ORDER OF THE COURT (Tenth Chamber)

22 April 2020 (*)

(Taxation of costs)

In Case C‑691/15 P-DEP,

APPLICATION for taxation of recoverable costs under Article 145 of the Rules of Procedure of the Court, brought on 20 June 2019,

Bilbaína de Alquitranes SA, established in Luchana-Baracaldo (Spain),

Deza a.s., established in Valašské Meziříčí (Czech Republic),

Industrial Química del Nalón SA, established in Oviedo (Spain),

Koppers Denmark A/S, established in Nyborg (Denmark),

Koppers UK Ltd, established in Scunthorpe (United Kingdom),

Koppers Netherlands BV, established in Uithoorn (Netherlands),

Rütgers Germany GmbH, formerly Rütgers Basic Aromatics GmbH, established in Castrop-Rauxel (Germany),

Rain Carbon BVBA, formerly Rütgers Belgium NV, established in Zlezate (Belgium),

Rütgers Poland sp. z o.o., established in Kędzierzyn-Koźle (Poland),

Bawtry Carbon International Ltd, established in Doncaster (United Kingdom),

Grupo Ferroatlántica SA, established in Madrid (Spain),

Showa Denko Carbon Products Germany GmbH & Co. KG., established in Meitingen (Germany),

Showa Denko Carbon Austria GmbH, established in Bad Goisern am Hallstättersee (Austria),

SGL Carbon SAS, established in Passy (France),

Showa Denko Carbon Spain SA, established in La Coruña (Spain),

COBEX Polska sp. z o.o., established in Raciborz (Poland),

ThyssenKrupp Steel Europe AG, established in Duisburg (Germany),

Tokai erftcarbon GmbH, established in Grevenbroich (Germany),

represented by K. Van Maldegem, P. Sellar, M. Grunchard and S. Saez Moreno, avocats,

appellants,

v

European Commission, represented by M. Wilderspin, R. Lindenthal and K. Talabér-Ritz, acting as Agents,

respondent,

THE COURT (Tenth Chamber),

composed of I. Jarukaitis, President of Chamber, E. Regan (Rapporteur), President of the Fifth Chamber, and E. Juhász, Judge,

Advocate General: M. Bobek,

Registrar: A. Calot Escobar,

having regard to the written procedure,

having decided, after hearing the Advocate General, to proceed to judgment without an Opinion,

makes the following

Order

1        This case concerns the taxation of the costs incurred by Bilbaína de Alquitranes SA,  Deza a.s., Industrial Química del Nalón SA,  Koppers Denmark A/S,  Koppers UK Ltd,  Koppers Netherlands BV,  Rütgers Germany GmbH,  Rain Carbon BVBA,  Rütgers Poland sp. z o.o.,  Bawtry Carbon International Ltd,  Grupo Ferroatlántica SA,  Showa Denko Carbon Products Germany GmbH & Co. KG,  Showa Denko Carbon Austria GmbH,  SGL Carbon SAS, Showa Denko Carbon Spain SA,  COBEX Polska sp. z o.o.,  ThyssenKrupp Steel Europe AG  and  Tokai erftcarbon GmbH in Cases C‑691/15 P and C‑691/15 P-R.

2        By an appeal lodged on 17 December 2015, under Article 56 of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union, the European Commission sought to have set aside the judgment of the General Court of the European Union of 7 October 2015, Bilbaína de Alquitranes and Others v Commission (T‑689/13, not published, EU:T:2015:767; ‘the judgment under appeal’), by which the General Court annulled Commission Regulation (EU) No 944/2013 of 2 October 2013 amending, for the purposes of its adaptation to technical and scientific progress, Regulation (EC) No 1272/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council on classification, labelling and packaging of substances and mixtures (OJ 2013 L 261, p. 5; ‘the regulation at issue’) in so far as it classifies pitch, coal tar, high-temperature (EC No 266-028-2; ‘CTPHT’) as an Aquatic Acute 1 (H400) and Aquatic Chronic 1 (H410) substance.

3        By its order of 7 July 2016, Commission v Bilbaína de Alquitranes and Others (C‑691/15 P-R, not published, EU:C:2016:597), the Vice-President of the Court dismissed the application for interim measures brought by the respondents on 24 March 2016, which sought, in essence, the suspension of the effects of the regulation at issue, and reserved the costs. By its judgment of 22 November 2017, Commission v Bilbaína de Alquitranes and Others (C‑691/15 P, EU:C:2017:882), the Court dismissed that appeal and ordered the Commission to pay the costs incurred by the appellants.

4        Since no agreement has been reached between the appellants and the Commission on the amount of recoverable costs relating to the appeal and the interlocutory proceedings, the appellants have lodged the present application. The appellants made a similar application to the General Court for recovery of the costs incurred in the case that gave rise to the judgment of the General Court of 7 October 2015, Bilbaína de Alquitranes and Others v Commission (T‑689/13, not published, EU:T:2015:767).

 Forms of order sought

5        The appellants request the Court to set the amount of recoverable costs in Cases C‑691/15 P and C‑691/15 P-R at EUR 94 116.91 and to order the Commission to pay them the sum of EUR 20 000 in respect of the costs of the present proceedings, together with default interest from the date of service of the present order.

6        The Commission contends that the Court should dismiss the appellants’ claim for costs and set the recoverable costs at the amount of EUR 20 000 or, in any event, at an amount lower than that which the Commission had proposed both in its letter of 20 July 2018, namely EUR 84 500 for all three cases before the Court of Justice and the General Court, and orally during the amicable settlement negotiations, during which it had proposed payment of the sum of EUR 100 000 in respect of those three cases.

 Arguments of the parties

7        As regards, in the first place, the costs incurred in respect of the proceedings before the Court of Justice in Cases C‑691/15 P and C‑691/15 P-R, the appellants submit, first, that the Commission put forward, in support of its appeal, three grounds relating to points of law and alleged a manifest distortion of the evidence. They submit that, by its second ground of appeal, the Commission raised delicate questions requiring a review of the technical and scientific aspects concerning the actual use of the summation method for the purpose of determining the toxicity category to which CTPHT belongs and its correct application to the present case. The appellants state that although the Court held, in its judgment of 22 November 2017, Commission v Bilbaína de Alquitranes and Others (C‑691/15 P, EU:C:2017:882), that the question raised, in the context of that second ground of appeal, could be resolved relatively simply by the application of the rule of law, the fact remained that the Commission’s line of argument in that regard was complex.

8        Second, the application for interim measures made in the context of the appeal also presented difficulties. Those difficulties relate, on the one hand, to the identification and presentation of the economic and financial consequences for the appellants of the unlawfulness of the classification of CTPHT as an Aquatic Acute 1 and Aquatic Chronic 1 substance and, on the other, to the establishment of the causal link between that classification and the resulting consequences for the appellants. They maintain that they were required, to that end, to examine a number of European sets of rules. The appellants also argue that, in addition to the complex nature of the application for interim measures, there was the relative novelty and rarity of the submission of such an application in the context of an appeal brought by the Commission in the field of environmental law.

9        Third, the judgment of 22 November 2017, Commission v Bilbaína de Alquitranes and Others (C‑691/15 P, EU:C:2017:882), has a certain legal significance, since the legal and practical consequences of classifying a chemical substance go beyond the territorial framework of the European Union.

10      Fourth, the financial loss to the appellants as a result of the unlawfulness of the classification of CTPHT is evidenced by the actions for compensation which they have recently brought before the General Court and the significant sums which they have claimed.

11      In that regard, they state that they have a substantial interest in the determination, by the EU Courts, of the correct manner in which the summation method is to be applied, in respect of which the Commission has a global discretion, in so far as that method is also applied to substances other than CTPHT which they manufacture and which they market.

12      As regards, fifth, the amount of work generated by the appeal and the interlocutory proceedings, the appellants claim that they submitted a 21-page response to the Commission’s appeal, which was supported by three interveners all having submitted observations on the merits to which the appellants were permitted to respond. They point out that that case was also the subject of a hearing before the Court.

13      They state that 354.6 hours of work were devoted to the interlocutory proceedings and to the main proceedings, allocated fairly and economically among the various lawyers involved. The main part of the work was carried out by lawyers at an intermediate level, with the involvement of the partners being limited to what was strictly necessary. The most significant expenses are connected with the use of an external lawyer, which is fully justified by reason of the difficulty and complexity of the case and its importance to the appellants. Recourse to such external advice is a common practice, in particular for the Commission and the European Chemicals Agency (ECHA) when intervening before the Court.

14      The appellants rely in that regard on the case-law of the Court, in particular the order of 16 May 2013, Deoleo v Aceites del Sur-Coosur (C‑498/07 P-DEP, not published, EU:C:2013:302, paragraph 28), from which it is apparent that, in order to set the amount of recoverable costs, it is necessary to take account of the total number of hours of work which may appear to be objectively necessary for the purpose of the proceedings, irrespective of the number of lawyers between whom they may have been allocated.

15      In addition, both the communications between lawyers and the appellants and the internal discussions between the lawyers involved in those proceedings and the administrative costs relating to the non-legal work in the context of those proceedings were essential to the preparation thereof.

16      Sixth, they claim that the lawyers’ fees of which they seek the reimbursement by the Commission are based on an average hourly rate of EUR 246. The appellants point out that the Court has accepted a high hourly rate where the lawyers are particularly experienced professionals. The appellants claim in particular that, in comparison with the fees charged by law firms of a similar size, the average hourly rates charged by their lawyers are in the low range. The costs claimed are also comparable to the costs previously granted by the Court to undertakings in similar taxation cases, in particular in view of the number of appellants concerned and the complexity of the case.

17      Finally, by way of lawyers’ disbursements, the appellants claim that the holding of the hearing gave rise, on account of the presence of Mr Sellar, assisted by Ms Grunchard, to travel expenses and, in view of the time spent at that hearing, to accommodation expenses.

18      In the second place, as regards the costs incurred in connection with the present taxation of costs proceedings, the appellants point out that the Court must rule, in the order on taxation of costs, on all the recoverable costs, including the expenses necessarily incurred in relation to the taxation procedure itself, and take account of all the circumstances of the case up to the date of that order. They claim, in respect of the taxation procedure, the sum of EUR 20 000.

19      In the third place, the appellants also claim that the sum of recoverable costs should be subject to default interest, calculated on the basis of the rate applied by the European Central Bank (ECB) to its main refinancing operations in force on the first day of the month in which payment is due, increased by three and a half percentage points, from the date of service of the present order.

20      The Commission observes, as a preliminary point, that the costs actually incurred by the successful party are not all ‘recoverable costs’ within the meaning of Article 144 of the Rules of Procedure of the Court. In fact, the Court must make an unfettered assessment of the costs, taking into account the purpose and nature of the proceedings, its significance from the point of view of EU law, the difficulties presented by the case, the amount of work generated by the litigation for the agents or advisers involved and the financial interest which the parties had in the proceedings.

21      The Commission is also of the view that the Courts of the European Union are not empowered to tax the fees payable by the parties to their own lawyers, but may determine the amount of those fees to be recovered from the party ordered to pay the costs. Accordingly, not all the fees paid by the appellants to their lawyers are recoverable.

22      The Commission also contends that the appellants amended their claim, without justification, from EUR 227 900.35 to EUR 209 093.73 in respect of the proceedings before the Court of Justice and the General Court, to which is added EUR 45 000 for the three proceedings relating to the taxation of costs.

23      As regards the recovery of costs in Cases C‑691/15 P and C‑691/15 P-R, the Commission argues, first, that the complexity of the case, in the context of the present application, must be examined taking account of the fact that the appellants invoke the same complexity for the other two parallel proceedings concerning the taxation of costs before the General Court. However, the complexity of the case at the appeal stage is not particularly high, since the legal advisers dealing with the case, who were the same as those dealing with the case before the General Court, had already acquired sufficient knowledge of the case. In particular, the summation method had already been dealt with in detail at first instance in the judgment of 7 October 2015, Bilbaína de Alquitranes and Others v Commission (T‑689/13, not published, EU:T:2015:767). Moreover, the issues raised in the appeal, which were limited to points of law only, were not of the same complexity as issues developed in the case before the General Court. The same is true of the proceedings for interim relief, the purpose of which does not increase the complexity of the facts relied upon.

24      In that regard, the Commission considers that the complexity of the facts does not generally constitute, in itself, a justification for the amount of costs claimed. The appellants must show why the facts of the case, in comparison with those of other cases of the same type, were particularly complex.

25      The Commission is of the opinion, second, that the appellants have not put forward any legal argument to justify the objective importance of Case C‑691/15 P for EU law.

26      In addition, the Commission disputes the significance of that case. It submits that the summation method is not essential for EU legislation on chemicals, since it concerned only a limited point of law, restricted to Annex I to Regulation (EC) No 1272/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2008 on classification, labelling and packaging of substances and mixtures, amending and repealing Directives 67/548/EEC and 1999/45/EC, and amending Regulation (EC) No 1907/2006 (OJ 2008 L 353, p. 1).

27      Third, the Commission acknowledges that Cases C‑691/15 P and C‑691/15 P-R could have been of some financial interest for the appellants, which may have been induced to incur expenditure in order to comply with the obligations laid down in the regulation at issue. The Commission points out, however, that the appellants have brought actions for damages against the Commission specifically seeking compensation for the damage alleged in that regard.

28      Moreover, the appellants did not provide any information on their respective turnover which would have made it possible to prove the financial interest which they had in those cases.

29      Furthermore, since the appellants have also failed to specify which substances similar to CTPHT might have been concerned by those cases, it is not possible to determine whether other extensive financial interests may exist on that basis.

30      Fourth, the Commission regards the total number of hours declared by the appellants, corresponding to 354.6 hours, spent on both cases as ‘very excessive’, taking the view that it is not satisfactorily justified by the invoices provided by the appellants and that those invoices do not make it possible to identify the hours spent on each of the cases.

31      It states that, since its agents devoted a total of 160 hours of work for the three cases, it agrees to take 320 hours as the basis for its proposal for resolution in respect of those three cases. It is of the opinion that 20 hours of work may be taken into account in respect of the interlocutory order and 60 hours in respect of the main proceedings. The number of hours worked by the appellants is therefore manifestly excessive, as are the hourly rates claimed.

32      Furthermore, the participation of an expert partner should have had the effect of reducing the number of hours of the other participating lawyers. Similarly, the appellants’ legal advisers should have had a thorough knowledge of the case at the appeal stage, since they had already represented the appellants before the General Court and the effects of synergy between those various cases should have reduced preparation times. However, the appellants declared an equivalent number of hours for preparing the proceedings before the General Court and then before the Court of Justice.

33      The Commission also states that, since the three statements in intervention lodged in Case C‑691/15 P are to a large extent similar and do not exceed a total of 10 pages, they also do not justify the number of hours claimed by the appellants.

34      Fifth, the Commission considers that the remuneration of a single lawyer may be covered by the concept of ‘expenses necessarily incurred’ within the meaning of Article 144(b) of the Rules of Procedure. Allocating the work among several lawyers necessarily involves a duplication of effort, thereby risking needlessly increasing the costs. The appellants have not shown that the use of several categories of advisers would not have entailed any unnecessary duplication of those costs or that recourse to an external lawyer was essential in the light of the experience of the other lawyers.

35      Sixth, the appellants did not provide a clear description of the tasks included in the invoices or of certain items of expenditure. It is therefore impossible to ascertain whether those tasks are connected with work necessary for the proceedings before the Court and, consequently, gave rise to costs which are recoverable costs.

36      In that regard, the Commission observes that the appellants submitted the same invoices for the claims relating to Cases C‑691/15 P-DEP and T‑689/13 DEP, without drawing any distinction between the costs of each proceedings.

37      Lastly, the Commission submits that EUR 260 is sufficient to cover the travel expenses for each agent in a case. The sum of EUR 520 allows those costs to be covered for two lawyers for a hearing lasting part of a day.

 Findings of the Court

38      Under Article 144(b) of the Rules of Procedure, expenses necessarily incurred by the parties for the purpose of the proceedings, in particular the travel and subsistence expenses and the remuneration of agents, advisers or lawyers are regarded as recoverable costs.

39      It follows from the wording of that provision that the recoverable costs are limited, first, to those incurred for the purpose of the proceedings before the Court and, second, to those which were necessary for that purpose (order of 16 January 2020, Eulex Kosovo v Elitaliana, C‑439/13 P-DEP, not published, EU:C:2020:14, paragraph 12).

40      Furthermore, in fixing the recoverable costs, the Court takes account of all the circumstances of the case up to the delivery of the order on taxation of the costs, including the expenses necessarily incurred in relation to the taxation of costs proceedings (order of 19 December 2019, Unitec Bio and Others v Council, C‑602/16 P-DEP, not published, EU:C:2019:1148, paragraph 24).

41      Thus, in accordance with the Court’s settled case-law, the EU Court is authorised, not to tax the fees payable by the parties to their own lawyers, but to determine the amount up to which that remuneration may be recovered from the party ordered to pay the costs (order of 4 December 2019, PT Wilmar Bioenergi Indonesia and PT Wilmar Nabati Indonesia v Council, C‑603/16 P-DEP, not published, EU:C:2019:1040, paragraph 18).

42      In the absence of provisions of EU law laying down fee scales, the Court must make an unfettered assessment of the facts of the case, taking into account the purpose and nature of the proceedings, their significance from the point of view of EU law, the difficulties presented by them, the amount of work generated by the case for the agents or advisers involved and the financial interests which the parties had in the proceedings (order of 10 April 2019, Giant (China) v EBMA, C‑61/16 P-DEP, not published, EU:C:2019:298, paragraph 21).

43      The amount of the recoverable costs must be assessed in the light of those criteria.

44      In the first place, with regard to the subject matter and the nature of the dispute, it is appropriate to note that, as regards Case C‑691/15 P, the proceedings are appeal proceedings which are, by nature, limited to questions of law and do not concern themselves with findings as to the facts or the assessment of the facts of the dispute (order of 10 April 2019, Giant (China) v EBMA, C‑61/16 P-DEP, not published, EU:C:2019:298, paragraph 23).

45      In the second place, as regards the significance of the dispute from the point of view of EU law and the difficulties presented by the case, it must be noted that the appeal brought by the Commission sought to have set aside the judgment of the General Court of the European Union of 7 October 2015, Bilbaína de Alquitranes and Others v Commission (T‑689/13, not published, EU:T:2015:767), by which the General Court annulled the regulation at issue. By that regulation, the Commission had determined the classification of the mixture CTPHT as an Aquatic Acute 1 and Aquatic Chronic 1 substance on the basis of the summation method. In accordance with the rules for applying that method, defined in point 4.1.3.5.5 of Annex I to Regulation No 1272/2008, a mixture is to be classified as an Aquatic Acute 1 and Aquatic Chronic 1 substance if the sum of the concentrations of its components, classified in those categories and multiplied by a factor M which depends on the toxicity level of the component in question, is greater than or equal to 25%.

46      In support of its appeal, the Commission raised three grounds of appeal, alleging (i) breach of the obligation to state reasons, (ii) manifest error of assessment by the General Court and, (iii) infringement of the limits of judicial review and distortion of evidence.

47      The Court of Justice was thus called upon, in the context of the examination of the second ground of appeal, to assess the factors to be taken into account by the Commission in applying the summation method in order to determine whether a substance falls within the categories of acute and chronic toxicity to the aquatic environment.

48      It thus appears that, in addition to the fact that it formed part of a certain level of factual complexity on account of the scientific nature of the data relevant to the classification of the CTPHT mixture, the second ground of appeal raised a question of law which did not fall within the scope of a mere application of EU law, as interpreted by the Court, which, moreover, justified the holding of a hearing and the fact that the Court ruled with the benefit of an Opinion. Consequently, it cannot be disputed that that ground of appeal required an in-depth analysis (see, to that effect, order of 10 April 2019, Giant (China) v EBMA, C‑61/16 P-DEP, not published, EU:C:2019:298, paragraph 26).

49      In that regard, it must also be observed that three Member States have intervened in support of the Commission.

50      As regards, however, the first and third grounds of appeal, it is clear that they were not particularly complex.

51      As regards, in the third place, the amount of work carried out by the appellants’ lawyers, it must be borne in mind that, while, in principle, the remuneration of only one agent, adviser or lawyer is recoverable, it is possible that, depending on the individual circumstances and, most importantly, the complexity of each case, the fees of a number of lawyers may be considered ‘necessary expenses’ under Article 144(b) of the Rules of Procedure (order of 25 February 2016, Gamesa Eólica v Enercon, C‑35/14 P-DEP, not published, EU:C:2016:123, paragraph 22).

52      It follows that, when setting the amount of the recoverable costs, account must be taken of the total number of hours of work which may appear to be objectively necessary for the purpose of the proceedings, irrespective of the number of lawyers who carried out that work (order of 19 December 2019, Unitec Bio and Others v Council, C‑602/16 P-DEP, not published, EU:C:2019:1148, paragraph 35).

53      Thus, it must be examined whether the 354.6 working hours that the appellants’ advisers devoted to the defence of their clients in the appeal and interlocutory proceedings appear to have been ‘necessarily incurred … for the purpose of the proceedings’ within the meaning of Article 144(b) of the Rules of Procedure.

54      In that regard, it appears, in the light of the foregoing findings, that the drafting by the lawyers for the appellants of the response to the appeal lodged by the Commission, which was supported by three Member States, required an in-depth analysis of the second ground of appeal. In addition, it was necessary to prepare for the hearing before the Court in which the parties were invited to participate and, on that basis, to reply in writing, before and for the purpose of the hearing, to the questions posed by the Court. However, the view cannot be taken that the corresponding workload was particularly significant, since the drafting of that pleading and the answers to those questions required the examination of only a limited number of questions of law, even if they were part of a complex factual context.

55      Furthermore, lawyers whose services are, as in the present case, charged at an average hourly rate of EUR 246 must demonstrate high qualifications and greater experience and are assumed to handle the cases entrusted to them, including cases involving some complexity, efficiently and expeditiously. Accordingly, the taking into account of such a level of remuneration requires in return a strict assessment of the total number of hours of work necessary for the purposes of the proceedings concerned (see, to that effect, order of 26 September 2018, Viasat Broadcasting UK v TV2/Danmark, C‑660/15 P-DEP, not published, EU:C:2018:778, paragraph 34).

56      Furthermore, as regards, in particular, the interlocutory proceedings, it must be observed that, in such proceedings, the Court is not called upon to rule on the substance of the case and the pleas in law which the parties may put forward before it are limited.

57      Moreover, the extent of the work involved in bringing those proceedings must be assessed having regard, in particular, to the fact that the matters of fact and law on the basis of which those proceedings are brought are already subject to analysis by the same lawyers when drafting the response to the appeal lodged by the Commission.

58      It follows that the 354.6 hours of work performed by the lawyers instructed by appellants in the appeal and interlocutory proceedings do not appear, in their entirety, to have been ‘necessarily incurred … for the purpose of the proceedings’ within the meaning of Article 144(b) of the Rules of Procedure.

59      In the fourth place, as regards the parties’ financial interest in the proceedings, it should be noted that the appellants had a certain interest in the appeal brought by the Commission being dismissed. They either supplied CTPHT or used it for the production of aluminium, carbon, graphite, ferro-alloys or steel. Following the adoption and subsequent entry into force of the regulation at issue, the appellants were required to take measures to comply with the legal consequences of the classification of CTPHT as an Aquatic Acute 1 and Aquatic Chronic 1 substance. As a result, the present cases were of some economic importance to the appellants.

60      In the fifth place, as regards the sum of EUR 20 000 claimed by the appellants in respect of the conduct of the present taxation of costs proceedings, it must be noted that an application for taxation of costs is largely standardised and, in principle, does not present any difficulties (order of 19 December 2019, Unitec Bio and Others v Council, C‑602/16 P-DEP, not published, EU:C:2019:1148, paragraph 41).

61      The appellants’ financial claim appears, for that reason, to be disproportionate and cannot, at least in its entirety, be accepted as costs objectively necessary for the purpose of the present proceedings.

62      In the light of all the foregoing considerations, the costs recoverable by the appellants from the Commission in Cases C‑691/15 P and C‑691/15 P-R and those relating to the present taxation proceedings will be fairly assessed by setting their total amount at EUR 50 000, to which sum default interest will be added, from the date of service of the present order until the date of payment of the total amount due, at a rate equal to that applied by the ECB to its main refinancing operations in force on the first day of the month in which payment is due, increased by three and a half percentage points.

On those grounds, the Court (Tenth Chamber) hereby orders:

The total amount of costs which the European Commission shall pay to Bilbaína de Alquitranes SA, Deza a.s., Industrial Química del Nalón SA, Koppers Denmark A/S, Koppers UK Ltd, Koppers Netherlands BV, Rütgers Germany GmbH, Rain Carbon BVBA, Rütgers Poland sp. z o.o., Bawtry Carbon International Ltd, Grupo Ferroatlántica SA, Showa Denko Carbon Products Germany GmbH & Co. KG, Showa Denko Carbon Austria GmbH, SGL Carbon SAS, Showa Denko Carbon Spain SA, COBEX Polska sp. z o.o., ThyssenKrupp Steel Europe AG and Tokai erftcarbon GmbH in respect of Cases C‑691/15 P and C‑691/15 P-R is set at EUR 50 000, to which sum default interest shall be added, from the date of service of the present order until the date of payment of the total amount due, at a rate equal to that applied by the European Central Bank (ECB) to its main refinancing operations in force on the first day of the month in which payment is due, increased by three and a half percentage points.

Luxembourg, 22 April 2020.

*      Language of the case: English.