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COUNCIL REGULATION (EU) 2018/1542

of 15 October 2018

concerning restrictive measures against the proliferation and use of chemical weapons

(OJ L 259, 16.10.2018, p. 12)

Amended by:

		Official Journal		
		No	page	date
► <u>M1</u>	Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/84 of 21 January 2019	L 18I	1	21.1.2019
► <u>M2</u>	Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/1163 of 5 July 2019	L 182	33	8.7.2019
► <u>M3</u>	Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2020/1463 of 12 October 2020	L 335	1	13.10.2020
► <u>M4</u>	Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2020/1480 of 14 October 2020	L 341	1	15.10.2020
► <u>M5</u>	Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2022/595 of 11 April 2022	L 114	60	12.4.2022
► <u>M6</u>	Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2022/1936 of 13 October 2022	L 268	7	14.10.2022
► <u>M7</u>	Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2022/2228 of 14 November 2022	L 293I	1	14.11.2022

**COUNCIL REGULATION (EU) 2018/1542****of 15 October 2018****concerning restrictive measures against the proliferation and use of chemical weapons***Article 1*

For the purposes of this Regulation, the following definitions shall apply:

- (a) ‘chemical weapons’ means chemical weapons as defined in Article II of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC);
- (b) ‘claim’ means any claim, whether asserted by legal proceedings or not, made before or after the date of entry into force of this Regulation, under or in connection with a contract or transaction, and includes in particular:
 - (i) a claim for performance of any obligation arising under or in connection with a contract or transaction;
 - (ii) a claim for extension or payment of a bond, financial guarantee or indemnity of whatever form;
 - (iii) a claim for compensation in respect of a contract or transaction;
 - (iv) a counterclaim;
 - (v) a claim for the recognition or enforcement, including by the procedure of *exequatur*, of a judgment, an arbitration award or an equivalent decision, wherever made or given;
- (c) ‘contract or transaction’ means any transaction of whatever form and whatever the applicable law, whether comprising one or more contracts or similar obligations made between the same or different parties; for this purpose ‘contract’ includes a bond, guarantee or indemnity, particularly a financial guarantee or financial indemnity, and credit, whether legally independent or not, as well as any related provision arising under, or in connection with, the transaction;
- (d) ‘competent authorities’ refers to the competent authorities of the Member States as identified on the websites listed in Annex II;
- (e) ‘economic resources’ means assets of any kind, whether tangible or intangible, movable or immovable, which are not funds, but may be used to obtain funds, goods or services;
- (f) ‘freezing of economic resources’ means preventing the use of economic resources to obtain funds, goods or services in any way, including, but not limited to, by selling, hiring or mortgaging them;

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- (g) ‘freezing of funds’ means preventing any move, transfer, alteration, use of, access to, or dealing with funds in any way that would result in any change in their volume, amount, location, ownership, possession, character, destination or other change that would enable the funds to be used, including portfolio management;
- (h) ‘funds’ means financial assets and benefit of every kind, including, but not limited to:
- (i) cash, cheques, claims on money, drafts, money orders and other payment instruments;
 - (ii) deposits with financial institutions or other entities, balances on accounts, debts and debt obligations;
 - (iii) publicly- or privately-traded securities and debt instruments, including stocks and shares, certificates representing securities, bonds, notes, warrants, debentures and derivatives contracts;
 - (iv) interest, dividends or other income on or value accruing from or generated by assets;
 - (v) credit, right of set-off, guarantees, performance bonds or other financial commitments;
 - (vi) letters of credit, bills of lading, bills of sale; and
 - (vii) documents showing evidence of an interest in funds or financial resources;
- (i) ‘territory of the Union’ means the territories of the Member States to which the Treaty is applicable, under the conditions laid down in the Treaty, including their airspace.

Article 2

1. All funds and economic resources belonging to, owned, held or controlled by any natural or legal person, entity or body as listed in Annex I shall be frozen.

2. No funds or economic resources shall be made available, directly or indirectly, to or for the benefit of natural or legal persons, entities or bodies listed in Annex I.

3. Annex I shall include natural or legal persons, entities and bodies which, in accordance with Article 3(1) of Council Decision (CFSP) 2018/1544, have been identified by the Council as:

- (a) natural or legal persons, entities or bodies which are responsible for, or provide financial, technical or material support for or are otherwise involved in:

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- (i) manufacturing, acquiring, possessing, developing, transporting, stockpiling or transferring chemical weapons;
 - (ii) using chemical weapons; or
 - (iii) engaging in any preparations for the use of chemical weapons;
- (b) natural or legal persons, entities or bodies which assist, encourage or induce any natural or legal person, entity or body to engage in any activity referred to in point (a) of this paragraph and thereby cause or contribute to a danger that such activities may be carried out; and
- (c) natural or legal persons, entities or bodies associated with the natural or legal persons, entities and bodies covered by points (a) and (b) of this paragraph.

Article 3

1. By way of derogation from Article 2, the competent authorities of the Member States may authorise the release of certain frozen funds or economic resources, or the making available of certain funds or economic resources, under such conditions as they deem appropriate, after having determined that the funds or economic resources concerned are:

- (a) necessary to satisfy the basic needs of natural or legal persons, entities or bodies listed in Annex I and dependent family members of such natural persons, including payments for foodstuffs, rent or mortgage, medicines and medical treatment, taxes, insurance premiums, and public utility charges;
- (b) intended exclusively for payment of reasonable professional fees or reimbursement of incurred expenses associated with the provision of legal services;
- (c) intended exclusively for payment of fees or service charges for routine holding or maintenance of frozen funds or economic resources;
- (d) necessary for extraordinary expenses, provided that the relevant competent authority has notified the competent authorities of the other Member States and the Commission of the grounds on which it considers that a specific authorisation should be granted, at least two weeks prior to authorisation; or
- (e) to be paid into or from an account of a diplomatic or consular mission or an international organisation enjoying immunities in accordance with international law, insofar as such payments are intended to be used for official purposes of the diplomatic or consular mission or international organisation.

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2. The Member State concerned shall inform the other Member States and the Commission within two weeks of any authorisation granted under paragraph 1.

Article 4

1. By way of derogation from Article 2(1), the competent authorities of the Member States may authorise the release of certain frozen funds or economic resources if the following conditions are met:

- (a) the funds or economic resources are the subject of an arbitral decision rendered prior to the date on which the natural or legal person, entity or body referred to in Article 2 was listed in Annex I, or are the subject of a judicial or administrative decision rendered in the Union or a judicial decision enforceable in the Member State concerned, prior to or after that date;
- (b) the funds or economic resources will be used exclusively to satisfy claims secured by such a decision or recognised as valid in such a decision, within the limits set by applicable laws and regulations governing the rights of persons having such claims;
- (c) the decision is not for the benefit of a natural or legal person, entity or body listed in Annex I; and
- (d) recognising the decision is not contrary to public policy in the Member State concerned.

2. The Member State concerned shall inform the other Member States and the Commission within two weeks of any authorisation granted under paragraph 1.

Article 5

1. By way of derogation from Article 2(1) and provided that a payment by a natural or legal person, entity or body listed in Annex I is due under a contract or agreement that was concluded by, or an obligation that arose for, the natural or legal person, entity or body concerned before the date on which that natural or legal person, entity or body was included in Annex I, the competent authorities of the Member States may authorise, under such conditions as they deem appropriate, the release of certain frozen funds or economic resources, provided that the competent authority concerned has determined that:

- (a) the funds or economic resources will be used for a payment by a natural or legal person, entity or body listed in Annex I; and
- (b) the payment is not in breach of Article 2(2).

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2. The Member State concerned shall inform the other Member States and the Commission within two weeks of any authorisation granted under paragraph 1.

Article 6

1. Article 2(2) shall not prevent financial or credit institutions that receive funds transferred by third parties to the account of a listed natural or legal person, entity or body from crediting the frozen accounts, provided that any additions to such accounts will also be frozen. The financial or credit institution shall inform the relevant competent authority about any such transaction without delay.

2. Article 2(2) shall not apply to the addition to frozen accounts of:

- (a) interest or other earnings on those accounts;
- (b) payments due under contracts, agreements or obligations that were concluded or arose before the date on which the natural or legal person, entity or body referred to in Article 2 was included in Annex I; or
- (c) payments due under judicial, administrative or arbitral decisions rendered in a Member State or enforceable in the Member State concerned.

Article 7

1. Without prejudice to the applicable rules concerning reporting, confidentiality and professional secrecy, natural and legal persons, entities and bodies shall:

- (a) supply immediately any information which would facilitate compliance with this Regulation, such as information on accounts and amounts frozen in accordance with Article 2, to the competent authority of the Member State where they are resident or located, and they shall transmit such information, directly or through the Member State, to the Commission; and
- (b) cooperate with the competent authority in any verification of this information.

2. Any additional information received directly by the Commission shall be made available to the Member States.

3. Any information provided or received in accordance with this Article shall be used only for the purposes for which it was provided or received.

Article 8

It shall be prohibited to participate, knowingly and intentionally, in activities the object or effect of which is to circumvent the measures referred to in Article 2.

▼B*Article 9*

1. The freezing of funds and economic resources or the refusal to make funds or economic resources available, carried out in good faith on the basis that such action is in accordance with this Regulation, shall not give rise to liability of any kind on the part of the natural or legal person or entity or body implementing it, or its directors or employees, unless it is proved that the funds and economic resources were frozen or withheld as a result of negligence.

2. Actions by natural or legal persons, entities or bodies shall not give rise to any liability of any kind on their part if they did not know, and had no reasonable cause to suspect, that their actions would infringe the measures set out in this Regulation.

Article 10

1. No claims in connection with any contract or transaction, the performance of which has been affected, directly or indirectly, in whole or in part, by the measures imposed under this Regulation, including claims for indemnity or any other claim of this type, such as a claim for compensation or a claim under a guarantee, notably a claim for extension or payment of a bond, guarantee or indemnity, particularly a financial guarantee or financial indemnity, of whatever form, shall be satisfied, if they are made by:

- (a) designated natural or legal persons, entities or bodies listed in Annex I;
- (b) any natural or legal person, entity or body acting through or on behalf of one of the persons, entities or bodies referred to in point (a).

2. In any proceedings for the enforcement of a claim, the onus of proving that satisfying the claim is not prohibited by paragraph 1 shall be on the natural or legal person, entity or body seeking the enforcement of that claim.

3. This Article is without prejudice to the right of the natural or legal persons, entities and bodies referred to in paragraph 1 to judicial review of the legality of the non-performance of contractual obligations in accordance with this Regulation.

Article 11

1. The Commission and Member States shall inform each other of the measures taken under this Regulation and share any other relevant information at their disposal in connection with this Regulation, in particular information:

- (a) in respect of funds frozen under Article 2 and authorisations granted under Articles 3, 4 and 5;

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(b) in respect of violation and enforcement problems and judgments handed down by national courts.

2. The Member States shall immediately inform each other and the Commission of any other relevant information at their disposal which might affect the effective implementation of this Regulation.

Article 12

1. Where the Council decides to subject a natural or legal person, entity or body to the measures referred to in Article 2, it shall amend Annex I accordingly.

2. The Council shall communicate its decision, including the grounds for listing, to the natural or legal person, entity or body referred to in paragraph 1, either directly, if the address is known, or through the publication of a notice, providing such natural or legal person, entity or body with an opportunity to present observations.

3. Where observations are submitted, or where substantial new evidence is presented, the Council shall review its decision and inform the natural or legal person, entity or body accordingly.

4. The list in Annex I shall be reviewed at regular intervals and at least every 12 months.

5. The Commission shall be empowered to amend Annex II on the basis of information supplied by Member States.

Article 13

1. Annex I shall include the grounds for the listing of natural or legal persons, entities or bodies concerned.

2. Annex I shall include, where available, information necessary to identify the natural or legal persons, entities or bodies concerned. With regard to natural persons, such information may include names including aliases, date and place of birth, nationality, passport and identity card numbers, gender, address, if known, and function or profession. With regard to legal persons, entities and bodies, such information may include names, place and date of registration, registration number and place of business.

Article 14

1. Member States shall lay down the rules on penalties applicable to infringements of the provisions of this Regulation and shall take all measures necessary to ensure that they are implemented. The penalties provided for must be effective, proportionate and dissuasive.

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2. Member States shall notify those rules to the Commission without delay after the entry into force of this Regulation and shall notify it of any subsequent amendment.

Article 15

1. The Commission shall process personal data in order to carry out its tasks under this Regulation. These tasks include:

- (a) adding the contents of Annex I in the electronic ‘Consolidated list of persons, groups and entities subject to EU financial sanctions’ and in the interactive EU Sanctions Map, which are both accessible to the public;
- (b) processing of information on the impact of the measures of this Regulation such as the value of frozen funds and information on authorisations granted by the competent authorities.

2. For the purpose of paragraph 1, the Commission service listed in Annex II is designated as ‘controller’ for the Commission within the meaning of Article 2(d) of Regulation (EC) No 45/2001, in order to ensure that the natural persons concerned can exercise their rights under Regulation (EC) No 45/2001.

Article 16

1. Member States shall designate the competent authorities referred to in this Regulation and identify them on the websites listed in Annex II. Member States shall notify the Commission of any changes in the addresses of their websites listed in Annex II.

2. Member States shall notify the Commission of their competent authorities, including the contact details of those competent authorities, without delay after the entry into force of this Regulation, and shall notify it of any subsequent amendment.

3. Where this Regulation sets out a requirement to notify, inform or otherwise communicate with the Commission, the address and other contact details to be used for such communication shall be those indicated in Annex II.

Article 17

This Regulation shall apply:

- (a) within the territory of the Union, including its airspace;
- (b) on board of any aircraft or any vessel under the jurisdiction of a Member State;
- (c) to any natural person inside or outside the territory of the Union who is a national of a Member State;

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- (d) to any legal person, entity or body, inside or outside the territory of the Union, which is incorporated or constituted under the law of a Member State;
- (e) to any legal person, entity or body in respect of any business done in whole or in part within the Union.

Article 18

This Regulation shall enter into force on the date of its publication in the *Official Journal of the European Union*.

This Regulation shall be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States.

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ANNEX I

LIST OF NATURAL AND LEGAL PERSONS, ENTITIES AND BODIES
REFERRED TO IN ARTICLE 2▼ M1

A. NATURAL PERSONS

Name	Identifying information	Grounds for designation	Date of listing
1. Tariq YASMINA	a.k.a.: Tarq Yasmina طارق ياسمينية Gender: male; Title: Colonel; Nationality: Syrian	Tariq Yasmina acts as the liaison officer between the Scientific Studies and Research Centre (SSRC) and the Presidential Palace, and, as such, is involved in the use and preparations for the use of chemical weapons by the Syrian regime.	21.1.2019
2. Khaled NASRI	a.k.a.: Mohammed Khaled Nasri; Haled Natsri; خالد نصري محمد خالد نصري Gender: male; Title: Head of Institute 1000 of the SSRC; Nationality: Syrian	Khaled Nasri is the Director of Institute 1000, the division of the Scientific Studies and Research Centre (SSRC) responsible for developing and producing computer and electronic systems for Syria's chemical weapons programme.	21.1.2019
3. Walid ZUGHAIIB	a.k.a.: Zughib, Zgha'ib, Zughayb; وليد زغيب Title: Doctor, Head of Institute 2000 of the SSRC; Gender: male; Nationality: Syrian	Walid Zughuib is the Director of Institute 2000, the division of the Scientific Studies and Research Centre (SSRC) responsible for mechanical development and production for Syria's chemical weapons programme.	21.1.2019
4. Firas AHMED	a.k.a.: Ahmad; فiras أحمد Title: Colonel, Head of Security Office at Institute 1000 of the SSRC; Gender: male; Date of birth: 21 January 1967; Nationality: Syrian	Firas Ahmed is the Director of the Security Office of Institute 1000, the division of the Scientific Studies and Research Centre (SSRC) responsible for developing and producing computer and electronic systems for Syria's chemical weapons programme. He was involved in transferring and concealing chemical weapons related materials following Syria's accession to the Chemical Weapons Convention.	21.1.2019

▼ M1

Name	Identifying information	Grounds for designation	Date of listing
▼ <u>M3</u> 5. Said SAID	a.k.a.: Saeed, Sa'id Sa'id, سعيد سعيد Title: Doctor, member of Institute 3000 (a.k.a. Institute 6000) of the SSRC; Gender: male; Date of birth: 11 December 1955	Said Said is a significant figure in Institute 3000 a.k.a. Institute 6000, the division of the Scientific Studies and Research Centre (SSRC) that is responsible for developing and producing Syria's chemical weapons.	21.1.2019
▼ <u>M1</u> 6. Anatoliy Vladimirovich CHEPIGA	Анатолий Владимирович ЧЕПИГА, a.k.a.: Ruslan BOSHIROV Gender: male; Dates of birth: 5 April 1979; 12 Apr 1978; Places of Birth: Nikolaevka, Amur Oblast, Russia; Dushanbe, Tajikistan	GRU Officer Anatoliy Chepiga (a.k.a. Ruslan Boshirov) possessed, transported and then, during the weekend of 4 March 2018, in Salisbury, used a toxic nerve agent ('Novichok'). On 5 September 2018, the UK Crown Prosecution Service charged Ruslan Boshirov for conspiracy to murder Sergei Skripal; for the attempted murder of Sergei Skripal, Yulia Skripal and Nick Bailey; for the use and possession of Novichok; and for causing grievous bodily harm with intent to Yulia Skripal and Nick Bailey.	21.1.2019
7. Alexander Yevgeniyevich MISHKIN	Александр Евгеньевич МИШКИН, a.k.a.: Alexander PETROV Gender: male; Date of birth: 13 July 1979; Places of Birth: Loyga, Russia; Kotlas, Russia	GRU Officer Alexander Mishkin (a.k.a. Alexander Petrov) possessed, transported and then, during the weekend of 4 March 2018, in Salisbury, used a toxic nerve agent ('Novichok'). On 5 September 2018, the UK Crown Prosecution Service charged Alexander Petrov for conspiracy to murder Sergei Skripal; for the attempted murder of Sergei Skripal, Yulia Skripal and Nick Bailey; for the use and possession of Novichok; and for causing grievous bodily harm with intent to Yulia Skripal and Nick Bailey.	21.1.2019
8. Vladimir Stepanovich ALEXSEYEV	Владимир Степанович АЛЕКСЕЕВ Gender: male; Title: First Deputy Head of the GRU	Vladimir Stepanovich Alexseyev is the First Deputy Head of the GRU (a.k.a. GU). Given his senior leadership role in the GRU, Alexseyev is responsible for the possession, transport and use in Salisbury during the weekend of 4 March 2018 of the toxic nerve agent 'Novichok' by officers from the GRU.	21.1.2019

▼ M1

Name	Identifying information	Grounds for designation	Date of listing
9. Igor Olegovich KOSTYUKOV	Игорь Олегович КОСТЮКОВ Gender: male; Title: Head of the GRU	Igor Olegovich Kostyukov, given his senior leadership role as First Deputy Head of the GRU (a. k. a. GU) at that time, is responsible for the possession, transport and use in Salisbury during the weekend of 4 March 2018 of the toxic nerve agent 'Novichok' by officers from the GRU.	21.1.2019

▼ M4

10. Andrei Veniaminovich YARIN (Андрей Вениаминович ЯРИН)	Gender: male; Date of birth: 13 February 1970; Place of birth: Nizhny Tagil; Nationality: Russian; Title: Chief of the Presidential Domestic Policy Directorate	<p>Andrei Yarin is Chief of the Presidential Domestic Policy Directorate in the Presidential Executive Office in the Russian Federation. In this function, he is in charge of designing and implementing internal political orientations. Andrei Yarin was also appointed to a task force inside the Presidential Executive Office whose role was to counter Alexei Navalny's influence in Russian society including through operations meant to discredit him.</p> <p>Alexei Navalny has been the target of systematic harassment and repression by State and judicial actors in the Russian Federation due to his prominent role in the political opposition.</p> <p>Alexei Navalny's activities were closely monitored by the authorities of the Russian Federation during his journey to Siberia in August 2020. On 20 August 2020, he was taken seriously ill and admitted to a hospital in Omsk, Russian Federation. On 22 August 2020, he was transported to a hospital in Berlin, Germany. A specialised laboratory in Germany subsequently found clear evidence, also corroborated by laboratories in France and Sweden, that Alexei Navalny had been poisoned with a toxic nerve agent of the Novichok group. This toxic agent is accessible only to State authorities in the Russian Federation.</p> <p>In these circumstances, it is reasonable to conclude that the poisoning of Alexei Navalny was only possible with the consent of the Presidential Executive Office. Given his senior leadership role in that Office, Andrei Yarin is therefore responsible for inducing and providing support to the persons who carried out or were involved in the poisoning of Alexei Navalny with the Novichok nerve agent, which constitutes a use of chemical weapons under the Chemical Weapons Convention.</p>	15.10.2020
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Name	Identifying information	Grounds for designation	Date of listing
11. Sergei Vladilenovich KIRIYENKO (Сергей Владиленович КИРИЕНКО)	Gender: male; Date of birth: 26 July 1962; Place of birth: Sukhumi; Nationality: Russian; Title: First Deputy Chief of Staff of the Presidential Executive Office	<p>Sergei Kiriyenko is the First Deputy Chief of Staff of the Presidential Executive Office of the Russian Federation. In this function, he is responsible for domestic affairs, including political groups and activities.</p> <p>Alexei Navalny has been the target of systematic harassment and repression by State and judicial actors in the Russian Federation due to his prominent role in the political opposition.</p> <p>Alexei Navalny's activities were closely monitored by the authorities of the Russian Federation during his journey to Siberia in August 2020. On 20 August 2020, he was taken seriously ill and admitted to a hospital in Omsk, Russian Federation. On 22 August 2020, he was transported to a hospital in Berlin, Germany. A specialised laboratory in Germany subsequently found clear evidence, also corroborated by laboratories in France and Sweden, that Alexei Navalny had been poisoned with a toxic nerve agent of the Novichok group. This toxic agent is accessible only to State authorities in the Russian Federation.</p> <p>In these circumstances, it is reasonable to conclude that the poisoning of Alexei Navalny was only possible with the consent of the Presidential Executive Office. Given his senior leadership role in that Office, Sergei Kiriyenko is therefore responsible for inducing and providing support to the persons who carried out or were involved in the poisoning of Alexei Navalny with the Novichok nerve agent, which constitutes a use of chemical weapons under the Chemical Weapons Convention.</p>	15.10.2020

▼ M6

12. Sergei Ivanovich MENYAILO (Сергей Иванович МЕНЯЙЛО)	Gender: male; Date of birth: 22 August 1960; Place of birth: Alagir; Nationality: Russian; Title: Head of North Ossetia-Alania	<p>Sergei Menyailo is the Head of North Ossetia-Alania. He was the Plenipotentiary Representative of the President of the Russian Federation in the Siberian Federal District between 2016 and April 2021. In that capacity he was responsible for ensuring the implementation of the constitutional powers of the President including the implementation of domestic and foreign policy of the State. Sergei Menyailo was a member of the Security Council of the Russian Federation until August 2021.</p> <p>Alexei Navalny has been the target of systematic harassment and repression by State and judicial actors in the Russian Federation due to his prominent role in the political opposition.</p>	15.10.2020
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Name	Identifying information	Grounds for designation	Date of listing
		<p>Alexei Navalny's activities were closely monitored by the authorities of the Russian Federation during his journey to Siberia in August 2020. On 20 August 2020, he was taken seriously ill and admitted to a hospital in Omsk, Russian Federation. On 22 August 2020, he was transported to a hospital in Berlin, Germany. A specialised laboratory in Germany subsequently found clear evidence, also corroborated by laboratories in France and Sweden, that Alexei Navalny had been poisoned with a toxic nerve agent of the Novichok group. This toxic agent is accessible only to State authorities in the Russian Federation. In those circumstances, it is reasonable to conclude that the poisoning of Alexei Navalny was only possible with the consent of the Presidential Executive Office.</p> <p>Given his senior leadership role as the former representative of that Office in the Siberian Federal District, Sergei Menyailo is therefore responsible for inducing and providing support to the persons who carried out or were involved in the poisoning of Alexei Navalny with the Novichok nerve agent, which constitutes a use of chemical weapons under the Chemical Weapons Convention.</p>	

▼ M4

<p>13. Aleksandr Vasilievich BORTNIKOV (Александр Васильевич БОРТНИКОВ)</p>	<p>Gender: male; Date of birth: 15 November 1951; Place of birth: Perm; Nationality: Russian; Title: Director of the Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation</p>	<p>Aleksandr Bortnikov is the Director of the Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation and in this capacity he is responsible for the activities of the principal security agency in Russia.</p> <p>Alexei Navalny has been the target of systematic harassment and repression by State and judicial actors in the Russian Federation due to his prominent role in the political opposition.</p> <p>Alexei Navalny's activities were closely monitored by the Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation during his journey to Siberia in August 2020. On 20 August 2020, he was taken seriously ill and admitted to a hospital in Omsk, Russian Federation. On 22 August 2020, he was transported to a hospital in Berlin, Germany. A specialised laboratory in Germany subsequently found clear evidence, also corroborated by laboratories in France and Sweden, that Alexei Navalny had been poisoned with a toxic nerve agent of the Novichok group. This toxic agent is accessible only to State authorities in the Russian Federation.</p>	15.10.2020
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Name	Identifying information	Grounds for designation	Date of listing
		<p>In these circumstances and taking into account that Alexei Navalny was under surveillance at the time of his poisoning, it is reasonable to conclude that the poisoning was only possible with the involvement of the Federal Security Service.</p> <p>Given his senior leadership role in the Federal Security Service, Aleksandr Bortnikov is therefore responsible for providing support to the persons who carried out or were involved in the poisoning of Alexei Navalny with the Novichok nerve agent, which constitutes a use of chemical weapons under the Chemical Weapons Convention.</p>	
<p>14. Pavel Anatolievich POPOV (Павел Анатольевич ПОПОВ)</p>	<p>Gender: male; Date of birth: 01 January 1957; Place of Birth: Krasnoyarsk; Nationality: Russian; Title: Deputy Minister of Defence of the Russian Federation</p>	<p>Pavel Popov is the Deputy Minister in the Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation and in this capacity he has overall responsibility for research activities. This includes the oversight and development of the Ministry's scientific and technical capabilities, including the development of potential and modernisation of existing weapons and military equipment.</p> <p>The Russian Ministry of Defence took on the responsibility for the chemical weapons stocks inherited from the Soviet Union and their safe storage until their destruction could be completed.</p> <p>On 20 August 2020, Alexei Navalny was taken seriously ill and admitted to a hospital in Omsk, Russian Federation. On 22 August 2020, he was transported to a hospital in Berlin, Germany. A specialised laboratory in Germany subsequently found clear evidence, also corroborated by laboratories in France and Sweden, that Alexei Navalny had been poisoned with a toxic nerve agent of the Novichok group. This toxic agent is accessible only to State authorities in the Russian Federation.</p> <p>As a consequence of the overall responsibility of the Ministry of Defence for the safe storage and destruction of chemical weapons, the use of such chemical weapons in the territory of the Russian Federation could only be as a result of intent or negligence by the Ministry of Defence and its political leadership.</p> <p>Given his senior leadership role in the Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation, Pavel Popov is therefore responsible for assisting the persons who carried out or were involved in the poisoning of Alexei Navalny with the Novichok nerve agent, which constitutes a use of chemical weapons under the Chemical Weapons Convention.</p>	<p>15.10.2020</p>

▼ M4

Name	Identifying information	Grounds for designation	Date of listing
15. Aleksei Yurievich KRIVORUCHKO (Алексей Юрьевич КРИВОРУЧКО)	Gender: male; Date of birth: 17 July 1975; Place of Birth: Stavropol; Nationality: Russian; Title: Deputy Minister of Defence of the Russian Federation	<p>Aleksei Krivoruchko is the Deputy Minister in the Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation with the overall responsibility for armaments. This includes the oversight of the Ministry's stocks of weapons and military equipment. He is also responsible for their elimination within the framework of the implementation of international treaties assigned to the Ministry of Defence.</p> <p>The Russian Ministry of Defence took on the responsibility for the chemical weapons stocks inherited from the Soviet Union and their safe storage until their destruction could be completed.</p> <p>On 20 August 2020, Alexei Navalny was taken seriously ill and admitted to a hospital in Omsk, Russian Federation. On 22 August 2020, he was transported to a hospital in Berlin, Germany. A specialised laboratory in Germany subsequently found clear evidence, also corroborated by laboratories in France and Sweden, that Alexei Navalny had been poisoned with a toxic nerve agent of the Novichok group. This toxic agent is accessible only to State authorities in the Russian Federation.</p> <p>As a consequence of the overall responsibility of the Ministry of Defence for the safe storage and destruction of chemical weapons, the use of such chemical weapons in the territory of the Russian Federation could only be as a result of intent or negligence by the Ministry of Defence and its political leadership.</p> <p>Given his senior leadership role in the Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation, Aleksei Krivoruchko is therefore responsible for assisting the persons who carried out or were involved in the poisoning of Alexei Navalny with the Novichok nerve agent, which constitutes a use of chemical weapons under the Chemical Weapons Convention.</p>	15.10.2020

▼ M7

16. Alexey Alexandrovich ALEXANDROV (Алексей Александрович АЛЕКСАНДРОВ) a.k.a. Alexey Andreevich FROLOV (Алексей Андреевич ФРОЛОВ)	Gender: male; Date of birth: 16.6.1981 or 16.6.1980; Nationality: Russian	<p>Alexey Alexandrov is an agent of the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) working as a Criminalistics Institute operative.</p> <p>In that capacity, he was directly involved in the preparations for and the execution of the poisoning of Alexei Navalny with a Novichok-type nerve agent in Tomsk on 20 August 2020, which constitutes a use of chemical weapons under the Chemical Weapons Convention.</p>	14.11.2022
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Name	Identifying information	Grounds for designation	Date of listing
		Therefore, Alexey Alexandrov was involved in preparations for the use of chemical weapons as well as in the use of chemical weapons.	
17. Vladimir Alexandrovich PANYAEV (Владимир Александрович ПАНЯЕВ) a.k.a. Vladimir ALEXEEV (Владимир АЛЕКСЕЕВ) a.k.a. Vladimir ALEXEYEV (Владимир АЛЕКСЕЕВ)	Gender: male; Date of birth: 25.11.1980; Place of birth: Serdobsk, Russian Federation; Nationality: Russian	Vladimir Panyaev is an agent of the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) working as a Criminalistics Institute operative. In that capacity, he was directly involved in the preparations for and the execution of the poisoning of Alexei Navalny with a Novichok-type nerve agent in Tomsk on 20 August 2020, which constitutes a use of chemical weapons under the Chemical Weapons Convention. Therefore, Vladimir Panyaev was involved in preparations for the use of chemical weapons as well as in the use of chemical weapons.	14.11.2022
18. Ivan Vladimirovich OSIPOV (Иван Владимирович ОСИПОВ) a.k.a. Ivan Vasilyevich SPIRIDONOV (Иван Васильевич СПИРИДОНОВ)	Gender: male; Date of birth: 21.8.1976 or 21.8.1975; Nationality: Russian	Ivan Osipov is an agent of the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) working as a Criminalistics Institute operative. In that capacity, he was directly involved in the preparations for and the execution of the poisoning of Alexei Navalny with a Novichok-type nerve agent in Tomsk on 20 August 2020, which constitutes a use of chemical weapons under the Chemical Weapons Convention. Therefore, Ivan Osipov was involved in preparations for the use of chemical weapons as well as in the use of chemical weapons.	14.11.2022
19. Artur Alexandrovich ZHIROV (Артур Александрович ЖИРОВ)	Gender: male; Date of birth: 6.7.1961; Nationality: Russian	Artur Zhirov is a chemical weapons expert and Director of SC Signal, a research institute that has been linked to Russia's chemical weapons program. As Director of SC Signal, Artur Zhirov provided technical support to operations against Yulia Navalnaya and Alexei Navalny that took place in Kaliningrad on 6 July 2020 and to the planning of the subsequent poisoning of Alexei Navalny with a Novichok-type nerve agent in Tomsk on 20 August 2020, which constitutes a use of chemical weapons under the Chemical Weapons Convention. Therefore, Artur Zhirov was engaged in preparations for the use of chemical weapons and he provided technical and material support for using chemical weapons.	14.11.2022

▼ M7

Name	Identifying information	Grounds for designation	Date of listing
20. Kirill Yurievich VASILIEV (Кирилл Юрьевич ВАСИЛЬЕВ) a.k.a. Kirill VASILYEV (Кирилл ВАСИЛЬЕВ)	Gender: male; Date of birth: 22.2.1973; Nationality: Russian; Tax-ID No.: 773721109701 (Russia)	<p>General Kirill Vasiliev is the Director of the Criminalistics Institute of the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB), which conducted operations to closely monitor the activities of Alexei Navalny over a long period of time, including during his journey to Tomsk where he was poisoned with a Novichok-type nerve on 20 August 2020. That poisoning constitutes a use of chemical weapons under the Chemical Weapons Convention.</p> <p>Kirill Vasiliev, in his capacity as Director of the Criminalistics Institute of the FSB, provided the operational framework and direction to conduct the surveillance and the assassination attempt against Alexei Navalny.</p> <p>Therefore, he was involved in preparations for the use of chemical weapons, he is responsible for the use of chemical weapons and he provided technical and material support for using chemical weapons.</p>	14.11.2022
21. Konstantin Borisovich KUDRYAVTSEV (Константин Борисович КУДРЯВЦЕВ) a.k.a. Konstantin Yevgenievich SOKOLOV (Константин Евгеньевич СОКОЛОВ)	Gender: male; Date of birth: 28.4.1980 or 28.4.1981; Nationality: Russian	<p>Konstantin Kudryavtsev is a chemical weapons expert and an agent of the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) working as a Criminalistics Institute operative.</p> <p>In that capacity, he was directly involved in the preparations for and the clean-up operations of the poisoning of Alexei Navalny with a Novichok-type nerve agent in Tomsk on 20 August 2020, which constitutes a use of chemical weapons under the Chemical Weapons Convention. Furthermore, he admitted to his involvement in at least one other poisoning attempt against Navalny in 2017.</p> <p>Therefore, Konstantin Kudryavtsev was involved in preparations for the use of chemical weapons as well as in the use of chemical weapons.</p>	14.11.2022
22. Stanislav Valentinovich MAKSHAKOV (Станислав Валентинович МАКШАКОВ)	Gender: male; Date of birth: 1966; Nationality: Russian	<p>Stanislav Makshakov is a military scientist and Deputy Director of the Criminalistics Institute of the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB), which conducted operations to closely monitor the activities of Alexei Navalny over a long period of time. In his capacity as Deputy Director of the Criminalistics Institute, Stanislav Makshakov was the commander of the team of operatives involved in the preparations and execution of the poisoning of Alexei Navalny with a Novichok-type nerve in Tomsk on 20 August 2020, which constitutes a use of chemical weapons under the Chemical Weapons Convention.</p>	14.11.2022

▼ M7

Name	Identifying information	Grounds for designation	Date of listing
		<p>Therefore, Stanislav Makshakov was involved in preparations for the use of chemical weapons, he is responsible for the use of chemical weapons and he provided technical and material support for using chemical weapons.</p>	
<p>23. Vladimir Mikhailovich BOGDANOV (Владимир Михайлович БОГДАНОВ)</p>	<p>Gender: male; Date of birth: 17.7.1958; Place of birth: Moscow, Russian Federation; Nationality: Russian</p>	<p>Vladimir Bogdanov is the Head of Special Technology Centre of the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB), which is the parent entity of the Criminalistics Institute. In that capacity, Vladimir Bogdanov oversees and controls the activities of those entities.</p> <p>The FSB conducted operations to closely monitor the activities of Alexei Navalny over a long period of time, including during his journey to Tomsk where Navalny was poisoned with a Novichok-type nerve on 20 August 2020. That poisoning constitutes a use of chemical weapons under the Chemical Weapons Convention.</p> <p>Vladimir Bogdanov, in his capacity as the Head of Special Technology Centre of the FSB, provided the operational framework and direction to conduct the surveillance and the assassination attempt against Alexey Navalny.</p> <p>Therefore, he was involved in preparations for the use of chemical weapons, he is responsible for the use of chemical weapons and he provided technical and material support for using chemical weapons.</p>	14.11.2022
<p>24. Chadi HOURANIEH</p>	<p>Gender: male; Date of birth: 29.5.1979; Place of birth: Damascus, Syria; Nationality: Canadian</p>	<p>Chadi Houranieh is the co-owner of MHD Nazier Houranieh & Sons Co company, which operates in the metals industry and supplies the Syrian Studies and Research Centre (SSRC) with materials used in the manufacture of chemical weapons delivery systems.</p> <p>Therefore, Chadi Houranieh is responsible for providing material support for manufacturing chemical weapons and is engaged in preparations for the use of chemical weapons and thus contributes to the continued threat posed by the proliferation and use of chemical weapons.</p>	14.11.2022

▼ M7

Name	Identifying information	Grounds for designation	Date of listing
25. Mohammad Nazier HOURANIEH	Gender: male; Date of birth: 6.5.1976; Place of birth: Damascus, Syria; Nationality: Canadian	Mohammad Nazier Houranieh is the co-owner of MHD Nazier Houranieh & Sons Co company, which operates in the metals industry and supplies the Syrian Studies and Research Centre (SSRC) with materials used in the manufacture of chemical weapons delivery systems. Therefore, Mohammad Nazier Houranieh is responsible for providing material support for manufacturing chemical weapons and is engaged in preparations for the use of chemical weapons and thus contributes to the continued threat posed by the proliferation and use of chemical weapons.	14.11.2022

▼ M1

B. LEGAL PERSONS, ENTITIES AND BODIES

Name	Identifying information	Grounds for designation	Date of listing
1. Scientific Studies and Research Centre (SSRC)	a.k.a.: Centre d'Études et de Recherches Scientifiques (CERS), Centre de Recherche de Kaboun Address: Barzeh Street, Po Box 4470, Damascus	The Scientific Studies and Research Centre (SSRC) is the Syrian regime's principal entity for the development of chemical weapons. The SSRC is responsible for the development and production of chemical weapons, as well as the missiles to deliver them, operating at a number of sites in Syria.	21.1.2019

▼ M4

2. State Scientific Research Institute for Organic Chemistry and Technology (GosNIIOKhT) (Государственный научно-исследовательский институт органической химии и технологии)	Address: Shosse Entuziastov 23, 11 124 Moscow, Moscow Oblast, Russia; Phone: +7 (495) 673 7530; Fax: +7 (495) 673 2218; Web: http://gosniiokht.ru E-mail: dir@gosniiokht.ru	The State Scientific Research Institute for Organic Chemistry and Technology (GosNIIOKhT) is a state research institute with the responsibility for the destruction of chemical weapons stocks inherited from the Soviet Union. The institute in its original role before 1994 was involved in the development and production of chemical weapons including the toxic nerve agent now known as 'Novichok'. After 1994, the same facility took part in the government's programme for the destruction of the stocks of chemical weapons inherited from the Soviet Union.	15.10.2020
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▼ M4

Name	Identifying information	Grounds for designation	Date of listing
		<p>On 20 August 2020, Alexei Navalny was taken seriously ill and admitted to a hospital in Omsk, Russian Federation. On 22 August 2020, he was transported to a hospital in Berlin, Germany. A specialised laboratory in Germany subsequently found clear evidence, also corroborated by laboratories in France and Sweden, that Alexei Navalny had been poisoned with a toxic nerve agent of the Novichok group. This toxic agent is accessible only to State authorities in the Russian Federation.</p> <p>The deployment of a toxic nerve agent of the Novichok group would therefore only be possible due to the failure of the Institute to carry out its responsibility to destroy the stockpiles of chemical weapons.</p>	

▼ M7

3. MHD Nazier Houranieh & Sons Co	<p>Address: Zoukak Al Jin Abed Al Rahman Bn Al Kassem Street. Damascus, Syria;</p> <p>Phone: (+963) 11-2210758, (+963) 11-2224349;</p> <p>Fax: (+963) 11-2235892;</p> <p>Web: https://houranieh.com/</p> <p>Email: info@houranieh.com</p>	<p>MHD Nazier Houranieh & Sons Co is a company operating in the metals industry and supplies the Syrian Studies and Research Centre (SSRC) with materials used in the manufacture of chemical weapons delivery systems.</p> <p>Therefore, MHD Nazier Houranieh & Sons Co provides material support for manufacturing chemical weapons and is engaged in preparations for the use of chemical weapons and thus contributes to the continued threat posed by the proliferation and use of chemical weapons.</p>	14.11.2022
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▼ B*ANNEX II***WEBSITES FOR INFORMATION ON THE COMPETENT
AUTHORITIES AND ADDRESS FOR NOTIFICATIONS TO THE
COMMISSION****▼ M5****BELGIUM**

https://diplomatie.belgium.be/en/policy/policy_areas/peace_and_security/sanctions

BULGARIA

<https://www.mfa.bg/en/EU-sanctions>

CZECHIA

www.financnianalytickyrad.cz/mezinarodni-sankce.html

DENMARK

<http://um.dk/da/Udenrigspolitik/folkeretten/sanktioner/>

GERMANY

<https://www.bmwi.de/Redaktion/DE/Artikel/Aussenwirtschaft/embargos-aussenwirtschaftsrecht.html>

ESTONIA

<https://vm.ee/et/rahvusvahelised-sanktsioonid>

IRELAND

<https://www.dfa.ie/our-role/policies/ireland-in-the-eu/eu-restrictive-measures/>

GREECE

<http://www.mfa.gr/en/foreign-policy/global-issues/international-sanctions.html>

SPAIN

<https://www.exteriores.gob.es/es/PoliticaExterior/Paginas/SancionesInternacionales.aspx>

FRANCE

<http://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/fr/autorites-sanctions/>

CROATIA

<https://mvep.gov.hr/vanjska-politika/medjunarodne-mjere-ogranicavanja/22955>

ITALY

https://www.esteri.it/it/politica-estera-e-cooperazione-allo-sviluppo/politica_europea/misure_deroghe/

CYPRUS

<https://mfa.gov.cy/themes/>

LATVIA

<http://www.mfa.gov.lv/en/security/4539>

LITHUANIA

<http://www.urm.lt/sanctions>

▼ M5

LUXEMBOURG

<https://maee.gouvernement.lu/fr/directions-du-ministere/affaires-europeennes/organisations-economiques-int/mesures-restrictives.html>

HUNGARY

<https://kormany.hu/kulgazdasagi-es-kulugyminiszterium/ensz-eu-szankcios-tajekoztato>

MALTA

<https://foreignandeu.gov.mt/en/Government/SMB/Pages/SMB-Home.aspx>

NETHERLANDS

<https://www.rijksoverheid.nl/onderwerpen/internationale-sancties>

AUSTRIA

<https://www.bmeia.gv.at/themen/aussenpolitik/europa/eu-sanktionen-nationale-behoerden/>

POLAND

<https://www.gov.pl/web/dyplomacja/sankcje-miedzynarodowe>

<https://www.gov.pl/web/diplomacy/international-sanctions>

PORTUGAL

<https://www.portaldiplomatico.mne.gov.pt/politica-externa/medidas-restritivas>

ROMANIA

<http://www.mae.ro/node/1548>

SLOVENIA

http://www.mzz.gov.si/si/omejevalni_ukrepi

SLOVAKIA

https://www.mzv.sk/europske_zalezitosti/europske_politiky-sankcie_eu

FINLAND

<https://um.fi/pakotteet>

SWEDEN

<https://www.regeringen.se/sanktioner>

Address for notifications to the European Commission:

European Commission

Directorate-General for Financial Stability, Financial Services and Capital Markets Union (DG FISMA)

Rue de Spa 2

B-1049 Brussels, Belgium

E-mail: relex-sanctions@ec.europa.eu