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Document 02018R1542-20221114

    Consolidated text: Council Regulation (EU) 2018/1542 of 15 October 2018 concerning restrictive measures against the proliferation and use of chemical weapons

    ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2018/1542/2022-11-14

    02018R1542 — GA — 14.11.2022 — 006.001


    Is áis doiciméadúcháin amháin an téacs seo agus níl aon éifeacht dhlíthiúil aige. Ní ghabhann institiúidí an Aontais aon dliteanas orthu féin i leith inneachar an téacs. Is iad na leaganacha de na gníomhartha a foilsíodh in Iris Oifigiúil an Aontais Eorpaigh agus atá ar fáil ar an suíomh gréasáin EUR-Lex na leaganacha barántúla de na gníomhartha ábhartha, brollach an téacs san áireamh. Is féidir teacht ar na téacsanna oifigiúla sin ach na naisc atá leabaithe sa doiciméad seo a bhrú

    ►B

    COUNCIL REGULATION (EU) 2018/1542

    of 15 October 2018

    concerning restrictive measures against the proliferation and use of chemical weapons

    (IO L 259 16.10.2018, lch. 12)

    Arna leasú le:

     

     

    Iris Oifigiúil

      Uimh

    Leathanach

    Dáta

    ►M1

    COUNCIL IMPLEMENTING REGULATION (EU) 2019/84 of 21 January 2019 (*)

      L 18I

    1

    21.1.2019

     M2

    COMMISSION IMPLEMENTING REGULATION (EU) 2019/1163 of 5 July 2019 (*)

      L 182

    33

    8.7.2019

    ►M3

    RIALACHÁN CUR CHUN FEIDHME (AE) 2020/1463 ÓN gCOMHAIRLE an 12 Deireadh Fómhair 2020

      L 335

    1

    13.10.2020

    ►M4

    RIALACHÁN CUR CHUN FEIDHME (AE) 2020/1480 ÓN gCOMHAIRLE an 14 Deireadh Fómhair 2020

      L 341

    1

    15.10.2020

    ►M5

    RIALACHÁN CUR CHUN FEIDHME (AE) 2022/595 ÓN gCOIMISIÚN an 11 Aibreán 2022

      L 114

    60

    12.4.2022

    ►M6

    RIALACHÁN CUR CHUN FEIDHME (AE) 2022/1936 ÓN gCOMHAIRLE an 13 Deireadh Fómhair 2022

      L 268

    7

    14.10.2022

    ►M7

    RIALACHÁN CUR CHUN FEIDHME (AE) 2022/2228 ÓN gCOMHAIRLE an 14 Samhain 2022

      L 293I

    1

    14.11.2022



    (*)

    Níor foilsíodh an gníomh seo i nGaeilge




    ▼B

    COUNCIL REGULATION (EU) 2018/1542

    of 15 October 2018

    concerning restrictive measures against the proliferation and use of chemical weapons



    Article 1

    For the purposes of this Regulation, the following definitions shall apply:

    (a) 

    ‘chemical weapons’ means chemical weapons as defined in Article II of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC);

    (b) 

    ‘claim’ means any claim, whether asserted by legal proceedings or not, made before or after the date of entry into force of this Regulation, under or in connection with a contract or transaction, and includes in particular:

    (i) 

    a claim for performance of any obligation arising under or in connection with a contract or transaction;

    (ii) 

    a claim for extension or payment of a bond, financial guarantee or indemnity of whatever form;

    (iii) 

    a claim for compensation in respect of a contract or transaction;

    (iv) 

    a counterclaim;

    (v) 

    a claim for the recognition or enforcement, including by the procedure of exequatur, of a judgment, an arbitration award or an equivalent decision, wherever made or given;

    (c) 

    ‘contract or transaction’ means any transaction of whatever form and whatever the applicable law, whether comprising one or more contracts or similar obligations made between the same or different parties; for this purpose ‘contract’ includes a bond, guarantee or indemnity, particularly a financial guarantee or financial indemnity, and credit, whether legally independent or not, as well as any related provision arising under, or in connection with, the transaction;

    (d) 

    ‘competent authorities’ refers to the competent authorities of the Member States as identified on the websites listed in Annex II;

    (e) 

    ‘economic resources’ means assets of any kind, whether tangible or intangible, movable or immovable, which are not funds, but may be used to obtain funds, goods or services;

    (f) 

    ‘freezing of economic resources’ means preventing the use of economic resources to obtain funds, goods or services in any way, including, but not limited to, by selling, hiring or mortgaging them;

    (g) 

    ‘freezing of funds’ means preventing any move, transfer, alteration, use of, access to, or dealing with funds in any way that would result in any change in their volume, amount, location, ownership, possession, character, destination or other change that would enable the funds to be used, including portfolio management;

    (h) 

    ‘funds’ means financial assets and benefit of every kind, including, but not limited to:

    (i) 

    cash, cheques, claims on money, drafts, money orders and other payment instruments;

    (ii) 

    deposits with financial institutions or other entities, balances on accounts, debts and debt obligations;

    (iii) 

    publicly- or privately-traded securities and debt instruments, including stocks and shares, certificates representing securities, bonds, notes, warrants, debentures and derivatives contracts;

    (iv) 

    interest, dividends or other income on or value accruing from or generated by assets;

    (v) 

    credit, right of set-off, guarantees, performance bonds or other financial commitments;

    (vi) 

    letters of credit, bills of lading, bills of sale; and

    (vii) 

    documents showing evidence of an interest in funds or financial resources;

    (i) 

    ‘territory of the Union’ means the territories of the Member States to which the Treaty is applicable, under the conditions laid down in the Treaty, including their airspace.

    Article 2

    1.  
    All funds and economic resources belonging to, owned, held or controlled by any natural or legal person, entity or body as listed in Annex I shall be frozen.
    2.  
    No funds or economic resources shall be made available, directly or indirectly, to or for the benefit of natural or legal persons, entities or bodies listed in Annex I.
    3.  

    Annex I shall include natural or legal persons, entities and bodies which, in accordance with Article 3(1) of Council Decision (CFSP) 2018/1544, have been identified by the Council as:

    (a) 

    natural or legal persons, entities or bodies which are responsible for, or provide financial, technical or material support for or are otherwise involved in:

    (i) 

    manufacturing, acquiring, possessing, developing, transporting, stockpiling or transferring chemical weapons;

    (ii) 

    using chemical weapons; or

    (iii) 

    engaging in any preparations for the use of chemical weapons;

    (b) 

    natural or legal persons, entities or bodies which assist, encourage or induce any natural or legal person, entity or body to engage in any activity referred to in point (a) of this paragraph and thereby cause or contribute to a danger that such activities may be carried out; and

    (c) 

    natural or legal persons, entities or bodies associated with the natural or legal persons, entities and bodies covered by points (a) and (b) of this paragraph.

    Article 3

    1.  

    By way of derogation from Article 2, the competent authorities of the Member States may authorise the release of certain frozen funds or economic resources, or the making available of certain funds or economic resources, under such conditions as they deem appropriate, after having determined that the funds or economic resources concerned are:

    (a) 

    necessary to satisfy the basic needs of natural or legal persons, entities or bodies listed in Annex I and dependent family members of such natural persons, including payments for foodstuffs, rent or mortgage, medicines and medical treatment, taxes, insurance premiums, and public utility charges;

    (b) 

    intended exclusively for payment of reasonable professional fees or reimbursement of incurred expenses associated with the provision of legal services;

    (c) 

    intended exclusively for payment of fees or service charges for routine holding or maintenance of frozen funds or economic resources;

    (d) 

    necessary for extraordinary expenses, provided that the relevant competent authority has notified the competent authorities of the other Member States and the Commission of the grounds on which it considers that a specific authorisation should be granted, at least two weeks prior to authorisation; or

    (e) 

    to be paid into or from an account of a diplomatic or consular mission or an international organisation enjoying immunities in accordance with international law, insofar as such payments are intended to be used for official purposes of the diplomatic or consular mission or international organisation.

    2.  
    The Member State concerned shall inform the other Member States and the Commission within two weeks of any authorisation granted under paragraph 1.

    Article 4

    1.  

    By way of derogation from Article 2(1), the competent authorities of the Member States may authorise the release of certain frozen funds or economic resources if the following conditions are met:

    (a) 

    the funds or economic resources are the subject of an arbitral decision rendered prior to the date on which the natural or legal person, entity or body referred to in Article 2 was listed in Annex I, or are the subject of a judicial or administrative decision rendered in the Union or a judicial decision enforceable in the Member State concerned, prior to or after that date;

    (b) 

    the funds or economic resources will be used exclusively to satisfy claims secured by such a decision or recognised as valid in such a decision, within the limits set by applicable laws and regulations governing the rights of persons having such claims;

    (c) 

    the decision is not for the benefit of a natural or legal person, entity or body listed in Annex I; and

    (d) 

    recognising the decision is not contrary to public policy in the Member State concerned.

    2.  
    The Member State concerned shall inform the other Member States and the Commission within two weeks of any authorisation granted under paragraph 1.

    Article 5

    1.  

    By way of derogation from Article 2(1) and provided that a payment by a natural or legal person, entity or body listed in Annex I is due under a contract or agreement that was concluded by, or an obligation that arose for, the natural or legal person, entity or body concerned before the date on which that natural or legal person, entity or body was included in Annex I, the competent authorities of the Member States may authorise, under such conditions as they deem appropriate, the release of certain frozen funds or economic resources, provided that the competent authority concerned has determined that:

    (a) 

    the funds or economic resources will be used for a payment by a natural or legal person, entity or body listed in Annex I; and

    (b) 

    the payment is not in breach of Article 2(2).

    2.  
    The Member State concerned shall inform the other Member States and the Commission within two weeks of any authorisation granted under paragraph 1.

    Article 6

    1.  
    Article 2(2) shall not prevent financial or credit institutions that receive funds transferred by third parties to the account of a listed natural or legal person, entity or body from crediting the frozen accounts, provided that any additions to such accounts will also be frozen. The financial or credit institution shall inform the relevant competent authority about any such transaction without delay.
    2.  

    Article 2(2) shall not apply to the addition to frozen accounts of:

    (a) 

    interest or other earnings on those accounts;

    (b) 

    payments due under contracts, agreements or obligations that were concluded or arose before the date on which the natural or legal person, entity or body referred to in Article 2 was included in Annex I; or

    (c) 

    payments due under judicial, administrative or arbitral decisions rendered in a Member State or enforceable in the Member State concerned.

    Article 7

    1.  

    Without prejudice to the applicable rules concerning reporting, confidentiality and professional secrecy, natural and legal persons, entities and bodies shall:

    (a) 

    supply immediately any information which would facilitate compliance with this Regulation, such as information on accounts and amounts frozen in accordance with Article 2, to the competent authority of the Member State where they are resident or located, and they shall transmit such information, directly or through the Member State, to the Commission; and

    (b) 

    cooperate with the competent authority in any verification of this information.

    2.  
    Any additional information received directly by the Commission shall be made available to the Member States.
    3.  
    Any information provided or received in accordance with this Article shall be used only for the purposes for which it was provided or received.

    Article 8

    It shall be prohibited to participate, knowingly and intentionally, in activities the object or effect of which is to circumvent the measures referred to in Article 2.

    Article 9

    1.  
    The freezing of funds and economic resources or the refusal to make funds or economic resources available, carried out in good faith on the basis that such action is in accordance with this Regulation, shall not give rise to liability of any kind on the part of the natural or legal person or entity or body implementing it, or its directors or employees, unless it is proved that the funds and economic resources were frozen or withheld as a result of negligence.
    2.  
    Actions by natural or legal persons, entities or bodies shall not give rise to any liability of any kind on their part if they did not know, and had no reasonable cause to suspect, that their actions would infringe the measures set out in this Regulation.

    Article 10

    1.  

    No claims in connection with any contract or transaction, the performance of which has been affected, directly or indirectly, in whole or in part, by the measures imposed under this Regulation, including claims for indemnity or any other claim of this type, such as a claim for compensation or a claim under a guarantee, notably a claim for extension or payment of a bond, guarantee or indemnity, particularly a financial guarantee or financial indemnity, of whatever form, shall be satisfied, if they are made by:

    (a) 

    designated natural or legal persons, entities or bodies listed in Annex I;

    (b) 

    any natural or legal person, entity or body acting through or on behalf of one of the persons, entities or bodies referred to in point (a).

    2.  
    In any proceedings for the enforcement of a claim, the onus of proving that satisfying the claim is not prohibited by paragraph 1 shall be on the natural or legal person, entity or body seeking the enforcement of that claim.
    3.  
    This Article is without prejudice to the right of the natural or legal persons, entities and bodies referred to in paragraph 1 to judicial review of the legality of the non-performance of contractual obligations in accordance with this Regulation.

    Article 11

    1.  

    The Commission and Member States shall inform each other of the measures taken under this Regulation and share any other relevant information at their disposal in connection with this Regulation, in particular information:

    (a) 

    in respect of funds frozen under Article 2 and authorisations granted under Articles 3, 4 and 5;

    (b) 

    in respect of violation and enforcement problems and judgments handed down by national courts.

    2.  
    The Member States shall immediately inform each other and the Commission of any other relevant information at their disposal which might affect the effective implementation of this Regulation.

    Article 12

    1.  
    Where the Council decides to subject a natural or legal person, entity or body to the measures referred to in Article 2, it shall amend Annex I accordingly.
    2.  
    The Council shall communicate its decision, including the grounds for listing, to the natural or legal person, entity or body referred to in paragraph 1, either directly, if the address is known, or through the publication of a notice, providing such natural or legal person, entity or body with an opportunity to present observations.
    3.  
    Where observations are submitted, or where substantial new evidence is presented, the Council shall review its decision and inform the natural or legal person, entity or body accordingly.
    4.  
    The list in Annex I shall be reviewed at regular intervals and at least every 12 months.
    5.  
    The Commission shall be empowered to amend Annex II on the basis of information supplied by Member States.

    Article 13

    1.  
    Annex I shall include the grounds for the listing of natural or legal persons, entities or bodies concerned.
    2.  
    Annex I shall include, where available, information necessary to identify the natural or legal persons, entities or bodies concerned. With regard to natural persons, such information may include names including aliases, date and place of birth, nationality, passport and identity card numbers, gender, address, if known, and function or profession. With regard to legal persons, entities and bodies, such information may include names, place and date of registration, registration number and place of business.

    Article 14

    1.  
    Member States shall lay down the rules on penalties applicable to infringements of the provisions of this Regulation and shall take all measures necessary to ensure that they are implemented. The penalties provided for must be effective, proportionate and dissuasive.
    2.  
    Member States shall notify those rules to the Commission without delay after the entry into force of this Regulation and shall notify it of any subsequent amendment.

    Article 15

    1.  

    The Commission shall process personal data in order to carry out its tasks under this Regulation. These tasks include:

    (a) 

    adding the contents of Annex I in the electronic ‘Consolidated list of persons, groups and entities subject to EU financial sanctions’ and in the interactive EU Sanctions Map, which are both accessible to the public;

    (b) 

    processing of information on the impact of the measures of this Regulation such as the value of frozen funds and information on authorisations granted by the competent authorities.

    2.  
    For the purpose of paragraph 1, the Commission service listed in Annex II is designated as ‘controller’ for the Commission within the meaning of Article 2(d) of Regulation (EC) No 45/2001, in order to ensure that the natural persons concerned can exercise their rights under Regulation (EC) No 45/2001.

    Article 16

    1.  
    Member States shall designate the competent authorities referred to in this Regulation and identify them on the websites listed in Annex II. Member States shall notify the Commission of any changes in the addresses of their websites listed in Annex II.
    2.  
    Member States shall notify the Commission of their competent authorities, including the contact details of those competent authorities, without delay after the entry into force of this Regulation, and shall notify it of any subsequent amendment.
    3.  
    Where this Regulation sets out a requirement to notify, inform or otherwise communicate with the Commission, the address and other contact details to be used for such communication shall be those indicated in Annex II.

    Article 17

    This Regulation shall apply:

    (a) 

    within the territory of the Union, including its airspace;

    (b) 

    on board of any aircraft or any vessel under the jurisdiction of a Member State;

    (c) 

    to any natural person inside or outside the territory of the Union who is a national of a Member State;

    (d) 

    to any legal person, entity or body, inside or outside the territory of the Union, which is incorporated or constituted under the law of a Member State;

    (e) 

    to any legal person, entity or body in respect of any business done in whole or in part within the Union.

    Article 18

    This Regulation shall enter into force on the date of its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union.

    This Regulation shall be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States.




    ANNEX I

    LIST OF NATURAL AND LEGAL PERSONS, ENTITIES AND BODIES REFERRED TO IN ARTICLE 2

    ▼M1

    A.   NATURAL PERSONS



    Name

    Identifying information

    Grounds for designation

    Date of listing

    1.  Tariq YASMINA

    a.k.a.: Tarq Yasminaimage

    Gender: male;

    Title: Colonel;

    Nationality: Syrian

    Tariq Yasmina acts as the liaison officer between the Scientific Studies and Research Centre (SSRC) and the Presidential Palace, and, as such, is involved in the use and preparations for the use of chemical weapons by the Syrian regime.

    21.1.2019

    2.  Khaled NASRI

    a.k.a.: Mohammed Khaled Nasri; Haled Natsri;image

    image

    Gender: male;

    Title: Head of Institute 1000 of the SSRC;

    Nationality: Syrian

    Khaled Nasri is the Director of Institute 1000, the division of the Scientific Studies and Research Centre (SSRC) responsible for developing and producing computer and electronic systems for Syria's chemical weapons programme.

    21.1.2019

    3.  Walid ZUGHAIB

    a.k.a.: Zughib, Zgha'ib, Zughayb;image

    Title: Doctor, Head of Institute 2000 of the SSRC;

    Gender: male;

    Nationality: Syrian

    Walid Zughaib is the Director of Institute 2000, the division of the Scientific Studies and Research Centre (SSRC) responsible for mechanical development and production for Syria's chemical weapons programme.

    21.1.2019

    4.  Firas AHMED

    a.k.a.: Ahmad;image

    Title: Colonel, Head of Security Office at Institute 1000 of the SSRC;

    Gender: male;

    Date of birth: 21 January 1967;

    Nationality: Syrian

    Firas Ahmed is the Director of the Security Office of Institute 1000, the division of the Scientific Studies and Research Centre (SSRC) responsible for developing and producing computer and electronic systems for Syria's chemical weapons programme. He was involved in transferring and concealing chemical weapons related materials following Syria's accession to the Chemical Weapons Convention.

    21.1.2019

    ▼M3

    5. Said SAID

    dá ngairtear freisin: Saeed, Sa’id Sa’idimage

    Teideal: Dochtúir, ball de Institute 3000 (dá ngairtear freisin Institute 6000) de SSRC;

    Inscne: fireann;

    Dáta breithe: 11 Nollaig 1955

    Pearsa shuntasach é Said Said in Institute 3000 dá ngairtear freisin Institute 6000, an rannán den Ionad Staidéir Eolaíochta agus Taighde (SSRC) atá freagrach as airm cheimiceacha na Siria a fhorbairt agus a tháirgeadh.

    21.1.2019

    ▼M1

    6.  Anatoliy Vladimirovich CHEPIGA

    Анатолий Владимирович ЧЕПИГА, a.k.a.: Ruslan BOSHIROV

    Gender: male;

    Dates of birth: 5 April 1979; 12 Apr 1978;

    Places of Birth: Nikolaevka, Amur Oblast, Russia; Dushanbe, Tajikistan

    GRU Officer Anatoliy Chepiga (a.k.a. Ruslan Boshirov) possessed, transported and then, during the weekend of 4 March 2018, in Salisbury, used a toxic nerve agent (‘Novichok’). On 5 September 2018, the UK Crown Prosecution Service charged Ruslan Boshirov for conspiracy to murder Sergei Skripal; for the attempted murder of Sergei Skripal, Yulia Skripal and Nick Bailey; for the use and possession of Novichok; and for causing grievous bodily harm with intent to Yulia Skripal and Nick Bailey.

    21.1.2019

    7.  Alexander Yevgeniyevich MISHKIN

    Александр Евгеньевич МИШКИН, a.k.a.: Alexander PETROV

    Gender: male;

    Date of birth:13 July 1979;

    Places of Birth: Loyga, Russia; Kotlas, Russia

    GRU Officer Alexander Mishkin (a.k.a. Alexander Petrov) possessed, transported and then, during the weekend of 4 March 2018, in Salisbury, used a toxic nerve agent (‘Novichok’). On 5 September 2018, the UK Crown Prosecution Service charged Alexander Petrov for conspiracy to murder Sergei Skripal; for the attempted murder of Sergei Skripal, Yulia Skripal and Nick Bailey; for the use and possession of Novichok; and for causing grievous bodily harm with intent to Yulia Skripal and Nick Bailey.

    21.1.2019

    8.  Vladimir Stepanovich ALEXSEYEV

    Владимир Степанович АЛЕКСЕЕВ

    Gender: male;

    Title: First Deputy Head of the GRU

    Vladimir Stepanovich Alexseyev is the First Deputy Head of the GRU (a.k.a. GU). Given his senior leadership role in the GRU, Alexseyev is responsible for the possession, transport and use in Salisbury during the weekend of 4 March 2018 of the toxic nerve agent ‘Novichok’ by officers from the GRU.

    21.1.2019

    9.  Igor Olegovich KOSTYUKOV

    Игорь Олегович КОСТЮКОВ

    Gender: male;

    Title: Head of the GRU

    Igor Olegovich Kostyukov, given his senior leadership role as First Deputy Head of the GRU (a. k. a. GU) at that time, is responsible for the possession, transport and use in Salisbury during the weekend of 4 March 2018 of the toxic nerve agent ‘Novichok’ by officers from the GRU.

    21.1.2019

    ▼M4

    10.  Andrei Veniaminovich YARIN

    (Андрей Вениаминович ЯРИН)

    Inscne: fireann;

    Dáta breithe: 13 Feabhra 1970;

    Áit bhreithe: Nizhny Tagil;

    Náisiúntacht: Rúiseach;

    Teideal: Ceann an Presidential Domestic Policy Directorate

    Tá Andrei Yarin ina cheann ar an Presidential Domestic Policy Directorate sa Presidential Executive Office i gCónaidhm na Rúise. Sa phost sin, tá sé i bhfeighil ar threoshuíomhanna polaitiúla inmheánacha a cheapadh agus a chur chun feidhme. Ceapadh Andrei Yarin freisin sa tascfhórsa laistigh den Presidential Executive Office agus ba é ról an tascfhórsa tionchar Alexei Navalny i sochaí na Rúise a chomhrac lena n-áirítear trí oibríochtaí a bhí ceaptha chun míchlú a tharraingt air.

    Tá ciapadh agus cos ar bolg déanta ar Alexei Navalny ag gníomhaithe an Stáit agus ag gníomhaithe breithiúnacha i gCónaidhm na Rúise toisc an róil lárnaigh atá aige sa fhreasúra polaitiúil.

    15.10.2020

     

     

    Rinne údaráis Chónaidhm na Rúise faireachán géar ar ghníomhaíochtaí Alexei Navalny agus é ag taisteal go dtí an tSibéir i mí Lúnasa 2020. An 20 Lúnasa 2020, d’éirigh sé go dona tinn agus tugadh chun an ospidéil in Omsk, Cónaidhm na Rúise é. An 22 Lúnasa 2020, aistríodh chuig ospidéal i mBeirlín, sa Ghearmáin é. D’aimsigh sainsaotharlann sa Ghearmáin fianaise shoiléir ina dhiaidh sin, fianaise ar chomhthacaigh saotharlanna sa Fhrainc agus sa tSualainn léi, go ndearnadh Alexei Navalny a nimhiú le hoibreán néaróg tocsaineach de chuid an ghrúpa Novichok. Níl rochtain ag aon dream seachas údaráis Stáit i gCónaidhm na Rúise ar an oibreán tocsaineach sin.

    Sna himthosca sin, tá sé réasúnta a rá nárbh fhéidir Alexei Navalny a nimhiú ach amháin le toil an Presidential Executive Office. I bhfianaise a róil shinsearaigh ceannaireachta san Oifig sin, tá Andrei Yarin freagrach, dá bhrí sin, as tacaíocht a spreagadh agus a chur ar fáil do na daoine sin a nimhigh Alexei Navalny nó a raibh baint acu lena nimhiú le hoibreán néaróg Novichok, agus is ionann sin agus úsáid arm ceimiceach faoin gCoinbhinsiún um Airm Cheimiceacha.

     

    11.  Sergei Vladilenovich KIRIYENKO

    (Сергей Владиленович КИРИЕНКО)

    Inscne: fireann;

    Dáta breithe: 26 Iúil 1962;

    Áit bhreithe: Sukhumi;

    Náisiúntacht: Rúiseach;

    Teideal: Céad-Leas-Cheann-Foirne ar an Presidential Executive Office

    Is é Sergei Kiriyenko Céad-Leas-Cheann-Foirne an Presidential Executive Office de Chónaidhm na Rúise. Sa phost sin, tá sé freagrach as gnóthaí intíre, lena n-áirítear grúpaí agus gníomhaíochtaí polaitiúla.

    Tá ciapadh agus cos ar bolg déanta ar Alexei Navalny ag gníomhaithe an Stáit agus ag gníomhaithe breithiúnacha i gCónaidhm na Rúise toisc an róil lárnaigh atá aige sa fhreasúra polaitiúil.

    Rinne údaráis Chónaidhm na Rúise faireachán géar ar ghníomhaíochtaí Alexei Navalny agus é ag taisteal go dtí an tSibéir i mí Lúnasa 2020. An 20 Lúnasa 2020, d’éirigh sé go dona tinn agus tugadh chun an ospidéil in Omsk, Cónaidhm na Rúise é. An 22 Lúnasa 2020, aistríodh chuig ospidéal i mBeirlín, sa Ghearmáin é. D’aimsigh sainsaotharlann sa Ghearmáin fianaise shoiléir ina dhiaidh sin, fianaise ar chomhthacaigh saotharlanna sa Fhrainc agus sa tSualainn léi, go ndearnadh Alexei Navalny a nimhiú le hoibreán néaróg tocsaineach de chuid an ghrúpa Novichok. Níl rochtain ag aon dream seachas údaráis Stáit i gCónaidhm na Rúise ar an oibreán tocsaineach sin.

    15.10.2020

     

     

    Sna himthosca sin, tá sé réasúnta a rá nárbh fhéidir Alexei Navalny a nimhiú ach amháin le toil an Presidential Executive Office. I bhfianaise a róil shinsearaigh ceannaireachta san Oifig sin, tá Sergei Kiriyenko freagrach, dá bhrí sin, as tacaíocht a spreagadh agus a chur ar fáil do na daoine sin a nimhigh Alexei Navalny nó a raibh baint acu lena nimhiú le hoibreán néaróg Novichok, agus is ionann sin agus úsáid arm ceimiceach faoin gCoinbhinsiún um Airm Cheimiceacha.

     

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    12.  Sergei Ivanovich MENYAILO

    (Сергей Иванович МЕНЯЙЛО)

    Inscne: fireann;

    Dáta breithe: an 22 Lúnasa 1960;

    Áit bhreithe: Alagir;

    Náisiúntacht: Rúiseach;

    Teideal: Ceann North Ossetia-Alania.

    Is é Sergei Menyailo Ceann North Ossetia-Alania. Bhí sé ina Ionadaí Lánchumhachtach d’Uachtarán an Russian Federation don Siberian Federal District idir 2016 agus mí Aibreáin 2021. Sa cháil sin, bhí sé freagrach as cur chun feidhme chumhachtaí bunreachtúla an Uachtaráin a áirithiú, lena n-áirítear beartas intíre agus eachtrach an Stáit a chur chun feidhme. Bhí Sergei Menyailo ina chomhalta den Security Council of the Russian Federation go dtí mí Lúnasa 2021.

    Dhírigh gníomhaithe Stáit agus gníomhaithe breithiúnacha ciapadh agus diansmacht córasach ar Alexei Navalny i ngeall ar an ról tábhachtach a bhí aige sa fhreasúra polaitiúil.

    Rinne údaráis Chónaidhm na Rúise dlúthfhaireachán ar ghníomhaíochtaí Alexei Navalny le linn a thurais go dtí an tSibéir i mí Lúnasa 2020. An 20 Lúnasa 2020, buaileadh go dona tinn é agus tugadh isteach in ospidéal é in Omsk i gCónaidhm na Rúise. An 22 Lúnasa 2020, tugadh go hospidéal é i mBeirlín na Gearmáine. Ina dhiaidh sin, d’aimsigh sainsaotharlann sa Ghearmáin fianaise shoiléir, lenar chomhthacaigh saotharlanna sa Fhrainc agus sa tSualainn freisin, gur nimhíodh Alexei Navalny le néar-oibreán tocsaineach de chuid an ghrúpa Novichok. Is ag údaráis Stáit i gCónaidhm na Rúise amháin atá rochtain ar an oibreán tocsaineach sin. Sna cúinsí sin, tá sé réasúnta a mheas nach bhféadfaí Alexei Navalny a nimhiú ach amháin le toiliú ó Oifig Feidhmiúcháin an Uachtaráin.

    Dá bhrí sin, i bhfianaise a róil shinsearaigh cheannaireachta mar iar-ionadaí na hOifige sin sa Siberian Federal District, tá Sergei Menyailo freagrach as spreagadh agus tacaíocht a thabhairt do na daoine a nimhigh Alexei Navalny nó a raibh baint acu lena nimhiú leis an néar-oibreán Novichok, agus is ionann sin agus arm ceimiceach a úsáid faoin gCoinbhinsiún maidir le hAirm Cheimiceacha.

    15.10.2020

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    13.  Aleksandr Vasilievich BORTNIKOV

    (Александр Васильевич БОРТНИКОВ)

    Inscne: fireann;

    Dáta breithe: 15 Samhain 1951;

    Áit bhreithe: Perm;

    Náisiúntacht: Rúiseach;

    Teideal: Stiúrthóir ar Federal Security Service Chónaidhm na Rúise

    Tá Aleksandr Bortnikov ina Stiúrthóir ar Federal Security Service Chónaidhm na Rúise agus sa cháil sin tá sé freagrach as gníomhaíochtaí príomhghníomhaireacht slándála na Rúise.

    Tá ciapadh agus cos ar bolg déanta ar Alexei Navalny ag gníomhaithe an Stáit agus ag gníomhaithe breithiúnacha i gCónaidhm na Rúise toisc an róil lárnaigh atá aige sa fhreasúra polaitiúil.

    Rinne an Federal Security Service faireachán géar ar ghníomhaíochtaí Alexei Navalny agus é ag taisteal go dtí an tSibéir i mí Lúnasa 2020. An 20 Lúnasa 2020, d’éirigh sé go dona tinn agus tugadh chun an ospidéil in Omsk, Cónaidhm na Rúise é. An 22 Lúnasa 2020, aistríodh chuig ospidéal i mBeirlín, sa Ghearmáin é. D’aimsigh sainsaotharlann sa Ghearmáin fianaise shoiléir ina dhiaidh sin, fianaise ar chomhthacaigh saotharlanna sa Fhrainc agus sa tSualainn léi, go ndearnadh Alexei Navalny a nimhiú le hoibreán néaróg tocsaineach de chuid an ghrúpa Novichok. Níl rochtain ag aon dream seachas údaráis Stáit i gCónaidhm na Rúise ar an oibreán tocsaineach sin.

    15.10.2020

     

     

    Sna himthosca sin, agus é á chur san áireamh go raibh faireachas á dhéanamh ar Alexei Navalny tráth a nimhithe, tá sé réasúnta a rá nárbh fhéidir an nimhiú a dhéanamh mura mbeadh an Federal Security Service rannpháirteach.

    I bhfianaise a róil shinsearaigh ceannaireachta sa Federal Security Service, tá Aleksandr Bortnikov freagrach, dá bhrí sin, as tacaíocht a chur ar fáil do na daoine sin a nimhnigh Alexei Navalny nó a raibh baint acu lena nimhiú le hoibreán néaróg Novichok, agus is ionann sin agus úsáid arm ceimiceach faoin gCoinbhinsiún um Airm Cheimiceacha.

     

    14.  Pavel Anatolievich POPOV

    (Павел Анатольевич ПОПОВ)

    Inscne: fireann;

    Dáta breithe: 1 Eanáir 1957;

    Áit bhreithe: Krasnoyarsk;

    Náisiúntacht: Rúiseach;

    Teideal: Leas-Aire Cosanta Chónaidhm na Rúise

    Is é Pavel Popov Leas-Aire Cosanta Chónaidhm na Rúise agus sa cháil sin, is air atá an fhreagracht fhoriomlán maidir le gníomhaíochtaí taighde. Áirítear leis sin maoirseacht agus forbairt ar chumais eolaíocha agus teicneolaíocha na hAireachta, lena n-áirítear airm agus trealamh míleata ionchais a fhorbairt agus nuachóiriú a dhéanamh ar an cinn atá ann faoi láthair.

    Ghlac Aireacht Cosanta na Rúise le cúram na stoc arm ceimiceach a bhí fágtha ón Aontas Sóivéadach agus tá sí freagrach as na stoic sin a stóráil ar bhealach sábháilte go dtí gur féidir iad go léir a scriosadh.

    15.10.2020

     

     

    An 20 Lúnasa 2020, d’éirigh Alexi Navalny go dona tinn agus tugadh chun an ospidéil in Omsk, Cónaidhm na Rúise é. An 22 Lúnasa 2020, aistríodh chuig ospidéal i mBeirlín, sa Ghearmáin é. D’aimsigh sainsaotharlann sa Ghearmáin fianaise shoiléir ina dhiaidh sin, fianaise ar chomhthacaigh saotharlanna sa Fhrainc agus sa tSualainn léi, go ndearnadh Alexei Navalny a nimhiú le hoibreán néaróg tocsaineach de chuid an ghrúpa Novichok. Níl rochtain ag aon dream seachas údaráis Stáit i gCónaidhm na Rúise ar an oibreán tocsaineach sin.

     

     

     

    Ós rud é gurb ar an Aireacht Cosanta atá an fhreagracht fhoriomlán maidir le hairm cheimiceacha a stóráil ar bhealach sábháilte agus as na hairm sin a scriosadh, is le hintinn nó trí mhórfhaillí ar thaobh na hAireachta Cosanta agus na ceannaireachta polaitiúla, agus leis sin amháin, a bhféadfaí airm cheimiceacha mar sin a úsáid ar chríoch Chónaidhm na Rúise.

    I bhfianaise a róil shinsearaigh ceannaireachta in Aireacht Cosanta Chónaidhm na Rúise, tá Pavel Popov freagrach, dá bhrí sin, as cúnamh a thabhairt do na daoine sin a nimhigh Alexei Navalny nó a raibh baint acu lena nimhiú le hoibreán néaróg Novichok, agus is ionann sin agus úsáid arm ceimiceach faoin gCoinbhinsiún um Airm Cheimiceacha.

     

    15.  Aleksei Yurievich KRIVORUCHKO

    (Алексей Юрьевич КРИВОРУЧКО)

    Inscne: fireann;

    Dáta breithe: 17 Iúil 1975;

    Áit bhreithe: Stavropol;

    Náisiúntacht: Rúiseach;

    Teideal: Leas-Aire Cosanta Chónaidhm na Rúise

    Is é Aleksei Krivoruchko Leas-Aire Cosanta Chónaidhm na Rúise agus is air atá an fhreagracht fhoriomlán maidir le harmálacha. Áirítear maoirseacht ar stoc arm agus trealaimh mhíleata na hAireachta leis sin. Tá sé freagrach as na hairm agus an trealamh míleata a dhíothú faoi chuimsiú chur chun feidhme na gconarthaí idirnáisiúnta a shanntar don Aireacht Cosanta chomh maith.

    Ghlac Aireacht Cosanta na Rúise le cúram stoc na n-arm ceimiceach a bhí fágtha ón Aontas Sóivéadach agus tá sí freagrach as na hairm sin a stóráil ar bhealach sábháilte go dtí gurbh fhéidir iad go léir a scriosadh.

    15.10.2020

     

     

    An 20 Lúnasa 2020, d’éirigh Alexi Navalny go dona tinn agus tugadh chun an ospidéil in Omsk, Cónaidhm na Rúise é. An 22 Lúnasa 2020, aistríodh chuig ospidéal i mBeirlín, sa Ghearmáin é. D’aimsigh sainsaotharlann sa Ghearmáin fianaise shoiléir ina dhiaidh sin, fianaise ar chomhthacaigh saotharlanna sa Fhrainc agus sa tSualainn léi, go ndearnadh Alexei Navalny a nimhiú le hoibreán néaróg tocsaineach de chuid an ghrúpa Novichok. Níl rochtain ag aon dream seachas údaráis Stáit i gCónaidhm na Rúise ar an oibreán tocsaineach sin.

     

     

     

    Ós rud é gurb ar an Aireacht Cosanta atá an fhreagracht fhoriomlán maidir le hairm cheimiceacha a stóráil ar bhealach sábháilte agus as na hairm sin a scriosadh, is le hintinn nó trí mhórfhaillí ar thaobh na hAireachta Cosanta agus na ceannaireachta polaitiúla, agus leis sin amháin, a bhféadfaí airm cheimiceacha mar sin a úsáid ar chríoch Chónaidhm na Rúise.

    I bhfianaise a róil shinsearaigh ceannaireachta in Aireacht Cosanta Chónaidhm na Rúise, tá Aleksei Krivoruchko freagrach, dá bhrí sin, as cúnamh a thabhairt do na daoine sin a nimhigh Alexei Navalny nó a raibh baint acu lena nimhiú le hoibreán néaróg Novichok, agus is ionann sin agus úsáid arm ceimiceach faoin gCoinbhinsiún um Airm Cheimiceacha.

     

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    16.  Alexey Alexandrovich ALEXANDROV

    (Алексей Александрович АЛЕКСАНДРОВ)

    ar a dtugtar freisin Alexey Andreevich FROLOV

    (Алексей Андреевич ФРОЛОВ)

    Inscne: fireann,

    Dáta breithe: 16.6.1981 nó 16.6. 1980,

    Náisiúntacht: Rúiseach

    Tá Alexey Alexandrov ina ghníomhaire de Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) atá ag obair mar oibrí de chuid an Criminalistics Institute.

    Sa cháil sin, bhí sé rannpháirteach go díreach in ullmhúcháin agus i gcur i ngníomh nimhiú Alexei Navalny le néar-oibreán de chineál Novichok in Tomsk an 20 Lúnasa 2020, agus is ionann sin agus úsáid arm ceimiceach faoin gCoinbhinsiún maidir le hAirm Cheimiceacha.

    Dá bhrí sin, bhí baint ag Alexey Alexandrov le hullmhúcháin chun airm cheimiceacha a úsáid agus le hairm cheimiceacha a úsáid.

    14.11.2022

    17.  Vladimir Alexandrovich PANYAEV

    (Владимир Александрович ПАНЯЕВ)

    ar a dtugtar freisin Vladimir ALEXEEV

    (Владимир АЛЕКСЕЕВ)

    ar a dtugtar freisin Vladimir ALEXEYEV

    (Владимир АЛЕКСЕЕВ)

    Inscne: fireann,

    Dáta breithe: 25.11.1980,

    Áit bhreithe: Serdobsk, Russian Federation,

    Náisiúntacht: Rúiseach

    Tá Vladimir Panyaev ina ghníomhaire de Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) atá ag obair mar oibrí de chuid an Criminalistics Institute.

    Sa cháil sin, bhí sé rannpháirteach go díreach in ullmhúcháin agus i gcur i ngníomh nimhiú Alexei Navalny le néar-oibreán de chineál Novichok in Tomsk an 20 Lúnasa 2020, agus is ionann sin agus úsáid arm ceimiceach faoin gCoinbhinsiún maidir le hAirm Cheimiceacha.

    Dá bhrí sin, bhí baint ag Vladimir Panyaev le hullmhúcháin chun airm cheimiceacha a úsáid agus le hairm cheimiceacha a úsáid.

    14.11.2022

    18.  Ivan Vladimirovich OSIPOV

    (Иван Владимирович ОСИПОВ)

    ar a dtugtar freisin Ivan Vasilyevich SPIRIDONOV

    (Иван Васильевич СПИРИДОНОВ)

    Inscne: fireann,

    Dáta breithe: 21.8.1976 nó 21.8.1975,

    Náisiúntacht: Rúiseach

    Tá Ivan Osipov ina ghníomhaire de Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) atá ag obair mar oibrí de chuid an Criminalistics Institute.

    Sa cháil sin, bhí sé rannpháirteach go díreach in ullmhúcháin agus i gcur i ngníomh nimhiú Alexei Navalny le néar-oibreán de chineál Novichok in Tomsk an 20 Lúnasa 2020, agus is ionann sin agus úsáid arm ceimiceach faoin gCoinbhinsiún maidir le hAirm Cheimiceacha.

    Dá bhrí sin, bhí baint ag Ivan Osipov le hullmhúcháin chun airm cheimiceacha a úsáid agus le hairm cheimiceacha a úsáid.

    14.11.2022

    19.  Artur Aleksandrovich ZHIROV

    (Артур Александрович ЖИРОВ)

    Inscne: fireann,

    Dáta breithe: 6.7.1961,

    Náisiúntacht: Rúiseach

    Is saineolaí ar airm cheimiceacha é Artur Zhirov agus tá sé ina Stiúrthóir ar SC Signal, institiúid taighde a bhfuil baint aige le clár arm ceimiceach na Rúise.

    Mar Stiúrthóir ar SC Signal, thug Artur Zhirov tacaíocht theicniúil d’oibríochtaí i gcoinne Yulia Navalny agus Alexei Navalny a tharla in Kaliningrad an 6 Iúil 2020 agus don phleanáil maidir le nimhiú Alexei Navalny ina dhiaidh sin le néar-oibreán de chineál Novichok in Tomsk an 20 Lúnasa 2020, agus is ionann sin agus úsáid arm ceimiceach faoin gCoinbhinsiún maidir le hAirm Cheimiceacha.

    Dá bhrí sin, bhí baint ag Artur Zhirov le hullmhúcháin chun airm cheimiceacha a úsáid agus chuir sé tacaíocht theicniúil agus ábhartha ar fáil chun airm cheimiceacha a úsáid.

    14.11.2022

    20.  Kirill Yurievich VASILIEV

    (Кирилл Юрьевич ВАСИЛЬЕВ)

    ar a dtugtar freisin Kirill VASILYEV

    (Кирилл ВАСИЛЬЕВ)

    Inscne: fireann,

    Dáta breithe: 22.2.1973,

    Náisiúntacht: Rúiseach

    Uimhir aitheantais chánach: 773721109701 (an Rúis)

    Tá an General Kirill Vasiliev ina Director of the Criminalistics Institute of the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB), a sheol oibríochtaí chun dlúthfhaireachán a dhéanamh ar ghníomhaíochtaí Alexei Navalny thar thréimhse fhada, lena n-áirítear agus é ar thuras go dtí Tomsk áit ar nimhíodh é le néar-oibreán de chineál Novichok an 20 Lúnasa 2020. Is ionann an nimhiú sin agus úsáid arm ceimiceach faoin gCoinbhinsiún maidir le hAirm Cheimiceacha.

    Chuir Kirill Vasiliev, ina cháil mar Director of the Criminalistics Institute of the FSB, an creat oibríochtúil agus an stiúradh oibríochtúil ar fáil chun an faireachas a dhéanamh agus chun iarracht a dhéanamh Alexei Navalny a fheallmhárú.

    Dá bhrí sin, bhí baint aige le hullmhúcháin chun airm cheimiceacha a úsáid, tá sé freagrach as airm cheimiceacha a úsáid agus chuir sé tacaíocht theicniúil agus ábhartha ar fáil chun airm cheimiceacha a úsáid.

    14.11.2022

    21.  Konstantin Borisovich KUDRYAVTSEV

    (Константин Борисович КУДРЯВЦЕВ)

    ar a dtugtar freisin Konstantin Yevgenievich SOKOLOV

    (Константин Евгеньевич СОКОЛОВ)

    Inscne: fireann,

    Dáta breithe: 28.4.1980 nó 28.4.1981,

    Náisiúntacht: Rúiseach

    Tá Konstantin Kudryavtsev ina shaineolaí ar airm cheimiceacha agus ina ghníomhaire den Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) agus é ag obair mar oibrí de chuid an Criminalistics Institute.

    Sa cháil sin, bhí sé rannpháirteach go díreach in ullmhúcháin agus in oibríochtaí glantacháin nimhiú Alexei Navalny le néar-oibreán de chineál Novichok in Tomsk an 20 Lúnasa 2020, agus is ionann sin agus úsáid arm ceimiceach faoin gCoinbhinsiún maidir le hAirm Cheimiceacha. Thairis sin, d’admhaigh sé go raibh sé rannpháirteach in iarracht nimhithe amháin eile ar a laghad i gcoinne Navalny in 2017.

    Dá bhrí sin, bhí baint ag Konstantin Kudryavtsev le hullmhúcháin chun airm cheimiceacha a úsáid agus le hairm cheimiceacha a úsáid.

    14.11.2022

    22.  Stanislav Valentinovich MAKSHAKOV

    (Станислав Валентинович МАКШАКОВ)

    Inscne: fireann;

    Dáta breithe: 1966,

    Náisiúntacht: Rúiseach

    Tá Stanislav Makshakov ina eolaí míleata agus ina Deputy Director of the Criminalistics Institute of the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB), a sheol oibríochtaí chun dlúthfhaireachán a dhéanamh ar ghníomhaíochtaí Alexei Navalny thar thréimhse fhada. Ina cháil mar Deputy Director of the Criminalistics Institute, bhí Stanislav Makshakov ina cheannasaí ar fhoireann na n-oibrithe a raibh baint acu le hullmhú agus cur i gníomh nimhiú Alexei Navalny le néar-oibreán de chineál Novichok in Tomsk an 20 Lúnasa 2020, agus is ionann sin agus úsáid arm ceimiceach faoin gCoinbhinsiún maidir le hAirm Cheimiceacha.

    Dá bhrí sin, bhí baint ag Stanislav Makshakov le hullmhúcháin chun airm cheimiceacha a úsáid, tá sé freagrach as airm cheimiceacha a úsáid agus chuir sé tacaíocht theicniúil agus ábhartha ar fail chun airm cheimiceacha a úsáid

    14.11.2022

    23.  Vladimir Mikhaylovich BOGDANOV

    (Владимир Михайлович БОГДАНОВ)

    Inscne: fireann,

    Dáta breithe: 17.7.1958,

    Áit bhreithe: Moscow, Russian Federation,

    Náisiúntacht: Rúiseach

    Is é Vladimir Bogdanov Head of Special Technology Centre of the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB), arb é máthaireintiteas an Criminalistics Institute é. Sa cháil sin, déanann Vladimir Bogdanov maoirseacht agus rialú ar ghníomhaíochtaí na n-eintiteas sin.

    Sheol an FSB oibríochtaí chun dlúthfhaireachán a dhéanamh ar ghníomhaíochtaí Alexei Navalny thar thréimhse fhada, lena n-áirítear agus é ar thuras go dtí Tomsk áit ar nimhíodh Navalny le néar-oibreán de chineál Novichok an 20 Lúnasa 2020. Is ionann an nimhiú sin agus úsáid arm ceimiceach faoin gCoinbhinsiún maidir le hAirm Cheimiceacha.

    Chuir Vladimir Bogdanov, ina cháil mar Head of Special Technology Centre of the FSB, an creat oibríochtúil agus an stiúradh oibríochtúil ar fáil chun an faireachas a dhéanamh agus chun iarracht a dhéanamh Alexei Navalny a fheallmhárú.

    Dá bhrí sin, bhí baint aige le hullmhúcháin chun airm cheimiceacha a úsáid, tá sé freagrach as airm cheimiceacha a úsáid agus chuir sé tacaíocht theicniúil agus ábhartha ar fail chun airm cheimiceacha a úsáid.

    14.11.2022

    24.  Chadi HOURANIEH

    Inscne: fireann,

    Dáta breithe: 29.5.1979

    Áit bhreithe: Damascus, Syria,

    Náisiúntacht: Ceanadach

    Is comhúinéir é Chadi Houranieh ar chuideachta MHD Nazier Houranieh & Sons Co, a oibríonn i dtionscal na miotal a oibríonn i dtionscal na miotal agus a sholáthraíonn don Syrian Studies and Research Centre (SSRC) ábhair a úsáidtear chun córais seachadta arm ceimiceach a mhonarú.

    Dá bhrí sin, tá Chadi Houranieh freagrach as tacaíocht ábhartha a chur chun airm cheimiceacha a mhonarú agus bíonn sé rannpháirteach in ullmhúcháin chun airm cheimiceacha a úsáid agus, dá bhrí sin, cuireann sé leis an mbagairt leanúnach a bhaineann le leathadh agus úsáid arm ceimiceach.

    14.11.2022

    25.  Mohammad Nazier HOURANIEH

    Inscne: fireann,

    Dáta breithe: 6.5.1976

    Áit bhreithe: Damascus, Syria,

    Náisiúntacht: Ceanadach

    Is comhúinéir é Mohammad Nazier Houranieh ar chuideachta MHD Nazier Houranieh & Sons Co, a oibríonn i dtionscal na miotal agus a dhéanann ábhair, a úsáidtear chun córais seachadta arm ceimiceach a mhonarú, a sholáthar don Syrian Studies and Research Centre (SSRC).

    Dá bhrí sin, tá Mohammad Nazier Houranieh freagrach as tacaíocht ábhartha a chur ar fáil chun airm cheimiceacha a mhonarú agus bíonn sé rannpháirteach in ullmhúcháin chun airm cheimiceacha a úsáid agus, dá bhrí sin, cuireann sé leis an mbagairt leanúnach a bhaineann le leathadh agus úsáid arm ceimiceach.

    14.11.2022

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    B.   LEGAL PERSONS, ENTITIES AND BODIES



    Name

    Identifying information

    Grounds for designation

    Date of listing

    1.  Scientific Studies and Research Centre (SSRC)

    a.k.a.: Centre d'Études et de Recherches Scientifiques (CERS), Centre de Recherche de Kaboun

    Address:

    Barzeh Street,

    Po Box 4470,

    Damascus

    The Scientific Studies and Research Centre (SSRC) is the Syrian regime's principal entity for the development of chemical weapons.

    The SSRC is responsible for the development and production of chemical weapons, as well as the missiles to deliver them, operating at a number of sites in Syria.

    21.1.2019

    ▼M4

    2.  State Scientific Research Institute for Organic Chemistry and Technology (GosNIIOKhT)

    (Государственный научно-исследовательский институт органической химии и технологии)

    Seoladh: Shosse Entuziastov 23, 11 124 Moscow, Moscow Oblast, Russia;

    Teileafón: +7 (495) 673 7530;

    Facs: +7 (495) 673 2218;

    Suíomh gréasáin: http://gosniiokht.ru

    Rphost: dir@gosniiokht.ru

    Is institiúid taighde stáit é The State Scientific Research Institute for Organic Chemistry and Technology (GosNIIOKhT) atá freagrach as stoc na n-arm ceimiceach a bhí fágtha ón Aontas Sóivéadach a scriosadh.

    Sa ról bunaidh a bhí aici roimh 1994, bhí an institiúid rannpháirteach i bhforbairt agus i dtáirgeadh arm ceimiceach, lena n-áirítear an t-oibreán néaróg tocsaineach ar a dtugtar ‘Novichok’ anois. Tar éis 1994, bhí an tsaoráid chéanna rannpháirteach i gclár an rialtais chun stoc na n-arm ceimiceach a bhí fágtha ón Aontas Sóivéadach a scriosadh.

    15.10.2020

     

     

    An 20 Lúnasa 2020, d’éirigh Alexi Navalny go dona tinn agus tugadh chun an ospidéil in Omsk, Cónaidhm na Rúise é. An 22 Lúnasa 2020, aistríodh chuig ospidéal i mBeirlín, sa Ghearmáin é. D’aimsigh sainsaotharlann sa Ghearmáin fianaise shoiléir ina dhiaidh sin, fianaise ar chomhthacaigh saotharlanna sa Fhrainc agus sa tSualainn léi, go ndearnadh Alexei Navalny a nimhiú le hoibreán néaróg tocsaineach de chuid an ghrúpa Novichok. Níl rochtain ag aon dream seachas údaráis Stáit i gCónaidhm na Rúise ar an oibreán tocsaineach sin.

    Mar sin de, ní fhéadfaí oibreán néaróg tocsaineach de chuid an ghrúpa Novichok a úsáid mura mhainnigh an Institiúid sa chúram a bhí uirthi stoc-chairn na n-arm ceimiceach a scriosadh.

     

    ▼M7

    3.  MHD Nazier Houranieh & Sons Co

    Seoladh: Zoukak Al Jin Abed Al Rahman Bn Al Kassem Street. Damascus, Syria,

    Fón: (+963) 11-2210758,

    (+963) 11-2224349,

    Facs: (+963) 11-2235892,

    Gréasán: https://houranieh.com/

    Rphost: info@houranieh.com

    Is cuideachta é MHD Nazier Houranieh & Sons Co, a oibríonn i dtionscal na miotal agus a dhéanann ábhair, a úsáidtear chun córais seachadta arm ceimiceach a mhonarú, a sholáthar don Syrian Studies and Research Centre (SSRC).

    Dá bhrí sin, cuireann MHD Nazier Houranieh & Sons Co tacaíocht ábhartha ar fáil chun airm cheimiceacha a mhonarú agus bíonn sé rannpháirteach in ullmhúcháin chun airm cheimiceacha a úsáid agus, dá bhrí sin, cuireann sé leis an mbagairt leanúnach a bhaineann le leathadh agus úsáid arm ceimiceach.

    14.11.2022

    ▼B




    ANNEX II

    WEBSITES FOR INFORMATION ON THE COMPETENT AUTHORITIES AND ADDRESS FOR NOTIFICATIONS TO THE COMMISSION

    ▼M5

    AN BHEILG

    https://diplomatie.belgium.be/en/policy/policy_areas/peace_and_security/sanctions

    AN BHULGÁIR

    https://www.mfa.bg/en/EU-sanctions

    AN tSEICIA

    www.financnianalytickyurad.cz/mezinarodni-sankce.html

    AN DANMHAIRG

    http://um.dk/da/Udenrigspolitik/folkeretten/sanktioner/

    AN GHEARMÁIN

    https://www.bmwi.de/Redaktion/DE/Artikel/Aussenwirtschaft/embargos-aussenwirtschaftsrecht.html

    AN EASTÓIN

    https://vm.ee/et/rahvusvahelised-sanktsioonid

    ÉIRE

    https://www.dfa.ie/our-role-policies/ireland-in-the-eu/eu-restrictive-measures/

    AN GHRÉIG

    http://www.mfa.gr/en/foreign-policy/global-issues/international-sanctions.html

    AN SPÁINN

    https://www.exteriores.gob.es/es/PoliticaExterior/Paginas/SancionesInternacionales.aspx

    AN FHRAINC

    http://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/fr/autorites-sanctions/

    AN CHRÓIT

    https://mvep.gov.hr/vanjska-politika/medjunarodne-mjere-ogranicavanja/22955

    AN IODÁIL

    https://www.esteri.it/it/politica-estera-e-cooperazione-allo-sviluppo/politica_europea/misure_deroghe/

    AN CHIPIR

    https://mfa.gov.cy/themes/

    AN LAITVIA

    http://www.mfa.gov.lv/en/security/4539

    AN LIOTUÁIN

    http://www.urm.lt/sanctions

    LUCSAMBURG

    https://maee.gouvernement.lu/fr/directions-du-ministere/affaires-europeennes/organisations-economiques-int/mesures-restrictives.html

    AN UNGÁIR

    https://kormany.hu/kulgazdasagi-es-kulugyminiszterium/ensz-eu-szankcios-tajekoztato

    MÁLTA

    https://foreignandeu.gov.mt/en/Government/SMB/Pages/SMB-Home.aspx

    AN ÍSILTÍR

    https://www.rijksoverheid.nl/onderwerpen/internationale-sancties

    AN OSTAIR

    https://www.bmeia.gv.at/themen/aussenpolitik/europa/eu-sanktionen-nationale-behoerden/

    AN PHOLAINN

    https://www.gov.pl/web/dyplomacja/sankcje-miedzynarodowe

    https://www.gov.pl/web/diplomacy/international-sanctions

    AN PHORTAINGÉIL

    https://www.portaldiplomatico.mne.gov.pt/politica-externa/medidas-restritivas

    AN RÓMÁIN

    http://www.mae.ro/node/1548

    AN tSLÓIVÉIN

    http://www.mzz.gov.si/si/omejevalni_ukrepi

    AN tSLÓVAIC

    https://www.mzv.sk/europske_zalezitosti/europske_politiky-sankcie_eu

    AN FHIONLAINN

    https://um.fi/pakotteet

    AN tSUALAINN

    https://www.regeringen.se/sanktioner

    Seoladh chun fógraí a chur chuig an gCoimisiún Eorpach:

    An Coimisiún Eorpach

    An Ard-Stiúrthóireacht um Chobhsaíocht Airgeadais, Seirbhísí Airgeadais agus Aontas na Margaí Caipitil (AS FISMA)

    Rue de Spa/Spastraat 2

    1049 Bruxelles/Brussel, BELGIQUE/BELGIË

    R-phost: relex-sanctions@ec.europa.eu

    Top