

IV

(Informaciones)

INFORMACIÓN PROCEDENTE DE LAS INSTITUCIONES, ÓRGANOS
Y ORGANISMOS DE LA UNIÓN EUROPEA

PARLAMENTO EUROPEO

PREGUNTAS ESCRITAS FORMULADAS CON SOLICITUD DE
RESPUESTA ESCRITA

Preguntas escritas formuladas por los diputados al Parlamento Europeo y las respuestas
de una de las instituciones de la Unión Europea

(2013/C 182 E/01)

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(Dansk udgave)

Forespørgsel til skriftlig besvarelse P-005921/12
til Kommissionen
Christel Schaldemose (S&D)
(13. juni 2012)

Om: Ændring af konklusioner i en rapport om mænds sundhed i Europa

Kommissionen har fået udarbejdet en rapport om status på mænds sundhed i Europa. I forbindelse med udarbejdelsen af rapporten har forfatterne oplevet, at Kommissionen har foretaget en slags censur af konklusionerne.

Rapporten undersøger forskellige aspekter af mænds sundhed. I det som Kommissionen kalder the »extended report« nævnes selvmord, skilsmisse, kondomer, homoseksualitet, bøsser/lesbiske, faderskab adskillige gange. I forfatterens eget resume er antallet af gange dette nævnes naturligvis beskåret forholdsvis. I det Kommissionen selv kalder for »rapporten«, er alle benævnelser af skilsmisse, kondomer, homoseksualitet, bøsser/lesbiske simpelthen ikke nævnt.

Med andre ord ser det ud som om, Kommissionen markant har ændret i rapportens konklusioner og helt udeladt at nævne centrale dele. Det giver ikke bare et misvisende billede af resultaterne i rapporten, det giver også indtryk af et bevist forsøg på at censurere konklusionerne. Ikke mindst fordi de konklusioner, der ikke nævnes, er emner som i visse lande stadig betragtes som tabu.

1. Kan Kommissionen forklare, hvad der her er sket?
2. Vil Kommissionen bruge rapporten, selv om konklusionerne ikke er dækkende?
3. Kan jeg få garanti for, at Kommissionen ikke har nogen politik om at undgå eller nedtone forskeres resultater?
4. Og kan Kommissionen svare på, hvad den vil gøre for at rette op på den skæve konklusion?

Svar afgivet på Kommissionens vegne af John Dalli
(4. juli 2012)

Kommissionen har offentliggjort rapporten »The State of Men's Health in Europe« (status over mænds sundhed i Europa) efter et udbud og råder over alle rettigheder til denne rapport, herunder samtlige ophavsrettigheder. Rapporten er blevet offentliggjort i en kort og en udvidet version. Tilsammen udgør disse en officiel rapport fra Kommissionen, og begge er offentligt tilgængelige ⁽¹⁾.

Kommissionen har offentliggjort rapporten i elektronisk format ⁽²⁾. Både den korte og den udvidede version er blevet trykt, og den udvidede version er desuden tilgængelig på cd-rom. Kommissionen omdeler de trykte kopier i forbindelse med arrangementer og har ligeledes tilsendt forfatterne trykte kopier. Ni måneder efter rapportens offentliggørelse er den udvidede version stadig fremhævet på Kommissionens websted ⁽³⁾.

I betragtning af længden og omfanget af den udvidede rapport (400 sider) var det passende at supplere dette lange dokument med en kortere version, som giver et overblik over sundhedsspørgsmål, der afspejler Kommissionens nuværende arbejdsområder. Efter Kommissionens opfattelse fortjener en række centrale emner at blive fremhævet som prioriteter, f.eks. risikofaktorer, som kan forebygges, adgang til sundhedstjenester, sundhedstilstand, hjerte-kar-sygdomme, overførbare sygdomme (herunder hiv/aids) og mental sundhed, som alle er vigtige sundhedsspørgsmål, der står centralt i den europæiske sundhedspolitik.

Den udvidede rapport, som Kommissionen har offentliggjort, indeholder samtlige oplysninger og emner, som blev behandlet af kontrahenten, og den er tilgængelig for alle, som måtte ønske at anvende den som kilde til den lange række af emner, der behandles heri. Kommissionen ser derfor ingen grund til at foretage en berigtigelse.

⁽¹⁾ http://ec.europa.eu/health/reports/publications/index_en.htm

⁽²⁾ http://ec.europa.eu/health/reports/publications/index_en.htm

⁽³⁾ http://ec.europa.eu/health/reports/european/index_en.htm

(English version)

**Question for written answer P-005921/12
to the Commission**

Christel Schaldemose (S&D)

(13 June 2012)

Subject: Change to conclusions in a report on men's health in Europe

The Commission has had a report prepared on the status of men's health in Europe. During the preparation of the report, the authors have found that the Commission has exercised a form of censorship of the conclusions.

The report investigates various aspects of men's health. In what the Commission calls the 'extended report', suicide, divorce, condoms, homosexuality, gays/lesbians and fatherhood are all mentioned several times. In the authors' own summary, the number of times these are mentioned is of course reduced proportionately. In what the Commission itself calls 'the report', all mentions of divorce, condoms, homosexuality and gays/lesbians are simply left out.

In other words, it looks as though the Commission has markedly changed the conclusions of the report and entirely omitted key elements. This not only gives a misleading picture of the results in the report, it also gives the impression of a deliberate attempt to censor the conclusions; not least because the conclusions that are not mentioned are subjects that in some countries are still considered taboo.

1. Can the Commission explain what has happened here?
2. Will the Commission use the report, even though the conclusions are not complete?
3. May I have a guarantee that the Commission does not have a policy of evading or toning down research results?
4. And can the Commission state what it will do to correct the unbalanced conclusion?

Answer given by Mr Dalli on behalf of the Commission

(4 July 2012)

The Commission published the report 'The State of Men's Health in Europe' following a call for tender, and holds all rights to it, including full copyright. The report has been published as a short and as an extended version. The two constitute the official Commission report and are both publicly available ⁽¹⁾.

The Commission made the report available electronically ⁽²⁾. It printed both short and extended reports, and also made the extended version available on CD-Rom. The Commission distributes the hard copies at events, and has also provided the authors with copies. Nine months after publishing the report, the extended version is still highlighted on the Commission's website ⁽³⁾.

Given the length and the broad scope of the extended report (400 pages), it was appropriate to accompany such a long document with a shorter report providing an overview of health issues which reflect current areas of work. In the Commission's view, a number of key issues merit being put forward as priorities, for example preventable risk factors, accessing health services, health status, cardio-vascular disease, cancer, communicable diseases (including HIV/AIDS) and mental health, which are all major health issues at the core of European health policy.

The extended report published by the Commission includes all data and topics which were covered by the contractor and is publicly available for reference on the broad range of issues covered. Thus the Commission does not see the need for any rectification.

⁽¹⁾ http://ec.europa.eu/health/reports/publications/index_en.htm

⁽²⁾ http://ec.europa.eu/health/reports/publications/index_en.htm

⁽³⁾ http://ec.europa.eu/health/reports/european/index_en.htm

(Nederlandse versie)

Vraag met verzoek om schriftelijk antwoord E-005922/12
aan de Commissie
Cornelis de Jong (GUE/NGL), Bas Eickhout (Verts/ALE), Judith A. Merkies (S&D)
en Keith Taylor (Verts/ALE)
 (13 juni 2012)

Betreft: Mogelijk uitstel van volledig verbod op handel in op dieren geteste cosmetica

De cosmeticarichtlijn van de EU heeft tot doel dierproeven geleidelijk af te schaffen. De richtlijn stelt een verbod in op het testen met behulp van dierproeven van cosmetische eindproducten (sinds 2004) en cosmetische ingrediënten (sinds 2009) en een verbod op de handel binnen de EU in cosmetische eindproducten en ingrediënten van cosmetische producten die buiten de EU met behulp van dierproeven zijn getest. Dit laatste handelsverbod geldt sinds 2009 voor alle effecten op de gezondheid van de mens, met uitzondering van toxiciteit bij herhaalde toediening, toxiciteit met betrekking tot de voortplanting en toxicokinetiek. Voor deze gezondheidseffecten zal het verbod gefaseerd worden ingevoerd, maar niet later dan uiterlijk 10 jaar na de inwerkingtreding van de richtlijn (11 maart 2013), ongeacht of er op dat moment alternatieve tests zonder dierproeven beschikbaar zijn ⁽¹⁾.

1. Vindt de Commissie niet ook dat afwijkingen in specifieke gevallen zouden kunnen leiden tot vertraging voor het volledig handelsverbod op producten die met behulp van dierproeven zijn getest, en dat zij met dit derde uitstel geloofwaardigheid verliest bij de burgers in Europa?
2. Gegeven het feit dat 80 tot 90 % van de ingrediënten een breder toepassingsgebied heeft dan alleen in cosmetische producten ⁽²⁾ en dat deze stoffen kunnen worden getest conform andere wetgeving, wetgeving inzake chemicaliën en farmaceutische producten bijvoorbeeld, zal het gebruik van deze ingrediënten in cosmetische producten dan vanaf 11 maart 2013 ook verboden zijn?
3. Aangezien toxicokinetiek een van de gezondheidseffecten is waarvoor volgens de genoemde wetenschappelijke studie in 2013 nog geen alternatieve methoden beschikbaar zullen zijn, terwijl microdosering een techniek is die onderzoek naar toxicokinetiek bij mensen mogelijk maakt en ook al wordt toegepast in de farmaceutische industrie en door bedrijven die contractonderzoek doen, kan de Commissie aangeven of, en zo ja hoe, nader onderzoek wordt gedaan naar microdosering als een mogelijk veelbelovende techniek voor onderzoek naar de toxicokinetische eigenschappen van stoffen die worden onderzocht ten behoeve van een mogelijk gebruik in cosmetische producten?

Antwoord van de heer Dalli namens de Commissie
 (22 augustus 2012)

De Commissie heeft nog geen formeel besluit genomen over haar handelen met betrekking tot artikel 4 bis, lid 2, onder 2.3, van Richtlijn 76/768/EEG ⁽³⁾, waarin haar wordt gevraagd een wetgevingsvoorstel in te dienen. Een van de opties die in de effectbeoordeling van de Commissie ⁽⁴⁾ aan de orde komen, is de omzettingsdatum in 2013 te handhaven, maar fabrikanten de mogelijkheid te bieden om per geval een afwijking onder strikte voorwaarden te vragen. Door afwijkingen toe te staan, wordt het verbod niet uitgesteld en is er geen sprake van een verlies van geloofwaardigheid. De uiterste termijn wordt gehandhaafd, terwijl de Europese burgers van geval tot geval de mogelijkheid wordt geboden toegang te krijgen tot innovatieve cosmetische producten met aanzienlijke voordelen.

De bepalingen van Richtlijn 76/768/EEG hebben ten doel te waarborgen dat het cosmetische gebruik van een stof geen aanleiding of reden is voor dierproeven. Wat tests betreft waarop andere wetgeving, zoals op chemisch of geneesmiddelengebied, van toepassing is, moeten stoffen die onder het toepassingsgebied van dergelijke wetgeving vallen, aan de eisen van die wetgeving voldoen, wat in bepaalde gevallen kan betekenen dat er ook dierproeven nodig zijn. Dergelijke proeven leiden niet tot een verbod op het in de handel brengen.

⁽¹⁾ http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/sectors/cosmetics/animal-testing/index_en.htm (toegang vanaf 15 april 2012)

⁽²⁾ Verslag over de ontwikkeling, de validering en de wettelijke erkenning van alternatieve methoden ter vervanging van dierproeven op het gebied van cosmetica (2008) — verslag van de Commissie aan het Europees Parlement en de Raad, Brussel, 16.9.2010, COM(2010)0480.

⁽³⁾ Richtlijn 76/768/EEG van de Raad betreffende de onderlinge aanpassing van de wetgevingen der lidstaten inzake cosmetische producten (PB L 262 van 27.9.1976, blz. 169).

⁽⁴⁾ Zie ook de antwoorden op de schriftelijke vragen E-00024/2011, E-00025/2011, P-00175/2011, E-00689/2011, E-00948/2011, E-010545/2011 en E-005016/2012: <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/QP-WEB>.

In het deskundigenverslag „Alternative (non-animal) methods for cosmetics testing: current status and future prospects — 2010” wordt diepgaand op microdosering ingegaan ⁽⁵⁾. De conclusie luidt dat microdosering op het gebied van cosmetische producten waarschijnlijk weinig toepassing zal vinden. In sommige gevallen kunnen microdoseringsgegevens voor geneesmiddelen wellicht van belang zijn voor de veiligheidsbeoordeling voor cosmetische producten. In de meeste gevallen zijn er evenwel in elk geval studies naar de toxiciteit voor dieren op korte termijn nodig voordat microdosering kan worden toegepast. Desalniettemin zal de Commissie de ontwikkelingen op dit gebied blijven volgen.

(5) Beschikbaar op de website van de Commissie: http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/sectors/cosmetics/documents/animal-testing/index_en.htm

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-005922/12
to the Commission**

**Cornelis de Jong (GUE/NGL), Bas Eickhout (Verts/ALE), Judith A. Merkies (S&D)
and Keith Taylor (Verts/ALE)**
(13 June 2012)

Subject: Possible postponement of complete trade ban on cosmetics tested on animals

The EU Cosmetics Directive aims to phase out animal testing. It established a prohibition on the testing of finished cosmetic products (since 2004) and cosmetic ingredients (since 2009) on animals and a prohibition on the marketing in the EU of finished cosmetic products and ingredients included in cosmetic products which were tested on animals outside the EU. The latter marketing ban applies since 2009 for all human health effects with the exceptions of repeated-dose toxicity, reproductive toxicity and toxicokinetics. For these health effects, the ban will apply step by step but with a maximum cut-off date of 10 years after the entry into force of the directive (11 March 2013), irrespective of the availability of alternative non-animal tests. ⁽¹⁾

1. Does the Commission agree that a case-by-case derogation would mean a delay in the complete marketing ban on animal testing, and that with this third delay the Commission will lose credibility with the citizens of Europe?
2. Given that 80-90% of the ingredients have a broader scope of application than cosmetics only ⁽²⁾ and that these substances can be tested under other legislation, for instance the legislation on chemicals and pharmaceuticals, will these ingredients also be banned for use in cosmetic products as of 11 March 2013?
3. Since toxicokinetics is one of the health effects for which no alternatives will be ready by 2013, according to the scientific review cited, while microdosing is a technique which enables research to be carried out on toxicokinetics in humans and is already in use in the pharmaceutical industry and in contract research companies, can the Commission state if, and if so how, microdosing is being investigated further as a possible promising technique for studying toxicokinetic features of substances which are under investigation for use in cosmetic products?

Answer given by Mr Dalli on behalf of the Commission

(22 August 2012)

The Commission has not yet taken any formal decision how to respond to Article 4a (2.3) of Directive 76/768/EEC ⁽³⁾ asking it to put forward a legislative proposal. One of the options considered in the Commission's impact assessment ⁽⁴⁾ is to maintain the 2013 implementation date, but to introduce the possibility for manufactures to request a case-by-case derogation under strict conditions. Such derogation would not delay the ban or lead to a loss of credibility. It would maintain the deadline while allowing, on a case-by-case basis, to permit European citizen's access to innovative cosmetics with significant benefits.

The provisions under Directive 76/768/EEC aim to ensure that no animal testing is triggered or motivated by the cosmetic use of a substance. As regards testing under other legislation, such as chemical or pharmaceuticals, substances used in cosmetics falling under the scope of such legislation have to comply with its requirements, which may in specific cases also require animal testing. Such testing will not trigger the marketing ban.

The micro dosing approach was thoroughly discussed in the expert report 'Alternative (non-animal) methods for cosmetics testing: current status and future prospects — 2010' ⁽⁵⁾. It concludes that micro dosing is likely to be of limited application in the cosmetics field. Micro dosing data from the pharmaceutical field could in some cases be of interest in the cosmetics safety assessment. However, in most cases, short-term animal toxicity studies are needed anyway before employing micro dosing. Nevertheless, the Commission will continue to follow the developments in this field.

⁽¹⁾ http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/sectors/cosmetics/animal-testing/index_en.htm (accessed on 15 April 2012)

⁽²⁾ Report on the Development, Validation and Legal Acceptance of Alternative Methods to Animal Tests in the Field of Cosmetics (2008) — report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council, Brussels, 16.9.2010, COM(2010)0480.

⁽³⁾ Council Directive 76/768/EEC on the approximation of the laws of the Member States relating to cosmetic products, OJ L 262, 27.9.1976, p. 169.

⁽⁴⁾ See also the answers to Written Questions E-00024/2011, E-00025/2011, P-00175/2011, E-00689/2011, E-00948/2011, E-010545/2011 and E-005016/2012: <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/QP-WEB>.

⁽⁵⁾ Available on the Commission website at: http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/sectors/cosmetics/documents/animal-testing/index_en.htm

(Versione italiana)

Interrogazione con richiesta di risposta scritta E-005923/12

alla Commissione

Andrea Zanoni (ALDE)

(13 giugno 2012)

Oggetto: Grave persistenza del fenomeno dell'avvelenamento doloso di animali selvatici e domestici tramite esche e bocconi avvelenati in Italia e nell'Unione europea

In Italia il fenomeno della disseminazione di esche avvelenate nell'ambiente è ancora oggi molto diffuso, con conseguente morte di animali selvatici tutelati dalle vigenti normative europee. Fino a qualche decina di anni fa, le associazioni di cacciatori organizzavano la distribuzione sistematica e programmata dei bocconi avvelenati sul territorio, al fine di eliminare i cosiddetti «animali nocivi» (volpi, tassi, corvidi e rapaci). Nonostante il divieto di utilizzo di esche avvelenate introdotto dalle direttive Uccelli e Habitat e dalla legge 157/92, questa pratica non ha mai smesso di esistere ed è proprio nei primi mesi dell'anno, a seguito della chiusura della stagione venatoria, che la problematica assume proporzioni maggiori.

Al fine di capire l'entità e la diffusione del fenomeno, nel periodo gennaio — maggio 2012 lo scrivente ha realizzato una raccolta dati tramite la stampa e le associazioni animaliste italiane, la quale ha evidenziato ben 282 casi di probabile avvelenamento, parte di questi confermati dalle analisi di laboratorio o dalle diagnosi dei medici veterinari. Sono state raccolte segnalazioni provenienti da 11 regioni e 30 province italiane, con una particolare concentrazione di casi in Veneto e in Sicilia. È stato registrato in totale il coinvolgimento di ben 151 cani, 124 gatti e di alcune specie selvatiche (aquila reale, tasso, storno e colombo).

In alcuni casi di avvelenamento è stata accertata la responsabilità di sostanze afferenti alla categoria dei lumachicidi e degli insetticidi, mentre la stricnina, sostanza dichiarata illegale in Italia, risulta aver causato il decesso di sei cani. I casi registrati rappresentano soltanto la «punta dell'iceberg» che emerge a seguito della morte di animali domestici di proprietà e delle denunce dei rispettivi proprietari. L'ampia diffusione del fenomeno è evidenziata anche dalla letteratura scientifica, dove uno studio ⁽¹⁾ del 2009 condotto in cinque Stati membri ⁽²⁾ ricorda come sia proprio l'avvelenamento una delle principali cause di mortalità della fauna selvatica in questi paesi.

1. La Commissione è al corrente dell'esistenza di questo fenomeno in Italia?
2. Quali iniziative intende prendere affinché gli Stati membri facciano rispettare le disposizioni previste in particolare nell'allegato IV della direttiva 2009/147/CE e nell'allegato VI della direttiva 92/43/CEE?
3. Non ritiene importante disporre di una banca dati europea per valutare l'impatto di tale fenomeno sulla fauna selvatica e protetta in tutti gli Stati membri, rispondendo così alla necessità di un approccio europeo come suggerito dalla comunità scientifica?

Risposta di Janez Potočnik a nome della Commissione

(17 luglio 2012)

La Commissione è a conoscenza dei problemi causati in Europa dall'uso di esche avvelenate. La direttiva uccelli e la direttiva habitat proibiscono esplicitamente tali metodi, insieme ad altre prassi simili non selettive e pericolose. L'attuazione e l'applicazione della legislazione di cui sopra sono di competenza delle autorità degli Stati membri. La Commissione, consapevole del fatto che l'uso illecito di veleno rappresenti uno dei maggiori problemi per la conservazione di alcune specie a rischio di estinzione, ha finanziato diversi progetti LIFE che hanno direttamente affrontato il problema («Innovation against poison» ⁽³⁾, «Antidoto» ⁽⁴⁾, «Veneno No» ⁽⁵⁾). I risultati e l'esperienza ottenuti da questi progetti contribuiranno a trovare modi possibili più efficaci per far fronte alla questione delle esche avvelenate in Europa.

⁽¹⁾ Guitart, R., Sachana, M., Caloni, F., Crounells, S., Vandenbroucke, V., Berny, P., 2009. Animal poisoning in Europe. Part 3: Wildlife. The Veterinary journal, 183: 260-265.

⁽²⁾ Italia, Belgio, Francia, Grecia e Spagna.

⁽³⁾ <http://www.lifeagainstopoison.org/modulos.php?modulo=contenido&pid=8>

⁽⁴⁾ http://www.lifeantidoto.it/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=45&Itemid=1&lang=en

⁽⁵⁾ <http://www.venenono.org/>.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-005923/12
to the Commission**

Andrea Zanoni (ALDE)

(13 June 2012)

Subject: Worrying persistence of the problem of malicious poisoning of wild and domestic animals with poisoned bait in Italy and the European Union

In Italy, the scattering of poisoned bait in the environment is still a very widespread practice, resulting in the deaths of wild animals protected under current EU regulations. Until a few decades ago, hunters' associations would organise the systematic, planned distribution of poisoned bait in their region in order to eliminate so-called 'pests' (foxes, badgers, corvids and raptors). This practice has never stopped, despite the ban on the use of poisoned bait introduced in the Birds and Habitat Directives and in Italian Law 157/92, and during the first few months of the year, following closure of the hunting season, the issue assumes even greater proportions.

To understand the scale and extent of this practice, I personally gathered data between January and May 2012 from the press and Italian animal welfare organisations. This revealed 282 cases in total of likely poisoning, some of them confirmed by laboratory analysis or veterinary diagnosis. Evidence was collected from 11 Italian regions and 30 provinces, with a particularly high number of cases recorded in Veneto and Sicily. The recorded total involved 151 dogs, 124 cats and various wildlife species (golden eagle, badger, starling and dove).

In some cases of poisoning, substances classified as slug and snail killers and insecticides were found to be responsible, while strychnine, a substance outlawed in Italy, was shown to have caused the death of six dogs. The recorded cases are merely the 'tip of the iceberg' which is emerging as pets die and their owners lodge complaints. The wide scale of the practice can also be seen from scientific literature, with a study ⁽¹⁾ conducted in 2009 in five Member States ⁽²⁾ revealing poisoning to be one of the main causes of wildlife mortality in those countries.

1. Is the Commission aware of the existence of this practice in Italy?
2. What action will it take to ensure that Member States enforce the provisions of Annex IV to Directive 2009/147/EC and Annex VI to Directive 92/43/EEC?
3. Does it not think a European database would be useful to assess the impact of this problem on protected wildlife in all the Member States, thereby responding to the need for a Europe-wide approach as suggested by the scientific community?

Answer given by Mr Potočník on behalf of the Commission

(17 July 2012)

The Commission is aware of the problems caused by the use of poisoned baits in Europe. Both the Birds Directive and the Habitats Directive explicitly prohibit such methods, along with other similarly non-selective and dangerous practices. The implementation and enforcement of the abovementioned legislation is a responsibility of the Member States authorities. The Commission, aware that the illegal use of poison represents one of the biggest conservation problems for some endangered species, has been funding several LIFE projects which have directly addressed this problem ('Innovation against poison' ⁽³⁾, 'Antidoto' ⁽⁴⁾, 'Veneno No' ⁽⁵⁾). The outcome and experience obtained from these projects will help find possible and more effective ways to tackle the problem of poisoned baits in Europe.

⁽¹⁾ Guitart R., Sachana M., Caloni F., Crounbel S., Vandenbroucke V., Berny P., 2009. Animal poisoning in Europe. Part 3: Wildlife. The Veterinary Journal, 183: 260-265.

⁽²⁾ Belgium, France, Greece, Italy and Spain.

⁽³⁾ <http://www.lifeagainstopoison.org/modulos.php?modulo=contenido&pid=8>

⁽⁴⁾ http://www.lifeantidoto.it/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=45&Itemid=1&lang=en

⁽⁵⁾ <http://www.venenono.org/>

(Versione italiana)

Interrogazione con richiesta di risposta scritta E-005924/12

alla Commissione

Mario Borghezio (EFD)

(13 giugno 2012)

Oggetto: Intolleranza religiosa in Kosovo

Un prete ortodosso serbo è stato aggredito e picchiato oggi da due sconosciuti nella parte sud di Kosovska Mitrovica, il settore a maggioranza albanese. Come ha riferito la Tanjug, padre Mitrofan è stato soccorso e condotto dalla polizia kosovara in un ospedale del settore nord della città kosovara (quello abitato dai serbi), con ferite alla testa e a un braccio.

Secondo il viceministro serbo per le questioni del Kosovo, Oliver Ivanovic, la missione europea Eulex e la polizia locale kosovara non sono in grado di assolvere al loro compito di proteggere tutti i cittadini del Kosovo.

La Commissione come intende reagire di fronte a questo ennesimo episodi di intolleranza religiosa nei confronti degli ortodossi serbi?

Risposta di Štefan Füle a nome della Commissione

(4 settembre 2012)

La Commissione e il SEAE deplorano la recente aggressione subita da un prete ortodosso serbo nella parte sud di Mitrovica. La Commissione ha sollevato due volte la questione durante il dialogo nell'ambito del processo di stabilizzazione e di associazione, da ultimo in occasione della riunione plenaria tenutasi il 13 luglio in presenza del primo ministro del Kosovo ⁽¹⁾ Thaçi. I servizi della Commissione ritengono, e lo hanno confermato per iscritto alle autorità del Kosovo, che questa aggressione comprometta gli sforzi prodigati per far regnare la fiducia reciproca e debba essere condannata al massimo livello. La Commissione ha invitato il Kosovo a indagare in proposito e a migliorare la propria capacità di monitoraggio, segnalazione e prevenzione relativamente a episodi di questo tipo.

La Commissione continua a monitorare attentamente gli sviluppi in Kosovo. Si richiama l'attenzione dell'onorevole parlamentare sulle risposte date alle precedenti interrogazioni E-010810/2011 e E-011051/2011, in cui si confermava che «la relazione della Commissione del 2011 sullo stato di avanzamento indica che [...] nel Kosovo settentrionale devono essere allentate le tensioni interetniche». La relazione esorta inoltre tutte le parti interessate a smorzare i toni, a vantaggio degli abitanti della regione, e a collaborare pienamente con EULEX. Lo studio di fattibilità relativo a un accordo di stabilizzazione e di associazione con il Kosovo, che la Commissione pubblicherà quest'autunno, conterrà anche una valutazione degli sviluppi in Kosovo per quanto riguarda la tolleranza religiosa. Il rappresentante speciale dell'UE in Kosovo considera prioritaria la tutela del patrimonio religioso e culturale e ha incaricato una parte del suo personale di occuparsi della questione.

Alla luce delle raccomandazioni della Commissione, il Kosovo sta elaborando modifiche volte a migliorare la legislazione sulla libertà di religione per allinearla ulteriormente con le migliori pratiche europee.

⁽¹⁾ Tale designazione non pregiudica le posizioni riguardo allo status ed è in linea con la risoluzione 1244 (1999) dell'UNSC e con il parere della CIG sulla dichiarazione di indipendenza del Kosovo.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-005924/12
to the Commission**

Mario Borghezio (EFD)

(13 June 2012)

Subject: Religious intolerance in Kosovo

A Serbian Orthodox priest was attacked and beaten today by two unknown assailants in the southern part of Kosovska Mitrovica, the Albanian majority area. The Serbian news agency Tanjug reported that the Kosovan police came to the assistance of Brother Mitrofan and took him to a hospital in the northern part of the Kosovan city (home to the Serbian community), with injuries to his head and arm.

According to Oliver Ivanovic, Serbia's State Secretary for Kosovo, the EULEX mission and local Kosovan police are not in a position to perform their task of protecting all citizens of Kosovo.

How will the Commission react to yet another instance of religious intolerance against Serbian Orthodox Christians?

Answer given by Mr Füle on behalf of the Commission

(4 September 2012)

The Commission and the EEAS deplore the recent attack on the Serbian Orthodox priest in South Mitrovica. The Commission has raised the incident twice during Stabilisation and Association Process Dialogue meetings, most recently at the SAPD plenary meeting on 13 July in the presence of Kosovo ⁽¹⁾ Prime Minister Thaçi. Commission services have also confirmed in writing to Kosovo authorities that they consider that the incident damages efforts to build confidence and mutual trust and deserves condemnation at the highest level. The Commission has urged an investigation. It has also called for strengthening Kosovo's capacity to monitor, report and prevent such incidents.

The Commission continues to monitor developments in Kosovo very closely. The Honourable Member will recall earlier replies to questions E-010810/2011 and E-011051/2011 which confirmed that 'the 2011 Commission progress report says that [...] in northern Kosovo inter-ethnic tensions need to be defused'. Also, 'it urges all concerned in Kosovo to defuse tensions for the benefit of the people living there and to fully cooperate with EULEX'. The feasibility study for a Stability and Association Agreement with Kosovo which the Commission will issue this autumn will also include an assessment of developments in Kosovo as regards religious tolerance. The EUSR in Kosovo follows Religious and Cultural Heritage matters as a priority and has dedicated staff that work on this issue.

Further to Commission recommendations, Kosovo is currently drafting amendments to improve legislation on freedom of religion so as to further align it with European best practice.

⁽¹⁾ This designation is without prejudice to positions on status, and is in line with UNSCR 1244/1999 and the ICJ Opinion on the Kosovo Declaration of Independence.

(English version)

**Question for written answer P-005926/12
to the Commission**

Brian Simpson (S&D)

(14 June 2012)

Subject: Right to fly

Yes or no: is the policy of refusing passengers the right to fly when they refuse to go through an X-ray backscatter machine — such as those involved in a trial at Manchester and other UK airports — illegal under present EU legislation?

If so, will the Commission inform the UK Government and take the appropriate action?

Answer given by Mr Kallas on behalf of the Commission

(18 July 2012)

EC law requires that passengers be offered to opt out from scanners. The UK has notified a more stringent measure to the Commission in relation to this rule, resulting in the refusal to grant passengers an opt-out from a security measure at some UK airports.

The Commission has already requested detailed information from the UK authorities in order to assess whether such measure constitutes a breach of EU legislation. The legal assessment of the measure is still ongoing.

The Commission will inform the European Parliament as soon as it takes an official position on the subject matter.

(Versione italiana)

**Interrogazione con richiesta di risposta scritta P-005927/12
alla Commissione (Vicepresidente/Alto Rappresentante)**

Cristiana Muscardini (PPE)

(14 giugno 2012)

Oggetto: VP/HR — Pescherecci italiani sequestrati dai militari libici

Circa una settimana fa 3 pescherecci italiani sono stati sequestrati da militari libici a 42 miglia dalla costa, condotti nel porto di Benghasi e i pescatori sono stati rinchiusi in carcere, accusati di reati dei quali non si conosce né la portata né la definizione.

Considerato che è un problema di tutta l'Unione, anche perché i pescatori di Mazara del Vallo si sono più volte adoperati in operazioni di soccorso e solidarietà in mare, salvando vite umane di migranti che cercavano riparo lontano dalle terre colpite dalla rivoluzione politica.

Chiediamo all'Alto Rappresentante:

1. è a conoscenza della situazione?
2. per quale motivo a tutt'oggi non vi è stato un intervento risolutivo dell'UE presso le autorità libiche?
3. non ritiene di dover immediatamente inviare un suo incaricato per verificare la situazione e ottenere la pronta liberazione dei prigionieri?

Risposta dell'Alta Rappresentante/Vicepresidente Catherine Ashton a nome della Commissione

(3 agosto 2012)

L'Alta Rappresentante/Vicepresidente ha seguito la vicenda da vicino. La delegazione UE a Tripoli è rimasta in contatto con l'Ambasciata d'Italia per verificare se l'Unione europea potesse fornire sostegno politico al paese al fine di garantire il rilascio dei pescatori in questione. L'ambasciatore italiano ha però affermato che il sostegno dell'Unione europea non era necessario.

L'Alta Rappresentante/Vicepresidente è stata quindi lieta di apprendere che i pescatori erano già stati rilasciati.

(English version)

**Question for written answer P-005927/12
to the Commission (Vice-President/High Representative)**

Cristiana Muscardini (PPE)

(14 June 2012)

Subject: VP/HR — Italian fishermen captured by Libyan military

About a week ago, three Italian fishing boats were captured by the Libyan military at 42 miles from the coast and taken to the port of Benghazi, where the fishermen were put in jail and charged with offences of which neither the seriousness nor nature are known.

This is a problem for the whole European Union, also because fishermen from Mazara del Vallo have often taken part in rescue and solidarity operations at sea, saving the lives of migrants who were seeking refuge far from countries struck by political revolution.

1. Is the Vice-President/High Representative aware of the situation?
2. Why has the EU not so far taken decisive action with the Libyan authorities?
3. Does the Vice-President/High Representative not agree that she should immediately send a representative to assess the situation and secure the prompt release of the prisoners?

Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Ashton on behalf of the Commission

(3 August 2012)

The High Representative/Vice-President has followed this issue closely. The EU Delegation in Tripoli has been in contact with the Italian Embassy to see whether the European Union could provide any political support to Italy in securing the release of the fishermen in question. The Italian Ambassador indicated that support from the European Union was not needed.

The High Representative/Vice-President was therefore delighted to learn that the fishermen in question have now been released.

(Deutsche Fassung)

Anfrage zur schriftlichen Beantwortung E-005928/12
an die Kommission (Vizepräsidentin/Hohe Vertreterin)
Evelyn Regner (S&D) und Jutta Steinruck (S&D)
(14. Juni 2012)

Betrifft: VP/HR — Verletzung des Streikrechts in der Türkei

Das türkische Parlament hat (mit Stimmen der AKP) am 31.5.2012 ein Gesetz verabschiedet, welches Arbeitskämpfmaßnahmen im Luftfahrtsektor verbietet. Als dies unter den im Luftfahrtsektor Beschäftigten bekannt wurde, hatten sich mehrere Hundert Mitarbeiter des Bodenpersonals und Techniker der halbstaatlichen Turkish Airlines (THY) einem Bummelstreik angeschlossen oder sich aus Protest krankgemeldet. Danach verkündete der türkische Verkehrsminister Binali Yildirim die Entlassung von 300 Arbeitnehmern. Diese Arbeitnehmer sind inzwischen per SMS gekündigt worden. Am 3.6.2012 hat der Vorsitzende der THY weitere 150 Entlassungen angekündigt.

1. Wie beurteilt die Vizepräsidentin/Hohe Vertreterin das Vorgehen der türkischen Regierung?
2. Erkennt die Vizepräsidentin/Hohe Vertreterin die Einschränkung des Streikrechts durch das am 31.5.2012 verabschiedete Gesetz? Teilt die Vizepräsidentin/Hohe Vertreterin die Meinung, dass die Türkei hier gegen den Artikel 11 EMRK (Versammlungs- und Vereinigungsfreiheit) verstößt?
3. Gedenkt die Vizepräsidentin/Hohe Vertreterin, diese immer wiederkehrenden Verletzungen (vgl. auch Anfrage an die Kommission vom 13.1.2011, E-011154/2010) im Rahmen ihrer diplomatischen Beziehungen und ihrem diplomatischen Austausch mit der Türkei zum Thema zu machen?
4. Gedenkt die Vizepräsidentin/Hohe Vertreterin, im Rahmen von bilateralen Gesprächen aufgrund der wiederholten massiven Verletzungen von Gewerkschaftsrechten und Rechten von Arbeitnehmern größeren Druck als bisher auf die Türkei auszuüben?
5. Hat die Vizepräsidentin/Hohe Vertreterin bisher Maßnahmen getroffen, um die türkische Regierung auf diese Missstände aufmerksam zu machen und diese zu einem Umdenken zu bewegen? Wenn ja, welche?
6. Was gedenkt die Vizepräsidentin/Hohe Vertreterin zu unternehmen, um die Türkei dazu zu bewegen, grundlegende Reformen in Richtung von europäischen Sozialstandards umzusetzen?
7. Inwieweit berücksichtigt die Vizepräsidentin/Hohe Vertreterin das Verbot wegen der Nichteinhaltung von Tarifverträgen in einen Streik zu treten, in ihren bilateralen Gesprächen und Verhandlungen mit der Türkei?
8. Inwieweit macht die Vizepräsidentin/Hohe Vertreterin diese Missstände im Dialog mit der internationalen Staatengemeinschaft zum Thema?

Anfrage zur schriftlichen Beantwortung E-005929/12
an die Kommission
Evelyn Regner (S&D) und Jutta Steinruck (S&D)
(14. Juni 2012)

Betrifft: Verletzung des Streikrechts in der Türkei

Das türkische Parlament hat (mit Stimmen der AKP) am 31.5.2012 ein Gesetz verabschiedet, welches Arbeitskämpfmaßnahmen im Luftfahrtsektor verbietet. Als dies unter den im Luftfahrtsektor Beschäftigten bekannt wurde, hatten sich mehrere Hundert Mitarbeiter des Bodenpersonals und Techniker der halbstaatlichen Turkish Airlines (THY) einem Bummelstreik angeschlossen oder sich aus Protest krankgemeldet. Danach verkündete der türkische Verkehrsminister Binali Yildirim die Entlassung von 300 Arbeitnehmern. Diese Arbeitnehmer sind inzwischen per SMS gekündigt worden. Am 3.6.2012 hat der Vorsitzende der THY weitere 150 Entlassungen angekündigt.

1. Wie beurteilt die Kommission das Vorgehen der türkischen Regierung/der THY/die Entlassungen per SMS?
2. Erkennt die Kommission die Einschränkung des Streikrechts durch das am 31.5.2012 verabschiedete Gesetz? Teilt die Kommission die Meinung, dass die Türkei hier gegen den Artikel 11 EMRK (Versammlungs- und Vereinigungsfreiheit) verstößt?

3. Gedenkt die Kommission, diese immer wiederkehrenden Verletzungen (vgl. Anfrage vom 13.1.2011, E-011154/2010) intensiver als bisher zu untersuchen und ausführlich in ihrem nächsten Fortschrittsbericht zu erläutern?
4. Gedenkt die Kommission, die Ausgestaltung des Streikrechts, welches in der Türkei an viele Auflagen gekoppelt ist, zu untersuchen bzw. zu evaluieren?
5. Gedenkt die Kommission, im Rahmen von bilateralen Gesprächen aufgrund der wiederholten massiven Verletzungen von Gewerkschaftsrechten und Rechten von Arbeitnehmern größeren Druck als bisher auf die Türkei auszuüben?
6. Teilt die Kommission die Auffassung, dass die bisherigen Bemühungen keinen Fortschritt gebracht haben?
7. Wie in der Antwort auf die Anfrage vom 13.1.2011 (E-011154/2010) bereits mitgeteilt wurde, „behandelt“ die Kommission und „trägt“ die Kommission ihre Bedenken „vor“, was offenbar wenig zum Fortschritt beiträgt. Was gedenkt die Kommission nun zu unternehmen, um die Türkei dazu zu bewegen, grundlegende Reformen in Richtung von europäischen Sozialstandards umzusetzen?
8. Wie beurteilt die Kommission das Verbot, wegen der Nichteinhaltung von Tarifverträgen zu streiken?

Gemeinsame Antwort von Herrn Füle im Namen der Kommission

(28. August 2012)

Die Verabschiedung des türkischen Gesetzes 6321/2012 gibt Anlass zu ernsthafter Besorgnis, weil sich die Türkei durch die damit bewirkte Ausweitung des Streikverbots auf den Luftverkehrssektor noch weiter von den Standards der EU und der ILO entfernt.

Die Kommission bringt ihre Sorgen in Bezug auf Gewerkschaftsrechte bei den jährlichen Sitzungen des Assoziationsausschusses EU-Türkei (und seiner Unterausschüsse) sowie im Assoziationsrat EU-Türkei regelmäßig zur Sprache. Diese Anliegen werden im jährlichen Kommissionsbericht über die Fortschritte der Türkei auch publik gemacht. Die Kommission hat außerdem wiederholt betont, dass als Vorbedingung für die Aufnahme der Verhandlungen zu Kapitel 19 (Beschäftigung und Sozialpolitik) die Türkei die uneingeschränkte Achtung der Gewerkschaftsrechte im privaten und öffentlichen Sektor im Einklang mit den Standards der EU und der ILO gewährleisten muss.

Die Kommission wird die Türkei weiterhin bei der Suche nach angemessenen Lösungen für die noch verbleibenden Probleme, die der Eröffnung der Verhandlungen zu Kapitel 19 entgegenstehen, unterstützen und sich in vollem Umfang am Dialog mit der Türkei über sozial- und beschäftigungspolitische Reformen beteiligen.

Sie wird außerdem den sozialen Dialog in der Türkei, einschließlich des Streikrechts, nach wie vor aufmerksam verfolgen und — solange die Probleme ungelöst bleiben — dieses Thema auf geeigneter Ebene zur Sprache bringen.

(English version)

Question for written answer E-005928/12
to the Commission (Vice-President/High Representative)
Evelyn Regner (S&D) and Jutta Steinruck (S&D)
(14 June 2012)

Subject: VP/HR — violation of the right to strike in Turkey

On 31 May 2012 the Turkish Parliament passed a law (with the votes of the AKP) banning industrial action in the aviation sector. When this became known among employees in the aviation sector, several hundred ground staff and technicians employed by Turkish Airlines (THY), which is part state-owned, joined a go-slow or called in sick in protest. The Turkish Transport Minister Binali Yıldırım subsequently announced the dismissal of 300 employees. These employees were, incidentally, given notice of termination by text message. On 3 June 2012 the chairman of THY announced a further 150 layoffs.

1. How does the Vice-President/High Representative assess the actions of the Turkish government?
2. Does the Vice-President/High Representative acknowledge the restriction to the right to strike as a result of the law passed on 31 May 2012? Does the Vice-President/High Representative share the view that Turkey is in contravention of Article 11 ECHR (freedom of assembly and association)?
3. Does the Vice-President/High Representative intend to take up these recurrent violations (cf. question of 13 January 2011, E-011154/2010) in the context of her diplomatic relations and diplomatic exchange with Turkey?
4. Does the Vice-President/High Representative intend to bring greater pressure to bear on Turkey than previously in the context of bilateral discussions, as a result of repeated serious violations of trade union rights and the rights of employees?
5. Has the Vice-President/High Representative previously taken measures to bring these shortcomings to the attention of the Turkish government and to prompt it to reconsider? If so, what measures?
6. What does the Vice-President/High Representative intend to do to move Turkey towards implementing fundamental reforms in the direction of European social standards?
7. To what extent does the Vice-President/High Representative take the ban on joining a strike on account of non-compliance with collective agreements into consideration in her bilateral discussions and negotiations with Turkey?
8. To what extent does the Vice-President/High Representative take up these shortcomings in dialogue with the international community?

Question for written answer E-005929/12
to the Commission
Evelyn Regner (S&D) and Jutta Steinruck (S&D)
(14 June 2012)

Subject: Violation of the right to strike in Turkey

On 31 May 2012 the Turkish parliament passed a law (with the votes of the AKP) banning industrial action in the aviation sector. When this became known among employees in the aviation sector, several hundred ground staff and technicians employed by Turkish Airlines (THY), which is part state-owned, joined a go-slow or called in sick in protest. The Turkish Transport Minister Binali Yıldırım subsequently announced the dismissal of 300 employees. These employees were, incidentally, given notice of termination by text message. On 3 June 2012 the chairman of THY announced a further 150 layoffs.

1. How does the Commission assess the actions of the Turkish government, the THY and the terminations by text message?
2. Does the Commission acknowledge the restriction to the right to strike as a result of the law passed on 31 May 2012? Does the Commission share the view that Turkey is in contravention of Article 11 ECHR (freedom of assembly and association)?

3. Does the Commission intend to investigate these recurrent violations (cf. question of 13 January 2011, E-011154/2010) more rigorously than before and comment in detail in its next progress report?
4. Does the Commission intend to investigate or evaluate the form of the right to strike, which in Turkey is linked to many conditions?
5. Does the Commission intend to bring greater pressure to bear on Turkey than previously in the context of bilateral discussions, as a result of the repeated serious violations of trade union rights and the rights of employees?
6. Does the Commission share the view that efforts to date have not brought about progress?
7. As previously communicated in the answer to the question of 13 January 2011 (E-011154/2010), the Commission 'reports' its concerns and they are 'brought to the attention' [of the Turkish authorities], which has obviously resulted in little progress. What does the Commission now intend to do in order to move Turkey towards implementing fundamental reforms in the direction of European social standards?
8. How does the Commission assess the ban on striking on account of non-compliance with collective agreements?

Joint answer given by Mr Füle on behalf of the Commission

(28 August 2012)

The Turkish Law 6321/2012 raises serious concerns, as extending the prohibition of strike to the civil aviation sector brings Turkey a step further away from EU and ILO standards.

The Commission has regularly raised its concerns on the respect for trade union rights in the annual EU-Turkey Association Committee and Subcommittee meetings, and in the EU-Turkey Association Council. These concerns are made public in each year's Commission's Turkey Progress Report. The Commission has repeatedly stressed, as well, that the opening benchmark of accession negotiation Chapter 19 (employment and social policies) establishes that Turkey must ensure full trade union rights in both the private and public sector, in line with EU and ILO standards.

The Commission will continue offering Turkey help to find appropriate solutions for the remaining problems that hinder the opening of Chapter 19 as well, as full engagement with Turkey in the dialogue on social and employment policy reforms.

The Commission will also continue monitoring closely social dialogue in Turkey, including the right to strike, and as long as the problems remain the Commission will continue raising this question at the appropriate levels.

(Deutsche Fassung)

Anfrage zur schriftlichen Beantwortung E-005930/12
an die Kommission
Angelika Werthmann (NI)
(14. Juni 2012)

Betrifft: Reichen die „Rettungsmaßnahmen“ auch wirklich aus?

Spaniens Kampf gegen die überbordenden Schulden spielt sich an vielen Schauplätzen ab — Arbeitsmarkt (höchste Jugendarbeitslosigkeit), Immobilienmarkt, Bankenkrise (100 Mrd. EUR zur Stabilisierung der Banken) und Staatshaushalt (Defizit von 8,9 %), um nur die wichtigsten zu nennen; nun wird auch Zypern Hilfe in Anspruch nehmen, und Italien erlebt eine wahre „Zitterpartie“ — immerhin muss Italien Renditen bieten wie schon lange nicht mehr (die durchschnittliche Rendite betrug heute immerhin 3,97 %), während Deutschland gerade einmal 1,5 % Rendite zahlt.

1. Wie lange kann dieses Ungleichgewicht nach Einschätzung der Kommission noch bestehen, ohne dass es zu einem totalen Überborden des Finanzplatzes „Europa“ kommt?
2. Glaubt die Kommission angesichts der möglichen Folgen, dass die Rettungsmechanismen in der Tat ausreichend sein werden (gerade unter Berücksichtigung des Schuldenbergs Italiens)?

Antwort von Herrn Rehn im Namen der Kommission
(16. August 2012)

Auch wenn die Ungleichgewichte in den Mitgliedstaaten des Euroraums weiterhin abnehmen, sind die Fortschritte im Hinblick auf spezifische Länder und Sektoren unausgewogen. Spanien hat beispielsweise gute Fortschritte beim Auffangen seiner Verluste aus jüngster Zeit bei der Preis- und Kostenwettbewerbsfähigkeit gemacht, wie seine starke Leistung auf dem Gebiet der Exporte und die klare Reduzierung seines Leistungsbilanzdefizits verdeutlichen. Auf der anderen Seite werden die Bereinigung der Haushaltslage und der Abbau der hohen Privat- sowie der hohen Auslandsverschuldung mehr Zeit in Anspruch nehmen. Für alle von Ihnen genannten Länder wurden Politikmaßnahmen ergriffen (entweder im Rahmen eines Programms oder auf sonstige Art und Weise), um ihre öffentlichen Schulden in tragfähigere Bahnen zu lenken und ihr Wachstumspotenzial zu erhöhen. Sofern die betroffenen Volkswirtschaften auf Reformkurs bleiben und die Geldpolitik der Europäischen Zentralbank (EZB) nachhaltig bleibt, dürften der Marktzugang sowohl für die Staaten als auch für die Banken zu tragfähigen Zinsen weiterhin möglich sein und die Rettungsmechanismen ausreichen. Zur Abschwächung der mit diesem Prozess einhergehenden Risiken sowie zur Erleichterung der Anpassung hat die Kommission neue Maßnahmen für eine weitere Vertiefung der Europäischen Währungsunion vorgeschlagen. Dazu zählt vor allem die Schaffung einer Bankenunion.

Per Beschluss der Eurogruppe vom 30. März 2012 beläuft sich das Darlehensvolumen aus der Europäischen Finanzstabilisierungsfazilität (EFSF) und dem Europäischen Stabilisierungsmechanismus (ESM) derzeit auf 700 Mrd. EUR. Die Beschlüsse auf diesem Gebiet sind schlussendlich allein von den Mitgliedstaaten zu fassen.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-005930/12
to the Commission**

Angelika Werthmann (NI)

(14 June 2012)

Subject: Are the 'rescue measures' really enough?

Spain's battle with excessive debt is being played out on a number of stages — the labour market (highest rate of youth unemployment), the property market, the banking crisis (EUR 100 billion needed to stabilise the banks) and the national budget (deficit of 8.9%), to mention just the most important. Now Cyprus is also set to seek assistance, and Italy is experiencing a real 'nail-biter' — the country is still having to offer returns that have already passed into memory elsewhere: the average return on short-term borrowing today is still 3.97%, while Germany is paying only 1.5%.

1. How long does the Commission consider this imbalance can continue, without it leading to Europe as a financial centre being totally overwhelmed?
2. Given the possible consequences, does the Commission believe that the rescue mechanisms are actually sufficient (particularly in view of the Italian debt mountain)?

Answer given by Mr Rehn on behalf of the Commission

(16 August 2012)

The adjustment of imbalances within euro area Member States is ongoing, but progress is uneven with regards to specific countries and sectors. Spain, for example, has made good progress in recovering its past losses in price and cost competitiveness, as demonstrated by its strong export performance and sharp reduction of its current account deficit. On the other hand, the adjustment of the fiscal position and the high levels of private and external debt will take longer. In any case, for all the countries that you mention, policy actions have been taken (either within or outside of a programme) in order to maintain their public debt on a sustainable trajectory and enhance their growth potential. If the concerned economies will stay on the reform course and the European Central Bank (ECB)'s monetary policy remains supportive, market access for the sovereign and the banks is likely to remain open at sustainable interest rates and the rescue mechanisms will be sufficient. In addition, in order to mitigate the risks surrounding this process and facilitate the adjustment, the Commission has suggested new measures for a further deepening of the European Monetary Union, such as the creation of a banking union.

The maximum combined lending volume of the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) and the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) is currently set at EUR 700 billion by the decision of the Eurogroup of 30 March 2012. Decisions in this field eventually fall solely upon Member States.

(Versione italiana)

**Interrogazione con richiesta di risposta scritta E-005931/12
alla Commissione**

**Elisabetta Gardini (PPE), Gabriele Albertini (PPE), Roberta Angelilli (PPE), Paolo Bartolozzi (PPE),
Mara Bizzotto (EFD), Antonio Cancian (PPE), Sergio Gaetano Cofferati (S&D), Lara Comi (PPE),
Carlo Fidanza (PPE), Lorenzo Fontana (EFD), Mario Mauro (PPE), Erminia Mazzoni (PPE),
Claudio Morganti (EFD), Cristiana Muscardini (PPE), Fiorello Provera (EFD), Oreste Rossi (EFD),
Licia Ronzulli (PPE), Marco Scurria (PPE), Sergio Paolo Francesco Silvestris (PPE) e Andrea Zaroni (ALDE)**
(14 giugno 2012)

Oggetto: Commercio dei prodotti provenienti dai laogai

Da oltre sessant'anni in Cina, milioni di persone, uomini, donne e bambini vengono segregati nei laogai, costretti al lavoro forzato in condizioni disumane, di denutrizione o tortura e schiavismo.

Secondo alcune associazioni queste prigionie mascherate da industrie sarebbero più di mille e si calcola che fino ad oggi vi siano stati reclusi almeno 50 milioni di individui.

Dietro a queste strutture si nascondono forti interessi economici del governo cinese o delle multinazionali straniere che producono in Cina. Basti pensare che secondo la «Laogai Research Foundation» il costo del lavoro cinese rappresenta il 5 % del costo del lavoro nell'Unione europea.

Inoltre, dal momento che queste strutture offrono un'immensa forza lavoro a costo zero, la produzione al loro interno è in continua crescita.

Alla luce di quanto precede, può la Commissione far sapere:

1. Se non ritiene opportuno valutare questa drammatica situazione di lavoro forzato e di completa violazione dei diritti umani prima di procedere nei negoziati per la semplificazione dei controlli doganali con la Cina?
2. Quali misure possono essere adottate dall'Unione europea per contrastare questo business immorale?

Risposta dell'Alta Rappresentante/Vicepresidente Catherine Ashton a nome della Commissione
(8 agosto 2012)

L'UE è dell'avviso che l'esistenza del sistema di rieducazione attraverso il lavoro in Cina costituisca una violazione delle pertinenti disposizioni del Patto internazionale relativo ai diritti civili e politici e ha ripetutamente esortato la Cina ad adottare le opportune riforme, come è accaduto recentemente il 20 maggio 2012 in occasione del dialogo UE-Cina sui diritti dell'uomo.

Nel 2011 la Commissione ha istituito un gruppo interservizi per esaminare la risposta dell'UE alla pratica dei lavori forzati negli istituti di pena dei paesi terzi. Il gruppo è impegnato ad ottenere un quadro il più chiaro possibile dei luoghi in cui (oltre ai noti casi in Cina e Myanmar) questa pratica verrebbe utilizzata per la produzione destinata all'esportazione. A questa attività partecipano anche ambasciate degli Stati membri, organizzazioni internazionali e organizzazioni non governative. A tal riguardo la Commissione rinvia alla sua risposta alle precedenti interrogazioni scritte E-010606/11 ed E-010839/11 ⁽¹⁾. La Commissione non esclude la possibilità di introdurre un divieto alle importazioni per i prodotti fabbricati con il lavoro forzato dei detenuti, a condizione che tale misura risulti fattibile ed efficace.

La Commissione esorta gli importatori e le imprese dell'UE ad applicare elevati standard in materia di responsabilità sociale delle imprese per evitare l'impiego di detti prodotti.

⁽¹⁾ <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/plenary/en/parliamentary-questions.html?tabType=wq#sidesForm>

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-005931/12
to the Commission**

**Elisabetta Gardini (PPE), Gabriele Albertini (PPE), Roberta Angelilli (PPE), Paolo Bartolozzi (PPE),
Mara Bizzotto (EFD), Antonio Cancian (PPE), Sergio Gaetano Cofferati (S&D), Lara Comi (PPE),
Carlo Fidanza (PPE), Lorenzo Fontana (EFD), Mario Mauro (PPE), Erminia Mazzoni (PPE),
Claudio Morganti (EFD), Cristiana Muscardini (PPE), Fiorello Provera (EFD), Oreste Rossi (EFD),
Licia Ronzulli (PPE), Marco Scurria (PPE), Sergio Paolo Francesco Silvestris (PPE) and Andrea Zanoni
(ALDE)**

(14 June 2012)

Subject: Marketing of goods coming from the laogai

For over sixty years in China millions of people — men, women and children — have been imprisoned in the laogai, condemned to forced labour under inhuman conditions, starvation or torture and slavery.

According to some associations these prisons, masked as factories, number more than a thousand and it is calculated that up to now at least 50 million individuals have been held there.

These structures hide the powerful economic interests of the Chinese government and the foreign multinationals which produce in China. Suffice it to say that, according to the 'Laogai Research Foundation', the cost of Chinese labour is only 5% of the cost of labour in the European Union.

In addition, given that these structures offer a huge work force at zero cost, the production carried out there is continuing to grow.

In the light of the above, can the Commission state:

1. whether it does not think it should assess this dramatic situation of forced labour and total violation of human rights before proceeding with negotiations for the simplification of customs controls with China;
2. what measures can be adopted by the European Union to combat this immoral business?

Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Ashton on behalf of the Commission

(8 August 2012)

The EU believes that the existence of the Re-education through Labour (RTL) system in China constitutes a violation of the relevant provisions of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and has repeatedly called on China to adopt reforms, most recently at the EU-China human rights dialogue on 29 May 2012.

In 2011, the Commission established an inter-service group to review the EU response to forced prison labour practices in third countries. The inter-service group is working to obtain as full a picture as possible of where — other than known cases in China and Myanmar — forced prison labour for export production may take place. This work also involves Member State Embassies, international organisations and non-governmental organisations. In this regard, the Commission refers to its reply to previous written questions E-010606/11 and E-010839/11 ⁽¹⁾. The Commission does not rule out the possibility of introducing an import prohibition for goods produced using forced prison labour, but this must be both feasible and effective.

EU importers and businesses are encouraged by the Commission to apply high Corporate Social Responsibility standards to avoid *inter alia* the use of goods produced with forced labour.

⁽¹⁾ <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/plenary/en/parliamentary-questions.html?tabType=wq#sidesForm>

(Versione italiana)

Interrogazione con richiesta di risposta scritta E-005933/12

alla Commissione

Mara Bizzotto (EFD)

(14 giugno 2012)

Oggetto: Trivellazioni, tecnica del fracking e terremoti: possibile correlazioni e prospettive future

Dopo il forte terremoto che ha colpito l'Emilia Romagna, il Veneto e la Lombardia nelle scorse settimane, diverse fonti scientifiche hanno correlato questo fenomeno con l'alta densità di trivellazioni (sia per l'estrazione di gas che per le prospezioni geofisiche) che caratterizzano l'area. Anche un'altra tecnica estrattiva è stata recentemente messa sotto accusa, il fracking, ovvero l'estrazione di gas metano da rocce porose (il cosiddetto shale gas): nello Stato dell'Ohio in USA, le autorità hanno deciso di sospendere l'attività di fracking, perché ritenuta la causa scatenante dei continui terremoti che stanno minacciando la zona nonché di gravi danni al sottosuolo e all'ambiente.

1. La Commissione è a conoscenza dei fatti sopra citati?

— Ritiene plausibile la correlazione tra fracking e terremoti in Ohio?

— Può indicare se la tecnica del fracking è stata sperimentata in qualche Stato membro?

— Qual è la posizione della Commissione al riguardo, dato che molti paesi europei, come ad esempio la Polonia, vorrebbero intensificare lo sfruttamento dello shale gas? Intende la Commissione imporre restrizioni alla sua estrazione?

2. Per quanto concerne le trivellazioni, ritiene la Commissione scientificamente possibile una correlazione tra quelle praticate nella pianura padana e i recenti eventi sismici della zona?

— Ritiene di dover prendere misure o imporre limitazioni a livello comunitario relativamente a questa tecnica estrattiva, visto che molti Stati membri, come l'Italia, nella definizione della propria strategia energetica nazionale, intendono rilanciare le trivellazioni per la produzione nazionale di idrocarburi?

Risposta di Janez Potočnik a nome della Commissione

(25 luglio 2012)

1. La Commissione è a conoscenza delle conclusioni della relazione dell'Ohio Department of Natural Resources ⁽¹⁾.

Sulla scorta delle informazioni a disposizione della Commissione, in Europa si è praticata in una certa misura la fratturazione idraulica, in particolare nell'ambito della ristretta produzione gasiera in Germania nonché in progetti offshore nel Mare del Nord, prevalentemente in pozzi verticali. Le prove di fratturazione idraulica sono state effettuate nell'ambito di progetti di esplorazione del gas di scisto in alcuni Stati membri, come la Polonia, la Germania e il Regno Unito. Tali prassi sono verosimilmente diverse per scala e complessità dalle operazioni di fratturazione idraulica del passato.

Nell'ambito dell'attuale quadro di riferimento, spetta agli Stati membri garantire, per mezzo di valutazioni, attività di monitoraggio e regimi di autorizzazione adeguati, che tutte le attività di esplorazione o sfruttamento di fonti energetiche, comprese quelle che si avvalgono della fratturazione idraulica, siano conformi a quanto disposto dal quadro giuridico vigente nell'UE, che comprende fra l'altro disposizioni relative alla protezione delle acque superficiali e sotterranee ⁽²⁾, alle valutazioni dell'impatto ambientale ⁽³⁾ e alla gestione dei rifiuti ⁽⁴⁾.

2. La Commissione non dispone di elementi sufficienti per accertare una possibile correlazione fra le attività nella Valle del Po e i recenti terremoti avvenuti nella zona.

⁽¹⁾ Relazione preliminare sul pozzo d'iniezione di classe II Northstar 1 e gli eventi sismici verificatisi a Youngstown, Ohio, nel marzo 2012: <http://ohiodnr.com/downloads/northstar/UICReport.pdf>

⁽²⁾ Direttiva 2000/60/CE che istituisce un quadro per l'azione comunitaria in materia di acque (GU L 327 del 22.12.2000) e direttiva 2006/118/CE sulla protezione delle acque sotterranee dall'inquinamento e dal deterioramento, GU L 372 del 27.12.2006.

⁽³⁾ Direttiva 2011/92/UE concernente la valutazione dell'impatto ambientale di determinati progetti pubblici e privati, GU L 26 del 28.1.2012.

⁽⁴⁾ Direttiva 2006/21/CE relativa alla gestione dei rifiuti delle industrie estrattive e che modifica la direttiva 2004/35/CE, GU L 102 dell'11.4.2006.

Per quanto attiene alle misure a livello unionale, la Commissione ha avviato i lavori per valutare entro la fine del 2013 l'adeguatezza della tutela della salute umana e dell'ambiente offerti dalla vigente legislazione dell'UE e la necessità di adottare un quadro di riferimento per la gestione del rischio relativa ai combustibili fossili non convenzionali, in particolare gli sviluppi relativi al gas di scisto in Europa, compresa l'eventuale forma di tale quadro. Nell'ambito di questo lavoro saranno tenute in debita considerazione tutte le opzioni.

(English version)

Question for written answer E-005933/12
to the Commission
Mara Bizzotto (EFD)
(14 June 2012)

Subject: Drilling, fracking techniques and earthquakes: possible linkage and future prospects

After the strong earthquake which hit Emilia Romagna, the Veneto and Lombardy during the last few weeks, various scientific sources have linked this phenomenon to the high density of drilling (both for gas extraction and for geo-physical prospecting) which characterises the area. Another extractive process has recently been accused, fracking, that is the extraction of methane gas from porous rocks (shale gas): in the State of Ohio in the USA the authorities have decided to suspend fracking operations, because they are considered to be the trigger cause of the continuous earthquakes which are threatening the area, as well as causing serious damage to the subsoil and the environment.

1. Is the Commission aware of the above-listed facts?

— Does it consider plausible the linkage between fracking and earthquakes in Ohio?

— Can it indicate if the fracking process has been tried out in any Member State?

— What is the position of the Commission in this regard, given that many European countries, like for example Poland, wish to intensify the exploitation of shale gas? Does the Commission intend to impose restrictions on its extraction?

2. With regard to drilling, does the Commission consider it scientifically possible that there is a link between what is being done in the Po Valley and the recent seismic events in the area?

— Does it consider it should take measures or impose limits at community level regarding this extractive technique, given that many Member States, like Italy, intend to start drilling for the domestic production of hydrocarbons in the framework of their national energy strategy?

Answer given by Mr Potočník on behalf of the Commission
(25 July 2012)

1. The Commission is aware of the conclusions of the report from the Ohio Department of Natural Resources ⁽¹⁾.

According to information available to the Commission, some limited hydraulic fracturing has taken place in Europe, especially in the context of tight gas production in Germany as well as in offshore projects in the North Sea, essentially in vertical wells. Hydraulic fracturing tests have been carried out in the framework of shale gas exploration projects in a few Member States such as Poland, Germany, and the United Kingdom. Such practices are likely to differ in scale and complexity from past hydraulic fracturing occurrences.

Under the current framework, it is up to Member States to ensure — via appropriate assessments, permitting regimes and monitoring activities — that any exploration or exploitation of energy sources, including those using hydraulic fracturing, complies with the requirements of the existing legal framework in the EU. This includes, *inter alia*, provisions on the protection of surface and groundwater ⁽²⁾, on environmental impact assessments ⁽³⁾, and on waste management ⁽⁴⁾.

2. The Commission does not have sufficient information to be able to verify a possible correlation between activities in the Po Valley and recent earthquakes in the area.

⁽¹⁾ Preliminary report on the Northstar 1 Class II Injection well and the seismic events in the Youngstown, Ohio, March 2012: <http://ohiodnr.com/downloads/northstar/UICReport.pdf>

⁽²⁾ Directive 2000/60/EC establishing a framework for Community action in the field of water policy, OJ L 327, 22.12.2000, and Directive 2006/118/EC on the protection of groundwater against pollution and deterioration, OJ L 372, 27.12.2006.

⁽³⁾ Directive 2011/92/EU on the assessment of the effects of certain public and private projects on environment, OJ L 26, 28.1.2012.

⁽⁴⁾ Directive 2006/21/EC on the management of waste from extractive industries and amending Directive 2004/35/EC, OJ L 102, 11.4.2006.

As regards measures at EU level, the Commission has initiated work in order to assess by end 2013 whether the level of human health and environmental protection provided by the existing EU legislation is appropriate and whether or not there is a need for a risk management framework for unconventional fossil fuels and in particular shale gas developments in Europe, and if necessary the form it would take. All options will be duly considered in the frame of this work.

(Versione italiana)

Interrogazione con richiesta di risposta scritta E-005934/12

alla Commissione

Mara Bizzotto (EFD)

(14 giugno 2012)

Oggetto: Test rapido salivare dell'HIV

La Food and Drug Administration ha ricevuto parere positivo dal Blood Products Advisory Committee per l'eventuale commercializzazione di un test in grado di diagnosticare l'HIV attraverso la saliva con risultato in poche decine di minuti. Le indiscrezioni parlano della possibilità che esso sia commercializzato anche senza ricetta. Secondo i test effettuati risulta attendibile: nel 93 % dei casi viene individuato se il soggetto è effettivamente sieropositivo, nel 7 % dei casi il test dà risultato negativo anche se la persona ne è affetta.

1. È la Commissione a conoscenza di questo test?
2. Come valuta la Commissione l'eventuale liberalizzazione della vendita nell'UE di questo genere di test senza la supervisione medica?
3. Secondo alcuni esperti l'adozione di test di questo tipo permetterebbe di abbattere la barriera psicologica che spesso inibisce le persone a effettuare le consuete analisi in strutture ospedaliere e quindi consentirebbe diagnosi precoci dell'infezione, fondamentali per accedere velocemente alla terapia. Come si pone la Commissione verso queste posizioni?
4. In Italia un test rapido di questo tipo è in uso dal gennaio di quest'anno all'ospedale Amedeo di Savoia in Piemonte, affiancato ai normali test ematici. Qual è la situazione negli altri Stati membri?
5. Ritiene la Commissione di sostenere l'adozione di tale tecnica diagnostica?

Risposta di John Dalli a nome della Commissione

(22 agosto 2012)

1. La Commissione è a conoscenza di tale strumento diagnostico.
2. La legislazione dell'UE stabilisce le necessarie specifiche e i requisiti essenziali da rispettare affinché qualsiasi dispositivo medico-diagnostico in vitro possa essere commercializzato nel mercato interno ⁽¹⁾ ⁽²⁾. In particolare, i reagenti e i prodotti per la ricerca e la conferma dell'HIV figurano nell'Allegato II a corredo della direttiva 98/79/CE¹.
3. La Commissione promuove gli esami diagnostici per la ricerca dell'HIV in collaborazione con gli Stati membri e le parti interessate e cofinanzia progetti in questo settore mediante il relativo programma di sanità pubblica. A titolo d'esempio, la Commissione sta attualmente finanziando il progetto SIALON II, che esamina l'effetto delle diagnosi rapide di HIV in contesti di comunità, partito a novembre 2011 e della durata prevista di 3 anni. L'importanza della diagnosi precoce e quindi dell'inizio tempestivo del trattamento per ridurre la trasmissione dell'HIV è sottolineata nella comunicazione della Commissione «Lotta contro l'HIV/AIDS nell'Unione europea e nei paesi vicini (2009-2013)» ⁽³⁾ e nel concomitante piano d'azione. Il Centro europeo per la prevenzione e il controllo delle malattie ha inoltre emesso orientamenti in fatto di diagnostica dedicati ai contesti nei quali si dovrebbero usare gli strumenti di diagnostica rapida e ai vantaggi correlati.
4. La Commissione è consapevole del fatto che l'uso dei dispositivi diagnostici rapidi per l'HIV è consentito in diversi Stati membri, tuttavia essa non effettua il monitoraggio di tale uso.
5. La Commissione promuove programmi diagnostici basati su evidenze scientifiche per giungere a coinvolgere coloro che sono maggiormente a rischio. Tali programmi diagnostici dovrebbero essere accompagnati da counselling e da proposte terapeutiche.

⁽¹⁾ Direttiva 98/79/CE del 27/10/1998 del Parlamento europeo e del Consiglio sui dispositivi medico-diagnostici in vitro. G.U.L. 331 del 27/10/1998.

⁽²⁾ Decisione della Commissione n. 2009/886/CE del 27/11/2009 che modifica la decisione n. 2002/364/CE relativa alle specifiche tecniche comuni per i dispositivi medico-diagnostici in vitro [notificata con il numero C(2009)9464].

⁽³⁾ (COM 569/2009).

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-005934/12
to the Commission**

Mara Bizzotto (EFD)

(14 June 2012)

Subject: Quick saliva test for HIV

The Food and Drug Administration has received a positive opinion from the Blood Products Advisory Committee for the marketing of a test able to diagnose HIV by means of saliva, giving the result in around half an hour. It has been rumoured that it could be marketed even without a prescription. According to the tests carried out it appears to be reliable: in 93% of cases it can be ascertained if the subject is actually HIV positive, in 7% of cases the test gives a negative result even if the person is affected by HIV.

1. Is the Commission aware of this test?
2. How does the Commission consider a possible liberalisation of the sale in the EU of this type of test without medical supervision?
3. According to some experts, the adoption of this type of test would help break down the psychological barrier which often inhibits people from carrying out the usual tests in hospitals and would therefore enable earlier diagnosis of the infection, vital for getting rapid treatment. What is the Commission's position on these issues?
4. In Italy a rapid test of this type has been in use since January this year at the Amedeo di Savoia hospital in Piedmont, along with the usual blood tests. What is the situation in other Member States?
5. Does the Commission support the adoption of this diagnostic technique?

Answer given by Mr Dalli on behalf of the Commission

(22 August 2012)

1. The Commission is aware of this type of test.
2. EU legislation sets out the specifications demanded and the essential requirements that an in-vitro diagnostic device must meet before being sold on the internal market ⁽¹⁾ ⁽²⁾. In particular, reagents and products for the detection and confirmation of HIV are listed in the accompanying Annex II of Directive 98/79/EC¹.
3. The Commission promotes HIV testing in cooperation with Member States and stakeholders and co-funds relevant projects through the Health Programme. For example, the Commission is currently financing a project that explores the effect of the rapid HIV tests on community-based settings SIALON II, which started in November 2011 for a duration of three years. The importance of early testing and consequent timely treatment to reduce HIV transmission is emphasised in the Commission Communication on 'Combating HIV/AIDS in the European Union and neighbouring countries, 2009-2013' ⁽³⁾ and in its accompanying Action Plan. Furthermore, the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control has issued testing guidelines for the settings in which rapid tests should be used and their benefits.
4. The Commission is aware of the fact that the use of rapid HIV tests is allowed in several Member States, however, the Commission does not monitor this practice.
5. The Commission supports evidence-based testing programmes to reach out to people most at risk. These testing programmes should be linked to counselling and to offers of treatment.

⁽¹⁾ Directive 98/79/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on *in vitro* diagnostic medical devices, OJ L 331, 27.10.1998.

⁽²⁾ Commission Decision amending Decision 2002/364/EC on common technical specifications for *in vitro* diagnostic medical devices (notified under document C(2009) 9464), 2009/886/EC, 27.11.2009.

⁽³⁾ (COM 569/2009).

(Ελληνική έκδοση)

Ερώτηση με αίτημα γραπτής απάντησης E-005937/12

προς την Επιτροπή

Rodi Kratsa-Tsagaropoulou (PPE)

(14 Ιουνίου 2012)

Θέμα: Πολιτικές για τον υποχρεωτικό έλεγχο οντοτήτων δημοσίου συμφέροντος

Στις 30.11.2011 δημοσιοποιήθηκε η πρόταση ⁽¹⁾ της Ευρωπαϊκής Επιτροπής για τις ειδικές απαιτήσεις όσον αφορά στον υποχρεωτικό έλεγχο οντοτήτων δημοσίου συμφέροντος, η οποία και εισάγει πολιτικές και μέτρα σύμφωνα με την έκθεση εκτίμησης αντικτύπου ⁽²⁾. Ωστόσο, η έκθεση της Copenhagen Economics ⁽³⁾, όπως και η μελέτη Bocconi ⁽⁴⁾, επισημαίνουν την αρνητική επίδραση συγκεκριμένων προτεινόμενων πολιτικών σε τομείς που η Επιτροπή θεωρεί πρωτεύοντες. Συγκεκριμένα, τονίζεται η επιδείνωση των όρων ανταγωνισμού στην ελεγκτική αγορά, η αύξηση του κόστους των παρεχόμενων εργασιών που προκύπτει από την υποχρέωση εναλλαγής των ελεγκτικών εταιρειών ανά διαστήματα, ο κίνδυνος βραχυπρόθεσμης υποβάθμισης της ποιότητας, ενώ παράλληλα τίθεται το ζήτημα μη επαρκούς ανάλυσης για την εξαγωγή συμπερασμάτων στο πλαίσιο της έκθεσης εκτίμησης επιπτώσεων. Την ίδια στιγμή, σύμφωνα με την έκθεση εκτίμησης αντικτύπου «δεν είναι δυνατό να δοθεί μία αξιόπιστη εκτίμηση για το συνολικό κόστος του πακέτου πολιτικών».

Δεδομένων των παραπάνω ευρημάτων και αναφορών, ερωτάται η Επιτροπή:

1. Πώς αξιολογεί τα προαναφερόμενα ευρήματα των μελετών;
2. Διαθέτει επαρκή και αξιόπιστη ποσοτική εκτίμηση των οφελών που συνεπάγονται οι προτεινόμενες πολιτικές της;
3. Θεωρεί πως τα ευρήματα των μελετών δικαιολογούν επαναθεώρηση συγκεκριμένων πολιτικών, προκειμένου να επιτευχθούν οι επιδιώξεις και οι στόχοι των κοινοτικών οργάνων, απομακρύνοντας κατά αυτό τον τρόπο το ενδεχόμενο πιθανών στρεβλώσεων εντός της ελεγκτικής αγοράς;

Απάντηση του κ. Barnier εξ ονόματος της Επιτροπής

(30 Ιουλίου 2012)

Η ανεξαρτησία των εξωτερικών ελεγκτών θεωρείται σημαντική προϋπόθεση για την επίδειξη επιφυλακτικότητας και την εκπόνηση εκθέσεων ελέγχου καλής ποιότητας. Η επί μακρόν παραμονή στην ίδια θέση, που αποτελεί πραγματικότητα στη σημερινή αγορά παροχής ελεγκτικών υπηρεσιών, συνιστά σοβαρή απειλή για την ανεξαρτησία των ελεγκτών ⁽⁵⁾. Η υποχρεωτική μετακίνηση σε άλλη θέση με ανάλογα καθήκοντα θεωρείται αποτελεσματικό μέσο για την αντιμετώπιση αναλόγων κινδύνων. Επί παραδείγματι το εν λόγω μέτρο έχει ήδη εφαρμοστεί στην Ιταλία και αναμένεται να καθιερωθεί σύντομα στην Ολλανδία και εξετάζεται στις Ηνωμένες Πολιτείες.

Η έρευνα που πραγματοποίησε το Bocconi και το έγγραφο που δημοσίευσε η Copenhagen Economics είναι χαρακτηριστικά παραδείγματα των πολυάριθμων μελετών που έχουν εξετάσει την ανεξαρτησία των ελεγκτών. Θα πρέπει ωστόσο να σημειωθεί ότι οι ως άνω δύο μελέτες έχουν ανατεθεί και χρηματοδοτηθεί από τον ίδιο τον εν λόγω επαγγελματικό κλάδο των ελεγκτών ⁽⁶⁾.

Η έρευνα του Bocconi αναγνωρίζει ότι «οι συμμετέχοντες στην έρευνα γενικά θεώρησαν αποδεκτό ότι ο ήδη υφιστάμενος μηχανισμός εναλλαγής στην Ιταλία αποτελεί μηχανισμό που εξασφαλίζει την ανεξαρτησία των ελεγκτών ⁽⁷⁾. Ανάλογο συμπέρασμα έχει διατυπώσει και η Assonime, η ιταλική ένωση εισηγμένων εταιριών».

⁽¹⁾ http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/auditing/docs/reform/regulation_el.pdf

⁽²⁾ http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/auditing/docs/reform/impact_assessment_en.pdf

⁽³⁾ http://www.google.gr/url?sa=t&trct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=1&ved=0CCQqFjAA&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.copenhageneconomics.com%2FAdmin%2FPublic%2FDWDownload.aspx%3FFile%3D%252FFiles%252FIntranet%252FDocuments%252FGenerelle%2Bfiler%252F622-01%2BCE%2BFinal%2Breport%2BReview%2Bof%2BEC%2BImpact%2BAssessment%2B0n%2BAudit%2BMarket%2B01FEB2012.pdf&ei=K3mWT62iC871sgbJps24Dg&usq=AFQjCNFutrj7hrUX7j8bVwaLi_dQYFD-vw&sig2=1j6sP1rYMwjoZ5xkovHaUw

⁽⁴⁾ http://www.google.gr/url?sa=t&trct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=1&ved=0CCoQFjAA&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.sdbocconi.it%2Ffiles%2Fwp_1_JP0PYEQS7BXXANG8DJYA61200663293.pdf&ei=53qWT8fjNZHBtAaZluynDg&usq=AFQjCNFsIsunJ3QsQ3CIBMusx2J-t3yHsA&sig2=DP5dAmm-EXs1yAsCu0Py4w

⁽⁵⁾ 48 χρόνια κατά μέσο όρο ανάθεσης του ελέγχου όσον αφορά τις επιχειρήσεις του δείκτη FTSE 100 και 36 χρόνια τις επιχειρήσεις του δείκτη FTSE 250, σε ορισμένες περιπτώσεις μάλιστα, όπως στην Barclays, ανάθεση του ελέγχου στον ίδιο φορέα (PwC) για περισσότερο από 100 χρόνια.

⁽⁶⁾ Η έρευνα του Bocconi χρηματοδοτείται από την KPMG (βλ. σελίδα 8 Ευχαριστίες για τη χρηματοδότηση που εξασφαλίστηκε από την KPMG). Η μελέτη Copenhagen Economics χρηματοδοτήθηκε από τις Big 4 (4 μεγάλες εταιρείες) (σελίδα 2 Πελάτες: Deloitte, Ernst & Young, KPMG και PwC).

⁽⁷⁾ Το 69 % των διευθυντικών στελεχών των εισηγμένων εταιρειών εγκρίνουν την εναλλαγή των ελεγκτών κυρίως διότι πιστεύουν ότι με την πάροδο του χρόνου οι ελεγκτές τείνουν να επικεντρώνονται σε δραστηριότητες ρουτίνας αποδίδοντας μικρότερη προσοχή στη διατύπωση προτάσεων και την επιβολή βελτιώσεων.

Το Bocconi αναφέρει επίσης ότι «οι περισσότεροι από τους ερωτηθέντες θεωρούν ότι το κόστος ελέγχου είτε δεν άλλαξε είτε μειώθηκε μετά την εκλογή του ελεγκτή ⁽⁹⁾».

Η εκτίμηση των επιπτώσεων που συνόδευε τις προτάσεις της Επιτροπής τον Νοέμβριο του 2011 ανέφερε σειρά εξωτερικών πηγών, συμπεριλαμβανομένης της έρευνας που πραγματοποίησε το Bocconi ⁽⁹⁾. Ως εκ τούτου κατά τα φαινόμενα δεν συντρέχουν λόγοι να επανεξεταστεί επί του παρόντος η εν λόγω έκθεση. Η Επιτροπή υποστηρίζει την άποψη ότι οι προτάσεις της θα έχουν θετικό αντίκτυπο στην οικονομία και τη χρηματοπιστωτική σταθερότητα καθώς αναμένεται ότι θα ενισχύσει την εμπιστοσύνη των επενδυτών όσον αφορά τις οικονομικές καταστάσεις των οντοτήτων δημοσίου συμφέροντος και θα μειωθεί έτσι το κόστος του κεφαλαίου ⁽¹⁰⁾.

⁽⁹⁾ Μόνο το 36 % των διευθυντικών στελεχών και το 36 % των δημάρχων και προέδρων κοινοτήτων που συμμετείχαν στην έρευνα θεωρούν ότι το κόστος του ελέγχου αυξήθηκε μετά την αλλαγή του ελεγκτή.

⁽⁹⁾ Εκτίμηση των επιπτώσεων της Ευρωπαϊκής Επιτροπής/Παράρτημα 11 Υποχρεωτική εναλλαγή των ελεγκτικών εταιρειών.

⁽¹⁰⁾ Οι ενδιαφερόμενοι φορείς, οι επενδυτές, οι μέτοχοι και οι επιχειρήσεις θα επωφεληθούν κατά κύριο λόγο από τη βελτίωση της ποιότητας των ελέγχων που αναμένεται να αποκαταστήσουν και την αξιοπιστία των χρηματοπιστωτικών πληροφοριών. Παρά το γεγονός ότι δεν είναι δυνατόν να γίνουν ακριβείς εκτιμήσεις όσον αφορά το συνολικό όφελος της πρότασης λόγω της πολυπλοκότητας των προτεινόμενων μέτρων, είναι δυνατόν να εκτιμηθεί το άμεσο όφελος ορισμένων εξ αυτών, όπως για παράδειγμα η καθιέρωση των κοινών ελεγκτικών προτύπων σε επίπεδο Ευρωπαϊκής Ένωσης που αναμένεται να αποβούν επωφελή για την οικονομία της ΕΕ στο σύνολό της μέσω της μείωσης του κόστους του κεφαλαίου, που εκτιμάται ότι θα υπερβούν τα 2 δισεκατ. ευρώ.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-005937/12
to the Commission**

Rodi Kratsa-Tsagaropoulou (PPE)

(14 June 2012)

Subject: Policies regarding the statutory audit of public-interest entities

On 30 November 2011 the proposal ⁽¹⁾ of the European Commission concerning specific requirements regarding statutory audit of public-interest entities, which introduces policies and measures arising from the impact assessment report, was made public ⁽²⁾. However, the Copenhagen Economics report ⁽³⁾, as well as the Bocconi survey ⁽⁴⁾, note the negative effect of certain proposed policies in areas to which the Commission attaches primary importance. More specifically, attention is focused on the deterioration of competition in the auditors' market, cost increases in the services provided as a result of the compulsory rotation of auditors after specific periods and the risk of impaired quality in the short term. Furthermore, it is noted that the analysis is insufficiently comprehensive to allow conclusions to be drawn in the context of the impact assessment report, which itself states that 'it is not possible to provide a reliable estimation of the aggregate costs of the package'.

In view of the above findings and reports:

1. How does the Commission evaluate the above findings?
2. Does it have adequate and reliable quantitative assessments of the benefits of its proposed policies?
3. Does it consider that the findings of the studies justify re-examination of certain policies in order to achieve the goals and targets set by EU bodies, thereby eliminating any potential distortions within the audit market?

Answer given by Mr Barnier on behalf of the Commission

(30 July 2012)

The independence of external auditors is considered an important pre-condition for applying professional scepticism and deliver good quality audit reports. Over time, long audit tenures, which are a reality on the current audit market, represent a serious threat to auditors' independence ⁽⁵⁾. Mandatory rotation is considered to be an effective tool to tackle this potential risk. By way of example, such measure is already applied in Italy, will be introduced shortly in the Netherlands and is being considered in the United States.

Both the survey of Bocconi and the paper published by Copenhagen Economics are examples of many studies looking at the independence of auditors. It should however be noted that these two studies have been commissioned and financed by the audit profession itself ⁽⁶⁾.

The Bocconi survey acknowledges that 'people contacted in the survey generally agreed that the current existing mandatory rotation in Italy constitutes a mechanism to guarantee auditor independence ⁽⁷⁾. This has also been recognised by Assonime, the association of Italian listed companies.'

Bocconi also states that 'most of the questioned people believed that auditing costs either did not change or even dropped following a change of the auditor. ⁽⁸⁾'

⁽¹⁾ http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/auditing/docs/reform/regulation_el.pdf

⁽²⁾ http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/auditing/docs/reform/impact_assessment_en.pdf

⁽³⁾ http://www.google.gr/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=1&ved=0CCQQFjAA&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.copenhageneconomics.com%2FAdmin%2FPublic%2FDWSDownload.aspx%3FFile%3D%252FFiles%252FIntranet%252FDocuments%252FGenerelle%2Bfiler%252F622-01%2BCE%2BFinal%2Breport%2BReview%2Bof%2BEC%2BImpact%2BAssessment%2BBon%2BAudit%2BMarket%2B01FEB2012.pdf&ei=K3mWT62iC871sgbJps24Dg&usq=AFQjCNFutrj7hrUX7j8bVwaLi_dQYFD-vw&sig2=1j6sP1rYMwjoZ5xkovHaUw

⁽⁴⁾ http://www.google.gr/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=1&ved=0CCQQFjAA&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.sdabocconi.it%2Ffiles%2Fwp_1_JP0PYEQS7BXXANG8DJYA61200663293.pdf&ei=53qWT8fjNZHBtAaZluyvDg&usq=AFQjCNFsI8unJ3QsQ3CIBMusx2J-t3yHsA&sig2=DP5dAmm-EXs1yAsCu0Py4w

⁽⁵⁾ 48 years of average audit engagement in FTSE 100 market and 36 years in FTSE 250, in some cases like Barclays audit engagement (PWC) more than 100 years.

⁽⁶⁾ Bocconi survey is funded by KPMG (page 8 Acknowledgements- Funding received from KPMG is gratefully acknowledged). Copenhagen Economics Paper is commissioned and financed by the Big 4 (page 2 Clients: Deloitte, Ernst & Young, KPMG and PwC).

⁽⁷⁾ 69% of managers of listed companies approve rotation mainly because they believe that over the years auditors tend to concentrate on routine activities and pay less attention to making suggestions/improvements.

⁽⁸⁾ Only 36% of the managers and 36% of the contacted 'sindaci' held that auditing costs increased following a change of the auditor.

The impact assessment accompanying the Commission's proposals in November 2011 referred to a number of external sources, including the survey done by Bocconi ⁽⁹⁾. Thus, there does not appear to be any reason to re-examine that study at this point of time. The Commission maintains the view that its proposals will have a positive impact on the economy and financial stability by strengthening investor confidence in the financial statements of Public Interest Entities, thus lowering the cost of capital ⁽¹⁰⁾.

⁽⁹⁾ Impact Assessment of the European Commission/Annexe 11 Mandatory Rotation of Audit Firms.

⁽¹⁰⁾ Stakeholders, investors, shareholders and companies will primarily benefit from better quality audits and restored credibility and confidence in financial information. Although, it is not possible to commit to a total estimated benefit of the proposal due to the complexity of the proposed measures, it is possible to estimate the direct benefit of some of them- for example the introduction of common auditing standards at the level of the Union should result in total recurring net benefits for the EU economy as a whole through lower costs of capital which are estimated to exceed EUR 2 billion euro.

(Versione italiana)

Interrogazione con richiesta di risposta scritta E-005940/12

alla Commissione

Oreste Rossi (EFD)

(14 giugno 2012)

Oggetto: Risultati allarmanti dal Quinto Rapporto sul monitoraggio della Convenzione ONU sui diritti dell'infanzia e dell'adolescenza

Il Gruppo di Lavoro per la Convenzione sui Diritti dell'Infanzia e dell'Adolescenza (Gruppo CRC) lancia l'allarme sulle condizioni di vita di milioni di bambini che vivono in Europa. Dal Rapporto emerge che la penisola italiana è ai primi posti in Europa per dispersione scolastica e incremento della povertà minorile o esclusione sociale. Sono infatti milioni i minori in condizioni di povertà relativa. Il Gruppo CRC chiede al governo italiano di adottare misure per combattere il lavoro minorile e contrastare la povertà minorile. In Italia manca un sistema di raccolta dati su questo argomento ed è inesistente un sistema di accoglienza nazionale per i minori stranieri non accompagnati che, al 31 dicembre 2011, risultavano essere 7 750 di cui 1 791 irreperibili.

Anche «Save the Children» è preoccupata per il netto peggioramento delle condizioni di vita di molti bambini in Europa.

Considerato che il Presidente Barroso, nello scorso vertice straordinario del Consiglio europeo dedicato alla crescita ha appoggiato la proposta dell'introduzione della golden rule, può la Commissione far sapere se è stato preso in considerazione il suggerimento di scomputare le spese destinate all'infanzia dal calcolo dell'indebitamento del paese?

Risposta di Olli Rehn a nome della Commissione

(3 agosto 2012)

I valori di riferimento per il disavanzo e il debito pubblico stabiliti dal trattato e dal protocollo sulla procedura per i disavanzi eccessivi non prevedono di scomputare alcun tipo di spesa.

La Commissione appoggia con determinazione le azioni intese a combattere il lavoro minorile e a contrastare la povertà minorile. Tra gli obiettivi della strategia Europa 2020 figurano i seguenti: portare il tasso di abbandono scolastico al di sotto del 10 % e ridurre di 20 milioni il numero di persone in stato di povertà o a rischio di povertà e di esclusione sociale. La piattaforma europea contro la povertà e l'esclusione sociale è una delle iniziative faro della strategia Europa 2020.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-005940/12
to the Commission**

Oreste Rossi (EFD)

(14 June 2012)

Subject: Alarming results from the Fifth Report on the monitoring of the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child

The Working Group for the Convention on the Rights of the Child (the CRC Group) has sounded the alarm on the living conditions of millions of children living in Europe. According to the report, Italy has one of the highest school drop-out rates in Europe and is one of the countries in which child poverty and social exclusion have increased the most. There are in fact millions of minors in conditions of relative poverty. The CRC Group is calling on the Italian Government to adopt measures to combat child labour and to counter child poverty. In Italy there is no system for collecting data on this issue and neither is there a national system for dealing with foreign unaccompanied minors who, at 31 December 2011, amounted to 7 750 of whom 1 791 were untraceable.

'Save the Children', too, is worried about the marked worsening of the living conditions of many children in Europe.

Considering that President Barroso, in the last extraordinary meeting of the European Council dedicated to growth, supported the proposal to introduce the 'golden rule', can the Commission say whether the suggestion of deducting expenditure for children from the calculation of the country's debt has been taken into consideration?

Answer given by Mr Rehn on behalf of the Commission

(3 August 2012)

The reference values for government deficit and debt set by the Treaty and the Protocol on the Excessive Deficit Procedure do not envisage exclusion of any type of expenditure.

The Commission strongly supports actions to combat child labour and to counter child poverty. The Europe 2020 goals include reducing school drop-out rates below 10% and at least 20 million fewer people in or at risk of poverty and social exclusion. The European Platform against poverty and social exclusion is one of the flagship initiatives of the EU 2020 strategy.

(Versione italiana)

Interrogazione con richiesta di risposta scritta E-005941/12

alla Commissione

Oreste Rossi (EFD)

(14 giugno 2012)

Oggetto: L'erosione costiera: spiagge che scompaiono

Le coste italiane presentano uno sviluppo di 7 687 km; tra questi, circa il 37 % è costituito da costa alta e rocciosa, mentre il restante 63 % è costituito da coste basse, cioè litorali sabbiosi. Le analisi di modificazione della linea di riva evidenziano che circa il 24 % dei litorali, pari a oltre 1 100 km di costa, mostra una tendenza all'erosione. Naturalmente modellate dal vento e dalla ritmica azione delle onde con morbide morfologie delle spiagge, le dune costiere mostrano evidenti segni dell'erosione, ovvero di arretramento verso terra della linea di riva. In nessun altro paesaggio come quello costiero gli equilibri ambientali sono stati sempre stravolti dalla mancata o errata pianificazione delle attività umane: bonifiche e sviluppo urbanistico.

Allo stato attuale, l'equilibrio di tutte le spiagge è quasi ovunque compromesso dagli interventi sul territorio. Il trasporto litorale comporta il disequilibrio della spiaggia che si traduce nella maggior parte dei casi nella sua demolizione. Inoltre, gli studiosi prevedono in futuro un aumento delle criticità connesse alle coste per effetto dell'innalzamento del livello del mare e dell'incremento di fenomeni meteorologici estremi causati dal cambiamento climatico. Per queste motivazioni molte spiagge del Mediterraneo sono interessate dall'erosione, fenomeno che intacca gravemente una risorsa fondamentale da conservare e tutelare per le generazioni future. L'erosione delle spiagge è frequentemente associata alla demolizione delle dune costiere, che rappresentano il risultato di lenti processi di accumulo, ad opera del vento, delle sabbie trasportate dalle correnti marine lungo la costa che, in condizioni naturali, costituiscono un serbatoio di sabbia in grado di rifornire le spiagge nelle fasi ordinarie di erosione.

Considerando che per prevenire l'erosione costiera è importante una corretta pianificazione territoriale dettata dai principi dello sviluppo sostenibile, intende la Commissione favorire la ricerca scientifica nel settore della protezione dei litorali che, negli ultimi anni, ha conosciuto già un notevole sviluppo?

Risposta di Janez Potočnik a nome della Commissione

(31 luglio 2012)

La Commissione è preoccupata dall'aumento della pressione esercitata sui litorali europei. Gli effetti dei cambiamenti climatici e le attività dell'uomo, come lo sviluppo costiero, incidono in modo significativo sulle coste, anche attraverso la loro erosione.

Per sostenere una risposta integrata alla gestione delle coste, nel 2002 l'Unione europea ha adottato la raccomandazione relativa all'attuazione della gestione integrata delle zone costiere in Europa (ICZM) ⁽¹⁾ e nel 2010 ha ratificato il protocollo ICZM ⁽²⁾ della Convenzione di Barcellona per il Mar Mediterraneo. Entrambi gli strumenti considerano l'erosione costiera una grave minaccia per le zone costiere.

La Commissione ha finanziato uno studio sulla gestione sostenibile dell'erosione costiera in Europa intitolato «Eurosion», i cui risultati sono pubblicati sul sito <http://www.eurosion.org/>.

La Commissione ha inoltre finanziato il progetto «Ourcoast», che ha realizzato una piattaforma web sulla gestione costiera che comprende una banca dati delle migliori pratiche di gestione delle coste, compresi diversi casi di prevenzione e attenuazione dell'erosione. La banca dati è accessibile all'indirizzo <http://ec.europa.eu/ourcoast/>. Anche la piattaforma europea sull'adattamento ai cambiamenti climatici, consultabile su <http://climate-adapt.eea.europa.eu>, che mira a fornire all'Europa un contributo per adattarsi ai cambiamenti climatici, presenta informazioni pertinenti alle zone costiere.

Nell'invito a presentare proposte nell'ambito del Settimo programma quadro di ricerca, pubblicato il 9 luglio 2012, è stato inserito un tema specifico dal titolo «Coasts at threat in Europe: tsunamis and climate-related risks» (Coste a rischio in Europa: tsunami e rischi legati al clima), inteso a migliorare la valutazione della vulnerabilità e dei rischi delle coste nonché a sviluppare misure adeguate di prevenzione, attenuazione e reazione.

⁽¹⁾ Raccomandazione 2002/413/CE.

⁽²⁾ Decisione 2009/89/CE del Consiglio.

(English version)

Question for written answer E-005941/12
to the Commission
Oreste Rossi (EFD)
(14 June 2012)

Subject: Coastal erosion: disappearing beaches

The Italian coastline is 7 687 kilometres long; of this about 37% consists of high rocky ground, while the remaining 63% consists of low-lying areas, i.e. sandy beaches. Studies of changes to the coastline show that about 24% of seashores, equal to over 1 100 km, are showing a tendency to erode. Coastal dunes, which are naturally shaped by the wind and the rhythmic action of the waves against the soft consistency of the beaches, are showing clear signs of erosion, i.e. the coastline is retreating towards the land. Coasts, more than any other land area, have always been ruined by bad planning of human activities — land reclamation and urban development — or no planning at all.

At the moment the equilibrium of all the beaches is being compromised almost everywhere by land works. This movement of the coastline is causing an imbalance in the beaches which, in most cases, results in their destruction. In addition, researchers are anticipating increased coastal problems in future because of the rising sea levels and increase in extreme weather events caused by climate change. For these reasons many Mediterranean beaches are being affected by erosion, a process which is seriously damaging a fundamental resource which should be conserved and protected for future generations. The erosion of the beaches is frequently associated with the destruction of the coastal dunes, which are the result of slow processes of accretion, by the wind, of the sand transported by sea currents along the coast, which, under natural conditions, constitute a reservoir of sand capable of renewing the beaches during ordinary erosion.

Considering that proper land resources planning is vital for preventing coastal erosion, based on the principles of sustainable development, will the Commission encourage scientific research into the protection of coasts, which, over the last few years, has already been developed considerably?

Answer given by Mr Potočník on behalf of the Commission
(31 July 2012)

The Commission is concerned about the increase in pressures on European coastlines. Climate change effects and human activities, such as coastal development, cause significant impacts on the coastlines, including coastal erosion.

In order to support an integrated response to coastal management, the European Union adopted the recommendation on Integrated Coastal Zone Management ⁽¹⁾ (ICZM) in 2002, and ratified the ICZM Protocol ⁽²⁾ to the Barcelona Convention for the Mediterranean in 2010. Both instruments refer to coastal erosion as an important threat for coastal areas.

The Commission funded a study on sustainable coastal erosion management in Europe called 'Eurosion'. The results are published on <http://www.eurosion.org/>.

Furthermore, the Commission funded the 'Ourcoast' project, which established a web-based platform on coastal management that includes a database of best practices for coastal management, including several cases on erosion prevention and mitigation. The database can be consulted at <http://ec.europa.eu/ourcoast/>. The European Climate Adaptation Platform, <http://climate-adapt.eea.europa.eu>, which aims to support Europe in adapting to climate change, also includes information relevant to coastal areas.

In the call for proposals of the Seventh Framework Programme for Research (published on 9 July 2012) a dedicated topic has been foreseen titled 'Coasts at threat in Europe: tsunamis and climate-related risks', aimed at improving the assessment of coastal vulnerability and risks and develop adequate prevention, mitigation and preparedness measures.

⁽¹⁾ Recommendation 2002/413/EC.

⁽²⁾ Council 2009/89/EC.

(Versión española)

**Pregunta con solicitud de respuesta escrita P-005943/12
a la Comisión**

Salvador Sedó i Alabart (PPE)

(14 de junio de 2012)

Asunto: La gobernanza en el Mediterráneo

Tomando como ejemplo estrategias macrorregionales ya en funcionamiento, el Parlamento Europeo estudia la posibilidad de proponer una estrategia mediterránea macrorregional teniendo en cuenta las fructíferas experiencias de cooperación en la región Mediterránea, como en el mar Báltico, pero a diferencia del Danubio.

La Unión por el Mediterráneo (UpM) constituye el ejemplo más reciente y ambicioso, creado en 2008, con la voluntad política de revitalizar el Proceso de Barcelona y lograr transformar el Mediterráneo en una zona de paz, democracia, cooperación y prosperidad, por medio de proyectos de carácter transnacional, regional y local, a partir de determinadas prioridades establecidas de común acuerdo.

1. ¿Cómo valora la Comisión la eventual creación de una estrategia mediterránea macrorregional, teniendo en cuenta las estructuras institucionales ya existentes en la región?
2. ¿Cómo valora la Comisión que dicha estrategia macrorregional pueda ser participada por la Unión por el Mediterráneo (UpM) a partir de sus prioridades estratégicas, sin exclusión de cualquier otra prioridad que pueda surgir del trabajo en común de las regiones afectadas?
3. ¿Cómo entiende la Comisión que debería construirse dicha estrategia macrorregional? ¿Debería la región mediterránea dividirse en tres macrorregiones distintas —la occidental, la central y la oriental—, en dos —la occidental y la oriental—, o bien considerar una única estrategia macrorregional para todo el Mediterráneo?

Respuesta del Sr. Füle en nombre de la Comisión

(26 de julio de 2012)

Tras los acontecimientos de comienzos de 2011, la Comisión y la AR/VP han presentado una estrategia para la acción de la UE en los países del Mediterráneo meridional, en forma de Asociación para la Democracia y la Prosperidad Compartida. En mayo de 2012 se presentó una hoja de ruta para la continuación de la ejecución de esta estrategia. Ambos documentos fueron aprobados por el Consejo.

La Comisión y la AR/VP están convencidos de que las cuestiones regionales requieren soluciones regionales. Aunque efectivamente la UE es consciente de que cada socio se enfrenta a retos específicos que requieren una respuesta de la UE adaptada en consonancia con el principio de diferenciación y de «más por más», también aspira a crear las sinergias y dinámicas positivas que podrían conducir finalmente a una cooperación regional reforzada.

La UE ha manifestado su disposición a desarrollar una cooperación más estructurada y el diálogo en toda la zona mediterránea. En marzo de 2012, la UE asumió la Copresidencia septentrional de la Unión por el Mediterráneo (UpM) para dar un nuevo impulso a los diálogos en el sector y mejorar la coherencia entre las políticas y actividades de la UE y la UpM. La Unión, que ya apoya a la Secretaría de la UpM en Barcelona, organiza periódicamente grupos de trabajo de alto nivel. Su objetivo es reforzar el diálogo político y apoyar proyectos concretos. Asimismo, lleva a cabo un diálogo más estructurado con la Liga de Estados Árabes (LEA). En otoño de 2012 tendrá lugar una reunión de Ministros de Asuntos Exteriores entre los 22 miembros de la LEA y los 27 miembros de la UE. La UE también está explorando posibilidades para apoyar la cooperación entre los países del Magreb, identificando sinergias con las actividades del grupo de 5 + 5 y articulando una cooperación subregional con una mayor cooperación de Euromed.

En este contexto, la Comisión no ve la necesidad de desarrollar una nueva estrategia macrorregional para el Mediterráneo.

(English version)

**Question for written answer P-005943/12
to the Commission**

Salvador Sedó i Alabart (PPE)

(14 June 2012)

Subject: Governance in the Mediterranean

Taking macro-regional strategies that are already in operation as an example and with past experiences of productive cooperation in the Mediterranean in mind, Parliament is studying the possibility of proposing a macro-regional Mediterranean strategy. This would be similar to the one for the Baltic Sea region, but unlike the one for the Danube region.

The Union for the Mediterranean (UfM), created in 2008, represents the most recent and ambitious example of such a strategy, with the political will to revitalise the Barcelona process and succeed in transforming the Mediterranean into an area of peace, democracy, cooperation and prosperity by means of transnational, regional and local projects, based on mutually agreed specific priorities.

1. What is the Commission's opinion regarding the potential creation of a macro-regional Mediterranean strategy, bearing in mind the institutional structures that already exist in the region?
2. What does the Commission think of the possible participation of the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM) in this macro-regional strategy, based on its strategic priorities, and without excluding any other priority that might arise from joint work in the regions in question?
3. How does the Commission think that this macro-regional strategy ought to be constructed? Should the Mediterranean region be divided into three (western, central and eastern) or two (western and eastern) separate macro-regions, or should a single macro-regional strategy be developed for the entire Mediterranean area?

Answer given by Mr Füle on behalf of the Commission

(26 July 2012)

Following events of early 2011, the Commission and the HR/VP have put forward a strategy for EU action in the Southern Mediterranean, in the form of a partnership for Democracy and shared prosperity. A roadmap for the further implementation of this strategy was put forward in May 2012. Both documents were endorsed by the Council.

The Commission and the HR/VP are persuaded that regional questions require regional solutions. Indeed while the EU is aware that each of our partners faces specific challenges that require a tailor-made EU response in line with the principle of differentiation and 'more for more', it aims at creating the synergies and positive dynamics that would eventually lead to enhanced regional cooperation.

The EU has signalled its readiness to develop a more structured cooperation and dialogue throughout the Mediterranean area. In March 2012 it assumed the UfM Northern Co-Presidency to give new impetus to sector dialogues and enhance coherence between EU and UfM actions and policies. The EU organises regular high-level working groups and already supports the UfM Secretariat in Barcelona. It aims to enhance political dialogue and supports concrete projects. The EU also conducts a more structured dialogue with the League of Arab States (LAS). A Foreign Ministers meeting between the 22 Members of the LAS and the 27 Members of the EU will take place in the autumn of 2012. The EU is also exploring opportunities to support cooperation among the Maghreb countries, identify synergies with the activities of the 5+5 group and articulate sub-regional cooperation with wider Euromed cooperation.

In this context, the Commission does not see a need to develop a new macro-regional Mediterranean strategy.

(English version)

**Question for written answer P-005944/12
to the Commission**

Richard Howitt (S&D)

(14 June 2012)

Subject: UK requests for state aid for the Coryton refinery in Essex

Can the Commission state whether it has had any informal or formal requests for state aid approval to be given or investigated with regard to support for the Coryton oil refinery, which is located in Essex in my UK constituency?

Can the Commission detail any discussions, correspondence or other communication held between itself and the UK Government with regard to the possible provision of state aid to Coryton, as this is a matter which impacts on the jobs and livelihoods of almost one thousand workers at the plant?

Answer given by Mr Almunia on behalf of the Commission

(9 July 2012)

The Commission has not had any informal or formal requests for state aid approval to be given or investigated with regard to support for the Coryton refinery.

The Commission would like to point out, however, that the assessment of state aid is based on a set of clear and transparent rules. To the extent that firms in difficulty are concerned, the Community guidelines on state aid for rescuing and restructuring firms in difficulty, set out in a communication from the Commission ⁽¹⁾, apply.

⁽¹⁾ Community guidelines on state aid for rescuing and restructuring firms in difficulty, OJ C 244, 1.10.2004, p. 2, prolonged in 2009, OJ C 156, 9.7.2009, p. 3.

(Deutsche Fassung)

Anfrage zur schriftlichen Beantwortung E-005946/12
an die Kommission
Andreas Mölzer (NI)
(14. Juni 2012)

Betrifft: Griechenlands Rüstungskäufe

Griechenland will Gerüchten zufolge trotz drohenden Staatsbankrotts im großen Stil von den USA Rüstungsgüter, darunter 400 Abram-Kampfpanzer, 700 M113-Mannschaftstransportpanzer Bradley und zehn Black-Hawk-Hubschrauber kaufen. Offenbar will Washington die Panzer und Hubschrauber, die nach dem Abzug aus dem Irak nicht mehr benötigt werden, günstig loswerden, weil dies billiger wäre als der Transport in die Vereinigten Staaten.

1. Wie steht die Kommission dazu, dass Athen auf der einen Seite die bestehenden Kreditverträge mit der EU neu verhandeln will und auf der anderen Seite das Militär aufgerüstet werden soll?
2. Wie steht die Kommission dazu, dass Griechenland, wenn es schon — quasi dank milliardenstarker EU-Hilfen — Geld für einen Waffenkauf hat, nicht bei europäischen Staaten kauft, sondern in den USA auf Einkaufstour geht?
3. Wird die EU im Rahmen der EU-Hilfen von Griechenland konkrete Einsparungen im Bereich der Armee fordern?
4. Wurden im Konflikt an der Ägäis Fortschritte erzielt?
5. Falls ja, welche?
6. Falls nein, gibt es Pläne seitens der EU für den Fall einer möglichen Eskalation des griechisch-türkischen Konflikts?

Antwort von Herrn Rehn im Namen der Kommission
(20. August 2012)

Bezüglich der Fragen 1 und 3 verweist die Kommission den Herrn Abgeordneten auf ihre Antworten auf die schriftlichen Anfragen E-000812/2012, E-616/2012 und E-002666/2012 ⁽¹⁾.

Griechenlands Käufe von Rüstungsgütern von den Vereinigten Staaten von Amerika sind eine nationale Angelegenheit. Die Kommission überwacht jedoch im Rahmen des zweiten Griechenland-Memorandums die Staatsausgaben aufmerksam.

Die Türkei und Griechenland haben ihre Anstrengungen zur Verbesserung ihrer bilateralen Beziehungen fortgesetzt, unter anderem mit der Vorbereitung des zweiten hochrangigen türkisch-griechischen Kooperationsrats sowie durch bilaterale Außenministertreffen am Rande zahlreicher internationaler Tagungen. Seit 2002 fanden 52 Sondierungsgespräche statt.

Die Resolution von 1995, in der die Große Türkische Nationalversammlung die Ausweitung der griechischen Hoheitsgewässer zum „casus belli“ erklärte, hat weiterhin Bestand. Entsprechend dem Verhandlungsrahmen hat der Rat erklärt, dass „sich die Türkei eindeutig zu gut-nachbarlichen Beziehungen und zur friedlichen Beilegung von Streitigkeiten im Einklang mit der Charta der Vereinten Nationen bekennen muss, insbesondere indem sie erforderlichenfalls den Internationalen Gerichtshof anruft“. Vor diesem Hintergrund betont die Union nachdrücklich, dass alle Drohungen, Irritationen oder Handlungen, welche die gut-nachbarlichen Beziehungen und die friedliche Beilegung von Streitigkeiten beeinträchtigen könnten, zu unterlassen sind.

⁽¹⁾ <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/plenary/en/parliamentary-questions.html>

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-005946/12
to the Commission
Andreas Mölzer (NI)
(14 June 2012)**

Subject: Greece's arms purchases

Despite impending national bankruptcy, there are rumours that Greece wants to make large-scale arms purchases from the USA, including 400 Abrams battle tanks, 700 M113 Bradley armoured personnel carriers and ten Black Hawk helicopters. Clearly Washington is keen to get rid of the tanks and helicopters, which are no longer required after the withdrawal from Iraq, at a reasonable price, as this would be cheaper than transporting them to the United States.

1. What is the Commission's stance on the situation that, on the one hand, Athens wants to renegotiate its existing credit agreements with the EU and, on the other, equipment is to be bought for the military?
2. What is the Commission's stance on the fact that Greece, if it has the money — effectively thanks to billions in EU aid — for arms purchases, goes on a shopping trip to the USA rather than buying from European countries?
3. Will the EU, in the context of EU assistance, require Greece to make concrete savings in the area of its armed forces?
4. Has any progress been made in the Aegean conflict?
5. If so, what?
6. If not, does the EU have plans in place in the event of a possible escalation of the Greek-Turkish conflict?

**Answer given by Mr Rehn on behalf of the Commission
(20 August 2012)**

Regarding questions 1 and 3, the Commission would like to refer the Honourable Member to its responses to Questions E-000812/2012, E-616/2012 and E-002666/2012 ⁽¹⁾.

Greek purchases of military equipment from the United States are a national matter. The Commission, however, closely monitors government spending in the context of Greece's second memorandum of understanding.

Turkey and Greece have continued their efforts to improve bilateral relations, including through preparations for the 2nd High Level Cooperation Council, as well as through bilateral meetings of Foreign Ministers in the margins of various international meetings. Since 2002, 52 rounds of exploratory talks have taken place.

The threat of *casus belli* in response to the possible extension of Greek territorial waters made in the 1995 resolution of the Turkish Grand National Assembly still stands. In line with the negotiating framework, the Council has noted that 'Turkey needs to commit itself unequivocally to good neighbourly relations and to the peaceful settlement of disputes in accordance with the United Nations Charter, having recourse, if necessary, to the international Court of Justice. In this context, the Union urges the avoidance of any kind of threat, source of friction or action which could damage good neighbourly relations and the peaceful settlement of disputes'.

⁽¹⁾ <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/plenary/en/parliamentary-questions.html>

(Ελληνική έκδοση)

Ερώτηση με αίτημα γραπτής απάντησης E-005947/12
προς την Επιτροπή
Ioannis Kasoulides (PPE)
(14 Ιουνίου 2012)

Θέμα: Πτητικά μέσα δημοσίου τομέα και άδεια αεροπλοϊμότητας

Ερωτάται η Επιτροπή κατά πόσο τα πτητικά μέσα που ανήκουν στο δημόσιο τομέα ενός κράτους μέλους, όπως για παράδειγμα στην αστυνομία, στην πυροσβεστική και στη δασοπυρόσβεση, πρέπει να υπόκεινται στη διαδικασία της απόκτησης άδειας αεροπλοϊμότητας για σκοπούς αεροπορικής ασφάλειας (safety) ή εάν μπορούν να εξαιρούνται.

Μπορεί η Επιτροπή να μεταφέρει επί του προκειμένου και την άποψη του Ευρωπαϊκού Οργανισμού Ασφάλειας Αεροπορίας (EASA) κατά πόσον επιτρέπεται μία τέτοια εξαίρεση;

Ποια πρέπει να είναι τα προσόντα όσων αποκτούν άδεια για να οδηγούν αυτού του είδους τα πτητικά μέσα και ποια πρέπει να είναι τα προσόντα του Διοικητή Αεροπορικής Μονάδας (π.χ., της Αστυνομίας, της Πυροσβεστικής, της Δασοπυρόσβεσης, κτλ);

Από τη στιγμή που τέτοιου είδους πτητικά μέσα κυκλοφορούν διασυνοριακά από ένα κράτος μέλος σε ένα άλλο, ερωτάται η Επιτροπή εάν υπάρχει κοινή οδηγία που να διέπει αυτά τα θέματα που άπτονται της ασφάλειας της αεροπορίας και, στην περίπτωση που δεν υπάρχει, εάν βρίσκεται στα σχέδια της Επιτροπής η προετοιμασία μιας τέτοιας οδηγίας.

Απάντηση του κ. Kallas εξ ονόματος της Επιτροπής
(24 Ιουλίου 2012)

Τα πτητικά μέσα που διεξάγουν στρατιωτικές, τελωνειακές, αστυνομικές υπηρεσίες, υπηρεσίες έρευνας και διάσωσης, πυρόσβεσης, ακτοφυλακής ή παρόμοιες δραστηριότητες ή υπηρεσίες καθώς και το προσωπικό και οι φορείς που εμπλέκονται στη λειτουργία αυτών των πτητικών μέσων είναι εκτός του πεδίου εφαρμογής των κανονιστικών ρυθμίσεων της νομοθεσίας της ΕΕ σε ό,τι αφορά την αεροπορική ασφάλεια, δηλαδή του κανονισμού (ΕΚ) αριθ. 216/2008 ⁽¹⁾. Αυτό σημαίνει ότι θα παραμείνουν υπό τον κανονιστικό έλεγχο των κρατών μελών και ότι ο Ευρωπαϊκός Οργανισμός Ασφάλειας Αεροπορίας δεν είναι αρμόδιος για να διεξάγει λειτουργίες και καθήκοντα που ανατίθενται στα κράτη μέλη από τις ισχύουσες διεθνείς συμβάσεις, ιδίως τη σύμβαση του Σικάγου.

Κατά συνέπεια, τα εν λόγω πτητικά μέσα δεν επωφελούνται από την αμοιβαία αναγνώριση που προβλέπεται στον προαναφερθέντα κανονισμό και, ως εκ τούτου, κανένα πτητικό μέσο ενός κράτους μέλους δεν μπορεί να εκτελεί πτήσεις πάνω από το έδαφος άλλου κράτους μέλους χωρίς την άδεια του τελευταίου με ειδική συμφωνία.

Το πεδίο εφαρμογής των αρμοδιοτήτων της Ευρωπαϊκής Ένωσης ορίστηκε από τους Ευρωπαίους νομοθέτες και η Επιτροπή δεν προτίθεται να κάνει οποιαδήποτε πρόταση τροποποίησης του εν λόγω πεδίου εφαρμογής όσον αφορά τις δραστηριότητες που αναφέρονται στην ερώτηση του Αξιότιμου Μέλους του Κοινοβουλίου. Ωστόσο, ο κανονισμός (ΕΚ) αριθ. 216/2008 ενθαρρύνει τα κράτη μέλη να εξασφαλίζουν ότι οι σχετικές δραστηριότητες ή υπηρεσίες διεξάγονται λαμβανομένων δεόντως υπόψη, στο μέτρο του εφικτού, των στόχων του παρόντος κανονισμού.

⁽¹⁾ ΕΕ L 79 της 19.03.2008, σ. 1.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-005947/12
to the Commission**

Ioannis Kasoulides (PPE)

(14 June 2012)

Subject: Public sector aircraft and airworthiness certification

Can the Commission indicate whether public sector aircraft in the Member States, owned by the police, the fire department or the forest fires department for example, must for safety reasons be subject to airworthiness certification procedures or whether they are entitled to exemption?

What is the opinion of the European Aviation Safety Agency regarding the admissibility of such exemptions?

What should the necessary qualifications be for acquisition of a pilot's licence for such aircraft and what are the qualifications of the Air Unit Commander (in the police, the fire department, the forest fires department, etc.)?

Given that such aircraft are used across borders between Member States, is there a common directive governing air safety issues and, if not, is the Commission planning to draft one?

Answer given by Mr Kallas on behalf of the Commission

(24 July 2012)

Aircraft carrying out military, customs, police, search and rescue, firefighting, coastguard or similar activities or services as well as personnel and organisations involved in the operation of these aircraft are out of scope of Regulation the EU Air Safety legislation, i.e. (EC) No 216/2008 ⁽¹⁾. This means that they remain under the regulatory control of the Member States and that the European Aviation Safety Agency is not empowered to conduct functions and tasks ascribed to Member States by applicable international conventions, in particular the Chicago Convention.

As a consequence, these aircraft do not benefit from the mutual recognition provided in the aforementioned Regulation and, therefore, no aircraft of a Member State can fly over the territory of another Member State without the latter's authorisation by special agreement.

The scope of the European Union's competence was defined by the European Legislators and the Commission does not intend to make any proposal to amend this scope with respect to the activities referred to in the question of the Honourable Member. Through Regulation (EC) No 216/2008, the Member States are however encouraged to ensure that such activities or services have due regard as far as practicable to the objectives of this regulation.

⁽¹⁾ OJ L 79, 19.3.2008, p. 1.

(Nederlandse versie)

Vraag met verzoek om schriftelijk antwoord E-005948/12
aan de Commissie (Vicevoorzitter — Hoge Vertegenwoordiger)
Peter van Dalen (ECR), Thijs Berman (S&D) en Sir Graham Watson (ALDE)
(14 juni 2012)

Betreft: VP/HR — Gedwongen (kinder-)arbeid van Dalit-meisjes in de kledingindustrie van in de EU gevestigde bedrijven

De afgelopen paar jaren zijn er verschillende rapporten gepubliceerd over de betrokkenheid van Europese en Amerikaanse (VS-)kledingmerken en -detaillisten bij de kledingproductie in Zuid-India, waar tenminste 100 000 meisjes en jonge vrouwen -veelal behorend tot de Dalits (de „onaanraakbaren”) of afkomstig uit de lagere kasten — werk verrichten dat door de wijze van recrutering en de arbeidsomstandigheden neerkomt op dwangarbeid. Onlangs werd in het rapport „Maid in India” van de Stichting Onderzoek Multinationale Ondernemingen (SOMO) en de Landelijke Werkgroep India (beter bekend als het ICN, India Committee of the Netherlands) bewijs geleverd dat 37 in de EU gevestigde bedrijven hun goederen betrekken van vier grote kledingproducenten uit de deelstaat Tamil Nadu, waar deze en soortgelijke mensenrechtenschendingen plaatsvinden. Naar aanleiding van een eerder rapport — „Captured by Cotton” — gepubliceerd in mei 2011, zijn er enkele verbeteringen tot stand gebracht onder druk van actieve consumenten, ngo's enz., maar volgens het rapport „Maid in India” is er nog steeds sprake van grove wantoestanden.

1. Is de hoge vertegenwoordiger — vicevoorzitter bereid om het onderwerp op het gebied van de mensenrechten en het maatschappelijk verantwoord ondernemen, waarbij zoveel Europese bedrijven betrokken zijn, aan te snijden bij de regering van India om tot een gezamenlijke oplossing te komen?
2. Is de HV/VV bereid om dit onderwerp aan te snijden bij de betrokken en in de EU gevestigde bedrijven om tot een gezamenlijk actieplan te komen, de uitvoering daarvan te controleren en over de bereikte resultaten jaarlijks verslag uit te brengen aan het Europees Parlement?
3. Is de HV/VV bereid, gezien de criteria van de Commissie voor effectieve zelf- en coreguleringsprocessen ter bevordering van maatschappelijk verantwoord ondernemen (MVO) in sectoren (hoofdstuk 4.3 van de EU-strategie 2011-2014 ter bevordering van MVO), om met de kledingindustrie samen te werken aan een initiatief om een code van goede praktijken voor zelf- en coregulering te ontwikkelen (actiepunt 5 van de MVO-strategie)?
4. Is de HV/VV bereid, gegeven het feit dat de Commissie de VN-richtsnoeren inzake het bedrijfsleven en mensenrechten (UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights) onderschrijft, om bij de Europese kledingindustrie aan te dringen op totale transparantie wat betreft het bevoorradingsproces, naar het voorbeeld van het Nederlandse parlement dat hierom onlangs gevraagd heeft in een motie?
5. Is de HV/VV bereid om deze zaak ter sprake te brengen in het kader van de vrijhandelsonderhandelingen tussen de EU en India als bijdrage aan de besprekingen over het hoofdstuk over duurzaamheid en hoe er omgegaan dient te worden met deze kwesties in het kader van de vrijhandelsovereenkomst tussen de EU en India?

Antwoord van hoge vertegenwoordiger/vicevoorzitter Ashton namens de Commissie
(8 augustus 2012)

De EU heeft het probleem van kinderarbeid hoog op haar mensenrechtenagenda met India staan. In het kader van de lokale mensenrechtendialoog worden projecten gefinancierd en beleidsgerichte discussies gevoerd. Bij de universele periodieke doorlichting 2012 van India hebben vijf lidstaten aanbevelingen gedaan waaraan de EU met India zal werken. India bereidt een wijzigingsvoorstel voor zijn wet inzake kinderarbeid voor, om de weg vrij te maken voor ratificatie van de hiermee samenhangende IAO-verdragen.

De Commissie ijvert voor de uitbanning van kinderarbeid en steunt de maatregelen die de IAO en de Europese sociale partners uit de textiel- en kledingsector daartoe treffen. Zij werkt samen met belanghebbende partijen aan een mensenrechtenrichtsnoer voor maatschappelijk verantwoord ondernemen in industriële sectoren. Daarbij dienen de VN-richtsnoeren inzake het bedrijfsleven en mensenrechten als uitgangspunt.

De Commissie werkt ook aan richtsnoeren inzake bedrijfsleven en mensenrechten voor kmo's. Onlangs heeft zij een studie begeleid inzake verantwoordelijk beheer van de toeleveringsketen. De OESO-richtsnoeren voor multinationale ondernemingen bevatten aanbevelingen inzake de zorgvuldigheid die bedrijven moeten betrachten met betrekking tot het verantwoordelijk beheer van hun toeleveringsketen. Verder werkt de Commissie aan een code voor zelf- en coregulering, waarover momenteel een openbare raadpleging wordt gehouden. Zij zou graag zien dat de kledingindustrie aan deze raadpleging deelnam.

Wat de onderhandelingen over een vrijhandelsovereenkomst betreft, streeft de EU ernaar hierin een hoofdstuk over duurzame ontwikkeling op te nemen. Net als bij andere vrijhandelsovereenkomsten dient hierbij niet te worden uitgegaan van sancties, maar van transparantie en dialoog. Zo'n hoofdstuk zou een alomvattend kader moeten bieden dat op internationaal erkende normen en overeenkomsten berust, waaronder de IAO-kernnormen voor arbeid. Hoewel dit punt bij onderhandelingen gevoelig ligt, houdt de EU voet bij stuk.

(English version)

Question for written answer E-005948/12
to the Commission (Vice-President/High Representative)
Peter van Dalen (ECR), Thijs Berman (S&D) and Sir Graham Watson (ALDE)
(14 June 2012)

Subject: VP/HR — Bonded (child) labour of Dalit girls in garment production of EU-based companies

Various reports have been published in the last few years on the involvement of European and US garment brands and retailers in garment production in South India, where at least 100 000 girls and young women — mostly of Dalit ('untouchable') or low caste background — work under recruitment and employment schemes that amount to bonded labour. Recently the report 'Maid in India' by SOMO and the India Committee of the Netherlands provided evidence that 37 EU-based companies are sourcing from four large Tamil Nadu-based garment manufacturers where these and related human rights violations are taking place. Following on from an earlier report entitled 'Captured by Cotton', which was published in May 2011, some improvements have been made as a result of pressure from active buyers, NGOs, etc., but according to 'Maid in India', major abuses continue to occur.

1. Is the Vice-President/High Representative willing to raise this corporate social responsibility — (CSR) and human rights-related issue — which concerns numerous European companies — with the Indian Government, with a view to working on a joint solution?
2. Is the VP/HR willing to raise this issue with the EU-based companies involved in order to come up with a joint plan of action, to monitor its implementation and to report the results achieved to Parliament every year?
3. Is the VP/HR, in view of the Commission's criteria for effective self- and co-regulation processes on CSR (point 4.3. of the EU strategy 2011-2014 on CSR), willing to work with the garment industry as a pilot in order to develop a code of good practice for self- and co-regulation exercises (point of action 5 of CSR strategy)?
4. Is the VP/HR, in view of the Commission's endorsement of the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, willing to demand full supply-chain transparency from the European garment industry, for example as the Dutch Parliament has recently demanded in a motion?
5. Is the VP/HR willing to bring up this case in the context of the EU-India free-trade negotiations as input for the discussion about the sustainability chapter and how issues like this should be dealt with under the EU-India free trade agreement?

Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Ashton on behalf of the Commission
(8 August 2012)

Child labour is firmly on the EU's human rights agenda in India, with project-financing and policy discussions in the local Human Rights Dialogue. During India's 2012 Universal Periodic Review five Member States sponsored recommendations on which the EU will work with India. India is also preparing an amendment to its Child Labour Act that should pave the way for ratification of the related ILO conventions.

The Commission works towards the elimination of child labour and supports the action of the ILO and the European social partners of the textile and clothing sector in this field. It is working with stakeholders to develop a Corporate Social Responsibility human rights guide for industrial sectors, based on the UN Guiding Principles for business and human rights.

The Commission is also producing guidance material on Business and Human Rights for SMEs and has recently overseen a study on responsible supply chain management. The recommendations for enterprises to conduct due diligence for responsible supply chains are spelled out in the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises. The Commission is furthermore developing a code for self and co-regulation, on which public consultation is under way, and in which the garment industry would be welcome to participate.

Concerning the Free Trade Agreement (FTA) negotiations, the inclusion of a chapter on sustainable development is an EU objective and, as with other recent FTAs, this should be based on transparency and dialogue rather than on sanctions. Such a chapter would provide an overall framework based on internationally recognised standards and agreements, including the ILO's core labour standards, and while its negotiation is a sensitive matter, the EU's position on it remains firm.

(Versione italiana)

**Interrogazione con richiesta di risposta scritta E-005950/12
alla Commissione**

**Mario Pirillo (S&D), Debora Serracchiani (S&D), Luigi Berlinguer (S&D), Salvatore Caronna (S&D),
Gianluca Susta (S&D), Rita Borsellino (S&D), Gianni Pittella (S&D) e Rosario Crocetta (S&D)**
(14 giugno 2012)

Oggetto: Presunta violazione della direttiva 2009/148/CE del Parlamento europeo e del Consiglio del 30.11.2009

Nel novembre del 2009 è stata adottata la direttiva 2009/148/CE, avente ad oggetto la protezione dei lavoratori contro i rischi connessi con un'esposizione all'amianto durante il lavoro, per tutelarne i diritti, primi fra tutti quelli di cui agli artt. 2, 8 e 14 CEDU ed artt. 1, 2, 20, 21, 31, 34, 35, 37, 47 della Carta dei diritti fondamentali dell'Unione europea, e 45, 153, 157, 173, 174, TFUE. La Repubblica Italiana è stata già condannata dalla Corte di Giustizia con la decisione del 13.12.1990 nella procedura n. 240/1989, per mancato recepimento della precedente direttiva n. 477/83/CEE.

La Repubblica Italiana continua a non dare puntuale applicazione alla normativa dell'Unione, e ne discende l'esponentiale aumento delle patologie correlate all'asbesto e dei decessi conseguenti, oltre 5 000 ogni anno, con discriminazione anche nel conferimento delle prestazioni previdenziali per i lavoratori, con violazione delle specifiche norme comunitarie, tra cui quelle della direttiva n. 79/7/CEE del 19.12.1978, specialmente nei confronti dei cittadini e lavoratori dei siti della Regione Sicilia e della Regione Veneto, oltre che per altre realtà.

Vittime e lavoratori hanno inoltrato diverse istanze amministrative alla Commissione, e ricorsi alla Corte europea per i Diritti dell'Uomo, al fine di ottenere l'adempimento e/o l'applicazione delle norme dei Trattati e delle altre fonti di diritto dell'Unione.

Chiede alla Commissione:

1. se è a conoscenza di ciò e quali provvedimenti ha assunto.
2. se non sia il caso, in relazione alla norma di cui agli artt. 20 e 21 della Carta di Nizza, e art. 1, prot. 1, e 14 CEDU e 157 TFUE, di verificare con una commissione d'inchiesta il *modus operandi* della Repubblica Italiana e degli enti ausiliari, la discriminazione di cui sono oggetto i lavoratori nella Regione Sicilia nella erogazione delle prestazioni previdenziali ed assistenziali per i danni determinati dall'amianto, nonché l'opportunità di avviare la procedura di infrazione ed ogni altra azione al fine di ottenere il rispetto delle norme di diritto dell'Unione.
3. se e come sono stati investiti i finanziamenti ottenuti dalla Regione Sicilia, e quelli di cui ai Fondi Europei di Sviluppo Regionale e Strutturali.

Risposta di Laszlo Andor a nome della Commissione
(3 agosto 2012)

1 e 2. L'attenzione della Commissione è già stata attirata sulla qualità del recepimento della direttiva 2009/148/CE da parte della Repubblica italiana in seguito a diverse denunce presentate da cittadini italiani. La Commissione sta procedendo pertanto al riesame e all'analisi della legislazione italiana nonché della sua applicazione per assicurare il mantenimento dell'efficacia di tale direttiva concernente la protezione dei lavoratori contro i rischi legati all'esposizione all'amianto. Sulla base di tale analisi la Commissione adotterà le iniziative necessarie, tra cui, se del caso, l'avvio di una procedura d'infrazione.

La legislazione dell'Unione europea non contiene nessuna disposizione vincolante in tema d'indennizzo dei lavoratori esposti all'amianto e tale ambito rientra pertanto nelle competenze degli Stati membri.

3. La Commissione non è a conoscenza del fatto che finanziamenti nel Fondo europeo di sviluppo regionale siano stati usati dalla Regione Sicilia per realizzare progetti su siti contaminati senza procedere previamente alla loro decontaminazione. La Commissione esaminerà la questione e chiede agli onorevoli deputati di informarla dei casi in cui ciò sarebbe avvenuto.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-005950/12
to the Commission**

**Mario Pirillo (S&D), Debora Serracchiani (S&D), Luigi Berlinguer (S&D), Salvatore Caronna (S&D),
Gianluca Susta (S&D), Rita Borsellino (S&D), Gianni Pittella (S&D) and Rosario Crocetta (S&D)**
(14 June 2012)

Subject: Alleged breach of European Parliament and Council Directive 2009/148/EC of 30.11.2009.

Directive 2009/148/EC was adopted in November 2009, aimed at the protection of workers against risks linked to exposure to asbestos during work, to protect their rights, particularly those covered by Articles 2, 8 and 14 of the ECHR and Articles 1, 2, 20, 21, 31, 34, 35, 37, 47 of the European Convention on Human Rights, and 45, 153, 157, 173, 174 of the TFEU. The Italian Republic has already been condemned by the Court of Justice through its ruling of 13.12.1990 in action No 240/1989, for failure to implement the previous directive No 477/83/EEC.

The Italian Republic continues to fail to apply the rules of the Union and this gives rise to an exponential increase in pathologies linked to asbestos and the resultant deaths, over 5 000 per year, with discrimination also in providing social services to workers, thus breaching specific community rules, including those in Directive No 79/7/EEC of 19.12.1978, especially vis-à-vis persons and workers in sites in the Region of Sicily and the Region of The Veneto, as well as others.

Victims and workers have launched various legal actions to the Commission and recourses to the European Court of Human Rights, in order to obtain the adherence and/or the application of the rules of the Treaties and other European Union legal precedents.

The Commission is asked:

1. if it is aware of the above matter and what provisions it has undertaken.
2. if this is not the case, in relation to the rule covered by Articles 20 and 21 of the Nice Charter, and Article 1, prot. 1, and 14 ECHR and 157 TFEU, to establish a commission of enquiry on the *modus operandi* of the Italian Republic and auxiliary bodies and to investigate the discrimination to which workers in the Region of Sicily are subject in the provision of social and welfare services for harm caused by asbestos, as well as the suitability of launching breach proceedings and any other action in order to obtain observance of the legal regulations of the Union.
3. if and how the loans obtained by the Region of Sicily have been used, as well as those from the European Regional and Structural Development Funds.

Answer given by Mr Andor on behalf of the Commission
(3 August 2012)

1 and 2. The Commission's attention has already been drawn to the Italian Republic's implementation of Directive 2009/148/EC by a number of complaints from Italian citizens. The Commission is therefore in the process of examining and analysing the Italian legislation and the way it is applied, in order to safeguard the benefits provided by this directive on the protection of workers from the risks related to exposure to asbestos at work. On the basis of its analysis, the Commission will take all the necessary steps including, if necessary, the launching of infringement proceedings.

European Union legislation does not contain any binding provisions on compensation for workers exposed to asbestos, which means that this subject comes under the jurisdiction of the Member States.

3. The Commission is not aware that European Regional Development Fund funding would have been used by the Region of Sicily to realise projects on contaminated sites without prior decontamination. The Commission will look into this matter and would invite the Honourable Members to inform the Commission of cases in which this would have happened.

(Versão portuguesa)

Pergunta com pedido de resposta escrita E-005952/12

à Comissão

Nuno Teixeira (PPE)

(14 de junho de 2012)

Assunto: Revisão da dotação específica adicional para as RUP, caso Mayotte se torne uma região ultraperiférica

Considerando que:

- De acordo com a sua proposta de Quadro Financeiro Plurianual para o período de 2014 a 2020, «Um Orçamento para 2020», publicada a 29 de junho de 2011, a Comissão Europeia pretende atribuir uma dotação específica adicional às regiões ultraperiféricas e às regiões nórdicas de baixa densidade populacional da União Europeia num valor equivalente a 926 milhões de euros a preços de 2011;
- Esta dotação específica adicional será partilhada entre as várias regiões ultraperiféricas e as regiões nórdicas de baixa densidade populacional da União Europeia e que o Conselho se orientará, de acordo com as Conclusões da sua reunião de 24 de maio de 2012, sobre o Quadro Financeiro Plurianual 2014 a 2020, por um critério baseado na distribuição por habitante segundo a regra de 20 euros por habitante;
- Uma ação preparatória intitulada «Assistência Técnica para apoiar Mayotte ou qualquer outro território potencialmente afetado com a transição para o estatuto de região ultraperiférica» foi adotada na decisão relativa ao orçamento da UE para 2012 e que, nos termos do artigo 355.º, n.º 6, do Tratado sobre o Funcionamento da União Europeia, este território poderá tornar-se uma região ultraperiférica;

Pergunta-se à Comissão:

1. De acordo com o critério avançado pelo Conselho, qual o valor resultante da dotação específica adicional que caberia a cada região ultraperiférica e a cada região nórdica de baixa densidade populacional?
2. Uma vez que o montante definido a título da dotação específica adicional será distribuído pelas regiões existentes, pretende a Comissão rever este valor e/ou a sua distribuição, caso Mayotte se torne também uma região ultraperiférica até ao final do próximo período de programação?
3. E, na eventualidade de Mayotte se tornar uma região ultraperiférica ainda antes de se iniciar o próximo período de programação, isto é, ainda antes de 2014, pretende a Comissão propor um reforço do valor previsto âmbito desta dotação específica adicional?

Resposta dada por Johannes Hahn em nome da Comissão

(25 de julho de 2012)

1. Segundo o critério proposto para a determinação do montante da dotação específica, a importância total é proposta para repartição entre as regiões, no respeito da proporção exata da população de cada região.
 - 2,3. Em 11 de julho de 2012, o Conselho Europeu decidiu que Mayotte se tornaria uma região ultraperiférica a partir de 1 de janeiro de 2014. A Comissão tenciona propor um ajustamento do quadro financeiro plurianual, aditando uma dotação para Mayotte segundo os mesmos critérios que os utilizados na proposta original.
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(English version)

**Question for written answer E-005952/12
to the Commission**

Nuno Teixeira (PPE)

(14 June 2012)

Subject: Revision of the specific additional allocation to the outermost regions in the event of Mayotte becoming an outermost region

According to its multiannual financial framework for the period 2014 to 2020, 'A budget for 2020', published on 29 June 2011, the Commission intends to provide a specific additional allocation to the outermost regions and the northern sparsely populated regions of the European Union for a sum equivalent to EUR 926 million at 2011 prices.

This specific additional allocation will be shared among the various outermost regions and the northern sparsely populated regions of the European Union, and it will be directed by the Council, in accordance with the conclusions of its meeting of 24 May 2012, towards the multiannual financial framework for 2014 to 2020, using a criterion based on an allocation of EUR 20 per inhabitant.

A preparatory action entitled 'Technical assistance on supporting Mayotte, or any other territory potentially affected with the switchover to outermost region status' was adopted in the decision on the EU's 2012 budget, and under Article 355(6) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, this territory may become an outermost region.

1. According to the criterion advanced by the Council, what would be the resulting value of the specific additional allocation for each outermost region and each northern sparsely populated region?
2. Once the amount of the specific additional allocation has been distributed to the existing regions, does the Commission intend to review this sum and/or its distribution in the event that Mayotte becomes an outermost region by the end of the next programming period?
3. In the event of Mayotte becoming an outermost region before the start of the next programming period, that is, before 2014, does the Commission intend to increase the amount planned for this specific additional allocation?

Answer given by Mr Hahn on behalf of the Commission

(25 July 2012)

1. In accordance with the criterion proposed for determining the level of the special allocation, the total amount is proposed to be distributed among the regions in strict proportion to the population of each region.
 - 2, 3. On 11 July 2012, the European Council decided that Mayotte would become an outermost region as from 1 January 2014. The Commission intends to propose an adjustment to the multiannual financial framework by adding an allocation for Mayotte, following the same criteria as those used in the original proposal.
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(Versão portuguesa)

Pergunta com pedido de resposta escrita P-005953/12

à Comissão

Edite Estrela (S&D)

(14 de junho de 2012)

Assunto: Condições do resgate financeiro concedido à Espanha

Considerando as notícias que dão conta de que a Espanha irá pagar uma taxa de juro de 3 % pelo resgate financeiro, cujo valor global poderá ascender a 100 mil milhões de euros, amortizáveis em 15 anos, mas com um período de carência de cinco, ao longo dos quais o governo espanhol não terá de pagar juros sobre o montante das ajudas concedidas ao setor financeiro;

Pergunto à Comissão se confirma as condições do resgate financeiro concedido à Espanha, designadamente no que se refere à aplicação de uma taxa de juro de 3 % e ao período de carência de cinco anos?

Resposta dada por Olli Rehn em nome da Comissão

(25 de julho de 2012)

As condições financeiras a aplicar ao apoio financeiro concedido à Espanha, incluindo taxas de juro e prazos de vencimento, serão determinadas por um acordo-quadro financeiro entre o Fundo Europeu de Estabilidade Financeira e a Espanha. Os termos desse acordo estão atualmente a ser finalizados.

(English version)

Question for written answer P-005953/12
to the Commission
Edite Estrela (S&D)
(14 June 2012)

Subject: Conditions of the financial rescue package granted to Spain

It has been reported that Spain will pay an interest rate of 3% for the financial rescue package, the overall value of which could reach EUR 100 billion payable over 15 years, but with a period of grace of five years, during which the Spanish Government will not have to pay interest on the amount of aid granted to the financial sector.

Can the Commission confirm the conditions of the financial rescue package granted to Spain, in particular with regard to the imposition of an interest rate of 3% and the period of grace of five years?

Answer given by Mr Rehn on behalf of the Commission
(25 July 2012)

The financial conditions that will apply to the financial assistance granted to Spain, including interest rates and maturity, will be determined by a Financial Framework Agreement between the European Financial Stability Facility and Spain. The terms of this agreement are currently being finalised.

(Ελληνική έκδοση)

Ερώτηση με αίτημα γραπτής απάντησης E-005955/12
προς την Επιτροπή
Niki Tzavela (EFD)
(14 Ιουνίου 2012)

Θέμα: Κρίση και ελληνικές επιχειρήσεις

Πτώση μεγαλύτερη του 20 % σημείωσαν οι αφίξεις αλλοδαπών τουριστών στην Ελλάδα τον Μάιο, σύμφωνα με δημοσιεύματα στον ελληνικό Τύπο.

Από τα Ιόνια Νησιά και τις Κυκλάδες, και από τη Χαλκιδική μέχρι την Κρήτη και τη Ρόδο, η εικόνα είναι ίδια. Ο Μάιος δεν απέφερε τα προσδοκώμενα τόσο σε επίπεδο αφίξεων όσο και κρατήσεων.

Λαμβάνοντας υπόψη ότι προς όλους τους δημοφιλείς προορισμούς οι κρατήσεις από το εξωτερικό εμφανίζουν σημαντική υστέρηση σε σχέση με πέρυσι, καθώς επίσης φέτος δεν υπάρχει η «τονωτική ένεση» των προγραμμάτων κοινωνικού τουρισμού, που γέμιζαν πολλές μονάδες τον Ιούνιο και από τα μέσα Σεπτεμβρίου μέχρι το τέλος Οκτωβρίου, ερωτάται η Επιτροπή με ποιες ενέργειες μπορεί να βοηθήσει στη διαμόρφωση μιας στρατηγικής για την ενίσχυση του ελληνικού τουρισμού;

Απάντηση του κ. Tajani εξ ονόματος της Επιτροπής
(30 Ιουλίου 2012)

Η Επιτροπή παραπέμπει τον κ. βουλευτή στην απάντησή της στη γραπτή ερώτηση E-005906/2012 του κ. Γεωργίου Κουμουτσάκου ⁽¹⁾.

⁽¹⁾ <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/plenary/en/parliamentary-questions.html>

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-005955/12
to the Commission
Niki Tzavela (EFD)
(14 June 2012)**

Subject: Impact of the crisis on Greek enterprises

According to the Greek press, the number of foreign tourists arriving in Greece in May fell by over 20%.

From the Ionian and Cyclades islands, and from Halkidiki to Crete and Rhodes, the picture is the same. May did not bring the expected number of arrivals and bookings.

In view of the fact that all popular destinations are reporting a significant slump in foreign reservations from the previous year, and given the absence this year of any 'shot in the arm' from social tourism programmes, which previously filled many tourist facilities in June and during the period from mid-September until the end of October, what action can be taken by the Commission to help formulate a strategy to bolster the tourist industry in Greece?

**Answer given by Mr Tajani on behalf of the Commission
(30 July 2012)**

The Commission would refer the Honourable Member to its answer to Written Question E-005906/2012 by M. Georgios Koumoutsakos ⁽¹⁾.

⁽¹⁾ <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/plenary/en/parliamentary-questions.html>

(Ελληνική έκδοση)

Ερώτηση με αίτημα γραπτής απάντησης E-005957/12

προς την Επιτροπή

Niki Tzavela (EFD)

(14 Ιουνίου 2012)

Θέμα: Προμήθεια φαρμάκων σε καρκινοπαθείς

Σε κατάσταση απελπισίας έχουν οδηγηθεί λόγω των επιπτώσεων της οικονομικής κρίσης στον τομέα της υγείας οι χρόνια πάσχοντες, οι οποίοι έχουν φτάσει σε σημείο να... θέλουν να πεθάνουν. Η υποβάθμιση της περίθαλψης, οι ελλείψεις στα νοσοκομεία και η άρνηση των φαρμακοποιών να χορηγούν φάρμακα στους ασφαλισμένους λόγω των χρεών των ασφαλιστικών ταμείων δυσχεραίνουν την κατάσταση των χρονίως πασχόντων.

Ερωτάται η Επιτροπή αν υπάρχει κάποια πολιτική πρωτοβουλία που μπορεί να πάρει έτσι ώστε να μην στερούνται φάρμακα τουλάχιστον καρκινοπαθείς και άλλες ομάδες υψηλού κινδύνου, λόγω των σκληρών μέτρων που εφαρμόζονται στην Ελλάδα, και να μην επαναληφθεί τέτοιο φαινόμενο που δεν αρμόζει σε μια χώρα της ΕΕ;

Απάντηση του κ. Rehn εξ ονόματος της Επιτροπής

(3 Αυγούστου 2012)

Η αναφερόμενη κατάσταση είναι το αποτέλεσμα της απόφασης των ελληνικών φαρμακείων να αρνούνται να παρέχουν φάρμακα στους ασθενείς των οποίων το κόστος επιστρέφεται από τον ΕΟΠΥΥ ⁽¹⁾ (Εθνικός Οργανισμός Παροχής Υπηρεσιών Υγείας). Τα φαρμακεία αποφάσισαν να ζητούν από τους ασθενείς να καταβάλουν σε μετρητά το κόστος των φαρμάκων που αγοράζουν και τους καλούν εν συνεχεία να διεκδικούν την επιστροφή των χρημάτων απευθείας από τον ΕΟΠΥΥ. Η ενέργεια αυτή οφείλεται στο γεγονός ότι ο ΕΟΠΥΥ δεν είχε εξοφλήσει όλα τα τιμολόγια των τεσσάρων πρώτων μηνών του 2012 καθώς και το γεγονός ότι το ελληνικό κράτος έχει σημαντικές καθυστερημένες οφειλές προς τους ιδιώτες προμηθευτές συμπεριλαμβανομένων των φαρμακείων ⁽²⁾ από τα προηγούμενα έτη. Παρά τη διάθεση ορισμένων κονδυλίων τον Ιούνιο του 2012 για την πληρωμή των φαρμακείων, αυτά θεώρησαν ότι οι τοιοιυτοτρόπως εκτελεσθείσες πληρωμές δεν επαρκούσαν για να αλλάξουν την απόφασή τους. Ο ΕΟΠΥΥ έχει ήδη εξοφλήσει όλα τα τιμολόγια μέχρι τον Απρίλιο του 2012 και τα φαρμακεία έχουν ανακαλέσει στο μεταξύ την απόφασή τους.

Αξίζει να σημειωθεί ότι, σύμφωνα με το άρθρο 168 της ΣΛΕΕ, η δράση της ΕΕ πρέπει να σέβεται τις αρμοδιότητες των κρατών μελών (ΚΜ) όσον αφορά τον καθορισμό της πολιτικής τους για την υγεία και για την οργάνωση και την παροχή υπηρεσιών υγείας/ιατρικής μέριμνας. Ως εκ τούτου υφίστανται σαφείς περιορισμοί των δυνατοτήτων παρέμβασης όσον αφορά την υγειονομική περίθαλψη εκ μέρους των κρατών μελών.

Είναι επίσης προφανές ότι η εξόφληση εκκρεμών οφειλών από δημόσιους οργανισμούς και η αποφυγή του ίδιου φαινομένου στο μέλλον αποτελεί κοινή επιδίωξη της Επιτροπής και της Ελληνικής Κυβέρνησης. Αυτό αποδεικνύεται από τα μέτρα που περιλαμβάνει το μνημόνιο συμφωνίας για την Ελλάδα. Τα μέτρα αυτά θα μπορούσαν να συμβάλουν ώστε να εξασφαλιστεί ότι ανάλογα φαινόμενα δεν θα παρατηρηθούν πλέον στο μέλλον και ως εκ τούτου θα μπορούσαν να βοηθήσουν στην επίτευξη οριστικής λύσης για τα εν λόγω προβλήματα. Στην ειδική περίπτωση των δαπανηρών φαρμάκων που είναι καθοριστικής σημασίας για τη σωτηρία ζωών, ο ΕΟΠΥΥ ενισχύει την άμεση διανομή τους στους ασθενείς μέσω των φαρμακείων του ΕΟΠΥΥ.

Η Επιτροπή, στο πλαίσιο του προγράμματος οικονομικής προσαρμογής, παρακολουθεί με προσοχή την κατάσταση στην οποία αναφέρεται το Αξιότιμο Μέλος του Κοινοβουλίου όσον αφορά την Ελλάδα.

⁽¹⁾ Το Ελληνικό Ταμείο Δημόσιας Υγείας.

⁽²⁾ Τα τιμολόγια που έχουν παραμείνει ανεξόφλητα για περισσότερο από 90 ημέρες μετά την καθορισμένη ημερομηνία λήξης.

(English version)

Question for written answer E-005957/12
to the Commission
Niki Tzavela (EFD)
(14 June 2012)

Subject: Supply of medicines to cancer patients

Chronic cancer patients are in such a desperate situation due to the impact of the financial crisis on the health sector that they have reached the point of wanting to die. The downgrading of healthcare, the hospital shortages and the pharmacists' refusal to provide medicines to the insured due to the large amounts of money owed by the social security funds is making things worse for chronically ill patients.

Can any political initiatives be taken to ensure that at least cancer patients and other high-risk patients in Greece are not deprived of their medication as a result of the harsh austerity measures being implemented in Greece and prevent any recurrence of such a situation, which is unworthy of an EU Member State?

Answer given by Mr Rehn on behalf of the Commission
(3 August 2012)

The situation reported is the result of the decision by Greek pharmacies to refuse delivering medicines to patients, which are reimbursed by EOPYY ⁽¹⁾. Pharmacies decided to claim the full cost of the medicines from patients in cash, who would have then to claim for reimbursement directly to EOPYY. The reason of this action is that EOPYY had not paid all the invoices of the first 4 months of 2012 and that the Greek State owes private suppliers- including pharmacies- significant arrears ⁽²⁾ from previous years. Despite some funds being released in June 2012 to pay pharmacies, these considered those payments to be insufficient to end their action. EOPYY has now paid all the invoices up to April 2012 and pharmacies have called off the action.

Please note that under Article 168 TFEU, EU action must respect the responsibilities of the Member States (MS) for the definition of their health policy and for the organisation and delivery of health services/medical care. There are therefore clear limitations to possible actions as regards healthcare delivery in MS.

It's also evident that clearing arrears in payments by public bodies and avoiding the build-up of new arrears is a concern shared by the Commission and the Greek Government. This is demonstrated by the various measures listed in the memorandum of understanding for Greece. These can help ensuring that such developments do not occur and hence help deliver a sustainable solution for these problems. In the particular case of expensive life-savings medicines, EOPYY is strengthening the direct distribution of such medicines to patients in its network of EOPYY pharmacies.

The Commission, in the context of the Economic Adjustment Programme, remains attentive to the situation the Honourable Member reported regarding Greece.

⁽¹⁾ The Greek health public fund.

⁽²⁾ Invoices that have remained unpaid for more than 90 days beyond a specified due date.

(Versão portuguesa)

**Pergunta com pedido de resposta escrita E-005958/12
à Comissão (Vice-Presidente / Alta Representante)**

Ana Gomes (S&D) e Elisa Ferreira (S&D)

(14 de junho de 2012)

Assunto: VP/HR — Detenção ilegal do encenador palestino Nabil Al-Raei por Israel

Às 3 horas da madrugada do dia 6 de junho de 2012, pessoal militar israelita efetuou uma incursão no domicílio de Nabil Al-Raei, diretor artístico do Freedom Theatre, uma companhia sediada no campo de refugiados de Jenin, no norte da Cisjordânia. Os soldados recusaram-se a explicar o motivo da detenção. Segundo a televisão Al Arabiya, os israelitas terão confirmado o incidente, afirmando que Raei «foi detido (...) por suspeita de atividade ilícita». Nabil Al-Raei ficou detido em regime de isolamento, num ato que representa uma violação dos direitos dos prisioneiros, nos termos do direito internacional.

Este acontecimento constitui a sexta vez, nos últimos 12 meses, que as forças israelitas detiveram um membro do pessoal ou da administração do Freedom Theatre. De acordo com a mulher de Raei, a portuguesa Micaela Miranda, Raei está atualmente detido em regime de isolamento nas instalações prisionais de Jalame, no norte de Israel, e o seu advogado ainda não conseguiu averiguar o motivo exato da sua detenção.

As forças de segurança palestinianas, em cooperação com as forças de segurança israelitas, detiveram duas vezes o cofundador do Freedom Theatre, Zakaria Zubeidi, que esteve detido sem culpa formada numa prisão em Jericó. As mesmas forças de segurança israelitas e palestinianas não procederam a qualquer investigação rigorosa relativamente ao homicídio não resolvido de Juliano Mer Khamis, cofundador e diretor do Freedom Theatre, em abril de 2011, apesar da existência de provas forenses substanciais.

O Freedom Theatre é conhecido pela sua defesa da arte enquanto resistência contra a ocupação. Várias das suas produções foram apresentadas em vários locais na Europa e nos Estados Unidos. No entanto, Israel tem impedido frequentemente as suas apresentações internacionais.

1. Adotará a Vice-Presidente/Alta Representante todas as medidas necessárias com as autoridades israelitas para assegurar a integridade física e psicológica de Nabil Al-Raei?
2. Será que a Vice-Presidente/Alta Representante procurará garantir que Raei tenha acesso regular a representação jurídica e a visitas da família?
3. Exigirá a Vice-Presidente/Alta Representante que Raei seja imediatamente libertado caso não exista qualquer acusação juridicamente válida e que, caso existam acusações, tenha direito a um julgamento célere e justo?

Resposta dada pela Alta Representante/Vice-Presidente Catherine Ashton em nome da Comissão

(1 de agosto de 2012)

A Alta Representante/Vice-Presidente está consciente da detenção de Nabi al-Raed pelas Forças de Defesa de Israel.

A delegação da UE em Tel-Aviv, abordou esta questão com as autoridades israelitas. De acordo com as informações recebidas, Nabi al-raed não se encontra sob detenção administrativa, mas está detido no âmbito de uma investigação criminal relativa ao assassinio no ano passado do antigo diretor do Teatro Jenin, Juliano Mer-Khamis. Nabi al-Raed teve acesso ao seu advogado com quem se encontrou em 19 de junho, de acordo com as informações fornecidas. A questão é, portanto, de um inquérito criminal num caso de homicídio.

A delegação da UE continuará a acompanhar de perto a evolução da situação.

(English version)

Question for written answer E-005958/12
to the Commission (Vice-President/High Representative)
Ana Gomes (S&D) and Elisa Ferreira (S&D)
(14 June 2012)

Subject: VP/HR — Illegal arrest of Palestinian theatre director Nabil Al-Raei by Israel

At 3 a.m. on 6 June 2012, Israeli military personnel raided the home of Nabil Al-Raei, the artistic director of the Freedom Theatre in Jenin Refugee Camp in the northern West Bank. The soldiers refused to say why they were detaining him. According to Al Arabiya TV, the Israelis confirmed the incident, saying that Raei 'was arrested (...) on suspicion of illegal activity'. Nabil Al-Raei was detained incommunicado, in an act representing a violation of detainees' rights under international law.

This marks the sixth time in the last 12 months that Israeli forces have arrested a member of the staff or board of the Freedom Theatre. According to Raei's wife, Portuguese national Micaela Miranda, he is currently being held incommunicado at the Jalame detention facility in northern Israel, and his lawyer has been unable to ascertain the exact reason for his arrest.

Palestinian security forces, in cooperation with Israeli security, have twice arrested Freedom Theatre co-founder Zakaria Zubeidi, who has been held without charge in a Jericho prison. The same Israeli and Palestinian security forces have failed to carry out any serious investigation into the unsolved murder of Juliano Mer Khamis, co-founder and director of the Freedom Theatre, in April 2011, despite the existence of substantial forensic evidence.

The Freedom Theatre is well-known for its advocacy of art as resistance against occupation. Several of its productions have toured Europe and the United States, but Israel has frequently obstructed its international performances.

1. Will the High Representative/Vice-President take all necessary steps with the Israeli authorities to ensure the physical and psychological integrity of Nabil Al-Raei?
2. Will the High Representative/Vice-President seek guarantees that he will be granted regular access to legal representation and family visits?
3. Will the High Representative/Vice-President demand that he be immediately released in the absence of valid legal charges, and if such charges exist, that he be ensured a prompt and fair trial?

Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Ashton on behalf of the Commission
(1 August 2012)

The HR/VP is aware of the arrest of Nabi al-Raed by the Israeli Defence Force.

The EU delegation in Tel-Aviv has raised this matter with the Israeli Authorities. According to the information received, Mr al-Raed is not being held under administrative detention. He is being held as part of the criminal investigation into the murder last year of the former director of the Jenin Theatre, Mr Juliano Mer-Khamis. Mr al-Raed has had access to his lawyer whom he had last met, according to the information provided, on 19 June. The matter is therefore one of a criminal investigation into a murder case.

The EU Delegation will continue to monitor closely developments in this case.

(Version française)

Question avec demande de réponse écrite E-005959/12

à la Commission

Robert Goebbels (S&D)

(14 juin 2012)

Objet: Gaz non conventionnels et émissions de CO²

Selon l'Agence internationale de l'énergie, les États-Unis d'Amérique ont pu réduire leurs émissions de CO² ces cinq dernières années en raison d'un recours de plus en plus prononcé au «shale gas» pour la production d'énergie électrique.

En même temps, et grâce à l'exploitation des gaz non conventionnels en Amérique du Nord, le prix du gaz national a continuellement chuté ces dernières années. Notamment, les consommateurs industriels paient jusqu'à un quart des prix du gaz facturés aux entreprises européennes, ce qui pèse bien évidemment sur la compétitivité de l'économie européenne. En tout, l'utilisation massive de gaz non conventionnels a mené à une renaissance industrielle dans certains États américains.

La Commission n'estime-t-elle pas qu'il est grand temps que l'UE discute sérieusement du recours aux gaz non conventionnels en Europe?

La Commission entend-elle prendre des initiatives dans ce domaine?

Réponse donnée par M. Oettinger au nom de la Commission

(25 juillet 2012)

L'Honorable Parlementaire souligne à juste titre l'incidence significative des gaz non conventionnels américains, sur le plan tant du changement climatique que des prix offerts aux consommateurs et aux industriels. La Commission examine donc avec attention quelles pourraient être les répercussions de cette nouvelle évolution sur la politique européenne.

Les travaux de la Commission se concentrent sur trois aspects:

- les incidences potentielles sur le marché de l'énergie dans l'UE, y compris les aspects concernant la viabilité économique des gaz non conventionnels dans l'UE, de même que les incidences sur le marché de l'énergie découlant d'événements extérieurs à l'Europe;
- l'incidence sur le climat de l'éventuelle production de gaz non conventionnels sur le territoire de l'UE;
- les risques éventuels pour l'environnement et la santé humaine.

La Commission mettra également en œuvre en 2012-2013 un projet pilote encourageant les débats publics au sein des États membres dans les régions concernées par des projets d'exploration des gaz de schiste actuellement en cours ou explicitement prévus, précédés par des consultations en ligne.

Enfin, la Commission réfléchit à l'organisation éventuelle, au cours des prochains mois, d'une conférence à l'échelle européenne portant sur l'incidence des gaz non conventionnels et sur les arguments en faveur de leur exploitation éventuelle sur le territoire européen.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-005959/12
to the Commission**

Robert Goebbels (S&D)

(14 June 2012)

Subject: Unconventional gas and CO₂ emissions

According to the International Energy Agency, the United States has been able to reduce its CO₂ emissions over the past five years due to the markedly increased use of 'shale gas' for power generation.

At the same time, and thanks to the development of unconventional gas in North America, the national gas price has fallen continuously in recent years. In particular, industrial consumers are paying up to a quarter of the price of gas charged to European companies, which obviously affects the competitiveness of the European economy. In all, the massive use of unconventional gas has led to an industrial revival in some US states.

Does the Commission not think that it is high time that the EU seriously discusses the use of unconventional gas in Europe?

Does the Commission intend to take any initiatives in this area?

Answer given by Mr Oettinger on behalf of the Commission

(25 July 2012)

The Honourable Member is right to highlight the significant impact of American unconventional gas both in terms of climate change and prices offered to consumers and businesses. The Commission is therefore carefully studying the possible repercussions of this new development for European policy.

The Commission's work is focusing on three main aspects:

- potential energy market impacts in the EU, including aspects relevant for the economic viability of unconventional gas in the EU as well as energy market impacts stemming from developments outside Europe;
- climate impact of potential unconventional gas production in the EU;
- potential risks for the environment and human health.

In 2012-2013, the Commission will also implement a pilot project fostering public debates in Member States in regions with current or concretely planned shale gas exploration projects preceded by online consultations.

Finally, the Commission is reflecting on the possible organisation in the coming months of a European-level conference on the impact of unconventional gas and the arguments underlying its potential exploitation in Europe.

(Versione italiana)

**Interrogazione con richiesta di risposta scritta E-005961/12
alla Commissione**

Lorenzo Fontana (EFD)

(14 giugno 2012)

Oggetto: Applicazione del regolamento (UE) n. 1007/2011 relativo alla denominazione delle fibre tessili e all'etichettatura della composizione fibrosa dei prodotti tessili

Il regolamento in oggetto sancisce l'obbligo, per coloro che fabbricano o commerciano prodotti tessili di ciascun genere, di contrassegnare il prodotto con un'etichetta recante informazioni sul produttore o importatore, sulla composizione fibrosa, sulla presenza di sostanze che possono arrecare danno all'uomo, sui materiali o metodi di lavorazione impiegati e sulle istruzioni e/o precauzioni d'uso.

Quanto previsto dal regolamento in parola comporta obblighi di etichettatura anche per quanto riguarda la vendita di ritagli di tessuto (scampoli) di lunghezza inferiore ai tre metri. Il commercio di tali prodotti deriva dai fine produzione delle aziende che confezionano i capi di abbigliamento e costituisce una fonte di reddito importante per molti attori economici, specialmente nell'attuale congiuntura: infatti, grazie alla caratteristiche di convenienza ed economicità, questo genere di prodotto è apprezzato da un vasto segmento del mercato consumatori.

Relativamente a detti prodotti, la problematica posta dal regolamento risiede nel fatto che, nella quasi totalità dei casi, i ritagli di tessuto sono privi dell'etichettatura originariamente presente sul rotolo iniziale in quanto, a seguito delle successive lavorazioni, l'etichetta viene separata dai ritagli acquistati dai commercianti.

L'obbligo di etichettatura comporta che le ditte che forniscono gli scampoli siano tenute ad etichettare i residui prodotti prima della vendita, nonostante questi non rappresentino per loro che degli sfridi di lavorazione.

Alla luce di quanto precede, e del fatto che l'obbligo di etichettatura per gli scampoli ne rende anti-economico il commercio, al punto che la distruzione o lo smaltimento del prodotto diventano soluzioni preferibili, e tenuto conto delle oggettive difficoltà riscontrate dagli operatori del settore al riguardo, può far sapere la Commissione se sia possibile ottenere una parziale revisione del regolamento o, in alternativa, intervenire con atti di esecuzione di competenza della Commissione, in modo da esonerare dall'obbligo di etichettatura i ritagli di tessuto di lunghezza inferiore a 3 metri?

Risposta di Antonio Tajani a nome della Commissione

(24 luglio 2012)

Il regolamento (UE) n. 1007/2011 ⁽¹⁾, relativo alle denominazioni delle fibre tessili e all'etichettatura e al contrassegno della composizione fibrosa dei prodotti tessili, illustra le condizioni e le norme relative all'etichettatura dei prodotti tessili e armonizza i nomi delle fibre tessili. A norma di tale regolamento, i prodotti tessili commercializzati nell'UE devono essere etichettati o contrassegnati in modo da fornire informazioni sulla loro composizione fibrosa. Il regolamento non prescrive tuttavia obblighi relativamente alle informazioni su: produttore o importatore; presenza di sostanze potenzialmente nocive per la salute umana; materiali e metodi usati per la loro produzione o istruzioni e/o precauzioni d'uso.

Il regolamento (UE) n. 1007/2011 riguarda i prodotti in tutte le fasi della catena di approvvigionamento e non contiene disposizioni speciali o esenzioni per gli scampoli. Pertanto, come evidenziato dall'onorevole parlamentare, il regolamento si applica anche ai ritagli di tessuto (scampoli). Le principali disposizioni del regolamento (UE) n. 1007/2011 si basano tuttavia sulla direttiva 2008/121/CE ⁽²⁾ e gli obblighi vigenti per i ritagli di tessuto non sono stati modificati rispetto a quelli stabiliti da tale direttiva.

Per quanto riguarda la domanda dell'onorevole parlamentare circa eventuali modifiche al regolamento, il nuovo atto giuridico è entrato in applicazione l'8 maggio 2012, quindi la sua applicazione è ancora agli inizi. La Commissione sta collaborando con le autorità nazionali degli Stati membri e con le parti interessate per esaminare le questioni relative all'applicazione del nuovo regolamento. Al momento, tuttavia, non sono previste modifiche di tale atto legislativo.

⁽¹⁾ Regolamento (UE) n. 1007/2011 del Parlamento europeo e del Consiglio, del 27 settembre 2011, relativo alle denominazioni delle fibre tessili e all'etichettatura e al contrassegno della composizione fibrosa dei prodotti tessili.

⁽²⁾ Direttiva 2008/121/CE del Parlamento europeo e del Consiglio, del 14 gennaio 2009, relativa alle denominazioni del settore tessile — GU L19 del 23.1.2009.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-005961/12
to the Commission**

Lorenzo Fontana (EFD)

(14 June 2012)

Subject: Application of Regulation (EU) No 1007/2011 on textile fibre names and marking of the fibre composition of textile products

This regulation requires manufacturers and traders of textile products of all kinds to mark the product with a label containing information about the producer or importer, the fibre composition, the presence of substances potentially detrimental to human health, the materials and methods involved in their production and instructions and/or precautions for use.

As provided by the regulation in question, labelling is also required when selling fabric offcuts (remnants) less than three metres long. Trading in these products derives from the leftovers of businesses making articles of clothing and provides an important source of income for many economic operators, especially in current circumstances. In fact, a large segment of the consumer market appreciates goods of this type, as they are convenient and inexpensive.

The problem posed for these goods by this regulation lies in the fact that in almost all cases, fabric offcuts lack the labelling originally affixed to the roll of cloth from which they originate, since as the result of successive operations, the label becomes separated from the offcuts acquired by traders.

Obligatory labelling means that the firms supplying remnants are obliged to label residue before sale, despite the fact that for them these are only the scrap from the production process.

In view of this, and of the fact that obligatory labelling of remnants makes trade in them non-economic, so that it becomes preferable to destroy or dispose of these products, and bearing in mind the objective difficulties that operators in this sector encounter in this respect, can the Commission state if it would be possible to partially amend the regulation or, alternatively, adopt implementing acts within the Commission's competence in order to exempt fabric offcuts less than three metres long from obligatory labelling?

Answer given by Mr Tajani on behalf of the Commission

(24 July 2012)

Regulation (EU) No 1007/2011 ⁽¹⁾, on textile names and related labelling of textile products, describes conditions and rules for the labelling of textile products and harmonises textile fibre names used for that purpose. According to the regulation, textile products marketed in the EU need to be labelled or marked so as to provide information about their fibre composition. However, the regulation does not establish any requirements concerning information about: the producer or importer; the presence of substances potentially detrimental to human health; the materials and methods involved in their production or instructions and/or precautions for use.

Regulation (EU) No 1007/2011 covers products in all stages of the supply chain and does not include any special provisions or exemptions for fabric off-cuts. Thus, as pointed out by the Honourable Member, fabric off-cuts are covered by the regulation. Nevertheless, the main provisions of Regulation (EU) No 1007/2011 are based on Directive 2008/121/EC ⁽²⁾ and current obligations for fabric off-cuts have not been changed in comparison with obligations existing under that directive.

As regards the question of the Honourable Member concerning possible amendments to the regulation, the new legal act became applicable on 8 May 2012 and is in its early stages of implementation. The Commission is engaging with the national authorities of Member States and also with stakeholders to examine issues related to the implementation of this new regulation. Nonetheless, an amendment of this piece of legislation is not planned for the time being.

⁽¹⁾ Regulation (EU) No 1007/2011 of the European Parliament and the Council of 27 September 2011 on textile fibre names and related labelling and marking of the fibre composition of textile products — OJ L 272, 18.10.2011.

⁽²⁾ Directive 2008/121/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 January 2009 on textile names — OJ L19, 23.1.2009.

(Wersja polska)

**Pytanie wymagające odpowiedzi pisemnej E-005963/12
do Komisji**

Marek Henryk Migalski (ECR)

(14 czerwca 2012 r.)

Przedmiot: Szef rosyjskiego Komitetu Śledczego groził śmiercią dziennikarzowi

13 czerwca na łamach rosyjskiej „Nowej gazety” został opublikowany list otwarty redaktora naczelnego Dmitrija Muratowa do szefa Komitetu Śledczego Rosji Aleksandra Bastrykina. W liście Muratow informuje, że szef Komitetu Śledczego groził dziennikarzowi „Nowej gazety” Siergiejowi Sokołowowi śmiercią, wypowiadał się negatywnie o polityce informacyjnej gazety, a także w niepochlebnych słowach mówił o zamordowanej przed prawie sześcioma laty dziennikarce „Nowej gazety” Annie Politkowskiej. Ze względu na swe bezpieczeństwo Sokołow zmuszony był czasowo opuścić kraj po konflikcie z Bastrykinem.

Rosja jest uznawana przez międzynarodowe organizacje praw człowieka za kraj, w którym nie ma wolności słowa. Wczorajsze doniesienia jedynie potwierdzają ten fakt. W Federacji Rosyjskiej, jak się okazuje, wciąż dochodzi do ataków na przedstawicieli niezależnych mediów, prób zastraszania dziennikarzy, częste są również przypadki gróźb wobec krytyków Kremla.

W związku z tym zwracam się do Komisji z zapytaniem, czy ma zamiar podjąć interwencję i wyjaśnić tę sprawę, a także wyrazić zdecydowany sprzeciw wobec łamania wolności słowa w Federacji Rosyjskiej?

**Odpowiedź udzielona przez Wysoką Przedstawiciel/Wiceprzewodniczącą Catherine Ashton w imieniu
Komisji**

(7 sierpnia 2012 r.)

UE wie o doniesieniach na temat zdarzenia, o którym wspomina Szanowny Pan Poseł, a także podziela obawy Szanownego Pana Posła. Doniesienia takie ponownie rodzą poważne zaniepokojenie, jeżeli chodzi o wolność słowa i poczucie bezkarności w odniesieniu do przemocy wobec dziennikarzy w Rosji.

UE regularnie przypomina Rosji o jej zobowiązaniach międzynarodowych w zakresie zagwarantowania prawa do wolności wypowiedzi, a także podnosi kwestie zdarzeń, takich jak omawiany tutaj przypadek, na różnych szczeblach, w tym na odbywających się co dwa lata konsultacjach UE z Rosją w zakresie praw człowieka.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-005963/12
to the Commission**

Marek Henryk Migalski (ECR)

(14 June 2012)

Subject: Head of Russian Investigative Committee threatens journalist's life

On 13 June 2012, the Russian newspaper *Novaya Gazeta* published an open letter by its editor-in-chief, Dmitry Muratov, to the head of the Russian Investigative Committee, Aleksandr Bastrykin. In his letter, Muratov said that the head of the Investigative Committee had threatened the life of Sergey Sokolov, a journalist at the paper, made negative comments about the paper's editorial policy and said disparaging words about Anna Politkovskaya, a correspondent of *Novaya Gazeta* who was murdered six years ago. For his own safety, Mr Sokolov has been forced to leave the country for the time being following his clash with Bastrykin.

International human rights organisations regard Russia as a country in which there is no freedom of expression. The above incident provides further evidence of this. Attacks on representatives of the independent media and attempts to intimidate journalists are clearly continuing in the Russian Federation, and threats against critics of the Kremlin are commonplace.

Given the above, does the Commission intend to intervene with a view to shedding light on this matter and to voice its resolute opposition to infringements of the right to free speech in the Russian Federation?

Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Ashton on behalf of the Commission

(7 August 2012)

The EU is aware of reports about the incident referred to by the Honourable Member, and shares the concerns expressed. These reports once more raise serious questions about the freedom of expression and the climate of impunity regarding violence against journalists in Russia.

The EU regularly reminds Russia of its international commitments to guarantee the right to freedom of expression, and raise cases like the one in question at various levels, including at the biannual EU-Russia Human Rights Consultations.

(Version française)

Question avec demande de réponse écrite P-005964/12

à la Commission

Catherine Grèze (Verts/ALE)

(14 juin 2012)

Objet: Épandages aériens de pesticides dans le Sud-Ouest

Plusieurs départements du Sud-Ouest de la France (dont les Landes, le Gers et la Haute-Garonne) sont actuellement sujets à des demandes de dérogations concernant l'épandage aérien de pesticides sur des cultures de maïs, suite à la décision prise en mai 2011 par M. Bruno Le Maire, alors ministre de l'agriculture. Si ces dérogations étaient actées, elles contrediraient pas moins de trois directives européennes.

Tout d'abord, la directive européenne relative à une utilisation des pesticides compatible avec le développement durable (directive 2009/128/CE) dispose, dans son article 14, que la pulvérisation aérienne est interdite sauf si cette technique ne présente qu'une «incidence limitée sur la santé et l'environnement». Or, des études scientifiques ont prouvé les effets néfastes entre autres de la déltaméthrine et de la cyperméthrine (insecticides présents dans les épandages prévus) sur les abeilles (hausse de la mortalité, baisse de la fertilité, de la croissance et du développement etc.). Force est de penser que si ces «sentinelles de l'environnement» peuvent être affectées, d'autres espèces, dont l'être humain, le seront inévitablement.

D'autre part, certaines communes concernées par l'épandage figurent sur des sites Natura 2000 (par exemple, les villes de Muret et de Carbonne sur les sites FR7301822 «Garonne, Ariège, Hers, Salat, Pique et Neste», FR7312014 «Vallée de la Garonne de Muret à Moissac» et FR7312010 «Vallée de la Garonne de Boussens à Carbonne»; ou de Betcave-Aguin et Simorre sur le site FR7300897 «Vallée et coteaux de la Lauze»). Au vu des incidences néfastes précitées, les directives «Habitats» (92/43/CEE) et «Oiseaux» (79/409/CEE) ne sont clairement pas respectées car il y a un risque de «détérioration et d'élimination de la faune et de la flore présentes» sur ces sites.

Enfin, la directive-cadre sur l'eau ((2000/60/CE) est elle aussi malmenée puisqu'elle prône une protection des eaux et une diminution croissante des produits dangereux rejetés dans l'eau (articles 22, 27, 43) à l'horizon 2015. Or, la fiche technique de Bayer Crop au sujet du Decis Protech notamment, pesticide bientôt pulvérisé par avion sur les terres en question, précise que celui-ci est «très toxique pour les organismes aquatiques, peut entraîner des effets néfastes à long terme pour l'environnement aquatique.»

La Commission est-elle informée de l'existence de ces dérogations et de leurs conséquences environnementales?

Qu'entend faire la Commission pour que les directives précitées soient respectées?

Réponse donnée par M. Dalli au nom de la Commission

(17 juillet 2012)

La pulvérisation aérienne de pesticides est réglementée par la directive 2009/128/CE instituant un cadre d'action communautaire pour parvenir à une utilisation des pesticides compatible avec le développement durable ⁽¹⁾, qui devait être transposée au plus tard le 26 novembre 2011.

L'article 9 de cette directive prévoit l'interdiction de la pulvérisation aérienne, sauf dérogations pouvant être accordées par les États membres dans des conditions extrêmement rigoureuses. Entre autres, les pesticides utilisés doivent être expressément approuvés pour la pulvérisation aérienne par l'État membre à la suite d'une évaluation spécifique des risques liés à cette pulvérisation.

En dehors de l'obligation de notification de la transposition de la directive, dont la France s'est dûment acquittée, les États membres ne sont pas tenus de communiquer à la Commission d'autres informations concernant l'interdiction de la pulvérisation aérienne.

Le service d'inspection de la Commission, l'Office alimentaire et vétérinaire, a déjà inscrit dans son programme d'inspection l'évaluation de la mise en œuvre de la directive dans les États membres.

⁽¹⁾ JO L 309 du 24.11.2009, article 9.

La directive-cadre sur l'eau prévoit la réduction progressive ou l'arrêt des émissions de certaines substances prioritaires qui présentent un risque au niveau de l'UE, ainsi que l'identification et le contrôle par les États membres d'autres polluants spécifiques présentant des risques à l'échelon national. Dans les deux cas, les eaux de surface doivent être surveillées et des normes de qualité doivent être respectées. Actuellement, aucun des pesticides mentionnés n'est une substance prioritaire, bien qu'il ait été proposé que la cyperméthrine soit reconnue comme telle. Que l'un ou l'autre des pesticides soit désigné comme une substance prioritaire ou un polluant spécifique n'empêcherait pas son utilisation, pour autant que des mesures appropriées soient prises afin de garantir le respect des normes de qualité applicables aux eaux de surface.

(English version)

**Question for written answer P-005964/12
to the Commission
Catherine Grèze (Verts/ALE)
(14 June 2012)**

Subject: Aerial application of pesticides in south-west France

Following the decision taken in May 2011 by Bruno Le Maire, the then Minister of Agriculture, requests for derogations concerning the aerial application of pesticides to maize crops have been submitted in several departments in south-west France (including the Landes, the Gers and Haute-Garonne). If these derogations were to be granted, they would breach no fewer than three EU directives.

Firstly, the directive on the sustainable use of pesticides (2009/128/EC) stipulates, in Article 14, that aerial spraying is prohibited unless this method poses the 'lowest risk to human health and the environment'. However, scientific studies have proven the harmful effects of two of the insecticides to be applied, deltamethrin and cypermethrin, on bees (increase in mortality, decrease in fertility, growth and development, etc.). The obvious conclusion is that if these 'sentinels of the environment' are likely to be affected, other species, including human beings, inevitably will be as well.

Secondly, some communes in which aerial application would be carried out lie within Natura 2000 sites (for example, the towns of Muret and Carbonne within sites FR7301822, 'Garonne, Ariège, Hers, Salat, Pique and Neste', FR7312014, 'Valley of the Garonne from Muret to Moissac', and FR7312010, 'Valley of the Garonne from Bousens to Carbonne'; or the towns of Betsave-Aguin and Simorre within site FR7300897, 'Valley and slopes of the Lauze'). Given the aforementioned harmful effects, the 'Habitats' (92/43/EEC) and 'Birds' (79/409/EEC) Directives are clearly not being complied with, since there is a risk of 'deterioration and elimination of fauna and flora present' on these sites.

Finally, the Water Framework Directive (2000/60/EC) is also being wilfully disregarded, since it provides for the protection of bodies of water and steady reductions in discharges of dangerous substances into water (Articles 22, 27 and 43) by 2015. However, Bayer Crop's datasheet on Decis Protech, one of the pesticides soon to be sprayed on the areas in question, states that it is 'very toxic to aquatic organisms, and can lead to long-term harmful effects for the aquatic environment'.

Is the Commission aware of these requests for derogations and their environmental implications?

What does the Commission intend to do to ensure that the aforementioned directives are complied with?

**Answer given by Mr Dalli on behalf of the Commission
(17 July 2012)**

Aerial spraying of pesticides is regulated by Directive 2009/128/EC⁽¹⁾ establishing a framework for Community action to achieve the sustainable use of pesticides, which had to be transposed by 26 November 2011.

Article 9 of that directive provides for the ban of aerial spraying, with exception for derogations which may be granted by Member States under very restricted conditions. Among others, the pesticides used must be explicitly approved for aerial spraying by the Member State following a specific assessment addressing risks there from.

Apart from notifying the transposition of the directive, which has been duly done in France, Member States have no obligation to inform the Commission of further details concerning the prohibition of aerial spraying.

The Commission inspection service Food and Veterinary Office has already included the assessment of the implementation of the directive in the Member States in its inspection programme.

The Water Framework Directive requires the progressive reduction or cessation of emissions of selected priority substances that pose a risk at EU level, and the identification and control by Member States of other specific pollutants posing a risk in their countries. For both categories, monitoring is required in surface waters, and quality standards must be met. Neither of the pesticides mentioned is currently a priority substance, although cypermethrin has been proposed as such. Designation of either pesticide as a priority substance or specific pollutant would not preclude their use, providing that appropriate measures are taken to ensure that the relevant quality standards in surface waters were not exceeded.

⁽¹⁾ OJ L 309, 24.11.2009, Article 9.

(Versione italiana)

**Interrogazione con richiesta di risposta scritta E-005965/12
alla Commissione (Vicepresidente/Alto Rappresentante)**

Claudio Morganti (EFD)

(14 giugno 2012)

Oggetto: VP/HR — Controllo delle nascite in Cina

In questi giorni sta suscitando molto scalpore la notizia di un ennesimo caso di aborto forzato nella Repubblica popolare cinese: una ragazza dello Shaanxi è stata infatti costretta a porre termine alla sua gravidanza, oramai giunta al settimo mese, in quanto impossibilitata a pagare una cospicua somma di denaro che le permettesse di aggirare le severe regole imposte dalla pianificazione familiare decisa dalle autorità di Pechino.

Questa politica, in palese contrasto con i diritti e le libertà degli individui, viene portata avanti in Cina da oramai diversi decenni e a partire dal 2001 è stata codificata attraverso una specifica legislazione.

Secondo diverse statistiche, si stima che ogni anno vi siano nel paese asiatico oltre 13 milioni di aborti, la maggior parte dei quali a carattere forzoso.

L'Alto Rappresentante/Vicepresidente della Commissione è a conoscenza di questa vicenda e della più generale situazione concernente la politica sul controllo delle nascite in Cina?

Quali misure intende attuare, nell'ambito del prossimo dialogo sui diritti umani con la Cina, per cercare di superare questa condizione attuale lesiva della libertà e della dignità delle persone?

Risposta dell'Alta Rappresentante/Vicepresidente Catherine Ashton a nome della Commissione

(8 agosto 2012)

L'UE è a conoscenza del caso di Feng Jianmei, una donna della provincia dello Shaanxi che all'inizio del mese di giugno, secondo quanto è stato riferito, sarebbe stata costretta ad abortire al settimo mese di gravidanza mediante un'iniezione letale sul feto. L'UE ha preso atto del fatto, che nel caso di Feng Jianmei, le autorità cinesi hanno condannato tali pratiche e hanno annunciato l'avvio di un'indagine e la punizione dei funzionari responsabili. Secondo le fonti, controlli su vasta scala saranno effettuati nelle 19 province in cui sono stati segnalati problemi nell'attuazione della politica di pianificazione familiare. L'UE è tuttavia preoccupata per le voci secondo le quali Feng Jianmei e la sua famiglia sarebbero vittime di molestie e di misure di ritorsione a causa della pubblicità data al loro caso. L'UE continuerà a seguire la situazione da vicino.

Aborti forzati, sterilizzazioni forzate e altri atti di violenza e di coercizione contro le donne sono illegali in Cina, ma l'applicazione pratica della legge rimane un problema ancora irrisolto. L'UE ha pertanto espresso preoccupazione per gli abusi segnalati nell'applicazione della politica di pianificazione familiare in Cina in occasione dell'ultima sessione del dialogo UE-Cina sui diritti umani, che ha avuto luogo il 29 maggio a Bruxelles. L'UE ha esortato le autorità cinesi a prendere misure concrete per garantire che l'attuazione della politica di pianificazione familiare sia conforme alle leggi cinesi e agli obblighi internazionali assunti dalla Cina in materia di diritti umani.

L'UE ha inoltre espresso preoccupazione per le misure repressive imposte a singoli cittadini, attivisti e avvocati, come Chen Guangcheng e Mao Hengfeng, che criticano pubblicamente queste pratiche punitive.

L'UE continuerà a seguire attivamente la questione e a esprimere le proprie preoccupazioni alle autorità cinesi.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-005965/12
to the Commission (Vice-President/High Representative)**

Claudio Morganti (EFD)

(14 June 2012)

Subject: VP/HR — Birth control in China

News of yet another case of forced abortion in the People's Republic of China is currently causing a major sensation. A young woman from Shanxi was in fact forced to terminate her pregnancy of seven months as she was unable to pay the enormous sum that would have allowed her to circumvent the strict family-planning rules imposed by the authorities in Beijing.

This policy, which is in blatant breach of the rights and freedoms of the individual, has been pursued in China for several decades now, and has been embodied in special legislation since 2001.

According to various statistics, the number of abortions in this Asian country are estimated to exceed 13 million, the majority of which are forced.

Is the High Representative/Vice-President of the Commission aware of this event and of the overall situation of birth-control policy in China?

What measures does she intend to take within the framework of the next Human Rights Dialogue with China to try and overcome the current situation, which is detrimental to the freedom and dignity of the individual?

Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Ashton on behalf of the Commission

(8 August 2012)

The EU is aware of the case of Mrs Feng Jianmei from Shaanxi province who was reportedly forced to abort her child by lethal injection in early June when she was seven months pregnant. The EU has taken note that the Chinese authorities have condemned such practices in the case of Mrs Feng Jianmei, and have announced that an investigation has been launched and that the responsible officials would be punished. Reportedly a large-scale inspection will be conducted in 19 provinces where problems in the implementation of the family planning policy have been reported. The EU is nevertheless concerned by reports that Mrs Feng and her family are faced with harassment and retaliation measures due to the publicity they have given to their situation. The EU will continue to monitor this case closely.

Forced abortions, forced sterilizations and other instances of violence and coercion against women are illegal in China, but implementation of the law remains an entrenched problem on the ground. The EU has thus raised its concern about reports of abuses in the enforcement of the family planning policy in China in the context of the last session of the EU-China Human Rights dialogue which took place on 29 May in Brussels. The EU urged the Chinese authorities to take measures on the ground to ensure that the implementation of the family planning policy conforms with Chinese laws and China's international human rights obligations.

The EU also expressed its concern about the fact that individuals, activists and lawyers such as Mr Chen Guangcheng and Mrs Mao Hengfeng who publicly criticize such punitive enforcement tactics face repressive measures.

The EU will continue to actively follow this issue and to raise its concerns with the Chinese authorities.

(Tekstas lietuvių kalba)

Klausimas, į kurį atsakoma raštu, Nr. E-005966/12

Komisijai

Viktor Uspaskich (ALDE)

(2012 m. birželio 14 d.)

Tema: Europos Žmogaus Teisių Teismo darbo efektyvumo didinimas

Pagal Lisabonos sutartį Europos Sąjunga įpareigojama ratifikuoti Europos žmogaus teisių konvenciją. ES, kaip juridinis asmuo, gaus teisę skirti savo teisėją Europos Žmogaus Teisių Teisme (EŽTT). Atsižvelgiant į tai, kad procedūra EŽTT trunka šešerius arba septynerius metus, ar Komisija neturėtų prisiimti pareigos padidinti Strasbūro EŽTT darbo efektyvumo? Pateikiu pavyzdį. Airijos Vyriausybė už savo pinigus organizavo EŽTT posėdžių transliavimą per internetą. Ar Komisija neturėtų taip pat parodyti gero pavyzdžio ir finansuoti Strasbūro EŽTT personalo padidinimo du kartus? Visos Europos tautos laukia tos dienos, kada ES ratifikuos Europos žmogaus teisių konvenciją.

J. M. Barroso atsakymas Komisijos vardu

(2012 m. rugpjūčio 24 d.)

Šiuo metu vyksta derybos dėl Europos Sąjungos prisijungimo prie Europos žmogaus teisių konvencijos (EŽTK). Komisija ryžtingai siekia, kad Europos Sąjunga prie EŽTK prisijungtų kuo greičiau.

Viena iš prisijungimo prie Europos žmogaus teisių konvencijos sąlygų yra Sąjungos įnašas Europos žmogaus teisių teismo veiklos išlaidoms, kurios tenka Europos Tarybos biudžetui, padengti.

Be to, Komisija visų pirma pagal Europos demokratijos ir žmogaus teisių rėmimo priemonę (EDŽTRP) ir vykdydama plėtros politiką teikia finansinę paramą Europos Tarybos įgyvendinamiems projektams, siekdama gerinti Europos žmogaus teisių konvencijos taikymą nacionaliniu lygiu.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-005966/12
to the Commission**

Viktor Uspaskich (ALDE)

(14 June 2012)

Subject: Improving efficiency of the European Court of Human Rights

The Lisbon Treaty obliges the European Union to ratify the European Convention on Human Rights. The EU as a legal entity will acquire the right to appoint its judge to the European Court of Human Rights. Taking into account the fact that proceedings at the Court may run for six or seven years, should the Commission not undertake to improve the efficiency of the Strasbourg Court? For example, the Government of Ireland arranged, using its own money, for Court hearings to be broadcast online. Should the Commission not also set a good example by funding a doubling of the number of staff at the Strasbourg Court? All nations of Europe await the day when the EU ratifies the European Convention on Human Rights.

Answer given by Mr Barroso on behalf of the Commission

(24 August 2012)

The negotiations on the accession of the European Union to the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) are ongoing. The Commission is strongly committed to a speedy accession of the EU to the ECHR.

The accession to the European Convention on Human Rights will also include a contribution of the Union to the expenditure related to the functioning of the European Court of Human Rights which is borne by the budget of the Council of Europe.

In addition, the Commission provides, in particular through the European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR) and in the context of enlargement policies, financial support to projects implemented by the Council of Europe aiming at improving the efficiency of the application of the European Convention of Human Rights at national level.

(Deutsche Fassung)

Anfrage zur schriftlichen Beantwortung P-005967/12
an die Kommission
Knut Fleckenstein (S&D)
(14. Juni 2012)

Betrifft: Flüssiggas (LNG) als alternativer Schiffskraftstoff

Es gibt mindestens drei Gründe, warum die Verwendung von Flüssiggas (LNG) als Schiffskraftstoff eine der vielversprechendsten neuen Schiffstechnologien ist: LNG wird die Schwefeloxidemissionen (SOx) um 90-95 % und außerdem die Stickoxidemissionen (NOx) senken. Da außerdem der Kohlenstoffgehalt niedriger als bei herkömmlichen Schiffskraftstoffen ist, ist eine Senkung der Kohlendioxidemissionen um 20-25 % möglich. Schließlich ist der aktuelle Preis von LNG vergleichbar mit dem Preis von Schweröl (HFO).

Vor diesem vielversprechenden Hintergrund gibt die Kommission bekannt, welche Initiativen sie in Bezug auf folgende Punkte unternommen hat:

- Entwicklung von regulatorischen Maßnahmen, insbesondere Sicherheitsmaßnahmen;
- detailliertes Festlegen der finanziellen Mittel zur Unterstützung des Sektors, insbesondere in Bezug auf die Umsetzung von Projekten, Studien und Pilotmaßnahmen;
- Einführung neuer Technologien, einer innovativen Infrastruktur und von Instrumenten zur Unterstützung des Einsatzes von LNG;
- Schaffung einer zentralen Anlaufstelle für die Branche im Zusammenhang mit finanzieller Unterstützung;
- Prüfung, ob es einen Bedarf an weiteren Tätigkeiten im Bereich Forschung und Entwicklung und/oder Pilotprojekten gibt.

Antwort von Herrn Kallas im Namen der Kommission
(12. Juli 2012)

Um das „Henne-Ei-Problem“ zu lösen, das die Nutzung von LNG in großem Umfang insbesondere im Kurzstreckenseeverkehr verhindert, verfolgt die Kommission aktiv eine Strategie zur Einführung von LNG.

Es gibt einige EU-finanzierte Projekte⁽¹⁾, die derzeit durchgeführt werden, wobei der Schwerpunkt auf der Entwicklung der Infrastruktur liegt. Diese Projekte betreffen Infrastrukturplanung und -entwicklung ebenso wie das Schließen rechtlicher und sicherheitstechnischer Lücken einschließlich von Maßnahmen im Bereich Ausbildung und Sensibilisierung der Öffentlichkeit.

Die Kommission hat mit Unterstützung der Europäischen Agentur für die Sicherheit des Seeverkehrs (EMSA) und gemeinsam mit Sachverständigen der Häfen, der Reeder und der Energieunternehmen konkrete technische und betriebsspezifische Hindernisse für die Nutzung von LNG untersucht. Die EMSA wird 2012 im Anschluss daran eine Studie zur Analyse der Lücken in den Rechtsvorschriften vorlegen, auf deren Grundlage Leitlinien entwickelt werden sollen, die eine Einführung von LNG-Tankanlagen erleichtern. Dabei wird den internationalen Entwicklungen Rechnung getragen. Im Herbst werden die Kommission und die EMSA eine Plattform für interessierte Parteien einrichten, die betroffene öffentliche und private Akteure zusammenbringt, um die Leitlinien zu testen und die Möglichkeiten für eine weitere Zusammenarbeit, einschließlich der Finanzierung, zu prüfen.

Die entsprechenden Mittel sind bereits im aktuellen Finanzrahmen (Marco Polo und TEN-V) vorgesehen. Die Verfügbarkeit alternativer Kraftstoffe ist eine der Voraussetzungen für die Kernnetz-Infrastruktur, die in der neuen Verordnung über das transeuropäische Verkehrsnetz 2014-2020 festgelegt ist.

⁽¹⁾ http://tentea.ec.europa.eu/en/ten-t_projects/ten-t_projects_by_transport_mode/water.htm

(English version)

**Question for written answer P-005967/12
to the Commission
Knut Fleckenstein (S&D)
(14 June 2012)**

Subject: Liquefied natural gas (LNG) as alternative ship fuel

Using liquefied natural gas (LNG) as ship fuel is one of the most promising new shipping technologies for at least three reasons: LNG will reduce sulphur oxide (SOx) emissions by 90-95%, and also reduce nitrogen oxide (NOx) emissions. Furthermore, as the carbon content of LNG is lower than that of traditional ship fuels, a 20-25% reduction in carbon dioxide (CO₂) emissions is possible. Finally, the current price of LNG is comparable to that of heavy fuel oil (HFO).

Against this promising background, will the Commission state what initiatives it has taken with regard to:

- developing regulatory measures, especially safety measures;
- identifying in detail financial means to support the sector, in particular as regards the implementation of projects, studies and pilot measures;
- introducing new technologies, innovative infrastructure and facilities to support the deployment of LNG;
- creating a one-stop shop for industry, addressing financial support;
- identifying whether there is a need for further R & D work and/or pilot projects?

**Answer given by Mr Kallas on behalf of the Commission
(12 July 2012)**

In order to break the 'chicken and egg' situation preventing the large scale adoption of LNG in particular for short sea shipping, the Commission actively pursues a deployment agenda for LNG.

There are several EU funded projects ⁽¹⁾ currently underway with a focus on infrastructure. These projects address infrastructure planning and development as well as filling of legal and safety gaps, including training and public awareness issues.

The Commission assisted by the European Maritime Safety Agency (EMSA) explores with a number of experts from ports, shipowners and energy companies concrete technical and operational obstacles to the use of LNG. A subsequent regulatory gap-analysis study will be presented by EMSA in 2012 with a view to developing a set of guidelines facilitating the introduction of LNG bunkering. In all this, account will be taken of international developments. In the autumn, the Commission and EMSA will launch a stakeholder platform, gathering relevant public and private stakeholders, to test the guidelines and explore further cooperation, including financing.

Relevant financial means have already been made available in the current financial framework through both Marco Polo and TEN-T. Availability of alternative fuels is one of the requirements for core network infrastructure envisaged in the new Regulation for a Trans-European Transport Network for 2014-20.

⁽¹⁾ http://tentea.ec.europa.eu/en/ten-t_projects/ten-t_projects_by_transport_mode/water.htm

(Deutsche Fassung)

**Anfrage zur schriftlichen Beantwortung P-005968/12
an die Kommission**

Silvana Koch-Mehrin (ALDE)

(15. Juni 2012)

Betrifft: Verhandlungen zwischen der EU und Kanada über ein umfassendes Wirtschafts- und Handelsabkommen (CETA): Schaffung einheitlicher Wettbewerbsbedingungen für die Biowissenschaftsindustrie

Das umfassende Wirtschafts- und Handelsabkommen (CETA), das derzeit zwischen der EU und Kanada verhandelt wird, birgt das Potenzial, den bilateralen Handel um 20 % zu erhöhen, und verschafft beiden Parteien erhebliche Vorteile, indem auf beiden Seiten des Atlantiks gleiche Wettbewerbsbedingungen geschaffen werden.

Einigen vor Kurzem veröffentlichten Berichten zufolge besteht zwischen den beiden Handelspartnern im Hinblick auf Verzögerungen beim Marktzugang für den Sektor der Biowissenschaften eine beträchtliche Lücke. So waren die Zulassungszeiten für Arzneimittel in Kanada im Zeitraum zwischen 2006 und 2010 beispielsweise im Schnitt mehr als fünf Monate (165 Tage) länger als in der EU. In den Jahren 2009 und 2010 ist diese Lücke noch größer geworden.

Dieser aufsichtsrechtliche Verzug führt für kanadische Patienten nicht nur zu einem langsameren Zugang zu neuen Arzneimitteln, sondern erschwert Biowissenschaftsunternehmen mit Hauptsitz in der EU die Beibehaltung ihres bestehenden Marktanteils in Kanada und die Tätigung neuer Investitionen. Als Ausgleich für solche Zeitverluste bietet die EU in Europa einen Rückerstattungsmechanismus an. In Kanada gibt es einen solchen Mechanismus nicht; tatsächlich gehört Kanada zu den einzigen drei Nationen der 34 OECD-Nationen, die den Zeitaufwand im Zusammenhang mit der Einhaltung von aufsichtsrechtlichen Anforderungen oder mit der klinischen Entwicklung nicht ausgleichen.

Ist sich die Kommission der beträchtlichen Lücke zwischen den beiden Handelspartnern und des negativen Anreizes bewusst, der damit für EU-Unternehmen geschaffen wird, die in Kanada Geschäfte und Investitionen tätigen?

Teilt die Kommission die Ansicht, dass dieses Ungleichgewicht und diese ungleichen Wettbewerbsbedingungen behoben werden sollten?

Befasst sich die Kommission mit dieser Situation als Teil der aktuellen CETA-Verhandlungen im Rahmen des Kapitels über das geistige Eigentum?

Antwort von Herrn De Gucht im Namen der Kommission

(10. Juli 2012)

Der Kommission ist bekannt, dass das Regelungsumfeld für den Arzneimittelsektor in Kanada einige Schwächen aufweist, insbesondere bei Fragen des geistigen Eigentums, und die Kommission ist sich auch darüber im Klaren, welche Auswirkungen dies für EU-Unternehmen haben kann.

Deshalb werden diese Punkte in der Tat im Rahmen der laufenden Verhandlungen über ein umfassendes Wirtschafts- und Handelsabkommen behandelt, wobei die Verhandlungsführer der EU Kanada gegenüber klargestellt haben, dass es sich hierbei für die EU um prioritäre Angelegenheiten handelt, insbesondere, was die Verlängerung der Patentlaufzeit anbelangt.

(English version)

**Question for written answer P-005968/12
to the Commission**

Silvana Koch-Mehrin (ALDE)

(15 June 2012)

Subject: EU-Canada negotiations for a Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement: levelling the playing field for the life science industry

The Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) currently being negotiated between the EU and Canada has the potential to boost bilateral trade by 20%, bringing considerable benefits to both parties by creating a level playing field on both sides of the Atlantic.

According to some recent reports, there is a significant gap between the two trading partners in terms of market access delays for the life science sector. For example, approval times for medicines in Canada between 2006 and 2010 were on average more than five months (165 days) longer than in the EU. In 2009 and 2010, this gap increased further.

In addition to slower access to new medicines for Canadian patients, this regulatory delay makes it harder for EU-based life science companies to maintain their existing footprints in Canada and to bring in new investments. To compensate for such time losses in Europe, the EU offers a restoration mechanism. No such mechanism exists in Canada; indeed, it is among only three of the 34 OECD nations that do not provide compensation for time spent complying with regulatory requirements or for clinical development.

Is the Commission aware of the significant gap between the two trading partners and the disincentive this creates for EU companies operating and investing in Canada?

Does the Commission agree that this imbalance and the lack of a level playing field should be corrected?

Is the Commission addressing this situation as part of the current CETA negotiations, under the intellectual property chapter?

Answer given by Mr De Gucht on behalf of the Commission

(10 July 2012)

The Commission is aware of several weaknesses of the regulatory environment applicable to the pharmaceutical sector in Canada — especially regarding intellectual property issues — and of the impact this can have on EU companies.

This is why these issues are indeed being addressed in the framework of the ongoing Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) negotiations, where the EU negotiators have made it clear to Canada that they represent a priority for the EU, notably insofar as patent term restoration is concerned.

(Versione italiana)

**Interrogazione con richiesta di risposta scritta E-005969/12
alla Commissione (Vicepresidente/Alto Rappresentante)**

Sonia Alfano (ALDE)

(15 giugno 2012)

Oggetto: VP/HR — Relazione annuale di Amnesty International su Italia e Libia

Il 24 maggio 2012 Christine Weiss, presidente di Amnesty International Italia, presentando la relazione annuale dell'organizzazione, ha denunciato la presenza in Libia di una fenomenologia diffusa, spesso lesiva dei diritti fondamentali.

In particolare, ha posto l'accento sulla perpetrazione di pratiche inumane e degradanti, quali la tortura, e ha manifestato evidente preoccupazione per il perdurare di episodi discriminatori e xenofobi, a detrimento delle minoranze etniche presenti sul territorio.

La presidente di Amnesty International ha denunciato altresì la detenzione di 8500 persone — verosimilmente ex seguaci del regime dittatoriale di Muammar Gheddafi — in attesa di un processo equo che definisca la loro situazione giudiziaria.

La risoluzione del Parlamento europeo del 10 marzo 2011 «Paesi vicini a Sud, e in particolare la Libia, compresi gli aspetti umanitari» ha voluto esprimere un sentimento condiviso in seno all'Assemblea parlamentare, favorevole alla protezione incondizionata dei diritti della persona. In particolare, il Parlamento ha esortato «l'UE a contribuire alle riforme democratiche e alla creazione di istituzioni fondate sullo stato di diritto in Libia»; ha ribadito la necessità di «presentare proposte circa le migliori modalità per promuovere la democrazia e i diritti dell'uomo»; ha ribadito «la richiesta di essere strettamente associato ai lavori della task-force istituita per coordinare la risposta dell'UE alla crisi in Libia».

Non ritiene il Vicepresidente/Alto Rappresentante che l'Unione europea e i governi degli Stati membri dovrebbero intervenire presso le autorità libiche, a sostegno dei diritti umani e delle libertà fondamentali nel Paese? Quali misure ha esso adottato per garantire la protezione dei diritti umani e delle libertà fondamentali in Libia? Quali iniziative saranno intraprese e concretizzate dal Vicepresidente/Alto Rappresentante per raggiungere questi obiettivi, nell'ambito dei suoi rapporti con la Libia?

**Interrogazione con richiesta di risposta scritta E-005970/12
alla Commissione**

Sonia Alfano (ALDE)

(15 giugno 2012)

Oggetto: Relazione annuale di Amnesty International Italia e Libia

Il 24 maggio 2012 Christine Weiss, presidente di Amnesty International Italia, presentando la relazione annua dell'organizzazione, ha denunciato la presenza in Libia di una fenomenologia diffusa, spesso lesiva dei diritti fondamentali.

In particolare, ha posto l'accento sulla perpetrazione di pratiche inumane e degradanti, quali la tortura, e ha manifestato evidente preoccupazione per il perdurare di episodi discriminatori e xenofobi, a detrimento delle minoranze etniche presenti nel paese.

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Non ritiene la Commissione che l'Unione europea e i governi degli Stati membri dovrebbero intervenire presso le autorità libiche, a sostegno dei diritti umani e delle libertà fondamentali nel Paese? Quali misure ha preso per garantire la protezione dei diritti umani e delle libertà fondamentali in Libia? Che iniziative saranno intraprese e messe in pratica dalla Commissione per raggiungere questi obiettivi, nell'ambito dei suoi rapporti con la Libia?

Risposta congiunta di Catherine Ashton a nome della Commissione

(6 agosto 2012)

L'UE ha sollevato la questione del maltrattamento dei detenuti nel dialogo con le autorità libiche. Quando sono stati resi pubblici i primi rapporti sugli abusi nei centri detentivi, l'AR/VP ha reso nota una dichiarazione in cui invitava a rispettare tutti i detenuti in Libia conformemente alle norme internazionali. L'AR/VP ha inoltre invitato le autorità ad accelerare il trasferimento sotto il loro controllo di tutti i centri detentivi e ad indagare sulle accuse di violazione dei diritti dei detenuti. In seguito il governo libico ha dichiarato che stava prendendo misure per trasferire alle autorità il controllo dei centri detentivi. L'UE continua comunque a seguire molto da vicino la questione.

La delegazione UE a Tripoli, in collaborazione con le ambasciate di alcuni Stati membri, segue molto da vicino la questione della protezione delle minoranze e dei gruppi vulnerabili nel paese ed è regolarmente in contatto con le autorità in proposito.

L'UE ha fornito un'assistenza d'emergenza alle persone bisognose di protezione in seguito al conflitto ed è pronta ad aiutare le autorità a garantire il rispetto dei diritti umani, dei valori democratici e dello Stato di diritto.

L'UE finanzia inoltre, nell'ambito della linea tematica dello Strumento europeo per la democrazia e i diritti umani, un progetto i cui obiettivi sono fornire alle vittime di tortura, sparizioni forzate e traumi violenti in Libia servizi di riabilitazione e sostegno e promuovere la creazione di un quadro giuridico e politico nazionale riguardante la tortura e altre forme di maltrattamento.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-005969/12
to the Commission (Vice-President/High Representative)**

Sonia Alfano (ALDE)

(15 June 2012)

Subject: VP/HR — Amnesty International's annual report on Italy and Libya

On 24 May 2012 Christine Weiss, President of Amnesty International Italy, denounced widespread violations of fundamental rights in Libya while presenting the organisation's annual report.

In particular, she focused on the use of inhumane and degrading practices such as torture, and voiced her concern about continuing incidents of discrimination and xenophobia affecting ethnic minorities in the country.

Ms Weiss also denounced the detention of 8 500 people — probably former followers of Mu'ammar Gaddafi's dictatorial regime — awaiting a fair trial to determine their judicial situation.

The European Parliament resolution of 10 March 2011 'on the Southern Neighbourhood, and Libya in particular, including humanitarian aspects' was aimed at expressing a common wish in Parliament for the unconditional protection of human rights. In particular, Parliament urged 'the EU to contribute to democratic reforms and the establishment of rule of law institutions in Libya', as well as reiterating the need to 'put forward proposals on how best to promote democracy and human rights' and repeating 'its request to be closely involved in the work of the task force established to coordinate the EU response to the crisis in Libya'.

Does the Vice-President/High Representative not believe that the European Union and the governments of the Member States should intervene with the Libyan authorities to support human rights and fundamental freedoms in that country? What measures has it taken to ensure the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms in Libya? What initiatives will be undertaken and implemented by the Vice-President/High Representative to achieve these objectives, within the context of its relations with Libya?

Question for written answer E-005970/12

to the Commission

Sonia Alfano (ALDE)

(15 June 2012)

Subject: Amnesty International's annual report on Italy and Libya

On 24 May 2012 Christine Weiss, President of Amnesty International Italy, denounced widespread violations of fundamental rights in Libya while presenting the organisation's annual report.

In particular, she focused on the use of inhumane and degrading practices such as torture, and voiced her concern about continuing incidents of discrimination and xenophobia affecting ethnic minorities in the country.

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Does the Commission not believe that the European Union and the governments of the Member States should intervene with the Libyan authorities to support human rights and fundamental freedoms in that country? What measures has it taken to ensure the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms in Libya? What initiatives will be undertaken and implemented by the Commission to achieve these objectives, within the context of its relations with Libya?

Joint answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Ashton on behalf of the Commission
(6 August 2012)

The EU has raised the issue of ill-treatment of detainee's in its dialogue with the Libyan authorities. When the first reports of abuses in detention centres were made public the HR/VP issued a statement in which she called for the respect of all detainees in Libya in accordance with international standards. The HR/VP also called on the authorities to accelerate the process of bringing all places of detention under their control and to investigate allegations of violations of detainee's rights. The Libyan government has subsequently declared that it is in the process of implementing measures aiming at transferring the control of detention facilities to the authorities. Nonetheless the EU continues to follow this issue very closely.

The EU Delegation in Tripoli, in cooperation with embassies from EU Member States, is following the issue of the protection of minorities and vulnerable groups in Libya very closely and is in regular contact with the authorities on these issues.

The EU has provided emergency assistance to people in need of protection as a result of the conflict and stands ready to provide assistance to the authorities in their efforts to ensure respect for human rights, democratic values and the rule of law.

Moreover, the EU is currently funding a project under the thematic line of the European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights whose objective is to provide victims of torture, enforced disappearances and victims of violent trauma in Libya with rehabilitation and support services and to advocate for a national legal and policy framework that addresses torture and other forms of ill-treatment.

(Versione italiana)

Interrogazione con richiesta di risposta scritta E-005971/12

alla Commissione

Aldo Patriciello (PPE)

(15 giugno 2012)

Oggetto: Terremoto in Emilia-Romagna

A partire da domenica 20 maggio violente scosse di terremoto, che hanno raggiunto magnitudo 6, hanno colpito il Centro-Nord e in particolare l'Emilia-Romagna. Ci troviamo di fronte a una catastrofe nazionale, il sisma ha provocato numerose vittime e feriti, i danni ammontano a circa 5 miliardi di euro. Gravi sono i danni a case, aziende, fabbriche, nonché al settore agroalimentare e alle principali attività economiche dei territori colpiti, oltre ai notevoli danni al patrimonio culturale ed architettonico.

Il 16 maggio è stato pubblicato sulla Gazzetta ufficiale il decreto legge 59 che riforma la Protezione civile, la quale è stata in grado di intervenire e rispondere alle esigenze relative al sisma che ha colpito l'Emilia, seppur alcuni importanti elementi delle nuove disposizioni abbiano invece dimostrato di essere inadeguati dinanzi a un evento di tale complessità. Uno dei punti deboli del nuovo decreto riguarda l'esclusione della possibilità di operare mediante ordinanze in deroga all'ordinamento vigente per tutti gli aspetti che non riguardino strettamente il soccorso e l'assistenza, misura che invece risulterebbe necessaria per garantire interventi tempestivi ed efficaci. Pertanto, si avverte l'esigenza di una semplificazione burocratica che permetta di gestire gli interventi con la massima urgenza.

Alla luce di quanto precede può la Commissione far sapere:

se ritiene opportuno aiutare gli Stati membri (in determinate condizioni di emergenza) ad adottare strumenti di semplificazione di tutti gli iter burocratici, al fine di garantire la celerità degli interventi finanziari, in particolare razionalizzando le attività delle amministrazioni e degli organi di controllo, prevedendo per esempio controlli a posteriori sugli adempimenti amministrativi?

Risposta di Kristalina Georgieva a nome della Commissione

(8 agosto 2012)

I trattati dell'UE e la legislazione che disciplina la protezione civile non assegnano competenze specifiche all'Unione o alla Commissione per quanto riguarda l'organizzazione di servizi nazionali di soccorso e di protezione civile negli Stati membri.

La questione sollevata dall'onorevole parlamentare è di competenza esclusiva delle autorità italiane.

(English version)

Question for written answer E-005971/12
to the Commission
Aldo Patriciello (PPE)
(15 June 2012)

Subject: Earthquake in Emilia-Romagna

Beginning on Sunday 20 May 2012, violent earthquakes reaching a magnitude of 6 hit the central-northern regions of Italy and in particular Emilia-Romagna. This national disaster caused many deaths and injuries as well as damage valued at around EUR 5 billion. Serious damage was caused to homes, companies, factories and the agri-food sector, as well as the region's main economic activities. The region's cultural and architectural assets also suffered considerable damage.

On 16 May 2012, Decree Law No 59 on reforming Italy's civil protection service was published. This service intervened and responded to the needs arising from the earthquake that struck Emilia-Romagna. However, a number of important provisions in the decree have proven to be inappropriate for dealing with such a complex event. One of the weaknesses of the new decree is that it rules out the option of operating by local ordinance, as a waiver to the laws currently in force, for all aspects which are not closely related to relief and assistance. Such a measure is however necessary in order to guarantee timely and effective intervention. Red tape must therefore be simplified in order to allow interventions to be managed with the urgency required.

In view of the above, does the Commission not believe it would be appropriate (during particular emergencies) to help Member States adopt instruments to simplify all bureaucratic processes, in order to ensure prompt financial intervention, in particular by streamlining the activities of government and control bodies, for example by providing for *ex post* checks on the fulfilment of administrative formalities?

Answer given by Ms Georgieva on behalf of the Commission
(8 August 2012)

The EU Treaties and civil protection legislation do not provide any specific competence for the Union or the Commission as regards the organisation of national rescue and civil protection services within the Member States.

The matter referred to by the Honourable Member is strictly within the competence of Italian authorities.

(Versione italiana)

Interrogazione con richiesta di risposta scritta E-005972/12

alla Commissione

Aldo Patriciello (PPE)

(15 giugno 2012)

Oggetto: Interventi per tutelare il paesaggio del Gargano

Il Gargano è un imponente promontorio situato in provincia di Foggia, nella regione Puglia, in Italia meridionale. Sul suo territorio si estende il Parco nazionale del Gargano, un'area protetta tra le più importanti dell'intera zona centro meridionale per la ricchezza delle specie di fauna e per la vasta eterogeneità ambientale.

Purtroppo, questo paradiso naturale è in pericolo. Molte sono le segnalazioni del WWF, del Corpo Forestale dello Stato, di giornali locali e nazionali per l'aumento delle azioni devastatrici da parte dell'uomo con strade, costruzioni edilizie in continua espansione, incendi e bracconaggi: già nel 2007 un imponente incendio doloso ha distrutto in questa zona migliaia di ettari di bosco.

Una delle ultime denunce alle autorità locali riguarda il danno al paesaggio della «Baia Zaiana», una porzione protetta di costa in pieno Parco nazionale del Gargano dove, scavando illegalmente la montagna, è stata ricavata una strada per accedere alla spiaggia.

Ai sensi della direttiva 92/43/CEE «Habitat» è stata istituita Natura 2000, una rete ecologica diffusa su tutto il territorio dell'UE, con l'obiettivo di garantire il mantenimento a lungo termine degli habitat naturali e delle specie di flora e fauna minacciati o rari a livello dell'Unione.

Alla luce di quanto sopra, potrebbe la Commissione chiarire

1. in che modo intenda stimolare gli Stati membri a mantenere oppure, ove necessario, a sviluppare la coerenza ecologica della rete Natura 2000?

Risposta di Janez Potočnik a nome della Commissione

(24 luglio 2012)

La zona cui l'onorevole parlamentare fa riferimento presenta diversi siti appartenenti alla rete Natura 2000, designati ai sensi della direttiva 92/43/CEE ⁽¹⁾ (direttiva Habitat) e della direttiva 2009/147/CE ⁽²⁾ (direttiva Uccelli).

A norma delle suddette direttive spetta alle autorità degli Stati membri prendere le misure appropriate per evitare, nei siti appartenenti alla rete Natura 2000, il degrado degli habitat o la perturbazione significativa delle specie per cui i siti sono stati designati. L'istituzione, per ogni sito, degli obiettivi di conservazione e delle misure di conservazione appropriate miranti al mantenimento o al ripristino degli habitat e delle specie di interesse comunitario è responsabilità esclusiva delle autorità nazionali competenti.

Le due direttive citate non vietano la costruzione di strade, edifici o altri progetti nei siti Natura 2000. La compatibilità di tali progetti con la tutela dei siti interessati deve essere stabilita caso per caso. Spetta alle autorità nazionali competenti valutare se un determinato progetto possa avere effetti negativi rilevanti sulle specie, sugli habitat e sull'integrità del sito interessato.

⁽¹⁾ G.U. L. 206 del 22.7.1992.

⁽²⁾ G.U. L. 20 del 26.1.2010.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-005972/12
to the Commission
Aldo Patriciello (PPE)
(15 June 2012)**

Subject: Gargano: measures to protect the landscape

Gargano is a majestic promontory in Foggia province, in the Apulia region of southern Italy. Within its boundaries lies Gargano National Park, one of the most important protected areas in central southern Italy as a whole because of its abundant fauna and its vast environmental diversity.

Unfortunately, this natural paradise is in peril. There have been numerous reports from the World Wildlife Fund, the Italian State Forestry Corps, and the local and national press about the increasing destruction being inflicted by human agency, for example roads, the growing spate of building, fires, and poaching. An arson attack back in 2007 destroyed thousands of hectares of woodland.

One of the most recent reports to the local authorities speaks of disfigurement of the 'Baia Zaiana', a protected stretch of coast in the middle of Gargano National Park, where an access road to the beach has been created by illegally excavating the mountain.

Directive 92/43/EEC, the Habitats Directive, has established Natura 2000, an EU-wide ecological network designed to ensure the long-term survival of natural habitats and endangered or rare plant and animal species in all parts of the Union.

1. How will the Commission encourage Member States to maintain or, where necessary, enhance the ecological coherence of the Natura 2000 network?

**Answer given by Mr Potočník on behalf of the Commission
(24 July 2012)**

The area mentioned by the Honourable Member is concerned by several Natura 2000 sites designated under Directive 92/43/EEC ⁽¹⁾ (Habitats Directive) and Directive 2009/147/EC ⁽²⁾ (Birds Directive).

In accordance with the abovementioned Directives it is up to Member States authorities to take the appropriate steps to avoid, in the designated Natura 2000 sites, the deterioration of the habitats, or the significant disturbance of species, for which the sites have been designated. The establishment, at site level, of the conservation objectives, as well as of the appropriate conservation measures aiming at maintaining or restoring the habitats and species of Community interest at a favourable conservation status falls under the full responsibility of the national competent authorities.

The two mentioned Directives do not prohibit roads, constructions or other projects inside Natura 2000 sites. The compatibility of such developments with the protection of the concerned sites needs to be determined on a case by case basis. It is again up to the competent national authorities to assess whether a certain project could cause significant negative effects on the relevant species and habitats and on the integrity of the site.

⁽¹⁾ OJ L 206, 22.7.1992.

⁽²⁾ OJ L 20, 26.1.2010.

(Dansk udgave)

Forespørgsel til skriftlig besvarelse P-005974/12
til Kommissionen
Søren Bo Søndergaard (GUE/NGL)
(18. juni 2012)

Om: Censureret EU resumé af forskningsrapporten »The State of Men's Health in Europe«

Kommissionen bedes gøre rede for, hvorfor Kommissionens resumé af forskningsrapporten: »The State of Men's Health in Europe« om europæiske mænds sundhedstilstand, er renset for emner som vedrører mænds seksualitet? Den bedes desuden oplyse, hvem der er ansvarlig for udfærdigelsen af resuméet?

Eksempler på emner, som fylder en væsentlig del i den oprindelige forskningsrapport samt det resume, som forskergruppen har lavet, men som er udeladt i resuméet, hører: homoseksualitet, biseksualitet, skilsmisse, brug af kondom, og alder for seksuel debut.

I følge den danske organisation Sex & Samfund forekommer ordet kondom f.eks. 23 gange i den oprindelige rapport, 16 gange i forskernes resumé og 0 gange i EU's resumé. Ligeledes bliver homoseksualitet nævnt 12 gange i den oprindelige rapport, 7 gange i forskernes resumé og 0 gange i EU's resumé.

Andre eksempler inkluderer:

Skilsmisse: nævnes 21 gange i den oprindelige forskningsrapport, 10 gange i forskernes resumé og 0 gange i EU's resumé.

Erectile (som i forbindelse med fx erectile dysfunction): nævnes 19 gange i forskningsrapporten, 14 gange i forskernes resumé og 0 gange i EU's resume.

Reproduktion og reproduktiv sundhed nævnes tilsammen 21 gange i den oprindelige forskningsrapport, 19 gange i forskernes resumé og 0 gange i EU's resumé.

Svar afgivet på Kommissionens vegne af John Dalli
(7. august 2012)

Kommissionen offentliggjorde rapporten »The State of Men's Health in Europe« efter en indkaldelse af forslag under sundhedsprogrammet (2008-2013) og har alle rettigheder til den, herunder samtlige ophavsrettigheder. Rapporten er blevet offentliggjort i en kort og en udvidet version. De to versioner udgør tilsammen den officielle kommissionsrapport og er begge offentligt tilgængelige ⁽¹⁾.

I betragtning af længden og det omfattende anvendelsesområde af den udvidede version var det hensigtsmæssigt at ledsage et så langt dokument af en kortere rapport, som giver et overblik over de sundhedsspørgsmål, der afspejler aktuelle arbejdsområder. Efter Kommissionens opfattelse fortjener en række centrale emner at blive fremhævet som prioriterede områder, f.eks. risikofaktorer, som kan forebygges, adgang til sundhedstjenester, sundhedsstatus, hjertekar-sygdomme, kræft, overførbare sygdomme (herunder hiv/aids) samt mental sundhed, som alle er vigtige sundhedsspørgsmål, der er centralt placeret i den europæiske sundhedspolitik.

Den udvidede rapport, som Kommissionen har offentliggjort, indeholder alle oplysninger og emner, som blev dækket af kontrahenten, og er offentligt tilgængelig til referenceformål i forbindelse med den omfattende række af behandlede emner.

⁽¹⁾ http://ec.europa.eu/health/reports/publications/index_en.htm

(English version)

**Question for written answer P-005974/12
to the Commission**

Søren Bo Søndergaard (GUE/NGL)

(18 June 2012)

Subject: Censored EU summary of research report on 'The State of Men's Health in Europe'

Can the Commission please explain why its summary of the research report entitled 'The State of Men's Health in Europe' has been purged of topics relating to men's sexuality? Could it also please state who is responsible for drawing up this summary?

Topics which took up a substantial part of the original research report and the abstract drawn up by the research team, but were omitted from the summary, include homosexuality, bisexuality, divorce, use of condoms and age of first sexual intercourse.

According to the Danish organisation Sex & Samfund (Sex and Society) the word 'condom', for example, appears 23 times in the original document, 16 times in the researchers' abstract and 0 times in the EU summary. Similarly, homosexuality is referred to 12 times in the original report, seven times in the abstract and 0 times in the EU summary.

Other examples include:

Divorce: referred to 21 times in the original research report, 10 times in the researchers' abstract and 0 times in the EU summary.

Erectile (e.g. in the context of erectile dysfunction): referred to 19 times in the research report, 14 times in the researchers' abstract and 0 times in the EU summary.

Reproduction and reproductive health (both terms): referred to 21 times in the original research report, 19 times in the researchers' abstract and 0 times in the EU summary.

Answer given by Mr Dalli on behalf of the Commission

(7 August 2012)

The Commission published the report 'The State of Men's Health in Europe' following a call for tender under the Health Programme (2008-2013) and holds all rights to it, including full copyright. The report has been published as a short and as an extended version. The two versions constitute the official Commission report and are both publicly available ⁽¹⁾.

Given the length and the broad scope of the extended report it was appropriate to accompany such a long document with a shorter report providing an overview of health issues which reflect current areas of work. In the Commission's view, a number of key issues merit being put forward as priorities, for example preventable risk factors, accessing health services, health status, cardio-vascular disease, cancer, communicable diseases (including HIV/AIDS) and mental health, which are all major health issues at the core of European health policy.

The extended report published by the Commission includes all data and topics which were covered by the contractor and is publicly available for reference on the broad range of issues covered.

⁽¹⁾ http://ec.europa.eu/health/reports/publications/index_en.htm

(Versiunea în limba română)

Întrebarea cu solicitare de răspuns scris P-005975/12
adresată Comisiei
Elena Băsescu (PPE)
(18 iunie 2012)

Subiect: Acțiuni discriminatorii împotriva romilor

La 1 iunie 2012, primarul orașului Baia Mare (România) a evacuat 38 de familii de romi din cartierul Craica și le-a mutat forțat în incinta fostului combinat chimic CUPROM.

Spațiul este impropriu pentru locuit, nerespectând cerințele minime legale în acest domeniu. Nu au fost făcute amenajările necesare și nici măcar evacuate recipientele pline cu substanțe chimice, potențial toxice. De asemenea, nu au fost făcute teste cu privire la nivelul poluării ambientale, deși acestea ar fi fost necesare pentru a determina dacă spațiul prezintă condiții adecvate de locuit, având în vedere că fostul combinat chimic CUPROM, închis în 2006, era considerat al doilea poluator din România și supranumit „Uzina morții”.

În aceste condiții, la numai câteva ore de la instalarea forțată în așa-numitele locuințe, 22 de copii și 2 adulți au fost transportați de urgență la spital, suferind de intoxicație în urma ingerării unor substanțe chimice aflate în incintă.

Ca urmare a acestor măsuri, mai multe ONG-uri au organizat proteste în fața Guvernului, denunțând caracterul rasist, discriminatoriu și bazat pe considerente electorale al deciziei primarului. De asemenea, a fost sesizat Consiliul Național pentru Combaterea Discriminării.

Până în prezent, Guvernul României nu a luat atitudine împotriva acestor încălcări grave ale drepturilor omului.

Cum reacționează Comisia față de măsurile abuzive și discriminatorii luate de primarul din Baia Mare împotriva comunității rome? A solicitat Comisia Guvernului român să ia atitudine pe acest subiect? Cum va urmări Comisia implementarea măsurilor din Strategia națională pentru incluziunea romilor, având în vedere și Comunicarea sa din mai 2012? Cum va reacționa în fața unor nerespectări ale angajamentelor luate în acest cadru, așa cum este cazul evenimentelor de la Baia Mare?

Răspuns dat de dna Reding în numele Comisiei
(16 iulie 2012)

Comisia Europeană a urmărit îndeaproape și cu o profundă îngrijorare situația comunităților rome din zona Craica, Baia Mare, în nord-vestul României, și recunoaște gravitatea situației.

Directiva 2000/43/CE ⁽¹⁾ privind egalitatea rasială interzice discriminarea pe bază de rasă sau origine etnică într-o serie de domenii, inclusiv în sectorul locuințelor. În prezent, Comisia Europeană efectuează un studiu pentru a determina dacă reinstalarea romilor în uzina chimică ar constitui o încălcare a directivei.

La 21 mai 2012, Comisia Europeană a adoptat primul raport de evaluare privind strategiile naționale de integrare a romilor care au fost propuse de către statele membre. Raportul Comisiei subliniază că mai sunt multe de făcut în ceea ce privește asigurarea unei finanțări suficiente pentru incluziunea romilor, instituirea unor mecanisme de monitorizare și combaterea discriminării și a segregării. Nu toate statele membre au abordat aspectele importante referitoare la accesul la o locuință decentă sau la îngrijire medicală. Comunicarea este însoțită de un document de lucru al serviciilor Comisiei care oferă observații detaliate cu privire la punctele tari și la punctele slabe ale documentelor prezentate de statele membre.

Comisia Europeană se așteaptă ca guvernele să abordeze aceste priorități care au fost evidențiate în raport. Comisia Europeană va revizui anual punerea în aplicare a strategiilor naționale de integrare a romilor și va prezenta Parlamentului European și Consiliului un raport pe această temă, precum și în cadrul Strategiei Europa 2020.

⁽¹⁾ Directiva 2000/43/CE a Consiliului din 29 iunie 2000 de punere în aplicare a principiului egalității de tratament între persoane, fără deosebire de rasă sau origine etnică, JO L 180, 19.7.2000, p. 22.

(English version)

Question for written answer P-005975/12
to the Commission
Elena Băsescu (PPE)
(18 June 2012)

Subject: Discriminatory measures against the Roma

On 1 June 2012, the mayor of Baia Mare (Romania) evicted 38 Roma families from the Craica district of the city and forcibly relocated them in the old CUPROM chemicals complex.

The complex is not an appropriate place to live, failing to meet the minimum legal requirements in that respect. The necessary alterations were not made and containers full of potentially toxic chemicals not even removed. At the same time, no tests were conducted on ambient pollution levels, even though these were needed to ascertain whether this was an appropriate place to live bearing in mind that the old CUPROM chemicals complex, which closed in 2006, was considered to be the second biggest polluter in Romania and nicknamed 'The Factory of Death'.

As such, only a few hours after being forcibly resettled in their so-called 'housing', 22 children and 2 adults were rushed to hospital and treated for poisoning after ingesting chemical substances present on the premises.

Several NGOs protested to the Romanian Government against the decision to adopt these measures, which they condemned as racist, discriminatory and electorally motivated. The matter was also referred to the National Council for Combating Discrimination.

The Romanian Government has yet to adopt a position on these serious infringements of human rights.

What is the Commission's view of the wrongful and discriminatory measures taken by the mayor of Baia Mare against the Roma community? Has it asked the Romanian Government to take a stance on this matter? How will the Commission monitor implementation of Romania's National Roma Integration Strategy, not least in view of its communication of May 2012? What action will it take in response to non-fulfilment of the commitments made in that connection, as in the case of the events in Baia Mare?

Answer given by Mrs Reding on behalf of the Commission
(16 July 2012)

The European Commission has been following the situation of Roma communities in Craica in Baia Mare, northwest of Romania, closely and with great concern, and acknowledges the gravity of the situation.

Directive 2000/43/EC on Racial Equality ⁽¹⁾ prohibits discrimination on the basis of racial or ethnic origin in a number of areas, including housing. The European Commission is currently analysing whether the re-housing of the Roma to the chemical factory would constitute a breach of the directive.

On 21 May 2012, the European Commission adopted its first assessment report of the National Roma Integration Strategies submitted by the Member States. The Commission report highlights that much more needs to be done when it comes to securing sufficient funding for Roma inclusion, putting monitoring mechanisms in place and fighting discrimination and segregation. Not all Member States have addressed the important issues of access to decent housing and healthcare. The communication is accompanied by a Staff Working Document which provides a detailed feedback on the strengths and weaknesses of the documents provided by the Member States.

The European Commission expects the governments to address these priorities pointed out in the report. The European Commission will review annually the implementation of the National Roma Integration Strategies, reporting to the European Parliament and the Council, as well as under the framework of the Europe 2020.

⁽¹⁾ Council Directive 2000/43/EC of 29 June 2000 implementing the principle of equal treatment between persons irrespective of racial or ethnic origin, LJ L 180, 19.7.2000, p. 22.

(Versión española)

**Pregunta con solicitud de respuesta escrita E-005976/12
a la Comisión**

Ramon Tremosa i Balcells (ALDE)

(18 de junio de 2012)

Asunto: IAG

El Reino de España, mediante dinero público, destinará más de 23 000 millones de euros para rescatar a una entidad financiera privada, esto es BFA (Banco Financiero de Ahorros) y su participada, el Banco Bankia. BFA es accionista de IAG (International Airlines Group) con una participación del 12,087 % del grupo compuesto por British Airlines e Iberia. Ahora, con dicha inyección de dinero público, el Gobierno de España se hará con una participación muy importante en esta aerolínea. De hecho, será el principal accionista de la empresa con un 14.7 por ciento de las acciones: controla, a través de la empresa pública SEPI (Sociedad Estatal de Participaciones Industriales), un 2,71 % de la empresa. ELFAA (European Low Fares Airline Association (ELFAA)), de la que Iberia es parte, envió una carta a la CE ⁽¹⁾ en la que se exigía a, entre otras acciones, poner fin a las ayudas públicas en las compañías aéreas: Se hablaba de competencia desleal y son un uso irresponsable del dinero del gobierno y más en momentos de austeridad fiscal. Exigía que dichas acciones del gobierno Catalán no deberían permitirse.

A la luz de lo anterior,

1. ¿Exigirá la Comisión al Gobierno Español que venda su participación de manera rápida en IAG, en aras de respetar la legislación europea y las ayudas de estado, tal y como le exigió ELFAA en su carta enviada a la CE en el caso de Spanair?
2. ¿Tomará la Comisión medidas urgentes y realizará una investigación profunda en la decisión por parte del Gobierno de España de controlar BFA convirtiéndose, mediante dinero público, en el principal accionista de Iberia-IAG, siendo ahora una compañía controlada por el Estado?

Respuesta del Sr. Almunia en nombre de la Comisión

(1 de agosto de 2012)

Aunque los Estados miembros tengan participación de control en distintas empresas, estas pueden considerarse independientes si guardan una capacidad de decisión autónoma.

En cuanto a la primera pregunta, si la participación del Estado español no es de control o si las empresas mantienen una capacidad de decisión autónoma, no se plantea problema alguno en relación con la normativa sobre concentraciones.

La segunda pregunta solo es pertinente si i) el Estado español ha obtenido el control y ii) las empresas no guardan una capacidad de decisión autónoma. Las adquisiciones pueden, pues, constituir operaciones con obligación de notificación según la normativa de concentraciones de la UE. Si se concluyera que la concentración traba considerablemente la competencia efectiva, pueden exigirse medidas correctoras, e incluso enajenaciones, para que la operación sea compatible con el mercado común.

En cuanto a la normativa sobre ayudas estatales, la Comisión es consciente de la situación actual de Bankia/BFA. No obstante, comoquiera que el asunto al que se refiere Su Señoría es un asunto en curso, la Comisión no está en condiciones de entrar en los detalles del mismo.

Por regla general, como Su Señoría sabe, la Comisión siempre ha exigido tres condiciones para la reestructuración de los bancos en Europa: primero, que tuvieran un plan creíble de vuelta a la viabilidad; segundo, que el coste para el Estado se redujera al mínimo necesario y se garantizara un reparto adecuado de las cargas, y, por último, que se limitara el impacto negativo sobre la competencia. En cuanto a la reducción del coste para el Estado, la Comisión considera positiva toda medida que reúna capital de inversores privados reforzando, por ejemplo, el capital de la entidad a cuenta de sus actuales acreedores, o movilizándolo recursos internos del banco cediendo, por ejemplo, activos cuyo valor de mercado sea superior al contable.

⁽¹⁾ http://www.elfaa.com/101115_ELFAA_PressRelease_Spanair_StateAid.pdf; <http://atwonline.com/international-aviation-regulation/news/elfaa-condemns-latest-round-cash-handouts-spanair-1117>.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-005976/12
to the Commission**

Ramon Tremosa i Balcells (ALDE)

(18 June 2012)

Subject: IAG

The kingdom of Spain intends to use over EUR 23 billion in public money to rescue the private financial group BFA (*Banco Financiero de Ahorros*) and its subsidiary bank Bankia. BFA holds shares in IAG (International Airlines Group), the holding group of British Airlines and Iberia, in which it has a 12.087% stake. Through this injection of public funds, the Spanish Government will now obtain a significant stake (14.7%) in this air company and will in fact become its main shareholder, since it already controls 2.71% of the company through the public body SEPI (State Industrial Holding Company). The European Low Fares Airline Association (ELFAA), of which Iberia is a member, sent a letter to the Commission ⁽¹⁾ in which it called, among other measures, for an end to state aid for airlines. It raised the issue of unfair competition, called it 'an irresponsible use of government funds, particularly in these times of fiscal austerity', and demanded that the Catalan Government be prevented from taking such action.

In light of the above:

1. Will the Commission require the Spanish Government to swiftly sell its stake in IAG, in order to comply with European legislation and state aid rules, as demanded by ELFAA in its letter to the Commission concerning the Spanair case?
2. Will the Commission take urgent action and carry out a far-reaching investigation of the Spanish Government's decision to control BFA, using public money to become the main shareholder in Iberia-IAG, which is now a state-controlled company?

Answer given by Mr Almunia on behalf of the Commission

(1 August 2012)

Even if Member States have controlling interests in several companies, these companies can be considered as independent companies if they have an independent power of decision.

As regards the first question, if the stake of the Spanish state is non-controlling or the companies retain independent power of decision, no issue arises under the merger rules.

The second question is only pertinent if (i) the Spanish state has acquired control and (ii) the companies do not retain independent powers of decision. The acquisitions may then constitute a notifiable operation under the EU merger rules. Should the merger then be found to significantly impede effective competition, remedies that may include divestitures may be required to render the operation compatible with the common market.

As regards the state aid rules, the Commission is aware of the current situation Bankia/BFA. However, as the case the Honourable Member refers to is an ongoing case, the Commission is not in the position of entering in the details of the case.

In general, as the Honourable Member knows, the Commission has consistently required three elements to banks under restructuring across Europe: first to have a credible plan for returning to viability, second to reduce the cost to the State to the minimum necessary and ensure appropriate burden sharing, and finally to limit the negative impact on competition. In regards to the reduction of cost to the State, the Commission views positively any measure that raises capital from private investors through, for example by strengthening the capital of the entity by its current creditors, or that mobilises resources internal to the bank, for example divestments of assets with a market value above book value.

⁽¹⁾ http://www.elfaa.com/101115_ELFAA_PressRelease_Spanair_StateAid.pdf; <http://atwonline.com/international-aviation-regulation/news/elfaa-condemns-latest-round-cash-handouts-spanair-1117>.

(Deutsche Fassung)

Anfrage zur schriftlichen Beantwortung E-005977/12

an die Kommission

Klaus-Heiner Lehne (PPE)

(18. Juni 2012)

Betrifft: Entziehung der unbefristeten Aufenthaltsgenehmigung eines Drittstaatsangehörigen aufgrund eines Studiums im EU-Ausland

Aus Deutschland sind Fälle bekannt, in denen Ausländerbehörden Drittstaatsangehörigen die unbefristete Aufenthaltsgenehmigung deshalb entzogen haben, weil diese im EU-Ausland studiert haben. Eine derartige Verwaltungspraxis kann dazu führen, dass Drittstaatsangehörige auch dann, wenn sie Bildungsinländer sind, faktisch von der Hochschulmobilität ausgeschlossen werden, da sie andernfalls ihre unbefristete Aufenthaltserlaubnis verlieren.

Ist es nach Ansicht der Kommission mit dem EU-Recht bzw. mit den Zielsetzungen der Europäischen Kommission zur Förderung von Freizügigkeit und Hochschulmobilität vereinbar, wenn eine nationale Ausländerbehörde Drittstaatsangehörigen, die Bildungsinländer sind bzw. einen anerkannten inländischen Schulabschluss haben, den unbefristeten Aufenthaltsstatus nur deshalb entzieht, weil sie in einem anderen EU-Mitgliedsland studieren?

Antwort von Frau Malmström im Namen der Kommission

(8. August 2012)

Die Richtlinie über die Bedingungen für die Zulassung von Drittstaatsangehörigen zur Absolvierung eines Studiums ⁽¹⁾ gelangt nicht zur Anwendung, wenn einem Drittstaatsangehörigen bereits in einem Mitgliedstaat die Rechtsstellung eines langfristig Aufenthaltsberechtigten zuerkannt wurde.

Bei den Vorschriften für den Verlust der Aufenthaltsgenehmigung ist danach zu unterscheiden, ob dem Drittstaatsangehörigen die Rechtsstellung eines langfristig Aufenthaltsberechtigten gemäß der Richtlinie 2003/109 ⁽²⁾ (nachstehend „die Richtlinie“) zuerkannt wurde oder ob die Aufenthaltsgenehmigung nach nationalem Recht ausgestellt worden ist. Im letzteren Fall kommt die Richtlinie nicht zum Tragen und die Angelegenheit ist ausschließlich nach Maßgabe des nationalen Rechts zu regeln.

Wurde die Aufenthaltsgenehmigung auf der Grundlage der Richtlinie erteilt, kann der Entzug oder Verlust der Rechtsstellung als langfristig Aufenthaltsberechtigter nur in den Fällen erfolgen, die in Artikel 9 der Richtlinie festgelegt sind. Die Abwesenheit von dem Mitgliedstaat, der die langfristige EU-Aufenthaltsberechtigung ausgestellt hat, und die sich daraus ergebenden Auswirkungen auf den Entzug oder Verlust der Rechtsstellung eines langfristig Aufenthaltsberechtigten werden in Artikel 9 Absatz 1 Buchstabe c sowie den Absätzen 2 und 4 geregelt (Abwesenheit vom Gebiet der Union während eines Zeitraums von 12 aufeinander folgenden Monaten, sechsjährige Abwesenheit vom Hoheitsgebiet des Mitgliedstaates, der die Rechtsstellung eines langfristig Aufenthaltsberechtigten zuerkannt hat). In Zusammenhang mit dem Verlust der besagten Rechtsstellung sieht Artikel 9 Absatz 5 vor, dass die Mitgliedstaaten, die die Rechtsstellung eines langfristig Aufenthaltsberechtigten zuerkannt haben, ein vereinfachtes Verfahren für deren Wiedererlangung einführen. Diese Bestimmung dürfte auch Personen betreffen, die sich zur Absolvierung eines Studiums in einem zweiten Mitgliedstaat aufgehalten haben. Die einschlägigen Voraussetzungen und Verfahren bestimmen sich nach dem nationalen Recht.

⁽¹⁾ Richtlinie 2004/114/EG des Rates.

⁽²⁾ Richtlinie 2003/109/EG des Rates betreffend die Rechtsstellung der langfristig aufenthaltsberechtigten Drittstaatsangehörigen. 2011 hat die Kommission einen Bericht über die Anwendung der Richtlinie durch die Mitgliedstaaten angenommen, KOM(2011)585 endg.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-005977/12
to the Commission**

Klaus-Heiner Lehne (PPE)

(18 June 2012)

Subject: Revocation of residence permits of third-country nationals, previously valid indefinitely, on account of study elsewhere in the EU

Cases have occurred in Germany in which authorities responsible for aliens have revoked third-country nationals' residence permits, which had been valid for an indefinite period, because they were studying in another EU Member State. This administrative practice can have the result that, even if a third-country national has received his secondary education in the country where the residence permit was issued, he is effectively debarred from higher education abroad because he would then lose his residence permit which previously was valid indefinitely.

Is it compatible with EC law and with the Commission's objectives with a view to promoting freedom of movement and mobility in higher education if a national aliens authority revokes the residence permits of third-country nationals who have received their secondary education in the country concerned and/or hold a recognised school-leaving qualification obtained in that country, simply because they are studying in another EU Member State?

Answer given by Ms Malmström on behalf of the Commission

(8 August 2012)

The directive on the conditions of admission of third-country nationals for the purposes of studies ⁽¹⁾ does not apply to situations where a third-country national already enjoys long-term resident status in a Member State.

Concerning the rules applicable to the loss of a residence permit, there is a difference between a situation in which the third-country national enjoys long-term resident status under Directive 2003/109 ⁽²⁾ (hereafter 'the directive') and situations where he/she has a residence permit under national law. In the latter case, the directive does not apply and the question is regulated by national law alone.

In the case of a permit acquired under the directive, the permit can be withdrawn or the long-term resident status be lost only in cases which are laid down in Article 9 of the directive. Regarding periods of absence from the territory of a Member State which issued the EU long-term residence permit and their impact on the loss or withdrawal of long-term residence status, Article 9 (1) (c), (2) and (4) are relevant (absence from the territory of the Union for a period of 12 consecutive months, six years of absence from the territory of the Member State that granted long-term resident status). At the same time, according to Article 9 (5), in case of loss of long-term residence status, Member States who have granted it, must provide for a facilitated procedure for its re-acquisition. This should apply to persons who have resided in a second Member State to pursue studies. The relevant conditions and the procedures are determined by national law.

⁽¹⁾ Council Directive 2004/114/EC.

⁽²⁾ Council Directive 2003/109/EC concerning the status of third-country nationals who are long-term residents. In 2011, the Commission adopted a report on the implementation of the directive by the Member States, COM(2011) 585 final.

(Versione italiana)

**Interrogazione con richiesta di risposta scritta E-005978/12
alla Commissione (Vicepresidente/Alto Rappresentante)**

Fiorello Provera (EFD)

(18 giugno 2012)

Oggetto: VP/HR — Fallimento dei colloqui sul nucleare dell'Iran e accesso all'impianto di Parchin

L'11 giugno 2012, BBC News ha riferito che secondo Herman Nackaerts, ispettore capo dell'Agenzia internazionale per l'energia atomica (AIEA), i colloqui sul programma nucleare dell'Iran si sono conclusi senza aver compiuto alcun progresso. L'AIEA ha chiesto di poter accedere all'impianto di Parchin, dove l'Agenzia delle Nazioni Unite sospetta che si siano svolti gli esperimenti di esplosivo ad alto potenziale da impiegare nelle testate nucleari. L'Iran nega l'esistenza di componenti militari nei suoi impianti nucleari. Nel novembre 2011 l'AIEA ha ricevuto informazioni secondo le quali sarebbero in corso degli esperimenti. Il sito è ubicato a circa 20 km a sud-est del centro di Teheran.

I prossimi colloqui sul programma nucleare iraniano sono previsti per il 18 e 19 giugno 2012 a Mosca, con la partecipazione del gruppo P5+1. L'ambasciatore iraniano all'AIEA, Ali Ashghar Soltanieh, ha affermato che il suo paese continuerà a collaborare per dissipare i timori circa il programma nucleare iraniano: «Siamo pronti a chiarire ogni ambiguità e a dimostrare al mondo che le nostre attività sono esclusivamente pacifiche e che le accuse (di sviluppare una bomba) sono false». I precedenti colloqui con il gruppo P5+1 svoltisi a Istanbul e a Baghdad non hanno sortito risultati.

1. Considerato il disappunto delle autorità dell'AIEA, dovuto al diniego delle autorità iraniane alla richiesta di accesso al sito nucleare di Parchin, la questione sarà al centro dei prossimi colloqui previsti per il novembre 2012?
2. Ha discusso il VP/HR la possibilità di imporre nuove sanzioni o restrizioni alla Repubblica islamica dell'Iran, nel caso il prossimo ciclo di colloqui non riesca a produrre risultati concreti, come ad esempio il rilascio dell'autorizzazione agli ispettori nucleari di accedere ai siti importanti?
3. Qual è la posizione del VP/HR riguardo alla visita in Iran del ministro degli Esteri russo, Sergei Lavrov, finalizzata ad affrontare la questione del programma nucleare iraniano e la crisi in Siria? Ritiene che egli possa fare progressi?

Risposta dell'Alta Rappresentante/Vicepresidente Catherine Ashton a nome della Commissione

(16 agosto 2012)

1. L'AIEA continua a indagare su tutte le questioni ancora in sospeso, fra cui un'eventuale dimensione militare del programma nucleare iraniano. È prevedibile che il Direttore generale dell'AIEA presenti un rapporto sulla questione nucleare iraniana in occasione della prossima riunione del Consiglio dei governatori dell'AIEA, che si terrà nel settembre 2012, riguardante tutti gli aspetti pertinenti secondo il mandato dell'Agenzia.
2. Le misure restrittive imposte all'Iran dall'UE, che affiancano e rafforzano le misure del Consiglio di sicurezza dell'ONU, sono parte integrante del duplice approccio E3/UE+3 nella ricerca di una soluzione diplomatica alla questione nucleare iraniana. L'obiettivo della politica dell'Unione europea resta quello di risolvere tale questione in modo globale e duraturo. Nel gennaio 2012, il Consiglio Affari esteri ha sottolineato in proposito che lo stesso regime iraniano può agire in modo responsabile e far cessare tutte le sanzioni. Finché ciò non avverrà, l'UE manterrà le attuali politiche, compresa l'applicazione di misure restrittive.
3. L'Alta Rappresentante/Vicepresidente ha sottolineato più volte l'assoluta necessità che l'E3/UE+3 agisca di concerto e con ferma determinazione, utilizzando i canali diplomatici, per rassicurare in tempi rapidi la comunità internazionale circa la natura esclusivamente pacifica del programma nucleare iraniano. Si compiace di tutti gli sforzi volti a contribuire alla soluzione della questione nucleare iraniana che sostengono l'approccio E3/UE+3 mirante a rafforzare la fiducia.

(English version)

Question for written answer E-005978/12
to the Commission (Vice-President/High Representative)
Fiorello Provera (EFD)
(18 June 2012)

Subject: VP/HR — Failure of Iranian nuclear talks and access to Parchin facility

On 11 June 2012, BBC News reported that according to the International Atomic Energy Agency's chief inspector Herman Nackaerts, talks on Iran's nuclear programme had ended with 'no progress'. The IAEA had sought access to Parchin, which is where the UN agency suspects that high-explosive tests relevant to nuclear warheads have taken place. Iran denies that there is any military component to its nuclear facilities. The IAEA received information in November 2011 that tests are taking place. The site is located approximately 20 kilometres southeast of downtown Tehran.

The next round of talks on Iran's nuclear programme are due to take place in Moscow from 18 to 19 June 2012 with members of the P5+1. Iran's ambassador to the IAEA, Ali Ashghar Soltanieh, has stated that his country will continue to work to allay fears about the country's nuclear programme: 'We are ready to remove all ambiguities and prove to the world that our activities are exclusively for peaceful purposes and none of these allegations [of developing a bomb] are true'. Previous P5+1 talks in Istanbul and Baghdad have failed to achieve results.

1. Given the IAEA's frustration over the Iranian authorities' failure to allow access to the Parchin nuclear site, will this issue be top of the agenda at the next round of talks in November 2012?
2. Has the Vice-President of the Commission/High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy discussed the possibility of imposing fresh sanctions or restrictions on the Islamic Republic of Iran if the next round of talks does not succeed in producing tangible results, such as granting nuclear inspectors access to crucial sites?
3. What is the position of the VP/HR regarding Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov's visit to Iran in order to address the issue of its nuclear programme and the Syrian crisis? Does she believe he can make significant inroads with the Iranian authorities?

Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Ashton on behalf of the Commission
(16 August 2012)

1. The IAEA continues its investigations on all outstanding issues, including a possible military dimension, regarding the Iranian nuclear programme. It is to be expected that the IAEA Director-General will issue a report on the Iranian nuclear issue on the occasion of the next IAEA Board of Governors' meeting that will take place in September 2012 covering all aspects relevant to the mandate of the agency.
 2. The restrictive measures imposed by the EU against Iran, in addition to and reinforcing UN Security Council measures, are an integral part of the E3/EU+3's dual-track approach in working for a diplomatic solution to the Iranian nuclear issue. The objective of the European Union's policy remains to achieve a comprehensive and long-term settlement in relation to the Iranian nuclear issue. In January 2012, the Council of Foreign Affairs stressed in this respect that 'the Iranian regime itself can act responsibly and bring all sanctions to an end'. As long as this is not the case, the EU will maintain its current policies, including the application of restrictive measures.
 3. The High Representative/Vice-President has repeatedly stressed the importance of the E3/EU+3 acting united and firmly determined in seeking a swift diplomatic resolution of the international community's concerns on the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran's nuclear programme. She welcomes all efforts aimed at contributing to a resolution of the Iranian nuclear issue which are supportive of the E3/EU+3's confidence-building approach.
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(Versione italiana)

**Interrogazione con richiesta di risposta scritta E-005979/12
alla Commissione (Vicepresidente/Alto Rappresentante)
Fiorello Provera (EFD)
(18 giugno 2012)**

Oggetto: VP/HR — Ulteriori chiusure di chiese in Indonesia

Il 5 giugno 2012, l'associazione Open Doors ha riferito che in Indonesia nei primi cinque mesi del 2012 sono stati registrati almeno 40 casi di violazione dei diritti religiosi dei cristiani. Stando al Christian Communication Forum di Giacarta, ciò rappresenta quasi due terzi del numero complessivo di azioni ai danni di cristiani commesse l'anno scorso. Il presidente del forum ha dichiarato che le violenze sono in aumento così come la chiusura delle chiese; quest'anno sono state registrate almeno 22 chiusure, di cui 18 a maggio nel distretto di Singkil, in provincia di Aceh. Numerose autorità locali subiscono pressioni da parte dei gruppi musulmani radicali. Le chiusure sono iniziate dopo l'elezione di un governatore islamico intransigente. Il 13 maggio, a seguito dell'intervento di Open Doors, i cristiani hanno potuto praticare nuovamente la propria fede, anche se, stando a informazioni non confermate, altre chiese sono state costrette a chiudere.

Anche nei dintorni di Giacarta e Singkil sono in aumento le violenze contro i cristiani. Il 17 maggio almeno 600 islamisti hanno scagliato sacche di urina e acqua di fosso contro 100 membri della chiesa cristiana protestante Filadelfia Batak di Bekasi, nei pressi di Giacarta. Le autorità hanno chiuso altresì una piccola chiesa pentecostale a circa 15 miglia a ovest di Giacarta, dopo gli attacchi del 14 aprile ad opera di alcuni membri del gruppo radicale «Fronte di difesa islamico (FPI)». Si tratta del secondo attacco di quest'anno contro la chiesa Gereja Pentakosta di Indonesia (GPdI) da parte degli estremisti dell'FPI, che ha indotto il pastore della chiesa a nascondersi e a cercare asilo negli Stati Uniti.

1. È al corrente il VP/HR degli attacchi contro i cristiani in Indonesia?
2. Ritiene il VP/HR che le autorità indonesiane siano disposte a contrastare le richieste dei gruppi islamici radicali come l'FPI, i quali commettono aggressioni ai danni delle congregazioni dei cristiani? Ritiene inoltre che il governo indonesiano presti la dovuta attenzione alle forze che incitano allo scontro settario?
3. Il 26 aprile 2012, l'Alto Rappresentante ha rilevato l'esistenza, tra l'UE e l'Indonesia, di uno «stretto legame e di una collaborazione attiva in molti campi, tra cui la lotta al terrorismo, i diritti umani, la cooperazione interconfessionale». Quali sono gli esempi di «cooperazione interconfessionale» in Indonesia che sono monitorati dall'UE?

**Risposta dell'Alto Rappresentante/Vicepresidente Catherine Ashton a nome della Commissione
(6 agosto 2012)**

L'AR/VP è preoccupata per l'aumento degli episodi di violenza in Indonesia perpetrati da gruppi estremisti ai danni di cristiani e altre minoranze.

Durante il dialogo annuale UE-Indonesia sui diritti umani, nel maggio 2012, l'UE ha sottolineato la necessità che l'Indonesia rispetti i diritti umani internazionali e garantisca la protezione delle minoranze religiose.

La delegazione UE ha incontrato i leader religiosi di Aceh a giugno ed ha espresso al nuovo governatore, Zaini Abdullah, preoccupazione per il trattamento dei cristiani. Abdullah ha promesso di esaminare i casi di chiusura di chiese e ha espresso il proprio impegno nei confronti della libertà religiosa.

La delegazione UE ha organizzato due grandi seminari sulle questioni interconfessionali, nel luglio 2010 e nell'ottobre 2011, e prevede di organizzare in autunno a Giacarta una conferenza con la società civile che si concentrerà sulla non discriminazione.

Inoltre, la delegazione lavora su tali temi con Nahdlatul Ulama, la più grande organizzazione musulmana del mondo, che ha un ruolo chiave nella protezione delle minoranze in Indonesia.

Tutte queste attività sono volte ad incoraggiare il dialogo interconfessionale e a sottolineare la necessità che il governo si occupi di organizzazioni intransigenti come il Fronte di difesa islamico (FPI). L'UE ha esortato il governo a prendere misure per evitare azioni illecite da parte di tali gruppi.

Il ministero indonesiano degli Affari religiosi ha da poco istituito un programma di borse di studio per funzionari e gruppi di riflessione dell'UE, invitati a recarsi in Indonesia in agosto, con l'obiettivo di promuovere il dialogo per poter affrontare meglio tali questioni.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-005979/12
to the Commission (Vice-President/High Representative)**

Fiorello Provera (EFD)

(18 June 2012)

Subject: VP/HR — Increase in church closures in Indonesia

On 5 June 2012, the organisation Open Doors reported that during the first five months of 2012 at least forty violations of Christians' religious rights were recorded in Indonesia. This represents nearly two thirds of the total number of cases of anti-Christian actions in the whole of last year, according to the Jakarta Christian Communication Forum. The president of the forum said there is a growing incidence of violence and church closures — at least twenty-two this year, including eighteen in the Singkil regency of Aceh that were sealed in May. Many local authorities are under pressure from radical Muslim groups. The closures began following the election of a hard-line Islamic governor. Following intervention by Open Doors, Christians were able to start worshipping again on 13 May, but unconfirmed reports indicate that other churches have since been forced to close.

Violence is also on the rise against Christians in areas surrounding Jakarta and Singkil. On 17 May, at least 600 Islamists hurled bags of urine and ditchwater at 100 members of the Philadelphia Batak Christian Protestant Church in Bekasi, near Jakarta. Authorities also closed down a small Pentecostal church about 15 miles west of Jakarta, after members of the radical Islamic Defenders Front (FPI) attacked it on 14 April. This is the second attack this year on the Gereja Pentakosta di Indonesia (GPdI) church by FPI extremists, which has driven the church's pastor into hiding and caused him to seek asylum in the United States.

1. Is the Vice-President/High Representative aware of the rise in anti-Christian attacks in Indonesia?
2. Does the VP/HR believe that the Indonesian authorities are prepared to tackle the demands of radical Islamist groups such as the FPI, who are perpetrating aggressive acts against Christian congregations? Does the VP/HR think that the Indonesian Government takes them seriously as a force to incite sectarian conflict?
3. On 26 April 2012, the High Representative noted the 'strong relationship and ongoing collaboration in many areas, including counter-terrorism, human rights, interfaith cooperation' that exist between the EU and Indonesia. What examples of 'interfaith cooperation' existing within Indonesia and overseen by the EU can be cited?

Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Ashton on behalf of the Commission

(6 August 2012)

The HR/VP is concerned about the rise of incidents in Indonesia by extremist groups against Christians and other minorities

At the annual EU-Indonesia Human Rights Dialogue, which took place in May 2012, the EU has stressed the need for Indonesia to fulfil international human rights obligations and ensure the protection of religious minorities.

The EU Delegation met with church leaders from Aceh in June and raised concern at the treatment of Christians with the new Governor, Zaini Abdullah. Mr Abdullah undertook to look into cases of church closure and expressed his commitment to religious freedom.

The EU Delegation has organised two major seminars on interfaith issues, in July 2010 and in October 2011 and is planning a conference with civil society in Jakarta this autumn focusing on non-discrimination.

Moreover, the EU Delegation is working on these issues with Nahdlatul Ulama, the world's largest Muslim organisation which has a pivotal role in protecting minorities in Indonesia.

All these activities are aimed at encouraging interfaith dialogue and at highlighting the need of the Government to tackle hard line organisations such as the Islamic Defenders Front (FPI). The EU has pressed the government to take action to prevent unlawful action by such groups.

The Indonesian Ministry of Religious Affairs has just established a scholarship program for EU officials and think tanks to visit Indonesia in August with the objective of promoting dialogue in order to better address these issues.

(Versione italiana)

**Interrogazione con richiesta di risposta scritta E-005980/12
alla Commissione (Vicepresidente/Alto Rappresentante)**

Fiorello Provera (EFD)

(18 giugno 2012)

Oggetto: VP/HR — Una fatwa chiede l'uccisione di 19 artisti in Tunisia

Il 13 giugno, il Centro strategico di intelligence e sicurezza europeo ha riferito che lo sceicco salafita tunisino Abu Ayoub Ettounsi ha emesso pubblicamente una fatwa autorizzando l'uccisione di 19 artisti considerati «nemici di Dio». Tutte le persone in questione hanno partecipato alla mostra organizzata nella galleria «Springs of Art» del palazzo El Ebdellia di Marsa, nella periferia di Tunisi.

La mostra d'arte è stata causa di scontri violenti tra le forze di sicurezza e almeno 500 salafiti. Sono almeno 162 le persone arrestate dopo giorni di disordini in varie località del paese, e il governo ha deciso di chiudere la galleria d'arte. Con un comunicato congiunto il presidente della Tunisia, il capo dell'Assemblea costituente e il primo ministro hanno dichiarato che: «I gruppi estremisti stanno minacciando le libertà, si arrogano il diritto di sostituirsi alle istituzioni statali e cercano di portare sotto il loro controllo i luoghi di culto».

1. Alla luce delle minacce nei confronti dei 19 artisti tunisini, quali misure è disposto a prendere il VP/HR per la loro tutela?
2. Il VP/HR si aspetta che le autorità tunisine condannino e affrontino la fatwa emessa dallo sceicco salafita Abu Ayoub Ettounsi?

Risposta dell'Alta Rappresentante/Vicepresidente Catherine Ashton a nome della Commissione

(6 agosto 2012)

1. L'UE mantiene contatti regolari con le autorità tunisine riguardo al processo di transizione democratica ed ha ripetutamente sottolineato la necessità di consolidare i progressi storici compiuti grazie alla rivoluzione tunisina, in particolare la libertà di espressione e di riunione, garantendo nel contempo il mantenimento dell'ordine pubblico. L'AR/VP continuerà a seguire gli sviluppi da vicino.
 2. Le autorità tunisine hanno condannato pubblicamente la dichiarazione citata dall'onorevole parlamentare e hanno annunciato che sarà avviata un'azione legale nei confronti del suo autore.
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(English version)

**Question for written answer E-005980/12
to the Commission (Vice-President/High Representative)**

Fiorello Provera (EFD)

(18 June 2012)

Subject: VP/HR — Fatwa calling for the killing of 19 artists in Tunisia

On 13 June the European Strategic Intelligence and Security Center reported that the Tunisian Salafist Sheikh Abu Ayoub Ettounsi had issued a public fatwa authorising the killing of 19 artists considered to be 'enemies of God'. All the individuals in question were involved in an exhibition held at the 'Springs of Art' gallery in El Ebdellia Palace in Marsa, a suburb of Tunis.

Violent clashes broke out between security forces and at least 500 Salafis over this art exhibition. At least 162 people were arrested after days of rioting in several locations across the country. The art gallery has now been closed by the government. Tunisia's president, the head of its constituent assembly and the prime minister have issued a joint statement saying: 'Extremist groups are threatening freedoms, claiming the right to substitute themselves for state institutions and trying to bring places of worship under their control'.

1. In light of the threats against 19 Tunisian artists, what steps is the VP/HR prepared to take in order to offer protection to these individuals?
2. Does the VP/HR expect the Tunisian authorities to condemn and address the fatwa issued by the Salafist Sheikh Abu Ayoub Ettounsi?

Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Ashton on behalf of the Commission

(6 August 2012)

1. The EU is in regular contact with the Tunisian authorities regarding the process of democratic transition and has repeatedly underlined the need to protect the historic achievements of the Tunisian revolution notably freedom of expression and assembly while at the same time ensuring maintenance of law and order. The HR/VP will continue to follow developments closely.
 2. The Tunisian authorities have publicly condemned the declaration mentioned by the Honourable Member; it was also announced that legal proceedings would be launched against its author.
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(Versione italiana)

**Interrogazione con richiesta di risposta scritta E-005981/12
alla Commissione (Vicepresidente/Alto Rappresentante)**

Fiorello Provera (EFD)

(18 giugno 2012)

Oggetto: VP/HR — Scontri nella capitale tunisina tra salafiti e polizia

Il 12 giugno 2012, diverse nuove fonti hanno riferito di scontri tra centinaia di salafiti e la polizia a seguito di una mostra d'arte. I manifestanti hanno bloccato le strade e scagliato bombe incendiarie contro la polizia. Un funzionario del ministero dell'Interno ha dichiarato che 86 persone sono in stato di fermo, mentre 7 membri delle forze di sicurezza hanno riportato ferite nel tentativo di sedare la rivolta usando gas lacrimogeni e sparando in aria. Le proteste si sono estese a diverse zone residenziali, dove l'azione di alcuni giovani ha impedito ai tram di attraversare alcuni quartieri della città e i negozi sono rimasti chiusi. In alcune zone sono state frantumate le vetrine dei negozi.

I disordini sono scoppiati quando alcuni salafiti hanno visitato una mostra d'arte nel quartiere esclusivo di La Marsa deturpando le opere d'arte ritenute offensive. L'opera che ha suscitato le ire maggiori ritraeva il nome di Allah scritto usando insetti. Le persone che hanno sfregiato le opere d'arte hanno accusato gli artisti di attaccare l'Islam. I salafiti chiedono un ruolo maggiore per l'Islam nella società tunisina. Nel maggio 2012 in almeno due città di provincia i salafiti hanno attaccato bar e negozi che vendevano alcol, stando a quanto sostiene la Reuters. I tunisini laici affermano che i salafiti non tollerano altri punti di vista e cercano di reprimere la libertà di espressione. Secondo loro l'Ennahda, il partito al governo, è troppo indulgente nei confronti dei salafiti, e ciò li incoraggia a intensificare le loro richieste. Ayman al-Zawahiri, attualmente al vertice di Al Qaeda, ha chiesto ai tunisini di difendere la legge islamica dal partito Ennahda.

1. Ritiene il VP/HR che la Tunisia rischi una diffusa instabilità a causa degli scontri tra islamisti e le comunità laiche del paese?
2. Ritengono i funzionari dell'UE a Tunisi che il partito Ennahda stia prendendo sul serio questo problema?
3. Ritiene il VP/HR che in Tunisia si possa verificare un esodo di laici e appartenenti a minoranze religiose, data la recrudescenza degli attacchi registrata nelle ultime settimane?

Risposta dell'Alta Rappresentante/Vicepresidente Catherine Ashton a nome della Commissione

(9 agosto 2012)

1. Tramite la delegazione dell'UE a Tunisi, l'Alta Rappresentante/Vicepresidente segue da vicino gli sviluppi sul terreno. Gli incidenti di cui fa menzione l'onorevole parlamentare sono motivo di preoccupazione e sembrano coinvolgere alcuni gruppi violenti guidati dai salafiti contro la comunità tunisina in senso ampio, in particolare studenti, media, società civile, artisti e perfino sindacalisti e uomini d'affari.
 2. L'UE è in contatto costante con le autorità tunisine in merito al processo di transizione democratica e ha sottolineato più volte la necessità di proteggere le conquiste storiche della rivoluzione tunisina, segnatamente la libertà d'espressione e di riunione, assicurando al tempo stesso la conservazione dello stato di diritto. Giudica positivamente il ritorno alla calma a Tunisi in seguito agli interventi del governo per controllare i disordini e la successiva abolizione del coprifuoco.
 3. L'Alta Rappresentante/Vicepresidente non ritiene sussista il rischio che laici e minoranze religiose abbandonino la Tunisia a causa degli avvenimenti recenti.
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(English version)

Question for written answer E-005981/12
to the Commission (Vice-President/High Representative)
Fiorello Provera (EFD)
(18 June 2012)

Subject: VP/HR — Clashes between Salafis and police in the Tunisian capital

On 12 June 2012, various news sources reported that hundreds of Salafis had clashed with police over an art exhibition. Protesters had blocked streets and hurled petrol bombs at the police. An Interior Ministry official said that 86 people had been detained, while seven members of the security forces had been wounded as they tried to quell the rioting by using tear gas and firing into the air. Protests had spread to a number of residential areas, with young men preventing trams from passing through certain districts of the capital, where shops remained closed. Evidence was found in some areas that shop windows had been smashed.

The riots were sparked when a number of Salafis went to an art exhibition in the upscale La Marsa suburb and defaced artwork which they deemed to be offensive. The artwork which caused the most fury was a piece depicting the name of Allah written using insects. The individuals who defaced the artwork accused the artists of attacking Islam. Salafis are demanding a larger role for Islam within Tunisian society. In May 2012, Salafis attacked bars and shops selling alcohol in at least two provincial towns, according to Reuters reports. Secular Tunisians say the Salafis are unwilling to tolerate alternative points of view and seek to stifle freedom of expression. They say the ruling Ennahda party has been too lenient with Salafis, giving them the confidence to step up their demands. Al-Qaeda's current head, Ayman al-Zawahiri, has called on Tunisians to defend Islamic law from the Ennahda party.

1. Does the High Representative / Vice-President believe that Tunisia is at risk of widespread instability caused by clashes between Islamists and the country's secular communities?
2. Do EU officials in Tunis believe that the Ennahda party is taking this problem seriously?
3. Does the HR/VP believe there is a possibility that Tunisia may see an exodus of secularists and religious minorities, given the upsurge in attacks in recent weeks?

Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Ashton on behalf of the Commission
(9 August 2012)

1. The HR/VP, through the EU Delegation in Tunis, is following closely developments on the ground. The incidents mentioned by the Honourable Member are of concern and appear to involve some violent groups led by Salafists against the wider Tunisian community in particular students, the media, civil society, artists and even trade unionists and businesses.
 2. The EU is in regular contact with the Tunisian authorities regarding the process of democratic transition and has repeatedly underlined the need to protect the historic achievements of the Tunisian revolution notably freedom of expression and assembly while at the same time ensuring maintenance of law and order. The restoration of calm in Tunis following government interventions to control the riots as well as the lifting of the curfew thereafter are welcome.
 3. The HR/VP does not consider that there is a risk of secularists and religious minorities leaving Tunisia in the light of recent events.
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(Nederlandse versie)

Vraag met verzoek om schriftelijk antwoord E-005982/12
aan de Commissie
Emine Bozkurt (S&D)
(18 juni 2012)

Betreft: Racisme op het werk

De EU heeft de richtlijn rassengelijkheid (2000/43/EG) aangenomen om gelijke behandeling ongeacht ras of etnische afstamming te garanderen, en de richtlijn gelijke behandeling in arbeid en beroep (2000/78/EG) om discriminatie op het werk te bestrijden. Voorts heeft zij het Handvest van de grondrechten goedgekeurd om te garanderen dat alle burgers gelijk zijn en dat hun rechten in gelijke mate gevrijwaard worden. Het Handvest verplicht de lidstaten alle nodige maatregelen te treffen om de rechten van al hun burgers te vrijwaren en alle vormen van discriminatie op basis van ras of etnische afstamming te bestrijden.

Op 7 juni 2012 werd de Nederlandse nationale voetbelploeg het slachtoffer van racistische beledigingen tijdens een openbare trainingssessie in Krakau, Polen in de aanloop naar de openingsmatch van het Europees Kampioenschap. Volgens berichten in de media hebben honderden van de 23 000 kijkers de zwarte spelers van de ploeg beledigd met „apenkreten”. Aangezien voetballers ook werknemers zijn en sportclubs en stadions hun werkplaats, moeten professionele sporters ook recht hebben op een werkomgeving zonder racisme, net als alle andere werknemers.

1. Is de Commissie op de hoogte van dit specifieke voorval?
2. Is de Commissie op de hoogte van andere, soortgelijke voorvallen?
3. Hoe zal de Commissie ervoor zorgen dat de lidstaten de richtlijn rassengelijkheid en de richtlijn gelijke behandeling in arbeid en beroep toepassen op werknemers in de sportsector?
4. Welke maatregelen zal de Commissie nemen om soortgelijke voorvallen te voorkomen en de EU-burgers te beschermen tegen racisme op het werk?

Antwoord van mevrouw Reding namens de Commissie
(1 augustus 2012)

De Commissie is ervan op de hoogte dat racisme en discriminatie voorkomen in zowel de professionele als de amateursport ⁽¹⁾.

Richtlijn 2000/43/EG houdende toepassing van het beginsel van gelijke behandeling van personen ongeacht ras of etnische afstamming ⁽²⁾ verbiedt discriminatie op grond van ras of etnische afkomst op een aantal gebieden, waaronder werkgelegenheid. Alle lidstaten hebben deze richtlijn in hun nationale recht omgezet, en de Commissie heeft geconstateerd dat de nationale wetten ook in overeenstemming zijn met de richtlijn.

Kaderbesluit 2008/913/JBZ verplicht de lidstaten om het opzettelijk en publiekelijk aanzetten tot geweld of haat op grond van ras, huidskleur, godsdienst, afstamming of nationale of etnische afkomst strafrechtelijk te bestraffen. De Commissie onderzoekt momenteel de nationale uitvoeringsmaatregelen die door de lidstaten zijn gemeld en zal in 2013 verslag uitbrengen.

Het is de taak van de lidstaten om ervoor te zorgen dat de nationale wetgeving wordt nageleefd. Gevallen van discriminatie en racistische of xenofobische haatuitingen moeten nationaal worden vervolgd en onderzocht worden volgens het nationale recht.

Via het programma Progress verleent de Commissie financiële steun aan de nationale autoriteiten en maatschappelijke organisaties om discriminatie op het werk te bestrijden. Ook voert de Commissie sinds 2003 een voorlichtingscampagne om stereotypen te bestrijden ⁽³⁾, en faciliteert zij discussies en de uitwisseling van goede praktijken tussen de nationale diversiteitshandvesten door middel van een platform voor het stimuleren van diversiteitsbeleid in de particuliere sector en bij de overheid.

⁽¹⁾ Zie voor meer informatie over de situatie in de EU bijvoorbeeld het verslag van het EU-bureau voor de grondrechten op http://fra.europa.eu/fraWebsite/research/publications/publications_per_year/2010/pub-racism-in-sport_en.htm

⁽²⁾ Richtlijn 2000/43/EG van de Raad van 29 juni 2000 houdende toepassing van het beginsel van gelijke behandeling van personen ongeacht ras of etnische afstamming (PB L 180 van 19.7.2000, blz. 22).

⁽³⁾ De campagne „Verschil moet er zijn. Discriminatie niet” (<http://ec.europa.eu/justice/fdad/>) loopt sinds 2003.

In het kader van de voorbereidende acties 2010 en 2011 op het gebied van sport en het programma voor een leven lang leren geeft de Commissie bovendien financiële steun aan preventie- en voorlichtingsprojecten in de sectoren sport en onderwijs. Daarbij zijn supporters, scholen en clubs betrokken.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-005982/12
to the Commission**

Emine Bozkurt (S&D)

(18 June 2012)

Subject: Racism in the workplace

The EU adopted the Racial Equality Directive (2000/43/EC) with a view to guaranteeing equal treatment irrespective of racial or ethnic origin, and the Employment Equality Framework Directive (2000/78/EC) with a view to combating discrimination in the work place. Furthermore, it adopted the Charter of Fundamental Rights in order to ensure that citizens are equal and that their rights are equally safeguarded. The Charter obliges Member States to take all necessary steps to safeguard the rights of all of their citizens and to combat all forms of racial and ethnic discrimination.

On 7 June 2012, the Dutch national football team was subjected to racial abuse during a public training session in Kraków, Poland, ahead of the opening match of the European Championships. Media reports claim that several hundred of the 23 000 spectators abused the team's black players with 'monkey chants'. Since football players are also employees, and sports clubs and stadiums are their workplace, professional sportspeople should have the right to a working environment that is free of racism, as do all other workers.

1. Is the Commission aware of this specific incident?
2. Is the Commission aware of other similar incidents?
3. How will the Commission ensure that Member States implement the Racial Equality Directive and the Employment Equality Framework Directive with regard to employees in the sports sector?
4. What steps will the Commission take to prevent similar incidents and protect EU citizens from racism in the workplace?

Answer given by Mrs Reding on behalf of the Commission

(1 August 2012)

The Commission is aware that racism and discrimination affect sport both at professional and amateur level ⁽¹⁾.

Directive 2000/43/EC on Racial Equality ⁽²⁾ prohibits discrimination on the basis of racial or ethnic origin in a number of areas, including employment. All the Member States have transposed this directive and the Commission has verified that the national laws are in conformity with the directive.

Framework Decision 2008/913/JHA obliges the Member States to sanction with criminal penalties the intentional incitement to violence or hatred on the basis of race, colour, religion, descent or national or ethnic origin, which takes place publicly. The Commission is currently analysing the national implementing measures notified by Member States and it will prepare a report to this end in 2013.

It is up to the Member States to ensure enforcement of national law in specific events. Individual cases of discrimination or racist or xenophobic hate speech need to be pursued in national proceedings and examined under national law.

The Commission provides financial support to national authorities and civil society to combat discrimination at the workplace through the PROGRESS programme. The Commission also runs since 2003 an awareness raising campaign to fight against stereotypes ⁽³⁾ and facilitates discussions and good practices between the national Diversity Charters through a dedicated Platform aiming at promoting diversity policies in the private and public sectors.

In addition, the Commission provides financial support to preventive and educational projects in the sector of sport and education, involving supporters, schools and clubs in the framework of the 2010 and 2011 Preparatory Actions in the field of sport as well as the Lifelong Learning Programme.

⁽¹⁾ For more information on the situation in the EU see e.g. the report of the EU Agency for Fundamental Rights at: http://fra.europa.eu/fraWebsite/research/publications/publications_per_year/2010/pub-racism-in-sport_en.htm

⁽²⁾ Council Directive 2000/43/EC of 29 June 2000 implementing the principle of equal treatment between persons irrespective of racial or ethnic origin.

⁽³⁾ The 'For Diversity, Against Discrimination' campaign (<http://ec.europa.eu/justice/fdad>) has been running since 2003.

(Versión española)

**Pregunta con solicitud de respuesta escrita E-005983/12
a la Comisión**

Ramon Tremosa i Balcells (ALDE)

(18 de junio de 2012)

Asunto: Acuerdo de Libre Comercio con Japón: preocupación de la industria europea y del sector europeo del automóvil

¿Podría la Comisión responder a las siguientes preguntas relativas a los debates en curso vinculados a un acuerdo de libre comercio (ALC) con Japón? Aunque acojo con satisfacción el acuerdo, al igual que otros acuerdos de libre comercio que la Comisión ha negociado, se plantean algunas cuestiones sensibles para la industria europea, y especialmente para el sector del automóvil europeo. Debemos asegurarnos de que no se penaliza la competitividad de las empresas europeas en estos momentos económicos difíciles.

En cuanto al ejercicio de evaluación:

1. ¿Por qué ha decidido la Comisión cerrar el ejercicio de evaluación?
2. Considera la Comisión que el ejercicio de evaluación proporciona una hoja de ruta creíble, clara y completa, así como un compromiso para eliminar las barreras no arancelarias a las exportaciones de automóviles de la UE a Japón dentro de un plazo de tiempo limitado y razonable?

En cuanto a la lista de barreras no arancelarias al comercio de la Asociación de Fabricantes Europeos de Automóviles (ACEA) y la armonización de las normas técnicas y los procedimientos de certificación:

3. ¿Ha acordado Japón que los vehículos fabricados y homologados en la UE deben ser aceptados en Japón, sin más pruebas y/o modificaciones? ¿Qué reglamentos de la Comisión Económica para Europa de las Naciones Unidas ha adoptado hasta ahora Japón? ¿Cuáles no?

En cuanto a los incentivos fiscales para los vehículos ecológicos:

4. ¿Ha aceptado Japón el plan de refuerzo de la cooperación para la aplicación del procedimiento mundial de ensayo de vehículos ligeros (WLTP), y se ha comprometido al mismo tiempo a adoptarlo?
5. ¿Ha aceptado Japón que, mientras tanto, la eficiencia del combustible y las emisiones se medirán utilizando el ciclo de pruebas combinadas de la Unión Europea para evaluar si los vehículos importados de la UE tienen derecho a recibir los incentivos fiscales para los vehículos ecológicos?
6. Coches «Kei»: ¿ha abolido Japón los privilegios fiscales y regulatorios para los coches «Kei» que distorsionan la competencia para los autos compactos importados?
7. Zonificación: ¿ha facilitado Japón el establecimiento de talleres de reparación/servicio en las zonas restringidas?
8. Dispositivos pirotécnicos de seguridad: ¿adoptará Japón la norma ISO 14451 cuando esté concluida, así como el procedimiento de pruebas para demostrar la seguridad de los dispositivos pirotécnicos para su utilización en los automóviles?
9. Tanques de alta presión: ¿está Japón dispuesto a aprobar la utilización en Japón de vehículos que se ajusten a la actual normativa de la UE relativa a los tanques de alta presión, sin necesidad de demostrar el cumplimiento por separado de la Ley de Seguridad del Gas de Alta Presión de Japón?

Respuesta del Sr. De Gucht en nombre de la Comisión

(17 de agosto de 2012)

La Comisión ha concluido el «ejercicio de delimitación del alcance» de un acuerdo de libre comercio UE-Japón, al considerar que se habían tratado suficientemente los elementos necesarios para la negociación de un ambicioso acuerdo de libre comercio con Japón y que estaban cubiertas las prioridades de la UE. Este ambicioso documento sobre la delimitación del alcance es una buena base para definir el marco de toda futura negociación de un acuerdo de libre comercio y defender los intereses de la UE, por ejemplo en lo que respecta a las barreras no arancelarias.

Respecto a las mencionadas barreras no arancelarias en el sector del automóvil, el «ejercicio de delimitación del alcance» se refiere al objetivo común de que un certificado de conformidad emitido para un vehículo de motor por la parte exportadora, o la presencia de una marca de homologación de tipo de la Comisión Económica para Europa (CEPE) de las Naciones Unidas en el producto en el caso de componentes y unidades técnicas separadas, se considere prueba suficiente para la homologación de tipo por la parte importadora.

Se pretende además lograr una mayor convergencia de los requisitos nacionales de Japón con los correspondientes Reglamentos de la CEPE. La consecución de estos objetivos y el desmantelamiento de las barreras no arancelarias en este sector son una condición para el desarme arancelario de la UE en un futuro acuerdo de libre comercio. Si se inician las negociaciones, la Comisión ⁽¹⁾ hará balance de los avances de Japón en la supresión de las barreras no arancelarias al cabo de un año de negociación y las abandonará si los resultados no son satisfactorios.

Por lo que respecta a las preguntas detalladas de Su Señoría, la Comisión tiene el placer de anunciar que Japón ha acordado debatir esas cuestiones durante las negociaciones del acuerdo de libre comercio. Para más detalles, le rogamos consulte el informe remitido a la Comisión INTA del Parlamento Europeo.

⁽¹⁾ SPEECH/12/562 de 18.7.2012:
<http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=SPEECH/12/562&format=HTML&aged=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=en>

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-005983/12
to the Commission**

Ramon Tremosa i Balcells (ALDE)

(18 June 2012)

Subject: Free Trade Agreement with Japan: European industry and European automobile sector worries

Could the Commission answer the following questions regarding the ongoing discussions linked to a free trade agreement (FTA) with Japan? While I welcome the agreement, together with other FTAs that the Commission has negotiated, some sensitive issues remain for European industry, and especially for the European automobile sector. We should make sure that we do not penalise European companies' competitiveness in such difficult economic times.

Regarding the scoping exercise,

1. Why has the Commission decided to close the scoping exercise?
2. Does the Commission believe that the scoping exercise provides a credible, clear and comprehensive road map, as well as commitments for the elimination of non-tariff barriers (NTBs) to EU automobile exports to Japan within a limited and reasonable timeframe?

Regarding the state of play on the ACEA NTB list/harmonisation of technical requirements and certification procedures,

3. Has Japan agreed that vehicles that are manufactured and type approved in the EU should be accepted in Japan without further testing and/or modification? Which UN ECE regulations has Japan adopted so far? Which not?

Regarding the fiscal incentives for eco-friendly vehicles,

4. Has Japan agreed to the plan to strengthen cooperation for the completion of the Worldwide Light Duty Test Procedure (WLTP), and has it committed itself to adopting this plan within the same timeframe?
5. Has Japan accepted that, in the meantime, fuel efficiency and emissions be measured using the EU combined test cycle to evaluate whether vehicles imported from the EU are eligible to receive the fiscal incentives for eco-friendly vehicles?
6. Kei cars: has Japan abolished the fiscal and regulatory privileges enjoyed by Kei cars which distort competition from imported compact cars?
7. Zoning: has Japan facilitated the establishment of repair/service shops in restricted areas?
8. Pyrotechnic safety devices: is Japan willing to adopt ISO 14451, when it is finalised, as the test procedure in Japan for demonstrating the safety of pyrotechnic devices for automobile application?
9. High pressure tanks: is Japan willing to approve for use in Japan vehicles which comply with the current EU high pressure tank regulation without the need to demonstrate separate compliance under the High Pressure Gas Safety Law of Japan?

Answer given by Mr De Gucht on behalf of the Commission

(17 August 2012)

The Commission concluded the 'scoping exercise' for an EU-Japan FTA, as it considered that the necessary elements for negotiating an ambitious FTA with Japan were sufficiently addressed and EU's priorities were covered. This ambitious scoping paper is a good basis to frame any future FTA negotiations and deliver on EU interests, including on Non-Tariff Barriers (NTBs).

With regard to NTBs in the automotive sector, the 'scoping exercise' refers to the common objective that a certificate of conformity issued for a motor vehicle by the exporting side, or a United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE) type approval mark affixed to the product in the case of components and separate technical units, will be considered sufficient proof for the type approval by the importing side.

In addition it seeks to achieve greater convergence of Japan's national requirements with the relevant UNECE Regulations. The achievement of these objectives, and the dismantling of the other NTBs in the sector, are a condition for tariff dismantling by the EU, in a future FTA. If negotiations are launched, the Commission ⁽¹⁾ will take stock of the progress Japan has made on dismantling the NTBs after one year of negotiations and will stop them if the implementation has not been satisfactory.

With regard to the Honourable Member's detailed questions the Commission is pleased to state that Japan has agreed to discuss the issues during the FTA negotiations. For further details, please refer to the Commission's debriefing provided to the EP INTA Committee.

⁽¹⁾ SPEECH/12/562 of 18/07/2012:
<http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=SPEECH/12/562&format=HTML&aged=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=en>

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-005984/12
to the Commission
Marina Yannakoudakis (ECR)
(18 June 2012)**

Subject: Assessment of awareness of the 112 emergency number throughout the EU

An Italian couple and their dog were recently cut off by the tide during a coastal walk in Lynton, Somerset (UK). In order to be rescued, they called a local pharmacy using the number on the only receipt that they found in their pockets. They did not know the British emergency number, nor were they aware of the pan-European 112 emergency number.

1. Will the Commission carry out an assessment of awareness of the 112 emergency number throughout the EU?
2. Can the Commission also provide details of the amount it has spent on promoting and raising awareness of the 112 emergency number since the latter was introduced in 1991?

**Answer given by Ms Kroes on behalf of the Commission
(25 July 2012)**

The promotion of the European Emergency Number is primarily the responsibility of Member States according to the Universal Service Directive (2002/22/EC) as amended by the Citizens' Rights Directive (2009/136/EC). In addition, the Commission continuously supports and supplements the initiatives of Member States and periodically evaluates public awareness of the European Emergency Number 112.

Since 2008, the Commission has annually published the results of the Eurobarometer survey on the awareness of 112. In addition a dedicated website is managed by the Commission in order to inform both European citizens and European policy-makers on the state of play of the implementation of the 112 Emergency Number in the EU: www.112.eu.

This year the Vice-President and Member of the Commission responsible for Transport and the Vice-President and Member of the Commission responsible for Communication Networks, Content and Technology called on EU transport companies to join in a year-long awareness raising campaign on 112. This campaign is an effort to supplement Member States' awareness raising actions where the knowledge of the EU-wide number 112 could be most useful, namely amongst travellers. More than 30 EU transport companies and associations joined the campaign. The promotion measures reported by them will be published on the abovementioned website to serve as best practices examples. The Commission relies on the support of the members of the European Parliament and the reach they have to their constituency to further the message of this awareness raising campaign and the benefits of this potentially life-saving number.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-005985/12
to the Commission**

Peter Skinner (S&D)

(18 June 2012)

Subject: Animal transports from the UK

Can the Commission confirm that under Regulation (EC) No 1/2005 a country should ensure that if an animal is not fit for travel, it should be unloaded, watered, fed and rested (Article 21(3)), and that this should be done at a suitable assembly centre that is approved by the competent authority?

I would also like to ask if the United Kingdom is transgressing this provision, as it does not have a suitable lairage in the region of the port of Ramsgate, through which currently all transportation of animals takes place. This means that any animal that is not fit for travel through Ramsgate has to travel an additional distance to a suitable assembly point, which could be several hours away.

Answer given by Mr Dalli on behalf of the Commission

(3 August 2012)

Article 21 of Regulation (EC) No 1/2005 ⁽¹⁾ on the protection of animals during transport concerns checks at exit points and border inspection posts. Point 3 of this Article states that 'Where the competent authority considers that animals are not fit to complete their journey, they shall be unloaded, watered, fed and rested'. There is no obligation under the regulation that this must take place at an assembly centre.

The port of Ramsgate is not listed as an exit point or border inspection post under EU legislation, but is used only for shipping animals to other EU Member States. The rules of Article 21 of Regulation (EC) No 1/2005 therefore do not apply to this port.

⁽¹⁾ Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2005 on the protection of animals during transport and related operations; OJ L 3, 5.1.2005, p. 1.

(Versiunea în limba română)

Întrebarea cu solicitare de răspuns scris E-005986/12
adresată Comisiei
Vasilica Viorica Dăncilă (S&D)
(18 iunie 2012)

Subiect: Schimbarea climei, bioenergie, managementul apei și biodiversitate

Trei noi provocări cruciale pentru agricultura UE se ridică în domeniul schimbărilor climatice, al managementului resurselor de apă și al bioenergiei. Dintre acestea trei, schimbările climatice reprezintă pilonul de susținere al celorlalte două, influențând evoluții în alte două zone.

Agricultura UE este însă în mare măsură supusă schimbărilor climatice. Mare parte a îngrijorărilor se leagă de incertitudini privind cantitatea de precipitații, fenomene climatice extreme, nivelul temperaturilor, resursele de apă disponibile și condițiile de sol.

Declinul biodiversității rămâne o provocare majoră, iar aceasta este amplificată de modificările climatice și cererea de apă. Statele membre se angajează să stopeze declinul biodiversității ca obiectiv principal până în anul 2020, dar acest obiectiv este greu de realizat, iar agricultura joacă un rol-cheie în protejarea biodiversității.

În aceste condiții, care este strategia Comisiei pentru a preveni și preîntâmpina aceste noi provocări de mediu strâns legate între ele și cu rol crucial pentru agricultura de pe întreg teritoriul Uniunii? Ce soluții are în vedere Comisia pentru diminuarea și adaptarea la schimbările climatice, pentru îmbunătățirea managementului resurselor de apă și pentru furnizarea de servicii ecologice în sectorul bioenergiei, pentru păstrarea biodiversității și pentru întărirea măsurilor de dezvoltare rurală deja existente?

Răspuns dat de dl Ciolos în numele Comisiei
(14 august 2012)

Având în vedere provocările majore cu care se confruntă agricultura europeană în domeniul mediului, legate de schimbările climatice, bioenergie, gestionarea apei și biodiversitate, propunerea legislativă înaintată de Comisie cu privire la reforma PAC cuprinde diverse elemente care vor contribui la utilizarea mai durabilă a resurselor naturale, la diminuarea schimbărilor climatice și la adaptarea la acestea.

Demersul de „ecologizare” a PAC include următoarele elemente: un grad ridicat de ecocondiționalitate, ecologizarea mai accentuată a primului pilon prin intermediul noilor plăți directe decuplate acordate pe criterii ecologice și prin consolidarea priorităților și a măsurilor în domeniul mediului în cadrul celui de-al doilea pilon, la care se adaugă sprijinul important primit din partea sistemului de consiliere agricolă și cercetarea aplicată.

Noua „ecologizare” a plăților directe include trei practici obligatorii și se așteaptă să aibă avantaje indiscutabile în ceea ce privește biodiversitatea, calitatea apei și a solului, sechestrarea carbonului și peisajele. Ecocondiționalitatea și plățile directe acordate pe criterii ecologice vor fi însoțite de măsuri voluntare pentru agricultură-mediul-climă, dar și de alte măsuri de dezvoltare rurală care pot juca un rol important în crearea avantajelor menționate anterior în ceea ce privește mediul. Printre aceste măsuri se numără și cele legate de energia regenerabilă, dacă sunt programate și implementate corespunzător de statele membre.

În plus, Comisia a lansat numeroase alte inițiative politice, menite să răspundă provocărilor legate de protecția mediului și de schimbările climatice. Printre acestea se numără următoarele: strategia privind biodiversitatea, planul pentru garantarea resurselor de apă, încorporarea emisiilor și a absorbțiilor de gaze cu efect de seră care rezultă din activități legate de exploatarea terenurilor, schimbarea destinației terenurilor și silvicultură (LULUCF) în politica UE privind schimbările climatice, strategia de adaptare a UE, politica în domeniul energiei regenerabile, foaia de parcurs către o Europă eficientă din punctul de vedere al utilizării resurselor, precum și noul cadru pentru cercetare „Orizont 2020”.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-005986/12
to the Commission**

Vasilica Viorica Dăncilă (S&D)

(18 June 2012)

Subject: Climate change, bioenergy, water management and biodiversity

European agriculture is facing three crucial new challenges in the fields of climate change, the management of water resources and bioenergy. Climate change is the cornerstone, and developments in this area will influence developments in the other two.

Climate change is a key factor affecting EU agriculture. Many of the present concerns are linked to uncertainty surrounding rainfall levels, extreme weather, temperature levels, available water resources and soil conditions.

The decline in biodiversity remains a significant challenge that is also heightened by climate change and the demand for water. The Member States are committed to halting the decline in biodiversity as one of the key objectives for 2020. This target will be difficult to meet, and agriculture has a key role to play in protecting biodiversity.

Against this background, what is the Commission's strategy for anticipating and tackling these new environmental challenges, which are closely interlinked and play a critical role for agriculture throughout the EU? What solutions does the Commission have in mind in order to mitigate and adapt to climate change, improve the management of water resources and provide ecological services in the bioenergy sector, preserve biodiversity and strengthen existing rural development measures?

Answer given by Mr Ciolos on behalf of the Commission

(14 August 2012)

In view of the huge environmental challenges for European agriculture in the fields of climate change, bioenergy, water management and biodiversity, the Commission's legal proposal for reform of the CAP includes various elements that will contribute to a more sustainable use of natural resources and climate change mitigation and adaptation.

The 'greening of the CAP' comprises: enhanced cross-compliance, further greening of the first pillar through a new 'green' decoupled direct payment and the reinforcement of environmental priorities and measures under the second pillar, as well as broad support from the Farm Advisory System and applied research.

The new greening of direct payments is comprised of three compulsory practices and is expected to deliver proven benefits for biodiversity, water and soil quality, carbon sequestration, and landscapes. Cross-compliance and the green direct payments will be accompanied by voluntary agri-environment-climate measures as well as other rural development measures that can play a central role in providing the abovementioned environmental benefits, including renewable energy if appropriately programmed and implemented by Member States.

In addition, various other policy initiatives of the Commission, such as the biodiversity strategy, the water blueprint, the incorporation of emissions and removals resulting from activities related to land use, land use change and forestry (LULUCF) into EU climate policy, the EU adaptation strategy, the renewable energy policy, the roadmap to a resource efficient Europe as well as the new research framework 'Horizon 2020', will help to handle the environment and climate change challenges.

(Versiunea în limba română)

Întrebarea cu solicitare de răspuns scris E-005987/12
adresată Comisiei
Daciana Octavia Sârbu (S&D)
(18 iunie 2012)

Subiect: Cercetarea din domeniul medical

Având în vedere noile descoperiri științifice din domeniul medical și faptul că, de cele mai multe ori, acestea sunt date publicității, dar și faptul că există posibilitatea ca aceste rezultate să fie folosite în scopul creării armelor biologice de către formațiuni teroriste,

Poate spune Comisia dacă:

1. Există reguli similare la nivelul UE privind publicarea rezultatelor cercetării în domeniul ingineriei genetice sau a cercetărilor din domeniul medical?
2. Există măsuri de protecție a rezultatelor cercetărilor științifice care ar putea fi folosite de către teroriști la crearea de arme biologice?

Răspuns dat de dna Geoghegan-Quinn în numele Comisiei
(31 iulie 2012)

Decizia publicării rezultatelor cercetărilor științifice le aparține cercetătorilor respectivi și autorităților finanțatoare.

La nivelul Uniunii Europene, conform normelor prevăzute de Al șaptelea program-cadru pentru cercetare și dezvoltare tehnologică (FP7, 2007-2013), participanții au obligația de a asigura difuzarea rezultatelor cu cât mai multă promptitudine, respectând în același timp normele de protecție a drepturilor de proprietate intelectuală, obligațiile legate de confidențialitate și interesele legitime ale proprietarilor rezultatelor respective. Aceste norme nu specifică, însă, sub ce formă se face difuzarea. În plus, proiectele de cercetare depuse pentru finanțare în cadrul FP7 fac obiectul unei evaluări științifice riguroase înainte de luarea deciziei de acordare a fondurilor. Pentru anumite proiecte și ori de câte ori este cazul, se realizează o evaluare a aspectelor legate de etică și securitate, cu scopul de a asigura protecția și securitatea proiectelor de cercetare, ale cercetătorilor și ale comunității în general.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-005987/12
to the Commission**

Daciana Octavia Sârbu (S&D)

(18 June 2012)

Subject: Medical research

Many new scientific discoveries are being made in the field of medicine, most of which are published. However, there is a possibility that these results could be used by terrorist groups to create biological weapons.

Can the Commission answer the following questions:

1. Are there similar rules at EU level on the publication of research results in the fields of genetic engineering and medicine?
2. Are any measures in place to protect results of scientific research that could be used by terrorists to create biological weapons?

Answer given by Ms Geoghegan-Quinn on behalf of the Commission

(31 July 2012)

The decision on publication of scientific results is the responsibility of concerned scientists and funding authorities.

At the level of the European Union, the Rules under the Seventh Framework Programme for Research and Technological Development (FP7, 2007-2013) stipulate that participants have to ensure that results are disseminated as swiftly as possible whilst respecting the protection of intellectual property rights, confidentiality obligations, and the legitimate interests of the owner of the results. However, these rules do not prescribe in which form the dissemination is accomplished. In addition, research submitted for FP7 funding undergoes a rigorous scientific evaluation prior to the funding decision. For selected projects and when appropriate, an ethics review and a security scrutiny is undertaken to safeguard issues related to safety and security of the research subjects, the researchers and the community at large.

(Versione italiana)

Interrogazione con richiesta di risposta scritta E-005988/12

alla Commissione
Fiorello Provera (EFD)
(18 giugno 2012)

Oggetto: Aggressioni ai danni della comunità ebraica in Francia

Il 4 giugno 2012, il servizio di protezione della comunità ebraica francese (*Service de Protection de la Communauté Juive*, o SPCJ) ha riferito che il ministro degli Interni francese ha registrato almeno 90 aggressioni antisemite dopo l'attacco alla scuola Ozar Hatorah di Tolosa, avvenuto il 19 marzo 2012. Il 6 giugno 2012, a Villeurbanne (dipartimento del Rhône), 10 persone hanno aggredito con martelli e sbarre di ferro tre ragazzi ebrei tra la tardo adolescenza e i primi 20 anni. I ragazzi indossavano la kippah e mentre si stavano recando a un servizio religioso sono stati «insultati e aggrediti da tre persone» alle quali se ne sono aggiunte altre per proseguire nell'aggressione. Uno dei ragazzi ebrei è stato colpito alla testa con un martello e una sbarra di ferro. Il primo ministro francese Jean-Marc Ayrault ha denunciato l'aggressione e il ministro degli Interni ha dichiarato che verranno prese misure per rispondere al numero crescente di attacchi antisemiti.

In Francia, tra marzo e aprile 2012, sono state denunciate altre aggressioni. Il 26 marzo 2012, ad esempio, uno scolaro di 11 anni che indossava gli tzitzit è stato colpito in volto da un pugno e bersagliato di ingiurie antisemite come «sale juif» (sporco ebreo). Il 1° aprile 2012, un uomo ebreo che stava passeggiando con sua moglie e due bambini è stato avvicinato in maniera aggressiva da un uomo che ha pronunciato la frase: «*Sale juif on ne veut pas de toi ici... rentrez chez vous, dégagez, libérez la Palestine*» («Sporco ebreo, qui non siete desiderati. Tornatevene a casa! Sparite! Palestina libera!»). L'uomo è stato quindi colpito in volto e soccorso dalla polizia e dai vigili del fuoco. Lo SPCJ si dichiara preoccupato per la presenza di persone che sembrano simpatizzare con Mohammad Merah, l'autore dell'attacco alla scuola di Tolosa. Sui muri sono state trovate numerose scritte che incoraggiano l'uccisione di ebrei e giustificano le azioni di Merah.

1. Ritiene la Commissione che a seguito dell'attacco di Tolosa del 19 marzo 2012 le aggressioni antisemite registrino una tendenza in ascesa?
2. Prevede la Commissione di elaborare nuove proposte per affrontare tale recrudescenza antisemita?
3. Quali sono le strategie attuali per affrontare l'antisemitismo e altre forme di discriminazione razziale ed etnica nell'UE?

Risposta di Viviane Reding a nome della Commissione

(12 luglio 2012)

In base ai dati ufficiali a disposizione della Commissione, le aggressioni antisemite in Francia hanno registrato una tendenza in ascesa dal 2001 ⁽¹⁾. Sebbene questi dati non includano l'anno 2012, la Commissione è al corrente delle informazioni cui fa riferimento l'onorevole parlamentare e che destano seria preoccupazione.

La Commissione desidera ricordare che ha ripetutamente condannato qualsiasi manifestazione di antisemitismo e che è impegnata a combattere questi episodi con tutti i mezzi messi a disposizione dai trattati. Per quanto riguarda le misure concrete per affrontare l'antisemitismo, il razzismo e la xenofobia, la Commissione rimanda l'onorevole parlamentare alle risposte date alle interrogazioni E-003216/2012, E-003079/2012 ed E-006161/2011 ⁽²⁾.

⁽¹⁾ Relazione dell'Agenzia dei diritti fondamentali «Antisemitism: Summary overview of the situation in the European Union 2001-2011», disponibile in lingua inglese all'indirizzo http://fra.europa.eu/fraWebsite/research/publications/publications_per_year/2012/pub-antisemitism-summary-update-2012_en.htm

⁽²⁾ <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/QP-WEB/home.jsp>

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-005988/12
to the Commission**

Fiorello Provera (EFD)

(18 June 2012)

Subject: Attacks against the Jewish community in France

On 4 June 2012, France's Jewish Community Protection Service (Service de Protection de la Communauté Juive, or SPCJ) reported that the French Interior Ministry had recorded at least 90 anti-Semitic attacks since the attack on the Ozar Hatorah school in Toulouse on 19 March 2012. On 6 June 2012, three Jews wearing kippot (yarmulkes) were attacked in Villeurbanne (Rhône *département*) by 10 individuals who beat them with hammers and iron bars. The individuals, in their late teens and early 20s, were on their way to a religious service when they were 'insulted and jostled by three individuals'. Others joined in and continued to attack the men. One of the Jews was hit on the head with a hammer and an iron bar. French Prime Minister Jean-Marc Ayrault denounced the attack, and the Interior Minister said that steps would be taken to respond to the rising number of anti-Semitic attacks.

Other attacks were reported in March and April 2012 across France. For instance, on 26 March 2012 an 11-year-old schoolboy wearing a Jewish tzitzit was punched in the face and subjected to anti-Semitic remarks such as '*sale juif*' ('dirty Jew'). On 1 April 2012, a Jewish man was walking with his wife and two children when they were aggressively approached by a man who made the following remarks: '*Sale juif on ne veut pas de toi ici... rentrez chez vous, dégagez, libérez la Palestine*' ('Dirty Jew, you are not wanted here. Go back home! Get lost! Freedom for Palestine!'). The man was then hit in the face, and had to be rescued by police and fire services. The SPCJ says that it is concerned that there are individuals who appear to sympathise with the perpetrator of the Toulouse school attack, Mohammad Merah. Numerous examples of graffiti encouraging the killing of Jews and making excuses for Merah's actions have been discovered on walls.

1. Does the Commission believe there is a growing trend of anti-Semitic attacks in France following the 19 March 2012 attack in Toulouse?
2. Does the Commission plan to draw up fresh proposals aimed at tackling this resurgence of anti-Semitism?
3. What are some of the current strategies in place for tackling anti-Semitism and other forms of racial and ethnic discrimination in the EU?

Answer given by Mrs Reding on behalf of the Commission

(12 July 2012)

According to the official data available to the Commission, there has been an upward trend in antisemitic incidents in France since 2001 ⁽¹⁾. While this data does not cover the year 2012, the Commission is aware of the information to which the Honourable Member refers and which gives rise to serious concern.

The Commission would like to recall that it has repeatedly condemned all manifestations of antisemitism and is committed to fighting against them with all means available under the Treaties. As for concrete measures undertaken to combat antisemitism, racism and xenophobia, the Commission would refer the Honourable Member to its replies to Written Questions E-003216/2012, E-003079/2012 and E-006161/2011 ⁽²⁾.

⁽¹⁾ EU Fundamental Rights Agency: Antisemitism: Summary overview of the situation in the European Union 2001-2011, at http://fra.europa.eu/fraWebsite/research/publications/publications_per_year/2012/pub-antisemitism-summary-update-2012_en.htm.

⁽²⁾ <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/QP-WEB/home.jsp>

(Versión española)

Pregunta con solicitud de respuesta escrita E-005989/12
a la Comisión
Maria Badia i Cutchet (S&D) y Andres Perello Rodriguez (S&D)
(18 de junio de 2012)

Asunto: Seguimiento y actuación ante la plaga de la especie invasora *Pomacea Insularum* en el Delta de l'Ebre

Habiendo advertido con anterioridad de la grave situación en el Delta de l'Ebre ante la plaga de la especie invasora (comúnmente conocida como Caracol manzana) ⁽¹⁾, la Comisión informó de las actuaciones que iba a llevar a cabo al respecto ⁽²⁾. A saber, la solicitud un dictamen científico a la Autoridad de Seguridad Alimentaria (EFSA) para estudiar la necesidad de adoptar medidas de urgencia a escala de la UE y la concreción de una propuesta de instrumento legislativo de la UE relativo a especies exóticas invasoras, en el marco de la Estrategia de la UE sobre Biodiversidad 2020.

En lo que atañe a los instrumentos financieros existentes, la Comisión también detalló aquellos a los que se podía acoger el gobierno español para llevar a cabo acciones concretas para combatir la plaga.

Teniendo en cuenta el fuerte resurgimiento de la especie invasora en la actual campaña del arroz en el Delta de l'Ebre y a la luz de los recientes avances respecto a las actuaciones que señalaba la Comisión:

1. ¿Cuáles son las valoraciones de la Comisión en relación a las conclusiones del dictamen científico de la EFSA?
2. ¿Dado que la EFSA considera que la información enviada por España debería de ser completada, ha pedido la Comisión información complementaria a las autoridades españolas competentes?
3. ¿Tiene la Comisión constancia de las ayudas concretas —en el marco de los instrumentos existentes— que ha pedido el Gobierno español para hacer frente a la plaga del Caracol manzana y cuáles le han sido otorgados?
4. ¿Podría la Comisión informar sobre sus líneas de trabajo y sus orientaciones para el nuevo instrumento sobre Biodiversidad y en qué medida abordan el problema de la plaga de la *Pomacea Insularum*?
5. ¿Estaría dispuesta la Comisión, en nombre de la UE, a pedir la inclusión de esta especie invasora en los catálogos de la ONU?

Respuesta del Sr. Dalli en nombre de la Comisión
(7 de agosto de 2012)

Tras el dictamen científico de la Autoridad Europea de Seguridad Alimentaria (EFSA) sobre el análisis del riesgo de plaga del caracol manzana (*Pomacea insularum*) español, la Comisión consideró que la información era suficiente para adoptar medidas de emergencia a escala de la UE. Por lo tanto, no se consideró conveniente recabar más información de las autoridades españolas. Cuando se apliquen las medidas de emergencia provisionales, se recopilará la experiencia adquirida en la implementación, así como información científica y técnica adicional, para poder realizar una eventual revisión de la situación fitosanitaria del caracol manzana y de los requisitos específicos de control.

En el marco de la cofinanciación fitosanitaria de la Unión ⁽³⁾, en 2010 y 2011 se concedieron a España (Cataluña) 1,1 millones de euros mediante la Decisión 2011/868/UE ⁽⁴⁾ para las medidas de control del caracol manzana. España ha introducido recientemente una nueva petición de cofinanciación de las medidas para el año 2012, que la Comisión está examinando.

La Comisión está elaborando un instrumento legislativo dedicado a las especies exóticas invasoras para abordar los problemas que no entran en el ámbito de aplicación de la normativa de la UE existente. La propuesta de la Comisión tendrá en cuenta los objetivos de biodiversidad acordados a escala mundial, que requieren, específicamente que se identifiquen y controlen o gestionen las especies exóticas invasoras y sus vías de penetración ⁽⁵⁾. En este contexto, la Comisión está estudiando distintas opciones posibles.

⁽¹⁾ Pregunta E-009553/2011 presentada por Maria Badia i Cutchet y Andrés Perelló Rodríguez, 14 de octubre de 2011.

⁽²⁾ Respuesta del Sr. Dalli en nombre de la Comisión a la pregunta E-009553/2011.

⁽³⁾ Artículos 22 y 23 de la Directiva 2000/29/CE del Consejo (DO L 169 de 10.7.2000, p. 1).

⁽⁴⁾ <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2011:341:0057:0062:ES:PDF>.

⁽⁵⁾ Décima Conferencia de las Partes en el Convenio sobre la Diversidad Biológica, Decisión X/2, Nagoya, Japón, 18-29 de octubre de 2010, objetivo relacionado con las EEI: «Determinar y jerarquizar por orden de prioridad, no más tarde de 2020, las especies exóticas invasoras y sus vías de penetración, controlar o erradicar las especies prioritarias y gestionar las vías de penetración para impedir la irrupción y establecimiento de nuevas especies.».

Esta especie figura en la base de datos de especies invasoras ⁽⁶⁾ gestionada por el Grupo de Especialistas en Especies Invasoras de la UICN. La Comisión no tiene constancia de que exista ningún catálogo de las Naciones Unidas sobre especies exóticas invasoras.

⁽⁶⁾ <http://www.issg.org/database/species/ecology.asp?si=1712&fr=1&sts=&lang=ES>.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-005989/12
to the Commission
Maria Badia i Cutchet (S&D) and Andres Perello Rodriguez (S&D)
(18 June 2012)**

Subject: Follow-up and action to combat the invasive pest *Pomacea insularum* in the Ebro Delta

Having been alerted about the serious situation in the Ebro Delta caused by the presence of the invasive species commonly known as the apple snail ⁽¹⁾, the Commission detailed the action it intended to take to combat the problem ⁽²⁾. This included requesting the European Food Safety Authority (EFSA) to issue a scientific opinion in order to determine the need to adopt emergency measures at EU level, and drafting a proposal for a legislative instrument on invasive alien species in the framework of the EU biodiversity strategy to 2020.

The Commission also indicated which of the existing financial instruments could be used by the Spanish Government to carry out specific measures to combat this pest.

Bearing in mind that there has been a major resurgence of this invasive pest during the present rice-planting cycle in the Ebro Delta and considering recent progress in the areas outlined by the Commission:

1. How does the Commission view the conclusions reached by EFSA in its scientific opinion?
2. Given that EFSA considers that Spain needs to complete the information it has submitted, has the Commission asked the relevant Spanish authorities to provide further information?
3. Does the Commission know what specific assistance the Spanish Government has requested, within the framework of the existing instruments, with which to combat the invasion of apple snails and whether such aid has been granted?
4. Could the Commission provide information about its areas of work and guidelines for the new instrument on biodiversity and the extent to which they address the problem of the *Pomacea insularum* pest?
5. Would the Commission be prepared, on behalf of the EU, to request the inclusion of this invasive species in the UN's catalogues?

**Answer given by Mr Dalli on behalf of the Commission
(7 August 2012)**

Following the scientific opinion of the European Food Safety Authority (EFSA) on the Spanish *Pomacea insularum* pest risk analysis, the Commission considers the information was sufficient to allow taking emergency measures at EU level. Therefore, it was not considered appropriate to request further information from the Spanish authorities. Once temporary emergency measures will be in place experience with the implementation, as well as additional technical and scientific information will be collected to allow potential review of the phytosanitary status of *Pomacea* and the specific control requirements.

Under the framework of Union plant health co-financing ⁽³⁾, EUR 1.1 million has been granted to Spain (Catalonia) by Decision 2011/868/EU ⁽⁴⁾ for control measures of *Pomacea insularum* in 2010 and 2011. Spain introduced recently a new co-financing request for measures in 2012, which is under examination by the Commission.

The Commission is developing a dedicated legislative instrument on invasive alien species (IAS), to address the problems that do not fall under the scope of existing EU rules. The Commission proposal will seek to meet the globally agreed biodiversity targets, which specifically require IAS and pathways to be identified and controlled or managed ⁽⁵⁾. In this context, the Commission is considering various options.

The species is included in the Global Invasive Species Database ⁽⁶⁾ managed by the IUCN Invasive Species Specialist Group. The Commission is not aware of an UN catalogue on IAS.

⁽¹⁾ Question E-009553/2011, presented by Maria Badia i Cutchet and Andrés Perelló Rodríguez, 14 October 2011.

⁽²⁾ Answer to Question E-009553/2011, given by Mr Dalli on behalf of the Commission.

⁽³⁾ Article 22 and 23 of Council Directive 2000/29/EC (OJ L 169, 10.7.2000, p. 1).

⁽⁴⁾ <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2011:341:0057:0062:EN:PDF>

⁽⁵⁾ Tenth Conference of the Parties to the Convention on Biological Diversity, decision X/2, Nagoya, Japan, 18-29 October 2010, IAS target: 'By 2020, IAS and pathways are identified and prioritized, priority species are controlled or eradicated, and measures are in place to manage pathways to prevent their introduction and establishment'.

⁽⁶⁾ <http://www.issg.org/database/species/ecology.asp?si=1712&fr=1&sts=&lang=EN>

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-005990/12
to the Commission**

Phil Bennion (ALDE)

(18 June 2012)

Subject: Illegal logging in Bangladesh

According to the United Nations, Bangladesh is one of the countries most vulnerable to the potentially devastating impact of climate change. The increasingly intense and unpredictable natural disasters suffered by the country have been clearly linked to the changes in climate and are further aggravated by the man-made menace of widespread corruption. This menace was highlighted by a recent report on illegal logging by Transparency International (an anti-corruption think tank). This report recognised the role of corruption in the loss of 37 000 hectares of Bangladesh's forests each year, largely as a result of illegal logging.

1. In light of this situation and with reference to the recent Timber Regulation (EU) No 995/2010, what concrete measures has the Commission taken to ensure that the necessary support and guidance on the implementation of the due diligence procedure will be provided to developing countries such as Bangladesh?
2. Furthermore, could the Commission provide details of the ways in which it plans to make certain that the Timber Regulation aids countries such as Bangladesh to tackle the problem of illegal logging on the ground and does not simply divert the practice towards other markets?
3. In view of the established link between deforestation and climate change, with particular reference to the devastating floods suffered by Bangladesh and the integral role of its forests, such as the Sundarban, in protecting the country against natural disasters, could the Commission provide data on the negative climatic impact of illegal logging, particularly in Bangladesh?
4. Finally, could the Commission confirm whether it has entered into negotiations with Bangladesh with a view to concluding a FLEGT voluntary partnership agreement to support it in establishing the necessary procedures to enhance legal logging and diminish the opportunity for illegal logging? Such an agreement would benefit Bangladesh by creating an opportunity for the EU REDD+ facility to operate in the country.

Answer given by Mr Potočník on behalf of the Commission

(1 August 2012)

Bangladesh is a net importer of forest products; domestic timber production, whether legally or illegally harvested, is almost entirely used in the domestic market. Given that Bangladeshi exports of timber and timber products, including to the EU, are at very low levels, the impact of Regulation 995/2010 ⁽¹⁾ is likely to be minimal. Nevertheless the Commission will inform Bangladesh about the regulation through interventions in relevant multilateral meetings in which Bangladesh and the EU participate and through the EU Delegation in Dhaka.

The Commission does not have access to reliable information on the levels of illegal logging in Bangladesh and therefore is not in a position to assess its impact on climate change. It recognises nonetheless that the Sundarban mangrove forest has a critical role to play in protecting the coastline from flooding as sea levels rise, as well as in the conservation of biodiversity and as a source of livelihood for many coastal dwellers. It has therefore funded a EUR10-million specific programme of support for the Sundarban ecosystem; further support for reforestation and forest conservation is being provided through the multi-donor Climate Change Resilience Fund, to which the EU is contributing the EUR 8.5-million through the Global Climate Change Alliance and which also counts with the support of EU Member States through their bilateral cooperation programmes.

There are currently no discussions on a FLEGT voluntary partnership agreement (VPA) between the EU and Bangladesh. The Commission seeks to maximise synergies between FLEGT VPAs and REDD+ initiatives, though it does not consider that one should be conditional on the other. The EU REDD Facility ⁽²⁾ is one of the main instruments for promoting such synergies.

⁽¹⁾ Regulation (EU) No 995/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 October 2010 laying down the obligations of operators who place timber and timber products on the market, OJ L 295, 12.11.2010.

⁽²⁾ http://www.efi.int/portal/policy_advice/eu_redd/.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-005991/12
to the Commission
Chris Davies (ALDE)
(18 June 2012)**

Subject: Destruction by Israel of EU-funded Palestinian projects

1. Will the Commission confirm that it has received from the Government of Israel neither an apology nor any financial recompense with regard to any of the EU-funded Palestinian projects that it has ever destroyed, or, if such apologies and recompense have ever been received, will it provide details?
2. Is the Commission aware of claims published by EurActiv that six EU-funded (using German funds) wind and solar energy projects, including one at Shaab al-Buttum, that provide electricity for up to 600 West Bank Palestinians have been put on a 'demolition list' by Israel, allegedly in response to the Government of Israel being displeased with calls from EU heads of mission for measures to discourage financial transactions that may support the illegal construction of Jewish settlements on Palestinian territory? If so, what representations has it made to the Government of Israel about the matter?

**Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Ashton on behalf of the Commission
(7 August 2012)**

The reply to the first question is provided in the reply to parliamentary Question E-000053/2012 ⁽¹⁾.

The Commission is aware of the circumstances referred to by the Honourable Member in the second question. In the framework of its bilateral dialogue with Israel particularly in the EU-Israel political dialogue, the EU raises the issue of the destruction and/or threat of demolition of EU-funded projects. Upon request of the concerned member state, the EU also raises the issue of any specific projects funded by EU member states that are under threat from demolition.

⁽¹⁾ <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/plenary/en/parliamentary-questions.html>

(Versione italiana)

**Interrogazione con richiesta di risposta scritta E-005992/12
alla Commissione (Vicepresidente/Alto Rappresentante)**

Mario Mauro (PPE)

(18 giugno 2012)

Oggetto: VP/HR — Scontri e violenze in Siria

Le violenze in Siria non si arrestano e anzi, proseguono con un'escalation preoccupante.

A inizio giugno un centinaio di persone, tra cui una ventina di bambini e donne, sono stati uccisi nella regione di Hama, nei villaggi di Al-Koubeir e Maarzaf. A denunciare questo ennesimo massacro di civili da parte del regime è il Consiglio nazionale siriano, che ne attribuisce la responsabilità alle forze del regime di Bashar Al-Assad.

Si tratta di una strage che ricorda molto il massacro perpetrato a Hula, nella provincia di Homs, lo scorso 25 maggio, in cui sono state trucidate almeno 108 persone.

La conta dei morti continua a crescere e fa ancora più orrore quella dei bambini: secondo i gruppi a tutela dei diritti umani, sono ormai circa 1 200 i bimbi uccisi nei 15 mesi di rivolta contro il regime di Bashar al-Assad. I dati più sconcertanti provengono da un rapporto Onu, secondo il quale le truppe siriane hanno torturato, usato come scudi umani nelle incursioni militari contro i ribelli ed ucciso bambini di 8 anni.

L'inviato speciale dell'Onu e della Lega araba in Siria, Kofi Annan, ha proposto al Consiglio di sicurezza delle Nazioni Unite di incaricare un gruppo di potenze globali e regionali, tra cui l'Iran, di trovare una strategia volta a porre fine al conflitto in Siria, dove le violenze continuano.

Si interroga pertanto l'Alto Rappresentante per sapere se:

1. È al corrente di questa situazione i cui sviluppi si stanno rivelando sempre più drammatici?
2. Quali misure intende adottare al fine di salvaguardare la sicurezza internazionale e di punire le ripetute violazioni dei diritti umani?
3. Intende concordare una strategia con l'inviato speciale dell'Onu ed il Consiglio di sicurezza per porre fine al più presto a questa escalation di violenze?

**Interrogazione con richiesta di risposta scritta E-006034/12
alla Commissione (Vicepresidente/Alto Rappresentante)**

**Barbara Matera (PPE), Lara Comi (PPE), Crescenzo Rivellini (PPE), Clemente Mastella (PPE),
Paolo Bartolozzi (PPE), Roberta Angelilli (PPE), Mario Mauro (PPE), Sergio Paolo Francesco Silvestris (PPE),
Antonio Cancian (PPE) e Alfredo Antoniozzi (PPE)**

(19 giugno 2012)

Oggetto: VP/HR — Questione siriana

Dopo la notizia del massacro avvenuto il 25 maggio scorso a Hula nella provincia di Homs, in Siria, a opera delle forze armate fedeli al presidente Bashar al-Assad e dopo la conferma da parte del Consiglio Onu sui diritti umani delle cifre ufficiali dell'attacco alla città da cui si evince che hanno perso la vita 180 persone (tra cui 49 bambini sotto i dieci anni) a causa del fuoco d'artiglieria e dei carri armati dell'esercito insieme alla brutale circostanza per cui 20 persone sono state uccise nelle proprie case;

a seguito delle immediate dichiarazioni di forte condanna a livello internazionale sul comportamento del governo di Assad da parte di molti leader europei e mondiali che hanno portato alla recente espulsione dei diplomatici siriani taluni Stati membri come Italia, Francia, Inghilterra, Germania, Spagna, Olanda e Belgio oltre che da Stati Uniti, Australia e Canada;

alla luce delle continue violazioni del cessate il fuoco imposte al regime di Assad dal piano di pace dell'ONU e sulla base delle testimonianze di continui attacchi, come il massacro di Al-Qubair del 7 giugno costato la vita a 78 persone;

può l'Alto Rappresentante europeo riferire:

1. se l'Unione europea ha intenzione di nominare un rappresentante speciale in Siria per affrontare le gravi violazioni dei diritti umani e per rafforzare la missione degli osservatori ONU;
2. quali misure la Commissione intende proporre alla comunità internazionale per la risoluzione del conflitto civile interno siriano senza escludere alcuna opzione sotto l'egida della NATO?

Risposta congiunta di Catherine Ashton a nome della Commissione
(10 agosto 2012)

Il 13 giugno, dinanzi al Parlamento europeo, l'AR/VP ha espresso il proprio sgomento per i massacri e le brutali uccisioni avvenuti a Houla e Qubeir. Nelle dichiarazioni del 7 giugno e del 27 maggio, l'Alta Rappresentante ha vigorosamente condannato questi crimini sollecitando che si proceda celermente a investigare i fatti e offrendo il proprio sostegno a tutte le iniziative che verranno intraprese a tal fine. Le conclusioni del Consiglio del 25 giugno condannano vigorosamente l'uso dei bambini quali scudi umani e rammentano che devono essere assicurati alla giustizia tutti i perpetratori di violazioni dei diritti umani.

Dall'aprile 2011 l'UE ha svolto un ruolo guida in diverse sessioni speciali della commissione delle Nazioni Unite per i diritti umani (UNHRC) partecipando a risoluzioni sulla situazione dei diritti umani in Siria. L'Unione sostiene appieno gli sforzi della commissione d'inchiesta indipendente incaricata dall'UNHRC di investigare tutte le denunce di violazioni e abusi dei diritti umani in Siria e ha sollecitato le autorità siriane a concedere alla Commissione un accesso illimitato anche ai centri di detenzione.

Il 30 giugno l'AR/VP ha partecipato alla prima riunione del gruppo d'azione sulla Siria in cui siedono i 5 rappresentanti permanenti del Consiglio di sicurezza delle Nazioni Unite e rappresentanti delle potenze regionali. Il gruppo ha sostenuto gli sforzi di mediazione dell'inviato speciale dell'ONU-Lega araba Kofi Annan e ha ribadito l'importanza di dare piena attuazione al suo piano articolato in sei punti e alle risoluzioni 2042 e 2043 del Consiglio di sicurezza. È stato raggiunto un accordo sui principi della transizione politica, compresa l'istituzione di un governo di transizione che eserciti in Siria i pieni poteri esecutivi. L'Alta Rappresentante/Vicepresidente continua a sollecitare i membri del Consiglio di sicurezza perché adottino sanzioni in forza del capitolo VII della Carta delle Nazioni Unite.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-005992/12
to the Commission (Vice-President/High Representative)**

Mario Mauro (PPE)

(18 June 2012)

Subject: VP/HR — Clashes and violence in Syria

Violence in Syria is not ceasing and indeed, is escalating alarmingly.

In early June, a hundred or so people, including around twenty women and children, were killed in the region of Hama, in the villages of Al-Kubeir and Maarzaf. This latest massacre of civilians by the regime was reported by the Syrian National Council, which lays the blame on the forces of Bashar al-Assad's regime.

It is a tragedy that is reminiscent of the massacre in Hula, province of Homs, on 25 May, in which at least 108 people were massacred.

The body count is continuing to rise and that of children is even more horrifying: according to human rights protection groups, some 1 200 children have now been killed in the 15-month uprising against the regime of Bashar al-Assad. The most disconcerting information comes from a UN report, which states that Syrian troops have tortured 8 year-old children, used them as human shields in military raids against insurgents and killed them.

The UN-Arab League Special Envoy to Syria, Kofi Annan, has proposed that the UN Security Council charge a group of regional and global powers, including Iran, with finding a strategy to end the conflict in Syria, where violence continues.

Can the Vice-President/High Representative therefore say:

1. whether she is aware of this increasingly tragic situation;
2. what measures she intends to take to safeguard international security and punish the repeated human rights violations;
3. whether she intends to agree on a strategy with the UN Special Envoy and the Security Council to end this escalation of violence as soon as possible?

**Question for written answer E-006034/12
to the Commission (Vice-President/High Representative)**

**Barbara Matera (PPE), Lara Comi (PPE), Crescenzo Rivellini (PPE), Clemente Mastella (PPE),
Paolo Bartolozzi (PPE), Roberta Angelilli (PPE), Mario Mauro (PPE), Sergio Paolo Francesco Silvestris (PPE),
Antonio Cancian (PPE) and Alfredo Antoniozzi (PPE)**

(19 June 2012)

Subject: VP/HR — Syria

It has been reported that on 25 May 2012 armed forces loyal to President Bashar al-Assad committed a massacre in Hula, province of Homs, Syria. The UN Human Rights Council has confirmed the official figures relating to the attack on the city in which 180 people were killed (including 49 children under the age of ten) by army artillery and tanks and 20 people were brutally killed in their own homes.

Following the immediate statements of strong international condemnation of the behaviour of the Assad government by many European and world leaders, Syrian diplomats have recently been expelled from certain Member States such as Italy, France, the United Kingdom, Germany, Spain, the Netherlands and Belgium, in addition to the United States, Australia and Canada.

In the light of the continuing violations of the ceasefire imposed on the Assad regime by the UN peace plan, and on the basis of the eye-witness accounts of ongoing attacks, such as the massacre of Al-Qubair on 7 June that killed 78 people, can the Vice-President/High Representative say:

1. whether the EU intends to appoint a special envoy to Syria, to address the gross violations of human rights and to strengthen the UN observer mission;
2. what measures the Commission intends to propose to the international community to resolve the civil conflict inside Syria, without ruling out any option under the NATO aegis?

Joint answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Ashton on behalf of the Commission

(10 August 2012)

In the European Parliament on 13 June the HR/VP stated she was appalled by the massacres and point-blank killings in Houla and Qubeir. In her statements of 7 June and 27 May she strongly condemned these heinous acts, called for swift investigations and pledged support to all efforts serving this end. The Council conclusions of 25 June strongly condemn the use of children as human shields, recalling that all perpetrators of human rights violations must be held accountable.

Since April 2011 the EU has had a leading role on several UN Human Rights Council (UNHRC) special sessions and resolutions addressing the situation of human rights in Syria. It fully supports the efforts of the Independent Commission of Inquiry tasked by the UNHRC to investigate all alleged human rights violations and abuses in Syria. The EU has called on the Syrian authorities to grant unhindered access to the Commission, including to all detention facilities.

On 30 June the HR/VP participated in the first meeting of the Action Group on Syria, including the 5 permanent members of the UN Security Council and regional powers. The Group backed up mediation efforts by UN-Arab League Special Envoy Kofi Annan and reiterated the importance of full implementation of his six point plan and Security Council Resolutions 2042 and 2043. It agreed on the principles for political transition, including the set up of a transitional governing body exerting full executive powers in Syria. The HR/VP continues to call on Security Council members to adopt sanctions under Chapter VII of the UN Charter.

(Nederlandse versie)

Vraag met verzoek om schriftelijk antwoord E-005993/12

aan de Commissie

Laurence J. A. J. Stassen (NI)

(18 juni 2012)

Betreft: Inbeslagname Europese vliegtuigen dreigt door Europese vliegtaks

Deze week is er een nieuw hoofdstuk toegevoegd aan het langsepende handelsconflict veroorzaakt door invoering van het Europese emissiehandelschema (ETS) voor de luchtvaart. China heeft herhaald dat het zal weigeren emissiegegevens aan de Europese Unie te verstrekken. Inmiddels is de deadline om deze gegevens te verstrekken gepasseerd (31 maart jl.). De Europese Commissie heeft nu gedreigd met boetes en zelfs inbeslagname van vliegtuigen. China heeft vervolgens gedreigd met tegenmaatregelen door Europese vliegtuigen in beslag te nemen. Luchtvaartmaatschappijen zijn uitermate ongerust en pleiten ervoor dat de EU afziet van ETS⁽¹⁾.

1. Is de Commissie ervan op de hoogte dat China heeft gedreigd Europese vliegtuigen in beslag te nemen in geval Chinese vliegtuigen door de EU aan de grond worden gehouden?
2. Is de Commissie het met de PVV eens dat het zeer onverstandig is dreigementen te uiten naar landen als China, omdat hiermee de handelsrelaties op het spel worden gezet? Zo neen, waarom niet?
3. Kan de Commissie aangeven wat het onderneemt in geval China besluit als represaillemaatregel Europese vliegtuigen in beslag te nemen?
4. Kan de Commissie garanderen dat Europese vliegmaatschappijen worden beschermd tegen inbeslagname door landen als China?
5. Is de Commissie het met de PVV eens dat vliegmaatschappijen gedupeerd worden door de halsstarrige opstelling van de EU inzake ETS? Zo neen, waarom niet?

Antwoord van mevrouw Hedegaard namens de Commissie

(3 augustus 2012)

1 t/m 4. Vliegtuigexploitanten die vliegen van en naar de Europese Unie moeten de EU-wetgeving en het recht eerbiedigen. De EU zal op bijeenkomsten van hoog politiek niveau met China van de gelegenheid gebruikmaken om deze kwestie ter sprake te brengen. De EU blijft bereid om met China en andere partners, waaronder de luchtvaartsector, constructieve besprekingen te voeren over de vraag hoe hun bezwaren tijdens de uitvoering van onze wetgeving kunnen worden ondervangen. De EU-ETS-wetgeving bevat bepalingen waardoor de EU rekening kan houden met maatregelen die door derde landen worden vastgesteld ten aanzien van inkomende vluchten naar de EU met de bedoeling deze van de regeling uit te sluiten. Dergelijke maatregelen moeten op niet-discriminerende wijze gelden voor alle vliegtuigexploitanten met vluchten vanuit die staat. Indien er represaillemaatregelen tegen luchtvaartmaatschappijen uit de EU worden getroffen, zal de EU dit zeer ernstig nemen. De Commissie is van oordeel dat andere landen geen reden hebben om represailles tegen de EU-ETS te nemen en zal, in nauwe samenwerking met de bevoegde autoriteiten van de lidstaten, alle passende maatregelen treffen om de EU en haar ondernemingen te beschermen tegen illegale maatregelen van derde landen. Voorts verwijst de Commissie het geachte Parlementslid naar haar antwoord op zijn schriftelijke vraag E-001482/2012⁽²⁾.

5. De Commissie heeft een volledige effectbeoordeling uitgevoerd van de uitbreiding van de EU-ETS naar de luchtvaart. De door het geachte Parlementslid gevraagde informatie is beschikbaar op de website van de Commissie⁽³⁾.

Tot slot verwijst de Commissie het geachte Parlementslid naar haar antwoord op de schriftelijke vraag E-000817/2012 van de heer Liam Aylward⁽⁴⁾.

⁽¹⁾ <http://www.cityam.com/latest-news/china-threatens-seize-planes-eu-tax-row>;

<http://www.euractiv.com/climate-environment/global-airlines-press-eu-cease-f-news-513219>.

⁽²⁾ <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+WQ+E-2012-001482+0+DOC+XML+V0//NL>.

⁽³⁾ http://ec.europa.eu/clima/documentation/transport/aviation/docs/sec_2006_1684_en.pdf

⁽⁴⁾ <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getAllAnswers.do?reference=E-2012-000817&language=EN>.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-005993/12
to the Commission**

Laurence J.A.J. Stassen (NI)

(18 June 2012)

Subject: Risk of seizure of European aircraft due to European tax on flights

This week, there has been a further development in the protracted trade dispute caused by the introduction of the European Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS) for air travel. China has reiterated that it will refuse to provide the EU with data on emissions. The deadline for supplying the data (31 March 2012) has now passed. The Commission has threatened to impose fines and even to impound aircraft. In return, China has threatened to retaliate by impounding European aircraft. Airlines are extremely concerned and are calling for the EU not to proceed with the ETS ⁽¹⁾.

1. Is the Commission aware that China has threatened to impound European aircraft if the EU prevents Chinese aircraft from departing from its airports?
2. Does the Commission agree with the PVV that it is very foolish to issue threats to countries such as China, because this jeopardises trade with that country? If not, why not?
3. Can the Commission indicate what it will do if China decides to impound European aircraft as a reprisal?
4. Can the Commission guarantee that European airlines will be protected against the seizure of aircraft by countries such as China?
5. Does the Commission agree with the PVV that airlines will suffer because of the EU's obstinate position on the ETS? If not, why not?

Answer given by Ms Hedegaard on behalf of the Commission

(3 August 2012)

1 to 4. Aircraft operators who fly to and from the European Union must respect EU legislation and the rule of law. The EU takes the opportunity of high level political meetings with China to raise this issue. The EU remains open to continue constructive discussions with China and other partners, including the aviation industry, on how to address their concerns during the implementation of our legislation. The EU ETS legislation contains provisions which allow the EU to take into account measures adopted by third countries in relation to incoming flights to the EU with a view to exempting them from the system. Such measures must apply in a non-discriminatory way for all aircraft operators with flights departing from that State. If any retaliatory action was taken against EU Airlines, the European Commission would take this very seriously. The Commission considers that there is no justification for other countries to take retaliatory action against the EU ETS and will take all appropriate actions, in close cooperation with the relevant Member State authorities, to defend the EU and its companies against any illegal measures taken by other countries. The Commission would further refer the Honourable Member to the Commission's answer to Written Question E-001482/2012 by the Honourable Member ⁽²⁾.

5. The Commission has carried out a full impact assessment on the extension of the EU ETS to aviation. The information required by the Honourable Member is available on the Commission's website ⁽³⁾.

The Commission would further refer the Honourable Member to its answer to Written Question E-000817/2012 by Mr Aylward ⁽⁴⁾.

⁽¹⁾ <http://www.cityam.com/latest-news/china-threatens-seize-planes-eu-tax-row>;
<http://www.euractiv.com/climate-environment/global-airlines-press-eu-cease-f-news-513219>.
⁽²⁾ <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/QP-WEB/application/home.do?language=EN>.
⁽³⁾ http://ec.europa.eu/clima/documentation/transport/aviation/docs/sec_2006_1684_en.pdf
⁽⁴⁾ <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/QP-WEB/application/home.do?language=EN>.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-005994/12
to the Commission (Vice-President/High Representative)**

Charles Tannock (ECR)

(18 June 2012)

Subject: VP/HR — The situation of the Ahwazi Arab minority in Iran

The High Representative may be aware of the Ahwazi Arabs in Iran, an ethnic minority numbering around half a million who mostly inhabit Iran's southern province of Khuzestan. The Ahwazi Iranian population are allegedly discriminated against on a regular basis by the Iranian authorities and made to suffer a plethora of disadvantages in the areas of education and employment, as well as cultural discrimination and other hardships. A constituent brought to my attention the recent case of five Ahwazi men who could face the death penalty after they were convicted of 'enmity against God' for allegedly killing a police officer. Amnesty International and Ahwazi activists assert that the men are entirely innocent of such charges and that they were made to sign false confessions under extreme duress. The convicted men Abd al-Rahman Heidari, Taha Heidari, Jamshid Heidari and Mansour Heidari — three of them brothers — potentially face imminent execution.

Can the High Representative comment on the human rights situation of the Ahwazi Arab minority in southern Iran? Does she agree that the Ahwazi, in common with many other ethnic and religious minorities in Iran, including homosexuals, Baha'is, Jews and Christians, are subjected to systematic repression and discrimination? Will she therefore press Tehran to improve respect for basic human rights standards, including the fundamental rights of freedom of religion and the freedom to peacefully protest against government policies, as permitted under the Iranian constitution and required by Iran's international legal obligations? Will she also urgently press for these allegedly innocent men to have their death sentences reviewed or commuted?

Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Ashton on behalf of the Commission

(2 August 2012)

The High Representative is fully aware of the precarious situation of Ahwazi Arabs in Iran. Despite constitutional guarantees of equality, persons belonging to ethnic minorities in Iran are subject to an array of discriminatory laws and practices, including land and property confiscations, denial of state employment, and restrictions on social, cultural, linguistic and religious freedoms. Common practices include imprisonment for conscience, unfair trial, corporal punishment and use of the death penalty, as well as systematic restrictions on movement and denial of certain civil rights.

The EU has used and is using all tools available to raise awareness and call on Iran to respect the principles of equal treatment and non-discrimination. The EU and the HR have issued Statements and Declarations on ethnic and religious intolerance in Iran and have undertaken demarches on individual cases.

Unfortunately, the three Ahwazi Arab men mentioned by the Honourable Parliamentary have been executed. The HR Spokesperson issued a statement of public condemnation on their specific case; the execution came following detention since 2011 on grounds which reliable reports suggest were political.

The EU has expressed on numerous occasions its concern about the position of minorities in Iran and has called on Iran to refrain from discriminatory policies. On capital punishment, the EU has called on Iran, as it does on all states which insist on maintaining the death penalty, to halt pending executions and to introduce a moratorium.

Needless to say, the EU will continue to monitor the situation of vulnerable individuals and groups in Iran and call on the country to abide by its international obligations and cease its discriminatory policies.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-005995/12
to the Commission
Marian Harkin (ALDE)
(18 June 2012)**

Subject: Disadvantaged Areas Scheme in Ireland

Are there any legal impediments to the Irish Department of Agriculture introducing retrospective requirements for inclusion in the Disadvantaged Areas Scheme? As this is an annual scheme, the Department may change the criteria on a yearly basis; however, if it links inclusion in the scheme in year X to the criteria in force in year X-1, then it has itself created a link between the two years and the scheme cannot strictly be seen as an annual one.

In this context, how can a retrospective requirement be deemed legal? Not only is such a retrospective requirement grossly unjust, it also creates huge uncertainty in all schemes, since if retrospective decisions are taken in one scheme, they may also be taken elsewhere.

I would also ask the Commission to make a general statement about the use of this mechanism of retrospectively changing qualifying criteria, and to indicate whether this is acceptable in other schemes. If so, I would ask that some relevant examples be provided.

**Answer given by Mr Ciolos on behalf of the Commission
(3 August 2012)**

The Commission considers that a retrospective/retroactive change of rules occurs, when the date of applicability of a changed rule precedes the date when the change was introduced. Adverse retrospective/retroactive changes to conditions for EAFRD co-funded schemes could be in conflict with the principles of legitimate expectations and legal certainty.

However, the Commission does not consider that a retrospective/retroactive change of rules occurs, when a payment in year X is conditional upon meeting certain conditions/status in year X-1. In such cases, the change of the rules must be announced prior to the date by which the applications can be submitted.

A change in conditions for annual payments (for example payments to farmers in areas with handicaps, other than mountain areas) is not in conflict with the principle of legitimate expectations and legal certainty, provided it is announced prior to the date by which the applications for these payments can be submitted.

(Versión española)

**Pregunta con solicitud de respuesta escrita E-005996/12
a la Comisión (Vicepresidenta/Alta Representante)**

**Marco Scurria (PPE), Iva Zanicchi (PPE), Licia Ronzulli (PPE), Pino Arlacchi (S&D), Erminia Mazzoni (PPE),
Santiago Fisas Aixela (PPE), Roberta Angelilli (PPE), Lara Comi (PPE), Carlo Fidanza (PPE), Raffaele
Baldassarre (PPE), Antonio Cancian (PPE), Barbara Matera (PPE), Sergio Paolo Francesco Silvestris (PPE),
Mario Mauro (PPE) y Potito Salatto (PPE)**

(18 de junio de 2012)

Asunto: VP/HR — Sáhara Occidental

Marruecos ha decidido de manera arbitraria retirar la confianza a Christopher Ross, enviado especial del Secretario General de las Naciones Unidas en el Sáhara Occidental, que tiene la difícil tarea de encontrar una solución justa y duradera al conflicto entre el Frente Polisario y la monarquía alauí.

La decisión se produjo tras la presentación del informe sobre el Sáhara Occidental del Secretario Ban Ki Moon, al Consejo de Seguridad. El texto, inspirado en la labor del Embajador Ross, fue aprobado al principio por Marruecos, actual miembro del Consejo de Seguridad, y posteriormente considerado parcial y desequilibrado.

Esta iniciativa interrumpe el proceso de paz en un momento en que se habían programado la visita a las poblaciones afectadas por el conflicto y nuevas reuniones entre las partes.

1. ¿Puede decir la Vicepresidenta/Alta Representante qué medidas piensa adoptar para garantizar la continuación de las negociaciones de paz y el diálogo?
2. ¿Puede decir, además, qué medidas piensa adoptar para proteger los derechos humanos en la zona de que se trata?

Respuesta de la Alta Representante y Vicepresidenta Sra. Ashton en nombre de la Comisión
(8 de agosto de 2012)

La AR/VP apoya los esfuerzos del Secretario General de las Naciones Unidas con vistas a alcanzar una solución política justa, duradera y mutuamente aceptable que contemple la autodeterminación de la población del Sáhara Occidental, de conformidad con las correspondientes resoluciones del Consejo de Seguridad de las Naciones Unidas.

La UE está preocupada por la larga duración de este conflicto y espera que la retirada de la confianza al enviado especial del Secretario General de las Naciones Unidas, Christopher Ross, por parte de Marruecos no demore aún más las negociaciones.

La AR/VP apoya la Resolución del Consejo de Seguridad de las Naciones Unidas 2044 (2012), de 24 de abril de 2012, por la que se prorroga el mandato de la Minurso en el Sáhara Occidental hasta el 30 de abril de 2013. La Resolución subraya la importancia de «mejorar la situación de los derechos humanos en el Sáhara Occidental y en los campamentos de Tinduf», alienta «a las partes a que colaboren con la comunidad internacional para formular y aplicar medidas independientes y creíbles que aseguren el pleno respeto de los derechos humanos» y acoge con beneplácito «las medidas adoptadas por Marruecos para cumplir su compromiso de asegurar un acceso sin trabas ni condiciones a todos los procedimientos especiales del Consejo de Derechos Humanos de las Naciones Unidas».

Los derechos humanos son uno de los aspectos esenciales del diálogo político de la UE con Marruecos y se tratan regularmente en las reuniones de los organismos conjuntos establecidos en virtud del Acuerdo de Asociación. La Alta Representante y Vicepresidenta considera que, en general, Marruecos avanza hacia un mayor cumplimiento de los principios relativos a los derechos humanos, aunque son necesarias más mejoras. La creación por la nueva Constitución del Consejo Nacional de Derechos Humanos y de las Comisiones del Sáhara Occidental es un ejemplo de una evolución positiva a este respecto.

(Versione italiana)

**Interrogazione con richiesta di risposta scritta E-005996/12
alla Commissione (Vicepresidente/Alto Rappresentante)**

**Marco Scurria (PPE), Iva Zanicchi (PPE), Licia Ronzulli (PPE), Pino Arlacchi (S&D), Erminia Mazzoni (PPE),
Santiago Fisas Ayxela (PPE), Roberta Angelilli (PPE), Lara Comi (PPE), Carlo Fidanza (PPE), Raffaele
Baldassarre (PPE), Antonio Cancian (PPE), Barbara Matera (PPE), Sergio Paolo Francesco Silvestris (PPE),
Mario Mauro (PPE) e Potito Salatto (PPE)**

(18 giugno 2012)

Oggetto: VP/HR — Sahara Occidentale

Il Marocco ha arbitrariamente deciso di ritirare la fiducia a Christopher Ross, inviato speciale del Segretario Generale delle Nazioni Unite nel Sahara occidentale, cui spetta il difficile compito della ricerca di una soluzione giusta e duratura del conflitto che oppone la monarchia alawita al Fronte Polisario.

La decisione è arrivata dopo la presentazione del rapporto sul Sahara occidentale del Segretario Ban Ki-moon al Consiglio di Sicurezza. Il testo, ispirato dai lavori dell'ambasciatore Ross, è stato in un primo momento approvato anche dal Marocco, attualmente membro del CdS, e in seguito giudicato parziale e squilibrato.

L'iniziativa interrompe il processo di pace proprio nel momento in cui in agenda erano previsti una visita alle popolazioni colpite dal conflitto e nuovi incontri tra le parti.

1. Può dire la Vicepresidente/Alto Rappresentante quali azioni intende mettere in atto per garantire il proseguimento dei negoziati di pace e del dialogo?
2. Può dire, altresì, quali misure intende intraprendere per la salvaguardia e la tutela dei diritti umani nella zona interessata?

Risposta dell'Alta Rappresentante/Vicepresidente Catherine Ashton a nome della Commissione
(8 agosto 2012)

L'Alta Rappresentante/Vicepresidente sostiene gli sforzi del Segretario Generale dell'ONU per raggiungere una soluzione politica equa, duratura, e reciprocamente accettabile, che riconosca al popolo del Sahara Occidentale il diritto all'autodeterminazione in conformità con le pertinenti risoluzioni del Consiglio di Sicurezza dell'ONU.

L'UE è preoccupata per la lunga durata del conflitto e si augura che il ritiro della fiducia, da parte del Marocco, a Christopher Ross, inviato speciale del Segretario generale dell'ONU, non ritardi ulteriormente i negoziati.

L'Alta Rappresentante/Vicepresidente è a favore della risoluzione 2044 (2012) del 24 aprile 2012 del Consiglio di Sicurezza dell'ONU, che proroga fino al 30 aprile 2013 il mandato della MINURSO nel Sahara Occidentale. La risoluzione sottolinea l'importanza di migliorare la situazione dei diritti dell'uomo nel Sahara Occidentale e nei campi di Tindouf, incoraggia le parti a collaborare con la comunità internazionale con l'obiettivo di sviluppare e attuare misure indipendenti e credibili per assicurare il pieno rispetto dei diritti dell'uomo e saluta con favore i passi compiuti dal Marocco per tener fede al suo impegno a garantire un accesso incondizionato e senza restrizioni a tutte le procedure speciali del Consiglio dei diritti dell'uomo dell'ONU.

Il tema dei diritti dell'uomo è al centro del dialogo politico UE-Marocco e viene affrontato regolarmente nel corso delle riunioni degli organi congiunti istituiti nel quadro dell'accordo di associazione. L'Alta Rappresentante/Vicepresidente ritiene che, complessivamente, il Marocco stia compiendo progressi verso un maggiore rispetto di tali diritti, ma auspica ulteriori miglioramenti. La creazione, da parte della nuova Costituzione, del Consiglio nazionale per i diritti dell'uomo e delle Commissioni per il Sahara Occidentale segna uno sviluppo positivo a tal riguardo.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-005996/12
to the Commission (Vice-President/High Representative)**

**Marco Scurria (PPE), Iva Zanicchi (PPE), Licia Ronzulli (PPE), Pino Arlacchi (S&D), Erminia Mazzoni (PPE),
Santiago Fisas Aixela (PPE), Roberta Angelilli (PPE), Lara Comi (PPE), Carlo Fidanza (PPE), Raffaele
Baldassarre (PPE), Antonio Cancian (PPE), Barbara Matera (PPE), Sergio Paolo Francesco Silvestris (PPE),
Mario Mauro (PPE) and Potito Salatto (PPE)**

(18 June 2012)

Subject: VP/HR — Western Sahara

Morocco has arbitrarily decided to withdraw its confidence in the UN Secretary-General's special envoy for Western Sahara, Christopher Ross, who has the difficult task of attempting to find a just and lasting settlement of the conflict between the Alawite monarchy and the Polisario Front.

The decision came after the submission of a report on Western Sahara to the Security Council by Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon. The text, guided by the work of Ambassador Ross, was initially approved also by Morocco, which is currently a member of the Security Council, but was later deemed to be biased and unbalanced.

This initiative halts the peace process at the very moment when a visit to the peoples affected by the conflict was on the agenda, in addition to further meetings between the parties.

1. Can the Vice-President/High Representative say what action she intends to take to ensure that the peace negotiations and dialogue continue?
2. Can she also say what measures she will take to safeguard and protect human rights in the area in question?

Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Ashton on behalf of the Commission

(8 August 2012)

The HR/VP supports the efforts of the UN Secretary General with a view to achieving a just, lasting, and mutually acceptable political solution, which will provide for the self-determination of the people of Western Sahara in accordance with the relevant UN Security Council Resolutions.

The EU is concerned about the long duration of this conflict and hopes that Morocco's withdrawal of confidence in the UNSG's Personal Envoy, Christopher Ross, will not further delay negotiations.

The HR/VP supports UN Security Council Resolution 2044 (2012) of 24 April 2012 extending the mandate of MINURSO in the Western Sahara until 30 April 2013. The Resolution underlines 'the importance of improving human rights situation in Western Sahara and the Tindouf camps', encourages 'the parties to work with the international community to develop and implement independent and credible measure to ensure full respect for human rights' and 'welcomes the steps taken by Morocco in order to fulfil its commitment to ensure unqualified and unimpeded access to all Special Procedures of the United Nations Human Rights Council.'

Human rights are one of the core issues in the EU-Morocco political dialogue and are regularly addressed in the meetings of the joint bodies established under the Association Agreement. The HR/VP considers that overall Morocco is making progress towards more compliance with the human rights principles, although further improvements are necessary. The creation by the new Constitution of the National Council for Human Rights and the Commissions in Western Sahara is an example of a positive development in this regard.

(Nederlandse versie)

Vraag met verzoek om schriftelijk antwoord E-005997/12

aan de Commissie

Auke Zijlstra (NI)

(18 juni 2012)

Betreft: Commissie start Europees centrum voor bestrijding cybercriminaliteit (vervolgvraag)

Op 25 mei 2012 heeft Eurocommissaris Malmström namens de Commissie antwoord gegeven op schriftelijke vraag E-003348/2012. Naar aanleiding van haar antwoord heb ik de volgende aanvullende vragen:

Subsidiariteit is het principe dat (politieke) beslissingsbevoegdheid op het laagst mogelijke niveau wordt neergelegd. Het is een principe van zeggenschap en niet van effectiviteit of efficiency. De EU omarmt dit principe.

1. Kan de Commissie aangeven hoe in de dagelijkse praktijk van de wetgevingsprocedure wordt omgegaan met het subsidiariteitsprincipe? Is er een checklist om na te gaan of er sprake is van overschrijding, en zo ja, kan de Commissie deze checklist beschikbaar stellen?
2. Ziet de Commissie bezwaren via de gele kaartprocedure als een integraal onderdeel van het proces, of als een te voorkomen effect?
3. Hoe verhouden effectiviteit, efficiency en subsidiariteit zich met elkaar in de ogen van de Commissie?

Antwoord van de heer Barroso namens de Commissie

(10 augustus 2012)

Subsidiariteit is een van de leidende beginselen van het Verdrag betreffende de Europese Unie en alle EU-instellingen zijn voor het verloop van het wetgevingsproces aan dit beginsel gebonden. In het kader van haar initiatiefrecht garandeert de Commissie dat de correcte keuze met betrekking tot de vraag of en hoe op Europees niveau tot actie moet worden overgegaan, wordt gemaakt in een vroeg stadium van de beleidsvorming. Het Europees Parlement en de Raad zijn verplicht een door hen ingebracht amendement dat een effect heeft op de reikwijdte van de actie van Unie, met betrekking tot het subsidiariteitsbeginsel te rechtvaardigen ⁽¹⁾.

Wat de Commissie betreft, wordt de subsidiariteit op drie essentiële niveaus gecontroleerd: in de routekaarten, de effectbeoordelingen en de voorstellen van de Commissie (toelichting en overwegingen). Hoewel het Protocol betreffende de toepassing van het subsidiariteits- en het evenredigheidsbeginsel, herzien bij het Verdrag van Lissabon, niet langer melding maakt van conformiteitscriteria, zoals „noodzaak” en „meerwaarde voor de EU”, heeft de Commissie hiervan toch verder gebruik gemaakt als onderdeel van haar analytische kader en beveelt zij andere betrokkenen zulks ook aan. Grotere doelmatigheid of doeltreffendheid van actie op EU-niveau, vergeleken met actie op het niveau van de lidstaten, is immers een noodzakelijke voorwaarde om het subsidiariteitsbeginsel na te komen. De gestructureerde vragen betreffende de analyse van subsidiariteit en evenredigheid zijn opgenomen in de richtsnoeren van de Commissie voor effectbeoordeling ⁽²⁾ die op de website van de Commissie ter inzage staan.

De zogenaamde „gele-kaart-procedure” is een aanvulling op de controle van de subsidiariteit door de EU-instellingen. Tegelijk heeft de grondige analyse van de Commissie in het prelegislatieve stadium tot doel te garanderen dat er geen gronden zijn om de naleving van het subsidiariteitsbeginsel met betrekking tot een voorstel te betwisten.

⁽¹⁾ Punt 2.3 van het Interinstitutionele Akkoord over subsidiariteit van 1993.

⁽²⁾ SEC(2009) 92.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-005997/12
to the Commission**

Auke Zijlstra (NI)

(18 June 2012)

Subject: Commission starts European centre for combating cyber crime (follow-up question)

On 25 May 2012 Commissioner Malmström replied on behalf of the Commission to my Written Question E-003348/2012. Further to her answer, I wish to put the following supplementary questions:

Subsidiarity is the principle whereby (political) decision-making power should be situated at the lowest possible level. It is a principle that concerns authority, not effectiveness or efficiency. The EU embraces this principle.

1. Can the Commission say how the subsidiarity principle is applied in everyday practice in the legislative procedure? Is there a check-list to ascertain whether the principle has been infringed, and if so, can the Commission make this list available?
2. Does the Commission regard complaints via the yellow card procedure as an integral part of the process, or as an effect to be avoided?
3. In the Commission's view, what is the relationship between effectiveness, efficiency and subsidiarity?

Answer given by Mr Barroso on behalf of the Commission

(10 August 2012)

Subsidiarity is one of the guiding principles enshrined in the Treaty on European Union, and all EU institutions are bound to respect it throughout the legislative process. Under its right of initiative, the Commission ensures that the correct choices about whether and how to propose European action are made at an early stage of policy development. The European Parliament and Council must provide a justification regarding subsidiarity if an amendment they make affects the scope of Union action ⁽¹⁾.

As regards the Commission, subsidiarity checks are applied at three key stages: in roadmaps, in impact assessments and in the Commission proposal (explanatory memorandum and recitals). While the Protocol on the application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality, as revised by the Lisbon Treaty, no longer mentions conformity tests, such as 'necessity' and 'EU value added', the Commission has continued to use them as part of its analytical framework and recommends the other actors to do likewise. Indeed, greater efficiency, or effectiveness of EU level action compared to Member States action are a necessary condition for respecting the subsidiarity principle. The structured questions for the subsidiarity and proportionality analysis are integrated in the Commission's Impact Assessment Guidelines ⁽²⁾, which are available on the Commission's public website.

The so-called 'yellow-card procedure' complements the subsidiarity checks carried out by the EU institutions. At the same time, the objective of the Commission's thorough analysis during the pre-legislative stage is to make sure that there are no grounds on which a proposal's compliance with the principle of subsidiarity could be contested.

⁽¹⁾ Section 2, point 3 of the Inter-Institutional Agreement on Subsidiarity of 1993.

⁽²⁾ SEC(2009)92.

(Nederlandse versie)

**Vraag met verzoek om schriftelijk antwoord E-005998/12
aan de Commissie**

Barry Madlener (NI) en Auke Zijlstra (NI)

(18 juni 2012)

Betreft: EU wil Turkije visa verstrekken in ruil voor terugname illegalen

Jaarlijks komen tienduizenden illegalen uit Turkije naar de EU. Brussel wil dat Turkije de illegalen terugneemt; in ruil daarvoor wil Brussel Turkije EU-visa in het vooruitzicht stellen.

1. Is de Commissie bekend met het bericht „Flüchtlinge gegen Visa — EU will Deal mit der Türkei” ⁽¹⁾?
2. Kan de Commissie verklaren waarom de EU Turkije wil gaan belonen door EU-visa te verstrekken wanneer Turkije zijn eigen illegalen terugneemt? Is de Commissie met de PVV van mening dat, in plaats daarvan, slecht gedrag bestraft moet worden — in dit geval bijvoorbeeld door de toetredingsonderhandelingen met Turkije te stoppen? Is de Commissie hiertoe bereid? Zo neen, waarom niet?

Antwoord van mevrouw Malmström namens de Commissie

(6 augustus 2012)

Naar aanleiding van de vragen van de geachte Parlementsleden merkt de Commissie op dat de Raad in zijn conclusies van 21 juni 2012 — onder meer — de Commissie heeft verzocht maatregelen te nemen met het oog op visumliberalisering voor Turkije als gradueel perspectief voor de lange termijn.

In de conclusies gaf de Raad ook aan dat de vooruitgang van Turkije in de richting van dit perspectief van visumliberalisering moet worden gemeten op basis van prestaties; met name moet zijn voldaan aan een aantal eisen, waaronder betere beheersing van gemengde migratiestromen, volledige en doeltreffende uitvoering van de overnameverplichtingen jegens alle lidstaten en doeltreffende samenwerking met de lidstaten op het gebied van justitie en binnenlandse zaken.

De Turkse autoriteiten hebben verklaard dat zij de overnameovereenkomst, waarover de Commissie de onderhandelingen op 21 juni 2012 met succes heeft afgerond, pas zullen overwegen te ondertekenen wanneer zij het document hebben ontvangen met alle eisen waaraan Turkije moet voldoen om vooruitgang te boeken in de richting van visumliberalisering.

⁽¹⁾ <http://www.welt.de/politik/ausland/article106429859/Fluechtlinge-gegen-Visa-EU-will-Deal-mit-der-Tuerkei.html>

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-005998/12
to the Commission**

Barry Madlener (NI) and Auke Zijlstra (NI)

(18 June 2012)

Subject: EU plans to issue visas to Turkey in exchange for illegal immigrants

Tens of thousands of illegal immigrants come to the EU from Turkey every year. Brussels wants Turkey to take its illegals back, and in exchange it plans to hold out the prospect of EU visas for Turkey.

1. Is the Commission aware of the report in the German weekly *Die Welt* entitled 'Flüchtlinge gegen Visa — EU will Deal mit der Türkei' (Refugees in exchange for visas — EU wants to do a deal with Turkey) ⁽¹⁾?

2. Can the Commission explain why the EU plans to reward Turkey by issuing EU visas if Turkey takes back its own illegal immigrants? Does the Commission agree with the Dutch Party for Freedom that bad behaviour should rather be punished — in this case, for example, by halting accession negotiations with Turkey? Is the Commission prepared to do this? If not, why not?

Answer given by Ms Malmström on behalf of the Commission

(6 August 2012)

In reply to the questions asked by the Honourable Members, the Commission would like to note that, through conclusions adopted on 21 June 2012, the Council has — *inter alia* — invited the Commission to take steps towards visa liberalisation for Turkey as a gradual and long-term perspective.

These Council conclusions also indicated that progress of Turkey towards such visa liberalisation perspective should be founded on a performance based approach and in particular on the fulfilment of a certain number of requirements, including a better management of mixed migratory flows, the full and effective implementation of readmission obligations towards all Member States, as well as effective cooperation with them in justice and home affairs matters.

The Turkish authorities have declared that they will consider signing the readmission agreement, the negotiation of which the Commission successfully concluded on 21 June 2012, only once they have received the document indicating all the requirements to be fulfilled by Turkey in view of making progress towards visa liberalisation.

⁽¹⁾ <http://www.welt.de/politik/ausland/article106429859/Fluechtlinge-gegen-Visa-EU-will-Deal-mit-der-Tuerkei.html>

(Nederlandse versie)

Vraag met verzoek om schriftelijk antwoord E-005999/12

aan de Raad

Auke Zijlstra (NI)

(18 juni 2012)

Betreft: Grensoverschrijdende misdaad (vervolgvraag)

Op 6 juni 2012 heeft de Raad antwoord gegeven op schriftelijke vraag E-003601/2012. Naar aanleiding van dit antwoord heb ik de volgende aanvullende vragen:

1. Is de Raad op de hoogte van cijfermateriaal van de door de Raad genoemde agentschappen, betreffende misdaadcijfers? Trekt de Raad conclusies uit deze cijfers? Zo ja, welke conclusies?
2. In de door mij in vraag E-003601/2012 ⁽¹⁾ genoemde bron is sprake van verplaatsing van misdaad van Polen naar andere lidstaten. Is er sprake van dezelfde verplaatsing van misdaad in de door de Raad genoemde bronnen? Zo neen, welke bron beschouwt de Raad dan als betrouwbaar? Zo ja, is de Raad dan alsnog bereid een conclusie te trekken en die aan mij mede te delen?
3. Welk instrument beschouwt de Raad als het meest effectief om het grensoverschrijdende karakter van misdaad te bestrijden en waarom?

Antwoord

(18 september 2012)

Met betrekking tot de eerste vraag en onder verwijzing naar zijn vorig antwoord ⁽²⁾ verklaart de Raad dat hij bepaalde verslagen en analyses betreffende verschillende soorten misdrijven ontvangt van de betrokken EU-agentschappen, zoals Europol en het Europees Waarnemingscentrum voor drugs en drugsverslaving. Eén voorbeeld is de door Europol opgestelde dreigingsevaluatie van de georganiseerde criminaliteit (OCTA) 2011 ⁽³⁾, die een compleet en uitvoerig beeld schetst van de criminele dreigingen die een impact hebben op de EU. Op basis van dat verslag en zoals bepaald in de EU-beleidscyclus inzake georganiseerde en zware internationale criminaliteit ⁽⁴⁾ heeft de Raad de EU-prioriteiten ter bestrijding van de georganiseerde criminaliteit voor de periode 2011-2013 vastgesteld ⁽⁵⁾, en geeft hij uitvoering aan de strategische doelstellingen en aan de jaarlijkse operationele actieplannen voor elke prioriteit.

Wat betreft de „verplaatsing van de criminaliteit”, waaraan het geachte Parlementslid in zijn tweede vraag refereert, zij opgemerkt dat daar in bovengenoemd verslag geen gewag van wordt gemaakt; evenmin is daar melding van gemaakt door leden van de Raad of door de betrokken EU-agentschappen.

Met betrekking tot de derde vraag is de Raad van oordeel dat zeer veel instrumenten die overeenkomstig de strategische richtsnoeren in het programma van Stockholm ⁽⁶⁾ zijn vastgesteld, een effectieve bijdrage leveren tot de bestrijding van georganiseerde criminaliteit.

⁽¹⁾ <http://www.volkskrant.nl/vk/nl/2686/Binnenland/article/detail/3077381/2011/12/15/Mobiele-bendes-Oost-Europa-massaal-richting-westen.dhtml>.

⁽²⁾ 9386/12.

⁽³⁾ 8709/11.

⁽⁴⁾ 15358/10.

⁽⁵⁾ 11050/11.

⁽⁶⁾ PB C 115 van 4.5.2010, blz. 1.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-005999/12
to the Council**

Auke Zijlstra (NI)

(18 June 2012)

Subject: Cross-border crime (follow-up question)

On 6 June 2012 the Council gave its answer to Written Question E-003601/2012. That answer prompts a number of follow-up questions:

1. Is the Council aware of the crime statistics published by the agencies it refers to in its answer? What conclusions, if any, does the Council draw from those statistics?
2. The article I refer to in my Question E-003601/2012 ⁽¹⁾ talks about a shift in crime from Poland to other Member States. Do the reports cited by the Council in its answer also talk about such a shift? If they do not, which source does the Council regard as reliable? If they do refer to such a shift, is the Council prepared to draw appropriate conclusions and inform me of them?
3. What instrument does the Council regard as the most effective in the fight against cross-border crime, and why?

Reply

(18 September 2012)

As regards the first question and with reference to the Council's previous reply ⁽²⁾, the Council does receive certain reports and analyses regarding different types of crime from the relevant EU agencies such as Europol or the European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction. One example is the EU Organised Crime Threat Assessment 2011 (OCTA) prepared by Europol ⁽³⁾, providing a complete and thorough picture of criminal threats impacting on the EU. On the basis of this report and as provided for in the EU Policy Cycle for organised and serious international crime ⁽⁴⁾, the Council has laid down the EU's priorities for the fight against organised crime between 2011 and 2013 ⁽⁵⁾ and is implementing the strategic goals and annual Operational Action Plans for each priority.

As regards the 'shift in crime' pointed out in the Honourable Member's second question, it has neither been mentioned in the aforementioned report nor has it been referred to the Council, either by its members or by the relevant EU agencies.

As regards the third question, the Council considers that there are very many instruments effectively contributing to combating cross-border crime, adopted in line with the strategic guidelines set out in the Stockholm Programme ⁽⁶⁾.

⁽¹⁾ <http://www.volkskrant.nl/vk/nl/2686/Binnenland/article/detail/3077381/2011/12/15/Mobiele-bendes-Oost-Europa-massaal-richting-westen.dhtml>.

⁽²⁾ 9386/12.

⁽³⁾ 8709/11.

⁽⁴⁾ 15358/10.

⁽⁵⁾ 11050/11.

⁽⁶⁾ OJ C 115, 4.5.2010, p. 1.

(Nederlandse versie)

Vraag met verzoek om schriftelijk antwoord E-006000/12
aan de Commissie
Auke Zijlstra (NI)
(18 juni 2012)

Betreft: Recordaantal Polen naar Nederland

Vorig jaar kwamen 19 000 Polen naar Nederland. Dat is een historisch hoog cijfer. Het aantal van 19 000 is zelfs het op een na hoogste aantal immigranten uit een land binnen een jaar, meldt het Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek.

1. Is de Commissie bekend met het bericht „Nog nooit zoveel Polen naar Nederland”? ⁽¹⁾
2. Overeenkomstig het toetredingsverdrag dient een nieuwe lidstaat zich zodanig te hervormen dat van verstoringen in de arbeidsmarkt van bestaande lidstaten geen sprake is. Is de Commissie met de PVV van mening dat het almaar toenemende aantal Polen in/naar Nederland aantoonst dat niet is voldaan aan deze bepaling? Zo neen, waarom niet? Zo ja, welke mogelijkheden om deze verstoringen te beëindigen staan de lidstaten, inclusief Polen, nog open?
3. Ziet de Commissie mogelijkheden om Nederland te compenseren?

Antwoord van de heer Andor namens de Commissie
(3 augustus 2012)

1. Ja, de Commissie is bekend met het bericht.
2. Overeenkomstig de toetredingsverdragen van 2003 en 2005 is een nieuwe lidstaat niet verplicht aanpassingen uit te voeren om een verstoring van de arbeidsmarkt in andere lidstaten te voorkomen. In plaats daarvan bepalen zij dat de andere lidstaten tijdens de laatste twee jaar durende fase van de overgangsperiode de toegang tot de arbeidsmarkt alleen mogen beperken als er sprake is van een ernstige verstoring of een dreigende ernstige verstoring van hun arbeidsmarkt. De overgangsregelingen inzake vrij verkeer van werknemers uit de EU-8 ⁽²⁾ vervielen echter in april 2011. Sindsdien genieten EU-8-werknemers, onder wie ook Poolse werknemers, net zoals andere EU-werknemers, alle voordelen van de EU-wetgeving inzake vrij verkeer van werknemers in de EU, en mogen er geen verdere beperkingen worden toegepast.

Het bericht waarnaar het geachte Parlements lid verwijst, vermeldt dat in 2011 19 000 Poolse onderdanen Nederland zijn binnengekomen en 7 000 uit Nederland zijn weggegaan. Het is niet duidelijk waarom het geachte Parlements lid vindt dat de netto-instroom van 12 000 Poolse onderdanen, die 0,07 % van de totale bevolking van Nederland uitmaken, een verstoring is.

3. De EU-wetgeving inzake vrij verkeer van werknemers biedt de nodige flexibiliteit omdat de lidstaten zelfs in tijden van economische achteruitgang mobiele werknemers moeten blijven aantrekken om te voldoen aan de vraag naar arbeidskrachten in bepaalde sectoren waar een tekort aan lokale werknemers bestaat. Vrij verkeer levert dus een positieve bijdrage aan de arbeidsmarkten in de hele Unie en is goed voor de economie ⁽³⁾. Het is niet duidelijk waarom of waarvoor Nederland volgens het geachte Parlements lid moet worden gecompenseerd.

⁽¹⁾ http://www.rtl.nl/components/actueel/rtlnieuws/2012/06_juni/11/binnenland/historisch-veel-polen-naar-nederland-in-2011.xml.

⁽²⁾ Tsjechië, Estland, Letland, Litouwen, Hongarije, Polen, Slowakije en Slovenië.

⁽³⁾ Werkgelegenheid en sociale ontwikkelingen in Europa 2011, Europese Commissie 2012, hoofdstuk 6 (Arbeidsmobiliteit binnen de EU en de invloed van de uitbreiding), op <http://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?catId=738&langId=nl&pubId=6176>.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-006000/12
to the Commission**

Auke Zijlstra (NI)

(18 June 2012)

Subject: Record influx of Polish nationals into the Netherlands

Last year 19 000 Polish nationals entered the Netherlands, an all-time record. Furthermore, according to the Central Bureau of Statistics, this is the second largest number of immigrants ever to have arrived from any one country within a single year.

1. Is the Commission aware of the report entitled 'More Polish nationals entering the Netherlands than ever before'? ⁽¹⁾
2. Under the relevant Accession Treaty, a new Member State is required to make the necessary adjustments to prevent any employment market disruption in the other Member States. Does the Commission agree with the PVV that the steady increase in the number of Polish nationals resident in or entering the Netherlands is evidence of non-compliance with this provision? If not, why not? If so, what courses of action remain open to Member States, including Poland, to remedy such disruptions?
3. Does the Commission see any possibility of compensating the Netherlands?

Answer given by Mr Andor on behalf of the Commission

(3 August 2012)

1. Yes, the Commission is aware of the report.
2. The 2003 and 2005 Accession Treaties do not oblige Member States that acceded recently to make adjustments to prevent employment market disruption in other Member States. Instead, they provide that, during the final two-year phase of the transitional period, the other Member States may continue to restrict labour market access only in the event of serious disturbances of their labour markets or a threat thereof. However, the transitional arrangements on free movement of EU-8 ⁽²⁾ workers expired in April 2011. Since then, EU-8 workers, including Polish workers, enjoy the full benefits of EC law on free movement of workers throughout the EU in the same way as other EU workers, and no further restrictions may be applied.

The report to which the Honourable Member refers states that 19 000 Polish nationals entered the Netherlands in 2011 and 7 000 left. It is unclear why the Honourable Member considers the net inflow of 12 000 Polish nationals, representing 0.07% of the total population of the Netherlands, to be a disruption or in what respect.

3. EC law on free movement of workers offers much needed flexibility because, even in an economic downturn, Member States continue to need to attract mobile workers to meet labour demand that cannot be met by local workers in certain sectors. Freedom of movement thus makes a positive contribution to labour markets throughout the Union and is good for the economy ⁽³⁾. It is not clear why or for what the Honourable Member considers that the Netherlands should be compensated.

⁽¹⁾ http://www.rtl.nl/components/actueel/rtlnieuws/2012/06_juni/11/binnenland/historisch-veel-polen-naar-nederland-in-2011.xml.

⁽²⁾ The Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Poland, Slovenia and Slovakia.

⁽³⁾ Employment and Social Developments in Europe 2011, European Commission 2012, Chapter 6 (Intra-EU labour mobility and the impact of enlargement), at <http://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?catId=738&langId=en&pubId=6176>.

(Nederlandse versie)

Vraag met verzoek om schriftelijk antwoord E-006001/12
aan de Commissie
Auke Zijlstra (NI)
(18 juni 2012)

Betreft: Kosovaren visumvrij door EU

De inwoners van Kosovo kunnen op den duur zonder visum naar Nederland en andere EU-landen reizen. Voorwaarde is dat de regering een lijst hervormingen doorvoert. Dat staat in een routekaart naar visumliberalisering die donderdag in Brussel is gepresenteerd. De hervormingen gaan over invoering van veiliger documenten, grensbewaking en de aanpak van georganiseerde criminaliteit.

1. Is de Commissie bekend met het bericht „Kosovaren op den duur zonder visum naar EU” ⁽¹⁾, de daarin aangehaalde routekaart naar visumliberalisering ⁽²⁾ en mijn schriftelijke vragen E-000903/2012 en E-002972/2012?
2. In de antwoorden op bovengenoemde vragen wordt door de Commissie gesteld dat visumvrij reizen door de EU voor Kosovaren pas mogelijk is als Kosovo door alle landen in de Schengenzone als soeverein land is erkend. Is dat (nog) correct? Zo ja, betekent dit dat de in genoemd artikel enige voorwaarde niet klopt? Zo nee, hoe verhouden de antwoorden van de Commissie op mijn vragen zich dan tot de routekaart naar visumliberalisering?
3. Wanneer verwacht de Commissie dat Kosovaren daadwerkelijk visumvrij door de EU kunnen reizen? Waarop baseert de Commissie deze verwachting?
4. Kan de Commissie verklaren waarom zij klaarblijkelijk zoveel waarde hecht aan visumvrij reizen door de EU voor burgers uit derde landen? Welk belang hebben de EU-burgers daarbij?
5. Hoe beoordeelt de Commissie de positie van de Servische minderheid die zich, tegen haar zin, niet meer in Servië maar thans in het buitenland, namelijk Kosovo, bevindt?

Antwoord van mevrouw Malmström namens de Commissie
(6 augustus 2012)

Overeenkomstig de EU-wetgeving inzake visa en grenzen zijn alleen de lidstaten bevoegd voor de erkenning van door derde landen afgegeven reisdocumenten.

De Commissie is op 19 januari 2012 met Kosovo ⁽³⁾ een dialoog over visumliberalisering aangegaan. Op 14 juni 2012 heeft het voor Binnenlandse Zaken bevoegde Commissielid aan de regering van Kosovo een routekaart voor visumliberalisering overhandigd. Dit document noemt een reeks hervormingen die de regering van Kosovo wordt verzocht uit te voeren om een veilige omgeving voor visumvrij reizen tot stand te brengen. De eisen op het gebied van discriminatiebestrijding zijn van toepassing op alle minderheden in Kosovo, waaronder de Servische minderheid. Na raadpleging van de lidstaten heeft de Raad nota genomen van de routekaart.

Erkenning van Kosovo door de lidstaten is geen voorwaarde voor het opheffen van de visumplicht voor burgers van Kosovo.

De duur van de visumdialoog met Kosovo zal afhangen van het tempo waarin de regering van Kosovo de hervormingen uitvoert die een veilige en betrouwbare omgeving voor visumvrij reizen in het Schengengebied tot stand moeten brengen.

Het Europees Parlement stelt in zijn meest recente resolutie over het proces voor Europese integratie van Kosovo ⁽⁴⁾ dat het „er verheugd over [is] dat de visumdialoog is aangegaan [...] teneinde het toenemende isolement van de Kosovaarse burgers te stoppen [...] [en] benadrukt dat betere intermenselijke contacten een krachtige stimulans zijn voor democratisering en een drijfveer voor verdere hervormingen in de regio.” De Commissie deelt dit standpunt volledig.

⁽¹⁾ <http://www.nu.nl/buitenland/2835040/kosovaren-duur-zonder-visum-eu.html>

⁽²⁾ <http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/12/605&format=HTML&aged=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=en>

⁽³⁾ Deze benaming laat de standpunten over de status van Kosovo onverlet, en is in overeenstemming met Resolutie 1244 (1999) van de VN-Veiligheidsraad en het advies van het Internationaal Gerechtshof over de onafhankelijkheidsverklaring van Kosovo.

⁽⁴⁾ P7_TA-PROV(2012)0115.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-006001/12
to the Commission**

Auke Zijlstra (NI)

(18 June 2012)

Subject: Visa-free travel within the EU for Kosovars

Ultimately, it will be possible for residents of Kosovo to travel to the Netherlands and other EU Member States without a visa. This is subject to the condition that the government implements a list of reforms. This is the gist of a roadmap for visa liberalisation presented in Brussels on Thursday. The reforms concern the introduction of more secure documents, border control and tackling organised crime.

1. Is the Commission aware of the report 'Kosovaren op den duur zonder visum naar EU' [Kosovars ultimately able to travel to the EU without visas] ⁽¹⁾, the roadmap to visa liberalisation which it quotes ⁽²⁾ and my Written Questions E-000903/2012 and E-002972/2012?
2. In the answers to the above questions, the Commission states that visa-free travel within the EU will only become possible for Kosovars once Kosovo has been recognised as a sovereign country by all countries in the Schengen area. Is this (still) correct? If so, does this mean that the sole condition stated in the aforementioned article is not correct? If not, how can the Commission's answers to my questions be reconciled with the roadmap to visa liberalisation?
3. When does the Commission expect that Kosovars will in practice be able to travel within the EU without obtaining visas? On what does the Commission base its prediction?
4. Can the Commission explain why it evidently attaches so much importance to visa-free travel within the EU for citizens of third countries? Of what benefit is this to EU citizens?
5. What view does the Commission take of the position of the Serb minority which — against its will — is now no longer resident in Serbia but abroad, namely in Kosovo?

Answer given by Ms Malmström on behalf of the Commission

(6 August 2012)

According to the *acquis* on visas and borders, Member States are solely competent for the recognition of travel documents issued by a third country.

The Commission launched a visa liberalisation dialogue with Kosovo ⁽³⁾ on 19 January 2012 and on 14 June, the Member of the Commission responsible for Home Affairs handed over a roadmap on visa liberalisation to the Kosovo government. This document spells out various reforms that the Kosovo government is requested to implement to create a secure environment for visa-free travel. The requirements on anti-discrimination address all minorities in Kosovo, including persons belonging to the Kosovo Serb minority. Following a period of consultation with Member States, the Council took note of this roadmap.

Member States' recognition of Kosovo is not a requirement for lifting the visa obligation for Kosovo citizens.

The length of the visa dialogue with Kosovo will depend on the pace at which the Kosovo government implements the reforms that will create a secure and reliable environment for visa-free travel in the Schengen area.

In its latest resolution on the European integration process for Kosovo ⁽⁴⁾, the European Parliament '[welcomed] the start of the visa dialogue ... in order to counter the increasing isolation among Kosovar citizens ... [and stressed] that improved people-to-people contacts are a powerful incentive for democratisation and a driver for further reforms in the region.' The European Commission fully shares this view.

⁽¹⁾ <http://www.nu.nl/buitenland/2835040/kosovaren-duur-zonder-visum-eu.html>

⁽²⁾ <http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/12/605&format=HTML&aged=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=en>.

⁽³⁾ This designation is without prejudice to positions on status, and is in line with UNSCR 1244/99 and the ICJ Opinion on the Kosovo declaration of independence.

⁽⁴⁾ P7_TA-PROV(2012)0115.

(Nederlandse versie)

**Vraag met verzoek om schriftelijk antwoord E-006002/12
aan de Commissie (Vicevoorzitter — Hoge Vertegenwoordiger)**

Auke Zijlstra (NI)

(18 juni 2012)

Betreft: VP/HR — Executies in de Gazastrook (vervolgvraag)

Op 15 juni 2012 heeft HV/VZ Ashton namens de Commissie antwoord gegeven op schriftelijke vraag E-003688/2012. Daarin meldt zij dat de Commissie en de EU-missies in Jeruzalem en Ramallah de executies in de Gazastrook, en de doodstraf in het algemeen, veroordelen.

1. Ashton heeft medegedeeld dat de EU de executies veroordeelt. Met andere woorden: harerzijds betreft het louter een mededeling. Ondertussen worden de executies in de Gazastrook gewoon uitgevoerd. Kan de Commissie aangeven of het slechts bij een mededeling blijft, of is zij voornemens verdere stappen te ondernemen? Beschikt zij voorts over een (financieel) drukmiddel om de executies daadwerkelijk tegen te gaan? Zo ja, welk drukmiddel, en is zij ertoe bereid dit in te zetten?

Voorts schrijft Ashton in haar antwoord: „In reactie op punt 3 van de vraag wordt eraan herinnerd dat de EU geen geld verstrekt aan Hamas. Een strikt en uitgebreid audit- en controlemechanisme zorgt ervoor dat de EU de precieze bestemming kan nagaan van middelen die worden toegekend in het kader van PEGASE (Palestijns-Europees mechanisme voor het beheer van de sociaaleconomische bijstand).”

2. Kan de Commissie uitleggen hoe het audit- en controlemechanisme werkt? In concreto: hoe gaat de EU na of de middelen die in het kader van PEGASE worden verstrekt op de beoogde plek terechtkomen en vooral niet in handen van Hamas vallen? Is het audit- en controlemechanisme een succes, en hoe weet de Commissie dit? Is de Commissie met de PVV van mening dat de EU überhaupt geen geld aan de Palestijnen behoort te verstrekken? Zo neen, waarom niet?

Antwoord van hoge vertegenwoordiger/vicevoorzitter Ashton namens de Commissie

(27 juli 2012)

De EU onderhoudt principieel geen contacten met Hamas. Zij verleent geen financiële steun aan de de facto-autoriteiten in Gaza en kan hun dus geen financiële sanctie opleggen zoals in de vraag wordt gesuggereerd.

De Commissie is ervan overtuigd dat alle middelen voor de bezette Palestijnse gebieden hun doel bereiken. Dankzij de verificaties en audits vooraf en achteraf in het kader van het Pegasemechanisme, dat voor het beheer van deze procedure is opgezet, is precies bekend waar iedere bankoverschrijving terechtkomt. De Commissie voert alle betalingen in de bezette Palestijnse gebieden uit. De middelen kunnen onmogelijk op een andere dan hun oorspronkelijke bestemming terechtkomen.

Het systeem van externe en interne verificatie en audits zorgt ervoor dat het geld van de belastingsbetalers van de EU de best mogelijke bescherming krijgt. In het licht van de positieve verslagen van de Rekenkamer en de internecontrolediensten worden aanvullende maatregelen niet nodig geacht.

De Commissie staat volledig achter het EU-beleid van een „tweestatenoplossing” voor het Israëliisch-Palestijnse conflict. Zonder de middelen die door de EU en andere donoren ter beschikking worden gesteld, zou het bestaan van de Palestijnse Autoriteit in gevaar zijn. Deze middelen zijn dan ook van essentieel belang, niet alleen omdat de Palestijnse Autoriteit en de VN-organisatie voor hulpverlening aan Palestijnse vluchtelingen (UNRWA) hierdoor levensbelangrijke diensten kunnen verlenen aan de Palestijnse bevolking, maar ook voor de toekomst van het vredesproces in het Midden-Oosten.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-006002/12
to the Commission (Vice-President/High Representative)**

Auke Zijlstra (NI)

(18 June 2012)

Subject: VP/HR — Executions in the Gaza Strip (follow-up question)

On 15 June 2012 the VP/HR, Catherine Ashton, answered Written Question E-003688/2012 on behalf of the Commission. In that answer she states that the Commission and the EU Missions in Jerusalem and Ramallah condemn the executions in the Gaza Strip and the death penalty in general.

1. Baroness Ashton has issued a *statement* condemning the executions. Meanwhile, executions are now being carried out regularly in the Gaza Strip. Can the Commission indicate whether its response will consist only of a *statement*, or whether it is prepared to take further steps? Does it have any means of exerting (financial) pressure on the Palestinian authorities in order to stop any further executions? If so, what are means in question, and is it prepared to use them?

Baroness Ashton also writes the following in her answer: 'With regard to point 3 of the question, it is recalled that the EU does not provide funds to Hamas. A strict and extensive mechanism of audit and verification is in place which allows the EU to verify the precise destination of funds committed through the PEGASE [Palestinian-European mechanism for the management of socioeconomic assistance] Mechanism.'

2. Can the Commission explain how the audit and verification mechanism works? How exactly does the EU ensure that funds committed through the PEGASE Mechanism reach their intended recipients and, above all, do not end up in the pockets of Hamas? Is the audit and verification mechanism a success, and how does the Commission know this? Does the Commission agree with the PVV that the EU should not be handing over any money at all to the Palestinians? If not, why not?

Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Ashton on behalf of the Commission

(27 July 2012)

The EU maintains a no-contact policy with Hamas. It does not provide any financial support to the de facto authorities in Gaza and so can apply no financial sanction on them as suggested in the question.

The Commission is satisfied that all funds for the occupied Palestinian territory (oPt) reach their targets. The *ex-ante* and *ex-post* verifications and audits provided for under the PEGASE Mechanism, which was set up to manage this procedure ensure that the precise destination of each and every bank transfer is known. All payments in the oPt are carried out by the Commission. There is no possibility of funds being diverted from their intended destination.

The system of external and internal verification and audit in place ensures that EU taxpayers' money is protected to the fullest possible extent. In view of positive reports from the Court of Auditors and internal audit services, it is not considered necessary to take any additional measures.

The Commission is fully committed to the EU policy of a 'two-state solution' to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Without the funds provided by the EU, and other donors the Palestinian Authority would be in danger of collapse. The funds provided are therefore essential, not only to allow the Palestinian Authority (PA) and the UN Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) to provide vital services to the Palestinian people, but also to the future of the Middle East peace process.

(Nederlandse versie)

Vraag met verzoek om schriftelijk antwoord E-006003/12
aan de Commissie
Auke Zijlstra (NI)
(18 juni 2012)

Betreft: „Coalition Against Racism” (gefinancierd door de EU)

„Coalition Against Racism” ⁽¹⁾ is een door de EU gefinancierd project.

1. Waarom steunt de EU „Coalition Against Racism”?
2. Hoeveel geld krijgt „Coalition Against Racism” (jaarlijks) van de EU?
3. Wat zijn de doelstellingen van „Coalition Against Racism”? Wie — wat vertegenwoordigt dit project? Namens wie spreekt/handelt het?
4. Wie maken deel uit van „Coalition Against Racism”? Wie bekleden het bestuur? Vertegenwoordigen zij alle mogelijke lagen — groepen van de bevolking? Op basis waarvan zijn deze personen op hun plek terecht gekomen? Hoe zijn zij geselecteerd?
5. Wat heeft „Coalition Against Racism” tot dusver gepresteerd? Zijn de doelstellingen (al) gehaald? Is de Commissie tevreden met „Coalition Against Racism” en haar resultaten? Kan de Commissie de goedgekeurde cijfers verstrekken?

Antwoord van de heer Füle namens de Commissie
(31 augustus 2012)

De EU ondersteunt de Coalition Against Racism op zich niet, maar heeft, na een oproep voor het indienen van voorstellen, voor de periode van januari 2011 tot januari 2013 een subsidie van 196 880 EUR verstrekt voor een project dat de organisatie Mossawa (het centrum voor de behartiging van de belangen van Arabische burgers in Israël) in het kader van het landenspecifieke steunprogramma van het EIDHR ⁽²⁾ voor Israël heeft uitgevoerd. Met dit project worden de hoofddoelstellingen van het EIDHR duidelijk verwezenlijkt, in dit geval het versterken van een gezamenlijke aanpak ter bestrijding van racisme en ter bevordering van de toegankelijkheid van mensenrechten in Israël door een pluralistische coalitie van het maatschappelijk middenveld.

De partnerorganisaties zijn het Israel Religious Action Center (IRAC) van de Israel Movement for Progressive Judaism, Tebeka, Advocacy and Justice for Ethiopian-Israelis, en Tmura, het Israëlsch antidiscriminatiecentrum. Deze partners werden door de aanvrager geselecteerd op basis van de specifieke sterke punten waarmee zij aan het algehele welslagen van het project konden bijdragen.

De Commissie houdt rekening met de ervaring van een aanvrager op het gebied van projectuitvoering en zijn capaciteiten inzake personele, financiële en materiële middelen voor het uitvoeren van het project en volgt via de PADOR-registratiedienst ⁽³⁾ de jaarlijkse financiële verslagen en activiteitenverslagen van de organisatie. Het Mossawa Center is een onafhankelijke ngo die bij de Israëlische autoriteiten als betrouwbaar bekendstaat.

De rol van de Commissie beperkt zich tot het toezien op en evalueren van de resultaten van de gefinancierde actie en het verzekeren dat de begunstigde zich houdt aan de voorwaarden van het contract dat door beide partijen is ondertekend. Op basis van het eerste externe controlebezoek is de Commissie erg tevreden over de uitvoering van het project.

⁽¹⁾ <http://www.fightracism.org/>.

⁽²⁾ Europees instrument voor democratie en mensenrechten.

⁽³⁾ Potential Applicant Data Online Registration.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-006003/12
to the Commission**

Auke Zijlstra (NI)

(18 June 2012)

Subject: 'Coalition Against Racism' (financed by the EU)

The 'Coalition Against Racism' ⁽¹⁾ is an EU-funded project.

1. Why is the EU supporting the 'Coalition Against Racism'?
2. How much funding is the 'Coalition Against Racism' receiving from the EU each year?
3. What are the aims of the 'Coalition Against Racism'? Who or what does the project represent? On whose behalf does it speak/act?
4. Who forms part of the 'Coalition Against Racism'? Who sits on its board? Do they represent all possible population strata/groups? On what basis were these people appointed? How were they selected?
5. What has the 'Coalition Against Racism' done so far? Have its aims already been achieved? Is the Commission satisfied with the 'Coalition Against Racism' and its results? Can the Commission communicate the approved figures?

Answer given by Mr Füle on behalf of the Commission

(31 August 2012)

The EU does not support the Coalition Against Racism as such but has provided a grant, following a competitive call for proposals, of EUR 196 880 for the period from January 2011 until January 2013 for a project implemented by the Mossawa organisation (the advocacy centre for Arab citizens in Israel), in the framework of the EIDHR ⁽²⁾ country-based support programme for Israel. The project clearly addresses the core aims of EIDHR, in this specific case, to strengthen a united approach to combat racism and promote the accessibility to human rights in Israel through a pluralistic civil society coalition.

The partner organisations are the Israeli Religious Action Centre of the Israeli Movement for Progressive Judaism (IRAC); Tabeka, Advocacy and Justice for Ethiopian-Israelis; and Tmura, the Israeli anti-discrimination centre. These partners were selected by the applicant on the basis of the specific strengths which they could bring to the overall success of the project.

The Commission takes into account an applicant's experience in terms of project implementation and its capacity in terms of human, financial and material resources to implement the project and monitors, through the PADOR registration system ⁽³⁾ the organisation's annual financial and narrative reports. Mossawa Center is an independent NGO in good standing with the Israeli authorities.

The Commission's role is confined to monitoring and evaluating the results of the action financed and to ensuring that the beneficiary respects the conditions of the contract signed by the two parties. According to the first external monitoring visit, the Commission is very satisfied with the implementation of the project.

⁽¹⁾ <http://www.fightracism.org/>.

⁽²⁾ European Instrument for Democracy & Human Rights.

⁽³⁾ Potential Applicant Data Online Registration.

(Versão portuguesa)

Pergunta com pedido de resposta escrita E-006004/12

à Comissão

Nuno Teixeira (PPE)

(18 de junho de 2012)

Assunto: Relações entre a União Europeia e a América Latina

Considerando que:

- A União Europeia atravessa atualmente uma crise económica e financeira sem precedentes, que conduziu à adoção de medidas de austeridade em vários países europeus com vista à contenção dos défices públicos e à elaboração de novos programas ao nível europeu para promover o crescimento e o emprego;
- Tais medidas têm tomado conta da agenda europeia, dada a sua urgência e necessidade face à gravidade e ao contágio dos efeitos da crise do euro e à lentidão e atraso da recuperação económica em muitos Estados-Membros;
- Face à prioridade destas medidas na agenda europeia, outras questões ligadas à sua dimensão externa, mas com impacto nas suas políticas internas, têm sido adiadas e que esta dimensão, sobretudo após a projeção pretendida com a entrada em vigor do Tratado de Lisboa e o início de funções do Serviço Europeu de Ação Externa, não pode, nem deve, de forma alguma, ser esquecida;
- O Parlamento Europeu aprovou a 12 de junho de 2012 uma resolução sobre a cooperação para o desenvolvimento com a América Latina, defendendo a necessidade de repensar os objetivos da cooperação bilateral para o desenvolvimento da União Europeia;

Pergunta-se à Comissão:

1. Qual o estado atual das relações entre a União Europeia e a América Latina a nível de política de cooperação e desenvolvimento?
2. Como se antevêm as eventuais negociações entre a União Europeia e a América Latina no que respeita à investigação científica e tecnológica com vista a um espaço euro-latino-americano de inovação e conhecimento, que contribua para o aumento da competitividade?
3. Como melhorar o diálogo e a aproximação da União Europeia à América Latina nos próximos anos?

Resposta dada por Andris Piebalgs em nome da Comissão

(7 de agosto de 2012)

A UE é a principal fonte de financiamento de Ajuda Pública ao Desenvolvimento para os países da América Latina e a Comissão continua empenhada em apoiar a região no seu percurso de desenvolvimento. Nos próximos anos, tal como previsto na Agenda para a Mudança, a UE continuará a cooperar com os países da região latino-americana, segundo uma «diferenciação» de critérios. A saber: a) Ajuda baseada em subvenções para apoiar o crescimento nos países que dependem fortemente da ajuda externa. Esses países contarão com dotações financeiras individuais; b) Os países «graduados», que contarão com as dotações regionais globais.

Tal será complementado através da proposta de Instrumento de Parceria, dos programas temáticos, bem como através de outros instrumentos financeiros internos e externos (por exemplo, o programa «Horizonte 2020»). Os instrumentos financeiros externos propostos devem dar flexibilidade e âmbito de aplicação suficientes e ao mesmo tempo a necessária atenção para desenvolver estratégias de cooperação efetivas. As relações com os países da América Latina estão a avançar para além da cooperação para o desenvolvimento, através de uma série de diálogos e acordos setoriais, designadamente no domínio da investigação, da inovação e da tecnologia, que têm interesse e potencial crescentes para a cooperação com os países da América Latina. Neste sentido, a Cimeira bi-regional, realizada em Madrid em 2010, aprovou o estabelecimento de um diálogo bi-regional regular sobre este tema e que está já a produzir resultados. A Comissão confia que este diálogo e as atividades daí resultantes intensificarão a cooperação entre as duas regiões e promoverão a inovação.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-006004/12
to the Commission
Nuno Teixeira (PPE)
(18 June 2012)**

Subject: Relations between the European Union and Latin America

The European Union is currently experiencing an unprecedented economic and financial crisis that has led to austerity measures being adopted in a number of European countries, with the aim of curbing public deficits and designing new programmes at European level to promote growth and employment.

The seriousness of the situation and the risk that the impact of the eurocrisis might spread, as well as the slow pace of economic recovery in many Member States, have meant that these urgent measures have dominated the European agenda. As a result, other issues linked to the external dimension of the European agenda, but which also have an impact on its internal policies, have been postponed. Nevertheless, this external dimension cannot and must not be forgotten, particularly bearing in mind the aspirations triggered by the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty and the launch of the European External Action Service.

On 12 June 2012 Parliament adopted a resolution on development cooperation with Latin America in which it underlined the need to rethink the EU's bilateral development cooperation objectives.

Can the Commission answer the following questions:

1. How would it describe the state of relations between the European Union and Latin America with regard to cooperation and development policy?
2. What are the prospects for possible negotiations between the European Union and Latin America on scientific and technological research, with a view to a Euro-Latin American area of innovation and know-how that will help to boost competitiveness?
3. How can the dialogue be improved and a closer relationship established between the European Union and Latin America in the coming years?

**Answer given by Mr Piebalgs on behalf of the Commission
(7 August 2012)**

The EU is the main provider of Official Development Aid to Latin America and the Commission remains committed to support the region on its development path. In the coming years, as foreseen in the Agenda for Change, the EU will continue to cooperate with countries of the Latin America region according to 'differentiation' criteria as follows: (a) Grant based aid to sustain growth in countries that heavily depend on external support. Those countries will count with individual financial allocations; (b) The 'graduated' countries that will count on global regional allocations.

This will be complemented through the proposed Partnership Instrument, thematic programmes, as well as through other external and internal financing instruments (e.g. Horizon 2020). The proposed external financial instruments should give sufficient flexibility and scope and at the same time the necessary focus to develop effective cooperation strategies. Relations with Latin America are moving beyond development cooperation to take shape through a number of sectorial dialogues and agreements, including in the area of research, innovation and technology, which are of increasing interest and potential for cooperation with Latin America. In this sense, the bi-regional Summit that took place in Madrid in 2010 endorsed the establishment of a regular bi-regional dialogue on the topic, which is already delivering results. The Commission trusts that this dialogue and activities derived from it will increase cooperation between the two regions and promote innovation.

(Versão portuguesa)

Pergunta com pedido de resposta escrita E-006005/12

à Comissão

Nuno Teixeira (PPE)

(18 de junho de 2012)

Assunto: Relações entre a União Europeia e a Rússia

Considerando que:

- A União Europeia atravessa atualmente uma crise económica e financeira sem precedentes, que conduziu à adoção de medidas de austeridade em vários países europeus com vista à contenção dos défices públicos e à elaboração de novos programas ao nível europeu para promover o crescimento e o emprego;
- Tais medidas têm tomado conta da agenda europeia, dada a sua urgência e necessidade face à gravidade e ao contágio dos efeitos da crise do euro e à lentidão e atraso da recuperação económica em muitos Estados-Membros;
- Face à prioridade destas medidas na agenda europeia, outras questões ligadas à sua dimensão externa, mas com impacto nas suas políticas internas, têm sido adiadas e que esta dimensão, sobretudo após a projeção pretendida com a entrada em vigor do Tratado de Lisboa e o início de funções do Serviço Europeu de Ação Externa, não pode, nem deve, de forma alguma, ser esquecida;

Pergunta-se à Comissão:

1. Qual o estado das relações entre a União Europeia e a Rússia?
2. Como se anteveem as eventuais negociações entre a União Europeia e a Rússia no que respeita ao abastecimento e fornecimento de energia?
3. Quais as potenciais áreas de convergência numa eventual aproximação futura da União Europeia à Rússia?

Resposta dada pela Alta Representante/Vice-Presidente Catherine Ashton em nome da Comissão

(27 de julho de 2012)

A Rússia é um parceiro estratégico e a interação tem continuado com um elevado nível de intensidade durante a crise. Os resultados do ano passado foram dignos de atenção, sendo de mencionar a adesão à OMT, as medidas comuns com vista à isenção de vistos, bem como a Parceria para a Modernização.

A UE e a Rússia cooperam de forma positiva num conjunto de temas mundiais, por exemplo em relação ao processo de paz no Médio Oriente, ao Irão ou ao Afeganistão e em matéria de questões económicas mundiais, no âmbito do G-8 e do G-20. Continuam a registar-se diferenças de pontos de vista em relação a outros temas, como é o caso da Líbia e da Síria. A UE tenta também alcançar uma melhor cooperação com a Rússia na solução de conflitos prolongados na nossa Vizinhança Comum.

A situação da democracia, dos direitos humanos e das liberdades fundamentais na Rússia é fonte de grandes preocupações. A UE recorda frequentemente à Rússia os seus compromissos internacionais no sentido de garantir esses direitos. O âmbito e o potencial da futura cooperação dependerão obviamente da evolução da Rússia a nível interno.

O comércio no setor da energia constitui o ponto principal da parceria de comércio UE-Rússia. A cooperação no âmbito do Diálogo sobre a Energia está em curso. As negociações sobre contratos específicos ou projetos de infraestruturas são uma questão comercial. Em termos gerais, a Rússia deverá continuar a ser o maior fornecedor de fontes de energia à União Europeia.

A UE é de longe o parceiro comercial mais importante da Rússia, sendo responsável por cerca de 49 % de todo o comércio russo. Em 2011, a Rússia era o terceiro maior parceiro comercial da UE-27, a seguir aos EUA e à China, respondendo por 7 % das exportações da UE-27 e 12 % das importações. O comércio de bens da UE-27 com a Rússia ascendia a 108 mil milhões de euros em 2011.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-006005/12
to the Commission**

Nuno Teixeira (PPE)

(18 June 2012)

Subject: Relations between the European Union and Russia

The European Union is currently experiencing an unprecedented economic and financial crisis that has led to austerity measures being adopted in a number of European countries, with the aim of curbing public deficits and designing new programmes at European level to promote growth and employment.

The seriousness of the situation and the risk that the impact of the eurocrisis might spread, as well as the slow pace of economic recovery in many Member States, have meant that these urgent measures have dominated the European agenda. As a result, other issues linked to the external dimension of the European agenda, but which also have an impact on its internal policies, have been postponed. Nevertheless, this external dimension cannot and must not be forgotten, particularly bearing in mind the aspirations triggered by the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty and the launch of the European External Action Service.

Can the Commission answer the following questions:

1. How would it describe the state of relations between the European Union and Russia?
2. What are the prospects for possible negotiations between the European Union and Russia on the transmission and supply of energy?
3. What potential areas of convergence can be identified in a possible closer relationship between the European Union and Russia in the future?

Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Ashton on behalf of the Commission

(27 July 2012)

Russia is a Strategic Partner and interaction has continued on a high level of intensity throughout the crisis. Last year it produced particularly noteworthy results, such as WTO accession, Common Steps towards visa-free travel, and in our Partnership for Modernisation.

The EU and Russia cooperate well on a number of global issues, for instance on the Middle East Peace Process, Iran or Afghanistan and, on global economic issues within the G8 and G20. Differences of views persist on other issues, such as Libya and Syria. EU also seeks better cooperation with Russia in solving protracted conflicts in our Common Neighbourhood.

The situation of democracy, human rights and fundamental freedoms in Russia gives rise to serious concerns. The EU regularly reminds Russia of its international commitments to guarantee these rights. In the context of recent mass protests in favour of fair elections and political and judicial reform in Russia, the EU has been urging Russia to use this civil activism as an opportunity. The scope and potential for future cooperation will obviously also depend on further domestic developments in Russia.

Energy trade forms the backbone of the EU-Russia trade partnership. Cooperation is ongoing in the Energy Dialogue. Negotiations on specific contracts or infrastructure projects are a commercial matter. Overall, Russia is expected to remain a major supplier of energy sources to the EU.

The EU is by far Russia's most important trading partner, responsible for nearly 49% of all Russian trade. In 2011, Russia was the EU-27's third most important trading partner after the USA and China, accounting for 7% of EU-27 exports and 12% of EU-27 imports. EU-27 trade in goods with Russia amounted to EUR 108 billion in 2011.

(Versão portuguesa)

Pergunta com pedido de resposta escrita E-006006/12

à Comissão

Nuno Teixeira (PPE)

(18 de junho de 2012)

Assunto: Relações entre a União Europeia e o Japão

Considerando que:

- A União Europeia atravessa atualmente uma crise económica e financeira sem precedentes, que conduziu à adoção de medidas de austeridade em vários países europeus com vista à contenção dos défices públicos e à elaboração de novos programas ao nível europeu para promover o crescimento e o emprego;
- Tais medidas têm tomado conta da agenda europeia, dada a sua urgência e necessidade face à gravidade e ao contágio dos efeitos da crise do euro e à lentidão e atraso da recuperação económica em muitos Estados-Membros;
- Face à prioridade destas medidas na agenda europeia, outras questões ligadas à sua dimensão externa, mas com impacto nas suas políticas internas, têm sido adiadas e que esta dimensão, sobretudo após a projeção pretendida com a entrada em vigor do Tratado de Lisboa e o início de funções do Serviço Europeu de Ação Externa, não pode, nem deve, de forma alguma, ser esquecida;

Pergunta-se à Comissão:

1. Qual o estado das relações entre a União Europeia e o Japão?
2. Como se anteveem as eventuais negociações entre a União Europeia e o Japão no que respeita a uma maior liberalização do comércio, com a eliminação de barreiras às trocas comerciais?
3. Quais as potenciais áreas de convergência numa eventual aproximação futura da União Europeia ao Japão?

Resposta dada por Karel De Gucht em nome da Comissão

(14 de agosto de 2012)

1. A parceria estratégica entre a UE e o Japão tem vindo a alargar-se ao longo da última década, ultrapassando em grande medida as questões relacionadas com o comércio. A cooperação setorial com o Japão é cada vez maior, incluindo a investigação e a inovação; o ambiente, as alterações climáticas, a segurança dos consumidores, as questões relacionadas com os transportes e a sociedade da informação. Ambas as partes estão já a trabalhar em conjunto no que respeita às questões políticas e de segurança.

Na cimeira UE-Japão, em 2011, os dirigentes decidiram aprofundar a relação. Assim, procedeu-se a um exercício de delimitação do âmbito de dois acordos: um Acordo-Quadro (A-Q) e um Acordo de Comércio Livre (ACL). Os projetos de mandatos de negociação dos dois acordos serão debatidos nos próximos meses pelo Conselho.

2. O documento de delimitação do âmbito do ACL, em que se define o âmbito do potencial ACL, abrange integralmente as prioridades da UE e constitui uma base sólida de enquadramento para as negociações futuras. O objetivo da Comissão é garantir uma liberalização do comércio mais aprofundada, através da eliminação dos obstáculos ao comércio. Já no contexto do «exercício de delimitação do âmbito», a Comissão encontrou soluções satisfatórias para vários obstáculos não pautais colocados pela indústria da UE em setores como o setor automóvel, dos produtos alimentares e dos produtos farmacêuticos. Seriam analisados outros produtos no contexto das negociações do ACL, após a adoção, por parte dos Estados-Membros, da decisão de lançamento das negociações com base numa proposta da Comissão. Em 18 de julho de 2012, o Colégio adotou a referida proposta.

3. A Comissão considera que, no que se refere às questões relativas ao comércio e ao investimento, os domínios em que se poderia potencialmente estreitar a cooperação incluem os setores automóvel, dos dispositivos médicos, dos produtos alimentares, dos produtos farmacêuticos e da contratação pública. O A-Q fornecerá uma base para o reforço da colaboração em matéria de política externa e da cooperação setorial em áreas como gestão da crise, ajuda ao desenvolvimento ou energia.

(English version)

Question for written answer E-006006/12
to the Commission
Nuno Teixeira (PPE)
(18 June 2012)

Subject: Relations between the European Union and Japan

The European Union is currently experiencing an unprecedented economic and financial crisis that has led to austerity measures being adopted in a number of European countries, with the aim of curbing public deficits and designing new programmes at European level to promote growth and employment.

The seriousness of the situation and the risk that the impact of the eurocrisis might spread, as well as the slow pace of economic recovery in many Member States, have meant that these urgent measures have dominated the European agenda. As a result, other issues linked to the external dimension of the European agenda, but which also have an impact on its internal policies, have been postponed. Nevertheless, this external dimension cannot and must not be forgotten, particularly bearing in mind the aspirations triggered by the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty and the launch of the European External Action Service.

Can the Commission answer the following questions:

1. How would it describe the state of relations between the European Union and Japan?
2. What are the prospects for possible negotiations between the European Union and Japan on greater trade liberalisation, with a view to removing barriers to trade?
3. What potential areas of convergence can be identified in a possible closer relationship between the European Union and Japan in the future?

Answer given by Mr De Gucht on behalf of the Commission
(14 August 2012)

1. The EU's strategic partnership with Japan has broadened over the last decade to extend far beyond trade-related issues. There is a growing amount of sectoral cooperation with Japan including research and innovation; the environment, climate change, consumer safety, transport matters, the information society. Both sides are also working together in political and security matters.

At 2011 EU Japan-Summit leaders decided to upgrade the relationship. This resulted in scoping exercise for two agreements: a Framework Agreement (FA) and a Free Trade Agreement (FTA). Draft negotiating mandates for the two agreements will be discussed in the coming months by the Council.

2. The FTA scoping paper, which lays out the scope of the potential FTA fully covers EU's priorities, is a good basis to frame the future negotiations. The aim of the Commission is to ensure greater trade liberalisation by removing barriers to trade. Already in the context of the 'scoping exercise' Commission has found satisfactory solutions for a number of non-tariff barriers raised by the EU industry in sectors such as the automotive, food products and pharmaceutical. Other items would be addressed in the context of the FTA negotiations once a decision to launch them is taken by the Member States on the basis of a Commission proposal. On 18 July 2012, the College adopted such a proposal.

3. The Commission believes that as far as trade and investment matters are concerned the potential areas for closer cooperation could be in the automotive, medical devices, food products, pharmaceuticals and public procurement sectors. The FA would provide a basis for enhanced collaboration on foreign policy and sectoral cooperation on issues like crisis management, development assistance or energy.

(Versão portuguesa)

Pergunta com pedido de resposta escrita E-006008/12

à Comissão

Nuno Teixeira (PPE)

(18 de junho de 2012)

Assunto: Efeitos da crise económica na dimensão geopolítica e geoestratégica da União Europeia

Considerando que:

- A União Europeia atravessa atualmente uma crise económica e financeira sem precedentes, que conduziu à adoção de medidas de austeridade em vários países europeus com vista à contenção dos défices públicos e à elaboração de novos programas ao nível europeu para promover o crescimento e o emprego;
- Tais medidas têm tomado conta da agenda europeia, dada a sua urgência e necessidade face à gravidade e ao contágio dos efeitos da crise do euro e à lentidão e atraso da recuperação económica em muitos Estados-Membros;
- Face à prioridade destas medidas na agenda europeia, outras questões ligadas à sua dimensão externa, mas com impacto nas suas políticas internas, têm sido adiadas e que esta dimensão, sobretudo após a projeção pretendida com a entrada em vigor do Tratado de Lisboa e o início de funções do Serviço Europeu de Ação Externa, não pode, nem deve, de forma alguma, ser esquecida;

Pergunta-se à Comissão:

1. Não considera que se deve apostar mais no reforço do papel da União Europeia ao nível mundial, tendo nomeadamente em conta uma eventual desvantagem ao nível geopolítico resultante da crise do euro?
2. Quais os passos que têm sido dados no sentido do reforço da cooperação transatlântica com os Estados Unidos da América desde o início da crise económica e financeira na Europa e no desenhar de uma nova grande estratégia?
3. Como deve a União Europeia continuar a desenvolver a sua ação externa, nomeadamente através do seu «soft power», quando comparada com outras potências mundiais que possuem um poder militarizado?
4. Como pode a União Europeia tirar partido de eventuais investimentos no seu território e dos consequentes crescimento e criação de emprego por parte de novas potências económicas emergentes, como o Brasil, a China, a Índia, a Rússia, a África do Sul e a Indonésia?

Resposta dada pela Alta Representante/Vice-Presidente Catherine Ashton em nome da Comissão

(6 de agosto de 2012)

1. A União Europeia, para evitar que a atual crise interna comprometa a sua vontade de desempenhar um papel visível, eficaz e de autoridade na cena internacional, tem reforçado o seu papel tanto a nível bilateral (na vizinhança, na Ásia e na América Latina) como multilateral (ONU, fóruns regionais, G-8 e G-20) utilizando todas as suas políticas e instrumentos externos para esse efeito. Tem também explicado aos seus parceiros internacionais o impacto positivo das decisões na zona euro e do crescimento sustentável «verde» enquanto contribuições da UE para a estabilidade, a prosperidade e a governação a nível mundial.
2. Para a UE, é importante que os EUA continuem empenhados na Europa e na sua vizinhança, mas o desenvolvimento da Ásia, bem como o interesse dos EUA pela Ásia em termos económicos e geopolíticos, colocam novos desafios. Uma relação transatlântica reforçada poderá centrar-se em questões práticas de interesse mútuo (energia, quadros regulamentares, segurança alimentar, governação global) e envolver outros parceiros atlânticos.
3. O chamado «soft power» é apenas uma das formas de ação da UE a nível externo. A política externa da UE implica um equilíbrio — adaptado a cada parceiro e a cada situação — de diversas ferramentas e instrumentos europeus, nomeadamente no domínio do comércio, ajuda, aspetos externos das políticas internas da UE, tais como diálogos regulamentares ou ações da PESC, todos eles baseados no respeito pelo Estado de direito e pelos princípios fundamentais consagrados no Tratado de Lisboa. Pode implicar, por exemplo, a colaboração com a sociedade civil e com intervenientes não estatais ou o apoio não militar a operações de manutenção da paz ou de estabilização internacional apoiadas pelas Nações Unidas.

4. A UE tem interesse em garantir aos operadores europeus em países terceiros igualdade de tratamento e acesso equitativo aos mercados, acesso estratégico a matérias-primas essenciais, em cumprimento das normas ambientais e sociais e dentro do respeito pela transparência, responsabilização e responsabilidade social das empresas.

(English version)

Question for written answer E-006008/12
to the Commission
Nuno Teixeira (PPE)
(18 June 2012)

Subject: Impact of the economic crisis on the EU's geopolitical and geostrategic dimension

The EU is now going through an unprecedented economic and financial crisis, in which several Member States have had to adopt austerity measures in order to rein in government deficits and pave the way for new Europe-wide programmes to promote growth and employment.

These measures have allowed for the European agenda, a matter of urgent necessity given, on the one hand, the seriousness of the euro crisis and the risk that its effects might spread and, secondly, the fact that, in many Member States, economic recovery is proceeding sluggishly or has yet to happen.

Because Europe is treating the above measures as a priority, other matters related to its external dimension, but which also affect its internal policies, have been shelved. However, Europe is aiming to raise its international profile now that the Treaty of Lisbon has entered into force and the European External Action Service has started work. That being the case, the external dimension certainly cannot — and nor should it — be overlooked.

1. Does the Commission not believe that it should seek more determinedly to strengthen the EU's role on the world stage, especially bearing in mind that, in geopolitical terms, the EU could be placed at a disadvantage by the euro crisis?
2. What steps have been taken to intensify transatlantic cooperation with the United States since the onset of the economic and financial crisis, not least with a view to mapping out a new grand strategy?
3. What must the EU do in the future to pursue its external action by wielding its 'soft power', as opposed to other world powers equipped with militarised resources?
4. How can the EU exploit the advantages, including growth and job creation, resulting from possible investment in Europe by emerging new economic powers such as Brazil, China, India, Russia, South Africa, and Indonesia?

Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Ashton on behalf of the Commission
(6 August 2012)

1. To avoid any risk that the current internal EU crisis might undermine the EU's ambition to become a visible, effective and authoritative actor on the international scene, the EU is strengthening its role bilaterally (in the neighbourhood, Asia and Latin America) and multilaterally (UN, regional fora, G8 and G20) by using all its external policies and instruments. It is also explaining to international counterparts the positive impact of eurozone decisions and sustainable 'green' growth, as the EU's contribution to global stability, prosperity and governance.
 2. The EU needs the US to remain engaged in Europe and its neighbourhood, but the rise of Asia, and US interest in Asia, in economic and geo-political terms poses new challenges. A strengthened trans-Atlantic relationship could focus on practical issues of mutual concern (energy, regulatory frameworks, food security, global governance) and involve other Atlantic partners.
 3. 'Soft power' is only one of the ways in which the EU can act externally. EU foreign policy involves a balance — adapted to each partner and situation — of various EU tools and instruments i.a. trade, aid, external aspects of internal EU policies such as regulatory dialogues, or CFSP actions, all based on respect for rule of law and fundamental principles enshrined in the Lisbon Treaty. It can involve working with e.g. civil society and non-state actors or non-military support for UN-supported peace-keeping or international stabilisation operations.
 4. The EU's interest is to ensure equal treatment and fair market access for European operators in third countries, strategic access to vital raw materials, complying with environmental and social standards and respect for transparency, accountability and social corporate responsibility.
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(English version)

**Question for written answer E-006010/12
to the Commission**

Sir Graham Watson (ALDE)

(18 June 2012)

Subject: Compliance of Commission websites with the e-Piracy Directive

It has been widely reported that very few, if any, Commission websites meet the spirit of the new rules on asking visitors' permission to use cookies.

Does the Commission believe that, given the large number of businesses which currently fail to apply these rules to their websites, the Commission could boost confidence in the rules by applying them to its own websites?

Answer given by Mme Reding on behalf of the Commission

(6 August 2012)

The Commission is in the process of implementing the principles of information and consent set out in Article 5(3) of the ePrivacy Directive ⁽¹⁾.

To this end, the Commission is currently reviewing the type of cookies and similar technologies used on Europa ⁽²⁾ websites and assessing whether they require informed consent or fall within the exemption. In this context, the Commission is also adapting the information notices currently available in Europa.

When the nature and purposes of the cookies used in Europa require providing information and obtaining users' consent, the Commission will deploy a standard protocol to inform individuals and seek their informed consent.

The Commission aims at achieving a more streamlined web presence in which the use of cookies should only be required for the functioning of the website. This activity is part of the bigger project of reviewing the Europa web presence.

⁽¹⁾ Directive 2009/136/EC, OJ L 337, 18.12.2009.

⁽²⁾ <http://europa.eu/>.

(Deutsche Fassung)

**Anfrage zur schriftlichen Beantwortung E-006011/12
an die Kommission**

**Mario Mauro (PPE), David-Maria Sassoli (S&D), Paolo De Castro (S&D),
Sergio Paolo Francesco Silvestris (PPE), Salvatore Caronna (S&D), Carlo Fidanza (PPE),
Giancarlo Scottà (EFD), Gabriele Albertini (PPE), Roberta Angelilli (PPE), Antonello Antinoro (PPE),
Pino Arlacchi (S&D), Raffaele Baldassarre (PPE), Francesca Balzani (S&D), Paolo Bartolozzi (PPE),
Luigi Berlinguer (S&D), Mara Bizzotto (EFD), Mario Borghesio (EFD), Rita Borsellino (S&D),
Antonio Cancian (PPE), Sergio Gaetano Cofferati (S&D), Lara Comi (PPE), Silvia Costa (S&D),
Andrea Cozzolino (S&D), Rosario Crocetta (S&D), Francesco De Angelis (S&D), Luigi Ciriaco De Mita (PPE),
Herbert Dorfmann (PPE), Lorenzo Fontana (EFD), Elisabetta Gardini (PPE), Giuseppe Gargani (PPE),
Roberto Gualtieri (S&D), Salvatore Iacolino (PPE), Vincenzo Iovine (ALDE), Giovanni La Via (PPE),
Clemente Mastella (PPE), Barbara Matera (PPE), Erminia Mazzoni (PPE), Guido Milana (S&D),
Claudio Morganti (EFD), Cristiana Muscardini (PPE), Alfredo Pallone (PPE), Pier Antonio Panzeri (S&D),
Aldo Patriciello (PPE), Mario Pirillo (S&D), Gianni Pittella (S&D), Vittorio Prodi (S&D),
Fiorello Provera (EFD), Niccolò Rinaldi (ALDE), Crescenzo Rivellini (PPE), Licia Ronzulli (PPE),
Oreste Rossi (EFD), Potito Salatto (PPE), Amalia Sartori (PPE), Tiziano Motti (PPE), Marco Scurria (PPE),
Debora Serracchiani (S&D), Gianluca Susta (S&D), Salvatore Tatarella (PPE), Patrizia Toia (S&D),
Gino Trematerra (PPE), Gionmaria Uggias (ALDE), Gianni Vattimo (ALDE), Andrea Zaroni (ALDE),
Iva Zanicchi (PPE) e Vito Bonsignore (PPE)**

(18. Juni 2012)

Betrifft: Erdbeben in Emilia-Romagna: Solidaritätsfonds der Europäischen Union

Die Lebensmittelbranche ist der Wirtschaftszweig, in dem die größten Schäden durch die Erdstöße zu verzeichnen sind, die den Nordosten Italiens in den vergangenen Wochen heimgesucht haben.

Besonders schwer betroffen sind die Regionen Emilia-Romagna und Lombardei, die zusammen eines der Kerngebiete der italienischen Agrarerzeugung darstellen. Auf dieses Gebiet entfallen nahezu 50 Prozent des gesamten Umsatzes der Branche, annähernd 60 Mrd. EUR der landesweit insgesamt 127 Mrd. EUR.

Die Schäden wurden nicht nur in der Infrastruktur, sondern auch in der Produktion verursacht. So wurde in wirtschaftlicher Hinsicht der größte Schaden bei Erzeugnissen mit einem langen Lagerungs- und Reifungsprozess angerichtet. An erster Stelle sind da die Käsesorten „Parmigiano Reggiano“ (Parmesan) und „Grana Padano“ sowie der Balsamessig aus Modena und Qualitätsweine zu nennen.

Schätzungen zufolge belaufen sich die Schäden für Produkte, die zum Zwecke der Reifung gelagert wurden, auf 150 bis 200 Mio. EUR.

Der Solidaritätsfonds der Europäischen Union, der gemäß Verordnung (EG) Nr. 1212/2002 des Rates vom 11. November 2002 eingerichtet wurde, kommt zum Einsatz, wenn die Wirtschaft einer oder mehrerer Regionen eines Mitgliedstaats durch eine schwere Naturkatastrophe geschädigt wurde.

Italien ist gerade dabei, das Dossier fertigzustellen, das der Kommission unter Einhaltung der Frist gemäß Artikel 4 der genannten Verordnung vorgelegt werden soll, um Hilfe aus dem Solidaritätsfonds der Europäischen Union zu erhalten.

Kann die Kommission angesichts der außerordentlichen und ernsten Lage Auskunft darüber geben, ob ein Teil der Mittel aus dem Solidaritätsfonds der Europäischen Union für Naturkatastrophen dafür eingesetzt werden kann, abgesehen von den Schäden an der Infrastruktur auch Schäden an gelagerten Produkten zu beheben?

Antwort von Herrn Hahn im Namen der Kommission

(6. August 2012)

Der Solidaritätsfonds der Europäischen Union dient ausschließlich der (Re)finanzierung von Notfallmaßnahmen, die von den Behörden ergriffen werden, beispielsweise zur Unterstützung der Bevölkerung oder zur Reparatur wichtiger Infrastruktur; er kann nicht zur Entschädigung von Privatpersonen eingesetzt werden.

(Versione italiana)

**Interrogazione con richiesta di risposta scritta E-006011/12
alla Commissione**

**Mario Mauro (PPE), David-Maria Sassoli (S&D), Paolo De Castro (S&D),
Sergio Paolo Francesco Silvestris (PPE), Salvatore Caronna (S&D), Carlo Fidanza (PPE),
Giancarlo Scottà (EFD), Gabriele Albertini (PPE), Roberta Angelilli (PPE), Antonello Antinoro (PPE),
Pino Arlacchi (S&D), Raffaele Baldassarre (PPE), Francesca Balzani (S&D), Paolo Bartolozzi (PPE),
Luigi Berlinguer (S&D), Mara Bizzotto (EFD), Mario Borghezio (EFD), Rita Borsellino (S&D),
Antonio Cancian (PPE), Sergio Gaetano Cofferati (S&D), Lara Comi (PPE), Silvia Costa (S&D),
Andrea Cozzolino (S&D), Rosario Crocetta (S&D), Francesco De Angelis (S&D), Luigi Ciriaco De Mita (PPE),
Herbert Dorfmann (PPE), Lorenzo Fontana (EFD), Elisabetta Gardini (PPE), Giuseppe Gargani (PPE),
Roberto Gualtieri (S&D), Salvatore Iacolino (PPE), Vincenzo Iovine (ALDE), Giovanni La Via (PPE),
Clemente Mastella (PPE), Barbara Matera (PPE), Erminia Mazzoni (PPE), Guido Milana (S&D),
Claudio Morganti (EFD), Cristiana Muscardini (PPE), Alfredo Pallone (PPE), Pier Antonio Panzeri (S&D),
Aldo Patriciello (PPE), Mario Pirillo (S&D), Gianni Pittella (S&D), Vittorio Prodi (S&D),
Fiorello Provera (EFD), Niccolò Rinaldi (ALDE), Crescenzo Rivellini (PPE), Licia Ronzulli (PPE),
Oreste Rossi (EFD), Potito Salatto (PPE), Amalia Sartori (PPE), Tiziano Motti (PPE), Marco Scurria (PPE),
Debora Serracchiani (S&D), Gianluca Susta (S&D), Salvatore Tatarella (PPE), Patrizia Toia (S&D),
Gino Trematerra (PPE), Giommaria Uggias (ALDE), Gianni Vattimo (ALDE), Andrea Zannoni (ALDE),
Iva Zanicchi (PPE) e Vito Bonsignore (PPE)**
(18 giugno 2012)

Oggetto: Terremoto in Emilia-Romagna: Fondo di Solidarietà dell'Unione europea

L'agroalimentare è il comparto nel quale si sono registrati i maggiori danni derivanti dagli eventi sismici che hanno interessato il Nord-Est dell'Italia nelle ultime settimane.

Ad essere maggiormente colpite sono state in particolare l'Emilia-Romagna e la Lombardia, una delle principali arterie del sistema agroalimentare italiano, che concentra quasi il 50 % dell'intero fatturato del settore per un valore complessivo che sfiora i 60 miliardi di euro sui 127 dell'insieme del comparto nazionale.

I danni non sono riconducibili solo alle infrastrutture ma anche alle produzioni: in particolare, il danno economicamente più rilevante ha interessato i prodotti a lunga stagionatura e invecchiamento, in primis il Parmigiano reggiano, ma anche il Grana padano, l'aceto balsamico di Modena e il sistema vinicolo di qualità.

Le stime effettuate indicano un danno alle scorte e ai prodotti in stagionatura che si situa tra i 150 e i 200 milioni di euro.

Il Fondo di solidarietà dell'Unione europea, istituito con il regolamento (CE) n. 2012/2002 del Consiglio, dell'11 novembre 2002, interviene per far fronte ai danni procurati da gravi calamità naturali all'economia di una o più regioni di uno Stato membro.

L'Italia sta ultimando la predisposizione del dossier per presentare alla Commissione, entro i tempi stabiliti dall'articolo 4 del citato regolamento, la domanda d'intervento del Fondo di solidarietà dell'Unione europea.

In considerazione dell'eccezionalità e della gravità della situazione, può far sapere la Commissione se parte delle risorse attivabili con il Fondo di solidarietà dell'Unione europea per le calamità naturali possano essere utilizzate per il risarcimento dei danni alle scorte di prodotti, oltre che per il risarcimento dei danni infrastrutturali?

Risposta di Johannes Hahn a nome della Commissione
(6 agosto 2012)

Il Fondo di solidarietà dell'UE può contribuire unicamente al finanziamento o rifinanziamento degli interventi di emergenza effettuati dalle autorità pubbliche, quali l'assistenza alla popolazione e il ripristino di infrastrutture vitali. Non sono risarcibili danni subiti da privati.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-006011/12
to the Commission**

**Mario Mauro (PPE), David-Maria Sassoli (S&D), Paolo De Castro (S&D),
Sergio Paolo Francesco Silvestris (PPE), Salvatore Caronna (S&D), Carlo Fidanza (PPE),
Giancarlo Scottà (EFD), Gabriele Albertini (PPE), Roberta Angelilli (PPE), Antonello Antinoro (PPE),
Pino Arlacchi (S&D), Raffaele Baldassarre (PPE), Francesca Balzani (S&D), Paolo Bartolozzi (PPE),
Luigi Berlinguer (S&D), Mara Bizzotto (EFD), Mario Borghesio (EFD), Rita Borsellino (S&D),
Antonio Cancian (PPE), Sergio Gaetano Cofferati (S&D), Lara Comi (PPE), Silvia Costa (S&D),
Andrea Cozzolino (S&D), Rosario Crocetta (S&D), Francesco De Angelis (S&D), Luigi Ciriaco De Mita (PPE),
Herbert Dorfmann (PPE), Lorenzo Fontana (EFD), Elisabetta Gardini (PPE), Giuseppe Gargani (PPE),
Roberto Gualtieri (S&D), Salvatore Iacolino (PPE), Vincenzo Iovine (ALDE), Giovanni La Via (PPE),
Clemente Mastella (PPE), Barbara Matera (PPE), Erminia Mazzoni (PPE), Guido Milana (S&D),
Claudio Morganti (EFD), Cristiana Muscardini (PPE), Alfredo Pallone (PPE), Pier Antonio Panzeri (S&D),
Aldo Patriciello (PPE), Mario Pirillo (S&D), Gianni Pittella (S&D), Vittorio Prodi (S&D),
Fiorello Provera (EFD), Niccolò Rinaldi (ALDE), Crescenzo Rivellini (PPE), Licia Ronzulli (PPE),
Oreste Rossi (EFD), Potito Salatto (PPE), Amalia Sartori (PPE), Tiziano Motti (PPE), Marco Scurria (PPE),
Debora Serracchiani (S&D), Gianluca Susta (S&D), Salvatore Tatarella (PPE), Patrizia Toia (S&D),
Gino Trematerra (PPE), Gionmaria Uggias (ALDE), Gianni Vattimo (ALDE), Andrea Zanon (ALDE),
Iva Zanocchi (PPE) e Vito Bonsignore (PPE)**

(18 June 2012)

Subject: Earthquake in Emilia-Romagna: European Union Solidarity Fund

The agri-food industry is the sector which has suffered the greatest damage after the earthquakes that have struck north-eastern Italy over the past few weeks.

The most heavily affected areas have been Emilia-Romagna and Lombardy in particular — one of the main arteries of the Italian agri-food system, which accounts for nearly 50% of the entire turnover of the sector, for a total value of nearly EUR 60 billion out of the EUR 127 billion turnover of the entire national sector.

The damage has not been to infrastructure alone, but also to products. More specifically, the most economically significant damage has been to products which are fermented and aged for a long time, primarily Parmigiano Reggiano (parmesan) and Grana Padano cheeses, balsamic vinegar of Modena and quality wines.

It has been estimated that damage of between EUR 150 million and EUR 200 million has been done to stocks and to products which were being aged or fermented.

The European Union Solidarity Fund, established by Council Regulation (EC) No 2012/2002 of 11 November 2002, intervenes to deal with damage to the economy of one or more regions of a Member State caused by a major natural disaster.

Italy is currently finalising its dossier for submission to the Commission within the time frame laid down by Article 4 of the above regulation, to apply for assistance from the European Union Solidarity Fund.

In view of the exceptional nature and seriousness of the situation, can the Commission say whether some of these resources from the European Union Solidarity Fund for natural disasters can be used to compensate damage to product stocks, in addition to damage to infrastructure?

Answer given by Mr Hahn on behalf of the Commission
(6 August 2012)

The EU Solidarity Fund is limited to help (re)finance emergency operations undertaken by the public authorities such as assistance to the population and repair of vital infrastructure. Private damage may not be compensated.

(Wersja polska)

**Pytanie wymagające odpowiedzi pisemnej E-006012/12
do Komisji**

Marek Józef Gróbarczyk (ECR)

(18 czerwca 2012 r.)

Przedmiot: Dopuszczalność udzielenia przez polski rząd pomocy publicznej w celu odbudowy przemysłu stoczniowego w Polsce

W oparciu o art. 117 Regulaminu Parlamentu Europejskiego, kieruję do Komisji następujące pytania:

1. Czy Komisja przestrzegać będzie zasady równości wszystkich uczestników obrotu prawnego i wynikający z niej zakaz niedyskryminacji, a tym samym zezwoli na udzielenie przez polski rząd pomocy publicznej w celu odbudowy przemysłu stoczniowego w Polsce – w przypadku złożenia wniosku w trybie przewidzianym w Rozporządzeniu Rady (WE) nr 659/1999 z dnia 22 marca 1999 r. ustanawiającym szczegółowe zasady stosowania art. 93 Traktatu WE?
2. Czy w oparciu o postanowienia art. 3 Traktatu o Unii Europejskiej oraz art. 8 i 10 Traktatu o Funkcjonowaniu Unii Europejskiej oraz regulacje wyżej przywołanego Rozporządzenia Rady, możliwe będzie udzielenie pomocy publicznej w celu odbudowy przemysłu stoczniowego w Polsce na zasadach nie gorszych i w kwotach nie niższych, niż zostało to przewidziane dla niemieckich stocznii w Wolgastie i Stralsundzie, co zostało już zagwarantowane przez rząd landu Meklemburgii-Pomorze Przednie?

Odpowiedź udzielona przez komisarza Joaquína Almuníę w imieniu Komisji

(3 sierpnia 2012 r.)

1. Obowiązujące zasady dotyczące pomocy na rzecz przemysłu stoczniowego określono między innymi w zasadach ramowych dotyczących pomocy państwa dla przemysłu stoczniowego z 2011 r. ⁽¹⁾ oraz wytycznych dotyczących pomocy państwa w celu ratowania i restrukturyzacji zagrożonych przedsiębiorstw z 2004 r. ⁽²⁾. Przepisy te są wiążące dla Komisji i stosowane do wszystkich państw członkowskich zgłaszających pomoc.
2. Co się zaś tyczy niedawnej sprawy dotyczącej pomocy przyznanej przez Niemcy „P+S Werften” ⁽³⁾, do której odnosi się Szanowny Pan Poseł, Komisja zatwierdziła odnośną pomoc na ratowanie na mocy wytycznych dotyczących ratowania i restrukturyzacji z 2004 r. Kryteria przyznawania takiej pomocy zostały jasno określone we wspomnianych wytycznych. Pomoc na ratowanie w formie pożyczki lub gwarancji może być przyznana przedsiębiorstwu znajdującemu się w trudnej sytuacji wyłącznie w celu zaradzenia problemom związanym z brakiem płynności finansowej, na okres nieprzekraczający sześciu miesięcy. Pomoc taka może zostać przedłużona jedynie pod warunkiem przedstawienia przez państwo członkowskie planu restrukturyzacji, w którym wyraźnie określone zostaną przyczyny trudnej sytuacji przedsiębiorstwa oraz planowane środki restrukturyzacyjne mające na celu przywrócenie długoterminowej rentowności.

⁽¹⁾ Dz.U. C 364 z 14.12.2011.

⁽²⁾ Dz.U. C 244 z 1.10.2004.

⁽³⁾ Komunikat prasowy IP/12/770 z 11.7.2012.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-006012/12
to the Commission**

Marek Józef Gróbarczyk (ECR)

(18 June 2012)

Subject: Admissibility of the Polish Government granting state aids for modernising Poland's shipbuilding industry

1. Will the Commission act in accordance with the principle that everyone is equal before the law and the ban on discrimination that stems from that principle and permit the Polish Government to provide state aids for modernising Poland's shipbuilding industry, should an application be made to it pursuant to Council Regulation (EC) No 659/1999 of 22 March 1999 laying down detailed rules for the application of Article 93 of the EC Treaty?
2. Under Article 3 of the Treaty on European Union and Articles 8 and 10 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, as well as the provisions of the above Council regulation, will it be possible for state aids for modernising Poland's shipbuilding industry to be granted on no less favourable terms and in no smaller amounts than is the case for the aid to the German shipyards in Wolgast and Strasund which has already been guaranteed by the government of the state of Mecklenburg-Vorpommern?

Answer given by Mr Almunia on behalf of the Commission

(3 August 2012)

1. The existing rules for aid in the shipbuilding sector are contained *inter alia* in the 2011 Framework on state aid for shipbuilding ⁽¹⁾ and 2004 Guidelines on state aid for rescuing and restructuring firms in difficulty ⁽²⁾. These rules apply to all Member States' State aid notifications and are binding on the Commission.
2. As far as the recent German state aid case P+S Werften ⁽³⁾, to which the Honourable Member refers, the Commission approved rescue aid under the 2004 rescue and restructuring Guidelines. The criteria for granting such aid are clearly spelled out in these Guidelines. Rescue aid in the form of loan or guarantees can only be granted to companies in difficulty to tackle liquidity problems for a maximum period of six months. This can be prolonged only if a Member State submits a restructuring plan, identifying clear reasons for the company's difficult situation and the restructuring measures envisaged to restore its long term viability.

⁽¹⁾ OJ C 364, 14.12.2011.

⁽²⁾ OJ C 244, 1.10.2004.

⁽³⁾ Press release IP/12/770, 11.7.2012.

(Deutsche Fassung)

**Anfrage zur schriftlichen Beantwortung P-006013/12
an die Kommission**

Herbert Dorfmann (PPE)

(19. Juni 2012)

Betrifft: Preisdiskriminierungen im Tourismusbereich aufgrund der Staatsbürgerschaft

Viele deutschsprachige Südtiroler Bürgerinnen und Bürger buchen Ihren Urlaub über deutschsprachige Reiseanbieter im nahe gelegenen Österreich oder Deutschland. Wenn ein Bürger mit italienischer Staatsbürgerschaft einen Urlaub im eigenen Land über einen ausländischen — in diesem Fall deutschen — Reiseanbieter bucht, kann es sein, dass er Zusatzzahlungen zum ursprünglich angebotenen Preis zahlen muss oder diesen erst gar nicht buchen kann.

In diesem Zusammenhang ersuche ich um Beantwortung folgender Fragen:

1. Sieht die Kommission hierin eine Verletzung von Artikel 20 Absatz 2 der Richtlinie 2006/123/EG, wenn ja, welche Maßnahmen ergreift die Kommission?
2. Sind der Kommission derartige Vorfälle bekannt, und wie wurden diese in Vergangenheit behandelt?

Antwort von Herrn Barnier im Namen der Kommission

(24. Juli 2012)

Nach Artikel 20 Absatz 2 der Dienstleistungsrichtlinie dürfen Dienstleistungsempfänger nicht aufgrund ihrer Staatsangehörigkeit oder ihres Wohnsitzes diskriminiert werden, sofern keine objektiven Gründe vorliegen, die die Anwendung unterschiedlicher Bedingungen für den Zugang zu den Dienstleistungen rechtfertigen. Es ist daher in jedem Einzelfall nachzuprüfen, ob aufseiten des Dienstleistungserbringers diese objektiv gerechtfertigten Gründe für die unterschiedliche Behandlung von Kunden aus anderen Mitgliedstaaten vorliegen.

Dieser Artikel wurde im deutschen Recht durch Paragraph 5 DL-InfoV (Verordnung über Informationspflichten für Dienstleistungserbringer) und im österreichischen Recht durch Artikel 1 Paragraph 23 des Dienstleistungsgesetzes umgesetzt. Es ist daher die Aufgabe der zuständigen deutschen und österreichischen Behörden, sicherzustellen, dass die auf ihrem Hoheitsgebiet niedergelassenen Dienstleistungserbringer diese Vorschriften einhalten.

Der Kommission liegen Informationen über Fälle unterschiedlicher Behandlung in Bezug auf Reisebüro-Dienstleistungen vor, nicht aber über Fälle der Art, wie sie der Herr Abgeordnete hier beschrieben hat. In der Vergangenheit haben Bürger mit ähnlichen Problemen ihre lokalen Beratungsstellen kontaktiert, die Beschwerden über die betreffenden Dienstleistungserbringer einlegen und sie, falls erforderlich, bei der Kontaktaufnahme mit den nationalen Behörden, die für die Durchsetzung von Vorschriften zuständig sind, unterstützen können. Im angesprochenen Fall könnten die Südtiroler Bürger das Europäische Verbraucherzentrum wegen weiterer Unterstützung kontaktieren (siehe: <http://www.ecc-netitalia.it/tedesco/Redirect%20ECC%20IT%20Bz.htm>).

(English version)

**Question for written answer P-006013/12
to the Commission
Herbert Dorfmann (PPE)
(19 June 2012)**

Subject: Price discrimination on grounds of nationality in the field of tourism

Many of the German-speaking citizens of South Tyrol (Alto Adige) in Italy book their holidays through German-language travel operators in nearby Austria or Germany. It can be the case that persons with Italian nationality booking a holiday in their own country through a foreign — in this case German — travel operator have to pay supplements to the price originally offered or are even unable to make the booking.

1. Does the Commission consider this to be an infringement of Article 20(2) of Directive 2006/123/EC and, if so, what measures does it intend to take?
2. Is the Commission aware of such cases, and how have these been dealt with in the past?

**Answer given by Mr Barnier on behalf of the Commission
(24 July 2012)**

Under Article 20(2) of the Services Directive, service recipients may not be discriminated against on the basis of nationality or residence unless there are objectively justified reasons to apply different conditions of access to their services. It is therefore necessary to make an assessment in each specific case of whether the service provider has such objectively justified reasons for different treatment of cross-border customers.

This article has been implemented in the German legal order by way of § 5 DL-InfoV (Service Information Requirements Regulation) and in the Austrian legislation by means of Art. 1, § 23 of the Dienstleistungsgesetz. It is therefore up to the relevant German and Austrian authorities to enforce this provision upon service providers established in their territories.

The Commission is aware of instances of different treatment regarding travel agency services but not of cases of the particular nature mentioned by the Honourable Member. In the past, citizens facing similar problems have contacted their local assistance body who can pursue the complaint with the trader concerned and, if necessary, assist them with contacts with the national enforcement authorities. In this case the citizens of the South Tyrol region could contact the European Consumer Centre (see www.ecc-netitalia.it) for further assistance.

(Tekstas lietuvių kalba)

Klausimas, į kurį atsakoma raštu, Nr. P-006014/12

Komisijai

Juozas Imbrasas (EFD)

(2012 m. birželio 19 d.)

Tema: Prevencinių priemonių taikymas kovoje su telefoniniais sukčiais

Prevencinės kovos su telefoniniais sukčiais priemonės neduoda tokių gerų rezultatų, kokių tikimasi. Žmonės vis dar patiki telefonu skambinančiais sukčiais ir atiduoda jiems savo pinigus arba pasako elektroninės bankininkystės duomenis.

Atliekant baudžiamąjį tyrimą negalima nustatyti tapatybės asmenų, kurie naudojami anoniminėmis išankstinio mokėjimo SIM kortelėmis. Atsižvelgiant į tai, kad duomenų saugojimas yra viena iš baudžiamojo tyrimo priemonių, kurias naudojamos teisėsaugos institucijos gali praktiškai ir ekonomiškai spręsti dabartines nusikalstamumo problemas, šešios ES valstybės narės (Danija, Italija, Ispanija, Graikija, Slovakija ir Bulgarija) priėmė priemones, pagal kurias reikalaujama registruoti išankstinio mokėjimo SIM korteles. Kaip ir kitos valstybės narės (Lenkija, Kipras), jos pritaria ES lygmens priemonei, kuria nustatoma išankstinio mokėjimo paslaugų naudotojų tapatybės privaloma registracija (registracijos metu prašoma užpildyti specialią formą nurodant: kortelės naudotojo vardą, pavardę, adresą, taip pat pateikti asmens dokumentą; t. y. Komisijos taikymo ir vertinimo ataskaita Tarybai ir Europos Parlamentui dėl Duomenų saugojimo direktyvos (Direktyva 2006/24/EB). Asmenys, įsigiję išankstinio mokėjimo SIM korteles dar iki privalomos registracijos nustatymo, turi per 1-2 mėn. pereinamąjį laikotarpį užsiregistruoti, nes praėjus pereinamajam laikotarpiui neužregistruotos SIM kortelės neveiks.

Paminėtina tai, kad 2010 metais Rusijoje mobiliųjų operatorių iniciatyva priimta speciali kompleksinė kovos su telefoniniais sukčiais programa, kuri taip pat numato privalomą SIM kortelių naudotojų registraciją.

Ar Komisija nemano, kad atsižvelgiant į ES valstybių narių praktiką būtina imtis prevencinių kovos su telefoniniais sukčiais priemonių, nustatant privalomą išankstinio mokėjimo SIM kortelių naudotojų registraciją? Ar nereikėtų šios problemos spręsti visos Europos Sąjungos mastu? Ar Komisija ketina formuoti bendrą politiką šiuo klausimu priimant reglamentą ar direktyvą, kaip bendrąjį teisės aktą, kurį būtų privaloma vykdyti visose valstybėse narėse?

C. Malmström atsakymas Komisijos vardu

(2012 m. liepos 17 d.)

Diskusijose su suinteresuotaisiais subjektais ir Duomenų saugojimo ekspertų grupe (įsteigta pagal Komisijos sprendimą 2008/325/EB) Komisija reguliariai svarsto teigiamą direktyvos poveikį teisėsaugos veiksmingumui. Komisija žino, kad kai kurios valstybės narės priėmė išankstinio mokėjimo SIM kortelių registracijos reikalaujančias priemones, ir paragino visas valstybes nares pateikti tokių priemonių faktinės ir potencialios naudos įrodymų. Šiuo metu nėra jokių įrodymų, kad baudžiamiesiems tyrimams ir sklandžiam vidaus rinkos veikimui pagerinti šioje srityje būtina parengti bendrą ES lygmens priemonę, tačiau Komisija reguliariai svarstys šį klausimą.

(English version)

**Question for written answer P-006014/12
to the Commission
Juozas Imbrasas (EFD)
(19 June 2012)**

Subject: The application of preventative measures to combat telephone fraud

The results of preventative measures to combat telephone fraud are not as good as expected. People still fall victim to telephone fraudsters and hand over their money or reveal their electronic bank details.

In a criminal investigation, it is impossible to establish the identity of people who use anonymous pre-paid SIM cards. Given that data retention is among the criminal investigation tools necessary to enable law enforcement authorities to address contemporary crime challenges in a manageable and cost-efficient manner, six Member States (Denmark, Italy, Spain, Greece, Slovakia and Bulgaria) have adopted measures requiring the registration of pre-paid SIM cards. These and other Member States (Poland, Cyprus) have argued in favour of an EU-wide measure for mandatory registration of the identity of users of pre-paid services (during registration applicants are asked to complete a special form indicating the card user's name, surname and address and also to provide ID) — see the Evaluation report from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament on the Data Retention Directive (Directive 2006/24/EC). People who have acquired pre-paid SIM cards have a transition period of 1-2 months to register the card before compulsory registration because, once the transition period has passed, unregistered SIM cards will no longer work.

It should be noted that in Russia in 2010 a special comprehensive programme for combating telephone fraud was adopted on the initiative of mobile operators, which also provides for the compulsory registration of SIM card users.

Does the Commission believe that given the practices in EU Member States, it is necessary to adopt preventative measures to combat telephone fraud, making the registration of pre-paid SIM cards compulsory? Should we not address this issue throughout the European Union? Does the Commission intend to develop a common policy on this issue by adopting a regulation or a directive such as a common piece of legislation which would have to be implemented by all Member States?

**Answer given by Ms Malmström on behalf of the Commission
(17 July 2012)**

The Commission in its discussions with stakeholders, and in the context of the Data Retention Expert Group (set up under Commission Decision 2008/325/EC), regularly considers the extent to which the directive improves the effectiveness of law enforcement. The Commission is aware that some Member States have adopted measures requiring SIM card registration, and has invited all Member States to provide evidence of the actual or potential benefit of such measures. At present there is no evidence, in terms of benefits for criminal investigation or the smooth functioning of the internal market, of any need for a common EU approach in this area, but the Commission will keep the issue under review.

(Versión española)

**Pregunta con solicitud de respuesta escrita E-006016/12
a la Comisión**

Raül Romeva i Rueda (Verts/ALE)

(19 de junio de 2012)

Asunto: Retraso hispabonos

Actualmente, y desde el año 2004, el Gobierno central no avala las emisiones de deuda de las administraciones regionales. Esta situación, ha tenido graves consecuencias para las finanzas públicas de las autonomías desde el inicio de la crisis. Por este motivo, el Gobierno español planteó la introducción de deuda pública regional avalada por el Estado. En el día 18 de junio, la prensa se ha echo eco de la decisión del Ministerio de Hacienda del Estado español según la cual, la puesta en marcha de los hispabonos ⁽¹⁾ se retrasará «hasta que haya pasado la crisis del euro». La vaguedad del plazo propuesto, puede tener consecuencias muy negativas durante su interludio para las finanzas de los gobiernos autonómicos. Las autonomías tienen muy complicada su financiación a largo plazo debido a la desconfianza de los mercados. Actualmente, por ejemplo, la Generalitat de Catalunya paga un 4,75 % de interés en sus emisiones de deuda pública a un año y un 5,25 % de interés a dos años, muy por encima del 2,623 % ⁽²⁾ que pagó el gobierno central en el mes de abril de 2012, por ejemplo. Cabe tener en cuenta que son las comunidades autónomas quienes ostentan las competencias sobre sanidad, educación y bienestar social (pilar del Estado del Bienestar) y que a pesar de ser responsables sobre el 80 % del gasto en estas materias, su presupuesto está basado en transferencias del Gobierno central, que recauda todos los grandes impuestos.

Además, el aumento del pago de intereses en las autonomías repercute negativamente en el volumen de la deuda total de España, tal y como se encuentra definida en el artículo 2 del Protocolo nº 12 sobre control de déficit excesivo en el TUE.

A la luz de lo anterior:

1. ¿Piensa la Comisión tener en cuenta esta propuesta para las nuevas *country-specific recommendations*?
2. ¿Cree la Comisión que es necesaria la puesta en marcha de instrumentos para tratar de disminuir los intereses de la deuda regional, y por lo tanto el volumen de la deuda total del Estado?
3. ¿No debería recomendar la Comisión que se ponga en marcha un instrumento de naturaleza similar a los citados hispabonos, con capacidad para reducir los intereses de la deuda regional, como pre-condición a nuevos recortes en sanidad y educación?

**Pregunta con solicitud de respuesta escrita E-006826/12
a la Comisión**

Ramon Tremosa i Balcells (ALDE)

(9 de julio de 2012)

Asunto: Ajustes autonómicos equitativos

En España, el gobierno central ha puesto en marcha un programa de ajuste del gasto con el objetivo de limitar el déficit para el año 2012 y hacer más sostenible la deuda del Estado español. Este programa de ajustes tiene como referencia llegar a tener un 5,3 % de déficit este año 2012. Tal objetivo se reparte en un 3,5 % de déficit para el gobierno central, 1,5 % para las autonomías y 0,3 % para las administraciones locales.

Cada autonomía pues debe marcar objetivos ambiciosos para controlar el déficit. Así, Catalunya (con aproximadamente un 16 % de la población del Estado) acumula el 23,4 % de los ajustes incluidos en los planes económico-financieros aceptados por el ministerio de Hacienda, lo que suponen 2 802 millones en recortes de gasto y 1 385 millones en previsión de ingresos en el ejercicio 2012. Un total de 4 187 millones de los 17 891 millones ajustados por todas las autonomías ⁽³⁾.

⁽¹⁾ <http://www.vozpopuli.com/economia/10258-hacienda-retrasa-el-auxilio-a-las-comunidades-hasta-que-se-despeje-la-crisis-del-euro>.

⁽²⁾ http://www.tesoro.es/SP/subastas/antiores/L_12m_12_04_17.asp.

⁽³⁾ <http://www.lavanguardia.com/politica/20120709/54322159969/catalunya-23-recortes.html>

Como sabe la Comisión, son las autonomías las encargadas del gasto sobre servicios sociales, y por lo tanto quienes tienen un impacto mayor sobre el día a día de la población. También cabe tener en cuenta los desequilibrios en los flujos fiscales que existen actualmente en España. Cataluña, por ejemplo, recibe 16 000 M de euros menos de los que los ciudadanos que habitan en su territorio pagan en concepto de impuestos. Más allá de consideraciones sobre la solidaridad interna de las regiones del Estado, es evidente que esta cifra tiene un impacto grande sobre el estado de las finanzas autonómicas y su capacidad para estabilizar el déficit.

A la luz de lo anterior,

— Tendrá en cuenta la Comisión en sus próximas recomendaciones *«country-specific»* el impacto que tiene el reparto desigual del ajuste entre las distintas autonomías?

Respuesta conjunta del Sr. Rehn en nombre de la Comisión

(21 de agosto de 2012)

La Comisión remite recomendaciones específicas por países al Consejo una vez al año, en el marco del semestre europeo. Así se hizo el 30 de mayo de 2012 ^(*). La Comisión publicará su próxima serie de recomendaciones específicas por países en mayo de 2013. Además, en el marco del procedimiento de déficit excesivo y a raíz de una propuesta de la Comisión, el Consejo también emitió el 10 de julio una recomendación revisada sobre las medidas que debe adoptar España para corregir su déficit público en el plazo de un año más, atendiendo a la coyuntura económica negativa.

Según la actualización de las previsiones de primavera de 2012 por los servicios de la Comisión, la deuda pública bruta en España se prevé que supere el valor de referencia del Tratado durante el período 2012-2013. Este aumento del ratio de deuda se debe principalmente a los mayores pagos de intereses y, en menor medida, a la dinámica del déficit primario.

Por este motivo, se recomendó a España que aplicara las medidas adoptadas en el presupuesto de 2012 y en los planes de equilibrio de las comunidades autónomas y que adoptara el anunciado plan presupuestario plurianual para 2013-2014 a finales de julio de 2012, incluida una estrategia presupuestaria a medio plazo, donde se concreten plenamente las medidas estructurales necesarias para corregir el déficit excesivo de aquí a 2014. Además, las autoridades españolas habrán de aplicar estrictamente las nuevas disposiciones de la Ley de Estabilidad Presupuestaria relativas a la transparencia y el control de la ejecución del presupuesto.

En cualquier caso, se introduce un sistema de emisión conjunta de deuda del Gobierno central y las comunidades autónomas, de forma voluntaria y con sujeción a una vigilancia presupuestaria más rigurosa de las regiones, dentro del paquete de medidas aprobado por el Consejo de Ministros el 13 de julio de 2012.

^(*) Para España, véase COM(2012) 310. Adopción final por el Consejo el 10 de julio de 2012 como Recomendación sobre el programa nacional de reforma de 2012 de España y por la que se emite un dictamen del Consejo sobre el programa de estabilidad de España para 2012-2015.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-006016/12
to the Commission**

Raül Romeva i Rueda (Verts/ALE)

(19 June 2012)

Subject: Delay in 'hispanonos'

At present, and as has been the case since 2004, the central government in Spain does not act as guarantor for debt issuances by the regional authorities. This situation has had serious repercussions for public finance in the autonomous communities since the onset of the crisis. For this reason, the Spanish Government proposed the introduction of regional public debt guaranteed by the State. On 18 June, it was reported in the press that the Spanish Ministry of Finance had decided to delay the introduction of 'hispanonos' ⁽¹⁾ until the euro crisis was over. The vagueness of the timetable proposed may have a very negative impact in the interim on regional government finances. Long-term financing is very complicated for the autonomous communities because of market distrust. At present, for example, the Catalan regional government pays 4.75% interest on its 1-year and 5.25% interest on its 2-year public debt issuances, far more than the 2.623% ⁽²⁾ paid by the central government in April 2012, for example. It should be borne in mind that it is the autonomous communities that govern health, education and social welfare (a main pillar of the welfare state) and that despite being responsible for 80% of spending in these areas, their budgets are based on transfers from the central government which collects all the main taxes.

The increase in interest payments in the autonomous communities has, moreover, negative repercussions for the volume of Spain's total debt, as defined in Article 2 of Protocol No 12 on the excessive debt procedure in the TEU.

1. Will the Commission take this proposal into consideration for the new country-specific recommendations?
2. Does the Commission consider it necessary to introduce instruments to try and reduce interest on regional debt and thereby the volume of total government debt?
3. Should the Commission not recommend the introduction of an instrument similar in nature to the aforementioned 'hispanonos', which is capable of reducing interest rates for regional debt as a precondition for further cuts on in health and education?

**Question for written answer E-006826/12
to the Commission**

Ramon Tremosa i Balcells (ALDE)

(9 July 2012)

Subject: Fair distribution of adjustment burden among Spain's regional governments

The Spanish Government has begun implementing a spending adjustment programme aimed at reducing the country's deficit by the end of 2012 and making its debt burden more manageable. The programme seeks to reduce the deficit to 5.3% of GDP in 2012. This target means reducing the deficits of the central government, regional governments and local authorities to 3.5%, 1.5% and 0.3% respectively.

Each regional government is therefore required to set ambitious targets in order to control its deficit. For Catalonia, which accounts for approximately 16% of the country's population, this means shouldering 23.4% of the cost of the adjustment contained in the economic and financial plans approved by the Spanish Finance Ministry. More specifically, this involves spending cuts of EUR 2.802 billion and a EUR 1.385 billion reduction in projected revenue for the 2012 financial year. These figures amount to a total cut for Catalonia of EUR 4.187 billion, out of EUR 17.891 billion for the regional governments as a whole ⁽³⁾.

As the Commission knows, the responsibility for spending on social services in Spain lies with the regional governments and it is they who therefore have the greater impact on people's everyday lives. It is also important to take account of current imbalances in flows of tax revenue in Spain. Catalonia, for example, receives EUR 16 billion less than the amount its residents pay in tax. This amount of money, in addition to raising the issue of equality between Spain's regions, clearly has major implications for Catalonia's public finances and its capacity to stabilise its deficit.

⁽¹⁾ <http://www.vozpopuli.com/economia/10258-hacienda-retrasa-el-auxilio-a-las-comunidades-hasta-que-se-despeje-la-crisis-del-euro>.

⁽²⁾ http://www.tesoro.es/SP/subastas/antiores/L_12m_12_04_17.asp.

⁽³⁾ <http://www.lavanguardia.com/politica/20120709/54322159969/catalunya-23-recortes.html>

— Will the next country-specific recommendations issued by the Commission take account of the potential impact of an uneven distribution of adjustment measures among the regional governments?

Joint answer given by Mr Rehn on behalf of the Commission

(21 August 2012)

The Commission transmits country-specific recommendations to the Council once a year in the context of the European Semester. This happened on 30 May 2012 ⁽⁴⁾. The Commission will issue its next set of country-specific recommendations in May 2013. In addition, within the context of the excessive deficit procedure, following a proposal by the Commission, on 10 July the Council also issued a revised recommendation on measures to be taken by Spain to correct its government deficit within one extra year on account of adverse economic circumstances.

According to the Commission services' update of the 2012 Spring Forecast, gross public debt in Spain is expected to exceed the Treaty reference value over the period 2012-2013. This increase in the debt ratio is mainly driven by higher interest payments and to a lesser extent by the dynamics of the primary deficit.

For that reason, it was recommended to Spain that it should implement the measures adopted in the 2012 budget and in the Autonomous Communities' rebalancing plans and adopt the announced multi-annual budget plan for 2013-14 by end of July 2012, including a medium-term budgetary strategy, which fully specifies the structural measures that are necessary to achieve the correction of the excessive deficit by 2014. Furthermore, the Spanish authorities should strictly apply the new provisions of the Budgetary Stability Law regarding transparency and control of budget execution.

In any case, a scheme of common debt issuance between the central government and the Autonomous regions is introduced, on a voluntary basis and subject to stricter fiscal surveillance of the regions, as part of the package of measures approved by the Spanish Council of Ministers on 13 July 2012

⁽⁴⁾ For Spain, see COM(2012) 310. Final adoption by the Council on 10 July 2012 as Recommendation on the National Reform Programme 2012 of Spain and delivering a Council opinion on the Stability Programme for Spain, 2012-2015.

(Deutsche Fassung)

**Anfrage zur schriftlichen Beantwortung E-006017/12
an die Kommission (Vizepräsidentin/Hohe Vertreterin)**

Martin Ehrenhauser (NI)

(19. Juni 2012)

Betrifft: VP/HR — EU Intelligence Analysis Centre (INTCEN)

1. Was ist der konkrete Aufgabenbereich des EU Intelligence Analysis Centre (INTCEN), und worin liegt der Unterschied zu den Aufgaben des Situation Centre (SitCen)?
2. Wie hoch ist das Jahresbudget des INTCEN im Jahr 2012 und voraussichtlich 2013? Welche Ausgaben werden damit gedeckt?
3. Wie viele Mitarbeiter beschäftigt das INTCEN im Jahr 2012 und voraussichtlich 2013?
4. Welche Arten von Mitarbeitern sind im INTCEN 2012 und voraussichtlich 2013 beschäftigt?
5. Wie gliedert sich die interne Struktur des INTCEN? Kann die Hohe Vertreterin ein Organigramm vorlegen? Welche Aufgaben haben die unterschiedlichen Einheiten?
6. Wie funktioniert die Zusammenarbeit zwischen INTCEN und dem EU Situation Room?

Antwort von Frau Catherine Ashton — Hohe Vertreterin/Vizepräsidentin im Namen der Kommission

(25. Juli 2012)

1. Der zentrale Aufgabenbereich des EU Intelligence Analysis Centre (EU INTCEN) ist identisch mit dem des Lagezentrums (SitCen), wobei jedoch kürzlich folgende Umstrukturierungen vorgenommen wurden:
 - Das Referat für konsularische Angelegenheiten wurde der Direktion für Krisenreaktion und operative Koordinierung zugeordnet,
 - Der Dienstbereich wurde ebenfalls der Direktion für Krisenreaktion und operative Koordinierung zugeordnet,
 - Die Sektion sichere Kommunikation (auch bekannt als ComCen) wurde in die Direktion Ressourcen (IT-Abteilung) verschoben.
2. INTCEN verfügt über keinen eigenen Jahreshaushalt, da es Teil des EAD ist.
3. Die gesamte Mitarbeiterzahl des INTCEN liegt in den Jahren 2012 und 2013 bei fast 70.
4. Wie im Falle von SitCen sind die Mitarbeiter von INTCEN überwiegend EU-Beamte und Zeitbedienstete. Darüber hinaus werden eine Reihe von nationalen Experten aus den Nachrichten- und Sicherheitsdiensten der Mitgliedstaaten im INTCEN beschäftigt sein.
5. INTCEN besteht aus zwei Abteilungen:
 - Das Referat Analyse ist für die Erstellung strategischer Analysen auf der Grundlage der Beiträge der Nachrichten- und Sicherheitsdienste der Mitgliedstaaten zuständig und besteht aus mehreren geografischen und thematischen Unterabteilungen.
 - Das Referat Allgemeine und Außenbeziehungen ist für alle rechtlichen und administrativen Fragen sowie die Open-Source-Analyse zuständig. Es besteht aus drei Unterabteilungen für IT-Angelegenheiten, interne und externe Kommunikation sowie dem für die Open-Source-Analyse zuständigen Büro.

(English version)

Question for written answer E-006017/12
to the Commission (Vice-President/High Representative)
Martin Ehrenhauser (NI)
(19 June 2012)

Subject: VP/HR — EU Intelligence Analysis Centre (INTCEN)

1. What is the specific remit of the EU Intelligence Analysis Centre (INTCEN), and how do its tasks differ from those of the Situation Centre (SitCen)?
2. What is INTCEN's annual budget for 2012, and how much is it expected to be in 2013? What expenditure does it cover?
3. How many staff is INTCEN employing in 2012, and how many is it expected to employ in 2013?
4. What types of staff is INTCEN employing in 2012, and what types is it expected to employ in 2013?
5. What is INTCEN's internal structure? Can the High Representative provide an organogram? What tasks do the various units have?
6. How does cooperation between INTCEN and the EU Situation Room work?

Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Ashton on behalf of the Commission
(25 July 2012)

1. The core remit of the EU INTCEN is identical to that of the Situation Centre, it being understood that the following changes have taken place recently:
 - the consular affairs desk has been moved to the Crisis Response and Operational coordination Managing Directorate
 - the duty area has also been moved to the Crisis Response and Operational coordination Managing Directorate
 - the secure communication sector (also known as ComCen) has been moved to the Managing Directorate for Resources (IT department).
2. INTCEN has no annual budget of its own as it is part of the EEAS.
3. The total number of INTCEN staff in 2012 and 2013 will be close to 70.
4. As was the case with SITCEN, the majority of INTCEN staff are EU officials and temporary agents. Furthermore a number of national experts from the security and intelligence services of the Member States are employed by INTCEN.
5. INTCEN is composed of two divisions:
 - The Analysis Division is responsible for providing strategic analysis based on input from the security and intelligence services of the Member States. It is composed of various sections, dealing with geographical and thematic topics.
 - The General and External Relations Division deals with all legal and administrative questions, as well as open source analysis. It is composed of three sections, dealing respectively with IT questions, internal and external communication as well as the open source office responsible for open source analysis.

(Deutsche Fassung)

**Anfrage zur schriftlichen Beantwortung E-006018/12
an die Kommission (Vizepräsidentin/Hohe Vertreterin)**

Martin Ehrenhauser (NI)

(19. Juni 2012)

Betrifft: VP/HR — „EU Intelligence Analysis Centre“ (INTCEN) — Produkte und Informationen

1. Welche Produkte produziert das „EU Intelligence Analysis Centre“ (INTCEN) und wie oft?
2. An welche Bedarfsträger werden diese Produkte und wie oft übermittelt?
3. Welche Klassifizierungsstufen erhalten die Produkte?
4. Welche Dienstleistungen bietet das INTCEN an, für welche Bedarfsträger und wie oft?
5. Werden von nationalen Nachrichtendiensten direkt Informationen an das INTCEN übermittelt? Wenn ja: Von welchen Diensten, welche Art von Informationen, und welche Klassifizierungsstufe erreichen diese Informationen? Wie gestaltet sich der Informationsaustauschprozess?
6. Von welchen Dienststellen des Rates, der EU-Kommission und des EADs erhält das INTCEN Informationen, und welche Klassifizierungsstufe erreichen diese? Wie gestaltet sich der Informationsaustauschprozess?
7. Werden von den EU-Delegationen weltweit Informationen direkt und auf einer regelmäßigen Basis an das INTCEN übermittelt? Wenn ja: Wie oft, und welche Arten von Informationen werden übermittelt? Wie gestaltet sich der Informationsaustauschprozess?
8. Werden zivile und militärische Informationen an das INTCEN übermittelt?

**Anfrage zur schriftlichen Beantwortung E-006020/12
an die Kommission (Vizepräsidentin/Hohe Vertreterin)**

Martin Ehrenhauser (NI)

(19. Juni 2012)

Betrifft: VP/HR — „EU Situation Room“ („Lagezentrum“) — Produkte und Informationen

1. Welche Produkte produziert der gegenwärtige „EU Situation Room“, und wie oft?
2. An welche Bedarfsträger werden diese Produkte übermittelt, und wie oft?
3. Welche Klassifizierungsstufen erhalten die Produkte?
4. Welche Dienstleistungen bietet der „EU Situation Room“ an, für welche Bedarfsträger und wie oft?
5. Werden von nationalen Nachrichtendiensten direkt Informationen an den „EU Situation Room“ übermittelt? Wenn ja: Von welchen Diensten, welche Art von Informationen, und welche Klassifizierungsstufe erreichen diese Informationen? Wie gestaltet sich der Informationsaustauschprozess?
6. Von welchen Dienststellen des Rates, der EU-Kommission und des EADs erhält der „EU Situation Room“ Informationen, und welche Klassifizierungsstufe erreichen diese? Wie gestaltet sich der Informationsaustauschprozess?
7. Werden von den EU-Delegationen weltweit Informationen direkt und/oder auf einer regelmäßigen Basis an den „EU Situation Room“ übermittelt? Wenn ja: Wie oft, und welche Arten von Informationen werden übermittelt? Wie gestaltet sich der Informationsaustauschprozess?
8. Werden zivile und militärische Informationen an den „EU Situation Room“ übermittelt?

**Gemeinsame Antwort von Frau Catherine Ashton — Hohe Vertreterin/Vizepräsidentin im Namen der
Kommission**
(16. August 2012)

Das EU INTCEN erstellt nachrichtendienstliche Bewertungen unter Heranziehung aller Informationsquellen. Jährlich werden vom EU INTCEN ungefähr 200 strategische Lagebeurteilungen und 50 Sonderberichte und Briefings ausgearbeitet.

Für welche Empfänger diese Dokumente bestimmt sind richtet sich nach dem Gegenstand oder dem Land, mit dem sich diese Bewertungen des EU INTCEN befassen. Ein Großteil ist für die Hohe Vertreterin/Vizepräsidentin bestimmt, weitere Empfänger sind die Führungsebene des EAD, die Kommission und die EU-Mitgliedstaaten (PSK), dabei wird der Grundsatz „Kenntnis nur, wenn notwendig“ und eine geeignete Sicherheitsüberprüfung angewandt.

Die Produkte des EU INTCEN werden entweder mit dem Vermerk „Limited“ (Zur eingeschränkten Verwendung) gekennzeichnet oder als Verschlusssache bis zum Geheimhaltungsgrad EU TOP SECRET/TRÈS SECRET UE eingestuft, je nachdem ob und mit welchem Grad die Ausgangsdokumente als vertraulich eingestuft wurden.

Das Hauptprodukt des EU INTCEN — die nachrichtendienstliche Bewertung unter Heranziehung aller verfügbaren Quellen — macht das INTCEN zum nachrichtendienstlichen Drehkreuz des EAD. Das EU INTCEN bietet darüber hinaus auch besondere Präsentationen oder Briefings an.

Von allen Nachrichten- und Sicherheitsdiensten in den EU-Mitgliedstaaten wird erwartet, dass sie dem EU INTCEN ihre Erkenntnisse übermitteln. In welchem Umfang sie solche Beiträge leisten, hängt von den Erkenntnissen ab, die den Dienststellen der Mitgliedstaaten zur Verfügung stehen und ihrer Bereitschaft, diese mit dem EU INTCEN zu teilen. Auch als EU TOP SECRET/TRÈS SECRET UE eingestufte Verschlusssachen können in den Räumlichkeiten des EU INTCEN sicher übermittelt und ausgewertet werden.

Das EU INTCEN erhält für seine Bewertungen Informationen von allen zuständigen Abteilungen des Rates, der Kommission und des EAD einschließlich der EU-Delegationen.

Das EU INTCEN ist in die Single Intelligence Analysis Capacity (SIAC) eingebunden, die die zivile nachrichtendienstliche Tätigkeit (EU INTCEN) mit dem Nachrichtenwesen des Militärstabs (EUMS INT DIR) kombiniert. Im Rahmen der SIAC fließen sowohl zivile als auch militärische Erkenntnisse in die nachrichtendienstlichen Bewertungen unter Heranziehung aller Informationsquellen ein.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-006018/12
to the Commission (Vice-President/High Representative)**

Martin Ehrenhauser (NI)

(19 June 2012)

Subject: VP/HR — EU Intelligence Analysis Centre (INTCEN) — products and information

1. What products constitute the output of the EU Intelligence Analysis Centre (INTCEN), and how often does it produce them?
2. To which users are these products forwarded, and how often?
3. What security classifications are assigned to these products?
4. What services does INTCEN provide, for what users and how often?
5. Do national intelligence services directly communicate information to INTCEN? If so, which services do so, what is the nature of the information and what is the highest security classification of this information? What is the procedure for exchanging the information?
6. From which departments of the Council, Commission and EEAS does INTCEN receive information, and what is the highest security classification of this information? What is the procedure for exchanging the information?
7. Do the EU delegations around the world supply information to INTCEN directly and regularly? If so, how often and what is the nature of the information supplied? What is the procedure for exchanging the information?
8. Is civil and military information communicated to INTCEN?

**Question for written answer E-006020/12
to the Commission (Vice-President/High Representative)**

Martin Ehrenhauser (NI)

(19 June 2012)

Subject: VP/HR — EU Situation Room — products and information

1. What products constitute the output of the current EU Situation Room, and how often does it produce them?
2. To which users are these products forwarded, and how often?
3. What security classifications are assigned to these products?
4. What services does the EU Situation Room provide, for what users and how often?
5. Do national intelligence services directly communicate information to the EU Situation Room? If so, which services do so, what is the nature of the information and what is the highest security classification of this information? What is the procedure for exchanging the information?
6. From which departments of the Council, Commission and EEAS does the EU Situation Room receive information, and what is the highest security classification of this information? What is the procedure for exchanging the information?
7. Do the EU delegations around the world supply information to the EU Situation Room directly and/or regularly? If so, how often and what is the nature of the information supplied? What is the procedure for exchanging the information?
8. Is civil and military information communicated to the EU Situation Room?

Joint answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Ashton on behalf of the Commission*(16 August 2012)*

The EU INTCEN produces all source intelligence assessments. Annually, the EU INTCEN produces around 200 strategic situation assessment and around 50 special reports and briefings.

Recipients of EU INTCEN's intelligence assessments vary, depending on the topic or country concerned. The HR/VP is the primary client, but products are also provided to EEAS senior management, Commission, and EU Member States (PSC). The need-to-know principle applies, as well as the proper security clearance.

EU INTCEN products are either marked 'Limited' or classified up to the level SECRET UE/EU SECRET, depending on whether and at what level the input is marked or classified..

The EU INTCEN serves as the EEAS' intelligence hub, its main product being the all source intelligence assessment. Occasionally, the EU INTCEN also provides specific presentations or briefings.

All European Union Member State's Intelligence and Security Services are requested to provide input to the EU INTCEN. Contributions depend on the availability of intelligence in the Member States' Services and the willingness to share them with the EU INTCEN. Intelligence up to TRES SECRET UE/EU TOP SECRET can be securely handled and processed within EU INTCEN premises.

The EU INTCEN receives inputs for its assessments from all relevant departments within the Council, Commission and the EEAS including EU Delegations.

The EU INTCEN is part of the Single Intelligence Analysis Capacity (SIAC), which combines civilian intelligence (EU INTCEN) and military intelligence (EUMS INT DIR). In the framework of the SIAC, both civilian and military contributions are used in the all source intelligence assessments.

(Deutsche Fassung)

**Anfrage zur schriftlichen Beantwortung E-006019/12
an die Kommission (Vizepräsidentin/Hohe Vertreterin)
Martin Ehrenhauser (NI)
(19. Juni 2012)**

Betrifft: VP/HR — Umstrukturierung des SitCen

Nach der Gründung des Europäischen Auswärtigen Dienstes wurden unterschiedliche Dienststellen umstrukturiert: Das Gemeinsame Lagezentrum (SitCen) wurde aufgelöst, das „EU Intelligence Analysis Centre“ (INTCEN) gegründet und der „EU Situation Room“ („Lagezentrum“) in der Direktion „Crisis Response and Operational Coordination“ (Krisenreaktion und Einsatzkoordinierung) eingerichtet.

1. Was ist der Mehrwert dieser Umstrukturierung?
2. Innerhalb welchen Zeitraums fand die Umstrukturierung statt?
3. Welche Dienststellen des Rates, der Kommission oder des EADs wurden in das INTCEN und in die Direktion „Crisis Response and Operational Coordination“ integriert?
4. Ist die ehemalige „Watchkeeping Capability“ (WKC — Kapazität zur permanenten Lageüberwachung) des Rates in das INTCEN oder in die Direktion „Crisis Response and Operational Coordination“ integriert worden?

**Antwort von Frau Catherine Ashton — Hohe Vertreterin/Vizepräsidentin im Namen der Kommission
(2. August 2012)**

1. Zweck der Umstrukturierung ist die Stärkung der Krisenreaktionskapazitäten: Der „Duty Area“ (Bereitschaftsdienst) und das „Consular Desk“ (Referat für konsularische Angelegenheiten) wurden in die Direktion „Crisis Response and Operational coordination“ (Krisenreaktion und operative Koordinierung) integriert.

Die ComCen (Sektion sichere Kommunikation) wurde in die Abteilung Informationstechnologie integriert, um Ressourcen zu rationalisieren.

2. Die Umstrukturierung ist seit dem 16. März 2012 wirksam.
 3. Das Lagezentrum (SitCen) des Rates wurde am 1. Januar 2011 in den Europäischen Auswärtigen Dienst (EAD) integriert. Später wurden Teile von zwei Referaten („EU Situation Room“/Lagezentrum und „Consular Crisis Management“/konsularisches Krisenmanagement) der Direktion für Krisenreaktion und operative Koordinierung zugeordnet.
 4. Die „Watchkeeping Capability“ (Kapazität zur permanenten Lageüberwachung — WKC) ist ebenso wie der „Duty Area“ (Bereitschaftsdienst) im „EU Situation Room“ (Lagezentrum) angesiedelt, um die rund um die Uhr verfügbare Lageerfassungskapazität zu stärken. Sie untersteht weiterhin dem EAD.
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(English version)

**Question for written answer E-006019/12
to the Commission (Vice-President/High Representative)**

Martin Ehrenhauser (NI)

(19 June 2012)

Subject: VP/HR — Restructuring of SitCen

After the establishment of the European External Action Service, various units were restructured. The Joint Situation Centre (SitCen) was abolished, the EU Intelligence Analysis Centre (INTCEN) founded and the EU Situation Room established within the Crisis Response and Operational Coordination Directorate.

1. What is the added value of this restructuring?
2. Within what period of time did the restructuring take place?
3. Which units of the Council, the Commission or the EEAS were integrated into INTCEN and into the Crisis Response and Operational Coordination Directorate?
4. Was the Council's former Watchkeeping Capability (WKC) incorporated into INTCEN or into the Crisis Response and Operational Coordination Directorate?

Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Ashton on behalf of the Commission

(2 August 2012)

1. The restructuring aimed at strengthening the crisis response capabilities by integrating the Duty Area and the consular desk into the Crisis Response and Operational coordination Managing Department.

The ComCen was integrated into the Information Technology department in order to rationalise resources.

2. The restructuring took effect on 16 March 2012.
 3. The Council SitCen structure was integrated into the European External Action Service (EEAS) SitCen on 1 January 2011. Subsequently parts of two Divisions (EU Situation Room and Consular Crisis Management) were moved to the Crisis Response and Operational Coordination Department.
 4. The Watchkeeping Capability is co-located with the Duty Area in the EU Situation Room to strengthen the 24/7 situational awareness capacity. It continues to report to the EEAS.
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(Deutsche Fassung)

**Anfrage zur schriftlichen Beantwortung E-006021/12
an die Kommission (Vizepräsidentin/Hohe Vertreterin)
Martin Ehrenhauser (NI)
(19. Juni 2012)**

Betrifft: VP/HR — Umstrukturierung des „EU Situation Room“

Nach der Gründung des Europäischen Auswärtigen Dienstes, wurden Einheiten, die für die nachrichtendienstliche Kooperation zuständig waren, umstrukturiert: Ein EU Situation Room wurde in der Direktion „Crisis Response and Operational Coordination“ etabliert.

1. Was ist der konkrete Aufgabenbereich des EU Situation Room?
2. Wie hoch ist das Jahresbudget des EU Situation Room im Jahr 2012 und voraussichtlich 2013? Welche Ausgaben werden damit gedeckt?
3. Wie viele Mitarbeiter beschäftigt der EU Situation Room im Jahr 2012 und 2013?
4. Welche Arten von Mitarbeitern sind im EU Situation Room 2012 und voraussichtlich 2013 beschäftigt?
5. Wie gliedert sich die interne Struktur des EU Situation Room? Kann die Vizepräsidentin/Hohe Vertreterin ein Organigramm vorlegen? Welche Aufgaben haben die unterschiedlichen Einheiten?

**Antwort von Frau Catherine Ashton — Hohe Vertreterin/Vizepräsidentin im Namen der Kommission
(6. August 2012)**

Das EU-Lagezentrum unterstützt die Hohe Vertreterin, den EAD und andere EU-Akteure (Europäische Kommission, Generalsekretariat des Rates, EU-Agenturen, Mitgliedstaaten usw.) durch eine kontinuierliche Überwachung der internationalen Lage, die sich hauptsächlich auf öffentlich zugängliche Informationen stützt.

Für den Fall, dass EAD-Bedienstete mit externen Sicherheitsproblemen konfrontiert sein könnten, dient das EU-Lagezentrum als Anlaufstelle für Informationen und sorgt dafür, dass die Kommunikations- und Weisungsstrukturen mobilisiert werden, damit geeignete Maßnahmen zum Schutz des Personals, der Vermögenswerte und der Interessen des EAD getroffen werden. Das Lagezentrum bietet auch erste Lageeinschätzungen zu Ereignissen und Situationen, die die EU-Delegationen und die GSVP-Missionen und -Operationen der EU betreffen könnten.

Im EU-Lagezentrum, das nicht über einen eigenen Haushalt verfügt, sind derzeit 33 Bedienstete (4 AD, 16 AST und 13 abgeordnete nationale Sachverständige) tätig. Dieselbe Personalausstattung ist für 2013 vorgesehen.

Beim EU-Lagezentrum handelt es sich um ein Referat, das aus der Führungsebene (Referatsleiter und Stellvertreter), einer Reihe von AD-Bediensteten (Krisenreaktion, Krisenkoordinierungsvorkehrungen, internationale Beziehungen) und einem Bereitschaftsdienst („Duty Area“, zuständig für Überwachung und Unterstützung) besteht. Die Kapazität zur permanenten Lageüberwachung, die dem Militärpersonal der EU unterstellt ist, trägt die Sorgfaltspflicht für GSVP-Missionen und -Operationen und überwacht diese.

(English version)

Question for written answer E-006021/12
to the Commission (Vice-President/High Representative)
Martin Ehrenhauser (NI)
(19 June 2012)

Subject: VP/HR — Restructuring of the EU Situation Room

After the establishment of the European External Action Service, units responsible for intelligence cooperation were restructured: an EU Situation Room was established within the Crisis Response and Operational Coordination Directorate.

1. What is the specific remit of the EU Situation Room?
2. What is the EU Situation Room's annual budget for 2012, and how much is it expected to be in 2013? What expenditure does it cover?
3. How many staff is the EU Situation Room employing in 2012 and 2013?
4. What types of staff is the EU Situation Room employing in 2012, and what types is it expected to employ in 2013?
5. What is the EU Situation Room's internal structure? Can the Vice-President/High Representative provide an organogram? What tasks do the various units have?

Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Ashton on behalf of the Commission
(6 August 2012)

The EU Situation Room ensures that the High Representative, the EEAS and other EU actors (European Commission, General Secretariat of the Council, EU Agencies, Member States, etc) are supported through continuous worldwide situation monitoring, primarily based on information available in the public domain.

When EEAS staff may face safety or security related situations externally, the EU Situation Room acts as the entry point of information, ensuring that the lines of communication and command are being activated for proper action to protect EEAS staff, assets, and interests. The Situation Room also provides initial situational awareness for events and situations potentially affecting EU Delegations and EU CSDP Missions and Operations.

The EU Situation Room does not have specific budget lines attributed to it. Presently, it employs 33 staff (4 AD, 16 AST and 13 seconded national experts) and the forecast for 2013 is the same.

The EU Situation Room is a Division, comprised of the Management (Head of Division and Deputy), a number of AD staff (Crisis Response, Crisis Coordination Arrangement, International Relations) and the Duty Area (Monitoring and Corporate Support). The Watchkeeping Capability reports to the EU Military Staff and deals with duty of care and monitoring of CSDP Missions and operations.

(Deutsche Fassung)

**Anfrage zur schriftlichen Beantwortung E-006022/12
an die Kommission (Vizepräsidentin/Hohe Vertreterin)
Martin Ehrenhauser (NI)
(19. Juni 2012)**

Betrifft: VP/HR — Intelligence Division (INT) — Produkte und Informationen

1. Welche Produkte produziert die Intelligence Division (INT) und wie oft?
2. An welche Bedarfsträger werden diese Produkte übermittelt und wie oft?
3. Welche Klassifizierungsstufen erhalten die Produkte?
4. Welche Dienstleistungen bietet die INT an, für welche Bedarfsträger und wie oft?
5. Werden von nationalen Nachrichtendiensten direkt Informationen an die INT übermittelt? Wenn ja, von welchen Diensten, welche Art von Informationen werden übermittelt und welche Klassifizierungsstufe erreichen diese Informationen? Wie funktioniert der Informationsaustauschprozess?
6. Von welchen Einheiten des Rates, der EU-Kommission und des Europäischen Auswärtigen Dienstes erhält die INT Informationen und welche Klassifizierungsstufe erreichen diese? Wie funktioniert der Informationsaustauschprozess?
7. Werden von den EU-Delegationen weltweit Informationen direkt und auf regelmäßiger Basis an die INT übermittelt? Wenn ja, wie oft, und welche Arten von Informationen werden übermittelt? Wie funktioniert der Informationsaustauschprozess? Woher erhalten die Delegationen diese Informationen?
8. Werden militärische und zivile Informationen an die INT übermittelt?

**Antwort von Frau Catherine Ashton — Hohe Vertreterin/Vizepräsidentin im Namen der Kommission
(24. August 2012)**

1. Die Direktion „Aufklärung“ (INT) des EU-Militärstabs arbeitet gemeinsam mit dem EU Intelligence Analysis Centre (EU INTCEA) an einer Reihe nachrichtendienstlicher Produkte für den EAD.
2. Die Bedarfsträger für diese Produkte sind Führungspersonen des EAD, des Generalsekretariats des Rates, der Kommission und der Mitgliedstaaten.
3. Die Produkte werden je nach Inhalt als „RESTREINT UE“ oder „SECRET UE“ eingestuft.
4. Siehe Antwort zu Frage 1 und Frage 2.
5. Die nachrichtendienstliche Unterstützung für die EU beruht auf Beiträgen der Nachrichten- und Sicherheitsdienste der Mitgliedstaaten.
6. Die nachrichtendienstlichen Produkte für den EAD speisen sich aus allen verfügbaren Quellen und können damit auch GSVP-bezogene Informationen umfassen. Dazu gehören u. a. Berichte der GSVP-Missionen und der militärischen Einsätze.
7. Siehe Antwort zu Frage 6. Hierbei kann es sich auch um Informationen der EU-Delegationen handeln.
8. Die Nachrichtendienste der Mitgliedstaaten tragen gemäß ihrer jeweiligen innerstaatlichen Organisation zur Arbeit der Direktion „Aufklärung“ des EU-Militärstabs bei.

(English version)

Question for written answer E-006022/12
to the Commission (Vice-President/High Representative)
Martin Ehrenhauser (NI)
(19 June 2012)

Subject: VP/HR — Intelligence Division (INT) — products and information

1. What products constitute the output of the Intelligence Division (INT), and how often does it produce them?
2. To which users are these products forwarded, and how often?
3. What security classifications are assigned to these products?
4. What services does INT provide, for what users and how often?
5. Do national intelligence services directly communicate information to INT? If so, which services do so, what is the nature of the information and what is the highest security classification of this information? What is the procedure for exchanging the information?
6. From which departments of the Council, Commission and EEAS does INT receive information, and what is the highest security classification of this information? What is the procedure for exchanging the information?
7. Do the EU delegations around the world supply information to INT directly and regularly? If so, how often and what is the nature of the information supplied? What is the procedure for exchanging the information? Where do the delegations obtain this information?
8. Is civil and military information communicated to INT?

Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Ashton on behalf of the Commission
(24 August 2012)

1. The Intelligence Directorate of the EU Military Staff is working jointly with the EU Intelligence Analysis Centre in the EEAS (EU INTCEN) on a range of EEAS Intelligence products.
 2. The customers of EEAS Intelligence products are principals of the EEAS, the General Secretariat of the Council, the Commission and the Member States.
 3. The classification depends on the content and varies from Restreint UE to Secret UE
 4. See answer to question 1 and 2.
 5. The intelligence support function for the EU is based on contributions from Intelligence Organisations and Security Services of the Member States.
 6. The EEAS Intelligence Products are considered to be all-source products and could comprise also CSDP related information. This also includes reporting from CSDP missions and military operations.
 7. See answer to question six. This could include information from EU Delegations.
 8. The Intelligence Organisations of the Member States contribute to the EU Military Staff Intelligence Directorate according to their respective domestic organisation.
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(Deutsche Fassung)

**Anfrage zur schriftlichen Beantwortung E-006023/12
an die Kommission (Vizepräsidentin/Hohe Vertreterin)**

Martin Ehrenhauser (NI)

(19. Juni 2012)

Betrifft: VP/HR — Military Intelligence System Support (MISS)

1. Was ist das genaue Ziel des Military Intelligence System Support (MISS), und wie gestalten sich seine Aufgaben und Funktionsweise?
2. Wie hoch waren die Gesamtkosten für das MISS-Projekt, und wie hoch sind die jährlichen Betriebskosten?
3. Wurden sämtliche Kosten des MISS-Projekts aus dem EU Haushalt beglichen? Wenn ja, aus welcher Budgetzeile? Wenn nein, wer hat zu welchen Teilen die Kosten übernommen?
4. Welche Firmen sind an der Entwicklung, Implementierung und dem Betrieb beteiligt?
5. Wann hat das MISS-Projekt seinen Betrieb aufgenommen?
6. Wie lauten die Namen der Organisationen, aufgeschlüsselt nach Ländern, die daran teilnehmen?
7. Welche EU- und einzelstaatlichen Einheiten sind in das Projekt involviert?
8. Welche Informationen werden im MISS-Projekt ausgetauscht?

Antwort von Frau Catherine Ashton — Hohe Vertreterin/Vizepräsidentin im Namen der Kommission

(6. August 2012)

Antwort auf die Fragen 1 und 8:

Seit 2012 ist die neue Bezeichnung des Projekts „EEAS wide Civ/Mil Intelligence System Support“ (EAD-weite Systemunterstützung für die zivil-militärische Erkenntnisgewinnung). Mit diesem Projekt soll ein sicheres Verbindungssystem für den Austausch von Verschlusssachen im Rahmen der GASP geschaffen werden.

Antwort auf die Fragen 2 bis 7:

Die Planung steht kurz davor, den „Projektstatus“ zu erreichen. Einzelheiten liegen daher noch nicht vor.

(English version)

Question for written answer E-006023/12
to the Commission (Vice-President/High Representative)
Martin Ehrenhauser (NI)
(19 June 2012)

Subject: VP/HR — Military Intelligence System Support (MISS)

1. What is the precise objective of the Military Intelligence System Support (MISS) project, and what are its duties and operating methods?
2. How high are the total costs for the MISS project and how high are its annual running costs?
3. Have all the costs of the MISS project been paid from the EU budget? If so, under which budget line? If not, who has assumed what proportion of the costs?
4. What companies are involved in its development, implementation and operation?
5. When did the MISS project begin operations?
6. What are the names of the organisations taking part, with a breakdown by country?
7. Which EU and national units are involved in the project?
8. What information is exchanged under the MISS project?

Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Ashton on behalf of the Commission
(6 August 2012)

Questions 1 and 8:

Since 2012, the new name of the project is 'EEAS wide Civ/Mil Intelligence System Support'. It will provide a secure connectivity system to exchange classified information among the CSDP stakeholders.

Question 2 to 7:

The Project is in the process of achieving 'project status', details are not yet available.

(Deutsche Fassung)

**Anfrage zur schriftlichen Beantwortung E-006024/12
an die Kommission (Vizepräsidentin/Hohe Vertreterin)**

Martin Ehrenhauser (NI)

(19. Juni 2012)

Betrifft: VP/HR — Military Staff Intelligence Directors Conclave und „Community of Interest“

Jährlich findet ein Treffen der Direktoren der militärischen Nachrichtendienste der Mitgliedstaaten statt (Military Staff Intelligence Directors Conclave).

1. Seit wann finden diese Treffen statt?
2. Wo und wann genau fanden diese Treffen statt, aufgeschlüsselt nach Jahren?
3. Wo und wann werden die nächsten Treffen stattfinden?
4. Wie lange dauerten diese Treffen in der Vergangenheit?
5. Wer nimmt an diesen Treffen teil — aufgeschlüsselt nach Land, Name der Organisation sowie Anzahl der Personen?
6. Wer vertritt die EU und nimmt ihre Interessen während dieser Treffen wahr?
7. Welche Themen werden bei diesen Treffen besprochen, und welche Arten von Informationen werden bei diesen Treffen ausgetauscht?
8. Was ist der genaue Zweck dieser Treffen?

Innerhalb des EU — Militärstabes (EUMS) wurde eine „Community of Interest“ geschaffen, um die horizontale Kooperation zwischen den „Military Customers“ (Planners) und der Intelligence Division (INT) zu verbessern.

9. Wer konkret nimmt an dieser „Community of Interest“ teil, und wann genau wurde diese geschaffen?
10. Wie genau gestaltet sich deren Arbeitsablauf?
11. Welche Arten von Informationen werden ausgetauscht?

Antwort von Frau Catherine Ashton — Hohe Vertreterin/Vizepräsidentin im Namen der Kommission

(24. August 2012)

An den Treffen der Direktoren der militärischen Nachrichtendienste (IDC) nehmen die Direktoren der militärischen Nachrichtendienste der Mitgliedstaaten teil. Die EU wird hierbei vom Leiter der Direktion „Aufklärung“ des EU-Militärstabes vertreten, der diese Sitzungen leitet. Oft werden Vertreter des EAD als Gastredner geladen. Es handelt sich hierbei um informelle Treffen, auf denen die nachrichtendienstliche Unterstützung der EU seitens der Mitgliedstaaten erörtert und die Standpunkte und Ratschläge der Direktoren der militärischen Nachrichtendienste eingeholt werden. Zweck dieser Treffen ist die nachrichtendienstliche Unterstützung der EU durch die Direktoren der militärischen Nachrichtendienste. Das erste Treffen hat 2001 stattgefunden. Die Treffen werden einmal jährlich in Brüssel abgehalten und dauern einen Tag. Das nächste Treffen findet im November 2012 in Brüssel statt.

Innerhalb des EU-Militärstabes (EUMS) wurde eine Interessengemeinschaft („Community of Interest“) geschaffen, um die horizontale Kooperation zwischen den militärischen Bedarfsträgern (Planern) und der Direktion „Aufklärung“ (INT) zu verbessern. Sie besteht seit 2009 und ihr gehören die Leiter aller EUMS-Zweige an. Es handelt sich um ein informelles Treffen, das alle 3 bis 4 Monate stattfindet und auf dem die aufgabenübergreifende Koordinierung zwischen den EUMS-Zweigen und aktuelle militärische Operationen der EU erörtert sowie eventuell anstehende Einsätze vorausgeplant werden.

(English version)

Question for written answer E-006024/12
to the Commission (Vice-President/High Representative)
Martin Ehrenhauser (NI)
(19 June 2012)

Subject: VP/HR — Military Staff Intelligence Directors Conclave and ‘Community of Interest’

The Military Staff Intelligence Directors Conclave takes place every year.

1. When did the first of these meetings take place?
2. Where and when exactly has each annual meeting taken place?
3. Where and when will the next meetings take place?
4. How long have the individual meetings lasted?
5. Who attends these meetings — broken down by country, name of organisation and number of participants from each organisation?
6. Who represents the EU at these meetings?
7. What topics are discussed at these meetings and what kinds of information are exchanged?
8. What is the exact purpose of these meetings?

A ‘Community of Interest’ has been set up within the EU Military Staff (EUMS) in order to improve horizontal cooperation between the military customers (Planners) and the Intelligence Division (INT).

9. Who exactly is involved in this ‘Community of Interest’ and when exactly was it set up?
10. What are its working methods?
11. What types of information are exchanged?

Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Ashton on behalf of the Commission
(24 August 2012)

The attendees of the Intelligence Directors Conclave (IDC) are the Directors of Defense Intelligence Organisations (DIOs) of Member States. The EU is represented by the Director Intelligence of the EU Military Staff who chairs the meetings. Representatives of EEAS structures are often invited as guest speakers. The IDC is an informal meeting for discussions on the MS’ Intelligence support function to the EU and is seeking to obtain DIOs’ opinions and advice. The purpose is to manage the intelligence support of DIOs to the EU. The first meeting took place in 2001. Annual meetings are held for one day in Brussels. The next meeting will take place in Brussels in Nov. 2012.

A ‘Community of Interest’ has been set up within the EU Military Staff (EUMS) in order to improve horizontal cooperation between the military customers (planners) and the Intelligence Division (INT). It exists since 2009 and involves all Branch Chiefs in the EUMS. It is an informal meeting that takes place every 3-4 months to discuss cross-functional coordination between the EUMS Branches. Discussions take place on current EU military operations and advance planning for possible future operations.

(Deutsche Fassung)

**Anfrage zur schriftlichen Beantwortung E-006025/12
an die Kommission (Vizepräsidentin/Hohe Vertreterin)**

Martin Ehrenhauser (NI)

(19. Juni 2012)

Betrifft: VP/HR — Direktion „Crisis Response and Operational Coordination“ (CROC)

1. Was ist der konkrete Aufgabenbereich der Direktion „Crisis Response and Operational Coordination“ (CROC)?
2. Wie hoch ist das Jahresbudget der Direktion CROC im Jahr 2012 und voraussichtlich 2013? Welche Ausgaben werden damit gedeckt?
3. Wie viele Mitarbeiter beschäftigt die CROC im Jahr 2012 und 2013?
4. Welche Arten von Mitarbeitern sind in der CROC 2012 und voraussichtlich 2013 beschäftigt?
5. Wie gliedert sich die interne Struktur der Direktion CROC? Kann die Vizepräsidentin / Hohe Vertreterin ein Organigramm vorlegen? Welche Aufgaben haben die unterschiedlichen Einheiten?

Antwort von Frau Catherine Ashton — Hohe Vertreterin/Vizepräsidentin im Namen der Kommission

(8. August 2012)

Die Abteilung Krisenreaktion und operative Koordinierung (MD VII) spielt eine wichtige Rolle bei der ersten politischen Einschätzung der Lage in einem Krisengebiet und der Organisation einer raschen und koordinierten Reaktion der EU unter Beteiligung aller mit dieser Krise befassten EAD-Dienststellen. Zu den Aufgaben der MD VII gehört die genaue Beobachtung der politischen und sicherheitsrelevanten Entwicklungen weltweit, damit der EAD kurzfristig auf drohende oder neu auftretende Krisen reagieren kann. Zu ihrem Aufgabenbereich gehört weder die Bereitstellung von Unterstützung, Soforthilfe und Schutz zur Deckung des humanitären Bedarfs der Opfer von Naturkatastrophen oder vom Menschen verursachten Katastrophen außerhalb der EU noch die Unterstützung von Maßnahmen der Mitgliedstaaten zur Vermeidung oder Abwehr solcher Katastrophen innerhalb der EU, die gemäß den Bestimmungen des Vertrags in die Zuständigkeit der Kommission fallen.

Da die MD VII Teil des EAD ist, verfügt sie nicht über eine eigene Haushaltslinie. Ihr Stellenplan sieht 48 Posten vor (Beamte, Bedienstete auf Zeit und abgeordnete nationale Sachverständige).

Die MD VII umfasst drei Referate:

MD VII.1: Krisenreaktionsplanung und laufende Operationen. Dieses Referat organisiert Treffen der Krisenplattform in Echtzeit, um rechtzeitig und wirksam auf Krisen reagieren zu können. Dieses Referat leitet außerdem Missionen des EAD in Krisenfällen und verwaltet gemeinsam mit den Dienststellen der für Verwaltung und Finanzen zuständigen Abteilung den internen Dienstplan des EAD für auf Krisenreaktion spezialisierte Sachverständige.

MD VII.2: EU-Lagezentrum. Dieses Referat stellt täglich Berichte über die politische Entwicklung weltweit anhand öffentlich zugänglicher Informationsquellen bereit und steht mit GSVP-Missionen und Operationen in Verbindung. Ihm obliegt außerdem die Wahrnehmung der Fürsorgepflicht für das EAD-Personal weltweit und die Unterstützung von EU-Akteuren und Mitgliedstaaten im Rahmen der EU-Regelungen zur Koordinierung in Notfällen und Krisen.

MD VII.3: Konsularisches Krisenmanagement. Dieses Referat ist für die logistische Unterstützung der Mitgliedstaaten im Falle einer konsularischen Krise zuständig.

(English version)

Question for written answer E-006025/12
to the Commission (Vice-President/High Representative)
Martin Ehrenhauser (NI)
(19 June 2012)

Subject: VP/HR — Crisis Response and Operational Coordination Directorate (CROC)

1. What is the specific remit of the Crisis Response and Operational Coordination Directorate (CROC)?
2. What is the CROC's annual budget for 2012, and how much is it expected to be in 2013? What expenditure does it cover?
3. How many staff is the CROC employing in 2012 and 2013?
4. What types of staff is the CROC employing in 2012, and what types is it expected to employ in 2013?
5. What is the CROC's internal structure? Can the Vice-President/High Representative provide an organogram? What tasks do the various units have?

Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Ashton on behalf of the Commission
(8 August 2012)

Crisis Response and Operational Coordination Department (MD VII) plays a key role in providing first political assessment in crisis prone areas and in ensuring a rapid and coordinated EU response that brings together all EEAS services dealing with that particular crisis. MD VII has the responsibility to closely follow political and security developments in the world to enable the EEAS to respond to potential and emerging crises at short notice. MD VII is neither responsible for the provision of assistance, relief and protection to meet the humanitarian needs of victims of natural and man-made disasters outside the EU nor for the support to Member States' actions in the prevention and response to natural or man made disasters within the EU which under the terms of the Treaty are the responsibility of the Commission.

As part of the EEAS, MD VII does not have a dedicated budget line. Its establishment plan is composed of 48 posts (officials, temporary agents and seconded national experts).

MD VII has three divisions:

MD VII.1: Crisis Response Planning and Operations Division organises meetings of the Crisis Platform in real-time to respond to crises timely and efficiently. This Division is also in the lead for EEAS crisis response missions. In cooperation with the EEAS Administration and Finances Department services, it manages an internal EEAS roster of Crisis Response Experts.

MD VII.2: EU Situation Room provides daily worldwide political reporting based on open sources, liaises with CSDP missions and operations, provides duty-of-care to EEAS personnel all around the world and supports EU actors and member states in the framework of the EU Emergency and Crisis Coordination Arrangements.

MD VII.3: Consular Crisis Management Division provides logistical support to member states in consular emergencies.

(Deutsche Fassung)

**Anfrage zur schriftlichen Beantwortung E-006026/12
an die Kommission (Vizepräsidentin/Hohe Vertreterin)**

Martin Ehrenhauser (NI)

(19. Juni 2012)

Betrifft: VP/HR — Direktion „Crisis Response and Operational Coordination“ (CROC) — Produkte, Informationen

1. Welche Produkte produziert die „Crisis Response and Operational Coordination“ (CROC) und wie oft?
2. An welche Bedarfsträger werden diese Produkte übermittelt — und wie oft?
3. Welche Klassifizierungsstufen erhalten die Produkte?
4. Welche Dienstleistungen bietet die CROC an, für welche Bedarfsträger und wie oft?
5. Werden von nationalen Nachrichtendiensten direkt Informationen an die CROC übermittelt? Wenn ja, von welchen Diensten, um welche Art von Informationen handelt es sich und welche Klassifizierungsstufe erreichen diese Informationen? Wie gestaltet sich der Informationsaustauschprozess?
6. Von welchen Einheiten des Rates, der EU-Kommission und des EAD erhält die CROC Informationen, und welche Klassifizierungsstufe erreichen diese? Wie gestaltet sich der Informationsaustauschprozess?
7. Werden von den EU-Delegationen weltweit Informationen direkt und/oder auf regelmäßiger Basis an die CROC übermittelt? Wenn ja, wie oft und welche Arten von Informationen werden übermittelt? Wie gestaltet sich der Informationsaustauschprozess?
8. Werden zivile und militärische Informationen an die CROC übermittelt?

Antwort von Frau Catherine Ashton — Hohe Vertreterin/Vizepräsidentin im Namen der Kommission

(6. August 2012)

Die Abteilung MD VII „Krisenreaktion und operative Koordinierung“ des EAD liefert — über das EU-Lagezentrum — täglich morgens und nachmittags Schlagzeilen und Presseübersichten, unter der Woche morgendliche Briefings, tägliche Ad-hoc-SMS-Meldungen sowie Ad-hoc-Informationen, Lageeinschätzungen und Informationsblätter zur Krisenreaktion auf Anfrage der Führungsebene des EAD. Hauptnutzer dieser nicht als Verschlussachen eingestuften Informationen sind die EU-Institutionen und die Mitgliedstaaten. Darüber hinaus veranstaltet MD VII Tele- und Videokonferenzen auf Verlangen der Führungsebene des EAS, organisiert Sitzungen der EAD-Krisenplattform und unterstützt sie durch Briefing-Vermerke und Kartenmaterial.

MD VII tauscht Informationen vor allem mit anderen Dienststellen des EAD, den GSVP-Missionen und -Operationen, den Abteilungen des Generalsekretariats des Rates und der Europäischen Kommission aus. Die genannten Informationen sind nicht als Verschlussachen eingestuft; einzige Ausnahme bilden die Berichte der Leiter der GSVP-Missionen und -Operationen, die als „EU — Nur für den Dienstgebrauch“ eingestuft sind und in einem gesicherten Netz gespeichert werden. MD VII tauscht weder zivile noch militärische Informationen mit nationalen Nachrichtendiensten aus.

(English version)

Question for written answer E-006026/12
to the Commission (Vice-President/High Representative)
Martin Ehrenhauser (NI)
(19 June 2012)

Subject: VP/HR — Crisis Response and Operational Coordination Directorate (CROC) — products and information

1. What products constitute the output of the Crisis Response and Operational Coordination Directorate (CROC), and how often does it produce them?
2. To which users are these products forwarded, and how often?
3. What security classifications are assigned to these products?
4. What services does the CROC provide, for what users and how often?
5. Do national intelligence services directly communicate information to the CROC? If so, which services do so, what is the nature of the information and what is the highest security classification of this information? What is the procedure for exchanging the information?
6. From which departments of the Council, Commission and EEAS does the CROC receive information, and what is the highest security classification of this information? What is the procedure for exchanging the information?
7. Do the EU delegations around the world supply information to the CROC directly and/or regularly? If so, how often and what is the nature of the information supplied? What is the procedure for exchanging the information?
8. Is civil and military information communicated to the CROC?

Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Ashton on behalf of the Commission
(6 August 2012)

The EEAS Crisis Response and Operational Coordination Department (MD VII) regularly produces — through the EU Situation Room — daily morning and afternoon headlines and press summaries, morning briefings during the week, daily ad hoc SMS alerts, as well as ad hoc information, monitoring products and crisis response fact sheets upon the request of EEAS senior management. Main users of these unclassified products are the EU institutions and Member States. Furthermore, MD VII also provides teleconferences and videoconferences at the request of EEAS senior management, as well as organises and supports the EEAS Crisis Platform meetings with briefing notes and maps.

MD VII exchanges information primarily with other parts of the EEAS, CSDP Missions and Operations and departments of the General Secretariat of the Council and the European Commission. All information is unclassified apart from the reports of the Heads of CSDP Missions and Operations, which are EU RESTRICTED and stored in a secure network. MD VII does not exchange information with any national intelligence service, neither civilian nor military.

(Deutsche Fassung)

**Anfrage zur schriftlichen Beantwortung E-006027/12
an die Kommission (Vizepräsidentin/Hohe Vertreterin)
Martin Ehrenhauser (NI)
(19. Juni 2012)**

Betrifft: VP/HR — Intelligence Division (INT)

1. Welche Konsequenzen hat die Eingliederung des EU-Militärstabs (EUMS) in den Europäischen Auswärtigen Dienst für die Kompetenzen, die Funktionsweise, das Personal und das Budget der Intelligence Division (INT)?
2. Was ist der gegenwärtige Aufgabenbereich der INT?
3. Wie viele Mitarbeiter hat die INT derzeit, und wie viele Mitarbeiter hatte die INT seit ihrem Bestehen, aufgeschlüsselt nach Jahren?
4. Welche Arten von Mitarbeitern hat die INT derzeit, und welche Arten von Mitarbeitern hatte die INT seit ihrem Bestehen, aufgeschlüsselt nach Jahren?
5. Wie hoch ist das gegenwärtige Budget der INT? Wie hoch war das jährliche INT — Budget, aufgeschlüsselt nach Jahren?
6. Kann die Hohe Vertreterin ein aktuelles Organigramm der internen Struktur der INT vorlegen?
7. Wer genau trifft die endgültige Entscheidung über die Besetzung des Direktor-Postens der INT im EU-Militärstab, und wie gestaltete sich das Auswahlverfahren?
8. Wie genau funktioniert die Zusammenarbeit zwischen der INT, dem EU-Militärstab und dem INTCEN (Intelligence Analysis Centre)?

**Antwort von Frau Catherine Ashton — Hohe Vertreterin/Vizepräsidentin im Namen der Kommission
(7. August 2012)**

Mit der Schaffung des Europäischen Auswärtigen Dienstes (EAD) hat sich der Aufgabenbereich der Direktion Nachrichtenwesen des Militärstabs der Europäischen Union (EUMS INT) nicht verändert, aber die Anforderungen an Qualität und Quantität der nachrichtendienstlichen Produkte sind erheblich gestiegen. Die für diese Direktion zur Verfügung stehenden Mittel sind Teil des Budgets für den Militärstab, das denselben haushaltspolitischen Zwängen wie alle anderen Abteilungen des EAD unterliegt.

EUMS INT hat die Aufgabe, die EU gemeinsam mit dem EU Intelligence Analysis Centre (INTCEN) im Rahmen des Einheitlichen Analyseverfahrens (SIAC) nachrichtendienstlich zu unterstützen und so einen Beitrag zur Entwicklung strategischer Leitlinien, zur Frühwarnung und zur frühzeitigen Planung der Krisenreaktion sowie zur Planung und Leitung von GASP-Missionen/-Operationen und -Übungen zu leisten. Durch diese Struktur bleiben eigene Identität und Kompetenzen von EUMS INT und INTCEN gewahrt, gleichzeitig ermöglicht sie aber eine enge Zusammenarbeit und die Zusammenlegung der Analyse-Instrumente, so dass sie ein breites Spektrum nachrichtendienstlicher Produkte aus verschiedenen Quellen bereitstellen können.

Für EUMS INT wurden bei ihrer Einrichtung 2001 ursprünglich 30 Stellen vorgesehen. Derzeit verfügt die Direktion über 41 Posten und ist in drei organisatorische Einheiten unterteilt: Grundsatzfragen, Unterstützung und Produktion. Die Mitarbeiter von EUMS INT sind vorwiegend abgeordnete nationale Experten; daneben gibt es zwei Assistentenstellen, die mit EU-Beamten besetzt sind. Gemäß den Standardverfahren für alle Direktorenposten des EU-Militärstabs (EUMS) wählen die militärischen Vertreter (MilRep) des EU-Militärausschusses (EUMC) den künftigen Direktor unter den von den Mitgliedstaaten nominierten Kandidaten aus und schlagen ihn der Hohen Vertreterin/Vizepräsidentin vor, die für seine Berufung zuständig ist. Die endgültige Entscheidung über die Besetzung des Postens liegt also bei der Hohen Vertreterin/Vizepräsidentin.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-006027/12
to the Commission (Vice-President/High Representative)**

Martin Ehrenhauser (NI)

(19 June 2012)

Subject: VP/HR — Intelligence Division (INT)

1. What are the consequences of incorporating the EU Military Staff (EUMS) in the European External Action Service regarding the terms of reference, operations, staffing and budget of the Intelligence Division (INT)?
2. What are the INT's current responsibilities?
3. What is the current INT staffing level and what have been its staff numbers by year since its inception?
4. What are the INT's current staff categories and what have been its staff categories by year since its inception?
5. What is the present INT budget? What were its previous annual budgets?
6. Can the High Representative provide an updated establishment plan showing the internal structure of the INT?
7. Who exactly has the final say regarding the appointment of the INT chief within the EU Military Staff and what selection procedures are followed?
8. What exact procedures are followed for cooperation between the INT, the EU Military Staff and INTCEN (Intelligence Analysis Centre)?

Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Ashton on behalf of the Commission

(7 August 2012)

With the establishment of the European External Action Service (EEAS) the terms of reference for the EU Military Staff Intelligence Division (EUMS INT) Directorate remained unchanged but the requirements for Intelligence products in quality and quantity have increased considerably. The budget of EUMS INT is part of the EUMS budget which has experienced the same constraints like all other EEAS departments.

The responsibilities of EUMS INT are to provide, together with the EU Intelligence Analysis Centre (INTCEN) within the format of the Single Intelligence Analysis Capacity (SIAC), the Intelligence support for the EU, thus contributing to policy development, early warning, advance and crisis response planning and to planning and conduct of CSDP missions/operations and exercises. This cooperation between EUMS INT and EU INTCEN allows both, while maintaining their independent identity and capabilities, to operate jointly and to combine their analysis tools, generating a wide range of intelligence products from different sources.

In 2001, when established, EUMS INT comprised 30 posts. It currently has 41 posts and it is organised in three units (Policy, Support and Production). The staff of EUMS INT mainly consist of seconded national experts with the exception of two Assistants as EU officials. Following the standard procedures for all posts at Director level within the EUMS, the EU Military Committee at MilRep level selects and endorses the future Director out of the candidates nominated by Member States, and offers the endorsed candidate for HR/VP's approval. The final decision lies therefore with the HR/VP.

(Versione italiana)

**Interrogazione con richiesta di risposta scritta E-006028/12
alla Commissione (Vicepresidente/Alto Rappresentante)**

Mario Borghezio (PPE)

(19 giugno 2012)

Oggetto: VP/HR — Attentati dinamitardi nelle chiese in Nigeria

Domenica 17 giugno 2012 tre attentati dinamitardi contro chiese cristiane in Nigeria hanno tolto la vita ad almeno 21 persone. Non si conosce il numero esatto delle vittime a causa delle notizie contraddittorie date dal governo e dalla Croce rossa nigeriana, ma secondo alcune fonti i morti sarebbero 50 e 125 i feriti. Il primo attentato è avvenuto alle 9.00, quando un kamikaze suicida si è lanciato in auto attraverso una barricata contro la chiesa evangelica della Buona Novella nel distretto di Wusasa nella città di Zaria. Un secondo attentato è avvenuto pochi minuti dopo contro la chiesa cattolica del Cristo Re a Zaria, seguito da un terzo attentato contro un'altra chiesa a Kaduna.

Giovani cristiani di entrambe le città hanno reagito violentemente e, secondo quanto riferito, hanno incendiato copertoni per le strade e cacciato la polizia a colpi di bastone. Nessun gruppo ha ancora rivendicato la responsabilità di questi crimini, ma il presidente nigeriano sospetta che siano opera di Boko Haram, un gruppo militante islamico il cui nome significa «l'educazione occidentale è vietata».

Questo è il terzo fine settimana consecutivo di violenze religiose in Nigeria. Il Vaticano ha denunciato questi crimini dettati dall'odio contro comunità religiose definendoli «orribili e inaccettabili» e confida in un «efficace intervento» contro tali atti di terrorismo.

I seguenti quesiti sono sottoposti all'attenzione della Vicepresidente/Alto Rappresentante:

1. È consapevole la Vicepresidente/Alto Rappresentante degli attuali continui pericoli che corrono i cristiani in Nigeria?
2. Quali eventuali misure sono già state prese per contrastare queste violazioni delle libertà di religione?
3. La situazione dei cristiani nigeriani richiede un'attenzione immediata. Quali risposte immediate e a lungo termine possono essere messe in atto per rafforzare la sicurezza e la libertà di queste persone?
4. Può valutare il livello di minaccia di Boko Haram per la Nigeria, il suo sviluppo e, se del caso, per il mondo occidentale?

Risposta dell'Alta Rappresentante/Vicepresidente Catherine Ashton a nome della Commissione

(14 agosto 2012)

L'Alta Rappresentante/Vicepresidente è naturalmente al corrente dei recenti attentati terroristici in Nigeria che hanno preso di mira, oltre alle chiese, edifici del governo e di sicurezza, mercati, scuole e civili innocenti senza distinzioni. L'Unione europea condanna questi attentati che rappresentano vere e proprie attività criminali. Si veda inoltre la dichiarazione dell'AR/VP Ashton del 19 giugno 2012.

La collaborazione tra UE e Nigeria mira ad aiutare il paese a realizzare l'obiettivo di una sicurezza duratura, affrontando i molteplici fattori socioeconomici e politici che conducono alla radicalizzazione.

L'Unione ha già reindirizzato parti del programma di cooperazione con la Nigeria verso il nord del paese in modo da velocizzare le iniziative per la lotta alla povertà e alla deprivazione.

L'UE ha inoltre recentemente contribuito allo sviluppo delle capacità di mediazione in una delle aree più a rischio attivando i fondi del progetto per il sostegno alla mediazione (EEAS BL 2238) varato dal Parlamento europeo.

(English version)

Question for written answer E-006028/12
to the Commission (Vice-President/High Representative)
Mario Borghezio (PPE)
(19 June 2012)

Subject: VP/HR — Church bombings in Nigeria

On Sunday, 17 June 2012 a series of three church bombings took the lives of at least 21 Christians in Nigeria. The exact number of victims is unknown on account of conflicting reports from the Government and the Nigerian Red Cross Society, but according to some reports the death toll is thought to be as high as 50, with an additional 125 injured. The first attack occurred at 9 a.m. when a suicide bomber drove a vehicle through a barricade and into the ECWA Good News church in the Wusasa district of the city of Zaria. A second attack on the Christ the King Catholic church in Zaria followed within minutes, with a third attack targeting another church in Kaduna.

Christian youths in both cities reacted violently, reportedly burning tyres in the streets and chasing police with clubs. No group has taken responsibility for the crimes as yet, but the Nigerian president suspects them to be the work of Boko Haram, a militant Islamic group whose name may be translated as 'Western education is forbidden'.

This is the third consecutive weekend of religious violence in Nigeria. The Vatican has denounced these hate crimes against religious communities as 'horrible and unacceptable', and is seeking 'effective intervention' against such acts of terrorism.

The Vice-President/High Representative is asked to answer the questions set out below.

1. Is she aware of the current and continuing danger to Christians in Nigeria?
2. What measures — if any — have already been taken to address these violations of religious freedoms?
3. The situation of Nigerian Christians demands immediate attention. What immediate and long-term action can be taken to further their safety and freedom?
4. Can she assess the level of threat that Boko Haram poses to Nigeria, its development and, if applicable, the western world?

Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Ashton on behalf of the Commission
(14 August 2012)

HR/VP is truly aware of these recent attacks by terrorists in Nigeria which have targeted government and security buildings, markets, schools and innocent civilians of all kinds as well as churches. All such attacks are criminal activities and have been condemned as such by the EU. Please also refer to HRVP Ashton's statement of 19 June 2012.

The EU is working together with Nigeria to help it tackle the challenges of creating a durable security and dealing with the multiple socioeconomic and political factors conducive to radicalisation.

The EU has already reoriented parts of its cooperation programme with Nigeria to the North of the country to accelerate action against poverty and deprivation there.

In addition, the EU has recently provided capacity building for mediation in one of the most fragile areas making use of funds from the mediation support project (EEAS BL 2238) initiated by the European Parliament.

(Verzjoni Maltija)

Mistoqsija għal tweġiba bil-miktub E-006030/12
lill-Kummissjoni
Simon Busuttil (PPE)
(19 ta' Ġunju 2012)

Suġġett: Legiżlazzjoni Belġjana dwar il-logħob tal-azzard online

Fmistoqsija parlamentari preċedenti (E-000724/2012), saqsejt lill-Kummissjoni jekk il-liġi l-gdida Belġjana dwar il-logħob tal-azzard online hijiex f'konformità mal-liġi tal-KE. Fit-tweġiba tagħha, il-Kummissjoni kkonfermat li kien għad għandhom jiġu adottati numru ta' digriet implimentattivi sabiex is-sistema Belġjana tkun kompletament operattiva, u li l-Kummissjoni kienet se tkompli d-djalogu tagħha mal-awtoritajiet Belġjani sabiex tiddeċiedi dwar jekk il-qafas legali Belġjan għal-logħob tal-azzard online kienx konformi jew le mal-liġi tal-UE.

1. Il-Kummissjoni hija sodisfatta li l-qafas legali Belġjan għal-logħob tal-azzard online huwa konformi mal-liġi tal-UE kif inhi llum?
2. Il-Kummissjoni tikkunsidra li l-prattiki adottati mill-awtoritajiet Belġjani, bħall-hruġ ta' liċenzji u l-listi suwed ta' operaturi tal-UE b'liċenzja, huma konformi mal-legiżlazzjoni tal-UE?
3. Il-Kummissjoni hija sodisfatta bir-riżultat tad-djalogu mal-awtoritajiet Belġjani dwar dan id-dossier?
4. X'azzjoni immedjata se tiegħu l-Kummissjoni biex tirrimedja kwalunkwe irregolaritajiet urġenti?

Tweġiba mogħtija mis-Sur Barnier f'isem il-Kummissjoni
(7 ta' Awwissu 2012)

Kif iddikjarat fit-tweġiba tagħha għall-mistoqsija parlamentari E-000724/2012 mill-Onorevoli Membru ⁽¹⁾, il-Kummissjoni qajmet ċertu thassib dwar il-konformità mal-liġi tal-UE fil-qafas ġuridiku Belġjan għal-logħob tal-azzard, fil-qafas ta' proċedura ta' notifika skont id-Direttiva 98/34/KE. Il-Kummissjoni bl-istess mod irriservat id-dritt li tibda l-proċeduri ta' ksur fi stadji aktar tard. Il-kwistjonijiet imqajma fil-proċedura ta' notifika, inklużi l-kundizzjonijiet għall-hruġ tal-liċenzji tal-logħob tal-azzard onlajn jekk meħtieġ, għadhom qed jiġu diskussi mal-awtoritajiet Belġjani fil-limiti tar-regoli u l-proċeduri applikabbli li jirregolaw il-monitoraġġ tal-applikazzjoni korretta tal-liġi tal-UE.

⁽¹⁾ <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/QP-WEB/>.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-006030/12
to the Commission
Simon Busuttil (PPE)
(19 June 2012)**

Subject: Belgian online gambling legislation

In an earlier parliamentary question (E-000724/2012), I asked the Commission whether the new Belgian online gambling law is in conformity with EC law. In its reply, the Commission confirmed that a number of implementing decrees still needed to be adopted to make the Belgian system fully operational, and that the Commission would continue its dialogue with the Belgian authorities in deciding on whether or not the Belgian legal framework for online gambling was in line with EC law or not.

1. Is the Commission satisfied that the Belgian legal framework for online gambling conforms with EC law as it stands today?
2. Does the Commission consider that the practices adopted by the Belgian authorities, such as the issuing of licenses and the blacklisting of licensed EU operators, are in line with EU legislation?
3. Is the Commission satisfied with the outcome of the dialogue with the Belgian authorities on this dossier?
4. What immediate action is the Commission taking to rectify any urgent irregularities?

**Answer given by Mr Barnier on behalf of the Commission
(7 August 2012)**

As stated in its reply to parliamentary Question E-000724/2012 by the Honourable Member ⁽¹⁾, the Commission raised certain concerns of compliance with EC law of the Belgian legal framework for gambling, in the framework of notification procedure under Directive 98/34/EC. The Commission equally reserved the right to initiate infringement proceedings at later stages. The issues raised in the notification procedure, including the conditions for granting if necessary online gambling licences, are still being discussed with the Belgian authorities within the applicable rules and procedures governing the monitoring of correct application of EC law.

⁽¹⁾ <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/QP-WEB/>.

(Versión española)

**Pregunta con solicitud de respuesta escrita E-006031/12
a la Comisión (Vicepresidenta/Alta Representante)**

Ramon Tremosa i Balcells (ALDE)

(19 de junio de 2012)

Asunto: VP/HR — Graves violaciones de los derechos de los practicantes de Falun Gong en Rusia — Decisión del Tribunal de distrito de Krasnodar de considerar el material relacionado con Falun Gong como literatura extremista

En su anterior Resolución de 16 de febrero de 2012, el Parlamento Europeo expresó su profunda preocupación por el uso indebido de la legislación contra el extremismo en relación con la aplicación ilegal de las leyes penales contra organizaciones de la sociedad civil, tales como Memorial, las minorías religiosas como Falun Gong, y la indebida prohibición de su material por motivos de extremismo. También somos conscientes de los siguientes casos en los que los derechos de los practicantes de Falun Gong en Rusia han sido groseramente violados:

1. La decisión del Tribunal de distrito de Pervomaisk, Krasnodar, de 27 de octubre de 2011, de considerar el material relacionado con Falun Gong como literatura extremista: «Zhuan Falun», el libro principal de las enseñanzas de Falun Gong, del fundador del movimiento, Li Hongzhi, «Informe sobre los alegatos de sustracción de órganos a practicantes de Falun Gong en China», de los defensores canadienses de los derechos humanos David Matas y David Kilgour, y folletos de Falun Gong. El 20 de junio de 2012, los practicantes de Falun Gong presentarán un recurso de apelación ante el Tribunal Supremo, que es el tribunal de última instancia de Rusia.
2. La prohibición de las actividades que los practicantes de Falun Gong pensaban organizar, en virtud del artículo 8 del Tratado de buena vecindad y cooperación amistosa entre la República Popular de China y la Federación de Rusia, según el cual los practicantes de Falun Gong son considerados terroristas sobre la base exclusiva de las cartas difamatorias de la Embajada de la República Popular de China, sin ninguna evidencia, física o de otro tipo. Y todo ello a pesar de que Falun Gong está oficialmente registrada como organización legal en seis regiones de Rusia.
3. La deportación forzosa a China de ciudadanos chinos, entre ellos una mujer, un niño y un anciano, que habían vivido en Rusia con miembros de la familia rusos durante muchos años, que eran practicantes de Falun Gong y que habían sido registrados por la Cruz Roja como personas que requieren protección internacional.
4. La denegación del registro a organizaciones y medios de comunicación operados por los practicantes de Falun Gong en varias regiones de Rusia.

A la luz de lo que antecede:

- ¿Ha instado la Vicepresidenta/Alta Representante a las autoridades rusas a que pongan fin al acoso ilegal de que son víctima los practicantes de Falun Gong en Rusia?
- ¿Ha pedido a las autoridades rusas que respeten el Estado de Derecho y garanticen que los practicantes de Falun Gong en Rusia disfrutan de los derechos fundamentales reconocidos por la Constitución rusa?
- ¿Se asegurará la Vicepresidenta/Alta Representante de la presencia de observadores en el Tribunal Supremo de Rusia cuando se juzgue este caso, con el fin de garantizar un juicio justo?

Respuesta de la Alta Representante y Vicepresidenta Sra. Ashton en nombre de la Comisión

(7 de agosto de 2012)

La UE sigue de cerca la situación del movimiento Falun Gong en Rusia, tanto en la sede central en Bruselas como a través de los contactos de nuestra Delegación en Moscú, y también en cooperación con los Estados miembros. Nos hemos reunido con representantes de Falun Gong de Rusia en numerosas ocasiones para obtener información de primera mano. El SEAE tiene conocimiento de la decisión del Tribunal mencionada.

Todas las cuestiones relacionadas con la libertad de expresión, la aplicación de la legislación contra el extremismo y la conformidad con las garantías procesales en los tribunales rusos se están abordando regularmente con las autoridades rusas. El SEAE ha planteado la cuestión de la utilización y el abuso de la Ley federal contra el extremismo durante las tres últimas consultas consecutivas con la Federación de Rusia sobre los derechos humanos. La cuestión del Ministerio de Justicia sobre la lista de publicaciones extremistas ha formado parte de los debates. El SEAE planteó el tema de los materiales prohibidos del movimiento Falun Gong en la reunión de consultas del 29 de noviembre. La Delegación de la UE en Moscú está realizando el seguimiento de los procedimientos judiciales en relación con los materiales prohibidos, que Falun Gong ha llevado ante el Tribunal Supremo de la Federación de Rusia.

Además de las conversaciones sobre estos asuntos en diferentes foros, la UE utiliza una serie de instrumentos adicionales para fomentar el cambio positivo en las estructuras institucionales de Rusia y de la sociedad en general. Uno de dichos instrumentos es nuestro acuerdo de colaboración para la modernización con Rusia. El Estado de Derecho es parte central del acuerdo y la UE anima a Rusia a, entre otras cosas, realizar reformas del sistema judicial también en este contexto.

(English version)

Question for written answer E-006031/12
to the Commission (Vice-President/High Representative)
Ramon Tremosa i Balcells (ALDE)
(19 June 2012)

Subject: VP/HR — Gross violations of the rights of Falun Gong practitioners in Russia — decision of Krasnodar district court to treat Falun Gong-related material as extremist literature

In its previous resolution of 16 February 2012, the European Parliament expressed its deep concern at the misuse of anti-extremism legislation with regard to the illegal implementation of criminal laws against civil society organisations such as Memorial, religious minorities such as Falun Gong, and the improper banning of their material on grounds of extremism. We are also aware of the following cases in which the rights of practitioners of Falun Gong in Russia have been grossly violated.

1. The decision of Pervomaisky district court, Krasnodar, of 27 October 2011 to treat the following Falun Gong-related material as extremist literature: 'Zhuan Falun', the main book of Falun Gong teachings by the founder of the movement, Mr Li Hongzhi, 'Report into Allegations of Organ Harvesting of Falun Gong Practitioners in China' by Canadian human rights advocates David Matas and David Kilgour, and Falun Gong flyers. On 20 June 2012, an appeal will be sent by Falun Gong practitioners to the Supreme Court, which is Russia's court of final instance.
2. The banning of planned Falun Gong activities pursuant to Article 8 of the Treaty of Good-Neighbourliness and Friendly Cooperation between the People's Republic of China and the Russian Federation, whereby Falun Gong practitioners are treated as terrorists on the sole basis of slanderous letters from the Embassy of the People's Republic of China, without any evidence, physical or otherwise. This is in spite of the fact that Falun Gong is officially registered as a legal organisation in six Russian regions.
3. The forced deportation to China of Chinese citizens — including a woman, a child and an elderly man — who had lived with Russian family members in Russia for many years, who were practitioners of Falun Gong and who were registered by the Red Cross as individuals requiring international protection.
4. The refusal to register organisations and media outlets operated by Falun Gong practitioners in various regions of Russia.

In light of the above:

- Did the Vice-President/High Representative urge the Russian authorities to stop the unlawful harassment of law-abiding Falun Gong practitioners in Russia?
- Did she call on the Russian authorities to respect the rule of law and to ensure that Falun Gong practitioners in Russia are able to enjoy the fundamental rights granted by the Russian constitution?
- Will the Vice-President/High Representative make sure that observers are present at the Supreme Court in Russia when this case is adjudicated in order to guarantee a fair trial?

Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Ashton on behalf of the Commission
(7 August 2012)

The EU is following the situation of Falun Gong in Russia very closely, both at headquarters in Brussels, as well as through contacts of our Delegation in Moscow, and also in cooperation with Member States. We have met with Falun Gong representatives from Russia on numerous occasions to get firsthand information. The EEAS is aware of the court ruling mentioned.

Issues relating to the freedom of expression, the application of the anti-extremist law, and the due process of law in the Russian courts are all being raised with the Russian authorities on a regular basis. The EEAS has raised the issue of the use and abuse of the Federal Law of the Anti-Extremism during the last three consecutive human rights consultations with the Russian Federation. The issue of the Ministry of Justice's list of extremist publications has been part of those discussions. The EEAS raised the case of the banned Falun Gong materials at the November 29 meeting of the consultations. The EU Delegation in Moscow is monitoring the judicial proceedings on the banned material, which Falun Gong has brought to the level of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation.

In addition to discussions of these questions in different fora, the EU uses a number of other instruments to encourage positive change in Russia's institutional structures and the society at large. One is our Partnership for Modernisation with Russia. Rule of law is at the core of this Partnership, and the EU encourages Russia to *inter alia* pursue reforms of the judiciary system also in this context.

(Deutsche Fassung)

Anfrage zur schriftlichen Beantwortung E-006032/12
an die Kommission
Thomas Ulmer (PPE)
(19. Juni 2012)

Betrifft: Pflanzliche Arzneimittel

Um die Schwierigkeiten zu beseitigen, die für die Mitgliedstaaten bei der einheitlichen Anwendung des Arzneimittelrechts für pflanzliche Arzneimittel bestehen, wurde durch die Richtlinie 2001/83/EG, geändert durch die Richtlinie 2004/24/EG, ein spezielles Registrierungsverfahren für pflanzliche Arzneimittel eingeführt, welche die Kriterien für traditionelle pflanzliche Arzneimittel erfüllen.

Dieses „vereinfachte Registrierungsverfahren“ ermöglicht die Registrierung pflanzlicher Arzneimittel, ohne dass Angaben und Unterlagen zu Sicherheits- und Wirksamkeitsprüfungen und -versuchen erforderlich sind, sofern ausreichende Nachweise darüber vorliegen, dass das Arzneimittel seit mindestens 30 Jahren, davon mindestens 15 Jahre in der Gemeinschaft, medizinisch verwendet wird.

Gemäß Artikel 16i muss die Kommission dem Europäischen Parlament und dem Rat einen Bericht über die Anwendung des vereinfachten Registrierungsverfahrens vorlegen, in dem auch die Möglichkeit einer Ausdehnung der Registrierung als traditionelles Arzneimittel auf andere Arten von Arzneimitteln beurteilt wird. Ein solcher Bericht wurde im September 2008 veröffentlicht (KOM(2008)0584 endg.), und die Kommission erklärte darin, dass sie die Ausweitung des vereinfachten Verfahrens auf andere Arzneimittel in Erwägung ziehe, die keine pflanzlichen Stoffe oder Zubereitungen sind und eine lange und nachweislich sichere traditionelle Verwendung aufweisen. Eine solche Ausweitung des vereinfachten Registrierungsverfahrens wurde jedoch bislang noch nicht in das Arbeitsprogramm der Europäischen Kommission aufgenommen.

Als das neue, vereinfachte Registrierungsverfahren 2004 eingeführt wurde, erschien es zweckmäßig, seinen Anwendungsbereich zunächst auf traditionelle pflanzliche Arzneimittel zu beschränken. Es gibt jedoch viele Arzneimittel, die keine pflanzlichen Stoffe sind, jedoch eine lange Tradition der medizinischen und nachweislich sicheren Verwendung aufweisen und für die daher ebenfalls ein vereinfachtes Registrierungsverfahren gelten sollte. Zu ihnen können Stoffe tierischen, mineralischen oder metallischen Ursprungs sowie Mikroorganismen gehören.

1. Zu welchen Schlussfolgerungen ist die Kommission bei ihrer Beurteilung der Möglichkeit einer Ausweitung des vereinfachten Registrierungsverfahrens gemäß Artikel 16i gelangt? Welche Arten von Arzneimitteln wurden in Betracht gezogen?
2. Ist eine Ausweitung des vereinfachten Registrierungsverfahrens auf Stoffe tierischen, mineralischen oder metallischen Ursprungs sowie Mikroorganismen geplant? Wenn ja, welcher Zeitplan ist dafür vorgesehen?
3. Weshalb wurden im Arbeitsprogramm der Kommission keine Arbeiten zur Ausweitung des Anwendungsbereichs des vereinfachten Registrierungsverfahrens auf andere Arten von Arzneimitteln vorgesehen?

Antwort von Herrn Dalli im Namen der Kommission
(14. August 2012)

In der Richtlinie 2004/24/EG ⁽¹⁾ ist vorgesehen, dass die Kommission dem Europäischen Parlament und dem Rat einen Bericht über die Anwendung der Richtlinie vorlegt, in dem auch die mögliche Ausweitung der Registrierung als traditionelles Arzneimittel auf andere Kategorien von Arzneimitteln geprüft wird.

Die Kommission hat ihren Bericht ⁽²⁾ dem Europäischen Parlament und dem Rat im September 2008 vorgelegt. Darin erklärt sie sich bereit, eine Ausweitung des vereinfachten Verfahrens auf andere, nichtpflanzliche Arzneimittel mit einer langen und sicheren traditionellen Verwendung in Betracht zu ziehen, und zwar u. a. auf Stoffe tierischen, mineralischen oder metallischen Ursprungs sowie Mikroorganismen.

Bevor die Kommission jedoch weitere Schritte unternehmen kann, benötigt sie einen Hinweis darauf, ob das Europäische Parlament und der Rat ihr geplantes Vorgehen befürworten.

Da sich weder das Europäische Parlament noch der Rat zu dem Bericht geäußert haben, hat die Kommission die mögliche Ausweitung des vereinfachten Verfahrens nicht in ihr Arbeitsprogramm aufgenommen.

⁽¹⁾ Richtlinie 2004/24/EG des Europäischen Parlaments und des Rates vom 31. März 2004 zur Änderung der Richtlinie 2001/83/EG zur Schaffung eines Gemeinschaftskodexes für Humanarzneimittel hinsichtlich traditioneller pflanzlicher Arzneimittel, ABl. L 136 vom 30.4.2004, S. 85.

⁽²⁾ Mitteilung der Kommission an das Europäische Parlament und den Rat zum Bericht über die Erfahrung mit der Anwendung von Kapitel 2a der Richtlinie 2001/83/EG in der Fassung der Richtlinie 2004/24/EG auf bestimmte für traditionelle pflanzliche Arzneimittel geltende Vorschriften, KOM(2008)584 endg.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-006032/12
to the Commission**

Thomas Ulmer (PPE)

(19 June 2012)

Subject: Herbal medicinal products

In order to overcome the difficulties encountered by Member States in applying pharmaceutical legislation to herbal medicinal products in a uniform manner, a specific registration procedure was introduced by Directive 2001/83/EC, as amended by Directive 2004/24/EC, for herbal products that meet the criteria for a traditional herbal medicinal product.

This 'simplified registration procedure' allows for the registration of herbal medicinal products without requiring details and documents on tests and trials of safety and efficacy, provided that there is sufficient evidence of the product's medicinal use over a period of at least 30 years, including at least 15 years in the Community.

Article 16i requires the Commission to submit a report concerning the application of the simplified registration procedure — which is to include an assessment of the possible extension of traditional use registration to other categories of medicinal products — to the European Parliament and to the Council. Such a report was published in September 2008 (COM(2008) 0584 final), wherein the Commission stated that it was considering extending the simplified procedure to products other than herbal substances and herbal preparations with a long tradition of safe use. However, this extension of the simplified registration procedure has not yet been incorporated into the European Commission's working plan.

When the new simplified registration procedure was introduced in 2004, it seemed appropriate to limit its scope initially to traditional herbal medicinal products. Nevertheless, many medicinal products exist which are not herbal substances but which have a long tradition of medicinal use combined with a proven safety record, and which should therefore also benefit from a simplified registration procedure. These may include substances of animal, mineral or metallic origin and microorganisms.

1. What were the conclusions of the Commission's assessment regarding the extension of the simplified registration procedure under Article 16i? What categories of products were taken into consideration?
2. Are there any plans to extend the simplified registration procedure to substances of animal, mineral or metallic origin and microorganisms? If so, what is the time schedule?
3. What was the reason for not incorporating work on extending the scope of the simplified registration procedure to other categories of medicinal products into the Commission's working programme?

Answer given by Mr Dalli on behalf of the Commission

(14 August 2012)

Directive 2004/24/EC ⁽¹⁾ asks the Commission to submit a report to the European Parliament and to the Council concerning the application of the provisions of the directive, including an assessment on the possible extension of traditional use registration to other categories of medicinal products.

The report ⁽²⁾ was submitted by the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council in September 2008. The Commission indicated that it was prepared to consider extending the simplified procedure to products other than herbal substances with a long tradition of safe use, including substances of animal, mineral or metallic origin and micro-organisms.

However, it is important for the Commission, before taking any further steps, to have an indication that the suggested way forward is acceptable for the European Parliament and the Council.

In the absence of reactions from the European Parliament and the Council on this report, the Commission has not included the possible extension of the simplified procedure in its work program.

⁽¹⁾ Directive 2004/24/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 31 March 2004 amending, as regards traditional herbal medicinal products, Directive 2001/83/EC on the Community code relating to medicinal products for human use, OJ L 136, 30.4.2004, p. 85.

⁽²⁾ Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament concerning the report on the experience acquired as a result of the application of the provisions of Chapter 2a of Directive 2001/83/EC, as amended by Directive 2004/24/EC, on specific provisions applicable to traditional herbal medicinal products, COM(2008)584 final.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-006033/12
to the Commission**

Struan Stevenson (ECR)

(19 June 2012)

Subject: Foie gras imports

Foie gras, which is made of the liver of a duck or goose that has been specially fed and fattened, raises many animal welfare concerns. The mortality rate in force-fed birds varies from 2% to 4% in the two-week force-feeding period, compared with around 0.2% in comparable ducks during normal rearing.

Since 1997, the number of European countries producing foie gras has halved. Only five countries still produce foie gras: Belgium, Bulgaria, France, Hungary and Spain. Some countries, including Denmark, Germany, Norway and Poland, have legislation that specifically prohibits the force-feeding of animals. Others, including Switzerland and the United Kingdom, interpret this practice to be prohibited under general animal protection legislation that provides for animals to be kept in conditions which meet their physiological and ethological needs.

Yet despite the production of foie gras being banned in many European countries, the sale of foie gras is not prohibited. This makes a mockery of existing animal welfare legislation in countries such as the UK, by allowing a product to be sold that is illegal to produce.

In line with Articles 34 and 35 of the TFEU, quantitative restrictions on imports and exports are prohibited between Member States. However, Article 36 states that '(t)he provisions of Articles 34 and 35 shall not preclude prohibitions or restrictions on imports, exports or goods in transit justified on grounds of public morality, public policy or public security; the protection of health and life of humans, animals or plants; the protection of national treasures possessing artistic, historic or archaeological value; or the protection of industrial and commercial property. Such prohibitions or restrictions shall not, however, constitute a means of arbitrary discrimination or a disguised restriction on trade between Member States.'

Could the Commission advise whether Article 36 could be taken into consideration with regard to imports of foie gras?

Answer given by Mr Dalli on behalf of the Commission

(3 August 2012)

The Commission would refer the Honourable Member to its answer to Written Question E-3959/2009 ⁽¹⁾ regarding the current legal framework which covers the production of foie gras in the EU.

Council Directive 98/58/EC ⁽²⁾ on the protection of animals kept for farming purposes allows Member States to apply within their territories stricter provisions for the protection of animals, provided they are in compliance with the general rules of the EU Treaties. The Commission considers that not allowing trade of foie gras between Member States, on animal welfare grounds, would be in breach of Article 34 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union ⁽³⁾ (TFEU). Such quantitative restrictions are prohibited between Member States. The Commission considers that in the case of foie gras the grounds invoked in Article 36 of TFEU to prohibit or restrict the marketing between Member States cannot be applied, since foie gras production is covered by Directive 98/58/EC concerning the protection of animals kept for farming purposes ⁽⁴⁾. The European Court of Justice has held in its judgment in the case *Hedley Lomas* (Case C-5/94) that recourse to Article 36 is no longer possible where [Union] law has already provided for harmonisation (par.18).

⁽¹⁾ <http://www.cc.cec/basil3/search/advanced.do>.

⁽²⁾ OJ L 221, 8.8.1998, p. 23.

⁽³⁾ OJ C 83, 30.3.2010, p. 47.

⁽⁴⁾ This directive aims at giving effect within Union legislation to the European Convention for the Protection of Animals kept for Farming Purposes of 1976 ('the Convention'). The recommendation concerning domestic geese and their crossbreeds ('the recommendation') covers the production of foie gras from these animals; it was adopted in 1999 with the support of the then Community.

(Versão portuguesa)

Pergunta com pedido de resposta escrita E-006035/12

à Comissão

Diogo Feio (PPE)

(19 de junho de 2012)

Assunto: Vacinação de crianças

Ontem, o Diretor-Geral da Saúde português, Francisco George, expressou a sua preocupação com o aumento do número de crianças não vacinadas contra doenças infecciosas, como seja o sarampo. A não vacinação deve-se a uma opção dos pais, que ao recusarem a vacinação dos filhos não apenas os expõem a doenças perfeitamente evitáveis como criam um risco para a sociedade.

Assim, pergunto à Comissão:

1. Tem conhecimento desta situação? Tem dados que lhe permitam determinar se a recusa da vacinação das crianças é um problema exclusivamente português ou se é, pelo contrário, uma tendência europeia?
2. Que medidas pode tomar de forma a incentivar a vacinação das crianças e evitar a recusa pelos pais?
3. Há planos de contingência para o caso de a recusa de vacinação levar a epidemias de doenças infecciosas e altamente contagiosas que considerávamos perfeitamente controladas?

Resposta dada por John Dalli em nome da Comissão

(23 de julho de 2012)

A Comissão tem conhecimento do acentuado aumento de casos de sarampo na UE pelo facto de as crianças não terem recebido duas doses da vacina contra o sarampo: nos dois últimos anos a UE e os países EEE/EFTA notificaram cerca de 30 000 casos de sarampo. Este número é quatro vezes superior ao de 2009 e 2008. Não se registaram aumentos semelhantes noutras doenças preveníveis por vacinação.

A recusa dos pais em vacinar os filhos não é o único motivo da não vacinação das crianças, nem é uma realidade exclusiva de Portugal. Com efeito, a diminuição do número de doses de reforço de vacinas administradas sugere que uma parte significativa dos pais não é recordado, se esquece ou não dá importância à necessidade de os filhos completarem o ciclo de vacinação. Há também casos em que os pais podem ter apreensões quanto à segurança de certas vacinas. Só uma pequena percentagem de pais invoca razões religiosas, filosóficas ou ideológicas para recusar a vacinação.

A Comissão, com o apoio do Centro Europeu de Prevenção e Controlo das Doenças, está a intensificar esforços para ajudar os Estados-Membros a resolver as principais causas da insuficiência das taxas de vacinação, desenvolvendo materiais de comunicação para o público, defendendo a vacinação junto dos trabalhadores do setor da saúde, apoiando o intercâmbio de boas práticas, melhorando a recolha de dados sobre a cobertura de vacinação e proporcionando orientações e ferramentas para reforçar os programas de imunização.

Para além das conclusões do Conselho sobre «Imunização infantil: sucessos e desafios da imunização infantil na Europa e perspetivas futuras», adotadas em junho de 2011, a Comissão está a organizar uma conferência sobre imunização infantil com um vasto leque de intervenientes, a fim de fazer o balanço das ações até à data realizadas e identificar as áreas prioritárias para ação futura. A conferência realizar-se-á em outubro de 2012.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-006035/12
to the Commission**

Diogo Feio (PPE)

(19 June 2012)

Subject: Vaccination of children

The Portuguese Director-General of Health, Francisco George, has recently expressed alarm about the growing number of children who are not being vaccinated against measles and other infectious diseases. The decision to forgo vaccination is being taken by parents, who, by refusing to get their children vaccinated, are not only exposing them to entirely avoidable illnesses, but are also endangering society.

1. Is the Commission aware of this situation? Is it in a position to say, on the basis of figures in its possession, whether the refusal to have children vaccinated is confined to Portugal or, on the contrary, a wider European trend?
2. What steps can the Commission take to encourage vaccination of children and prevent parents refusing it?
3. Are there contingency plans in place if the refusal of vaccination were to cause epidemics of highly infectious diseases once considered to be fully under control?

Answer given by Mr Dalli on behalf of the Commission

(23 July 2012)

The Commission is aware of a steep increase of measles cases in the EU, as a result of children not having received two doses of a measles vaccine: in the past two years, about 30,000 cases of measles were reported by EU and EEA/EFTA countries. This represents a four-fold increase compared with 2009 and 2008. No such increases have been seen for other vaccine-preventable diseases.

Parents refusing vaccination is not the only cause of children not being vaccinated, nor is it confined to Portugal. Indeed, lower coverage rates for follow-up doses of vaccines suggests that a substantial proportion of parents are not reminded, forget, or are complacent about having their child complete the vaccination course. Other parents may have concerns about the safety of certain vaccines. Only a small percentage of parents refuse vaccination on religious, philosophical or ideological grounds.

The Commission, supported by the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control, is stepping up efforts to help Member States to address the main causes of insufficient vaccination rates by developing communication material for the public, advocating vaccination to healthcare workers, supporting the exchange of best practices, improving data collection on vaccination coverage and providing guidance and tools to strengthen immunisation programmes.

Further to the Council conclusions on 'Childhood immunisation: successes and challenges of European childhood immunisation and the way forward' adopted in June 2011, the Commission is organising a conference on childhood immunisation with a wide range of stakeholders, to take stock of actions taken so far and to identify priority areas for future action. The conference will take place in October 2012.

(Versão portuguesa)

Pergunta com pedido de resposta escrita E-006036/12

à Comissão

Diogo Feio (PPE)

(19 de junho de 2012)

Assunto: Taxas cobradas pelos bancos portugueses em transferências internacionais: eventual violação dos direitos dos consumidores

Em resposta à minha pergunta E-0070/2010, a Comissão, por intermédio do Comissário Barnier, declarou que a Comissão «não tem indicações de que a prática de propor os custos a cargo do ordenante se encontra generalizada em Portugal, abrangendo também as transações na UE que não implicam uma conversão monetária. Se tal for o caso, essa prática poderia constituir uma infração ao direito português que transpõe a Diretiva 2007/64/CE. Numa primeira instância esta problemática deveria ser comunicada ao Banco de Portugal, que é a autoridade responsável pelo controlo da aplicação das normas nacionais.»

Assim, pergunto à Comissão:

1. Dispõe de mais informações acerca desta prática?
2. Sabe se esta problemática foi comunicada ao Banco de Portugal?
3. Em caso afirmativo, tem conhecimento de alguma resposta por parte desta instituição?

Resposta dada por Michel Barnier em nome da Comissão

(14 de agosto de 2012)

A Comissão não recebeu qualquer denúncia sobre esta questão e não dispõe de mais informações quanto ao facto de a referida prática se encontrar ou não generalizada em Portugal e abranger também as transações na UE que não implicam uma conversão monetária. Além disso, a Comissão não tem conhecimento da comunicação ao Banco de Portugal de quaisquer preocupações suscitadas por esta questão.

Não obstante, a Comissão solicitou ao Estado-Membro em causa o fornecimento de informações sobre a matéria. Neste contexto, a Comissão solicita igualmente ao Senhor Deputado que forneça mais pormenores sobre a questão que o preocupa, para que a mesma possa ser corretamente investigada.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-006036/12
to the Commission**

Diogo Feio (PPE)

(19 June 2012)

Subject: Fees charged by Portuguese banks on international transfers: possible violation of consumer rights

In reply to my Question E-0070/2010, the Commission, represented by Commissioner Barnier, stated that it had 'no indications as to whether the practice of proposing the "our" cost is widespread and whether it also encompasses transactions within the EU that do not require a currency exchange. If the latter were to be the case, such practice could constitute a breach of the Portuguese law transposing Directive 2007/64/EC. In the first instance, any concerns should be referred to the Central Bank of Portugal, Banco de Portugal, the competent authority for enforcing the national rules'.

In the light of the foregoing:

1. Does the Commission have any more information about the above practice?
2. Has the matter been referred to the Bank of Portugal?
3. If so, does the Commission know whether and how the Bank has responded?

Answer given by Mr Barnier on behalf of the Commission

(14 August 2012)

The Commission has not received any complaints regarding this matter and does not have any further information as to whether the practice mentioned is widespread in Portugal and whether it also encompasses transactions within the EU that do not require a currency exchange. Neither is the Commission aware of any concerns being referred to the Central Bank of Portugal.

Nevertheless, the Commission has asked the Member State concerned to provide information regarding the matter raised. In this context, the Commission would also ask the Honourable Member to provide more details as regards his concerns in order to be able to properly investigate the matter.

(Versão portuguesa)

Pergunta com pedido de resposta escrita E-006037/12

à Comissão

Diogo Feio (PPE)

(19 de junho de 2012)

Assunto: Serviço Eletrónico Europeu de Portagem — bloqueios e prospectiva

Em resposta à minha pergunta E-003108/2012, a Comissão, por intermédio do Sr. Comissário Siim Kallas, declarou que «Embora o quadro legislativo necessário para a introdução do SEEP tenha evoluído nos Estados-Membros, continuam a faltar diversos elementos essenciais à implantação e à aplicação do SEEP. Estes incluem a criação de órgãos de conciliação nacionais que promovam a mediação e a resolução de diferendos entre os concessionários rodoviários e as empresas fornecedoras de serviços de portagem, bem como a conclusão do quadro para o registo dos fornecedores de SEEP. Os Estados-Membros envidam esforços no sentido de disporem dos seus quadros legislativos e regulamentar nacionais até 8 de outubro de 2012. A partir desta data, serão intentados processos de infração contra os Estados-Membros que continuam a não dar cumprimento aos requisitos do SEEP.»

De igual modo, que «as organizações que podem tornar-se fornecedores de SEEP invocam, cada vez mais, as dificuldades colocadas por certos concessionários nos seus contactos preliminares. Nestas circunstâncias, e na ausência de fornecedores de SEEP registados até à data, não será possível dispor, até outubro de 2012, de um verdadeiro SEEP que cubra toda a Europa.»

Assim, pergunto à Comissão:

1. De que modo pretende contribuir para permitir que o SEEP entre em funcionamento com a maior brevidade?
2. Na presente data, quantos Estados ainda não deram cumprimento aos requisitos do SEEP?
3. Realisticamente, quando prevê a entrada em funcionamento do SEEP?

Resposta dada por Siim Kallas em nome da Comissão

(26 de julho de 2012)

1. A Comissão adotará brevemente uma comunicação sobre a aplicação do Serviço Eletrónico Europeu de Portagem (SEEP), que fixa as medidas destinadas a ajudar a assegurar que o SEEP entre em funcionamento o mais rapidamente possível. A Comissão gostaria igualmente de informar o Senhor Deputado de que já alertou os Ministros dos Transportes dos Estados-Membros para esta questão no Conselho dos Transportes de 7 de junho de 2012.

As medidas previstas incluem a abertura de processos de infração, quando houver provas de que os Estados-Membros não cumpriram as obrigações previstas pela legislação do SEEP até outubro de 2012. Incluem igualmente uma vigilância mais estreita dos novos sistemas de cobrança de portagens quando notificados nos termos da Diretiva 1999/62/CE relativa à imposição dos veículos pesados de mercadorias ⁽¹⁾.

Outra medida é a prestação de apoio técnico e financeiro à implantação fronteiriça precoce do SEEP a nível regional. A Comissão está atualmente a contactar as partes potencialmente interessadas dos Estados-Membros que têm os principais fluxos de tráfego internacional e sistemas de portagem eletrónicos generalizadamente instalados. Esta primeira abordagem regional tem como objetivo lançar e acelerar a implantação do SEEP. Neste contexto, a Comissão está a pensar incluir uma secção sobre o SEEP no próximo convite à apresentação de propostas do programa de trabalho RTE-T.

2. A maioria dos Estados-Membros não concluiu os procedimentos de registo dos fornecedores do SEEP.
3. A Comissão espera que a primeira aplicação do SEEP entre em funcionamento no contexto de projetos regionais como descrito no ponto 1.

⁽¹⁾ Diretiva 1999/62/CE do Parlamento Europeu e do Conselho, de 17 de junho de 1999, relativa à aplicação de imposições aos veículos pesados de mercadorias pela utilização de certas infraestruturas, JO L 187 de 20.7.1999, p. 42-50.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-006037/12
to the Commission**

Diogo Feio (PPE)

(19 June 2012)

Subject: European electronic toll service — obstacles and outlook

In reply to my Question E-003108/2012 Commissioner Siim Kallas, answering on behalf of the Commission, stated that 'although the legislative framework necessary for the introduction of EETS has progressed in the Member States, a number of elements essential to EETS deployment and implementation are still missing. These include the establishment of national Conciliation Bodies to facilitate mediation and dispute settlement between the road concessionaires and toll service companies as well as completion of the framework for the registration of EETS Providers. Member States endeavour to have their national legislative and regulatory frameworks ready by 8 October 2012. Infringement procedures will be launched as from that date against Member States which still do not comply with EETS requirements'.

He added that 'organisations eligible to become EETS Provider are increasingly invoking the difficulties raised by some concessionaires in their preliminary contacts. Under these circumstances, with no registered EETS Provider at this point in time, a fully-fledged EETS with full European coverage will not be available by October 2012'.

1. What will the Commission do to help ensure that EETS comes into operation as soon as possible?
2. At present, how many Member States have still not complied with EETS requirements?
3. Realistically, when does the Commission expect EETS to come into operation?

Answer given by Mr Kallas on behalf of the Commission

(26 July 2012)

1. The Commission will soon adopt a communication on the implementation of the European Electronic Toll Service (EETS), setting out measures intended to help ensure that EETS comes into operation as soon as possible. The Commission would also like to inform the Honourable Member that it has already drawn the attention of the Transport Ministers of the Member States on this matter in the Transport Council of 7 June 2012.

The measures envisaged include the launching of infringement procedures when evidence is available that Member States have not fulfilled their obligations within the deadline of October 2012 foreseen by the EETS legislation. They also include closer monitoring of new tolling arrangements when notified under the directive 1999/62/EC on the charging of heavy goods vehicles ⁽¹⁾.

Another measure is to provide technical and financial support to early cross-border deployment at regional level of EETS. The Commission is currently taking contacts with potentially interested stakeholders from the Member States with the main flows of international traffic and with extensive electronic tolling systems. This initial regional approach aims to kick-start and accelerate the deployment of EETS. In this context, the Commission is considering including a section on EETS in the next call for proposals of the TEN-T work programme.

2. The majority of the Member States have not finalised the procedures for registration of EETS providers.
3. The Commission expects that the first implementation of EETS will come into operation within the context of regional projects as described under point 1.

⁽¹⁾ Directive 1999/62/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 June 1999 on the charging of heavy goods vehicles for the use of certain infrastructures, OJ L 187, 20.7.1999, p. 42-50.

(Versão portuguesa)

Pergunta com pedido de resposta escrita E-006039/12

à Comissão

Diogo Feio (PPE)

(19 de junho de 2012)

Assunto: Implantes PIP: medidas imediatas — ponto da situação

Em resposta à minha pergunta E-001477/2012, o Sr. Comissário John Dalli afirmou que «A Comissão debruçou-se sobre esta situação a fim de identificar eventuais insuficiências na legislação relativa aos dispositivos médicos. As conclusões serão tidas em conta nas propostas de revisão desta legislação, previstas para 2012, cujos trabalhos preparatórios já tinham sido iniciados antes de esta problemática vir a lume» e também que «Além disso, a Comissão elaborou uma lista de medidas que poderiam ser tomadas imediatamente ao abrigo da legislação em vigor a fim de reforçar o sistema, em especial no que diz respeito às auditorias sem aviso prévio, ao ensaio das amostras e a uma melhor partilha da informação.»

Assim, pergunto à Comissão:

1. Está em condições de anunciar quando prevê apresentar as propostas de revisão da legislação?
2. Que acolhimento têm merecido as medidas concretas que elencou?
3. Têm sido tomadas com a brevidade que indicou ou têm conhecido resistências inesperadas?
4. Como avalia o seu cumprimento e o consequente reforço do sistema?

Resposta dada por John Dalli em nome da Comissão

(3 de agosto de 2012)

A adoção das propostas está prevista para o final de setembro de 2012.

A lista de medidas específicas foi bem acolhida. A sua execução foi debatida em várias reuniões com os Estados-Membros, tendo a Comissão apreciado o interesse dos mesmos em reforçar os controlos de mercado e a cooperação mútua. Os Estados-Membros encontram-se atualmente a reexaminar as respetivas designações de Organismos Notificados. Preparam também as respostas a um questionário exaustivo sobre fiscalização do mercado que servirão de base a uma ação coordenada. Ao responder ao Plano de Ação, os Organismos Notificados reveem o Código de Conduta, em especial no que se refere a auditorias surpresa.

Todavia, durante o período de consulta, os peritos dos Estados-Membros e as partes interessadas levantaram algumas questões técnicas, sobretudo no que diz respeito a determinados atos formais (regulamento de execução da Comissão relativo à supervisão de organismos notificados e recomendação da Comissão sobre auditorias). Está atualmente a proceder-se à clarificação daquelas questões e a um maior ajustamento dos atos. A Comissão espera que o último dos três atos formais seja adotado até ao final de 2012, tal como inicialmente programado.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-006039/12
to the Commission**

Diogo Feio (PPE)

(19 June 2012)

Subject: PIP implants: immediate measures — current situation

In his answer to my previous Question E-001477/2012, Commissioner John Dalli stated that 'the Commission has analysed this case to identify possible shortcomings in the medical device legislation. The findings will be taken into account in the proposals to revise this legislation, whose preparations had started before this case and which are foreseen for 2012' and that 'the Commission has also prepared a list of measures that could be taken immediately under existing legislation to reinforce the system, in particular with regard to unannounced audits, sample testing and better data sharing'.

1. Is the Commission able to say when it intends to present the proposals to revise this legislation?
2. How has the list of specific measures been received?
3. Were they adopted as swiftly as the Commission envisaged, or did they encounter unexpected resistance?
4. What is the Commission's appraisal of compliance with these measures and the resulting reinforcement of the system?

Answer given by Mr Dalli on behalf of the Commission

(3 August 2012)

The adoption of the proposals is scheduled for the end of September 2012.

The list of specific measures has been well received. Their implementation has been discussed during several meetings with the Member States and the Commission has appreciated their willingness to reinforce the controls on the market and the cooperation between them. Member States are currently reviewing their designations of Notified Bodies. They also prepare the answers to a comprehensive questionnaire on market surveillance which will be the basis for coordinated action. Responding to the action plan, Notified Bodies are revising their Code of Conduct, especially with regard to unannounced audits.

However, above all with regard to certain formal measures (Commission Implementing Regulation on the Supervision of Notified Bodies and Commission Recommendation on Audits) technical questions were raised by experts of the Member States and stakeholders during the consultations. The clarification of these questions and the fine-tuning of the measures is ongoing. The Commission expects the last of these formal measures to be adopted by the end of 2012, in line with the initial scheduling.

(Versão portuguesa)

Pergunta com pedido de resposta escrita E-006040/12

à Comissão

Diogo Feio (PPE)

(19 de junho de 2012)

Assunto: Transações comerciais: atraso nos pagamentos — ponto da situação

Em resposta à minha pergunta E-4953/2009, o senhor Comissário Günter Verheugen concordou plenamente com a minha preocupação acerca da importância que então assumia o combate aos atrasos de pagamento na UE e anunciou que uma proposta acerca desta mesma questão tinha sido submetida ao Conselho e ao Parlamento.

A Diretiva 2011/7/UE do Parlamento Europeu e do Conselho, de 16 de fevereiro de 2011, que estabelece medidas de luta contra os atrasos de pagamento nas transações comerciais, entrou em vigor em 15 de março de 2011 e corresponde à materialização desta preocupação por parte das instituições europeias.

Face à crescente crise económico-financeira, é cada vez mais gritante a necessidade de liquidez por parte das empresas e de conseguir-se esse mesmo desiderato por intermédio da agilização dos pagamentos das transações comerciais e do combate aos atrasos aos mesmos.

Assim, pergunto à Comissão:

1. Que avaliação faz da aplicação da diretiva?
2. Que países já a transpuseram?
3. Considera os seus termos suficientes, atendendo à presente crise?
4. Em caso negativo, que medidas adicionais recomenda?
5. Como avalia os atrasos nos pagamentos no seio da União Europeia?
6. Quais considera serem os principais problemas que obstam a que o combate aos atrasos nos pagamentos conheça um maior sucesso?

Resposta dada por Antonio Tajani em nome da Comissão

(8 de agosto de 2012)

Os atrasos de pagamento continuam a ser uma prática comum na Europa, apesar da correta transposição pela Diretiva 2000/35/CE, que estabelece medidas de luta contra os atrasos de pagamento nas transações comerciais. Por esse motivo, esta diretiva será substituída da Diretiva 2011/7/UE, que estabelece medidas de luta contra os atrasos de pagamento nas transações comerciais e que prevê disposições mais rigorosas. A nova diretiva, que promove uma cultura de «pagamento dentro do prazo», inclui várias melhorias significativas, sendo a mais importante de todas a harmonização dos prazos de pagamento para as autoridades públicas. Só por si, esta medida irá criar uma liquidez adicional para as empresas num montante de 179 110 milhões de euros.

Dado que a Diretiva 2011/7/UE tem de ser transposta até 16 de março de 2013, ainda é demasiado cedo para avaliar a sua execução. Tendo em conta a atual crise económica e os seus incessantes efeitos nocivos para os operadores económicos, a Comissão para a Indústria e o Empreendedorismo convidou os Estados-Membros a considerarem a possibilidade de, a título voluntário, anteciparem a transposição e a aplicação da diretiva ⁽¹⁾. Até à data, Chipre é o primeiro Estado-Membro que está prestes a concluir o processo legislativo com vista à adoção da disposição nacional de transposição ⁽²⁾.

A luta contra os atrasos de pagamento depende em muito da aplicação correta da nova diretiva por parte dos Estados-Membros. É importante sublinhar que a diretiva em si mesma não será suficiente para assegurar uma melhoria real do prazo de pagamento. Para isso exige-se também um consenso político e determinação para evoluir para uma cultura de pagamentos rápidos.

⁽¹⁾ Mais informações sobre a importância de uma transposição rápida da Diretiva 2011/7/UE e sobre as medidas adicionais adotadas pela Comissão para assistir os Estados-Membros nessa tarefa difícil, constam da resposta à pergunta escrita E-533/2012, (<http://www.europarl.europa.eu/QP-WEB>).

⁽²⁾ O Parlamento aprovou a disposição nacional cipriota a 12 de julho. A sua publicação no jornal oficial nacional deve ocorrer dentro de semanas.

Além disso, e tal como anunciado na revisão do SBA ⁽³⁾, a Comissão está atualmente a analisar o problema das práticas comerciais desleais entre empresas na cadeia de abastecimento aos retalhistas e tenciona apresentar uma comunicação até ao final de 2012.

⁽³⁾ Revisão do «Small Business Act» para a Europa [COM(2011)78 final de 23.2.2011].

(English version)

Question for written answer E-006040/12
to the Commission
Diogo Feio (PPE)
(19 June 2012)

Subject: Commercial transactions: late payments — current situation

In his answer to Question E-4953/2009, Commissioner Günter Verheugen fully agreed with the concerns raised by this Member regarding the importance of combating late payment within the EU and stated that a proposal on the subject had been submitted to Parliament and the Council.

Directive 2011/7/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 February 2011, on combating late payment in commercial transactions, came into force on 15 March 2011, as a concrete expression of the European institutions' concern over this matter.

Faced with the expanding economic and financial crisis, businesses are in ever more crying need of liquidity, and of being able to obtain it via swifter payment of commercial transactions and combating late payment.

1. How does the Commission assess the implementation of the directive?
2. Which countries have already transposed it?
3. Does the Commission consider its provisions to be adequate, in terms of the present crisis?
4. If not, what additional measures does it recommend?
5. What is its assessment of the situation concerning late payments within the EU?
6. What does the Commission consider to be the main problems hindering greater success in combating late payments?

Answer given by Mr Tajani on behalf of the Commission
(8 August 2012)

Late payment is still a common practice across Europe and this despite the correct transposition of Directive 2000/35/EC on combating late payment in commercial transactions. This is why this directive will be replaced by the more stringent provisions of Directive 2011/7/EU on combating late payment in commercial transactions. The new Directive, which promotes a culture of 'payment in time', includes a number of important improvements, most important of all the harmonisation of the payment period for public authorities. This measure alone will create an additional liquidity for businesses amounting to EUR 179.11 billion.

As Directive 2011/7/EU has to be transposed by 16 March 2013, it is too early to assess the state of implementation. In view of the current economic crisis and its continual damaging effects on economic operators, the Commission for Industry and Entrepreneurship called on Member States to consider, on a voluntary basis, an early transposition and implementation ⁽¹⁾. To date Cyprus is the first Member State on its way to finalise the legislative procedure leading to the adoption of it national measure ⁽²⁾.

Combating late payment depends significantly on the correct implementation of the new Directive by Member States. It is important to emphasise that the directive in itself will not be sufficient to ensure a real improvement of the payment period. It also requires political consensus and determination to move to a culture of prompt payment.

Besides, and as announced in the SBA Review ⁽³⁾ the Commission is currently analysing the problem of unfair trading practises between businesses in the retail supply chain and plans to come forward with a communication before the end of 2012.

⁽¹⁾ More information on the importance of an early transposition of Directive 2011/7/EU and on the additional measures adopted by the Commission to assist Member States in this challenging task, are provided in the answer to Written Question E-533/2012, <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/QP-WEB>.

⁽²⁾ The Cyprian parliament adopted its national measure on July the 12. Its publication on the national official journal is expected in the coming weeks.

⁽³⁾ Review of the 'Small Business Act' for Europe, COM(2011)78 final, 23.2.2011.

(Versão portuguesa)

Pergunta com pedido de resposta escrita E-006041/12

à Comissão

Diogo Feio (PPE)

(19 de junho de 2012)

Assunto: Guiné-Bissau: Banco Africano de Desenvolvimento

Segundo a comunicação social portuguesa, o presidente do Banco Africano de Desenvolvimento (BAD), Donald Kaberuka, anunciou a suspensão das operações da instituição na Guiné-Bissau, tendo-a justificado com as atuais circunstâncias decorrentes do derrube militar do regime democrático e da não reposição da ordem constitucional, que as põem em causa.

Assim, pergunto à Comissão:

1. Contactou o BAD a este respeito?
2. Que informações obteve?
3. Que efeitos para as populações poderão vir a decorrer desta suspensão?

Resposta dada por Andris Piebalgs em nome da Comissão

(7 de agosto de 2012)

A delegação da UE na Guiné-Bissau tinha conhecimento da suspensão das operações do Banco Africano de Desenvolvimento (BAD), através da coordenação dos doadores a nível nacional. Sujeita a verificação direta com o BAD, a delegação da União Europeia informou que na sequência do mais recente golpe de Estado na Guiné-Bissau em abril de 2012, o BAD suspendeu todos os desembolsos para os seus projetos em curso. Esta medida foi adotada relativamente à totalidade dos setores prioritários do BAD na Guiné-Bissau: as infraestruturas, a governação e a saúde. No setor da saúde, o BAD tinha um projeto de reabilitação, extensão e fornecimento de equipamento hospitalar para o Hospital Simão Mendes em Bissau, o principal hospital do país.

O pacote de ajuda ao desenvolvimento da UE para a Guiné-Bissau, de cerca de 100 milhões de euros, no âmbito do 10.º Fundo Europeu de Desenvolvimento (FED) está suspenso desde abril de 2010. Contudo, a ajuda humanitária, bem como o apoio direto à população não foram afetados. No âmbito dos Objetivos de Desenvolvimento do Milénio (ODM), a Comissão continua a responder às necessidades das populações da Guiné-Bissau no domínio da saúde. A Comissão está atualmente a elaborar um projeto de 5,5 milhões de euros para melhorar o acesso aos serviços básicos de saúde para as mulheres grávidas e as crianças com menos de 5 anos de idade nas regiões de Biombo, Cacheu, Oin e Farim.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-006041/12
to the Commission
Diogo Feio (PPE)
(19 June 2012)**

Subject: Guinea-Bissau: African Development Bank

According to the Portuguese media, the President of the African Development Bank (AfDB), Donald Kaberuka, has announced the suspension of the bank's operations in Guinea-Bissau, on the grounds that they are jeopardised by the situation arising from the military overthrow of the democratic regime and the subsequent failure to restore constitutional order.

1. Has the Commission contacted the AfDB about this matter?
2. What information has it received?
3. What effect is this suspension likely to have on the population of Guinea-Bissau?

**Answer given by Mr Piebalgs on behalf of the Commission
(7 August 2012)**

The EU Delegation in Guinea-Bissau was aware of the African Development Bank (AfDB) suspension through in-country donor coordination. Subject to verification directly with AfDB, the EU Delegation has informed that following the latest coup in Guinea-Bissau in April 2012, the AfDB has suspended all disbursements for its ongoing projects. This measure has been taken regarding all AfDB's focal sectors in Guinea-Bissau, which are infrastructure, governance and health. In the health sector, the AfDB had a project for the rehabilitation, extension and equipment provision of the Simao Mendes Hospital in Bissau, the country's main hospital.

The EU development aid package to Guinea-Bissau of about EUR 100 million under the 10th European Development Fund (EDF) has been suspended since April 2010. However, humanitarian aid and direct support to the population have not been affected. In the framework of the Millennium Development Goals (MDG) Initiative, the Commission continues to respond to the healthcare needs of the Guinea-Bissau population. The Commission is currently formulating a EUR 5.5 million project to improve access to basic health services for pregnant women and children under five years old in the Biombo, Cacheu, Oin and Farim regions.

(Versão portuguesa)

**Pergunta com pedido de resposta escrita E-006042/12
à Comissão (Vice-Presidente / Alta Representante)**

Diogo Feio (PPE)
(19 de junho de 2012)

Assunto: VP/HR — Guiné-Bissau: segurança de ex-dirigentes políticos

Segundo a comunicação social portuguesa, antigos governantes e altos quadros do Estado guineense que se haviam refugiado na delegação da União Europeia estariam a abandoná-la e a regressar a suas casas.

Ante a demora na reposição da ordem constitucional e a imposição de autoridades de transição sem mandato popular e altamente dependentes dos militares golpistas, é legítima a preocupação quanto à segurança dos antigos governantes e altos quadros depostos?

Assim, pergunto à Alta Representante:

1. Contactou os militares golpistas a este propósito?
2. E o autoproclamado governo de transição?
3. Que respostas, informações e garantias obteve da parte de ambos?
4. Como avalia o grau de segurança de que gozam os antigos governantes e altos quadros depostos?

Resposta dada pela Alta Representante/Vice-Presidente Catherine Ashton em nome da Comissão
(20 de agosto de 2012)

O Serviço Europeu para a Ação Externa fez o máximo para proteger a segurança das quatro pessoas que se refugiaram na delegação da UE em Bissau. Na sequência desta ação, duas delas (Zamora Induta e o ex-ministro do Interior, Fernando Gomes) conseguiram deixar a Guiné-Bissau em direção a Portugal. As outras duas (a ex-Primeira-Ministra em exercício de funções, Maria Adiato, e o ex-Presidente da Comissão Nacional de Eleições, Desejado da Lima) deixaram voluntariamente as instalações da delegação depois de terem recebido um compromisso formal das autoridades transitórias de proteção da respetiva segurança, o que as pessoas em causa consideraram suficientemente fiável.

(English version)

Question for written answer E-006042/12
to the Commission (Vice-President/High Representative)
Diogo Feio (PPE)
(19 June 2012)

Subject: VP/HR — Guinea-Bissau: safety of former leaders

According to the Portuguese media, former leaders and high-ranking officials of the Guinean State who had taken refuge in the EU Delegation in Bissau are on the point of leaving to return to their homes.

In view of the delay in restoring constitutional order and the imposition of transition authorities with no popular mandate and who are highly dependent on the military putschists, is there reason to fear for the safety of these ousted former rulers and high-ranking officials?

1. Has the High Representative contacted the leaders of the military coup concerning this matter?
2. Has she contacted the self-proclaimed transitional government?
3. What answers, information and guarantees did she receive from both of these?
4. In her opinion, what level of safety can these former leaders and high-ranking officials count on?

Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Ashton on behalf of the Commission
(20 August 2012)

The EEAS did its at most to protect the security of the four people who took refuge in the EU Delegation in Bissau. As a result, two of them (Adm. Zamora Induta and the ex-Minister of Interior, Fernando Gomes) were able to leave Guinea-Bissau for Portugal. The other two (ex-Acting Prime Minister Maria Adiato and ex-President of the National Elections Committee, Desejado da Lima) left voluntarily the premises of the Delegation after receiving the formal commitment of the transitional authorities to protect their safety, which the persons concerned considered sufficiently reassuring.

(Versão portuguesa)

**Pergunta com pedido de resposta escrita E-006043/12
à Comissão (Vice-Presidente / Alta Representante)**

Diogo Feio (PPE)
(19 de junho de 2012)

Assunto: VP/HR — Guiné-Bissau: força militar da Cedeao

Na sequência de um acordo de transição não subscrito pelas autoridades depostas e pelo principal partido político da Guiné-Bissau e que viola a exigência de reposição da ordem constitucional constante das resoluções das principais organizações internacionais, a Cedeao fez deslocar para aquele país africano um contingente de 600 homens, maioritariamente provenientes da Nigéria.

Assim, pergunto à Alta Representante:

1. Que comentário lhe merece a entrada de um contingente militar na Guiné-Bissau ao arrepio da opinião dos seus principais dirigentes, instituições e partidos políticos?
2. Considera que uma força deste tipo tem condições para garantir o retorno à ordem constitucional, exigida pelo Conselho de Segurança das Nações Unidas e pela União Europeia?
3. Não crê que a imparcialidade da mesma se encontra comprometida e que este facto arrisca cavar as tensões existentes e pode pôr em causa a segurança dos militares que a integram e da própria população guineense?
4. Não julga que a União Europeia deveria bater-se pela projecção na Guiné-Bissau de uma força multinacional imparcial capaz de estabilizar o país e que integrasse, para além da Cedeao, forças de outras organizações internacionais?
5. Estaria disponível para integrar semelhante força?

Resposta dada pela Alta Representante/Vice-Presidente Catherine Ashton em nome da Comissão

(24 de agosto de 2012)

A Alta Representante/Vice-Presidente condenou o golpe de Estado de 12 de abril na Guiné-Bissau, tendo exigido o restabelecimento imediato da ordem constitucional, incluindo um processo eleitoral democrático e o afastamento dos militares relativamente às questões políticas através de uma ampla e profunda reforma do setor da segurança.

O Governo de transição não resulta de um processo democrático e não é inclusivo. Além disso, parece permanecer sob o controlo das forças armadas. Antes de reconhecer quaisquer autoridades de transição, a UE procuraria que o processo se tornasse mais inclusivo, incluindo todos os principais grupos políticos e excluindo os militares.

A Alta Representante/Vice-Presidente apoia os esforços envidados pela Cedeao para facilitar o regresso à ordem constitucional na Guiné-Bissau e está consciente da complexidade dos desafios com que a Cedeao é confrontada. A Alta Representante/Vice-Presidente congratula-se com os esforços envidados pela Cedeao para promover a participação de todos na Guiné-Bissau.

Neste contexto, a presença da missão militar da Cedeao na Guiné-Bissau (Ecomib) pode contribuir para o regresso à ordem constitucional, mas por si só, não é suficiente.

A UE encoraja todas as partes interessadas a trabalhar no âmbito da Resolução 2048/2012 do Conselho de Segurança da ONU, tendo em vista chegar a acordo sobre um roteiro inclusivo, com parâmetros e calendário acordados, para o regresso à ordem constitucional, a execução da reforma do setor da segurança, a luta contra a impunidade, o combate ao tráfico de droga e a eliminação de qualquer controlo militar sobre o poder político.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-006043/12
to the Commission (Vice-President/High Representative)**

Diogo Feio (PPE)

(19 June 2012)

Subject: VP/HR — Guinea-Bissau: Ecowas military force

Following a transition agreement which was not signed by the deposed authorities or by the main political party in Guinea-Bissau and which fails to restore permanent constitutional order as demanded in resolutions passed by the main international organisations, Ecowas has deployed a contingent of 600 men to this African country, mainly from Nigeria.

1. How does the High Representative view the arrival in Guinea-Bissau of a military contingent, against the wishes of its principal leaders, institutions and political parties?
2. Does she consider that such a force will be able to guarantee a return to constitutional order, as demanded by the UN Security Council and the EU?
3. Does she not believe the neutrality of this force to be compromised and that this is likely to exacerbate existing tensions and endanger the safety of the military personnel involved, as well as the local population?
4. Does the VP/HR not consider that the EU should advocate the deployment in Guinea-Bissau of an impartial multinational force capable of stabilising the country and involving personnel from other international organisations apart from Ecowas?
5. Would she be prepared to put together a force of this type?

Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Ashton on behalf of the Commission

(24 August 2012)

The HR/VP condemned the 12 April coup in Guinea-Bissau and demanded the immediate restoration of the constitutional order, including a democratic electoral process and the withdrawal of the military from political affairs through a deep and broad security sector reform.

The transitional government is not the result of a democratic process and is not inclusive. Furthermore, it seems to remain under the control of the armed forces. Before recognising any transitional authorities, the EU would look for it to become a more inclusive process, including all major political groups and excluding the military.

The HR/VP supports the efforts by Ecowas to facilitate the return to constitutional order in Guinea-Bissau and is aware of the complexity of the challenges with which Ecowas is confronted. The HR/VP welcomes the efforts by Ecowas to promote inclusiveness in Guinea-Bissau.

In this context, the presence of the Ecowas military mission in Guinea-Bissau (ECOMIB) may contribute to the return to the constitutional order, but in itself, it is not sufficient.

The EU encourages all stakeholders to work within the framework of the UNSC Resolution 2048/2012 in view to agreeing on an inclusive roadmap, with agreed benchmarks and calendar, for the return to constitutional order, the implementation of the security sector reform, fight against impunity, combat drug trafficking and removal of any military grip on power.

(Versão portuguesa)

**Pergunta com pedido de resposta escrita E-006044/12
à Comissão (Vice-Presidente / Alta Representante)**

Diogo Feio (PPE)
(19 de junho de 2012)

Assunto: VP/HR — Guiné-Bissau: violência contra manifestantes

O Uniogbis — United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Guinea-Bissau — condenou a repressão de que foram alvo manifestantes que exerciam o seu direito de protesto junto das suas instalações.

As ações de intimidação e violência sobre os manifestantes foram levadas a cabo por forças de segurança e de defesa afetas ao golpe do passado dia 12 de abril e confirmam o cerceamento das liberdades cívicas e políticas que resultaram do derrube da ordem constitucional na Guiné-Bissau.

Assim, pergunto à Alta Representante:

1. Contactou os militares golpistas a este propósito?
2. E o autoproclamado governo de transição?
3. Que respostas, informações e garantias obteve da parte de ambos?
4. Tem conhecimento de mais violações da liberdade de manifestação e de expressão na Guiné-Bissau?

Resposta dada pela Alta Representante/Vice-Presidente Catherine Ashton em nome da Comissão
(27 de agosto de 2012)

A Alta Representante/Vice-Presidente condenou oficialmente o golpe de 12 de abril de 2012 na Guiné-Bissau, tendo exigido o restabelecimento imediato da ordem constitucional, incluindo um processo eleitoral democrático e o afastamento dos militares relativamente às questões políticas através de uma ampla e profunda reforma do setor da segurança.

A Alta Representante/Vice-Presidente apelou ao respeito pelos Direitos Humanos, tendo recordado que os infratores serão responsabilizados.

A delegação da UE abstém-se de contactos oficiais com o governo de transição que não é reconhecido pela UE.

(English version)

Question for written answer E-006044/12
to the Commission (Vice-President/High Representative)
Diogo Feio (PPE)
(19 June 2012)

Subject: VP/HR — Guinea-Bissau: violence against protestors

The United Nations Integrated Peace-Building Office in Guinea-Bissau (UNIOGBIS) has condemned the use of force against demonstrators exercising their right to protest outside its premises.

Intimidatory and violent action was taken against the demonstrators by security and defence forces linked to the military coup on 12 April 2012, confirming that civil and political rights are being restricted as a result of the overthrow of constitutional order in Guinea-Bissau.

1. Has the High Representative contacted the leaders of the military coup about this matter?
2. Has she contacted the self-proclaimed transitional government?
3. What response, information and guarantees has she received from both of the above?
4. Is the High Representative aware of any further violations of the right to freedom of protest and expression in Guinea-Bissau?

Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Ashton on behalf of the Commission
(27 August 2012)

The HR/VP officially condemned the 12 April 2012 coup in Guinea-Bissau and demanded the immediate restoration of the constitutional order, including a democratic electoral process and the withdrawal of the military from political affairs through a deep and broad security sector reform.

She called for the respect of Human Rights and reminded that violators will be held responsible.

The EU Delegation abstains from official contacts with the transitional government which is not recognised by the EU.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-006045/12
to the Commission**

Timothy Kirkhope (ECR)

(19 June 2012)

Subject: Improved budget monitoring mechanisms — disaggregated data on children

Article 3 of the Lisbon Treaty explicitly recognises the promotion of children's rights in internal and external affairs as an objective of the EU. Article 24 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights recognises the principle of the best interest of the child and the right of all children to participation. The Europe 2020 strategy outlines targets for Europe in 2020. Of the five targets, two are directly linked to children and youth: education and poverty.

Currently, the Commission does not collect or provide consolidated information on expenditure on children through its funding instruments and programmes. DG Justice is in the process of developing its data collection mechanisms, and there is a need to ensure that data on children will be available in order to (a) track progress and (b) assess the needs for further investments towards the achievement of agreed objectives and quantitative targets.

With these points in mind, how is the Commission planning to ensure the timely, accurate and disaggregated data collection needed to monitor progress towards meeting the policy objectives and financial targets for children in the next MFF (2014-2020)?

Answer given by Mrs Reding on behalf of the Commission

(31 July 2012)

One of the specific objectives of the Rights and Citizenship Programme, proposed by the Commission for the period 2014-20, is to enhance the respect of the rights of the child. The Programme is currently under negotiation with the European Parliament and the Council.

The Commission aims to strengthen its monitoring mechanisms for the implementation of the Programme, and detailed provisions on regular monitoring, on evaluation and on indicators are included in the proposal. The aim is to monitor and evaluate the extent to which each of the Programme's specific objectives, including the specific objective on children's rights, has been achieved through funding by the Programme. Having a specific objective dedicated to children's rights will make it easier to monitor the related expenditure.

In addition, it is also planned that the indicators for the Programme's monitoring will be disaggregated by different criteria, including age. Similar provisions on monitoring, evaluation and indicators are also included in the Justice Programme and detailed monitoring is planned also in other Programmes that have children among their target groups under the next Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF). This detailed monitoring will enable the Commission to monitor progress towards meeting its policy objectives and financial targets during the next MFF period.

(Nederlandse versie)

Vraag met verzoek om schriftelijk antwoord E-006049/12

aan de Commissie

Marietje Schaake (ALDE)

(19 juni 2012)

Betreft: Aanwezigheid van schepen met Russische wapens voor het regime van Bashar al-Assad in EU-wateren

Op 9 juni 2012 verscheen het bericht dat het schip de *Professor Katsman* op 26 mei jl. Russische wapens in de Syrische haven Tartus heeft afgeleverd ⁽¹⁾. Het schip is naar verluidt geregistreerd bij de North West Shipping Company, die eigendom is van Universal Cargo Logistics (UCL). UCL heeft toegegeven ⁽²⁾ dat de *Professor Katsman* Syrië heeft aangedaan, maar ontkent op de hoogte te zijn geweest van de lading. UCL heeft ook verklaard dat de lading in Sint-Petersburg aan boord was gebracht. Volgens UCL heeft het bedrijf geen enkele internationale (VN) sanctie omzeild. Het is echter zeer waarschijnlijk dat het schip op weg van Sint-Petersburg naar Tartus door wateren van EU-lidstaten is gevaren, en daarbij mogelijkwerwijs EU-sancties tegen Syrië heeft overtreden. UCL heeft een kantoor in Amsterdam, in Nederland. Ik verwijs ook naar eerdere vragen over leveringen van Russische wapens aan Syrië (E-004020/2012 en E-000493/2012). Op 17 juni werd bekend dat de VS en het VK een ander schip in EU-wateren in de gaten houden dat mogelijkwerwijs helikopters en raketten vervoert ⁽³⁾.

1. Is de Commissie op de hoogte van het feit dat de leveringen van Russische wapens aan Assad, in het bijzonder door de *Professor Katsman* op 26 mei jl. en door het schip met helikopters en raketten aan boord, gewoon doorgaan?
2. Kan de Commissie bevestigen dat de *Professor Katsman* door EU-wateren is gevaren, en kan zij, indien dit inderdaad het geval is, aangeven of zij weet of de respectieve lidstaten geprobeerd hebben de aard van de lading van het schip vast te stellen?
3. Welke verantwoordelijkheden hebben de lidstaten uit hoofde van de op dit moment door de EU tegen Syrië ingestelde sanctieregelingen om mogelijke schendingen daarvan in EU-wateren proactief te onderzoeken? Controleert de Commissie of de lidstaten op proactieve wijze de naleving van de EU-sancties tegen Syrië waarborgen?
4. Is de Commissie bereid een ad-hoc marinemissie op poten te zetten om te verhinderen dat schepen met wapens voor het regime-Assad aan boord in overtreding van de EU-sancties door EU-wateren varen, en zo niet, waarom niet?
5. Kan de Commissie bevestigen dat UCL een kantoor heeft in Amsterdam, in Nederland?
6. Is de Commissie bevoegd en/of in staat om, gezien het feit dat UCL kantoor houdt in een lidstaat van de EU, een onderzoek in te stellen naar zowel het gedrag van het bedrijf, alsook naar de wettigheid (verenigbaarheid met de EU-wetgeving) van zijn wapenleveranties aan het regime-Assad, en zo niet, waarom niet?
7. Is de Commissie bereid de Nederlandse autoriteiten te vragen een onderzoek in te stellen naar de vermeende bedrijfsactiviteiten van UCL indien de Commissie zelf niet de bevoegdheid heeft dat te doen, en zo niet, waarom niet?
8. Welke concrete maatregelen neemt de Commissie om de levering van wapens door Rusland aan Assad te voorkomen?

Antwoord van hoge vertegenwoordiger/vicevoorzitter Ashton namens de Commissie

(7 september 2012)

De lidstaten zijn verantwoordelijk voor de toepassing en handhaving van het wapenembargo tegen Syrië. Besluit 2011/782/GBVB ⁽⁴⁾ van de Raad betreffende beperkende maatregelen tegen Syrië is onlangs gewijzigd bij Besluit 2012/420/GBVB ⁽⁵⁾ van de Raad, dat op 24 juli 2012 in werking is getreden. Dit bepaalt dat indien een lidstaat beschikt over informatie op grond waarvan een redelijk vermoeden bestaat dat de vracht van een vaartuig op weg naar Syrië in een zeehaven of in de territoriale wateren van de lidstaat verboden goederen bevat, de lidstaat dit vaartuig moet inspecteren.

⁽¹⁾ <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/syria/9321536/The-Russian-oligarch-in-Britain-and-ship-taking-arms-to-Syria.html>

⁽²⁾ <http://www.uclholding.ru/en/press/pressrelease/600.phtml>

⁽³⁾ <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/syria/9336170/US-enlists-Britains-help-to-stop-ship-carrying-Russian-attack-helicopters-to-Syria.html>

⁽⁴⁾ PB L 319 van 2.12.2011, blz. 56.

⁽⁵⁾ PB L 196 van 24.7.2012, blz. 59.

De Commissie heeft onlangs maatregelen voorgesteld om de lidstaten beter in staat te stellen op dit gebied op te treden; zo moet onder meer de verplichting voorafgaandelijk informatie te verstrekken van toepassing zijn op alle goederen die het douanegebied van de Unie naar Syrië verlaten ⁽⁶⁾.

De Commissie is op de hoogte van de berichten in de pers dat de *Professor Katsman* Russische wapens aan Syrië zou hebben geleverd, maar beschikt niet over specifieke aanvullende informatie. De Commissie heeft vernomen dat UCL een kantoor heeft in Amsterdam en dat de Nederlandse rechtshandavingsinstanties deze zaak momenteel onderzoeken.

⁽⁶⁾ JOIN(2012) 23.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-006049/12
to the Commission
Marietje Schaake (ALDE)
(19 June 2012)**

Subject: Vessels carrying Russian weapons to the Bashar al-Assad regime through EU waters

It was reported on 9 June 2012 that Russian-made weapons were delivered on 26 May by a vessel, registered under the name of *Professor Katsman*, in the Syrian harbour of Tartus ⁽¹⁾. The vessel is said to be registered with North West Shipping Company, which is owned by Universal Cargo Logistics (UCL). UCL has admitted ⁽²⁾ that the vessel had docked in Syria, but said it had no knowledge of the cargo's content. UCL also stated that the cargo was taken on board at the port of St Petersburg. According to UCL, the company has not violated any international (UN) sanctions. However, en route from St Petersburg to Tartus, the vessel most likely sailed through waters belonging to EU Member States, possibly violating EU sanctions against Syria. UCL has an office in Amsterdam, the Netherlands. I also refer to earlier questions about Russian arms supplies to Syria: E-004020/2012 and E-000493/2012. On 17 June it was reported that the US and UK are monitoring another ship in EU waters, which is possibly carrying helicopters and missiles ⁽³⁾.

1. Is the Commission aware of the ongoing deliveries of Russian weapons to Assad, particularly by the *Professor Katsman* in Tartus on 26 May and the ship carrying helicopters and missiles?
2. Can the Commission confirm whether the *Professor Katsman* sailed through EU waters? If so, is the Commission aware of any actions taken by the respective Member States to investigate the vessel's cargo?
3. What responsibilities do Member States have under the current EU sanctions regulations against Syria to proactively investigate possible violations of sanctions in EU waters? Does the Commission monitor whether Member States are proactively ensuring compliance with EU sanctions against Syria?
4. Is the Commission willing to set up an ad hoc naval monitoring mission to prevent ships carrying weapons for Assad from passing through EU waters in violation of EU sanctions? If not, why not?
5. Can the Commission confirm that UCL has an office in Amsterdam, the Netherlands?
6. Given the statutory presence of UCL in a Member State, is the Commission competent and/or able, to investigate both the company's conduct and the lawfulness, under EC law, of its weapon deliveries to the Assad regime? If not, why not?
7. Is the Commission willing to ask the Dutch authorities to carry out an investigation into UCL's alleged business operations, should the Commission lack the powers to do so itself? If not, why not?
8. What specific steps is the Commission taking to prevent the supply of weapons from Russia to Assad?

**Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Ashton on behalf of the Commission
(7 September 2012)**

Implementation and enforcement of the arms embargo concerning Syria is the responsibility of Member States. Council Decision 2011/782/CFSP ⁽⁴⁾ concerning restrictive measures against Syria has recently been amended by Council Decision 2012/420/CFSP ⁽⁵⁾ which came into effect on the 24th July 2012. This provides that if a Member State has reasonable grounds to believe that the cargo of a vessel bound for Syria within a seaport or territorial sea of the Member State contains prohibited items, the Member State shall inspect such a vessel.

The Commission has recently proposed measures to enhance the ability of Member States' action in this area including that the obligation to provide advance information shall apply to all goods leaving the customs territory of the Union to Syria ⁽⁶⁾.

⁽¹⁾ <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/syria/9321536/The-Russian-oligarch-in-Britain-and-ship-taking-arms-to-Syria.html>

⁽²⁾ <http://www.ucholding.ru/en/press/pressrelease/600.phtml>.

⁽³⁾ <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/syria/9336170/US-enlists-Britains-help-to-stop-ship-carrying-Russian-attack-helicopters-to-Syria.html>

⁽⁴⁾ OJ L 319, 2.12.2011, p. 56.

⁽⁵⁾ OJ L 196, 24.7.2012, p. 59.

⁽⁶⁾ JOIN(2012) 23.

The Commission is aware of the allegations in the press that the Professor Katsman delivered Russian weapons to Syria, but holds no specific additional information. The Commission understands that UCL has an office in Amsterdam, and that Dutch enforcement authorities are investigating this case.

(České znění)

Otázka k písemnému zodpovězení E-006051/12

Komisi

Zuzana Roithová (PPE)

(19. června 2012)

Předmět: Diskriminační smluvní podmínky půjčoven automobilů

Celoevropsky působící společnosti půjčující automobily s významným postavením na trhu mají často ve smluvních podmínkách ustanovení fragmentující vnitřní trh a působící diskriminujícím způsobem na volný pohyb do některých členských států. Tyto společnosti (mezi nimi např. společnost Hertz) ve všeobecných obchodních podmínkách neumožňují, aby jejich klienti s vozidlem vycestovali do určitých členských zemí EU, např. z Francie či Německa do zemí, jako jsou Bulharsko, Estonsko, Řecko, Litva, Lotyšsko nebo Rumunsko. S určitými typy pronajatých vozů nesmí nájemce vjet ani do České republiky, Itálie, Maďarska, Polska, Slovenska či Slovinska. Občany postižených států podobné praktiky staví do nerovného postavení.

Takové postupy rovnou mohou ovlivnit nepříznivým způsobem turistický ruch v daných zemích a působit tak významné ekonomické ztráty. Tato omezení platí, přestože dané společnosti samy či prostřednictvím svých smluvních partnerů operují na území daných států. Argumentem není geografická vzdálenost, jelikož se v určitých případech jedná i o sousední země. V případě porušení takových omezení pozbývají pojištění klientů uzavřená prostřednictvím těchto půjčoven platnosti a nájemce pronajímateli zodpovídá za všechny škody, poplatky apod. O těchto omezeních nejsou běžně klienti společností obeznámeni a zejména tyto restrikce volného pohybu služeb nejsou opodstatněné objektivními nediskriminačními kritérii (viz. např. čl. 20 odst. 2 směrnice o službách).

1. Nedomnívá se Komise, že tato praxe uměle fragmentuje vnitřní trh, což může mít vliv na cenovou politiku daných společností?
2. Není Komise toho názoru, že může docházet tímto postupem k zneužití významného postavení na trhu v rámci férové hospodářské soutěže?
3. Nemůže podobné jednání mít znaky nekalých obchodních praktik a být tak v rozporu se spotřebitelským *acquis*?
4. Nejedná se o rozpor s evropskými pravidly vyplývajícími ze směrnice o službách, směrnice o spotřebitelských právech a směrnice o nepřiměřených spotřebitelských smluvních podmínkách či schengenského *acquis*?
5. V případě, že by půjčovny reagovaly na podmínky jim stanovené pojišťovnami, není potřeba prověřit postupy pojišťoven?
6. Všeobecné obchodní podmínky s popsánymi restrikcemi mohou ovlivnit volný pohyb osob a služeb a být tak v přímém či nepřímém rozporu se základními principy evropského práva, zejména se zásadou nediskriminace. Pokud se potvrdí tyto a další výše zmíněné obavy, provede Komise náležité prošetření a přikročí k nápravě (případně vyzve k tomu příslušné dozorové orgány jednotlivých členských států)?

Odpověď pana Barniera jménem Komise

(6. srpna 2012)

Ustanovením čl. 20 odst. 2 směrnice o službách se zakazuje diskriminace příjemců služeb na základě státní příslušnosti nebo místa bydliště. Praxe omezování území, na které mohou klienti s vozidly autopůjčoven vycestovat, nesouvisí se státní příslušností ani s místem bydliště klienta, a proto se o diskriminaci nejedná.

Půjčovny vozidel se mohou na základě posouzení nebezpečí poškození nebo krádeže vozidla v určitých oblastech rozhodnout, že budou uplatňovat územní omezení. Tuto praxi upravuje vnitrostátní smluvní právo. Územní omezení souvisí s tzv. havarijním pojištěním motorových vozidel, na které se spíše než směrnice o pojištění motorových vozidel 2009/103/ES vztahují vnitrostátní právní předpisy o pojištění. Komise proto doporučuje obrátit se s touto záležitostí na kontrolní orgány příslušného členského státu.

Je zřejmé, že Vámi popsaná praxe zřejmě nespadá do oblasti působnosti pravidel hospodářské soutěže EU, neboť neobsahuje prvky, které by svědčily o existenci chování, které by se dalo považovat za protikonkurenční dohodu, rozhodnutí nebo dohodnutou praxi mezi dvěma nebo několika podniky ve smyslu článku 101 SFEU nebo za zneužití dominantního postavení na trhu ve smyslu článku 102 SFEU. Nic nenasvědčuje zejména tomu, že tato praxe pramení z nějakých protikonkurenčních jednání mezi pojišťovnami a půjčovnami automobilů. Kromě toho neexistují ani žádné známky toho, že by nějaká půjčovna vozidel nebo pojišťovna (pokud by to byla ona, která by ukládala taková územní omezení) zaujímal dominantní postavení na některém z příslušných trhů v rámci EU.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-006051/12
to the Commission**

Zuzana Roithová (PPE)

(19 June 2012)

Subject: Discriminatory terms in car rental contracts

Car-hire firms operating EU-wide and holding a significant market share often include in their contractual terms clauses that fragment the internal market and have a discriminatory effect on freedom of movement to certain Member States. In their general terms and conditions, these companies (including, for example, Hertz) do not permit their clients to travel with a hired vehicle to certain EU countries, for example with a vehicle hired in France or Germany to countries such as Bulgaria, Estonia, Greece, Latvia, Lithuania or Romania. With certain types of vehicle, clients are indeed not allowed to travel even to the Czech Republic, Italy, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia or Slovenia. Citizens of the affected countries thus find themselves put in an unfair position.

Such practices may have a direct adverse effect on tourism in the countries concerned and thus cause significant economic losses. These restrictions apply even though the firms in question operate, directly or through contractual partners, on the territory of the countries concerned. The reason for the restrictions is also not geographical distance since in certain cases the countries are neighbours. In the event of a breach of these restrictions, the insurance concluded by the client through the car-hire firm is invalidated and the client is liable to the rental firm for all damage, fines, etc. Clients are often unaware of these restrictions. Above all, these restrictions on the free movement of services are not justified on any objective non-discriminatory grounds (see for example Article 20(2) of the services directive).

1. Does the Commission not consider that these practices constitute an artificial fragmentation of the internal market that may influence the pricing policy of the companies concerned?
2. Does the Commission not consider that this may result in abuse of a significant market position and disrupt fair competition on the market?
3. Can such conditions not amount to unfair commercial practices and thus constitute a breach of the consumer acquis?
4. Is this situation not in breach of European rules based on the services directive, the consumer rights directive and the unfair business-to-consumer commercial practices directive, or of the Schengen acquis?
5. If car-hire firms are reacting to terms imposed on them by insurance companies, is there not a case for investigating the practices of the insurance industry?
6. General business terms and conditions containing the abovementioned restrictions may affect the free movement of persons and services and thus directly or indirectly breach the basic principles of European law, especially the principle of non-discrimination. If this concern and others previously mentioned prove to be justified, will the Commission conduct an immediate investigation and redress the situation (or call on the appropriate supervisory authorities in the Member States to do so)?

Answer given by Mr Barnier on behalf of the Commission

(6 August 2012)

Article 20(2) of the Services Directive prohibits discrimination of service recipients on the basis of their nationality or place of residence. The practice of restricting the territory into which rental vehicles may be brought does not relate to the nationality or place of residence of the customer and therefore does not apply here.

Car rental firms may decide to impose territorial restrictions based on an assessment of the risk of damage to or theft of their vehicles in certain territories. This practice is regulated in national contract law. The territorial restrictions relate to the so-called first party motor insurance, which is not regulated by Motor Insurance Directive 2009/103/EC but rather by national insurance law. The Commission would thus suggest referring this matter to the national supervisory authorities concerned.

The practices described do not appear to fall within the scope of the EU competition rules as there are no elements to suggest the existence of behaviour which could amount to an anticompetitive agreement, decision or concerted practice between two or more undertakings in the sense of Article 101 TFEU or to an abuse of a dominant position in the sense of Article 102 TFEU. In particular, there are no indications that the practices stem from any anti-competitive discussions between insurers and car rental companies. Moreover, there is no indication that any car rental firm or insurance company (if the latter were the one imposing such territorial restrictions) holds a dominant position on any relevant market within the EU.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-006052/12
to the Commission (Vice-President/High Representative)**

Nicole Sinclaire (NI)

(19 June 2012)

Subject: VP/HR — Recognition of same-sex partnerships in Peru

In response to a question I had raised during his address to EuroLat members in the European Parliament on 13 June 2012, Ollanta Humala, the President of Peru, said that his country had no intention of officially recognising same-sex partnerships.

The trade agreement between the EU and Peru (and Colombia) emphasises the need for progress in the area of human rights.

Could the Vice-President/High Representative please confirm that the recognition of same-sex partnerships is a human right, and can she assure me that she will raise this matter with the Peruvian President?

Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Ashton on behalf of the Commission

(27 July 2012)

The Trade Agreement concluded between the EU and Colombia and Peru does indeed contain commitments and incentives to further promote human rights in both countries. However, there is no formal obligation based on international human rights law for states to recognise same sex partnerships legally. Nevertheless, general human rights principles — such as the principle of non-discrimination, the right to equality before the law, the right to privacy, the right to work, the right to health, and the rights of children — should be applied to persons living in same sex partnerships as to everyone else. The EU promotes these human rights principles in its relations with Peru as well as with other third countries.

(English version)

Question for written answer E-006053/12
to the Commission (Vice-President/High Representative)
Phil Bennion (ALDE)
(19 June 2012)

Subject: VP/HR — Deterioration of the political situation in Bangladesh

Given the worrying deterioration of the political situation in Bangladesh, the alarming number of disappearances of members of the opposition but also the repression of the political opposition including arrests of their leaders, support and reactivity from the European Union is particularly important in view of the approaching general elections in 2014. Without any support, Bangladesh runs a strong risk of reverting to the antagonistic climate that surrounded the chaotic 2007 elections which brought the country to the brink of outright army intervention.

In the light of this, can the Vice-President/High Representative answer the following questions:

1. Has the European External Action Service (EEAS) or the Vice-President/High Representative herself raised the issue of the alarming number of enforced disappearances of senior opposition figures, and in particular of Mr Elias Ali? Furthermore, has pressure been applied on the Bangladeshi Government for a thorough and transparent investigation of these cases and for the perpetrators to be brought before an independent judge?
2. What plans does the Vice-President/High Representative have to make sure that the increasingly harsh crackdown on the political opposition in Bangladesh does not contribute to a wider security problem in South Asia, while the freedom of manoeuvre of the parliamentary opposition is restricted, potentially driving opposition underground and into Islamic extremist movements?
3. Does the Vice-President/High Representative support the view that a caretaker government should be installed for the 2014 election campaign period, similarly to a number of previous parliamentary elections in Bangladesh, to ensure that free and fair elections can take place?

Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Ashton on behalf of the Commission
(27 July 2012)

The HR/VP has stressed its concern about the recent disappearances in Bangladesh, including, the cases of Mr Ilias Ali and his driver, Mr Ansar Ali, and also the killing of the trade union activist, Mr Aminul Islam, last April. The circumstances surrounding these cases are still to be clarified and the HR/VP will continue to follow developments closely.

These points were particularly underlined in the press conference held by EU Heads of Mission in Dhaka on 9th May on the occasion of Europe Day. The EU's concern has been widely reported by the Bangladeshi media, and the EU Delegation has also called for a full investigation of the abovementioned cases while urging all political actors to exercise restraint.

The EU has noted the growing confrontation between the Government and the opposition, including the BNP-led public demonstrations against the Government, following last year's constitutional reform which led to the abolition of the caretaker government mechanism. In its contacts with all political forces and in its public statements, the HR/VP has stressed the need to avoid a confrontational approach to politics and engage in constructive dialogue inside and outside the parliament, with a view to ensuring the inclusiveness of the next elections.

While it is for the political actors in Bangladesh to decide on their future legal framework, the HR/VP believes that the functioning of the democratic institutions is, and will be, one of the most critical elements contributing to Bangladesh's stability. Institution building is also an important aspect of the development programmes of the EU and its Member States, as reflected in the recent document Bangladesh-Europe 2012, published on the EEAS website.

(Nederlandse versie)

Vraag met verzoek om schriftelijk antwoord E-006054/12
aan de Commissie
Marietje Schaake (ALDE)
(19 juni 2012)

Betreft: Aanhouden visum aanvragen Iraanse kenniswerkers door nieuwe EU sancties

Donderdag 14 juni jl. heeft de Nederlandse minister van Buitenlandse Zaken in een brief aan de Tweede Kamer van het Nederlandse parlement geschreven dat „aanvragen van Iraniërs voor een machtiging tot voorlopig verblijf (MVV) of een verblijfsvergunning ten behoeve van werk en/of promotie (wordt) aangehouden” ⁽¹⁾. Als reden voor het aanhouden van de aanvragen van deze kenniswerkers (volgens de Immigratie en Naturalisatie Dienst („IND”) gaat het om 125 aanvragen) geeft de minister de sancties tegen Iran, zoals vastgelegd in EU verordening 267/2012 van 23 maart 2012 (de „nieuwe sancties”) ⁽²⁾. Naast deze kenniswerkers zijn ook Iraanse studenten bezorgd over het uitstel van behandeling omdat ook al toegekende visa mogelijk niet op tijd worden verlengd en/of nieuwe aanvragen mogelijk worden afgewezen. Zonder verlenging moeten betrokkenen terugkeren naar Iran. Enkele Iraniërs hebben een bericht ontvangen dat de behandeling van hun aanvraag ook wordt opgeschort.

1. Is de Commissie op de hoogte van vergelijkbare beleidswijzigingen n.a.v. nieuwe sancties tegen Iran, in andere lidstaten van de Europese Unie, zo ja, welke lidstaten?
2. Is de Commissie van mening dat onder „technische assistentie” zoals bedoeld in artikel 1, sub b) van de nieuwe sancties ook het geven van (universitair) onderwijs, of het ontvangen van trainingen voor arbeid, dan wel het verrichten van arbeid vallen? Zo ja? Waarom?
3. Kan de Commissie uitleggen waarom zij van mening is dat de nieuwe sancties ook beperkingen dient op te leggen aan de mogelijkheid van Iraanse studenten om een opleiding te volgen, of te werken, in de EU?
4. Is de Commissie met mij van mening dat het Europese sanctiebeleid geen doel op zich moet worden, maar louter ingezet dient te worden om een politieke oplossing voor de bezorgdheid betreffende de doelstellingen van het Iraanse nucleaire programma weg te nemen? Zo nee, waarom niet?
5. Is de Commissie met mij van mening dat Iraanse studenten, door een deel van hun studie in de Europese Unie te volgen, bij terugkeer kunnen bijdragen aan het wederzijds begrip tussen Iraanse en Europese burgers en daarmee een positieve invloed kunnen hebben op de wederzijdse relaties?

Antwoord van Hoge Vertegenwoordiger/Vicevoorzitter Ashton namens de Commissie
(29 augustus 2012)

De EU past sinds 2007 toegangsbeperkingen toe ten aanzien van bepaalde onderdanen van derde landen in het kader van de beperkende maatregelen tegen Iran, die met name gericht zijn tegen personen die zich bezighouden met de Iranse nucleaire activiteiten van Iran.

De lidstaten moeten, overeenkomstig de artikelen 19 en 21 van Besluit 2010/413/GBVB, verhinderen dat gespecialiseerde vorming of opleiding aan Iraanse onderdanen wordt aangeboden in disciplines die zouden bijdragen tot dergelijke activiteiten. Aangezien evenwel voor toegangsbeperkingen en het verhinderen van gespecialiseerde vorming of opleiding geen optreden van de Unie vereist is, vallen deze maatregelen niet onder Verordening (EU) nr. 267/2012 van 23 maart 2012.

De maatregelen zijn gebaseerd op soortgelijke, in resoluties van de VN-Veiligheidsraad opgenomen bepalingen (met name resolutie 1737 (2006)), en zijn voornamelijk bedoeld om de overdracht van proliferatiegevoelige technologie aan Iran te verhinderen. De maatregelen behelzen geen algemeen verbod op de toelating van Iraniërs tot de EU of de vorming of opleiding van Iraniërs in de EU.

Technische bijstand overeenkomstig de definitie van artikel 1, onder r), van Verordening (EU) nr. 267/2012 kan ook vorming omvatten; het verlenen van dergelijke bijstand door Europese actoren is verboden in het kader van het verbod op de uitvoer van bepaalde goederen (zoals wapens, nucleaire producten of producten voor tweërlei gebruik).

⁽¹⁾ <http://www.rijksoverheid.nl/ministeries/bz/documenten-en-publicaties/kamerstukken/2012/06/14/kamerbrief-over-aanvragen-visa-en-verblijfsvergunning-mensen-met-iraanse-nationaliteit.html>

⁽²⁾ <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2012:088:0001:0112:EN:PDF>.

De Commissie is het ermee eens dat het bevorderen van de mobiliteit van studenten bijdraagt tot een beter wederzijds begrip tussen Iraanse en Europese burgers. Daarom steunt de EU de uitwisseling van studenten en docenten met Iran via het Erasmus Mundus-programma.

(English version)

Question for written answer E-006054/12
to the Commission
Marietje Schaake (ALDE)
(19 June 2012)

Subject: Postponement of consideration of visa applications submitted by Iranian knowledge workers due to new EU sanctions

On Thursday, 14 June 2012, the Netherlands Minister for Foreign Affairs wrote in a letter ⁽¹⁾ to the House of Representatives of the Netherlands Parliament that 'consideration of applications by Iranians for a temporary residence permit or for a residence permit for purposes of employment and/or in order to study for a doctorate is being deferred'. The reason stated by the Minister for postponing consideration of applications by these knowledge workers (according to the Immigration and Naturalisation Service, there are 125 such applications) lies in the sanctions imposed against Iran by Regulation (EU) No 267/2012 of 23 March 2012 (the 'new sanctions') ⁽²⁾. In addition to these knowledge workers, Iranian students are also concerned about the postponement of consideration of visa applications, because it is also possible that visas which have already been granted may not be extended in time and/or that new applications may be rejected. If visas are not extended, the persons concerned must return to Iran. A few Iranians have already been notified that consideration of their applications is likewise being suspended.

1. Is the Commission aware of similar changes of policy based on new sanctions against Iran in other EU Member States? If so, in which?
2. Does the Commission consider that 'technical assistance' as referred to in Article 1(b) of the regulation concerning the new sanctions includes teaching (notably at a university), undergoing training for purposes of employment, or working? If so, why?
3. Can the Commission indicate why it believes that the new sanctions should also restrict the possibility for Iranian students to take courses, or work, in the EU?
4. Does the Commission agree that the European sanctions policy should not become an end in itself but be used purely as a political solution to assuage the concern about the aims of Iran's nuclear programme? If not, why not?
5. Does the Commission agree that if Iranian students receive part of their higher education in the European Union, they will be able, upon return, to contribute to mutual understanding between Iranian and European citizens and can thus have a positive influence on mutual relations?

Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Ashton on behalf of the Commission
(29 August 2012)

Since 2007, the EU has been applying restrictions on admission against certain third-country nationals in the framework of restrictive measures against Iran, targeting in particular persons engaged in Iran's nuclear activities.

Member States are required to prevent specialised teaching or training of Iranian nationals in disciplines which would contribute to such activities, pursuant to Articles 19 and 21 of Decision 2010/413/CFSP. As restrictions on admission and prevention of specialised teaching or training do not require Union action, these measures are however not subject to Regulation (EU) No 267/2012 of 23 March 2012.

The measures are based on similar provisions contained in UN Security Council Resolutions (in particular UNSCR 1737 (2006) and are primarily aimed at preventing the transfer of proliferation-sensitive technology to Iran. The measures do not entail a general prohibition on admission of Iranians to the EU or teaching or training of Iranians in the EU.

Technical assistance, as defined in point (r) of Article 1 of Regulation No (EU) 267/2012, might encompass teaching as well; its provision is prohibited by European operators in relation to prohibitions to export certain goods (e.g. arms, nuclear or dual use items).

The Commission shares the opinion that supporting mobility of students contributes to a better understanding between Iranian and European citizens. This is why the EU supports student and scholar exchanges with Iran via the programme Erasmus Mundus.

⁽¹⁾ <http://www.rijksoverheid.nl/ministeries/bz/documenten-en-publicaties/kamerstukken/2012/06/14/kamerbrief-over-aanvragen-visa-en-verblijfsvergunning-mensen-met-iraanse-nationaliteit.html>

⁽²⁾ <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2012:088:0001:0112:EN:PDF>.

(Wersja polska)

**Pytanie wymagające odpowiedzi pisemnej E-006056/12
do Komisji**

Marek Henryk Migalski (ECR)

(19 czerwca 2012 r.)

Przedmiot: Zmiany w białoruskim ustawodawstwie – zwiększenie uprawnień KGB

14 czerwca białoruski parlament w drugim czytaniu przyjął poprawki do ustawy o organach bezpieczeństwa państwowego, które nadają KGB szerokie uprawnienia do swobodnego użycia środków przymusu.

Zgodnie z nowym ustawodawstwem służby bezpieczeństwa będą mogły bez ograniczeń wkraczać do mieszkań, zatrzymywać i aresztować tak białoruskich obywateli, jak i chronionych immunitetem dyplomatów oraz przedstawicieli instytucji międzynarodowych. W ustawie znalazł się również zapis zwalniający funkcjonariuszy KGB z wszelkiej odpowiedzialności prawnej za spowodowanie uszczerbku na zdrowiu osób, względem których podejmują działania. Białoruskie służby specjalne będą miały również szerokie uprawnienia przy rozpędzaniu manifestacji.

Nowe ramy prawne bez wątpienia będą służyć reżimowi Łukaszenki do wzmożonej walki z działaczami społecznymi i przedstawicielami białoruskiej opozycji. Bezkarność KGB w sposób jawny i skuteczny będzie krępować działania społeczeństwa obywatelskiego.

1. Jak zmieni się polityka Komisji względem Białorusi w związku z nadaniem KGB nowych uprawnień?
2. Czy Komisja przywiduje specjalne formy wsparcia dla osób i organizacji pokrzywdzonych przez białoruskie służby bezpieczeństwa?

Odpowiedź udzielona przez komisarza Štefana Fülego w imieniu Komisji

(6 sierpnia 2012 r.)

1. Projekty poprawek do białoruskiej ustawy o organach bezpieczeństwa państwa, do których odnosi się Szanowny Pan Poseł, jeszcze bardziej zwiększają uprawnienia służb bezpieczeństwa kosztem praworządności. Jako takie, wpisują się w szerszą taktykę nasilania prześladowań, zastraszania i nękania przedstawicieli społeczeństwa obywatelskiego, opozycji politycznej i społeczeństwa obywatelskiego od czasu naruszenia norm wyborczych podczas wyborów prezydenckich w dniu 19 grudnia 2010 r.

W kontekście utrzymującego się braku poszanowania praw człowieka, praworządności i zasad demokratycznych przez władze Białorusi, polityka UE wobec Białorusi, w tym środki ograniczające określone ostatnio w konkluzjach Rady do Spraw Zagranicznych z dnia 23 marca 2012 r., pozostają w mocy.

2. W następstwie wyborów prezydenckich w 2010 r. UE przyjęła szereg środków, których celem jest wspieranie osób i organizacji niesprawiedliwie atakowanych przez różne białoruskie organy, w tym służby bezpieczeństwa.

Środki te obejmują wsparcie w formie pomocy prawnej, pokrycie opłat sądowych, wsparcie w zakresie nieuzasadnionych kosztów związanych z karami, jak również wsparcie w przypadkach represji lub wydalenia studentów z uczelni wyższych. Pomoc udzielana jest również organizacjom społeczeństwa obywatelskiego, zwłaszcza w zakresie, w jakim działają one w wolnych środkach masowego przekazu.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-006056/12
to the Commission**

Marek Henryk Migalski (ECR)

(19 June 2012)

Subject: Changes to Belarusian legislation — increasing the powers of the KGB

On 14 June the Belarusian Parliament passed its second reading of amendments to the law on national security bodies, which give the KGB wide-ranging powers to freely use coercion.

Under this new legislation, the security services will be able to enter people's homes without restriction and detain and arrest Belarusian citizens as well as diplomats protected by immunity and representatives of international institutions. The law also contains a provision absolving KGB officers of any legal responsibility for injuries caused by their actions. Belarus's special services will also have wide-ranging powers to break up demonstrations.

This new legal framework will undoubtedly help the Lukashenko regime step up its fight against social activists and the Belarusian opposition. The KGB enjoying such impunity will clearly and effectively restrict civil society activities.

1. How will the Commission alter its policy towards Belarus in the light of these new powers being granted to the KGB?
2. Does the Commission plan to provide any special support for individuals and organisations targeted by the Belarusian security services?

Answer given by Mr Füle on behalf of the Commission

(6 August 2012)

1. The draft amendments to the Belarusian law on the state security bodies, referred to by the Honourable Member, further strengthen the powers of the security services at the expense of the rule of law. As such, they fit into a broader pattern of increasing persecution, intimidation and harassment of representatives of civil society, the political opposition and civil society since the violations of electoral standards in the 19 December 2010 Presidential elections.

Against the background of the continuing lack of respect by the authorities of Belarus for human rights, the rule of law and democratic principles, the EU's policies against Belarus, including restrictive measures, as last set out in the 23 March 2012 conclusions of the Foreign Affairs Council, remain in place.

2. In the aftermath of the 2010 Presidential elections, the EU adopted a series of measures designed to assist individuals and organisations unjustly targeted by various Belarus bodies, including the security services.

Those measures include support in the form of legal aid, covering court fees, support with unjustified fine-related costs, as well as support in cases of repression or expulsion of students from universities. Support is equally extended to civil society organisations, especially insofar as they are active in free media coverage.

(Versión española)

**Pregunta con solicitud de respuesta escrita E-006058/12
a la Comisión**

Raimon Obiols (S&D) y María Muñoz De Urquiza (S&D)

(19 de junio de 2012)

Asunto: Situación sanitaria en Afganistán

Afganistán se enfrenta a enormes necesidades de recuperación después de tres décadas de guerra, disturbios civiles y desastres naturales recurrentes. Pese a la atención mediática internacional del país, y la presencia de fuerzas internacionales, millones de afganos se encuentran en una situación de pobreza extrema, con más de la mitad de la población viviendo por debajo del umbral de pobreza.

Según el estudio «National Risk and Vulnerability Assessment 2007-08», financiado, entre otros, con fondos de la Unión Europea, concluye que 7,4 millones de personas (casi un tercio de la población) viven sin obtener suficientes alimentos para llevar una vida activa y saludable. Otros 8,5 millones de personas, el 37 por ciento, se encuentran en el límite de la inseguridad alimentaria. Más de la mitad de los niños menores de cinco años están desnutridos.

Junto con una de las tasas de mortalidad infantil más elevadas del mundo, Afganistán sufre de uno de los más altos niveles de mortalidad materna (1 600 muertes por cada 100 000 nacidos vivos).

— ¿Cuál es el esfuerzo que realizan la Comisión y el SEAE en relación a la ayuda médica en Afganistán? ¿Tiene la Comisión intención de tomar medidas para contribuir a mejorar esta ayuda?

— ¿Qué medidas puede aplicar la Comisión para mejorar la seguridad alimentaria, las vacunaciones y, en general, la situación médica?

Respuesta del Sr. Piebalgs en nombre de la Comisión

(7 de agosto de 2012)

Desde 2001, la UE ha venido apoyando la estrategia de Afganistán en favor de la Salud y la Nutrición (216 millones EUR). Ha contribuido, junto con los EE.UU. y el Banco Mundial, a apoyar colectivamente el sistema sanitario afgano a través del Conjunto Básico de Servicios Sanitarios [*Basic Package of Health Services* (BPHS)] y el Conjunto Básico de Servicios Hospitalarios [*Essential Package of Hospital Services* (EPHS)]. Ha facilitado apoyo técnico para reforzar las capacidades de Ministerio de Salud Pública afgano para gestionar el sistema público de atención sanitaria, que contempla el desarrollo de un Plan estratégico para el sector sanitario.

Los indicadores de salud de Afganistán están entre los peores del mundo, pero han mejorado de forma notable en los últimos años. Los progresos son atribuibles en gran medida a la aplicación del BPHS y el EPHS. En la actualidad, el 65 % de los afganos vive a un máximo de dos horas a pie de un centro de salud, el 74 % de los centros cuenta con al menos un profesional especializado en salud femenina y el 73 % realiza una gestión integrada de las enfermedades infantiles. Tales mejoras, incluida la inmunización sistemática de los recién nacidos, han contribuido a la reducción sustancial de la tasa de mortalidad de los menores de cinco años.

En el futuro la Comisión espera continuar reforzando los sistemas esenciales del Ministerio, mantener su financiación al BPHS y al EPHS y ampliar la cobertura de la prestación de servicios.

El apoyo de la UE al desarrollo agrícola y rural (por ejemplo, a las comunidades rurales, al pastoreo y a la investigación de políticas eficaces) constituye su respuesta a la inseguridad alimentaria. El Programa Temático de Seguridad Alimentaria presta apoyo a las poblaciones vulnerables al tiempo que vincula la ayuda a la rehabilitación y al desarrollo. La ayuda futura de la UE a Afganistán seguirá teniendo como elemento principal la ayuda alimentaria.

Para más información, Su Señoría puede consultar el documento *State of Play on EU Afghanistan Cooperation* ⁽¹⁾ sobre la situación de la cooperación en Afganistán.

(1) http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/afghanistan/documents/content/state_of_play_september_2011_en.pdf

(English version)

Question for written answer E-006058/12
to the Commission
Raimon Obiols (S&D) and María Muñiz De Urquiza (S&D)
(19 June 2012)

Subject: Healthcare situation in Afghanistan

Following three decades of war, civil unrest and recurring natural disasters, Afghanistan has huge recovery needs. Despite international media attention and the presence of international forces in the country, millions of Afghans are living in extreme poverty, with more than half of the population falling below the poverty line.

According to the National Risk and Vulnerability Assessment 2007-08, which was partly financed by the EU, 7.4 million people (almost a third of the population) do not have enough food to be able to lead an active and healthy lifestyle. Another 8.5 million people (37% of the population) are on the threshold of food insecurity and more than 50% of children under the age of five are malnourished.

In addition to having one of the highest infant mortality rates in the world, Afghanistan also has one of the highest levels of maternal mortality (with 1 600 deaths for every 100 000 live births).

— What are the Commission and the EEAS doing to support healthcare in Afghanistan? Does the Commission intend to take steps to help improve the support it provides?

— What measures could the Commission implement to enhance food security, vaccination programmes and the healthcare situation in general?

Answer given by Mr Piebalgs on behalf of the Commission
(7 August 2012)

Since 2001, the EU has continuously supported Afghanistan's Health and Nutrition Strategy (EUR 216 million). Together with the US and the World Bank, it has collectively supported the Afghan health system, including the Basic Package of Health Services (BPHS) and the Essential Package of Hospital services (EPHS). It has provided technical support to strengthen the Afghan Ministry of Public Health's capacities to manage the public healthcare system, including the development of a Health Sector Strategic Plan.

Afghanistan's health indicators, though among the worst in the world, have substantially improved in past years. Progress is largely due to the implementation of the BPHS and EPHS. Today, 65% of Afghans live within two-hours' walking distance from health facilities; 74% of the facilities have at least one female healthcare worker and 73% provide integrated management of childhood illnesses. Such improvements, including systematic immunisation of newborns, have contributed to a substantial reduction of the under-five mortality rate.

In future, the Commission expects to continue to strengthen the Ministry's core systems, maintain BPHS and EPHS funding and to expand service delivery coverage.

Food insecurity is addressed through EU support to agriculture and rural development (e.g. rural and pastoral communities; research to develop effective policies). The Food Security Thematic Programme supports vulnerable populations while linking relief to rehabilitation and development. Food Security is expected to remain a core component of future EU support to Afghanistan.

For additional information, the Commission would refer the Honourable Member to the State of Play on EU Afghanistan Cooperation ⁽¹⁾.

⁽¹⁾ http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/afghanistan/documents/content/state_of_play_september_2011_en.pdf.

(Deutsche Fassung)

Anfrage zur schriftlichen Beantwortung E-006059/12
an die Kommission
Franz Obermayr (NI)
 (19. Juni 2012)

Betrifft: Illegaler Vogelfang auf Zypern

Der aktuelle Bericht der Artenschutzorganisation „BirdLife“ gibt einen Überblick über die aktuelle Situation und über die erschreckenden ökologischen Auswirkungen des illegalen Vogelfangs auf Zypern. Diesem Bericht zufolge wurden 2011 rund 2,8 Millionen Vögel auf Zypern illegal gefangen und grausam getötet. Seit mit der Überwachung der Vogelfänge begonnen wurde, ist das die höchste Anzahl. Ich beziehe mich auch auf die Anfrage Mr Potočník E-000954/2011 und bitte um Beantwortung folgender Fragen:

1. Sind der Kommission die aktuellen Studienergebnisse bekannt, und wie beurteilt sie die neuerlichen erschreckenden Zahlen aus der Fangsaison Winter 2011-2012?
2. Die Kommission betont, dass es ihrerseits kontinuierliche Bemühungen gibt, um den illegalen Vogelfang, der gegen die EU-Gesetzgebung verstößt, gemeinsam mit der Republik Zypern effektiv zu bekämpfen?
3. Wie beurteilt die Kommission die bisherigen Anstrengungen der zyprischen zuständigen Behörden, dagegen anzukämpfen?
4. Welche Schritte hat die Kommission seit der internationalen „Konferenz gegen den Vogelmord“ auf Zypern in Larnaca im Juli 2011 eingeleitet, um nachhaltig gegen den illegalen Vogelfang auf Zypern vorzugehen?
5. In der Erklärung von Larnaca sollte ein umfassendes Maßnahmenpaket umgesetzt werden, das alle Ursachen des illegalen Tötens von Vögeln in Europa beseitigt. Um welches Maßnahmenpaket handelt es sich im Konkreten?
6. Ich beziehe mich auf die Antwort der Kommission auf die Anfrage E-000954/2011 und bitte um Informationen über den neuesten Wissensstand der Kommission in dieser Angelegenheit.

Antwort von Herrn Potočník im Namen der Kommission
 (1. August 2012)

Der Kommission sind der jüngste BirdLife-Bericht und die aktuelleren Daten zu illegalen Fangtätigkeiten im Herbst 2011 bekannt. Sie ist äußerst besorgt über die extrem große Zahl von Vögeln, die noch immer solchen illegalen Praktiken zum Opfer fallen.

Die Kommission hat die zyprischen Behörden erneut um zusätzliche Informationen zu den konkreten Maßnahmen zur Lösung dieses Problems gebeten. In ihrer Antwort übermittelten die zyprischen Behörden detaillierte Angaben zu den Maßnahmen, die ergriffen wurden. Die Kommission ist der Auffassung, dass mit diesen Maßnahmen die richtige Richtung eingeschlagen wird, da sie darauf abzielen, die Koordination zwischen den Akteuren zu verbessern. Da auch im Gebiet der britischen Militärlager erhebliche illegale Fangtätigkeiten zu verzeichnen sind, haben die zyprischen Behörden auch auf die Zusammenarbeit mit den dort zuständigen Behörden verwiesen. Die Kommission hat die Angelegenheit gegenüber den Behörden des Vereinigten Königreichs angesprochen. Sie wird die Bemühungen zur wirksamen Bekämpfung des Problems in Zypern und deren Ergebnisse weiterhin aufmerksam verfolgen.

In Folge der Konferenz in Larnaka und der daraus hervorgehenden Empfehlungen ⁽¹⁾ bereitet die Kommission derzeit eine Liste möglicher Maßnahmen zur Unterbindung der illegalen Tötung von Vögeln in der EU vor, die noch mit den Mitgliedstaaten, BL ⁽²⁾, FACE ⁽³⁾ und dem Übereinkommen von Bern diskutiert wird. Die Liste möglicher Maßnahmen umfasst Bereiche wie die Überwachung illegaler Tätigkeiten, den Informationsaustausch, die Sensibilisierung der Öffentlichkeit, Prävention, die Verbesserung von Durchsetzungsmaßnahmen, Koordination usw.

Im Auftrag der Kommission wurde eine Studie zu Art und Ausmaß der illegalen Tätigkeiten zum Schaden wildlebender Vögel in der gesamten EU durchgeführt. Auf Grundlage der Ergebnisse dieser Studie und der Empfehlung des Übereinkommens von Bern arbeitet die Kommission nun mit den Mitgliedstaaten, BL und FACE gemeinsam an der Lösung des Problems.

⁽¹⁾ Recommendation on the Illegal Killing, Trapping and Trade of Wild Birds — T-PVS(2011)22E:
http://www.coe.int/t/dg4/cultureheritage/nature/bern/institutions/standingcommittee_122011_en.asp.

⁽²⁾ BirdLife International.

⁽³⁾ Zusammenschluss der Verbände für Jagd und Wildtierhaltung in der EU (Federation of Associations for Hunting and Conservation of the EU).

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-006059/12
to the Commission**

Franz Obermayr (NI)

(19 June 2012)

Subject: Illegal bird trapping in Cyprus

The latest report by the species protection organisation 'Birdlife' outlines the situation regarding illegal bird traffic in Cyprus and the disastrous ecological consequences thereof, indicating that in 2011 around 2.8 million birds were illegally trapped and cruelly killed in Cyprus, this being the highest number since the monitoring of bird trapping commenced. In view of this and further to the question by Mr Potočník (E-000954/2011):

1. Is the Commission aware of these current findings and what view does it take of the alarming figures recently released for the 2011-2012 winter hunting season?
2. Can the Commission confirm that it is, together the Republic of Cyprus, endeavouring to combat effectively illegal bird trapping, which infringes EU legislation?
3. What view does the Commission take of efforts to date by the Cypriot authorities to combat this practice?
4. What efforts have been made by the Commission since the European Conference on Illegal Killing of Birds in July 2011 held in Larnaca, Cyprus, by way of sustained opposition to illegal bird trapping in Cyprus?
5. The Larnaca declaration referred to the implementation of a comprehensive package of measures to eliminate all the causes behind the illegal killing of birds in Europe. What does this package of measures consist of specifically?
6. Further to the Commission's answer to Question E-000954/2011, what is its latest intelligence regarding this matter?

Answer given by Mr Potočník on behalf of the Commission

(1 August 2012)

The Commission is aware of the latest Birdlife report and of more recent data on the illegal trapping activities in autumn 2011. It is seriously concerned about the extremely high number of birds still affected by such illegal practices.

The Commission has asked the Cypriot authorities again for more information on the concrete measures taken to tackle the problem. In their reply, the Cypriot authorities provided detailed information on the measures taken. The Commission is of the opinion that these measures go in the right direction as they aim to improve coordination with stakeholders. Since significant illegal trapping activities occur in the area of the Sovereign British Bases (SBB) too, the Cypriot authorities also refer to cooperation with those authorities. The Commission has raised the matter with the UK authorities. The Commission shall continue to monitor closely the efforts deployed and results achieved to tackle effectively the issue in Cyprus

Further to the Larnaca conference and its recommendation ⁽¹⁾, the EC is preparing a possible list of actions aimed at eliminating illegal killing of birds in the EU that is still under discussion with Member States, BL ⁽²⁾, FACE ⁽³⁾ and the Bern Convention. The list of possible actions covers areas such as monitoring of illegal activities, information exchange, awareness-raising, prevention, enforcement improvements, coordination, etc.

The Commission has had a survey carried out on the nature and extent of illegal activities affecting wild birds throughout the EU. On the basis of its findings and the Bern Convention recommendation, it is now cooperating with Member States, BL and the FACE to address the issue.

⁽¹⁾ Recommendation on the Illegal Killing, Trapping and Trade of Wild Birds — T-PVS(2011)22E,
http://www.coe.int/t/dg4/cultureheritage/nature/bern/institutions/standingcommittee_122011_en.asp.

⁽²⁾ Birdlife International.

⁽³⁾ Federation of the Associations for Hunting and Conservation of the EU.

(Versione italiana)

**Interrogazione con richiesta di risposta scritta E-006060/12
alla Commissione (Vicepresidente/Alto Rappresentante)**

Mario Mauro (PPE)

(19 giugno 2012)

Oggetto: VP/HR — Etiopi sfollati con la forza

L'organizzazione Human Rights Watch (HRW) ha pubblicato una relazione che riporta lo sfollamento forzato di decine di migliaia di etiopi dalla patria dei loro antenati nella valle del fiume Omo. Il territorio verrà presumibilmente utilizzato per l'irrigazione della piantagione di zucchero, di proprietà dello Stato, che è in via di sviluppo nell'area. Il governo etiope nega gli sfollamenti, tuttavia, stando alla relazione di HRW, i soldati ricorrono alla violenza e all'intimidazione per costringere i residenti ad allontanarsi. La relazione afferma che «unità militari si sono recate periodicamente nei villaggi per intimidire i residenti e reprimere il dissenso intorno allo sviluppo della piantagione di zucchero».

I programmi del governo, di cui si è potuto recentemente disporre, mostrano che le ambizioni ufficiali non riguardano soltanto l'irrigazione delle piantagioni di zucchero, ma anche la controversa diga idroelettrica Gibe III. Una relazione non pubblicata in precedenza mostra progetti di cui fanno parte uno stabilimento di trasformazione, canali di irrigazione e terreni riservati ad altri usi agricolo-commerciali. Se verrà completato, il progetto inciderà sulla vita di circa 200 000 etiopi nella valle dell'Omo e circa 300 000 kenioti oltre confine. In un'area dove l'acqua è già una fonte preziosa si ritiene che il controllo esercitato dal governo su Gibe III e il vicino lago Turkana provocherà ulteriori conflitti nella zona.

Il governo etiope afferma che il progetto è indispensabile per lo sviluppo e il progresso dell'Etiopia.

Sono sottoposte all'attenzione del Vicepresidente/Alto Rappresentante le seguenti domande:

1. Quale posizione va assunta in merito a tale conflitto?
2. Qual è il metodo più etico ed efficiente per affrontare tale conflitto al fine di difendere i diritti della popolazione etiope?

Risposta dell'Alta Rappresentante/Vicepresidente Catherine Ashton a nome della Commissione

(20 agosto 2012)

L'UE sollecita attivamente il governo etiope a partecipare ad un dialogo politico regolare e concreto conformemente alla strategia di partenariato con i paesi ACP nell'ambito dell'accordo di Cotonou. In questo contesto l'UE non esita a sollevare questioni che ritiene preoccupanti sul piano dei diritti umani, della situazione nelle regioni periferiche, dello sviluppo economico e delle relazioni regionali.

L'UE segue con particolare attenzione la situazione nelle regioni periferiche, comprese quelle di Gambela e dell'Omo meridionale, e discute con il governo dei risultati delle visite in loco dei donatori e delle missioni di monitoraggio relative al programma di «villaggizzazione», dell'attività agricola a fini commerciali e delle tensioni che ne conseguono.

L'UE non ha finora sollevato con le autorità etiopi la questione specifica del lago Turkana. Nell'ambito del dialogo con il governo dell'Etiopia si rivolge tuttavia la dovuta attenzione alle considerazioni generali di sostenibilità ambientale dei piani, dei processi e degli interventi di sviluppo, tra cui le azioni di industrializzazione.

L'Unione continuerà a seguire con attenzione tali questioni, anche nel quadro del suo dialogo regolare con le autorità etiopi.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-006060/12
to the Commission (Vice-President/High Representative)**

Mario Mauro (PPE)

(19 June 2012)

Subject: VP/HR — Ethiopians forcibly displaced

Human Rights Watch has published a report exposing the forced displacement of tens of thousands of Ethiopians from the homeland of their ancestors in the Omo Valley. The land will supposedly be used to irrigate the state-owned sugar plantation being developed in the area. The Ethiopian Government denies that such evictions are occurring, but according to the HRW report soldiers have been using violence and intimidation to force residents to leave. It states that 'military units regularly visited villages to intimidate residents and suppress dissent related to the sugar plantation development'.

Recently available government plans show that official ambition extends beyond irrigation of the sugar plantations via the controversial Gibe III hydropower dam. A previously unpublished report shows projects that include a processing factory, irrigation channels and land reserved for other commercial agricultural uses. If completed, the project will affect the lives of an estimated 200 000 Ethiopians in the Omo Valley and of 300 000 Kenyans across the border. In an area where water is already a precious resource, it is believed that the government's control of Gibe III and nearby Lake Turkana will incite further conflict in the area.

The Ethiopian Government claims that this project is necessary for the development and progress of Ethiopia.

The following questions are submitted for the consideration of the Vice-President/High Representative:

1. What stand should be taken on this conflict?
2. What is the most ethical and efficient method of dealing with this conflict in order to support the rights of the Ethiopian population?

Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Ashton on behalf of the Commission

(20 August 2012)

The EU is actively engaging the Ethiopian Government in a regular and substantial political dialogue which is part of our partnership approach with ACP countries under the Cotonou Agreement. This includes raising matters of concern to the EU as regards human rights, the situation in peripheral regions, economic development as well as regional relations.

We are following particularly closely the situation in the periphery, including Gambella and South Omo, and results of donors' field visits and monitoring missions concerning the villagisation programme, commercial farming and resulting tensions are discussed with the Government.

The EU has thus far not raised the specific issue of Lake Turkana with the Ethiopian Authorities. However, in the dialogue with the Government of Ethiopia due attention is given to general considerations of environmental sustainability of the development plans, processes and interventions, including industrialisation.

We will continue to follow up these issues, including through its regular dialogue with the Ethiopian authorities.

(České znění)

Otázka k písemnému zodpovězení E-006061/12

Komisi

Jan Březina (PPE)

(19. června 2012)

Předmět: Právní předpisy na ochranu spotřebitele a v oblasti potravin

V době, kdy Evropané přibývají na váze a kdy se v Bruselu diskutuje o tom, jak zlepšit výrobu potravin, aby byla udržitelnější z hlediska životního prostředí, narůstá v celé Evropě znepokojení nad politikou a právními předpisy v oblasti potravin.

Pro spotřebitele je dosti obtížné vyznat se ve spleti všech značení týkajících se zdravotních aspektů a bioprodukce, a proto je třeba stanovit jasnější požadavky s cílem pomoci spotřebitelům pochopit, které výrobky obsahují méně tuku a soli, které jsou biopotravinami a které pocházejí ze spravedlivého obchodu. Je nezbytné, aby mezi jednotlivými zeměmi EU fungovala větší koordinace, která by zajistila udržitelnost produkce potravin a chránila spotřebitele před nárůstem obezity, diabetu a jiných zdravotních problémů. Obzvláště zranitelné, pokud jde o reklamu na rychlé občerstvení a slazené nápoje, jsou děti. Tento způsob stravování bývá společně s nedostatkem pohybu označován za hlavní příčinu přibývání na váze a zdravotních problémů. V EU je asi 22 milionů dětí, které trpí nadváhou nebo obezitou, a jejich počet se každým rokem zvyšuje o 400 000.

Jaké konkrétní kroky Komise podnikne s cílem chránit spotřebitele, pokud jde o právní předpisy v oblasti potravin, a vyřešit související problémy spočívající v obezitě a zdravotních rizicích, zejména v případech dětí?

Odpověď Johna Dalliho jménem Komise

(18. července 2012)

Oblast veřejného zdraví, která se týká výživy, spadá do pravomoci členských států. Komise úsilí členských států v této oblasti podporuje, a to zvláště prostřednictvím následujících činností:

V roce 2007 Komise přijala bílou knihu „Strategie pro Evropu“ týkající se zdravotních problémů souvisejících s výživou, nadváhou a obezitou⁽¹⁾. Tato strategie je prováděna prostřednictvím činností Komise, jakož i na základě spolupráce mezi členskými státy ve skupině na vysoké úrovni⁽²⁾ pro výživu a tělesnou aktivitu a prostřednictvím dobrovolných iniciativ víceodvětvových zúčastněných stran v rámci akční platformy EU pro stravu, tělesnou aktivitu a zdraví⁽³⁾, počínaje prosazováním zdravé stravy a fyzické aktivity až k omezení obsahu soli a dalších nutričních látek v potravinách.

Příkladem opatření na ochranu dětí, pokud jde o reklamu, je závazek EU⁽⁴⁾ přijatý skupinou předních společností obchodujících s potravinami a nápoji. Závazek v celé EU výrazně omezil reklamu na potraviny a nápoje pro děti mladší 12 let. Směrnice o audiovizuálních mediálních službách⁽⁵⁾ navíc vyzývá k samoregulačnímu přístupu v oblasti reklamy na potraviny pro děti, ale nevylučuje statutární regulaci ze strany členských států.

Pokud jde o regulační opatření, nařízení (EU) 1169/2011⁽⁶⁾ zavede povinné nutriční označování. Nařízení (EU) č. 1924/2006⁽⁷⁾ stanoví rámec pro schvalování výživových a zdravotních tvrzení. Komise nedávno přijala seznam povolených tvrzení. Tato tvrzení společně se seznamem neschválených tvrzení lze nalézt v registru tvrzení dostupném na zvláštních internetových stránkách⁽⁸⁾. Uvedené činnosti by měly občanům umožnit přijímat informovaná rozhodnutí ohledně jejich stravování.

⁽¹⁾ KOM(2007) 279 v konečném znění.

⁽²⁾ http://ec.europa.eu/health/nutrition_physical_activity/high_level_group/index_en.htm

⁽³⁾ http://ec.europa.eu/health/nutrition_physical_activity/platform/index_en.htm

⁽⁴⁾ <http://www.eu-pledge.eu/>.

⁽⁵⁾ Směrnice 2010/13/EU (Úř. věst. L 95, 15.4.2010, s. 1).

⁽⁶⁾ Nařízení (EU) č. 1169/2011 o poskytování informací o potravinách spotřebitelům, Úř. věst. L 304, 22.11.2011.

⁽⁷⁾ Úř. věst. L 404, 30.12.2006, opraveno v Úř. věst. L 12, 18.1.2007.

⁽⁸⁾ <http://ec.europa.eu/nuhclaims/>.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-006061/12
to the Commission**

Jan Březina (PPE)

(19 June 2012)

Subject: Consumer protection and food law

At a time when Europeans are getting fatter, and amid debates in Brussels over how to revamp food production in order to make it more environmentally sustainable, there are growing concerns throughout Europe about food policies and regulations.

Consumers are quite confused by the maze of health and eco labels, and clearer requirements are needed to help them understand which products are lower in fat and salt, and which are organic or 'fair trade'. There is a need for greater cooperation among EU countries in order to ensure that food production is sustainable and to protect consumers from rising levels of obesity, diabetes and other health problems. Children are seen as being particularly vulnerable to advertising for snacks, sugary beverages and fast food, which — along with inactivity — are blamed for the increase in weight and health problems. Some 22 million children in the EU are considered overweight or obese, with this figure growing by 400 000 per year.

What specific steps will the Commission take to protect consumers with regard to food law and to tackle the connected problems of obesity and other health risks, especially among children?

Answer given by Mr Dalli on behalf of the Commission

(18 July 2012)

The area of public health in relation to nutrition is mainly the responsibility of Member States. The Commission is supporting national efforts, in particular through the following activities:

In 2007, the Commission adopted a White Paper on 'A Strategy for Europe on Nutrition, Overweight and Obesity-related health issues' ⁽¹⁾. This strategy is implemented through Commission activities as well as cooperation among Member States in the High Level Group ⁽²⁾ on Nutrition and Physical Activity, and through voluntary initiatives taken by multi-sectoral stakeholders in the EU Platform for Action on Diet, Physical Activity and Health ⁽³⁾, ranging from promotion of healthy eating and physical activity to reducing salt and other nutrients content from food.

The EU Pledge ⁽⁴⁾, a commitment by a group of leading food and beverage companies, is an example of action to protect children with respect to advertising. The Pledge has restricted food and beverage advertising to children under 12 across the EU. Furthermore, the Audiovisual Media Services Directive ⁽⁵⁾ calls for a self-regulatory approach in the field of food advertising to children, but it does not exclude statutory regulation by Member States.

With regard to regulatory measures, Regulation (EU) 1169/2011 ⁽⁶⁾ will introduce mandatory nutrition labelling. Regulation (EU) 1924/2006 ⁽⁷⁾ provides a framework for the authorisation of nutrition and health claims. The Commission has recently adopted a list of permitted claims. These together with the list of non-authorised claims can be found in the Register of claims which can be accessed in a specific website ⁽⁸⁾. These activities should enable citizens to make informed dietary choices.

⁽¹⁾ COM(2007) 279 final.

⁽²⁾ http://ec.europa.eu/health/nutrition_physical_activity/high_level_group/index_en.htm

⁽³⁾ http://ec.europa.eu/health/nutrition_physical_activity/platform/index_en.htm

⁽⁴⁾ <http://www.eu-pledge.eu/>.

⁽⁵⁾ Directive 2010/13/EU (OJ L 95, 15.4.2010, p. 1).

⁽⁶⁾ Regulation (EU) 1169/2011 on the provision of food information to consumers, OJ L 304, 22.11.2011.

⁽⁷⁾ OJ L 404, 30.12.2006, corrected by OJ L 12, 18.1.2007.

⁽⁸⁾ <http://ec.europa.eu/nuhclaims/>.

(Versione italiana)

**Interrogazione con richiesta di risposta scritta E-006062/12
alla Commissione (Vicepresidente/Alto Rappresentante)**

Fiorello Provera (EFD)

(19 giugno 2012)

Oggetto: VP/HR — Ampliamento delle operazioni di intelligence in Africa da parte degli Stati Uniti

Il 14 giugno il Washington Post ha riferito che il governo degli Stati Uniti sta ampliando le operazioni di intelligence in Africa, istituendo una rete di piccole basi aeree per spiare le attività terroristiche. Dal 2007 sono state realizzate in Africa almeno una dozzina di basi.

Uno dei principali centri di dette operazioni è situato a Ouagadougou, capitale del Burkina Faso. Aerei spia disarmati volano verso nord in Mali e in Mauritania, e attraverso il Sahara, alla ricerca di elementi di Al Qaeda nel Maghreb islamico (AQIM). Il controllo sul Mali è stato intensificato dopo il colpo di stato di marzo e a seguito della presunta presenza di simpatizzanti di Al Qaeda nella parte settentrionale del paese. I comandanti statunitensi stanno altresì monitorando da vicino l'espansione di Boko Haram in Nigeria e di al-Shabab in Somalia, mentre almeno 100 militari dei reparti speciali degli Stati Uniti stanno coordinando la caccia a Joseph Kony, il capo ugandese dell'esercito di Resistenza del Signore (LRA). L'esercito statunitense dispone inoltre di centri per la sorveglianza creativa in Mauritania, nell'Africa centrale, in Stati africani orientali quali Etiopia, Gibuti e Kenya e nell'Oceano indiano. Nella testimonianza resa a marzo davanti al Congresso degli Stati Uniti, il capo del comando africano USA, il generale dell'esercito Carter F. Ham, ha accennato all'importanza e all'entità di queste basi aeree. Inoltre ha manifestato espressamente l'intenzione di ampliare in Africa le operazioni di ISR (intelligence, sorveglianza e ricognizione). La sorveglianza è realizzata mediante piccoli velivoli turboelica disarmati e camuffati in modo da sembrare aerei privati. In alcune basi aeree degli Stati Uniti, ad esempio a Gibuti, in Etiopia e alle Seychelles, sono di stanza i droni Predator e Reaper. Si tratta degli stessi tipi di velivoli senza pilota utilizzati per uccidere i capi di Al Qaeda in Pakistan e nello Yemen.

1. È al corrente l'Alto Rappresentante/Vicepresidente delle portate delle operazioni di intelligence degli Stati Uniti nella regione del Sahel e nell'Africa orientale?
2. Qual è la posizione dell'AR/VP circa l'espansione dei programmi di ISR statunitensi? È l'UE interessata a coordinare con essi le proprie operazioni? Prevede l'AR/VP di discutere la questione con il Segretario di Stato USA Hillary Clinton?
3. Ritiene l'AR/VP che l'espansione delle operazioni USA nella regione del Sahel e nell'Africa orientale avrà un effetto positivo nel contrastare la minaccia alla stabilità rappresentata da gruppi come AQIM e al-Shabab?

Risposta dell'Alta Rappresentante/Vicepresidente Catherine Ashton a nome della Commissione

(2 ottobre 2012)

L'Alta Rappresentante/Vicepresidente è al corrente del crescente interesse degli USA verso l'Africa in generale, e la regione del Sahel e dell'Africa orientale in particolare.

L'UE ha una panoramica globale delle operazioni militari degli USA nel Sahel, grazie ai rapporti con l'EUMS e agli elementi raccolti dall'INTCEN. Tuttavia, i dettagli non sono sempre noti.

L'UE intrattiene un dialogo regolare con il Dipartimento di Stato degli Stati Uniti a proposito dell'evoluzione della situazione nella regione, come fa per altre materie di interesse comune.

A questo proposito, l'ultimo scambio significativo è avvenuto l'11 giugno quando il sottosegretario di Stato americano per gli affari africani Carson ha presenziato agli incontri bilaterali UE-USA per l'Africa tenutisi a Bruxelles. Un evento a parte per il Sahel è stato organizzato dal Direttore operativo per l'Africa Westcott, che ha riunito i direttori per l'Africa degli Stati membri dell'UE.

Gli scambi avvengono anche localmente nelle capitali del Sahel e nel quadro del gruppo di sostegno e monitoraggio del Mali, dove l'UE è membro di una task force insieme a ONU, UA, ECOWAS e OIF.

L'UE non è impegnata in nessuna operazione di intelligence, materia che rimane di competenza esclusiva degli Stati membri. Pertanto, l'UE non collabora direttamente con gli USA in quel settore, ma si concentra solamente, in conformità con la sua strategia per il Sahel e in linea con l'ultimo Consiglio «Affari esteri» del 23 luglio 2012, a) sul sostegno alle capacità nazionali (Stato di diritto, sicurezza nazionale), attraverso le missioni civili PSDC (EUCAP SAHEL in Niger), e b) sul potenziamento della cooperazione regionale (offerta di sostegno alle «pays du champ initiatives»).

L'UE incoraggia l'impegno dei suoi partner nel Sahel, purché sia mirato a potenziare le capacità dei paesi della regione di affrontare le complesse sfide che li aspettano. Pertanto, l'UE considera le operazioni militari come uno dei possibili strumenti nell'ambito di una strategia globale.

(English version)

Question for written answer E-006062/12
to the Commission (Vice-President/High Representative)
Fiorello Provera (EFD)
 (19 June 2012)

Subject: VP/HR — Expansion of US intelligence operations in Africa

On 14 June the Washington Post reported that the United States Government is expanding its intelligence operations across Africa. It is establishing a network of small air bases to spy on terrorist activities. At least a dozen bases have been set up in Africa since 2007.

One of the key hubs of these operations is based in Ouagadougou, capital of Burkina Faso. Unarmed spy planes fly north to Mali and Mauritania, and across the Sahara, in search of elements of al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). Surveillance of Mali has increased since the country witnessed a coup in March, and al-Qaeda sympathisers are believed to be active in the northern half of the country. US commanders are also keeping a close eye on the spread of Boko Haram in Nigeria and on the al-Shabab in Somalia, while at least 100 US Special Operations troops are coordinating the hunt for Joseph Kony, the Ugandan leader of the Lord's Resistance Army. The US military also has creative surveillance hubs in Mauritania, in Central Africa, in East African states such as Ethiopia, Djibouti and Kenya, and in the Indian Ocean. In testimony given before the US Congress in March, the head of the United States Africa Command, United States Army General Carter F. Ham, hinted at the importance and extent of these air bases. He made a clear case that he wanted to expand ISR (intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance) in Africa. Surveillance is carried out using small, unarmed turboprop aircraft disguised to resemble private planes. From some US air bases, for example in Djibouti, Ethiopia and the Seychelles, Predator and Reaper drones are deployed. These are the same types of unmanned aircraft that have been used to kill al-Qaeda leaders in Pakistan and Yemen.

1. Is the High Representative/Vice-President aware of the scale of US intelligence operations in the Sahel region and in East Africa?
2. What is the position of the HR/VP regarding the expansion of the United States' ISR programmes, and is the EU interested in coordinating its own operations with them? Does the HR/VP plan to discuss this issue with US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton?
3. Does the HR/VP believe that the expansion of US operations in the Sahel region and in East Africa will have a positive effect in tackling the threat to stability posed by groups such as AQIM and al-Shabab?

Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Ashton on behalf of the Commission
 (2 October 2012)

The HR/VP is aware of the rising US interest for Africa in general and the Sahel stripe as well as East Africa in particular.

The EU has a global view of US military involvement in Sahel, through its relations to EUMS and elements collected by its INTCEN. Nevertheless, details are not always precisely known.

A regular dialogue is conducted with the US State Department on the evolution of the situation in the region as it is done for other common interests.

In this regard, the last significant exchange took place on 11 June when the US Undersecretary of State for African affairs Mr Carson attended the EU/US Africa exchanges in Brussels. A side event on Sahel was organised by MD Africa Mr Westcott, associating EU MS Africa Directors.

Exchanges also take place locally in the Sahelian capitals as well as in the frame of the follow-up and support group to Mali, where the EU is a member of cope group together with UN, the AU, Ecowas and the Francophonie.

The EU itself is not engaged in any intelligence 'operations', which remain within the exclusive competence of EU Member States. Therefore, the EU does not cooperate directly with the United States in that Sector. The EU merely focuses, according to its Sahel Strategy and in line with the latest Foreign Affairs Council of 23 July 2012, on (a) supporting national capacities (rule of law, interior security), eventually through CSDP missions (EUCAP SAHEL in Niger); and (b) enhancing regional cooperation (support offer to 'pays du champ initiatives').

The EU welcomes any involvement of its partners in the Sahel, provided it aims at enhancing the local states' capacity to address the multifaceted challenges they face. Thus, the EU considers that military operations are one of the possible tools within a comprehensive strategy.

(Version française)

Question avec demande de réponse écrite E-006063/12
à la Commission
Christine De Veyrac (PPE)
(19 juin 2012)

Objet: Sécurité des enfants sur Internet

Le 2 mai 2012, la Commission publiait une communication exposant sa «Stratégie européenne pour un Internet mieux adapté aux enfants», dans laquelle elle proposait ses grandes orientations sur la politique à conduire par les différents acteurs publics et privés, nationaux et européens, pour améliorer la protection des enfants sur Internet.

Or, la chaîne britannique Channel 4 a diffusé le 12 juin 2012 un reportage qui démontre les défaillances des sites communautaires dans la protection des jeunes adolescents européens contre les conversations à connotation sexuelle, voire contre les délinquants sexuels.

Via son avatar sur le monde virtuel d'un site Internet, une journaliste, se faisant passer pour une jeune fille de 11 ans, a ainsi été sollicitée à plusieurs reprises pour des conversations vidéo avec des personnes inconnues ou même pour la diffusion d'images à connotation sexuelle.

Cette enquête vient malheureusement rappeler les risques auxquels sont exposés les jeunes citoyens européens sur l'espace transfrontières d'Internet. Elle souligne l'importance des législateurs nationaux et de la coordination européenne pour mieux protéger les enfants et les adolescents, compte tenu de leur plus grande vulnérabilité.

Cet évènement apparaît d'autant plus inquiétant que le site concerné s'était engagé en 2009 auprès de la Commission à protéger les mineurs et qu'il avait entrepris en ce sens de nombreux efforts, constatés par la Commission dans son rapport d'évaluation sur l'application des principes pour des réseaux sociaux plus sûrs, publié le 9 février 2010.

1. La Commission envisage-t-elle de vérifier la véracité des résultats de cette enquête journalistique?
2. Estime-t-elle que l'autorégulation et l'approche éducative privilégiées dans sa communication sont suffisantes pour répondre à ces menaces?
3. Des mesures nationales plus poussées en matière de sécurité, de contrôles et de régulation de l'accès des enfants à Internet ne pourraient-elles pas être encouragées?
4. Ne faudrait-il pas en particulier envisager l'interdiction d'accès à ces sites pour les mineurs de moins de 16 ans, ou l'imposition de normes minimales en matière de modération (humaine et non technologique) des sites?

Réponse donnée par Mme Kroes au nom de la Commission
(25 juillet 2012)

La Commission partage les préoccupations de l'Honorable Parlementaire au sujet de la sécurité des enfants sur l'internet. Dans le même temps, elle estime que l'internet offre un grand nombre de possibilités pour les enfants et qu'il faut leur donner les outils et les connaissances nécessaires afin qu'ils puissent en tirer le meilleur parti, plutôt qu'en bloquer l'accès, mesure aisément contournable par des jeunes férus de technologies, notamment en l'absence d'un mécanisme de vérification de l'âge entièrement fiable. Les mesures décrites dans la communication de la Commission intitulée «Stratégie européenne pour un Internet mieux adapté aux enfants» ⁽¹⁾ visent à responsabiliser et à protéger les enfants en ligne, en particulier les plus jeunes. Elles prévoient l'enseignement de la sécurité en ligne à l'école, des activités de sensibilisation, des outils de signalement solides et simples à utiliser pour des problèmes tels que la cyberintimidation ou la séduction malintentionnée, des paramètres de confidentialité adaptés à l'âge, et la disponibilité et l'utilisation accrues d'outils de contrôle parental. Cette communication définit clairement le rôle et les responsabilités des États membres, notamment dans la mise en place de l'enseignement de la sécurité en ligne à l'école et dans le suivi de la mise en œuvre, au niveau national, des différentes mesures décrites.

⁽¹⁾ <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2012:0196:FIN:FR:PDF>.

En ce qui concerne la mise en œuvre de ladite communication, l'option privilégiée est celle de l'autorégulation, par l'intermédiaire de forums tels que la coalition CEO ⁽²⁾, instaurée en 2011, car elle permet de parvenir à des solutions souples et adaptées au dynamisme de cet environnement. En cas d'échec, la Commission considérera des options réglementaires réalisables et proportionnées. La coalition travaille notamment sur des mécanismes de signalement solides pour les utilisateurs, ainsi que sur la qualité des retours d'informations à ces derniers. Parallèlement, la Commission a toujours insisté sur la nécessité d'évaluations périodiques de la mise en œuvre des accords d'autorégulation en vigueur, afin d'en vérifier l'efficacité.

(2) http://ec.europa.eu/information_society/activities/sip/index_en.htm

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-006063/12
to the Commission**

Christine De Veyrac (PPE)

(19 June 2012)

Subject: Safety of children on the Internet

On 2 May 2012, the Commission published a communication entitled 'European strategy for a better Internet for children' in which it outlined the policy to be implemented by public and private bodies at national and EU level to improve the protection of children on the Internet.

On 12 June 2012, the British television broadcaster Channel 4 aired a report which showed how ineffective EU websites are at protecting young adolescents against people wishing to hold conversations of a sexual nature with them or even against sex offenders.

Via her avatar on an Internet site, a female journalist posing as an 11 year-old girl was asked several times if she wanted to take part in activities involving video conversations with unknown persons or even the distribution of images of a sexual nature.

This investigation is a sad reminder of the risks to which young Europeans are exposed on the Internet. It highlights the key role to be played by national legislators and the importance of European coordination in protecting children and adolescents more effectively, given their greater vulnerability as Internet users.

This incident is all the more worrying because in 2009 the site concerned had given an undertaking to the Commission to protect minors and had made considerable efforts to do just that, as acknowledged by the Commission in its assessment report on the application of the principles for safer social networks published on 9 February 2010.

1. Does the Commission plan to check the accuracy of the findings of the investigation conducted by Channel 4?
2. Does it take the view that self-regulation and education, the twin-track approach advocated in its communication, are sufficient to address the dangers facing young Internet users?
3. Would it not be possible to encourage Member States to take more stringent measures in the areas of safety, monitoring and the regulation of children's access to the Internet?
4. In particular, should consideration not be given to banning access to such sites for minors or to imposing minimum standards for their moderation (by people, not machines)?

Answer given by Ms Kroes on behalf of the Commission

(25 July 2012)

The Commission shares the Honourable Member's concern for the safety of children online. At the same time, it takes the view that the Internet opens up a great number of opportunities for youngsters and they need to be empowered with the tools and knowledge to make the most out of it instead of blocking their Internet access, a measure which could be easily circumvented by technology-savvy youngsters especially in the absence of a fully reliable age-verification mechanism for the online environment. The measures set out in the communication for a European Strategy for a Better Internet for Children ⁽¹⁾ are aimed at empowering and protecting especially young children online, and include teaching online safety in schools, scaling up awareness activities, simple and robust reporting tools for users for issues such as cyberbullying or grooming, age-appropriate privacy settings, wider availability and use of parental controls. The communication clearly sets out the role and responsibilities of the Member States, especially in implementing the teaching online safety in schools and monitoring the implementation at national level of the different measures set out.

⁽¹⁾ <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2012:0196:FIN:EN:PDF>.

The preferred option for the implementation of the communication is self-regulation, through fora such as the CEO Coalition ⁽²⁾ that was set up in 2011, as it can ensure flexible solutions in this very dynamic environment. Should this fail, the Commission will look into regulatory options that are both feasible and proportionate. One of the points the Coalition is working on is robust reporting mechanisms for users, including the quality of feedback to users. At the same time, the Commission has always stated the need for periodical assessment of the implementation of the self-regulatory agreements in force to monitor their effectiveness.

(2) http://ec.europa.eu/information_society/activities/sip/self_reg/index_en.htm

(Versione italiana)

**Interrogazione con richiesta di risposta scritta E-006065/12
alla Commissione (Vicepresidente/Alto Rappresentante)
Sergio Paolo Francesco Silvestris (PPE)**

(19 giugno 2012)

Oggetto: VP/HR — Attacchi in sei città irachene

Una ventina di autobombe sono esplose oggi in Iraq. Due a Hilla, nel sud del paese, e cinque a Bagdad, dove si sono verificate anche diverse sparatorie. In almeno altre sei città irachene sono stati registrati altrettanti attentati. Il bilancio provvisorio è di circa settanta morti e quasi un centinaio di feriti. La maggior parte delle vittime sono pellegrini sciiti che si trovavano nella capitale per prendere parte a un evento religioso.

A Hilla le bombe sono esplose a pochi minuti l'una dall'altra, nelle vicinanze di un ristorante, uccidendo 22 persone e ferendone 38. A Bagdad e nei sobborghi sono scoppiate cinque bombe, molte dentro auto, e ci sono stati due attacchi con armi da fuoco. La prima deflagrazione si è verificata intorno alle 5 di mattina nel quartiere di Taji, nella zona nord della capitale irachena, provocando sette vittime. Dopo poche ore altre tre esplosioni hanno colpito altre processioni di sciiti in diverse zone di Bagdad, uccidendo almeno 13 persone. Le autorità riferiscono che il bilancio delle vittime è destinato ad aumentare.

Nella città di Karbala, a sud del paese, una macchina è esplosa intorno alle 8 del mattino, uccidendo tre pellegrini e ferendone altri 22. A nord di Bagdad invece, nella città sciita di Balad, due autobombe sono deflagrate contemporaneamente mentre i pellegrini si muovevano verso la capitale. Quattro i morti, 34 i feriti. Una vittima anche a Haswa, a 50 chilometri da Bagdad.

Questa serie di attentati, iniziati domenica scorsa, avviene mentre Bagdad si prepara alla celebrazione sciita della morte del settimo dei 12 Imam, Moussa al-Kazem, prevista per il 18 giugno, aumentando la tensione con i musulmani sunniti.

Il Vicepresidente/Alto Rappresentante è a conoscenza della situazione che sta attraversando l'Iraq?

Come intende affrontare il Vicepresidente/Alto Rappresentante questi ennesimi attacchi in Iraq per garantire nel paese una stabilità che risulta fondamentale anche per i paesi limitrofi e per gli attori internazionali, compresa l'UE?

Risposta dell'Alta Rappresentante/Vicepresidente Catherine Ashton a nome della Commissione
(6 agosto 2012)

L'UE segue molto da vicino la situazione in Iraq ed è preoccupata per i continui atti di violenza nel paese.

Il 14 giugno 2012 l'AR/VP Ashton ha condannato pubblicamente la recente ondata di feroci attacchi in numerose province irachene, che hanno provocato decine di morti e moltissimi feriti. Le perdite di vite umane e gli enormi danni conseguenti a questi atti terroristici non fanno altro che esacerbare una situazione politica già fragile.

L'Alta Rappresentante/Vicepresidente ha esortato nuovamente il governo e i gruppi politici iracheni ad avviare un dialogo aperto e inclusivo per affrontare le divergenze politiche. Un governo in grado di promuovere l'unità nazionale e l'inclusività e di essere efficace ha maggiori possibilità di far fronte alla violenza continua.

(English version)

Question for written answer E-006065/12
to the Commission (Vice-President/High Representative)
Sergio Paolo Francesco Silvestris (PPE)
(19 June 2012)

Subject: VP/HR — Attacks in six Iraqi cities

Around twenty car bombs exploded in Iraq today. Two in Hilla, in the south of the country, and five in Baghdad, where there were also several shootings. In at least six other Iraqi towns and cities there have been just as many attacks. The provisional death toll stands at around seventy, with nearly a hundred people wounded. Most of the victims were Shiite pilgrims who were in the capital to take part in a religious event.

In Hilla, the bombs exploded within a few minutes of each other, near a restaurant, killing 22 people and injuring 38. In Baghdad and its suburbs five bombs exploded, many in cars, and there were two firearms attacks. The first explosion occurred at around 5 a.m. in the district of Taji, north of the Iraqi capital, killing seven people. After a few hours three more explosions struck Shiite processions in several other areas of Baghdad, killing at least 13 people. According to the authorities the death toll is likely to increase.

In the city of Karbala, in the south, a car bomb exploded at around 8 a.m., killing three pilgrims and injuring 22 others. To the north of Baghdad meanwhile, in the Shiite city of Balad, two car bombs simultaneously exploded while pilgrims were on their way to the capital, resulting in four people being killed and 34 injured. There was another victim in Haswa, 50 kilometres from Baghdad.

This series of attacks, which began last Sunday, took place while Baghdad is preparing a Shiite celebration of the death of the seventh of the 12 Imams — Moussa al-Kazem — scheduled to take place on 18 June, which is increasing tensions with Sunni Muslims.

Is the Vice-President/Representative aware of the situation in Iraq?

How will she deal with these further attacks in Iraq, to guarantee stability in the country, which is also vital for neighbouring countries and international stakeholders, including the EU?

Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Ashton on behalf of the Commission
(6 August 2012)

The EU follows the situation in Iraq very closely and is concerned about continuing acts of violence across the country.

The HR/VP Ashton condemned publicly on 14 June 2012 the recent wave of ruthless attacks in a number of Iraqi provinces where dozens of people have died and many more have been injured and deplored the death and destruction caused by these acts of terrorism, which can only exacerbate an already fragile political situation.

The High Representative/Vice-President has reiterated her call on the Government and Iraqi political groups to engage in an inclusive and genuine dialogue to address political differences. A government which can demonstrate national unity, inclusiveness and effectiveness stands the best chance of defying the continuing violence.

(Versione italiana)

**Interrogazione con richiesta di risposta scritta E-006066/12
alla Commissione**

Sergio Paolo Francesco Silvestris (PPE)

(19 giugno 2012)

Oggetto: Contenitore antibomba per aereo

Fly-Bag ha vinto il premio nazionale italiano per l'innovazione 2012. Si tratta di un contenitore per stiva che consente di limitare gli effetti delle esplosioni sugli aerei. Una società di consulenza d'ingegneria ha ideato e sviluppato questo primo contenitore antibomba tessile di nuova generazione dedicato al trasporto sicuro di bagagli nella stiva degli aerei di linea e capace di proteggere i velivoli e i passeggeri da esplosioni causate da eventuali ordigni nascosti all'interno di bagagli.

Fly-Bag è una sacca capace di contenere circa cinquanta valigie, realizzata in materiali tessili e compositi che la rendono resistente ai carichi dinamici e termici di un'esplosione. La struttura è di peso contenuto, di cruciale importanza per le applicazioni in campo aeronautico.

A differenza dei prototipi degli anni Novanta, più rigidi e pesanti, pensati per resistere all'onda d'urto generata dall'esplosione senza deformarsi, Fly-Bag è caratterizzato da una struttura flessibile e leggera, capace di assorbire l'esplosione grazie alla deformazione controllata del multistrato a base tessile di cui è costituito. Ogni strato della struttura assolve una funzione specifica: contenimento dei frammenti, assorbimento dell'onda d'urto, resistenza al fuoco.

Alla luce dei fatti più sopra esposti, può la Commissione far sapere se:

1. è a conoscenza della creazione del nuovo contenitore per stiva che consente di limitare le conseguenze di un'esplosione?
2. lo ritiene un utile strumento per mitigare gli effetti di un eventuale attentato terroristico laddove quest'ultimo sia progettato attraverso la spedizione di pacchi e finta corrispondenza imbottita di esplosivo?

Risposta di Siim Kallas a nome della Commissione

(7 agosto 2012)

La Commissione è al corrente dell'esistenza e dell'efficacia dei contenitori per stiva che consentono di limitare gli effetti di esplosioni causate da ordigni nascosti in valigie o pacchi caricati a bordo degli aerei.

La Commissione intende valutare, in cooperazione con il settore aeronautico e gli Stati membri, le eventuali possibilità e modalità con cui tale settore possa avvalersi al meglio tale innovazione, una volta che ne sia confermata l'efficacia ai fini di un suo utilizzo diffuso.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-006066/12
to the Commission**

Sergio Paolo Francesco Silvestris (PPE)

(19 June 2012)

Subject: Bomb-proof container for aircraft

'Fly-Bag' has won the 2012 Italian national award for innovation. It is a container designed for aircraft hold, which is able to limit the effects of explosions on planes. An engineering consultancy designed and developed this new-generation bomb-proof textile container for the safe transportation of baggage in the hold of passenger aircraft, which can protect aircraft and passengers from explosions caused by bombs hidden inside baggage.

Fly-Bag can contain around fifty suitcases. It is made of a textile-composite material that makes it resistant to dynamic and thermal explosion loads. The structure is lightweight, which is of crucial importance for applications in aeronautics.

Unlike the prototypes of the 1990s, which were heavier and more rigid and designed to withstand the shock wave generated by an explosion without being deformed, Fly-Bag has a flexible, lightweight structure that is able to absorb explosions due to the controlled deformation of the multi-layer material of which it is made. Each layer of the material performs a specific function: containment of fragments, absorption of shock waves, fire resistance.

Can the Commission therefore answer the following questions:

1. Is it aware of the invention of this new hold container which limits the impact of an explosion?
2. Does it believe it could be a useful tool for mitigating the effects of a possible terrorist attack, for example through the sending of parcel bombs and letter bombs?

Answer given by Mr Kallas on behalf of the Commission

(7 August 2012)

The Commission is aware of the existence and effectiveness of aircraft hold containers that are capable of reducing the impact of explosions triggered from luggage or parcels carried therein.

The Commission has the intention to investigate with industry and Member States in order to assess if and how aviation security could best profit from this innovation, once its efficiency for wider-spread use is confirmed.

(Versione italiana)

**Interrogazione con richiesta di risposta scritta E-006067/12
alla Commissione (Vicepresidente/Alto Rappresentante)
Sergio Paolo Francesco Silvestris (PPE)**

(19 giugno 2012)

Oggetto: VP/HR — Scontri a Tunisi: coprifuoco in otto regioni del paese

Un coprifuoco notturno dalle 21 alle 5 del mattino è stato decretato in otto regioni tunisine, fra cui la capitale Tunisi, a seguito delle violenze che la scorsa notte hanno visto implicati dei salafiti in diverse zone del paese. Il coprifuoco è stato decretato per il «Grande Tunisi» (che conta quattro governatorati) e i governatorati di Sousse (est), Monastir (est), Jendouba (nord ovest), e Medenine (sud), secondo un comunicato dei Ministeri della Difesa e dell'Interno.

Diverse località, oltre alla capitale, sono state teatro la scorsa notte di attacchi a commissariati, sedi sindacali, partiti politici e tribunali da parte di gruppi di radicali salafiti a cui si sarebbero aggiunti dei delinquenti comuni. Le violenze sono apparentemente legate ad una mostra d'arte a La Marsa (periferia nord di Tunisi), le cui opere sono state giudicate offensive per l'islam. I disordini hanno causato un centinaio di feriti, fra cui 65 poliziotti. Più di 160 persone sono state arrestate.

Quella adottata è la misura a tutela dell'ordine pubblico più grave presa in Tunisia dopo i giorni della «rivoluzione». Il coprifuoco, di fatto, riguarda tutte le più importanti città del paese.

Alla luce di quanto precede, può il Vicepresidente/Alto Rappresentante far sapere se:

1. è a conoscenza degli scontri che stanno interessando la Tunisia?
2. considerando che quanto avvenuto nei giorni scorsi rappresenta solo l'ultimo di una serie di incidenti nella Tunisia post-rivoluzionaria, che vedono opporsi estremisti salafiti e sostenitori di uno Stato più laico, non intende intervenire al fine di tutelare i tanti cittadini europei che scelgono la Tunisia e la capitale Tunisi come meta turistica?

Risposta dell'Alta Rappresentante/Vicepresidente Catherine Ashton a nome della Commissione

(7 agosto 2012)

1. L'Alta Rappresentante/Vicepresidente segue da vicino gli sviluppi sul campo attraverso la delegazione UE a Tunisi. Gli incidenti menzionati dall'onorevole parlamentare destano preoccupazione e sembrano coinvolgere alcuni gruppi violenti guidati da salafiti contro la comunità tunisina in generale, in particolare studenti, media, società civile, artisti e anche sindacalisti e imprese.

2. Il modo migliore per affrontare la questione a medio/lungo termine è proseguire sulla via della transizione democratica. L'UE mantiene contatti regolari con le autorità tunisine riguardo al processo di transizione democratica ed ha ripetutamente sottolineato la necessità di consolidare i progressi storici compiuti grazie alla rivoluzione tunisina, in particolare la libertà di espressione e di riunione, garantendo nel contempo il rispetto della legge e il mantenimento dell'ordine pubblico. Sono quindi benvenuti il ritorno alla calma a Tunisi in seguito agli interventi del governo per metter fine ai disordini e la successiva fine del coprifuoco.

(English version)

Question for written answer E-006067/12
to the Commission (Vice-President/High Representative)
Sergio Paolo Francesco Silvestris (PPE)
(19 June 2012)

Subject: VP/HR — Clashes in Tunis: curfew in eight parts of the country

A night-time curfew from 9 p.m. to 5 a.m. has been imposed in eight Tunisian regions, including the capital, Tunis, in the wake of the violence involving Salafists in various parts of the country last night. According to a statement from the Ministries of Defence and the Interior the curfew was imposed on 'Greater Tunis' (which has four governorates) and the governorates of Sousse (east), Monastir (east), Jendouba (north-west) and Medenine (south).

Last night, a number of places, in addition to the capital, saw attacks on police stations, trade union offices, political parties and courts by groups of radical Salafists, apparently aided by common criminals. The violence was allegedly linked to an art exhibition in La Marsa (northern suburb of Tunis), whose works were deemed offensive to Islam. The riots resulted in hundreds of casualties, including 65 policemen. More than 1 60 people were arrested.

This is the most serious measure taken to protect public order in Tunisia since the 'revolution'. The curfew, in fact, concerns all major cities in the country.

Can the Vice-President/High Representative therefore say:

1. whether she is aware of this conflict in Tunisia;
2. whether, given that the recent events are only the latest in a series of incidents in post-revolutionary Tunisia, in which Salafist extremists are opposing those who support a more secular state, she will take action to protect the many EU citizens who choose Tunisia and its capital, Tunis, as a tourist destination?

Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Ashton on behalf of the Commission
(7 August 2012)

1. The High Representative/Vice-President (HR/VP), through the EU Delegation in Tunis, is following closely developments on the ground. The incidents mentioned by the Honourable Member are of concern and appear to involve some violent groups led by Salafists against the wider Tunisian community in particular students, the media, civil society, artists and even trade unionists and businesses.
 2. The best way to deal with this issue in the medium-long term is to move forward with democratic transition. The EU is in regular contact with the Tunisian authorities regarding the process of democratic transition and has repeatedly underlined the need to protect the historic achievements of the Tunisian revolution notably freedom of expression and assembly while at the same time ensuring maintenance of law and order. The restoration of calm in Tunis following government interventions to control the riots as well as the lifting of the curfew thereafter are welcome.
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(Versão portuguesa)

Pergunta com pedido de resposta escrita E-006069/12

à Comissão

Nuno Teixeira (PPE)

(19 de junho de 2012)

Assunto: Impacto no orçamento da Política de Coesão devido à adesão de novos países

Tendo em conta que:

- A proposta da Comissão Europeia de Regulamento do Parlamento Europeu e do Conselho relativa ao estabelecimento do Quadro Estratégico Comum (COM(2011)0615 final) para a Política de Coesão entre 2014/2020 refere que serão disponibilizados 162,6 mil milhões de euros para as regiões menos desenvolvidas da União Europeia;
- Na mesma proposta, a Comissão salienta que as regiões menos desenvolvidas são aquelas cujo PIB é inferior a 75 % da média da União Europeia;
- No próximo período de programação da Política de Coesão (2014/2020), existe a possibilidade de novos países aderirem à União Europeia, tendo assim direito a usufruir de financiamento por parte da Política de Coesão;
- Segundo o estudo, efetuado pela Direção-Geral das Políticas Internas, «Structural and Cohesion Policies for 2020: Tools to Overcome the Crisis», a possível adesão de novos países até 2019 pode ter um impacto significativo ao nível do desenvolvimento regional, já que o PIB dos candidatos é maioritariamente inferior a 75 % da média europeia;
- O estudo refere ainda que se os candidatos aderirem à União Europeia, as suas regiões serão elegíveis no âmbito do Objetivo Convergência, o que irá implicar elevadas questões orçamentais;

Pergunta-se à Comissão:

1. Qual o procedimento que adotou em anos anteriores, quando um país aderiu à União Europeia e a meio de um Quadro Financeiro Plurianual teve direito a receber financiamento no âmbito da Política de Coesão?
2. Considera que a adesão de novos países irá ter fortes implicações no orçamento da União Europeia, nomeadamente no Objetivo Convergência da Política de Coesão?
3. Como irá proceder ao nível da dotação financeira para as regiões menos desenvolvidas caso um novo país seja considerado membro efetivo e tenha direito a receber verbas da Política de Coesão?

Resposta dada por Johannes Hahn em nome da Comissão

(8 de agosto de 2012)

1. O Acordo Interinstitucional sobre a disciplina orçamental e a boa gestão financeira do processo orçamental, que estabelece o Quadro Financeiro Plurianual para 2007/2013, inclui uma disposição relativa ao ajustamento do referido quadro na previsão de um alargamento. Ali se pode ler, a dado passo: «Em caso de alargamento da União a novos Estados-Membros no decurso do período coberto pelo (...) quadro financeiro, o Parlamento Europeu e o Conselho, deliberando sob proposta da Comissão (...), adaptarão conjuntamente o quadro financeiro para ter em conta as necessidades de despesas decorrentes dos resultados das negociações de adesão». Esta disposição será utilizada para ajustar o quadro financeiro à adesão da Croácia, em 1 de julho de 2013. Idêntica disposição foi utilizada para o alargamento de 2004. O projeto de Quadro Financeiro Plurianual para 2014/2020 também prevê a eventualidade de um alargamento durante a respetiva vigência.
2. A questão de saber se as futuras adesões terão um impacto significativo no orçamento da UE, terá de ser avaliada caso a caso. Nas recentes adesões, as afetações financeiras para os novos Estados-Membros previam um período de transição que atenuava o impacto no orçamento da UE
3. As repartição das verbas destinadas às regiões menos desenvolvidas não é afetada pelas novas adesões, já que é fixada para a totalidade do período de programação.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-006069/12
to the Commission
Nuno Teixeira (PPE)
(19 June 2012)**

Subject: Impact on the cohesion policy budget resulting from new accessions

According to the Commission proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council laying down the Common Strategic Framework for cohesion policy between 2014 and 2020 (COM(2011)0615), EUR 162 600 million will be earmarked for the EU's less developed regions.

In that proposal the Commission defines less developed regions as those whose GDP is less than 75% of the EU average.

As regards the next cohesion policy programming period (2014-2020), there is a possibility that new countries will join the EU and thus be entitled to make use of cohesion policy funding.

According to the study by the Directorate-General for Internal Policies entitled 'Structural and Cohesion Policies for 2020: Tools to Overcome the Crisis', potential new accessions up to 2019 could have a significant impact in terms of regional development, since the candidate countries' GDP is, in most cases, below 75% of the European average.

The study also states that if the candidate countries join the EU, their regions will be eligible under the convergence objective, and that fact will have far-reaching budgetary implications.

1. What procedure did the Commission follow in earlier years, when a country, having joined the EU, become entitled — during the life of an existing multi-annual financial framework — to receive cohesion policy funding?
2. Does it believe that the accession of new countries will have far-reaching implications for the EU budget, not least where the convergence objective of cohesion policy is concerned?
3. How will it proceed as regards the financial allocation for the less developed regions if a further country is treated as a full member and hence entitled to benefit from cohesion policy funding?

**Answer given by Mr Hahn on behalf of the Commission
(8 August 2012)**

1. The Interinstitutional Agreement (IIA) on budgetary discipline and sound financial management, which establishes the multiannual financial framework 2007-2013, includes a provision for an adjustment of the financial framework to cater for enlargement. It states that: 'If new Member States accede to the EU during the period covered by the financial framework, the EP and the Council, acting on a proposal by the Commission..., will jointly adjust the financial framework to take account of the expenditure requirements resulting from the outcome of the accession negotiations'. This provision will be used to adjust the financial framework for 2013 for Croatia that will join the EU on 1 July 2013. A similar provision was used for the 2004 enlargement. The draft Multiannual financial framework regulation for 2014-2020 will also include similar provisions should any enlargement occur during that period.
 2. The question whether future EU accessions will have a significant impact on the EU budget will have to be assessed on a case by case basis. In recent accessions, financial allocations for new Member States contained a phasing-in period which mitigated the impact on the EU budget.
 3. The financial allocations for less developed regions are not affected by EU accession, as they are fixed for the entire programming period.
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(Versão portuguesa)

Pergunta com pedido de resposta escrita E-006070/12

à Comissão

Nuno Teixeira (PPE)

(19 de junho de 2012)

Assunto: Reforço da União Bancária

Tendo em conta que:

- Espanha tem vindo a deparar-se com elevadas dificuldades para aceder ao mercado de capitais, tendo os juros da dívida pública a 10 anos já superado a barreira psicológica dos 7 %. Este Estado-Membro já teve inclusivamente de solicitar ao Eurogrupo um apoio até 100 mil milhões de euros para injetar no sistema bancário espanhol, salvaguardando assim a posição dos cidadãos e das empresas;
- Vários outros Estados-Membros, nomeadamente Grécia, Irlanda e Portugal, receberam elevados montantes para apoiar os seus sistemas bancários, demonstrando que existe um problema alargado no setor bancário europeu;
- Na Grécia, são diariamente transferidos milhões de euros para outras instituições financeiras europeias, provocando uma enorme fuga de capitais que afeta a liquidez dos bancos gregos e impede que possuam recursos para injetarem na economia;
- Na sessão plenária do Parlamento Europeu de 13 de junho de 2012, o Presidente da Comissão Europeia defendeu que a criação de uma união bancária deve ser vista como uma prioridade da União Europeia, até porque a integração financeira é uma área onde «grandes progressos podem ser atingidos rapidamente»;
- Durante o debate, José Manuel Barroso apresentou algumas propostas que serão debatidas num futuro próximo entre as instituições europeias, como uma maior integração financeira, crescente supervisão bancária, sistema de garantia de depósitos, proteções financeiras, reforço do fundo de mecanismo e mutualização da dívida, normalmente conhecida por eurobonds;

Pergunta-se à Comissão:

1. Quando pretende definir o calendário que conduzirá a uma maior união bancária? Qual o prazo que estima para a sua discussão e consequente entrada em vigor?
2. Que outras soluções poderá vir a propor ao Conselho e ao Parlamento com vista a aumentar a coordenação das políticas fiscais?
3. Será a união bancária o passo decisivo para construir uma união económica e orçamental mais forte?

Resposta dada por Olli Rehn em nome da Comissão

(22 de agosto de 2012)

1. A Comissão Europeia está firmemente empenhada em contribuir para a rápida aplicação das conclusões da cimeira da área do euro de 29 de junho, que preveem, nomeadamente, a apresentação de propostas da Comissão relativas a um mecanismo único de supervisão. Os Chefes de Estado ou de Governo da área do euro pediram ao Conselho que atribuísse a essas propostas um caráter de urgência até ao final de 2012.
2. A união bancária é uma peça essencial no processo de aprofundamento da união económica e monetária. Por outro lado, será necessário progredir no respeitante a quadros de política orçamental e económica integrada, bem como assegurar a imprescindível legitimidade e responsabilidade democrática da tomada de decisões no seio da União Económica e Monetária.
3. Conforme indica o relatório de 25 de junho de 2012 «Rumo a uma verdadeira União Económica e Monetária» — que o Presidente do Conselho Europeu preparou em estreita cooperação com os Presidentes da Comissão, do Eurogrupo e do Banco Central Europeu —, uma das quatro peças basilares que terão de ser lançadas ao longo da próxima década é um quadro orçamental integrado que assegure a conceção de políticas orçamentais sólidas aos níveis nacional e europeu. É, porém, necessário prosseguir a elaboração de um roteiro específico e calendarizado, baseado igualmente em consultas regulares e informais com os Estados-Membros e as instituições da UE, conforme assinala o relatório. A Comissão está atualmente a preparar o seu contributo para o relatório intercalar a apresentar em outubro de 2012 e ao qual se seguirá o relatório final em finais de 2012.

(English version)

Question for written answer E-006070/12
to the Commission
Nuno Teixeira (PPE)
(19 June 2012)

Subject: Strengthening banking union

Spain is finding it increasingly difficult to access the capital market, with its 10-year public debt bonds having already exceeded the psychological barrier of 7%. This Member State has already had to ask the Eurogroup for EUR 100 billion to inject into the Spanish financial system, in order to provide security to businesses and the general public.

Several other Member States, namely Greece, Ireland and Portugal, have received large amounts with which to prop up their banking systems, demonstrating the existence of widespread problems within the European banking sector.

In Greece, millions of euros are being transferred on a daily basis to other European financial bodies, causing a massive capital flight which has affected the liquidity of Greek banks and deprived them of resources with which to boost the economy.

During Parliament's plenary sitting on 13 June 2012, the President of the Commission stated that the creation of a banking union should be seen as a priority for the EU, since financial integration is an area where 'major progress could be rapidly made'.

During the debate, José Manuel Barroso presented a number of proposals which will be discussed by the European institutions in the near future, which include greater financial integration, increased supervision of banks, a deposit guarantee system, financial safeguards and strengthening of the debt pooling and debt mechanism fund, usually known as Eurobonds.

1. When does the Commission intend to draft a timetable leading to increased banking union? How long does it think it will take to discuss and bring this into force?
2. What other solutions could the Commission propose to Parliament and the Council with a view to strengthening the coordination of fiscal policies?
3. Will banking union be the decisive step leading to the construction of a stronger economic and budgetary union?

Answer given by Mr Rehn on behalf of the Commission
(22 August 2012)

1. The European Commission is fully committed to contributing to implement swiftly the conclusions of the 29 June Euro area summit, which foresee *inter alia* the presentation of Commission Proposals for a single supervisory mechanism. The Euro Area Heads of State or Government have asked the Council to consider these Proposals as a matter of urgency by the end of 2012.
2. The banking union is an essential building block in the process towards deeper economic and monetary union. Moreover, progress with respect to integrated budgetary and economic policy frameworks will be required as well as ensuring the necessary democratic legitimacy and accountability of decision-making within the Economic and Monetary Union.
3. As indicated in the report of 25 June 2012 'Towards a genuine economic and monetary union' — which the President of the European Council prepared in close cooperation with the Presidents of the Commission, the Eurogroup and the European Central Bank — an integrated budgetary framework to ensure sound fiscal policy making at the national and European levels features amongst the four building blocks that will have to be put in place over the next decade. Further work is, however, necessary to develop a specific and time-bound road map, also based on regular and informal consultations with the Member States and the EU institutions as indicated in the report. The Commission is currently working on its contribution to the interim report that will be presented in October 2012, to be followed by the final report by the end of 2012.

(Versão portuguesa)

Pergunta com pedido de resposta escrita E-006071/12

à Comissão

Nuno Teixeira (PPE)

(19 de junho de 2012)

Assunto: Capping — Fundos estruturais limitados a 2,5 % do PIB

Tendo em conta que:

- Nas propostas de regulamentos para a Política de Coesão 2014/2020, o Quadro Estratégico Comum define que os fundos estruturais devem estar limitados a um valor máximo equivalente a 2,5 % do PIB de cada Estado-Membro;
- Têm sido levantadas muitas dúvidas relativamente a esta percentagem máxima que pode condicionar a atribuição de valores justos aos países menos desenvolvidos, podendo ainda estar em discordância com o princípio de coesão económica, social e territorial definido no Tratado sobre o Funcionamento da União Europeia;
- No Conselho existem várias discussões sobre este tema, sendo que algumas delegações se opõem à proposta apresentada pela Comissão Europeia de limitar os fundos estruturais a 2,5 % do PIB;
- O Comité das Regiões concorda com a abordagem de fixar a taxa limite para as dotações da coesão num valor que reflita as taxas efetivas de execução e as capacidades reais de absorção em cada Estado-Membro, mas salienta que o novo limite de 2,5 % do PIB deve ser definido a um nível que permita a execução de uma Política de Coesão eficaz em todos os Estados-Membros;
- Segundo o estudo efetuado pela Direção-Geral das Políticas Internas, intitulado «Structural and Cohesion Policies for 2020: Tools to Overcome the Crisis», atualmente o nível máximo de atribuição de fundos estruturais é de 3,8 % do PIB de cada Estado-Membro;
- O estudo refere ainda que esta alteração implicará uma grande mudança e pode afetar significativamente os beneficiários através da redução de verbas para as regiões do Objetivo Convergência e do Fundo de Coesão;

Pergunta-se à Comissão:

1. Sabendo que muitos Estados-Membros têm uma elevada absorção de fundos estruturais, como é o caso de Portugal, porque é que se propõe uma redução de 1,3 % na atribuição máxima de verbas?
2. Qual o valor máximo equivalente a 2,5 % do PIB que Portugal poderá receber no âmbito da Política de Coesão 2014/2020?
3. Está disponível para ponderar a sua posição, conforme tem vindo a ponderar em outras áreas de grande relevância para o futuro da Política de Coesão?

Resposta dada por Johannes Hahn em nome da Comissão

(3 de agosto de 2012)

1. A experiência adquirida com o quadro financeiro atual demonstra que alguns Estados-Membros têm dificuldades em absorver grandes volumes de fundos da UE ao longo de um período de tempo limitado. Esta situação conduziu a uma acumulação significativa de dotações não utilizadas. Além disso, a situação fiscal em alguns Estados-Membros tornou mais difícil assegurar fundos para providenciar cofinanciamento a nível nacional. A fim de garantir uma absorção dos fundos eficaz, a Comissão propôs fixar em 2,5 % do PIB a taxa máxima das dotações a favor da coesão. Isto garante que os Estados-Membros terão a oportunidade de beneficiar equitativamente da política de coesão, tendo em conta as condições macroeconómicas.
2. As dotações afetadas à coesão são definidas com base nas estatísticas mais recentes, em especial relativas à demografia, prosperidade regional e nacional e ao mercado de trabalho. Esse método assegura a igualdade de tratamento entre Estados-Membros e a concentração do financiamento nas regiões menos desenvolvidas. De acordo com esse método, é pouco provável que Portugal venha a receber 2,5 % do seu PIB.
3. O nível máximo a aplicar no futuro dependerá do resultado final das negociações sobre o próximo quadro financeiro plurianual para 2014/2020.

(English version)

Question for written answer E-006071/12
to the Commission
Nuno Teixeira (PPE)
(19 June 2012)

Subject: Capping — structural funds capped at 2.5% of GDP

In the proposals for cohesion policy regulations 2014-2020, the common strategic framework provides that the structural funds should be restricted to a maximum equivalent to 2.5% of each Member State's GDP. Many doubts have been raised in relation to this maximum percentage, which could affect the allocation of fair amounts to the least developed countries and conflict with the principle of economic, social and territorial cohesion enshrined in the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. There have been various discussions in the Council on this matter, and some delegations oppose the Commission's proposal to restrict the structural funds to 2.5% of GDP.

The Committee of the Regions agrees with the approach whereby a threshold for cohesion appropriations is set at a level that reflects actual implementation rates and absorption capacity in each Member State, but stresses that the new cap of 2.5% of GDP must be set at a level that will make it possible to implement an effective cohesion policy in all the Member States.

According to the study produced by the Directorate-General for Internal Policies entitled 'Structural and Cohesion Policies for 2020: Tools to Overcome the Crisis', the current maximum level of allocation of the structural funds is 3.8% of each Member State's GDP. The study points out that this cap would be an important change and could have a significant impact on the beneficiaries, as a result of the reduction in appropriations for regions covered by the convergence objective and the Cohesion Fund.

1. Given that many Member States have a high rate of absorption of structural funding, as is the case for Portugal, why is the Commission proposing a 1.3% reduction in the maximum amount of funding?
2. What is the maximum amount equivalent to 2.5% of GDP that Portugal will be able to receive under the cohesion policy 2014-2020?
3. Is the Commission prepared to reconsider its position, as it has done in other areas of great significance for the future of cohesion policy?

Answer given by Mr Hahn on behalf of the Commission
(3 August 2012)

1. Experience with the current financial framework shows that some Member States have difficulties in absorbing large volumes of EU funding over a limited period of time. This has led to an important backlog of unused appropriations. Furthermore, the fiscal situation in some Member States has made it more difficult to ensure funds to provide national co-financing. In order to ensure the efficient absorption of funding, the Commission has proposed to fix at 2.5% of GDP the capping rates for cohesion allocations. This ensures that each Member State will have a fair opportunity to benefit from Cohesion Policy, taking into account the macroeconomic conditions.
 2. The cohesion allocations are defined on the basis of the most recent statistics related in particular to population, regional and national prosperity and the labour market. This method ensures equal treatment between Member States and that funding is concentrated on the least developed regions. According to this method, it is unlikely that Portugal will receive 2.5% of its GDP.
 3. The future capping level will depend on the final result of the negotiations on the next multiannual financial framework 2014-20.
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(Versão portuguesa)

Pergunta com pedido de resposta escrita E-006072/12

à Comissão

Nuno Teixeira (PPE)

(19 de junho de 2012)

Assunto: Novo acordo interinstitucional com vista a estimular o crescimento económico e a geração de emprego

Tendo em conta que:

- Ao longo dos últimos meses, vários líderes europeus, economistas e professores universitários têm vindo a defender a necessidade de conciliar as medidas de austeridade com as de crescimento económico e geração de emprego;
- O novo presidente francês, François Hollande, já referiu que pretende introduzir alterações ao Tratado recentemente aprovado pelos líderes europeus, inserindo várias ideias com vista a estimular o crescimento económico;
- Na sessão plenária do Parlamento Europeu de 13 de junho de 2012, o Presidente da Comissão Europeia referiu que a próxima reunião do Conselho, realizada a 28 e 29 de junho, deverá centrar-se no crescimento e emprego, tendo já apresentado algumas propostas que devem conduzir à obtenção de resultados;
- No mesmo discurso realizado em Estrasburgo, José Manuel Barroso referiu que «é por isso que hoje proponho que celebremos um acordo interinstitucional sobre a iniciativa de crescimento. Dada a urgência da situação, é importante estabelecer prioridades sobre as decisões-chave, e um acordo interinstitucional definiria um calendário célere e faria as coisas avançarem»;

Pergunta-se à Comissão:

1. Qual o procedimento que entende ajustado para a elaboração do acordo interinstitucional que anunciou no Parlamento Europeu?
2. Quando considera que o novo acordo interinstitucional poderá entrar em vigor?

Resposta dada por José Manuel Barroso em nome da Comissão

(16 de agosto de 2012)

A Comissão Europeia defendeu a conclusão de um acordo entre o Parlamento Europeu, o Conselho e a Comissão Europeia para a aplicação do Pacto para o Crescimento e o Emprego adotado pelos Chefes de Estado e de Governo em 28 e 29 de junho.

Este acordo, independentemente da sua forma exata, deverá formalizar o compromisso solene e partilhado das instituições no sentido de realizarem progressos rápidos em relação às medidas de promoção do crescimento enunciadas no Pacto — em todos os domínios em que a Comissão Europeia apresentou já propostas concretas — em conformidade com as respetivas prerrogativas e procedimentos das instituições.

Estão em curso os debates entre as instituições sobre o conteúdo e a forma do acordo. A Comissão Europeia considera que estes debates devem ser concluídos o mais rapidamente possível, de modo a centrar a atenção na aplicação das medidas constantes do Pacto.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-006072/12
to the Commission
Nuno Teixeira (PPE)
(19 June 2012)**

Subject: New interinstitutional agreement to stimulate economic growth and job creation

Over the past few months, a number of European leaders, economists, and university professors have been maintaining that austerity measures need to be reconciled with measures to promote economic growth and job creation.

The new French President, François Hollande, has already stated his intention of proposing amendments to the Treaty recently approved by European leaders, his aim being to add a growth component.

Addressing Parliament at its sitting in Strasbourg on 13 June 2012, the Commission President said that the forthcoming Council meeting on 28 and 29 June 2012 was to focus on growth and employment, and that proposals had been put forward with a view to achieving results.

José Manuel Barroso went on to propose in the same speech that an interinstitutional agreement be concluded in order to underpin the growth initiative. Given the urgency of the situation, he considered that priorities had to be set regarding the key decisions, and an interinstitutional agreement would make for a short time-frame and help to ensure progress.

1. What would be the appropriate procedure to use, in the Commission's opinion, to draw up the interinstitutional agreement of which the Commission spoke in Parliament?
2. When does the Commission think that the new interinstitutional agreement could enter into force?

**Answer given by Mr Barroso on behalf of the Commission
(16 August 2012)**

The European Commission has advocated the conclusion of an agreement between the European Parliament, Council and European Commission to implement the Compact for Growth and Jobs decided by the Heads of State or Government on 28-29 June.

This understanding, irrespective of its precise form, should formalise the solemn and shared commitment of the institutions to make rapid progress on the growth-enhancing measures enumerated in the Compact — in all areas in which the European Commission has already presented concrete proposals — in accordance with the respective prerogatives and procedures of the institutions.

Discussions between the institutions on the content and form of the agreement are ongoing. The European Commission considers that these discussions should be concluded at the earliest opportunity so that attention can turn to the implementation of the measures contained therein.

(Versão portuguesa)

Pergunta com pedido de resposta escrita E-006073/12

à Comissão

Nuno Teixeira (PPE)

(19 de junho de 2012)

Assunto: Proposta de «building blocks» a apresentar na reunião do Conselho

Tendo em conta que:

- Os Estados-Membros devem continuar a elaborar reformas estruturais e, na medida do possível, investir em prioridades estratégicas que conduzam a uma nova fase de crescimento económico e geração de emprego;
- O crescimento económico define-se e implementa-se como objetivo, existindo uma grande diferença entre o querer e o fazer. Neste sentido, existe um conjunto alargado de medidas na área do crescimento e geração de emprego que é urgente definir;
- A Comissão Europeia tem vindo a apresentar sucessivas iniciativas com vista a estimular o crescimento, como o possível aumento de capital do Banco Europeu de Investimento (BEI), a reestruturação de 82 mil milhões de euros de fundos estruturais ou os «project bonds» com vista a investir em infraestruturas na área da energia, tecnologias da informação e comunicação e transportes;
- Na sessão plenária do Parlamento Europeu de 13 de junho de 2012, o Presidente da Comissão Europeia referiu que a próxima reunião do Conselho realizada a 28 e 29 de junho deverá discutir os «building blocks» com vista a estimular o crescimento económico e a geração de emprego;
- José Manuel Barroso referiu ainda que existe um largo consenso entre a posição da Comissão e do Parlamento, mas que as negociações com o Conselho não serão fáceis;
- É fundamental devolver a esperança e confiança aos cerca de 500 milhões de cidadãos europeus e às 23 mil PME, por forma a que a Europa caminhe no sentido do progresso e da geração de riqueza.

Pergunta-se à Comissão:

1. Quais as propostas de «building blocks» que serão apresentadas na reunião do Conselho de 28 e 29 de junho de 2012?
2. Considera que os Estados-Membros estão mais recetivos a discutirem medidas que impulsionem uma nova fase de desenvolvimento da União Europeia, conciliando a austeridade orçamental com uma nova fase de crescimento económico e geração de emprego?

Resposta dada por Olli Rehn em nome da Comissão

(20 de agosto de 2012)

Na reunião do Conselho Europeu de Junho, os Chefes de Estado e de Governo decidiram estabelecer um «Pacto para o Crescimento e o Emprego», que proporciona um enquadramento para as ações a nível nacional, da UE e da zona do euro. As ações previstas a nível da UE incluem o aumento do capital do BEI, medidas para aprofundar o mercado único, um rigoroso exame inter pares da aplicação da Diretiva Serviços, a finalização da Patente Europeia, a plena realização do mercado europeu da energia, a adoção de decisões sobre as propostas contidas no «Pacote do emprego»⁽¹⁾ apresentado pela Comissão, colocando a tónica na criação de empregos de qualidade, na reforma estrutural dos mercados de trabalho e no investimento no capital humano. O Pacto inclui o compromisso de reforçar o financiamento da economia com 120 mil milhões de euros (1 % do PIB). Muitos destes compromissos estão relacionados com propostas que já foram ou serão em breve apresentadas pela Comissão no contexto da sua estratégia global de medidas para incentivar o crescimento e o emprego, as reformas estruturais, os investimentos específicos e a consolidação orçamental⁽²⁾.

⁽¹⁾ (http://ec.europa.eu/commission_2010-2014/andor/headlines/news/2012/04/20120418_en.htm).

⁽²⁾ Para mais pormenores, ver o anexo às conclusões do Conselho Europeu:
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/131388.pdf.

Esta abordagem abrangente orientou também os trabalhos da Comissão ao longo do segundo Semestre Europeu. Na Análise Anual do Crescimento de 2012 ⁽³⁾ foram identificadas medidas estruturais a curto e a médio prazo a adotar pelos Estados-Membros para poderem assegurar um crescimento sustentável e a criação de emprego para o futuro. As recomendações específicas por país emitidas pelo Conselho Europeu especificam em mais pormenor as ações que os Estados-Membros devem adotar nas suas futuras decisões em matéria de orçamento, reformas estruturais e políticas de emprego a nível nacional.

⁽³⁾ (http://ec.europa.eu/europe2020/pdf/ags2012_en.pdf).

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-006073/12
to the Commission
Nuno Teixeira (PPE)
(19 June 2012)**

Subject: 'Building-block' proposals for the Council meeting

Member States must continue to produce structural reforms and, as far as possible, invest in strategic priorities leading to a new phase of economic growth and job creation.

Economic growth is defined, and finding practical expression, as a goal, but desire and action are two very different things. There are, to that extent, a wide range of growth-related and job-creating measures that need to be laid down urgently.

The Commission has been putting forward a series of initiatives aimed at boosting growth, for example the possible increase in the capital of the European Investment Bank (EIB), the reorganisation of structural funding, involving a total of EUR 82 000 million, or 'project bonds' to encourage investment in energy, ICT, and transport infrastructure.

Addressing Parliament at its sitting of 13 June 2012, the Commission President said that the forthcoming European Council on 28 and 29 June 2012 was to discuss the 'building-blocks' with a view to stimulating economic growth and job creation.

José Manuel Barroso added that there is a large measure of agreement between the Commission and Parliament, but negotiations with the Council will not be easy.

It is vital to restore hope and confidence to the 500 million European citizens and the 23 000 SMEs so as to set Europe on a path of progress and wealth creation.

1. What 'building-block' proposals will be submitted to the Council meeting on 28 and 29 June 2012?
2. Does the Commission believe that Member States are now more willing to discuss measures aimed at taking the EU's development into the next era by reconciling fiscal austerity with a new phase of economic growth and job creation?

**Answer given by Mr Rehn on behalf of the Commission
(20 August 2012)**

At the June European Council meeting, Heads of State or Government decided on a 'Compact for Growth and Jobs' setting out a framework for actions at national, EU and euro area levels. Actions committed to at EU level include the increase in the capital of the EIB; steps towards deepening the single market; a rigorous peer review on the implementation of the services directive; the finalisation of the European patent; completion of the European energy market; decisions on the proposals contained in the Commission's 'Employment package' ⁽¹⁾, putting emphasis on quality job creation, structural reform of labour markets and investment in human capital. The Compact includes a commitment to boosting the financing to the economy by EUR 120 billion (equivalent to 1% of GDP). Many of these commitments relate to proposals which have already been tabled or are shortly to be tabled by the Commission as part of its comprehensive approach combining action to boost growth and jobs, structural reforms, targeted investment and fiscal consolidation ⁽²⁾.

This comprehensive approach has also guided the Commission's work throughout the second European Semester. The 2012 Annual Growth Survey ⁽³⁾ pointed to short and medium term structural measures that should be taken by Member States to ensure sustainable growth and jobs for the future. The country specific recommendations endorsed by the European Council further specify actions to be translated by Member States into their forthcoming national decisions on budgets, structural reforms and employment policies.

⁽¹⁾ http://ec.europa.eu/commission_2010-2014/andor/headlines/news/2012/04/20120418_en.htm

⁽²⁾ For further details see the annex to the European Council conclusions:
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/131388.pdf.

⁽³⁾ http://ec.europa.eu/europe2020/pdf/ags2012_en.pdf

(Versão portuguesa)

Pergunta com pedido de resposta escrita E-006074/12

à Comissão

João Ferreira (GUE/NGL)

(19 de junho de 2012)

Assunto: Ausência de tradução do relatório de 2011 sobre a Coerência das Políticas para o Desenvolvimento

A União Europeia decidiu, em 2005, prosseguir uma abordagem baseada na Coerência das Políticas para o Desenvolvimento (CPD), que tenha implicações nas suas múltiplas políticas setoriais. Desde então, a UE afirma atribuir à CPD um papel central no desenho das suas políticas, reforçado pela base legal que lhe é atribuída pelo Tratado. De dois em dois anos, a UE elabora relatórios nos quais avalia os progressos feitos neste domínio. Todavia, o último desses relatórios, referente ao período 2009/2011, sob o pretexto de ser considerado um «documento de trabalho da Comissão», não se encontra traduzido em todas as línguas oficiais da UE.

Por esta razão, pergunto à Comissão:

1. Tendo em conta o papel que diz atribuir à CPD, não considera importante divulgar publicamente, de forma acessível aos cidadãos de todos os Estados-Membros, os progressos ou recuos no campo da CPD e os resultados das políticas setoriais da UE no campo da cooperação para o desenvolvimento?
2. Por que razão é este importante relatório considerado apenas um «documento de trabalho da Comissão»?
3. Como se justifica mais este desrespeito pelo princípio do multilinguismo, que priva os cidadãos de diversos Estados-Membros de acederem a informação relevante na sua língua?
4. Considera a possibilidade de alterar esta decisão, assegurando a tradução do Relatório sobre a Coerência das Políticas para o Desenvolvimento (de 2011 e futuros) em todas as línguas oficiais da UE?

Resposta dada pelo Comissário Andris Piebalgs em nome da Comissão

(27 de julho de 2012)

1. e 2. O documento que estabelece os fundamentos para a Coerência das Políticas para o Desenvolvimento (CPD) de 2005 era uma comunicação da Comissão, que foi traduzida em todas as línguas oficiais da UE. Desde então, de dois em dois anos, a Comissão tem apresentado um relatório sobre os progressos alcançados na UE e em todos os Estados-Membros, e concorda plenamente com o Senhor Deputado que esses relatórios de acompanhamento bienais são muito importantes. O relatório de 2011 é um documento de trabalho dos serviços da Comissão, em parte devido à sua natureza (concentra-se no acompanhamento dos progressos realizados mas não contém novas propostas) e, em parte, devido ao seu conteúdo (baseia-se nas contribuições dos Estados-Membros da UE e dos serviços da Comissão). O relatório reúne informações que, na sua maior parte, estão à disposição do público de outras formas, nomeadamente sob a forma de legislação ou de Comunicações da Comissão traduzidas em todas as línguas da UE. Quanto aos resultados das políticas setoriais da UE no âmbito da cooperação para o desenvolvimento, eles estão bem documentados no relatório anual da Comissão sobre a ajuda externa, cujo resumo está traduzido em todas as línguas da UE.

3. A Comissão respeita profundamente o princípio do multilinguismo mas, ao mesmo tempo, tem de gerir os seus limitados recursos de forma eficiente. A Comissão é legalmente obrigada a garantir, em primeiro lugar, que todos os textos legislativos são traduzidos em todas as línguas oficiais e que outras obrigações jurídicas são respeitadas. Uma vez cumpridas essas obrigações, a Comissão tem de atribuir prioridades à sua atividade de tradução, de modo a fazer o melhor uso possível dos restantes recursos. No contexto das atuais restrições orçamentais, a tradução do relatório CPD em todas as línguas não é uma opção viável. De salientar, no entanto, que o trabalho em matéria de CPD é em grande parte um esforço comum empreendido em conjunto com os Estados-Membros, os quais consultam os seus cidadãos sobre questões relacionadas com a CPD a nível nacional.

4. As discussões sobre a natureza e o formato do relatório de 2013 começaram a nível interno, nos serviços da Comissão, não tendo ainda sido tomadas quaisquer decisões.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-006074/12
to the Commission**

João Ferreira (GUE/NGL)

(19 June 2012)

Subject: Failure to translate the 2011 Report on Policy Coherence for Development

In 2005 the EU decided to follow an approach based on policy coherence for development (PCD), encompassing its many and varied sectoral policies. Since then it has maintained that PCD plays a central policy-making role, underpinned by its legal basis in the Treaty. Every two years it reports on the progress achieved in this area. Its last progress report, however, covering the period from 2009 to 2011, was treated as a 'Commission staff working paper' and therefore not translated into all the official languages.

1. Given the role which it claims to assign to PCD, does not the Commission believe that advances or setbacks in the PCD sphere and the outcome of sector-based EU development cooperation policies should be brought to public notice in a form accessible to the citizens of all Member States?
2. Why is it that this important report is considered to be merely a 'Commission staff working paper'?
3. Can the Commission explain why the principle of multilingualism has again been disregarded and the citizens of several Member States denied access to relevant information in their own language?
4. Does it think that it might change the decision in question and hence enable the reports on policy coherence for development (for 2011 and future years) to be translated into all of the EU official languages?

Answer given by Mr Piebalgs on behalf of the Commission

(27 July 2012)

1 and 2. The document establishing the policy foundations for Policy Coherence for Development (PCD) in 2005 was a Commission Communication, translated into all EU official languages. Every two years since, the Commission has reported on progress achieved in the EU and all Member States and agrees fully with the Honourable Member that these biennial monitoring reports are very important. The 2011 report is a Staff Working Paper partly due to its nature (focus on monitoring of progress but not containing new policy proposals) and partly its content (based on contributions from EU Member States and Commission services). The report gathers information that is mostly publicly available elsewhere, e.g. in the form of legislation or Commission Communications translated into all EU languages. As far as the outcome of sector-based EU development cooperation policies is concerned, it is well documented in the Commission Annual Report on External Assistance, the summary of which is translated into all EU languages.

3. The Commission holds the principle of multilingualism high but needs at the same time to manage its limited resources efficiently. The Commission is legally obliged to first ensure that all legislative texts are translated into all official languages and that other legal obligations are respected. Once these obligations are fulfilled, the Commission has to prioritise its translation activity so as to make best use of the remaining resources. Under the current budgetary constraints, the translation of the PCD report into all languages is not an option. It has to be noted however that work on PCD is very much a joint effort undertaken together with Member States who engage with their own citizens on PCD issues at national level.

4. Discussions on the nature and format of the 2013 report have started internally within the Commission but no decisions have yet been taken.

(Versão portuguesa)

**Pergunta com pedido de resposta escrita E-006075/12
à Comissão**

João Ferreira (GUE/NGL)

(19 de junho de 2012)

Assunto: Relatório do Tribunal de Contas sobre o falhanço da reforma do setor do vinho

Um relatório do Tribunal de Contas Europeu, recentemente divulgado, veio considerar que a União Europeia falhou o objetivo de reduzir o excesso de produção de vinho, que vem comprometendo a estabilidade dos mercados.

Esta constatação vem ao encontro das queixas de inúmeros viticultores, que consideram que as orientações adotadas para o setor vitivinícola em 2008 tiveram como efeito prático a «deslocalização da produção», com a sua concentração em grupos de grandes empresários do setor. Foi este o resultado prático da conjugação das medidas de arranque, por um lado, com as medidas de reestruturação e reconversão, por outro.

A estas críticas, os viticultores acrescentam a «falta de controlo no setor» e a crescente circulação de vinho adulterado, que resultaram da última reforma do setor e que aumentam, consideravelmente, a sua instabilidade, que poderá aumentar ainda mais se não for revertida a decisão de liberalizar as plantações de vinha.

Em face do exposto, pergunto à Comissão:

1. Que avaliação faz do relatório supramencionado?
2. Que medidas têm sido tomadas ou vão ser tomadas para lidar com o problema da crescente circulação de vinho adulterado e da falta de controlo existente?
3. Como pensa defender os interesses dos pequenos produtores, permitindo a necessária reestruturação de vinhas antigas para melhorar a produção e obter melhores vinhos, evitando ao mesmo tempo a concentração da produção apenas em grandes empresas?
4. Não considera necessário, à luz da situação atual, manter os limites à plantação da vinha, revertendo a decisão de liberalização tomada em 2008 (tal como têm vindo a defender vários Estados-Membros)?

Resposta dada por Dacian Cioloș em nome da Comissão

(8 de agosto de 2012)

A Comissão concorda com o teor de várias partes do relatório especial n.º 7/2012 do Tribunal de Contas ⁽¹⁾, mas tem uma opinião diferente em relação a determinadas conclusões do mesmo. A Comissão não considera que a reforma tenha falhado na redução do excesso de produção. Num contexto de diminuição do consumo interno, a produção também diminuiu, ao passo que as exportações aumentaram, o que conduziu a uma redução do nível das existências e a preços mais elevados. Nada indica que existam excedentes estruturais de vinho.

A Comissão não tem conhecimento de uma «crescente circulação de vinho adulterado». Não foi recebida qualquer informação das autoridades nacionais competentes, pelo que a Comissão agradece a comunicação de elementos de prova específicos.

Várias medidas neste setor, em especial a reestruturação e a reconversão das vinhas, estão disponíveis para os pequenos produtores, no âmbito dos programas nacionais de apoio. Estes produtores podem ainda beneficiar dos fundos de desenvolvimento rural.

Os direitos de plantação não estão abrangidos pelo relatório em questão. A Comissão remete ainda o Senhor Deputado para a resposta dada à pergunta escrita E-5399/2012 ⁽²⁾.

⁽¹⁾ (<http://eca.europa.eu/portal/pls/portal/docs/1/14824739.PDF>).

⁽²⁾ (<http://www.europarl.europa.eu/QP-WEB/home.jsp>).

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-006075/12
to the Commission**

João Ferreira (GUE/NGL)

(19 June 2012)

Subject: Court of Auditors' report on the failure of the wine sector reform

In a newly published report, the Court of Auditors takes the view that the EU has failed to achieve its aim of reducing overproduction in the wine sector, which is undermining market stability.

The Court's finding accords with the complaints of numerous wine-growers, who consider that the policy adopted for the wine sector in 2008 has served in practice to 'relocate' production by concentrating it into the hands of large business groups. This has been brought about by the combined effects of the grubbing-up scheme and the restructuring and conversion measures.

In addition to these criticisms, wine-growers speak of inadequate oversight in the sector and the increasingly large-scale movement of adulterated wine: these two consequences of the last reform have greatly exacerbated the prevailing instability, which could be worsened still further unless the decision to liberalise vine planting is reversed.

1. What is the Commission's assessment of the abovementioned report?
2. What measures have been or will be taken to deal with the increasingly large-scale movement of adulterated wine and the present lack of oversight?
3. How will the Commission safeguard the interests of small producers by allowing the necessary restructuring of older vineyards while preventing production being concentrated solely in the hands of large enterprises?
4. Does it not believe, in the light of the present situation, that the vine planting restrictions should remain in place and that it should reverse the liberalisation decision taken in 2008 (as several Member States have been calling for)?

Answer given by Mr Ciolos on behalf of the Commission

(8 August 2012)

The Commission can share several parts of the Court of Auditors' special report No 7/2012 ⁽¹⁾ but has a different view on certain of its conclusions. The Commission does not share that the reform has failed in reducing overproduction. In a context of declining internal consumption, production declined also, while exports increased leading to lower stocks levels and higher prices. There is no evidence on structural surpluses of wine.

The Commission is not aware of an 'increasing large scale movement of adulterated wine'. No information has been received from national competent authorities and the Commission would be grateful for specific evidence.

Several wine measures, in particular restructuring and conversion of vineyards, are available to small producers within the National Support Programs. In addition they may also benefit from rural development funds.

Planting rights are not covered by the report in question. The Commission would furthermore refer the Honourable Member to its answer to Written Question E-5399/2012 ⁽²⁾.

⁽¹⁾ <http://eca.europa.eu/portal/pls/portal/docs/1/14824739.PDF>

⁽²⁾ <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/QP-WEB/home.jsp>

(Versiunea în limba română)

Întrebarea cu solicitare de răspuns scris E-006076/12
adresată Comisiei
Rareș-Lucian Niculescu (PPE)
(19 iunie 2012)

Subiect: Statutul substanței 4-metilimidazol

În ianuarie 2012, statul California (SUA) a adăugat pe lista de substanțe cancerigene ingredientul 4-metilimidazol sau 4-MEI, un produs secundar format în procesul de obținere a colorantului caramel, un aditiv utilizat de regulă în băuturile cola carbogazoase aromatizate.

Comisia este rugată să precizeze care este statutul acestui produs în Uniunea Europeană și, având în vedere preocupările consumatorilor, dacă intenționează să deruleze noi analize cu privire la impactul acestuia asupra sănătății umane.

Răspuns dat de dl Dalli în numele Comisiei
(21 august 2012)

Comisia invită distinsul membru să consulte răspunsul oferit de Comisie la întrebarea scrisă E-002847/2012 ⁽¹⁾.

⁽¹⁾ <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/QP-WEB/application/home.do?language=EN>.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-006076/12
to the Commission**

Rareș-Lucian Niculescu (PPE)

(19 June 2012)

Subject: Classification of 4-Methylimidazol

In January 2012, the State of California (USA) added to its list of carcinogens 4-Methylimidazol or 4-MEI, a secondary product obtained in the production of caramel colorant, an additive generally contained in fizzy flavoured cola drinks.

Can the Commission say how this product is classified in the European Union and, in view of consumer concerns, whether it intends to carry out further analyses regarding its effect on human health?

Answer given by Mr Dalli on behalf of the Commission

(21 August 2012)

The Commission would refer the Honourable Member to its answer to Written Question E-002847/2012 ⁽¹⁾.

⁽¹⁾ <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/QP-WEB/application/home.do?language=EN>.

(Versiunea în limba română)

Întrebarea cu solicitare de răspuns scris E-006077/12
adresată Comisiei
Rareș-Lucian Niculescu (PPE)
(19 iunie 2012)

Subiect: Liberalizarea pieței funciare după anul 2014 în România

Tratatul de aderare al României la Uniunea Europeană nu prevede posibilitatea de prelungire a termenului de liberalizare a pieței funciare după anul 2014. În aceste condiții, autoritățile române au în vedere instituirea unui drept de preempțiune al statului la înstrăinarea terenurilor agricole.

Comisia este rugată să precizeze dacă această măsură corespunde exigențelor legislației europene în vigoare.

Răspuns dat de dl Barnier în numele Comisiei
(14 august 2012)

Achiziționarea proprietăților agricole reprezintă o mișcare de capital căreia, conform articolului 63 din Tratatul privind funcționarea Uniunii Europene (TFUE), nu i se aplică restricții decât dacă ele sunt justificate de excepții de la tratat, mai exact de articolul 65 din TFUE în interpretarea dată de jurisprudența Curții de Justiție a Uniunii Europene.

Conform Tratatului de aderare semnat în 2005, România poate menține în vigoare timp de șapte ani de la data aderării restricțiile prevăzute de legislația actuală cu privire la achiziționarea de teren agricol și forestier de către persoane fizice și juridice din țările UE/SEE. Tratatul de aderare nu prevede posibilitatea prelungirii acestei perioade. Începând cu anul 2014, cetățenii din UE/SEE vor avea aceleași drepturi ca cetățenii români în ceea ce privește achiziționarea liberă de terenuri agricole în România.

Serviciile Comisiei nu sunt la curent cu nicio inițiativă a autorităților române de a introduce, după expirarea perioadei de tranziție susmenționate, un drept de preempțiune pentru statul român cu privire la achiziționarea de terenuri agricole. În cazul în care ar prinde contur o astfel de inițiativă, serviciile Comisiei sunt pregătite să intervină pentru a garanta că măsurile adoptate respectă legislația UE.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-006077/12
to the Commission**

Rareș-Lucian Niculescu (PPE)

(19 June 2012)

Subject: Liberalisation of the land market after 2014 in Romania

Given that Romania's Accession Treaty does not provide for extension of the deadline for liberalisation of the land market after 2014, the Romanian authorities are envisaging the introduction of a pre-emptive right of purchase by the State with regard to the transfer of farmland.

Can the Commission indicate whether such a measure is in compliance with current EU legislation?

Answer given by Mr Barnier on behalf of the Commission

(14 August 2012)

The acquisition of agricultural real estate represents a capital movement to which, under Article 63 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), no restrictions shall apply unless justified by the Treaty exceptions, notably Article 65 TFEU in the interpretation by the case law of the CJEU.

According to the Accession Treaty signed in 2005, Romania may maintain in force for seven years from the date of accession the restrictions laid down in the existing legislation on the acquisition of agricultural and forestry land by natural and legal persons of EU/EEA countries. The Accession Treaty does not provide for any possibility to prolong this period. As from 2014, any EU/EEA national shall have equal rights in freely acquiring agricultural land in Romania as a Romanian resident.

The Commission services are not aware of any initiative of the Romanian authorities to introduce, after the expiration of the abovementioned transitional period, a pre-emptive right for the Romanian State with regard to the acquisition of agricultural land. Should any such plans materialise, the Commission services will be ready to act to ensure the measures are in compliance with EC law.
