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Document 52011SC1023
COMMISSION STAFF WORKING PAPER Results of the public consultation on the external dimension of the EU energy policy
COMMISSION STAFF WORKING PAPER Results of the public consultation on the external dimension of the EU energy policy
COMMISSION STAFF WORKING PAPER Results of the public consultation on the external dimension of the EU energy policy
/* SEC/2011/1023 final */
COMMISSION STAFF WORKING PAPER Results of the public consultation on the external dimension of the EU energy policy /* SEC/2011/1023 final */
The Commission
Communication "Energy 2020 - A strategy for competitive, sustainable and
secure energy" highlighted the need to strengthen the external dimension
of the EU energy policy as one of the key priorities in the coming years. A
coordinated, efficient and prioritised external energy policy is necessary to
pursue Europe's energy objectives and interests. The Commission
initiated on 21 December 2010 a public consultation[1] on the external dimension of
the EU energy policy in order to seek stakeholders' views on possible
priorities and initiatives in this field. A total of over
90 contributions were received. These came from a wide range of interested
parties. Seven Member States responded, together with four regulators'
associations and two Transmission System Operators. Furthermore, contributions
were submitted by industry players and associations, NGOs, think tanks, social
partners, individual citizens, academia, and consumers' associations. In addition to
the formal consultation process, targeted discussions were undertaken with a
number of stakeholders. A specialised event was organised on 6 April 2011 by the
Commission services, bringing together external energy and foreign policy
experts to debate key challenges and policy options for the EU external energy relations. The following
sections of the document summarise the views expressed by stakeholders
throughout the consultation process. 1. Integrating energy
markets and regulatory networks with our neighbours Question
1: Should the EU promote further energy market integration and regulatory
convergence (notably as regards energy market regulation, environmental and
safety standards) with its neighbours? Is there a need for a differentiated
approach between the Eastern and Southern neighbours or between countries? The majority of
contributors expressed the desire for further energy market integration and
regulatory convergence in the EU's neighbourhood and beyond. Most
acknowledged that cross-border investment and trade can flow more easily with compatible
market rules, strengthening energy security in Europe. There was a broad
agreement that a stable, reliable and transparent legal framework was
required in third countries and for the EU approach towards them. This would
ensure the necessary conditions for EU investment and its protection in
third countries. A sizeable number of contributions drew attention to the need
for compatible environmental and safety standards in the neighbourhood,
in order to ensure a true level playing field. Regarding electricity
markets, a number of contributions mentioned the need for a common approach on issues
like capacity allocation, congestion management and balancing frameworks, based
on the principles of liberalized markets. Another suggested solution was for imported
electricity to be traded through power exchange mechanisms that "filter
away" energy produced under environmentally unsound conditions. A substantial
part of the contributions pointed towards a differentiated approach to
promoting the energy-related acquis in the Eastern and Southern
neighbourhood. Political environment, legal heterogeneity, energy policy,
degree of energy market liberalization and availability of domestic resources
were underlined as criteria influencing the approach with each country. It was noted
that the EU is in a position to assist third countries with regulatory,
financial, training and R&D programs. It is necessary, however, to
better explain the EU's offer, as well as to increase synergies with other
institutions active in the region, in particular with the European Bank for
Reconstruction and Development (EBRD). It was suggested that cooperation with
neighbouring countries be based on three thematic dimensions – general
security, innovation and market access. Specific cooperation
instruments could include: (i) energy innovation pacts, (ii) efficiency and
sustainability partnerships, (iii) bilateral renewable energy platforms, and
(iv) twinning projects. Most of the
contributors acknowledged the Energy Community Treaty (EnCT) as the best
available instrument for collaboration with external partners, to drive
infrastructure expansion to the East and South of Europe and raise
environmental standards. Full accession of Turkey and Georgia was mentioned as
a short-term priority, whereas a medium/long term aim would be the extension to
Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus and countries in the Middle East and North Africa
(MENA) region. Some respondents argued that the EnCT should include market
integration as a goal, rather than a recommendation. Others believed that it
must integrate clear procedures and new acquis on renewable energy
sources and the third energy market package. The existing collaboration between
regulators should be continued, a number of stakeholders answered, as information
exchange and twinning projects have been successful so far. States without
free trade agreements with the EU should be supported to adhere to WTO rules
and to make use of structures like the Eastern Partnership or the Energy
Community Treaty. Respondents acknowledged that third countries cannot be
pressured, but can be supported to voluntarily adopt the EU energy acquis,
should they consider it necessary. Question
2: Should the EU take concrete actions to foster greater investment in
renewable energy sources in its neighbouring countries? What actions? Many
stakeholders agreed that the EU should promote investment in renewable
energy sources in its neighbourhood, particularly in the MENA region and
also in countries like Russia. Such action would stimulate the EU energy
industry, contribute to reaching the 2020 goals in a more affordable manner and
strengthen the Union's energy security. Some
respondents noted that by promoting decarbonisation agenda abroad the EU
will expose itself to higher energy prices and related domestic political pressures.
Others emphasized that that renewable energy generation is less politically
sensitive than fossil fuels and, consequently, collaboration might enhance
trust between the EU and its external energy partners. Another view
was that primary focus must be on the EU's internal potential for renewable
energy, particularly solar energy in the Iberian Peninsula and offshore wind
power in the UK, complemented with some degree of cooperation with neighbourhood
countries (e.g. dissemination of best practices and R&D results in the
field of renewable generation). To promote
investments in renewable energy in the neighbourhood, several challenges were
outlined. Most notable was the necessity to provide a common legal ground, based
on the EU Renewables Directive (2009/28/EC). There was a clear message that greenhouse
gas emissions reductions and renewable generation projects in third countries
need to count towards the Member States' sustainability targets. Enhanced
transmission possibilities, especially interconnection capacity, are also
needed. Large investments
in renewable energy generation in the neighbourhood countries could only take
place in the long-run and would require non-discriminatory treatment for
investors, regulatory coordination, as well as convergence of environmental
and safety standards. A number of contributions also emphasized that due to high
costs entailed by renewables and due to economic possibilities of neighbouring
countries such projects should be initiated if proven profitable for both sides
in the short and long-term. It was highlighted that diminishing regulatory risks
associated with renewable generation can act in the same way as financial
incentives, by reducing the risk premium paid for investments. Concrete activities
such as training of electricity experts or twinning projects, through the Technical
Assistance and Information Exchange Instrument (TAIEX), and collaboration with
the Association of the Mediterranean Regulators for Electricity and Gas (MEDREG)
and MEDELEC (the Liaison Committee of Electricity Associations around the
Mediterranean Basin) were considered as useful to promote regulatory
cooperation and common projects. It was also suggested that a decarbonisation
provision be included in the acquis covered by the Energy Community, so that it
can better frame investments in renewable energy. A few
respondents indicated energy efficiency as a priority for strengthening
economic competitiveness in the neighbourhood. Others saw energy efficiency as
a natural complement to renewable energy, needed to ensure sustainability both in
the EU and in the neighbourhood. Insulation of buildings, efficient appliances
and more efficient transport were the types of measures highlighted. Financial
support from the EU for renewables-related investments in the neighbourhood was considered by many respondents as
contingent on the existence of a common legal framework. The stakeholders
suggested that the EU ought to ensure more support via the European Investment Bank
(EIB) and the EBRD, in order to develop small-scale, distributed renewable
generation in the neighbourhood. The European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument
(ENPI) should be used to move renewable energy and energy efficiency projects
higher on the agenda of international financial institutions. Potential financial
instruments that were suggested included an EIB investment fund for initial
investments, a feed-in-tariff scheme for EU imports from solar thermal
electricity plants in MENA countries, guarantee bonds for
"first-of-their-kind" projects in case investors do not wish to
assume the risk, binding contributions for bankable projects, and
public-private partnerships with EU utilities. The latter would have the EU
rather than individual Member States as the public counterpart. 2. Strengthening
partnerships with energy suppliers and transit countries Question
3: What measures should the EU take to reinforce and focus its partnerships
with key suppliers (of hydrocarbons and other energy sources) and transit
countries? What should be the focus of such enhanced partnerships? (What
countries? What topics?) A considerable
number of respondents suggested that Europe's long-term reliance on fossil
fuels needed to be clearly reaffirmed in order not to mislead energy suppliers.
As the oil market is global and fairly liquid, it was suggested to focus on
enhanced partnerships on the provision of natural gas, as the EU is within
commercial reach of around two thirds of known resources. Others noted that oil
security is just as important as natural gas and electricity security. Many
contributions advocated that the role of the EU is to promote a reliable
legal and institutional framework in order to achieve mutually advantageous
relations with its main energy supplier and transit countries. Furthermore, stakeholders
urged for reciprocity in bilateral relations to ensure access for the EU
to upstream resources in third countries and access to the EU market for third
countries. Even though
national bilateral arrangements are the basis for cooperation, a few
stakeholders indicated that the EU should step in to eliminate common
barriers to investment and trade. While most of the respondents were of the
opinion that markets and companies should be the motor of the EU energy
security, they also admitted the role of foreign policy. The European External Action
Service (EEAS) needed to gain weight in ensuring coherence between political
dialogue and legislative provisions with energy suppliers and transit
countries, it was stated. Additionally, a common energy crisis management
system was advocated for. A number of
stakeholders indicated that the EU should further promote existing
multilateral frameworks. The Energy Charter Treaty (ECT) modernisation can
be used as a platform in this respect. WTO accession for suppliers that have
not yet joined should be supported by the EU, stakeholders generally agreed. Priority should
be given to efforts to stimulate export capacity in neighbouring countries, including
in the Southern Mediterranean region. To deepen relations, the EU should offer
Russia, the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) and other
important regions for oil supply (West Africa, Iraq, Kazakhstan) a bundled
package of energy and broad economic development related measures, it was
underlined. There was a broad agreement that the EU-Russia Energy Dialogue and
the Early Warning Mechanism are examples of good practice, which should be
extended to other countries and regions. The renewed European
Neighbourhood Policy should leverage closer relations with countries in Central
Asia and South Caucasus. Private initiatives for development of gas import
routes within the Southern Corridor were considered of high importance. Furthermore,
LNG suppliers are gaining importance for EU supply diversification. Stakeholders identified Ukraine and Turkey
as main transit countries, noting that their effective integration into the
Energy Community was necessary. Whereas some
stakeholders advocated that no derogation should be made from the rules of the
EU internal energy market (on transparency, liquidity, free transit and
investment), others acknowledged that key suppliers of hydrocarbons will
inevitably require some flexibility. Importance of
transparency to reduce corruption in resource-rich supplier-countries
was underlined and support was expressed for the EU to adopt an equivalent of
the EITI,[2]
requiring listed oil, gas and minerals companies to declare accurate values of
financial flows between them and governments of the countries they operate in. Question
4: How can the EU best support complex infrastructure projects outside the EU that
can contribute to enhancing the EU security of supply and diversifying its
supply sources and routes? For instance, should the EU seek to coordinate or be
party to intergovernmental agreements (IGA) which concern projects of European
interest? Most of the
contributors saw the EU as a provider of knowledge, funding and/or political
support for complex infrastructure undertakings outside its borders. At the
same time, a number of respondents thought that the EU should focus on internal
interconnections to match already existing external infrastructure and only then
on promotion of new projects. There was a clear call to further strengthen the
role of the private sector in materialising complex external infrastructure
projects. This was seen as closely intertwined with the need for transparent investment
laws in supplier/transit countries, thus facilitating a level playing field
for effective competition. The EU could sponsor
construction costs but should not contribute to commercial risk mitigation,
several stakeholders agreed. While the rule of thumb for such infrastructure
projects is to find financing on the market, there was a general view that the
EU could provide funding if a number of conditions are fulfilled (compliance
with the related EU acquis, ensuring individual Member States'
interests, accounting for the public good value of the infrastructure
concerned, difficulties in accessing other funds, and no market price
distortion due to such support). Finally, the EU was called upon to encourage
the EIB to provide additional funding for infrastructure projects, which
were seen as a way to address the impacts of the current economic downturn. Different views
were expressed regarding the EU involvement in negotiating intergovernmental
agreements. The most prominent was that the Union ought to become party to agreements
regarding the free passage of goods and long-term guarantees, but not become
involved in commercial agreements between companies. Others were of the opinion
that rather than becoming party to intergovernmental agreements, the EU should
act as a mediator. A third suggestion was a supervisory role for agreements
referring to supply/transit routes diversification, under a common set of
rules. Finally, a few stakeholders declared themselves satisfied with the
current state of play regarding the EU's involvement in agreements for complex
external infrastructure projects, noting the provisions on information exchange
of the recent Gas Security of Supply Regulation. The Southern
Corridor and particularly Nabucco were regarded by many stakeholders as
priority projects to secure gas imports into the EU. Stakeholders believed that
the EU should act to neutralise political rivalries between major external
infrastructure projects, and noted that visits of high-level EU officials to
the countries concerned have already lead to positive results. Part of the
respondents called for centralized EU energy raw materials procurement, to
achieve synergies from large scale purchases. In this respect, the Caspian
Development Corporation model of a single purchaser of gas from Turkmenistan
was generally supported, even though a few contributions felt its' concept contradicts
market principles. Opinions
regarding the development of the Mediterranean Energy Ring diverged, as some
stakeholders insisted it was not financially feasible, while others believed it
would be a cornerstone for grid stability in the region. A few responses asked
for caution regarding increased interconnection with Ukraine, Belarus and
the Kaliningrad region of Russia. Some
stakeholders were of the opinion that to be sustainable, future electricity
grids should be extended and made to incorporate low carbon sources. Not only
would this strategy permit the EU to enhance electricity security, but also to
export new technologies, spearheading a global grid upgrade. A few players
suggested that building the interconnections with the Southern Mediterranean region
can only be mediated via intergovernmental agreements, setting the framework
for cooperation between the Agency for Cooperation of Energy Regulators (ACER)
and local regulators, and between grid operators. Complex infrastructure
should not diminish energy security of the third countries concerned, nor
should they harm human rights, social development or the environment.
A few stakeholders considered that several external large projects had a strong
impact on such aspects. Additionally, others drew attention to the need to
enhance public acceptance of such infrastructure projects. 3. Promoting the EU role in
setting the global agenda for safe, competitive and low carbon energy Question
5: What focus should the EU give to its energy cooperation with major consuming
countries? In what topics and countries could the EU action bring most
added-value? The shift
towards a low-carbon economy is seen as unavoidable in the long-run. The EU
should take advantage of its advanced legal and institutional framework to
speed up the process and to be in a position to promote, export and exchange
best practices with large economies and developing countries. Among the most
frequent examples mentioned were the development of an international market for
carbon offsets and the export of demand management measures. By reaching out to
the world's largest energy consumers, the EU would contribute to creating of
appropriate global measures to tackle climate change. The main energy
consumers mentioned in the responses were: Brazil, China, India, Japan,
Russia and the USA, as well as Sub-Saharan Africa and countries in South
America. The predominant view was that energy collaboration with these
countries ought to be focused on promoting clean technologies, energy
efficiency measures and related know-how, with the aim of diminishing and
decarbonising energy consumption and at the same time avoiding carbon leakage.
Equally important, these collaborations could stimulate the EU energy
industry and contribute to bringing forward commercial maturity for the
technologies in question. Progress could be even more rapid should the EU also
promote its environmental standards in these countries. Several voices
advocated that the EU lead by example and establish an international platform
for technology and R&D-related cooperation, focusing on renewables, energy
efficiency, low carbon technologies (such as CCS), as well as nuclear
generation. The EU should
be prepared to invest in local low carbon energy production in order to stimulate
initiatives in developing countries, including by redirecting funds from
fossil-fuel projects. The Kyoto Clean Development Mechanism and Joint Implementation
instruments are investment channels that may be used to invest in developing countries
for the mutual benefit, and the EU should support their prolongation, it was
stated. With the US
in particular, one of the main collaboration topics should be shale gas
development. For cooperation with China and India, renewables
and low carbon technologies were deemed as the most important issues. Another
suggestion was to prepare a policy in response to Chinese energy agreements
with countries in the Caspian, Central Asia and Africa. For African countries,
energy access issues were considered as the most relevant topic. In Brazil,
Mexico, Argentina and Colombia, new oil discoveries and ever growing
energy consumption may materialise into an opportunity for the EU oil
extraction industry. At the same time, diplomatic efforts were seen as necessary
minimise protectionism in these countries. Question
6: Should the EU take action to increase its collective weight in global energy
discussions and in international organizations and initiatives dealing with
energy? How? There was
general consensus that the EU should enhance its weight in global energy
discussions and become a normative power with regard to promoting
energy efficiency and low-carbon technologies. Promoting sustainability in this
way should not penalise specific carbon-intensive technologies too severely. A considerable
part of respondents believe that credibility will naturally come with the EU leading
by example – by living up to international commitments, especially in
relation to climate change, implementing the "20:20:20" strategy, consolidating
its leadership role on the low carbon technologies and distributed generation
markets, and its successful energy R&D. The more coordinated
and non-contradictory its actions, the clearer will Europe's voice be heard.
Equally important, it was recalled that single-handed EU commitment to mitigate
climate change is not sufficient. To this end, efforts are required to engage
the rest of the world on the same track. To fulfil its climate leadership
ambition, some respondents argued that the EU should promote natural gas as a
relatively "clean" fossil fuel and CCS. The EU needs to
stay involved in a variety of international organizations in order to stay
abreast of the emerging energy issues and be in a better position to address
them later. The main international fora with which the EU should reinforce its
involvement are: the Energy Charter (ECT), the International Energy Agency (IEA),
G8 and G20, the International Energy Forum (IEF), the International Atomic
Energy Agency (IAEA), the International Partnership for Energy Efficiency
Cooperation (IPEEC), the International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor (ITER),
and the International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA). Some
respondents underlined the ECT as the best channel for the EU to disseminate
its energy acquis abroad. It was also added that the United
Nations Development Programme (UNDP) or the United Nations Environment
Programme (UNEP) should be used to disseminate best practices in least
developed countries. Relations with the IEA were highlighted as necessary to
attain robust data, build accurate scenarios and, consequently, take proper
policy decisions. Financial
support was also mentioned as a way to increase the EU's weight in
international energy fora. Question
7: What initiatives could help the EU promote nuclear safety, security and
non-proliferation standards globally? There was a general
agreement that the EU's nuclear safety standards are very high when
compared to the existing global references and that these should be promoted
widely, together with EU best practices and related technology. Some
contributions expressed caution and encouraged a step-by-step approach, as
there is wide global divergence on the topic of nuclear energy. Legally binding
international commitments on nuclear safety and non-proliferation standards
ought to be in line with the objectives of the EU Energy 2020 Strategy and the existing
and legislation. When promoting its own standards, the EU should take into
account WENRA[3]
objectives for new reactors, together with Euratom and IAEA provisions. It was
stressed that useful work should not be duplicated, but integrated in the EU
strategy. In this sense, more use of ENSREG, ENSRA and ESARDA[4] frameworks as well as the
Instrument for Nuclear Safety Cooperation and the Instrument for Stability was
encouraged, together with promoting international conventions (UN Espoo, the
Nuclear Safety Convention of the IAEA and WENRA). These efforts
should be done in conjunction with promoting a low carbon energy paradigm,
especially since there are parties who see nuclear energy as a major solution
for greenhouse gas emissions reduction. This is especially relevant as
countries with growing energy consumption in Asia and Latin America show
themselves engaged in nuclear initiatives and should be persuaded to adopt the
highest standards. Russia and countries of the Commonwealth of Independent
States (CIS), which already have a substantial nuclear fleet, should also be
encouraged to upgrade their existing nuclear safety and security standards
along the entire nuclear fuel cycle to the international level. R&D
partnerships were also commonly desired solutions,
especially in collaboration with countries like the US, Japan and South Korea.
The US model of smaller, more geographically distributed reactors was regarded
as a proposition that the EU should promote. In addition, it was suggested that
alternative fuels, such as thorium, are tested with a view to reducing costs
and increasing safety. A few
respondents specifically thought that the EU should establish a minimum nuclear
technology requirement for its internal energy market, channelling its
attention away from third and towards fourth and fifth generation reactors. Finally, on non-proliferation,
one of the suggested measures was for the EU to halt exports of nuclear
technology and services to countries that did not sign the Non-Proliferation
Treaty and to signatories with a weak rule of law. 4. Better combining EU and
Member States' efforts to promote European energy interests Question
8: How could the EU and its Member States gain together greater impact on international
energy issues? What concrete actions should be taken to ensure synergies and coordination
between Member States' initiatives and EU initiatives? Stakeholders
agreed that a balance is needed between the concept of the EU speaking with one
voice and the liberty of each Member State to choose their own energy mix and
energy strategy, and to establish international ties. Stakeholders
thought that the key factor that can fuel effective coordination between the
Member States is genuine internal energy market integration. Concrete
results internally can also bring international prestige (e.g. effectively
established EU-wide energy efficiency standards for buildings). Moreover, it
was said that once commercial arrangements start to dominate the energy market instead
of politically-motivated arrangements, the synergies between Member States' and
the EU-level initiatives would be captured more easily. Transparency and
reciprocal confidence were considered as pillars for cooperation between
the Member States. Nevertheless,
others supported the view that possibilities to formulate policies exist only
on issues with a broad consensus among the Member States. A few examples mentioned
are renewable energy policy, energy efficiency, infrastructure and market
liberalisation. Another
concrete suggestion was to reach coordination horizontally, between
existing agreements and initiatives (e.g. Energy Community, Baku Initiative and
investments in external supply in general) and vertically, between relevant
policy fields (such as trade, development cooperation, sustainability). In
addition, improved consultation with industry and exchanges between
Member States' experts are needed to increase the EU's weight in international
energy discussions. On the
regulatory side, platforms like the IERN (the International Energy Regulation
Network (IERN) and ICER (the International Confederation of Energy Regulators)
can be increasingly used to disseminate best practices among Member States.
Further information sharing could occur by creating a database with relevant
projects by region/Member State/third country, to which all EU countries could
have access. ACER was seen positively in terms of contribution to internal
synergies, together with existing dialogues and information exchange
mechanisms. A number of
respondents put emphasis on the potential role of the EU High Representative
for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, whose action needs to further promote the
external dimension of the EU energy policy. Question
9: Do you consider that the compliance with EU internal market rules and the EU
energy security objectives of Member States' bilateral agreements with third
countries can be an issue? Should the EU take action to ensure compliance? How? A considerable
number of responses denoted the belief that Member States' individual
bilateral agreements frequently disregard the internal energy market rules and
the interests of other Member States. Overall, it was thought that a common
approach can be a more appropriate and effective way to ensure energy security in
the long-run. Many
stakeholders agreed that the EU should step in to ensure compliance between
current and future bilateral agreements and internal energy market rules.
Some respondents recalled, however, that changing the existing bilateral
agreements requires re-negotiation with energy suppliers. In addition, some
respondents considered bilateral agreements to be of strictly national
competence – especially since Member States' bilateral initiatives with third
countries can in this way benefit from healthy effects of competition. The EU
should not itself be a party in agreements, unless such involvement is
justified. Strong support was
given to ensuring more transparency on the current and future intergovernmental
agreements. A few respondents expressed worries about the eventuality of
revealing commercially sensitive information and pointed out that the existing
framework for EU law enforcement was largely sufficient. These respondents
preferred to have the existing infringement procedures reinforced. The creation of
clear set of guidelines for the negotiation of bilateral energy agreements
with third countries by all Member States was also mentioned. Developing a common
list of objectives for each cooperation area (memoranda, agreements on
strategic partnerships, extended cooperation) was one possibility. Another
proposal was to create an approval procedure on competition and trade
matters before signature of bilateral agreements. A number of stakeholders
also believed that in order to forestall non-compliance and duplications,
EU-level notification of new bilateral agreements, as called for by the
European Council of the 4th February 2011, should be made mandatory.
Question
10: How could the European industry and civil society best contribute to the EU
external energy policy objectives? Primarily, the
role of companies was acknowledged as crucial for a successful external energy
policy. By exercising their core commercial purpose, companies can generate
wealth to pay for imports, contribute towards infrastructure optimization, develop
indigenous resources, as well as foster low carbon technologies, effective
energy efficiency measures and consumption reduction. Furthermore, companies
can also disseminate all these best practices in third countries where they operate. The EU should
promote not only its best practices but also share its' less positive
experiences. As an example, lessons drawn from the experience of private
companies acting inside the EU can be used in third countries, with the added
benefit of depoliticising the energy relation between the EU and its partners. Energy policy
goals are attainable if economically and technically feasible, but also if publicly
acceptable, it was added. Civil society organizations frequently ask for more
transparency on energy costs in order to help consumers understand energy mix
decisions and tax policy. The public should be further informed on the high
degree of external energy dependence, so as to encourage reduced consumption,
increased alignment of the EU internal energy market and enhanced renewable
energy goals. Dissemination of accurate information is the optimal solution for
society's best response. The EU can also
provide financing to NGOs that undertake independent research, as well as
initiatives for local alternative energy generation, involving citizens trying to
actively reduce their carbon footprints. Another
prominent opinion was that the European Commission should hold regular
meetings/consultations with industry and civil society on external energy
policy matters. By inviting representatives from all stakeholder groups, it
could gain useful periodical and independent evaluation for the EU external
energy policy. Finally, it was
noted that the existing mechanisms for openness and transparency within the EU
institutions must be made more accessible, in order to achieve more effective
contribution by industry and civil society to reaching the EU external energy
policy objectives. [1] http://ec.europa.eu/energy/international/consultations/20110221_external_dimension_en.htm. [2] EITI – Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative [3] WENRA – Western European Nuclear Regulators
Association [4] ENSREG – European Nuclear Safety Regulators Group,
ENSRA – European Nuclear Security Regulators Association, ESARDA – European
Safeguards Research and Development Association