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COUNCIL DECISION (CFSP) 2024/2643  
of 8 October 2024  
concerning restrictive measures in view of Russia’s destabilising activities  
(OJ L 2643, 9.10.2024, p. 1)

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**COUNCIL DECISION (CFSP) 2024/2643****of 8 October 2024****concerning restrictive measures in view of Russia's destabilising activities***Article 1*

1. Member States shall take the necessary measures to prevent the entry into, or transit through, their territories of natural persons, as listed in the Annex, who are:

- (a) responsible for, implementing, supporting, or benefitting from actions or policies by the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten democracy, the rule of law, stability or security in the Union or in one or several of its Member States, in an international organisation or in a third country, or which undermine or threaten the sovereignty or independence of one or several of its Member States, or of a third country, through any of the following actions:
  - (i) planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, or otherwise facilitating the obstruction or undermining of the democratic political process, including by obstructing or undermining the holding of elections or attempting to destabilise or overthrow the constitutional order;
  - (ii) planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting or otherwise facilitating violent demonstrations;
  - (iii) planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting or otherwise facilitating acts of violence, including activities to silence, intimidate, coerce, or exact reprisals against persons critical of the actions or policies of the Russian Federation;
  - (iv) planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting or otherwise facilitating the use of coordinated information manipulation and interference;
  - (v) planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting or otherwise facilitating any actions targeted at the functioning of democratic institutions, economic activities or services of public interest, including by unauthorised entry into the territory of a Member State, including its airspace, or aimed at interfering with, damaging or destroying, including through sabotage or malicious cyber activities as part of hybrid activities, critical infrastructure, including submarine infrastructure;
  - (vi) planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting or otherwise facilitating the instrumentalisation of migrants as referred to in Article 1(4), point (b), of Regulation (EU) 2024/1359;
  - (vii) exploiting an armed conflict, instability or insecurity, including through the illicit exploitation or trade of natural resources and wildlife in a third country;

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- (viii) instigating or facilitating an armed conflict in a third country;
  - (b) associated with the natural persons listed under point (a);
  - (c) supporting the natural persons engaged in activities referred to in point (a).
2. Paragraph 1 shall not oblige a Member State to refuse its own nationals entry into its territory.
3. Paragraph 1 shall be without prejudice to cases in which a Member State is bound by an obligation of international law, namely:
- (a) as a host country to an international intergovernmental organisation;
  - (b) as a host country to an international conference convened by, or under the auspices of the United Nations (UN);
  - (c) under a multilateral agreement conferring privileges and immunities; or
  - (d) under the 1929 Treaty of Conciliation (Lateran pact) concluded by the Holy See (State of the Vatican City) and Italy.
4. Paragraph 3 shall also apply where a Member State is host country to the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE).
5. The Council shall be duly informed in all cases where a Member State grants an exemption pursuant to paragraph 3 or 4.
6. Member States may grant exemptions from the measures imposed under paragraph 1 where travel is justified on the grounds of urgent humanitarian need, or on grounds of attending intergovernmental meetings, or those promoted or hosted by the Union or hosted by a Member State holding the Chairmanship in office of the OSCE, where a political dialogue is conducted that directly promotes the policy objectives of those measures.
7. Member States may also grant exemptions from the measures imposed under paragraph 1 where entry or transit is necessary for the fulfilment of a judicial process, including surrender and extradition procedures.
8. A Member State wishing to grant the exemptions referred to in paragraph 6 or 7 shall notify the Council in writing. An exemption shall be deemed to be granted unless one or more of the Council members raises an objection in writing within 2 working days of receiving notification of the proposed exemption. Should one or more of the Council members raise an objection, the Council, acting by qualified majority, may decide to grant the proposed exemption.

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9. Where, pursuant to paragraph 3, 4, 6, 7 or 8, a Member State authorises the entry into, or transit through its territory of a person listed in the Annex, that authorisation shall be limited to the purpose for which it is given to the person concerned therewith.

*Article 2*

1. All funds and economic resources belonging to, owned, held or controlled by natural or legal persons, entities or bodies that are:

(a) responsible for, implementing, supporting, or benefitting from actions or policies by the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten democracy, the rule of law, stability or security in the Union, or in one or more of its Member States, in an international organisation or in a third country, or which undermine or threaten the sovereignty or independence of one or several of its Member States, or of a third country, through any of the following actions:

(i) planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, or otherwise facilitating the obstruction or undermining of the democratic political process, including by obstructing or undermining the holding of elections or attempting to destabilise or overthrow the constitutional order;

(ii) planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting or otherwise facilitating violent demonstrations;

(iii) planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting or otherwise facilitating acts of violence, including activities to silence, intimidate, coerce, or exact reprisals against persons critical of the actions or policies of the Russian Federation;

(iv) planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting or otherwise facilitating the use of coordinated information manipulation and interference;

(v) planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting or otherwise facilitating any actions targeted at the functioning of democratic institutions, economic activities or services of public interest, including by unauthorized entry into the territory of a Member State, including its airspace, or aimed at interfering with, damaging or destroying, including through sabotage or malicious cyber activities as part of hybrid activities, critical infrastructure, including submarine infrastructure;

(vi) planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting or otherwise facilitating the instrumentalisation of migrants as referred to in Article 1(4), point (b), of Regulation (EU) 2024/1359;

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- (vii) exploiting an armed conflict, instability or insecurity, including through the illicit exploitation or trade of natural resources and wildlife in a third country;
- (viii) instigating or facilitating an armed conflict in a third country;
- (b) associated with the natural or legal persons, entities or bodies listed under point (a);
- (c) supporting the natural or legal persons, entities or bodies engaged in activities referred to point (a);

as listed in the Annex, shall be frozen.

2. No funds or economic resources shall be made available, directly or indirectly, to or for the benefit of natural or legal persons, entities or bodies listed in the Annex.

3. By way of derogation from paragraphs 1 and 2, the competent authorities of the Member States may authorise the release of certain frozen funds or economic resources, or the making available of certain funds or economic resources, under such conditions as they deem appropriate, after having determined that the funds or economic resources concerned are:

- (a) necessary to satisfy the basic needs of the persons listed in the Annex and their dependent family members, including payments for foodstuffs, rent or mortgage, medicines and medical treatment, taxes, insurance premiums, and public utility charges;
- (b) intended exclusively for the payment of reasonable professional fees and the reimbursement of incurred expenses associated with the provision of legal services;
- (c) intended exclusively for the payment of fees or service charges for the routine holding or maintenance of frozen funds or economic resources;
- (d) necessary for extraordinary expenses, provided that the competent authority has notified the competent authorities of the other Member States and the Commission of the grounds on which it considers that a specific authorisation should be granted, at least 2 weeks prior to the authorisation;
- (e) to be paid into or from an account of a diplomatic mission or consular post or an international organisation enjoying immunities in accordance with international law, insofar as such payments are intended to be used for official purposes of the diplomatic mission or consular post or international organisation;

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- (f) necessary for the functioning of diplomatic and consular representations of the Union and of the Member States or partner countries in Russia, including delegations, embassies and missions, or international organisations in Russia enjoying immunities in accordance with international law; or
- (g) necessary for the provision of electronic communication services by Union telecommunication operators, and for the provision of associated facilities and services necessary for the operation, maintenance and security of such electronic communication services.

4. The Member State concerned shall inform the other Member States and the Commission of any authorisation granted under paragraph 3 within 2 weeks of that authorisation.

5. By way of derogation from paragraph 1, the competent authorities of the Member States may authorise the release of certain frozen funds or economic resources, provided that the following conditions are met:

- (a) the funds or economic resources are the subject of an arbitral decision rendered prior to the date on which the person, entity or body referred to in paragraph 1 was listed in the Annex, or of a judicial or administrative decision rendered in the Union, or a judicial decision enforceable in the Member State concerned, prior to or after that date;
- (b) the funds or economic resources will be used exclusively to satisfy claims secured by such a decision or recognised as valid in such a decision, within the limits set by applicable laws and regulations governing the rights of persons having such claims;
- (c) the decision is not for the benefit of a natural or legal person, entity or body listed in the Annex; and
- (d) recognition of the decision is not contrary to public policy in the Member State concerned.

6. The Member State concerned shall inform the other Member States and the Commission of any authorisations granted under paragraph 5 within 2 weeks of that authorisation.

7. Paragraph 1 shall not prevent a listed natural or legal person, entity or body from making a payment due under a contract entered into prior to the date on which such natural or legal person, entity or body was listed in the Annex, provided that the Member State concerned has determined that the payment is not, directly or indirectly, received by a natural or legal person, entity or body referred to in paragraph 1.

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8. Paragraph 2 shall not apply to the addition to frozen accounts of:

- (a) interest or other earnings on those accounts;
- (b) payments due under contracts, agreements or obligations that were concluded or arose prior to the date on which those accounts became subject to the measures provided for in paragraphs 1 and 2; or
- (c) payments due under judicial, administrative or arbitral decisions rendered in the Union or enforceable in the Member State concerned;

provided that any such interest, other earnings and payments remain subject to the measures provided for in paragraph 1.

### *Article 3*

1. Article 2(1) and (2) shall not apply to the provision, processing or payment of funds, other financial assets or economic resources or to the provision of goods and services which are necessary to ensure the timely delivery of humanitarian assistance or to support other activities that support basic human needs where such assistance and other activities are carried out by:

- (a) the UN, including its programmes, funds and other entities and bodies, as well as its specialised agencies and related organisations;
- (b) international organisations;
- (c) humanitarian organisations having observer status with the UN General Assembly and members of those humanitarian organisations;
- (d) bilaterally or multilaterally funded non-governmental organisations participating in UN Humanitarian Response Plans, UN Refugee Response Plans, other UN appeals or humanitarian clusters coordinated by the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs;
- (e) organisations and agencies to which the Union has granted the Humanitarian Partnership Certificate or which are certified or recognised by a Member State in accordance with national procedures;
- (f) Member States' specialised agencies; or
- (g) employees, grantees, subsidiaries, or implementing partners of the entities referred to in points (a) to (f) while and to the extent that they are acting in those capacities.

2. The exemption set out in paragraph 1 shall not apply to the natural or legal persons, entities or bodies identified with an asterisk in the Annex.

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3. Without prejudice to paragraph 1, and by way of derogation from Article 2(1) and (2), the competent authorities of a Member State may authorise the release of certain frozen funds or economic resources, or the making available of certain funds or economic resources, under such conditions as they deem appropriate, after having determined that the provision of such funds or economic resources is necessary to ensure the timely delivery of humanitarian assistance or to support other activities that support basic human needs.

4. In the absence of a negative decision, a request for information or a notification for additional time from the relevant competent authority within 5 working days of the date of receipt of a request for authorisation under paragraph 1, that authorisation shall be considered granted.

5. The Member State concerned shall inform the other Member States and the Commission of any authorisation granted under this Article within 4 weeks of such authorisation.

*Article 4*

1. The Council, acting by unanimity upon a proposal from a Member State or the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (the ‘High Representative’), shall decide to establish and amend the list in the Annex.

2. The Council shall communicate a decision pursuant to paragraph 1, including the grounds for the listing, to the natural or legal person, entity or body concerned, either directly, if the address is known, or through the publication of a notice in the *Official Journal of the European Union*, providing such natural or legal person, entity or body with an opportunity to present observations.

3. Where observations are submitted, or where substantial new evidence is presented, the Council shall review the decision pursuant to paragraph 1 and inform the natural or legal person, entity or body concerned accordingly.

*Article 5*

1. The Annex shall include the grounds for listing the natural and legal persons, entities and bodies referred to in Articles 1 and 2.

2. The Annex shall contain, where available, the information necessary to identify the natural or legal persons, entities or bodies concerned. With regard to natural persons, such information may include: names and aliases; date and place of birth; nationality; passport and identity card numbers; gender; address, if known; and function or profession. With regard to legal persons, entities or bodies, such information may include: names; place and date of registration; registration number; and place of business.



**▼B***Article 6*

1. The Council and the High Representative may process personal data in order to carry out their tasks under this Decision, in particular:

- (a) as regards the Council, for preparing and making amendments to the Annex;
- (b) as regards the High Representative, for preparing amendments to the Annex.

2. The Council and the High Representative may process, where applicable, relevant data relating to criminal offences committed by listed natural persons, to criminal convictions of such persons or to security measures concerning such persons, only to the extent that such processing is necessary for the preparation of the Annex.

3. For the purposes of this Decision, the Council and the High Representative are designated as ‘controllers’ within the meaning of Article 3, point (8), of Regulation (EU) 2018/1725 of the European Parliament and of the Council<sup>(1)</sup>, in order to ensure that the natural persons concerned can exercise their rights under that Regulation.

*Article 7*

1. No claims in connection with any contract or transaction the performance of which has been affected, directly or indirectly, in whole or in part, by the measures imposed under this Decision, including claims for indemnity or any other claim of this type, such as a claim for compensation or a claim under a guarantee, in particular a claim for extension or payment of a bond, guarantee or indemnity, in particular a financial guarantee or financial indemnity, of whatever form, shall be satisfied, if they are made by:

- (a) natural or legal persons, entities or bodies listed in the Annex;
- (b) any natural or legal person, entity or body acting through or on behalf of one of the natural or legal persons, entities or bodies referred to in point (a).

2. In any proceedings for the enforcement of a claim, the onus of proving that satisfying the claim is not prohibited by paragraph 1 shall be on the natural or legal person, group, entity or body seeking the enforcement of that claim.

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<sup>(1)</sup> Regulation (EU) 2018/1725 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 October 2018 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data by the Union institutions, bodies, offices and agencies and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Regulation (EC) No 45/2001 and Decision No 1247/2002/EC (OJ L 295, 21.11.2018, p. 39).

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3. This Article is without prejudice to the right of the natural or legal persons, groups, entities and bodies referred to in paragraph 1 to judicial review of the legality of the non-performance of contractual obligations in accordance with this Decision.

*Article 8*

It shall be prohibited to participate, knowingly or intentionally, in activities the object or effect of which is to circumvent the prohibitions set out in this Decision, including by participating in such activities without deliberately seeking that object or effect but being aware that the participation may have that object or effect and accepting that possibility.

*Article 9*

In order to maximise the impact of the measures set out in this Decision, the Union shall encourage third States to adopt restrictive measures similar to those provided for in this Decision.

*Article 10*

This Decision shall apply until 9 October 2025.

This Decision shall be kept under constant review. It shall be renewed or amended, as appropriate, if the Council deems that its objectives have not been met.

The exceptions referred to in Article 3, as regards Article 2(1) and (2), shall be reviewed at regular intervals and at least every 12 months or at the urgent request of any Member State, of the High Representative or of the Commission following a fundamental change in circumstances.

*Article 11*

This Decision shall enter into force on the day following that of its publication in the *Official Journal of the European Union*.

List of natural and legal persons, entities and bodies referred to in Articles 1(1) and 2(1)

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A. Natural persons

	Name	Identifying information	Statement of Reasons	Date of listing
1.	Artem Sergeevich KUREEV (Russian: Артём Сергеевич КУРЕЕВ)	Officer of the 5th Service of the Federal Security Service, Editor-in-chief of the ‘African Initiative’, Founder of ‘Rusafro’ DOB: 24.10.1980 POB: USSR (now Russian Federation) Nationality: Russian Gender: male Passport number: 4002209800 Tax Identification Number (INN): 782500167259	Artem Sergeevich Kureev is a Russian Federal Security Service officer involved in malign activities, namely coordinated disinformation campaigns, both in Europe and Africa. He conducts influence campaigns in Europe, including by organising the dissemination of articles in Russian and their English translations on proxy websites and making payments for the publication of pro-Russian articles, with the aim of spreading Russian disinformation in Europe. He founded two media outlets in Africa and conducted deliberate disinformation campaigns aiming at undermining Western health projects in Africa by spreading conspiracy theories such as the alleged use of Africa for biological warfare experiments and illicit trials of various drugs by Western pharmaceutical companies.  Therefore, Artem Sergeevich Kureev is implementing actions or policies by the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten stability or security in the Union or in third countries by planning and directing the use of coordinated information manipulation and interference.	16.12.2024
2.	Nikolai Aleksandrovich TUPIKIN (Russian: Николай Александрович ТУПИКИН)	Executive director of the Structura National Technologies a.k.a. GK Struktura POB: USSR (now Russian Federation) Nationality: Russian Gender: male Tax Identification Number (INN): 773402066160	Nikolai Aleksandrovich Tupikin is the head and founder of Structura National Technologies (GK Struktura). The company has been involved in the so-called ‘Doppelganger’ campaign, a Russian-led digital disinformation campaign aimed at manipulating information and spreading disinformation in support of the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine and targeting the Union’s Member States, the United States and Ukraine. He works in close coordination with the Presidential Administration of the Russian Federation. He has also been one of the key figures in Russia’s disinformation campaign across Latin America aiming at undermining support for Ukraine.	16.12.2024

	Name	Identifying information	Statement of Reasons	Date of listing
			Therefore, Nikolai Aleksandrovich Tupikin is implementing actions or policies by the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten stability or security in the Union or in third countries by planning and directing the use of coordinated information manipulation and interference. He is also associated with Sofia Avraamovna Zakharova, department head in the Office of the President of the Russian Federation for the Development of Information and Communication Technologies and Communications Infrastructure.	
3.	Sofia Avraamovna ZAKHAROVA (Russian: София Авраамовна ЗАХАРОВА)	Department head in the Office of the President of the Russian Federation for the Development of Information and Communication Technologies and Communications Infrastructure  POB: USSR (now Russian Federation)  Nationality: Russian  Gender: female	Sofia Avraamovna Zakharova is the department head in the Office of the President of the Russian Federation for the Development of Information and Communication Technologies and Communications Infrastructure. She has been involved in the so-called ‘Doppelganger’ campaign aimed at manipulating information and spreading disinformation in support of the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine and targeting the Union’s Member States, the United States and Ukraine. She has been working directly with Ilya Gambashidze and Nikolai Tupikin, heads of Social Design Agency and GK Struktura, respectively, on this operation. She has also been one of the team leaders and active members of the so-called ‘Team I’ lead by Ilya Gambashidze, which stands behind the Kremlin’s campaign for disinformation in the West, interfering in the elections of different countries, and is preparing projects to discredit the Russian opposition.  Therefore, Sofia Avraamovna Zakharova is implementing actions or policies by the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten stability or security in the Union or in third countries by planning and directing the use of coordinated information manipulation and interference.	16.12.2024
4.	Andrey Vladimirovich AVERYANOV (Russian: Андрей Владимирович АВЕРЬЯНОВ)	Commander of GRU unit 29155  Major General  DOB: 29.9.1967  POB: USSR (now Russian Federation)  Nationality: Russian  Gender: male	Andrey Vladimirovich Averyanov is a high-ranking military official of the Main Directorate of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation (GRU). After the death of Yevgeny Prigozhin and the restructuring of the Wagner Group, the command of Russian military operations in Africa was restructured and placed under the Africa Corps under the umbrella of the Russian Ministry of Defence, and Averyanov was placed in charge of the operations. In many African countries, Russian forces provide security to military juntas that have overthrown legitimate democratic governments, gravely worsening the stability, security and democracy of the countries.	16.12.2024

	Name	Identifying information	Statement of Reasons	Date of listing
		Tax Identification Number (INN): 773378888007	<p>In addition, Russian forces in Africa exploit the natural resources there to finance their operations. In the beginning of 2024, Russian forces took control of the Intahaka gold mine in Mali.</p> <p>Therefore, Andrey Vladimirovich Averyanov is implementing actions or policies by the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten democracy, the rule of law, stability or security in third countries by undermining the democratic political process in the African countries where Russian forces operate and by exploiting an armed conflict, instability or insecurity, including through the illicit exploitation or trade of natural resources and wildlife in a third country.</p>	
5.	<p>Tinatin Givievna KANDELAKI a.k.a. Tina KANDELAKI (Russian: Тинатин Гивиевна КАНДЕЛАКИ)</p>	<p>Journalist, public figure, celebrity, TV presenter and producer, Deputy General Director of Gazprom Media Holding DOB: 10.11.1975 POB: Tbilisi, Georgian SSR (now Georgia) Nationality: Georgian Gender: female</p>	<p>Tinatin Givievna Kandelaki is a Russian journalist employed by the state-owned company Gazprom Media, and a public figure who has been using her popularity and influence in the public sphere to voice Russian propaganda and to justify the ongoing Russian war of aggression against Ukraine. She was among those who performed during the Luzhniki stadium concert of 18 March 2022 that marked the 8th anniversary of the illegal annexation of Crimea and served as a symbol of support for the ongoing war in Ukraine. After 2014, she fully supported the illegal annexation of Crimea. Moreover, she is a Deputy General Director of Gazprom Media Holding, a holding of several media outlets that spread anti-Ukrainian propaganda and justify Russian aggression against Ukraine.</p> <p>Several TV channels owned and governed by Gazprom Media Holding have replaced Ukrainian TV outlets on local TV frequencies previously seized forcefully by Russians after the Russian invasion of Crimea and have thus actively participated in the process of the illegal annexation of Crimea.</p> <p>Therefore, Tinatin Givievna Kandelaki is responsible for, implementing, supporting or benefiting from actions or policies by the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten democracy, the rule of law, stability or security in the Union or in one or several of its Member States, in an international organisation, or in a third country, or which undermine or threaten the sovereignty or independence of one or several of its Member States, or of a third country, by planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting or otherwise facilitating the use of coordinated information manipulation and interference.</p>	16.12.2024

	Name	Identifying information	Statement of Reasons	Date of listing
6.	Vladimir Vladimirovich SERGIYENKO  (Russian: Владимир Владимирович СЕРГИЕНКО)	Former assistant of Member of Bundestag Eugen Schmidt  DOB: 23.5.1971  POB: Lviv, Ukrainian SSR (now Ukraine)  Nationality: Russian / Ukrainian  Gender: male	Vladimir Vladimirovich Sergiyenko is a former parliamentary assistant of the Member of the German Bundestag, Eugen Schmidt. In parallel, Sergiyenko actively colluded with Russian intelligence officers seeking to leverage his privileged parliamentary and political access to the detriment of the democratic political process and constitutional order of the Federal Republic of Germany.  Therefore, Vladimir Vladimirovich Sergiyenko implemented and supported actions or policies by the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten democracy, the rule of law and security in the Federal Republic of Germany by engaging in, directly or indirectly, the obstruction or undermining of the democratic political process.	16.12.2024
7.	Denis Alexandrovich SMOLYANINOV  (Russian: Денис Александрович СМОЛЯНИНОВ)	GRU colonel  DOB: 26.8.1976  POB: Chelyabinsk, USSR (now Russian Federation)  Nationality: Russian  Gender: male  Passport number: 672904784466	Denis Alexandrovich Smolyaninov is a GRU colonel who specialises in psychological operations. He is in charge of the Ukrainian direction of the GRU. Lists of mercenaries to be sent to the Donbass passed through the Ukrainian direction. He also supervised two private military companies (PMCs) associated with the Ministry of Defense: Longifolia, a military company of crime bosses from the 1990s, through which contacts were established with Western PMCs, and Convoy, the military security company. Shortly before the Russian invasion of Ukraine, he deployed an agent network in Ukraine. He uses Telegram channels to spread disin- formation, including in Ukraine. Through social media he recruits agents for sabotage activities in the Union and other activities aimed at creating tensions between NATO countries.  The GRU is responsible for actively preparing explosions, arson and damage to infrastructure on Union territory, with the goal of slowing down the supply of weapons to Ukraine and of creating discord and the appearance of dissatisfaction with support for Ukraine in Europe.	16.12.2024

	Name	Identifying information	Statement of Reasons	Date of listing
			Therefore, Denis Alexandrovich Smolyaninov is responsible for, implementing, supporting or benefiting from actions or policies by the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten stability or security in the Union or in third countries by planning and directing acts of violence, and by facilitating the use of coordinated information manipulation and interference.	
8.	Vladimir/ Volodymyr LIPCHENKO  (Russian: Володимир ЛИПЧЕНКО)	GRU officer DOB: 28.9.1974 POB: Mykolaiv, Ukrainian SSR (now Ukraine) Nationality: Russian Gender: male Passport number: 4015400649	Vladimir Lipchenko is a GRU officer responsible for hybrid attacks in Europe under his pseudonym ‘Wlodek Lyakh’. He is part of a special department led by GRU Colonel Denis Alexandrovich Smolyaninov, set up to conduct sabotage activities in Western countries. He recruited a person to set fire to the Museum of the Occupation in Riga by throwing Molotov cocktails.  Therefore, Vladimir Lipchenko is responsible for or implementing actions by the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten stability or security in the Union by planning and directing acts of violence.	16.12.2024
9.	Yuriy SIZOV  (Russian: Юрий СИЗОВ)	GRU military officer DOB: 17.2.1988 POB: St. Petersburg, USSR (now Russian Federation) Nationality: Russian Gender: male Passport number: 784805190577	Yuriy Sizov is a GRU military officer. He serves in military unit No 92154. He personally gave instructions to recruit agents to target a supermarket in Kyiv and recorded a video tutorial on installing an explosive device in one of the stores of the same chain in the Moscow region. He was also responsible for orchestrating sabotage in Ukraine in the Lviv region in February 2024. He supervised and gave orders to the Russian intelligence agents involved in the planned sabotage activity.  Therefore, Yuriy Sizov is responsible for, implementing, supporting or benefiting from actions or policies by the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten stability or security in the Union by planning and directing acts of violence.	16.12.2024

	Name	Identifying information	Statement of Reasons	Date of listing
10.	Visa Nokhayevich MIZAEV (Виса Нохаевич МИЗАЕВ) a.k.a. Vishan Nochaevic MIZAYEV; Vysa Nokhaevich MIZAEV; Visa Nokhaievych MIZAIEV; Oleg SHISHKIN	Entrepreneur DOB: 9.7.1963 POB: Grozny, USSR (now Russian Federation) Nationality: Russian Gender: male Passport No 753870064 (Russian Federation) Passport No PRE0018440 (Federation of Saint Christopher and Nevis) Tax Identification Number (INN): 481101523410	Visa Nokhayevich Mizaev is a Russian entrepreneur. He played a key role in a Russian intelligence operation against the German Federal Intelligence Service (BND) in which he instigated his accomplices to procure highly classified information from the BND and to pass it to the Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation (FSB).  Therefore, Visa Nokhayevich Mizaev implements and supports actions by the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten the security in the Federal Republic of Germany by attempting to destabilise the constitutional order.	16.12.2024
11.	Olga Alekseevna BELYAVTSEVA (Ольга Алексеевна БЕЛЯВЦЕВА) a.k.a. Olha Oleksiyivna BIELIAVTSEVA; Olga Alekseevna BELJIAWZEWA; Olga Aleksevna MIZAEV	Entrepreneur DOB: 25.10.1969 POB: Lipetsk, USSR (now Russian Federation) Nationality: Russian Gender: female Passport No 768613166 (Russian Federation) Tax Identification Number (INN): 481100083621	Olga Alekseevna Belyavtseva is a Russian entrepreneur. She is the wife and business partner of Visa Nokhayevich Mizaev. She is associated with Visa Nokhayevich Mizaev through the co-ownership of the two Russia-based Limited Liability Companies ‘OOO Agronom-sad’ and ‘OOO Biplast’. She founded those companies and was the single shareholder before transferring 30 % of the shares for each company after their marriage in 2018. Moreover, Belyavtseva and Mizaev had a similar ownership arrangement over the company Agronom-Sad Trading before Mizaev sold his shares to Belyavtseva on 22 February 2023 in direct temporal connection with Visa Mizaev’s involvement in the Russian intelligence operation against the Federal Republic of Germany, providing Mizaev with additional liquidity and concealing his asset base.  Therefore, Olga Alekseevna Belyavtseva supports natural or legal persons, entities or bodies engaged in implementing actions or policies by the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten the security of the Federal Republic of Germany. She is also associated with Visa Nokhayevich Mizaev.	16.12.2024



	Name	Identifying information	Statement of Reasons	Date of listing
12.	Timofey Vyacheslavovich BORDACHEV (Russian: Тимофей Вячеславович БОРДАЧЕВ)	Political scientist DOB: 28.1.1973 POB: St. Petersburg, USSR (now Russian Federation) Nationality: Russian Gender: male	Timofey Vyacheslavovich Bordachev is a Russian political scientist and international affairs specialist. He is the Programme Director of the Valdai Discussion Club, Academic Supervisor of the Centre for Comprehensive European and International Studies at the National Research University – Higher School of Economics, as well as member of the Council for Foreign and Defence Policy.  Through his activities, he substantially contributes to the ideological base and rationalisation of the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine and aggressive policies of the Kremlin, including by promoting the view that neither Ukraine as a state nor its government are legitimate.  Therefore, Timofey Vyacheslavovich Bordachev is responsible for or supporting actions or policies by the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten the sovereignty or independence of Ukraine by engaging in and supporting the use of coordinated information manipulation and interference.	16.12.2024
13.	Harouna DOUAMBA	Businessman, director of the Groupe Panafricain pour le Commerce et l'investissement DOB: 8.1.1973 POB: Cocody, Ivory Coast Nationality: Ivorian Gender: male	Harouna Douamba is an Ivorian businessman, and the head of a pro-Russian, anti-Western disinformation network in the Central African Republic (CAR) and Burkina Faso.  In 2011, Douamba founded a non-governmental organisation called <i>Aimons Notre Afrique</i> (ANACOM) in the CAR. That organisation received funding from Lobaye Invest, which has been associated with the Wagner Group. In 2022, Harouna Douamba established the <i>Groupe Panafricain pour le Commerce et l'Investissement</i> (GPCI) in Burkina Faso. GPCI has been involved in covert influence operations.  Harouna Douamba's disinformation networks were dismantled by Meta in May 2021, and later in May 2023. Despite this, GPCI-related disinformation groups are still active and running structured and coordinated disinformation campaigns, with the use of a vast network of information chains. Those campaigns target France in particular, including through accusations of conspiracy, terrorism, destabilisation operations or preparing coups against the Union or its Member States.	16.12.2024

	Name	Identifying information	Statement of Reasons	Date of listing
			Therefore, Harouna Douamba is supporting and implementing actions or policies of the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten democracy, the rule of law, stability or security in a Member State or in a third country by planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting or otherwise facilitating the use of coordinated information manipulation and interference.	
14.	Anatolii PRIZENKO	<p>Businessman, employed by the Oriflame Cosmetics S.A. company</p> <p>DOB: 26.11.1974</p> <p>POB: Moldovan SSR (now Moldova)</p> <p>Nationality: Moldovan</p> <p>Gender: male</p>	<p>Anatolii Prizenko is a Moldovan businessman working for the Oriflame Cosmetics S.A. company. In late October 2023, he coordinated the dispatch of several Moldovan citizens to France, where they painted stars of David on the streets in exchange for financial compensation. That operation was widely reported by the media and had a significant destabilising effect, in the context of the conflict between Israel and Hamas following the attacks on 7 October 2023. The images of that operation were first spread by the Recent Reliable News media network, which is associated with the Government of the Russian Federation and used by Russian actors to conduct disinformation campaigns.</p> <p>Anatolii Prizenko publicly took responsibility for his role as the organiser of that operation. According to media reports, that destabilising operation was carried out for the benefit of the Russian military intelligence service, the GRU, and aimed at fuelling tensions in French society.</p> <p>Therefore, Anatolii Prizenko is responsible for, implementing, supporting or benefiting from actions or policies of the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten the stability in a Member State and therefore, in the Union by planning, directing, or engaging in, directly or indirectly, the use of coordinated information manipulation and interference.</p>	16.12.2024
15.	<p>Alesia MILORADOVICH or Alesya MILORADOVICH or Olesya MILORADOVIC</p> <p>Алеся МИЛОРАДОВИЧ or Олеся МИЛОРАДОВИЧ</p>	<p>Russian Government employee, ‘Foreign Affairs Facilitator’</p> <p>Associate of the project ‘Foreign journalists for Russia’ (‘Иностранцы журналисты за Россию’)</p> <p>DOB: 10.3.1968</p> <p>POB: Angarsk, USSR (now Russian Federation)</p>	<p>Alesya Miloradovich is a collaborator of the Government of the Russian Federation in France, and calls herself a ‘foreign affairs facilitator’.</p> <p>Alesya Miloradovich organised a so-called ‘electoral observation’ mission in the Ukrainian territories illegally occupied by Russia, in the context of the referendum on the annexation of those regions to Russia, and recruited French nationals who participated in the mission. She publicly admitted that she did this for the benefit of the Russian Government.</p>	16.12.2024

	Name	Identifying information	Statement of Reasons	Date of listing
		Nationality: Russian Gender: female	<p>She was also a co-organiser of trips for French children to the Artek International Children Center in illegally annexed Crimea, which were funded by the Government of the Russian Federation. She has also been involved in the Russian propaganda project ‘Foreign journalists for Russia’ and has participated in spreading pro-Russian views, including by claiming that French and Western societies support Russian actions against Ukraine.</p> <p>Therefore, Alesya Miloradovich is responsible for, implementing, supporting or benefiting from actions or policies by the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten democracy, the rule of law, stability or security in a third country by planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, or otherwise facilitating the obstruction or undermining of the democratic political process of a third country, including by attempting to destabilise its constitutional order.</p>	
16.	Oleg Sergeevich EREMENKO (Russian: Олег Сергеевич ЕРЕМЕНКО)	Representative of Officers of Russia, former GRU officer  DOB: 18.5.1978  POB: Bischkek, Kyrgyz SSR (now Kyrgyzstan)  Nationality: Russian  Gender: Male	<p>Oleg Sergeevich Eremenko is a former GRU officer and an active member of various Russian influence groups. Notably, he is a member of ‘Officers of Russia’ an organisation used by the Russian military and security services to influence domestic politics by cultivating links to veterans amongst the Russian diaspora and to retired military and security personnel of former Soviet-allied armed forces, in which he serves as their main representative in Germany. In that capacity, Oleg Sergeevich Eremenko is associated with the EU designated entities Rossotrudnischestvo, which is the operator of the ‘Russian House’ in Berlin, and the Wagner Group. In his role as an envoy of the Russian state security apparatus, Oleg Sergeevich Eremenko is cultivating links to and supporting anti-democratic organisations within Germany. He is well connected with far-left anti-democratic groups and groups of former personnel of outlawed GDR security services and veterans of GDR military formations, such as Desant e.V., a pro-Russian association of former paratroopers.</p> <p>Therefore, Oleg Sergeevich Eremenko is supporting actions or policies by the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten democracy, the rule of law, stability or security in the Federal Republic of Germany by undermining the democratic political process, including by attempting to destabilise its constitutional order.</p>	16.12.2024

B. Legal persons, entities and bodies

	Name	Identifying information	Statement of Reasons	Date of listing
1.	GRU Unit 29155 ФКУ 'Войсковая Часть 29155'	Place of registration: 105077, Moscow 11th Parkovaya Street, 38A Registration No: 7719737879 OGRN: 1097746770395	GRU Unit 29155 is a covert unit within the Russian military intelligence agency (GRU), known for its involvement in foreign assassinations and destabilisation activities across Europe. Through coups, assassinations, bombings, and cyberattacks against other countries around the world in connection with the war in Ukraine, it has sought to create chaos and destabilise European Union countries. By carrying out such actions, it seeks to help and benefit Russia. GRU Unit 29155 carried out cyberattacks and other attacks against critical infrastructure. Therefore, it is responsible for, implementing, supporting or benefiting from actions or policies by the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten democracy, the rule of law, stability or security in the Union or in one or several of its Member States by planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting or otherwise facilitating acts of violence, as well as planning, directing, engaging in, supporting or otherwise facilitating any actions aimed at interfering with, damaging or destroying, including through sabotage or malicious cyber activities as part of hybrid activities, critical infrastructure.	16.12.2024
2.	Groupe Panafricain pour le Commerce et l'Investissement GPCI	Place of registration: Lomé, Togo Date of registration: January 2022	<i>Groupe Panafricain pour le Commerce et l'Investissement</i> (GPCI) is a disinformation network carrying out pro-Russian covert influence operations, particularly in the Central African Republic and Burkina Faso. GPCI was dismantled by Meta in May 2023. Despite this, GPCI is still active and is running structured and coordinated disinformation campaigns with the use of a vast network of information chains. Those campaigns target France in particular, including through accusations of conspiracy, terrorism, destabilisation operations or preparing coups against the Union or its Member States. GPCI has been indirectly funded by the Wagner Group.	16.12.2024

	Name	Identifying information	Statement of Reasons	Date of listing
			Therefore, GPCI is responsible for, implementing and supporting actions or policies by the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten democracy, stability or security in the Union or in one or several of its Member States by planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting or otherwise facilitating the use of coordinated information manipulation and interference.	
3.	African Initiative	Place of Registration: Moscow, Russia Date of registration: September 2023	<p>African Initiative is a news agency that operates on the African continent. It has been involved in spreading Russian propaganda and disinformation against the West, and has hired journalists and influencers for the purpose of spreading Russian propaganda. It has also organised press tours for African journalists in the illegally occupied territories of Ukraine, during which pro-Russian narratives about the war were spread. African Initiative has also organised events serving the interests of the Government of the Russian Federation, including by facilitating access to mineral resources.</p> <p>Therefore, African Initiative is responsible for or supporting actions and policies by the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten democracy, the rule of law, stability and security in the Union or in one or several of its Member States or in a third country by planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting or otherwise facilitating the use of coordinated information manipulation and interference.</p>	16.12.2024