do>

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-004318/12  
to the Commission  
Jim Higgins (PPE)  
(25 April 2012)**

*Subject:* eCall programme

Can the Commission give an update on the implementation of the eCall programme? When does the Commission expect the system to be up and running in Europe?

**Answer given by Ms Kroes on behalf of the Commission  
(7 June 2012)**

As the Commission representatives explained in the joint meeting of IMCO-TRAN Committees of 24/04/2012, the Commission services are following the position of the Commission Communication 'eCall:Time for Deployment' COM(2009) 434, following the conclusion of the impact assessment SEC(2011) 1019 indicating that the regulatory measures are the most appropriate policy option for the deployment of the eCall service in Europe. For reminder, the following regulatory measures are under way:

1. Recommendation on support for an EU-wide eCall service in electronic communication networks for the transmission of in-vehicle emergency calls based on 112 ('eCalls') — 2011/750/EU, adopted on 8/9/2011. The Commission is waiting for the reports from all Member States as per Article 6 of the recommendation.
2. PSAPs upgrade: The Commission is expecting to adopt the common specifications under the ITS Directive 2010/40/EU by end of 2012 as initially planned.
3. Type approval regulation for the in-vehicle system. A proposal for adoption of this regulation is currently being prepared by the Commission services.

In principle the date of end of 2015 remains the expected date of introduction of the harmonised EU-wide eCall service in Europe.

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(English version)

**Question for written answer E-004319/12  
to the Commission  
Daniel Hannan (ECR)  
(25 April 2012)**

*Subject:* Human rights in China

Is the Commission aware that the Chinese human rights lawyer Gao Zhisheng has been imprisoned in his home country?

Could the Commission please state whether it is raising this issue in discussions with China, and what it is doing to promote human rights in China?

**Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Ashton on behalf of the Commission  
(19 June 2012)**

Gao Zhisheng's situation is a matter of deep concern to the European Union. Following his disappearance in 2009, the EU repeatedly called on the Chinese authorities to reveal the whereabouts of Mr Gao, to give Mr Gao access to a lawyer and to allow Mr Gao to maintain contact with his family. On 9 February 2010, the High Representative issued a public statement noting that the EU had made these repeated appeals; the statement underlined that the EU was especially concerned at recent reports that Mr Gao had 'gone missing' and urged China to clarify Mr Gao's situation without delay and to open a fully independent and transparent investigation into his disappearance.

On 22 December 2011, the High Representative issued a further statement expressing her concern that Mr Gao, who had been missing for 20 months, had been sentenced to a further three years in prison. She called for Mr Gao's immediate release and for information about his well-being and location and repeated these concerns in a further public statement of 4 January 2012.

Although Mr Gao has recently been granted a brief prison visit by members of his family, the EU will continue to urge the Chinese authorities to release him from prison and to raise its concerns with the Chinese authorities, including in the framework of the EU-China human rights dialogue which will hold its next session on 29 May.

The EU-China summit, which took place on 14 February 2012 and the visit of the Chinese Vice Premier Li Keqiang to Brussels, provided the opportunity to discuss the issue of human rights among other subjects. The EU's concerns were also raised at the last Human Rights Council on 6 March. Over the past few months, the EU has also made several demarches and statements about the human rights situation in China.

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(English version)

**Question for written answer E-004320/12  
to the Commission**

**Daniel Hannan (ECR)**

(25 April 2012)

*Subject:* Import of live bivalve molluscs

One of my constituents runs a company importing clams from the US. Following the Commission's Decision 2009/951/EU imports have been stopped. Due to this decision my constituent's company is at risk of closure.

We have been informed that discussions between EU Member States, DG SANCO and the US FDA are ongoing and that it is impossible to predict the outcome.

Could the Commission please explain what it is actually doing about this problem and where negotiations stand between the involved parties?

**Answer given by Mr Dalli on behalf of the Commission**

(22 June 2012)

The US market has been shut down for EU, live or processed, bivalve molluscs (BM) for more than 30 years, whilst imports of these commodities into the EU were possible under a provisional regime that ran out on 31 December 2009.

The US authorities were warned several times on the particular situation and were offered either to comply with the EU standards or to be evaluated in the context of equivalence against the EU standards. As no reaction was received by the US, an audit mission by the Commission inspection service — the Food and Veterinary Office (FVO) — was carried out in March 2009 to assess the US standards on a compliance basis.

As several non-compliances to the EU standards were identified, the provisional regime authorising the imports of BM from the US could no longer be maintained. However an additional six month period (until 1 July 2010), was exceptionally granted, to avoid trade disruption.

Since 1 July 2010 the imports of BM from the US are not authorised with the exception of eviscerated wild scallops without gonads.

On 29 October 2010, the Commission's proposal to engage in a reciprocal equivalence determination exercise was accepted by the US Food and Drug Administration (FDA).

Intensive discussions are currently running between the Commission, the FDA and EU Member States to determine the framework in which the project shall be advanced and to evaluate the respective public health standards. On the spot missions are under evaluation from both sides, as part of the evaluation process. These could be carried out in 2012.

The assessment by both sides runs in parallel to ensure the timely closure of the dossier which is expected to take place in 2013.

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*(English version)*

**Question for written answer E-004321/12  
to the Commission  
Daniel Hannan (ECR)  
(25 April 2012)**

*Subject:* Red diesel

Can the Commission explain why UK yachtsmen are only allowed to sail in UK waters with fuel (red diesel) purchased in the UK?

Does this mean that UK yachtsmen, as well as visiting yachtsmen from other EU countries, are forced to drain and refill their boats when leaving UK waters?

**Answer given by Mr Šemeta on behalf of the Commission  
(7 June 2012)**

The Honourable Member is referred to the Commission's replies to Questions E-003285/2012 and E-000130/2012.

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(English version)

**Question for written answer E-004322/12  
to the Commission**

**Andrew Henry William Brons (NI)**

(25 April 2012)

*Subject:* The Falkland Islands

What is the view of the Commission in respect of the recent hostile stance of the Argentinian President, Cristina Fernández, who has called for a shipping blockade of the Falkland Islands and for Argentinian companies to cease importing British goods?

Will the Commission condemn the Argentinian government for its attempt to interfere in the trading relations between Argentinian companies and the UK and, indeed, the ability of the islands to trade? If not, why not?

Might the Falkland Islanders be entirely assured of the unambiguous backing of the Commission in respect of any trading or other hostilities on the part of a foreign power, namely the Argentinian government?

**Answer given by Mr De Gucht on behalf of the Commission**

(8 June 2012)

In Part Four of the TFEU, Member States have agreed to associate the Falklands Islands (and other overseas countries and territories that have constitutional ties with Member States as set out in Annex II to the TFEU) with the European Union.

The purpose of association is to promote the economic and social development of the countries and territories and to establish close economic relations between them and the Union as a whole.

Issues of territorial sovereignty are matters for Member States. Falkland's issues are thus primarily a bilateral issue between the UK and Argentina.

The Vice-President/ High Representative is well aware of the Mercosur declaration referred to by the Honourable Member. EU Heads of Delegation in the region are monitoring developments and report regularly on the matter.

Specifically as regards the trade context, it is important to note that the EU has a common trade policy and that the Commission has a responsibility to defend the EU's trade interests, including trade and investment coming from the UK. On 27 of March 2012, the Commissioner responsible for Trade Karel De Gucht sent a letter to the Argentine Minister for Industry — Ms Debora Giorgi in defence of UK companies and exports coming from the UK potentially negatively affected by Argentine measures and official statements.

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(English version)

**Question for written answer E-004323/12  
to the Commission**

**Syed Kamall (ECR)**

(25 April 2012)

*Subject:* New EU proposal to outlaw cyber attacks on IT companies

I have been contacted by a constituent who works in an information security management role and who values the role played in testing the security of systems and websites by penetration testing companies, especially those who write their own security testing tools and appliances.

1. Can the Commission confirm that, in drawing up new legislation on cyber crime, it is not the intention to criminalise those who work to help people and companies secure their systems?
2. What safeguards are planned to protect those legitimately engaged in cyber security to prevent them being prosecuted for possessing or distributing hacking software and tools?
3. Given that some of these firms produce and distribute tools for testing, how can they be given immunity in relation to their production or sale of devices such as computer programs designed for cyber attacks or for finding a computer password by which an information system can be accessed?

**Answer given by Ms Malmström on behalf of the Commission**

(14 June 2012)

The European Commission proposed in September 2010 a directive on attacks against information systems. The proposal is fully conscious of the fact that professionals in the Internet industry who need to conduct penetration activities against information systems for authorised testing or protection of information systems, should be exempted from the scope of the directive. To that end, a recital (10) of the proposal specifically mentions this case, and considers such behaviour as not having a criminal intent. Moreover, the definition of each offence (Art. 3-7) includes limitations to the offence being committed intentionally and without right.

The Commission is convinced that the proposed Directive takes into account sufficiently well the interests of those, who are legitimately engaged in cyber security, and will remain vigilant on this issue in the current final stages of the proposal being discussed between the European Parliament and the Council of the EU.

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(English version)

**Question for written answer E-004324/12  
to the Commission  
Syed Kamall (ECR)  
(25 April 2012)**

*Subject:* Stray dogs in Bulgaria

I have been contacted by a constituent who is concerned that stray dogs in Bulgaria are routinely killed in an inhumane manner and that money provided by the EU for a stray dogs programme is not being spent as intended.

1. Can the Commission set out the terms upon which Bulgaria receives EU money for a stray dogs programme?
2. What monitoring of activities takes place?
3. What audit trail is provided by the Bulgarian authorities to the Commission for the expenditure of the funds?
4. What reports on the programme have been published?
5. How long is the programme intended to operate?

**Answer given by Mr Dalli on behalf of the Commission  
(22 June 2012)**

On the welfare of stray dogs the Commission would refer to its reply to Written Question E-006543/2011 <sup>(1)</sup>.

The Commission is not aware of EU money for stray dog programmes in Bulgaria or any other Member State.

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<sup>(1)</sup> <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/QP-WEB>.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-004325/12**  
**to the Commission**  
**Syed Kamall (ECR)**  
(25 April 2012)

*Subject:* Alleged breach of free movement of people and data protection by Hungarian authorities

I have been contacted by a constituent who has been attempting to move to Hungary but who was made to visit the Immigration Office in Győr five times by officials and has yet to be granted an address card, without which he cannot open a Hungarian bank account.

The Hungarian authorities have collected a huge amount of his personal data, including bank statements, copies of his passport and details of his London and Hungarian addresses, which according to my constituent were not stored safely.

1. What checks does the Commission routinely make on the application of the right of EU citizens to move freely between Member States and to live in those Member States?
2. Will the Commission investigate the application of this right under the Treaties by Hungarian officials?
3. Who in the Commission is prepared to investigate the barriers to my constituent receiving an address card for Hungary and the Hungarian authorities' clear breach of freedom of movement within the EU?
4. Given that my constituent has been frustrated by Hungarian bureaucracy and has given up trying to apply for an address card, is he entitled to ask for his personal data which is held insecurely by the Hungarian authorities to be destroyed, given his concerns over the safe storage of that data?

**Answer given by Mrs Reding on behalf of the Commission**  
(28 June 2012)

The Commission is monitoring the full and correct transposition of Directive 2004/38<sup>(1)</sup>. The Commission is pursuing since July 2010 a dialogue with the Hungarian authorities to resolve shortcomings identified regarding the transposition of the directive. The Hungarian authorities have subsequently adopted amendments with a view to adapting Hungarian legislation to the directive. The Commission is currently analysing these legislative amendments.

Article 8 of the directive regulates the administrative formalities for EU citizens wishing to reside in another Member State for more than three months and sets out an exhaustive list of documents that authorities may require from an EU citizen applying for a registration certificate. If your constituent considers a violation of his rights under this or any other rule of the directive, he may make use of the Solvit network<sup>(2)</sup>. Should the problem persist, or should he consider that the proposed solution is unacceptable, he is entitled to lodge a formal complaint with the Commission.

In the case of withdrawal of his application for an address card your constituent can request that the personal data he provided be erased from the Hungarian authorities. The legal basis is Art. 12 of Directive 95/46/EC<sup>(3)</sup> which obliges the data controller to erase data for which the processing no longer complies with the provisions of the directive. The ground which initially made the processing of the constituent's personal data legitimate — his consent with a view to obtaining an address card — ceased to exist when your constituent decided not to pursue his application (Art. 7).

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<sup>(1)</sup> Directive 2004/38 on the right of citizens of the Union and their family members to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States.

<sup>(2)</sup> For more details please consult <http://ec.europa.eu/solvit>.

<sup>(3)</sup> Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24.10.1995 on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, OJ L 281, 23.11.1995, p. 31.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-004326/12  
to the Commission  
Diane Dodds (NI)  
(25 April 2012)**

*Subject:* UK ban on pig stalls

Concerning the UK ban on pig stalls and tethers, what are the Commission's plans to enforce such a ban in the EU and what is the estimated increase in production costs per kg dead weight this will entail?

**Answer given by Mr Dalli on behalf of the Commission  
(22 August 2012)**

Member States are primarily responsible for implementing and enforcing EU animal welfare legislation.

The Commission has been working for several years with Member States and stakeholders to ensure a progressive implementation of group housing of sows respecting not only the spirit but also the letter of the law because those requirements which will be mandatory for sow stalls as from January 2013 were already required for all new farms established since 2003. To ensure the respect of the next deadline a specific implementation plan is in place and is being applied. The Commission is using all the tools at its disposal to push Member States to reach compliance by 1 January 2013.

In particular, the Commission is collecting data from the Member States on their current and future state of implementation. The data received from the Member States show a steady and regular progress towards compliance.

Should the need arise, the Commission will launch infringement procedures against any Member States which are not in compliance as of 1 January 2013.

The Commission mandated a consultant to carry out a study on the evaluation of the EU policy on Animal Welfare and Possible Options for the Future <sup>(1)</sup>. The study states that it is difficult to assess the overall costs of Directive 2008/120/EC on the protection of pigs <sup>(2)</sup> as there is a wide range of different estimates of the costs involved, depending on variations in the production systems and the assumptions employed. However a variety of studies suggest that the increase in overall production costs ranges around 2%.

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<sup>(1)</sup> <http://ec.europa.eu/food/animal/welfare/actionplan/3%20Final%20Report%20-%20EUPAW%20Evaluation.pdf>  
<sup>(2)</sup> OJ L 47, 18.2.2009.

*(English version)*

**Question for written answer E-004328/12  
to the Commission**

**William (The Earl of) Dartmouth (EFD)**

*(25 April 2012)*

*Subject:* Ending beet quotas and cane tariffs

Does the Commission agree that, in the context of sugar regime reform, the processes of ending beet quotas and cane tariffs need to be complementary, particularly with regard to timing and ensuring that both parts of the sector can compete to deliver the best possible outcome for sugar consumers?

**Answer given by Mr Ciolos on behalf of the Commission**

*(7 June 2012)*

The sugar reform should be considered against the background of the EU's 'Everything but Arms Initiative' (EBA) and the 'Economic Partnership Agreements' (EPA).

Following these two major development agreements, cane sugar can be sourced from ACP countries and Least Developed Countries (LDC's), duty free and quota free since 1 October 2009. Other tariff reductions and/or improved market access to the EU market through tariff rate quotas are under negotiation with various international partners.

In November 2005, the European Union decided that sugar quota would be in place until 30 September 2015.

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(Ελληνική έκδοση)

**Ερώτηση με αίτημα γραπτής απάντησης E-004329/12**  
**προς την Επιτροπή**  
**Nikolaos Chountis (GUE/NGL)**  
(25 Απριλίου 2012)

**Θέμα:** Νέοι όροι στα δάνεια της Ευρωπαϊκής Τράπεζας Επενδύσεων

Σάλο έχει προκαλέσει στην Ελλάδα η αποκάλυψη ότι η Ευρωπαϊκή Τράπεζα Επενδύσεων (ΕΤΕπ) επιδιώκει στις νέες δανειακές συμβάσεις με ελληνικές επιχειρήσεις, εν προκειμένω τη Δημόσια Επιχείρηση Ηλεκτρισμού (ΔΕΗ), να περιλαμβάνονται όροι που θα εξασφαλίζουν ότι η τράπεζα θα αποπληρωθεί στο νόμισμα στο οποίο έδωσε το δάνειο και ότι τα δάνεια θα υπάγονται στο «βρετανικό δίκαιο». Όροι, όμως, που δεν περιλαμβάνονται σε καμία προηγούμενη σύμβαση της ΕΤΕπ με τη ΔΕΗ ή με άλλη ελληνική επιχείρηση.

Με δεδομένο ότι οι ενέργειες αυτές της ΕΤΕπ παραπέμπουν στο ενδεχόμενο εξόδου της Ελλάδας από το ευρώ, και ότι οι όποιες διαφεύσεις, μέχρι τώρα, θεσμικών οργάνων της ΕΕ, επιβεβαίωσαν μάλλον παρά διέψευσαν το γεγονός, ερωτάται η Επιτροπή:

1. Ποια είναι τα δάνεια που έχουν ζητηθεί από την ελληνική κυβέρνηση για χρηματοδότηση διαφόρων προγραμμάτων και τα οποία εξετάζει η ΕΤΕπ;
2. Μπορεί να διαφεύσει κατηγορηματικά ότι η Ευρωπαϊκή Τράπεζα Επενδύσεων ζήτησε και εξετάζει να περιληφθούν νέες ρήτρες, που δεν υπάρχουν σε προηγούμενες συμβάσεις και οι οποίες αφορούν στο νόμισμα αποπληρωμής και στην επιλογή του βρετανικού δικαίου ως βάσης επίλυσης τυχών νομικών διαφορών;

**Ερώτηση με αίτημα γραπτής απάντησης E-004474/12**  
**προς την Επιτροπή**  
**Georgios Papanikolaou (PPE)**  
(27 Απριλίου 2012)

**Θέμα:** Νέα δανειακή σύμβαση μεταξύ ΔΕΗ και ΕΤΕπ

Σύμφωνα με πληθώρα δημοσιευμάτων, η Ευρωπαϊκή Τράπεζα Επενδύσεων έθεσε για πρώτη φορά στη διοίκηση της ΔΕΗ προκειμένου να της χορηγήσει δάνειο από αυτήν δύο νέους όρους, οι οποίοι σε προηγούμενες σχετικές συμφωνίες δεν υπήρχαν. Πρώτον, πρόβλεψη για επαναδιαπραγμάτευση της σύμβασης σε περίπτωση αλλαγής νομίσματος, με το επιχείρημα είτε της αποχώρησης της χώρας από την ευρωζώνη είτε της διάλυσης της ευρωζώνης, και δεύτερον, υπαγωγή στο αγγλικό δίκαιο για την περίπτωση αθέτησης της αποπληρωμής.

Ερωτάται η Επιτροπή:

Είναι ενήμερη για το θέμα αυτό; Για ποιο λόγο συμπεριλήφθησαν οι συγκεκριμένοι δύο όροι; Οι νέες αυτές προβλέψεις, αφορούν μόνο τις συμβάσεις που συνάπτουν ελληνικές εταιρείες ή το σύνολο των εταιρειών των κρατών μελών;

**Κοινή απάντηση του κ. Rehn εξ ονόματος της Επιτροπής**  
(9 Ιουλίου 2012)

Η Επιτροπή πληροφορεί το Αξιότιμο Μέλος του Κοινοβουλίου ότι όλα τα έργα υπό αξιολόγηση από την Ευρωπαϊκή Τράπεζα Επενδύσεων (ΕΤΕπ) δημοσιεύονται στον ιστότοπο της ΕΤΕπ, περιλαμβανομένων και αυτών που αξιολογούνται προς το παρόν στην Ελλάδα (<http://www.eib.org/projects/pipeline/index.htm>).

Σύμφωνα με το καταστατικό της, η ΕΤΕπ πρέπει να εφαρμόζει τις καλύτερες τυποποιημένες ρήτρες τραπεζικής πρακτικής για όλες τις χρηματοδοτούμενες συμβάσεις των οποίων η υλοποίηση γίνεται υπό την ευθύνη της ΕΤΕπ.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-004329/12  
to the Commission**

**Nikolaos Chountis (GUE/NGL)**

(25 April 2012)

*Subject:* New clauses in European Investment Bank loans

The revelation that the European Investment Bank (EIB) intends to include clauses in new loan agreements with Greek companies, in this case the Public Power Corporation S.A. (DEI), to ensure that the bank will be paid in the currency in which the loan was granted and that the loans will be subject to 'UK law', has caused an uproar in Greece. Similar clauses are not included in any other previous EIB agreement with DEI or any other Greek company.

Given that the actions taken by the EIB are motivated by Greece's potential withdrawal from the euro, and that disclaimers by EU institutions to date have merely served to confirm rather than dispel rumours to this effect, will the Commission answer the following:

1. What loans requested by the Greek Government to finance various programmes are currently being examined by the EIB?
2. Can it categorically deny that the EIB is considering the inclusion of new clauses, not contained in previous loan agreements, regarding the repayment currency and the resolution of any legal disputes under British law and that it has made requests to this effect?

**Question for written answer E-004474/12  
to the Commission**

**Georgios Papanikolaou (PPE)**

(27 April 2012)

*Subject:* New loan agreement between the Public Power Corporation and the European Investment Bank

It is being widely reported that the European Investment Bank has for the first time presented the management of the Public Power Corporation with two new conditions for the approval of a loan that were not to be found in previous agreements: firstly, a provision for renegotiation of the contract in the event of change, in response either to Greece's exit from the euro area or to the disintegration of the eurozone, and secondly, for recourse to English law in the event of default on repayment.

In view of the above, will the Commission say:

Whether it is aware of these facts? Why have these two specific conditions been included? Do these new conditions pertain only to contracts concluded with Greek companies or do they cover all companies in EU Member States?

**Joint answer given by Mr Rehn on behalf of the Commission**

(9 July 2012)

The Commission would like to inform the Honourable Member that all projects under appraisal by the European Investment Bank (EIB) are published on the EIB website including those currently being examined in Greece (<http://www.eib.org/projects/pipeline/index.htm>).

In compliance with its Statute, the EIB has to apply best banking practice standard clauses for all its financing contracts, the implementation of which falls under the responsibility of the EIB.

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(Ελληνική έκδοση)

**Ερώτηση με αίτημα γραπτής απάντησης E-004330/12**  
**προς την Επιτροπή**  
**Nikolaos Chountis (GUE/NGL)**  
(25 Απριλίου 2012)

**Θέμα:** Τα επίπεδα ακρυλαμιδίου στα τρόφιμα

Πρόσφατα, η Υπηρεσία Τροφίμων στη Βρετανία προέβη σε συστάσεις προς βρετανικές εταιρείες σε προϊόντα των οποίων εντοπίστηκαν υψηλές συγκεντρώσεις ακρυλαμιδίου. Αυτές εντοπίστηκαν σε 13 προϊόντα καθημερινής κατανάλωσης, από τσιπς έως στιγμιαίο καφέ και μπισκότα. Στην Ελλάδα ο ΕΦΕΤ προέβη σε ανάλογες συστάσεις προς ελληνικές εταιρείες, στα προϊόντα των οποίων διαπιστώθηκαν επίσης υψηλές συγκεντρώσεις ακρυλαμιδίου.

Τα επίπεδα ακρυλαμιδίου στα τρόφιμα παρακολουθούνται από τα κράτη μέλη επί τη βάση συστάσεων της Επιτροπής, και έχουμε εκθέσεις για τα αποτελέσματα της παρακολούθησης για τα έτη 2007 και 2008.

Ερωτάται η Επιτροπή:

1. Υπάρχουν εκθέσεις για τα έτη 2009 και 2010 και ποια είναι τα πορίσματά τους;
2. Σε ποίο βαθμό οι επιχειρήσεις τροφίμων έχουν εφαρμόσει τις επιλογές για την ελαχιστοποίηση των επιπέδων ακρυλαμιδίου, και ποια μέτρα έχει λάβει η Επιτροπή για να τις υποχρεώσει σε συμμόρφωση, καθώς, σύμφωνα με την Ευρωπαϊκή Αρχή για την Ασφάλεια των Τροφίμων, το 2008 παρατηρήθηκε ότι στην πλειονότητα των ομάδων τροφίμων τα επίπεδα παρέμειναν σταθερά και σε λίγες ομάδες παρατηρήθηκαν αυξήσεις;
3. Θα δημοσιοποιήσει τα ονόματα των εταιρειών στα προϊόντα των οποίων βρέθηκαν υψηλές συγκεντρώσεις ακρυλαμιδίου, ώστε να προστατευτούν οι καταναλωτές;
4. Τα κράτη μέλη έχουν κοινοποιήσει στην Επιτροπή τις εκθέσεις τους σχετικά με τα πορίσματα από τους ελέγχους στις εταιρείες τροφίμων για τα έτη 2011 και 2012; Ποιες είναι οι τάσεις που παρατηρούνται και πότε πρόκειται να δημοσιεύσει τα αποτελέσματα παρακολούθησης για αυτά τα έτη;
5. Έως σήμερα υπάρχουν ενδεικτικές τιμές για το ακρυλαμίδιο και βάσει αυτών γίνονται οι έλεγχοι. Προτίθεται η Επιτροπή να κατατάξει το ακρυλαμίδιο στον κατάλογο των επικίνδυνων χημικών ουσιών και να θεσπίσει ανώτατα όρια για αυτό, και πότε;

**Απάντηση του κ. Dalli εξ ονόματος της Επιτροπής**  
(22 Ιουνίου 2012)

Τον Απρίλιο του 2010 η Ευρωπαϊκή Αρχή για την Ασφάλεια των Τροφίμων (EFSA) δημοσίευσε έκθεση σχετικά με τα αποτελέσματα των επιπέδων ακρυλαμιδίου στα τρόφιμα κατά τα έτη παρακολούθησης 2007-2009 και την αξιολόγηση της έκθεσης σ' αυτά <sup>(1)</sup>. Η έκθεση συνοψίζει τα πορίσματα της παρακολούθησης των επιπέδων ακρυλαμιδίου σύμφωνα με τη σύσταση 2007/331/ΕΚ της Επιτροπής της 3ης Μαΐου 2007 <sup>(2)</sup>.

Τα κράτη μέλη εξακολουθούν να συλλέγουν δεδομένα. Τα πρόσφατα στοιχεία συγκεντρώνονται ήδη από την EFSA και θα δημοσιοποιηθούν κατά το 2012. Από τα διαθέσιμα αποτελέσματα προκύπτει ότι δεν υπήρχε γενική τάση προς χαμηλότερα επίπεδα ακρυλαμιδίου στα τρόφιμα παρά τις προσπάθειες που καταβλήθηκαν από τον κλάδο για τη μείωση των συγκεκριμένων επιπέδων.

Με βάση τα πορίσματα των εκθέσεων παρακολούθησης της EFSA, η Επιτροπή, τον Ιανουάριο του 2011, εξέδωσε σύσταση για τις έρευνες σχετικά με τα επίπεδα ακρυλαμιδίου στα τρόφιμα <sup>(3)</sup>, με την οποία καλεί τα κράτη μέλη να διενεργούν επιτόπιες έρευνες όταν διαπιστώνονται υψηλά επίπεδα ακρυλαμιδίου. Η Επιτροπή συλλέγει ήδη προκαταρκτικά στοιχεία από τα κράτη μέλη σχετικά με το αποτέλεσμα των ερευνών, διαδικασία που θα συνεχιστεί κατά το 2012. Έως το τέλος του 2012 η Επιτροπή θα αξιολογήσει τα αποτελέσματα προκειμένου να αποφασίσει αν είναι αναγκαία η λήψη άλλων ενδεικνυόμενων μέτρων. Η Επιτροπή δεν προτίθεται να δημοσιοποιήσει τα ονόματα μεμονωμένων εταιρειών στις οποίες διαπιστώνεται υπέρβαση των ενδεικτικών τιμών.

<sup>(1)</sup> Έκθεση με τίτλο «Results of acrylamide levels in food from monitoring years 2007-2009 and exposure assessment», η οποία εκπονήθηκε κατόπιν αιτήματος της Ευρωπαϊκής Επιτροπής. Ερώτηση αριθ. EFSA-Q-2010-01458, που δημοσιεύθηκε στις 22 Μαρτίου 2011. EFSA Journal 2011· 9(4):2133.

<sup>(2)</sup> ΕΕ L 123 της 2.5.2007.

<sup>(3)</sup> Σύσταση της Επιτροπής για τις έρευνες για τα επίπεδα ακρυλαμιδίου στα τρόφιμα [έγγραφο E(2010) 9681 τελικό της 10.1.2011].

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-004330/12  
to the Commission**

**Nikolaos Chountis (GUE/NGL)**

(25 April 2012)

*Subject:* Acrylamide levels in food

Recently, the UK Food Standards Agency has issued recommendations to British companies regarding products which have been found to contain high concentrations of acrylamide. These high concentrations have been found in 13 daily consumables, from chips to instant coffee and biscuits. In Greece, the Hellenic Food Authority (EFET) is issuing similar recommendations to Greek companies regarding products which have also been found to contain high concentrations of acrylamide.

Acrylamide levels in food are monitored on the basis of Commission recommendations in the Member States and we have reports on the monitoring results for 2007 and 2008.

Will the Commission answer the following:

1. Have reports been drawn up for 2009 and 2010 and what are the findings of these reports?
2. To what extent have food companies taken the recommended measures to minimise acrylamide levels and what action has the Commission taken to ensure that they do so as, according to the European Food Safety Authority, in 2008, acrylamide levels have remained stable in the majority of food groups, while an increase in levels has been observed in a few food groups?
3. Will it publish the names of the companies whose products were found to contain high concentrations of acrylamide so that consumers can be protected?
4. Have the Member States provided the Commission with their reports on inspection findings in respect of food companies for 2011 and 2012? What trends are observed and when does the Commission intend to publish the findings for the years in question?
5. Until now the inspections have been carried out on the basis of established indicative values for acrylamide. Does the Commission intend to classify acrylamide as a dangerous substance in the inventory of chemical substances and does it intend to set stricter limits for this substance and when?

**Answer given by Mr Dalli on behalf of the Commission**

(22 June 2012)

The European Food Safety Authority (EFSA) published a report 'Results of acrylamide levels in food from monitoring years 2007-2009 and exposure assessment' <sup>(1)</sup> in April 2010. The report summarises the findings of the acrylamide monitoring exercises according to Commission Recommendation 2007/331/EC of 3 May 2007 <sup>(2)</sup>.

Member States continue to collect data. Recent data are currently being compiled by EFSA and will be published during the year 2012. The already available results indicated that there was no general trend towards lower levels of acrylamide in foodstuffs despite the efforts undertaken by industry to bring the levels down.

In view of the findings of the EFSA monitoring reports, in January 2011 the Commission adopted a recommendation on 'investigations into the levels of acrylamide in food' <sup>(3)</sup>, which asks Member States to carry out on-the-spot investigations in cases where high acrylamide levels have been found. The Commission is currently in the process of collecting preliminary information from the Member States on the outcome of the investigations, an exercise which will continue during 2012. By the end of 2012 the Commission will evaluate the results in view of deciding about the need for other appropriate measures. The Commission does not intend to publish names of individual companies for which indicative values were exceeded.

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<sup>(1)</sup> On request from the European Commission. Question No EFSA-Q-2010-01458, issued on 22 March 2011. EFSA Journal 2011;9(4):2133.

<sup>(2)</sup> O.L. 123, 2.5.2007.

<sup>(3)</sup> Commission Recommendation on investigations into the levels of acrylamide in food (Document C(2010) 9681 final of 10.1.2011).



(Ελληνική έκδοση)

**Ερώτηση με αίτημα γραπτής απάντησης E-004331/12**  
**προς το Συμβούλιο**  
**Nikolaos Chountis (GUE/NGL)**  
(25 Απριλίου 2012)

**Θέμα:** Προβλεπόμενες κυρώσεις από την Εταιρική Σχέση Προσχώρησης αν η Τουρκία παγώσει τις συνομιλίες με την ΕΕ

Σε δηλώσεις του τον Ιούλιο του 2011 ο Υπουργός Εξωτερικών της Τουρκίας είχε απειλήσει ότι θα «παγώσει τις ευρωτουρκικές σχέσεις» αν η Κύπρος αναλάβει την προεδρία της ΕΕ το δεύτερο εξάμηνο του 2012 και δεν έχει προηγουμένως «επιλυθεί το Κυπριακό». Στις 19.4.2012 ο Πρωθυπουργός της Τουρκίας κ. Ερντογάν επανέλαβε την απειλή λέγοντας ότι «Θα κάνουμε ένα εξάμηνο διάλειμμα όταν ξεκινήσει η Προεδρία των Ελληνοκυπρίων». Λαμβάνοντας υπόψη ότι στα συμπεράσματα του, το Ευρωπαϊκό Συμβούλιο της 9ης Δεκεμβρίου 2011 εκφράζει τη «σοβαρή ανησυχία του για τις τουρκικές δηλώσεις και απειλές και ζητεί τον πλήρη σεβασμό του ρόλου της Προεδρίας του Συμβουλίου, η οποία αποτελεί θεμελιώδες θεσμικό χαρακτηριστικό γνώρισμα της ΕΕ, προβλεπόμενο στη Συνθήκη» και ότι με τις δηλώσεις του ο κ. Ερντογάν απορρίπτει πλήρως τα συμπεράσματα του Συμβουλίου για σεβασμό των θεσμικών λειτουργιών της ΕΕ αλλά και τις ανάλογες παρανέσεις και προτροπές των υπολοίπων θεσμικών οργάνων της ΕΕ, και με δεδομένο ότι η ανοχή την οποία έχει επιδείξει η ΕΕ στις προφανείς παραβιάσεις των όρων της Εταιρικής Σχέσης Προσχώρησης έχει αποθρασύνει την Τουρκία και, ως εκ τούτου, υπάρχει ανάγκη άμεσης και έμπρακτης αντίδρασης της ΕΕ στο πολύ πιθανό ενδεχόμενο να υλοποιήσει τις απειλές της Τουρκία, ερωτάται το Συμβούλιο:

Πώς προτίθεται να αντιδράσει στη πλήρη έλλειψη σεβασμού των θεσμών της ΕΕ, στην εμμονή της Τουρκίας για μη εφαρμογή του πρόσθετου πρωτοκόλλου επέκτασης της τελωνιακής ένωσης, στην αμφισβήτηση κυριαρχικών δικαιωμάτων κράτους μέλους και στην απόρριψη των εκκλήσεων εκ μέρους των θεσμικών οργάνων για καλλιέργεια σχέσεων καλής γειτονίας, ιδίως με τα κράτη μέλη της ΕΕ;

Προτίθεται, ως πρώτο και συμβολικό βήμα, να εισηγηθεί τη διακοπή της προενταξιακής βοήθειας προς την Τουρκία, όπως προβλέπει η Εταιρική Σχέση Προσχώρησης και συγκεκριμένα το άρθρο 5, το οποίο ορίζει ότι: «Σε περίπτωση μη τήρησης των ανωτέρω γενικών προϋποθέσεων, το Συμβούλιο ενδέχεται να λάβει απόφαση για την αναστολή της χρηματοδοτικής βοήθειας βάσει του κανονισμού (ΕΚ) αριθ. 2500/2001 ή βάσει του άρθρου 21 του κανονισμού (ΕΚ) αριθ. 1085/2006»;

**Απάντηση**  
(19 Ιουνίου 2012)

Ο κ. βουλευτής παραπέμπεται στην απάντηση του Συμβουλίου στη γραπτή ερώτηση E-007295/2011.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-004331/12  
to the Council**

**Nikolaos Chountis (GUE/NGL)**

(25 April 2012)

*Subject:* Penalties provided for by the Accession Partnership if Turkey freezes talks with the EU

In July 2011, the Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs issued statements threatening that Turkey would freeze EU-Turkey relations' if Cyprus assumed the Presidency of the EU in the second half of 2012 without first solving the 'Cyprus problem'. On 19 April 2012, the Turkish Prime Minister, Mr Erdogan, reiterated the threat, saying 'we will take a six-month break when the Cypriot Presidency begins'. Considering that the European Council, in its conclusions of 9 December 2011, with regard to Turkish statements and threats, expresses its 'serious concern and calls for full respect for the role of the Presidency of the Council, which is a fundamental institutional feature of the EU provided for in the Treaty' and that Mr Erdogan, with these statements, completely rejects Council conclusions on compliance with EU institutional procedures as well as the corresponding recommendations and proposals made by other EU institutions; given that the tolerance shown by the EU towards the obvious infringements of the conditions of the Accession Partnership has encouraged Turkey in its actions and there is therefore a need for an immediate and concrete EU reaction to the very likely possibility that Turkey will carry out its threats, will the Council answer the following:

How does it intend to react to the complete lack of respect towards EU institutions, to Turkey persistently failing to implement the Customs Union Additional Protocol, disputing Member States' sovereign rights and rejecting appeals by the institutions to cultivate neighbourly relations, especially with EU Member States?

Does it intend as a first, symbolic step to cut off pre-accession assistance to Turkey, as specified in the Accession Partnership, specifically Section 5 which states: 'Failure to respect these general conditions could lead to a decision by the Council on the suspension of financial assistance on the basis of Regulation (EC) No 2500/2001 or on the basis of Article 21 of Regulation (EC) No 1085/2006'?

**Reply**

(19 June 2012)

The Honourable Member should refer to the Council's reply to Written Question E-007295/2011.

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(Ελληνική έκδοση)

**Ερώτηση με αίτημα γραπτής απάντησης E-004332/12**  
**προς την Επιτροπή (Αντιπρόεδρος/Υπατη Εκπρόσωπος)**  
**Nikolaos Chountis (GUE/NGL)**  
(25 Απριλίου 2012)

**Θέμα:** VP/HR — Προβλεπόμενες κυρώσεις από την Εταιρική Σχέση Προσχώρησης αν η Τουρκία παγώσει τις συνομιλίες με την ΕΕ

Σε δηλώσεις του τον Ιούλιο του 2011 ο Υπουργός Εξωτερικών της Τουρκίας είχε απειλήσει ότι θα «παγώσει τις ευρωτουρκικές σχέσεις» αν η Κύπρος αναλάβει την προεδρία της ΕΕ το δεύτερο εξάμηνο του 2012 και δεν έχει προηγουμένως «επιλυθεί το Κυπριακό». Στις 19.4.2012 ο Πρωθυπουργός της Τουρκίας κ. Ερντογάν επανέλαβε την απειλή λέγοντας ότι «Θα κάνουμε ένα εξάμηνο διάλειμμα όταν ξεκινήσει η Προεδρία των Ελληνοκυπρίων». Λαμβάνοντας υπόψη ότι στα συμπεράσματα του, το Ευρωπαϊκό Συμβούλιο της 9ης Δεκεμβρίου 2011 εκφράζει τη «σοβαρή ανησυχία του για τις τουρκικές δηλώσεις και απειλές και ζητεί τον πλήρη σεβασμό του ρόλου της Προεδρίας του Συμβουλίου, η οποία αποτελεί θεμελιώδες θεσμικό χαρακτηριστικό γνώρισμα της ΕΕ, προβλεπόμενο στη Συνθήκη» και ότι με τις δηλώσεις του ο κ. Ερντογάν απορρίπτει πλήρως τα συμπεράσματα του Συμβουλίου για σεβασμό των θεσμικών λειτουργιών της ΕΕ αλλά και τις ανάλογες παραινέσεις και προτροπές των υπολοίπων θεσμικών οργάνων της ΕΕ, και με δεδομένο ότι η ανοχή την οποία έχει επιδείξει η ΕΕ στις προφανείς παραβιάσεις των όρων της Εταιρικής Σχέσης Προσχώρησης έχει αποθρασύνει την Τουρκία και, ως εκ τούτου, υπάρχει ανάγκη άμεσης και έμπρακτης αντίδρασης της ΕΕ στο πολύ πιθανό ενδεχόμενο να υλοποιήσει τις απειλές της η Τουρκία, ερωτάται η Υπατη Εκπρόσωπος:

Πώς προτίθεται να αντιδράσει στη πλήρη έλλειψη σεβασμού των θεσμών της ΕΕ, στην εμμονή της Τουρκίας για μη εφαρμογή του πρόσθετου πρωτοκόλλου επέκτασης της τελωνιακής ένωσης, στην αμφισβήτηση κυριαρχικών δικαιωμάτων κράτους μέλους και στην απόρριψη των εκκλήσεων εκ μέρους των θεσμικών οργάνων για καλλιέργεια σχέσεων καλής γειτονίας, ιδίως με τα κράτη μέλη της ΕΕ;

Προτίθεται να ανακαλέσει τον Πρέσβη-Επικεφαλής της Αντιπροσωπείας της ΕΕ στην Τουρκία για «περαιτέρω διαβουλεύσεις»;

**Ερώτηση με αίτημα γραπτής απάντησης E-004333/12**  
**προς την Επιτροπή**  
**Nikolaos Chountis (GUE/NGL)**  
(25 Απριλίου 2012)

**Θέμα:** Προβλεπόμενες κυρώσεις από την Εταιρική Σχέση Προσχώρησης αν η Τουρκία παγώσει τις συνομιλίες με την ΕΕ

Σε δηλώσεις του τον Ιούλιο του 2011 ο Υπουργός Εξωτερικών της Τουρκίας είχε απειλήσει ότι θα «παγώσει τις ευρωτουρκικές σχέσεις» αν η Κύπρος αναλάβει την προεδρία της ΕΕ το δεύτερο εξάμηνο του 2012 και δεν έχει προηγουμένως «επιλυθεί το Κυπριακό». Στις 19.4.2012 ο Πρωθυπουργός της Τουρκίας κ. Ερντογάν επανέλαβε την απειλή λέγοντας ότι «Θα κάνουμε ένα εξάμηνο διάλειμμα όταν ξεκινήσει η Προεδρία των Ελληνοκυπρίων». Λαμβάνοντας υπόψη ότι στα συμπεράσματα του, το Ευρωπαϊκό Συμβούλιο της 9ης Δεκεμβρίου 2011 εκφράζει τη «σοβαρή ανησυχία του για τις τουρκικές δηλώσεις και απειλές και ζητεί τον πλήρη σεβασμό του ρόλου της Προεδρίας του Συμβουλίου, η οποία αποτελεί θεμελιώδες θεσμικό χαρακτηριστικό γνώρισμα της ΕΕ, προβλεπόμενο στη Συνθήκη» και ότι με τις δηλώσεις του ο κ. Ερντογάν απορρίπτει πλήρως τα συμπεράσματα του Συμβουλίου για σεβασμό των θεσμικών λειτουργιών της ΕΕ αλλά και τις ανάλογες παραινέσεις και προτροπές των υπολοίπων θεσμικών οργάνων της ΕΕ, και με δεδομένο ότι η ανοχή την οποία έχει επιδείξει η ΕΕ στις προφανείς παραβιάσεις των όρων της Εταιρικής Σχέσης Προσχώρησης έχει αποθρασύνει την Τουρκία και, ως εκ τούτου, υπάρχει ανάγκη άμεσης και έμπρακτης αντίδρασης της ΕΕ στο πολύ πιθανό ενδεχόμενο να υλοποιήσει τις απειλές της η Τουρκία, ερωτάται η Επιτροπή:

Πώς προτίθεται να αντιδράσει στη πλήρη έλλειψη σεβασμού των θεσμών της ΕΕ, στην εμμονή της Τουρκίας για μη εφαρμογή του πρόσθετου πρωτοκόλλου επέκτασης της τελωνιακής ένωσης, στην αμφισβήτηση κυριαρχικών δικαιωμάτων κράτους μέλους και στην απόρριψη των εκκλήσεων εκ μέρους των θεσμικών οργάνων για καλλιέργεια σχέσεων καλής γειτονίας, ιδίως με τα κράτη μέλη της ΕΕ;

Προτίθεται, ως πρώτο και συμβολικό βήμα, να εισηγηθεί τη διακοπή της προενταξιακής βοήθειας προς την Τουρκία, όπως προβλέπει η Εταιρική Σχέση Προσχώρησης και συγκεκριμένα το άρθρο 5, το οποίο ορίζει ότι: «Σε περίπτωση μη τήρησης των ανωτέρω γενικών προϋποθέσεων, το Συμβούλιο ενδέχεται να λάβει απόφαση για την αναστολή της χρηματοδοτικής βοήθειας βάσει του κανονισμού (ΕΚ) αριθ. 2500/2001 ή βάσει του άρθρου 21 του κανονισμού (ΕΚ) αριθ. 1085/2006»;

**Κοινή απάντηση του κ. Füle εξ ονόματος της Επιτροπής**

(18 Ιουνίου 2012)

Η Επιτροπή παραπέμπει στα συμπεράσματα του Ευρωπαϊκού Συμβουλίου, της 9ης Δεκεμβρίου 2011, στα οποία το Ευρωπαϊκό Συμβούλιο εξέφρασε τη σοβαρή ανησυχία του σχετικά με τις τουρκικές δηλώσεις και απειλές, και στα συμπεράσματα του Συμβουλίου, της 5ης Δεκεμβρίου 2011, στα οποία το Συμβούλιο εξέφρασε την προσδοκία του να στηρίξει η Τουρκία ενεργά τις τρέχουσες διαπραγματεύσεις οι οποίες στοχεύουν σε δίκαιη, συνολική και βιώσιμη διευθέτηση του Κυπριακού στα πλαίσια του ΟΗΕ, σύμφωνα με τις συναφείς αποφάσεις του Συμβουλίου Ασφαλείας του ΟΗΕ και σύμφωνα με τις αρχές επί των οποίων εδράζεται η Ευρωπαϊκή Ένωση.

Σχετικά με τη διαδικασία προσχώρησης, η Επιτροπή θα ήθελε να επιστήσει την προσοχή του Αξιότιμου Μέλους στις διατάξεις που καθορίζονται με σαφήνεια στο διαπραγματευτικό πλαίσιο το οποίο συμφώνησαν όλα τα κράτη μέλη το 2005, καθώς και στην απόφαση του Συμβουλίου το Δεκέμβριο του 2006.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-004332/12  
to the Commission (Vice-President/High Representative)  
Nikolaos Chountis (GUE/NGL)**

(25 April 2012)

*Subject:* VP/HR — Penalties provided for by the Accession Partnership if Turkey freezes talks with the EU

In July 2011, the Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs issued statements threatening that Turkey would 'freeze EU-Turkey relations' if Cyprus accepted the Presidency of the EU in the second half of 2012 without first solving the 'Cyprus problem'. On 19 April 2012, the Turkish Prime Minister, Mr Erdogan, reiterated the threat, saying 'we will take a six-month break when the Cypriot Presidency begins'. Considering that the European Council, in its conclusions of 9 December 2011, with regard to Turkish statements and threats, expresses its 'serious concern and calls for full respect for the role of the Presidency of the Council, which is a fundamental institutional feature of the EU provided for in the Treaty' and that Mr Erdogan, with these statements, completely rejects Council conclusions on compliance with EU institutional procedures as well as the corresponding recommendations and proposals made by other EU institutions; given that the tolerance shown by the EU towards the obvious infringements of the conditions of the Accession Partnership has encouraged Turkey in its actions and there is therefore a need for an immediate and concrete EU reaction to the very likely possibility that Turkey will carry out its threats, will the High Representative answer the following:

How does she intend to react to the complete lack of respect towards EU institutions, to Turkey persistently failing to implement the Customs Union Additional Protocol, disputing Member States' sovereign rights and rejecting appeals by the institutions to cultivate neighbourly relations, especially with EU Member States?

Does she intend to recall the Head of the EU Delegation to Turkey for 'further consultations'?

**Question for written answer E-004333/12  
to the Commission  
Nikolaos Chountis (GUE/NGL)**

(25 April 2012)

*Subject:* Penalties provided for by the Accession Partnership if Turkey freezes talks with the EU

In July 2011, the Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs issued statements threatening that Turkey would 'freeze EU-Turkey relations' if Cyprus assumed the Presidency of the EU in the second half of 2012 without first solving the 'Cyprus problem'. On 19 April 2012, the Turkish Prime Minister, Mr Erdogan, reiterated the threat, saying 'we will take a six-month break when the Cypriot Presidency begins'. Considering that the European Council, in its conclusions of 9 December 2011, with regard to Turkish statements and threats, expresses its 'serious concern and calls for full respect for the role of the Presidency of the Council, which is a fundamental institutional feature of the EU provided for in the Treaty' and that Mr Erdogan, with these statements, completely rejects Council conclusions on compliance with EU institutional procedures as well as the corresponding recommendations and proposals made by other EU institutions; given that the tolerance shown by the EU towards the obvious infringements of the conditions of the Accession Partnership has encouraged Turkey in its actions and there is therefore a need for an immediate and concrete EU reaction to the very likely possibility that Turkey will carry out its threats, will the Commission answer the following:

How does it intend to react to the complete lack of respect towards EU institutions, to Turkey persistently failing to implement the Customs Union Additional Protocol, disputing the Member States' sovereign rights and rejecting appeals by the institutions to cultivate neighbourly relations, especially with EU Member States?

Does it intend as a first, symbolic step to cut off pre-accession assistance to Turkey, as specified in the Accession Partnership, specifically Section 5 which states: 'Failure to respect these general conditions could lead to a decision by the Council on the suspension of financial assistance on the basis of Regulation (EC) No 2500/2001 or on the basis of Article 21 of Regulation (EC) No 1085/2006'?

**Joint answer given by Mr Füle on behalf of the Commission**

*(18 June 2012)*

The Commission refers to the Conclusions of the European Council of 9 December 2011, in which the European Council expressed serious concern with regard to Turkish statements and threats and to the Council conclusions of 5 December 2011, in which the Council expressed its expectation that Turkey actively supports the ongoing negotiations aimed at a fair, comprehensive and viable settlement of the Cyprus problem within the UN framework, in accordance with the relevant UN Security Council resolutions and in line with the principles on which the Union is founded.

Regarding the accession process the Commission would like to draw the Honourable Member's attention to the provisions clearly set out in the Negotiating Framework agreed by all Member States in 2005 as well as the Council Decision of December 2006.

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(Ελληνική έκδοση)

**Ερώτηση με αίτημα γραπτής απάντησης P-004334/12**  
**προς την Επιτροπή**  
**Antigoni Papadopoulou (S&D)**  
(26 Απριλίου 2012)

**Θέμα:** Παραβίαση των κανονισμών εναέριας κυκλοφορίας

Από την 1η Δεκεμβρίου 2011 έως την 29η Φεβρουαρίου 2012, στρατιωτικά αεροσκάφη της τουρκικής αεροπορίας παραβίασαν αρκετές φορές τους διεθνείς κανονισμούς εναέριας κυκλοφορίας και τον εθνικό εναέριο χώρο της Κυπριακής Δημοκρατίας. Τέτοιου είδους συστηματικές καταχρήσεις της κυριαρχίας και της εδαφικής ακεραιότητας της Κυπριακής Δημοκρατίας εκ μέρους της Τουρκίας συνιστούν κατάφωρη παραβίαση του διεθνούς δικαίου και των κανονισμών εναέριας κυκλοφορίας και θέτουν σε σοβαρό κίνδυνο την ασφάλεια της διεθνούς αεροπορίας στην ευρύτερη περιοχή. Το γεγονός αυτό είναι ιδιαίτερα ανησυχητικό στο πλαίσιο των πρόσφατων στρατιωτικών απειλών που εξέφρασε η Τουρκία έναντι στην Κύπρο, σχετικά με τις δραστηριότητες στην αποκλειστική οικονομική ζώνη της Κυπριακής Δημοκρατίας, καθώς και των πρόσφατων δηλώσεων υψηλόβαθμων τούρκων αξιωματούχων που απειλούν με προσάρτηση του κατεχόμενου τμήματος της Κύπρου στην Τουρκία.

1. Πώς είναι δυνατόν η ΕΕ να δέχεται το γεγονός ότι η Τουρκία, μια υποψήφια προς ένταξη χώρα, παραβιάζει επανειλημμένως τους ευρωπαϊκούς και διεθνείς κανονισμούς και παράλληλα δεν σέβεται την κυριαρχία, την ανεξαρτησία και την εδαφική ακεραιότητα της Κυπριακής Δημοκρατίας, κράτους μέλους της ΕΕ και των Ηνωμένων Εθνών;
2. Οι προαναφερθείσες παραβιάσεις δεν λειτουργούν εις βάρος των διαπραγματεύσεων που διεξάγονται επί του παρόντος και αποσκοπούν στην εξεύρεση μιας δίκαιης και βιώσιμης λύσης για το Κυπριακό ζήτημα;
3. Σκοπεύει η ΕΕ να λάβει μέτρα ώστε να παύσει αυτή η απαράδεκτη εκ μέρους της Τουρκίας συμπεριφορά;

**Απάντηση του κ. Füle εξ ονόματος της Επιτροπής**  
(8 Ιουνίου 2012)

Η Επιτροπή παραπέμπει το Αξιότιμο Μέλος στην απάντησή της στη γραπτή ερώτηση E-003162/2012 <sup>(1)</sup>.

<sup>(1)</sup> <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/QP-WEB/application/home.do?language=EL>.

(English version)

**Question for written answer P-004334/12  
to the Commission**

**Antigoni Papadopoulou (S&D)**

(26 April 2012)

*Subject:* Violation of air traffic regulations

During the period from 1 December 2011 to 29 February 2012, military aircraft of the Turkish Air Force violated international air traffic regulations and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus on several occasions. Such systematic abuses by Turkey of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of Cyprus blatantly violate international law and air traffic regulations and seriously jeopardise international aviation safety in the wider region. This is particularly disturbing in the context of the recent military threats by Turkey against Cyprus, relating to activity in the Exclusive Economic Zone of the Republic of Cyprus, as well as the recent statements by high-level Turkish officials threatening annexation of the occupied part of Cyprus.

1. How can the EU accept that Turkey, a candidate country for accession, repeatedly violates European and international regulations, showing at the same time no respect for the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of the Republic of Cyprus, a Member State of the EU and the United Nations?
2. Are the abovementioned violations not counterproductive in the current phase of negotiations, which seek a just and viable solution to the Cyprus issue?
3. Does the EU intend to take any action to end this unacceptable behaviour by Turkey?

**Answer given by Mr Füle on behalf of the Commission**

(8 June 2012)

The Commission refers the Honourable Member to its answer to Written Question E-003162/2012 <sup>(1)</sup>.

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<sup>(1)</sup> <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/QP-WEB/home.jsp>



(Deutsche Fassung)

**Anfrage zur schriftlichen Beantwortung E-004336/12  
an die Kommission**

**Angelika Werthmann (NI)**

(26. April 2012)

*Betrifft:* Erkennen gefährlicher Fahrzeuge zwischen München und Salzburg

Die Autobahn A8 zwischen den Städten München (Deutschland) und Salzburg (Österreich) wird täglich von Tausenden von Nutzfahrzeugen befahren. An einem Abschnitt des in Bayern liegenden Teils dieser Autobahn werden die vorbeifahrenden Fahrzeuge ständig von Kameras und Sensoren überwacht.

1. Welche Art von Maßnahmen oder Programmen hat die Kommission zur Unfallverhütung auf Autobahnen eingeleitet? Welche Maßnahmen hat sie umgesetzt?
2. Gibt es in anderen Mitgliedstaaten ähnliche Beispiele für Überwachungsmaßnahmen dieser Art?

**Antwort von Herrn Kallas im Namen der Kommission**

(5. Juni 2012)

Die Kommission ist gemeinsam mit den Mitgliedstaaten und den lokalen Behörden für die Straßenverkehrssicherheit zuständig.

Die Kompetenzen, die der Europäischen Kommission vom Gesetzgeber im Bereich der Sicherheit der Straßenverkehrsinfrastruktur übertragen wurden, sind beschränkt und allgemeiner Natur, wie etwa der Austausch bewährter Praktiken im Rahmen der Richtlinie 2008/96/EG über ein Sicherheitsmanagement für die Straßenverkehrsinfrastruktur, die nur für das transeuropäische Straßennetz gilt.

Für das Management des Straßenverkehrs und die Kameraüberwachung der Straßen sind die nationalen und die lokalen Behörden zuständig. Daher obliegt es den zuständigen Verkehrsmanagement-Behörden, im Einklang mit dem nationalen Recht zu entscheiden, ob und weshalb sie Überwachungskameras einsetzen. Es mag ähnliche Fälle auf anderen Straßen der Mitgliedstaaten geben, aber die Kommission verfolgt dieses spezifische Thema nicht.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-004336/12  
to the Commission**

**Angelika Werthmann (NI)**

(26 April 2012)

*Subject:* Detecting dangerous vehicles between Munich and Salzburg

Every day thousands of commercial vehicles and trucks use the A8 motorway between the cities of Munich (Germany) and Salzburg (Austria). On one section of the Bavarian part of this motorway the passing vehicles are permanently monitored by cameras and sensors.

1. What kind of actions or programmes has the Commission initiated to tackle accident prevention on motorways? What are the measures it has implemented?
2. Are there similar examples of this kind of surveillance in operation in other Member States?

**Answer given by Mr Kallas on behalf of the Commission**

(5 June 2012)

The Commission shares competencies on road safety matters with Member States and local authorities.

The powers conferred by the legislator to the European Commission in the area of road infrastructure safety are limited and of general nature, such as sharing of best practices within the limits of Directive 2008/96/EC <sup>(1)</sup> on road infrastructure safety management, which applies only to the Trans European Road Network.

The management of road traffic and the monitoring by cameras on the roads are competency of national or local authorities. Therefore, traffic management authorities can decide, in conformity with the national legislation, whether and why to deploy control cameras. Similar examples might be existing in many other roads of the Member States, but the Commission is not following this specific issue.

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<sup>(1)</sup> OJ L 319, 29.11.2008, p. 59-67.

(Deutsche Fassung)

**Anfrage zur schriftlichen Beantwortung E-004337/12**  
**an die Kommission**  
**Angelika Werthmann (NI)**  
(26. April 2012)

*Betrifft:* Gefahr einer „verlorenen“ Generation junger Menschen in Griechenland

Im Januar 2012 wurde in Griechenland eine Arbeitslosenquote von 21,8 % gemeldet — ein neuer Rekord für das Land —, da die Sparmaßnahmen zur Senkung der Defizite die Rezession verstärkt und zu weiterem Stellenabbau geführt haben. Dies war die höchste Quote, seit Griechenland im Jahr 2004 erstmalig monatliche Daten erhoben hat.

Am stärksten betroffen sind junge Menschen, bei denen 40,4 % der unter 24-Jährigen ohne Arbeit sind. In der Altersgruppe von 25 bis 34 lag die Quote bei 19,9 %.

Durch die wirtschaftlichen Schwierigkeiten drohen die Arbeitslosenzahlen Griechenlands eine ähnliche Höhe zu erreichen wie beim Eurozonen-Partner Spanien, wo die Arbeitslosenquote im ersten Quartal 2011 auf 21,3 % stieg und damit mehr als das Doppelte des Durchschnitts in der Europäischen Union betrug.

Immer mehr junge Menschen verlassen Griechenland und wandern in andere Mitgliedstaaten und Länder außerhalb der EU aus.

1. Welche Maßnahmen ergreift die Kommission, um dieses ernste Problem anzugehen und der griechischen Regierung bei der Bewältigung dieser Situation zu helfen?
2. Wie unterstützt die Kommission Griechenland dabei, neue und innovative Wege zu finden, jungen Menschen einen besseren Zugang zu Arbeitsplätzen sowie einen angemessenen Lebensstandard zu bieten und Absolventen hervorzubringen, die den Anforderungen des Marktes entsprechen?

**Antwort von Herrn Andor im Namen der Kommission**  
(14. Juni 2012)

1. Wie die Kommission in ihrer Mitteilung „Wachstum für Griechenland“ <sup>(1)</sup> über das neue Programm für finanzielle Hilfe von EU und IWF, die wirksamere Verwendung der EU-Strukturfonds und die Einrichtung einer Griechenland-Task-Force hervorgehoben hat, unterstützt die Kommission die griechischen Behörden bei der Umsetzung eines umfassenden Reformprogramms, um das Wirtschaftswachstum neu zu beleben, die steuerliche und finanzielle Stabilität zu fördern, Arbeitsplätze zu schaffen und die sozialen Auswirkungen der Krise abzufedern. Diese Anstrengungen sind wesentlich, um auch jungen Menschen nachhaltige Beschäftigungsmöglichkeiten zu bieten.
2. Entsprechend der Mitteilung der Kommission <sup>(2)</sup> „Chancen für junge Menschen“ wurde unter Beteiligung der Dienststellen der Kommission und der griechischen Behörden ein Aktionsteam zur Bekämpfung der Jugendarbeitslosigkeit in Griechenland eingerichtet. Das Aktionsteam erarbeitet derzeit einen Plan, um die äußerst hohe Jugendarbeitslosigkeit in Griechenland in den Griff zu bekommen. In diesem Zusammenhang könnte eine Neuzuweisung von Mitteln in Höhe von rund 200 bis 250 Mio. EUR aus den bestehenden EU-Strukturfonds zur Unterstützung von Initiativen ins Auge gefasst werden, die sofortige Ergebnisse für Jugendliche bewirken können, denen es nicht gelingt, eine Beschäftigung zu finden.
3. Der vorgenannte Aktionsplan könnte folgende Maßnahmen umfassen: Förderangebote zur Erlangung einer ersten Arbeitserfahrung, Finanzierung einer kurzfristigen Stellenvermittlung im Privatsektor oder bei kommunalen Trägern, Lehr- oder Praktikantenstellen für Studierende und Hochschulabsolventen, Umschulung oder Weiterbildung, Förderung von Existenzgründungen auch im sozialen Bereich sowie Studien- und Arbeitserfahrungen im Ausland.
4. Wie in dem Programm zur EU/IWF-Finanzhilfe ausgeführt wurde, beabsichtigt Griechenland, die Besteuerung der Sozialbeiträge weiterhin budgetneutral zu senken, was den Weg zur Schaffung von mehr Arbeitsplätzen für Jugendliche ebnen sollte.

<sup>(1)</sup> KOM(2012)183 endg. vom 18. April 2012.

<sup>(2)</sup> KOM(2011)933 endg. vom 20. Dezember 2011.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-004337/12  
to the Commission  
Angelika Werthmann (NI)  
(26 April 2012)**

*Subject:* Danger of a 'lost' generation of young people in Greece

The unemployment rate in Greece was reported to be 21.8% in January 2012 — a new record for the country — as austerity measures to reduce deficits deepened the recession and led to more job cuts. It was the highest rate recorded since Greece started compiling monthly data in 2004.

Young people were hardest hit, with 40.4% of those under the age of 24 out of work. The rate was 19.9% for those aged 25 to 34.

Economic woes are threatening to drive Greece's unemployment figures close to those of fellow eurozone member Spain, where the jobless rate rose to 21.3% in the first quarter of 2011, more than double the European Union average.

Ever more young people are leaving Greece and emigrating to other Member States and countries outside the EU.

1. What measures is the Commission taking to deal with this severe problem and to help the Greek Government cope with this situation?
2. How does the Commission support Greece in finding new and innovative ways to give young people better access to jobs and a respectable standard of living, and to produce graduates who are able to meet the needs of the market?

**Answer given by Mr Andor on behalf of the Commission  
(14 June 2012)**

1. As highlighted in the Commission's Communication 'Growth for Greece' <sup>(1)</sup> with the new EU/IMF financial assistance programme, the more effective use of EU Structural Funds and the setting up of a dedicated Taskforce for Greece, the Commission is supporting the Greek authorities in implementing a comprehensive reform programme to unblock economic growth, support fiscal and financial stability, create jobs and mitigate the social impact of the crisis. These efforts will be essential to spur sustainable job opportunities, also for young people.
2. In line with the Commission communication <sup>(2)</sup> 'Youth Opportunities Initiative', a Youth Action team, comprising Commission services and Greek authorities, has been set up for Greece. The Action team is currently working on the definition of a plan to tackle the extremely high youth unemployment in Greece. In this context, a re-allocation of funding of around EUR 200-250 million could be envisaged under existing EU structural funds to support initiatives, which can deliver immediate results for young people unable to find work.
3. Actions under the abovementioned plan could include support for the acquisition of first work experience; subsidising short-term job placements in the private sector or in local communities; expanding apprenticeship or traineeship opportunities for students and graduates; promoting re-skilling or up-skilling within a growth and development pathway; boosting entrepreneurship, including social entrepreneurship; and study and work experience periods abroad.
4. As spelled out in the programme underlying the EU/IMF financial assistance, Greece intends to pursue a budget-neutral tax shift away from social contributions which should pave the way for more job creation for the youth.

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<sup>(1)</sup> COM(2012) 183 final of 18 April 2012.

<sup>(2)</sup> COM(2011) 933 of 20 December 2011.

(Deutsche Fassung)

**Anfrage zur schriftlichen Beantwortung E-004338/12  
an die Kommission**

**Angelika Werthmann (NI)**

(26. April 2012)

*Betrifft:* Steigende Selbstmordrate in Griechenland

Die Eurozone hat Griechenland umfangreiche Finanzhilfen bereitgestellt, um das Land vor dem Bankrott zu bewahren. Als Bedingung wurden dem Land drastische Sparmaßnahmen auferlegt. Tausende von Arbeitsplätzen im öffentlichen Dienst wurden gestrichen, die Steuern wurden erhöht, und es gab Einschnitte bei Löhnen, Sozialleistungen und Renten.

Der Nachrichtenagentur Reuters zufolge stieg die Zahl der Selbstmorde im Jahr 2010 im Vergleich zum Vorjahr um 18 %. Die Zahl der Selbstmorde allein in Athen ist im letzten Jahr um 25 % gestiegen.

1. Welche Art von Maßnahmen oder Programmen hat die Kommission eingeführt, um dieses ernste gesellschaftliche Problem zu bekämpfen?
2. Hat die Kommission spezielle Aktionsprogramme zur Bekämpfung dieses Problems umgesetzt, insbesondere in jenen Ländern, die von den Auswirkungen der Finanzkrise am stärksten betroffen sind?
3. Falls nicht, hat die Kommission die Absicht, dieses Phänomen zu bekämpfen?

**Antwort von Herrn Dalli im Namen der Kommission**

(22. Juni 2012)

Die Kommission verweist die Frau Abgeordnete auf ihre Antworten auf die schriftlichen Anfragen E-000761/2012, E-002077/2012 und E-003326/2012 <sup>(1)</sup>.

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<sup>(1)</sup> [www.europarl.europa.eu/QP-WEB](http://www.europarl.europa.eu/QP-WEB).

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-004338/12  
to the Commission**

**Angelika Werthmann (NI)**

(26 April 2012)

*Subject:* Increasing suicide rate in Greece

Drastic austerity measures have been imposed on Greece to meet the terms of the huge eurozone financial bailout needed to save the country from bankruptcy. Thousands of civil service jobs have been cut, taxes have been raised and there have been reductions in pay, benefits and pensions.

Suicides increased by 18% in 2010 from the previous year, according to Reuters news agency. The number of suicides in Athens alone rose over 25% last year.

1. What kind of activities or programmes have been put in place by the Commission to combat this severe social problem?
2. Does the Commission have in place any specific action programmes to tackle this problem, especially in those countries which are hit hardest by the effects of the financial crisis?
3. If not, does the Commission intend to combat this phenomenon?

**Answer given by Mr Dalli on behalf of the Commission**

(22 June 2012)

The Commission would refer the Honourable Member to its replies to Questions E-000761/2012, E-002077/2012 and E-003326/12 <sup>(1)</sup>.

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<sup>(1)</sup> [www.europarl.europa.eu/QP-WEB](http://www.europarl.europa.eu/QP-WEB).

(Deutsche Fassung)

**Anfrage zur schriftlichen Beantwortung E-004339/12  
an die Kommission (Vizepräsidentin / Hohe Vertreterin)  
Angelika Werthmann (NI)  
(26. April 2012)**

*Betrifft:* VP/HR — Neue diplomatische Präsenz der EU in Birma/Myanmar

Der Europäische Auswärtige Dienst (EAD) soll eine diplomatische Präsenz in Birma/Myanmar errichten.

1. Welche Programme hat der EAD in Birma/Myanmar eingeführt, um der Regierung und ihren politischen Kräften zu helfen, den demokratischen Prozess fortzusetzen, der mit den im Land abgehaltenen Wahlen in Gang gesetzt wurde?
2. Wie hoch sind die jährlichen Kosten der EU für eine diplomatische Präsenz in einem Land außerhalb der EU?
3. Wie kann die neue diplomatische Präsenz der EU in Birma/Myanmar dabei helfen, politischen Pluralismus zu begründen und die Wirtschaft des Landes anzukurbeln?

**Antwort von Frau Catherine Ashton — Hohe Vertreterin/Vizepräsidentin im Namen der Kommission  
(5. Juli 2012)**

Am 28. April 2012 hat die Hohe Vertreterin ein EU-Büro in Yangon eröffnet, nachdem die Vereinbarung über seine Errichtung unterzeichnet worden war. Eine der Aufgaben des Büros wird darin bestehen, die Durchführung der Hilfsprojekte der EU im Land zu überwachen.

Neben Unterstützung für die grundlegende Gesundheitsversorgung, die Bildung und die Existenzsicherung führt die EU Programme zur Stärkung der Zivilgesellschaft durch. So wurden vor den Wahlen des Jahres 2010 Wähler- und Medienschulungsprogramme finanziert. Ein Programm, das zur Modernisierung der öffentlichen Verwaltung in Birma/Myanmar beiträgt, wird gerade eingeleitet.

Diese Programme werden an die neue Situation im Land angepasst, um den Demokratie- und Reformprozess weiter voranzutreiben. Die Menschenrechtskommission beispielsweise erhält Hilfe beim Kapazitätsaufbau, und es wird erwogen, die Wahlkommission zu unterstützen. Dabei findet eine Koordinierung mit anderen im Land vertretenen Gebern statt.

Die Kosten einer Vertretung in einem Drittland variieren je nach den örtlichen Lebens- und Sicherheitsbedingungen. Was die Personalkosten des Büros in Yangon anbelangt, so werden anfangs Posten der Delegation in Bangkok umgeschichtet, von der aus die politische Lage und die Entwicklungssituation in Birma/Myanmar bisher beobachtet wurden. Die Kosten einer möglichen EU-Delegation werden berechnet, sobald ein förmlicher Beschluss über die Eröffnung gefasst wird.

Die Kommission erkennt an, dass der derzeitige Reformprozess in Birma/Myanmar friedlich verläuft und vom Land selbst ausgeht. Die Zusammenarbeit der EU mit politischen und sonstigen Akteuren in Myanmar stellt daher ein Mittel dar, weitere Reformen zu fördern. Darin besteht auch das Mandat des neuen EU-Büros — neben der Überwachung der EU-Programme für Gesundheit, Bildung, Existenzsicherung und andere Bereiche.

Bezüglich der Kooperationsprogramme möchte die Kommission die Frau Abgeordnete auf ihre Antwort auf die Schriftliche Anfrage E-003463/2012 <sup>(1)</sup> verweisen.

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<sup>(1)</sup> <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/QP-WEB/application/home.do?language=DE>.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-004339/12**  
**to the Commission (Vice-President/High Representative)**  
**Angelika Werthmann (NI)**  
(26 April 2012)

*Subject:* VP/HR — New EU diplomatic presence in Burma

The European External Action Service (EEAS) is to establish a diplomatic presence in Burma.

1. What programmes has the EEAS implemented in Burma in order to help the government and its political forces to continue the democratic process that began with the elections held in the country?
2. What are the annual costs of the EU having a diplomatic presence in a non-EU country?
3. How can the EU's new diplomatic presence in Burma help establish political pluralism and develop the country's economy?

**Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Ashton on behalf of the Commission**  
(5 July 2012)

An EU Office in Yangon was inaugurated by the High Representative on 28 April 2012, following signature of the Establishment Agreement. One of its tasks will be to oversee implementation of EU assistance projects in the country.

In addition to support for basic health, education and livelihoods, the EU has implemented programmes aimed at strengthening civil society. For instance, prior to the 2010 elections, programmes for voter education and media training were implemented. A programme helping to upgrade the Myanmar public administration is being launched.

These assistance programmes will be adapted to the new situation in the country, in order to help take forward the democratic and reform process. For instance, capacity building assistance is being provided to the Human Rights Commission and support to the Elections Commission is being considered. This is being coordinated with other donors present in the country.

As regards the costs of having a presence in a non-EU country, these costs vary depending upon local living and security conditions. In the case of the staffing costs of the Yangon office, staff will initially be redeployed from existing posts in Delegation in Bangkok where, up to now, Myanmar political and development aspects have been followed. The cost of an eventual EU Delegation will be calculated at the time of a formal decision on its opening.

The EU recognises that the current reform process in Myanmar is peaceful and home-grown. The EU engagement with political and other actors in Myanmar is therefore a way to encourage further reform. This is the mandate of the new EU Office, in addition to overseeing EU assistance programmes in health, education and livelihoods, among others.

On cooperation programmes the Commission would refer the Honourable Member to its answer to Written Question E-003463/2012 <sup>(1)</sup>.

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<sup>(1)</sup> <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/QP-WEB/home.jsp>



(Deutsche Fassung)

**Anfrage zur schriftlichen Beantwortung E-004340/12**  
**an die Kommission**  
**Angelika Werthmann (NI)**  
(26. April 2012)

*Betrifft:* Die Rolle von Generika in der EU

Das Abkommen zur Bekämpfung von Produkt- und Markenpiraterie (ACTA) schränkt möglicherweise den Zugang zu lebensrettenden Generika ein. Dieser spezielle Aspekt von ACTA hat bei den vielen europäischen Bürgern, die mithilfe von Generika ihre Krankheiten behandeln und kurieren, Empörung hervorgerufen. Die jüngsten Diskussionen, die darauf abzielten, die Position nationaler und europäischer Behörden zu ändern, unterstrichen die Bedeutung von Generika zur Verbesserung der Gesundheit vieler Bürger, die andernfalls sterben würden.

1. Sieht die Kommission diesen Aspekt von ACTA als Verletzung der Artikel 2 und 35 der Charta der Grundrechte der Europäischen Union an?
2. Hat die Kommission die Daten zum aktuellen Marktanteil von Generika in der EU aktualisiert?
3. Leistet die Kommission finanzielle Unterstützung für Forschung auf dem Gebiet der Generika? Falls ja, wie hoch sind die für diese Art der Forschung vorgesehenen Finanzmittel und über welche Programme werden sie bereitgestellt?
4. Betrachtet die Kommission die Beibehaltung von Generika als positives Element, das den freien und produktiven Wettbewerb auf dem EU-Markt fördern kann?

**Antwort von Herrn De Gucht im Namen der Kommission**  
(12. Juni 2012)

Die Kommission bestätigt, dass das ACTA frei von Bestimmungen ist, durch die der legale Generika-Handel direkt oder indirekt beeinträchtigt werden könnte. Vielmehr enthält das Abkommen Ausführungen zum Schutz des Zugangs zur Gesundheitsfürsorge sowie eine ausdrückliche Bezugnahme auf die Erklärung von Doha zum geistigen Eigentum und zur öffentlichen Gesundheit.

Nach Auffassung der Kommission ist das ACTA mit der EU-Grundrechtecharta vereinbar. Zur weiteren Klärung dieser Frage hat sich die Kommission bezüglich des ACTA an den Gerichtshof der Europäischen Union gewandt und ihn gebeten, eine Stellungnahme zu dessen Vereinbarkeit mit den EU-Verträgen und der Grundrechtecharta abzugeben.

Die Kommission verfügt weder über Daten zum aktuellen Marktanteil der Generika in der EU noch unterstützt sie die Generika-Forschung mit EU-Mitteln. Grundsätzlich erfordert die Entwicklung von Generika keine nennenswerten Forschungsaktivitäten, da Generika im Wesentlichen mit den originalen Markenpräparaten identisch sind. Allerdings sind Generika Thema von insgesamt 16 Projekten, für die über 41 Mio. EUR aufgewendet werden und die sich mit unerwünschten Arzneimittelwirkungen, dem Zugang von Entwicklungsländern zu Arzneimitteln sowie der Konformität, der Sicherheit und dem Verbrauch von Arzneimitteln beschäftigen.

Die Kommission setzt sich dafür ein, den Zugang zu sicheren, innovativen und erschwinglichen Arzneimitteln zu gewährleisten. Durch das EU-Arzneimittelrecht wird der Zugang zum EU-Markt für Generika erleichtert. In der EU sollen die Marktpräsenz von Generika und der Wettbewerb durch mehrere Initiativen gefördert werden, etwa durch die „Transparenz-Richtlinie“ (2004/109/EG), durch die Generika rascher auf den Markt gelangen sollen, oder durch den Bericht über die Untersuchung der Arzneimittelbranche (2009), in dem bestätigt wurde, dass Generika für die Senkung der Arzneimittelpreise und damit der für die Patienten und die nationalen Gesundheitssysteme entstehenden Kosten eine entscheidende Rollen spielen.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-004340/12  
to the Commission**

**Angelika Werthmann (NI)**

(26 April 2012)

*Subject:* Role of generic medicines in the EU

The Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA) potentially reduces access to lifesaving generic medicines. This particular aspect of ACTA has caused indignation among the large number of European citizens who use generic medicines to treat and cure their illnesses. The recent debates aimed at changing the position of national and European authorities underlined the contribution of generic drugs to improving the health of many citizens who would otherwise die.

1. Does the Commission view this aspect of ACTA as a violation of Articles 2 and 35 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union?
2. Has the Commission updated the data on the current market share of generic medicines in the EU?
3. Does the Commission provide financial support for research on generic drugs? If so, how much funding has been allocated to this kind of research and through which programmes?
4. Does the Commission view the maintenance of generic medicines as a positive element which can boost free and productive competition in the EU market?

**Answer given by Mr De Gucht on behalf of the Commission**

(12 June 2012)

The Commission reaffirms that there are no ACTA provisions that could directly or indirectly affect legitimate trade in generic medicines. On the contrary, it contains language safeguarding access to health and expressly refers to the Doha Declaration on intellectual property and public health.

The Commission considers that ACTA is compatible with the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. In order to further clarify this, the Commission has referred ACTA to the European Court of Justice for it to give its position on ACTA's compatibility with the EU Treaties and the Charter of Fundamental Rights.

The Commission does not have data on the current EU market share of generics nor is it providing EU financial support for research on generics. No significant dedicated research activities are in principle necessary for the development of generic medicines, since these are essentially the same as the branded originals. However, generic drugs are considered by projects dealing with adverse drug reactions, access to medicines for developing countries, compliance, safety and consumption of drugs — altogether 16 projects for around EUR 41 million.

The Commission is committed to ensure access to safe, innovative and affordable medicines. EU pharmaceutical legislation facilitates access to the EU market for generics. Several initiatives seek to enhance their market penetration and competition in the EU, such as the review of the 'Transparency Directive' (2004/109/EC) aiming at quicker market access for generics or the 2009 report of sector inquiry into pharmaceuticals, which confirmed the fundamental role of generics in lowering prices for medicines and thereby costs for patients and national health funds.

(Versione italiana)

**Interrogazione con richiesta di risposta scritta E-004342/12**  
**alla Commissione**  
**Mara Bizzotto (EFD)**  
(26 aprile 2012)

Oggetto: Destinazione fondi UE per lo sviluppo del territorio nelle regioni del Meridione italiano

Dai dati che si hanno sugli investimenti dei fondi europei destinati allo sviluppo del territorio si evince in particolare che le regioni del Mezzogiorno italiano stanno facendone, in molti casi, un utilizzo decisamente poco conforme ai programmi operativi dei fondi (che vorrebbero un impegno di questo denaro per investimenti a lungo termine volti al rafforzamento delle economie locali), con finanziamenti «una tantum» che hanno più sapore di «aiuto clientelare».

In Sicilia sono state destinate decine di migliaia di euro a singole attività imprenditoriali (torronifici, autoscuole, torrefazioni), in modalità del tutto svincolate da un piano organico di investimento, piuttosto che 460 000 euro per finanziare la «Coppa degli assi di equitazione» di Palermo o 1 000 000 euro per due edizioni del «Festival del cous cous» di San Vito lo Capo. Non si discostano da questo trend neppure Calabria e Campania con finanziamenti a festival e sagre: «Festival del peperoncino» di Diamante 169 000 euro, «Festa delle invasioni» di Cosenza 114 000 euro, «Afrakà rock festival» di Afragola 70 000 euro.

— La Commissione è a conoscenza di questi dati e sta monitorando l'utilizzo dei fondi destinati all'Italia?

— Com'è la situazione negli altri Stati membri?

— Ritiene la Commissione che tale utilizzo dei contributi europei sia conforme agli scopi per i quali essi sono stati studiati e voluti?

**Risposta di Johannes Hahn a nome della Commissione**  
(6 luglio 2012)

1. La Commissione non era a conoscenza dei singoli progetti menzionati dall'onorevole deputata. Nel contesto della gestione condivisa soltanto i grandi progetti il cui costo totale supera i 50 milioni di euro sono esaminati e approvati dalla Commissione. Gli Stati membri sono responsabili della selezione ed esecuzioni di tutti gli altri progetti. Nel contempo, la Commissione assicura il monitoraggio dei progressi dei programmi, in particolare nel contesto della rendicontazione annuale sulla loro attuazione.

2. Per i motivi summenzionati la Commissione non dispone di un quadro della situazione relativa ai singoli progetti in altri Stati membri.

3. La Commissione concorda con l'onorevole deputata che l'obiettivo della politica di coesione è migliorare la qualità della vita e la competitività nelle regioni attraverso investimenti strutturali di lungo termine. In proposito, il tipo di progetti menzionati dall'onorevole deputata può essere in linea con tale obiettivo se essi rientrano, ad esempio, in una strategia più ampia volta a migliorare l'attrattiva di una determinata regione o area.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-004342/12  
to the Commission  
Mara Bizzotto (EFD)  
(26 April 2012)**

*Subject:* Allocation of EU funds for local development in southern Italian regions

Available data regarding the investment of European funds for local development reveal in particular that, in many cases, southern Italian regions are decidedly not using them in accordance with the funds' operational programmes (which require this money to be committed to long-term investments aimed at strengthening local economies), using the money instead for 'one-off' funding that smacks of patronage.

In Sicily, tens of thousands of euros have been allocated to individual businesses (nougat factories, driving schools, coffee roasters) by methods that have no connection with any organic investment plan. EUR 460 000 were used to finance Palermo's 'Coppa degli assi di equitazione' equestrian event, with another EUR 1 000 000 being spent for two couscous festivals at San Vito lo Capo. Calabria and Campania also seem to be following this trend, funding festivals and fairs such as the chilli pepper festival in Diamante, at a cost of EUR 169 000, the 'Festa delle invasioni' in Cosenza for EUR 114 000 and the 'Afrakà rock festival' in Afragola for EUR 70 000.

— Is the Commission aware of these data and is it monitoring the use of funds allocated to Italy?

— What is the situation in other Member States?

— Does the Commission believe that this use of European funds is consistent with the purposes for which they were developed and intended?

**Answer given by Mr Hahn on behalf of the Commission  
(6 July 2012)**

1. The Commission was not previously aware of the individual projects mentioned by the Honourable Member. In the context of shared management, only major projects whose total cost exceeds EUR 50 million are examined and approved by the Commission. The Member States is responsible for selecting and implementing all other projects. At the same time, the Commission does monitor programme progress, notably in the context of annual reporting on their implementation.
2. For the above reasons, the Commission does not have a project-by-project overview of the situation in other Member States.
3. The Commission agrees with the Honourable Member that the objective of cohesion policy is to improve the quality of life in, and the competitiveness of, regions through structural, long-term investments. In this respect, the type of projects mentioned by the Honourable Member may be consistent with this objective if they are part, for example, of a wider strategy to improve the attractiveness of a given region or area.

(Versione italiana)

**Interrogazione con richiesta di risposta scritta E-004343/12  
alla Commissione (Vicepresidente/Alto Rappresentante)**

**Sergio Paolo Frances Silvestris (PPE)**

(26 aprile 2012)

Oggetto: VP/HR — Attentato in Algeria

Doveva colpire un convoglio di militari algerini ed invece lo scoppio di una bomba di fattura artigianale ha ferito gravemente tre civili nelle vicinanze di Si Mustapha, ad Est di Boumerdes. La bomba, nascosta sotto pochi centimetri di terra, lungo la strada nazionale, è scoppiata quando il convoglio militare — diretto ad Algeri — era già passato, coinvolgendo invece delle vetture con civili a bordo, tre dei quali feriti in modo serio e trasferiti in ospedali della zona.

Secondo gli inquirenti, dietro l'attentato ci sarebbe la cellula locale di al-Qaeda nel Maghreb islamico.

Alla luce di quanto esposto sopra, si interroga il Vicepresidente/Alto Rappresentante per sapere:

1. se è a conoscenza di quanto accaduto in Algeria;
2. quali sono le strategie adottate nel territorio africano, nell'ambito della politica estera e di sicurezza dell'UE.

**Risposta dell'Alta Rappresentante/Vicepresidente Catherine Ashton a nome della Commissione**

(9 luglio 2012)

L'UE segue attentamente gli sviluppi riguardanti la sicurezza in Algeria ed è impegnata in un dialogo regolare al riguardo con le autorità a tutti i livelli, in particolare attraverso le riunioni del Consiglio e del Comitato di associazione e del Sottocomitato UE-Algeria «Dialogo politico, sicurezza e diritti umani».

Di conseguenza l'UE ha dimostrato la sua volontà di sostenere le iniziative africane per combattere il terrorismo, come ad esempio il «Centro africano di studi e ricerche sul terrorismo». L'UE ha inoltre proposto, nell'ambito della strategia per il Sahel, il sostegno ai paesi della regione particolarmente colpiti da atti di terrorismo (Algeria, Niger, Mauritania e Mali). L'UE è pronta a inviare esperti al Comitato di Stato Maggiore Operativo Congiunto (CEMOC) di Tamanrasset e ha offerto il suo sostegno al centro di fusione regionale «Unité de Liaison et de Fusion» (per lo scambio di informazioni tra i servizi di intelligence dei quattro paesi principali).

Il sostegno dell'Unione va inoltre a iniziative multilaterali per la lotta al terrorismo nella regione del Sahel e nei dintorni. Nel settembre 2011, l'UE ha partecipato alla conferenza di Algeri su sicurezza e sviluppo nella regione del Sahel e nel novembre del 2011 alla prima riunione del gruppo di lavoro sul Sahel del forum globale per il contrasto al terrorismo. A maggio, l'Unione europea ha inoltre partecipato alla 15ª riunione del Forum globale per il contrasto al terrorismo a Niamey.

In aggiunta, l'UE sta progettando un'operazione in Niger nell'ambito della politica di sicurezza e di difesa comune, comprendente una componente per la lotta al terrorismo. Anche il progetto anti-terrorismo per il Sahel (Civipol) e un progetto nell'ambito per lo strumento per la stabilità nel nord del Niger si concentreranno su disarmo, smobilitazione e reintegro dei rimpatriati dalla Libia. L'UE sta inoltre esaminando il possibile sostegno alla Nigeria nell'ambito del contrasto al terrorismo e ad Abuja è stato avviato un dialogo sulla sicurezza.

Nel novembre 2011 è stato adottato un quadro strategico per condurre le operazioni dell'UE nel Corno d'Africa. L'UE continua ad attuare le strategie cooperando con le autorità locali.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-004343/12**  
**to the Commission (Vice-President/High Representative)**  
**Sergio Paolo Frances Silvestris (PPE)**  
(26 April 2012)

*Subject:* VP/HR — Attack in Algeria

It was intended to hit a convoy of Algerian soldiers, but instead the blast of an improvised explosive device seriously injured three civilians in the vicinity of Si Mustapha, to the east of Boumerdes. The bomb, hidden under a few centimetres of soil on the national highway, exploded after the military convoy — on its way to Algiers — had already passed by and instead struck vehicles carrying civilians, three of whom were seriously injured and transferred to hospitals in the area.

According to the investigators, the local al-Qaeda cell in Islamic Maghreb were behind the attack.

In view of the above, can the Vice-President/High Representative say:

1. whether she is aware of what happened in Algeria;
2. what strategies have been adopted in Africa under the EU Foreign and Security Policy?

**Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Ashton on behalf of the Commission**  
(9 July 2012)

The EU is closely following security developments in Algeria and engages in a regular dialogue with the authorities on this issue at all levels including in particular through the meetings of the Association Council and Committee and the EU-Algeria Sub-committee (notably on Political Dialogue, Security and Human Rights).

The EU has consistently demonstrated its willingness to support African initiatives to combat terrorism, such as the African Centre for Studies against Terrorism. The EU has also proposed, as part of its Sahel Strategy, support for countries in the region which have been particular targets for acts of terrorism (Algeria, Niger, Mauritania and Mali). The EU is ready to send experts to the joint operational centre of Tamanrasset (CEMOC). The EU has also offered to support the Unité de Liaison et de Fusion (aimed at information exchange between the intelligence services of the four core countries).

The EU also supports multilateral initiatives aimed at fighting against terrorism in the Sahel region and beyond. The EU was present at the Algiers Conference on Security and Development in the Sahel region in September 2011 and the first meeting of the Global Counter-Terrorism Forum's Working Group on Sahel issues in November 2011. The EU will also take part in the May 15th Global Counter-Terrorism Forum in Niamey.

Furthermore, the EU is planning a CSDP operation in Niger which contains a counter-terrorism component. The Counter-Terrorism Sahel Project (Civipol) and an Instrument for Stability project in Northern Niger also focus on disarmament demobilisation and reintegration for returnees from Libya. The EU is also exploring possible support to Nigeria in counter-terrorism matters and a security dialogue has been initiated in Abuja.

In November 2011 a Strategic Framework was adopted to guide the EU's engagement in the Horn of Africa. The EU continues to implement the strategies in cooperation with local authorities.

(Versione italiana)

**Interrogazione con richiesta di risposta scritta E-004344/12  
alla Commissione**

**Sergio Paolo Frances Silvestris (PPE)**

(26 aprile 2012)

Oggetto: Alimentazione e salute dei cittadini europei

Si rinuncia a un'alimentazione sana e a praticare sport, mentre aumenta l'uso di antidepressivi. È quanto emerge dal rapporto Osservasalute 2011, presentato a Roma al policlinico Agostino Gemelli e dedicato allo stato di salute e alla qualità dell'assistenza nelle regioni italiane.

A essere in pericolo è la nostra salute e la causa principale è la crisi economica che porta a dover tagliare voci di bilancio familiare, in primis le «azioni preventive» di base come la buona alimentazione e l'attività fisica. Si rinuncia per esempio a frutta e verdura, che diventano un lusso destinato a pochi: per la prima volta dal 2005 si registra un calo del numero di porzioni consumate quotidianamente (da 5,7 % a 4,8 %), mentre tale dato era rimasto all'incirca stabile fino al 2008. Paradossalmente si mangia più sano nelle mense, che si confermano le principali «fornitrici» di verdura, frutta e ortaggi. Alla base c'è una minore disponibilità economica: secondo il rapporto, la quota di famiglie a rischio povertà sale a una su quattro.

Alla luce di quanto sopra esposto, può dunque la Commissione comunicare:

1. se è a conoscenza del rapporto Osservasalute 2011,
2. come intende promuovere una sana e corretta alimentazione tra i cittadini dell'Unione europea e attraverso quali programmi; se in passato sono stati attuati programmi relativi a tale questione;
3. come intende incentivare la pratica sportiva tra i cittadini europei?

**Risposta di John Dalli a nome della Commissione**

(22 giugno 2012)

La Commissione non era a conoscenza del rapporto italiano menzionato dall'onorevole deputato.

La «Strategia europea sugli aspetti sanitari connessi all'alimentazione, al sovrappeso e all'obesità» <sup>(1)</sup> risponde alla necessità di incentivare l'attività fisica e di promuovere un'alimentazione sana nell'UE. Essa è attuata per il tramite di attività della Commissione, della cooperazione tra gli Stati membri nel Gruppo ad alto livello sulla nutrizione e l'attività fisica <sup>(2)</sup> e di iniziative volontarie adottate dalle parti interessate nell'ambito della Piattaforma d'azione europea per l'alimentazione, l'attività fisica e la salute <sup>(3)</sup> come la promozione di un'alimentazione sana e dell'attività fisica. Ad esempio, la Commissione coordina il programma Frutta nelle scuole <sup>(4)</sup> che fornisce frutta e verdura agli alunni delle scuole e sollecita gli Stati membri partecipanti a porre in atto misure educative per insegnare l'importanza di un'alimentazione sana. Inoltre, nell'ambito del programma Salute, la Commissione fornisce un sostegno finanziario a progetti volti a incoraggiare gli stili alimentari sani e l'esercizio fisico <sup>(5)</sup>.

La promozione dell'attività fisica volta a mantenere la salute svolge un ruolo importante nella politica dell'UE per lo sviluppo dello sport <sup>(6)</sup>.

Nell'ambito dell'Azione preparatoria 2009 nel settore dello sport la Commissione ha sostenuto finanziariamente progetti transnazionali volti a promuovere l'attività fisica. Nel 2012 i progetti cofinanziati sosterranno l'attività fisica ai fini di un invecchiamento attivo. Il capitolo Sport nella proposta della Commissione relativa al nuovo programma dell'UE «Erasmus per tutti 2014-2020» comprende la promozione dell'attività fisica.

<sup>(1)</sup> COM(2007)279 definitivo del 30.5.2007.

<sup>(2)</sup> [http://ec.europa.eu/health/nutrition\\_physical\\_activity/high\\_level\\_group/index\\_en.htm](http://ec.europa.eu/health/nutrition_physical_activity/high_level_group/index_en.htm)

<sup>(3)</sup> [http://ec.europa.eu/health/nutrition\\_physical\\_activity/platform/index\\_en.htm](http://ec.europa.eu/health/nutrition_physical_activity/platform/index_en.htm)

<sup>(4)</sup> [http://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/sfs/index\\_en.htm](http://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/sfs/index_en.htm)

<sup>(5)</sup> <http://ec.europa.eu/eahc/projects/database.html>

<sup>(6)</sup> Libro bianco sullo sport, COM(2007)391 definitivo dell'11.7.2007; Comunicazione sullo sport, COM(2011)12 definitivo del 18.1.2011.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-004344/12  
to the Commission**

**Sergio Paolo Frances Silvestris (PPE)**

(26 April 2012)

*Subject:* Nutrition and public health in Europe

Healthy eating and sport are on the decline, while the use of antidepressants is on the rise. These are the findings of the *Osservasalute 2011* report on health and the quality of healthcare in Italian regions that was presented in Rome at the Policlinico Agostino Gemelli.

Our health is in danger and the main cause is the recession, which is leading to cuts in household expenditure, primarily affecting basic 'preventive action' such as proper nutrition and physical activity. For example, people are stopping buying fruit and vegetables, which are becoming a luxury for the few. For the first time since 2005, there has been a decline (from 5.7% to 4.8%) in the number of daily portions — a figure which, until 2008, had been relatively stable. Paradoxically, canteens are healthier places to eat and are now the main 'suppliers' of vegetables, fruit and greens. The root of the problem is the fact that people have less disposable income, and, according to the report, the proportion of families at risk of poverty has risen to one in four.

In view of the above, can the Commission say:

1. whether it is aware of the *Osservasalute 2011* report;
2. how it intends to promote proper, healthy nutrition among European Union citizens, and through which programmes, and whether programmes addressing this issue have been implemented in the past;
3. how it intends to promote sport among European citizens?

**Answer given by Mr Dalli on behalf of the Commission**

(22 June 2012)

The Commission was not aware of the Italian report mentioned by the Honourable Member.

The 'Strategy for Europe on Nutrition, Overweight and Obesity-related Health Issues' <sup>(1)</sup> addresses the need to enhance physical activity and to promote healthy diets in the EU. It is implemented through Commission activities, cooperation among Member States in the High Level Group on Nutrition and Physical Activity <sup>(2)</sup> and voluntary initiatives taken by stakeholders in the EU Platform for Action on Diet, Physical Activity and Health <sup>(3)</sup> such as promotion of healthy eating and physical activity. For example, the Commission is coordinating the European School Fruit Scheme <sup>(4)</sup> which provides fruit and vegetables to school children, and requires participating Member States to set up educational measures to teach the importance of healthy eating. Furthermore, under the Health Programme, the Commission provides financial support to projects aiming at encouraging healthy eating and exercise <sup>(5)</sup>.

The promotion of health-enhancing physical activity plays a significant role in the EU's developing sport policy <sup>(6)</sup>.

Under the 2009 Preparatory Action in the field of sport, the Commission has financially supported transnational projects to promote physical activity. In 2012 co-funded projects will support physical activity for active ageing. The Sport Chapter in the Commission's proposal for the new EU programme Erasmus for all 2014-2020 includes the promotion of physical activity.

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<sup>(1)</sup> COM(2007)279 final, 30.5.2007.

<sup>(2)</sup> [http://ec.europa.eu/health/nutrition\\_physical\\_activity/high\\_level\\_group/index\\_en.htm](http://ec.europa.eu/health/nutrition_physical_activity/high_level_group/index_en.htm)

<sup>(3)</sup> [http://ec.europa.eu/health/nutrition\\_physical\\_activity/platform/index\\_en.htm](http://ec.europa.eu/health/nutrition_physical_activity/platform/index_en.htm)

<sup>(4)</sup> [http://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/sfs/index\\_en.htm](http://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/sfs/index_en.htm)

<sup>(5)</sup> <http://ec.europa.eu/eahc/projects/database.html>

<sup>(6)</sup> White Paper on Sport, COM(2007)391 final, 11.7.2007; Communication on sport, COM(2011)12 final, 18.1.2011.



(Versione italiana)

**Interrogazione con richiesta di risposta scritta E-004345/12  
alla Commissione**

**Sergio Paolo Frances Silvestris (PPE)**

(26 aprile 2012)

Oggetto: Associazione «Insieme»

L'associazione «Insieme» nasce a Mola di Bari grazie all'iniziativa di un gruppo di genitori con figli disabili, nell'intento di garantire il rispetto della dignità umana, i diritti e l'autonomia del diversamente abile. Nel marzo 1999 modifica la sua posizione e diviene una ONLUS. Si impegna quotidianamente a garantire il pieno rispetto della dignità umana e il diritto di libertà ed autonomia del «diversamente abile», che rappresenta lo scopo essenziale della grande famiglia dell'Associazione «Insieme». A tal fine organizza feste, gite, escursioni, spettacoli, e partecipa ad ogni iniziativa del territorio per agevolare il più possibile l'integrazione sociale di questi «ragazzi speciali». Un gruppo di volontariato che s'impegna per migliorare la qualità della vita dei portatori di handicap, organizzando e promuovendo attività di tempo libero per ragazzi disabili.

Alla luce di quanto esposto sopra, si interroga la Commissione per sapere:

1. se l'Associazione ha in precedenza fatto richiesta di fondi europei;
2. in caso di risposta negativa, se è possibile per la suddetta Associazione, visto il grande impegno messo in atto nel campo dei diritti umani e in virtù dell'interesse della Comunità europea verso l'inclusione sociale, usufruire di fondi diretti per migliorare le manifestazioni organizzate e rispondere al meglio alle necessità e ai bisogni quotidiani dei ragazzi disabili e delle loro famiglie.

**Risposta di Viviane Reding a nome della Commissione**

(28 giugno 2012)

I nomi dei beneficiari delle sovvenzioni UE concesse dalla Commissione dal 2007 in avanti e gestite dalla Commissione a livello centrale sono resi pubblici attraverso l'iniziativa di trasparenza finanziaria <sup>(1)</sup>.

La Commissione non sovvenziona direttamente organizzazioni locali/nazionali come l'associazione «Insieme» con sede a Mola di Bari. Ciononostante, tali associazioni potrebbero beneficiare del sostegno dei Fondi strutturali europei, in particolare del Fondo sociale europeo (FSE) <sup>(2)</sup>. Le priorità per i fondi FSE in ogni Stato membro sono stabilite nei programmi operativi nazionali o regionali.

Il programma operativo FSE della regione Puglia può finanziare azioni volte a rafforzare l'inclusione sociale delle persone in condizioni svantaggiate, comprese quelle con disabilità, al fine di favorire una loro integrazione sostenibile nel mercato del lavoro.

Le informazioni sulle possibilità di finanziamento dovrebbero essere richieste alle autorità di gestione regionale. Conformemente al principio di sussidiarietà, i programmi operativi cofinanziati dai fondi strutturali sono attuati dagli Stati membri e dalle regioni. La Commissione non interviene nella selezione, nel monitoraggio e nella valutazione dei progetti.

Ulteriori opportunità di finanziamento attraverso altri programmi UE vengono segnalate dalle Direzioni generali competenti per gli specifici settori politici <sup>(3)</sup>. Le organizzazioni interessate possono candidarsi rispondendo agli opportuni inviti a presentare proposte.

<sup>(1)</sup> [http://ec.europa.eu/beneficiaries/fts/index\\_en.htm](http://ec.europa.eu/beneficiaries/fts/index_en.htm)

<sup>(2)</sup> <http://ec.europa.eu/esf/home.jsp?langId=it>.

<sup>(3)</sup> Una lista dei settori di azione è disponibile all'indirizzo: [http://ec.europa.eu/contracts\\_grants/grants\\_it.htm](http://ec.europa.eu/contracts_grants/grants_it.htm)

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-004345/12  
to the Commission**

**Sergio Paolo Frances Silvestris (PPE)**

(26 April 2012)

*Subject:* The Insieme [Together] Association

The Insieme Association was founded in Mola di Bari at the initiative of a group of parents with disabled children, with the aim of ensuring respect for the human dignity, rights and autonomy of the disabled. In March 1999, it changed its position and became a non-profit social organisation. It strives daily to ensure full respect of human dignity and the right to freedom and autonomy of disabled people, which is the fundamental goal of the large Insieme Association family. To achieve this, it organises parties, trips, excursions, shows and takes part in any local initiative to facilitate as far as possible the social integration of these 'special children'. It is a group of volunteers which strives to improve the quality of life of people with disabilities, organising and promoting leisure activities for disabled children.

In view of the above, can the Commission state:

1. whether the Association has requested European funding in the past;
2. if not, whether it would be possible for the abovementioned association, given its great efforts in the field of human rights and by virtue of the European Union's interest in social inclusion, to receive direct funding to improve the events they organise and better meet the daily needs of disabled children and their families?

**Answer given by Mrs Reding on behalf of the Commission**

(28 June 2012)

The names of the beneficiaries of EU grants awarded by the Commission from 2007 onwards and managed by the Commission at the central level are published via the Financial Transparency Initiative <sup>(1)</sup>.

The Commission does not directly fund national/local organisations such as the association Insieme based in Mola di Bari. However, such associations could qualify for support from the European Structural Funds, in particular the European Social Fund (ESF) <sup>(2)</sup>. The priorities for ESF funding in each Member State are established in national or regional Operational Programmes.

The ESF Operational Programme of the Puglia region can finance actions to reinforce the social inclusion of disadvantaged people, including those with disabilities, with a view to their sustainable integration in employment.

Information on funding opportunities should be asked to the regional managing authority. As a matter of fact, according to the subsidiarity principle, the Operational Programmes co-financed by the structural funds are implemented by the Member States and their regions. The Commission does not intervene in the selection, monitoring and evaluation of projects.

Funding opportunities under other EU programmes are advertised by the Commission Directorates-General responsible for a specific policy area <sup>(3)</sup>. Interested organisations can apply by responding to the relevant Calls for Proposals.

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<sup>(1)</sup> [http://ec.europa.eu/beneficiaries/fts/index\\_en.htm](http://ec.europa.eu/beneficiaries/fts/index_en.htm)

<sup>(2)</sup> <http://ec.europa.eu/esf/home.jsp?langId=en>.

<sup>(3)</sup> A list of fields of action is available for browsing at [http://ec.europa.eu/contracts\\_grants/grants\\_en.htm](http://ec.europa.eu/contracts_grants/grants_en.htm)

(Versione italiana)

**Interrogazione con richiesta di risposta scritta E-004346/12  
alla Commissione**

**Sergio Paolo Frances Silvestris (PPE)**

(26 aprile 2012)

Oggetto: Energia da dossi artificiali

È pronta a debuttare una nuova tecnologia per la produzione di energia elettrica «pulita», sfruttando il passaggio di mezzi (e più pesanti sono, meglio è) su strada.

Si tratta di una sorta di dosso artificiale che, «schacciato» dai veicoli, crea energia mettendo in azione una pompa a pistoncini — sotto il manto stradale — con un sistema a pressione idraulica e un convertitore, collegato poi alla rete elettrica. Il nuovo dispositivo, creato in Israele come l'asfalto piezoelettrico e le applicazioni più avanzate per il fotovoltaico, ha un indiscusso vantaggio: costa relativamente poco, visto che a fronte di un investimento di 300 000 dollari, con un traffico giornaliero di 20 000 veicoli, si ha una produzione di oltre 450 KWh al giorno e un break even di quattro anni, la metà dei tempi medi di ritorno degli investimenti nel solare.

Alla luce dei fatti sopraesposti, può dire la Commissione se è a conoscenza del suddetto brevetto? Intende promuovere la realizzazione di dossi artificiali sulle strade europee per produrre energia in maniera pulita?

**Risposta di Máire Geoghegan-Quinn a nome della Commissione**

(22 giugno 2012)

La Commissione non è a conoscenza di un brevetto per la tecnologia illustrata dall'onorevole parlamentare, ma è consapevole di una serie di applicazioni analoghe utilizzate in Europa e negli Stati Uniti dal 2004. La tecnologia offre alcuni aspetti interessanti da studiare e valutare ulteriormente e la Commissione sostiene un approccio in tal senso.

Ad esempio, nell'ambito del Settimo programma quadro di ricerca e sviluppo tecnologico (2007-2013), la Commissione finanzia il progetto INROAD (INtelligent Renewable Optical ADvisory System) <sup>(1)</sup> che valuta il potenziale della generazione di energia dalle vibrazioni della strada per la sua illuminazione, la comunicazione e le applicazioni a sensori di dispositivi LED per informare i conducenti sulle condizioni stradali.

Il progetto INROADS esaminerà il potenziale dello stato dell'arte della produzione di energia piezoelettrica, basata su un sistema attualmente in fase di valutazione in scala reale in Israele. Il sistema in oggetto dispone di apparecchiature piezoelettriche PEG (generatori piezoelettrici) integrati nel manto stradale a una profondità di 4-5 cm sotto la superficie. Essi trasformano l'energia meccanica impartita dai veicoli alla pavimentazione in energia elettrica che è prelevata dalla strada. Il numero delle applicazioni potenziali sono considerevoli e il gruppo di lavoro propone di sottoporre a dimostrazione un numero limitato di esperimenti, ognuno dei quali contribuirà a fornire una verifica teorica per altre applicazioni.

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<sup>(1)</sup> <http://www.fehrl.org/?m=320>.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-004346/12  
to the Commission**

**Sergio Paolo Frances Silvestris (PPE)**

(26 April 2012)

*Subject:* Energy from speed bumps

A new technology is ready to be rolled out that can produce 'clean' electrical energy by exploiting the movement of vehicles (the heavier the better) on the roads.

It involves a sort of speed bump, which creates energy as it is 'flattened' by vehicles by activating a piston pump — underneath the road surface — with a system using hydraulic pressure and a converter connected to the national grid. The new device, designed in Israel like piezoelectric asphalt and the most advanced photovoltaic applications, has one indisputable advantage: it costs relatively little, given that with an investment of USD 300 000, and daily traffic of 20 000 vehicles, it generates over 450 KWh per day and has a break-even point of four years, half the time for a return on investment in solar power.

Can the Commission say whether it is aware of the abovementioned patent? Does it intend to promote the manufacture of speed bumps on European roads to produce energy in a clean way?

**Answer given by Ms Geoghegan-Quinn on behalf of the Commission**

(22 June 2012)

The Commission is not aware of a patent covering the technology illustrated by the Honourable Member, but is aware of a number of similar applications deployed in Europe and the US since 2004. The technology offers some interesting aspects to be further studied and assessed, and the Commission supports such a development.

For example, within the Seventh Framework Programme for Research and Technological Development (FP7, 2007-2013), the Commission funds the INROADS project ('INtelligent Renewable Optical ADVisory System')<sup>(1)</sup>, which assesses the potential of generating energy from the vibration of the road to power the lighting, communication and sensor applications of LED studs to inform drivers on road conditions.

The INROADS project will study the potential of the state of the art of piezoelectric power generation, based on a system currently at the full scale trial stage in Israel. The system in object has PEG (piezoelectric generators) embedded in the pavement at a depth of four to five cm under the surface. They transform the mechanical energy imparted by vehicles to the pavement into electrical energy which is harvested from the road. The number of potential applications is considerable and the project team proposes to demonstrate a limited number of trials, each of which will provide proof of concept for other applications.

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<sup>(1)</sup> <http://www.fehrl.org/?m=320>.

(Versione italiana)

**Interrogazione con richiesta di risposta scritta E-004348/12  
alla Commissione**

**Sergio Paolo Frances Silvestris (PPE)**

(26 aprile 2012)

Oggetto: Italia più lontana dagli obiettivi di Kyoto

Dopo il tracollo del 2009, provocato dalle ripercussioni della crisi finanziaria statunitense sull'economia reale, nel 2010 le emissioni italiane di gas serra sono tornate a crescere, facendo registrare un +2 % rispetto all'anno precedente. A certificarlo è l'ente del ministero dell'Ambiente preposto a monitorare l'andamento delle emissioni e a comunicarlo all'Unione europea.

La lieve ripresa del 2010 ha portato il conteggio totale delle emissioni a un —3,5 % rispetto a quelle del 1990, data presa come riferimento per calcolare gli obiettivi di riduzione fissati dal Protocollo di Kyoto. Per l'Italia il traguardo fissato a —6,5 % dunque si allontana. Un contributo, per colmare la differenza con l'obiettivo di Kyoto, deriverà dai crediti ricavati dai progetti per l'abbattimento delle emissioni nei paesi in via di sviluppo già in corso. I settori delle industrie energetiche e dei trasporti sono quelli che maggiormente contribuiscono alle emissioni totali, rappresentando insieme più della metà delle emissioni nazionali di gas climalteranti.

Alla luce di quanto precede, può la Commissione far sapere quali Stati membri sono in linea con gli obiettivi fissati dal Protocollo di Kyoto alla Convenzione quadro delle Nazioni Unite sui cambiamenti climatici e con l'esecuzione congiunta degli impegni che ne derivano?

**Risposta di Connie Hedegaard a nome della Commissione**

(5 giugno 2012)

Ogni anno, all'interno della relazione della Commissione al Parlamento europeo e al Consiglio «Progressi nella realizzazione degli obiettivi di Kyoto», COM(2011)624 definitivo <sup>(1)</sup>, viene pubblicata la valutazione dei progressi compiuti per il conseguimento dell'obiettivo di riduzione delle emissioni di gas serra nell'UE nell'ambito del protocollo di Kyoto. L'ultima relazione, pubblicata nell'ottobre del 2011, perviene ai risultati qui riportati.

In base alle ultime proiezioni sulle emissioni di gas serra, sei Stati membri (Finlandia, Francia, Germania, Grecia, Svezia, Regno Unito) sono sulla buona strada per raggiungere gli obiettivi di riduzione fissati a livello nazionale. Tenuto conto dell'impiego programmato dei meccanismi flessibili di Kyoto, dei pozzi di assorbimento di carbonio nonché di altre politiche e misure, solo tre Stati membri (Austria, Italia e Lussemburgo) potrebbero avere difficoltà a conseguire i loro obiettivi.

Per quanto concerne i dodici Stati membri che hanno aderito all'Unione dal 2004, per nove di quelli con un obiettivo da rispettare nell'ambito del protocollo di Kyoto si prevede l'effettivo raggiungimento o perfino il superamento dei loro impegni unicamente attuando le politiche e le misure vigenti. La Slovenia prevede di conseguire il proprio obiettivo quando tutte le misure esistenti e in programma, tra cui l'acquisizione di crediti Kyoto, produrranno i risultati attesi. Cipro e Malta non hanno obiettivi da raggiungere nell'ambito del protocollo di Kyoto.

Un'analisi aggiornata verrà pubblicata il prossimo autunno.

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<sup>(1)</sup> <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2011:0624:FIN:IT:PDF>.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-004348/12  
to the Commission**

**Sergio Paolo Frances Silvestris (PPE)**

(26 April 2012)

*Subject:* Italy further away from Kyoto objectives

After a drop in 2009 caused by the effects of the financial crisis in the US on the real economy, Italian greenhouse gas emissions rose again in 2010, reaching a figure 2% higher than the previous year. This has been confirmed by the Ministry of the Environment's agency tasked with monitoring emission trends and reporting to the European Union.

The slight upswing in 2010 brought the figure for total emissions to 3.5% down on the figure for 1990, the reference year for calculation of reduction targets set by the Kyoto Protocol. The likelihood that Italy will achieve its target of -6.5% is receding therefore. Credits obtained from existing projects to reduce emissions in developing countries will be one way of helping bridge the gap with the Kyoto target. The energy industry and transport are the sectors that contribute the most to total emissions, accounting together for more than half of national greenhouse gas emissions.

In view of the above, can the Commission state which Member States are in line with the objectives set by the Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on climate change and the joint implementation of ensuing commitments?

**Answer given by Ms Hedegaard on behalf of the Commission**

(5 June 2012)

The assessment of the progress towards the EU greenhouse gas reduction target under the Kyoto Protocol is published annually in the Commission's report to the European Parliament and the Council 'Progress towards achieving the Kyoto objectives', COM(2011) 624 final <sup>(1)</sup>. The last report was published in October 2011 and includes the following results:

According to the recent GHG projections, six Member States (Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Sweden, and the United Kingdom) are on track to achieve their individual GHG reduction targets domestically. Taking into account the planned use of the Kyoto flexible mechanisms and carbon sinks as well as additional policies and measures, only three Member States (Austria, Italy and Luxembourg) might face difficulties with achieving their targets.

As regards the twelve Member States which acceded to the Union as from 2004, nine of them that have a Kyoto target are projected to meet or over-achieve their commitments using only existing policies and measures. Slovenia is estimated to meet its target when all the existing and planned measures, including the purchase of Kyoto credits, deliver as expected. Cyprus and Malta do not have targets under the Kyoto Protocol.

An updated analysis will be published this autumn.

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<sup>(1)</sup> [http://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/g-gas/docs/com\\_2011\\_624\\_en.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/g-gas/docs/com_2011_624_en.pdf)

(Versione italiana)

**Interrogazione con richiesta di risposta scritta E-004349/12  
alla Commissione**

**Sergio Paolo Frances Silvestris (PPE)**

(26 aprile 2012)

Oggetto: Nuova ricerca sul grafene

Il grafene è un materiale capace di condurre l'elettricità meglio del rame, trasparente come il vetro e più resistente dell'acciaio. È possibile piegarlo come se fosse plastica e realizzare così schermi touchscreen da arrotolare e portare in tasca. Gli scienziati conoscono da anni il grafene, un materiale con proprietà e applicazioni in parte ancora ignote. Costituito da uno strato di atomi di carbonio collocati su una struttura a nido d'ape, il grafene è considerato uno dei materiali più promettenti del futuro. Questo materiale bidimensionale è infatti ultrasottile e flessibile, ed è circa 200 volte più resistente dell'acciaio. È inoltre un ottimo conduttore di calore e di elettricità e, per le sue proprietà di trasporto degli elettroni, è già considerato l'erede del silicio nell'elettronica del futuro.

Così, mentre parte della comunità scientifica sta studiando le caratteristiche del grafene, molti ricercatori in tutto il mondo sono impegnati a sviluppare tecniche di produzione innovative, come quella recentemente maturata.

Un gruppo coordinato di studiosi è infatti riuscito ad «addomesticare» dei microorganismi, raccolti in un fiume vicino al campus universitario, e ad utilizzarli per produrre i sottilissimi fogli di grafene. Il nuovo metodo sfrutta un procedimento ibrido che combina processi chimici e agenti biologici e che potrebbe offrire un nuovo canale per produrre grafene di alta qualità, a basso costo e nel completo rispetto dell'ambiente.

Alla luce di quanto precede, può la Commissione far sapere se è a conoscenza del nuovo studio sul grafene? Considerate le sue potenzialità, non ritiene che si debba finanziare e approfondire le ricerche su questo materiale e finanziarle tramite il Settimo Programma Quadro (7° PQ) oppure tramite il Programma Quadro per la competitività e l'innovazione?

**Interrogazione con richiesta di risposta scritta E-004465/12  
alla Commissione**

**Oreste Rossi (EFD)**

(27 aprile 2012)

Oggetto: Potenzialità del grafene

Un materiale capace di condurre calore ed elettricità meglio del rame, 200 volte più resistente dell'acciaio, trasparente come il vetro e flessibile come la plastica. Il grafene ha tutte queste caratteristiche e molte altre ancora ignote. Esso è costituito da uno strato di atomi di carbonio collocati su una struttura a nido d'ape. A detta di molti scienziati, il grafene è uno dei materiali più promettenti del futuro. Ciò che sorprende è che lo utilizziamo già ogni giorno quando scriviamo con una matita. Il cuore della matita, infatti, è una sovrapposizione di strati di grafene.

Pertanto, gli scienziati erano a conoscenza del suddetto materiale già da tempo, ma lo studio delle sue potenzialità ha avuto una spinta dal 2004, quando un gruppo di ricercatori dell'Università di Manchester riuscì ad isolare il grafene in laboratorio. Più recentemente, alla Toyohashi University of Technology, gli studiosi sono riusciti ad «addomesticare» dei microorganismi raccolti in un fiume e ad utilizzarli per produrre sottilissimi fogli di grafene. Questo metodo potrebbe essere la soluzione ideale per produrre grafene di alta qualità a basso costo e nel completo rispetto dell'ambiente.

Le applicazioni del materiale sono molteplici e non ancora del tutto chiare. A detta del premio Nobel Andre Geim, potremmo paragonarlo alla plastica un secolo fa. Ci sono potenzialità incredibili e ancora ignote.

Considerato che il grafene potrebbe rivoluzionare il campo della tecnologia — ma anche della nanotecnologia — ed essere utilizzato per numerosi scopi anche nella vita quotidiana, chiedo alla Commissione se sia al corrente delle ricerche in merito al suddetto materiale e se intenda promuoverne la ricerca anche in Europa.

**Risposta congiunta di Máire Geoghegan-Quinn a nome della Commissione***(21 giugno 2012)*

La Commissione è a conoscenza delle potenzialità del grafene e degli studi che vengono attualmente effettuati su questo materiale.

Un primo invito a presentare proposte dedicato al grafene è stato pubblicato nel programma di lavoro di ricerca per il 2009, nell'ambito del tema 4 del Settimo programma quadro di ricerca e sviluppo tecnologico (7<sup>o</sup> PQ, 2007-2013) (nanoscienze, nanotecnologie, materiali e nuove tecnologie di produzione).

Nel 2011 la Commissione ha organizzato un workshop sul futuro della ricerca sul grafene con la partecipazione del Commissario responsabile per la ricerca, l'innovazione e la scienza e di tre vincitori del premio Nobel. A seguito delle conclusioni del suddetto workshop, attualmente si sta varando un altro invito a presentare proposte per il 2013; inoltre, un documento orientativo è stato recentemente pubblicato sulla pagina web della Commissione <sup>(1)</sup>. Il tema da affrontare sarà il controllo della produzione di grafene di alta qualità in quantitativi industrialmente significativi, il che costituisce tuttora un'*impasse* nel processo di immissione sul mercato di prodotti a base di grafene.

In aggiunta ai suddetti due inviti a presentare proposte, la ricerca sul grafene viene al momento finanziata grazie a diversi progetti di ricerca in collaborazione, alle sovvenzioni del Consiglio europeo della ricerca (destinate sia ai ricercatori all'inizio della carriera sia a quelli di comprovata esperienza) ed alle Azioni Marie Skłodowska-Curie. Nel complesso, si calcola che il contributo globale della Commissione ai progetti sul grafene si aggiri attualmente attorno ai 60 milioni di EUR (senza tenere conto dell'invito a presentare proposte per il 2013).

Conformemente alla decisione sul programma quadro per la competitività e l'innovazione, questo programma non finanzia alcun tipo di ricerca.

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<sup>(1)</sup> [https://ec.europa.eu/research/participants/portal/ShowDoc/Extensions+Repository/General+Documentation/Orientation+papers+2013/Cooperation/NMP\\_2013\\_Orientation\\_Paper\\_en.pdf](https://ec.europa.eu/research/participants/portal/ShowDoc/Extensions+Repository/General+Documentation/Orientation+papers+2013/Cooperation/NMP_2013_Orientation_Paper_en.pdf)



(English version)

**Question for written answer E-004349/12  
to the Commission**

**Sergio Paolo Frances Silvestris (PPE)**

(26 April 2012)

*Subject:* New research on graphene

Graphene is a material that conducts electricity better than copper, is as transparent as glass and more durable than steel. It can be folded like plastic to produce touchscreens that can be rolled up and put in a pocket. Graphene — a material whose properties and applications are still to some extent unknown — has been known to scientists for years. It is made up of a layer of carbon atoms arranged in a honeycomb and is considered to be one of the most promising materials for the future. This two-dimensional material is ultra-thin, flexible and some 200 times stronger than steel. It is also an excellent conductor of heat and electricity, and its electron-transport properties mean it is already regarded as the heir to silicon in for electronics in the future.

So while part of the scientific community is studying the characteristics of graphene, many researchers around the world are working on developing innovative production techniques, similar to one developed recently.

A coordinated group of researchers has managed to 'tame' micro-organisms collected from a river near the university campus and use them to produce extremely thin sheets of graphene. This new method uses a hybrid procedure that combines chemical processes and biological agents and could offer a new route for producing top-quality, low-cost graphene with no harm to the environment.

Is the Commission aware of the new research on graphene? Considering its potential, does it not think that the Seventh Framework Programme (FP7) or the Competitiveness and Innovation Framework Programme should be used to fund in-depth research on this material?

**Question for written answer E-004465/12  
to the Commission**

**Oreste Rossi (EFD)**

(27 April 2012)

*Subject:* Potential of graphene

A material that can conduct heat and electricity better than copper, is 200 times stronger than steel, as transparent as glass and as flexible as plastic. Graphene has all these features and many more that are still unknown. It consists of a layer of carbon atoms arranged in a honeycomb. Many scientists believe graphene to be one of the most promising materials of the future. Surprisingly, we use it every day when we write with a pencil. In fact, the heart of a pencil is composed of layers of graphene.

Scientists have therefore been aware of this material for some time, but study of its potential was boosted in 2004, when a group of researchers from the University of Manchester was able to isolate graphene in the laboratory. More recently, at Toyohashi University of Technology, scientists have managed to 'tame' micro-organisms collected in a river and use them to produce extremely thin sheets of graphene. This method might be the ideal solution for producing high-quality, low-cost graphene without harming the environment.

There are many applications for the material and not all have yet come to light. Nobel Prize winner Andre Geim thinks it is comparable to plastic a century ago. There is incredible and still unknown potential.

Given that graphene could revolutionise the field of technology, including nanotechnology, and may be used for various purposes in everyday life, I ask the Commission whether it is aware of research regarding this material and if it intends to promote research into it in Europe.

**Joint answer given by Ms Geoghegan-Quinn on behalf of the Commission**  
(21 June 2012)

The Commission is aware of the potential of graphene and of investigations being carried out on this material.

A first call for proposals dedicated to graphene was published in the research work programme for 2009, under Theme 4 of the Seventh Framework Programme for Research and Technological Development (FP7, 2007-2013) (nanosciences, nanotechnologies, materials and new production technologies).

A workshop on the future of graphene research was organised by the Commission in 2011, with the participation of the Member of the Commission responsible for Research, Innovation and Science, and three Nobel prize laureates. As part of the conclusions of this workshop, a second call for proposals is currently being prepared for the year 2013; an orientation paper has recently been made public on the Commission's website <sup>(1)</sup>. This upcoming topic will be focused on mastering the production of high-quality graphene in industrially significant quantities, which is still a bottleneck in the process of bringing graphene-based products to the market.

Additionally to these two dedicated calls, graphene research is being funded in the form of several collaborative research projects, European Research Council grants (both starting and advanced) and Marie Skłodowska-Curie actions. Altogether, it is estimated that the total Commission contribution to graphene-related projects is currently about EUR 60 million (without taking into account the 2013 call).

In line with the decision on the Competitiveness and Innovation Framework Programme, this programme does not support any kind of research.

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<sup>(1)</sup> [https://ec.europa.eu/research/participants/portal/ShowDoc/Extensions+Repository/General+Documentation/Orientation+papers+2013/Cooperation/NMP\\_2013\\_Orientation\\_Paper\\_en.pdf](https://ec.europa.eu/research/participants/portal/ShowDoc/Extensions+Repository/General+Documentation/Orientation+papers+2013/Cooperation/NMP_2013_Orientation_Paper_en.pdf)

(Versione italiana)

**Interrogazione con richiesta di risposta scritta E-004350/12  
alla Commissione (Vicepresidente/Alto Rappresentante)**

**Sergio Paolo Frances Silvestris (PPE)**

(26 aprile 2012)

Oggetto: VP/HR — Ancora scontri nel Sud Sudan

Terribile il bilancio degli scontri tra le forze del Sudan e quelle di Juba nel centro petrolifero di Heglig. Sono infatti ben 1 200 i soldati sud-sudanesi che hanno perso la vita. La notizia è stata comunicata dal comandante delle forze di Khartoum, che non ha però precisato il numero dei propri soldati morti.

Nuovi bombardamenti sono stati registrati nella giornata di ieri e hanno causato sedici morti e trentaquattro feriti nello Stato frontaliero dell'Unità, secondo quanto indicato dall'ambasciatrice americana all'ONU che ha citato come fonte un bilancio fornito dalla missione ONU in Sudan nel corso di una riunione del Consiglio di sicurezza delle Nazioni Unite.

I bombardamenti hanno anche causato importanti danni alle infrastrutture, in particolare agli impianti petroliferi. Nella notte tra lunedì e martedì, secondo quanto affermato dal governatore dello Stato dell'Unità, Taban Deng, gli aerei sudanesi hanno avuto per obiettivo le località sud-sudanesi di Panakwach e Lalop, nonché la frontiera di Teshwin. I paesi membri del Consiglio hanno chiesto l'interruzione immediata dei bombardamenti aerei da parte di Khartoum, un cessate il fuoco immediato e il ritorno dei due paesi al tavolo dei negoziati. Il Consiglio ha condannato fermamente l'attacco contro una pattuglia della missione di pace dell'Unione africana e dell'ONU in Darfur, nel quale ha perso la vita un soldato del Togo e sono rimaste ferite tre persone.

Alla luce di quanto sopra esposto, può il Vicepresidente/Alto Rappresentante comunicare:

1. se è a conoscenza delle ultime vicende che hanno interessato il Sud Sudan;
2. quali sono le azioni intraprese dall'UE dall'inizio del conflitto e se sono previsti ulteriori provvedimenti e nuove contromisure per evitare i continui attacchi che ogni giorno coinvolgono la società civile?

**Risposta dell'Alta Rappresentante/Vicepresidente Catherine Ashton a nome della Commissione**

(5 luglio 2012)

L'Alta Rappresentante/Vicepresidente ha seguito molto attentamente il recente inasprirsi dei conflitti tra Sudan e Sud Sudan. L'11 aprile 2012 ha condannato fermamente gli atti di violenza commessi da entrambe le parti e ha esortato i paesi a cessare immediatamente le ostilità e a tornare al tavolo dei negoziati. Il presidente del Consiglio europeo Herman Van Rompuy ha esortato il presidente del Sud Sudan, Salva Kiir, a chiedere il ritiro immediato e incondizionato delle truppe dal centro petrolifero di Heglig.

Il consiglio «Affari Esteri» del 23 aprile 2012 ha ribadito la condanna degli atti compiuti da entrambi i paesi ed ha accolto con favore il ritiro dei soldati sud-sudanesi da Heglig. Il 26 aprile l'Alta Rappresentante/Vicepresidente ha accolto con favore l'adozione da parte del Consiglio per la pace e la sicurezza dell'Unione Africana di una tabella di marcia per porre fine alle tensioni tra le parti. Il 5 maggio 2012 ha inoltre espresso compiacimento per la risoluzione del Consiglio di sicurezza delle Nazioni Unite n. 2046 del 2012 e ha esortato entrambi i paesi ad applicarla.

Nell'ambito dei suoi contatti diplomatici bilaterali, l'UE sostiene l'attuazione della tabella di marcia e della risoluzione del Consiglio di sicurezza delle Nazioni Unite, nonché la possibilità di imporre la risoluzione delle questioni ancora irrisolte e sanzioni di carattere non militare.

L'UE continua a sostenere politicamente e finanziariamente il gruppo di attuazione ad alto livello dell'Unione africana. L'attuazione della tabella di marcia richiede inoltre un impegno internazionale unificato e l'UE si rivolge pertanto ad altri attori internazionali con influenza su Khartoum e Juba quali la Cina, i paesi arabi e altri Stati della regione per assicurare un approccio coerente.

Inoltre, le agenzie umanitarie che operano nelle zone colpite dal conflitto, molte delle quali beneficiano di finanziamenti dell'UE, hanno fornito assistenza agli sfollati (ripari, generi alimentari, acqua e strutture igienico-sanitarie), nonché cure mediche ai feriti civili.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-004350/12  
to the Commission (Vice-President/High Representative)  
Sergio Paolo Frances Silvestris (PPE)**

(26 April 2012)

*Subject:* VP/HR — Further clashes in South Sudan

The death toll from the clashes between Sudanese and South Sudanese forces at the Heglig oilfield has been enormous, with 1 200 South Sudanese soldiers losing their lives. This figure was released by the commander of the Sudanese forces, who did not, however, specify how many of his own men were killed.

According to the US ambassador to the United Nations, who quoted her source as figures supplied by the UN mission in Sudan during a meeting of the UN Security Council, further bombings which killed 16 people and wounded 34 were recorded yesterday in Unity State, which lies on the border.

The bombings also caused serious damage to infrastructure, in particular oilfield installations. According to a statement by Taban Deng, Governor of Unity State, during the night between Monday and Tuesday Sudanese planes targeted the South Sudanese towns of Panakwach and Lalop, as well the Teshwin border post. The Security Council member states called for an immediate halt to aerial bombing by Khartoum, an immediate ceasefire and the return of both countries to the negotiating table. The Council strongly condemned the attack on a patrol of peacekeepers from the African Union and UN mission in Darfur, in which a Togolese soldier was killed and three people were wounded.

In view of the above, can the Vice-President/High Representative say:

1. whether she is aware of the latest developments regarding South Sudan;
2. what steps have been taken by the EU since the start of the conflict, and whether there are plans to take further countermeasures to put an end to the constant attacks to which civilians are being subjected day after day?

**Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Ashton on behalf of the Commission**

(5 July 2012)

The High Representative/Vice-President has followed very closely the recent escalation of conflict between Sudan and South Sudan. On 11 April 2012 she strongly condemned the acts of violence committed by both sides and urged them to immediately end hostilities and return to the negotiation table. President Van Rompuy called on South Sudan's President Salva Kiir to ask for the immediate and unconditional withdrawal of South Sudan's forces from the Heglig oil fields.

The Foreign Affairs Council on 23 April 2012 repeated the condemnation of actions by both sides and welcomed South Sudan's withdrawal from Heglig. On 26 April, the High Representative/Vice-President welcomed the adoption by the African Union Peace and Security Council (AU PSC) of a Roadmap to end tensions between the parties. On 5 May 2012, she welcomed UN Security Council Resolution 2046 (2012) backing the AU Roadmap and urged both parties to start implementing it.

The EU supports the implementation of the Roadmap and the UN Security Council Resolution in its bilateral diplomatic contacts, including the possibility of imposing settlements on outstanding issue and non-military sanctions.

The EU continues to support, both politically and financially, the AU High Level Implementation Panel. The implementation of the Roadmap also requires united international engagement. The EU is reaching out to other international players with influence over Khartoum and Juba such as China, Arab and other countries in the region, to ensure a coherent approach.

In addition, humanitarian agencies operating in areas affected by the fighting, many of which receive funding from the EU, have been providing support (shelter, food, water and sanitation) to the displaced, as well as medical assistance to wounded civilians.

(Versione italiana)

**Interrogazione con richiesta di risposta scritta E-004351/12  
alla Commissione**

**Sergio Paolo Frances Silvestris (PPE)**

(26 aprile 2012)

Oggetto: Nuovo rapporto Unicef

Negli ultimi 20 anni, gli adolescenti hanno beneficiato di progressi nel campo dell'istruzione e della salute pubblica. Tuttavia, secondo un nuovo rapporto Unicef, le necessità di molti adolescenti vengono trascurate, e ogni anno più di 1 milione perde la vita e decine di altri milioni non frequentano la scuola. Secondo il Rapporto, in Africa sub-sahariana il numero di adolescenti sta ancora crescendo e si prevede che, entro il 2015, questa sarà l'area al mondo con il maggior numero di adolescenti. Solo la metà dei bambini nell'Africa sub-sahariana completa la scuola primaria, e l'occupazione giovanile è bassa.

Il nuovo rapporto Unicef mette in evidenza altre conseguenze allarmanti dei benefici di un progresso che non ha raggiunto equamente il totale di 1,2 miliardi di adolescenti. Ogni anno 1,4 milioni di adolescenti muoiono a causa di incidenti stradali, complicazioni dovute al parto, suicidi, Aids, violenze e altre cause. In Africa, le complicazioni durante la gravidanza e il parto sono la principale causa di morte per le ragazze tra i 15 ai 19 anni.

Globalmente, il 90 % dei bambini in età scolare è iscritto alle scuole elementari. Pur con dei miglioramenti a livello mondiale, il tasso di iscrizione alla scuola secondaria rimane comunque basso nei paesi in via di sviluppo, soprattutto in Africa e in Asia.

Alla luce di quanto sopraesposto, si interroga la Commissione per sapere:

1. quali strategie ha avviato negli ultimi anni l'UE insieme all'Unione africana (UA), al Nuovo partenariato per lo sviluppo dell'Africa (NEPAD) e con le organizzazioni internazionali per fornire all'Africa un tracciato politico ed economico e una visione per il futuro;
2. se non ritiene che si dovrebbe incrementare il sostegno nei settori considerati essenziali per il conseguimento degli Obiettivi di sviluppo del Millennio (OSM) (pace, sicurezza e buon governo), nei settori che garantiscono un contesto favorevole alla crescita economica nonché nel campo della coesione sociale e ambientale.

**Risposta di Andris Piebalgs a nome della Commissione**

(19 giugno 2012)

1. Nella strategia comune (2007) <sup>(1)</sup>, l'UE e l'Africa hanno ribadito il loro impegno per il conseguimento degli obiettivi di sviluppo del millennio (OSM) e hanno deciso di rafforzare la cooperazione. Mentre la maggior parte delle iniziative pertinenti vengono attuate a livello nazionale, regionale e mondiale attraverso le pertinenti dotazioni dell'UE, la strategia comune e i relativi piani d'azione (2008-2010 e 2011-2013) hanno individuato una serie di iniziative mirate, ad esempio nel settore sanitario, nell'ambito delle questioni di genere, della formazione, dell'agricoltura, della collaborazione tra continenti.

2. Il nuovo quadro dell'UE per la politica di sviluppo «Potenziare l'impatto della politica di sviluppo dell'Unione europea: un programma di cambiamento» (2011) <sup>(2)</sup> è stato concepito per garantire che l'UE abbia il maggior impatto possibile sull'eradicazione della povertà nei paesi in via di sviluppo. Il programma di cambiamento afferma che l'UE dovrebbe concentrare la cooperazione allo sviluppo in sostegno (i) dei diritti umani, della democrazia e di altri aspetti relativi al buon governo e (ii) della crescita inclusiva e sostenibile per lo sviluppo umano; si tratta di due settori prioritari considerati essenziali per il raggiungimento degli obiettivi di sviluppo del millennio (OSM).

Nella prosecuzione al programma di cambiamento, la Commissione elabora al momento una comunicazione sulla protezione sociale nel contesto della cooperazione allo sviluppo dell'Unione europea. Inoltre, l'UE è fortemente impegnata nei principali settori che contribuiscono all'inclusione dei giovani. Per esempio, in Algeria e Guatemala sono in fase di elaborazione progetti su vasta scala specificatamente dedicati ai giovani. Nel campo della formazione, l'UE fornisce sostegno a più di 40 paesi, con un investimento di oltre 300 milioni di euro nel 2011.

<sup>(1)</sup> <http://www.africa-eu-partnership.org/africa-eu-strategic-partnership>

<sup>(2)</sup> COM(2011)637 definitivo del 13.10.2011. Cfr. anche: [http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms\\_data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/130243.pdf](http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/130243.pdf)

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-004351/12  
to the Commission**

**Sergio Paolo Frances Silvestris (PPE)**

(26 April 2012)

*Subject:* New Unicef report

In the last 20 years, adolescents have benefited from advances in the fields of education and public health. However, according to a new Unicef report, the needs of many adolescents are being neglected and every year more than one million lose their lives and tens of millions more do not attend school. According to the report, in Sub-Saharan Africa the number of adolescents is still rising and it is predicted that, by 2015, this will be the part of the world with the largest number of adolescents. Only half of the children in Sub-Saharan Africa finish primary school and youth employment is low.

The new Unicef report highlights further alarming consequences of the benefits of progress not being equally shared among the total of 1.2 billion adolescents around the world. Each year, 1.4 million adolescents die as a result of road traffic accidents, complications during childbirth, suicide, AIDS, violence and other causes. In Africa, complications during pregnancy and childbirth are the leading cause of death among girls between 15 and 19 years of age.

Globally, 90% of primary school-aged children are enrolled in primary school. Although the situation has improved globally, the secondary school enrolment rate remains low in developing countries, particularly in Africa and Asia.

In view of the above, can the Commission say:

1. what strategies the EU has conducted over recent years in conjunction with the African Union, the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) and international organisations with a view to offering Africa a political and economic roadmap and a vision for the future;
2. whether it would not agree that support should be stepped up in the sectors considered essential for the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals (peace, security and good governance) and those that provide a favourable context for economic growth, as well as in the field of social and environmental cohesion?

**Answer given by Mr Piebalgs on behalf of the Commission**

(19 June 2012)

1. In their Joint Strategy (2007) <sup>(1)</sup>, the EU and Africa reaffirmed their commitment to the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and agreed to step up cooperation. While most of the relevant initiatives are carried out at the national, regional and global levels through the relevant envelopes of the EU Instruments, the Joint Strategy and its Action Plans (2008-2010 and 2011-2013) have identified a number of targeted initiatives, e.g. in health, gender, education, agriculture, for continental collaboration.

2. The EU's new development policy framework, 'Increasing the Impact of EU Development Policy: An Agenda for Change' (2011) <sup>(2)</sup>, was designed to ensure that the EU has the greatest possible impact on poverty eradication in developing countries. The Agenda for Change states that the EU should concentrate its development cooperation in support of (i) human rights, democracy and other aspects of good governance and (ii) inclusive and sustainable growth for human development. These two priority areas are considered by the EU to be essential for the achievement of the MDGs.

In the follow up to the Agenda for Change, the Commission is preparing a communication on Social Protection in EU Development Cooperation. Additionally the EU is heavily engaged with the major domains that contribute to youth inclusion. For example, large youth-specific projects are currently in preparation in Algeria and Guatemala. In the field of education, the EU is providing support to over 40 countries, investing over EUR 300 million in 2011.

<sup>(1)</sup> <http://www.africa-eu-partnership.org/africa-eu-strategic-partnership>

<sup>(2)</sup> COM(2011) 637 final of 13.10.2011. See also: [http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms\\_data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/130243.pdf](http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/130243.pdf)

(Versione italiana)

**Interrogazione con richiesta di risposta scritta E-004352/12  
alla Commissione**

**Sergio Paolo Frances Silvestris (PPE)**

(26 aprile 2012)

Oggetto: Diffusione della zanzara tigre

Con l'avvicinarsi dell'estate torna il pericolo della zanzara tigre. L'insetto, infatti, secondo gli esperti può trasmettere all'uomo gravi malattie, come la dengue e la febbre chikungunya. A preoccupare maggiormente è invece un altro fenomeno: a causa del cambiamento climatico l'insetto tropicale sta proliferando anche nel nord-ovest dell'Europa e nei Balcani.

Secondo i ricercatori dell'Università di Liverpool gli inverni sempre più caldi e le piogge sempre più frequenti, attirano oramai la zanzara anche in Francia, nei paesi del Benelux, in Portogallo e persino in Germania, Gran Bretagna, sugli altipiani svizzeri, in Turchia, a Cipro, in Bulgaria e Slovacchia. Tuttavia, ci sono pure zone in Europa dove le condizioni di vita per l'insetto sono nel frattempo diventate sfavorevoli, perché distinte da un clima troppo caldo e secco: nel sud della Spagna o in Corsica. Ciononostante, a oggi la zanzara tigre è una delle cento specie animali che si stanno diffondendo più rapidamente in tutto il mondo, affermano gli studiosi britannici e belgi.

Le informazioni sulla diffusione di questo insetto provengono dai dati raccolti fino a dicembre 2011. I ricercatori azzardano anche una previsione: ritengono infatti che al più tardi nel 2050 la zanzara tigre asiatica possa essersi diffusa in quasi tutta Europa.

Alla luce dei fatti sopraesposti, può la Commissione precisare quanto segue:

1. è a conoscenza del pericolo della zanzara tigre e in passato ha predisposto programmi per la limitazione della diffusione?
2. sta monitorando la diffusione dell'insetto capace di trasmettere malattie all'uomo?
3. come intende contrastare la diffusione della zanzara tigre nei Paesi membri?

**Risposta di John Dalli a nome della Commissione**

(22 giugno 2012)

La Commissione è a conoscenza della diffusione della zanzara tigre (*Aedes albopictus*) in Europa e del suo impatto potenziale su patologie umane quali dengue, chikungunya e febbre del Nilo occidentale.

Tali malattie, come altre malattie umane trasmesse da vettori, sono monitorate regolarmente dalla rete di sorveglianza epidemiologica e di controllo delle malattie trasmissibili dell'UE stabilita con decisione n. 2119/98/CE <sup>(1)</sup> del Parlamento europeo e del Consiglio. Il programma sulle malattie emergenti e vettore-trasmesse del Centro europeo per la prevenzione e il controllo delle malattie contribuisce ad assicurare la predisposizione operativa e le capacità di risposta e fornisce agli Stati membri l'accesso a consulenze peritali, valutazioni geografiche delle malattie e alle conoscenze scientifiche più aggiornate <sup>(2)</sup>.

Le azioni specifiche di lotta contro la zanzara tigre e altri vettori responsabili della trasmissione di malattie umane rientrano nelle responsabilità delle autorità nazionali competenti negli Stati membri.

<sup>(1)</sup> GUL 268 del 3.10.98.

<sup>(2)</sup> [http://ecdc.europa.eu/en/activities/diseaseprogrammes/emerging\\_and\\_vector\\_borne\\_diseases/Pages/index.aspx](http://ecdc.europa.eu/en/activities/diseaseprogrammes/emerging_and_vector_borne_diseases/Pages/index.aspx).

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-004352/12  
to the Commission**

**Sergio Paolo Frances Silvestris (PPE)**

(26 April 2012)

*Subject:* Spread of the Asian tiger mosquito

As summer approaches, the risks brought by the Asian tiger mosquito are drawing closer once again. According to experts, the insect can transmit serious diseases, such as dengue and chikungunya fever, to humans. More worrying still is the fact that, owing to climate change, this tropical insect is spreading to north-western Europe and the Balkans.

Researchers from the University of Liverpool believe that increasingly mild winters and ever more frequent rainfall are now attracting the insect to France, the Benelux countries and Portugal, and even to Germany, the United Kingdom, the Swiss uplands, Turkey, Cyprus, Bulgaria and Slovakia. However, there are also areas in Europe, such as southern Spain and Corsica, where living conditions for the insect have become unfavourable owing to an excessively hot and dry climate. Despite this, the tiger mosquito is currently one of the 100 animal species that are spreading most rapidly worldwide, according to the British and Belgian researchers.

This information on the spread of the insect is based on data gathered up to December 2011. The researchers are even predicting that by 2050 the Asian tiger mosquito may have spread throughout almost the whole of Europe.

In view of the above, can the Commission say:

1. whether is aware of the threat posed by the Asian tiger mosquito and whether it has drawn up plans to limit its spread;
2. whether it is monitoring the spread of this insect, which can transmit diseases to humans;
3. how it intends to combat the spread of the Asian tiger mosquito in Member States?

**Answer given by Mr Dalli on behalf of the Commission**

(22 June 2012)

The Commission is aware of the spread of the tiger mosquito (*Aedes albopictus*) in Europe, and of its potential impact on human diseases such as Dengue, Chikungunya and West Nile fever.

These diseases, as well as other human diseases transmitted by vectors, are monitored on a regular basis by the EU network for the epidemiological surveillance and control of communicable diseases, established under Decision No 2119/98/EC<sup>(1)</sup> of the Parliament and of the Council. The Emerging and Vector-borne Diseases Programme of the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control contributes to the EU-wide preparedness and response capabilities and provides Member States with access to expertise, geographical assessments of diseases, and the latest scientific knowledge<sup>(2)</sup>.

Specific actions to fight against the tiger mosquito and other vectors responsible for transmission of human diseases, falls under the responsibilities of the national competent authorities in the Member States.

<sup>(1)</sup> OJL 268, 3.10.1998.

<sup>(2)</sup> [http://ecdc.europa.eu/en/activities/diseaseprogrammes/emerging\\_and\\_vector\\_borne\\_diseases/Pages/index.aspx](http://ecdc.europa.eu/en/activities/diseaseprogrammes/emerging_and_vector_borne_diseases/Pages/index.aspx).



(Versión española)

**Pregunta con solicitud de respuesta escrita E-004353/12**  
**a la Comisión**  
**Esther Herranz García (PPE)**  
(26 de abril de 2012)

*Asunto:* Importación de Carne de Vacuno Americana y Canadiense

Recientemente ha sido aprobado el aumento del contingente de importación de carne de vacuno americana y canadiense de «alta calidad» a cambio de que se retiraran las represalias comerciales contra la UE en el contencioso mantenido hace años ante la OMC por la prohibición europea de importar carne con hormonas de crecimiento. Este acuerdo incrementa a 48 200 toneladas el contingente de importación con derecho nulo de carne de «alta calidad» procedente de animales no tratados con dichas hormonas.

— ¿Cómo garantizarán las autoridades americanas que la carne que entra en Europa mediante este contingente ha estado libre de hormonas durante toda la vida del animal y no únicamente en su fase final de engorde?

— ¿Cómo garantizará la Comisión que la carne amparada en este contingente no ha utilizado promotores de crecimiento y antibióticos prohibidos en Europa pero autorizadas en EE.UU.?

— ¿Qué controles efectuará la Comisión al respecto?

**Respuesta del Sr. Dalli en nombre de la Comisión**  
(4 de julio de 2012)

El Parlamento Europeo y el Consejo han aprobado recientemente el aumento del contingente arancelario de carne de vacuno de calidad superior establecido por el Reglamento (CE) n° 617/2009 <sup>(1)</sup>. Este contingente no requiere que el origen sea Estados Unidos o Canadá. Puede ser también utilizado para la carne de vacuno procedente de otros países exportadores.

El sistema sanitario de importación de la UE exige que los terceros países presenten cada año un plan de control de los residuos de medicamentos veterinarios, junto con los resultados de la aplicación del programa del año anterior. Este plan debe ser aprobado por la Comisión.

El plan de Estados Unidos incluye el control del uso de hormonas y garantiza que la carne de vacuno exportada a la Unión no presenta indicios de sustancias prohibidas por la legislación de la Unión y que procede de animales que nunca en su vida han sido tratados con hormonas.

Además, el Departamento de Agricultura de Estados Unidos ha establecido un programa especial para garantizar que toda la carne exportada a la UE procede de animales que nunca han sido tratados con promotores hormonales del crecimiento. Además, los mataderos estadounidenses autorizados a exportar carne de vacuno a la UE aplican un sistema de circuitos separados, en el que las canales de animales destinadas a ser exportadas a la UE están separadas de las destinadas a otros mercados.

El plan de residuos estadounidense también incluye disposiciones sobre control de los antibióticos como promotores del crecimiento.

Los Estados miembros deben efectuar los controles de conformidad con el Reglamento (CE) n° 882/2004 <sup>(2)</sup>, sobre los controles en materia de piensos y alimentos en los puestos de inspección fronterizos para garantizar el cumplimiento de la legislación de la UE. Estos controles pueden incluir la toma de muestras para comprobar su conformidad con los límites de residuos de la UE. El servicio de inspección alimentaria y veterinaria de la Comisión realiza inspecciones sobre el terreno para verificar la aplicación de dichas disposiciones.

<sup>(1)</sup> DO L 182 de 15.7.2009, p. 1.

<sup>(2)</sup> DO L 165 de 30.4.2004, p. 1.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-004353/12  
to the Commission  
Esther Herranz García (PPE)  
(26 April 2012)**

*Subject:* US and Canadian beef imports

An increase in the import quota for 'high quality' US and Canadian beef was recently approved in exchange for the lifting of trade sanctions against the EU in the dispute over the European ban on imports of meat with growth hormones, that has been going on for years within the WTO. This agreement increases the zero-duty import quota for 'high quality' meat from animals not treated with these hormones to 48 200 tonnes.

— How will the American authorities guarantee that meat entering Europe under this quota has been free of hormones during an animal's entire life, and not only in the final stage of fattening?

— How will the Commission guarantee that meat covered by this quota has not been treated with growth promoters and antibiotics that are banned in Europe but authorised in the USA?

— What checks will the Commission make in this regard?

**Answer given by Mr Dalli on behalf of the Commission  
(4 July 2012)**

The increase of the tariff-rate quota for high-quality beef set up by Regulation (EC) No 617/2009 <sup>(1)</sup> has been recently approved by the European Parliament and the Council. This quota does not require United States or Canada as the origin. It is also open for use by other beef exporting countries.

The EU sanitary import system requires that third countries provide every year a monitoring plan for residue of veterinary medicines together with the results of the implementation of the previous year's programme. This plan has to be approved by the Commission.

The US plan includes the control of the use of hormones and ensures that beef exported to the Union does not contain any trace of substances banned by Union legislation and comes from animals that have not been treated with hormones during their life.

In addition, the US Department of Agriculture established a special programme to ensure that all meat exported to the EU comes from animals that have never received any treatment with hormonal growth promoters. Furthermore, a split system is in place in US slaughterhouses authorised for export of beef to the EU where carcasses of animals intended for export to the EU are separated from those destined to other markets.

The US residue plan also includes provisions related to the control of antibiotics for growth promotion.

Member States shall carry out checks in accordance with Regulation (EC) No 882/2004 <sup>(2)</sup> on feed and food controls at border inspection posts to ensure compliance with EC law. These checks may include taking samples to check compliance with EU residues limits. The Commission's food and veterinary inspection service conducts inspections on the spot to verify the implementation of the abovementioned provisions.

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<sup>(1)</sup> OJ L 182, 15.7.2009, p. 1.

<sup>(2)</sup> OJ L 165, 30.4.2004, p. 1.

(Versión española)

**Pregunta con solicitud de respuesta escrita E-004354/12**  
**a la Comisión**  
**Ramon Tremosa i Balcells (ALDE)**  
(26 de abril de 2012)

*Asunto:* Valores límite de No2

En respuesta a una pregunta mía (E-008817/2011), la CE dijo que el Estado español ha notificado un aplazamiento de los valores límite de No2 en la zona de Sabadell. Añadió, también, que en tal momento no estaba en condiciones de dar una respuesta sobre si la zona de calidad del aire en la que está situada Sabadell aplica correctamente la Directiva 2008/50/CE. En otra respuesta (E-001181/2011) la CE dijo que había llevado al Estado español ante el Tribunal por no aplicar, durante bastantes años, los valores límites del PM10 de la Directiva (2008/50/CE). Según el citado estudio <sup>(1)</sup>, Sabadell es la ciudad con el nivel más alto de contaminación de Catalunya, con un 26 % más del máximo permitido por la UE, con las graves consecuencias para la salud pública que esto acarrea a los ciudadanos.

A la luz de lo anterior y de la Directiva 2008/50/CE,

1. ¿Puede la Comisión informar si la zona de calidad del aire de Sabadell está superando los valores límites de No2?
2. Si los ha superado, ¿qué acciones ha tomado y va a tomar la Comisión?
3. ¿Está la Comisión satisfecha con el progreso hecho para rebajar los límites máximos de PM10 después de llevar al Estado español y, por lo tanto, al Ayuntamiento de Sabadell ante los tribunales?

**Pregunta con solicitud de respuesta escrita E-004355/12**  
**a la Comisión**  
**Ramon Tremosa i Balcells (ALDE)**  
(26 de abril de 2012)

*Asunto:* Análisis del aire

Sabiendo que la responsabilidad de enviar los datos de las estaciones de análisis del aire a la Comisión Europea es el Gobierno del Reino de España a través de la Subdirección General de Calidad del Aire y Medio Ambiente Industrial.

Dado que para el Ayuntamiento de Sabadell estos datos no son rigurosos y no responden a la realidad de la contaminación de la ciudad.

Teniendo en cuenta la Directiva 2008/50/CE,

1. ¿Puede informar la Comisión si estos datos que envía son suficientes y rigurosos para evaluar la calidad del aire de Sabadell?

**Respuesta conjunta del Sr. Potočnik en nombre de la Comisión**  
(20 de junio de 2012)

El último informe anual sobre la calidad del aire ambiente presentado por España confirma que, en 2010, la zona en que se encuentra Sabadell superó el valor límite anual de NO<sub>2</sub>. España ha notificado una prórroga del plazo de aplicación de los valores límites anuales de NO<sub>2</sub> hasta el 1 de enero de 2015 en esta zona. La Comisión dispone de nueve meses para evaluar la notificación y planteará objeciones si no se cumple alguna de las condiciones contempladas en el artículo 22 de la Directiva 2008/50/CE relativa a la calidad del aire ambiente y a una atmósfera más limpia en Europa <sup>(2)</sup>. La Comisión sigue evaluando la notificación.

En lo que respecta a las PM<sub>10</sub>, se respeta el valor límite anual correspondiente en esta zona. En cuanto a los valores límite diarios, la información proporcionada por España indica que se rebasan en la zona.

Por lo que se refiere a la tendencia de los niveles de concentración de PM<sub>10</sub> en la zona, se observa una tendencia a la disminución de dichos niveles.

<sup>(1)</sup> [http://www.ecologistasenaccion.org/IMG/pdf\\_Aire2009.pdf](http://www.ecologistasenaccion.org/IMG/pdf_Aire2009.pdf)

<sup>(2)</sup> DO L 152 de 11.6.2008.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-004354/12  
to the Commission**

**Ramon Tremosa i Balcells (ALDE)**

(26 April 2012)

*Subject:* NO<sub>2</sub> limit values

In reply to a question of mine (E-008817/2011), the Commission said that the Spanish State has given notice of a postponement of the deadline for applying NO<sub>2</sub> limit values in the Sabadell area. It added that it was not then in a position to establish whether the air quality zone in which Sabadell is located is adequately implementing Directive 2008/50/EC. In another reply (E-001181/2011), the Commission stated that it had taken the Spanish State to court for failure to apply the PM10 limit values of Directive 2008/50/EC over several years. According to the study quoted <sup>(1)</sup>, Sabadell, with ambient air pollution of 26% above the maximum allowed by the EU, is the most polluted city in Catalonia, a state of affairs with serious public health consequences for its citizens.

In view of the above, and given the provisions of Directive 2008/50/EC:

1. Can the Commission say whether Sabadell's air quality zone exceeds the NO<sub>2</sub> limit values?
2. If this is the case, what action has the Commission taken and what action is it going to take?
3. Is the Commission satisfied with the progress made in reducing maximum PM10 limits since it took the Spanish State and, therefore, Sabadell city council, to court?

**Question for written answer E-004355/12  
to the Commission**

**Ramon Tremosa i Balcells (ALDE)**

(26 April 2012)

*Subject:* Air analysis

Responsibility for sending data from Spanish air monitoring stations to the European Commission lies with the Spanish Government, through its Subdirectorate-General of Air Quality and Industrial Environment.

Given the fact that, in the case of Sabadell city council, these data are not sufficiently accurate and do not reflect the true picture as regards pollution in the city, and in view of the provisions of Directive 2008/50/EC:

1. Can the Commission say whether the data sent are comprehensive and accurate enough for Sabadell's air quality to be assessed?

**Joint answer given by Mr Potočník on behalf of the Commission**

(20 June 2012)

The latest annual report on ambient air quality provided by Spain confirms that in 2010 the zone in which Sabadell is situated exceeded the annual limit value for NO<sub>2</sub>. Spain has notified an extension of the deadline to apply the annual NO<sub>2</sub> limit value until 1 January 2015 for this zone. The Commission has nine months to assess the notification and raise objections if one of the conditions pursuant to Article 22 of the directive 2008/50/EC on ambient air quality and cleaner air for Europe <sup>(2)</sup> is not fulfilled. The Commission is still assessing the notification.

As regards PM<sub>10</sub>, the annual PM<sub>10</sub> limit value is complied within this zone. As regards the daily limit value, the information provided by Spain states the zone to be in exceedance.

As regards the trend of PM<sub>10</sub> concentration levels in the zone, a decreasing trend of the PM<sub>10</sub> concentration levels can be noted.

<sup>(1)</sup> [http://www.ecologistasenaccion.org/IMG/pdf\\_Aire2009.pdf](http://www.ecologistasenaccion.org/IMG/pdf_Aire2009.pdf)

<sup>(2)</sup> OJ L 152, 11.6.2008.

(Wersja polska)

**Pytanie wymagające odpowiedzi pisemnej E-004356/12  
do Komisji**

**Filip Kaczmarek (PPE)**

(26 kwietnia 2012 r.)

*Przedmiot:* Podziemne złoża wody pod Afryką

Zespół naukowców z British Geological Survey oraz University College London dokonał odkrycia, według którego pod powierzchnią cierpiącej z powodu notorycznej suszy Afryki kryją się ogromne złoża wody. Swoją tezę badacze udokumentowują hydrogeologicznymi mapami i wykonanymi 283 badaniami warstwy wodonośnej.

Ponad 300 milionów mieszkańców tego kontynentu nie posiada bezpośredniego dostępu do czystej wody, a tylko 5 % gruntów rolnych jest regularnie nawadniana. Odkrycie to mogłoby więc okazać się przełomowe dla najbardziej ubogich krajów Afryki.

Dostanie się do źródeł, ze względu na głębokość ich położenia, może jednak stanowić problem.

W związku z tym zwracam się z pytaniem, czy Komisja planuje wsparcie wydobycia wody ze źródeł podziemnych w Afryce?

**Odpowiedź udzielona przez komisarza Andrisa Piebalgsa w imieniu Komisji**

(8 czerwca 2012 r.)

Komisja działa na rzecz poprawy dostępu do wody, podstawowych urządzeń sanitarnych i higienicznych w 35 krajach (głównie w Afryce), przeznaczając na ten cel ze środków UE niemal 400 mln EUR rocznie, przede wszystkim dla grup szczególnie wrażliwych i potrzebujących w obszarach wiejskich i podmiejskich. W latach 2004-2009 dzięki wsparciu UE ponad 32 miliony osób uzyskało dostęp do lepszego zaopatrzenia w wodę, a 9,5 mln – do urządzeń sanitarnych.

Kwestia wody stanowi dla Komisji temat przekrojowy o kluczowym znaczeniu dla osiągnięcia celów w zakresie integracji regionalnej, rolnictwa, bezpieczeństwa żywnościowego, energii i rozwoju społecznego. Trwające przygotowania do kolejnego okresu programowania (rozpoczynającego się w 2014 r.) będą odnosić się do tych kwestii.

Należy jednak zauważyć, że działania Komisji opierają się na zasadzie dostosowania do potrzeb krajów partnerskich określonych w krajowych dokumentach strategicznych. Zdefiniowanie obszarów priorytetowych i odpowiedzi na związane z nimi wyzwania jest więc przede wszystkim zadaniem kraju partnerskiego, a zadaniem Komisji jest wspieranie tych wysiłków.

Co więcej, Komisja koncentruje się na długotrwałym zrównoważonym rozwoju, który wykracza poza natychmiastowe i masowe wykorzystanie dostępnych zasobów. Działanie winno opierać się na pełnej ocenie kosztów, trudności technicznych i potencjalnych nieprzewidzianych skutków eksploatacji podziemnych zbiorników wodnych z naukowego, społecznego i politycznego punktu widzenia.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-004356/12  
to the Commission  
Filip Kaczmarek (PPE)  
(26 April 2012)**

*Subject:* Underground water reserves in Africa

A team of scientists from the British Geological Survey and University College London have discovered vast underground water reserves lying beneath the surface of Africa, a continent which is suffering from chronic drought. The researchers document their thesis with hydrogeological maps and 283 aquifer tests which they performed.

More than 300 million inhabitants of this continent do not have direct access to clean water, and only 5% of agricultural land is regularly irrigated. This discovery could therefore prove to be a breakthrough for the poorest African countries.

However, reaching the sources may be problematic on account of their depth.

In consideration of this, is the Commission planning to support the extraction of water from the underground sources in Africa?

**Answer given by Mr Piebalgs on behalf of the Commission  
(8 June 2012)**

The Commission works on access to water, basic sanitation and hygiene in 35 countries (mainly in Africa), with almost EUR 400 million in EU support yearly, in particular for the most vulnerable and needy groups in rural and peri-urban areas. Between 2004 and 2009, the EU has helped more than 32 million people gain access to improved water supply and 9.5 million to sanitation facilities.

For the Commission, water is a cross-cutting theme of crucial importance to achieve goals in the areas of regional integration, agriculture, food security, energy and human development. The ongoing preparation for the next programming period (starting in 2014) will include reflections on these issues.

However, it should be noted that the Commission's work is based on the principle of alignment to partner countries' needs, identified in national country strategies. It is therefore mostly up to the partner country to define priorities and responses, and to the Commission to support in this effort.

Finally, the Commission focuses on long-term sustainability which goes beyond immediate and indiscriminate usage of available resources. Action should be based on a full assessment of costs, technological difficulties and the possible unforeseen impacts of the exploitation of underground water reservoirs from scientific, social and political perspectives.

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(Wersja polska)

**Pytanie wymagające odpowiedzi pisemnej E-004358/12  
do Komisji**

**Filip Kaczmarek (PPE)**

(26 kwietnia 2012 r.)

*Przedmiot:* Liczne zachorowania w Wietnamie

W Wietnamie odnotowano ponad 170 przypadków zachorowań na nieznaną chorobę. Pierwsze wzmianki o zachorowaniach pojawiły się w kwietniu 2011 r., kolejne zachorowania odnotowano w grudniu 2011 r. W jej wyniku zmarło już 9 osób, a 10 kolejnych jest w stanie krytycznym. Pierwsze objawy choroby to wysypka na dłoniach i stopach, jednak najprawdopodobniej jej dalszymi konsekwencjami jest uszkodzenie wątroby i innych organów wewnętrznych. Miejscowemu ministerstwu zdrowia nie udało się ustalić przyczyny choroby. Istnieje duża możliwość, że spowodował ją nieznaną wirus.

Rząd Wietnamu deklaruje zwrócenie się o pomoc do Światowej Organizacji Zdrowia i innych organizacji międzynarodowych. Rejon Quang Ngai w Wietnamie należy do regionów silnie dotkniętych problemem ubóstwa.

Zwracam się z pytaniami do Komisji:

1. Czy Komisja bierze pod uwagę przekazanie specjalnych funduszy na poszerzenie badań dotyczących tej nieznaną choroby?
2. Jakie kroki planuje podjąć Komisja w celu uchronienia państw członkowskich przed rozprzestrzenieniem się nieznaną choroby, zwłaszcza w przypadku, gdy jej przyczyną okaże się nieznaną wirus?

**Odpowiedź udzielona przez komisarza Johna Dallego w imieniu Komisji**

(22 czerwca 2012 r.)

Zdaniem Europejskiego Centrum ds. Zapobiegania i Kontroli Chorób – sieci nadzoru i kontroli epidemiologicznej chorób zakaźnych UE – wystąpienie choroby w Wietnamie nie stanowi obecnie zagrożenia dla Unii Europejskiej.

O ile przyczyny wystąpienia choroby pozostają nieznaną, analizy prowadzone przez władze Wietnamu nie wskazują na infekcje wirusowe lub bakteryjne. Najbardziej prawdopodobnym scenariuszem jest narażenie na wysoce toksyczną substancję.

Komisja finansuje badania mające na celu szybkie określenie wszelkich nowych patogenów powodujących chorobę<sup>(1)</sup>. Jednak mając na uwadze, że nieznaną choroba wykryta w Wietnamie wydaje się nie mieć powiązań z czynnikiem zakaźnym, Komisja nie zamierza na tym etapie rozszerzać badań w tym konkretnym przypadku.

Niemniej jednak Komisja wspiera obecnie Wietnam w ramach Funduszu Rozwoju UE. Wsparcie to ma na celu udzielenie pomocy w przeprowadzaniu reform sektora zdrowia, aby umożliwić Wietnamowi skuteczne i sprawne zaspokojenie zapotrzebowania w zakresie promocji i ochrony zdrowia.

Komisja przedstawiła w dniu 8 grudnia 2011 r. wniosek dotyczący decyzji Parlamentu i Rady<sup>(2)</sup>, aby usprawnić strukturę i wzmocnić zdolności UE w zakresie skutecznego reagowania na transgraniczne zagrożenia zdrowia.

<sup>(1)</sup> <http://www.emperie.eu/>.

<sup>(2)</sup> Wniosek dotyczący decyzji Parlamentu Europejskiego i Rady w sprawie poważnych transgranicznych zagrożeń zdrowia, COM (2011) 866 wersja ostateczna, z 8 grudnia 2011 r.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-004358/12  
to the Commission  
Filip Kaczmarek (PPE)  
(26 April 2012)**

*Subject:* Multiple outbreaks in Vietnam

More than 170 cases of an unknown disease have been recorded in Vietnam. The first mentions of incidents appeared in April 2011, and subsequent outbreaks were recorded in December 2011. As a result of the disease, nine people have already died and ten more are in a critical condition. The first symptoms of the disease are a rash on the hands and feet; however, the most likely further consequences include damage to the liver and to other internal organs. The local Ministry of Health has been unable to determine the cause of the disease. There is a significant possibility that it was caused by an unknown virus.

The Vietnamese Government states that it has asked the World Health Organisation and other international organisations for assistance. The Quang Ngai region in Vietnam is a region that is heavily affected by poverty.

1. Is the Commission considering devoting special funds to expanding research on this unknown disease?
2. What steps is the Commission planning to take to protect Member States from the spread of this unknown disease, particularly if it is caused by an unknown virus?

**Answer given by Mr Dalli on behalf of the Commission  
(22 June 2012)**

According to the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC), the EU network for the epidemiological surveillance and control of communicable diseases, the disease outbreak in Vietnam does not currently represent a threat to the European Union.

While the cause of the disease outbreaks remains unknown, investigations by the Vietnamese authorities show no indication of a disease of viral or bacterial origin. The most likely cause is exposure to a highly toxic substance.

The Commission is funding research aiming at rapidly identifying any new outbreak-causing pathogen <sup>(1)</sup>. However, given that the unknown diseases detected in Vietnam do not seem to be related to an infectious agent, the Commission does not plan, at this stage, to expand research on this issue.

Nevertheless, the Commission is currently providing support to Vietnam under the EU Development Fund. This support is aimed at helping Vietnam to reform its health sector to enable the Country to effectively and efficiently meet demand for health promotion and protection.

The Commission has put forward a proposal for a decision of the Parliament and Council on 8 December 2011 <sup>(2)</sup>, with the aim of streamlining and strengthening EU capacities and structures for effectively responding to serious cross-border health threats.

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<sup>(1)</sup> <http://www.emperie.eu/>.

<sup>(2)</sup> Proposal for a decision of the European Parliament and of the Council on serious cross-border threats to health, COM(2011) 866 final of 8 December 2011.



(Wersja polska)

**Pytanie wymagające odpowiedzi pisemnej E-004359/12  
do Komisji**

**Filip Kaczmarek (PPE)**

(26 kwietnia 2012 r.)

*Przedmiot: Zaginione osoby cywilne w Czeczenii*

Przed wyborami prezydenckimi w Rosji w marcu 2012 r. Władimir Putin złożył niezapowiedzianą wizytę w Czeczenii, gdzie po upadku Związku Radzieckiego Rosja prowadziła dwie wojny z separatystycznymi wojownikami. Wcześniej w tym roku rząd Rosji postanowił przeznaczyć 120 mld rubli dla republiki Północnego Kaukazu na odbudowę jej stolicy, miasta Grozny, co stanowiło nagrodę za „lojalność” tego regionu. Po wyborach wydaje się, że partia Putina – Jedyna Rosja – zanotowała wysoki, w porównaniu z resztą kraju, odsetek głosów w zdominowanej przez muzułmanów Czeczenii.

Według oficjalnych wyników poparcie dla Putina wynosiło 99,5 %, a frekwencja wyniosła 99,4 %. Oficjalni obserwatorzy nie złożyli ani jednej skargi dotyczącej naruszeń głosowania w Czeczenii, jednak wynik ten wywołał niedowierzanie wśród wielu lokalnych mieszkańców. Niektórzy mieszkańcy miasta Grozny wyrazili swoje zdanie o wyborach, mówiąc że Czeczenia nigdy nie zagłosowałaby na Putina. Z obawy przed karą odmówili podania swoich nazwisk. Inni mieszkańcy stwierdzili, że skoro ich przywódca Ramzan Kadyrow zagłosował na Jedyną Rosję, oni byli zmuszeni zrobić to samo. W przeciwnym wypadku sprowadziliby na siebie problemy. Kadyrow jest, według naszej wiedzy, odpowiedzialny za utrzymywanie porządku w swoim państwie w zamian za pieniądze otrzymywane od Rosji.

Jednocześnie mieszkańcy Groznego uważają, że przyczynami porwań i morderstw bezbronnych osób cywilnych jest zawsze posądzenie ich o pomoc mudżahedinom lub walka o prawa człowieka, a tym samym sprzeciwianie się polityce Kadyrowa. W ciągu ostatnich dziesięciu lat zaginęły tysiące Czeczenów. Rodziny zaginionych rzadko otrzymują od urzędników czeczeńskich i rosyjskich potwierdzenia śmierci swoich bliskich. Niemal wszyscy Czeczeni z obawy przed karą unikają mówienia o uprowadzeniach lub torturach ze strony czeczeńskich sił bezpieczeństwa.

Czy Komisja planuje udzielić pomocy rodzinom zaginionych osób poprzez instytucje UE lub we współpracy z instytucjami pozarządowymi, takimi jak Amnesty International? Czy Komisja sporządzi spis spraw związanych ze zniknięciem osób cywilnych i będzie monitorować takie sprawy oraz czy zwróci się do urzędników czeczeńskich z prośbą o ujawnienie losu zaginionych i upubliczni te informacje, nie narażając jednocześnie ich rodzin na niebezpieczeństwo związane z udzieleniem im bezpośredniej pomocy?

**Odpowiedź udzielona przez Wysoką Przedstawiciel/Wiceprzewodniczącą Catherine Ashton w imieniu  
Komisji**

(19 czerwca 2012 r.)

UE bardzo uważnie śledzi sytuację w Północnym Kaukazie. Jest ona stałym tematem konsultacji UE-Rosja dotyczących praw człowieka i częstym przedmiotem dyskusji z władzami rosyjskimi na innych forach. UE jest w pełni świadoma sytuacji w Czeczenii, gdzie występują wymuszone zaginięcia i porwania. Kwestia ta została omówiona szczegółowo ze stroną rosyjską podczas ostatnich konsultacji UE-Rosja dotyczących praw człowieka, które odbyły się w dniu 29 listopada 2011 r. UE współpracuje w tym zakresie z międzynarodowymi organizacjami pozarządowymi, takimi jak Amnesty International, i odbywa regularne spotkania z aktywistami, obrońcami praw człowieka, prawnikami działającymi w tym regionie oraz mieszkańcami Czeczenii. W kwietniu 2012 r. UE odbyła w Moskwie rozmowy z przedstawicielami rosyjskiego społeczeństwa obywatelskiego, podczas których po raz kolejny wyraziła odniesienie do tej kwestii.

UE nie posiada specjalnych mechanizmów ani środków, aby śledzić wszystkie przypadki wymuszonych zaginięć w tym regionie. Jednak w kontekście konsultacji UE-Rosja dotyczących praw człowieka przekazano rosyjskiej delegacji listę najbardziej pilnych i reprezentatywnych przypadków z prośbą o aktualne informacje na ich temat oraz na temat działań, które władze przedsięwzięły w tym względzie.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-004359/12**  
**to the Commission**  
**Filip Kaczmarek (PPE)**  
(26 April 2012)

*Subject:* Missing civilians in Chechnya

Before the presidential election in Russia in March 2012, Vladimir Putin made a surprise visit to Chechnya where Russia fought two wars with separatist rebels after the fall of the Soviet Union. Earlier this year the government in Russia decided to allocate RUB 120 billion to the North Caucasus republic to rebuild its capital, Grozny, as a reward for the region's 'loyalty' to the Kremlin. After the election it appeared that Putin's United Russia party had recorded a higher percentage of votes in predominantly Muslim Chechnya than anywhere else in the country.

Official results showed support for Putin at 99.5% on a voter turnout of 99.4%. Official monitors have not lodged a single complaint of voting violations in Chechnya, but among many local residents the outcome has stirred some incredulity. Some residents of Grozny expressed their opinions about the election, saying that Chechnya would never vote for Putin. They declined to give their names for fear of retribution. Other citizens claimed that if their leader Ramzan Kadyrov had voted for United Russia, they had had to do the same. Otherwise they would have created problems for themselves. Kadyrov is, as we know, responsible for maintaining order in his country in exchange for the money it receives from Russia.

At the same time citizens of Grozny find justification for the kidnappings and murders of innocent civilians, who are always claimed to be helping mujahedeen or fighting for human rights, and thus opposing Kadyrov's politics. In the last 10 years thousands of Chechens have disappeared. The families of the missing are rarely given any confirmation of the deaths of their loved ones from Chechen and Russian officials. Nearly all Chechens avoid talking about abduction or torture by Chechen security forces, for fear of punishment.

Does the Commission plan to support the families of the missing people through the institutions of the EU and/or in cooperation with non-governmental institutions, such as Amnesty International? Will it list and monitor the cases involving the disappearance of civilians and send a request to the Chechen officials to disclose their fate and make the information public while not putting the families in danger through direct help to them?

**Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Ashton on behalf of the Commission**  
(19 June 2012)

The EU is following the situation in the North Caucasus very closely. This is a regular topic at EU-Russia human rights consultations, and a frequent subject of discussions with the Russian authorities in other fora. The EU is well aware of the situation with the enforced disappearances and kidnappings in Chechnya. This issue has been addressed in detail with Russian counterparts during the last round of the EU-Russia human rights consultations, which took place on 29 November 2011. The EU is cooperating with international non-governmental organisations, including Amnesty International, on this issue, and is meeting regularly with activists, human rights defenders and lawyers working in the region as well as the residents of Chechnya. The EU held a round of talks with the Russian civil society in April 2012, in Moscow, where this issue once again was prominently addressed.

The EU has no special mechanism, or means, to monitor all the cases of enforced disappearances in the region. However, in the context of the EU-Russia human rights consultations, the list of most pressing and representative individual cases are handed over to the Russian delegation, with a request for information and update on those cases as well as actions taken by the authorities in that regard.

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(Versione italiana)

**Interrogazione con richiesta di risposta scritta E-004360/12  
alla Commissione**

**Sergio Paolo Frances Silvestris (PPE)**

(26 aprile 2012)

Oggetto: Nuovo caso di mucca pazza

Nuovo caso di «mucca pazza» negli Stati Uniti, in California. Ad annunciarlo è stato il ministero dell'agricoltura, spiegando in un comunicato che si tratta del quarto.

Si tratta di una mucca da latte, la cui carne non è mai entrata nella catena alimentare nazionale, ha precisato il dipartimento dell'agricoltura. La scoperta è avvenuta in un impianto dove capi malati vengono impiegati per la realizzazione di prodotti alternativi a quelli alimentari, come colla o sapone. Il morbo della mucca pazza (encefalopatia spongiforme — Bse) è stato diagnosticato per la prima volta in un allevamento di bovini in Gran Bretagna nel 1985. Nel 1988 il governo di Londra annunciò come misura precauzionale l'abbattimento di tutti i capi infetti e vietò il riciclaggio degli scarti della macellazione nel mangime bovino.

Nel 1996 il governo britannico ammise per la prima volta che la Bse poteva trasmettersi all'uomo nella nuova variante del morbo di Creutzfeld — Jakob (Cjd) e varò le misure per sconfiggere la Bse: l'abbattimento di tutte le mucche di età superiore ai trenta mesi e la distruzione delle carcasse. Negli Usa, il primo caso venne scoperto nel 2003 e causò una perdita di circa tre miliardi di dollari alle esportazioni di bovini americani.

Diversi i paesi, dopo la scoperta del caso di mucca pazza e in seguito alle preoccupazioni dei consumatori, hanno bloccato la vendita delle carni USA.

Alla luce di quanto sopraesposto, può la Commissione precisare quanto segue:

1. è a conoscenza del nuovo caso di mucca pazza riscontrato in California?
2. Quali provvedimenti intende adottare al fine di tutelare i consumatori? Ritiene che sia il caso di adottare un sistema di sorveglianza commerciale ovvero di bloccare l'importazione delle carni americane?

**Risposta di John Dalli a nome della Commissione**

(22 giugno 2012)

1. Le autorità competenti degli Stati Uniti (USDA-APHIS) hanno informato la Commissione, il 24 aprile 2012, del nuovo caso di BSE individuato in California.
2. Il regolamento (CE) n. 999/2001 del Parlamento europeo e del Consiglio è il pilastro della legislazione che stabilisce regole per la prevenzione, il controllo e l'eradicazione delle encefalopatie spongiformi trasmissibili. La disposizione più importante per la protezione della salute umana contro la BSE consiste nella rimozione e nella distruzione, sin dal 2000, del materiale specifico a rischio (MSR). Per MSR s'intendono gli organi ritenuti ospitare l'infettività da BSE in un animale affetto da BSE e che quindi può presentare un rischio per la salute umana se venisse consumato. Altre misure significative nell'UE comprendono la sorveglianza attiva e passiva e l'attuazione di un divieto estensivo in materia di mangimi che vieta l'uso della maggior parte delle proteine di origine animale nei mangimi somministrati agli animali da allevamento.
3. Il sistema di controlli sanitari all'importazione dell'UE prescrive che i prodotti importati da paesi terzi soddisfino i requisiti UE. La rimozione del MSR si applica pertanto a qualsiasi carne bovina importata, anche a quella proveniente dagli Stati Uniti. L'ottemperanza è verificata dal servizio d'ispezione della Commissione (UAV — Ufficio alimentare e veterinario). I pertinenti rapporti d'ispezione sono pubblicati nel sito: [http://ec.europa.eu/food/fvo/index\\_en.cfm](http://ec.europa.eu/food/fvo/index_en.cfm).
4. Le autorità sudcoreane hanno informato la Commissione che non adotteranno misure sanitarie in relazione alle carni bovine provenienti dagli USA sebbene due imprese private abbiano sospeso, per motivi loro, l'importazione di carni bovine dagli USA.
5. La Commissione non ritiene opportuno, in questa fase, adottare misure aggiuntive per quanto concerne le importazioni di carni bovine dagli USA.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-004360/12  
to the Commission**

**Sergio Paolo Frances Silvestris (PPE)**

(26 April 2012)

*Subject:* New case of mad cow disease

A new case of mad cow disease has been reported in California in the United States. The news source was a Ministry of Agriculture press release, explaining that this is the fourth case.

The Department of Agriculture stated that the disease was found in a dairy cow whose meat never entered the national food chain. The discovery was made in a facility where sick animals are used to produce alternative, non-food products such as glue or soap. Mad cow disease (bovine spongiform encephalopathy or BSE) was diagnosed for the first time in 1985, in a herd of British cattle. In 1988, the Government in London announced that as a precautionary measure, all infected cattle were to be slaughtered, and the recycling of by-products from slaughter for cattle feed was prohibited.

In 1996, the British Government admitted for the first time that BSE could be transmitted to humans in a new strain known as Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease (CJD) and adopted measures in order to eradicate BSE by ordering the slaughter of all cows aged over 30 months and the destruction of their carcasses. The first case in the US was detected in 2003 and resulted in losses of USD 3 billion in American beef exports.

Various countries have vetoed the sale of meat from the US following the discovery of mad cow disease and concerns voiced by consumers.

In view of the abovementioned facts, can the Commission state:

1. whether it is aware of the new case of mad cow disease reported in California;
2. what measures it intends to adopt in order to protect consumers, and whether it believes that it would be a good idea to apply a trade monitoring system or to stop imports of meat from the US?

**Answer given by Mr Dalli on behalf of the Commission**

(22 June 2012)

1. The US Competent Authorities (USDA-APHIS) informed the Commission on 24 April 2012 on the new BSE case detected in California.
2. Regulation (EC) No 999/2001 of the Parliament and Council is the central piece of legislation providing rules for prevention, control and eradication of transmissible spongiform encephalopathies. The most important provision for the protection of human health against BSE is the removal and destruction, since 2000, of Specified Risk Material (SRM). SRM are the organs considered to harbour the BSE infectivity in an animal affected by BSE and which can consequently pose a risk to human health if consumed. Other significant measures in the EU include active and passive surveillance and the implementation of a very comprehensive feed ban prohibiting the use of most proteins of animal origin in the feed of farmed animals.
3. The sanitary import controls system of the EU requests that products imported from third countries also meet the EU requirements. The removal of SRM therefore applies also to any imported beef, including from the United States. The compliance is verified by the Commission inspection service (FVO — Food Veterinary Office). The relevant inspection reports are published in: [http://ec.europa.eu/food/fvo/index\\_en.cfm](http://ec.europa.eu/food/fvo/index_en.cfm)
4. South Korean Authorities have informed the Commission that no sanitary measures will be taken on USA beef, although two private companies have suspended, on private grounds, the import of beef from USA.
5. The Commission does not consider appropriate, at this stage, to take any additional measure as regards the import of beef from USA.

(Versão portuguesa)

**Pergunta com pedido de resposta escrita E-004362/12**

**à Comissão**

**Nuno Melo (PPE)**

(26 de abril de 2012)

Assunto: Crise em Espanha

Considerando:

- Que, segundo o «The Washington Post», um agravamento da crise em Espanha seria suficiente para conduzir a economia mundial a uma «depressão persistente» e teria inúmeras repercussões;
- E que, «se a crise em Espanha acentuar, por sua vez, a crise na Europa poderá levar toda a economia mundial a uma depressão persistente», como afirma Robert Samuelson, um dos editores do jornal, num artigo de opinião;

Pergunto à Comissão:

- Como interpreta esta análise veiculada pelo «The Washington Post»?
- Que medidas está a Comissão a tomar, conjuntamente com Espanha, para que tal cenário não se verifique?

**Resposta dada por Olli Rehn em nome da Comissão**

(27 de junho de 2012)

A Comissão concorda que a Espanha enfrenta graves desafios económicos. Com efeito, a apreciação aprofundada sobre a Espanha, elaborada no âmbito do quadro do procedimento relativo aos desequilíbrios macroeconómicos, concluiu que a Espanha apresenta graves desequilíbrios. A evolução macroeconómica, nomeadamente relacionada com o nível significativo de endividamento do setor privado, a posição externa largamente negativa e o setor financeiro, que foram influenciados pela evolução do mercado imobiliário, requerem uma estreita supervisão e atenção urgente em termos de política económica a fim de evitar quaisquer efeitos adversos no funcionamento da economia e da União Económica e Monetária.

Em novembro de 2011, a Comissão publicou a sua Análise Anual sobre Crescimento para 2012 focando-se em cinco prioridades — consolidação orçamental favorável ao crescimento, restauração do crédito, promoção do crescimento e da competitividade, luta contra o desemprego e as consequências sociais da crise e modernização da administração pública. Neste contexto, a Espanha apresentou o seu Programa Nacional de Reformas e o Programa de Estabilidade em abril de 2012. A Comissão avaliou o estado de execução das recomendações específicas do país de 2011, identificou os atuais desafios políticos e adotou uma recomendação para as recomendações do Conselho em 30 de maio de 2012. O documento de trabalho subjacente a estas recomendações salienta que a Espanha enfrenta desafios fundamentais nos domínios das finanças públicas, do setor bancário, do mercado de trabalho e das reformas estruturais favoráveis ao crescimento que deverão ser abordados por ações concretas.

Esses documentos podem ser consultados no seguinte sítio Web:

([http://ec.europa.eu/europe2020/making-it-happen/country-specific-recommendations/index\\_en.htm](http://ec.europa.eu/europe2020/making-it-happen/country-specific-recommendations/index_en.htm)).

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(English version)

**Question for written answer E-004362/12  
to the Commission**

**Nuno Melo (PPE)**

(26 April 2012)

*Subject:* Crisis in Spain

According to *The Washington Post*, a deepening of the crisis in Spain would be enough to lead the world economy into a 'stubborn slump' and would have countless implications.

In an opinion piece, Robert Samuelson, a columnist for the paper, claims that 'if Spain's crisis deepens Europe's recession, it could tip the entire world economy into a stubborn slump'.

How does the Commission interpret this analysis published in *The Washington Post*?

What measures is the Commission taking, along with Spain, to prevent such a scenario?

**Answer given by Mr Rehn on behalf of the Commission**

(27 June 2012)

The Commission agrees that Spain faces severe economic challenges. Indeed, the in-depth review on Spain prepared within the framework of the Macroeconomic Imbalances Procedure concluded that Spain is experiencing very serious imbalances. Macroeconomic developments, notably related to the significant level of private sector debt, the large negative external position and the financial sector, which were influenced by housing market developments, require close monitoring and urgent economic policy attention in order to avert any adverse effects on the functioning of the economy and of economic and monetary union.

In November 2011, the Commission published its Annual Growth Survey for 2012 focusing on five priorities: growth-friendly fiscal consolidation, restoring lending, promoting growth and competitiveness, tackling unemployment and social consequences of the crisis, and modernising public administration. Against this background, Spain presented its national reform programme and stability programme in April 2012. The Commission assessed the state of implementation of the 2011 country-specific recommendations, identified current policy challenges and adopted a recommendation for Council recommendations on 30 May 2012. The Staff Working Document underpinning these recommendations highlights that Spain faces key challenges in the areas of public finances, banking sector, labour market and growth-enhancing structural reform which should be addressed by concrete policy action.

These documents can be consulted on the following website:

[http://ec.europa.eu/europe2020/making-it-happen/country-specific-recommendations/index\\_en.htm](http://ec.europa.eu/europe2020/making-it-happen/country-specific-recommendations/index_en.htm)

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(Versão portuguesa)

**Pergunta com pedido de resposta escrita E-004363/12**

**à Comissão**

**Nuno Melo (PPE)**

(26 de abril de 2012)

Assunto: Barreiras às empresas e produtos economias emergentes

Considerando:

- Que tem sido afirmado que «a Comissão quer obrigar a China ou o Brasil a abrir as suas portas a empresas europeias e ameaça travar o acesso de empresas de quaisquer países terceiros a concursos públicos europeus, se não houver reciprocidade»;
- Que a entrada de empresas chinesas no setor energético em Portugal poderá ter sido um dos elementos que demonstrou a necessidade de propor uma regra de reciprocidade e que este é um caminho que já vem sendo seguido em alguns setores dos EUA;

Pergunto à Comissão:

- Para além de pretender travar o acesso das empresas das economias emergentes, não acha também oportuno criar barreiras à entrada de produtos dessas mesmas economias, nomeadamente os têxteis da China e do Paquistão, quando seja manifesta a prática de «dumping» social e de concorrência desleal, desvirtuando, assim, as normais regras de mercado?

**Resposta dada por Karel De Gucht em nome da Comissão**

(3 de julho de 2012)

A Comissão tem o dever de estabelecer, para a indústria da UE, um ambiente competitivo no território da UE e de agir contra as distorções da concorrência, independentemente de terem origem dentro ou fora da União. No entanto, tal deverá ser feito de forma cautelosa e com base em regras claras e compatíveis com os acordos da Organização Mundial do Comércio (OMC).

A Comissão pode, após inquérito, instituir direitos antissubvenções ou *anti-dumping* nos casos em que se verifique uma distorção do comércio internacional de produtos manufaturados devido à concorrência desleal sob a forma de importações objeto de *dumping* ou de subvenções. Em 2010, a UE ficou em terceiro lugar no que diz respeito ao início de inquéritos *anti-dumping*, o que demonstra que este instrumento é efetivamente utilizado para combater a concorrência desleal.

O *dumping* social não é um conceito internacionalmente acordado nem sequer claramente definido para o qual possam ou devam ser utilizadas normas similares. As diferenças em matéria de salários e de condições de trabalho nos diferentes países são um reflexo normal dos níveis de desenvolvimento (e de produtividade), não devendo os países em desenvolvimento ser penalizados por essas diferenças, desde que as normas laborais fundamentais da Organização Internacional do Trabalho (OIT) sejam respeitadas. O direito dos países em desenvolvimento de utilizarem a sua vantagem competitiva para, através do comércio, saírem da pobreza é um meio válido para a promoção do desenvolvimento sustentável.

A UE está firmemente empenhada na promoção das normas laborais fundamentais e do trabalho digno para todos no contexto da liberalização do comércio. No entanto, rejeita uma abordagem baseada em sanções, que muitas vezes prejudica os mais pobres. Em vez disso, como incentivo para a realização de progressos, a UE prefere usar as preferências comerciais, juntamente com a cooperação, a transparência e o diálogo com os seus parceiros. As preferências comerciais podem e serão retiradas se as condições ligadas à concessão desses incentivos deixarem de ser cumpridas ou forem sistematicamente objeto de abusos.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-004363/12  
to the Commission  
Nuno Melo (PPE)  
(26 April 2012)**

*Subject:* Barriers to companies and products from emerging economies

It has been said that the Commission wants to make China and Brazil open their doors to European companies and is threatening to prevent businesses from any non-EU country from taking part in European public procurement procedures if there is no reciprocity.

The penetration of the Portuguese energy sector by Chinese companies may have been one of the factors to have revealed the need for a reciprocity rule, an option which has been pursued by some sectors in the US.

In addition to the intention to bar companies from emerging economies, does the Commission not agree that it should also introduce entry barriers for products from the countries in question, for example textiles from China and Pakistan, when there is clear evidence that social dumping and unfair competition are distorting normal market rules?

**Answer given by Mr De Gucht on behalf of the Commission  
(3 July 2012)**

The Commission has a duty to establish for the EU industry a competitive environment in the EU and act against competitive distortions, regardless of whether they come from within or outside the Union. However, this should be done in a careful way on the basis of clear rules, consistent with World Trade Organisation (WTO) agreements.

Anti-subsidy and/or anti-dumping duties can be imposed after investigation by the Commission in cases where international trade in manufactured goods is distorted by unfair competition under the form of dumped or subsidised imports. In 2010, the EU ranked third in terms of initiation of anti-dumping investigations, which shows that this instrument is indeed used to tackle unfair competition.

Social dumping is not an internationally agreed or even clearly defined concept for which similar rules could or should be used. Differences in wages and working conditions in different countries are a normal reflection of development (and productivity) levels, and developing countries should not be penalised for this, as long as the International Labour Organisation's (ILO) core labour standards are observed. The right of developing countries to use their competitive advantage to trade their way out of poverty is a powerful means to promote sustainable development.

The EU is firmly committed to promoting core labour standards and decent work for all in the context of trade liberalisation. However, the EU rejects a sanctions-based approach, which often hurts the poorest. The EU instead relies on the use of trade preferences as an incentive for progress coupled with cooperation, transparency and dialogue with its partners. Trade preferences can and will be withdrawn if the conditions linked to the granting of those incentives are no longer met or are systematically abused.

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(Versão portuguesa)

**Pergunta com pedido de resposta escrita E-004364/12**

**à Comissão**

**Nuno Melo (PPE)**

(26 de abril de 2012)

Assunto: Medidas de apoio à criação de emprego

Considerando:

- Que tem sido referido em vários meios que os elevados índices de desemprego jovem que afetam a Europa estão a deixar cada vez mais apreensiva a Comissão Europeia;
- Que esta terá apelado a semana passada aos Estados-Membros da UE para que reforcem as respetivas políticas de emprego, nomeadamente através da redução da carga fiscal e do apoio à iniciativa empresarial;
- E que, segundo essas notícias, numa proposta apresentada em Estrasburgo à margem da sessão plenária do PE, a Comissão Europeia apelou a um reforço da criação de emprego e definiu formas que possibilitem aos Estados-Membros a criação de emprego «incentivando a contratação, através da clara redução da carga fiscal associada ao trabalho, ou de um apoio acrescido à criação de novas empresas, capazes de gerar emprego»;

Pergunto à Comissão:

- Como pensa conseguir que Estados-Membros como Portugal concedam incentivos fiscais às empresas face à ausência de margem orçamental para o fazerem?
- Estão previstos alguns mecanismos de apoio aos Estados-Membros intervencionados, como Portugal, para que seja possível conceder tais incentivos à economia?

**Resposta dada por László Andor em nome da Comissão**

(26 de junho de 2012)

O Pacote Emprego, adotado no âmbito da Comunicação «Uma recuperação geradora de emprego»<sup>(1)</sup>, identifica medidas capazes de gerar as condições propícias à criação de emprego e à oferta de mão-de-obra. Evidencia também os setores e as atividades com maiores potencialidades em termos de novos postos de trabalho, designadamente a economia verde, o setor da saúde e as tecnologias de informação e comunicação, e cita casos de sucesso nas reformas do mercado de trabalho.

As propostas que o Pacote Emprego consubstancia serão implementadas pelos Estados-Membros em função das respetivas disponibilidades orçamentais. Contudo, a política que a Comunicação defende no que se refere à carga fiscal sobre o trabalho não se limita a reduzir os impostos sobre o trabalho, preconizando antes uma transferência da tributação do trabalho para a esfera do ambiente, do consumo ou da propriedade. Tal deve ser realizado de forma neutra em termos orçamentais e com a devida fiscalização dos respetivos efeitos redistributivos.

As propostas do Pacote Emprego relativas a reformas nesta área podem ser apoiadas por instrumentos financeiros europeus, sobretudo o FSE<sup>(2)</sup>. Para o período 2014/2020 do Quadro Financeiro Plurianual, a Comissão propôs dotações mínimas para o FSE e recomendou que o financiamento da UE fosse utilizado com maior eficácia para apoiar as reformas dos Estados-Membros.

O FSE tem dado apoio às pessoas que conhecem dificuldades no mercado de trabalho e financiado iniciativas locais em prol do emprego e da criação de empresas. No contexto do programa de ajustamento económico, o Governo português está a estudar outras medidas, designadamente as que dizem respeito a cortes nas contribuições para a segurança social, especificamente direcionados e neutros em termos orçamentais.

(1) Comunicação da Comissão ao Parlamento Europeu, ao Conselho, ao Comité Económico e Social Europeu e ao Comité das Regiões — Uma recuperação geradora de emprego, COM(2012)173 final de 18.4.2012.

(2) Fundo Social Europeu.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-004364/12  
to the Commission  
Nuno Melo (PPE)  
(26 April 2012)**

*Subject:* Measures to support job creation

The media have reported that the high youth unemployment rates affecting Europe are an increasing cause of concern to the Commission.

Last week the Commission apparently called on the Member States to strengthen their employment policies, particularly through tax reductions and support for enterprise.

The above reports also stated that, in a proposal presented in Strasbourg while Parliament was in session, the Commission called for job creation to be boosted and set out ways for Member States 'to encourage hiring by reducing taxes on labour or supporting business start-ups more', thereby generating jobs.

How does the Commission think that Portugal and other Member States can provide tax incentives to companies, given that their budgets do not allow them to do so?

Is it considering support arrangements for Portugal and the other Member States undergoing intervention, so that their economies can benefit from incentives of this kind?

**Answer given by Mr Andor on behalf of the Commission  
(26 June 2012)**

The Employment Package was adopted in the Commission's Communication 'Towards a job rich recovery' <sup>(1)</sup> and identifies employment measures that can help create conditions throughout the economy favourable to job creation and labour demand. It also underlines those sectors and activities which have the greatest potential for new jobs, such as the green economy, the health sector and the ICT sector. It also lays down successful reforms of the labour market.

The proposals in the Employment Package will be implemented by the Member States taking into account their budget. However, the communication's policy advice on the labour tax wedge is not confined to reducing taxes on labour. Instead, it focuses on shifting taxation away from labour and towards environmental, consumption or property taxes. This is to be done in a budgetary neutral way and with the proper monitoring of redistributive effects.

The Employment Package proposals for employment reform can be supported by European financial instruments, most notably the ESF <sup>(2)</sup>. For the 2014-2020 period of the Multiannual Financial Framework, the Commission has suggested minimum allocations for the ESF and has recommended improving the use and efficiency of EU funding to support the Member State reforms.

The ESF has provided support to people experiencing difficulties in the labour market, and financed local employment initiatives and business creation. Other measures in the framework of the economic adjustment programme such as targeted and budgetary neutral cuts in social security contributions are under consideration by the Portuguese Government.

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<sup>(1)</sup> Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, Towards a job-rich recovery, COM(2012)173, 18.4.2012.

<sup>(2)</sup> European Social Fund.

(Versão portuguesa)

**Pergunta com pedido de resposta escrita E-004365/12**

**à Comissão**

**Nuno Melo (PPE)**

(26 de abril de 2012)

Assunto: Mercados de dívida pública em euros

Considerando:

- Que, no final do mês de março, o jornal «Financial Times» revelava que as Obrigações do Tesouro portuguesas garantiram o melhor retorno no conjunto dos países do mundo desenvolvido;
- Que os títulos com maturidades entre sete e dez anos deram uma remuneração de 21,1 % desde o início do ano, superando a rentabilidade da dívida soberana de 25 outros mercados no índice Bloomberg/Effas;
- Que, apesar das medidas de austeridade do governo espanhol, a cotação dos seus títulos de dívida pública afunda, com o conseqüente aumento dos juros no mercado secundário;
- Que a taxa de juro implícita dos «bonos» a dez anos regressou aos 6 %, valor que não se registava desde o verão passado, um tempo em que o BCE não atuava no mercado, nem tinha ainda iniciado os seus empréstimos a três anos cobrando a uma taxa de 1 %;
- E que os factos acima descritos podem revelar que grandes instituições financeiras a nível mundial, que beneficiam das variações do mercado, podem aproveitar a instabilidade dos mercados para realizar vultuosas mais-valias, utilizando para isso a sua grande influência nos mercados da dívida pública;

Pergunto à Comissão:

- Acha possível que grandes instituições financeiras com enorme influência nos mercados de dívida pública consigam «manipular» as cotações das dívidas públicas dos países em dificuldades da zona euro, de forma a realizarem grandes mais-valias?

**Resposta dada por Olli Rehn em nome da Comissão**

(21 de junho de 2012)

Os mercados de dívida pública da zona euro têm apresentado grande volatilidade nos últimos dois anos. Esta volatilidade foi causada por um elevado grau de incerteza aliado a uma crescente aversão ao risco decorrente da crise das dívidas soberanas.

No contexto dessa crise, vários Estados da zona euro viram aumentar significativamente o seu custo de financiamento. Mais recentemente, no caso de Portugal e Espanha, as preocupações dos investidores quanto à sustentabilidade das finanças públicas destes países tiveram por base os efeitos de contágio da situação na Grécia e a degradação das notações de crédito. Além disso, os investidores estão preocupados com a situação do setor bancário em ambos os Estados e em particular em Espanha.

Convém assinalar que muitas das grandes instituições financeiras, com uma exposição significativa aos títulos de dívida pública da zona euro nos seus balanços, registaram efetivamente perdas significativas de capital associadas a esses investimentos.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-004365/12  
to the Commission  
Nuno Melo (PPE)  
(26 April 2012)**

*Subject:* The market for public debt in euros

At the end of March 2012, the *Financial Times* newspaper reported that Portuguese Government bonds gave the best returns out of all countries in the developed world.

Bonds maturing after seven to 10 years have returned 21.1% since the beginning of this year, surpassing the yield of 25 other sovereign debt markets in the Bloomberg/EFFAS bond indices.

Despite the Spanish Government's austerity measures, the price of its bonds has fallen, with a consequent increase in yields on the secondary market.

The implicit yields on Spain's 10-year bonds climbed back up to 6%, a level not recorded since summer 2011, when the European Central Bank was not intervening in the market and had not yet started its three-year loans at 1% interest.

This situation suggests that large global financial institutions, which benefit from market variations, are able to exploit market instability to make substantial capital gains by using their great influence on public debt markets.

Does the Commission believe that large financial institutions with extensive influence on public debt markets are able to manipulate the price of the public debt of struggling eurozone countries in order to make large capital gains?

**Answer given by Mr Rehn on behalf of the Commission  
(21 June 2012)**

The euro area sovereign bond markets have been experiencing a great deal of volatility over past couple of years. This volatility was caused by a high degree of uncertainty combined with increased risk aversion related to the sovereign crisis.

In the context of the sovereign debt crisis several euro area governments experienced a significant increase of their cost of borrowing. More recently, in case of Portugal and Spain investors' concerns about the sustainability of public finance in these countries was compounded by some contagion effect from the developments in Greece, and by credit rating downgrades. Moreover, investors are concerned about the condition of the banking sectors in both Member States, and in particular in Spain.

It should be noted that many large financial institutions with significant exposure to euro area sovereign bonds on their balance sheets actually recorded significant capital losses related to these investments.

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(Versão portuguesa)

**Pergunta com pedido de resposta escrita E-004366/12**  
**à Comissão**

**Nuno Melo (PPE)**

(26 de abril de 2012)

Assunto: Coreia do Norte ameaça Coreia do Sul

Considerando:

- Que, no seguimento do falhanço do lançamento do foguetão pela Coreia do Norte, o qual não conseguiu, sequer, entrar em órbita, o exército da Coreia do Norte anunciou que irá, em breve, desenvolver «ações especiais» contra o Presidente sul-coreano, por este ter, alegadamente, insultado os antigos líderes da Coreia do Norte;
- E que o falhanço do lançamento do foguetão, claramente uma provocação, poderá ter sido usado como disfarce de um teste militar;

Pergunto à Comissão:

- Que avaliação faz das referidas ameaças à Coreia do Sul?

**Resposta dada pela Alta Representante/Vice-Presidente Catherine Ashton em nome da Comissão**

(6 de julho de 2012)

A suposta tentativa da República Popular Democrática da Coreia (RPDC) de lançar um «satélite», em 13 de abril de 2012, constituiu uma clara violação das suas obrigações internacionais, em especial das resoluções do Conselho de Segurança das Nações Unidas n.ºs 1718 e 1874.

No mesmo dia, a Alta Representante da União Europeia para os Negócios Estrangeiros e a Política de Segurança/Vice-Presidente da Comissão (AR/VP) emitiu uma comunicação, expressando a sua profunda preocupação com o efeito perigoso e desestabilizador da referida tentativa. Na mesma declaração, instou a RPDC a abster-se de ações suscetíveis de agravar ainda mais as tensões regionais. A AR/VP deixou ainda bem claro que a UE continua disposta a colaborar com os seus parceiros internacionais a fim de contribuir para a paz e estabilidade duradouras na península coreana.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-004366/12  
to the Commission  
Nuno Melo (PPE)  
(26 April 2012)**

*Subject:* Threats made by North Korea to South Korea

Following the failed launch of North Korea's rocket, which did not manage to achieve orbit, the North Korean army announced that it will shortly initiate 'special actions' against the South Korean President, because he allegedly insulted past leaders of North Korea.

The failure of the rocket launch, clearly a provocative act, may have been used as cover for a military test.

How does the Commission view these threats against South Korea?

**Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Ashton on behalf of the Commission  
(6 July 2012)**

The purported attempt by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) to launch a 'satellite' on 13 April 2012 was a clear violation of the country's international obligations as set out in particular under UN Security Council Resolutions 1718 and 1874.

On the same day, the High Representative of the EU for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy/Vice-President of the Commission (HR/VP) issued a statement, expressing her deep concern about the dangerous and destabilising effect of the launch. In the same Statement she urged the DPRK to refrain from any action that could further increase regional tensions. The HR/VP also made it clear that the EU remains ready to continue working with international partners with a view to contributing to the pursuit of lasting peace and stability on the Korean peninsula.

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*(Versão portuguesa)*

**Pergunta com pedido de resposta escrita E-004367/12**

**à Comissão**

**Nuno Melo (PPE)**

*(26 de abril de 2012)*

*Assunto:* Criminalidade representa 7 % da economia mundial

Considerando que, segundo o diretor da agência anti-crime da ONU, a criminalidade gera cerca de 1,6 mil milhões de euros por ano, o equivalente a 7 % da economia mundial, tornando o crime comparável a uma das 20 maiores economias mundiais, pergunto à Comissão:

Sabendo-se que o crime global e, particularmente, o crime organizado, ameaçam as economias emergentes e fomentam a instabilidade internacional, quais as diretrizes que definem as políticas da Comissão para 2012 no âmbito do combate a este flagelo?

**Resposta dada por Cecilia Malmström em nome da Comissão**

*(14 de junho de 2012)*

A Comissão Europeia concorda que a criminalidade organizada é uma ameaça para as nossas sociedades e os nossos valores e que o seu impacto na economia global é muito grande.

Foi por esse motivo que o desmantelamento das redes de criminalidade e a confiscação dos produtos do crime foram reconhecidos como prioridades essenciais na Comunicação da Comissão intitulada «Estratégia de Segurança Interna da UE em Ação: cinco etapas para uma Europa mais segura» <sup>(1)</sup>.

A Comissão remete o Senhor Deputado para o seu primeiro relatório anual sobre a aplicação da Estratégia de Segurança Interna da UE <sup>(2)</sup>, que faz um balanço das medidas tomadas e enumera as iniciativas a tomar no futuro. A Comissão elaborará um segundo relatório.

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<sup>(1)</sup> COM(2010)673 final.

<sup>(2)</sup> COM(2011)790 final.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-004367/12  
to the Commission**

**Nuno Melo (PPE)**

(26 April 2012)

*Subject:* Criminality accounts for 7% of the world economy

According to the Executive Director of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, criminality generates around EUR 1.6 trillion a year, equivalent to 7% of the world economy, making crime one of the 20 largest world economies.

Given that global crime and, in particular, organised crime, threaten emerging economies and foster international instability, what are the defining guidelines of the Commission's policies for 2012 in the fight against this scourge?

**Answer given by Ms Malmström on behalf of the Commission**

(14 June 2012)

The European Commission agrees that organised crime is a threat to the societies and values of the EU, and that it has a serious impact on the global economy.

Ensuring that criminal networks are effectively dismantled, and that their illicit gains are confiscated, were therefore recognised as key priorities in the Commission's communication 'The EU Internal Security Strategy in Action: Five steps towards a more secure Europe' <sup>(1)</sup>.

The Commission would refer the Honourable Member to its first annual implementation report on that Strategy <sup>(2)</sup> which sets out the steps taken so far at EU level, and points to upcoming initiatives. A second annual report will be prepared by the Commission.

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<sup>(1)</sup> COM(2010) 673 final.

<sup>(2)</sup> COM(2011) 790 final.



(Versão portuguesa)

**Pergunta com pedido de resposta escrita E-004368/12**

**à Comissão**

**Nuno Melo (PPE)**

(26 de abril de 2012)

*Assunto:* Luta contra a criminalidade organizada

Deu-se início ao julgamento do autor do atentado de Oslo, em julho de 2011, que vitimou 77 pessoas. Este diz ter levado a cabo o ataque político «mais sofisticado e espetacular» feito na Europa desde a Segunda Guerra Mundial, que o «faria de novo» e que o plano envolvia ataques de maiores proporções. O autor do atentado inicia cada sessão de julgamento com uma saudação de extrema-direita e a imprensa norueguesa afirma o suspeito troca correspondência com seguidores em todo o mundo.

A esta luz, pergunto à Comissão:

- Considerando que o último ato legislativo da UE neste domínio foi adotado em 2008, não considera que deve ser encetada uma política mais visível de combate às organizações criminosas e ao terrorismo, reforçando a legislação da UE, definindo linhas estratégicas e alcançando melhorias em termos de segurança jurídica?

**Resposta dada por Cecilia Malmström em nome da Comissão**

(19 de junho de 2012)

A legislação relevante relativa à criminalidade organizada é a Decisão-Quadro de 2008 <sup>(1)</sup>, sobre a qual a Comissão está a preparar um relatório de execução que será publicado no final de 2012. A referida Decisão-Quadro destinava-se a estabelecer uma definição harmonizada de organização criminosa, bem como a harmonizar as sanções aplicáveis aos membros dessas organizações, quer sejam pessoas singulares ou coletivas.

Quanto à questão do terrorismo, o principal instrumento jurídico da União Europeia é a Decisão-Quadro de 2002, relativa à luta contra o terrorismo <sup>(2)</sup> com a última redação que lhe foi dada por uma Decisão-Quadro <sup>(3)</sup> de 2008, e sobre a qual a Comissão está também a preparar um relatório de execução que será publicado no final de 2012. Esta última legislação prevê a ação judicial contra pessoas que tentem envolver outras em atividades terroristas, quer através do incentivo à prática de atos terroristas, tentando recrutá-los para as suas redes terroristas, quer fornecendo-lhes a informação de que necessitam para a execução de atentados, tais como instruções para o fabrico de bombas.

A luta contra o terrorismo na União Europeia e a nível internacional exige uma ação tanto jurídica como política, que foram descritos em pormenor na Comunicação da Comissão, de 20 de julho de 2010, sobre «A política de luta contra o terrorismo da UE: principais realizações e desafios futuros» <sup>(4)</sup>.

<sup>(1)</sup> Decisão-Quadro 2008/841/JAI.

<sup>(2)</sup> Decisão-Quadro 2002/475/JAI.

<sup>(3)</sup> Decisão-Quadro 2008/919/JAI.

<sup>(4)</sup> (<http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2010:0386:FIN:PT:PDF>).

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-004368/12  
to the Commission  
Nuno Melo (PPE)  
(26 April 2012)**

*Subject:* The fight against organised crime

The perpetrator of the Oslo attacks, in which 77 people were killed in July 2011, has gone on trial. He says that he carried out 'the most sophisticated and spectacular political attack committed in Europe since the Second World War', that he 'would do it again' and that the plan involved attacks on a larger scale. The perpetrator of the attacks begins each session of the trial by making a far-right salute and the Norwegian media claim that he is in correspondence with followers around the world.

Given that the latest EU legislative act in this area was adopted in 2008, does the Commission not believe that a clearer policy to combat criminal organisations and terrorism should be introduced, to strengthen EU legislation, establish strategic guidelines and improve legal certainty?

**Answer given by Ms Malmström on behalf of the Commission  
(19 June 2012)**

The relevant legislation on organised crime is the 2008 Framework Decision <sup>(1)</sup> on which the Commission is preparing an implementation report to be published at the end of 2012. It aimed to provide a harmonised definition of a criminal organisation as well as to harmonise penalties to be imposed on the members of such organisations, be they natural or legal persons.

As far as terrorism is concerned, the European Union's main legal instrument is the 2002 Framework Decision on combating terrorism <sup>(2)</sup> as last modified by a Framework Decision <sup>(3)</sup> in 2008, on which the Commission is also preparing an implementation report to be published at the end of 2012. This legislation provides for the prosecution of people who try to involve others in terrorist activity, whether by encouraging them to commit terrorist acts, by trying to enlist them in their terrorist networks, or by providing them with information they need to commit their attacks, such as bomb-making recipes.

The fight against terrorism in the European Union and at international level requires both legal and policy action, which have been extensively detailed in the Commission Communication of 20 July 2010 on 'EU Counter-terrorism Policy: main achievements and future challenges' <sup>(4)</sup>.

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<sup>(1)</sup> 2008/841/JHA.

<sup>(2)</sup> 2002/475/JHA.

<sup>(3)</sup> 2008/919/JHA.

<sup>(4)</sup> [http://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/news/intro/docs/com\\_2010\\_386\\_en.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/news/intro/docs/com_2010_386_en.pdf)

(Versão portuguesa)

**Pergunta com pedido de resposta escrita E-004369/12**

**à Comissão**

**Nuno Melo (PPE)**

(26 de abril de 2012)

**Assunto:** Campanhas de crédito abusivas

O Banco de Portugal está a investigar uma campanha de crédito de uma empresa de crédito ao consumo. Em causa estão contratos de adesão, contratos parcialmente preenchidos que são enviados a potenciais clientes em que já constam os dados pessoais, como o nome, a morada e o número de telemóvel, bem como o valor do empréstimo aprovado pela empresa.

Considerando que:

- No plano da formação do contrato, os contratos de adesão aumentam consideravelmente o risco de o aderente desconhecer cláusulas que vão fazer parte do contrato;
- No plano do conteúdo, favorecem a inserção de cláusulas abusivas;
- No plano processual, mostram a inadequação e insuficiência do normal controlo judiciário, que atua *a posteriori*, dependendo da iniciativa processual do lesado, com efeitos circunscritos ao caso;
- A Diretiva 93/13/CEE prevê, no seu artigo 3.º, que «1. Uma cláusula contratual que não tenha sido objeto de negociação individual é considerada abusiva quando, a despeito da exigência de boa-fé, der origem a um desequilíbrio significativo em detrimento do consumidor, entre os direitos e obrigações das partes decorrentes do contrato», ou seja, quando o consumidor não tenha podido influir no seu conteúdo, em especial no âmbito de um contrato de adesão;

Pergunto à Comissão:

- Tendo em conta a sujeição frequente dos particulares a um regime contratual abusivo, que medidas têm sido implementadas no sentido de permitir um maior controlo e legalidade no âmbito do Direito europeu dos contratos, nomeadamente, na aplicação de um controlo preventivo, isto é, um controlo sobre as «condições gerais», independentemente de já ter sido celebrado, ou não, um qualquer contrato?

**Resposta dada por John Dalli em nome da Comissão**

(21 de junho de 2012)

O direito da UE <sup>(1)</sup> estabelece normas para a defesa dos interesses dos consumidores e impõe que os Estados-Membros assegurem a existência de meios adequados e eficazes destinados a evitar a utilização continuada de condições desleais em contratos celebrados com os consumidores <sup>(2)</sup>.

Esses meios devem incluir os poderes atribuídos pela legislação nacional às autoridades responsáveis pela aplicação da legislação para investigarem *ex officio* o comportamento de empresas individuais, bem como meios de recurso que permitam aos particulares ou às organizações que tenham um interesse legítimo na defesa dos consumidores recorrer aos tribunais ou aos órgãos administrativos competentes, com vista a obterem uma decisão quanto à eventualidade de as condições contratuais elaboradas para utilização geral serem desleais, de forma a evitar a utilização continuada dessas condições <sup>(3)</sup>. Este procedimento permite que as organizações de consumidores contestem, perante os tribunais nacionais, condições contratuais utilizadas por empresas; caso essa contestação seja bem sucedida, torna-se possível impedir que essas condições voltem a ser utilizadas no futuro.

<sup>(1)</sup> Diretiva 93/13/CEE do Conselho, de 5 de abril de 1993, relativa às cláusulas abusivas nos contratos celebrados com os consumidores, JO L 95 de 21.4.1993, p. 29-34; Diretiva 2005/29/CE do Parlamento Europeu e do Conselho, de 11 de maio de 2005, relativa às práticas comerciais desleais das empresas face aos consumidores no mercado interno, JO L 149 de 11.6.2005, p.22; Diretiva 2009/22/CE do Parlamento Europeu e do Conselho, de 23 de abril de 2009, relativa às ações inibitórias em matéria de proteção dos interesses dos consumidores (versão codificada), JO L 110 de 1.5.2009; Diretiva 2008/48/CE do Parlamento Europeu e do Conselho, de 23 de abril de 2008, relativa a contratos de crédito aos consumidores e que revoga a Diretiva 87/102/CEE do Conselho, JO L 133 de 22.5.2008.

<sup>(2)</sup> Artigo 7.º, n.º 1, da Diretiva 93/13/CEE.

<sup>(3)</sup> Artigo 7.º, n.º 2, da Diretiva 93/13/CEE.

A Diretiva 2005/29/CE relativa às práticas comerciais desleais <sup>(4)</sup> exige que os comerciantes afixem de forma clara, inteligível e atempada as informações de que os consumidores necessitam para efetuarem escolhas informadas, incluindo no que se refere às condições do produto ou serviço oferecido. No domínio dos serviços financeiros, os Estados-Membros podem adotar legislação nacional que preveja condições mais estritas do que as previstas na diretiva, com vista a reforçar o nível de defesa dos consumidores. A Comissão está a reexaminar a aplicação global da Diretiva relativa às práticas comerciais desleais e publicará, no decurso de 2012, um relatório com uma lista das práticas comerciais desleais mais frequentes, incluindo no domínio dos serviços financeiros.

No que respeita às infrações transfronteiriças do direito da UE, o Regulamento relativo à cooperação no domínio da defesa do consumidor <sup>(5)</sup> estabelece uma rede, a nível da UE, de autoridades responsáveis pela aplicação da legislação competentes para detetar, investigar e pôr termo a essas infrações.

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<sup>(4)</sup> Diretiva 2005/29/CE do Parlamento Europeu e do Conselho, de 11 de maio de 2005, relativa às práticas comerciais desleais das empresas face aos consumidores no mercado interno e que altera a Diretiva 84/450/CEE do Conselho, as Diretivas 97/7/CE, 98/27/CE e 2002/65/CE e o Regulamento (CE) n.º 2006/2004 (diretiva relativa às práticas comerciais desleais).

<sup>(5)</sup> JO L 364 de 9.12.2004.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-004369/12  
to the Commission  
Nuno Melo (PPE)  
(26 April 2012)**

*Subject:* Unfair loan campaigns

The Bank of Portugal is investigating a loan campaign by a consumer credit company. The investigation concerns the use of partially completed standard contracts, which are being sent to potential customers with personal data such as their name, address and mobile telephone number already filled in, as well as the loan amount approved by the company.

In terms of contract formation, pre-formulated standard contracts considerably increase the risk of the contracting party being unaware of the terms contained therein.

In terms of content, they encourage the inclusion of unfair terms.

In procedural terms, they reveal the inadequacy and shortcomings of ordinary judicial review, which is retroactive, depends on the victim bringing proceedings, and has effects limited to the case.

Article 3(1) of Council Directive 93/13/EEC lays down that 'A contractual term which has not been individually negotiated shall be regarded as unfair if, contrary to the requirement of good faith, it causes a significant imbalance in the parties' rights and obligations arising under the contract', in other words, when the consumer has not been able to influence the substance of the terms, particularly in the context of a pre-formulated standard contract.

Given that individuals are often subjected to unfair contractual arrangements, what measures have been taken to ensure greater control and legality under EU contract law, particularly in implementing preventive control, i.e. control of 'general conditions', regardless of whether any contract has been concluded or not?

**Answer given by Mr Dalli on behalf of the Commission  
(21 June 2012)**

EC law <sup>(1)</sup> lays down rules for the protection of consumers' interests and obliges Member States to ensure that adequate and effective means exist to prevent the continued use of unfair terms in contracts concluded with consumers <sup>(2)</sup>.

These means shall include the powers granted by national law to enforcement authorities to investigate ex officio the behaviour of individual companies and legal remedies whereby persons or organisations, having a legitimate interest in protecting consumers, may take action before the courts or competent administrative bodies for a decision on whether contractual terms drawn up for general use are unfair, in order to prevent the continued use of such terms <sup>(3)</sup>. This procedure allows consumer organisations to challenge contract terms used by businesses before national courts and, if successful, make sure that such terms are not used in the future.

Directive 2005/29/EC on Unfair Commercial Practices <sup>(4)</sup> requires traders to display in a clear, intelligible and timely manner information that consumers need to make informed choices, including on the conditions of the product or service offered. In the area of financial services Member States can adopt national legislation to provide for stricter requirements than those set out in the directive, to enhance the level of consumer protection. The Commission is reviewing the overall application of the UCPD and will issue in the course of 2012 a Report which will draw a list of the most unfair commercial practices encountered, including in the area of financial services.

For cross-border infringements of EC law, the regulation on Consumer Protection Cooperation <sup>(5)</sup> establishes an EU-wide network of enforcement authorities empowered to detect, investigate and stop such infringements.

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<sup>(1)</sup> Council Directive 93/13/EEC of 5 April 1993 on unfair terms in consumer contracts, OJ L 095, 21.4.1993, p. 29-34; Directive 2005/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 May 2005, concerning unfair business-to-consumer commercial practices in the internal market, OJ L 149/22, 11.6.2005; Directive 2009/22/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 April 2009 on injunctions for the protection of consumers' interests (Codified version), OJ L 110, 1.5.2009; Directive 2008/48/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 April 2008 on credit agreements for consumers and repealing Council Directive 87/102/EEC, OJ L 133, 22.5.2008.

<sup>(2)</sup> Article 7(1) of Directive 93/13/EEC.

<sup>(3)</sup> Article 7(2) of Directive 93/13/EEC.

<sup>(4)</sup> Directive 2005/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 May 2005 concerning unfair business-to-consumer commercial practices in the internal market and amending Council Directive 84/450/EEC, Directives 97/7/EC and 2002/65 of the European Parliament and of the Council and Regulation (EC) No 2006/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council (Unfair Commercial Practices Directive).

<sup>(5)</sup> OJ L 364, 9.12.2004.

(Versão portuguesa)

**Pergunta com pedido de resposta escrita E-004370/12**

**à Comissão**

**Nuno Melo (PPE)**

(26 de abril de 2012)

Assunto: Hepatites virais

No âmbito do Congresso Internacional do Fígado, promovido pela Associação Europeia para o Estudo do Fígado, um grupo europeu de peritos para as hepatites virais e o cancro do fígado recomendou à União Europeia e aos Estados-Membros que implementem um programa de vacinação para a hepatite B e programas de rastreio para as hepatites B e C.

Considerando que:

- A hepatite viral causa até 78 por cento dos casos de cancro do fígado e que o cancro do fígado é a terceira causa mais comum de morte por cancro em todo o mundo;
- A grande maioria dos casos de cancro de fígado podia ser prevenida com uma gestão apropriada das hepatites virais B e C e que, por isso, são necessárias medidas específicas que assegurem a deteção precoce das hepatites, das cirroses e do cancro do fígado;

Pergunto à Comissão:

- Qual a posição da Comissão sobre esta matéria?
- Que políticas europeias existem para controlar e prevenir o alastramento das hepatites virais?
- Está já a ser equacionada a implementação na União Europeia de um programa de vacinação para a hepatite B e de um programa de rastreio para as hepatites B e C, de molde a prevenir um aumento do número de ocorrências?

**Resposta dada por John Dalli em nome da Comissão**

(22 de junho de 2012)

Em conformidade com a Resolução da Assembleia Mundial da Saúde de 2010 sobre as hepatites virais e os pedidos do Parlamento e das partes interessadas, a Comissão reconhece a necessidade de novas iniciativas em matéria de saúde pública para abordar as hepatites virais. Neste contexto, em 2009, a Comissão convidou o Centro Europeu de Prevenção e Controlo das Doenças (CEPCD) a realizar estudos e projetos <sup>(1)</sup> sobre as hepatites virais, que sublinharam a situação heterogénea no interior da União, os limitados dados fiáveis sobre os custos representados por essas doenças e o valor acrescentado de medidas como o rastreio. Como resultado, o CEPCD identificou atividades suplementares para colmatar essas lacunas, atividades essas atualmente em vias de aplicação.

No contexto do Programa de Saúde da UE (2008/2013), a Comissão está a apoiar projetos que abordam as hepatites. Esses projetos dizem respeito à promoção de boas práticas e ao desenvolvimento de orientações e instrumentos de formação para a prevenção e gestão das hepatites B e C entre a população e os grupos vulneráveis.

É importante referir que a vacinação da população é da responsabilidade dos Estados-Membros, de acordo com as disposições do Tratado que preveem que a organização e a prestação de cuidados de saúde é uma responsabilidade nacional.

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(1) ([http://ecdc.europa.eu/en/healthtopics/hepatitis\\_C/Pages/index.aspx](http://ecdc.europa.eu/en/healthtopics/hepatitis_C/Pages/index.aspx)).

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-004370/12  
to the Commission  
Nuno Melo (PPE)  
(26 April 2012)**

*Subject:* Viral hepatitis

At the 2012 International Liver Congress, held by the European Association for the Study of the Liver, a European group of experts on viral hepatitis and liver cancer recommended that the European Union and its Member States implement a vaccination programme for hepatitis B and screening programmes for hepatitis B and C.

Viral hepatitis causes up to 78% of cases of liver cancer, which is the third deadliest form of cancer in the world.

The vast majority of liver cancer cases could be prevented through proper management of viral hepatitis B and C. Specific measures are therefore needed to ensure early detection of hepatitis, cirrhosis and liver cancer.

What is the Commission's view on this issue?

What EU policies are in place to monitor and prevent the spread of viral hepatitis?

Are an EU-wide vaccination programme for hepatitis B and a screening programme for hepatitis B and C already being considered, to prevent the number of cases rising?

**Answer given by Mr Dalli on behalf of the Commission  
(22 June 2012)**

In line with the 2010 World Health Assembly Resolution on viral hepatitis and requests from the Parliament and stakeholders, the Commission acknowledges the need for further public health initiatives to address viral hepatitis. In this context, in 2009, the Commission asked the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC) to carry out studies and projects <sup>(1)</sup> on viral hepatitis that underlined: the heterogeneous situation within the Union, the limited reliable data on the burden of these diseases and the added value of measures such as screening. As a result, additional activities to address these gaps have been identified by the ECDC and are currently being implemented.

Through the EU Health Programme (2008-2013), the Commission is supporting projects addressing hepatitis. These projects concern promoting good practices and developing guidelines and training tools for the prevention and management of Hepatitis B and C among the population and vulnerable groups.

It needs to be noted that vaccination of the population is under the responsibility of the Member States, according to the provisions of the Treaty which provide that the organisation and delivery of healthcare is a national responsibility.

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<sup>(1)</sup> [http://ecdc.europa.eu/en/healthtopics/hepatitis\\_C/Pages/index.aspx](http://ecdc.europa.eu/en/healthtopics/hepatitis_C/Pages/index.aspx).

(Versão portuguesa)

**Pergunta com pedido de resposta escrita E-004371/12**

**à Comissão**

**Nuno Melo (PPE)**

(26 de abril de 2012)

*Assunto:* Criminalidade contra Portugueses em Angola

— Considerando que, nos últimos meses, têm sido noticiados casos de homicídios de empresários portugueses em Angola, tendo sido relatado, na semana passada, mais um caso;

— Considerando que, em Angola, trabalham atualmente cerca de 120 mil Portugueses, sobretudo ligados ao setor da construção civil, mas também investidores e empresários em áreas diversificadas;

Pergunto à Comissão:

- Tem conhecimento desta situação?
- Que análise faz a Comissão da crescente criminalidade em Angola?

**Resposta dada pela Alta Representante/Vice-Presidente Catherine Ashton em nome da Comissão**

(19 de junho de 2012)

A União Europeia está consciente de que existe um problema crescente de segurança em Angola, especialmente na capital, Luanda, que tem afetado tanto os angolanos como os estrangeiros a viver no país.

A opinião geral, partilhada pela comunidade internacional, é a de que a criminalidade não tem afetado os portugueses de forma desproporcional em relação às outras comunidades estrangeiras. O número de vítimas portuguesas traduz simplesmente o facto de a comunidade portuguesa ser uma das mais importantes comunidades estrangeiras e de muitos dos portugueses viverem fora das zonas mais seguras de Luanda.

A União Europeia acompanha com preocupação a situação e o seu impacto sobre a segurança dos cidadãos da UE em Angola e abordará a questão no diálogo com as autoridades deste país.

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*(English version)*

**Question for written answer E-004371/12  
to the Commission  
Nuno Melo (PPE)  
(26 April 2012)**

*Subject:* Crime against Portuguese citizens in Angola

In recent months, there have been news reports of murders of Portuguese businesspeople in Angola, with yet another case reported last week.

There are currently about 120 000 Portuguese working in Angola, mainly in the building industry, along with investors and entrepreneurs in various fields.

Is the Commission aware of this situation?

How does it view the growing instances of crime in Angola?

**Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Ashton on behalf of the Commission  
(19 June 2012)**

The European Union is aware that there is an increasing problem of security in Angola, particularly in the capital city Luanda. This problem has been affecting both Angolans and foreigners living in the country.

The general opinion, shared inside the international community, is that criminality has not been disproportionately affecting the Portuguese above other foreign communities. The number of Portuguese victims simply reflects the fact that they are one of the largest foreign communities and many tend to live outside the safer areas in Luanda.

The European Union follows with concern the crime situation in Angola and its impact on the security of EU citizens and will bring up the matter in the dialogue with Angola.

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(Deutsche Fassung)

**Anfrage zur schriftlichen Beantwortung E-004372/12  
an die Kommission (Vizepräsidentin/Hohe Vertreterin)**

**Martin Ehrenhauser (NI)**

(26. April 2012)

*Betrifft:* VP/HR — Dokumente nach Geheimhaltungsstufen

1. Kann die Kommission Angaben machen, wie viele Dokumente der Geheimhaltungsstufen RESTREINT UE, CONFIDENTIEL UE, SECRET UE und TRES SECRET UE von den Mitgliedstaaten an Mitarbeiter der European Union Military Staff (EUMS), an die Intelligence Division (INT), an das Joint Situation Centre (SitCen), das European Union Sattelite Centre (EUSC) und den EAD insgesamt in den Jahren 2009, 2010 und 2011, aufgeschlüsselt nach Mitgliedstaaten und Geheimhaltungsstufen, übermittelt wurden? Wenn nicht, warum nicht?
2. Kann die Kommission Angaben machen, wie viele Dokumente der Geheimhaltungsstufen RESTREINT UE, CONFIDENTIEL UE, SECRET UE und TRES SECRET UE von den Mitarbeitern der European Union Military Staff (EUMS), der Intelligence Division (INT), des Joint Situation Centre (SitCen), des European Union Sattelite Centre (EUSC) und des EAD insgesamt in den Jahren 2009, 2010 und 2011, aufgeschlüsselt nach Geheimhaltungsstufen, erstellt wurden? Wenn nicht, warum nicht?
3. Kann die Hohe Kommission Angaben machen, wie viele Dokumente der Geheimhaltungsstufen RESTREINT UE, CONFIDENTIEL UE, SECRET UE und TRES SECRET UE von den Mitarbeitern der European Union Military Staff (EUMS), der Intelligence Division (INT), des Joint Situation Centre (SitCen), des European Union Sattelite Centres (EUSC) und des EAD insgesamt in den Jahren 2009, 2010 und 2011 an die Mitgliedstaaten, aufgeschlüsselt nach Geheimhaltungsstufen und Mitgliedstaaten, übermittelt wurden? Wenn nicht, warum nicht?

**Antwort von Frau Catherine Ashton — Hohe Vertreterin/Vizepräsidentin im Namen der Kommission**

(1. August 2012)

Die Sicherheitsvorschriften des Europäischen Auswärtigen Dienstes (EAD) legen Grundprinzipien und Standards für den Umgang mit Verschlusssachen fest.

Insgesamt werden in den EAD-Dienststellen jährlich mehrere tausend Dokumente des Geheimhaltungsgrades RESTREINT UE/EU RESTRICTED behandelt.

Die Dokumente, die als CONFIDENTIEL UE/EU CONFIDENTIAL und höher eingestuft werden, belaufen sich auf einige Hundert pro Jahr. Mehr als 90 % der Dokumente sind dem Geheimhaltungsgrad CONFIDENTIEL UE/EU CONFIDENTIAL zuzuordnen. Die übrigen sind Dokumente des Geheimhaltungsgrades SECRET UE/EU SECRET. Fast alle diese Dokumente werden an die Mitgliedstaaten übermittelt. Die Verteilung wird vom Generalsekretariat des Rates übernommen.

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(English version)

**Question for written answer E-004372/12  
to the Commission (Vice-President/High Representative)**

**Martin Ehrenhauser (NI)**

(26 April 2012)

*Subject:* VP/HR — Breakdown of documents by security classification levels

1. Can the Vice-President/High Representative say how many documents classified RESTREINT UE/EU RESTRICTED, CONFIDENTIEL UE/EU CONFIDENTIAL, SECRET UE/EU SECRET and TRÈS SECRET UE/EU TOP SECRET were supplied by Member States to personnel of the European Union Military Staff (EUMS), the Intelligence Division (INT), the Joint Situation Centre (SitCen), the European Union Satellite Centre (EUSC) and the European External Action Service (EEAS), in total, in 2009, 2010 and 2011, broken down by Member State and classification level? If not, why not?

2. Can the Vice-President/High Representative say how many documents classified RESTREINT UE/EU RESTRICTED, CONFIDENTIEL UE/EU CONFIDENTIAL, SECRET UE/EU SECRET and TRÈS SECRET UE/EU TOP SECRET were produced by EUMS, INT, SitCen, EUSC and EEAS personnel, in total, in 2009, 2010 and 2011, broken down by classification level? If not, why not?

3. Can the Vice-President/High Representative say how many documents classified RESTREINT UE/EU RESTRICTED, CONFIDENTIEL UE/EU CONFIDENTIAL, SECRET UE/EU SECRET and TRÈS SECRET UE/EU TOP SECRET were supplied to Member States by EUMS, INT, SitCen, EUSC and EEAS personnel, in total, in 2009, 2010 and 2011, broken down classification level and Member State? If not, why not?

**Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Ashton on behalf of the Commission**

(1 August 2012)

European External Action Service (EEAS) Security Rules establish basic principles and standards for the management of classified information.

Documents classified RESTREINT UE/EU RESTRICTED handled by EEAS services come to a total of many thousand a year.

Documents with security classification CONFIDENTIEL UE/EU CONFIDENTIAL and above reach several hundreds annually. More than 90% belong to the category CONFIDENTIEL UE/EU CONFIDENTIAL. The rest are SECRET UE/EU SECRET. Almost all these documents are shared with the Member States. This distribution is managed by the General Secretariat of the Council (GSC).

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(Deutsche Fassung)

**Anfrage zur schriftlichen Beantwortung E-004373/12  
an die Kommission  
Martin Ehrenhauser (NI)  
(26. April 2012)**

*Betrifft:* Dokumente nach Geheimhaltungsstufen an und von Europol

1. Kann die Kommission Angaben machen, wie viele Dokumente der Geheimhaltungsstufen RESTREINT UE, CONFIDENTIEL UE, SECRET UE und TRES SECRET UE sie, aufgeschlüsselt nach den jeweiligen Geheimhaltungsstufen und in den Jahren 2009, 2010 und 2011, an das European Police Office (Europol) übermittelt hat? Wenn nicht, warum nicht?
2. Kann die Kommission Angaben machen, wie viele Dokumente der Geheimhaltungsstufen RESTREINT UE, CONFIDENTIEL UE, SECRET UE und TRES SECRET UE sie, aufgeschlüsselt nach den jeweiligen Geheimhaltungsstufen und in Jahren 2009, 2010 und 2011, von dem European Police Office (Europol) erhalten hat? Wenn nicht, warum nicht?
3. Kann die Kommission Angaben machen, wie viele Dokumente der Geheimhaltungsstufen RESTREINT UE, CONFIDENTIEL UE, SECRET UE und TRES SECRET UE das European Police Office (Europol), aufgeschlüsselt nach den jeweiligen Geheimhaltungsstufen und in Jahren 2009, 2010 und 2011 erstellt hat? Wenn nicht, warum nicht?

**Antwort von Frau Malmström im Namen der Kommission  
(9. Juli 2012)**

Der Informationsaustausch zwischen Europol und der Europäischen Kommission basiert auf einer 2003 unterzeichneten Verwaltungsvereinbarung, die allein den Austausch strategischer (nicht personenbezogener) Informationen gestattet.

Gelegentlich übermittelt die Kommission verschlüsselte E-Mails der Geheimhaltungsstufe „RESTREINT UE“ an Europol. Die unten angegebenen Zahlen umfassen sowohl „Dokumente“ als auch „E-Mails“.

2009 und 2011 hat Europol von der Europäischen Kommission keine Dokumente/Nachrichten der Geheimhaltungsstufe „RESTREINT UE“ erhalten.

2010 gingen bei Europol 4 Dokumente/Nachrichten der Geheimhaltungsstufe „RESTREINT UE“ ein.

In den Jahren 2009, 2010 und 2011 hat die Kommission keine Dokumente/Nachrichten der Geheimhaltungsstufen „CONFIDENTIEL UE“, „SECRET UE“ sowie „TRES SECRET UE“ an Europol übermittelt.

1. Europol hat der Europäischen Kommission mehrere Verschlusssachen übermittelt:

2009: 112 Dokumente/Nachrichten der Geheimhaltungsstufe „RESTREINT UE“ oder „BPL“ (Basic Protection Level). Eine nähere Unterscheidung ist nicht möglich, da 2009 über das Registrierungssystem beide Arten von Verschlusssachen abgewickelt wurden.

2010: 8 Dokumente/Nachrichten der Geheimhaltungsstufe „RESTREINT UE“.

2011: 18 Dokumente/Nachrichten der Geheimhaltungsstufe „RESTREINT UE“.

Europol hat der Kommission keine Dokumente der Geheimhaltungsstufen „CONFIDENTIEL UE“, „SECRET UE“ und „TRES SECRET UE“ übermittelt.

2. Für Europol besteht keine rechtliche Verpflichtung, eine zentrale Registratur für „RESTREINT UE“-Dokumente zu unterhalten. Dokumente höherer Geheimhaltungsstufen werden zentral vom „Europol Confidentiality Desk“ verwaltet.

Zahl der von Europol im Zeitraum 2009 bis 2011 erstellten Verschlusssachen:

2009: „CONFIDENTIEL UE“: 3; „SECRET UE“: 0.

2010: „CONFIDENTIEL UE“: 2; „SECRET UE“: 7.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-004373/12  
to the Commission**

**Martin Ehrenhauser (NI)**

(26 April 2012)

*Subject:* Breakdown of documents supplied to and received from Europol by security classification levels

1. Can the Commission say how many documents classified RESTREINT UE/EU RESTRICTED, CONFIDENTIEL UE/EU CONFIDENTIAL, SECRET UE/EU SECRET and TRÈS SECRET UE/EU TOP SECRET it supplied to the European Police Office (Europol) in 2009, 2010 and 2011, broken down by classification level? If not, why not?
2. Can the Commission say how many documents classified RESTREINT UE/EU RESTRICTED, CONFIDENTIEL UE/EU CONFIDENTIAL, SECRET UE/EU SECRET and TRÈS SECRET UE/EU TOP SECRET it received from Europol in 2009, 2010 and 2011, broken down by classification level? If not, why not?
3. Can the Commission say how many documents classified RESTREINT UE/EU RESTRICTED, CONFIDENTIEL UE/EU CONFIDENTIAL, SECRET UE/EU SECRET and TRÈS SECRET UE/EU TOP SECRET were produced by Europol in 2009, 2010 and 2011, broken down by classification level? If not, why not?

**Answer given by Ms Malmström on behalf of the Commission**

(9 July 2012)

Europol and the European Commission can exchange information on the basis of an administrative arrangement signed in 2003 which only allows for the exchange of strategic information (non-personal data).

The Commission may sometimes send encrypted emails classified RESTREINT UE to Europol. The figures below therefore include both 'documents' and 'emails'.

Europol did not receive any classified documents/messages RESTREINT UE from the European Commission in 2009 and 2011.

In 2010 Europol received 4 documents/messages classified RESTREINT UE.

No documents/messages classified CONFIDENTIEL UE, SECRET UE AND TRES SECRET UE were sent by the Commission to Europol in 2009, 2010, 2011.

1. Europol sent several documents to the European Commission:

2009: 112 documents/messages classified RESTREINT UE or BPL (Basic Protection Level) (The distinction between the two is not possible because the registration system covered both classifications in 2009).

2010: 8 documents/messages classified RESTREINT UE.

2011: 18 documents/messages classified RESTREINT UE.

No documents classified CONFIDENTIEL UE, SECRET UE AND TRES SECRET UE were sent by Europol to the Commission.

2. There is no legal obligation requiring Europol to maintain a central registration of documents RESTREINT UE. Documents with higher classification levels are centrally managed by the Europol Confidentiality Desk.

Number of classified documents produced by Europol in years 2009-2011:

2009: CONFIDENTIEL UE: 3; SECRET UE: 0

2010: CONFIDENTIEL UE: 2; SECRET UE: 7

(Deutsche Fassung)

**Anfrage zur schriftlichen Beantwortung E-004374/12**

**an den Rat**

**Martin Ehrenhauser (NI)**

(26. April 2012)

*Betrifft:* Dokumente nach Geheimhaltungsstufen

1. Kann der Rat Angaben machen, wie viele Dokumente der Geheimhaltungsstufen RESTREINT UE, CONFIDENTIEL UE, SECRET UE und TRES SECRET UE er, aufgeschlüsselt nach den jeweiligen Geheimhaltungsstufen, in den Jahren 2009, 2010 und 2011, erstellt hat? Wenn nicht, warum nicht?
2. Kann der Rat Angaben machen, wie viele Dokumente der Geheimhaltungsstufen RESTREINT UE, CONFIDENTIEL UE, SECRET UE und TRES SECRET UE er, aufgeschlüsselt nach den jeweiligen Mitgliedstaaten und Geheimhaltungsstufen, in den Jahren 2009, 2010 und 2011, an die Mitgliedstaaten übermittelt hat? Wenn nicht, warum nicht?
3. Kann der Rat Angaben machen, wie viele Dokumente der Geheimhaltungsstufen RESTREINT UE, CONFIDENTIEL UE, SECRET UE und TRES SECRET UE er, aufgeschlüsselt nach den jeweiligen Mitgliedstaaten und Geheimhaltungsstufen, in den Jahren 2009, 2010 und 2011, von den Mitgliedstaaten erhalten hat? Wenn nicht, warum nicht?

**Antwort**

(2. Juli 2012)

Die Vorschriften für die Handhabung von EU-Verschlussachen innerhalb des Rates sind in dem Beschluss 2011/292/EU vom 31. März 2011 über die Sicherheitsvorschriften für den Schutz von EU-Verschlussachen festgelegt (ABl. L 141 vom 27. Mai 2011, S. 17).

In der nachstehenden Tabelle ist die Gesamtzahl der vom Rat bearbeiteten EU-Verschlussachen für jedes Jahr, das der Herr Abgeordnete genannt hat, aufgeführt.

Geheimhaltungsstufe	2009	2010	2011
RESTREINT UE/EU RESTRICTED	8 859	7 869	7 051
CONFIDENTIEL UE/EU CONFIDENTIAL	513	481	468
SECRET UE/EU SECRET	20	31	32
TRES SECRET UE/EU TOP SECRET	0	0	0
Gesamt	9 392	8 381	7 551

Generell werden Ratsdokumente an alle Mitglieder des Rates, Vertreter der Kommission und den EAD sowie deren zuständige Verwaltungsdienststellen verteilt, die gewährleisten müssen, dass der Zugang nur Personen gewährt wird, die in Kenntnis gesetzt werden müssen. In wenigen Fällen werden allerdings einige Dokumente aufgrund spezifischer Bestimmungen des Vertrags (z. B. Artikel 5 des Protokolls Nr. 22) nicht an alle EU-Mitgliedstaaten verteilt. Die meisten Verschlussachen beziehen sich auf den GASP-Bereich, und eine bedeutende Anzahl Verschlussachen erhält der Rat von der Kommission und dem EAD.

Aus Gründen der Vertraulichkeit und wegen des Grundsatzes der Kontrolle durch den Urheber kann der Rat keine detaillierten Angaben dazu machen, wie viele Verschlussachen er von jedem Mitgliedstaat erhält.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-004374/12  
to the Council**

**Martin Ehrenhauser (NI)**

(26 April 2012)

*Subject:* Breakdown of documents by security classification levels

1. Can the Council say how many documents classified EU RESTRICTED, EU CONFIDENTIAL, EU SECRET and EU TOP SECRET it produced in 2009, 2010 and 2011, broken down by classification level? If not, why not?
2. Can the Council say how many documents classified EU RESTRICTED, EU CONFIDENTIAL, EU SECRET and EU TOP SECRET it supplied to Member States in 2009, 2010 and 2011, broken down by Member State and classification level? If not, why not?
3. Can the Council say how many documents classified EU RESTRICTED, EU CONFIDENTIAL, EU SECRET and EU TOP SECRET it received from Member States in 2009, 2010 and 2011, broken down by Member State and classification level? If not, why not?

**Reply**

(2 July 2012)

The rules governing the handling of EU classified information within the Council are established in Council Decision 2011/292/EU of 31 March 2011 on the security rules for protecting EU classified information (OJ L 141, 27.5.2011, p. 17).

The table below gives the total number of EU classified documents handled by the Council for each of the years referred to by the Honourable Member:

Classification level	2009	2010	2011
RESTREINT UE/EU RESTRICTED	8 859	7 869	7 051
CONFIDENTIEL UE/EU CONFIDENTIAL	513	481	468
SECRET UE/EU SECRET	20	31	32
TRES SECRET UE/EU TOP SECRET	0	0	0
Total	9 392	8 381	7 551

As a general rule, Council documents are distributed to all members of the Council, representatives of the Commission and the EEAS and their relevant administrative services which have to ensure that access is granted only to individuals with a need to know. However, in a few cases some documents are not distributed to all EU Member States on account of specific Treaty provisions (e.g. Article 5 of Protocol No 22). Most classified documents relate to the CFSP, and a significant number are received by the Council from the Commission and the EEAS.

For reasons of confidentiality and the principle of originator control, the Council is not in a position to provide detailed information on how many classified documents it receives from each Member State.

(Deutsche Fassung)

**Anfrage zur schriftlichen Beantwortung E-004375/12**

**an die Kommission**

**Martin Ehrenhauser (NI)**

(26. April 2012)

*Betrifft:* Dokumente nach Geheimhaltungsstufen

1. Kann die Kommission Angaben machen, wie viele Dokumente der Geheimhaltungsstufen RESTREINT UE, CONFIDENTIEL UE, SECRET UE und TRES SECRET UE sie, aufgeschlüsselt nach den jeweiligen Geheimhaltungsstufen, in den Jahren 2009, 2010 und 2011, erstellt hat? Wenn nicht, warum nicht?
2. Kann die Kommission Angaben machen, wie viele Dokumente der Geheimhaltungsstufen RESTREINT UE, CONFIDENTIEL UE, SECRET UE und TRES SECRET UE sie, aufgeschlüsselt nach den jeweiligen Mitgliedstaaten und Geheimhaltungsstufen, in den Jahren 2009, 2010 und 2011, an die Mitgliedstaaten übermittelt hat? Wenn nicht, warum nicht?
3. Kann die Kommission Angaben machen, wie viele Dokumente der Geheimhaltungsstufen RESTREINT UE, CONFIDENTIEL UE, SECRET UE und TRES SECRET UE sie, aufgeschlüsselt nach den jeweiligen Mitgliedstaaten und Geheimhaltungsstufen, in den Jahren 2009, 2010 und 2011, von den Mitgliedstaaten erhalten hat? Wenn nicht, warum nicht?

**Anfrage zur schriftlichen Beantwortung E-004377/12**

**an die Kommission**

**Martin Ehrenhauser (NI)**

(26. April 2012)

*Betrifft:* Sicherheitsüberprüfungen für Zugang zu Kommissions-Verschlusssachen

Die Regeln, die der Rat in Bezug auf den Zugang zu EU-Verschlusssachen anwendet, sind im Ratsbeschluss vom 18. Juni 2007 niedergelegt. Für den Zugang zu EU-VERTRAULICH oder höher eingestuftem Verschlusssachen des Rates wird die jeweilige Person einer Sicherheitsüberprüfung unterzogen.

1. Kann die Kommission Angaben machen, wie viele Personen, aufgeschlüsselt nach den Geheimhaltungsstufen EU-VERTRAULICH, EU-GEHEIM und EU-STRENG GEHEIM sowie nach den Jahren 2009, 2010 und 2011, den Sicherheitsüberprüfungen unterzogen wurden? Wenn nicht, warum nicht?
2. Kann die Kommission Angaben machen, von wem diese Sicherheitsüberprüfungen unternommen werden, wie lange der Ablauf einer solchen Sicherheitsüberprüfung dauert, wie sich der Ablauf einer solchen Sicherheitsüberprüfung gestaltet und was konkret überprüft wird? Wenn nicht, warum nicht?
3. Kann die Kommission Angaben machen, wie viele Personen, aufgeschlüsselt nach den jeweiligen Geheimhaltungsstufen und ihrer Staatsangehörigkeit, diese Sicherheitsüberprüfung in den Jahren 2009, 2010 und 2011 nicht bestanden haben? Wenn nicht, warum nicht?
4. Kann die Kommission Angaben machen, wie viele Personen, aufgeschlüsselt nach Staatsangehörigkeit, befugt sind, Dokumente in den Klassifizierungsstufen EU-VERTRAULICH, EU-GEHEIM und EU-STRENG GEHEIM zu erhalten? Wenn nicht, warum nicht?

**Gemeinsame Antwort von Herrn Šeřčovič im Namen der Kommission**

(29. Juni 2012)

Für den Austausch von Verschlusssachen und den Umgang mit ihnen bei der Kommission gelten die Sicherheitsbestimmungen im Anhang zum Beschluss 2001/844/EG, EGKS, Euratom der Kommission vom 29. November 2001 zur Änderung ihrer Geschäftsordnung <sup>(1)</sup>. Diese Bestimmungen enthalten unter anderem die Grundprinzipien — wie die Grundsätze „Kenntnis nur, wenn notwendig“ und „Zustimmung des Urhebers“ — und Mindeststandards für den Schutz von EU-Verschlusssachen, insbesondere was ihre Vertraulichkeit angeht.

<sup>(1)</sup> ABl. L 317 vom 3.12.2001.



Bezüglich der Anforderungen und Verfahren für Sicherheitsüberprüfungen von Kommissionsbediensteten heißt es in den Sicherheitsvorschriften der Kommission, dass der Zugang zu EU-Verschlusssachen des Geheimhaltungsgrades CONFIDENTIEL UE und höher auf Personen beschränkt ist, die aufgrund ihrer Aufgabenbereiche nachweislich Kenntnis der betreffenden Verschlusssache haben müssen, entsprechend sicherheitsermächtigt sind und über ihre Pflicht zum Schutz von EU-Verschlusssachen belehrt wurden.

Die Sicherheitsüberprüfungen werden gemäß den nationalen Rechts- und Verwaltungsvorschriften unter der Verantwortung der nationalen Sicherheitsbehörde oder einer anderen zuständigen Behörde des Mitgliedstaates durchgeführt, dessen Staatsangehörigkeit die betreffende Person besitzt. Diese Überprüfungen dienen insbesondere dazu, die Loyalität, Vertrauenswürdigkeit und Zuverlässigkeit der betreffenden Person zu beurteilen. Die Verfahren und Kriterien sind in den nationalen Rechts- und Verwaltungsvorschriften der Mitgliedstaaten festgelegt.

Aufgrund des Verwaltungsaufwands kann die Kommission weder zur Zahl der Personen, die überprüft oder sicherheitsermächtigt wurden oder denen eine Sicherheitsermächtigung verweigert wurde, noch zu der Zahl und den Empfängern der EU-Verschlusssachen detaillierte Angaben machen.

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(English version)

**Question for written answer E-004375/12  
to the Commission**

**Martin Ehrenhauser (NI)**

(26 April 2012)

*Subject:* Breakdown of documents by security classification levels

1. Can the Commission say how many documents classified RESTREINT UE/EU RESTRICTED, CONFIDENTIEL UE/EU CONFIDENTIAL, SECRET UE/EU SECRET and TRÈS SECRET UE/EU TOP SECRET it produced in 2009, 2010 and 2011, broken down by classification level? If not, why not?
2. Can the Commission say how many documents classified RESTREINT UE/EU RESTRICTED, CONFIDENTIEL UE/EU CONFIDENTIAL, SECRET UE/EU SECRET and TRÈS SECRET UE/EU TOP SECRET it supplied to Member States in 2009, 2010 and 2011, broken down by Member State and classification level? If not, why not?
3. Can the Commission say how many documents classified RESTREINT UE/EU RESTRICTED, CONFIDENTIEL UE/EU CONFIDENTIAL, SECRET UE/EU SECRET and TRÈS SECRET UE/EU TOP SECRET it received from Member States in 2009, 2010 and 2011, broken down by Member State and classification level? If not, why not?

**Question for written answer E-004377/12  
to the Commission**

**Martin Ehrenhauser (NI)**

(26 April 2012)

*Subject:* Security clearance for access to classified Commission information

The rules applied by the Council for access to EU classified information are set down in the Council Decision of 18 June 2007. Personal security clearance is required for access to Council information classified EU CONFIDENTIAL or higher.

1. Can the Commission say how many individuals were screened in 2009, 2010 and 2011, broken down by EU CONFIDENTIAL, EU SECRET and EU TOP SECRET classification levels? If not, why not?
2. Can the Commission say who carries out these screenings, how long they take, how they are carried out, and what specifically is vetted? If not, why not?
3. Can the Commission say how many individuals failed security clearance in 2009, 2010 and 2011, broken down by classification level and nationality? If not, why not?
4. Can the Commission say how many individuals are authorised to receive documents classified EU CONFIDENTIAL, EU SECRET and EU TOP SECRET, broken down by nationality? If not, why not?

**Joint answer given by Mr Šefčovič on behalf of the Commission**

(29 June 2012)

The Commission handles and exchanges classified information in accordance with the security provisions set out in the annex to Commission Decision 2001/844/EC, ECSC, Euratom of 29 November 2001 amending its internal rules of procedure<sup>(1)</sup>. These provisions include the basic principles — such as the need-to-know and the originator consent principles — and minimum standards for protecting European Union Classified Information (EUCI), in particular as regards the confidentiality thereof.

As to the requirements and procedures concerning security clearances for Commission staff, the Commission's security rules indicate that access to EUCI of the level of CONFIDENTIEL UE and above is authorised only for individuals who by reason of their duties have an established need-to-know, are appropriately security cleared and have been briefed on their responsibilities for protecting EUCI.

<sup>(1)</sup> OJ L 317, 3.12.2001.

The security investigations are conducted, in accordance with national laws and regulations, under the authority of the National Security Authority (NSA) or any other competent authority of the Member State of which the individual concerned is a national. These 'vettings' aim in particular at assessing the loyalty, trustworthiness and reliability of the individual concerned. The procedures and criteria are laid down in the Member States' national laws and regulations.

For reasons pertaining to the administrative burden involved, the Commission is not in a position to give out any detailed information neither on the number of individuals screened, security-cleared or having been refused a security clearance, nor on the numbers, addressees and recipients of EUCI.

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(Deutsche Fassung)

**Anfrage zur schriftlichen Beantwortung E-004376/12**

**an den Rat**

**Martin Ehrenhauser (NI)**

(26. April 2012)

*Betrifft:* Sicherheitsüberprüfungen für Zugang zu Rat-Verschlusssachen

Die Regeln, die der Rat in Bezug auf den Zugang zu EU-Verschlusssachen anwendet, sind im Ratsbeschluss vom 18. Juni 2007 niedergelegt. Für den Zugang zu EU-VERTRAULICH oder höher eingestuftem Verschlusssachen des Rates wird die jeweilige Person einer Sicherheitsüberprüfung unterzogen.

1. Kann der Rat Angaben machen, wie viele Personen, aufgeschlüsselt nach den Geheimhaltungsstufen EU-VERTRAULICH, EU-GEHEIM und EU-STRENG GEHEIM sowie nach den Jahren 2009, 2010 und 2011, den Sicherheitsüberprüfungen unterzogen wurden? Wenn nicht, warum nicht?
2. Kann der Rat Angaben machen, von wem diese Sicherheitsüberprüfungen unternommen werden, wie lange der Ablauf einer solchen Sicherheitsüberprüfung dauert, wie sich der Ablauf einer solchen Sicherheitsüberprüfung gestaltet und was konkret überprüft wird? Wenn nicht, warum nicht?
3. Kann der Rat Angaben machen, wie viele Personen, aufgeschlüsselt nach den jeweiligen Geheimhaltungsstufen und ihrer Staatsangehörigkeit, diese Sicherheitsüberprüfung in den Jahren 2009, 2010 und 2011 nicht bestanden haben? Wenn nicht, warum nicht?
4. Kann der Rat Angaben machen, wie viele Personen, aufgeschlüsselt nach Staatsangehörigkeit, befugt sind, Dokumente in den Klassifizierungsstufen EU-VERTRAULICH, EU-GEHEIM und EU-STRENG GEHEIM zu erhalten? Wenn nicht, warum nicht?

**Antwort**

(16. Juli 2012)

Die Sicherheitsvorschriften des Rates für den Schutz von EU-Verschlusssachen sind im Beschluss 2011/292/EU des Rates vom 31. März 2011 (ABl. L 141 vom 27.5.2011, S. 17) niedergelegt.

Die Mitgliedstaaten und andere EU-Organe und -einrichtungen sind nicht verpflichtet, das Generalsekretariat des Rates systematisch über die Gesamtzahl der an Bedienstete erteilten Sicherheitsermächtigungen zu unterrichten. In Sitzungen, in denen EU-Verschlusssachen erörtert werden, wird der Sicherheitsstatus der Delegierten allerdings überprüft. Die Sicherheitsermächtigungen sind unterschiedlich lange gültig (zwischen 3 und 10 Jahre) oder aber so lange, wie dies für bestimmte Aufgaben oder Verträge erforderlich ist.

Personen, die sicherheitsüberprüft werden müssen, füllen einen nationalen Sicherheitsfragebogen aus, der ihrer Nationalen Sicherheitsbehörde bzw. einer anderen zuständigen nationalen Behörde zugeleitet wird, damit diese eine Sicherheitsüberprüfung für den Geheimhaltungsgrad von EU-Verschlusssachen durchführt, zu denen die betreffende Person Zugang haben muss. Hat die betreffende Person ihren Wohnsitz im Hoheitsgebiet eines anderen Mitgliedstaats oder eines Drittstaats, so ersuchen die zuständigen nationalen Behörden die zuständige Behörde des Wohnsitzstaats um Unterstützung.

Nach Artikel 7 Absatz 2 der oben genannten Sicherheitsvorschriften des Rates dienen die Verfahren für die Sicherheitsüberprüfung des Personals der Feststellung, ob eine Person unter Berücksichtigung ihrer Loyalität, Vertrauenswürdigkeit und Zuverlässigkeit zum Zugang zu EU-Verschlusssachen ermächtigt werden kann. Die Überprüfungsstandards müssen den innerstaatlichen Rechtsvorschriften entsprechen. Die Hauptkriterien für die Sicherheitsüberprüfung sind in Anhang I Nrn. 8 bis 10 der Sicherheitsvorschriften des Rates festgelegt.

Das Generalsekretariat des Rates hat ermittelt, für welche Aufgaben seine Bediensteten eine EU-Sicherheitsermächtigung („EU PSC“) benötigen und für welche Geheimhaltungsstufe. Eine Sicherheitsüberprüfung ist daher an eine bestimmte Aufgabe gebunden und nicht an die Staatsangehörigkeit einer Person. Die Bearbeitungszeit, die eine Nationale Sicherheitsbehörde braucht, um einem Ersuchen um Sicherheitsüberprüfung nachzukommen, ist von Fall zu Fall verschieden; im allgemeinen liegt sie zwischen 3 und 12 Monaten. Führt das Ergebnis der Sicherheitsüberprüfung zu der Feststellung, dass über die betreffende Person keine nachteiligen Erkenntnisse vorliegen, die ihre Loyalität, Vertrauenswürdigkeit und Zuverlässigkeit infrage stellen, so kann die Anstellungsbehörde des Generalsekretariats des Rates eine EU-Sicherheitsermächtigung erteilen.

Am 16. Mai waren ca. 2 040 Bedienstete des Generalsekretariats des Rates (d. h. rund zwei Drittel aller Bediensteten) einer Sicherheitsüberprüfung unterzogen, die ihnen bei ihrer Arbeit Zugang zu Verschlusssachen gewährt.

Im Generalsekretariat des Rates haben im Zeitraum 2009 bis 2011 fünf Anträge zunächst nicht zu der für den Zugang zu EU-Verschlusssachen erforderlichen Feststellung der Nationalen Sicherheitsbehörden geführt. Sicherheitsüberprüfungen unterliegen ebenso wie die daraus hervorgehenden Ergebnisse den in den betreffenden Mitgliedstaaten geltenden einzelstaatlichen Rechtsvorschriften und Regelungen. Entscheidungen der Anstellungsbehörde des Generalsekretariats des Rates sind gemäß dem Statut der Beamten der Europäischen Union anfechtbar.

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(English version)

**Question for written answer E-004376/12  
to the Council**

**Martin Ehrenhauser (NI)**

(26 April 2012)

*Subject:* Security clearance for access to classified Council information

The rules applied by the Council for access to EU classified information are set down in the Council Decision of 18 June 2007. Personal security clearance is required for access to Council information classified EU CONFIDENTIAL or higher.

1. Can the Council say how many individuals were screened in 2009, 2010 and 2011, broken down by EU CONFIDENTIAL, EU SECRET and EU TOP SECRET classification levels? If not, why not?
2. Can the Council say who carries out these screenings, how long they take, how they are carried out, and what specifically is vetted? If not, why not?
3. Can the Council say how many individuals failed security clearance in 2009, 2010 and 2011, broken down by classification level and nationality? If not, why not?
4. Can the Council say how many individuals are authorised to receive documents classified EU CONFIDENTIAL, EU SECRET and EU TOP SECRET, broken down by nationality? If not, why not?

**Reply**

(16 July 2012)

The Council's security rules for protecting EU classified information are laid down in Council Decision 2011/292/EU of 31 March 2011 (OJ L 141, 27.5.2011, p. 17).

Member States and other EU institutions or bodies are not required to inform the GSC systematically about the total number of EU clearances they issue to staff. However, the clearance status of delegates in meetings where EU classified information is discussed is verified. Clearances are valid for various periods of time (ranging from 3 to 10 years) or else for as long as a certain task or contract requires.

Individuals requiring clearance complete a national personnel security questionnaire which is forwarded to their National Security Authority, or other competent national authority, to conduct a security investigation for the level of EU classified information to which the individual will require access. Should the individual concerned reside on the territory of another Member State or a third State, the competent national authorities seek assistance from the competent authority of the State of residence.

Article 7(2) of the Council security rules cited above provides that personnel security clearance procedures shall be designed to determine whether an individual, taking into account his or her loyalty, trustworthiness and reliability, may be authorised to access EU classified information. The standards of investigation are in accordance with national laws and regulations. The principal security investigation criteria used are referred to in paragraphs 8 to 10 of Annex I to the Council security rules.

The General Secretariat of the Council has identified the staff positions which require an EU Personnel Security Clearance ('EU PSC'), and the relevant level. Clearance is therefore required for the particular position, and not based on the nationality of the individual. Response times for requests for security clearances vary from one NSA to another but generally take between 3 and 12 months. Where the security investigation results in an assurance from the NSA that nothing adverse is known which would call into question the loyalty, trustworthiness or reliability of the individual, the GSC Appointing Authority may then grant an EU PSC.

On 16 May approximately 2040 GSC staff members (i.e. around two thirds of the total staff) were cleared to access classified information for their work.

In the GSC in the period from 2009 to 2011, five requests for screening did not initially result in the necessary assurance being provided by NSAs for clearance to be granted for access to EU classified information. Security investigations together with the results obtained are subject to the relevant laws and regulations in force in the Member State concerned. Decisions by the GSC Appointing Authority are subject to appeals in accordance with the Staff Regulations of Officials of the European Union.

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(Deutsche Fassung)

**Anfrage zur schriftlichen Beantwortung E-004378/12**

**an die Kommission**

**Hans-Peter Martin (NI)**

(26. April 2012)

*Betrifft:* Auswirkungen von Hitzewellen auf die Bausubstanz und den Betrieb von Kernkraftwerken

Im März 2012 veröffentlichte der Weltklimarat IPCC einen Gesamtbericht zum Klimawandel. Demnach werden starke Hitzewellen in den meisten Landregionen mit hoher Wahrscheinlichkeit häufiger, länger und intensiver ausfallen. Dies gelte auf dem europäischen Kontinent vor allem für Südeuropa. Mittel- und Nordeuropa könnten dem Bericht zufolge jedoch ebenfalls betroffen sein. Seit Juni 2011 werden die Atomkraftwerke in der EU Stresstests unterzogen.

Sind der Kommission Vorfälle an europäischen Atomkraftwerken bekannt, bei denen Schäden an der Bausubstanz von Kernkraftwerken entdeckt wurden, die auf Hitzewellen zurückzuführen waren? Wenn ja, bei welchen Kernkraftwerken war dies der Fall?

Werden im Rahmen der an den europäischen Kernkraftwerken durchgeführten Stresstests auch die Auswirkungen von Hitzewellen auf die Bausubstanz und auf den Betrieb der Kraftwerke untersucht? Wenn ja, welche Ergebnisse brachten die bisherigen Untersuchungen? Wenn nicht, werden derartige Untersuchungen noch durchgeführt?

Sieht sich die Kommission aufgrund der Ergebnisse des Berichts des Weltklimarates IPCC dazu veranlasst, die Auswirkungen von Extremwettererscheinungen auf den Betrieb und die Bausubstanz von Kernkraftwerken noch einmal intensiv zu untersuchen?

**Antwort von Herrn Oettinger im Namen der Kommission**

(12. Juni 2012)

Die Kommission hat keine Kenntnis von sicherheitsrelevanten Vorfällen, bei denen ein Schaden an der Bausubstanz europäischer Kernkraftwerke aufgrund von Hitzewellen festgestellt wurde.

Extreme Wetterverhältnisse, einschließlich besonders hoher oder niedriger Temperaturen, waren ausdrücklich Gegenstand der Überprüfung im Rahmen der EU-Stresstests.

Sobald deren Ergebnisse zur Verfügung stehen, wird die Kommission ihren Abschlussbericht vorlegen.

Außerdem wurde für die Kommission im Jahr 2011 eine spezifische Studie <sup>(1)</sup> durchgeführt zum Investitionsbedarf für künftige Anpassungsmaßnahmen in Kernkraftwerken in der EU und andere Technologien zur Stromerzeugung im Zusammenhang mit dem Klimawandel, welche Bezug auf Hitzewellen nimmt und auf die wir den Herrn Abgeordneten verweisen.

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<sup>(1)</sup> [http://ec.europa.eu/energy/nuclear/studies/doc/2011\\_03\\_eur24769-en.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/energy/nuclear/studies/doc/2011_03_eur24769-en.pdf)



(English version)

**Question for written answer E-004378/12  
to the Commission**

**Hans-Peter Martin (NI)**

(26 April 2012)

*Subject:* The impact of heat waves on the structure and operation of nuclear power stations

In March 2012, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) published a general report on climate change. The report stated that most regions are likely to see more frequent, more prolonged and more intense heat waves. In Europe, this applies in particular to southern Europe, with central and northern Europe also possibly affected. Since June 2011, nuclear power stations in the EU have been subject to stress tests.

Is the Commission aware of incidents involving European nuclear power stations where damage to their structure was found to be due to heat waves? If so, which nuclear power stations were affected?

Do the stress tests being carried out on European nuclear power stations also examine the impact of heat waves on the structure and operation of power stations? If so, what have been the results of the tests undertaken so far? If not, are such tests still under way?

Does the Commission consider that the IPCC report findings give reason to initiate further intensive examination on the impact of extreme weather conditions on the operation and structure of nuclear power stations?

**Answer given by Mr Oettinger on behalf of the Commission**

(12 June 2012)

The Commission is not aware of safety related incidents involving European nuclear power stations where damage to their structure was found to be due to heat waves.

Extreme weather scenarios, including extreme high and low temperatures, were explicitly part of the scope covered during the EU stress tests.

As soon as the results of the stress tests are available, the final report of the Commission will be presented.

Moreover, a specific study <sup>(1)</sup> has been carried out for the Commission in 2011 on investment needs for future adaptation measures in EU nuclear power plants and other electricity generation technologies due to effects of climate change, which includes reference to heat waves and to which we refer the Honourable Member.

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<sup>(1)</sup> [http://ec.europa.eu/energy/nuclear/studies/doc/2011\\_03\\_eur24769-en.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/energy/nuclear/studies/doc/2011_03_eur24769-en.pdf)

(Deutsche Fassung)

**Anfrage zur schriftlichen Beantwortung E-004379/12**

**an die Kommission**

**Angelika Werthmann (NI)**

(26. April 2012)

*Betrifft:* Europäisches Nachbarschaftsinstrument COM(2011)0839

In dem Vorschlag für eine Verordnung des Europäischen Parlamentes und des Rates zur Schaffung eines Europäischen Nachbarschaftsinstrumentes heißt es in Artikel 11, Absatz 2: „Die betreffenden Mitgliedstaaten, Partnerländer und internationalen Organisationen gewährleisten das reibungslose Funktionieren des Verwaltungs- und Kontrollsystems, die Recht- und Ordnungsmäßigkeit der zugrundeliegenden Vorgänge sowie die Einhaltung des Grundsatzes der Wirtschaftlichkeit der Haushaltsführung. Sie sind für die Verwaltung und Kontrolle der Programme zuständig“.

1. Bedeutet der letzte Satz, dass die Kommission die Kontrolle über die ordnungsgemäße Verwendung der EU-Mittel, über Revisionen vor Ort, etc. komplett aus der Hand gibt?
2. Beabsichtigt die Kommission mit diesem Satz, die Verantwortung für EU-Mittel von sich zu weisen?
3. Werden durch diese Absicht der Kommission die Rechte von OLAF berührt oder gar eingeschränkt?

**Antwort von Herrn Füle im Namen der Kommission**

(4. Juli 2012)

Zu den Fragen 1 und 2: Der Vorschlag sieht in Artikel 11 Absatz 2 die Möglichkeit vor, dass gemeinsame grenzübergreifende operationelle Programme nach dem Prinzip der sogenannten geteilten Verantwortung mit den Mitgliedstaaten umgesetzt werden. Dies bedeutet nicht, dass die Kommission die Kontrolle über die Verwaltung der Mittel oder die Verantwortung hierfür abgibt. Nach dem Vertrag über die Arbeitsweise der EU (AEUV) und der Haushaltsordnung der EU ist die Kommission für den Vollzug des EU-Haushalts zuständig. Während die alleinige Zuständigkeit hierfür bei der Kommission liegt, ist das Parlament seinerseits dafür zuständig, dieser eine Entlastung für die Ausführung sämtlicher Teile des EU-Haushaltsplans zu erteilen. Die Mitgliedstaaten (und Drittländer bzw. internationale Organisationen) sind nur in dem Maß für die Ausführung des EU-Haushaltsplans zuständig, in dem sie nach den geltenden EU-Vorschriften damit beauftragt wurden.

Nach diesen Vorschriften (die größtenteils in der Haushaltsordnung festgelegt sind) haben die Mitgliedstaaten eine wirtschaftliche Haushaltsführung und den Schutz der finanziellen Interessen der Union sicherzustellen. Zu diesem Zweck müssen sie wirksame und effiziente Kontrollsysteme einführen, Überprüfungen vornehmen und zu Unrecht gezahlte Beträge wieder einziehen, um die Rechts- und Ordnungsmäßigkeit der Finanzvorgänge zu gewährleisten, und für die Veröffentlichung der Informationen über die Empfänger sorgen.

3. Die Zuständigkeiten von OLAF bleiben unberührt. Das Amt ist nicht an den Grundsatz der einzigen Prüfung oder die Ergebnisse von Kontrollen, Rechnungsprüfungen oder Berichten anderer Behörden gebunden. Der Grundsatz, nach dem die Normen auf dem Gebiet der Rechnungsführung, Rechnungsprüfung, Kontrolle und Auftragsvergabe Garantien bieten müssen, die den durch die international anerkannten Normen gebotenen Garantien gleichwertig sind, hindert OLAF nicht daran, Untersuchungen durchzuführen, wenn ein Verdacht auf Betrug, Korruption oder andere rechtswidrige Tätigkeiten besteht, die die finanziellen Interessen der EU beeinträchtigen könnten.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-004379/12  
to the Commission  
Angelika Werthmann (NI)  
(26 April 2012)**

*Subject:* European Neighbourhood Instrument (COM(2011) 0839)

Article 11(2) of the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing a European Neighbourhood Instrument states: 'Member States, partner countries and international organisations concerned shall ensure the effective functioning of their management and control system, the legality and regularity of the underlying transactions and the respect of the principle of sound financial management. They shall be responsible for the management and control of the programmes.'

1. Can the Commission state if the last sentence means that it is completely relinquishing control of the proper use of EU funds, local audits, etc.?
2. Does the Commission intend this sentence to indicate that it is relinquishing responsibility for EU funds?
3. Does this intention on the Commission's part affect or even restrict the rights of the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF)?

**Answer given by Mr Füle on behalf of the Commission  
(4 July 2012)**

1 and 2. The proposal of Article 11(2) foresees the possibility of cross-border joint operational programmes to be implemented with so-called shared management with Member States. This does not indicate that the Commission relinquishes control or responsibility for the use of EU funds. According to the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU (TFEU) and the EU Financial Regulation (FR), the Commission is responsible for the implementation of the EU budget. The corollary of this sole responsibility is the discharge given by the Parliament to the Commission for the implementation of all the parts of the EU budget. Member States (and third countries or international organisations) are responsible for the implementation of the EU budget only to the extent they have been tasked to do it in accordance with the applicable EU rules.

These rules (laid down mainly in the FR) require Member States to ensure sound financial management and the protection of the Union's financial interests. To this effect, Member States shall put in place effective and efficient control systems, conduct checks and recover funds unduly paid to ensure the legality and regularity of the financial operations and provide for the publication of beneficiaries.

3. The competences of OLAF remain unaffected. The Office is not bound by the single audit principle or by the results of any other authority's control, audit or report. The principle requiring that accounting, audit, control and procurement procedures standards offer guarantees equivalent to internationally accepted standards represents no obstacle for OLAF to carry out investigations concerning allegations of fraud, corruption and any other illegal activity potentially affecting the EU's financial interests.

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(České znění)

**Otázka k písemnému zodpovězení E-004380/12**

**Komisi**

**Andrea Češková (ECR)**

(26. dubna 2012)

**Předmět:** Zastoupení žen ve vedoucích pozicích – kvóty

Komisařka Viviane Redingová vyzvala v loňském roce evropské firmy, aby se pustily do řešení otázky nerovnoměrného zastoupení mužů a žen ve vedoucích pozicích formou dobrovolných opatření. V současné době probíhá do konce května připomínkové řízení (veřejná debata) všech zainteresovaných stran ohledně kvót. Výsledek této debaty bude Komisí analyzován a popřípadě vyústí v legislativní návrh týkající se závazných opatření s cílem zvýšit zastoupení žen do roku 2015 na 30 % a do roku 2020 na 40 %.

V této souvislosti si dovoluji položit Komisi následující otázky a požádat o jejich individuální zodpovězení:

1. Myslí si Komise, že závazná opatření pro stanovení počtu žen ve vedení podniků přinese prospěch ženám?
2. Myslí si Komise, že kvóty přinesou prospěch zvláště ženám, které mají rodičovské povinnosti?
3. Nemyslí si Komise, že samotné kvóty k dosažení daného cíle nestačí? Nejsou hlavní příčinou dlouhá pracovní doba, kterou právě vedoucí pozice vyžadují, a také nedostatečně zavedená opatření týkající se péče o děti, jejichž vyřešení právě ženám s dětmi umožní ve vedoucích pozicích zůstat či se do nich dostat?
4. Nemohla by Komise předložit výzkumy či dopady (i již zmíněné tříměsíční veřejné debaty) kvót u malých a středních podniků?
5. Mohla by Komise konkrétně definovat, jakých podniků by se mělo zavedení kvót týkat, a také definovat pojem „vedoucí pozice“?

**Odpověď paní Redingové jménem Komise**

(25. června 2012)

Jak místopředsdkyně Komise Viviane Redingová oznámila dne 5. března 2012 <sup>(1)</sup>, Komise zahájila veřejnou konzultaci, jejímž cílem je nalézt vhodná opatření, která by zmírnila nerovnoměrné zastoupení mužů a žen v řídicích orgánech společností v Evropě, a zjistit názor na případná opatření na úrovni EU, včetně právních předpisů, která by tuto nevyváženost napravila. Veřejná konzultace byla ukončena dne 28. března 2012 a poslouží jako podklad pro posouzení dopadů, které Komise vypracuje. V návaznosti na výsledky pak Komise v průběhu tohoto roku rozhodne o dalších krocích.

Odpovědi na jednotlivé otázky:

1. a 2. Účelem probíhajícího posuzování dopadů je právě určení možných přínosů, které by závazná a nezávazná opatření znamenala pro podniky, společnost i jednotlivce. Komise zatím nemá dostatek informací, aby mohla zaujmout konečné stanovisko.
3. Závazné cíle samy o sobě by k napravení nerovnováhy na trhu práce určitě nestačily, musela by je provázet řada doprovodných opatření. Komise však ještě nerozhodla, k jakým opatřením se přistoupí.
4. Objevuje se stále více výzkumů a důkazů o tom, jaké dopady má větší zastoupení žen ve vedení společností. Komisi však není znám žádný výzkum týkající se kvót v malých a středních podnicích.
5. Otázka, na jaké společnosti a pozice by se měla iniciativa EU zaměřit, je součástí veřejné konzultace.

<sup>(1)</sup> Viz tisková zpráva IP/12/213.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-004380/12**  
**to the Commission**  
**Andrea Češková (ECR)**  
(26 April 2012)

*Subject:* Representation of women in senior positions — quotas

Last year, Commissioner Viviane Reding called on European companies to address the issue of the unequal representation of men and women in senior positions through voluntary measures. Consultation (public debate) over quotas with all interested parties is currently underway and will continue until the end of May. The outcome of this debate will be analysed by the Commission and may result in a legislative proposal for binding measures aimed at increasing the representation of women to 30% by 2015 and to 40% by 2020.

In this context, I wish to put the following questions to the Commission, and ask that they be answered individually:

1. Does the Commission think that binding measures specifying the number of women in the management of businesses will benefit women?
2. Does the Commission think that quotas will, in particular, benefit women who have family obligations?
3. Does the Commission not think that quotas alone will be insufficient to achieve the objective in question? Are the main causes not the long working hours, which are what senior positions demand, and also the inadequate implementation of childcare measures, which if tackled would enable women with children to remain in senior positions or to attain them in the first place?
4. Could the Commission present research on quotas (including the abovementioned three-month public debate) in SMEs or on the impact of such quotas?
5. Could the Commission specifically define which companies the introduction of quotas would affect, and also define the term 'senior position'?

**Answer given by Mrs Reding on behalf of the Commission**  
(25 June 2012)

As announced by Commission Vice-President Viviane Reding on 5 March 2012 <sup>(1)</sup>, the Commission launched a public consultation to identify appropriate measures for addressing the persistent lack of gender diversity in corporate boardrooms in Europe and to seek views on possible action at EU level, including legislative measures, to redress this gender imbalance. The public consultation has ended on 28 May 2012 and will feed into an impact assessment that the Commission will conduct. Following this input, the Commission will take a decision on further action later this year.

Responding to the questions in turn:

1. and 2. The purpose of the ongoing impact assessment is precisely to analyse the potential benefits for companies, the society and individuals that binding or non-binding measures would bring. The Commission is not yet in a position to take a final view.
3. Binding objectives would certainly not be sufficient to redress the inequalities in the labour market, but would have to be accompanied by a number of flanking measures. However, the Commission has not yet decided which kind of measures will be taken.
4. There is a growing body of research and evidence on the impact of a stronger presence of women in company boards, but the Commission is not aware of research on quotas in SMEs.
5. The question as to which companies and which positions should be targeted by an EU initiative is part of the public consultation.

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<sup>(1)</sup> See also press release IP/12/213.





## 2013-as előfizetési díjak (áfa nélkül, rendes szállítási költségeket beleértve)

Az EU Hivatalos Lapja, L + C sorozat, kizárólag nyomtatott kiadvány	Az EU 22 hivatalos nyelvén	1 300 EUR/év
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Az *Európai Unió Hivatalos Lapjának*, amely az Európai Unió hivatalos nyelvein jelenik meg, 22 nyelvi változatára lehet előfizetni. Az L (jogsabályok) és a C (tájékoztatók és közlemények) sorozatot foglalja magában.

Valamennyi nyelvi változatra külön kell előfizetni.

A 920/2005/EK tanácsi rendelet értelmében, amelyet a Hivatalos Lap 2005. június 18-i L 156. száma tett közzé, és amely előírja, hogy az Európai Unió intézményei nem kötelesek minden jogi aktust ír nyelven is megszövegezni, illetve ezen a nyelven kihirdetni, az ír nyelven kiadott Hivatalos Lapok értékesítése külön történik.

A Hivatalos Lap Kiegészítő Kiadványára (S sorozat – közbeszerzés és ajánlati felhívások) történő előfizetés mind a 23 hivatalos nyelvi változatot magában foglalja egyetlen többnyelvű DVD-n.

Kérésére az *Európai Unió Hivatalos Lapjára* történő előfizetéssel a Hivatalos Lap különféle mellékleteit is megkaphatja. Az előfizetők a mellékletek megjelenéséről az *Európai Unió Hivatalos Lapjában* közölt „Az olvasóhoz” című közleménynek köszönhetően értesülnek.

## Értékesítés és előfizetés

A különböző, térítés ellenében kapható kiadványokra – például az *Európai Unió Hivatalos Lapjára* – való előfizetés a Kiadóhivatal forgalmazó partnereitől szerezhető be. A forgalmazó partnerek listája a következő címen található:

[http://publications.europa.eu/others/agents/index\\_hu.htm](http://publications.europa.eu/others/agents/index_hu.htm)

**Az EUR-Lex (<http://eur-lex.europa.eu>) közvetlen és ingyenes hozzáférést biztosít az Európai Unió jogához. Erről a honlapról elérhető az *Európai Unió Hivatalos Lapja*, valamint tartalmazza a szerződéseket, a jogszabályokat, a jogeseteket és az előkészítő dokumentumokat is.**

**További információt az Európai Unióról a <http://europa.eu> internetcímen találhat.**

