

(2003/C 268 E/014)

**WRITTEN QUESTION P-2718/02**  
**by Rolf Linkohr (PSE) to the Commission**

(20 September 2002)

*Subject:* Assessment of blocks 1-4 of the Kozlodui nuclear power station

The Commission has reached a very harsh judgment in its assessment of the Kozlodui nuclear power station.

Why, in its assessment of blocks 1-4 of the Kozlodui nuclear power station, did the Commission not adhere to the conclusions of the International Atomic Energy Agency?

Did the Commission adopt different criteria than the IAEA? If so, why, and what are these criteria? Who established them? Who took the decision to use different criteria than the IAEA, and when?

Did the Commission take its decision on the basis of an expert report? If so, who were the experts?

**Joint answer**  
**to Written Questions E-2527/02 and P-2718/02**  
**given by Mr Verheugen on behalf of the Commission**

(29 October 2002)

In response to the question submitted by the Honourable Member, the Commission recalls that the G-7 Nuclear Safety Working Group qualified certain reactor types, namely those of RBMK and VVER 440/230 designs, as lacking safety-related design features, resulting in deviations that cannot be wholly overcome by upgrading measures.

The Commission recalls that Bulgaria committed itself, in the Understanding signed in 1999, to the early closure of units 1-2 of the Kozloduy NPP by the end of 2002 and to the closure of units 3-4 prior to their originally foreseen dates of 2008 and 2010 respectively. The Commission stated that it understood this to mean in 2006 at the latest. The demand for Bulgaria to commit to the early closure of Units 1-4 of the Kozloduy NPP is now part of the EU common negotiating position on the Energy Chapter adopted by the Member States as Negotiating Parties at the Accession Conference. Recently the Bulgarian Government announced that it intended to close units 3-4 in 2006, in line with the EU common position, and it requested a peer review of these units.

As regards the recent IAEA report on Kozloduy Units 3 and 4, this followed an IAEA expert mission, carried out from 24 to 28 June 2002. This mission complemented three previous IAEA missions in the design and operational areas, in order to assess all previous recommendations and suggestions made for Kozloduy NPP Units 3 and 4 including design safety, seismic safety and operational safety. In the majority of the operational issues the Safety Review Mission recognised meaningful improvements, revealing the aim of the Kozloduy management and staff to continuously improve operational safety. Both the review team and the Kozloduy NPP recognise that for many issues improvement is an evolving process and the present attitude towards safety modernisation needs to be kept alive in the future. Nevertheless, the Report does not address to what extent the original design deficiencies have been sufficiently compensated through results of the modernisation programme.

The Commission also recalls that it was under the auspices of the Council that a Report on Nuclear Safety in the Context of Enlargement was elaborated in June 2001<sup>(1)</sup>, followed by a Peer Review Status report in June 2002. Details of the Kozloduy NPP modernisation programme that has been going on in the last years were taken into consideration, and the report indicated that the current safety improvement programme on units 3-4 would help to limit original deviations and to ensure their operation during the period until their early closure. In both instances, the situation and developments regarding nuclear safety in candidate countries were undertaken by an ad-hoc formation of the Council Group on Atomic Questions, namely the Working Party on Nuclear Safety (WPNS). The Member States, as expressed in the

Council Report on Nuclear Safety in the Context of Enlargement, held the view that this evaluation exercise did 'not lead to any transfer of competencies from the Member States to the Community'. In this report, Member State experts confirmed the need for firm closure commitments in view of existing deviations from safety requirements and practices widely applied within the Union.

(<sup>1</sup>) <http://register.consilium.eu.int/pdf/en/01/st09/09181-a1en1.pdf>.

(2003/C 268 E/015)

**WRITTEN QUESTION E-2532/02**  
**by Paulo Casaca (PSE) to the Commission**

(11 September 2002)

*Subject:* Commission reports on Iranian opposition organisations

Can the Commission confirm that it drew up a report on 18 March this year entitled 'Commission report on the Iranian opposition group Mujahedin-e-Khalq'?

Did the Commission decide to invoke any of the exceptions mentioned in Article 4 of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001 (<sup>1</sup>)?

If not, can it say why it did not distribute the report electronically?

Can the Commission supply a copy of the report or, if not, explain why it cannot?

(<sup>1</sup>) OJ L 145, 31.5.2001, p. 43.

**Answer given by Mr Patten on behalf of the Commission**

(17 October 2002)

The Commission has not drawn up a written report on the subject of the 'Mujahedin-e-Khalq' (MKO). The issue of invoking any of the exceptions mentioned in Article 4 of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001 has not arisen.

The Commission was asked by the Committee on Foreign Affairs, Human Rights, Common Security and Defence Policy, to make an intervention on the subject MKO at its meeting of 19 March 2002. At this meeting a representative of the Commission gave a brief oral presentation which provided a general background for the debate on the MKO.

It is worth recalling that under the Common Position adopted by the Council on 27 December 2001 (<sup>1</sup>), the Council in its review of May 2002 decided to include the MKO on the list of organisations whose funds shall be frozen.

(<sup>1</sup>) OJ L 344, 28.12.2001.

(2003/C 268 E/016)

**WRITTEN QUESTION E-2786/02**  
**by Ulla Sandbæk (EDD) to the Commission**

(3 October 2002)

*Subject:* Sugar

1. Would the Commission provide a detailed assessment of the impact on trade flows from LDCs to the EU in the areas where tariffs were reduced under the Everything But Arms Initiative. The assessment should include trade flows one year before and at least one year after implementation of the Everything But Arms Initiative started. Finally, would the Commission state whether the impact on LDC trade flows is considered satisfactory?