1.

Should Article 49 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, whether or not read in conjunction with Article 56 of that Treaty, with Articles 15 and 16 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union and with the principle of equality, be interpreted as precluding national legislative provisions that oblige persons or undertakings which, in a Belgian port area, wish to engage in dock-work activities within the meaning of the wet van 8 juni 1972 betreffende de havenarbeid (Law of 8 June 1972 organising dock work) — including activities which, strictly speaking, are unrelated to the loading and unloading of ships — to have recourse solely to recognised dockers?

2.

If the first question is answered in the affirmative, may the Grondwettelijk Hof provisionally maintain the effects of Articles 1 and 2 of the wet van 8 juni 1972 betreffende de havenarbeid in order to prevent legal uncertainty and social discontent and to enable the legislature to bring those provisions into line with the obligations arising from EU law?

1.

In the legal relationship arising from a subsidy agreement, are the authorities and intermediate bodies of the Member States which are competent to conduct irregularity proceedings at first or second tier empowered to examine directly in the course of the proceedings before them, in accordance with Council Regulation (EC) No 1083/2006 of 11 July 2006 laying down general provisions on the European Regional Development Fund, the European Social Fund and the Cohesion Fund and repealing Regulation (EC) No 1260/1999 (‘the Regulation’), (1) and in particular as part of the control mechanism provided for in Articles 60, 70 and 98 thereof, any infringement that has or may have an impact prejudicial to the financial interests of the budget of the European Union, and are they obliged, if necessary, to apply a financial correction?

2.

Is the protection of the financial interests of the European Union effectively guaranteed by national procedural legislation, or by the case-law interpreting it, which, in the case of a subsidy agreement, allows a breach of that agreement consisting in an infringement of public procurement legislation (an irregularity) to be established, and any civil claim based on the establishment of that infringement to be asserted, only where a final declaration as to the existence of that infringement has been made by the Arbitration Committee or, following a judicial review of the decision of the Arbitration Committee, by a court?

3.

If the infringement of public procurement legislation constitutes an irregularity but proceedings have not been instituted before the Arbitration Committee, is the court hearing the civil claims relating to compliance with the subsidy agreement empowered to assess the irregularity in the public procurement process in the course of examining the breach of the agreement?

1.

When assessing the question of whether, within the meaning of the second sentence of Article 12(1)(a) of Directive 2011/95/EU, (1) a stateless Palestinian is no longer granted protection or assistance of the UNRWA, is account to be taken from a geographical perspective solely of the respective field of operation (Gaza Strip, Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, West Bank) in which the stateless person had his actual residence upon leaving the area of operations of the UNRWA (in this case: Syria), or also of further fields of operation belonging to the area of operations of the UNRWA?

2.

If account is not solely to be taken of the field of operation upon leaving: Is account always to be taken, regardless of further conditions, of all the fields of operation of the area of operations? If not: Are further fields of operation only to be taken into consideration if the stateless person had a substantial (territorial) connection to that field of operation? Is a habitual residence — at the time of or prior to leaving — required for such a connection? Are further circumstances to be taken into consideration when examining a substantial (territorial) connection? If so: Which ones? Does it matter whether it is possible and reasonable for the stateless person to enter the relevant field of operation when leaving the UNRWA area of operations?

3.

Is a stateless person who leaves the area of operations of the UNRWA because his personal safety is at serious risk in the field of operation of his actual residence, and it is impossible for the UNRWA to grant him protection or assistance there, entitled, within the meaning of the second sentence of Article 12(1)(a) of Directive 2011/95/EU, ipso facto to the benefits of the Directive even if he previously went to that field of operation without his personal safety having been at serious risk in the field of operation of his former residence and without being able to expect, according to the circumstances at the time of the move, to experience protection or assistance by the UNRWA in the field of operation into which he moves and to return to the field of operation of his previous residence in the foreseeable future?

4.

When assessing the question of whether a stateless person is not to be granted ipso facto refugee status because the conditions of the second sentence of Article 12(1)(a) of Directive 2011/95/EU ceased to apply once he left the area of operations of the UNRWA, is account to be taken solely of the field of operation of the last habitual residence? If not: Is consideration also, by analogy, to be given to the areas of which account is to be taken under No 2 for the time of leaving? If not: Which criteria are to be used to determine the areas which are to be taken into consideration at the time of the ruling on the application? Does the cessation of application of the conditions of the second sentence of Article 12(1)(a) of Directive 2011/95/EU require the (state or quasi-state) bodies in the relevant field of operation to be prepared to (re)admit the stateless person?

5.

In the event that, in connection with the satisfaction or cessation of application of the conditions of the second sentence of Article 12(1)(a) of Directive 2011/95/EU, the field of operation of the (last) habitual residence is of significance: Which criteria are decisive for establishing habitual residence? Is lawful residence authorised by the country of residence required? If not: Is there at least a need for the conscious acceptance of the residence of the stateless person concerned by the responsible bodies of the field of operation? If so in this respect: Does the presence of the individual stateless person have to be specifically known to the responsible bodies or is the conscious acceptance of residence as a member of a larger group of people sufficient? If not: Is actual residence for a relatively long period of time sufficient in itself?

1.

2.

If Question 1 is answered to the effect that the present entry ban does come within the scope of Directive 2008/115/EC:

—

declare that, by failing to adopt the necessary measures to prevent the deterioration of the state of the bodies of groundwater in the Doñana region, by failing to carry out an additional characterisation of those which present a risk, without also determining the necessary measures, and by failing to include appropriate basic and complementary measures in the programme of measures for the River Basin Management Plan for the Guadalquivir River Basin District, the Kingdom of Spain has failed to fulfil its obligations under Article 4(1)(b) in conjunction with Article 1(a) and point 2.1.2 of Annex V; Article 5 read in conjunction with point 2.2 of Annex II; and Article 11(1)(3)(a), (c) and (e) and (4) of Directive 2000/60/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 October 2000 establishing a framework for Community action in the field of water policy (1);

—

declare that, by failing to adopt appropriate measures to prevent deterioration of the natural habitats and of the habitats of the species which led to the designation of the areas considered here (SPA/SCI ES0000024 Doñana, SPA/SCI ES6150009 Doñana North and West and SPA ES6150012 Dehesa del Estero and Montes de Moguer), the Kingdom of Spain has failed to fulfil its obligations under Article 6(2) read in conjunction with Article 7 of Council Directive 92/43/EEC of 21 May 1992 on the conservation of natural habitats and of wild fauna and flora (2);

—

order the Kingdom of Spain to pay the costs.

1)

Failure to fulfil obligations under Article 4(1)(b) of Directive 2000/60/EC, read in conjunction with Article 1(a) and point 2.1.2 of Annex V to that directive

Article 4(1)(b) of Directive 2000/60/EC requires Member States prevent the deterioration of the status of all bodies of groundwater? It must be read in conjunction with Article 1(a) of the directive, which specifies the environmental objectives to be achieved by Member States with regard to groundwater, and point 2.1.2. of Annex V thereto, which defines the good quantitative status of groundwater. The Commission considers that the Kingdom of Spain has not taken the necessary measures to prevent deterioration due to overexploitation of the bodies of groundwater in the region of Doñana. The Commission therefore concludes that the Kingdom of Spain has failed to fulfil its obligations under Article 4(1)(b) of Directive 2000/60/EC, read in conjunction with Article 1(a) and point 2.1.2 of Annex V thereto.

2)

Failure to fulfil obligations under Article 5 of Directive 2000/60/EC, read in conjunction with point 2.2 of Annex II to that directive.

Article 5 of Directive 2000/60/EC sets out the procedure to be followed for the river basin district, imposing in each case an analysis of the characteristics of the district, a study of the impact of human activity on the status of surface water and groundwater, and an economic analysis of water use. Where, following the initial analysis of the characteristics, a body of groundwater is identified as posing a risk, Member States are required, pursuant to point 2.2 of Annex II to the Directive, to carry out an additional characterisation. The Commission considers that the Kingdom of Spain has not correctly applied Article 5(1) of Directive 2000/60/EC, read in conjunction with point 2.2 of Annex II to that Directive, in so far as it has not carried out an additional characterisation of the groundwater bodies in the district of Doñana which exposed to a risk, without determining the necessary measures either. The Commission therefore concludes that the Kingdom of Spain has failed to fulfil its obligations under Article 5 of Directive 2000/60/EC, read in conjunction with point 2.2 of Annex II to that directive.

3)

Infringement of Article 11(1)(3)(a), (c) and (e) and (4) of Directive 2000/60/EC.

Under Article 11(1) of Directive 2000/60/EC, Member States ‘shall ensure the establishment for each river basin district, or for the part of an international river basin district within its territory, of a programme of measures, taking account of the results of the analyses required under Article 5, in order to achieve the objectives established under Article 4’. Article 11(3)(a), (c) and (e) sets out some of the basic measures to be included in that programme of measures. Article 11(4) of that provision refers to accompanying measures, which are those designed and implemented in addition to the basic measures. The Commission submits that the Kingdom of Spain failed to include in the River Basin Management Plan for the Guadalquivir River Basin District the appropriate basic and complementary measures and that the Kingdom of Spain has therefore failed to fulfil its obligations under Article 11(1), (3)(a), (c) and (e), and (4) of Directive 2000/60/EC.

4)

Infringement of Article 6(2) read in conjunction with Article 7 of Directive 92/43/EEC.

Article 6(2) of Directive 92/43/EEC lays down, on the basis of the principle of prevention, a general duty of protection which requires that habitats and species for which an area has been designated must be protected from any deterioration or disturbance likely to have a significant effect contrary to the objectives of the directive. Under Article 7 of that directive, that duty of protection extends to areas classified as Special Protection Areas for birds (SPAs) under Council Directive 79/409/EEC [of 2 April 1979] on the conservation of wild birds (3). The Commission considers that, by failing to take appropriate measures to prevent deterioration of the natural habitats and habitats of the species which led to the designation of the areas SPA/SCI ES0000024 Doñana, SPA/SCI ES6150009 Doñana North and West and SPA ES6150012 Dehesa del Estero and Montes de Moguer, the Kingdom of Spain has failed to fulfil its obligations under Article 6(2), read in conjunction with Article 7, of Directive 92/43/EEC.

—

set aside the judgment of the General Court (Ninth Chamber) delivered on 27 June 2019 in Case T-20/17, Hungary v Commission;

—

reject the second and third pleas presented by Hungary before the General Court, whereby Hungary alleges breach of the obligation to state reasons and misuse of powers; and order Hungary to pay all the costs relating both to the proceedings at first instance and the appeal;

—

or, in the alternative, refer the case back to the General Court for a new judgment ruling on the pleas that have not yet been examined; whilst reserving the costs relating both to the proceedings at first instance and the appeal.

—

First, in paragraphs 78 to 83 of the judgment under appeal, the General Court erred in stating that when the Commission identified the reference system, it incorrectly excluded the progressive rates of the Hungarian tax on advertisements. Contrary to what was held by the General Court, the approach proposed by the Commission in its decision is consistent with the case-law. Consequently, the General Court erred in the determination of the reference system.

—

Secondly, in paragraphs 84 to 90 of the judgment under appeal, the General Court erred in finding that the Commission had erroneously identified the objective of the tax on advertisements, in the light of which comparability must be assessed. According to the settled case-law of the Court of Justice, as regards the assessment of comparability, only the objective of the tax concerned by the measure is relevant, that is to say, the tax purpose of the measure determined by the taxable event. Other objectives, such as taxpaying capacity, are only relevant in connection with whether any differentiation in the implementation of the tax can be objectively justified, provided that such objectives are inherent in the nature of the tax. Therefore, the General Court erred in referring to an alleged redistributive objective in relation to the tax on advertisements for the purposes of assessing comparability.

—

Thirdly, the position of the General Court, as expressed in paragraphs 91 to 105 of the judgment under appeal, to the effect that the Commission erred in concluding that the objective of redistribution does not justify the progressive nature of the tax based on turnover, is incorrect. The General Court’s finding that the Hungarian tax on advertisements is not discriminatory and has a redistributive purpose is based on the erroneous premiss that undertakings with high turnover necessarily make greater profits than undertakings with a lower turnover. On the basis of that erroneous premiss, the General Court erred in law by accepting, as justification for the differentiation resulting from that tax, an objective that is not inherent in the nature of that tax. Furthermore, by accepting that erroneous premiss, the General Court unduly reversed the burden of proof, thus requiring the Commission to establish that the rates of the Hungarian tax on advertisements cannot be justified on the basis of its alleged redistributive objective.

1.

Is Directive 2012/29/EU (1) of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2012 establishing minimum standards on the rights, support and protection of victims of crime (principally the right to participate actively in criminal proceedings and the right to secure compensation for damage in criminal proceedings) applicable, as regards rights which, by their nature, are not enjoyed solely by a natural person, as a sentient being, also to legal persons and the State, or State authorities, where the provisions of national law confer on them the status of injured party in criminal proceedings?

2.

Are legislation and decision-making practice, (2) such that the State may not claim compensation in criminal proceedings for the damage caused to it by fraudulent conduct on the part of an accused person resulting in the misappropriation of funds from the budget of the European Union, or may not appeal, under Article 256(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, against the order by which the court decides not to admit it, or not to admit the authority representing it, to the main proceedings to seek compensation for the damage as an injured party, and it does not have any other type of procedure available to it by which it may assert its right as against the accused, which means that it is also not possible to guarantee its right to compensation for damage against the property and property rights of the accused under Article 50 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, thus rendering that right de facto unenforceable, compatible with Articles 17 and 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, Article 325 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, and Article 38(1)(h) of Council Regulation (EC) No 1260/1999 (3) of 21 June 1999, read in conjunction with Commission Regulation (EC) No 1681/94 (4) of 11 July 1994?

3.

Is the concept of ‘the same undertaking’ referred to in Council Regulation (EC) No 994/98 (5) of 7 May 1998, read in conjunction with Article 2(2) of Commission Regulation (EC) No 69/2001 (6) of 12 January 2001, to be interpreted only formally as meaning that it is necessary and sufficient to establish whether the companies concerned have separate legal personality under national law, such that it is possible to grant to each of those companies State aid of up to EUR 100 000, or is the decisive criterion the actual mode of operation and management of those companies, held by the same persons and inter-related, in the manner of a system of branches managed by a central company, even though each has its own legal personality under national law, so that they must be deemed to form ‘the same undertaking’ and, as a single entity, may receive State aid of up to EUR 100 000 only once?

4.

For the purposes of the Convention on the protection of the European Communities’ financial interests (7) of 26 July 1995, does the term ‘damage’ mean only that part of the funds wrongly obtained which is directly related to the fraudulent conduct, or also the costs actually incurred and duly proven and the use of the assistance, if the evidence shows that their expenditure was necessary to conceal the fraudulent conduct, delay the detection of the fraudulent conduct and obtain the full amount of the State aid granted?

1.

Must Article 4(2) of Directive 93/13 (1) be interpreted as meaning that terms stipulating repayments at fixed intervals allocated first to interest and providing for an extension of the term of the contract and for an increase in payments in order to pay the account balance, which [may] increase significantly as a result of exchange rate variations, constitute the main subject matter of a loan denominated in a foreign currency and repayable in the national currency, and that those terms cannot be considered in isolation?

2.

Must Article 3(1) of Directive 93/13 be interpreted as meaning that terms stipulating payments at fixed intervals allocated first to interest and providing for an extension of [the] term [of the contract] and for an increase in payments in order to pay the account balance, which may increase significantly as a result of exchange rate variations, cause a significant imbalance in the rights and obligations of the parties to the contract, in particular in that they expose the consumer to a disproportionate foreign exchange risk?

3.

Must Article 4 of Directive 93/13 be interpreted as requiring that the plainness and intelligibility of the terms of a loan agreement denominated in a foreign currency and repayable in the national currency be assessed by referring, at the time of conclusion of that agreement, to the foreseeable economic context, in the present case the consequences of the economic difficulties of the years 2007 to 2009 on exchange rate variations, taking into account the professional lender’s expertise and knowledge, as well as its good faith?

4.

Must Article 4 of Directive 93/13 be interpreted as requiring that the plainness and intelligibility of the terms of a loan agreement denominated in a foreign currency and repayable in the national currency be assessed by ascertaining that a lender, having [the] expertise and knowledge of a seller or supplier, has communicated to the consumer only objective and abstract information, inter alia quantitative information, which does not take into account the economic context capable of affecting exchange rate variations?

—

Set aside the judgment of the General Court in Case T-64/18, (1)

—

Annul Commission Decision C (2017) 8839 final, of 13 December 2017,

—

Order the European Commission to pay all of the costs.

—

set aside the judgment of the General Court (Second Chamber, Extended Composition) of 18 June 2019 in joined cases T-624/15, T-694/15 and T-704/15, European Food and Others v. Commission (1);

—

reject the first part of the first plea and the first part of the second plea put forward in case T-704/15;

—

reject the first and second part of the second plea put forward in cases T-624/15 and T-694/15;

—

refer joined cases T-624/15, T-694/15 and T-704/15 back to the General Court for reconsideration of the pleas not already assessed; and

—

reserve the costs of the proceedings at first instance and on appeal.

—

By a primary argument, the Commission submits that the General Court was wrong to conclude that the measure through which Romania granted aid to Ion and Viorel Micula, investors with Swedish nationality, and three Romanian companies they control (hereinafter collectively referred to as ‘The Miculas’) is the repeal of the incentive scheme on 22 February 2005. Rather, it is through the payment by Romania of the compensation awarded for the repeal of that scheme, which occurs after its accession to the Union that aid is granted to the Miculas.

—

By a subsidiary argument, the Commission submits that, even if the General Court was right to conclude that the aid granting measure was the repeal of the incentive scheme by Romania (quod non), the Commission was still competent to adopt the contested decision by virtue of Annex V, chapter 2, of Romania’s Act of Accession.

—

By a primary argument, the Commission submits that the General Court was wrong to conclude that EU law was not applicable to the compensation awarded on the basis that all the events giving rise to that compensation occurred prior to accession. Rather, the award of compensation constitutes the future effects of a situation arising prior to accession within the meaning of the rules on the application of EU law ratione temporis.

—

By a subsidiary argument, the Commission submits that even if the General Court was right to conclude that the award of compensation did not constitute the future effects of a situation arising prior to accession (quod non), EU law still applied to the compensation awarded because the 1995 Europe Agreement, which forms part of EU law, was applicable to all the events giving rise to that compensation that occurred pre-accession.

—

First, the General Court was wrong to conclude that the Commission lacked the competence to adopt the contested decision and that EU law was inapplicable to the compensation awarded.

—

Second, the General Court failed to address all arguments presented in the contested decision establishing that Romania conferred an advantage on the Miculas. The arguments not addressed suffice on their own to justify the presence of an advantage.

—

annul the decisions of the EEAS of 31 August 2018 and 10 January 2019, implementing the note of the Medical Service of 30 August 2018, by deducting sick leave;

—

order the defendant to pay the costs.

1.

First plea in law, alleging breach of the principle of good administration and duty of care, inflating cost estimates leading to unjustified attribution to the applicant of responsibility for not appearing for a medical check in Brussels.

2.

Second plea in law, alleging misuse of powers with an indication of deliberate intent to undermine the applicant due to personal bias.

3.

Third plea in law, alleging manifest error of assessment with regard to the question whether the applicant’s legal situation had changed and a failure to analyse thoroughly why responsibility was attributed to the applicant for not appearing for a medical check.

—

annul the decision of the European Commission of 22 July 2019 which partially rejected the applicants’ request for an extension – until 5 September 2019 or until the end of August 2019 – of the deadline for submitting comments in the context of the formal investigation procedure in case SA. 39078 (2019/C) (ex 2014/N) – Financing of the Fehmarn Belt Fixed Link project;

—

order the Commission to pay the costs.

1.

First plea in law, alleging that the Commission violated its obligation to motivate its decision not to grant an extension of the deadline in question until 5 September 2019 or 31 August 2019, as the contested decision contains no reasoning supporting this rejection, or, in any case, entails insufficient reasoning.

2.

Second plea in law, alleging that the Commission infringed Article 6(1) of the Procedural Regulation, (1) and thereby also the applicants’ right as interested parties to effectively participate in the formal investigation procedure regarding State aid case SA.39078, since the application was duly justified, well-founded and proportionate.

—

partially annul the contested decision, namely as far as it relates to the ground of opposition based on Article 8(1)(b) EUTMR;

—

authorize for the registration of European Union trade mark Application No 11 853 389;

—

order the Defendant to pay the costs of the action.

—

Infringement of Art 8(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council.

—

annul the contested decision;

—

annul the decision of the Cancellation Division of 23 November 2017 in Cancellation No 11921 C to revoke the European Union trade mark in relation to clothes dryers, washing machines, dishwashers and ranges;

—

maintain the European Union trade mark registered in respect of clothes dryers, washing machines, dishwashers and ranges;

—

order the defendant to bear its own costs and pay those of the applicant.

—

The Board wrongly applied the law in finding that the use of the European Union trade mark as evidenced by sales of clothes dryers, washing machines, dishwashers and ranges by the applicant to US military bases in Germany and Belgium did not amount to use of the European Union trade mark for the purposes of Article 58 of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council;

—

The Board wrongly applied Article 58 of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council by failing to take account of the applicant's evidence of use in the form of sales to Johann Fouquet GmbH when considering the totality of the applicant's use of the European Union trade mark in relation to the clothes dryers, washing machines, dishwashers and ranges;

—

The Board wrongly applied Article 58 of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council by failing to take account of the Applicant's evidence of use in the form of use on social media when considering the totality of the Applicant's use of the EUTM in relation to clothes dryers, washing machines, dishwashers and ranges.