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Document 62007FN0108

Case F-108/07: Action brought on 15 October 2007 — Bart Nijs v European Court of Auditors

OJ C 22, 26.1.2008, p. 56–56 (BG, ES, CS, DA, DE, ET, EL, EN, FR, IT, LV, LT, HU, MT, NL, PL, PT, RO, SK, SL, FI, SV)

26.1.2008   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 22/56


Action brought on 15 October 2007 — Bart Nijs v European Court of Auditors

(Case F-108/07)

(2008/C 22/108)

Language of the case: French

Parties

Applicant(s): Bart Nijs (Bereldange, Luxembourg) (represented by: F. Rollinger, lawyer)

Defendant: European Court of Auditors

Form of order sought

annul the decision of the European Court of Auditors to renew the mandate of the Secretary General of the Court of Auditors for a further period of six years from 1 July 2007

in the alternative, annul the two measures allegedly constituting ‘decisions of the appointing authority’ of 8 December 2006 implementing the judgment of the Court of First Instance of 3 October 2006 in Case T-171/05, and of 12 July 2007, rejecting the applicant's complaint of 12 March 2007

Pleas in law and main arguments

In support of his action, the applicant relies in particular on the following facts: (i) the Secretary General of the Court of Auditors acted unlawfully; rather than referring the matter to the Anti-Fraud Office, he expressly refused to take measures or to examine the question when he had been informed, with documentary evidence, of the existence of a fraud to the detriment of the invalidity pensions system; (ii) an official exercised his powers in an unlawful manner; (iii) promotion decisions and their dates were repeatedly not published; (iv) the staff committee elections of 2004 and 2006 were unlawful for a number of reasons; (v) there were many instances of misuse of the promotion procedure, of usurpation of the power to appoint allowed to a head of unit, and of personal interests likely to compromise the independence of the appointing authority in nearly all its decisions; (vi) the ‘decisions of the appointing authority’ emanated from the personal interests of all the applicant's hierarchical superiors, from the concealment of the call to a colleague to exercise superior functions on an interim basis, and from failure to refer the matter to the Anti-Fraud Office; (vii) the appointing authority based the contested decisions on the same series of manifest errors as the intial decisions, which they confirm, relying on a judgment that does not have the force of res judicata and without refuting any of the applicant's arguments; (viii) the committees also involved in the assessment and promotion procedure were not informed of the compromised independence of the applicant's hierarchical superiors.


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