6.2.2020

Euroopa Liidu Teataja

C 40/2

4. detsembri 2019. aasta otsus nr 085/19/COL algatada ametlik uurimine seoses võimaliku riigiabi andmisega kontsernile Remiks Group seoses jäätmekäitlusteenustega (juhtum 84370)

Kutse märkuste esitamiseks vastavalt EFTA riikide vahel järelevalveameti ja kohtu asutamise kohta sõlmitud lepingu riigiabi käsitleva protokolli nr 3 I osa artikli 1 lõikele 2

(2020/C 40/02)

Vastavalt EFTA riikide vahel järelevalveameti ja kohtu asutamise kohta sõlmitud lepingu protokolli nr 3 I osa artikli 1 lõikele 2 teatas EFTA järelevalveamet Norra ametiasutustele oma otsusest algatada eespool nimetatud meetme suhtes menetlus, kasutades eespool viidatud otsust, mis on esitatud käesolevale kokkuvõttele järgnevatel lehekülgedel autentses keeles.

EFTA Surveillance Authority

Registry

Rue Belliard 35

1040 Bruxelles/Brussel

BELGIQUE/BELGIË

registry@eftasurv.int

Märkused edastatakse Norra ametiasutustele. Märkused esitanud huvitatud isiku andmeid võidakse käsitleda konfidentsiaalselt, kui ta esitab selle kohta kirjaliku taotluse, milles täpsustab nõude põhjendused.

Kokkuvõte

Menetlus

(1)

Järelevalveamet sai 16. augustil 2016 kaebuse kaubandusorganisatsioonilt Norsk Industri.

(2)

Norra ametiasutused vastasid järelevalveameti päringutele 5. oktoobril 2016, 28. veebruaril, 20. märtsil, 22. augustil, 31. oktoobril ja 20. novembril 2017 ning 5. märtsil 2018.

Meetmete kirjeldus

(3)

Väidetavat riigiabi said ettevõtjad Remiks Miljøpark AS, Remiks Næring AS ja Remiks Produksjon AS.

(4)

Remiks Miljøpark AS kuulub 99,99 % ulatuses Tromsø omavalitsusele. Remiks Næring AS ja Remiks Produksjon AS kuuluvad 100 % ulatuses äriühingule Remiks Miljøpark AS.

(5)

Äriühingul Remiks Miljøpark AS on 100 %-line osalus ka äriühingus Remiks Husholdning AS. Kõnealune ettevõtja osutab aga teenuseid üksnes Tromsø omavalitsusele ega tegutse turul. Ettevõtja Remiks Husholdning AS ostud on seostatavad omavalitsusega.

(6)

Alates 2010. aasta algusest kuni 1. veebruarini 2017 ostis Tromsø omavalitsus ettevõtjalt Remiks Næring AS oma tööstusjäätmete kogumise teenuseid.

(7)

Alates 2010. aasta algusest on Tromsø omavalitsus kaudse kontrolli kaudu teinud – ja teeb seda jätkuvalt – ettevõtjale Remiks Husholdning AS ülesandeks koguda Tromsø omavalitsusüksuses kodumajapidamisjäätmeid. Alates 1. veebruarist on Tromsø omavalitsus teinud – ja teeb seda jätkuvalt – ettevõtjale Remiks Husholdning AS ülesandeks koguda ka Tromsø omavalitsuse tööstusjäätmeid. Remiks Husholdning AS osutab kõnealuseid teenuseid omavalitsuse nimel tehtud kulude põhjal, st ettevõtjale hüvitatakse kõik kulud, millest on maha arvatud tulu. Remiks Husholdning AS tegeleb jäätmete kogumisega, kuid ostab vajalikud jäätmekäitlusteenused oma sõsarettevõtjalt Remiks Produksjon AS.

(8)

Seoses kontserni Remiks Group loomisega kandis Tromsø omavalitsus 2010. ja 2012. aastal kapitali, võlad, vallasvara ja kinnisvara üle emaettevõtjale Remiks Miljøpark AS.

(9)

Otsus on seotud kolme meetmega: i) jäätmekogumisteenuste ostmine Tromsø omavalitsuse poolt ettevõtjalt Remiks Næring AS, ii) jäätmekäitlusteenuste ostmine ettevõtja Remiks Husholdning AS poolt ettevõtjalt Remiks Produksjon AS ja iii) Tromsø omavalitsuse 2010. ja 2012. aasta tehingud ettevõtjaga Remiks Group.

Meetmete hindamine

(10)

Punktides i ja ii märgitud meetmete puhul on järelevalveametil kahtlusi, kas Tromsø omavalitsus ja Remiks Husholdning AS on maksnud ostetud teenuste eest turuhinda. Punktis iii märgitud meetme puhul on järelevalveametil kahtlusi, kas Tromsø omavalitsuse tehingud ettevõtjaga Remiks Group toimusid turutingimustel, arvestades turumajanduse tingimustes tegutseva turuosalise põhimõtet.

(11)

Kui meetmed kujutavad endast riigiabi, ei ole täidetud EFTA riikide vahel järelevalveameti ja kohtu asutamise kohta sõlmitud lepingu protokolli nr 3 I osa artikli 1 lõikes 3 sätestatud kohustust teavitada järelevalveametit riigiabist enne selle rakendamist. Riigiabi oleks seega ebaseaduslik.

(12)

Norra ametiasutused ei ole esitanud argumente, mille põhjal saaks järeldada, et meetmeid, niivõrd kui need kujutavad endast riigiabi, võiks lugeda Euroopa Majanduspiirkonna lepinguga kooskõlas olevaiks. Seetõttu on järelevalveametil kahtlusi kõigi kolme meetme puhul nende kokkusobivuses siseturuga.

Decision No 085/19/COL of 4 December 2019 to open a formal investigation into potential state aid granted to the Remiks Group related to waste handling services

1. Summary

(1)

The EFTA Surveillance Authority (the „Authority“) wishes to inform Norway that, having assessed a complaint relating to (i) Tromsø municipality’s purchase of waste collection services from Remiks Næring AS, (ii) Remiks Husholdning AS’ purchase of waste treatment services from Remiks Produksjon AS, and (iii) transactions from Tromsø municipality to the Remiks Group in 2010 and 2012 (the „measures“), the Authority has doubts as to whether the measures constitute state aid within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement, and as to the compatibility of the measures with the EEA Agreement. Therefore, the Authority is required to open a formal investigation procedure (1).

(2)

The complainant has also submitted a separate complaint about alleged violations of the public procurement rules. This decision, however, concerns the state aid complaint only, and remains without prejudice to the ongoing investigation concerning public procurement handled by the Authority’s Internal Market Affairs Directorate (2).

(3)

The Authority has based its decision on the following considerations.

2. Procedure

(4)

By letter dated 16 August 2016, Norsk Industri, the Federation of Norwegian Industries, (the „complainant“) lodged a complaint against the measures (3).

(5)

The Norwegian authorities submitted comments to the complaint on 5 October 2016 (4). The Authority requested further information from the Norwegian authorities on 18 January 2017 (5), which was provided by letters dated 28 February (6) and 20 March 2017 (7).

(6)

The Authority provided the complainant with a preliminary view on the complaint by letter dated 24 May 2017 (8). The Authority received further information from the complainant on 22 June 2017 (9), and from the Norwegian Authorities on 22 August 2017 (10).

(7)

By letter dated 31 August 2017, the Authority requested further information from the Norwegian authorities (11). By letters dated 31 October and 20 November 2017, the Norwegian authorities replied to the information request (12).

(8)

By letter dated 16 January 2018, the Authority requested further information from the Norwegian authorities (13), and the Norwegian authorities provided information by letter dated 5 March 2018 (14).

(9)

The complainant sent additional information by emails of 14 December 2016; 15 September and 13 November 2017; and 12 January, 31 January and 22 May 2018 (15).

3. Background

3.1 Historical development

(10)

In Norway, waste handling services are regulated by the Pollution Control Act (16). The Act makes a distinction between household waste, which is all waste from the municipalities’ households, and industrial waste, which is the waste from public and private enterprises.

(11)

Up until 2009, Tromsø municipality organised its waste management services in-house through municipal units and enterprises. In 2009, the municipal council decided to organise the municipality’s waste management in a group of limited liability companies (17). This was done to put an „arm’s length“ between the municipality and the activities exposed to competition (18).

(12)

In June 2009, the municipal council converted the municipal enterprise Tromsø Miljøpark KF (19), which had previously performed waste management services for Tromsø municipality, into Remiks Miljøpark AS (20). In December 2009, three subsidiaries were established under Remiks Miljøpark AS (21): Remiks Husholdning AS („Remiks Husholdning“), Remiks Næring AS („Remiks Næring“) and Remiks Produksjon AS („Remiks Produksjon“). Collectively the companies are referred to as the „Remiks Group“.

3.2 Transactions involving the Remiks Group in 2010 and 2012

(13)

On 23 June 2010, Tromsø municipal council made the formal decision to transfer the capital and liabilities that were left in the municipal enterprises Tromsø Miljøpark KF and Remiks Tromsø KF to Remiks Miljøpark AS (22). The transactions involved movables, capital, liabilities, and real estate, including the waste handling facility Remiks Miljøpark (the same name as the parent company) where the Remiks Group companies have their business. The assets were converted into share capital in Remiks Miljøpark AS (23).

(14)

In 2012, Tromsø municipal council decided to transfer real estate and a loan to Remiks Miljøpark AS, in addition to adjusting the value of the real estate transferred in 2010 (24). In both the preparatory paper (25) and the decision (26), Tromsø municipality specified a requirement for a 9 % return on the investment.

3.3 The current company structure

(15)

Per November 2019, the Remiks Group is organised as follows (27):

—	Remiks Miljøpark AS is the parent company in the Remiks Group. It is owned 99,99 % by Tromsø municipality and 0,01 % by Karlsøy municipality (28). It provides services and rents out property to its subsidiaries.

—	Remiks Husholdning is owned 100 % by Remiks Miljøpark AS. Until 2017, it only collected household waste for Tromsø municipality. As of 1 February 2017, it also collectes Tromsø municipality’s own industrial waste.

—	Remiks Næring is owned 100 % by Remiks Miljøpark AS. Remiks Næring specialises in the collection of industrial waste, and offers such services on the market. Until 1 February 2017, it had an agreement with Tromsø municipality for the collection of Tromsø municipality’s own industrial waste.

—	Remiks Produksjon is owned 100 % by Remiks Miljøpark AS. It provides waste treatment services on the market, primarily to its sister companies.

(16)

Below is an illustration of the Remiks Group’s structure:

3.4 Household waste

(17)

The Norwegian Pollution Control Act, section 27a, first paragraph, defines household waste as waste from private households, including large objects such as furniture, etc.

(18)

Under the Pollution Control Act, sections 29 and 30, the municipalities are obliged to collect and have facilities to treat household waste (29). The costs associated with the waste management are to be covered by a fee, levied on the inhabitants (30). The municipal waste fee are to be calculated based on a self-cost principle; covering the total costs of collecting and handling the waste on behalf of the municipality, without generating a profit for the municipality, in accordance with the Waste Regulation, chapter 15 (31).

(19)

When Tromsø municipality reorganised its waste handling services and established the Remiks Group in 2010, by way of its control in Remiks Husholdning it instructed Remiks Husholdning to collect the household waste on behalf of the municipality, based on the self-cost principle. Remiks Husholdning collects and sorts the waste. However, it purchases the waste treatment services, consisting of incineration, depositing and recycling, from its sister company Remiks Produksjon.

3.5 Industrial waste

(20)

The Norwegian Pollution Control Act, section 27a, second paragraph, defines industrial waste as waste from public and private enterprises and institutions.

(21)

The Norwegian Pollution Control Act does not oblige the municipalities to organise the collection or handling of industrial waste. Any operator can therefore offer these services on the market. However, all producers of industrial waste are obliged to ensure the proper disposal and handling of their waste. Tromsø municipality, as a producer of industrial waste, is therefore obliged to ensure the proper collection and treatment of its own industrial waste, produced by the different municipal units (kindergartens, hospitals, nursing homes, municipal offices, etc.) (32).

(22)

Before 2010, Tromsø municipality ensured the collection of its own industrial waste through a municipal enterprise (33). When Tromsø municipality reorganised its waste handling services and established the Remiks Group, Remiks Næring took over the collection of the municipality’s own industrial waste (34). Therefore, the agreements for the services were not tendered out or renegotiated. From 2010, Remiks Næring merely continued to provide the same services to the municipality as the municipal enterprise had done before the reorganisation. The only thing that changed was the invoicing system, from internal and centralised to external and decentralised. This meant that each municipal unit (municipal offices, kindergarten, etc.) paid for the service from their budget, and Remiks Næring treated them as individual customers (35).

(23)

Because of this continuation of the collection services, Remiks Næring and Tromsø municipality never entered into a formal contract for the waste collection services (36). The Norwegian authorities have described the arrangement as an unwritten framework agreement where each municipal unit decided its need for waste collection, and was invoiced separately (37). The Authority will refer to the arrangement between Tromsø municipality and Remiks Næring, regarding the collection of industrial waste, simply as an agreement.

(24)

In 2016, Tromsø municipality decided to terminate the agreement with Remiks Næring, and concluded a new framework agreement with Remiks Husholdning for the collection of the municipality’s industrial waste, starting 1 February 2017. The agreement was awarded directly, and based on a self-cost principle, meaning that the compensation covers the full costs, but no profits (38).

(25)

Remiks Husholdning foresaw a total price for the services in 2017 of approximately NOK 8,2 million. This was NOK 3,2 million less than the combined total price all the individual municipal units paid to Remiks Næring in 2016 (39).

4. Measures covered by the complaint

(26)

The complainant has complained about three separate measures:

(27)

First, alleged overpayment under the agreement between Tromsø municipality and Remiks Næring for collection of industrial waste for the period running from 2010 until 1 February 2017.

(28)

Second, alleged overpayment in relation to Remiks Husholdning’s purchase of waste treatment services from its sister company Remiks Produksjon. This agreement has been in force since the establishment of Remiks Husholdning in 2010 and is ongoing.

(29)

Third, certain transactions from Tromsø municipality to the Remiks Group in 2010 and 2012, which allegedly were not conducted on market terms.

5. Presence of state aid

5.1 Introduction

(30)

Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement stipulates that:

„Save as otherwise provided in this Agreement, any aid granted by EC Member States, EFTA States or through State resources in any form whatsoever which distorts or threatens to distort competition by favouring certain undertakings or the production of certain goods shall, in so far as it affects trade between Contracting Parties be incompatible with the functioning of this Agreement.“

(31)

The qualification of a measure as aid within the meaning of this provision therefore requires the following cumulative conditions to be met: (i) the measure must be granted by the State or through state resources; (ii) it must confer an advantage on an undertaking; (iii) favour certain undertakings (selectivity); and (iv) threaten to distort competition and affect trade.

5.2 Presence of state resources

5.2.1 Introduction

(32)

For the measure to constitute aid, it must be granted by the State or through state resources. State resources include all resources of the public sector, including resources of intra-state entities (decentralised, federated, regional or other) (40).

(33)

The transfer of state resources may take many forms, such as direct grants, loans, guarantees, direct investment in the capital of companies and benefits in kind. A positive transfer of funds does not have to occur; waiving revenue that would otherwise have been paid to the state constitutes a transfer of state resources (41).

5.2.2 Tromsø municipality’s purchase of industrial waste collection services

(34)

The remuneration Tromsø municipality paid to Remiks Næring for the collection of industrial waste came from the budget of Tromsø municipality, as does the remuneration which Remiks Husholdning is currently receiving for the same services. The remuneration therefore constitutes state resources.

5.2.3 Remiks Husholdning’s purchase of waste treatment services from Remiks Produksjon

(35)

The notion of state aid as expressed in Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement is to be interpreted widely, therefore it covers not only aid granted directly via the state budget but also compulsory contributions imposed by state legislation. Measures financed through parafiscal charges or compulsory contributions imposed by the State and managed and apportioned in accordance with the provisions of public rules imply a transfer of state resources, even if not administered by the public authorities (42).

(36)

Remiks Husholdning is financed through the waste fee, which is fixed in accordance with the principles laid down in section 34 of the Pollution Control Act and chapter 15 of the Waste Regulation. The fee is collected by the municipality and disbursed via the municipal budget (43). Thus, the public authorities determine both the size and use of the fee. Further, its legal basis and the way it is collected indicates that it is under the permanent control of public authorities. The fee must therefore be considered to constitute state resources. This Assessment is in line with the Authority’s conclusion in its decision on the financing of municipal waste collectors in Norway in 2013 (44).

(37)

Further, it must be considered whether Remiks Husholdning’s purchase of waste treatment services from Remiks Produksjon is imputable to Tromsø municipality. That is, whether Tromsø municipality must be regarded as having been involved in the adoption of the measures (45).

(38)

Remiks Husholdning is indirectly owned by Tromsø municipality and subject to public law, such as the public procurement rules (46). The purchase of waste treatment services from Remiks Produksjon is conducted under the control and instruction of Tromsø municipality, in accordance with the Pollution Control Act. Furthermore, as Remiks Husholdning has been granted an exclusive right to collect the household waste by Tromsø municipality it is not subject to competition on the market, but rather operating under a monopoly (47).

(39)

Based on this, Remiks Husholdning’s purchase of waste treatment services from Remiks Produksjon appears imputable to Tromsø municipality, so as to constitute state resources for the purposes of Article 61(1) EEA.

5.2.4 The transactions involving the Remiks Group in 2010 and 2012

(40)

If public authorities or public undertakings provide goods or services at a price below market rates, or invest in an undertaking in a manner that is inconsistent with the market economy operator („MEO“) principle, this implies foregoing state resources (as well as the granting of an advantage) (48).

(41)

Therefore, if the transactions from Tromsø municipality to the Remiks Group in 2010 and 2012 were not conducted on market terms, state resources within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA might have been involved.

5.3 Undertaking

(42)

Only advantages granted to „undertakings“ are subject to state aid law. The concept of an undertaking covers any entity that engages in an economic activity regardless of its status and the way it is financed. Hence, the public or private status of an entity, or the fact a company is partly or wholly publicly owned, has no bearing on whether or not the entity is an „undertaking“ (49).

(43)

An activity is economic in nature where it consists in offering goods and services on a market (50). The assessment of the activity must be based on the factual evidence, and the question is whether there is a market for the services concerned (51). In this regard, it is relevant to consider whether the entities receive compensation for the services, at what level, and whether they face competition from other undertakings (52).

(44)

Remiks Næring has, since its establishment in 2010, been providing services for collection of industrial waste for remuneration in competition with other undertakings. Based on this, Remiks Næring appears to engage in economic activity so as to constitute an undertaking.

(45)

Remiks Produksjon offers waste treatment services. The services are offered on the market for remuneration and in competition with other providers. Remiks Produksjon thus appears to engage in economic activity so as to constitute an undertaking.

(46)

In relation to the transfers from Tromsø municipality to the Remiks Group in 2010 and 2012, the Group must be considered to form one economic unit (53). An entity which, owning controlling shareholdings in a company, actually exercises that control by involving itself directly or indirectly in the management thereof must be regarded as taking part in the economic activity carried on by the controlled undertaking (54).

(47)

The subsidiaries in the Remiks Group are fully owned by Remiks Miljøpark AS, and the Authority does not have any indications that Remiks Miljøpark AS is not involved in the management of its fully owned subsidiaries. The Authority has preliminarily concluded that both Remiks Næring and Remiks Produksjon undertake economic activity (see immediately above). With this, it is also the Authority’s preliminary conclusion that the Remiks Group, as one economic unit, constitutes an undertaking for the purposes of the application of state aid rules, in so far as it is engaged in the economic activities of Remiks Næring and Remiks Produksjon (55).

5.4 Advantage

5.4.1 Introduction

(48)

The qualification of a measure as state aid requires that it confers an advantage on the recipient. An advantage, within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement, is any economic benefit that an undertaking could not have obtained under normal market conditions (56).

(49)

The measure constitutes an advantage not only if it confers positive economic benefits, but also in situations where it mitigates charges normally borne by the budget of the undertaking. This covers all situations in which economic operators are relieved of the inherent costs of their economic activities (57).

(50)

Economic transactions carried out by public bodies are considered not to confer an advantage on the counterpart of the agreement, and therefore not to constitute aid, if they are carried out in line with normal market conditions (58). This is assessed pursuant to the MEO principle (59). Therefore, when public authorities purchase a service, it is generally sufficient, to exclude the presence of an advantage, that they pay market price.

(51)

Whether a transaction is in line with market conditions can be established on the basis of a generally accepted, standard assessment methodology, relying on the available objective, verifiable and reliable data, which should be sufficiently detailed and should reflect the economic situation at the time at which the transaction was decided, taking into account the level of risk and future expectations (60).

5.4.2 Tromsø municipality’s purchase of waste collection services from Remiks Næring

5.4.2.1 Introduction

(52)

According to the MEO principle, the decision to carry out a transaction must have been taken on the basis of economic evaluations comparable to those which, in similar circumstances, a rational MEO (with characteristics similar to those of the public body concerned) would have carried out to determine the profitability or economic advantage of the transaction (61). When examining compliance with the principle it is only the information known at the time of the decision which is relevant (62).

(53)

The purchase of the services through a competitive tender is only one of several methods for ensuring that a transaction does not confer an advantage within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement. To establish whether a transaction is in line with market conditions, that transaction can be assessed in the light of the terms on which comparable transactions carried out by comparable private operators have taken place in comparable situations (benchmarking) (63) or through a qualified financial assessment (64).

(54)

Below, the Authority examines the different lines of reasoning that the complainant has brought forward in support of its assertion that Remiks Næring has been overcompensated.

5.4.2.2 Benchmarking

(55)

The complainant alleges that Tromsø municipality has paid disproportionally more than Bodø municipality for similar waste collection services in the same period.

(56)

The complainant states that Tromsø municipality in 2016 paid to Remiks Næring five times what Bodø municipality paid to Retura Iris AS for collection of industrial waste. Both Tromsø and Bodø are municipalities in the North of Norway, located by the coast, and with a road network interrupted by fjords. The complainant argues that the two municipalities are comparable in size and population density. While there are 5 100 people working in Tromsø municipality at 160 municipal locations, there are 3 100 people working in Bodø municipality, at 100 locations. On that basis, the complainant argues that the price paid in Tromsø should not exceed a price which is proportionally higher (approximately 60–65 % higher) than that paid in Bodø for similar services (65).

(57)

The Norwegian authorities argue that the agreements in Tromsø and Bodø are different in both size and nature, and that the agreement with Bodø municipality therefore cannot serve as an appropriate benchmark. The municipality of Tromsø has paid a fixed price for waste collection services, based on the size of the bins, regardless of the actual weight. Thus, Remiks Næring carried the risk of the municipality disposing of more waste than budgeted for. The fixed price also covered additional services such as picking up waste that had fallen outside of the bins and additional bags placed next to the bins – in addition to educating the public, raising climate and environmental awareness (66). The municipality of Bodø had an agreement where it paid a price based on the actual weight of waste collected, which means the municipality carried the risk of disposing of more waste than budgeted for. Thus, the scope of and risk allocation under the two agreements are different.

(58)

Further, the Norwegian authorities argue that the difference in geography, the population density, and municipal locations, including the number of municipal employees, justify different prices for the collection of industrial waste in Tromsø and Bodø.

(59)

Based on the above, it is the Authority’s preliminary conclusion that benchmarking against Bodø municipality is not an appropriate way to evaluate the market price for the waste collection services (67).

5.4.2.3 Negotiating a better price

(60)

The complainant argues that the municipality of Tromsø is the largest purchaser of waste collection services in the area concerned, and that it therefore should have been able to negotiate a better price (68).

(61)

An advantage, within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement, is any economic benefit, which an undertaking could not have obtained under normal market conditions (69). To establish whether a transaction complies with market conditions, the transaction can be assessed in the light of the terms under which comparable transactions carried out by a comparable private operator would have taken place in a comparable situation (70).

(62)

The Norwegian authorities have provided documentation indicating that a number of private undertakings have purchased comparable products at the same or a higher price than Tromsø municipality (71). However, it is not clear whether the list includes the majority of Remiks Næring’s other customers, or only a smaller selection. The Authority invites the Norwegian authorities to provide further information on the proportion of other customers that have purchased comparable products to a price equal to or higher that paid by Tromsø municipality.

5.4.2.4 Increase in remuneration during the contract period

(63)

The complainant further points out that the total compensation paid to Remiks Næring for the relevant services increased from NOK 7,7 million in 2010 to NOK 11,4 million in 2016, so almost 50 % over six years.

(64)

The Norwegian authorities have provided documentation showing that the number of inhabitants and municipal employees has increased in the same period, and that the municipality has made several investments in new municipal buildings and units, which has led to an increase in the production of waste. The increase in remuneration to Remiks Næring is also mirrored in a corresponding increase in operating expenditure (72).

(65)

The Authority, however, has doubts as to whether the information provided can explain a 50 % increase in price over a period of six years. The Authority therefore invites the Norwegian authorities to provide further information on the basis for the increases in the total remuneration paid.

5.4.2.5 Difference compared to the price budgeted by Remiks Husholdning for 2017

(66)

As of 1 February 2017, Tromsø municipality terminated the agreement with Remiks Næring, and instructed Remiks Husholdning to collect the municipal industrial waste on an in-house basis, at a price not exceeding the costs (self-cost). Remiks Husholdning estimated budget for 2017 was NOK 8,2 million, which is NOK 3,2 million less than the NOK 11,4 million that Remiks Næring received for the services in 2016.

(67)

The complainant argues that, provided the costs for the waste collection services were the same in 2016 and 2017, Remiks Næring would have had a profit of NOK 3,2 million for the services it provided in 2016. This would entail a margin on these services of 30 %, which is considerably higher than the market standard, which the complainant estimates at 0–8 % (73).

(68)

The Norwegian authorities argue that the services provided by Remiks Næring under the 2016 agreement and the services provided by Remiks Husholdning under the 2017 agreement are materially different. Under the agreement with Remiks Næring, Tromsø municipality had a fixed price agreement whereby Remiks Næring carried the risk of the municipality disposing of more waste than budgeted for (74). Under the self-cost agreement with Remiks Husholdning, Tromsø municipality entered into an agreement based on the actual weight disposed, which means that the municipality carries the risk of disposing of more waste than budgeted for. The Norwegian authorities argue that the allocation of risk under the two agreements is thus not comparable, and justifies different prices.

(69)

Further, the Norwegian authorities argue that Remiks Husholdning has been able to take advantage of synergies and efficiency gains when coordinating the collection of industrial waste with the collection of household waste, leading to lower overall costs. It is also argued that Remiks Husholdning is currently at its most efficient, and therefore able to take full advantage of its resources. In the view of the Norwegian authorities, this justifies the difference in price between the remuneration paid to Remiks Næring in 2016 and Remiks Husholdning’s budget for 2017.

(70)

While the Norwegian authorities have provided explanations seeking to justify the difference in remuneration in 2016 and 2017, the Authority has not been provided with documentation underlying these explanations. The Authority therefore invites the Norwegian authorities to provide documentation evidencing the efficiency gains and synergies said to justify the difference.

5.4.2.6 Conclusion

(71)

Based on the above, the Norwegian authorities have not at present time provided sufficient evidence showing that the price paid to Remiks Næring for collection of industrial waste, complies with the MEO principle.

(72)

In light of the above, and in particular in light of the absence of sufficient evidence supporting that the price paid for the collection of industry waste in the period from 2010 to 1 February 2017 was determined in line with normal market conditions, the Authority has formed the preliminary view that Remiks Næring may have received an advantage, within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement.

5.4.3 Remiks Husholdning’s purchase of waste treatment services from Remiks Produksjon

(73)

The Norwegian authorities argue that it is impossible for Remiks Husholdning to purchase waste treatment services from any other undertaking than Remiks Produksjon. The reason being that for Remiks Husholdning to purchase waste treatment services from such a third party, the waste that goes through Remiks Husholdning’s optical sorting machine would have to be transported out of Remiks Miljøpark, through Remiks Produksjon’s business area. Remiks Produksjon has not consented to allowing third parties to enter its business area, let alone transport waste through it. This explains why Remiks Husholdning has been purchasing waste treatment services from Remiks Produksjon without tendering out the services (75).

(74)

The complainant intimates that the purchase of these services, without a tender, has led to Remiks Husholdning paying a price above market price for waste treatment services.

(75)

The Norwegian authorities argue that the services Remiks Husholdning purchase from Remiks Produksjon are provided on market terms and in accordance with the arm’s length principle in the Limited Liability Companies Act, section 3-9 (76).

(76)

In determining an appropriate price for Remiks Husholdning’s purchase of waste treatment services from Remiks Produksjon, the two parties looked at the price Remiks Næring paid to Remiks Produksjon for waste treatment services. Remiks Husholdning and Remiks Næring considered that the services Remiks Husholdning purchased were comparable in type and volume to those purchased by Remiks Næring, and that the costs for treating household and industrial waste are similar.

(77)

The Authority is, however, not convinced that the prices paid by another company in the same group is an appropriate benchmark for establishing market price.

(78)

In light of the above, and in particular in light of the absence of evidence supporting that the compensation paid to Remiks Produksjon did not lead to overcompensation, the Authority has formed the preliminary view that Remiks Produksjon may have received an advantage within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement.

(79)

The Authority invites the Norwegian authorities to provide documentation to substantiate that the compensation paid to Remiks Produksjon in line with normal market conditions (77).

5.4.4 Transactions to the Remiks Group in 2010 and 2012

(80)

The complainant argues that Tromsø municipality did not require a sufficient return on the transactions from Tromsø municipality to the Remiks Group in 2010 and 2012.

(81)

With the establishment of the Remiks Group in 2010, Tromsø municipality transferred (a) capital, (b) debt, (c) movables and (d) real estate to the Remiks Group (78). The assets were converted into share capital. The preparatory paper drafted for the purpose of the transactions (79) underlined the importance of complying with the MEO principle. However, it is not clear how the municipality actually ensured compliance with the principle.

(82)

In 2012, Tromsø municipality transferred (a) real estate and (b) debt to Remiks Miljøpark AS, in addition to (c) adjusting the value of the real estate transferred in 2010 (80). The Tromsø municipal board decided to require a 9 % return. The preparatory paper prepared for the purpose of the transactions underlined the need to determine an appropriate level of return on the basis of the MEO principle. The preparatory paper included a discussion on whether the fact that only 40 % of the Remiks Group’s activities are conducted in a competitive market, while the remaining 60 % are activities for which the municipality cannot obtain a profit, is relevant for the MEO principle, but does not seem to reach a conclusion on this point (81). The preparatory paper found a 9 % return appropriate (82), but did not set out the economic assessment explaining why.

(83)

The complainant further argues that the 9 % level of return set in 2012 was determined based on only 40 % of the Remiks Group’s turnover originating from the group’s commercial activities (Remiks Næring and Remiks Produksjon). According to the complainant, the division between commercial and non- commercial activity shifted, and in 2016, 58 % of the turnover was linked to the commercial activities in Remiks Næring and Remiks Produksjon (83). Allegedly, as the conditions for setting the relevant rate of return changed, Tromsø municipality should have adjusted the level of return (84).

(84)

Whether a transaction complies with the MEO principle must be examined on an ex ante basis, having regard to the information available at the time the transactions were decided. The relevant evidence is the information which was available, and the developments which were foreseeable, at the time when the investment decision was made (85).

(85)

The question is therefore whether, based on the information available at the time, a rational market economy operator (with characteristics similar to Tromsø municipality) would have carried out similar transactions.

(86)

In relation to the transactions referred to in paragraph (81) above, the Authority invites the Norwegian authorities to provide further information on the transfers and how these comply with the MEO principle.

(87)

In relation to the transactions referred to in paragraph (82) above, the Authority invites the Norwegian authorities to provide documentation for, and further elaborate on, the assessments forming the basis for an assessment of compliance with the MEO principle, and the relevant level of return.

5.5 Selectivity

(88)

To be characterised as state aid within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement, the measure must also be selective in that it favours „certain undertakings or the production of certain goods“. Not all measures which favour economic operators fall under the notion of aid, only those which grant an advantage in a selective way to certain undertakings, categories of undertakings or to certain economic sectors.

(89)

The purchase of services from Remiks Næring and Remiks Produksjon are specific transactions benefitting the two undertakings respectively.

(90)

Similarly, the transfers to the Remiks Group are specific transactions benefitting the company group.

(91)

Accordingly, the alleged measures must be considered selective in the sense of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement.

5.6 Effect on trade and distortion of competition

(92)

In order to constitute state aid within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement, the measures must be liable to distort competition and affect trade between EEA States.

(93)

Measures granted by the State are considered liable to distort competition when they are liable to improve the position of the recipient compared to other undertakings with which it competes. A distortion of competition within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement is generally found to exist when the State grants a financial advantage to an undertaking in a liberalised sector where there is, or could be, competition (86).

(94)

Public support may be liable to distort competition even if it does not help the recipient undertaking to expand or gain market share. It is enough that the aid allows it to maintain a stronger competitive position than it would have had if the aid had not been provided (87).

(95)

To the extent that the relevant measures have not been carried out in line with normal market conditions, they have conferred an advantage on the relevant undertakings which may have strengthened the undertakings’ position compared to other undertakings competing with them.

(96)

The measures must also be liable to affect trade between EEA States. Where state aid strengthens the position of an undertaking compared with other undertakings competing in intra-EEA trade, this is assumed to have effect on trade between EEA States (88).

(97)

The Authority has previously found that public support to waste collection services in Norway is liable to distort competition and affect trade between EEA States (89). Waste collection and treatment is increasingly an international industry. In 2017, Norway exported 1,7 million tons of waste (90). The practice of tendering out waste services also means that undertakings from other EEA States can compete for waste handling contracts in other municipalities (91).

(98)

The competitive situation is also highlighted in one of the preparatory papers in relation to the establishment of the Remiks Group in 2010. The paper notes an increasing number of undertakings competing on the markets for collection and handling of industrial waste, and highlights that the competition includes both national companies and companies with international owners (92).

(99)

Thus the Authority cannot exclude that the measures are liable to distort competition and affect trade within the EEA.

5.7 Conclusion

(100)

Based on the information provided by the Norwegian authorities and the complainant, the Authority cannot exclude that the measures described above may entail state aid within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement.

6. Procedural requirements

(101)

Pursuant to Article 1(3) of Part I of Protocol 3 to the Agreement between the EFTA States on the Establishment of a Surveillance Authority and a Court of Justice („Protocol 3“): „The EFTA Surveillance Authority shall be informed, in sufficient time to enable it to submit its comments, of any plans to grant or alter aid. […] The State concerned shall not put its proposed measures into effect until the procedure has resulted in a final decision.“

(102)

The Norwegian authorities did not notify the measures before putting them into effect. The Authority therefore concludes that, if the measures constitute state aid, the Norwegian authorities will not have respected their obligations pursuant to Article 1(3) of Part I of Protocol 3.

7. Compatibility of the aid measure

(103)

The Norwegian authorities have not provided any arguments substantiating why the measures, if they were to constitute state aid, should be considered compatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement. The Authority has also not identified any clear grounds for compatibility.

(104)

Thus, if the measures constitute state aid, the Authority has doubts as to their compatibility with the functioning of the EEA Agreement

8. Conclusion

(105)

As set out above, the Authority has doubts as to whether the measures constitute state aid within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement, and as to their compatibility with the functioning of the EEA Agreement.

(106)

Consequently, and in accordance Article 4(4) of Part II of Protocol 3, the Authority hereby opens the formal investigation procedure provided for in Article 1(2) of Part I of Protocol 3. The decision to open a formal investigation procedure is without prejudice to the final decision of the Authority, which may conclude that the measures do not constitute state aid, or are compatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement.

(107)

The Authority, acting under the procedure laid down in Article 1(2) of Part I of Protocol 3, invites the Norwegian authorities to submit, by 6 January 2020, their comments and to provide all documents, information and data needed for the assessment of the measures in light of the state aid rules.

(108)

The Norwegian authorities are requested to immediately forward a copy of this decision to the Remiks Group.

(109)

If this letter contains confidential information which should not be disclosed to third parties, please inform the Authority by 13 December 2019, identifying the confidential elements and the reasons why the information is considered to be confidential. In doing so, please consult the Authority’s Guidelines on Professional Secrecy in State Aid Decisions (93). If the Authority does not receive a reasoned request by that deadline, you will be deemed to agree to the disclosure to third parties and to the publication of the full text of the letter on the Authority’s website: http://www.eftasurv.int/state-aid/state-aid-register/.

For the EFTA Surveillance Authority

Bente ANGELL-HANSEN

President

Responsible College Member

Frank J. BÜCHEL

College Member

Högni KRISTJÁNSSON

College Member

Carsten ZATSCHLER

Countersigning as Director,

Legal and Executive Affairs

(1) Reference is made to Article 4(4) of Part II of Protocol 3 to the Agreement between the EFTA States on the Establishment of a Surveillance Authority and a Court of Justice.

(2) Case No 78085.

(3) Document No 814858.

(4) Document No 821154.

(5) Document No 840687.

(6) Document No 844198.

(7) Document No 848555.

(8) Document No 854974.

(9) Document No 862433.

(10) Document No 870978.

(11) Document No 870978.

(12) Documents No 880582 and 884931.

(13) Document No 882703.

(14) Document No 901145.

(15) Documents No 831575, 873959, 882172, 896066, 895954 and 914528.

(16) Forurensningsloven, LOV-1981-03-13-6.

(17) Attachments 2, 3 and 4b to letter dated 3.5.18, Documents No 901215, 901211 and 901203; Tromsø municipality’s letter dated 31. oktoober 2017, Document No 880582, and Attachment 7 to the letter, Document No 880592.

(18) Preparatory papers from Tromsø municipality’s administration to the municipality council, Attachment 2 to letter dated 5.3.18, Document No 901215.

(19) A municipal enterprise (in Norwegian: kommunalt foretak, shortened KF) is an administrative branch of the central municipality, and not a separate legal entity. Municipal enterprises are regulated by the Local Government Act chapter 11.

(20) Tromsø municipality’s letter, dated 31. oktoober 2017, Document No 880582, and Attachments 6 and 7 to the letter, Documents No 880590 and 880592.

(21) Letter from Tromsø municipality, dated 5. märts 2018, Document No 901145, and Attachment 4 to the letter, Document No 901219, and Tromsø municipality’s letter dated 31. oktoober 2017, Document No 880582 and Attachment 7 to the letter, Document No 880592.

(22) Attachment 8a to Tromsø municipality’s letter dated 5. märts 2018, Document No 901189. The transfers were decided on in 2010, but backdated to the establishment of Remiks Miljøpark AS in 2009.

(23) Attachments 4, 4c and 8a to Tromsø municipality’s letter dated 5. märts 2018, Documents No 901219, 901205 and 901189.

(24) Letter from Tromsø municipality, dated 5. märts 2018, Document No 901145, and attachments 8, 8b, 8c, 8d and 9 to the letter, Documents No 901183, 901181, 901177, 901179 and 901175.

(25) In Norwegian: saksfremlegg.

(26) Attachment 9 to the letter from Tromsø municipality, dated 5. märts 2018, Document No 901175.

(27) Based on information obtained at www.purehelp.no 21. november 2019.

(28) The 0,01 % ownership by Karlsøy municipality seems to be related to intentions that Tromsø and Karlsøy would cooperate on waste handling, but this seems not to have materialised. See letter from Tromsø municipality, dated 5. märts 2018, Document No 901145.

(29) This means that any private operator needs an explicit permission from the municipality, in order to provide the service.

(30) The Pollution Control Act, section 34. The fees can be secured through a statutory charge pursuant to the Mortgage Act (panteloven, LOV-1980-02-08-2).

(31) The Waste Regulation (avsfallsforskriften, FOR-2004-06-01-930), chapter 15.

(32) The Pollution Control Act, section 32, first paragraph.

(33) Letter from Tromsø municipality, dated 5. märts 2018, Document No 901145.

(34) Letter from Tromsø municipality, dated 5. märts 2018, Document No 901145.

(35) Letter from Tromsø municipality, dated 5. märts 2018, Document No 901145.

(36) Letter from Tromsø municipality, dated 5. märts 2018, Document No 901145.

(37) Letter from Tromsø municipality, dated 5. märts 2018, Document No 901145, and letter of 31. oktoober 2017, Document No 880582.

(38) Letter from Tromsø municipality, dated 5. märts 2018, Document No 901145, and attachment 16 to the letter, Document No 901161.

(39) This is based on calculations conducted by the complainant in letter from the complainant dated 22.6.17, Document No 862433.

(40) See the Authority’s Guidelines on the notion of state aid („NoA“) (OJ L 342, 21.12.2017, p. 35), and EEA Supplement No 82, 21. detsember 2017, p. 1, para. 48.

(41) NoA, para. 51.

(42) See NoA, para. 58; Decision No 306/09/COL of 8. juuli 2009 on the Norwegian Broadcasting Corporation, section 1.2.1, and judgment in Italy v Commission, 173/73, EU:C:1974:71, para. 16.

(43) The fifth paragraph of section 34 of the Pollution Control Act.

(44) Decision No 91/13/COL of 27. veebruar 2013, on the financing of municipal waste collectors, para. 26.

(45) Judgment in France v Commission, C-482/99, EU:C:2002:294, para. 52.

(46) Letter from Tromsø municipality, dated 5. märts 2018, Document No 901145.

(47) Letter from Tromsø municipality, dated 5. märts 2018, Document No 901145. See also NoA, para. 43.

(48) NoA, para. 52.

(49) Judgment in Congregación de Escuelas Pías Provincia Betania, C-74/16, EU:C:2017:496, para. 42.

(50) NoA, section 2.1.

(51) Judgment in Havenbedrijf Antwerpen and Maatschappij van de Brugse Zeehaven v Commission, T-696/17, EU:T:2019:652, para. 56.

(52) Case E-29/15 Sorpa [2016] EFTA Ct. Rep. 825, paras 51–64.

(53) NoA, para. 11.

(54) Judgment in AceaElectrabel Produzione v Commission, C-480/09 P, EU:C:2010:787, para. 49.

(55) NoA, para. 11.

(56) NoA, para. 66.

(57) NoA, para. 68.

(58) Judgment in SFEI and others, EU:C:1996:285, C-39/94, paras 60–62.

(59) NoA, para. 76.

(60) NoA, para. 101.

(61) NoA, para. 79.

(62) NoA, para. 78.

(63) NoA, paras 98–100.

(64) NoA, paras 101–105.

(65) The Complaint, dated 15. august 2016, Document No 814858, and Annexes IV–VII to the complaint, Documents No 818909–818911.

(66) Letter from Remiks Group, dated 30. oktoober 2017, Document No 880602.

(67) See also the Authority’s letter dated 24. mai 2017, Document No 854974.

(68) Letter from the complainant, dated 15. detsember 2016, Document No 831575.

(69) NoA, para. 66.

(70) NoA, para. 98.

(71) Letter from Remiks Næring, dated 29. september 2016, Document No 821156.

(72) Letter from Tromsø Municipality, dated 5. märts 2018, Document No 901145.

(73) Letter from the complainant, dated 13. november 2017, Document No 882862.

(74) Further explained in section 7.4.2.2.

(75) Letter from Tromsø municipality, dated 5.3.18, Document No 901145.

(76) Lov om aksjeselskaper, LOV-1997-06-13-44.

(77) NoA, para. 74.

(78) Attachment 8a to letter dated 5. märts 2018, Document No 901189.

(79) Attachments 4, 4a, 4b and 4c to the letter from Tromsø municipality dated 5. märts 2018, Documents No 901219, 901213, 901203 and 901205.

(80) Attachment 9 to letter dated 5. märts 2018, Document No 901175.

(81) The same assessment is included in the preparatory paper in relation to the 2010 transfer, Attachment 4 to the letter from Tromsø municipality dated 5. märts 2018, Document No 901219.

(82) Attachments 8, 8b, 8c, 8d to letter dated 5.3.18, Documents No 901183, 901181, 901177 and 901197.

(83) Note that some of the revenues in Remiks Produksjon stem from treating household waste from Remiks Husholdning. The complainant has not explained whether or how this affects the calculations.

(84) The complainant’s letter dated 22. mai 2018, Document No 914528.

(85) Judgment in Commission v EDF, C-124/10 P, EU:C:2012:318, paras 83–85 and 105; judgment in France v Commission, C-482/99, EU:C:2002:294, paras 71–72.

(86) NoA, para. 187.

(87) NoA, para. 189.

(88) Judgment in Eventech, C-518/13, EU:C:2015:9, para. 66.

(89) Decision No 91/13/COL of 27. veebruar 2013, on the financing of municipal waste collectors, para. 41.

(90) Report from the Nordic Competition Authorities, Competition in the waste management sector, section 3.2.4:

https://konkurransetilsynet.no/wp-content/uploads/2018/08/Nordic-Report-2016-Waste-Management-Sector.pdf

(91) Judgment in Altmark, C-280/00, EU:C:2003:415, paras 78–79.

(92) Preparatory paper 29. aprill 2009, attachment 2 to letter dated 5. märts 2018, Document 901215. The Authority’s office translation.

(93) OJ L 154, 8.6.2006, p. 27 and EEA Supplement No 29, 8. juuni 2006, p. 1.

6.2.2020

Euroopa Liidu Teataja

C 40/16

5. detsembril 2019. aasta otsus nr 86/19/COL algatada ametlik uurimine seoses väidetava riigiabi andmisega ettevõtjale Gagnaveita Reykjavíkur

Kutse märkuste esitamiseks vastavalt EFTA riikide vahel järelevalveameti ja kohtu asutamise kohta sõlmitud lepingu riigiabi käsitleva protokolli nr 3 I osa artikli 1 lõikele 2

(2020/C 40/03)

Vastavalt EFTA riikide vahel järelevalveameti ja kohtu asutamise kohta sõlmitud lepingu protokolli nr 3 I osa artikli 1 lõikele 2 teatas EFTA järelevalveamet Islandi ametiasutustele oma otsusest algatada eespool nimetatud meetme suhtes menetlus, kasutades eespool viidatud otsust, mis on esitatud käesolevale kokkuvõttele järgnevatel lehekülgedel autentses keeles.

Huvitatud isikud võivad esitada kõnealuse meetme kohta märkused ühe kuu jooksul alates käesoleva teatise avaldamisest aadressil:

EFTA Surveillance Authority

Registry

Rue Belliard 35

1040 Bruxelles/Brussel

BELGIQUE/BELGIË

registry@eftasurv.int

Märkused edastatakse Islandi ametiasutustele. Märkused esitanud huvitatud isiku andmeid võidakse käsitleda konfidentsiaalselt, kui ta esitab selle kohta kirjaliku taotluse, milles täpsustab nõude põhjendused.

Kokkuvõte

Menetlus

Järelevalveamet sai 26. oktoobril 2016 Islandi telekommunikatsiooniettevõtjalt Síminn hf. kaebuse riigiabi kohta, mida Orkuveita Reykjavíkur andis väidetavalt oma tütarettevõtjale Gagnaveita Reykjavíkur. Järelevalveamet sai kaebuse esitajalt lisateavet ja märkusi 23. novembri 2016. aasta, 16. jaanuari 2017. aasta, 28. märtsi 2017. aasta, 1. jaanuari 2018. aasta, 20. aprilli 2018. aasta, 21. septembri 2018. aasta, 26. märtsi 2019. aasta ja 13. septembri 2019. aasta kirjades ja e-kirjades.

Islandi ametiasutused vastasid järelevalveameti päringutele 7. veebruari 2017. aasta, 22. juuni 2017. aasta, 25. mai 2018. aasta ja 4. juuni 2019. aasta kirjades.

Meetmete kirjeldus

Kaebus käsitleb ettevõtja Orkuveita Reykjavíkur investeeringuid lairibataristusse alates 1999. aastast, mil asutati äriühingule Gagnaveita Reykjavíkur eelnev äriühing Lina.Net, kuni praeguseni. Kaebus käsitleb siiski peamiselt ajavahemikku alates 1. jaanuarist 2007, mil asutati Gagnaveita Reykjavíkur. Eelkõige käsitleb kaebus riigiabi, mida Orkuveita Reykjavíkur andis väidetavalt ettevõtjale Gagnaveita Reykjavíkur mitmesuguste meetmete, näiteks kapitalisüstide ja laenude kaudu, mida ei tehtud turutingimustel.

Orkuveita Reykjavíkur asutati 1. jaanuaril 1999 riigi osalusega äriühinguna Reykjavíki linnavolikogu otsusega ühendada linna omandis olevate elektri- ja soojusettevõtete tegevus. Orkuveita Reykjavíkur kuulub kolmele Islandi omavalitsusele: i) Reykjavíki linn (93,5 %), ii) Akranesi omavalitsus (5,5 %) ja iii) Borgarbyggði omavalitsus (1 %). Viis äriühingu Orkuveita Reykjavíkur juhatuse liiget nimetab ametisse Reykjavíki linnavolikogu ja ühe Akranesi linnavolikogu.

Gagnaveita Reykjavíkur on 2007. aastal asutatud telekommunikatsiooniettevõtja. Gagnaveita Reykjavíkur asutati sõltumatu juriidilise isikuna, et täita Islandi posti- ja telekommunikatsiooniameti (edaspidi „PTA“) nõudeid ettevõtja Orkuveita Reykjavíkur konkurentsipõhise ja konkurentsivälise tegevuse eraldamise kohta. Gagnaveita Reykjavíkur kuulub täielikult äriühingule Orkuveita Reykjavíkur. Põhikirja järgi on ettevõtja Gagnaveita Reykjavíkur eesmärk telekommunikatsiooni- ja andmeedastusvõrgu käitamine.

Gagnaveita Reykjavíkur on registreeritud ettevõtja (andmeedastuse ja -teenuse valdkonnas) vastavalt elektroonilise side seadusele nr 81/2003. Elektroonilise side seaduse artikli 36 eesmärk on tagada, et konkurentsipõhiseid telekommunikatsiooniteenuseid ei toetata ainuõigustega või muude vahenditega kaitstud tegevusest saadud tulust.

Elektroonilise side seaduse artikli 36 kohaselt tagab PTA, et konkurentsivälistest sektoritest saadavast tulust ei toetata telekommunikatsiooni konkurentsipõhise sektori tegevust. Seetõttu on PTA ülesanne kontrollida ettevõtja Orkuveita Reykjavíkur investeeringuid telekommunikatsiooniturul ning ettevõtjate Orkuveita Reykjavíkur ja Gagnaveita Reykjavíkur vahelisi suhteid. Asjaomaseid uurimisi võib PTA alustada omal algatusel või huvitatud isikute kaebuste põhjal. Gagnaveita Reykjavíkur on kohustatud teatama PTA-le ka erimeetmetest.

2006.–2019. aastal võttis PTA vastu üheksa ametlikku otsust ettevõtjate Orkuveita Reykjavíkur ja Gagnaveita Reykjavíkur finantsilise lahususe kohta. PTA uurimiste raames vaadati läbi ettevõtja Gagnaveita Reykjavíkur äriplaan, mida tuleb igal aastal uuendada vastavalt tegelikele finantsandmetele. Läbivaatamise käigus kontrollib PTA näiteks seda, kas investori (Orkuveita Reykjavíkur) saadava tulu määr on kooskõlas telekommunikatsioonituruga üldiselt, ning vaatleb kapitali struktuuri ja seda, kas ettevõtjate Orkuveita Reykjavíkur ja Gagnaveita Reykjavíkur vahelised hinnad on kooskõlas turutingimustega.

Kolmel juhul on PTA teinud kindlaks elektroonilise side seaduse artikli 36 konkreetsed rikkumised. Neist kahel juhul otsustas PTA, et meetmed tuleb tagasi nõuda, kuid kolmandal juhul ei nõudnud PTA eeliste tagastamist.

Islandi ametiasutused väidavad, et Orkuveita Reykjavíkur on kõigis suhetes ettevõtjaga Gagnaveita Reykjavíkur tegutsenud turumajanduse tingimustes tegutseva turuosalise kriteeriumi kohaselt ja et ettevõtjale Gagnaveita Reykjavíkur ei ole abi antud. Sellega seoses rõhutavad Islandi ametiasutused, et kõiki meetmeid, mille kohta on esitatud kaebus seoses ettevõtjate Orkuveita Reykjavíkur ja Gagnaveita Reykjavíkur vaheliste finantssuhetega, on PTA hinnanud elektroonilise side seaduse artikli 36 alusel. Islandi ametiasutuste sõnul on PTA kohaldatav kriteerium võrreldav järelevalveameti kohaldatava kriteeriumiga, kui määratakse kindlaks, kas meede põhineb turutingimustel (st turumajanduse tingimustes tegutseva turuosalise kriteeriumiga). Islandi ametiasutused märkisid ka, et järelevalveamet on oma 5. oktoobri 2011. aasta otsuses nr 300/11/COL juba lükanud tagasi kaebuse esitaja väited seoses ettevõtja Orkuveita Reykjavíkur investeeringutega ettevõtjasse Lina.Net.

Meetmete hindamine

Arvestades muu hulgas äriühingu Orkuveita Reykjavíkur õiguslikku seisundit, äriühingu ühingulepingut ja juhatuse koosseisu, ei saa järelevalveamet välistada, et meetmed on seostatavad riigiga ning et nendega kaasneb riigi ressursside ülekandmine, kui nendega antakse ja sellisel määral, mil nendega antakse, eelised ettevõtjale Gagnaveita Reykjavíkur.

Kuigi Gagnaveita Reykjavíkur ei müü oma teenuseid oma kiudoptilise võrgu kaudu, pakub ta erapooletut ja avatud juurdepääsu võrgule kõigile huvitatud telekommunikatsiooniteenuste osutajatele. Järelevalveamet on seisukohal, et võrgule juurdepääsu võimaldamine kindlaksmääratud hinnaga kolmandast isikust teenuseosutajatele kujutab endast majandustegevust ning seetõttu näib Gagnaveita Reykjavíkur tegutsevat ettevõtjana Euroopa Majanduspiirkonna (EMP) lepingu artikli 61 lõike 1 tähenduses.

Järelevalveameti esialgne seisukoht on, et võttes arvesse PTA otsustuspraktikat elektroonilise side seaduse artikli 36 kohaselt seoses ettevõtja Gagnaveita Reykjavíkur rahastamisega ja erinevate meetmete hindamisel rakendatava kontrolli taset, tagab PTA poolt artikli 36 alusel kohaldatav kriteerium üldiselt selle, et kõik tehingud ettevõtjate Orkuveita Reykjavíkur ja Gagnaveita Reykjavíkur vahel või muude seotud ettevõtjatega toimuvad turutingimustel. PTA lähenemisviis ei pruugi olla identne turumajanduse tingimustes tegutseva turuosalise hindamisega, mida järelevalveamet teeb EMP riigiabi eeskirjade alusel, kuid see tagab siiski sama tulemuse, st aitab hoida ära tehingud, mis ei toimu turutingimustel. Seepärast on järelevalveameti esialgne seisukoht praeguses etapis, et PTA hindamine on samaväärne järelevalveameti turumajanduse tingimustes tegutseva turuosalise hindamisega.

Kui PTA teeb tagantjärele kindlaks elektroonilise side seaduse artikli 36 rikkumised, st kui ta on leidnud, et konkreetne tehing ei toimunud turutingimustel, on tal õigus anda pooltele korraldus kõrvaldada mis tahes võimalik eelis asjakohaste meetmete võtmise kaudu. Kuid selleks, et PTA saaks anda korralduse eelise tagastamiseks, peab kokkusobimatu meede olema selgelt kindlaks määratud ja vaidlustamatu, nt konkreetne rahasumma, laenulepingu tingimus jms. Peale selle ei ole PTA juhul, kui ta on andnud korralduse ettevõtjale Gagnaveita Reykjavíkur antud eelis tagasi nõuda, nõudnud eelise tagastamist koos intressiga.

Selle kohta, et PTA on teinud kindlaks elektroonilise side seaduse artikli 36 konkreetsed rikkumised, on kolm näidet. Neist kahel juhul otsustas PTA, et meetmed tuleb tagasi nõuda, kuid kolmandal juhul ei nõudnud PTA eeliste tagastamist. Järelevalveamet on seisukohal, et meetmetega, mida PTA nendel juhtudel hindas, oli antud ettevõtjale Gagnaveita Reykjavíkur eelised, mida ta tavapärastes turutingimustes ei oleks saanud. Peale selle ei olnud neid eeliseid ettevõtjalt Gagnaveita Reykjavíkur täielikult tagasi nõutud.

Seetõttu on järelevalveameti esialgne seisukoht, et Gagnaveita Reykjavíkur on saanud eelise EMP lepingu artikli 61 lõike 1 tähenduses järgmiselt: i) mitte tasudes turuintressi eelise eest, mille ta sai intressimaksete ajutise peatamise kaudu, ii) saades kaudselt vahendeid ettevõtjalt Orkuveita Reykjavíkur kiudoptiliste kaablite võrgu rajamiseks Ölfusi omavalitsusüksuses, iii) saades lühiajalisi laene ettevõtjalt Orkuveita Reykjavíkur ja (iv) lisades ettevõtja Gagnaveita Reykjavíkur ja erasektori laenuandjate vahelistesse laenulepingutesse tingimuse, mis käsitleb äriühingu Orkuveita Reykjavíkur jätkuvat enamusosalust äriühingus Gagnaveita Reykjavíkur.

Järelevalveameti esialgne seisukoht on, et need meetmed on valikulised, sest need on üksikmeetmed, mis on suunatud üksnes ettevõtjale Gagnaveita Reykjavíkur. Peale selle näib, et meetmed võivad moonutada konkurentsi ja mõjutada kaubandust EMPs.

Islandi ametiasutused ei ole esitanud argumente, mille põhjal saaks järeldada, et meetmeid, niivõrd kui need kujutavad endast riigiabi, võiks lugeda EMP lepinguga kooskõlas olevaiks. Seetõttu on järelevalveametil kahtlusi kõigi nelja meetme puhul nende kokkusobivuses siseturuga.

Decision No 86/19/COL of 5 December 2019 to open a formal investigation into alleged state aid granted to Gagnaveita Reykjavíkur

1 Summary

(1)

The EFTA Surveillance Authority („the Authority“) wishes to inform the Icelandic authorities that some measures covered by the complaint related to Gagnaveita Reykjavíkur („GR“) might entail state aid within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement. Furthermore, the Authority has doubts concerning the compatibility of these measures with the functioning of the EEA Agreement. Therefore, the Authority is required to open a formal investigation procedure into these measures (*) (1).

(2)

The Authority has based its decision on the following considerations.

2 Procedure

(3)

By a letter dated 26 October 2016 (2), Síminn hf. („the complainant“) made a complaint regarding alleged state aid granted by Orkuveita Reykjavíkur („OR“) to its subsidiary GR. By letter dated 7 November 2016, the Authority acknowledged receipt of the complaint (3). By email of 23 November 2016, the complainant submitted further information (4).

(4)

By letter dated 28 November 2016 (5), the Authority forwarded the complaint and the additional information received to the Icelandic authorities, and invited them to submit information and observations. By email dated 16 January 2017, the Authority received additional information from the complainant (6). By letter dated 7 February 2017, the Icelandic authorities submitted their comments to the Authority (7).The complainant submitted further information by email of 28 March 2017 (8).

(5)

On 7 June 2017, the Authority discussed the complaint with the Icelandic authorities at the annual package meeting in Reykjavík. On 22 June 2017, the Icelandic authorities provided the Authority with copies of various decisions of the Post and Telecom Administration in Iceland („PTA“), concerning the financing of GR (9).

(6)

On 25 September 2017, the Authority met with the complainant, at its request, in Reykjavík. On 1 January 2018, the complainant submitted further comments (10).

(7)

By letter dated 13 March 2018 (11), the Authority informed the complainant about its preliminary assessment that the financing of GR did not raise concerns concerning potential state aid within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement. By letter dated 20 April 2018 (12), the complainant submitted its response to the Authority’s preliminary assessment.

(8)

By letter dated 27 April 2018 (13), the Authority forwarded the complainant’s response and additional information received to the Icelandic authorities, and invited them to submit their observations. By letter dated 25 May 2018 (14), the Icelandic authorities submitted their comments.

(9)

On 6 June 2018, the Authority discussed the complaint with the Icelandic authorities and received a presentation from the PTA at the annual package meeting in Reykjavík (15). By letter dated 21 September 2018 (16), the complainant submitted further information.

(10)

By letter dated 26 March 2019 (17), the Authority received additional information concerning new developments from the complainant. On 29 April 2019, the Authority requested additional information and clarifications from the Icelandic authorities (18). By letter dated 4 June 2019 (19), the Icelandic authorities replied to the information request and provided the requested information and clarifications. Finally, the complainant submitted additional comments and information by letter dated 13 September 2019 (20).The complaint

2.1 The complainant - Síminn hf.

(11)

The complainant is a telecommunications company which provides communication solutions to private and corporate clients in Iceland. It offers a range of services, such as: (i) mobile services on its 2G/3G/4G network, (ii) fixed line telephony, (iii) fixed broadband, and (iv) television. The complainant also offers communications and IT solutions for companies of all sizes. The complainant’s subsidiary, Míla ehf., owns and operates a telecommunications network covering the entire country, which builds mostly on fibre optic cables, but also on copper lines and microwave connections. Míla sells its services at a wholesale level to companies with a telecommunications licence in Iceland.

2.2 Scope of the complaint

(12)

The complaint concerns OR’s investments in fixed broadband from 1999, when GR’s predecessor Lina.Net was established, until today. However, the complaint predominantly concerns the period from 1 January 2007 onwards, following the establishment of GR. In particular, the complaint concerns alleged state aid granted by OR to GR through various means, such as capital injections and lending that was not on market terms.

(13)

Moreover, the complaint concerns the terms of loans GR has obtained from […]. According to the complainant, the interest rates on GR’s loans are not on market terms that reflect the credit risk inherent in an undertaking such as GR, with a very high debt to EBITDA ratio (21). The complainant maintains that the interest rates offered to GR are directly connected to its ownership, as no market lender would have offered GR such rates without a direct link to its public ownership.

2.3 Arguments brought forward by the complainant

(14)

The complainant maintains, in general terms, that GR’s activities represent a political rather than a commercial project. It alleges that the company has been operated with a view to enhance competition on the telecommunications market, and that a private investor would not have acted in the same way as OR, when providing loans and capital injections to GR. The complainant moreover alleges that OR has provided GR with several capital injections and loans to finance their operations, which have not been on market terms, as well as more favourable access to OR infrastructure than other market players could receive.

(15)

According to the complainant, a major part of the alleged unlawful state aid has been in the form of interest rates for loans granted by OR to GR, which have not corresponded to market terms. Furthermore, after the majority of GR’s loans were gradually replaced by loans financed by private lenders (with full replacement at the end of 2017), the interest rates have continued to not correspond to normal market conditions, as OR has provided lenders with a guarantee that it would maintain its majority ownership of GR. The complainant considers that this must be considered as state aid that is incompatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement.

(16)

The complainant puts forward that the assessment performed by the PTA under Article 36 of the Electronic Communications Act is substantially different from the assessment conducted by the Authority under the state aid rules. According to the complainant, the application of the said rule by the PTA has consisted in assessing the return on equity. It seems that PTA has not made a detailed comparison with other market investors. The focus has rather been on assessing the financing generally, concentrating on whether the measures provide a direct loss for OR, as opposed to assessing whether the financing would have been provided by an investor operating on the market.

3 Description of the measures

3.1 Background

3.1.1 OR – Orkuveita Reykjavíkur

(17)

OR was established on 1 January 1999 as a public undertaking with the decision of the City Council of Reykjavík to merge the operations of the electricity and heat utilities owned by the city. A year later, the water utility was also incorporated into the new company. The company was operated on the basis of Regulation No 793/1998, issued by the Ministry of Industry and the City Council of Reykjavik, with reference to legislative Act No 38/1940 on the Reykjavik Heating Utility, and the Power Act No 58/1967. OR currently provides the following services through its three subsidiaries: electricity (Orka Náttúrunar), geothermal water for heating, cold water, sewage services (Veitur) and fibre-optic data connections (GR).

(18)

On 1 December 2001, OR merged with a utility company owned by several small municipalities in the western part of Iceland. After the merger, the City of Reykjavík owns 93,5 % of the company, the municipality of Akranes owns 5,5 % and the municipality of Borgarbyggð 1 %. Five members of the board of directors are appointed by the City Council of Reykjavík and one is appointed by the Municipality Council of Akranes (22). OR currently operates as a public partnership company, sameignarfélag (23), on the basis of Act No 136/2013 on OR (24) and Regulation No 297/2006 (25).

3.1.2 GR – Gagnaveita Reykjavíkur

(19)

GR is a telecommunications company established in 2007 as an independent legal entity, in order to comply with the requirements of the PTA on separation between the competitive and non-competitive operations of OR. GR is fully owned by OR. The purpose of GR, according to its articles of association, is the operation of a telecommunication and data transmission network. It provides wholesale access to its fibre optic network, for a number of retail service providers that operate in the residential and businesses markets with different fixed broadband and data transmission services. GR also offers services on the household market, where it charges end-users directly for the use of the access network.

(20)

OR began investing in the telecommunications market in 1999, when it established the subsidiary Lina.Net, with the purpose of providing general telecommunication services with emphasis on data transmission and internet connections in urban areas in Iceland. Its operations were later expanded into the setting up of an electronic telecommunications network using fibre optic cables. The Authority investigated several capital injections into Lina.Net during the years 1999–2001 in its Decision No 300/11/COL and found that they were in line with the actions of a private investor such that no state aid was granted (26).

(21)

Lina.Net invested considerable sums in its fibre optic networks and, since 2007, GR has continued to expand the network. In total, the investments between 2002 and 2010 amounted to around ISK 8 billion.

3.2 National legal basis

(22)

GR is a registered operator (data transmission and service) (27) under the Electronic Communications Act No 81/2003. Article 36 of the Electronic Communications Act, on separation of concession activities from electronic communications activities, provides:

„Electronic communications undertakings or consolidations operating public communications networks or publicly available electronic communications services, which enjoy special or exclusive rights in sectors other than electronic communications, must keep their electronic communications activities financially separate from other activities as if they were two separate undertakings. Care shall be taken to ensure that competitive operations are not subsidised by activities enjoying exclusive rights or protected activities“. (emphasis added)

(23)

According to the legislative proposal (frumvarp) of the Electronic Communications Act, Article 36 is meant to ensure that competitive telecommunication operations are not subsidised through income from operations that are protected by exclusive rights or by other means (28).The proposal also makes it clear that the provision is applicable regardless of the undertaking’s market share and regardless of whether the telecommunications operations are carried out within the same undertaking or by a separate legal entity which it controls (29).

3.3 The PTA’s monitoring role

3.3.1 General

(24)

The PTA operates according to the Act on Post and Telecom Administration No 69/2003, which implements the provisions of the EU’s regulatory framework for electronic communications (30). As a supervisory authority, the PTA, inter alia, ensures, in accordance with Article 36 of the Electronic Communications Act, that revenues stemming from non-competitive sectors do not subsidise operations in the competitive telecommunications sector. Therefore, the PTA is entrusted with scrutinising OR’s investments in the telecommunications market and the business relations between GR and OR. Such investigations can start at the PTA’s own initiative or through complaints from interested parties. GR is also obligated to notify specific measures, such as increase in share capital (31), to the PTA to obtain prior approval and interested parties can be parties to such cases, if they demonstrate that they have a legitimate interest in the result of the case (32).

(25)

An interested party can challenge decisions of the PTA before the Rulings Committee for Electronic Communications and Postal Affairs (33). This includes decisions taken on the basis of Article 36 of the Electronic Communications Act (34).

(26)

The following is a brief summary of the PTA’s main decisional practice concerning OR’s investments in the telecommunications market and the business relations between GR and OR to which the complainant has referred.

3.3.2 OR’s purchase of the fibre-optic network from Lina.Net

(27)

In October 2002, OR purchased the fibre-optic network from Lina.Net for ISK 1 758 811 899. In early 2003, after the enactment of the Electronic Communications Act, the PTA sent OR an inquiry regarding how the company intended to fulfil the conditions for separation of activities stipulated by Article 36 of the Electronic Communications Act (35).

(28)

In the ensuing PTA procedure, the PTA requested two expert reports , from the two consultancies KPMG and Rafhönnun (36), on the fair market value of the Lina.Net fibre-optic network (37). Both reports concluded that there was no indication that the purchase price was below market value. Moreover, the audit firm KPMG analysed certain parts of the operational and financial separation (38). The PTA accepted the results of the expert reports.

3.3.3 The establishment and financing of GR as a separate legal entity

(29)

As part of the aforementioned procedure, the PTA required OR to submit a business plan for the operations of the fibre-network and telecommunication services, demonstrating an adequate rate of return on the investment. KPMG performed a due diligence review of the business plan and determined that the rate of return on the investment was appropriate. Moreover, the PTA instructed OR to fulfil the following conditions (39):

(i)	Separation of accounts. The PTA instructed OR to establish a separate entity, entrusted with the telecommunications operations, which should keep separate accounts in line with established corporate practices.

(ii)

Prepare a foundation balance sheet (stofnefnahagsreikningur), comprising the telecommunication assets (valued at an appropriate market price) as well as the liabilities that stemmed from the financing of the telecom operations of OR (with the reservation that if the terms were more favourable than market terms, the new entity would have to compensate OR for any difference).

(iii)

Arm’s-length terms should apply to all dealings between the new entity and OR.

(30)

On 1 January 2007, in accordance with instructions of the PTA described above, OR established the private limited liability company GR as a new legal entity.

(31)

On 8 March 2007, a framework agreement was concluded between OR and GR, setting out the terms of the investment and the opening balance sheet of GR. OR transferred assets to GR. GR provided payment in the form of a loan and issuing share capital to OR. The interest rate to be paid by GR to OR on its loan principal over a payback period of […] years was based on the […] plus a margin of […] basis points, and was linked to the exchange rates of several foreign currencies. According to the consulting firm Deloitte, the loan agreement contained normal market practice terms, comparable to agreements concluded between private undertakings, as regards the event of default, the provision of information to the lender, and other covenants. Deloitte submitted a declaration in accordance with Article 5 of the Act on Private Limited Companies No 138/1994 (40), dated 7 March 2007, on the value of the assets, and concluded that they had been valued at a fair price. The terms of the loans were also reviewed and approved by the PTA (41).

(32)

On 21 May 2010, the PTA issued Decision No 14/2010, concerning the financial separation between OR and GR. In its Decision, the PTA confirmed that GR had to obtain prior approval from the PTA for any increase in share capital on behalf of OR or related companies. The PTA also noted that it would only approve such measures if they were on arm’s-length terms and if they did not entail the subsidisation of competitive operations (42).

(33)

Following the financial crisis in Iceland in 2008, the ISK devalued considerably, and GR became unable to fulfil its commitments under the loan agreement. An agreement was made with OR on temporary suspension of interest payments. The PTA was informed and subsequently intervened. The PTA required that the suspension of payments be revoked on the grounds that it did not comply with the required arm’s-length terms (43). GR complied and paid instalments and accrued interests in full.

3.3.4 GR’s rate of return and the share capital increase of December 2008

(34)

In December 2008, OR increased its share of GR’s capital. On 22 December 2010, the PTA adopted Decision No 39/2010, concerning the share capital increase and GR’s rate of return on capital.

(35)

With this Decision, the PTA noted that the operations of GR went according to the initial business plan in the year 2007. GR’s equity ratio was approximately 52 % at the end of 2007 and the company made a profit of ISK 120 million that year. The financial crisis of 2008 hit the company hard and in spite of increasing operating revenues, the losses of 2008 were close to ISK 3 billion, almost solely attributable to the devaluation of the ISK, which caused the debt of the company to increase.

(36)

To urgently restore the viability of GR, OR decided to increase the share capital before the end of 2008. The capital was increased by ISK 1,2 billion, setting an equity ratio of 23 %. The PTA Decision states that in absence of the share capital increase, „practically all equity would have been wiped out“, due to the financial collapse and sharp devaluation of the operating currency whilst the liabilities were all linked to foreign currency rates (44).

(37)

Furthermore, the PTA observed that in 2008 OR and GR had contacted private lenders with the intention to finance further investment in ongoing projects (45). The financial markets, however, were completely frozen by the end of the year. The Icelandic authorities maintain that, as an investor, OR inevitably had to invest further, in order to protect its significant initial investment (46).

(38)

The PTA highlighted that OR’s decision to increase the share capital had to be considered not only from its perspective as GR’s owner, but also as GR’s largest creditor. The PTA noted that creditors of several telecommunication companies had acquired them following the financial crisis, and either converted debts to equity or restructured loans. Moreover, the PTA found that GR’s updated business plans convincingly demonstrated a satisfactory level of profitability for a telecommunication company in a competitive market, within a reasonable timeframe, and that there was a normal correlation between the profitability and the owner’s contribution (47).

3.3.5 The conversion of debt into equity in 2014

(39)

Like many companies in Iceland, GR needed to reorganize its financial affairs after the financial crisis of 2008. OR’s application for permission to increase the share capital of GR in July and August 2013 was the subject of PTA’s Decision No 2/2014 of 24 March 2014. The reorganisation involved: (i) a conversion of ISK 3,5 billion of debt into equity, and (ii) that GR would enter the financial markets to refinance all remaining debt owed to OR. Finally, OR intended to dispose of a large portion of its shares post-refinancing.

(40)

The PTA accepted that the debt conversion would not increase the total financing of GR by OR, since it only changed the composition of the financing. The PTA also recognised that the conversion would change the equity ratio of GR from 22 % to 52 %, thereby leaving the ratio at the same level as GR’s main competitor, Míla (48). The PTA also assessed the initial business plan of GR, and determined that it was credible. The cash flow analysis demonstrated that if the devaluation of the operating currency had not hit the company in 2008, there would not have been a need for refinancing. Moreover, the PTA’s financial analysis confirmed that the rate of return for the investor and the weighted average cost of capital (WACC) of GR were in conformity with the general benchmark set by the PTA (49).

(41)

Míla intervened in the procedure before the PTA. The PTA rejected all the objections from Míla. The PTA adopted its Decision No 2/2014 on 24 March 2014, and the debt conversion was finalized in early April 2014. In June 2014, Míla initiated a court case against the PTA, GR and OR, requesting the courts to annul the PTA’s decision (50). The District Court of Reykjavík dismissed the case on 26 February 2015, and the Supreme Court confirmed the ruling of the District Court by judgment of 27 March 2015 (51).

3.3.6 The implementation of GR’s financial separation for 2016–2017

(42)

On 20 March 2019, the PTA adopted Decision No 3/2019, concerning the implementation of GR’s financial separation for 2016–2017, and whether it was in compliance with Article 36 of the Electronic Communications Act (52).

(43)

The PTA concluded that the financial separation between OR and GR had been in accordance with Article 36 of the Electronic Communications Act in the years 2016 and 2017, except for short-term lending to GR from a shared cash pool by OR and GR. The PTA found that these loan arrangements between OR and GR infringed an earlier PTA decision from 13 November 2006, as well as PTA Decision No 14/2010, since there was no loan agreement concluded between OR and GR reflecting the conditions that prevailed on the market for such loans (53).

(44)

The PTA also commented on conditions in GR’s loan agreements with private lenders, relating to OR’s continuing majority ownership of GR. The loan agreements in question had included special conditions that if the ownership of OR in GR went below 50% then the lender was authorised to demand repayment, terminate the loan agreement, or declare the loan immediately due. Such a provision has been included in GR’s loan agreements with private lenders since OR’s loan financing of GR was replaced by private lenders, starting in 2014 and eventually being completely replaced by the end of 2017 (54).

(45)

The PTA noted that by including these provisions, private lenders connected the ownership of OR to the loan agreements, in order to minimise the probability of default (55). The PTA considered that such arrangements could lead to more advantageous loan terms and more access to loan capital than other comparable telecommunication undertakings and, therefore, distort competition (56). Moreover, the PTA considered that this provision in the loan agreements constituted a connection between OR and GR that was not in accordance with the financial separation imposed in order to ensure that the two acted as unrelated parties (57).

(46)

The PTA concluded that measures were required to ensure an efficient financial separation between OR and GR, in accordance with Article 36 of the Electronic Communications Act. The PTA decided that:

a)	OR’s lending to GR from a shared cash pool, without a loan agreement reflecting market conditions, infringed the PTA Decision of 13 November 2006 and, therefore, also Article 36 of the Electronic Communications Act.

b)	GR’s debt from the shared cash pool was not to, at any given time, exceed ISK […].

GR was to obtain prior authorisation from the PTA for any loans from OR, or any other undertaking within the company group. GR shall submit an application to the PTA along with the necessary documents, e.g. a draft loan agreement, an appropriate business plan, a calculation of the profitability requirements, as well key social security numbers and the acceptance of other landers. Such a credit increase was to be in line with standard separation of accounts, and was to entail that competitive operations are not subsidised by activities enjoying exclusive rights.

d)	New loan agreements with private lenders could not contain a provision stipulating that if the ownership of OR in GR goes below 50 % then the lender is authorised to declare the loan immediately due.

(47)

On 4 October 2019, following an appeal from GR, the Rulings Committee for Electronic Communications issued Ruling No 2/2019, confirming the decision of the PTA.

3.3.7 Other cases

(48)

In addition to the decisions referred to above, the PTA adopted a decision in 2013, under Article 36 of the Electronic Communications Act, to temporarily allow GR to extend its loan agreement with OR (58).

(49)

Moreover, in 2014, Míla complained to the PTA about certain measures relating to an agreement GR had concluded with Ölfus Municipality, which included funds indirectly deriving from OR. The funds had initially been paid by OR into the Ölfus Revegetation Fund („ÖRF“) in connection with OR’s geothermal power plant project in the municipality. OR had joint control of the ÖRF together with representatives from the municipality. In 2014, the ÖRF decided to use its funds to finance GR’s rollout of a fiber optic network in Ölfus Municipality. After assessing the measures, the PTA found that they were contrary to Article 36 of the Electronic Communications Act, and instructed GR to undertake certain measures to ensure that it did not obtain an advantage from the funds deriving from OR (59).

4 Comments by the Icelandic authorities

(50)

The Icelandic authorities point out that the Authority has already dismissed allegations by the complainant as regards OR’s investments in Lina.Net in its Decision No 300/11/COL of 5 October 2011 (60).

(51)

The Icelandic authorities maintain that in all its relations with GR, OR has acted in accordance with the market economy operator („MEO“) test, and that no aid has been granted to GR. In that regard, the Icelandic authorities highlight that all of the measures complained of concerning the financial relations between OR and GR, have been assessed by the PTA on the basis of Article 36 of the Electronic Communications Act. According to the Icelandic authorities, the test applied by the PTA is comparable to the criterion applied by the Authority when determining whether a measure is on market terms (i.e. the MEO test).

(52)

The Icelandic authorities have confirmed that GR’s current investments are financed with cash provided by its operating activities and loans from […]. According to the Icelandic authorities, these loans do not constitute state aid in any way, and nor do they indicate that state aid has been extended to GR by its owner, as it is clear that the loans from […] to GR were solely based on commercial motives. They state that the loans are fully in line with normal market terms.

5 Presence of state aid

(53)

Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement reads as follows:

„[…] any aid granted by EC Member States, EFTA States or through State resources in any form whatsoever which distorts or threatens to distort competition by favouring certain undertakings or the production of certain goods shall, in so far as it affects trade between Contracting Parties, be incompatible with the functioning of this Agreement.“

(54)

The qualification of a measure as aid within the meaning of this provision therefore requires the following cumulative conditions to be met: (i) the measure must be granted by the state or through state resources; (ii) it must confer an advantage on an undertaking; (iii) favour certain undertakings (selectivity); and (iv) be liable to distort competition and affect trade.

5.1 Presence of state resources

(55)

The measure must be granted by the state or through state resources. The transfer of state resources may take many forms, such as direct grants, loans, guarantees, direct investment in the capital of companies and benefits in kind. A positive transfer of funds does not have to occur; foregoing state revenue is sufficient. Waiving revenue which would otherwise have been paid to the state constitutes a transfer of state resources.

(56)

The state, for the purpose of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement, covers all bodies of the public administration, from the central government to the city or the lowest administrative level. Resources of public undertakings may also constitute state resources within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement because the state is capable of directing the use of these resources (61). For the purposes of state aid law, transfers within a public group may also constitute state aid if, for example, resources are transferred from the parent company to its subsidiary (62). However, the measure must be imputable to the state.

(57)

The mere fact that a measure is taken by a public undertaking is not per se sufficient to consider it imputable to the state. However, it does not need to be demonstrated that, in a particular case, the public authorities specifically incited the public undertaking to take the measure in question (63). Therefore, the imputability to the state of a measure taken by a public undertaking may be inferred from a set of indicators arising from the circumstances of the case and the context in which the measure was taken (64). Among the relevant indicators set out by the Court of Justice are:

—	the fact that the body in question could not take the contested decision without taking into account the requirements of the public authorities;

—	the nature of the undertaking’s activities and the extent to which the activities were exercised on the market in normal conditions of competition with private operators;

—	the intensity of the supervision exercised by the public authorities over the management of the undertaking, and the degree of control which the state has over the public undertaking; and

—	any other indicator showing an involvement by the public authorities in the adoption of the measure, or the unlikelihood of their not being involved, having regard to the compass of the measure, its content or the conditions which it contains.

(58)

The Authority will therefore need to assess, in light of the aforementioned indicators, whether OR, in its dealings with GR, was acting as an autonomous entity, free of any influence from its owners, or whether its actions are imputable to the Icelandic authorities, i.e. the City of Reykjavík and the municipalities of Akranes and Borgarbyggð.

(59)

As noted in paragraph (18) above, OR operates as a public partnership company on the basis of Act No 136/2013 on OR (65) and Regulation No 297/2006 (66). OR is therefore distinct from private companies which are subject to ordinary company law. OR’s annual accounts are also reflected in the City of Reykjavík’s consolidated financial statements (67).

(60)

The Board of OR consists of six members, five appointed by the Reykjavík City Council and one by the Municipality Council of Akranes. Currently, three board members are politicians who also serve as either City Council or Municipal Council representatives. According to OR’s partnership agreement, the Board is responsible for the company’s affairs between owner’s meetings and should monitor the company’s direction, organisation and that its operations are in good shape and in accordance with the ownership policy. The Board sets an overall policy and future vision for OR and adopts decisions concerning major matters within the limit of the ownership policy. Before adopting unusual or important decisions or policy decisions, the Board must consult with the owners of OR. The same applies to similar decisions regarding subsidiaries (such as GR). The Board is also responsible for recruiting OR’s Director, drafting his/her job description and his/her eventual employment termination (68).

(61)

OR produces and sells electricity in a liberalised market open to competition. The company also has legal obligations to provide utility services (heating and water) and carries out other projects in the municipalities of its owners as well as other municipalities (69). Those utility services have since 2014 been carried out by OR’s subsidiary, Veitur, in order to comply with the Electricity Act, which prohibits cross subsidisation between utility activities, as well as between activities enjoying exclusive rights and competitive operations (70). According to OR’s ownership policy, the company’s administrative practices shall reflect professionalism, efficiency, prudence, transparency and responsibility. The Board is responsible for adopting the company’s policies concerning dividends, risk management, purchasing, etc. (71).

(62)

Although it appears that OR’s owners have taken steps to separate its public utility services and its competitive operations, in order to ensure that the latter are operated in line with commercial practices on the market, with OR’s management being somewhat autonomous in its decision making process, there are nevertheless elements to indicate that the public authorities may influence the company’s strategy and decisions. As noted above, the Board sets OR’s policies in various fields and must approve the company’s major decisions, which in some instances requires consulting with OR’s owners. It appears that many of the measures complained of concern major investments, loan guarantees and loan transactions between OR and GR, which may have been subject to the Board’s scrutiny and approval. The Board, as noted above, is politically appointed, and currently half of the board members also serve as City or Municipal Council representatives. This arrangement has been evaluated by the Enquiry Committee on Orkuveita Reykjavíkur, which in its 2012 report noted that this arrangement could lead to a lack of professional knowledge and experience on the Board, and that its work could be characterised by political conflict and disunity (72).

(63)

In light of the legal status of OR, the composition of its Board and the general circumstances described above, the Authority is unable to exclude that the measures are imputable to the State and that they entail the transfer of state resources, if and to the extent they confer advantages on GR.

(64)

Against this background, the Icelandic authorities are invited to comment on the issue of imputability.

5.2 Conferral of an advantage on an undertaking

5.2.1 General

(65)

The qualification of a measure as state aid requires that it confers an advantage on the recipient. An advantage, within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement, is any economic benefit, which an undertaking could not have obtained under normal market conditions.

5.2.2 Does GR constitute an undertaking?

(66)

The EU Courts have consistently defined undertakings as entities engaged in an economic activity, regardless of their legal status and the way in which they are financed (73). Consequently, the public or private status of an entity or the fact that an entity is partly or wholly publicly owned has no bearing as to whether or not that entity is an „undertaking“ within the meaning of state aid law (74).

(67)

Economic activities are activities consisting of offering goods or services on a market (75). Conversely, entities that are not commercially active in the sense that they are not offering goods or services on a given market do not constitute undertakings. A single entity may carry out a number of activities, both economic and non-economic, provided that it keeps separate accounts for the different funds that it receives, so as to exclude any risk of cross-subsidisation of its economic activities by means of public funds received for its non-economic activities (76).

(68)

As described in paragraph (19) above, GR was established on 1 January 2007, and its role is to provide Icelandic households and businesses access to high quality services on an open access network (77). GR operates a telecommunications and data transmission network and it provides wholesale access to its fibre optic network for a number of retail service providers that operate in supplying homes and businesses with different fixed broadband and data transmission services. GR also offers services on the household market, where it charges end-users directly for the use of the access network.

(69)

Although GR does not sell its own services in the retail market, it offers neutral and open network access to all interested telecommunications providers. The Authority considers that the provision of network access for a fixed price to third-party service providers and households constitutes an economic activity. Consequently, GR appears to operate as an undertaking within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement (78).

(70)

Any advantage involved in the transactions between OR and GR will therefore have been conferred upon an undertaking.

5.2.3 PTA’s monitoring and decisional practice

(71)

The measures complained of, concerning the financial relations between OR and GR, have, as described in Section 3.3 above, all been assessed by the PTA on the basis of Article 36 of the Electronic Communications Act.

(72)

The Icelandic authorities maintain that the test applied by the PTA is comparable to the test applied by the Authority when determining whether a measure is on market terms (i.e. the MEO test).

(73)

It is the Authority’s preliminary view, considering the decisional practice of the PTA under Article 36 of the Electronic Communications Act on the financing of GR and the level of scrutiny involved in the assessment of the various measures, that the test applied by the PTA under Article 36 generally ensures that all transactions between GR and OR, or other related companies, are on market terms.

(74)

The PTA’s approach may not be identical to the MEO assessment that would be carried out by the Authority under the EEA state aid rules, but it nonetheless ensures the same outcome, i.e. it prevents transactions that are not on market terms. Therefore, at this stage the Authority is of the preliminary view that the PTA provides an assessment similar to the Authority’s MEO assessment. The enforcement of Article 36 of the Electronic Communications Act by the PTA thus appears to effectively prevent GR from obtaining an advantage from its dealings with OR and when infringements are found the PTA has the competence to order the clawback of any advantages. However, there are instances where the PTA has either not ordered the full clawback of advantages with interest, or not ordered clawback at all.

(75)

An advantage, within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement, is any economic benefit which an undertaking would not have obtained under normal market conditions, i.e. in the absence of state intervention, thereby placing it in a more favourable position than its competitors (79).

(76)

Generally, when examining this question, the Authority applies the MEO test (80), whereby the conduct of states or public authorities, when selling or leasing assets, is compared to that of private economic operators (81).

(77)

The purpose of the MEO test is to assess whether the state has granted an advantage to an undertaking by not acting like a private market economy operator with regard to a certain transaction, e.g. loan agreements or the sale of asset (82). In order to fulfil the test, the public authority must disregard public policy objectives and instead focus on the single objective of obtaining a market rate of return or profit on its investments and a market price for the sale or lease of assets (83). This assessment must take into account any special rights or obligations attached to the asset concerned, in particular those that could affect the market value.

(78)

It follows from this test that an advantage is present whenever a state makes funds available to an undertaking, which, in the normal course of events, would not be provided by a private investor applying ordinary commercial criteria and disregarding other considerations of a social, political or philanthropic nature (84).

(79)

The PTA, as described above, has examined the strategy and financial prospect of the relevant measures, in order to determine whether the financing of the operations of GR has been carried out in line with normal market conditions. In its assessment, the PTA has considered independent expert reports and drawn comparisons with other, private operators in the same market. The PTA’s assessment is normally carried out on an ex ante basis. However, there are also examples of the PTA having carried out an ex post assessment of the financial separation between OR and GR, as well as individual measures.

(80)

More precisely, from 2006 until 2019, the PTA adopted nine formal decisions regarding the financial separation of OR and GR. The PTA did not make formal comments for the years 2013–2015. The PTA’s investigations included a review of GR’s business plan, which must be renewed annually, in accordance with actual financial data. In its review, the PTA e.g. checks whether the rate of return for the investor (OR) is in conformity with the telecom market in general, and looks at the capital structure and whether transactions between OR and GR are on market terms.

(81)

GR has been obliged to submit to the PTA, on an annual basis, detailed operational and economic information, together with its revised business plans and profitability requirements. Whenever necessary, the PTA has requested additional data and has assessed whether the operations were in line with market terms and, if not, whether there was a reason for taking action.

(82)

In a letter from the PTA to the complainant, dated 6 September 2018, the PTA confirmed that it does not have legal powers to perform a cost analysis of the prices OR sets for renting out its facilities. The complainant has argued that because of this, the PTA’s assessment of the financial separation cannot replace that of the Authority, when assessing possible state aid.

(83)

It is the preliminary view of the Authority that even though the PTA does not have the legal basis to perform a cost analysis of OR’s prices, the PTA has other ways to ensure that OR’s pricing practices for renting out facilities are on market terms. Article 36 of the Electronic Communications Act obliges OR to ensure equality in pricing when renting out facilities to related and unrelated companies. Furthermore, OR is obliged to ensure that competitive operations are not subsidised by activities enjoying exclusive rights or protected activities. The PTA then enforces these obligations. As the PTA explains in its letter to the complainant, it did in fact open an investigation into OR pricing practices for renting out facilities, and concluded that OR’s pricing was in full conformity with Article 36 of the Electronic Communications Act (85).

(84)

The PTA has found that in order to ensure that the effectiveness of Article 36 of the Electronic Communications Act is guaranteed, the concept of „subsidy“ should be understood in a broad sense, so as to include any measures from OR, both direct and indirect, which potentially provide GR with an advantage that its competitors on the market do not enjoy. The PTA has also noted that its monitoring role, pursuant to Article 36, is comparable to the Authority’s, when it comes to assessing whether an advantage within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement is present (86).

(85)

It is the Authority‘s preliminary view that there is an efficient system in place in Iceland that entails an assessment similar to the MEO test. Consequently, Article 36 of the Electronic Communications Act sets up a system under which the PTA can ensure that GR’s operations are not subsidised through income from OR’s operations.

(86)

It follows from the test that an advantage is present whenever OR makes funds available to GR, which, in the normal course of events, would not be provided by a private investor applying ordinary commercial criteria. The PTA can conduct a formal investigation on its own initiative or based on a complaint. If a transaction is not in conformity with Article 36 of the Electronic Communications Act, the PTA can instruct the parties to eliminate any advantage through the adoption of relevant measures set forth in an administrative decision by the PTA. The decisions are challengeable before the Rulings Committee for Electronic Communications and Postal Affairs and the Courts.

(87)

The Icelandic authorities have explained that the PTA’s monitoring role is primarily focused on an ex ante assessment of GR’s business plans, financing, profitability requirements, loan arrangements, etc., with the PTA imposing conditions and obligations when necessary in order to ensure financial separation between OR and GR, and that the latter’s competitive operations are not subsidised by the mother company (87).

(88)

Where the PTA ex post finds an infringement of Article 36 of the Electronic Communications Act, i.e. where it finds that a particular transaction was not on market terms, it can instruct the parties to eliminate any potential advantage through the adoption of relevant measures. The advantage is then recovered from the beneficiary in accordance with national law (88).

(89)

However, for the PTA to order an advantage clawed back, the incompatible measure must be clearly defined and be incontestable, e.g. a particular monetary sum, a condition in a loan agreement, etc. (89). Moreover, when the PTA has ordered advantages granted to GR to be clawed back, it has not required those advantages to be recovered with interest.

(90)

As described in Section 4.3 above, there are three examples of the PTA having established concrete infringements of Article 36 of the Electronic Communications Act. In two of those cases, the PTA ordered that the measures be clawed back. In the third case, the PTA did not order any clawback.

(91)

The first case, described in paragraph (33) above, concerned a temporary suspension of interest payments on loans provided by OR to GR (90). The PTA concluded that this temporary suspension had been in breach of the requirement imposed by the PTA concerning arm’s-length terms in transactions between OR and GR. Moreover, the PTA found that the suspension of interest payments had provided GR with an advantageous subsidy. Considering the facts of this case, the nature of transactions, as well as the PTA’s assessment, the Authority is also of the preliminary view that the measure provided GR with an advantage that it would not have obtained under normal market conditions.

(92)

The PTA ordered GR to pay back the suspended interest payments, however, it did not order the company to pay back interest on those suspended payments (91). In order to effectively recover an unlawful advantage at national level, the beneficiary must be ordered to pay interest for the whole of the period in which it benefitted from that aid. The interest must at least be equivalent to that which would have been applied if the beneficiary had had to borrow the amount on the market at the time (92). Although GR has paid back the market interest it was obliged to pay in the first place, it has not been required to pay back market interest on the advantage it obtained through the temporary suspension of interest payments. Therefore, the full advantage has not been adequately clawed back.

(93)

The second case, briefly described in paragraph (49) above, concerned funds deriving from OR and used to finance GR’s fiber optic cable project in Ölfus Municipality (93). The PTA concluded that the transfer of funds from ÖRF (but deriving from OR) to GR had amounted to a cross-subsidy between OR’s protected geothermal activities and GR’s competitive operations. Having considered the facts of the case and the PTA’s assessment, the Authority takes the preliminary view that ÖRF’s financing of the fibre optic cable network was not on market terms and therefore provided GR with an advantage.

(94)

The PTA ordered GR to undertake appropriate measures to repay the funds it received from ÖRF, although it did not stipulate how GR should go about this. Nevertheless, the PTA suggested that GR could either repay the funds to Ölfus Municipality or that the municipality could obtain an appropriate share in the project proportional to its investment. The Authority does not have information concerning how GR reacted to the PTA’s proposals and which measures it adopted following the decision. At this stage, it is therefore not clear to the Authority whether the advantage has been fully clawed back from GR.

(95)

Finally, in its latest decision concerning the implementation of GR’s financial separation for 2016–2017 (see Section 4.3.6 above), the PTA found two infringements of Article 36 of the Electronic Communications Act (94):

(i)	The first infringement concerned OR’s lending to GR from a shared cash pool, without a loan agreement reflecting market conditions.

(ii)

The second infringement concerned conditions in GR’s loan agreements with private lenders relating to OR’s continuing majority ownership of GR. Such provisions had been included in GR’s loan agreements with private lenders, since OR’s loan financing of GR was replaced by private lenders, starting in 2014 and eventually being completely replaced at the end of 2017. The PTA found that by including these provisions, private lenders connected the ownership of OR to the loan agreements, in order to minimise the probability of default (95). The PTA considered that such arrangements could lead to more advantageous loan terms and more access to loan capital than other comparable telecommunications undertakings and, therefore, distort competition (96).

(96)

The Authority, considering the benchmarks applied by the PTA and its detailed assessment of these measures, takes the preliminary view that these two measures provided GR with an advantage that it would not have obtained under normal market conditions. Due to proportionality considerations, the PTA did not order the clawback of the aforementioned advantages.

5.2.4 Preliminary conclusions

(97)

Based on the above considerations, it is the Authority’s preliminary view that GR has obtained an advantage within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement, which it could not have obtained under normal market conditions, by: (i) not paying market interest on the advantage it obtained through a temporary suspension of interest payments, (ii) receiving funds indirectly from OR for the layout of a fibre optic cable network in Ölfus Municipality, (iii) receiving short-term lending from OR, and (iv) through the inclusion of a condition in GR’s loan agreements with private lenders on OR’s continued majority ownership in GR.

5.3 Selectivity

(98)

To be characterised as state aid within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement, the measure must also be selective in that it favours „certain undertakings or the production of certain goods“. Not all measures which favour economic operators fall under the notion of aid, but only those which grant an advantage in a selective way to certain undertakings, categories of undertakings or to certain economic sectors.

(99)

The potential aid measures at issue, i.e. (i) not paying market interest on the advantage GR obtained through a temporary suspension of interest payments, (ii) receipt of funds indirectly from OR for the layout of a fibre optic cable network in Ölfus Municipality, (iii) short-term lending from OR to GR, and (iv) the inclusion of a condition in GR’s loan agreements with private lenders on OR’s continued majority ownership in GR, are individual measures addressed only to GR. The measures therefore appear to be selective within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement.

5.4 Effect on trade and distortion of competition

(100)

The measures must be liable to distort competition and affect trade between the Contracting Parties to the EEA Agreement.

(101)

According to CJEU case law, it is not necessary to establish that the aid has a real effect on trade between the Contracting Parties to the EEA Agreement and that competition is actually being distorted, but only to examine whether the aid is liable to affect such trade and distort competition (97). Furthermore, it is not necessary that the aid beneficiary itself is involved in intra-EEA trade. Even a public subsidy granted to an undertaking, which provides only local or regional services and does not provide any services outside its state of origin, may nonetheless have an effect on trade if such internal activity can be increased or maintained as a result of the aid, with the consequence that the opportunities for undertakings established in other Contracting Parties are reduced (98).

(102)

GR is active in deploying a fibre network infrastructure in a market which can be entered directly or through financial involvement by participants from other EEA States. In general, the markets for electronic communications services (including the wholesale and the retail broadband markets) are open to trade and competition between operators and service providers across the EEA.

(103)

Therefore, it is the Authority’s preliminary view that the measures are liable to distort competition and affect trade between the Contracting Parties to the EEA Agreement.

5.5 Conclusion

(104)

Based on the information provided by the Icelandic authorities and the complainant, the Authority has formed the preliminary view that the measures, i.e. (i) not paying market interest on the advantage GR obtained through a temporary suspension of interest payments, (ii) receipt of funds indirectly from OR for the layout of a fibre optic cable network in Ölfus Municipality, (iii) short-term lending from OR to GR, and (iv) the inclusion of a condition in GR’s loan agreements with private lenders on OR’s, fulfil all criteria in Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement and therefore constitute state aid.

6 Procedural requirements

(105)

Pursuant to Article 1(3) of Part I of Protocol 3 to the Agreement between the EFTA States on the Establishment of a Surveillance Authority and a Court of Justice („Protocol 3“): „The EFTA Surveillance Authority shall be informed, in sufficient time to enable it to submit its comments, of any plans to grant or alter aid. …. The State concerned shall not put its proposed measures into effect until the procedure has resulted in a final decision.“

(106)

The Icelandic authorities did not notify the potential aid measures to the Authority. It is therefore the Authority’s preliminary view that the Icelandic authorities have not respected their obligations pursuant to Article 1(3) of Part I of Protocol 3. The granting of the potential aid therefore appears to be unlawful.

7 Compatibility

(107)

Having reached a preliminary conclusion that the measures might constitute unlawful aid, the Authority must assess whether they would be compatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement.

(108)

The Authority can declare state aid compatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement under its Articles 59(2) and 61(3)(c) provided that certain compatibility conditions are fulfilled.

(109)

It is for the Icelandic authorities to invoke possible grounds for compatibility and to demonstrate that the conditions for compatibility are met (99). However, the Icelandic authorities have not provided any arguments substantiating why the measures should be considered compatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement. In particular, no arguments supporting the conclusion that the aid is targeted at a well-defined objective of common interest have been presented. Furthermore, the Icelandic authorities have not presented evidence suggesting that GR has been entrusted with a public service obligation. The Authority has also not identified any clear grounds for compatibility.

(110)

To the extent that the measures constitute state aid, the Authority therefore has doubts as to their compatibility with the functioning of the EEA Agreement

8 Conclusion

(111)

As set out above, the Authority has formed the preliminary view that the measures fulfil all criteria in Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement and therefore appear to constitute state aid. The Authority furthermore has doubts as to whether the measures are compatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement.

(112)

Consequently, and in accordance with Article 4(4) of Part II of Protocol 3, the Authority hereby opens the formal investigation procedure provided for in Article 1(2) of Part I of Protocol 3. The decision to open a formal investigation procedure is without prejudice to the final decision of the Authority, which may conclude that the measures do not constitute state aid or are compatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement.

(113)

The Authority, acting under the procedure laid down in Article 1(2) of Part I of Protocol 3, invites the Icelandic authorities to submit, by 6 January 2020 their comments and to provide all documents, information and data needed for the assessment of the measures in light of the state aid rules.

(114)

The Icelandic authorities are requested to immediately forward a copy of this decision to OR.

(115)

If this letter contains confidential information which should not be disclosed to third parties, please inform the Authority by 13 December 2019, identifying the confidential elements and the reasons why the information is considered to be confidential. In doing so, please consult the Authority’s Guidelines on Professional Secrecy in State Aid Decisions (100). If the Authority does not receive a reasoned request by that deadline, the Icelandic authorities will be deemed to agree to the disclosure to third parties and to the publication of the full text of the letter on the Authority’s website: http://www.eftasurv.int/state-aid/state-aid-register/ and in the Official Journal of the European Union and the EEA Supplement thereto.

(116)

Finally, the Authority will inform interested parties by publishing a meaningful summary of it in the Official Journal of the European Union and the EEA Supplement thereto. All interested parties will be invited to submit their comments within one month of the date of such publication. The comments will be communicated to the Icelandic authorities.

For the EFTA Surveillance Authority

Bente ANGELL-HANSEN

President

Responsible College Member

Frank J. BÜCHEL

College Member

Högni KRISTJÁNSSON

College Member

Carsten ZATSCHLER

Countersigning as Director,

Legal and Executive Affairs

(*) The information in square brackets is covered by the obligation of professional secrecy.

(1) Reference is made to Article 4(4) of Part II of Protocol 3 to the Agreement between the EFTA States on the Establishment of a Surveillance Authority and a Court of Justice.

(2) Document No 825150, and Annexes 1–43 (Document Nos 825151, 825152, 825152, 825153 and 825156).

(3) Document No 825249.

(4) Document No 827877.

(5) Document No 828509.

(6) Document No 835622 and three attachments (Document Nos 835623, 835624 and 835625).

(7) Document Nos 840228 and 840229, and Annex 1 (Document No 840230).

(8) Document No 850420.

(9) Document No 862626 and eight attachments (Document Nos 862628, 862635, 862639, 862641, 862645, 862648, 862651 and 862655).

(10) Document No 892188.

(11) Document No 882024.

(12) Document No 910552 and Annexes 1 and 2 (Document No 910554).

(13) Document No 911001.

(14) Document No 915072.

(15) Document No 919903.

(16) Document Nos 931137, 931138 and 931139.

(17) Document No 1060941.

(18) Document No 1066345.

(19) Document No 1073306 and Annexes 1–5 (Document Nos 1073308, 1073310, 1073312, 1073314 and 1073316).

(20) Document No 1087462 and Annexes 1–5 (Document Nos 1087456–1087460).

(21) Earnings before interest, tax, depreciation and amortization (EBITDA) is a measure of a company’s operating performance.

(22) https://www.or.is/um-or/skipulag-og-stjornhaettir/stjorn/.

(23) https://www.rsk.is/fyrirtaekjaskra/leit/kennitala/5512983029.

(24) https://www.althingi.is/lagas/nuna/2013136.html.

(25) https://www.reglugerd.is/reglugerdir/allar/nr/297-2006.

(26) OJ C 10, 12.1.2012, p. 6 and EEA Supplement No 2, 12. jaanuar 2012, p. 4.

(27) Based on a general authorisation to operate telecommunication networks and services in accordance with Art. 4 of The Electronic Communications Act No 81/2003, see https://www.pfs.is/english/telecom-affairs/registration-and-licences/.

(28) Submitted to Parliament in the 128 parliamentary session 2002–2003; http://www.althingi.is/altext/128/s/0960.html.

(29) Ibid.

(30) The framework is made up of a package of primarily five Directives and two Regulations: Framework Directive 2002/21/EC (OJ L 108, 24.4.2002, p. 33); Access Directive 2002/19/EC (OJ L 108, 24.4.2002, p. 7); Better Regulation Directive 2009/140/EC (OJ L 337, 18.12.2009, p. 37); Authorisation Directive 2002/20/EC (OJ L 108, 24.4.2002, p. 21); the Universal Service Directive 2002/22/EC (OJ L 108, 24.4.2002, p. 51); the Regulation on Body of European Regulators for Electronic Communications (BEREC) (OJ L 337, 18.12.2009, p. 1); and the Regulation on roaming on public mobile communications networks (OJ L 172, 30.6.2012, p. 10).

(31) PTA Decision No 14/2010 of 21. mai 2010.

(32) PTA Decision No 20/2013 of 10. oktoober 2013.

(33) Article 13 of the Act on The Post and Telecom Administration No 69/2003.

(34) See for example Ruling of the Ruling Committee of 17 July 2006 in Case No 8/2006.

(35) PTA Decision of 13. november 2006, p. 1.

(36) Attachments contained in Document No 862628.

(37) PTA Decision of 13. november 2006, p. 5.

(38) PTA Decision of 13. november 2006, p. 16.

(39) PTA Decision of 13. november 2006, p. 15–23.

(40) Article 5 of the Act (available in English here) concerns the special provisions that a Memorandum of Association should contain. According to section 5 in paragraph 2 there should be attached to the Memorandum of Association a report containing „a declaration to the effect that the specific valuables correspond at least to the agreed remuneration, including the nominal value of the shares to be issued plus a conceivable surcharge on account of overprice; the remuneration must not exceed the amount at which these valuables may be credited in the Company’s accounts“.

(41) PTA Decision No 32/2008 of 30. detsember 2008.

(42) PTA Decision No 14/2010 of 21. mai 2010, p. 15.

(43) PTA Decision No 25/2010 of 7. september 2010.

(44) PTA Decision No 39/2010 of 22. detsember 2010, p. 21.

(45) PTA Decision No 39/2010 of 22. detsember 2010, p. 21.

(46) Document No 840229, p. 8.

(47) PTA Decision No 39/2010 of 22. detsember 2010, p. 24 and 26.

(48) PTA Decision No 2/2014 of 24. märts 2014, p. 35.

(49) PTA Decision No 2/2014 of 24. märts 2014, p. 40–42.

(50) According to Article 13, paragraph 4, of the Act on the Post and Telecom Administration No 69/2003, a party can decide to avoid the Ruling Committee and appeal a decision of the PTA directly to the District Court within 3 months from the time they are aware of the decision.

(51) Supreme Court of Iceland judgment of 27. märts 2015 in Case No 219/2015.

(52) PTA Decision No 3/2019 of 20. märts 2019.

(53) PTA Decision No 3/2019 of 20. märts 2019, paragraphs 372–373.

(54) PTA Decision No 3/2019 of 20. märts 2019, paragraph 375.

(55) PTA Decision No 3/2019 of 20. märts 2019, paragraph 353.

(56) PTA Decision No 3/2019 of 20. märts 2019, paragraph 353.

(57) PTA Decision No 3/2019 of 20. märts 2019, paragraph 354.

(58) PTA Decision No 26/2013 of 1. november 2013.

(59) PTA Decision No 11/2015 of 2. juuni 2015.

(60) Reply from the Icelandic authorities, dated 7. veebruar 2017, pages 2 and 3. Document No 840228.

(61) The Authority’s Guidelines on the notion of state aid („NoA“) (OJ L 342, 21.12.2017, p. 35), and EEA Supplement No 82, 21. detsember 2017, p. 1, paragraph 49.

(62) Judgment in SFEI and others, C-39/94, EU:C:1996:285, paragraph 62.

(63) NoA, paragraph 41.

(64) Judgment in France v Commission (Stardust Marine), C-482/99, EU:C:2002:294, paragraph 55.

(65) https://www.althingi.is/lagas/nuna/2013136.html.

(66) https://www.reglugerd.is/reglugerdir/allar/nr/297-2006.

(67) See for example: https://reykjavik.is/sites/default/files/ymis_skjol/skjol_utgefid_efni/city_of_ reykjavik_-_financial_statements_2018.pdf.

(68) https://www.or.is/um-or/skipulag-og-stjornhaettir/stjorn/. .

(69) See Article 2 of OR’s ownership policy: https://www.or.is/um-or/skipulag-og-stjornhaettir/eigendastefna/,

(70) Article 16 of the Electricity Act No 65/2003.

(71) See Article 6 of OR’s ownership policy: https://www.or.is/um-or/skipulag-og-stjornhaettir/eigendastefna/. .

(72) See Report of the Enquiry Committee on Orkuveita Reykjavíkur, page 73, https://rafhladan.is/handle/10802/5777.

(73) Judgments in Pavlov and others, C-180/98 to C-184/98, EU:C:2000:428, paragraph 74, and Cassa di Risparmio di Firenze and others, C-222/04, EU:C:2006:8, paragraph 107; Case E-5/07 Private Barnehagers Landsforbund [2008] EFTA Ct. Rep. 62, paragraph 78.

(74) Judgment in Congregación de Escuelas Pías Provincia Betania v Ayuntamiento de Getafe, C-74/16, EU:C:2017:496, paragraph 42.

(75) Judgment in Cassa di Risparmio di Firenze and Others, C-222/04, EU:C:2006:8, paragraph 108; and Case E-29/15 Sorpa [2016] EFTA Ct. Rep. 825, paragraph 72.

(76) Judgment in Congregación de Escuelas Pías Provincia Betania, C-74/16, EU:C:2017:496, paragraph 51.

(77) See https://www.ljosleidarinn.is/gagnaveita-reykjavikur.

(78) See the Authority’s Decision No 444/13/COL, The Deployment of a Next Generation Access network in the municipality of Skeiða- and Gnúpverjahreppur (OJ C 66, 6.3.2014, p. 6) and EEA Supplement No 82, 21. detsember 2017, p. 1, paragraph 56.

(79) Judgments in SFEI and Others, C-39/94, EU:C:1996:285, paragraph 60, and Spain v Commission, C-342/96, EU:C:1999:210, paragraph 41.

(80) NoA, chapter 4.2.

(81) For the application of the MEO test, see Case E-12/11 Asker Brygge [2008] EFTA Ct. Rep. 536, and judgment in Land Burgenland, C-214/12 P, C-215/12 P and C-223/12 P, EU:C:2013:682.

(82) NoA, paragraph 133.

(83) Judgment in Land Burgenland, C-214/12 P, C-215/12 P and C-223/12 P, EU:C:2013:682.

(84) See for example, the Opinion of Advocate-General Jacobs in Spain v Commission, C-278/92, C-279/92 and C-280/92, EU:C:1994:112, paragraph 28. See also judgments in Belgium v Commission, 40/85, EU:C:1986:305, paragraph 13, France v Commission, 301/87, EU:C:1990:67, paragraphs 39–40, and Italy v Commission, 303/88, EU:C:1991:136, paragraph 24.

(85) Document No 931139.

(86) PTA Decision No 3/2019 of 20. märts 2019, paragraphs 338–340.

(87) Document No 1073308.

(88) Judgment in Eesti Pagar, C-349/17, EU:C:2019:172, paragraph 89.

(89) Document No 1073308.

(90) PTA Decision No 25/2010 of 7. september 2010.

(91) PTA Decision No 25/2010 of 7. september 2010.

(92) Judgment in Eesti Pagar, C-349/17, EU:C:2019:172, paragraph 142.

(93) PTA Decision No 11/2015 of 2. juuni 2015.

(94) PTA Decision No 3/2019 of 20. märts 2019.

(95) PTA Decision No 3/2019 of 20. märts 2019, paragraph 353.

(96) PTA Decision No 3/2019 of 20. märts 2019, paragraph 353.

(97) Case E-6/98 Norway v ESA [1999] EFTA Ct. Rep. 76.

(98) See for example judgments in Eventech, C-518/13, EU:C:2015:9, paragraph 66, Libert and others, C-197/11 and C-203/11, EU:C:2013:288, paragraph 77, Friulia Venezia Giulia, T-288/97, EU:T:2001:115, paragraph 41.

(99) Judgment in Italy v Commission, C-364/90, EU:C:1993:157, paragraph 20.

(100) OJ L 154, 8.6.2006, p. 27 and EEA Supplement No 29, 8. juuni 2006, p. 1.

6.2.2020

Euroopa Liidu Teataja

C 40/38

Teate avaldamine veinisektoris kasutatava nimetuse tootespetsifikaadi standardmuudatuse heakskiitmise kohta vastavalt komisjoni aasta delegeeritud määruse (EL) 2019/33 artikli 17 lõigetele 2 ja 3

(2020/C 40/08)

Käesolev teade avaldatakse vastavalt komisjoni aasta delegeeritud määruse (EL) 2019/33 (1) artikli 17 lõikele 5.

STANDARDMUUDATUSE HEAKSKIITMISE TEADE

„Coteaux d’Ancenis“

PDO-FR-A0928-AM01

Teate kuupäev: 12. november 2019

KINNITATUD MUUDATUSE KIRJELDUS JA PÕHJUSED

1. Geograafiline piirkond

Geograafilist piirkonda käsitlevat teksti on muudetud järgmiselt: „Kõik tootmise etapid toimuvad geograafilises piirkonnas, mille riiklik päritolu- ja kvaliteediinstituut (Institut national de l’origine et de la qualité) kiitis heaks pädeva riikliku komitee 28. septembri 2011. aasta koosolekul. Piirkond hõlmab selle tootespetsifikaadi pädeva riikliku komitee poolse kinnitamise kuupäeva seisuga ja lähtuvalt 2018. aasta ametlikest geograafilistest koodidest järgmiste kommuunide territooriume:

—

Loire-Atlantique’i departemang: Ancenis, Carquefou, Le Cellier, Couffé, Divatte-sur-Loire (ainult Barbechat’ delegeeritud kommuuni territoorium), Ligné, Loireauxence (ainult Varades’i delegeeritud kommuuni territoorium), Mauves-sur-Loire, Mésanger, Montrelais, Oudon, Saint-Géréon, Thouaré-sur-Loire, Vair-sur-Loire.

—	Maine-et-Loire’i departemang: Mauges-sur-Loire (ainult La Chapelle-Saint-Florent’i delegeeritud kommuuni territoorium), Orée d’Anjou (ainult Bouzillé, Champtoceaux’, Draini, Landemont’i, Liré ja La Varenne’i delegeeritud kommuunide territoorium).

Geograafilist piirkonda hõlmavate kartograafiliste dokumentidega on võimalik tutvuda riikliku päritolu- ja kvaliteediinstituudi veebisaidi vahendusel“ .

Redaktsiooniline muudatus: haldusüksuste uues loetelus võetakse arvesse pärast tootespetsifikaadi kinnitamist toimunud ühinemisi või muid halduspiirkondade muudatusi. Suurema õiguskindluse huvides viidatakse selles loetelus Prantsusmaa statistikaameti (INSEE) igal aastal avaldatavate ametlike geograafiliste koodide kehtivale versioonile.

Ühtlasi viidatakse sellele, et avalikkuse paremaks teavitamiseks on INAO veebisaidil tehtud kättesaadavaks geograafilist piirkonda hõlmavad kartograafilised dokumendid.

Sellega seoses muudetakse geograafilist piirkonda hõlmavat koonddokumendi punkti 6.

2. Piiritletud maatüki kogupindala

1. peatüki punkti IV alapunktis 2 asendatakse sõna „piiritletud“ (délimité)“ sõnaga „tootmis-“ (de production);

Tegemist on redaktsioonilise muudatusega, millega ei muudeta kasvatusalade piirkonna ulatust.

See muudatus ei mõjuta koonddokumendis esitatud teavet.

3. Vahetus läheduses asuv piirkond

1. peatüki punkti IV alapunktis 3 asendatakse kommuunide nimekiri järgmisega:

—	Loire-Atlantique’i departemang: La Boissière-du-Doré, La Chapelle-Heulin, Divatte-sur-Loire (ainult ChapelleBasse-Meri delegeeritud kommuuni territoorium), Gorges, Haute-Goulaine, Le Landreau, Le Loroux-Bottereau, Maisdonsur-Sèvre, Mouzillon, La Remaudière, Saint-Julien-de-Concelles, Vallet.

—

Maine-et-Loire’i departemang: Montrevault-sur-Èvre (ainult Puiset-Doré ja Saint-Rémy-en-Mauges’i delegeeritud kommuunide territoorium), Orée d’Anjou (ainult Saint-Laurent-des-Autels’i ja Saint-Sauveur-de-Landemont’i delegeeritud kommuunide territoorium), Sèvremoine (ainult Tillières’i delegeeritud kommuuni territoorium).

Redaktsiooniline muudatus: haldusüksuste uues loetelus võetakse arvesse pärast tootespetsifikaadi kinnitamist toimunud ühinemisi või muid halduspiirkondade muudatusi.

Sellega seoses muudetakse lisatingimusi käsitlevat koonddokumendi punkti 9.

4. Viinamarjasordid

Punaste ja roosade veinide tootmisel on edaspidi võimalik täiendava sordina kasutada sorti „Cabernet franc“.

„Cabernet franc“ kuulub piirkonna ja nimetusega ajalooliselt seotud sortide hulka, lisades veinile struktuursust, muutmata samas selle tüüpilisi omadusi. See annab tootmisele teatava turvalisuse, kuna nimetatud sort ei ole külma ja seenhaiguste suhtes nii tundlik kui sort „Gamay“.

See muudatus ei mõjuta koonddokumendis esitatud teavet.

5. Kokkusegamine

—

1. peatüki punkti V lisati järgmine lõik:

„2.	Eri viinamarjasortide kasutamise osakaalu nõuded põllumajanduslikus majapidamises

Täiendava viinamarjasordi osakaal moodustab segu kogumassist kuni 10°%;

Konkreetset tüüpi veini puhul hinnatakse viinamarjasortide osakaalu vastavust, võttes arvesse põllumajandusliku majapidamise kõiki kasvatusalasid, mida kasutatakse kontrollitud geograafilise tähisega veini tootmiseks“.

—

1. peatüki punktile IX lisati järgmine alapunkt a:

„a)	– Viinamarjasortide segu

Punased ja roosad veinid saadakse viinamarjade või veinide segamise teel samas osakaalus, mis on kindlaks määratud viinamarjasortide jaoks põllumajanduslikus majapidamises“ .

Sordi ‛Cabernet franc’ lisamise tõttu tuli lisada eeskiri viinamarjasortide segu ja eri sortide proportsioonide kohta, millega piirati selle sordi osakaalu 10 %ni.

See muudatus ei mõjuta koonddokumendis esitatud teavet.

6. Pakendamine

Punkti IX alapunktis 2 muudeti pakendatud partiide analüüside tulemuste säilitamise kestust, edaspidi tuleb tõhusama kontrolli tagamiseks neid tulemusi säilitada 6 kuu asemel 12 kuud.

See muudatus ei mõjuta koonddokumendis esitatud teavet.

7. Veini liikumine tunnustatud ladustajate vahel

1. peatüki punkti IX punkti 4. alapunkt b, mis puudutab veinide ringlusse laskmist volitatud laopidajate vahel, jäetakse välja.

See muudatus ei mõjuta koonddokumendis esitatud teavet.

8. Seos geograafilise piirkonnaga

Seost on muudetud, et ajakohastada asjaomaste kommuunide arv (22 asemel 16).

Sellega seoses muudetakse geograafilist piirkonda käsitlevat koonddokumendi punkti 8.

9. Üleminekumeede

Üleminekumeetmed, mille tähtaeg on saabunud, on tootespetsifikaadist välja jäetud.

See muudatus ei mõjuta koonddokumendis esitatud teavet.

10. Märgistus

XII ossa on lisatud järgmine punkt: „c) Kontrollitud päritolunimetusega veinide märgistusel võib esitada väiksema geograafilise piirkonna nimetuse, kui kõnealune piirkond on:

—	kantud katastrisse,

—	märgitud saagideklaratsioonile.

Kõnealuse katastriüksuse nimetus esitatakse tähtedega, mille kõrgus, laius ja paksus moodustavad kuni poole kontrollitud päritolunimetuse tähtede suurusest. Samal visuaalsel väljal asub kontrollitud päritolunimetus“ .

Sellega seoses muudetakse lisatingimusi käsitlevat koonddokumendi punkti 9.

11. Kasvatusala kasutamise eeldeklaratsioon

2. peatüki punkti 1 alapunktis 1 on välja jäetud 5aastane tähtaeg kasvatusala kasutamise vaikimisi pikendamisel, selle eesmärk on vältida pikendamise unustamisega seotud probleeme; säilitatud on üksnes säte, mis hõlmab vaikimisi pikendamist juhul, kui ettevõtja ei ole teatanud muudatuse tegemisest.

See muudatus ei mõjuta koonddokumendis esitatud teavet.

12. Taotluse deklaratsioon

Taotluse deklaratsioon tuleb edaspidi esitada 31. detsembriks varasema 10. detsembri asemel.

See muudatus ei mõjuta koonddokumendis esitatud teavet.

13. Pakendamata veiniga tehtavate tehingute eeldeklaratsioon

2. peatüki punkti II alapunkti 3 on enne sõna „tehing“ lisatud sõna „esimene“ ning pärast sõna „tehing“ on lisatud sõnad „seoses vaadeldava aasta esimese partiiga või tarbijale määratud veini esimese turustamisega“.

See muudatus ei mõjuta koonddokumendis esitatud teavet.

14. Pakendamise eeldeklaratsioon

2. peatüki punkti II alapunkti 4 on lisatud järgmine taane:

„–	eeldatav pakendamise kuupäev“

See muudatus ei mõjuta koonddokumendis esitatud teavet.

15. Klassi alandamise deklaratsioon

2. peatüki punkti II alapunktis 6 on sõnad „ühe kuu jooksul“ asendatud sõnadega „hiljemalt 15. detsembriks“

See muudatus ei mõjuta koonddokumendis esitatud teavet.

16. Istandusregister

2. peatüki punkti II alapunkti 1 muudetakse järgmiselt:

„1

– Istandusregister

Kõik viinapuid kasvatavad ettevõtjad, kes toodavad kontrollitud päritolunimetusega tooteid, peavad enne koristusaasta 1. juunit kandma registrisse kasvatusalad, millel nad loobuvad kontrollitud päritolunimetusega toote tootmisest ja mille puhul nad ei soovi kohaldada kontrollitud päritolunimetusega viinamarjaistanduste toodangu suhtes kehtestatud tingimusi.

Toote kaitse- ja haldusasutus võib paluda ettevõtjatel esitada selle registri koopia.

Kõik ühe või mitme üleminekumeetmega hõlmatud ettevõtjad esitavad toote kaitse ja haldusasutusele ning kontrolliasutusele kasvatusalade loetelu, milles on näidatud:

—	kasvatusala katastrinumber;

—	asjaomane üleminekumeede“ .

See muudatus ei mõjuta koonddokumendis esitatud teavet.

17. Veinilao register

2. peatüki punkti II alapunktis 2 on mõiste „vihik“ asendatud sõnaga „register“ ning on lisatud, et väljapraagitud tooted kantakse sellesse registrisse.

See muudatus ei mõjuta koonddokumendis esitatud teavet.

18. Peamised kontrollitavad punktid

3. peatükki on muudetud, et tagada kooskõla Nantes’i piirkonna tootespetsifikaatides kontrollitavate põhipunktidega.

See muudatus ei mõjuta koonddokumendis esitatud teavet.

KOONDDOKUMENT

1. Toote nimetus

Coteaux d’Ancenis

2. Geograafilise tähise tüüp

KPN – kaitstud päritolunimetus

3. Viinamarjasaaduste kategooriad

Vein

4. Veini(De) kirjeldus

Punased veinid

Tegemist on vaiksete punaste veinidega

Veinide analüütilised omadused on järgmised:

—	minimaalne naturaalne alkoholisisaldus mahuprotsentides: punased veinid 10,5 %

—	minimaalne üldalkoholisisaldus mahuprotsentides: punased veinid 12,5 %

—	üldhappesus: punased veinid 57,1–102,1 milliekvivalenti liitri kohta

—	maksimaalne lenduvate hapete sisaldus: punased veinid 13,3 milliekvivalenti liitri kohta

—	fermenteeritava suhkru (glükoos, fruktoos) sisaldus: punased veinid kuni 3 grammi liitri kohta

—	maksimaalne õunhappe sisaldus: kuni 0,3 grammi liitri kohta punaste veinide puhul. Malolaktiline käärimine peab punaste veinide puhul olema lõppenud.

Punaste veinide üldhappesus, vääveldioksiidi kogusisaldus ja üldalkoholisisaldus vastavad liidu eeskirjadega sätestatud väärtustele.

Punastel veinidel on kirgas värvus, mis varieerub kirsipunasest granaatpunaseni. Veinide lõhnas on ülekaalus punased puuviljad, mõnikord lisanduvad vürtside lõhnanüansid. Veinides on elegantseid tanniine, mis annavad veinidele pehme ja õrna maitse, mida iseloomustab teatav värskus.

Üldised analüütilised omadused
Maksimaalne üldalkoholisisaldus (mahuprotsentides)
Minimaalne tegelik alkoholisisaldus (mahuprotsentides)
Minimaalne üldhappesus
Maksimaalne lenduvate hapete sisaldus (milliekvivalentides liitri kohta)
Maksimaalne vääveldioksiidi kogusisaldus (milligrammides liitri kohta):

Valged veinid

Tegemist on vaiksete valgete veinidega

Veinide analüütilised omadused on järgmised:

—	minimaalne naturaalne alkoholisisaldus mahuprotsentides: valged veinid 11,5 %

—	minimaalne üldalkoholisisaldus mahuprotsentides: valged veinid 13,5 %

—	üldhappesus: valged veinid 57,1–112,3 milliekvivalenti liitri kohta

—	fermenteeritava suhkru (glükoos, fruktoos) sisaldus: valged veinid 20–40 grammi liitri kohta.

Valgetel veinidel, mille kollane värvus annab tunnistust nende lopsakusest, on üldiselt intensiivsed lõhna- ja maitseomadused, mis meenutavad küpseid või eksootilisi puuvilju. Analüütilisi omadusi hõlmavad eeskirjad tagavad üldjuhul nende veinide maitse tasakaalustatuse ning fermenteeritavast suhkrust saadava täidluse, mida tasakaalustab Loire’i piirkonna veinidele iseloomulik värskus.

Üldised analüütilised omadused
Maksimaalne üldalkoholisisaldus (mahuprotsentides)
Minimaalne tegelik alkoholisisaldus (mahuprotsentides)	10
Minimaalne üldhappesus
Maksimaalne lenduvate hapete sisaldus (milliekvivalentides liitri kohta)	13,3
Maksimaalne vääveldioksiidi kogusisaldus (milligrammides liitri kohta):

Roosad veinid

Tegemist on vaiksete roosade veinidega

Veinide analüütilised omadused on järgmised:

—	minimaalne naturaalne alkoholisisaldus mahuprotsentides: roosad veinid 10 %

—	minimaalne üldalkoholisisaldus mahuprotsentides: roosad veinid 12 %

—	üldhappesus: roosad veinid 57,1–102,1 milliekvivalenti liitri kohta

—	maksimaalne lenduvate hapete sisaldus: roosad veinid 10,2 milliekvivalenti liitri kohta

—	fermenteeritava suhkru (glükoos, fruktoos) sisaldus: roosad veinid kuni 4 grammi liitri kohta.

Roosade veinide üldhappesus, vääveldioksiidi kogusisaldus ja üldalkoholisisaldus vastavad liidu eeskirjadega sätestatud väärtustele.

Üldised analüütilised omadused
Maksimaalne üldalkoholisisaldus (mahuprotsentides)
Minimaalne tegelik alkoholisisaldus (mahuprotsentides)
Minimaalne üldhappesus
Maksimaalne lenduvate hapete sisaldus (milliekvivalentides liitri kohta)
Maksimaalne vääveldioksiidi kogusisaldus (milligrammides liitri kohta):

5. Veinivalmistustavad

a. Peamised veinivalmistustavad

Viljelustavad

Puude minimaalne istutustihedus on 6 000 tüve hektari kohta.

Viinapuude ridade vahekaugus võib olla kuni 1,60 meetrit ning viinapuude tüvede vaheline vahemaa samas reas võib olla 0,90–1,10 meetrit.

Viinapuude lõikamisel jäetakse tüve kohta kuni 12 punga, kasutada võib järgmisi tehnikaid:

—	lühikeseks lõikamine (Royat nöörpuu vorm, lehtrikujuline lõikus (gobelet), lehvikukujuline lõikus (éventail);

—	tavaline Guyot’ lõikus.

Viljapuude lõikamine peab olema lõppenud koristusaasta 31. maiks.

Õite väljakujunemise etapis võib sama aasta viljavõrseid tüve kohta olla kuni 10.

Veinivalmistuse eritavad

Roosade veinide puhul on aktiivsöe kasutamine veini valmistamisel nii puhtal kujul kui ka seguna keelatud.

Punase veini puhul on lubatud kasutada subtraktiivseid rikastamismeetodeid ja maksimaalne osalise kontsentratsiooni määr kasutatud koguste suhtes on 10 %.

Pärast rikastamist ei tohi veinide alkoholisisaldus ületada järgmisi mahuprotsente: valged veinid 13,5 %, roosad veinid 12 %, punased veinid 12,5 %.

Lisaks eespool esitatud sätetele tuleb veinivalmistustavade puhul kinni pidada liidu tasandi ning maaseadustiku ja merekalapüügi seadustiku (code rural et de la pêche maritime) sätetest.

b. Maksimaalne saagikus

Valged veinid

55 hektoliitrit hektari kohta

Punased ja roosad veinid

66 hektoliitrit hektari kohta

6. Määratletud Geograafiline Piirkond

Kõik tootmise etapid toimuvad geograafilises piirkonnas, mille riiklik päritolu- ja kvaliteediinstituut (Institut national de l’origine et de la qualité) kiitis heaks pädeva riikliku komitee 28. septembri 2011. aasta koosolekul. Piirkond hõlmab selle tootespetsifikaadi pädeva riikliku komitee poolse kinnitamise kuupäeva seisuga ja lähtuvalt 2018. aasta ametlikest geograafilistest koodidest järgmiste kommuunide territooriume:

—

—	Maine-et-Loire’i departemang: Mauges-sur-Loire (ainult La Chapelle-Saint-Florent’i delegeeritud kommuuni territoorium), Orée d’Anjou (ainult Bouzillé, Champtoceaux’, Draini, Landemont’i, Liré ja La Varenne’i delegeeritud kommuunide territoorium).

7. Peamised veiniviinamarjasordid

„Gamay N“

„Pinot gris G“

8. Seos(T)E Kirjeldus

Seost väljendavate looduslike tegurite kirjeldus

Geograafiline piirkond asub Loire’i jõe mõlemal kaldal, Nantes’i ja Angers’ linna vahel poole peal. Viinapuud on istutatud peamiselt kallakutele, mis piirnevad vahetult jõega, mõnikord ka kõrvalolevate orgude veergudele. Viinapuud kasvavad peamiselt 20–80 meetri kõrgustel mäenõlvadel, mis eristuvad selgelt ümbritsevatest platoodest, kus tegeldakse peamiselt mitmekultuurilise põllumajanduse ja loomakasvatusega. Geograafiline piirkond paikneb Ancenis’ kommuuni ümber ja hõlmab Loire-Atlantique’i ja Maine-et-Loire’i departemangude 16 kommuuni territooriumi.

Viinamarjaistandused asuvad Armorikaani mäemassiivi vanadel moondekivimi formatsioonidel, mis koosnevad peamiselt kiltkivist, vilkkiltkivist ja gneissist. Nendest kõvadest aluskivimitest on moodustunud ränimullad, mis sisaldavad sageli klibu; mäekülgedel on mullad Loire’i jõe põhjustatud omaaegse erosiooni tõttu väga õhukesed. Vastavalt kehtivatele tavadele klassifitseeritakse maatükke, mis on ette nähtud viinamarjade tootmiseks, rangelt selle alusel, kas nad asuvad mäenõlvadel, kus peamine traditsiooniline kultuur ongi viinapuu; neil kasvatusaladel on puhtad väikese sügavusega mullad vähese veevaru ja mõõduka viljakusega. Mullastik kuivab ja soojeneb kiiresti.

Geograafilises piirkonnas on mõõdukas ookeaniline kliima, Loire’i jõgi kannab merekliima mõjutusi edasi sisemaale, seda enam, et Ancenis’ piirkonnas kulgeb jõgi valdavate tuultega samas suunas. Aasta keskmine õhutemperatuur on ligikaudu 11,5 °C, talved on pehmed ja suved jahedad. Aastane sademehulk on ligikaudu 700 millimeetrit, sademed jagunevad aasta ringi ühtlaselt, siiski võib suvel esineda veepuudust. Geograafilises piirkonnas on sügise alguses sageli tuuline ja kuiv periood, see jääb tavaliselt pööripäeva eelsete suurte meretõusude aega.

Seost väljendavate inimtegurite kirjeldus

Juba väga ammustel aegadel tekkinud viinamarjakasvatus levis eeskätt Ancenis’ piirkonnas alates XI sajandist, kui Loire’i jõe äärde tekkis mitu väikest kloostrit. Viinamarjadega seotud toodete pealt tasutud maksud annavad tunnistust aktiivsest viinamarjakasvatusest jõe kallastel juba keskajal. Peagi muutus Ancenis’ sadam piirkonna oluliseks veinide kaubandus- ja transpordikeskuseks. 1573. aastal andis kuningas Charles IX loa asutada neli gurmeeveinide kaubakeskust Ancenis’ sadamasse, 1584. aastal suurenes nende arv kümneni ja Louis XVI ajal oli linnas pidevalt paarkümmend laeva, mis olid seotud veinikaubandusega.

Alates XVII sajandist suurendati Ancenis’ viinamarjakasvatusaladel valgete magusate veinide tootmist, võttes kasutusele viinamarjasordi ‛Pinot gris G’. Sellest sordist saadava veini kohta hakati järk-järgult kasutama nimetust „Malvoisie“. Teised viinamarjasordid ilmusid hiljem, näiteks sort ‛Gamay N’ võeti kasutusele XIX sajandi keskel. See oli veinikaubanduse kõrghetk, veine saadeti Orléans’i kaudu Pariisi ja Põhja-Euroopasse ning Nantes’i turu kaudu Bretagne’i.

Pärast viinapuutäide põhjustatud kriisi ehitati viinamarjaistandused uuesti üles ning võeti lõplikult kasutusele viinamarjasordid ja viljelusmeetodid, mis on kasutusel tänapäevani, eeskätt hõlmasid need istutustihedust 6 000–7 000 tüvega hektari kohta. Kuivade roosade veinide ja punaste veinide tootmine hakkas domineerima valgete magusate „Malvoisie“ veinide üle. 1907. aastal asutati Ancenis’ ringkonna viinamarjakasvatajate ametkondlik ühendus, mis annab tunnistust kohaliku viinamarjakasvatuse arengust. Pärast Teist maailmasõda tootjate kehtestatud tootmiseeskirjad võimaldasid 1954. aastal tunnustada kvaliteetveini „Coteaux d’Ancenis“ päritolunimetusega veinina.

2009. aasta seisuga hõlmasid viinamarjaistandused 180 hektarit. Seal tegutses ligikaudu kolmkümmend viinamarjakasvatajat, kelle aastane toodang ületas 10 000 hektoliitrit, millest 45 % moodustasid roosad veinid, 38 % punased veinid ja 17 % valged veinid. Valgetel veinidel, mille kollane värvus annab tunnistust nende lopsakusest, on üldiselt intensiivsed lõhna- ja maitseomadused, mis meenutavad küpseid või eksootilisi puuvilju. Analüütilisi omadusi hõlmavad eeskirjad tagavad üldjuhul nende veinide maitse tasakaalustatuse ning fermenteeritavast suhkrust saadava täidluse, mida tasakaalustab Loire’i piirkonna veinidele iseloomulik värskus.

Punastel veinidel on kirgas värvus, mis varieerub kirsipunasest granaatpunaseni. Veinide lõhnas domineerivad punased puuviljad, mõnikord lisanduvad vürtside lõhnanüansid. Veinides on elegantseid tanniine, mis annavad veinidele pehme ja õrna maitse, mida iseloomustab teatav värskus.

Roosad veinid on kirkad, nende värvus varieerub kahvaturoosast lõheroosani. Nende peenekoelised ja diskreetsed lõhna- ning maitseomadused on värsked ja hõlmavad üldjuhul puuviljalisi nüansse. Maitseomaduste poolest on nendele veinidele iseloomulik kergus ja värskus, samuti on neis teatavat erksust. Geograafilises piirkonnas, mis asub Nantes’i piirkonna ja Angers’ piirkonna viinamarjaistanduste vahel ning olulise ühendustee, Loire’i jõe ääres, suutsid veinide „Coteaux d’Ancenis“ tootjad seda kahekordset mõju ära kasutada ning töötasid välja tehnoloogilised meetodid looduskeskkonnaga kohandatud tootmiseks.

Geograafilises piirkonnas asuvatel mäekülgedel, mis on moodustunud Armorikaani mäemassiivi moondekivimitest Loire’i jõe toimel, on enamasti hästi soojenev ja kiiresti kuivav mullastik ning piiratud veevarud, mis soodustavad viinamarja küpsemist; see asjaolu tingis juba keskajal kaubandusliku viinamarjakasvatuse tekke. Kuigi geograafilise piirkonna kliima on ookeani mõjutustega, on kliima eripäraks tihti suve lõpus ja sügise alguses esinevad tuulised ja kuivad perioodid. Kui võtta veel ka arvesse Loire’i jõe kallaste avatud maastikku selgitab see suurel määral, miks hakkas piirkonnas arenema just punaste ja roosade veinide tootmine. Viinamarjakasvatusalade väheviljakas ja happeline mullastik sobib eriti hästi viinamarjasordi ‛Gamay N’ kasvatamiseks, piirates selle sordi puhul täheldatud liigset jõulisust, ning see selgitab, miks kõnealune sort, mis võeti kasutusele küllaltki hilja, on tõrjunud välja teised tumeda viinamarja sordid. Viinamarjaistanduste haldamine kohandatud meetoditega ja saagikuse piiramine võimaldavad punastel veinidel saavutada kõik oma maitse- ja lõhnaomadused ning annavad roosadele veinidele õrna puuviljalise maitsenüansi.

Kliima võimaldab valmistada ka valgeid magusaid veine, mille jaoks kasutatakse täisküpselt koristatud viinamarju. Kliima on samuti soodustanud õrna viinamarjasordi ‛Pinot gris G’ kohanemist. Geograafilise piirkonna suvised mahedad temperatuurid on oluline tegur selle sordi peenekoeliste lõhna- ja maitseomaduste säilimiseks, jahedus piirab viinamarjades sisalduvate orgaaniliste hapete lagunemist ja tagab veinidele iseloomuliku värskuse. Neid veine kutsutakse kohapeal nimega „Malvoisie“ ning tegemist on kohaliku veinikultuuri pärandi tuntuima tootega.

Tootjad, kes moodustasid ametiühenduse XX sajandi alguses, on pidevalt parandanud oma toodangu kvaliteeti. Nimetuse „Coteaux d’Ancenis“ tunnustamisega kontrollitud päritolunimetusena kaasnes viinamarjakasvatusalade koondumine kõige sobivamatele mäekülgedele, sortide piiramine kahe viinamarjasordiga, milleks on ‛Gamay N’ ja ‛Pinot gris G’, ning tootmiseeskirjade karmistamine; kõik need sammud võimaldavad tagada tulevikus nende veinide tüüpiliste omaduste veelgi parema säilimise.

9. Olulised lisatingimused (pakendamine, märgistamine, muud nõuded)

Õigusraamistik:

riiklikud õigusaktid

Lisatingimuse liik:

määratletud geograafilises piirkonnas tootmisega seonduv erand

Tingimuse kirjeldus

Vahetus läheduses asuv piirkond, mille suhtes kohaldatakse viinamarjade pressimise ning veini valmistamise erandit, hõlmab järgmiste kommuunide territooriumi 2018. aasta ametlike geograafiliste koodide alusel:

—	Loire-Atlantique’i departemang: La Boissière-du-Doré, La Chapelle-Heulin, Divatte-sur-Loire (ainult Chapelle-Basse-Meri delegeeritud kommuuni territoorium), Gorges, Haute-Goulaine, Le Landreau, Le Loroux-Bottereau, Maisdon-sur-Sèvre, Mouzillon, La Remaudière, Saint-Julien-de-Concelles, Vallet.

—

Õigusraamistik:

riiklikud õigusaktid

Lisatingimuse liik:

märgistamisega seotud lisasätted

Tingimuse kirjeldus:

Kontrollitud päritolunimetusele võib lisada täiendava geograafilise nimetuse „Val de Loire“ vastavalt tootespetsifikaadis selle geograafilise tähise kohta sätestatud eeskirjadele.

Kontrollitud päritolunimetusele võib lisada täiendava kasutusnime „Malvoisie“ vastavalt tootespetsifikaadis selle geograafilise tähise kohta sätestatud eeskirjadele. Seda nimetust kasutatakse ainult vaiksete valgete veinide puhul.

Kõik vabatahtlikud märked, mille kasutamist võivad liidu sätete alusel reguleerida liikmesriigid, kantakse märgisele tähtedega, mille kõrgus, laius ja paksus ei ole üle kahe korra suuremad kui kontrollitud päritolunimetuse nime moodustavad tähed.

Täiendava geograafilise nimetuse „Val de Loire“ ja kasutuses oleva nime „Malvoisie“ tähed ei või olla kõrgemad, laiemad või paksemad kui kaks kolmandikku märgisel esitatud kontrollitud päritolunimetuse tähtedest.

Õigusraamistik:

riiklikud õigusaktid

Lisatingimuse liik:

märgistamisega seotud lisasätted

Tingimuse kirjeldus

Kaitstud päritolunimetusega veinide märgistusel võib esitada väiksema geograafilise piirkonna nimetuse, kui kõnealune piirkond on

—	kantud katastrisse,

—	märgitud saagideklaratsioonile.

Link tootespetsifikaadile

https://info.agriculture.gouv.fr/gedei/site/bo-agri/document_administratif-0569c539-0b4c-4402-9b68-c63cca20f36f

(1) EÜT L 9, 11.1.2019, lk 2.

		ISSN 1977-0898
Euroopa Liidu Teataja		C 40

Eestikeelne väljaanne	Teave ja teatised	63. aastakäik 6. veebruar 2020

Sisukord		Lehekülg
	IV Teave
	TEAVE EUROOPA LIIDU INSTITUTSIOONIDELT, ORGANITELT JA ASUTUSTELT
	Euroopa Komisjon
2020/C 40/01	Euro vahetuskurss — 5. veebruar 2020	1
	EUROOPA MAJANDUSPIIRKONDA KÄSITLEV TEAVE
	EFTA järelevalveamet
2020/C 40/02	4. detsembri 2019. aasta otsus nr 085/19/COL algatada ametlik uurimine seoses võimaliku riigiabi andmisega kontsernile Remiks Group seoses jäätmekäitlusteenustega (juhtum 84370) Kutse märkuste esitamiseks vastavalt EFTA riikide vahel järelevalveameti ja kohtu asutamise kohta sõlmitud lepingu riigiabi käsitleva protokolli nr 3 I osa artikli 1 lõikele 2	2
2020/C 40/03	5. detsembril 2019. aasta otsus nr 86/19/COL algatada ametlik uurimine seoses väidetava riigiabi andmisega ettevõtjale Gagnaveita Reykjavíkur Kutse märkuste esitamiseks vastavalt EFTA riikide vahel järelevalveameti ja kohtu asutamise kohta sõlmitud lepingu riigiabi käsitleva protokolli nr 3 I osa artikli 1 lõikele 2	16

	V Teated
	KOHTUMENETLUSED
	EFTA kohus
2020/C 40/04	Efta Kohus Kohtuotsus, 13. november 2019, kohtuasjas E-2/19	33
	ÜHISE KAUBANDUSPOLIITIKA RAKENDAMISEGA SEOTUD MENETLUSED
	Euroopa Komisjon
2020/C 40/05	Teade teatavate dumpinguvastaste meetmete eelseisva aegumise kohta	34
	KONKURENTSIPOLIITIKA RAKENDAMISEGA SEOTUD MENETLUSED
	Euroopa Komisjon
2020/C 40/06	Eelteatis koondumise kohta (Juhtum M.9714 — Viacom/beIN/Miramax) Võimalik lihtsustatud korras menetlemine ( 1 )	35
2020/C 40/07	Eelteatis koondumise kohta (Juhtum M.9719 — Fairfax Financial Holdings Limited/OMERS Administration Corporation/Riverstone Barbados Limited) Võimalik lihtsustatud korras menetlemine ( 1 )	37
	MUUD AKTID
	Euroopa Komisjon
2020/C 40/08	Teate avaldamine veinisektoris kasutatava nimetuse tootespetsifikaadi standardmuudatuse heakskiitmise kohta vastavalt komisjoni aasta delegeeritud määruse (EL) 2019/33 artikli 17 lõigetele 2 ja 3	38
2020/C 40/09	Teatis ettevõtjatele, kes kavatsevad 2021. aastal fluorosüsivesinikke mahtkaubana Euroopa Liidu turule lasta	47

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	(1) EMPs kohaldatav tekst