In the light of the foregoing, the association argues that the interpretation of last limb of the fourth paragraph of Article 263, given by the General Court in the contested order is manifestly contrary to Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights ('Everyone whose rights and freedoms guaranteed by the law of the Union are violated has the right to an effective remedy before a tribunal in compliance with the conditions laid down in this Article. Everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing …') and Articles 6 (Right to a fair trial) and 13 (Right to an effective remedy) of the European Convention on Human Rights, thereby hindering the possibility of bringing an action before the General Court on account of direct concern in such a scenario, and causing unjustified harm to the system of protection of rights enshrined in EU law.

Form of order sought

Associazione GranoSalus claims that the Court should annul the order of the General Court of 15 February 2019 in Case T-125/18, by which it declared the action inadmissible and that the members of the association did not have standing to bring proceedings by reason, first, of the alleged absence of individual effects of the contested regulation on the latter and, second, the existence of national implementing measures also excluding direct concern — and accordingly declare admissible the application seeking annulment of Implementing Regulation (EU) 2017/2324 and the requests for measures formulated therein, including measures of inquiry, and refer the case back to the General Court for a ruling on the substantive grounds of appeal.

Request for a preliminary ruling from the Grondwettelijk Hof (Belgium) lodged on 18 April 2019 — Centraal Israëlitisch Consistorie van België and Others, Unie Moskeeën Antwerpen VZW and Islamitisch Offerfeest Antwerpen VZW, JG and KH, Executief van de Moslims van België and Others, Coördinatie Comité van Joodse Organisaties van België. Section belge du Congrès juif mondial et Congrès juif européen VZW and Others, intervening parties: LI, Vlaamse regering, Waalse regering, Kosher Poultry BVBA and Others and Centraal Israëlitisch Consistorie van België and Others, Global Action in the Interest of Animals VZW (GAIA)

(Case C-336/19)

(2019/C 270/16)

Language of the case: Dutch

Referring court

Grondwettelijk Hof

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicants: Centraal Israëlitisch Consistorie van België and Others, Unie Moskeeën Antwerpen VZW, Islamitisch Offerfeest Antwerpen VZW, JG, KH, Executief van de Moslims van België and Others, Coördinatie Comité van Joodse Organisaties van België. Section belge du Congrès juif mondial et Congrès juif européen VZW and Others

Intervening parties: LI, Vlaamse regering, Waalse regering, Kosher Poultry BVBA and Others, Centraal Israëlitisch Consistorie van België and Others, Global Action in the Interest of Animals VZW (GAIA)

Questions referred

1. Should point (c) of the first subparagraph of Article 26(2) of Council Regulation (EC) No 1099/2009 ([1]) of 24 September 2009 on the protection of animals at the time of killing be interpreted as meaning that Member States are permitted, by way of derogation from the provision contained in Article 4(4) of that regulation and with a view to promoting animal welfare, to adopt rules such as those contained in the decreet van het Vlaamse Gewest van 7 juli 2017'houdende wijziging van de wet van 14 augustus 1986 betreffende de bescherming en het welzijn der dieren, wat de toegelaten methodes voor het slachten van dieren betreft' (Decree of the Flemish Region of 7 July 2017'amending the Law of 14 August 1986 on the protection and welfare of animals, regarding permitted methods of slaughtering animals'), rules which provide, on the one hand, for a prohibition of the slaughter of animals without stunning that also applies to the slaughter carried out in the context of a religious rite and, on the other hand, for an alternative stunning procedure for the slaughter carried out in the context of a religious rite, based on reversible stunning and on condition that the stunning should not result in the death of the animal?

2. If the first question referred for a preliminary ruling is to be answered in the affirmative, does point (c) of the first subparagraph of Article 26(2) of Regulation No 1099/2009, in the interpretation referred to in the first question, infringe Article 10(1) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union?

3. If the first question referred for a preliminary ruling is to be answered in the affirmative, does point (c) of the first subparagraph of Article 26(2) read in conjunction with Article 4(4) of Regulation No 1099/2009, in the interpretation referred to in the first question, infringe Articles 20, 21 and 22 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, since, in the case of the killing of animals by particular methods prescribed by religious rites, provision is only made for a conditional exception to the obligation to stun the animal (Article 4(4), read in conjunction with Article 26(2)), whereas in the case of the killing of animals during hunting and fishing and during sporting and cultural events, for the reasons stated in the recitals of the regulation, the relevant provisions stipulate that those activities do not fall within the scope of the regulation, or are not subject to the obligation to stun the animal when it is killed (Article 1(1), second subparagraph, and Article 1(3))?

(1) OJ 2009 L 303, p. 1.

Request for a preliminary ruling from the College van Beroep voor het bedrijfsleven (Netherlands) lodged on 3 May 2019 — Crown Van Gelder B.V. v Autoriteit Consument en Markt

(Case C-360/19)

(2019/C 270/17)

Language of the case: Dutch

Referring court

College van Beroep voor het bedrijfsleven

Parties to the main proceedings

Appellant: Crown Van Gelder B.V.

Respondent: Autoriteit Consument en Markt

Question referred

Must Article 37(11) of Directive 2009/72/EC (1) of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 July 2009 concerning common rules for the internal market in electricity and repealing Directive 2003/54/EC be interpreted as meaning that that provision also makes the right of complaint with regard to the operator of the national grid (transmission system operator) available to a party if that party has no connection to the grid of that national grid operator (transmission system operator) but has a connection only to a regional grid (distribution system) to which the transmission of electricity is interrupted as a result of a power cut on the national grid (transmission system) that feeds the regional grid (distribution system)?

(1) OJ 2009 L 211, p. 55.