Response

Frequency

Percentage

Member States

YES

17

63.0%

LT, SI, CZ, ES, HU, SK, PL, DE, BG, MT, CY, EE, RO, PT, LV, DK, IT

NO

10

37.0%

IE, LU, HR, SE, NL, FR, EL, BE, AT, FI

Member State

Response

LT

The evaluation identified that internal institutions in Lithuania are not sufficiently collaborating in terms of reporting and sharing information. As a result, there is a gap in communication and data exchange, which has affected the overall efficiency of the system. To address this issue, we are actively working on improving these processes to ensure better coordination and more effective information sharing between institutions moving forward

SI

Some institutions report YES, some institutions report NO.

CZ

Minor shortcomings in closure of cases.

ES

All the management authorities consulted answered no to this question, except one. In the case of the management authority that replied yes, the main finding was that the communications carried out have allowed for adequate monitoring

HU

The timeliness of recording the status of suspected fraud cases can be improved upon.

SK

AFCOS has reviewed the 2024 reporting effectiveness within the IMS internally, and the results are positive. We've identified some minor refinements to further improve efficiency.

PL

The effectiveness of reporting in the IMS was verified in 2024 by AFCOS, which in Poland is responsible for organising and coordinating the process of reporting to the Commission irregularities found in the context of spending EU funds implemented under shared management. The results of this verification were described in an analytical document, which was submitted for appropriate use to the relevant national reporting institutions at the next two levels of the IMS reporting structure.    
The analysis covered the irregularities reported under the 2014-2020 financial perspective, and particular attention was paid to cases of (suspected) fraud, as well as the timeliness of reporting irregularities. In order to obtain a horizontal view, the analysis also covered the closure status of the 2007-2013 PP cases in the IMS system.    
It showed that the reporting institutions continued to apply the good practices implemented with regard to whistleblowing, which had been developed and expanded over various financial perspectives. It was found that approx. 2000 reports of irregularities concerning the 2014-2020 PP remain open in the IMS due to ongoing investigations by law-enforcement authorities and time-consuming, challenging recovery proceedings. At the same time, many 2007-2013 PP cases remain open, which creates an additional administrative burden for the reporting institutions (the need for regular monitoring and appropriate action.

AFCOS found the results of the analysis satisfactory: it was established that, as a general rule, the reporting deadlines were respected in relation to the primary administrative or judicial findings (PACA) and that the completeness of the data in individual cases remained high. AFCOS also issued appropriate recommendations to speed up efforts to bring cases from the previous financial perspectives to a close so that attention could be redirected to the 2021-2027 PP, which is already being implemented.

DE

As examples: The Schleswig-Holstein ERDF Managing Authority: Reporting functions reliably and effectively thanks to detailed provisions in the guidance on anti-corruption/anti-fraud measures and irregularities.

The Saarland ESF Managing Authority: Reports of irregularities were followed up until the case was closed, and the comments of the BMS were taken into account and fed back. Corrections were made to cases. No cases of fraud.

BG

We prepared an Analysis of the reported irregularities for 2023 where we have made a statistical analysis of the reported fraudulent and non-fraudulent irregularities on national level and in the IMS. Also, we have made a review of the national procedures for administering of irregularities. The general conclusion is that the reporting system provides timely, correct and complete reporting of irregularities.

The IMS is currently updated to include the new look and feel. After reviewing the reporting in the IMS in 2024, it was found that the reporting was done correctly, with filled in up-to-date and comprehensive information. The identified gaps are of a technical nature, due to the large volume of cases, and are being eliminated in a timely manner and within the work process.
The reporting in IMS follows the reporting in Information System for Management and Monitoring EU Funds in Bulgaria 2020 (ISUN2020). The reporting in both systems is double checked by the AFCOS which tackles the mistakes that may occur. The reported cases of suspected fraud are updated in a timely manner with reliable and complete information and data.

A control is introduced by a second Irregularity Officer and Supervising Manager in order to improve the irregularity reporting.

MT

The Maltese AFCOS already has effective reporting measures in place. In addition, in 2024, the Financial Investigations Directorate (FID) within the Internal Audit and Investigations Department (IAID), in its role as the Maltese AFCOS, has been strengthened with the recruitment of new personnel, who are primarily responsible for reporting of irregularities in IMS. This is ensuring that the four-eyes principle is always adhered to (IMS Creator inputs a case; IMS Manager finalizes the case).

Once a case is closed, the Maltese AFCOS confirms that any data already inputted in IMS is correct by reconciling this data with the latest information received from the relevant Authorities.

CY

Issues with coordination between various entities regarding the status of cases, issues with timely reporting between entities.

EE

Estonian AFCOS, as the IMS Country Officer, checks open cases in the IMS annually to follow the quality and continuity of reports and supports the reporting authorities with knowhow.
Estonian Cohesion Policy Managing Authority regularly carries out checks on the reporting of irregularities to ensure whether the data is accurate. In general, the system works well, with minor errors occurring occasionally. Cases that have been referred to investigative bodies are more complex to report, as early-stage notification is often not possible. Premature reporting could jeopardize the investigation and subsequent criminal proceedings. For such cases, we await authorization from EPPO or the other investigative body before reporting.    
On a positive note, cooperation between the implementing agencies, the Managing Authority, and AFCOS is functioning, and we have an overview of the cases under investigation.

RO

- The Department for the Fight Against Fraud - DLAF: Communication is conducted in a timely manner, data completeness has been improved, solid cooperation with the reporting authorities.

- Paying Agency for Rural Investments (AFIR): No deficiencies in the method of reporting irregularities or system deficiencies were detected.    

- The Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development - Managing Authority for the Operational Programme for Fisheries and Maritime Affairs (DGP-AMPOPAM): Irregularities were reported in the IMS for all notifications and verifications of which the Managing Authority was aware. However, there were cases of delays in the information received from the institutions with audit/control functions concerning the submission of cases for investigation/verification to the judicial authorities. This then affected the reporting.

- The Ministry of Energy: The suspected irregularities related to: (1) setting up project teams with overlapping tasks and activities, failing to respect the guide on the call for projects, (2) the legal regime governing documents, (3) the justification for co-financing.

- The Ministry of Investments and European Projects (MIPE) – Directorate-General for Sustainable Development Programmes (DGPDD): The effectiveness of reporting was found to have improved, due to the updating of operational procedures, the frequency of use of prevention tools, and the performance of fraud risk assessment.

- The Ministry of Investments and European Projects (MIPE) – Managing Authority for the Human Capital Operational Programme (MA POCU): The reporting system has been improved compared to the version from the previous year. The criteria for filtering previously notified irregularity reports do not allow for identification using the internal reference number. The history of irregularity reports by operational programme can be consulted only by exporting the data available on each page viewed.

PT

As regards the irregularities related to the Cohesion Policy Funds in the 2014-2020 PP, there was some delay in the reporting to OLAF. Procedures are being reviewed to improve coordination and the timely reporting of irregularities.

LV

For the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Support Service: The reporting process is working. Reports are submitted complete in terms of content, updated in a timely manner where necessary with reliable and complete information and data, and submitted within the specified deadlines. Information exchange and cooperation between institutions is working and continuously developing. Communication channels (official correspondence) and operational communication are appropriate.

DK

Most of the contributions to the survey reported a “No” in Q.1.1.

The Danish Agency for Green Land Conversion and Water Environment reported “Yes” and noted: The reporting authority performs ongoing quality checks of our reporting to make it uniform and complete.

IT

The review of the Irregularity Management System (IMS), performed on an ongoing basis by the national liaison officers, gives an essentially positive picture as regards the consistency, completeness and correctness of the data. This is primarily thanks to continuous analysis, monitoring and control of reports, carried out at central level in close connection and consultation with the managing authorities, both when reports are sent and when they are updated.

For example, it is worth passing on the information received from the Ministry of Education and Merit, within whose remit, in 2024, the MA for the NOP/NP ‘School’ reported 5 cases to the IMS, classifying them as IRQ2 ‘irregularities’. In compliance with the [national] ‘Guidelines on how to notify the European Commission of irregularities and fraud against the EU budget’, the reports in question were preceded by careful internal investigations. These took account of the findings of the inspections ordered, the on-the-spot checks carried out at beneficiaries, the details obtained following dialogue with beneficiaries, and the information obtained via feedback from external control bodies so as to ascertain whether any criminal proceedings were ongoing for suspected criminal offences against the EU budget in respect of the NOP ‘School’ projects being examined. The reports can thus be considered effective as they are complete, timely, detailed and reflect the findings of all the checks carried out.

Response

Frequency

Percentage

Member States

We use a well-established reporting system capturing all relevant data on suspected fraud cases and irregularities

11

40.7%

LU, FR, AT, FI, CZ, SK, PL, DE, MT, EE, RO

We have a strong reporting system but with some gaps in capturing all relevant data

9

33.3%

HR, SE, BE, SI, HU, BG, LV, DK, IT

We are currently improving our reporting system to better capture and report suspected fraud cases and irregularities

5

18.5%

NL, EL, LT, CY, PT

Other (please specify)

2

7.4%

IE, ES

Member State

Response

IE

The vast bulk of expenditure is incurred initially via the Central fund/Vote management process and comes under the anti-fraud policy of the relevant Department. It is subject to audit by the Comptroller and Auditor General and where any instances of irregularities are discovered they are reported where required and excluded from the payment application submitted to the European Commission. Fraud and suspected fraud are reported as required.

ES

Some managing authorities have replied ´We use a well-established reporting system capturing all relevant data on suspected fraud cases and irregularities´ while others have replied ´We are currently improving our reporting system to better capture and report suspected fraud cases and irregularities´.

Member State

Response

IE

All fraud and suspected fraud cases are reported using the IMS. All payments are checked by the MAs and where an irregularity is found the case is removed from the payment claim.

LU

Prior checks, ex-post checks, regular risk analysis and follow-ups in addition to support/guidance for beneficiaries.

HR

Contribution from Ministry of Finance, Tax Administration:

The Tax Administration has a special Unit that cooperates with the European Public Prosecutor's Office (further in the text: EPPO) and other criminal prosecution bodies on investigations (Independent Sector for Financial Investigations).

Contribution from AFCOS unit:

AFCOS unit drafts Irregularity Management Guidelines that contain procedures describing proceedings in the area of prevention and detection of irregularities; proceedings related to suspicions of irregularities and identified irregularities, reporting on irregularities and follow-up of reported irregularities in the context of management and control of using EU funds. The objective of the Guidelines is to develop consistent practice in applying legal framework for the protection of European Union financial interests and to ensure high quality of irregularity reports.

Furthermore, AFCOS unit performs check of technical correctness of irregularity reports sent by Management and Control system bodies (further in the text: MCS bodies). If errors and/or omissions are detected during such a check, AFCOS unit rejects such reports, and it provides instructions for modification / correcting the report.

Finally, AFCOS unit provides trainings on the use of IMS. There are basic one-on-one trainings intended for each new IMS user during installation of IMS certificate, consultations with current users and periodical trainings for a larger number of trainees (e.g. employees of MCS bodies for a certain programme). Finally, user support in the form of phone consultations is ensured at any time.

SE

Irregularities and suspected fraud are detected during project audits and controls. The authorities have an expert function in support of administrators, covering compliance and the countering of irregularities. Case handlers responsible for payments are required to report recoveries, and any recoveries decided on are followed up. It is also ensured that suspected fraud cases are reported.

NL

n/a

FR

For CAP funds, agricultural irregularities are reported to the Secretariat of the CICC EAGF by the four paying agencies (ASP, FRANCEAGRIMER, ODARC and ODEADOM). The data are checked carefully by the bodies responsible, then forwarded to the Secretariat to be verified, coordinated and validated.

EL

Recovery and Resilience Facility Coordination Agency (RRFA): Regulation (EU) 2021/241 does not require Member States to use the Irregularity Management System (AFIS/IMS) to report irregularities found in Recovery and Resilience Facility projects to the European Commission. Nevertheless, relevant information is sent to OLAF by email, setting out all the relevant data concerning the irregularities or suspected cases of fraud as referred to in the Irregularity Management System (IMS). In any case, it should be noted that to date, no irregularities giving rise to the suspicion of fraud have been detected.

BE

ERDF, JTF and RRF at the SPW (Walloon Public Service): The OLAF working group meets quarterly. It is charged by the Walloon government with reporting irregularity cases to OLAF where this is required or reporting an absence of irregularity cases, pursuant to EU rules and with reference to the European Development Fund (ERDF), the Just Transition Fund (JTF) and Wallonia’s parts of the National Recovery and Resilience Plan (NRRP) and the Brexit Adjustment Reserve (BAR). The working group is made up of members representing the various administrations responsible. Minutes are taken of all OLAF working group meetings. These set out the proposals put to the working group members for examination, and, for in-person meetings, the decisions taken by the working group, as well as all the related documents sent to all members following the meeting. The secretariat reports irregularities to OLAF electronically. If, for the period concerned, there are no irregularities that need to be reported, the secretariat also reports this fact to OLAF electronically. Suspicions of fraud involving criminal offences are passed on to the Belgian judicial authorities.

AT

The Federal Ministry of Agriculture’s IMS reporting system focuses on recoveries made by the Paying Agency and determines their causes on a case-by-case basis.

FI

The intermediate bodies for the EU's regional and structural policy programme systematically record all suspected fraud and other observations in the programme's EURA 2021 information system.

During the training organised for the intermediate bodies by the managing authority for regional and structural policy, the importance of a low threshold for reporting crimes was emphasised. Where necessary, the intermediate body also reports suspected fraud to the European Public Prosecutor's Office (EPPO) in accordance with the instructions the EPPO provides.
Where required, the managing authority provides the intermediate bodies with support and guidance in cases of suspected fraud. The central authorities responsible for the management and control of programmes are responsible for reporting via the Irregularities Management System (IMS).

LT

One example of an effective reporting system in addressing suspected fraud and irregularities is the strengthened collaboration between the European Union (EU) funds management agencies and the Financial Crime Investigation Service (FCIS) in Lithuania. This partnership aims to ensure timely receipt of information and proper processing of data. By fostering better communication and coordination between these institutions, the system improves the detection and reporting of irregularities and fraud related to EU funding, enhancing overall effectiveness and responsiveness in combating financial crimes

SI

no

CZ

Carefully developed methodological environment within each programming period, national monitoring systems, centralised recording.

ES

(1) The existence of irregularities may be detected by any of the bodies involved in the management of the funds and will in all cases be recorded in their FAMI III (formerly FAMI II) application, prior to the relevant communication to the Commission.

(2) The authority which has definitively established the existence of the irregularity to be reported to OLAF shall register it in the IMS (Irregularities Management System). Once the irregularity has been reported in the IMS system, the relevant box shall be ticked in the FAMI III application.

(3) The Control Unit shall be responsible for the follow-up of reported irregularities and, where appropriate, related administrative and judicial proceedings and shall keep the Managing Authority and the Intermediate Body informed so that they can take the necessary fraud risk management measures.

HU

There has been long-standing and successful cooperation between national reporting organisations and Anti-Fraud Coordination Services (AFCOS). AFCOS organises quarterly meetings for the Irregularity Reporting Working Group with the participation of national reporting bodies (Managing Authorities, Certifying Authority, Paying Agency and judicial bodies) to support reporting in IMS. AFCOS also provides practical IMS training on reporting obligations and experience to Hungarian users on an annual basis. These measures form an important element of the action plan for an anti-fraud and anti-corruption strategy for EU funds.

SK

The Slovak republic has a well-functioning national information system (ITMS/ ITMS2014+/ITMS21+) for Cohesion policy. According to the national law, the Managing Authority and the Intermediate Body are required to provide information about any irregularities and their updates within 15 working days. Among the
typical qualification of irregularities (IRQ2, IRQ3 and IRQ5), we have also introduced an additional identification SIG “signal of irregularity”, which represents an initial detection of a violation. At this stage, the irregularity is already recorded in the national information system. This indicator SIG helps us, at the national level, to improve the detection and reporting of irregularities. Another well -functioning system for collecting data in the agricultural funds is AGIS MFR information system. The reports from these systems are inserted into IMS. JEMS - IT system is another IT tool for Interreg used at the national level which collects data of the beneficial owner data.

PL

Under the Code of Criminal Procedure, central and local-government institutions in Poland (including the institutions of the management and control system for EU funds) are legally obliged to report to the law enforcement authorities criminal offences prosecuted ex officio where such offences are detected by those institutions in the course of their activities. Reporting an offence may give rise to an investigation or inquiry. When reporting a criminal offence, it is necessary to provide evidence to substantiate the suspicion, which is why the reporting institutions make their own findings, taking into account the information and data identified, including data from dedicated IT tools supporting the fight against fraud. Where applicable, information on suspected fraud and on the involvement of law enforcement authorities is reflected in the IMS, in accordance with the rules resulting from the relevant EU sectoral regulations and the national procedure that has been designed in line with those regulations.

An example of good practices ensuring that cases of suspected fraud are reported to the Commission is the cooperation agreement between the National Public Prosecutor and the Minister responsible for regional development, which regulates the provision of information on ongoing and concluded proceedings concerning projects co-financed by European funds. On the basis of that agreement, there is a regular exchange of data on the beneficiaries of EU funds against whom investigative measures have been taken, and some institutions also make use of the possibility to directly contact the designated representatives of the Public Prosecutor’s Office where it is necessary to obtain data on ongoing proceedings without delay.

Examples of solutions that have been implemented in Poland also include:
1. agreements on the transmission to the organisational units of the Central Anti-Corruption Bureau, by means of distance communication, of information collected in the ICT systems SL2014 and CST2021 supporting the implementation of the programmes;

2. cooperation agreements between the Minister responsible for regional development and the Agency for Restructuring and Modernisation of Agriculture (the Paying Agency) concerning cooperation:

(a) as regards the implementation of cross-checks aimed at detecting and eliminating double financing of cohesion policy expenditure and agricultural and fisheries programmes under the 2014-2020 PP;    
b) as regards the exchange of data on beneficiaries implementing projects/operations/actions in programmes under: Cohesion Policy 2021-2027, the European Funds for Fisheries Programme and the Strategic Plan for the Common Agricultural Policy 2023-2027 (CAP SP);    
c) as regards the implementation of cross-checks aimed at detecting and eliminating double financing of expenditure under SP, FERS and the CAP SP;

3. granting designated OLAF and EC staff access to the SL2014 main application in order to enable independent analysis of information on applicants, beneficiaries, expenditure items being settled and checks;

4. the Paying Agency’s procedures to ensure the collection and use of fraud-related data (dedicated databases that allow the recording of suspected and proven fraud cases, operated by all organisational units of the Agency and entities performing delegated tasks which are involved in the detection of irregularities and fraud; the data collected significantly facilitate the analysis, investigation and prevention of detected and suspected fraud cases).

All these arrangements are effective in contributing to detecting cases of irregularities, including cases of suspected fraud (which results in reports being submitted to the Commission, where appropriate).

DE

In general:    
Drawing on IMS data findings and the corresponding explanations from the reporting bodies; regular exchanges with the managing and audit authorities. Below are examples from the competent ministries and ERDF authorities:

The Federal Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs (BMAS): In the context of the European Social Fund Plus (ESF Plus), there is a guidance document for the ESF Plus Federal Programme which deals with the reporting of irregularities (including suspected cases of fraud). Under the ESF Plus Federal Programme, cases are examined by the managing authority and the intermediate managing bodies. Where necessary, the managing authority instructs the relevant granting authority to take action, which may include, in particular, an on-the-spot check. The granting authority sends an IMS report to OLAF and, where necessary, notifies the offence to the national public prosecutor’s office or the European Public Prosecutor’s Office.

The Bremen ERDF Managing Authority: The intermediate bodies implement operations. Potential cases of fraud are reported to the managing authority while, at the same time, detailed checks are carried out in order to either confirm or dispel the suspicion of possible fraud. If the suspicion of fraud is confirmed, the intermediate body in turn notifies the managing authority and the public prosecutor’s office.

The Lower Saxony ERDF Managing Authority: Direct reporting to law enforcement has proven effective. Furthermore, the establishment of the Investitions- und Förderbank Niedersachsen (NBank) has proven to be the only intermediate body. The centralisation of the implementation of all EU funding programmes to only one body guarantees the proper fulfilment of the tasks assigned and a sustainable flow of information.    
In addition, the retention of the 100% verification of supporting documents contributes to a significant reduction in the number of suspected fraud cases within the framework of the calls for funds. The Schleswig-Holstein ERDF Managing Authority: Communication channel with the public prosecutor’s office; timely reporting of any suspicion, backed up by legal expertise.

BG

The national reporting system is based on the rules of the National regulation for administering irregularities and the Methodological guidelines for administering irregularities issued by the AFCOS Directorate. They transfer on the national level the EU regulations, the Handbook on reporting irregularities in shared management and the IMS manuals. The effective work of the national reporting system is guaranteed by regular trainings for the irregularity officers and a regular control of the compliance with the rules by the AFCOS Directorate.    
For instance, in cases of suspected fraud, after performed administrative proceedings on submitted signal for irregularity the “Territorial Cooperation Management” (TCM) Directorate at the Ministry of Regional Development and Public Works (MRDPW) is obliged to send the case to the Prosecutor’s Office.    
After performed investigation the TCM Directorate is informed about the prosecutor’s decision whether there are/ are not enough grounds to open an investigation or abandons an investigation that has been opened.    
Our reporting system contains clearly defined rules and processes with specifically named responsible persons for every task. There are check-lists to ensure rightful completion of the tasks.    
We report fraud cases and irregularities in 1-month period after every quarter in both ISUN2020 and IMS. We are also kept in touch with the prosecutor office every 6 months for decisions on fraud cases.    
When the need arises, joint inspections are carried out with the AFCOS Directorate at the Ministry of Interior; Methodological instructions are provided by the AFCOS Directorate for the administration of irregularities; Position from the AFCOS is given, including by phone/e-mail on the correct proceeding with the administration of irregularities;    
The AFCOS Directorate gives instructions on the correct entry of information into IMS;
Trainings for irregularity stuff conducted by the AFCOS Directorate is available, regarding operations with IMS and administration of irregularities.    

The Prosecutor’s Office of the Republic of Bulgaria (PORB) is a key institution in the fight with crimes against the EU’s financial interests in Bulgaria.    
By order of the General Prosecutor in 2021, in parallel with the start of the work of the EPPO, Department 08 “Crimes against the EU’s financial interests and interaction with the European Public Prosecutor’s Office” within the Supreme Cassation Prosecutor’s Office (at that time) was established in order to organize and ensure the interaction between the Prosecutor’s Office of the Republic of Bulgaria (PORB) and the European Public Prosecutor’s Office, as well as optimizing the work of the Bulgarian prosecutors on files and pre-trial proceedings for crimes against the financial interests of the EU.
The fore-mentioned department became contact point between PORB and OLAF, managed to achieve very high results in various directions of countering the crimes associated with European funds, as well as in increasing the efficiency in cooperation and reporting with all national and international partners in the field.    
All strategic analysis and targeted reports from the Commission, OLAF, EPPO, etc. are received, analysed, taken into account and practically implemented according to the competences of the Prosecutor's Office. Cooperation agreement on interaction and cooperation between the Prosecutor's Office of the Republic of Bulgaria and the Ministry of Interior in countering offenses affecting the EU’s financial interests was signed on 11.06.2024.

MT

The Maltese AFCOS receives all irregularity reports from the Managing Authorities of EU Funds on a quarterly basis, which reports are reviewed based on standing regulations and guidelines.

On a quarterly basis, the Maltese AFCOS also holds the Irregularity Reporting Sub-group meeting with the Managing Authorities of EU Funds, Audit Authority and Paying Agency to ensure the correct reporting of irregularities to OLAF via IMS.

CY

Under selected shared management programs there is an automated process when documenting an irregularity to indicate the requirement to complete an irregularity report.
For Cyprus Agricultural Payment Organisation- The reporting system is integrated into the information systems used by CAPO for administrative checks and in the accounting information system. Data can be retrieved and accessed automatically.    

Main weaknesses arrive from non-shared management programs/direct management from Commission/Territorial Cooperation programs where more than one MS authorities are involved.

EE

In our national grants information system, each project has a module for irregularities where information about specific project-related irregularities is entered, if necessary, with the same level of detail as the information reported to OLAF. All cases of suspected irregularities or fraud are recorded from the first euro cent, and the information remains even if it is later determined during the proceedings that no irregularity or fraud has occurred. Estonia uses a single grants information system that encompasses projects from various funds (ESI Funds, RRF, Norway/EEA, AMIF/ISF national support etc), enabling the implementing agency to check whether the beneficiary has had any irregularities and what kind. The same information system has been in use for several programming periods, allowing us to also see irregularities from previous periods.    
We have a similar reporting system for AGRI/FISH funds too. We have created a possibility to perform cross-checks between these two systems. The persons who have right to do cross-checks can see whether the beneficiary has irregularities in other system. For more details they must communicate with the owner of this project.

RO

- DLAF: Clear reporting regulations. Obligation to designate an irregularity officer in the reporting authority. Solid cooperation with the reporting authorities and continuous training of staff involved. Interinstitutional cooperation protocols. Operational irregularity reporting network.

- The Ministry of Energy: REGAS platform, ARACHNE platform.    

- MIPE – DGPDD - Reporting of all cases of suspected fraud recorded in the RD and in the other records specific to the activity of detecting irregularities and fraud, in accordance with operational procedures.    

- MIPE – Directorate-General for Health Programmes (DGPS): A communication channel with the National Anticorruption Directorate (DNA) has been created (contact person at MIPE level and exchange of information from a specific e-mail address through the contact person), since the exchange of information with the national investigative authorities and timely reporting are prerequisites for effective monitoring.    

- MIPE – Directorate-General for Management of the Recovery and Resilience Facility (DGMMRR):    
A) Reporting based on controls by the National Coordinator the Audit Control, Recovery and Monitoring Service of the DGMMRR performs the following activities:    
1. The control mandate is issued in the event of confirmation of the suspicion of irregularity/serious irregularity/ whistleblowing, where this is confirmed on the basis of checks carried out in light of the aspects included in OP DGMMRR No
10- ‘Checklist for suspensions of irregularity/fraud and mandate approval’. The persons included in the control mandate must make declarations concerning: - the absence of conflict of interest, - impartiality and confidentiality.    
2. If there is a notification regarding a suspicion of fraud and if this is confirmed by the checks carried out on the checklist included in Procedure No 10, the control mandate will be issued. Based on the control findings and if the suspicion of serious irregularity is confirmed by the evidence, the control team applies Government Emergency Ordinance No 70/2022, as amended, in which case the control body will notify the DLAF/OLAF, EPPO/DNA or other relevant prosecution authorities as soon as possible (immediately).
B) Reporting based on controls by the reform and/or investment coordinators through the National Coordinator in line with the following provisions:    
i) EMERGENCY ORDINANCE No 70/2022 on the prevention, verification and detection of irregularities/double funding, and serious irregularities found in obtaining and using external grants and loans allocated to Romania through the Recovery and Resilience Facility and/or national public funds related to them and the recovery of the resulting debts, ii) EMERGENCY ORDINANCE No 124/2021 establishing the institutional and financial framework for the management of European funds allocated to Romania under the Recovery and Resilience Facility and amending and supplementing Government Emergency Order No 155/2020 on certain measures for drawing up the National Recovery and Resilience Plan necessary for Romania to obtain external grants and loans under the Recovery and Resilience Facility. The reform and/or investment coordinators provide immediate/quarterly notification through (the Register of suspected irregularities/fraud and debtors) the specialised control body within the MIPE - the National Coordinator (NC) of referrals made by the bodies it coordinates and their result (debt securities/debt recovery notes), or whenever the NC so requests, concerning the status of the recovery of budget debts/the finalisation of the recovery process.    

- Ministry of the Environment, Water Resources and Forestry (MMAP): Reporting of all cases of suspected fraud recorded in the RD and in the other records specific to the activity of detecting irregularities and fraud, in accordance with operational procedures.

PT

The information system aggregating the results of administrative checks, on-the-spot checks and audits in the context of the collection, storage, processing and reporting of irregularities and suspected fraud cases has been optimised.

LV

There are no specific examples.

DK

The Danish Business Authority reported that potential whistleblowers have the opportunity to make contact and draw attention to a situation anonymously by making use of a whistleblower scheme.    
The managing authority makes use of an external auditor that is obliged to tell the managing authority if they encounter a case of possible fraud.

IT

At the start of 2024, the Guardia di Finanza Unit for Combatting Fraud against the European Union, as technical secretariat of the Committee for Combatting Fraud against the European Union (COLAF), issued all managing authorities with specific ‘Guidelines for improving the procedures for filling in/populating irregularity/fraud reporting forms in the IMS’. The aim of these guidelines was to improve the quality of the information in the IMS.
Specifically, the guidance concerned:    
a. how to create, save and finalise irregularity/fraud reporting forms, with specific reference to populating the various fields correctly, fully and consistently;    
b. the timescales for updating cases as new developments occur;    
c. details of case types in previous programming periods;    
d. drafting of the special report in cases where sums to be charged to the EU budget are irrecoverable;    
e. updating of cases in the system that have already been closed (e.g. owing to decertification, total recovery, etc.) but for which the associated judicial/administrative/accounting proceedings are still ongoing;    
f. close monitoring of all cases in the system in which the judicial authorities are known to be involved.    
In addition, should difficulties arise in any dialogue with the judicial authorities, the competent managing authorities have been given permission to immediately contact the aforementioned Guardia di Finanza Unit, which will provide support including, where possible, by facilitating contact with the prosecutors or judges involved.
These guidelines have helped to make the reporting of suspected fraud and irregularities more effective.        
To use the example of a specific case, the MA of the Ministry of Education and Merit’s NOP/NP ‘School’ has stated that the system for detecting and subsequently reporting irregularities or suspected fraud is composed of various stages that can be concisely summarised as follows:    
- detection: via ordinary first- and second-level checks, checks by higher-ranking control bodies, checks ordered following reports from third parties (e.g. complaints, reports, news stories, etc.);    
- assessment and examination of cases detected through e.g. specific on-the-spot checks, inspections at beneficiaries’ premises by the competent Regional Education Department (USR), and procedures for dialogue and information exchange with external control bodies where information has been received on possible relevant ongoing criminal proceedings;
- reporting: a report is made once the checks ordered have been completed, if conditions requiring the MA to make a report are fulfilled.

Response

Frequency

Percentage

Member States

NO

23

85.2%

IE, LU, HR, SE, NL, FR, EL, BE, AT, FI, LT, CZ, HU, SK, PL, DE, BG, MT, RO, PT, LV, DK, IT

YES

4

14.8%

SI, ES, CY, EE

Response

Frequency

Percentage

Member States

Providing high quality and complete data in suspected (and established) fraud reporting

4

14.8%

SI, ES, CY, EE

Reporting suspected fraud in a timely manner

3

11.1%

SI, ES, EE

Other (please specify)

2

7.4%

CY, EE

Reporting all cases of suspected fraud

2

7.4%

SI, ES

Technical issues with the reporting system (IMS)

1

3.7%

ES

Member State

Response

CY

Programs funded directly by EU not under shared management e.g. RRF or Erasmus programs or CEF programs where the initiation of the process may come from EPPO or another MS.

EE

In cases under criminal investigation where the investigation has been initiated by the investigative body on its own initiative, the implementing agency often lacks sufficiently detailed information about the circumstances. As a result, it is not possible to prepare comprehensive reporting. Additionally, reports cannot always be created or notifications made without authorization from the investigative body, as this could hinder a swift and effective investigation.

Response

Frequency

Percentage

Member States

NO, it was not necessary

9

33.3%

SE, BE, AT, CZ, DE, MT, EE, LV, DK

YES, we have improved the completeness of the reporting

9

33.3%

FR, EL, SI, ES, PL, BG, RO, PT, IT

YES, we have improved the accuracy of the reporting

7

25.9%

SI, PL, DE, BG, RO, PT, IT

NO, not yet

5

18.5%

HR, NL, LT, ES, CY

YES, we have improved the timeliness of the reporting

5

18.5%

FI, HU, SK, RO, IT

Not applicable

3

11.1%

IE, LU, SI

NO

1

3.7%

DE

Response

Frequency

Percentage

Member States

Enhanced training for staff members

16

59.3%

HR, FR, EL, AT, FI, ES, HU, SK, PL, DE, BG, CY, EE, RO, DK, IT

Improving exchange of information with investigative bodies

12

44.4%

SE, LT, SI, HU, SK, DE, BG, CY, EE, RO, DK, IT

Increase of the collaboration with law enforcement, prosecution services and/or other national authorities

11

40.7%

LT, SI, HU, DE, BG, CY, EE, RO, PT, DK, IT

Modifying policies and procedures

11

40.7%

SE, BE, LT, ES, SK, PL, DE, BG, CY, RO, PT

Hiring additional human resources to manage reporting requirements, including data entry and analysis

6

22.2%

LU, HR, BE, SI, MT, RO

Other (please specify)

6

22.2%

IE, HR, NL, CZ, MT, RO

Better technical infrastructures / adoption of new IT tools

5

18.5%

HR, SI, ES, RO, PT

No steps taken to improve the quality of reporting

4

14.8%

IE, AT, ES, LV

Allocation of more resources for system upgrades and maintenance

1

3.7%

RO

More formalised communication channels with EU bodies

1

3.7%

RO

Member State

Response

IE

There was an ESF+ specific IT system developed, and article 94 simplified cost options were adopted.

HR

AFCOS unit periodically checks press releases of EPPO and State Attorney’s Office. If AFCOS unit gets an information that EPPO / State Attorney’s Office requested indictment of natural / legal persons in Croatia, it checks whether the case has been reported via IMS and it contacts the competent MCS body to create follow up or initial request.

NL

new coordination anti-fraud expenditure as part of AFCOS to improve the anti-fraud (reporting) process.

CZ

The system mechanisms (methodologies, processes established) have been further developed.

MT

Kindly refer to Questions 1.2 and 1.4.

RO

NAFS (national anti-fraud strategy) – establishment of the irregularity reporting network

Response

Frequency

Percentage

Member States

Insufficient exchange of information with investigative bodies

4

14.8%

HR, LT, ES, CY

Legal or regulatory constraints

4

14.8%

HR, NL, ES, DE

Staff not adequately trained or skilled to manage reporting requirements

4

14.8%

HR, NL, LT, ES

Limited human resources to manage reporting requirements, including data entry and analysis

3

11.1%

HR, ES, DE

Insufficient technical infrastructures

2

7.4%

HR, ES

Other (please specify)

1

3.7%

DE

Member State

Response

DE

The Federal Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs (BMAS): Currently, no improvements are considered to be required.    

The Bremen ERDF Managing Authority: The mandatory reporting procedures in place are sufficient. Moreover, as there were no cases of fraud in Bremen, it has not been necessary to improve the quality of reporting.

Response

Frequency

Percentage

Member States

NO

14

51.9%

IE, LU, SE, NL, FR, EL, BE, AT, FI, CZ, DE, MT, LV, IT

YES, only fraudulent irregularities

11

40.7%

HR, LT, SI, HU, SK, PL, BG, EE, RO, PT, DK

YES, all irregularities

2

7.4%

ES, CY

Response

Frequency

Percentage

Member States

No difficulties encountered

11

40.7%

IE, LU, FR, BE, AT, FI, CZ, ES, DE, MT, LV

Timeliness of follow-up

10

37.0%

HR, LT, SI, ES, HU, SK, DE, EE, DK, IT

Completeness of information received

8

29.6%

SE, NL, SI, ES, PL, BG, EE, RO

No information received

6

22.2%

HR, ES, DE, CY, EE, RO

Other (please specify)

6

22.2%

HR, EL, BE, ES, DE, PT

Accuracy of information received

3

11.1%

NL, SI, PL

Member State

Response

HR

Contribution from Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries, Directorate for Support in Agriculture and Rural Development: Timeliness of information received.

EL

Financial Audit Committee (EDEL): Lack of awareness among and no exchange of information between the judicial authorities and the reporting authorities. Recovery and Resilience Facility Agency (RRFA): To date, no irregularities giving rise to the suspicion of fraud (‘fraudulent’ irregularities) have been detected.

BE

The exchange of information between judicial and administrative bodies could be streamlined (EFRD, JTF and RRF at the SPW).

ES

Technical difficulties, need to adapt IT systems, which are being improved.

DE

The Rhineland-Palatinate ERDF Managing Authority: Prosecution and judicial proceedings take a long time, and we usually only receive information after actively asking about the case in question.

PT

Follow-up of judicial proceedings

Member State

Response

IE

n/a

LU

No difficulties encountered.

HR

Contribution from Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries, Directorate of Fisheries:
Lack of feedback from investigative bodies on the outcome of the reported case causes difficulties in reporting/follow up of such cases. However, communication and information sharing during the investigations are restricted by law so there is not much space for the improvement.    
Contribution from AFCOS-unit:    
Some MCS bodies are not proactive enough in obtaining information needed for reporting updates of already reported fraudulent irregularities. In addition, the flow of information from judicial authorities to reporting authorities is not always prompt.    
Contribution from Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries, Directorate for Support in Agriculture and Rural Development:    
We have encountered difficulties in providing timely updates about the follow-up to fraudulent irregularities due to the length of court proceedings.

SE

In 2024, the Swedish Economic Crime Authority (Swedish AFCOS) found that the managing authorities’ investigations relating to reported crimes were legally incomplete, in particular with regard to the nature of the suspected infringement. Therefore, it is difficult to prove that an offence has been committed.

NL

Just setting up the coordination for antifraud, therefor the organisational structure is still in working progress

FR

X

EL

The judicial authorities have not informed the reporting authorities of any notified cases of suspected fraud. Consequently, the reporting authorities cannot update these cases

BE

The exchange of information between judicial and administrative bodies could be streamlined (EFRD, JTF and RRF at the SPW).

AT

No information.

FI

No difficulties encountered

LT

Due to recent personnel changes, we are experiencing a loss of institutional memory, which occasionally hinders our ability to fully update cases or retrieve historical irregularities.

SI

without additional explanation

CZ

N/A

ES

There are many difficulties in getting information from the EPPO and the courts.

HU

The channelling of judicial information could be improved upon

SK

In individual cases of criminal investigation, access to more detailed information is not possible in order not to interfere with the investigation procedure.    
Another problem is the length of the criminal investigation process.

PL

In some cases, in which criminal proceedings are still ongoing, it is difficult to obtain up-to-date data from law enforcement authorities due to the confidentiality of proceedings. In particular, this concerns cases where the reporting institution was not the party reporting the criminal offence.    
Due to the specific nature of criminal cases and the nomenclature used in court judgments, it is sometimes difficult for the reporting institution to establish all personal data of the convicted natural person that must be included in the IMS reporting form. This is because in their judgments, courts do not use the personal identification (PESEL) number, or the registered residence address of the person concerned.        
A separate category of criminal cases are particularly long criminal/judicial proceedings, the duration of which exceeds the relevant financial perspective.

DE

-

BG

On behalf of the PORB and cooperation with the EPPO office in Bulgaria we could detect some difficulties in obtaining timely and correct information concerning the cases which are already reported to the EPPO, the European Delegated Prosecutors decided not to evoke the case (art.27, par.8 of the Regulation) and therefore they have to be referred without undue delay to the competent national authorities (art.34 of the Regulation).
The Ministry of Justice established a procedure in accordance with Art. 24 par. 2 of the Regulation, according to which each prosecutor or investigator, part of the prosecution system (PORB), reports directly to the European Public Prosecutor's Office when a suspicion of an offence within its competence is identified. The centralized channel of communication was overruled which brought to some difficulties and misunderstandings in the process of the exchange of documents.    
The PORB and especially Department 08 within Supreme Cassation Prosecutor’s Office, actively cooperates and assists the EPPO in the process of ensuring prompt, relevant and efficient manner of reporting.    
The Managing Authorities claimed that receiving a timely information about the measures taken is crucial for the accurate irregularity reporting.

MT

Not applicable.

CY

Bodies initiating cases do not respect the procedure of following up on open cases.

EE

In cases under criminal investigation where the investigation has been initiated by the investigative body on its own initiative, the implementing agency often lacks sufficiently detailed information about the circumstances. As a result, it is not possible to prepare comprehensive reporting. Additionally, reports cannot always be created or notifications made without authorization from the investigative body, as this could hinder a swift and effective investigation.

RO

- Ministry of Development, Public Works and Administration (MDLPA): difficulties regarding the status of the checks undertaken by the other institutions involved. Please note that the judicial authorities have their own investigation deadlines. Please note that in cases where the MA is not party to the process, they do not receive information concerning its finalisation.

- AFIR (Agency for the Financing of Rural Investments): Exchange of information – the investigative bodies do not always provide all the information needed to complete the report

PT

The difficulties in obtaining information on the follow-up of judicial proceedings are essentially due to the fact that they are subject to legal confidentiality.

LV

No difficulties encountered.

DK

Regarding timeliness of follow-up, the Danish Business Authority explains that when a suspected case of fraud is reported to the police for further investigation it is not always, that the Managing Authority is noticed of the progress and results of the investigation and decisions made by the police, which makes it difficult to update IMS.

Response

Frequency

Percentage

Member States

YES, partly

15

55.6%

NL, LT, CZ, ES, SK, PL, DE, BG, MT, EE, RO, PT, LV, DK, IT

NO

10

37.0%

IE, HR, SE, FR, EL, BE, AT, FI, SI, CY

YES, fully

2

7.4%

LU, HU

Response

Frequency

Percentage

Member States

Establishment of clear instructions for handing over cases and defined guidelines

8

29.6%

LU, CZ, ES, DE, BG, RO, DK, IT

Increased trainings for both judicial and reporting bodies

8

29.6%

ES, HU, SK, DE, BG, MT, RO, IT

Other (please specify)

6

22.2%

PL, DE, RO, PT, LV, DK

Regular inter agency meetings or working groups to discuss ongoing cases and share information

6

22.2%

LT, CZ, ES, BG, RO, IT

No significant changes have been made in 2024

4

14.8%

PL, DE, EE, LV

Appointment of liaison officers to facilitate communication and coordination between authorities

3

11.1%

ES, HU, RO

Establishment of formal communication protocols (regular reporting schedules, standardized reporting formats)

3

11.1%

HU, BG, RO

Implementation of a digital platform for real-time sharing of information between authorities

2

7.4%

MT, RO

Setting up of a joint team

1

3.7%

NL

Member State

Response

PL

In 2024, there was no significant change in the tools used for the exchange of information, while the amount of correspondence between judicial authorities and the reporting institution (queries, replies, clarifications) went up, which also increased the flow of information between entities

DE

The Rhineland-Palatinate ERDF Managing Authority: We (ERDF Managing Authority) are now frequently asking for updates from prosecution officers.

RO

- NAFS (national anti-fraud strategy) – establishment of the irregularity reporting network

- AFIR: Every six months, the DCA expert who notified the suspicion of fraud asks the notified authorities about the measures subsequently taken. Protocol of collaboration with the EPPO. Clarification in the control and anti-fraud working procedure on how to notify the EPPO

PT

The information-sharing mechanisms have been consolidated and set in place on support platforms (shared, restricted-access folders updated on the basis of new information in each case).

LV

Cooperation between institutions is constantly promoted and improved.

DK

The Danish Agency for Green Land Conversion and Water Environment: Communication with the judicial authorities has been improved through meetings, clearer instructions when handing over cases and communication about the outcome of cases. Regular follow up with the police regarding the status of the cases.

Member State

Response

IE

Where a fraud or suspected fraud is identified, the process to be followed is set out in the various anti-fraud strategies of the managing authority

LU

Organizational structure and procedures for the exchange of information between judicial authorities and reporting authorities detailed in a guideline.

HR

Contribution from Ministry of Finance, Tax Administration:    
The Tax Administration exchanges information with judicial authorities based on Article 8 of the General Tax Law (no tax secrecy) and the Tax Administration Act. A special Unit - Independent Sector for Financial Investigations was established to cooperate with the EPPO.

Contribution from AFCOS unit:    
Reporting authorities can request AFCOS unit to organize a meeting with State Attorney’s Office and the Police (so called AFCOS Network meeting) in order to discuss suspected fraud cases. However, they are encouraged to establish direct communication with judicial authorities in order to speed up the obtaining of information on status of reported suspected fraud and to update the IMS case.    
Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries, Directorate for Support in Agriculture and Rural Development have established a special organizational unit for managing irregularities at the level of the Paying Agency responsible for the exchange of information with the judicial authorities.

SE

All cases reported in IMS are sent to the Swedish Economic Crime Authority. If necessary, the prosecutor is contacted to discuss cases. In addition to reporting suspected fraud to the Swedish Economic Crime Authority, information is exchanged at a more general level through the SEFI Council, the national OLAF network (approx. 2 meetings a year), meetings of OLAF’s ‘Fraud Prevention, Analysis and Reporting’ Fraud Prevention Group

NL

There was no coordination for expenditure, in 2024 the AFCOS got this new responsibility, and the organisation is still setting up for better reporting purposes

FR

x

EL

Information is exchanged by email between the judicial authorities and the reporting authorities in order to either provide information or take the appropriate measures to attribute or write off debts.

BE

ERDF, JTF and RRF at the SPW: Exchange of information between the SPW (ERDF, JTF, RRF) and the judicial authorities. The current procedure is as follows: A file is submitted to the Public Prosecutor’s Office if there is a suspected irregularity involving a criminal offence. The Public Prosecutor’s Office may request additional information concerning the file submitted. Legal basis: Article 29 of the Code of Criminal Procedure - Walloon decrees and/or Walloon government orders specifying the arrangements for communicating information to the authorities depending on the subject concerned. The information exchange procedures have not yet been formally set down in a written procedure

AT

In the event of a notification/message in the IMS, information is requested promptly and provided within a few days.    
ESF: The procedures and organisational structure for exchanging information are set out and explained in detail in the management and control system of the ESF Managing Authority. The management and control system has been approved by the European Commission.

FI

The authorities responsible for the implementation of EU programmes are administrative authorities, and they exercise administrative powers. Administrative authorities have the power and the obligation, as enshrined in sectoral legislation, to monitor and audit grants and, where necessary, recover them. If administrative authorities have reason to suspect fraud, they make a request to the pre-trial investigation authority, such as the police, for an investigation into the matter. The administrative authorities are also responsible for IMS reporting. The Police or Customs, which have the power to conduct criminal investigations, conduct the preliminary investigation. Following this, the prosecutor issues a decision to bring charges. After that, the matter is dealt with in court.    
Roles and powers are split among the various authorities. The Police, Customs and the public prosecutors, i.e. the enforcement authorities and judicial authorities, operate independently and have the power to conduct criminal investigations and take coercive measures. Administrative authorities do not have those sorts of powers, but they do communicate the necessary data for the pre-trial investigation authorities to use in connection with a request for an investigation.

LT

The Financial Crime Investigation Service (FCIS), serving as the primary body for reporting and investigating fraud related to EU funds in Lithuania, collects all relevant information from the EU paying agencies in the country and subsequently reports it to OLAF. A key challenge, however, lies in addressing regular irregularities that do not constitute fraud. In such cases, the paying agencies are not obligated to report these instances to the FCIS.

SI

While Ministry for Cohesion and Regional Development answer is YES; The Financial Admin of the Republic of Slovenia answers: NO. Agency for Agricultural Markets explains: Judicial authorities are separate from reporting authorities in organisational terms and work independently. Information is exchanged with judicial authorities in order to meet the needs of administrative procedures. Supreme State Prosecutor's Office of the Republic of Slovenia answers: In our legal system, the police act as the investigating authority, the public prosecutor acts as the prosecuting authority and the court acts as an independent judicial body. In certain cases, particularly more serious offences, the prosecution service may provide guidance to the police during the investigation. Once the investigation is complete, the police submit a criminal report to the prosecutor, together with all the evidence they have collected. The prosecutor then decides whether to initiate criminal proceedings. Our legal system follows the principle of legality, which means that the prosecutor is obliged to initiate criminal proceedings if there is a reasonable suspicion that a criminal offence has been committed and that the perpetrator should be prosecuted ex officio

CZ

The reporting authority is the managing authority of the operational programme. The reporter submits the criminal complaint to the Police of the Czech Republic/EPPO, and it is then dealt with at the Public Prosecutor’s Office, and an action is subsequently brought before the court. If the managing authority needs to contact the judicial authorities, the procedure depends on the nature of the particular information. Routine communication (such as the police asking for more detailed information about the project) can also take place directly. Where necessary, other bodies (the certifying authority, the national co-ordination authority, the audit authority) are also included in the communication. In the case of irregularities involving amounts above the established thresholds, AFCOS is also included in the communication.    
In some OPs, there is a coordinator of audits, controls and irregularities. This staff member communicates with the judicial authorities and the notifying authorities.

ES

The Spanish AFCOS carries out information and monitoring functions for the classification and communication of suspected fraud, informing the authorities of the existence of legal proceedings in progress, as well as their completion, requesting information from the judicial bodies, all on the basis of the criteria contained in the document ‘Classification criteria and procedure for action with regard to irregularities and suspected fraud that are the subject of criminal legal proceedings’ issued by the AFCOS.

HU

The Directorate for Internal Audit and Integrity serves as a single contact point for a two-way flow of information between managing authorities and investigative and judicial bodies, the procedural details of which are laid down in cooperation agreements with the Public Prosecutor’s Office, the police and the National Tax and Customs Administration.

SK

The process of reporting irregularities to OLAF involves several key steps which flows from Managing Authority (MA) or Intermediate Body (IB) through Certifying Authority/Paying Authority (CA/PA) to National Office for OLAF. The MA/IB is responsible for a reporting of detected irregularity and recording the information about irregularity into the national IT monitoring system. For this reason, the MA/IB receives information about any initiated and ongoing procedures from the authorities conducting the procedure.    
The national monitoring system contains detailed information about the given irregularity, on the basis of which the CA/PA assesses their reporting to National Office for OLAF (AFCOS) and afterwards the National Office for OLAF is reporting the cases to IMS. There is regular communication and exchange of information between all mentioned bodies (for example regarding legal procedures, technical procedures).    
Other bodies such as the Audit Authority, criminal agency, etc. are involved if necessary.
In agricultural funds judicial authorities contact/inform the Agricultural Paying Agency (APA). Then the exchange of information is as follows: APA via IMS to AFCOS.
The exchange of information regarding fraudulent irregularities is based on cooperation agreement between AFCOS and the General Prosecutor´s Office of the SR.

PL

The competent institution of the management and control system, after examining a particular case, reports suspected criminal offences to the law enforcement authorities, providing the necessary details substantiating its suspicion. In the area of cohesion policy, where the law enforcement authorities decide to initiate proceedings, further information about the stage of such proceedings is exchanged on the basis of the cooperation agreement between the National Public Prosecutor and the Minister responsible for regional development, which regulates the provision of information on ongoing and concluded proceedings concerning projects co-financed by European funds. On the basis of that agreement, there is a regular, periodic exchange of data on the beneficiaries of EU funds against whom investigative measures have been taken, and some institutions also make use of the possibility to directly contact the designated representatives of the Public Prosecutor’s Office where it is necessary to obtain data on ongoing proceedings without delay.
In the area of agriculture, the institution referring a case to law enforcement authorities is obliged to keep the data on criminal proceedings in the relevant register of irregularities up to date until the proceedings come to an end. As a general rule, the exchange of information between the institution and the law enforcement authorities takes place on a regular basis to ensure that the case is kept up to date in the Irregularity Management System. In the absence of information about the current stage of criminal proceedings being conducted by law enforcement authorities, the competent entity must request that such information be sent to the contact point in charge of the respective proceedings, and, on this basis, it must update the data in the register.    
Information obtained from law enforcement authorities forms the basis for possible reporting or updating of the case in the IMS by the competent reporting institution.

DE

The Federal Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs (BMAS): In the context of the European Social Fund Plus (ESF Plus), there is a guidance document for the ESF Plus Federal Programme which deals with the reporting of irregularities (including suspected cases of fraud). Under the ESF Plus Federal Programme, cases are examined by the managing authority and the intermediate managing bodies. Where necessary, the managing authority instructs the relevant granting authority to take action, which may include, in particular, an on-the-spot check. The granting authority sends an IMS report to OLAF and, where necessary, notifies the offence to the national public prosecutor’s office or the European Public Prosecutor’s Office.    

The Federal Ministry of Food and Agriculture (BMEL): Where necessary, cases in the area of agriculture and fisheries are reported to the judicial authorities or the European Public Prosecutor’s office by the paying agencies or managing authorities, with the involvement of their legal services.    

The Bremen ERDF Managing Authority: The intermediate bodies implement operations. Potential cases of fraud are reported to the managing authority while, at the same time, detailed checks are carried out in order to either confirm or dispel the suspicion of possible fraud. If the suspicion of fraud is confirmed, the intermediate body in turn notifies the managing authority and the public prosecutor’s office. The public prosecutor’s office investigates the case or closes the investigation. The outcome is communicated to the intermediate body, which in turn informs the managing authority.    

The Baden-Württemberg ERDF Managing Authority: Through Section 2 of the Subsidies Act (SubvG), Germany has obliged (reporting) authorities to disclose facts relevant to subsidies. Under Section 3 of the SubvG, beneficiaries are required to communicate facts which constitute an impediment to subsidies, as well as facts which are relevant to the recovery of subsidies in full or in part. Moreover, Section 6 of the SubvG requires the (reporting) authorities to notify the law enforcement authorities if, in the exercise of their duties, they become aware of facts giving rise to suspicions of subsidy fraud.
As a result, a complete chain is established in criminal law between the beneficiary or beneficiaries, the authorities and the law enforcement authorities.    

The Rhineland-Palatinate ERDF Managing Authority: We formally inform the prosecution officers about any cases as required by German federal law (Section 6 of the SubvG).
The Lower Saxony ERDF Managing Authority: In justified cases of suspected fraud, a direct notification (criminal complaint) is made by the intermediate body to the competent public prosecutor's office. The Intermediate body (NBank), investigating authorities and judicial authorities are in regular exchange during the proceedings. The managing authority shall be kept regularly informed of the progress of the procedure.    

The Schleswig-Holstein ERDF Managing Authority: The MA’s guidance document on anti-corruption and anti-fraud measures deals with the handling of suspicious cases and the reporting process. The reporting process is always the same, whichever institution detects a (suspected) case of fraud: If administrative checks confirm a (suspected) case of fraud, a submission is made to the public prosecutor’s office via the Electronic Court and Administrative Mailbox (EGVP). An IMS report is also made. The subsequent investigation is the responsibility of the public prosecutor’s office.    

The Thuringia ERDF Managing Authority: Cases where suspicions cannot be dispelled are reported to the law enforcement authorities by the ERDF MA or an intermediate body. If the case is closed, the aforementioned parties are notified. If there are sufficient grounds to believe that an offence has been committed (cf. Section 203 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (StPO)), the law enforcement authorities bring charges.

BG

In the field of penal investigation judicial authorities provide information only in case when Managing Authority is constituted as a victim in the indictment. The Managing Authorities provide assistance to the European prosecutor's Office at requests made for provision of information and documents in order to counteract irregularities and fraud affecting the EU’s financial interests.    
Following the Regulation (EU) 2017/1939 all reporting authorities as well as each prosecutor or investigator, part of the prosecution system (PORB), reports directly to the European Public Prosecutor's Office when a suspicion of an offence within its competence is identified. As a primary point for organizing and ensuring the interaction with EPPO, department 08 within the Supreme Cassation Prosecutor’s Office is also reliable link between reporting and judicial authorities and EPPO. The pointed procedures are ongoing practice for years in Bulgaria.

MT

The exchange of information with respect to reported fraudulent cases is established by Article 18 of the Internal Audit and Financial Investigations Act (Cap. 461 of the Laws of Malta).

CY

For CAPO, they report suspected fraud cases to the relevant authorities (e.g. Police, EPPO, Attorney General- depending on the case), as well as to AFCOS (via IMS and otherwise).    

AFCOS Organizational Structure:    
The AFCOS is presided by the Accountant General of the Republic and the following authorities are its members:

(Managing and Control Authorities): Treasury of the Republic of Cyprus, Directorate General for Growth, Ministry of Interior, Cyprus Agricultural Payments Organization.
(Legal and Investigation Authorities): Tax Department, Customs and Excise Department. (Prosecution Authorities) Law Office of the Republic, Cyprus Police.    
(Audit Authorities): The Cyprus Audit Office and the Internal Audit Service are observers. Other relevant authorities which AFCOS has cooperation with is the Independent Authority Against Corruption and the European Delegated Prosecutor (EPPO). Memorandums of Cooperation between the Cyprus AFCOS and other competent authorities involved in the fight against fraud to formalize communication and cooperation forms a deliverable of the TSI project that Cyprus is a beneficiary, and its expected delivery is between August and October of 2025.

EE

The irregularity report is created by the institution responsible for managing of the specific project/beneficiary (implementing agency) in the information system. If the irregularity or fraud is identified by another party (e.g., the Managing Authority, auditing authority, ECA, OLAF, investigative body) or comes from a whistleblower tip, the information is forwarded to the implementing agency responsible for managing of the case. This agency has the legal basis to make financial corrections if necessary or submit a request to the investigative body to initiate a criminal investigation. All irregularities/fraud are recorded to national grant information system from the first euro cent, and the information remains in the system even if it is later determined during the proceedings that no irregularity or fraud has occurred.    
The Managing Authority reports irregularities quarterly via IMS, ensuring that the irregularities have been updated and contain the required information. This includes verifying whether reporting has been initiated for cases they are aware of. Our investigative bodies generally share detailed information only with the institution managing this project. They do not provide separate notifications to the Managing Authority or AFCOS. The Managing Authority obtains the necessary information from the implementing agency or through the reporting system.

RO

- DLAF: Standardised form in follow-up to DNA/DLAF cases    

- AFIR: In the framework of the Agency for the Financing of Rural Investment, the Control and Anti-Fraud Directorate (DCA) reports directly to the Director-General, who fulfils the duties concerning the role of scrutiny over contracted projects, with a view to the prevention/identification of irregularities and suspected fraud which affect the financial interests of the European Union and the National Budget of Romania. Alongside the control missions carried out on the basis of sanctions and reporting, the Control and Anti-Fraud Directorate ensures ongoing collaboration with bodies responsible for investigating cases of irregularities and (suspected) fraud, representing the main contact point for the AFIR with these institutions. In this regard, the Control and Anti-Fraud Directorate, through the External Operational Cooperation Service, collaborates with OLAF, EPPO, DLAF, DNA, the Police and the Public Prosecution Service on verifying, ascertaining, assessing and monitoring cases of irregularities and suspected fraud. Depending on the information received from the EPPO, DLAF and OLAF, the Control and Anti-Fraud Directorate follows the cases under investigation by the DNA on an ongoing basis, regularly asking about the status of enquiries concerning projects financed by the EAFRD, and of the result of OLAF/EPPO/DLAF/DNA investigations, depending on the way in which the DCA is handling the cases assigned to the Directorate: following the administrative and judicial procedures opened after the discovery of irregularities/fraud, initiating the debt recovery procedure, entering the necessary information in the quarterly report on irregularities, etc. Taking into account the collaboration framework described above, the Control and Anti-Fraud Directorate, through the External Operational Cooperation Service takes over, centralises and analyses the notifications and information received from OLAF, EPPO,
DLAF, DNA, the Police and the Public Prosecution Service and cases of suspected fraud opened by other services under the DCA, where necessary ensuring quarterly reporting, monitoring and/or control of cases of irregularity and suspected fraud which have arisen.

- DGP-AM POPAM: The Managing Authority notifies cases of suspected fraud on the basis of current national legislation, both in writing and through the EPPO website. Information, documents and the outcome of checks/investigations are communicated in electronic and/or paper format depending on each individual case.

- The Ministry of Energy: Interinstitutional collaboration protocols have been opened in which ways of avoiding irregularities and serious irregularities, such as double financing, fraud or corruption, were identified. - South Muntenia Regional Development Agency (AMPR S–M): establishing official communication protocols, appointing liaison officers in order to facilitate communication and coordination between authorities, regular meetings between agencies or working groups in order to discuss ongoing cases and to exchange information.

- MIPE – DGPDD: Within the DGPDD – DACNMISC, the Irregularities Officers Department receives requests for information and data from the judicial bodies, responds to requests and regularly requests information on the status of the investigations carried out by the judicial authorities.

- MIPE – DGMMRR: Under Procedure No PO. DGMMRR.10- Control of irregularities/double financing, serious irregularities arising in the obtaining and use of external grants and loans allocated to Romania through the PNNR or related national public funds and the recovery of resulting debts. The Audit Control, Recovery and Monitoring Service enters in the register of suspected irregularities/fraud and debtors all cases of suspected irregularities/fraud identified in the checks by the DGMMRR-CN or in findings with financial implications submitted by institutions with responsibilities in this field audit/European Public Prosecutor’s Office/DLAF/DNA/OLAF/ANI/DIICOT, etc. Where appropriate, it informs them of the fact that in the course of the checks carried out, a reasonable suspicion arose concerning the identification of evidence of suspected fraud/serious irregularities.

- MMAP: Within the framework of the Legal and Debt Recovery Service of the Directorate-General for the National Recovery and Resilience Plan (DGPNRR – SJRC), the Department for Controls and the Establishment of Irregularities receives requests for information and data from the judicial bodies, responds to requests and regularly requests information on the status of the investigations carried out by the judicial authorities.

PT

Here, we should point out the information sharing with the Central Criminal Investigation and Prosecution Department (DCIAP) and the European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO). The Funds’ coordinating bodies are responsible for providing information on operations, beneficiaries, and their respective shareholders/managers/administrators, as well as service providers/suppliers. In turn, the DCIAP and the EPPO provide information on the state of play of proceedings initiated.    
The Funds’ coordinating bodies compile and validate data on irregularities to be reported to OLAF and monitor cases reported to the Public Prosecutor’s Office (suspected fraud cases) or to the relevant Operational Programmes, with a view to characterising beneficiaries in terms of good standing, so as to prevent their renewed involvement in similar situations. The information is sent to the AFCOS, which validates it and submits it to OLAF via the IMS.

LV

If, while administering EU funds (instruments or other programmes), a possible illegal act is detected or an act that does not comply with the conditions for implementing EU funds and raises suspicions of fraud that may affect the financial interests of the EU, this act is reported to the European Delegated Prosecutor's Office in Latvia and the European Public Prosecutor's Office (EPPO). The law enforcement authorities can also be contacted - the State Police, the Corruption Prevention and Combating Office - to receive the necessary advice, while at the same time informing the European Delegated Prosecutor's Office in Latvia.
The exchange of information between institutions is determined in the AFCOS procedure "Methodological material on cooperation and exchange of information between the Anti-Fraud Coordination Service of the Ministry of Finance (AFCOS), national institutions and the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) in the field of protection of the financial interests of the European Union" and AFCOS procedure "Procedure for institutions to report to the European Public Prosecutor's Office (EPPO) on suspected fraud against the EU's financial interests".
Each EU funds administering institution has a contact person for communication with the investigative authorities, and on the side of the investigative authorities there is a contact person for communication with the EU funds institution.

DK

The Danish Business Authority: When we, as a managing authority, find a case, where we after investigations have a reasonably certainty, that we have a case of fraud on our hands, we make a report to the police, who conducts further investigations and decides if it is a case suitable to take to court. We rarely communicate with the police regarding reported cases and almost never with the judicial authorities. When that is said it is also important to underline, that we have very few cases of fraud.

The Danish Agency for Green Land Conversion and Water Environment: A special department of the reporting authority designated to handle fraud is in charge of the communication with the judicial authorities.

IT

As stated in the aforementioned ‘Guidelines on how to notify the European Commission of irregularities and fraud against the EU budget’ issued in 2024, all managing authorities have been reminded to always bear in mind that, in the event of difficulties in dialogue with the judicial authorities, they can contact the Guardia di Finanza Unit for Combatting Fraud against the European Union at the Prime Minister’s Office, which will seek to facilitate contact with the local branch of the body concerned.    
In addition, by Order No 6 of 6 December 2024, the Prosecutor General at the Court of Auditors confirmed that at least one staff member authorised to access the IMS platform would be designated at each local public prosecutor’s office.    
In order to allow the data in the database to be updated in a timely manner, the regional public prosecutor’s offices have been asked to share information with managing authorities on summonses, case dismissals and judgments regarding fraud against the EU budget, with the public prosecutor’s offices at the courts of appeal and Court of Cassation being subject to a similar requirement to share information on judgments issued in appeals.

Response

Frequency

Percentage

Member States

Other (please specify)

24

88.9%

IE, LU, HR, SE, NL, FR, EL, BE, AT, FI, SI, HU, SK, PL, DE, BG, MT, CY, EE, RO, PT, LV, DK, IT

Standardised digital forms

11

40.7%

LU, HR, SE, BE, LT, CZ, ES, DE, BG, EE, RO

Secured online platforms

6

22.2%

SI, CZ, DE, MT, RO, IT

Regular meetings

5

18.5%

HR, CZ, SK, BG, RO

IMS

4

14.8%

AT, CZ, ES, DE

Shared case management system for tracking and reporting suspected fraud case

3

11.1%

CZ, ES, RO

Automated data exchange systems

2

7.4%

ES, EE

Member State

Response

IE

?

LU

In addition to response to Q.1.15., conventional communication methods (e.g., email, written correspondence, telephone calls, etc.) are equally used.

HR

Contribution from AFCOS unit: Formal written communication.    

Contribution from Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries, Directorate for Support in Agriculture and Rural Development: Inquiries sent by post or email.

SE

The Swedish Economic Crime Authority is notified quarterly of any reported cases. Following discussions with the Swedish Economic Crime Authority, information is shared in the most appropriate way. It can be done by encrypted email, by letter or on a USB stick. The Swedish Economic Crime Authority’s website has digital forms for reporting crimes and filling in other relevant information. There are also links to tip-off functions and to the Swedish Economic Crime Authority’s whistle-blower channel for reporting wrongdoing involving the Union’s financial interests in Sweden.

NL

At this moment the AFCOS is trying to get IMS authorisation for a better insight of the irregularities

FR

For the CAP - The exchange of information takes place between the judicial authorities and the paying agencies. These exchanges are then forwarded to the Secretariat of the CICC EAGF, which is responsible for officially submitting fraudulent and non-fraudulent data to OLAF.    
Equally, for the NRRP - In January 2024, an agreement was signed by the MICAF, the Treasury DG and the European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO) on operational cooperation on the reporting of offences in the context of the national recovery and resilience plan (NRRP) that fall within the competence of the EPPO. This working arrangement will act as a framework for enhanced cooperation between the EPPO and the French authorities in charge of administrating this funding. A form for reporting fraud to the EPPO in France and a practical manual were annexed to the working arrangement.

EL

Any information from the judicial authorities is sent by letter and/or by email.

BE

Via email

AT

Direct communication – as befits the particular situation - is conducted by email with the Authorising Body and/or the Paying Agency.

ESF: By means of electronic files (ELAK).

FI

A request for an investigation is made in a standard format, and a digital form or other form of notification can be used.

SI

AAMRD answers: Communication in writing by means of correspondence, which is recorded in the Agency’s document database. Supreme State Prosecutor's Office of the Republic of Slovenia answers: Information exchange between judicial and reporting authorities is primarily based on document-based communication. Although a limited form of electronic exchange has been established between police, prosecutors’ offices and courts, the operational processes are still predominantly based on the exchange of physical documents. This traditional approach ensures compliance with procedural and legal requirements. Efforts are underway to improve electronic data exchange and streamline communication, but full digitisation has not yet been achieved

HU

The information exchange process set out in cooperation agreements.

SK

Documentations and information received in accordance with Cooperation agreement and law obligation.

PL

A regular exchange of information on the basis of the cooperation agreement between the National Public Prosecutor and the Minister responsible for regional development, as regards the transmission of information on ongoing and concluded proceedings concerning projects co-financed by European funds:

- periodic cooperation – receiving from the National Public Prosecutor’s Office information on proceedings in cases in which the public prosecutor handling the case has consented to the transmission of information regarding those proceedings to the institution;

- ongoing cooperation – exchange of information via a dedicated e-mail address where it is necessary to obtain data on specific proceedings;

- direct referral of questions by managing authorities to individual public prosecutors’ offices regarding specific ongoing proceedings.

- The exchange of information at the stage of judicial proceedings is a formal process governed by the relevant legislation. In addition, the competent national institutions have access to digitised casefiles and to a judicial information portal, which facilitates communication and exchange of information between the judicial authorities and these institutions. However, the decision on whether or not to grant access to casefiles (including in digital form) is taken, in accordance with the relevant legislation, by the authority handling the case.

DE

The Federal Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs (BMAS): In the context of the ESF Plus Funding Programme, ESF managing authorities report suspected cases of fraud to OLAF via the IMS system. The judicial authorities (public prosecutor’s offices) are informed in writing of suspected cases of fraud, outside of the IMS.

The Federal Ministry of Food and Agriculture (BMEL): Parallel transmission of the relevant case files.

The Rhineland-Palatinate ERDF Managing Authority: Report via letters (on paper).

The Lower Saxony ERDF Managing Authority: In the case of a criminal complaint, an official letter from intermediate body (NBank) is sent to the public prosecutor's office. There is no regular exchange.

The Saarland ESF Managing Authority: Forwarding to the internal legal department.

The Thuringia ERDF Managing Authority: Email, letter, telephone.

BG

Written reports and correspondence. Receiving judicial follow-ups, when the Managing Authorities are constituted as a party in trial.

MT

In cases reported as fraudulent by IAID, the information is forwarded to judicial authorities by hand. (registered as private and confidential).

CY

Confidential correspondence (Email and Letter Communication)

EE

Meetings and information exchange regarding fraud suspicions.

RO

- DLAF: standardised form (legal follow-up)

- DGP-AM POPAM: written correspondence

- MIPE – DGPDD: The transmission of requests in digital form and the communication of responses in digital/paper form, depending on the situation.

- MIPE – DGMMRR: to the European Commission audit services (DG EC-FIN) and ECA secure online platforms. To the judicial authorities in letters and supporting documents.

PT

Information is shared by means of restricted email and joint recording in secure-access folders reserved for the parties involved in the proceedings.

LV

Official correspondence, electronic correspondence, telephone communication.

DK

The Danish Business Authority: The occasional phone call or e-mail.

 
The Danish Agricultural and Fisheries Agency: Secure tunnel mail system.

 
The Danish Agency for Green Land Conversion and Water Environment: The specialised department of the reporting authority sends a report to the police via secure digital mail and any communication between the authorities is by secure digital mail.

IT

Judicial authorities and reporting authorities (MAs) exchange information through formal data update requests. The reporting authority sends such a request directly to the judicial authority or, if the IMS report originated from a notification received from an external control body (e.g. a police force), sends it via that body. In the latter case, on each occasion the body concerned will request the necessary prior approval from the judicial authority that is conducting the investigation.    
See the information given in response to Q.1.4 and Q.1.5 for cases where problems or difficulties arise in the flow of information.    
In the context of the activities aimed at fighting fraud against the European budget, the control bodies in general (with specific reference to the police forces) draft a summary report upon completion of their inspection activities, in parallel with the notifications of findings that are sent to the competent criminal-law and accounting-law judicial authorities to allow them to move forward with their proceedings. They send this report by email to the Office of the Prosecutor General at the Court of Auditors for statistical analysis, for coordination with the local public prosecutor’s offices and possibly so that action can be taken.

Member State

Response

IE

AFCOS are working with the relevant MAs to ensure the process is clear to all parties.

LU

No need for improvement identified.

HR

Ministry of Regional Development and EU funds - Directorate for the Implementation of the Operational Programmes and Financial Instruments propose that OLAF regularly informs Member States about the start and end of investigations it conducts.

 
Contribution from Ministry of Finance, Tax Administration:    
Conclusion of a working agreement with EPPO and enabling EPPO to have direct access to certain databases of the Tax Administration.

Contribution from AFCOS unit:    
The exchange of information between judicial and reporting authorities could be improved by mutual trainings (MCS bodies could be trained in the area of Criminal Act, Criminal Proceedings Act and practice of judicial and investigative bodies while judicial and investigative bodies could be trained in the area of management and control of EU funds).
OLAF could contribute as an organizer of targeted training activities or a speaker at training activities organized by Croatian authorities. In addition, a round table could be organized in order to discuss difficulties related to handling suspected fraud cases from the aspect of MCS bodies and judicial bodies.

Contribution from Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries, Directorate for Support in Agriculture and Rural Development:    
The exchange of information can be improved by using standardized digital forms between judicial and reporting authorities.

SE

Training of case handlers working for the managing authorities, and enabling the authorities to strengthen their internal processes, including justifying why an identified regularity is not considered a suspected crime

NL

The new responsibility takes time to get the organisational structure in place, at this moment no help is needed from OLAF/Commission

FR

x

EL

The exchange of information between judicial and reporting authorities could be improved through the development of an automated data exchange platform (to which all parties involved would have access).

BE

ERDF, JTF and RRF at the SPW: Yes, work is under way to formally set down an information exchange procedure between the judicial authorities and the reporting authority. The purpose of this is not only to improve cooperation and the regular exchange of information but also to standardise the procedural practices for the submission of files reporting suspected infringements involving a criminal offence. OLAF can support the creation of these procedures by providing information on the information exchange procedure between the judicial authorities and OLAF and also by giving examples of the file submission and information exchange procedure in other Member States or the standard procedures expected by OLAF.

AT

No, support from OLAF is not necessary.

FI

This is a national competence, and the Commission has no role to play in it.

LT

Automated data exchange systems or IMS can be used for internal information exchange

SI

Supreme State Prosecutor's Office of the Republic of Slovenia answers: Yes, there is room for improvement in the exchange of information between judicial and reporting authorities. Key areas for improvement include:    

   - Automated transfer of attachments from police to prosecution registers - This would reduce administrative workload and minimise manual data entry and document scanning. A pilot test has started but has been delayed due to technical constraints. The plan is to gradually extend the test to other regions if the technical feasibility is confirmed.

   - Electronic filing of court documents - Intensive discussions have taken place with the courts to initiate its use and the necessary system upgrades are being tested. The first phase of testing will start early in 2025 and will focus on lower court cases.
OLAF and the Commission could assist by facilitating technical solutions, promoting interoperability standards and providing funding or expertise for digital transformation projects. Promoting cross-border best practices and ensuring alignment with EU-wide digital justice initiatives would also be beneficial.

CZ

Cooperation is at a very high level. No calls for improvements have been received.

ES

An improvement would be to be able to obtain more information from the EPPO and for it to be communicated to AFCOS in a systematic way, at least annually, with basic information within the limits allowed by the regulations of:
- cases that have been transferred to the National Court, cases that have been finalised in the EPPO, and. cases where there is an ongoing investigation in the EPPO. OLAF could help by establishing general rules.

HU

It could be improved by continuing the ongoing development of internal cooperation between Member States’ bodies. OLAF can support such processes by comparing and disseminating existing national practices.

SK

More trainings to strengthen the prevention and detection of fraud and irregularities, creating new secure online platform.

PL

Yes, with regard to some aspects of cooperation, we saw opportunities to improve the exchange of information between the judicial authorities and the reporting bodies. For example, preparatory work is currently underway at the Institution Coordinating the Partnership Agreement in connection with the conclusion of an agreement with the National Public Prosecutor, which covers information on draft cohesion policy programmes under the 2021-2027 financial perspective. The objective of the agreement is to define new rules of cooperation and the methods and means of exchanging information.
The Paying Agency’s cooperation with law enforcement authorities consists in providing all the information these authorities require for their investigations in its entirety and in a timely manner. Professional representatives of the institutions, both at the stage of preparatory proceedings and, potentially, at the stage of judicial proceedings, carry out all the procedural steps provided for by law and submit requests to the law enforcement authorities for access to information concerning the stage of the relevant proceedings. However, it is for law enforcement authorities and courts to take any decisions regarding the scope of information on ongoing proceedings to be provided and on the manner of providing it. At the same time, new solutions, such as the above-mentioned digitalisation of casefiles and the judicial information portal, have greatly facilitated the institutions’ process of obtaining information about ongoing proceedings. However, the decision on whether or not to grant access to casefiles (including in digital form) is taken, in accordance with the relevant legislation, by the authority handling the case.

DE

The Baden-Württemberg ERDF Managing Authority: No, there is currently no need to improve the exchange of information between judicial and reporting authorities.    

The Bremen ERDF Managing Authority: No, the existing possibilities for exchanging information are sufficient.    

The Thuringia ERDF Managing Authority: Faster processing by OLAF; definition of
vague legal concepts; updated manual/guidance on irregularities; recommendations for action; presentation of ‘best practice’ procedures.

BG

Through specialized targeted trainings and awareness-raising tools (online materials) for specialized units in the structure of the reporting authorities. Strengthening and increasing the level of cooperation with the Prosecutor’s Office of the Republic of Bulgaria. Updating the cooperation agreement between OLAF and Prosecutor’s Office of the Republic of Bulgaria. Amendments in criminal procedural legislation are needed. An improvement in the exchange of information between judicial and reporting authorities can be achieved through informing the reporting authorities of the results of judicial proceedings/sending final judicial decisions. Start using digital platforms, like automated data exchange systems.

MT

Yes, receiving periodical feedback from judicial national authorities and the EPPO.

CY

Yes, establishment of an online secured platform via which all the national authorities (AFCOS members and Judicial Bodies e.g. Attorney General/EPPO /Independent Authority Against Corruption/Police can exchange information on reporting and also on status of cases.

EE

We exchange general information on a regular basis, but it is not possible to share detailed information on specific cases. This is regulated at the national legal level.

RO

- DLAF: Yes. The communication of specific information on the reporting criteria in the IMS. Specific regulations concerning reporting by the judicial authorities.

- AFIR: Yes. Following criminal investigations, insofar as irregularities in the use of EU funds are found, the competent bodies could send evidence to the AFIR with a view to triggering the procedures for detecting irregularities and establishing budget debts independently of the outcome of criminal investigations. The organisation of the training session on reporting.

- DGP-AM POPAM: Yes, through the conclusion of protocols between the judicial and reporting authorities for the quarterly matching of cases referred for investigation. We think that the Commission could regulate this type of activity.

- The Ministry of Energy: By providing regular information at courses or seminars specifying methods for avoiding the risk of fraud and corruption arising from relevant cases or from allowing access to databases or reports generated from them for companies considered to be ineligible and to be avoided.

- West Regional Development Agency (ADR VEST): The exchange of information between the judicial and reporting authorities can be improved by the adoption of mechanisms and procedures. Possible measures include: the conclusion of agreements/protocols between the judicial and reporting authorities. The organisation of joint training sessions: these could improve mutual understanding of the needs and responsibilities of each party involved. The development of automated systems for the supply of/access to data/information – interoperability of databases. - MIPE – DGPDD: Through the creation of an automated data exchange system

- MIPE – AM POCU: Yes, through the implementation of a digital platform for the exchange of information in real time between authorities

- MIPE – DGPS: Yes, through the organisation of regular meetings or through the creation of an automated data exchange system.

- MIPE - DGMMRR: The judicial authorities have access to the platforms used in the management/implementation of the PNRR. In this respect, collaboration protocols have been concluded between MIPE -DGMMR and institutions with investigative/control tasks.

- MIPE - Directorate-General for Just Transition and Economic Competitiveness (DGTJCE): there is a common DLAF/DNA/EPPO database

- MMAP: Through the creation of an automated data exchange system

PT

Yes, through the creation of dedicated IT platforms to be used jointly by judicial bodies and administrative authorities, in order to enable up-to-date monitoring of cases and faster information sharing.

LV

Develop more secure and specialized information exchange channels. Financial support for developing digital tools.

DK

No possible improvement reported.

IT

The European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO) established by Regulation (EU) 2017/1939 has been fully operational for around three years and is competent for almost all types of crime against the financial interests of the EU. We thus believe that there should be a more robust form of information sharing between OLAF and the EPPO, including as regards the possible introduction of a single fraud detection and monitoring system. OLAF could support this process as part of its relations with the EPPO.

Member State

Response

IE

n/a

LU

N/A

HR

Contribution from AFCOS unit:    
In October 2023 OLAF organised an online training for Croatian authorities that was attended by more than 300 participants. In addition, in October 2024 OLAF organised a webinar on IMS refactoring. Croatian authorities found the trainings very informative. However, they expressed need for more specific trainings that would include case studies and exchange of practice with OLAF and member states as well as periodical trainings on the use of IMS where reporting challenges could be presented and discussed.

SE

N/A

NL

N/A

FR

x

EL

No further comments required.

BE

/

AT

No information.

FI

-

LT

-

SI

-

CZ

-

ES

Possibly one way to get authorities to report irregularities to OLAF completely, correctly and on time would be to establish some kind of consequence for non-compliance depending on the seriousness of the non-compliance and applying the principle of proportionality.

HU

The establishment of a single contact point (Directorate for Internal Control and Integrity) has, on the basis of experience so far, already added significant value in its cooperation with investigative and judicial bodies.

SK

x

PL

None

DE

The Lower Saxony ERDF Managing Authority: The exchange between the authorities and intermediate body (NBank) in case of a criminal complaint via the direct communication channels and the close exchange is guaranteed at all times.

Bremen: There were no potential cases of fraud in 2024.

BG

N/A

MT

Kindly refer to the replies provided.

CY

No additional thoughts.

EE

If possible, the EPPO regulation could stipulate the exchange of information on investigations and cooperation with AFCOS’s.

RO

The Ministry of Energy: We consider that access to interconnected databases in which to check financial and legality aspects in order to exclude companies which are not eligible would help to mitigate possible irregularities.

PT

The purpose of establishing a body of facts preventing and restricting access to the EU Funds is to prevent and combat fraudulent practices in connection with receiving financing from the Funds, based on rigorous scrutiny of applicants. This is achieved through the creation, management and consultation of a database containing relevant information on the good standing and debt situation of parties that have already benefited or will benefit from support from the EU Funds. The European Commission’s growing concerns about fraud and the establishment of channels for the handling of complaints/reports on the use of support co-financed by the Cohesion Policy Funds have made it necessary to adopt a specific methodology for determining parties’ good standing and debt situations, which enables this access requirement to be managed effectively. This should be instrumental in assessing the level of risk that parties may present, thereby making a decisive contribution to the effective protection of the financial interests of the EU and of the Member States, based on the coordination of various sources of information found in databases held by national authorities and made available by the European Commission.
For Portugal 2030, the codification regarding good standing, reliability and debt situation to be observed in the classification of parties receiving or applying for support from the Cohesion Policy Funds has been approved, as has the procedure for managing this information. In other words, the information on the good standing, reliability and debt situation of beneficiaries of the EU Funds must be kept in a specific information system, which supports the action of all the bodies involved in Portugal 2030, and determines the subsequent action of the managing, paying and auditing authorities in respect of applications or projects of beneficiaries that have already been approved.
The codification of this information was based on data contained in audit/monitoring reports, complaints, criminal or administrative proceedings for violations of legislation on child labour and discrimination in work and employment, enforced collection proceedings through the tax courts (tax enforcement proceedings), insolvency proceedings and special revitalisation proceedings.

LV

NA

DK

The Danish Agency for Green Land Conversion and Water Environment: Denmark reports cases of suspected fraud to the Commission when such a case is handed over to the police. A police investigation can be time-consuming, and it is natural that it will occasionally disprove the suspicion. Those conditions contribute to the observed trends with cases being open for a long time and cases that do not lead to prosecution. Nevertheless, there is still a potential for improvement in the area and the paying agency for agricultural support has implemented a significant effort to achieve in the period 2022-2024.
The Agency has set up a unit to follow up on cases of suspected fraud or circumvention in order to secure resources and the right skills for the task. This has significantly reduced case processing time and improved the quality of police reports in the paying agency, which provides better conditions for the police to follow up on the reports.
Since the end of 2023, the case processing time at the police has also gradually decreased with regard to reports of suspected subsidy fraud. The paying agency held a meeting with the Director of Public Prosecutions in February 2024. The meeting has improved cooperation between the authorities through a better common understanding of the legal basis. In the second half of 2024, the paying agency has noted an increase in the number of reports coming before a court. The Paying Agency for Agricultural Support will maintain the cooperation and internal efforts with the expectation of achieving further improvements in the area.

Response

Frequency

Percentage

Member States

YES

10

37.0%

FR, AT, ES, HU, SK, MT, RO, PT, LV, IT

Not yet, but we intend / are in the process of developing this part of the strategy

8

29.6%

LU, NL, BE, FI, LT, CZ, BG, CY

Digitalisation of the fight against fraud is part of another strategy / assessment / policy (please specify)

7

25.9%

HR, SE, EL, SI, PL, EE, DK

NO

2

7.4%

IE, DE

Member State

Response

HR

The Republic of Croatia has adopted two anti-fraud strategies related to the protection of the EU´s financial interests so far and they were both communicated to OLAF. One covered the period 2010-2012 (adopted 14/01/2010) while the other covered the period 2014-2016 (adopted 23/01/2014), and both strategies were fully implemented. Considering that the Anti-Fraud Coordination System in the Republic of Croatia has been established, fully operational, and no major weaknesses were identified, there were no new anti-fraud strategies aimed at protection of financial interests of the EU adopted, neither update of the existing ones have been made. Yet, AFCOS system in the Republic of Croatia has been constantly fine-tuned through softer measures. Contribution from the Ministry of Finance, Custom Administration: In Implementation Programme of the Ministry of Finance
(https://mfin.gov.hr/UserDocsImages/dokumenti/proracun/stratesko/Provedbeni%20program%20Ministarstva%20financija%20za%20razdoblje%202025.-2028.pdf) – Measure 29 prescribes “Enhancement of digitalisation and adjustment of e-customs, excise and other information systems and optimization of infrastructure and equipment.    
In addition, Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries, Directorate for Support in Agriculture and Rural Development and Directorate of Fisheries highlighted the following answer: Not yet, but we intend / are in the process of developing this part of the strategy.

SE

Implementing authorities, AFCOS and audit body all have different digitalisation strategies and policies.

EL

Digitalisation concerns the sectoral Anti-Fraud Strategy (Structural Funds) of the programmes under the 2021-2027 Partnership Agreement for Regional Development (ESPA). In particular with regard to the reception and examination of complaints concerning the programmes/projects co-financed under the 2021-2027 Partnership Agreement for Regional Development, Article 50(1) of Law 4914/2022 states that ‘The Secretariat-General for Public Investments and the Partnership Agreement for Regional Development (ESPA) of the Ministry of Development and Investment, through the Special Service for Institutional Support and Information Systems (EYTHYPS), is responsible for ensuring that complaints which fall within the scope of the programme are examined by means of the management and control system(s). In order to simplify and accelerate the procedure between the stakeholders, complaints and examination findings are recorded, information is exchanged, and the related documents are transmitted electronically by authorised users, through the integrated information system (IIS).’ Implementation of the above-mentioned provision in the IIS is expected to start later this year. The MAs, responsible for detecting irregularities in co-financed projects, exchange relevant information using the authorised access of the Anti-Fraud Officer in each MA to the special space created for the Internal Anti-Fraud Network on the DIAVLOS electronic platform. The technical infrastructure of the IIS has been set up to allow it to interconnect with the central beneficial ownership register. The pilot operation phase has been completed and full operation is expected in the immediate future. The NTA/AFCOS networking platform is used by AFCOS and the competent ESPA authorities to facilitate the management and best possible identification of complaints submitted concerning co-financed projects and operations. Cooperation through this tool is always encrypted using strong authentication procedures for accredited users only.

SI

Financial Amin. of the Republic of Slovenia: Indeed, the digitalisation is the part of the Strategy of the Financial Administration of the Republic of Slovenia (FARS), FARS Work Program and the FARS Annual Report. Furthermore, the risk management, risk analysis and Compliance Risk Management (CRM) are also included in such strategy for particular working fields.

PL

Poland has not adopted a national anti-fraud strategy (NAFS). Poland has not decided to create such a document, and the European Commission does not oblige Member States to do so. The competent institution of the management and control system, on the other hand, have mechanisms under which they carry out their anti-fraud mission, including the digitalisation of anti-fraud measures.    
The managing authorities of all cohesion policy programmes are required to draw up a document on how to prevent and deal with corruption and fraud, including conflicts of interest within the respective programme. The authorities also include information on the digitalisation of anti-fraud measures in their documents. This programme-based approach allows for a proper assessment of the current situation with regard to anti-fraud measures, and for risk assessment and the development and introduction of proportionate measures to combat fraud at the lowest possible management level.    
When drawing up programme documents, the institutions involved in the implementation of EU funds also take account of the fact that fraudulent operators use new technologies to commit fraud. To counter this, growth concepts are being developed for the existing IT tools and ways in which they can be used to combat fraud. In this way, the digitalisation of the area of implementation, management and control of cohesion policy is constantly evolving (implementing new functionalities and improving existing functionalities), and it is at a rather advanced stage in Poland. There are direct possibilities for the digitalisation of the fight against fraud and the use of modern technologies in Poland by the relevant investigation services.

EE

Estonia's digitalization strategy can be called the "Digital Society Development Plan 2030" (DAK), and to implement it, each ministry prepares an ICT strategy for its own field. The DAK does not contain sectoral digitalization goals, and these should be included in the ICT strategy of the MoF, which is not a public document.    
We do not have a NAFS at the national level. We have several different strategies, and all these documents have digitalisation information. We have established minimum requirements for controls, created a cross-check possibility between different databases. Additionally, we have proposed cooperation with national investigative bodies, which could contribute even more to the analysis of digital data related to grants to identify potential vulnerabilities and fraud. Once agreements are reached, they can also be formalized or confirmed at the level of a strategy, cooperation agreement, or other document.

DK

Digitalisation of the fight against fraud is part of the anti-fraud strategy of EMFF/EMFAF in Denmark.

Member State

Response

FR

In combating revenue fraud, for example, the French customs administration plans to make use of data mining in order to establish rapidly the profiles of at-risk traders.
On the expenditure side, the DGEFP has developed a complete data science platform making it possible to identify risk elements in the files and, thereby help the departments managing the ESF to detect fraud.    
France’s NAFS has promoted regular use of the Early Detection and Exclusion System (EDES) to various authorities.

AT

Use of the ARACHNE data mining tool

ES

The NAFS includes measures such as the improvement of tools for risk analysis, the widespread use of databases for prevention and detection purposes, and the analysis of the interoperability of databases. On the other hand, the guidelines of the State Tax Agency’s tax and customs control plan focus on the use of technology in the fight against fraud.

HU

On the basis of the periodic review of the EUPR and FAIR system with a view to exploring and taking advantage of opportunities to prevent fraud and corruption, improvements have been made to the fraud prevention function, to manage project transfers and succession, strengthen the link with the Irregularity Management Database and enable ARACHNE commitments to be implemented.

SK

The Slovak Republic aims to ensure that the digitalization of the fight against fraud is an integral part of our National Anti-Fraud Strategy (NAFS). This strategy emphasizes the need to utilize all available IT tools (including ARACHNE) in the fight against fraud and calls on the relevant authorities to use these tools in their activities for the prevention and detection of fraud cases and other irregularities. The structured exchange of data and information between anti-fraud authorities and managing authorities is highlighted in the NAFS as a fundamental principle of fraud investigation and prosecution.

MT

A Central Document Repository System (CDRS) has been implemented through the creation of a digital platform that allows file and document sharing between the members of the Co-ordinating Committee, set up in terms of Article 23 of the Internal Audit and Financial Investigations Act (Cap. 461 of the Laws of Malta) 'to co-ordinate the activities of, and to facilitate the exchange of information between, different entities charged with the protection and safeguarding of public funds'.    
The CDRS was set up in line with Action Points 13 and 14 of the National Anti-Fraud and Corruption Strategy (NAFCS), as well as Malta's Recovery and Resilience Plan (RRP) commitments, and has the following features:

   - Stores electronic documents;    
   - Offers a centralised access to documents that can be easily retrieved by the         members of the Co-ordinating Committee; and    
   - Provides the necessary security for sensitive information.

In addition, IAID has compiled a list of software tools that are being used to assist each member of the Co-ordinating Committee in the prevention, detection, reporting, investigation, prosecution and correction of fraud and corruption irregularities.

Information provided regarding (1) the procurement method used and (2) the involvement of the Ministries’ respective Information Management Unit (IMU) in the procurement of new software restricts procurement duplications and also ensures that the use of such software is optimized, as well as enables the sharing of best practices in the use of software tools.

RO

- ADR VEST: Specific objective No 1.4. Streamlining the reporting of irregularities within the framework of the 2023-2027 NAFS aims to standardise and create a uniform reporting process, and ensure the quality and comparability of the data provided by the Romanian authorities, bearing in mind the need for the European Commission to set up a uniform digital, interoperable system for the collection of comparable data on irregularities and cases of fraud from the EU Member States.

- AFIR: The existence of the Register for Suspected Fraud and Indicators of Fraud and of the Electronic Register of Evidence of AFIR correspondence with EPPO, DNA, DLAF, IPJ, OLAF, DG Agri, and ECA: both registers are managed by the External Operational Cooperation Service of the Control and Anti-Fraud Directorate.
In the Register for Suspected Fraud and Indicators of Fraud, the irregularities officer, a position provided for by Article 25 of Government Decision No 875/2011 approving the implementing rules for Government Emergency Order No 66/2011, keeps a record of the referrals to the EPPO/DNA, DLAF pursuant to Article 8(1) or (11) of Government Emergency Order No 66/2011 concerning projects relating to the 2007-2013 and 2014-2020 NRDPs and the transition period in which suspected fraud or attempted fraud has been identified.

The Electronic Register of AFIR correspondence with EPPO, DNA, DLAF, IPJ, OLAF, DG Agri and the ECA records all correspondence between the AFIR (headquarters, regional centres and county offices) and these institutions, correspondence which has or may have possible fraud in the implementation of EAFRD projects as its subject.

Also, the local structures of the AFIR are required to report to the Director-General and Control and Anti-Fraud Directorate all situations in which CRFIR/OJFIR staff are asked to appear at the headquarters of the control or criminal investigation bodies in order to be consulted on aspects relating to the projects implemented and/or the work carried out depending on the duties of the service, irrespective of the type of judicial procedure.
- MIPE – AM POCU: Through regular working meetings

PT

The NAFS includes a specific measure on the general use of all tools made available by the European Commission for the purposes of assessing and mitigating the risk of fraud, particularly ARACHNE and OLAF’s Early Detection and Exclusion System (EDES) database.
The systems covered by Portugal 2030 are already sending data to ARACHNE.

LV

Ensuring access to various databases of national importance, introducing automatic controls is a determining factor for both fraud prevention, detection and investigation and it is included in the NAFS. In the NAFS period from 2024 to 2026, it is planned to continue optimizing the use of available national information systems for combating fraud, analysing which national information systems could still be interconnected and what are the problems of data analysis, as well as identifying opportunities for automatic controls.

IT

On this point, the situation in Italy is that there is a comprehensive system that fully meets the need to prevent and combat fraud against the EU. Each institution, agency and body responsible for managing EU resources in various capacities and according to various remits has set up over time – as part of an ongoing process of digitalising the fight against fraud – many systems, applications and databases, as well as methods and procedures, to properly ensure prior assessment of the risk of fraud, corruption, conflicts of interest and double funding in connection with EU budget implementation.    
With regard to budget revenue and specifically traditional own resources, the Customs and Monopolies Agency has reported that risk analysis activity in 2023 was based on examining the main information sources, with particular focus on information from reliable sources such as OLAF (around 50 INF MA mutual assistance reports) concerning all of the main financial risk areas: evasion of anti-dumping duties or countervailing duties, under-invoicing, misclassification of goods, abuse of preferential origin, abuse of procedure 42/63.    
Analysis of the INF MA reports triggered the following activities:

-addition of more than 300 new risk profiles (relating to goods or to natural/legal persons);

- amendment and/or recalibration of almost 400 existing risk profiles.

In addition, more than 300 RIFs (Risk Information Forms) were issued via CRMS2 (Customs Risk Management System 2.0). These concerned tax-related risks and led to the addition of around 80 new risk profiles.    
What is more, risk profiles are still in place for the fight against under-invoicing using various control strategies targeting both goods and persons.    
As regards checks when customs declarations are submitted, the fight against under-invoicing follows two parallel tracks:

-for the first track, the analysis tool used to identify value thresholds is the dashboard in the THESEUS database provided by the Commission;

-the second track uses CREDIBILITY, a new tax monitoring methodology for the fight against under-invoicing that was developed by the Agency.
On the issue of e-commerce, a risk analysis strategy based on a statistical approach is being developed and tested with the aim of identifying any anomalies in the value of imports.

The statistical analysis is based on processing a significant quantity of data on e-commerce extracted from the Cognos Datawarehouse on the basis of analysis of the H7 dataset.
With informatics support from specific artificial intelligence algorithms based on the programming language Python, the statistical analysis aims to identify items/declarations with anomalous unit values (€/kg) (‘outliers’), i.e. values below a given threshold or above a given ceiling.    
During 2023, work also continued on assessing risks using some specific methodologies in use at the Agency. These include the Fiscal Vigilance methodology. This consists in an analysis application which, using various search criteria such as the 10-digit customs code (TARIC) and the country of origin, calculates the ‘threshold value’ of goods via an algorithm based on the maximum number of transactions in a given period of time (usually two months). The ‘threshold value’ or statistical limit value is the value beneath which an amount entered on a declaration is considered to be an under-invoicing risk. The algorithm subdivides the transactions carried out into percentiles (calculated on a base of 10 or 100) and, by applying Gaussian distribution (a bell curve representing a precise statistical curve), calculates the values that are at either end of the curve and thus considered borderline cases and/or anomalous values. The application can also be used to adjust the risk profiles by ‘categorising’ the findings of checks. Every finding of a checking activity is ‘categorised’ as either compliant or non-compliant and according to the type of non-compliance (nature, quantity, value). At the end of the categorisation, the application is asked to calculate the threshold value with which the profile should be associated (for a given profile, declarations are selected based on the ‘< threshold value’ criterion, meaning that if the value declared is less than (‘<’) the ‘threshold value’, it is deemed to be a case of under‑invoicing).
Another interoperability system and tool used for risk analysis is the aforementioned Customs Risk Management System (CRMS). This EU system for sharing risk reports between the Member States allows the customs authorities and the Commission to cooperate and priority control areas and crises to be managed. This application is hosted on a dedicated, protected network and allows the Member States to exchange risk information in real time.    
The CRMS comprises various domains designed for different purposes:

-- RIF (Risk Information Form): for exchanging information received from all Member States on tax and non-tax frauds;

-CM (Crisis Management): crisis management dashboard (e.g. COVID, etc.);

-PCA (Priority Control Area): priority control areas determined by the European Commission;

-RMCS (Risk Management Collaboration Service): a collaboration request (CLR) is created when it is deemed necessary to request an action or some information to confirm the risk indicator or anomaly for a specific consignment, whether incoming, in transit or outgoing;

-PRCI (Platform of Risk and Control Information): where specific risk detection methods exist (X-Ray Risk Form, K9 ‘Canine’ Cases Form and Rummage Cases Form.

Platform members add other details on risks using messages and secure email. Further assistance in mitigating the risk of fraud comes from ‘reports’ and ‘searches’ on the platform concerning all types of infringements.
In the same year, the Anti-Fraud Directorate trialled an Excel spreadsheet for the LEA (Logic, Experience and Analysis) project, which gives concrete form to a risk matrix aimed at the development of predictive models by:

-using an overall set of information that can be derived from the databases available to the Agency concerning imports, exports, cash import declarations and citations for cash import infringements;

-obtaining open-source information concerning economic studies, statistical publications, etc., so as to analyse potential inconsistencies (concerning individual persons or general categories of ATECO code or business/goods sector) in the relationship between cross-border movements of cash and the income declared by the offender or the person engaged in transit.

The risk matrix was used in 2023 in relation to various reports sent to the national financial intelligence unit (FIU) in order to prevent and combat money laundering linked to tax evasion and/or other serious tax and non-tax offences potentially involving cross-border movements of cash. The trialling of the LEA project led to dozens of reports also being sent to the Public Prosecutor’s Office’s Anti-Mafia and Anti-Terrorism Directorate and the local offices of the Customs and Monopolies Agency responsible for border crossings in order for targeted checks to be carried out on movements of cash and goods deemed to pose a risk of tax evasion, customs infringements linked to the taxable amount (under-invoicing or over-invoicing), infringements linked to the nature, quantity and origin of the goods declared for import and export, and money laundering.    
Work is also being done to deploy the LEA model for the purposes of applying Article 7 of Regulation (EU) 2018/1672 and thus temporarily detaining cash that is moved cross-border in a suspicious manner.    
Again with regard to budget revenue, and specifically VAT, the Revenue Agency has taken specific steps to prevent losses to the exchequer as a result of intra-EU VAT fraud by ensuring that national entities that commit VAT evasion by operating as shell companies in fraudulent schemes (‘missing traders’ or ‘defaulters’) have their VAT number swiftly cancelled or are excluded from VIES (VAT Information Exchange System) pursuant to Article 35(15-bis) of Presidential Decree No 633/1972 and the new paragraphs 15-bis-1 and 15-bis-2 (introduced with effect from 1 January 2023).
In this context, particular emphasis was placed on data from electronic invoices issued and received and on some innovative tools for cooperation with other European countries. With regard to the database of electronic invoicing data, since 2023 it has been possible to access, under certain conditions, specific data concerning the goods to which invoices relate. This allows for more detailed control and monitoring of the transactions carried out by high-risk entities.    
The TNA (Transaction Network Analysis) tool developed by the European Commission for Eurofisc purposes continues to make a particularly important contribution. It makes it possible to obtain information from the VIES of all EU Member States and analyse that information in one go. Intensive work continues to fight VAT fraud committed through the submission of false letters of intent. The entities posing the highest risk were identified thanks to timely analysis of all declarations of intent sent and, once irregularities were proven, formal notices were issued, and warning letters were sent to the sellers so as to stop the flow of fraudulent invoices and prevent further losses to the exchequer. The extent of the phenomenon has reduced significantly in the fuel sector thanks to the introduction of Article 6 of Decree-Law No 124/2019, and the sectors most affected are the clothing and clothing accessories sectors.    
The intention for the coming years is to strengthen the activities described above by stepping up risk analysis activities, including new AI and machine learning tools. In terms of technology, a new anti-fraud analysis tool, TAXNET, is fully operational. Through the interoperability of various databases (electronic invoices, declaration data, personal data, bank transfers, VIES, etc.), it makes it possible to automatically reconstruct the entire fraud chain and rapidly map the links and recurrent connections between the various entities (natural and/or legal persons) involved in fraudulent transactions.    
With regard to budget expenditure, risk assessment in relation to cohesion policy funding is one of the main control functions of the various managing authorities. The MAs widely apply EGESIF Guidance Note No 14-0021-00 issued by the European Commission on 16 June 2014 and concerning ‘Fraud Risk Assessment and Effective and Proportionate Anti-Fraud Measures’ and extensively use Arachne.    
The Arachne risk assessment system was developed by the European Commission to help Member States prevent fraud. It processes and analyses the data provided by EU countries on beneficiaries, contractors and other project stakeholders and carries out cross-checks between that data and information from external databases on undertakings and linked persons, making it possible to identify projects, beneficiaries and contractors posing a fraud risk.    
Originally developed for the cohesion policy, the tool was extended to the CAP via a pilot project launched in February 2019 for rural development projects. Various national administrations expressed the need to have uniform national guidance on how to use Arachne as a tool to improve the identification, prevention and detection of fraud, in line with the requirements of their respective management and control systems. To answer this need, the administrations were notified of the establishment of a technical working group for this purpose chaired by the Inspectorate-General for Financial Relations with the European Union at the State General Accounting Department, which comes under the Ministry of Economic Affairs and Finance, and made up of representatives of several managing authorities and audit authorities for ERDF and ESF operational programmes 2014-2020, the Agency for Territorial Cohesion and the National Agency for Active Labour Market Policy.    
That working group, which was established by Decision of the Head of the State General Accounting Department of 18 January 2019, drew up the ‘National guidelines for using the EU anti-fraud system Arachne’. Aimed at managing authorities, certification authorities, audit authorities and the intermediate bodies of operational programmes, those guidelines provide specific guidance on how the use the tool so as to help ensure compliance with anti-fraud legislation.    
In relation to their respective management and control systems, each administration, on the basis of its internal organisation, structural staffing level, and verification and oversight requirements, was able to choose the administrative stages at which the system would be used, in line with the existing specifications of EGESIF Guidance Note No 14-0021-00 of 16 June 2014.    
At central level, as part of its role of coordinating authorities and audit functions, the Inspectorate‑General for Financial Relations with the European Union (IGRUE) (part of the State General Accounting Department, which comes under the Ministry of Economic Affairs and Finance) issued its own Handbook of Audit Procedures 2021-2027 of 29 February 2024, which includes a specific section on risk assessment.    
In this context, IGRUE has developed a national risk assessment methodology, available on the MyAudit information system, which has a greater level of detail, and some differences compared to the methodology set out in the aforementioned EGESIF Guidance Note, especially as regards the method for calculating the risk score.    
IGRUE is also responsible for managing the Single Database (BDU), which contains all information on the planning and implementation of measures financed with regional policy funding from EU and national sources.    
The Guardia di Finanza has economic/financial police functions that cover all types of infringement against the national and European budget, and as a result it carries out risk analysis and assessment activities in respect of both revenue and expenditure.    
In order to combat VAT fraud, the Special Unit for Protecting Revenue and Combatting Tax Fraud conducts ongoing risk analysis to identify undertakings presumed to be involved in fraudulent schemes and then charges the force’s local departments with carrying out the necessary investigations.    
This analysis is based, firstly, on an examination of information from the Eurofisc network, as part of which the aforementioned TNA platform has been running since 2021. This makes it possible to use advanced analysis tools to rapidly and specifically identify potential cases of intra‑EU VAT fraud.    
This information is cross-checked against search results from the many databases to which the Guardia di Finanza has access, including:

-the STAF (Anti-Fraud Tool) application, which ensures effective monitoring of VAT‑registered taxpayers so as to promptly identify entities involved in tax fraud and assign a risk score to each of them;

-- the Invoices and Payments portal and the @-Fattura [@-Invoice] application, which allow targeted and integrated analysis of electronic invoice data;

-- the EMCS-eAD Dogane [Customs] and COGNOS - Dogane e Accise [Customs and Excise] applications, which make it possible to monitor the circulation of products subject to excise duty and operators in the sector. These applications are particularly useful in the fight against VAT fraud relating to fuels;

-- COGNOS - area Analisi libera Italia [Italy free analysis area], a partition of the ‘Customs declarations’ section of the COGNOS business intelligence platform, which makes it possible to carry out multidimensional processing using historical customs declaration data concerning the month preceding the query. It is especially useful for selecting entities for post-clearance customs controls, for conducting any subsequent in-depth investigations and for carrying out any other investigative activities requiring the reconstruction of international trade flows, including from past periods.

Further specific analyses have been developed by the Special Unit for Protecting Revenue and Combatting Tax Fraud so as to combat undue offsetting and fraud in the assignment to third parties of building and energy tax credits, including the ‘110% Superbonus’ scheme co-financed by the National Recovery and Resilience Plan (NRRP). Some of the main applications used for this are:

-P. Ris. M.A. - Collections, Monitoring and Applications Portal, which allows precise consultation of taxpayers’ subsidised tax credits and data on assignments of credits to third parties;

-Moni. C. - Monitoring of Offsetting, which allows both individual and bulk searches to be carried out by processing the data from F24 tax payment forms to detect undue offsetting of tax credits.

Another key tool for risk analysis in the area of tax is the record of accounts with financial institutions, which is linked to the Revenue Agency’s Tax Register.
The record of accounts with financial institutions is organised on the basis of the tax code of each person holding an account. Every month, financial institutions send data concerning accounts and non-account transactions (transactions carried out directly at the bank counter using bank drafts or cash) and personal data on the persons linked to the account, specifying their role.    
Every year, meanwhile, financial institutions send data on account balances, both the opening balance as of 1 January and the closing balance as of 31 December of the year to which the communication relates, or, for accounts closed during the year, the opening balance and the balance booked prior to the date of closure. Also sent are the total values of movements, broken down into debits and credits, the annual average deposits held in bank and post office deposit and current accounts, and other accounting data for other types of account.    
For particular types of accounts with banks or other financial institutions, there is a requirement to send further data in addition to the data on deposits and annual flows. For example, for safe deposit boxes, the bank must report how many times the taxpayer accessed the box during the year.    
The financial institutions required to send periodic reports to the record of accounts with financial institutions belong to various different categories, with the main ones being banks, the Italian post office, mutual guarantee societies and cooperatives, investment companies, collective investment undertakings (CIUs and SICAVs), asset management companies (AMCs), trusts, and insurance companies and institutions as regards their financial activities.
The record of accounts with financial institutions is currently used for financial investigations, to draw up selective lists for tax evasion risk analysis and for the checks and controls carried out for the purposes of the ISEE (Equivalent Economic Situation Indicator). Recently, revenue collection agents have made increased use of the data in the record of accounts with financial institutions in procedures to enforce attachment orders against third parties, since it is debtors’ bank accounts that are attached.    
As regards digitalisation and the use of new tools aimed at improving interoperability between systems in the fight against customs fraud, the Customs Agency has launched a project to digitalise the customs procedures for loading/unloading and entry/exit from ports.
During the development of this initiative, which is already in operation at the port of Bari and is being gradually extended to other ports (Ancona, Livorno and Venice), the MRN (Movement Reference Number) has been entered in each customs declaration processed by the competent offices. This is a unique identifier created by the customs systems when a declaration is submitted for the import, export or internal/external transit of goods. It makes it possible to identify, at any moment, the consignment with which the declaration is associated. The identifier is also available in a live environment in AIDA (Integrated Customs and Excise Automation).    
This new development simplifies operations at customs posts, as the Guardia di Finanza officers responsible for affixing the ‘exit stamp’ can read the barcodes on customs declarations using e.g. optical readers and thus access information on the consignment more quickly.    
In relation to public expenditure, a memorandum of understanding has been signed with the State General Accounting Department at the Ministry of Economic Affairs and Finance with the aim of regulating cooperation on making data available, establishing suitable access procedures and ensuring interoperability of information systems. In this context, a Technical Committee has been set up to determine the arrangements for implementing the agreement.    The application envisaged by the agreement encompasses:

-the Guardia di Finanza dashboard in BDAP (Database of the Public Administration), which is a single standardised and streamlined tool for surveying, measuring and analysing the public finances. It makes it possible to carry out precise searches for data on payments made by the central administrations to the beneficiary concerned, in the financial years selected, with the data then being further processed using predefined ‘analysis contexts’;

-the aforementioned BDU-IGRUE, the Single Database of the General Inspectorate for Relations with the European Union at the State General Accounts Department, which collates data on the payments made under the operational programmes financed by the structural funds. This data is used by the Guardia di Finanza to populate the Anti-Fraud Information System (SIAF) discussed below;

-ReGiS, the platform that all parties involved (central administrations and implementing bodies) must use for management, reporting, control and monitoring activities linked to NRRP initiatives.

To make the prevention and combatting of fraud against EU budget expenditure more effective, the Special Unit for Public Expenditure and Combatting Fraud against the European Union handled the evolutionary maintenance of SIAF (Anti-Fraud Information System), which was created as part of a project financed under the National Operational Programme ‘Governance’ and Technical Assistance 2007-2013.    
SIAF is a business intelligence platform that supports operational analyses in the field of public expenditure. By collating the information obtained, including from the other databases used by the Guardia di Finanza, it is possible to extract lists of public funding beneficiaries potentially posing a risk of irregularities.

With specific reference to the NRRP, the Guardia di Finanza’s Special Unit for Public Expenditure and Combatting Fraud against the European Union, with the support of the Guardia di Finanza Unit at the Department for European Affairs at the Prime Minister’s Office, which acts as Technical Secretariat of COLAF, has prepared detailed checklists with specific risk indicators separately applicable to the disbursement of support or the performance of public works and the provision of services. Through the Network of NRRP Anti-Fraud Contact Persons established alongside the Coordination Committee for NRRP Reporting and Control by Decision No 57 of 9 March 2022, and through the ReGiS system developed by the State General Accounting Department, these checklists have been made available to all central and local administrations responsible for measures and to the implementing bodies involved in the implementation of the Plan, thus enabling those entities to improve their independent capacity to identify anomalous situations requiring further investigation.    
An important new development in the measures taken by Italy to strengthen risk analysis in the management of EU funds is the Integrated Anti-Fraud Platform (PIAF-IT) developed by the General State Accounting Department in cooperation with COLAF and cofinanced by the European Commission (OLAF) with Hercule III funding. Specifically, PIAF-IT is an integration platform that extracts, aggregates and reconciles data from national sources (Revenue Agency, the Chamber of Commerce Information System (Infocamere), Court of Auditors) and EU sources (the Irregularity Management System (IMS), which directly comes under OLAF, and the Financial Transparency System (FTS), which is managed by the European Commission’s DG Budget in relation to beneficiaries of funds under direct management) to generate factsheets on natural or legal persons, providing a useful input for assessments of possible fraud. Its aim is to:

-intensify information exchange and thus strengthen the ‘fraud prevention’ stage as far as possible;

-centralise and make visible all key information on beneficiaries of EU public funding;

-develop specific outputs for analysing that information through a comparison against data in other databases via a search on a single information system, in an aggregated manner and without having to make several separate searches.

The platform is used as an effective tool supporting Arachne with the aim of consolidating and strengthening the fight against irregularities, fraud and other illegal activities against the EU budget both before expenditure is certified and during the ex-post control stage, as well as during administrative checks on implementation of the National Recovery and Resilience Plan.
The technical context of PIAF-IT, which includes a microservices architecture able to store big data, has the following additional functionalities:

-it can be used to perform online searches (ordinary and historical views of natural or legal persons) and generate and display detailed factsheets;

-it is highly extensible in the future to other data sources that would allow the entry concerned to be examined in greater detail as regards the person/activity involved (e.g. the data from the Ministry of Justice’s Criminal Records Information System concerning past convictions for specific offences involving fraud against the national and EU budget, and the Kohesio database managed by the Commission’s DG REGIO, which has up-to-date information on projects and beneficiaries co-financed by the EU cohesion policy).

In addition, for 2024, in order to achieve ever-improved results in the fight against fraud, the Carabinieri confirmed the validity of its memorandum of understanding with AGEA (Agricultural Payments Agency). Under this memorandum, the fraud risk indicators for the CAP have been refined and the Criminal Focus Area dashboard has been further developed. Using aerial photographs, the dashboard records and analyses qualitative and quantitative changes in elements that point to criminal activity that hinders socio-economic development, identifying risk areas that require constant monitoring. The cooperation with AGEA is also making it possible to run a series of training events for all staff, enabling Carabinieri officers to deepen their knowledge of the new control tools being put in place by the Agency. In order to step up the fight against fraud, a licence to use the anti-fraud platform SAS was requested during a meeting with AGEA’s Anti-Fraud and Risk Management Office.
In 2024, the Cyber Investigation Section at the Operational Department of the Carabinieri Agri‑Food Protection Unit became operational with the aim of training and upskilling officers to be deployed against threats coming from new IT technologies and enabling the use of investigation techniques and digital tools to be made available to the Carabinieri to fight crime committed using IT equipment.

Member State

Response

IE

Ireland does not have a NAFS; each MA has their own anti-fraud strategy for the protection of EU funds.

DE

General comment: As a federal state, Germany does not have a national anti-fraud strategy.    
However, in this context, we would refer to Germany’s Digital Strategy 2022-2025, p. 51 et seq.    
(https://digitalstrategie-deutschland.de/static/fcf23bbf9736d543d02b79ccad34b729 /Digitalstrategie_Aktualisierung_25.04.2023.pdf + https://digitalstrategie-deutschland.de/ ).
Measures reported here have been taken at Länder level. Replies to Q 2.1 from the Länder (ERDF) range from ‘Not yet, but we intend/are in the process of developing this part of the strategy’ to ‘NO’.

Response

Frequency

Percentage

Member States

Difficulty in scaling digital solutions across the state

14

51.9%

HR, SE, BE, LT, CZ, ES, DE, BG, CY, EE, RO, PT, LV, IT

Lack of funding for digital tools

14

51.9%

HR, NL, EL, BE, FI, SI, CZ, ES, SK, DE, BG, EE, RO, LV

Legal or regulatory barriers

14

51.9%

SE, NL, BE, LT, CZ, ES, SK, PL, DE, CY, EE, RO, LV, IT

Limited technical expertise within your organisation

14

51.9%

LU, HR, SE, NL, EL, FI, CZ, ES, HU, SK, DE, BG, MT, RO

Insufficient training for the staff and digital tools and processes

8

29.6%

HR, NL, CZ, ES, SK, BG, RO, LV

Outdated IT systems

8

29.6%

LU, NL, EL, SI, CZ, ES, CY, RO

No steps taken to identify gaps in digitalisation

6

22.2%

IE, FR, AT, SI, RO, DK

Resistance to change from the staffs and stakeholders involved

5

18.5%

LU, HR, SE, CZ, BG

Cybersecurity vulnerabilities

2

7.4%

CZ, RO

Response

Frequency

Percentage

Member States

Training and development for staff

17

63.0%

SE, EL, BE, AT, FI, LT, SI, CZ, ES, HU, SK, DE, BG, MT, CY, RO, IT

Other (please specify)

9

33.3%

IE, SE, CZ, PL, MT, CY, EE, PT, DK

Conducted internal assessments or audits

8

29.6%

LU, EL, CZ, DE, EE, RO, DK, IT

Performed a gap analysis comparing the current capabilities with desired capabilities

8

29.6%

BE, SI, CZ, ES, SK, DE, RO, IT

No specific actions taken yet to address gaps

5

18.5%

HR, NL, FR, ES, LV

Secured budget for digital improvements

5

18.5%

SI, CZ, MT, CY, RO

Developed a detailed digitalisation strategy addressing identified gaps

3

11.1%

CZ, ES, SK

Hired external consultants or experts

3

11.1%

LU, EL, CZ

Member State

Response

IE

?

SE

There is ongoing cooperation with other authorities (the Swedish Agency for Economic and Regional Growth, the Migration Agency and the Swedish Board of Agriculture) owing to the lack of digital tools. Paving the way for future development, such as structured data based on data from applicants and introducing organisation registers that retrieve data from public databases. See also point 2.7.

CZ

Preparation of the complete digitalisation of administrative processes at prosecutorial level is ongoing.    
Links to external systems have been created (the Register of Beneficial Owners information system (ESM) and MS2021+, ARACHNE and MS2021+) and access has been ensured to the non-public part of the ESM and Register of Trust Funds information systems).    
Applications were procured for screening (CRIBIS) and using web interfaces for detecting fraud (such as double funding), use of the ESM. Information sharing has been expanded using cloud solutions.

PL

The Institution Coordinating the Partnership Agreement cooperates on an ongoing basis with national bodies external to the institutions of the management and control system in the transmission of information on entities and persons with links to those entities obtained from external registers managed by these institutions. Where required, the Institution Coordinating the Partnership Agreement concludes agreements on rules of cooperation with register-managing entities for the exchange of data necessary to carry out verifications in relation to the detection of conflicts of interest and the fight against irregularities and fraud.

MT

With reference to Question 2.4, notwithstanding that the Maltese AFCOS has limited technical IT expertise, it is being assisted by IMU within the Office of the Prime Minister. Furthermore, the co-ordination between the members of the Co-ordinating Committee facilitates knowledge sharing with respect to Information and Communication Technology (ICT).

CY

Steps are sectoral and there are no steps for mainstream programs.

EE

We have begun reviewing our monitoring system to map out our current needs and subsequently implement changes, including addressing the need to enhance the fight against fraud through increased digitalization. Additionally, we are exploring greater opportunities for cooperation with investigative bodies, which already have the necessary tools and expertise. Including we are using internal risk analysis capabilities and Arachne.

PT

Contacts with public administration bodies have been established to improve and extend the set of interoperability solutions available/to be made available.

DK

The Danish Business Authority: We have made a fraud-risk assessment.

Response

Frequency

Percentage

Member States

Action taken

10

37.0%

SE, LT, SI, CZ, PL, DE, BG, MT, RO, IT

Action planned

9

33.3%

LU, HR, FR, AT, ES, HU, SK, CY, LV

Action not taken nor foreseen

8

29.6%

IE, NL, EL, BE, FI, EE, PT, DK

Response

Frequency

Percentage

Member States

Action not taken nor foreseen

13

48.1%

IE, LU, HR, NL, EL, AT, FI, ES, PL, EE, PT, LV, DK

Action planned

9

33.3%

FR, BE, CZ, HU, SK, BG, MT, CY, RO

Action taken

5

18.5%

SE, LT, SI, DE, IT

Response

Frequency

Percentage

Member States

Action planned

11

40.7%

LU, HR, FR, FI, LT, ES, BG, MT, CY, RO, PT

Action taken

10

37.0%

SE, BE, SI, CZ, HU, SK, PL, DE, LV, IT

Action not taken nor foreseen

6

22.2%

IE, NL, EL, AT, EE, DK

Response

Frequency

Percentage

Member States

Action planned

11

40.7%

LU, NL, FR, BE, FI, LT, ES, DE, MT, RO, DK

Action not taken nor foreseen

9

33.3%

IE, HR, EL, AT, HU, BG, CY, EE, LV

Action taken

7

25.9%

SE, SI, CZ, SK, PL, PT, IT

Response

Frequency

Percentage

Member States

Action planned

16

59.3%

LU, NL, FR, AT, FI, LT, CZ, ES, SK, DE, BG, CY, EE, RO, LV, DK

Action taken

8

29.6%

SE, BE, SI, HU, PL, MT, PT, IT

Action not taken nor foreseen

3

11.1%

IE, HR, EL

Response

Frequency

Percentage

Member States

Action taken

14

51.9%

SE, NL, BE, LT, SI, CZ, HU, SK, PL, DE, CY, PT, LV, IT

Action planned

8

29.6%

LU, HR, FR, ES, BG, MT, EE, RO

Action not taken nor foreseen

5

18.5%

IE, EL, AT, FI, DK

Response

Frequency

Percentage

Member States

Action taken

18

66.7%

SE, NL, BE, AT, LT, SI, CZ, ES, HU, SK, PL, DE, MT, CY, EE, LV, DK, IT

Action planned

7

25.9%

LU, HR, FR, FI, BG, RO, PT

Action not taken nor foreseen

2

7.4%

IE, EL

Response

Frequency

Percentage

Member States

Action taken

17

63.0%

LU, SE, NL, BE, SI, CZ, HU, SK, PL, DE, MT, CY, EE, RO, LV, DK, IT

Action planned

7

25.9%

HR, FR, FI, LT, ES, BG, PT

Action not taken nor foreseen

3

11.1%

IE, EL, AT

Response

Frequency

Percentage

Member States

Action not taken nor foreseen

18

66.7%

IE, LU, HR, NL, FR, BE, AT, LT, ES, SK, PL, BG, MT, CY, PT, LV, DK, IT

Action taken

7

25.9%

SE, FI, SI, CZ, HU, DE, RO

Action planned

2

7.4%

EL, EE

Member State

Response

IE

There is no national anti-fraud strategy in place,

LU

In addition to the actions described above, one stakeholder is in process of engaging an external consultant in anti-fraud matters and plans to recruit an anti-fraud officer in 2025.

HR

No other action is taken nor foreseen.

SE

Paving the way for future development;    
1. Introducing an integrated organisation register in the My Application/Nyps aid case system that retrieves public data on the organisation. The payment method (bankgiro and plusgiro) of the applicant organisation is verified automatically through checks against external services.    
2. Reporting of data from the project in a structured way in My Application/Nyps.    
3. The structured data in Nyps has made it possible for us to check whether there is double reporting of certain costs in ERUF9. With the ProDiver analysis programme, which retrieves data from Nyps, we can systematically analyse data on personnel costs and actual costs and detect possible double funding.

NL

N/a

EL

Together with the AFCOS of Cyprus and the AFCOS of Bulgaria, the EYTHYPS is participating in the transnational project ‘Strengthening national anti-fraud strategies in the financial interests of the EU’, financed through the Technical Support Instrument (TSI) of the European Commission. The Directorate-General for Structural Reform Support (DG REFORM) of the European Commission is responsible and the OECD is the beneficiary. The project’s aim is ‘the improvement of national anti-fraud strategies and the development of a comprehensive methodology with clear procedures and indicators to support the monitoring, assessment and updating of national anti-fraud strategies, including capacity-building in relation to the use of the methodology’ and, specifically for Greece, the assessment of the National Anti-Fraud Strategy implemented in the ESPA, its updating and the development of a monitoring and assessment methodology.

BE

/

FI

Participation of national experts in the Commission’s expert groups dealing with digital tools to protect the EU budget.

SI

In this moment we plan no further actions as mentioned in Q.2.6.

CZ

Training of an expert team of data analysts, implementation of new AI tools, architecture of electronic risk analysis strategy, development of own risk-analysis tools.
A self-assessment system has been put in place in accordance with the Commission’s guidelines. Staff participate not only in training specialised in fraud and fraud prevention, but also, for example, in the use of artificial intelligence, including training abroad. Furthermore, the managing authority prepares annual reports and evaluates the checks carried out under the Fraud Prevention Directive.

HU

Providing training on the application of artificial intelligence in the institutional system for development policy, not yet linked to specific workflows.

DE

The Federal Ministry of Food and Agriculture (BMEL) under ‘Other’: Use of new databases (e.g. the Transparency Register).

BG

N/A

MT

Not applicable.

EE

Developing risk systems in Customs and Tax areas - we are taking risk models to next SAS platform,

RO

- AFIR: The Paying Agency for Rural Investments has international certification for the standard ISO 37001:2016, which is applicable to the anti-bribery management system.

- MIPE - DGMMRR: Training planned at the start of 2025 with the Arachne team, analysis and verification of the information in the EDES Database -     https://commission.europa.eu/strategy-and-policy/eu-budget/how-it-works/annual-lifecycle/implementation/anti-fraud-measures/edes/edes-database_en    

IT

As far as legislation is concerned, mention should be made of:
1) Law No 90/2024 laying down provisions on strengthening national cybersecurity and on cybercrime. The changes made by this law are linked to the second recommendation in the 2023 PIF report, namely, to accelerate the digitalisation of the fight against fraud, specifically by strengthening national bodies’ ‘cyber resilience’ measures and the tools for fighting cybercrime. Its provisions include, in particular:    

a) making penalties more severe and introducing aggravating circumstances for cyber offences (Articles 615-ter, 615-quater, 617-bis, 617-quater, 617-quinquies, 617-sexies of the Criminal Code);    
b) introducing, for cyber offences, the mitigating circumstance of particularly minor nature and cooperation; c) redefining the offence of damaging IT or electronic systems of public interest;    
d) coordinating with the new provisions on extending the end dates of investigations and on maximum duration;    
e) extending to cybercrime the coordination role of the National Anti-Mafia and Anti‑Terrorism Prosecutor, the provisions on state witnesses and criminals who turn state’s evidence and the provisions on wiretapping for organised crime offences;    
f) extending corporate liability for cyber extorsion offences;    
1) Decree of the Minister for Justice of 15 March 2024 establishing the national register of reports, documents and recordings of wiretaps carried out in proceedings in which the European Public Prosecutor’s Office has exercised its power and any other documents related thereto. This provides for the units of the European Public Prosecutor’s Office to use the recently established inter-district digital infrastructure to save all conversations and communications recorded with Public Prosecution Office equipment used to investigate the offences referred to in the PIF Directive.    
Also, on the issue of accelerating the process of digitalising the fight against fraud, the Department for Technological Innovation (DIT) at the Ministry of Justice has stated that:

-the digitalisation of the fight against fraud has been ensured by structured monitoring of data on PIF offences using the applications made available to Italian law enforcement authorities (NDR), lawyers (PDP) and prosecutors/judges (REGEWEB and APP);

-the difficulties in rolling out digital solutions nationwide have been remedied by staff training and development;

-so as to keep pace with the development of new technologies used to commit fraud, the action taken has been to draw up an in-depth inventory of the existing digital tools and technologies used in the fight against fraud, and to assess and update the existing IT tools and develop new bespoke IT tools;

-the planned actions consist in making the systems already in use more interoperable so as to improve data sharing and staff training.

Specifically, the creation of the criminal law data lake via the central applications of the Italian electronic criminal-law process (NDR, PDP and ADP) will make it possible to improve and broaden the quality of the data and, as a result, the activities of prevention, investigation and punishment.    
In addition, particular importance has been placed on the inventory of existing digital tools and technologies used in the fight against fraud, the setting up of a special task force, staff training and the assessment of risk analyses.    
Utmost importance has also been placed on comparative analysis of new trends, with comparative research into the new technologies used in the fight against fraud, and on how to make the systems already in use more interoperable so as to improve data sharing.
Also in use are (integrated) automated data analysis tools, database integration and cybersecurity measures.    
Also planned are a system for managing fraud cases, data sharing between agencies and automation of information exchange.

Response

Frequency

Percentage

Member States

Important

14

51.9%

LU, HR, SE, NL, BE, LT, SI, CZ, HU, SK, DE, BG, CY, EE

Very important

7

25.9%

FR, ES, PL, MT, RO, LV, IT

No opinion

3

11.1%

IE, EL, AT

Neutral