02019R0796 — GA — 13.04.2022 — 004.002
Is áis doiciméadúcháin amháin an téacs seo agus níl aon éifeacht dhlíthiúil aige. Ní ghabhann institiúidí an Aontais aon dliteanas orthu féin i leith inneachar an téacs. Is iad na leaganacha de na gníomhartha a foilsíodh in Iris Oifigiúil an Aontais Eorpaigh agus atá ar fáil ar an suíomh gréasáin EUR-Lex na leaganacha barántúla de na gníomhartha ábhartha, brollach an téacs san áireamh. Is féidir teacht ar na téacsanna oifigiúla sin ach na naisc atá leabaithe sa doiciméad seo a bhrú
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COUNCIL REGULATION (EU) 2019/796 of 17 May 2019 concerning restrictive measures against cyber-attacks threatening the Union or its Member States (IO L 129I 17.5.2019, lch. 1) |
Arna leasú le:
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Iris Oifigiúil |
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Uimh |
Leathanach |
Dáta |
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RIALACHÁN CUR CHUN FEIDHME (AE) 2020/1125 ÓN gCOMHAIRLE an 30 Iúil 2020 |
L 246 |
4 |
30.7.2020 |
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RIALACHÁN CUR CHUN FEIDHME (AE) 2020/1536 ÓN gCOMHAIRLE an 22 Deireadh Fómhair 2020 |
L 351I |
1 |
22.10.2020 |
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RIALACHÁN CUR CHUN FEIDHME (AE) 2020/1744 ÓN gCOMHAIRLE an 20 Samhain 2020 |
L 393 |
1 |
23.11.2020 |
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RIALACHÁN CUR CHUN FEIDHME (AE) 2022/595 ÓN gCOIMISIÚN an 11 Aibreán 2022 |
L 114 |
60 |
12.4.2022 |
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Arna cheartú le:
COUNCIL REGULATION (EU) 2019/796
of 17 May 2019
concerning restrictive measures against cyber-attacks threatening the Union or its Member States
Article 1
Cyber-attacks constituting an external threat include those which:
originate, or are carried out, from outside the Union;
use infrastructure outside the Union;
are carried out by any natural or legal person, entity or body established or operating outside the Union; or
are carried out with the support, at the direction or under the control of any natural or legal person, entity or body operating outside the Union.
For this purpose, cyber-attacks are actions involving any of the following:
access to information systems;
information system interference;
data interference; or
data interception,
where such actions are not duly authorised by the owner or by another right holder of the system or data or part of it, or are not permitted under the law of the Union or of the Member State concerned.
Cyber-attacks constituting a threat to Member States include those affecting information systems relating to, inter alia:
critical infrastructure, including submarine cables and objects launched into outer space, which is essential for the maintenance of vital functions of society, or the health, safety, security, and economic or social well-being of people;
services necessary for the maintenance of essential social and/or economic activities, in particular in the sectors of: energy (electricity, oil and gas); transport (air, rail, water and road); banking; financial market infrastructures; health (healthcare providers, hospitals and private clinics); drinking water supply and distribution; digital infrastructure; and any other sector which is essential to the Member State concerned;
critical State functions, in particular in the areas of defence, governance and the functioning of institutions, including for public elections or the voting process, the functioning of economic and civil infrastructure, internal security, and external relations, including through diplomatic missions;
the storage or processing of classified information; or
government emergency response teams.
For the purposes of this Regulation, the following definitions apply:
‘information systems’ means a device or group of interconnected or related devices, one or more of which, pursuant to a programme, automatically processes digital data, as well as digital data stored, processed, retrieved or transmitted by that device or group of devices for the purposes of its or their operation, use, protection and maintenance;
‘information system interference’ means hindering or interrupting the functioning of an information system by inputting digital data, by transmitting, damaging, deleting, deteriorating, altering or suppressing such data, or by rendering such data inaccessible;
‘data interference’ means deleting, damaging, deteriorating, altering or suppressing digital data on an information system, or rendering such data inaccessible; it also includes theft of data, funds, economic resources or intellectual property;
‘data interception’ means intercepting, by technical means, non-public transmissions of digital data to, from or within an information system, including electromagnetic emissions from an information system carrying such digital data.
For the purposes of this Regulation, the following additional definitions apply:
‘claim’ means any claim, whether asserted by legal proceedings or not, made before or after the date of entry into force of this Regulation, under or in connection with a contract or transaction, and includes in particular:
a claim for performance of any obligation arising under or in connection with a contract or transaction;
a claim for extension or payment of a bond, financial guarantee or indemnity of whatever form;
a claim for compensation in respect of a contract or transaction;
a counterclaim;
a claim for the recognition or enforcement, including by the procedure of exequatur, of a judgment, an arbitration award or an equivalent decision, wherever made or given;
‘contract or transaction’ means any transaction of whatever form and whatever the applicable law, whether comprising one or more contracts or similar obligations made between the same or different parties; for this purpose, ‘contract’ includes a bond, guarantee or indemnity, particularly a financial guarantee or financial indemnity, and credit, whether legally independent or not, as well as any related provision arising under, or in connection with, the transaction;
‘competent authorities’ refers to the competent authorities of the Member States as identified on the websites listed in Annex II;
‘economic resources’ means assets of every kind, whether tangible or intangible, movable or immovable, which are not funds, but may be used to obtain funds, goods or services;
‘freezing of economic resources’ means preventing the use of economic resources to obtain funds, goods or services in any way, including, but not limited to, by selling, hiring or mortgaging them;
‘freezing of funds’ means preventing any move, transfer, alteration, use of, access to, or dealing with funds in any way that would result in any change in their volume, amount, location, ownership, possession, character or destination or any other change that would enable the funds to be used, including portfolio management;
‘funds’ means financial assets and benefit of every kind, including, but not limited to:
cash, cheques, claims on money, drafts, money orders and other payment instruments;
deposits with financial institutions or other entities, balances on accounts, debts and debt obligations;
publicly-and privately-traded securities and debt instruments, including stocks and shares, certificates representing securities, bonds, notes, warrants, debentures and derivatives contracts;
interest, dividends or other income on or value accruing from or generated by assets;
credit, right of set-off, guarantees, performance bonds or other financial commitments;
letters of credit, bills of lading and bills of sale; and
documents showing evidence of an interest in funds or financial resources;
‘territory of the Union’ means the territories of the Member States to which the Treaty is applicable, under the conditions laid down in the Treaty, including their airspace.
Article 2
The factors determining whether a cyber-attack has a significant effect as referred to in Article 1(1) include any of the following:
the scope, scale, impact or severity of disruption caused, including to economic and societal activities, essential services, critical State functions, public order or public safety;
the number of natural or legal persons, entities or bodies affected;
the number of Member States concerned;
the amount of economic loss caused, such as through large-scale theft of funds, economic resources or intellectual property;
the economic benefit gained by the perpetrator, for himself or for others;
the amount or nature of data stolen or the scale of data breaches; or
the nature of commercially sensitive data accessed.
Article 3
Annex I shall include, as identified by the Council in accordance with Article 5(1) of Decision (CFSP) 2019/797:
natural or legal persons, entities or bodies who are responsible for cyber-attacks or attempted cyber-attacks;
natural persons or legal persons, entities or bodies that provide financial, technical or material support for or are otherwise involved in cyber-attacks or attempted cyber-attacks, including by planning, preparing, participating in, directing, assisting or encouraging such attacks, or facilitating them whether by action or omission;
natural or legal persons, entities or bodies associated with the natural or legal persons, entities or bodies covered by points (a) and (b) of this paragraph.
Article 4
By way of derogation from Article 3, the competent authorities of the Member States may authorise the release of certain frozen funds or economic resources, or the making available of certain funds or economic resources, under such conditions as they deem appropriate, after having determined that the funds or economic resources concerned are:
►C1 necessary to satisfy the basic needs of the natural or legal persons, entities or bodies listed in Annex I ◄ and dependent family members of such natural persons, including payments for foodstuffs, rent or mortgage, medicines and medical treatment, taxes, insurance premiums, and public utility charges;
intended exclusively for the payment of reasonable professional fees or the reimbursement of incurred expenses associated with the provision of legal services;
intended exclusively for the payment of fees or service charges for the routine holding or maintenance of frozen funds or economic resources;
necessary for extraordinary expenses, provided that the relevant competent authority has notified the competent authorities of the other Member States and the Commission of the grounds on which it considers that a specific authorisation should be granted, at least two weeks prior to the authorisation; or
to be paid into or from an account of a diplomatic or consular mission or an international organisation enjoying immunities in accordance with international law, insofar as such payments are intended to be used for official purposes of the diplomatic or consular mission or international organisation.
Article 5
By way of derogation from Article 3(1), the competent authorities of the Member States may authorise the release of certain frozen funds or economic resources provided that the following conditions are met:
the funds or economic resources are the subject of an arbitral decision rendered prior to the date on which the natural or legal person, entity or body referred to in Article 3 was listed in Annex I, or of a judicial or administrative decision rendered in the Union, or a judicial decision enforceable in the Member State concerned, prior to or after that date;
the funds or economic resources will be used exclusively to satisfy claims secured by such a decision or recognised as valid in such a decision, within the limits set by applicable laws and regulations governing the rights of persons having such claims;
the decision is not for the benefit of a natural or legal person, entity or body listed in Annex I; and
recognition of the decision is not contrary to public policy in the Member State concerned.
Article 6
By way of derogation from Article 3(1) and provided that a payment by a natural or legal person, entity or body listed in Annex I is due under a contract or agreement that was concluded by, or an obligation that arose for, the natural or legal person, entity or body concerned before the date on which that natural or legal person, entity or body was included in Annex I, the competent authorities of the Member States may authorise, under such conditions as they deem appropriate, the release of certain frozen funds or economic resources, provided that the competent authority concerned has determined that:
the funds or economic resources will be used for a payment by a natural or legal person, entity or body listed in Annex I; and
the payment is not in breach of Article 3(2).
Article 7
Article 3(2) shall not apply to the addition to frozen accounts of:
interest or other earnings on those accounts;
payments due under contracts, agreements or obligations that were concluded or arose before the date on which the natural or legal person, entity or body referred to in Article 3(1) was included in Annex I; or
payments due under judicial, administrative or arbitral decisions rendered in a Member State or enforceable in the Member State concerned,
provided that any such interest, other earnings and payments remain subject to the measures provided for in Article 3(1).
Article 8
Without prejudice to the applicable rules concerning reporting, confidentiality and professional secrecy, natural and legal persons, entities and bodies shall:
supply immediately any information which would facilitate compliance with this Regulation, such as information on accounts and amounts frozen in accordance with Article 3(1), to the competent authority of the Member State where they are resident or located, and transmit such information, directly or through the Member State, to the Commission; and
cooperate with the competent authority in any verification of the information referred to in point (a).
Article 9
It shall be prohibited to participate, knowingly and intentionally, in activities the object or effect of which is to circumvent the measures referred to in Article 3.
Article 10
Article 11
No claims in connection with any contract or transaction the performance of which has been affected, directly or indirectly, in whole or in part, by the measures imposed under this Regulation, including claims for indemnity or any other claim of this type, such as a claim for compensation or a claim under a guarantee, in particular a claim for extension or payment of a bond, guarantee or indemnity, in particular a financial guarantee or financial indemnity, of whatever form, shall be satisfied, if they are made by:
designated natural or legal persons, entities or bodies listed in Annex I;
any natural or legal person, entity or body acting through or on behalf of one of the natural or legal persons, entities or bodies referred to in point (a).
Article 12
The Commission and Member States shall inform each other of the measures taken under this Regulation and share any other relevant information at their disposal in connection with this Regulation, in particular information in respect of:
funds frozen under Article 3 and authorisations granted under Articles 4, 5 and 6;
violation and enforcement problems and judgments handed down by national courts.
Article 13
Article 14
Article 15
Article 16
The Commission shall process personal data in order to carry out its tasks under this Regulation. These tasks include:
adding the contents of Annex I to the electronic, consolidated list of persons, groups and entities subject to Union financial sanctions and to the interactive sanctions map, both publicly available;
processing information on the impact of the measures of this Regulation such as the value of frozen funds and information on authorisations granted by the competent authorities.
Article 17
Article 18
This Regulation shall apply:
within the territory of the Union, including its airspace;
on board any aircraft or vessel under the jurisdiction of a Member State;
to any natural person inside or outside the territory of the Union who is a national of a Member State;
to any legal person, entity or body, inside or outside the territory of the Union, which is incorporated or constituted under the law of a Member State;
to any legal person, entity or body in respect of any business done in whole or in part within the Union.
Article 19
This Regulation shall enter into force on the day following that of its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union.
This Regulation shall be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States.
ANNEX I
List of natural and legal persons, entities and bodies referred to in Article 3
A. Daoine nádúrtha
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Ainm |
Faisnéis aitheantais |
Cúiseanna |
Dáta an liostaithe |
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1. |
GAO Qiang |
Dáta breithe: 4 Deireadh Fómhair 1983 Áit bhreithe: Shandong Province, China Seoladh: Room 1102, Guanfu Mansion, 46 Xinkai Road, Hedong District, Tianjin, China Náisiúntacht: Síneach Inscne: fireann |
Tá Gao Qiang páirteach in “Operation Cloud Hopper”, sraith cibirionsaithe a bhfuil éifeacht shuntasach acu agus a tháinig ó fhoinse lasmuigh den Aontas, agus ar bagairt sheachtrach iad ar an Aontas nó ar a Bhallstáit agus cibirionsaithe a bhfuil éifeacht shuntasach acu i gcoinne tríú Stáit. Dhírigh “Operation Cloud Hopper” ar chórais faisnéise cuideachtaí ilnáisiúnta i sé mhór-roinn, lena n-áirítear cuideachtaí atá lonnaithe san Aontas, agus d’éirigh leis rochtain neamhúdaraithe a fháil ar shonraí atá íogair ó thaobh na tráchtála de, agus caillteanas suntasach eacnamaíoch ann dá dheasca. Is é an gníomhaí “APT10” (“Ardbhagairt Sheasmhach 10”) (a.k.a. “Red Apollo”, “CVNX”, “Stone Panda”, “MenuPass” agus “Potassium”), mar a thugtar air go poiblí, a chuir “Operation Cloud Hopper” i gcrích. Tá fianaise ann go bhfuil nasc idir Gao Qiang agus APT10, lena n-áirítear tríd an mbaint atá aige le bonneagar ceannasaíochta agus rialaithe APT10. Thairis sin, bhí Gao Qiang fostaithe ag Huaying Haitai, eintiteas atá ainmnithe mar gheall ar thacaíocht a thabhairt do “Operation Cloud Hopper” agus é a éascú. Tá naisc idir é agus Zhang Shilong, fear atá ainmnithe agus luaite le “Operation Cloud Hopper”. Tá Gao Qiang bainteach, dá bhrí sin, le Huaying Haitai agus Zhang Shilong araon. |
30.7.2020 |
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2. |
ZHANG Shilong |
Dáta breithe: 10 Meán Fómhair 1981 Áit bhreithe: China Seoladh: Hedong, Yuyang Road No 121, Tianjin, China Náisiúntacht: Síneach Inscne: fireann |
Tá Zhang Shilong páirteach in “Operation Cloud Hopper”, sraith cibirionsaithe a bhfuil éifeacht shuntasach acu agus a tháinig ó fhoinse lasmuigh den Aontas, agus ar bagairt sheachtrach iad ar an Aontas nó ar a Bhallstáit agus cibirionsaithe a bhfuil éifeacht shuntasach acu i gcoinne tríú Stáit. Dhírigh “Operation Cloud Hopper” ar chórais faisnéise cuideachtaí ilnáisiúnta i sé mhór-roinn, lena n-áirítear cuideachtaí atá lonnaithe san Aontas, agus d’éirigh leis rochtain neamhúdaraithe a fháil ar shonraí atá íogair ó thaobh na tráchtála de, agus caillteanas suntasach eacnamaíoch ann dá dheasca. Is é an gníomhaí “APT10” (“Ardbhagairt Sheasmhach 10”) (a.k.a. “Red Apollo”, “CVNX”, “Stone Panda”, “MenuPass” agus “Potassium”), mar a thugtar air go poiblí, a chuir “Operation Cloud Hopper” i gcrích. Tá fianaise ann go bhfuil nasc idir Zhang Shilong agus APT10, lena n-áirítear trí na bogearraí mailíseacha a d’fhorbair sé agus a thástáil sé i ndáil leis na cibirionsaithe a rinne APT10. Thairis sin, bhí Zhang Shilong fostaithe ag Huaying Haitai, eintiteas atá ainmnithe mar gheall ar thacaíocht a thabhairt do “Operation Cloud Hopper” agus é a éascú. Tá naisc idir é agus Gao Qiang, fear atá ainmnithe i dtaca le “Operation Cloud Hopper”. Tá Zhang Shilong bainteach, dá bhrí sin, le Huaying Haitai agus Gao Qiang araon. |
30.7.2020 |
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3. |
Alexey Valeryevich MININ |
Алексей Валерьевич МИНИН Dáta breithe: an 27 Bealtaine 1972 Áit bhreithe: Perm Oblast, PCSS na Rúise (dá ngairtear Cónaidhm na Rúise anois) Uimhir an phas: 120017582 Arna eisiúint ag: Aireacht Gnóthaí Eachtracha Chónaidhm na Rúise Bailíocht: ón 17 Aibreán 2017 go dtí an 17 Aibreán 2022 Suíomh: Moscó, Cónaidhm na Rúise Náisiúntacht: Rúiseach Inscne: fireann |
Bhí Alexey Minin páirteach in iarracht cibirionsaithe i gcoinne na hEagraíochta um Thoirmeasc ar Airm Cheimiceacha (OPCW) san Ísiltír, cibirionsaí ar baol dó an-díobháil go deo a dhéanamh. Mar oifigeach tacaíochta faisnéise daonna do Phríomh-Stiúrthóireacht Fhoireann Ghinearálta Fhórsaí Armtha Chónaidhm na Rúise (GU/GRU), bhí Alexey Minin ar dhuine d’fhoireann de cheathrar oifigeach faisnéise míleata Rúiseacha a rinne iarracht rochtain neamhúdaraithe a fháil ar líonra WiFi OPCW sa Háig, an Ísiltír, i mí Aibreáin 2018. Is é a bhí beartaithe leis an iarracht sin ar chibirionsaí, briseadh isteach i líonra WiFi OPCW, rud a chuirfeadh slándáil an líonra agus an obair imscrúdaitheach atá ar bun ag OPCW faoi láthair i mbaol, dá mba rud é gur éirigh leis. Bhain Seirbhís Faisnéise Cosanta agus Slándála na hÍsiltíre (DISS) (Militaire Inlichtingen- en Veiligheidsdienst – MIVD) na cosa den iarracht sin ar chibirionsaí, agus ar an gcaoi sin, d’éirigh léi aon mhórdhíobháil a dhéanfaí do OPCW a chosc. |
30.7.2020 |
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4. |
Aleksei Sergeyvich MORENETS |
Алексей Сергеевич МОРЕНЕЦ Dáta breithe: an 31 Iúil 1977 Áit bhreithe: Murmanskaya Oblast, PCSS na Rúise (dá ngairtear Cónaidhm na Rúise anois) Uimhir an phas: 100135556 Arna eisiúint ag: Aireacht Gnóthaí Eachtracha Chónaidhm na Rúise Bailíocht: ón 17 Aibreán 2017 go dtí an 17 Aibreán 2022 Suíomh: Moscó, Cónaidhm na Rúise Náisiúntacht: Rúiseach Inscne: fireann |
Bhí Aleksei Morenets páirteach in iarracht cibearionsaithe i gcoinne na hEagraíochta um Thoirmeasc ar Airm Cheimiceacha (OPCW) san Ísiltír, cibirionsaí ar baol dó an-díobháil go deo a dhéanamh. Mar chibearoibreoir do Phríomh-Stiúrthóireacht Fhoireann Ghinearálta Fhórsaí Armtha Chónaidhm na Rúise (GU/GRU), bhí Aleksei Morenets ar dhuine d’fhoireann de cheathrar oifigeach faisnéise míleata Rúiseacha a rinne iarracht rochtain neamhúdaraithe a fháil ar líonra WiFi OPCW sa Háig, an Ísiltír, i mí Aibreáin 2018. Is é a bhí beartaithe leis an iarracht sin ar chibirionsaí, briseadh isteach i líonra WiFi OPCW, rud a chuirfeadh slándáil an líonra agus an obair imscrúdaitheach atá ar bun ag OPCW faoi láthair i mbaol, dá mba rud é gur éirigh leis. Bhain Seirbhís Faisnéise Cosanta agus Slándála na hÍsiltíre (DISS) (Militaire Inlichtingen- en Veiligheidsdienst – MIVD) na cosa den iarracht sin ar chibirionsaí, agus ar an gcaoi sin, d’éirigh léi aon mhórdhíobháil a dhéanfaí do OPCW a chosc. |
30.7.2020 |
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5. |
Evgenii Mikhaylovich SEREBRIAKOV |
Евгений Михайлович СЕРЕБРЯКОВ Dáta breithe: an 26 Iúil 1981 Áit bhreithe: Kursk, PCSS na Rúise (dá ngairtear Cónaidhm na Rúise anois) Uimhir an phas: 100135555 Arna eisiúint ag: Aireacht Gnóthaí Eachtracha Chónaidhm na Rúise Bailíocht: ón 17 Aibreán 2017 go dtí an 17 Aibreán 2022 Suíomh: Moscó, Cónaidhm na Rúise Náisiúntacht: Rúiseach Inscne: fireann |
Bhí Evgenii Serebriakov páirteach in iarracht cibirionsaithe i gcoinne na hEagraíochta um Thoirmeasc ar Airm Cheimiceacha (OPCW) san Ísiltír, cibirionsaí ar baol dó an-díobháil go deo a dhéanamh. Mar chibearoibreoir do Phríomh-Stiúrthóireacht Fhoireann Ghinearálta Fhórsaí Armtha Chónaidhm na Rúise (GU/GRU), bhí Evgenii Serebriakov ar dhuine d’fhoireann de cheathrar oifigeach faisnéise míleata Rúiseacha a rinne iarracht rochtain neamhúdaraithe a fháil ar líonra WiFi OPCW sa Háig, an Ísiltír, i mí Aibreáin 2018. Is é a bhí beartaithe leis an iarracht sin ar chibirionsaí, briseadh isteach i líonra WiFi OPCW, rud a chuirfeadh slándáil an líonra agus an obair imscrúdaitheach atá ar bun ag OPCW faoi láthair i mbaol, dá mba rud é gur éirigh leis. Bhain Seirbhís Faisnéise Cosanta agus Slándála na hÍsiltíre (DISS) (Militaire Inlichtingen- en Veiligheidsdienst – MIVD) na cosa den iarracht sin ar chibirionsaí, agus ar an gcaoi sin, d’éirigh léi aon mhórdhíobháil a dhéanfaí do OPCW a chosc. |
30.7.2020 |
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6. |
Oleg Mikhaylovich SOTNIKOV |
Олег Михайлович СОТНИКОВ Dáta breithe: an 24 Lúnasa 1972 Áit bhreithe: Ulyanovsk, PCSS na Rúise (dá ngairtear Cónaidhm na Rúise anois) Uimhir an phas: 120018866 Arna eisiúint ag: Aireacht Gnóthaí Eachtracha Chónaidhm na Rúise Bailíocht: ón 17 Aibreán 2017 go dtí an 17 Aibreán 2022 Suíomh: Moscó, Cónaidhm na Rúise Náisiúntacht: Rúiseach Inscne: fireann |
Bhí Oleg Sotnikov páirteach in iarracht cibirionsaithe i gcoinne na hEagraíochta um Thoirmeasc ar Airm Cheimiceacha (OPCW) san Ísiltír, cibirionsaí ar baol dó an-díobháil go deo a dhéanamh. Mar oifigeach tacaíochta faisnéise daonna do Phríomh-Stiúrthóireacht Fhoireann Ghinearálta Fhórsaí Armtha Chónaidhm na Rúise (GU/GRU), bhí Oleg Sotnikov ar dhuine d’fhoireann de cheathrar oifigeach faisnéise míleata Rúiseacha a rinne iarracht rochtain neamhúdaraithe a fháil ar líonra WiFi OPCW sa Háig, an Ísiltír, i mí Aibreáin 2018. Is é a bhí beartaithe leis an iarracht sin ar chibirionsaí, briseadh isteach i líonra WiFi OPCW, rud a chuirfeadh slándáil an líonra agus an obair imscrúdaitheach atá ar bun ag OPCW faoi láthair i mbaol, dá mba rud é gur éirigh leis. Bhain Seirbhís Faisnéise Cosanta agus Slándála na hÍsiltíre (DISS) (Militaire Inlichtingen- en Veiligheidsdienst – MIVD) na cosa den iarracht sin ar chibirionsaí, agus ar an gcaoi sin, d’éirigh léi aon mhórdhíobháil a dhéanfaí do OPCW a chosc. |
30.7.2020 |
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7. |
Dmitry Sergeyevich BADIN |
Дмитрий Сергеевич БАДИН Dáta breithe: 15 Samhain 1990 Áit breithe: Kursk, PCSS na Rúise (dá ngairtear Cónaidhm na Rúise anois) Náisiúntacht: Rúiseach Inscne: fireann |
Bhí Dmitry Badin páirteach i gcibirionsaí a rinne mórdhíobháil ar Pharlaimint Chónaidhme na Gearmáine (Deutscher Bundestag). Mar oifigeach faisnéise míleata den 85ú Príomh-Lárionad le haghaidh Seirbhísí Speisialta (GTsSS) Phríomh-Stiúrthóireacht Fhoireann Ghinearálta Fhórsaí Armtha Chónaidhm na Rúise (GU/GRU), bhí Dmitry Badin ar dhuine d’fhoireann d’oifigigh faisnéise míleata Rúiseacha a rinne cibirionsaí ar Pharlaimint Chónaidhme na Gearmáine (Deutscher Bundestag) i mí Aibreáin agus mí na Bealtaine 2015. Bhí an cibirionsaí sin dírithe ar chóras faisnéise na parlaiminte agus bhí tionchar aige ar fheidhmiú an chórais ar feadh roinnt laethanta. Goideadh líon suntasach sonraí agus bhí éifeacht ar chuntais ríomhphoist roinnt Comhaltaí Parlaiminte agus ar chuntas ríomhphoist an tSeansailéara Angela Merkel. |
22.10.2020 |
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8. |
Igor Olegovich KOSTYUKOV |
Игорь Олегович КОСТЮКОВ Dáta breithe: 21 Feabhra 1961 Náisiúntacht: Rúiseach Inscne: fireann |
Is é Igor Kostyukov Ceannaire reatha Phríomh-Stiúrthóireacht Fhoireann Ghinearálta Fhórsaí Armtha Chónaidhm na Rúise (GU/GRU), mar a raibh sé ina Phríomh-Leas-Cheannaire roimhe seo. Tá GTsSS mar cheann de na haonaid atá faoina cheannas, dá ngairtear “aonad míleata 26165” freisin (leasainmneacha tionscail: “APT28”, “Fancy Bear”, “Sofacy Group”, “Pawn Storm” agus “Strontium”). Sa cháil sin, tá Igor Kostyukov freagrach as cibirionsaithe a rinne GTsSS, lena n‐áirítear na hionsaithe sin a rinne mórdhíobháil agus ar bhagairt sheachtrach iad ar an Aontas nó ar a Bhallstáit. Go háirithe, bhí oifigigh faisnéise míleata de chuid an 85ú Príomh-Lárionad le haghaidh Seirbhísí Speisialta (GTsSS) páirteach sa chibirionsaí i gcoinne Pharlaimint Chónaidhme na Gearmáine (Deutscher Bundestag) a tharla i mí Aibreáin agus mí na Bealtaine 2015 agus san iarracht ar chibirionsaí a dhéanamh a raibh sé mar aidhm aige briseadh isteach i líonra WiFi na hEagraíochta um Thoirmeasc ar Airm Cheimiceacha (OPCW) san Ísiltír i mí Aibreáin 2018. Bhí an cibirionsaí i gcoinne Pharlaimint Chónaidhme na Gearmáine dírithe ar chóras faisnéise na parlaiminte agus bhí tionchar aige ar fheidhmiú an chórais ar feadh roinnt laethanta. Goideadh líon suntasach sonraí agus bhí éifeacht ar chuntais ríomhphoist roinnt Comhaltaí Parlaiminte agus ar chuntas ríomhphoist an tSeansailéara Angela Merkel. |
22.10.2020 |
B. Daoine dlítheanacha, eintitis agus comhlachtaí
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Ainm |
Faisnéis aitheantais |
Cúiseanna |
Dáta an liostaithe |
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1. |
Tianjin Huaying Haitai Science and Technology Development Co Ltd (Huaying Haitai |
dá ngairtear freisin: Haitai Technology Development Co. Ltd Suíomh: Tianjin, an tSín |
Thug Huaying Haitai tacaíocht airgeadais, theicniúil nó ábhartha do “Operation Cloud Hopper”, agus rinne éascaíocht don oibríocht sin, arb é a bhí ann sraith cibirionsaithe a rinne mórdhíobháil agus a tháinig ó fhoinse lasmuigh den Aontas, agus ar bhagairt sheachtrach iad ar an Aontas nó ar a Bhallstáit, agus a rinne mórdhíobháil freisin do thríú Stáit. Dhírigh “Operation Cloud Hopper” ar chórais faisnéise chuideachtaí ilnáisiúnta i sé mhór-roinn, lena n‐áirítear cuideachtaí atá lonnaithe san Aontas, agus d’éirigh leis rochtain neamhúdaraithe a fháil ar shonraí atá íogair ó thaobh na tráchtála de, agus caillteanas suntasach eacnamaíoch ann dá dheasca. Is é an gníomhaí “APT10” (“Ardbhagairt Sheasmhach 10”) (a.k.a. “Red Apollo”, “CVNX”, “Stone Panda”, “MenuPass” agus “Potassium”), mar a thugtar air go poiblí, a chuir “Operation Cloud Hopper” i gcrích. Tá fianaise ann go bhfuil ceangal idir Huaying Haitai agus APT10. Thairis sin, d’fhostaigh Huaying Haitai Gao Qiang agus Zhang Shilong, beirt atá luaite le “Operation Cloud Hopper”. Tá ceangal, dá bhrí sin, idir Huaying Haitai agus Gao Qiang agus Zhang Shilong. |
30.7.2020 |
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2. |
Chosun Expo |
dá ngairtear freisin: Chosen Expo; Korea Export Joint Venture Suíomh: DPDC |
Thug Chosun Expo tacaíocht airgeadais, theicniúil nó ábhartha do shraith cibirionsaithe, agus rinne sé éascaíocht dóibh, sraith cibirionsaithe a rinne mórdhíobháil agus a tháinig ó fhoinse lasmuigh den Aontas agus ar bhagairt sheachtrach iad ar an Aontas nó ar a Bhallstáit agus cibirionsaithe a rinne mórdhíobháil freisin do thríú Stáit, lena n‐áirítear cibirionsaithe “WannaCry”, mar a thugtar orthu go poiblí, agus cibirionsaithe i gcoinne Údarás Maoirseachta Airgeadais na Polainne agus Sony Pictures Entertainment, chomh maith le cibearghadaíocht ó Bhanc na Banglaidéise agus iarracht ar ghadaíocht ó Bhanc Tien Phong i Vítneam. Chuir “WannaCry” córais faisnéise in aimhréidh mórthimpeall an domhain trí bhogearraí éirice a chur i bhfeidhm ar chórais faisnéise agus trí rochtain ar shonraí a bhlocáil. Chuir sé as do chórais faisnéise chuideachtaí an Aontais, lena n‐áirítear córais faisnéise atá bainteach le seirbhísí atá riachtanach chun seirbhísí bunriachtanacha agus gníomhaíochtaí eacnamaíocha a chothabháil sna Ballstáit. Is é an gníomhaí “APT38” (“Ardbhagairt Sheasmhach 38”), mar a thugtar air go poiblí, nó Lazarus Group a chuir “WannaCry” i gcrích. Tá fianaise ann go bhfuil ceangal idir Chosun Expo agus APT38/Lazarus Group, lena n‐áirítear trí na cuntais a úsáideadh le haghaidh na gcibirionsaithe. |
30.7.2020 |
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3. |
Príomh-Lárionad le haghaidh Teicneolaíochtaí Speisialta (GTsST) Phríomh-Ard-Stiúrthóireacht Fhoireann Ghinearálta Fhórsaí Armtha Chónaidhm na Rúise (GU/GRU) |
Seoladh: 22 Sráid Kirova, Moscó, Cónaidhm na Rúise |
Is é Príomhionad Teicneolaíochtaí Speisialta (GTsST) Phríomh-Stiúrthóireacht Fhoireann Ghinearálta Fhórsaí Armtha Chónaidhm na Rúise (GU/GRU), nó 74455, mar a thugtar air óna uimhir phoist allamuigh, atá freagrach as cibirionsaithe a dhéanann mórdhíobháil agus a tháinig ó fhoinse lasmuigh den Aontas agus ar bagairt sheachtrach iad ar an Aontas nó ar a Bhallstáit agus as cibirionsaithe a dhéanann mórdhíobháil freisin do thríú Stáit, lena n‐áirítear cibirionsaithe “NotPetya” nó “EternalPetya”, mar a thugtar orthu go poiblí, i mí an Mheithimh 2017, agus cibirionsaithe ar eangach fuinnimh na hÚcráine i ngeimhreadh na bliana 2015 agus 2016. De dheasca “NotPetya” nó “EternalPetya”, fágadh cuideachtaí éagsúla san Aontas, san Eoraip i gcoitinne agus mórthimpeall na cruinne, gan rochtain ar shonraí nuair a cuireadh bogearraí éirice i bhfeidhm ar ríomhairí agus nuair a rinneadh rochtain ar shonraí a bhlocáil, agus caillteanas suntasach eacnamaíoch ann dá dheasca, i measc rudaí eile. Leis an gcibirionsaí ar eangach fuinnimh na hÚcráine, fágadh gur múchadh codanna de i gcaitheamh an gheimhridh. |
30.7.2020 |
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Is é an gníomhaí “Sandworm” (a.k.a. “Sandworm Team”, “BlackEnergy Group”, “Voodoo Bear”, “Quedagh”, “Olympic Destroyer” agus “Telebots”), mar a thugtar air go poiblí, a chuir “NotPetya” nó “EternalPetya” i gcrích, agus is é freisin ba chúis leis an ionsaí ar eangach fuinnimh na hÚcráine. Tá ról gníomhach ag Príomhionad Teicneolaíochtaí Speisialta (GTsST) Phríomh-Stiúrthóireacht Fhoireann Ghinearálta Fhórsaí Armtha Chónaidhm na Rúise sna cibirghníomhaíochtaí a rinne Sandworm agus tá fianaise ann go bhfuil ceangal idir é agus Sandworm. |
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4. |
85ú Príomh-Lárionad le haghaidh Seirbhísí Speisialta (GTsSS) Phríomh-Stiúrthóireacht Fhoireann Ghinearálta Fhórsaí Armtha Chónaidhm na Rúise (GU/GRU) |
Seoladh: Komsomol’skiy Prospekt, 20, Moscó, 119146, Cónaidhm na Rúise |
Is é 85ú Príomh-Lárionad le haghaidh Seirbhísí Speisialta (GTsSS) Phríomh-Stiúrthóireacht Fhoireann Ghinearálta Fhórsaí Armtha Chónaidhm na Rúise (GU/GRU), dá ngairtear freisin “aonad míleata 26165” (leasainmneacha tionscail: “APT28”, “Fancy Bear”, “Sofacy Group”, “Pawn Storm” agus “Strontium”), atá freagrach as cibirionsaithe a rinne mórdhíobháil agus ar bhagairt sheachtrach iad ar an Aontas nó ar a Bhallstáit. Go háirithe, bhí oifigigh faisnéise míleata de chuid GTsSS páirteach sa chibirionsaí i gcoinne Pharlaimint Chónaidhme na Gearmáine (Deutscher Bundestag) a tharla i mí Aibreáin agus mí na Bealtaine 2015 agus san iarracht ar chibirionsaí a dhéanamh a raibh sé mar aidhm aige briseadh isteach i líonra WiFi na hEagraíochta um Thoirmeasc ar Airm Cheimiceacha (OPCW) san Ísiltír i mí Aibreáin 2018. Bhí an cibirionsaí i gcoinne Pharlaimint Chónaidhme na Gearmáine dírithe ar chóras faisnéise na parlaiminte agus bhí tionchar aige ar fheidhmiú an chórais ar feadh roinnt laethanta. Goideadh líon suntasach sonraí agus bhí éifeacht ar chuntais ríomhphoist roinnt Comhaltaí Parlaiminte agus ar chuntas ríomhphoist an tSeansailéara Angela Merkel. |
22.10.2020 |
ANNEX II
Websites for information on the competent authorities and address for notifications to the Commission
AN BHEILG
https://diplomatie.belgium.be/en/policy/policy_areas/peace_and_security/sanctions
AN BHULGÁIR
https://www.mfa.bg/en/EU-sanctions
AN tSEICIA
www.financnianalytickyurad.cz/mezinarodni-sankce.html
AN DANMHAIRG
http://um.dk/da/Udenrigspolitik/folkeretten/sanktioner/
AN GHEARMÁIN
https://www.bmwi.de/Redaktion/DE/Artikel/Aussenwirtschaft/embargos-aussenwirtschaftsrecht.html
AN EASTÓIN
https://vm.ee/et/rahvusvahelised-sanktsioonid
ÉIRE
https://www.dfa.ie/our-role-policies/ireland-in-the-eu/eu-restrictive-measures/
AN GHRÉIG
http://www.mfa.gr/en/foreign-policy/global-issues/international-sanctions.html
AN SPÁINN
https://www.exteriores.gob.es/es/PoliticaExterior/Paginas/SancionesInternacionales.aspx
AN FHRAINC
http://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/fr/autorites-sanctions/
AN CHRÓIT
https://mvep.gov.hr/vanjska-politika/medjunarodne-mjere-ogranicavanja/22955
AN IODÁIL
https://www.esteri.it/it/politica-estera-e-cooperazione-allo-sviluppo/politica_europea/misure_deroghe/
AN CHIPIR
https://mfa.gov.cy/themes/
AN LAITVIA
http://www.mfa.gov.lv/en/security/4539
AN LIOTUÁIN
http://www.urm.lt/sanctions
LUCSAMBURG
https://maee.gouvernement.lu/fr/directions-du-ministere/affaires-europeennes/organisations-economiques-int/mesures-restrictives.html
AN UNGÁIR
https://kormany.hu/kulgazdasagi-es-kulugyminiszterium/ensz-eu-szankcios-tajekoztato
MÁLTA
https://foreignandeu.gov.mt/en/Government/SMB/Pages/SMB-Home.aspx
AN ÍSILTÍR
https://www.rijksoverheid.nl/onderwerpen/internationale-sancties
AN OSTAIR
https://www.bmeia.gv.at/themen/aussenpolitik/europa/eu-sanktionen-nationale-behoerden/
AN PHOLAINN
https://www.gov.pl/web/dyplomacja/sankcje-miedzynarodowe
https://www.gov.pl/web/diplomacy/international-sanctions
AN PHORTAINGÉIL
https://www.portaldiplomatico.mne.gov.pt/politica-externa/medidas-restritivas
AN RÓMÁIN
http://www.mae.ro/node/1548
AN tSLÓIVÉIN
http://www.mzz.gov.si/si/omejevalni_ukrepi
AN tSLÓVAIC
https://www.mzv.sk/europske_zalezitosti/europske_politiky-sankcie_eu
AN FHIONLAINN
https://um.fi/pakotteet
AN tSUALAINN
https://www.regeringen.se/sanktioner
Seoladh chun fógraí a chur chuig an gCoimisiún Eorpach:
An Coimisiún Eorpach
An Ard-Stiúrthóireacht um Chobhsaíocht Airgeadais, Seirbhísí Airgeadais agus Aontas na Margaí Caipitil (AS FISMA)
Rue de Spa/Spastraat 2
1049 Bruxelles/Brussel, BELGIQUE/BELGIË
R-phost: relex-sanctions@ec.europa.eu