21.11.2013   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 341/1

1.1

This opinion sets out an argument that an effective way of strengthening civil society partnerships in delivering the Baltic Sea Region Strategy is through the implementation of the partnership principle as set out in the Commission's code of conduct partnership.

1.2

The code of conduct partnership enjoys the support of the European Parliament, the Committee of the Regions and the EESC but is not yet endorsed by the Council. This remains a significant challenge for supporters of the partnership principle.

1.3

The EESC acknowledges that there is incomplete political support for the code of conduct among Baltic Member States and that the culture of partnership needs to be strengthened.

1.4

The EESC recommends that the Baltic Sea Region Strategy could informally embrace the process outlined in the code of conduct and apply it to the ongoing evolution and implementation of the Baltic Sea Region Strategy.

1.5

There is sufficient organisational experience and competence in the Baltic Sea Region to build upon to undertake the enhanced monitoring role envisaged under the code of conduct.

1.6

The Baltic could also emulate the Danube Strategy by establishing a Baltic Civil Society Forum. The EESC played a prominent role in the formation of the Danube Civil Society Forum and stand ready to play a similar coordinating role in the Baltic.

2.1

The concept of a macro-region first entered the vocabulary of the EU in 2007 as part of the political debate about appropriate forms of territorial governance. Subsequently macro-regional cooperation strategies were adopted for the Baltic Sea region (2009) and the Danube region (2011).

2.2

The Baltic Sea Region Strategy, as the first attempt at cooperation at macro-regional level, was initially a test case for this new model of regional cooperation. At its heart is a simple view that in a region such as the Baltic Sea serious problem such as maritime safety, environmental pollution and access ability can only be tackled and overcome through effective cooperation. In addition the precise geography of a macro-region can vary according to the definition and nature of the problem to be tackled. A former Commissioner for regional policy put this point succinctly when he stated that a macro-regional strategy is defined "on the basis of the challenges and transnational opportunities that require collective action".

2.3

The Baltic Sea Region Strategy has three main objectives: to save the sea, to connect the region and to increase prosperity. In order to achieve this, the Member States and the Commission have agreed on an Action Plan with 15 Priority Areas and about 80 different Flagship Projects.

2.4

The Baltic Sea Region Strategy has built upon existing levels of cooperation in the region and has been underway for four years. It has engendered a high level of cooperation between participating countries and regions. Multilevel governance has operated to coordinate national and regional authorities to improve maritime safety and to achieve a reduction in eutrophication levels in the Baltic. The EU has organised annual Civil Society Forums in the context of EUSBSR, since its establishment in 2009.

2.5

The economic performance of the region has not been hindered by the outworking of the strategy. The Baltic Sea region recovered in 2010 more quickly than other parts of Europe and retained solid growth rates throughout 2011. In 2012 the pace of growth slowed to 1,5 %, still well above the EU average. The outlook for 2013 remains muted but the region should still outperform its European peers, according to the Baltic Development Forum.

3.1

The EESC has long held the view that genuine partnership is necessary for the overall effectiveness of EU cohesion policy. Partnership is a means of achieving sustainable economic and social development. It is enshrined in the mechanism for delivering cohesion policy and formally set out in Article 11 of the general regulation.

3.2

The interpretation of article 11 by Member States has been problematic with some countries paying only lip service while others fully embraced the partnership principle. In April 2012 the Commission proposed a code of conduct partnership in the implementation of the common strategic framework in an attempt to set out a formal mechanism for the effective participation of all stakeholders in cohesion policy.

3.3

The Commission's proposed code of conduct partnership contains a set of minimum requirements which are necessary to attain a high quality partnership in the implementation of the funds while maintaining ample flexibility to Member States in ways they organise the participation of the different partners. The European code of conduct on partnership states that "public authorities, economic and social partners, and bodies representing civil society may establish, in their respective area of intervention, platforms or umbrella organisations to facilitate their involvement in the partnership. They may nominate a single representative to present the views of the platform or the umbrella organisation in the partnership. Principles to consider when partners nominate their representatives would include: competence, capacity to participate actively, and appropriate level of representation".

3.4

The Commission’s proposals are supported by the European Parliament, the EESC and the Committee of the Regions. The European Council however deleted the code of conduct from the Commission's overall set of proposals. This stand-off is unfortunate and demands concerted action from all supporters of the partnership principle to overcome it.

3.5

The code of conduct identifies three categories of partners constituting the partnership in cohesion policy:

3.6

It also sets out a set of principles for involvement of different categories of partners in the preparation of programmes, the information to be provided on their involvement as well as at the various stages of implementation. According to the Commission, partners should be involved in:

3.7

In terms of the preparation programmes, partners should be involved in:

3.7.1

The code also contains detailed set of principles for the rules of membership and governance of partnerships and monitoring committees.

3.7.2

In order for many of the smaller NGOs and other civil society organisations to take part effectively in this new partnership process, consideration should be given to providing them with adequate technical and financial assistance.

3.8

Although the Baltic Sea region strategy resulted from an unprecedented level of stakeholder consultation, it is fair to say that the partnership principle as outlined in the code of conduct is largely absent in the Baltic. Political "buy in" to the partnership principle remains to be achieved in some Member States.

3.9

There are several bodies and organisations operating successfully across the Baltic Sea Region with broad representation of civil society stakeholders. These could form the basis of a Baltic Partnership or umbrella organisation as envisaged in the code of conduct. There is no need to duplicate what is already in place.

3.10

In terms of cooperative relations with Russia, just as the new North West Federal District strategy has been influenced by the Baltic Sea Region strategy, a new partnership approach among the members of the Council of the Baltic States (CBSS) could have similar demonstration effects.

3.11

If the code of conduct could be broadly supported, it would help to galvanise stakeholder support once more for the Baltic Sea Strategy even during this very difficult period and in the period ahead. Just as the Baltic Sea Region Strategy was viewed as a test of macro-regional cooperation, the implementation of the partnership principle would be another first for the Baltic.

3.12

The appendix below sets out the partnership multilevel governance agreement between the Council and the European Parliament which could form the basis of the delegated act to give effect to a modified code of conduct partnership.