Contents

I Resolutions, recommendations and opinions

RESOLUTIONS

Joint Parliamentary Assembly of the Partnership Agreement concluded between the members of the African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States, of the one part, and the European Union and its Member States, of the other part

35th session — Brussels (Belgium), 18-20 June 2018

2018/C 415/01 Resolution on ACP-EU relations post-Cotonou: a strong parliamentary dimension

2018/C 415/02 Resolution on the impact of the illegal trade in phytosanitary products, seeds and other agricultural inputs on ACP countries' economies

2018/C 415/03 Resolution on the social and environmental consequences of urbanisation, particularly the sound management of industrial and domestic waste in ACP countries

2018/C 415/04 Resolution on the urgency of new measures to fight international terrorism

2018/C 415/05 Resolution on the humanitarian crisis in South Sudan

IV Notices

NOTICES FROM EUROPEAN UNION INSTITUTIONS, BODIES, OFFICES AND AGENCIES

Joint Parliamentary Assembly of the Partnership Agreement concluded between the members of the African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States, of the one part, and the European Union and its Member States, of the other part

35th session — Brussels (Belgium), 18-20 June 2018

2018/C 415/06 Answers from the Commission to written questions
I

(Resolutions, recommendations and opinions)

RESOLUTIONS


35th session — Brussels (Belgium), 18-20 June 2018

RESOLUTION (1)

on ACP-EU relations post-Cotonou: a strong parliamentary dimension

(2018/C 415/01)

The ACP-EU Joint Parliamentary Assembly,

— meeting in Brussels (Belgium) from 18 to 20 June 2018,

— having regard to the Partnership Agreement between the members of the African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States of the one part, and the European Community and its Member States, of the other part, signed in Cotonou on 23 June 2000 (the Cotonou Agreement) (2), and to its revisions of 2005 and 2010 (3),

— having regard to the Georgetown Agreement of 1975 setting up the ACP Group, and to its revision of 1992 (4),

— having regard to the Joint Africa-EU Strategy, adopted by the African and European Heads of State and Government at the Lisbon summit on 9 December 2007 (5),

— having regard to the 7th Summit of Heads of State and Government of the ACP countries on 13 and 14 December 2011 in Malabo,

— having regard to its resolution of 9 December 2015 on forty years of partnership: evaluation of the impact on trade and development in the ACP countries and prospects for enduring relations between the ACP countries and the European Union (6),

— having regard to its resolutions on ACP-EU relations, in particular that of 11 February 2015 on the work of the Joint Parliamentary Assembly (JPA) (7),

— having regard to its declaration of 21 December 2016 on the parliamentary dimension of post-Cotonou ACP-EU relations (8),

(1) Adopted by the ACP-EU Joint Parliamentary Assembly on 20 June 2018 in Brussels (Belgium).
(3) OJ L 287, 4.11.2010, p. 3.
(6) OJ C 179, 18.5.2016, p. 29.
(8) OJ C 170, 30.5.2017, p. 36.
— having regard to the joint statement of 9 December 2015 by the Co-Presidents of the ACP-EU Joint Parliamentary Assembly on the future of ACP-EU relations (9),

— having regard to the 103rd and 105th meetings of the ACP Council of Ministers on, respectively, 26 and 27 April 2016 in Dakar and 3 and 4 May 2017 in Brussels,

— having regard to the European Parliament resolution of 4 October 2016 on the future of ACP-EU relations beyond 2020 (10),

— having regard to the European Consensus on Development, adopted in Brussels on 7 June 2017 (11),

— having regard to the European Commission recommendation of 12 December 2017 for a Council Decision authorising the opening of negotiations on a Partnership Agreement between the European Union and the countries of the Africa, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States (12),

— having regard to the Joint Communication of the European Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy to the European Parliament and the Council of 22 November 2016: A renewed partnership with the countries of Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific (13),

— having regard to the Joint Consultation Paper of the European Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 6 October 2015: Towards a new partnership between the European Union and the African, Caribbean and Pacific countries after 2020 (14),

— having regard to the opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee adopted on 12 May 2016 on the future of the EU’s relations with the ACP Group of States (15),

— having regard to the United Nations Summit on Sustainable Development and the outcome document adopted by the UN General Assembly on 25 September 2015: Transforming our world: the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development (16),

— having regard to the Agenda 2063 adopted by the African Union Commission in April 2015 (17), having regard to the Communiqué of the 20th Meeting of the CARICOM Council for Foreign and Community Relations (COFCOR) held in Bridgetown Barbados on 18 — 19 May 2017,

— having regard to the outcomes of the 107th session of the ACP Council of Ministers on 29 May 2018 and the 43rd session of the ACP-EU Council of Ministers on 1 June 2018 in Lomé, Togo,

— having regard to the Waigani communiqué on the future perspectives of the ACP Group adopted by the 8th Summit of the ACP Heads of State and Government,

— having regard to the report of the Committee on Political Affairs (ACP-EU/102.400/fin.),

A. whereas the Cotonou Partnership Agreement (CPA) has been successful in the creation of a legally-binding reciprocal partnership between the EU and the ACP Group;

B. whereas the role of the JPA as laid out in the CPA is to facilitate greater understanding between the peoples of the EU and those of the ACP States, to raise public awareness on a wide range of topics, promote democratic processes through dialogue and consultation, ensure consistent monitoring of the CPA, and advocate for the empowerment of ACP national parliaments;

C. whereas the JPA has the merit of creating a cross-border framework for parliamentary debate on a large scale, and whereas, despite its imperfections, it is a valuable asset in an increasingly interconnected and interdependent world;

(13) JOIN(2016) 52 final.
(16) UN General Assembly resolution A/RES/70/1.
D. whereas the future negotiations on the ACP-EU relationship must be an opportunity to develop a vision and to give the relationship a political dimension;

E. whereas the Georgetown Agreement of 7 June 1975 needs to be revised in order to broaden and strengthen the foundations of the ACP Group with a view to responding to the challenges and geopolitical upheavals of the 21st century and to furthering multilateralism;

F. whereas the ‘three pillar’ approach of the CPA has enjoyed mixed results, with undeniable successes in the field of development and a clear contribution to the advancement of the Millennium Development Goals, but whereas substantial scope for improvement remains regarding political cooperation;

G. whereas the future agreement must move towards strengthening the partnership and boosting integration;

H. whereas both the EU and the ACP Group have undergone a substantial political and economic transformation since the ratification of the CPA, notably with the ACP Group displaying increased heterogeneity;

I. whereas the post-Cotonou agreement between the EU and the ACP Group must be complementary with wider EU and ACP strategies, such as the Global Strategy on the EU’s Foreign and Security Policy, the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and Agenda 2063;

J. whereas the issue of the financing of the new partnership needs to be addressed and negotiated as a priority, including the question of the inclusion of the European Development Fund in the EU budget;

K. whereas reinforcing the parliamentary dimension between the EU and the ACP Group and promoting its guiding role in decision-making should be a key element of the new ACP- EU partnership;

L. whereas the frequency and variety of JPA meetings has enabled consistent dialogue between EP and ACP Members, thus consolidating its legitimacy and strengthening parliamentary diplomacy, and whereas the JPA has been used as a model of parliamentary diplomacy in various political forums;

M. whereas the JPA's fact finding and joint election observation missions are sometimes considered politically useful, as they facilitate, on account of parity, frank, effective and direct dialogue between partners on subjects including democracy, the rule of law, good governance and human rights;

N. whereas the objective of the JPA should be to engage the public interest, and whereas, as the parliamentary body of the partnership, it should not become a forum for clashes between states or between geographical areas, but rather a forum for constructive, transparent, accountable and effective cooperation, especially since the states and geographical areas are no longer always the appropriate level for tackling the many challenges — hence the need to improve effectiveness regarding the implementation of the JPA’s decisions;

O. whereas there is a lack of presence and diligence in Brussels meetings of the JPA from certain EP Members, which has led to the weakening of the continuity of the JPA’s work, and indeed a questioning of its relevance, which would be extremely damaging;

P. whereas there is a significant gender imbalance within the JPA and a distinct lack of younger Members;

Q. whereas the ACP Secretariat lacks human and financial resources in comparison to the EP Secretariat and whereas ACP Members have complained of a perceived lack of leverage and expressed a desire for more meaningful input in the drafting process;

1. Calls for an overarching, legally-binding ACP-EU framework, in order that the future partnership may build on previous achievements, the United Nation’s Agenda 2030 and binding guidelines for fair and equitable trade, while ensuring significant improvements so as to further promote sustainable economic development in ACP countries;

2. Considers that the existing ACP framework should remain the ‘centre of gravity’ for a future partnership that will cover all three regions of Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific Islands while reinforcing the role of each one of them and taking into account their growing specificities, through the proposed legally-binding regional compacts;
3. Reiterates the importance of strengthening the parliamentary dimension of the future agreement, ensuring a real consultative power for the future overarching JPA; requests that its legal and operational autonomy be guaranteed; demands that the Assembly be closely associated with the implementation of the agreement and that it be regularly consulted on all matters of importance for the partnership;

4. Emphasises that the reinforcement of the political dimension of the CPA should be a prerequisite for the setting-up of the new future partnership, including in the form of enhanced parliamentary scrutiny accompanied by sufficient funding to allow for the adequate realisation of parliamentary activities;

5. Insists that Agenda 2030, the Sustainable Development Goals, the European Consensus on Development and Agenda 2063 must be at the heart of the renewed ACP-EU partnership and that their implementation should drive the activities of the JPA; believes that the JPA should produce regular updates on progress in SDG attainment and envisages establishing a mechanism for sharing best practices;

6. Recognises the increased importance of regional organisations and sub-regional integration within the ACP Group and believes this should be reflected in the architecture of the post-Cotonou partnership; calls, in this context, for more frequent JPA regional meetings to address region-specific issues, strengthen dialogue with regional and sub-regional institutions and focus more strongly on the specificity and sensitivities of each regional bloc; stresses, however, the need for coherence and complementarity between the sub-regional, regional and global strategies;

7. Requests that meetings between EU and ACP Members at the level of the regional compacts be held at least once a year in each region, and that they be complemented by a forum for women and young people;

8. Believes that the JPA should be fully involved in the negotiations for a reinforced political ACP-EU partnership after 2020 and that the essential role and prerogatives of the JPA should be redefined in order to maximise its efficiency and guarantee its legal and operational autonomy;

9. Recalls that it shall be immediately and fully informed at all stages of the negotiating procedure;

10. Calls for the consolidation of parliamentary diplomacy, particularly through the JPA's fact-finding and election observation missions and joint observation missions on security issues as they are key instruments for democratic capacity-building, and encourages the JPA to make better use of its space for dialogue and negotiation, so as to facilitate joint action and the building of effective ACP-EU coalitions in the international arena;

11. Calls for the future agreement to be negotiated by a unified entity consisting of the African, Caribbean and Pacific States represented in a single undertaking;

12. Considers that the parliamentary dimension could be reinforced by having trainees in the cabinets of the European members of the ACP-EU JPA;

13. Reaffirms its commitment to the principle of subsidiarity, which encourages decision making as close as possible to citizens, at the most relevant level of responsibility, be it national, regional, continental, or ACP-wide; stresses that, in many areas, responsibility must be taken at all levels — from the most global, to ensure an effective, level playing field, to the most local — so that the objectives are achievable in practice;

14. Advocates for improved communication and synchronisation between the EU and the ACP Group and each of their members, notably by ensuring that both partners are properly assisted by a dedicated secretariat; stresses that the use of specific secretariats is for practical reasons, not a reflection of the EU and the ACP Group having fundamentally different interests requiring an administrative separation; calls, nevertheless, for close and sincere cooperation between the secretariats and between parliamentarians;

15. Requests, therefore, that the new agreement foresees that the Joint Parliamentary Assembly meets twice a year in plenary session, alternately in the European Union and in an ACP State, without the Assembly depending on the Council being convened;

16. Encourages reforms that increase the JPA's transparency and public profile in order to ensure that it is accountable to the citizens of the various Member States;
17. Is convinced that regular meetings at ACP-EU level are needed to provide continuity and stability for the partnership and to allow for regular reporting and peer reviews;

18. Urges all ACP-EU Member States to strive for gender balance in their delegations to the JPA, and encourages better inclusion of delegates under 40 years of age; urges delegations to ensure appropriate representation of opposition parties in order to foster genuine cross-party parliamentary dialogue;

19. Requests that EP Members attend and be actively involved in all JPA activities; calls for the adoption of strict rules to ensure their participation in all JPA meetings and votes;

20. Calls upon the JPA’s Member States to guarantee consistent and predictable funding for the ACP Parliamentary Assembly and Co-Secretariat, to improve the overall capacity of the JPA;

21. Calls for a more active role for non-state actors, including civil society organisations and the local and regional private sector, in ACP-EU decision-making; insists that the new JPA structure include formal participation from civil society organisations at regional and ACP-EU level; emphasises that these actors should be involved in all ACP-EU decisions and activities in compliance with a multi-stakeholder approach; recalls, in this context, the need to ensure that the principles of transparency and democracy are respected within the organisations concerned; calls for the JPA to include regular, specific events focusing on women and young people;

22. Stresses that the fact that the EP Conference of Presidents is entitled to oppose the missions of the EP-component to the JPA meetings, although justified by budgetary constraints or security concerns, may hamper the legal and operational autonomy of the JPA; calls for the legal autonomy of the JPA to be ensured and for the decision-making process for all official activities of the JPA to be reviewed;

23. Calls on any EU Member State holding the EU Council Presidency by rotation to involve itself more deeply in the preparation, organisation and hosting of the JPA session as provided for in the current CPA, and furthermore stresses the added value of holding the JPA sessions in the EU Member State holding the EU Council Presidency by rotation;

24. Instructs its Co-Presidents to forward this resolution to the ACP-EU Council of Ministers, the European Parliament, the European Commission, the African Union, the regional organisations of the ACP States and the Secretary General of the United Nations.
RESOLUTION (1)

on the impact of the illegal trade in phytosanitary products, seeds and other agricultural inputs on
ACP countries’ economies

(2018/C 415/02)

The ACP-EU Joint Parliamentary Assembly,

— meeting in Brussels (Belgium) on 18-20 June 2018,

— having regard to Article 18(1) of its Rules of Procedure,

— having regard to the Partnership Agreement between the members of the African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States of the one part, and the European Community and its Member States, of the other part, signed in Cotonou on 23 June 2000 (the Cotonou Agreement) (2), as amended in 2005 and 2010 (3),

— having regard to the United Nations Summit on Sustainable Development and its outcome document adopted by the General Assembly on 25 September 2015 entitled ‘Transforming our world: the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development’, and in particular to Goal 2 of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) set out therein, namely to end hunger, achieve food security and improved nutrition and promote sustainable agriculture (4),

— having regard to report A/HRC/16/49 of the UN Special Rapporteur on the right to food of 8 March 2011 entitled ‘Agroecology and the right to food’,

— having regard to the ACP-EU Joint Parliamentary Assembly Resolution of 21 December 2016 on challenges for family farming and small-scale agriculture production in ACP countries,

— having regard to the European Parliament resolution of 15 February 2017 on low-risk pesticides of biological origin (5),

— having regard to paragraph 56 of the Joint statement by the Council and the representatives of the governments of the Member States meeting within the Council, the European Parliament and the Commission on the new European Consensus on Development entitled ‘Our World, Our Dignity, Our Future’ of 30 June 2017 (6),

— having regard to Regulation (EU) 2016/2031 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 October 2016 on protective measures against pests of plants (7),


— having regard to Regulation (EU) No 528/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 May 2012 concerning the making available on the market and use of biocidal products (11),


(1) Adopted by the ACP-EU Joint Parliamentary Assembly on 20 June 2018 in Brussels (Belgium).
(3) OJ L 287, 4.11.2010, p. 3.
(4) UN General Assembly resolution A/RES/70/1.
— having regard to the decisions (13), resolutions and declaration adopted at the 106th session of the ACP Council of Ministers, held on 5-6 December 2017,

— having regard to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Resolution 70/1 of the United Nations General Assembly of 25 September 2015 and the outcome document of the sustainable development summit entitled ‘Transforming our world: the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development’, and in particular, Sustainable Development Goal No 2,

— having regard to the International Plant Protection Convention (IPPC) of the UN Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO), adopted in 1952 to prevent the introduction and spread of organisms harmful to plants (14),

— having regard to the International Labour Organisation (ILO) conventions on safety and health in agriculture, in particular Convention No 170 concerning Safety in the Use of Chemicals at Work (15), and Convention No 184 concerning Safety and Health in Agriculture (16),

— having regard to Report A/HRC/34/48 of the UN Special Rapporteur on the right to food, of 24 January 2017 (17),

— having regard to the UN FAO’s and World Health Organisation’s International Code of Conduct on Pesticide Management. Guidelines on Highly Hazardous Pesticides (Rome, March 2016),

— having regard to the World Health Organisation (WTO) Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS Agreement) of 1995 (18) and the International Code of Conduct on Management of phytosanitary products, pesticides, seeds and other inputs (PPPSIs),

— having regard to the declaration of the 9th WTO Ministerial Conference, held on 3-6 December 2013 in Bali, on public stockholding for food security purposes (19),

— having regard to the 2009 report by the International Assessment of Agricultural Knowledge, Science and Technology for Development (IAASTD) entitled ‘Agriculture at a Crossroads’ (20),

— having regard to the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Network on Illegal trade of Pesticides,

— having regard to the report of the Committee on Economic Development, Finance and Trade (ACP-EU/xxxxxx),

A. whereas agriculture plays a key role in sustainable development, poverty reduction and the eradication of hunger in ACP countries;

B. whereas the recommendations made by the UN Special Rapporteur on the right to food in his 2011 report entitled ‘Agroecology and the right to food’ show that agroecology has the power to double food production in entire regions within 10 years while mitigating climate change and biodiversity loss and alleviating rural poverty;

C. whereas the development of intensive agriculture is dependent on scientific research — which is for the most part controlled by the agricultural chemicals and pharmaceutical industries — and the use of chemical substances, such as phytosanitary products or pesticides, seeds and other agricultural inputs;

D. whereas the international community has introduced a number of legislative instruments establishing the international consensus on PPPSIs necessary for trade, food safety and human health; whereas, however, the use of illicit goods in food, notably illicit pesticides, around the world is growing and involves highly sophisticated criminal networks and organised crime;

(13) Decision No 12/CVI/18 concerning non-tariff barriers
(14) http://www.ippc.int/en/history-of-the-ippc/
(17) http://www.cms.int/sites/default/files/document/UN-Human%20Rights%20Council_AHRC3448_Adverse%20effects%20of%20pesticides.pdf
(18) https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/sps_e/spsgag_e.htm
(19) https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/minist_e/mc9_e/desc38_e.htm
E. whereas the FAO and WHO estimate that in excess of 30% of the pesticides sold each year in developing countries do not meet international standards and are often incorrectly labelled or not identified;

F. whereas a wide range of illicit products are on the market, including substances not approved by the local authorities and counterfeit, expired or adulterated products with falsified packaging or labelling;

G. whereas the uncontrolled use of PPPSIs has a damaging impact on the environment, human health and the economy of the countries concerned;

H. whereas the most obvious risks concern human health, particularly ENT diseases and diseases affecting the skin, the lungs and the digestive system, as well as cancer, the main victims being young people and women, of whom the highest numbers are in sectors of the food production sector in which PPPSIs are used;

I. whereas the report of the UN Special Rapporteur on the right to food shows that PPPSIs cause the death of some 200,000 people each year as a result of acute poisoning, with 99% of cases occurring in developing countries;

J. whereas the use of pesticides that do not comply with international standards also undermines trust in agricultural products, and therefore also the potential for the further development of exports;

K. whereas legal agrochemicals including pesticides present safety challenges and health hazards throughout their product cycles, with the most severe potentially adverse consequences occurring during the storage, transportation and distribution, use and disposal stages; whereas the governments of ACP countries face major constraints in the development of an effective regulatory framework for PPPSIs, such as lack of data, insufficient budgets and human resources and inadequate implementation of laws, something that gives rise to large-scale trafficking in PPPSIs;

L. whereas the illicit trade reduces possible tax revenues, hampers cash flow control and weakens trust in public institutions, hence contributing to suboptimal access to foreign capital, higher-risk premiums for investments in domestic assets and a slower pace of economic development;

M. whereas most ACP countries have no legislation governing PPPSIs, and those that do have failed to establish appropriate and strict rules to deter trafficking in these products;

N. whereas many users of PPPSIs lack the requisite level of training or education to understand the technical characteristics of these products, and are thus unaware of their harmful effects on health, the economy and the environment;

O. whereas the global liberalisation of agricultural markets, the low price of illegal PPPSIs, the lack of training and knowledge among users and inadequate legislation and oversight by ACP countries go some way to explaining the proliferation of these illegal products on ACP markets;

1. Takes the view that it is essential to draw up a clear strategy to tackle the illegal trade in PPPSIs and to promote food security by supporting technological solutions leading to the development of local seeds appropriate to a given climate or geographical area, and producing organic PPPSIs; adds that this strategy should be based on support for agroecology and family farming which respects the environment and helps develop the social and solidarity-based economy;

2. Urges the EU and the Member States to make operational the commitment made in the European Consensus on Development to support agroecology, including through the agriculture investment window of the European Investment Plan and the European Fund for Sustainable Development, and by reflecting this commitment in the next multiannual financial framework, in order to implement the spirit of the 2030 Agenda and the Paris Climate Agreement;

3. Notes that in order to benefit from the possibilities offered by PPPSIs the development of agriculture, ACP countries should:

(a) familiarise themselves with the international and national regulatory frameworks governing PPPSIs;

(b) address a number of structural challenges hampering the legal and effective promotion of these products;
(c) identify the risks associated with PPPSIs in order to prevent, manage the impact of and ultimately eradicate the illegal trade in PPPSIs on their respective economies;

(d) ban fumigation and lay down strict rules to protect water and biodiversity;

(e) lay down strict rules to protect the health of workers exposed to PPPSIs — with special attention being paid to women — and with a view to providing training for medical staff on the health effects of PPPSIs;

4. Calls for the use of organic fertilisers to be promoted and for agricultural practices using reasonable quantities of lawful PPPSIs to be adopted; calls, at the same time, on the ACP countries to reflect on the use of substances which, although legal, have been proven to have harmful effects on the environment, biodiversity and human health;

5. Stresses the need to consolidate public scientific and technological expertise, that is independent of businesses, to help identify the actors and organised crime groups and networks involved in the illicit trade in PPPSIs, and to take concrete action to prevent and combat the importation, sale and use of illicit pesticides;

6. Stresses the need for governmental control of externalities caused by improper use of PPPSIs;

7. Calls for a ban on all PPPSIs that are harmful to bees and pollinators;

8. Emphasises the need for a thoroughgoing review of the marketing authorisation criteria for PPPSIs, ensuring that the procedure is based on data and scientific evidence that is independent of industry, and that the precautionary principle prevails in all circumstances;

9. Emphasises the need to establish measures to punish those responsible, within companies and administrations, for any concealment or manipulation of data for the purposes of obtaining a marketing authorisation;

10. Calls for meaningful action to address trafficking and food insecurity through technical and financial assistance, and through tough action on the part of EU Member States to tackle the export, or transit through their territory, of counterfeit PPPSIs;

11. Reiterates the urgent need for awareness-raising and training for farmers, small-scale producers and traders so that they appreciate the problem of illicit PPPSIs, their ineffectiveness and the danger they pose;

12. Notes the importance of disseminating information about PPPSIs so as to enable producers, users and consumers to adopt prudent safety practices; takes the view that, to this end, awareness-raising should have a collective focus, and not be restricted to the professionals concerned;

13. Stresses that ACP governments need to take measures to promote and reinforce legislation, in particular by creating a specific offence in order to establish criminal penalties for offenders, control the flow of illicit PPPSIs both within and outside their borders and set up laboratories and granaries at national level suitable for conserving local crops, which are more resistant to the local climate;

14. Urges companies manufacturing and selling the products concerned to provide them in forms suitable for ACP farmers in terms of volume, concentration and packaging so as to facilitate their use, reduce their cost and minimise the risk of exposure, inhalation and ingestion; recommends that efficient waste disposal processes be organised in order to achieve these goals;

15. Emphasises the need to bring in genuinely dissuasive criminal penalties for the distribution and sale of counterfeit or fake products, or products that do not comply with the legislation in force;

16. Calls for stronger international cooperation with a view to determining measures to impose harsher penalties for the production, export or import of counterfeit or illicit products, and for failure to comply with intellectual property rules;
17. Calls on the ACP countries and the EU Member States to step up their mutual administrative support on customs matters in order to identify, as clearly as possible, the transport routes and storage locations used for counterfeit or adulterated PPPSIs, and to take joint action to close them down, in particular by monitoring deliveries and setting up joint investigation teams;

18. Supports strengthening the regional approach in order to tackle counterfeiting more effectively since it is essential to establish regional laboratories in ACP countries and to enhance regional customs cooperation and information exchange networks on PPPSIs between ACP countries in the same region;

19. Emphasises that regional cooperation, in particular when it includes the mutual recognition of type-approvals, makes it possible to ensure safe and sound free movement, which is vital for a regional and continental market;

20. Advocates establishing, as part of ACP-EU cooperation, a common fund for public research that guarantees independence from industry, and development in the various sectors making up the field of agronomy, including secondary and higher education on agriculture, which would be used to strengthen the capacity of ACP countries to set up national PPPSI approval and certification processes, as well as information and training plans for farmers on organic crops;

21. Calls for the introduction of a mandatory, effective and rigorous public system for quality control and the destruction of poor stocks, in accordance with WHO and FAO specifications as well as a PPPSI traceability mechanism in order to determine their composition and their origin and identify them;

22. Instructs its Co-Presidents to forward this resolution to the ACP-EU Council of Ministers, the European Parliament, the European Commission, the European Council, the African Union, the Pan-African Parliament, the regional and national parliaments, the regional organisations relating to ACP countries, the European Investment Bank and the World Bank.
RESOLUTION (1)

on the social and environmental consequences of urbanisation, particularly the sound management of industrial and domestic waste in ACP countries

(2018/C 415/03)

The ACP-EU Joint Parliamentary Assembly,
— meeting in Brussels (Belgium) from 18 to 20 June 2018,
— having regard to the Partnership Agreement between the members of the African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States, of the one part, and the European Community and its Member States, of the other part, signed in Cotonou on 23 June 2000 (the Cotonou Agreement), and to subsequent revisions to the agreement adopted in 2005 and 2010 (2),
— having regard to its resolution of 20 December 2017 on the blue economy: opportunities and challenges for ACP States,
— having regard to the waste management policies, strategies, acts and regulations enacted by ACP States and regions, such as the Secretariat of the Pacific Regional Environment Programme (Cleaner Pacific 2025 (2016)), Rwanda (2015), South Africa (2009), Nigeria (2007), Jamaica (2002), Uganda (1999), Gambia (1994) and Barbados (1985), among others,
— having regard to the Commission report of 29 November 2011 entitled 'Implementing EU Waste Legislation for Green Growth' (5),
— having regard to the Commission report of 1 April 2011 entitled ‘Plastic waste in the environment’ (6),
— having regard to the Stockholm Convention on the Prior Informed Consent Procedure for certain hazardous chemicals and pesticides in international trade of 10 September 1998,

(1) Adopted by the ACP-EU Joint Parliamentary Assembly on 20 June 2018 in Brussels (Belgium).
(2) OJ L 287, 4.11.2010, p. 3.
(6) OJ L 312, 22.11.2008, p. 3.
(9) OJ L 226, 6.9.2000, p. 3.
— having regard to the Bamako Convention on the Ban of the Import into Africa and the Control of Transboundary Movement and Management of Hazardous Wastes within Africa of 30 January 1991,

— having regard to the Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and their Disposal of 22 March 1989,

— having regard to the Global Programme of Action for the Protection of the Marine Environment from Land-Based Activities, adopted by 108 governments and the European Commission,

— having regard to the conclusions of the 2nd ACP/EC/UN-Habitat Tripartite Conference on Sustainable Urbanisation as a Response to Urban Poverty Alleviation,

— having regard to the UN-Habitat Note on Urbanisation Challenges, Waste Management and Development of 14 February 2014 (12),

A. whereas pollution and its harmful effects on people’s health, the environment and the planet have often been neglected by governments and the international community, both the direct effects (such as the effects of air pollution on human health and of pesticide use on the environment and biodiversity) and the indirect effects (such as the pollution of soil in which crops are grown and the knock-on effects on human health);

B. whereas pollution is the largest environmental cause of disease and death in the world today, responsible for an estimated nine million premature deaths in 2015;

C. whereas 92% of all pollution-related mortality is seen in low- and medium-income countries and whereas, in some countries, the figures are very alarming;

D. whereas the United Nations has indicated that by 2014, the population living in urban areas in the world had reached 54% and is expected to reach 66% by 2050;

E. whereas Africa’s urban population is projected to grow by 54% by 2050;

F. whereas a growing urban population presents numerous challenges, but also has the potential to improve prosperity and development as well as the integration of ACP countries into global networks, thus increasing the chance of finding solutions to challenges;

G. whereas 62% of urban populations in Sub-Saharan Africa live in degraded suburbs, most often located in environmentally fragile areas, and without access to basic services such as water, sanitation, energy, transport and waste management systems; whereas those populations are therefore extremely exposed to pollution sources and to their consequences on the environment and health;

H. whereas strategies to reduce waste production should take priority, while recycling and processing of waste should be viewed only as fallback options;

I. whereas inadequate waste collection services and recycling systems, hazardous dumps and environmental damage — and the resulting risks to health — have an impact on the lives of millions of inhabitants in ACP States;

J. whereas poor waste management slows the economic and social development of ACP States, particularly their slums;

K. whereas lack of capacity to deal with industrial and domestic waste has severe negative consequences on the biodiversity of ACP countries, their particular ecosystems and the flora and fauna dependent on these ecosystems;

L. whereas in some ACP States, due to a lack of appropriate technology, infectious medical wastes and toxic industrial waste expose waste handlers to a wide array of risks;

M. whereas poor waste management practices, along with the lack of an efficient and sustainable waste management system, especially in rural areas, are the cause of persistent problems such as inefficient refuse collection, poor public compliance with waste sorting, and the uncontrolled open burning of waste;

N. whereas the Pacific islands have particular problems in dealing with untreated waste, particularly plastic waste;

O. whereas the widespread dumping of refuse in water bodies and uncontrolled dump sites aggravates the problems of generally low sanitation levels across the ACP States;

P. whereas the gap between waste management policy and legislation and actual waste management practices in ACP States is widening, due to ongoing capacity constraints or to the non-existence of management facilities for the different waste streams;

Q. whereas global consumption of electrical and electronic equipment is on the rise; whereas addressing the full life cycle of electrical and electronic equipment is central to the 2030 development agenda;

R. whereas many cities in EU Member States have had to address challenges caused by growing waste production and poor waste management in the past, but were able to find ways to cope, through a combination of educational campaigns and improved and better enforced legislation;

S. whereas countries, on occasion including EU Member States, have exported their hazardous and toxic waste to the ACP States since the 1970s; whereas the responsibility of the countries exporting such waste should be considered as important as that of the countries importing it;

T. whereas urban environments generate types of waste that often have serious implications for human health and environmental sustainability;

U. whereas, as already noted in the resolution of 20 December 2017 on the blue economy, efforts in waste management, particularly the implementation of the recommendations in the Global Programme of Action for the Protection of the Marine Environment, must be stepped up in order to preserve the potential of the blue economy; as marine pollution is largely caused by land-based factors, such as the accumulation of plastic waste;

V. whereas the goals for the blue economy, set out in the ACP-EU Joint Parliamentary Assembly resolution of 20 December 2017, include preserving the environment through joint action between ACP States and private sector stakeholders in a variety of areas, including proper and sustainable waste management;

W. whereas natural disasters such as earthquakes and hurricanes, which very often strike ACP States and, as regards hurricanes, at an intensity which is only likely to increase, given the effects of climate change, may lead to large amounts of waste being generated, which can result in unprecedented health risks to the population;

X. whereas urbanisation and poor waste management are also contributing to the pollution of our oceans and therefore have repercussions for local activities which rely on marine resources (fishing, tourism);

Y. whereas the fast-growing use of ICT and the rapid turnover in technology, particularly computers and mobile phones, creates growing electronic waste streams, particularly of rare and hazardous metals, for which sustainable waste management capacity has yet to be found and which accumulate along with municipal waste in dump sites;

Z. whereas efforts to improve the situation have not been enough to contend with rapid population growth and urbanisation; whereas per capita waste generation is increasing as economies grow;

AA. whereas, as noted at the United Nations Ocean Conference in June 2017, plastic use is one of the most pressing problems facing coastal areas and islands;

BB. whereas public authorities are ultimately responsible for ensuring the provision of adequate waste management services and the primary method of waste disposal in most ACP States is the ‘summon to bring’ system, which is managed at the municipal level;
CC. whereas in many ACP States waste management systems are constrained by the limited know-how concerning separate collection alternatives and the high cost factor involved in mixed waste collection, hence limiting recourse to the re-use, recycling and conversion alternatives;

DD. whereas current by-laws in most localities in ACP States place responsibility for waste management on municipalities that are insufficiently equipped to deal with collection and disposal, and such by-laws are now an impediment to investment in waste management by the private sector;

EE. whereas members of local civil society doing informal waste management work should be encouraged to regularise and formalise their work so that they can participate fully and officially in that economic activity;

FF. whereas, in some cases, the advent of private-sector operators has improved solid waste collection; whereas, however, a public authority with sufficient resources has every right to take primary responsibility for waste collection;

GG. whereas recycling efforts can improve urban environments while simultaneously generating income opportunities and improved livelihoods;

HH. whereas comprehensive waste management practices at national and local level reduce the damaging effects on human health and help health services to deal with the costs of these issues;

II. whereas the implementation and enforcement of waste regulations and conventions is severely constrained by the lack of good governance and transparency and, in some cases, by the prevalence of corruption;

1. Calls on the EU and the international community to actively support the development of national waste management strategies and a circular economy through adequate funding and monitoring, national capacity-building in low and middle income countries and by offering assistance, including technical and administrative expertise, in particular to ensure access for all to basic waste services, to stop uncontrolled dumping and burning, to bring hazardous waste under control and to focus on waste prevention (the 3Rs — reduce, reuse, recycle); calls on the national authorities, with the help of the European Union and with a view to creating jobs through special training, to establish a proper strategy;

2. Stresses that in order for waste legislation to have maximum impact, the creation of a mindset in which waste avoidance, waste reduction and waste collection are high priorities is crucial; recommends, to this end, that awareness and educational campaigns should be deployed in schools and among children in general;

3. Stresses that, according to the World Health Organisation (WHO), more than 12.6 million deaths each year are attributable to unhealthy environments, a figure set to skyrocket in the years to come owing to the population boom in Africa;

4. Recalls that public authorities are ultimately responsible for ensuring the provision of adequate waste management services; calls on the ACP States to create, where necessary, a Ministry for Urban Development and for the Environment, to implement urban development policy and to draw up urban development strategic plans and environmental action plans in close partnership with local authorities; stresses that the transition from a waste management policy to a resource management policy implies close cooperation across all levels of government, particularly with local governments, as well as the active support of the informal sector;

5. Insists that the most tangible results can be achieved at local level, through a combination of local regulations and waste collection and avoidance schemes adapted to local conditions, and with citizens’ involvement; recalls that national governments should assist these local areas, which are often under-financed and ill-equipped to exercise their responsibilities;

6. Calls on the EU to draw up rules for its companies to be effective partners in environmental management and to invest responsibly and with a view to sustainability in ACP States by taking into account the waste generation impact of their investments, as well as the opportunities to reuse or recycle the waste generated; stresses equally the need to build on existing small-scale entrepreneurial recycling schemes while eliminating hazardous working practices; stresses that companies should draw up a roadmap on how to manage the waste that they produce, with a view to including a management strategy in their investment projects;
7. Highlights the fact that rapid product innovation, miniaturisation and replacement, especially for information and communication technology (ICT) products and consumer equipment, are fuelling the increase in e-waste; is alarmed that improper and illegal e-waste traffic is prevalent in most developing countries, irrespective of whether or not national e-waste legislation exists; calls for a more coordinated approach to address the full potential of e-waste prevention, collection and treatment globally; calls on the EU and the ACP countries to engage more with the private sector to address business responsibility in the production of electrical and electronic equipment (EEE), particularly in the early stages of the life cycle of EEE, such as the acquisition of raw materials, design and production, as well as the repair, reuse and refurbishment of EEE;

8. Recalls that uncollected waste represents a serious public health issue in developing countries, particularly for children living in households without a waste collection service, while blocked drains aggravate floods and spread infectious diseases; is alarmed by the health and environmental impact of open dumping and burning (severe land pollution and freshwater, groundwater and sea pollution; local air pollution and climate change); highlights the fact that, according to the UNEP Global Waste Management Outlook (2015), the cost of inaction in developing countries (in terms of health care, lost productivity, flood damage, clean-up costs, etc.) exceeds the financial cost per capita of proper waste management by a factor of 5-10; urges the Commission, against this background, to provide proper incentives for public investments in the environmentally sound management of waste streams in the ACP States; stresses that any incentives to encourage private sector engagement should promote sustainability, job creation with full rights and wealth creation that will guarantee sustainable development; considers that incentives for investments could include the lowering of contributions, tax exemptions, incentives to encourage hiring, particularly of young people, and staff training, along with the exchange of good practices;

9. Calls on the Commission to launch, in cooperation with the ACP States, awareness-raising campaigns on sorting waste and responsible use of plastic bags, including through school education programmes;

10. Recalls that the development of national waste management strategies should take into account local biodiversity and ecosystems, which have significant ecological, cultural and aesthetic values, and upon which ACP countries are disproportionately dependent for food, water, health and tourism;

11. Notes with concern that, according to UNEP and Interpol, illegal trafficking of hazardous waste is one of the five major sectors of environmental crime; urges those ACP States that have yet to sign the Basel (13), Bamako (14), Stockholm (15) and Rotterdam (16) conventions to do so, and all the ACP States to initiate effective legislation which would ban the import and export of hazardous waste and punish its indiscriminate dumping, criminalising illicit waste trafficking; calls on the EU and its Member States to increase the share of ODA allocated to governance and judicial sector reform in order to combat and prevent environmental crime, especially in less-developed countries (LDCs);

12. Urges the ACP States which have yet to do so to formally ban the importing, manufacturing and sale on their territory of non-biodegradable plastic bags, which seriously harm the environment;

13. Calls on the ACP States, the European Union and the international community to step up actions to implement the recommendations in the Global Programme of Action for the Protection of the Marine Environment, preserving the potential of the blue economy so as to progressively reduce the threats to the livelihoods of the ACP coastal countries, especially the Small Island States, which are heavily dependent on this sector for their survival, and to support the national socio-economic development plans for sustainability of these countries;

14. Stresses the need, in order to discourage offenders, for sanctions to be truly dissuasive and to be applied;
15. Calls on the ACP States to design integrated waste management strategies that would enable regular reviews to be carried out and appropriate waste management systems to be monitored; calls for the EU and other appropriate international organisations to develop ad hoc country-specific measurable criteria, which would serve as a tool for ACP States to improve their waste management systems; recommends the publishing of annual reports on waste disposal, so that existing aid and assistance measures can be assessed in the light of the results obtained;

16. Calls on the ACP States to use their funds and resources to launch pilot projects, specifically on excellence in waste management, and in doing so to try to create a model which can be used in other fields;

17. Calls on the ACP States to invest in education on recycling and hygiene, as well as in training for local staff in safe and environmentally sustainable waste management; calls, with a view to raising awareness of the need for a sustainable approach to the environment and to waste treatment, for information to be given not only to staff but also to the population as a whole, starting with school children;

18. Reiterates the importance of everyday and simple waste treatment actions; calls on the ACP States to invest in simple, long-lasting infrastructures at municipal level to empower communities and neighbourhoods to improve their waste management and make use of by-products from such systems;

19. Invites the EU to offer ACP States technical, financial, logistical and administrative assistance and expertise related to waste management and the circular economy in order to promote best practices and know-how, as well as the transfer of technologies, technical material and equipment, including in the fields of plastics and radioactive, biological, chemical and biomedical waste;

20. Recalls the positive effects partnerships between EU and ACP cities can have on the exchange of best practices, and invites mayors and local governments to actively seek new partnerships and to strengthen existing ones;

21. Invites civil society organisations involved in environmental action and resource efficiency in both the EU and the ACP countries to build up partnerships, develop common programmes and share their knowledge;

22. Calls on the EU to provide the ACP States with technological expertise in waste recycling, particularly for plastics and aluminium;

23. Calls on the EU, in cooperation with the ACP States, and with a view to launching an efficient and effective intervention strategy, to make a list of the sites and geographical areas where waste management seems to be a more sensitive issue;

24. Calls on the ACP States to swiftly establish regional emergency response systems for sound waste management and access to sanitation in the case of humanitarian crises, such as conflicts or natural disasters, so that those states can quickly return to normal;

25. Recalls that waste management is dependent on good governance, and stresses that improving waste and resource management should be part of the climate change mitigation strategy; invites the ACP States to create collaborative platforms with stakeholders and civil society organisations in order to improve the ‘reduce, reuse and recycle’ (the 3Rs) approach; calls, furthermore, for the creation of similar platforms between ACP and EU Member States;

26. Recalls that environmentally friendly waste-to-energy initiatives can help solve both waste issues and energy poverty; invites the ACP States and the EU to cooperate more closely in this matter by devising efficient waste collection programmes to feed energy production facilities;

27. Stresses the need to promote energy recovery from waste: recalls that landfill is a major source of methane, a powerful greenhouse gas; recalls that biogas systems treat organic waste to produce biogas to supplement energy requirements while reducing the release of gases which are dangerous to health into the atmosphere; recommends, therefore, that the adaptation of such technologies for use in degraded suburban areas in particular be facilitated and financed;
28. Instructs its Co-Presidents to forward this resolution to the ACP Council of Ministers, the European Parliament, the European Commission, the European Council, the African Union, the Pan-African Parliament, the regional and national parliaments of the ACP States and of the EU Member States, and the regional organisations of ACP States.
RESOLUTION (1)

on the urgency of new measures to fight international terrorism

(2018/C 415/04)

The ACP-EU Joint Parliamentary Assembly,

— meeting in Brussels (Belgium) from 18 to 20 June 2018,
— having regard to Article 18(2) of its Rules of Procedure,
— having regard to the Cotonou Agreement of 2000 and to the 2005 and 2010 revisions thereof,
— having regard to the Joint Declaration of the 5th African Union-European Union Summit on 30 November 2017 in Abidjan (Côte d’Ivoire),
— having regard to the European Parliament’s recommendation of 1 March 2018 to the Council, the Commission and the Vice-President of the Commission/High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy on cutting the sources of income for jihadists — targeting the financing of terrorism (2017/2203(INI)),
— having regard to the EU Counter-Terrorism Strategy adopted by the Council in 2005,
— having regard to the Revised EU Strategy for Combating Radicalisation and Recruitment to Terrorism, adopted by the Justice and Home Affairs Council at its meeting on 19 May 2014 and approved by the Council at its meeting on 5 and 6 June 2014 (9956/14),
— having regard to the African Union Counter-Terrorism Framework including the OAU/African Union Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism adopted in July 1999 and to the additional Protocol thereto adopted in July 2004,
— having regard to United Nations Security Council Resolutions 2396 (2017), 2395 (2017) and 2178 (2014), as well as all other resolutions on combatting terrorism,
— having regard to the United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy of 2006,
— having regard to United Nations General Assembly Resolution 70/291 of 2016 on the Fifth Review of the United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy,
— having regard to United Nations General Assembly Resolution 71/291 of 15 June 2017 establishing the United Nations Office of Counter-Terrorism,
— having regard to the proposal for a comprehensive international framework to counter terrorist narratives of 28 April 2017 (S/2017/375), developed by the UN Counter-Terrorism Committee,
— having regard to the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations on 25 September 2015,
— having regard to the Council of Europe’s Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism (14445/2017),
— having regard to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, adopted in June 1981,
— having regard to the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, to Articles 2, 3 and 6 of the Treaty on European Union, and to the relevant Articles of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,
— having regard to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948,

(1) Adopted by the ACP-EU Joint Parliamentary Assembly on 20 June 2018 in Brussels (Belgium).
A. whereas terrorist acts claiming numerous lives have occurred during recent years in several African and EU countries, and therefore constitute a common challenge for both the EU and the ACP countries; whereas any act of terrorism is criminal and unjustifiable irrespective of its motivations;

B. whereas the terrorist threat to European societies and societies in ACP countries comes in large part from home-grown terrorists rather than foreign individuals; whereas there is no established connection between terrorism and migration;

C. whereas 90 per cent of all terrorist attacks have occurred in countries engaged in violent conflicts, which are exacerbated by widespread access to weaponry;

D. whereas in 2017 approximately 1 800 terrorist attacks occurred in Africa alone, half of these perpetrated by the Al-Shabab terrorist group; whereas following its major losses in Iraq and Syria, Isis is seeking new battlegrounds on the African continent; whereas Al-Qaida is increasingly developing networks in West and Central Africa, notably Niger, Burkina Faso and Nigeria; whereas the victims of jihadi terrorists have been overwhelmingly Muslim;

E. whereas the terrorist organisations based in the Sahel region benefit from the fragility of the countries in the region and from the length and porosity of the borders, which facilitate access to Libyan weapons arsenals; whereas peace cannot be restored to the region without the restoration of the state, social order and general stability in Libya;

F. whereas women and children have been the most vulnerable to terrorism, and children have suffered disproportionately; whereas there have been countless cases of rape and of child kidnappings and conscription as well as radicalisation of children and women;

G. whereas the increasing mobility of capital, new developments in finance such as crypto currencies and crowd funding, loopholes in tax and customs laws and a lack of due diligence requirements in global trade have allowed terrorist networks to amass wealth and sustain their existence;

H. whereas climate change contributes to increased shortages of water, food and other resources, which drive conflicts over land, exacerbate poverty and provide a breeding ground for terrorism;

I. whereas the phenomenon of ‘foreign fighters’ has developed; whereas thousands of foreign citizens have travelled to join terrorist groups and conflicts; whereas given the imminent territorial collapse of Isis, it is likely many will seek to return to their home countries; whereas this represents a severe security risk for those countries;

J. whereas there is increasing evidence of the overlapping of terrorist and organised crime networks concerning illicit trade in arms, oil, natural resources, tobacco, alcohol, drugs, endangered species and cultural goods, as well as human trafficking; whereas these have contributed greatly to terrorist financing;

K. whereas through the internet, the use of the dark web, social media and ICT, terrorist organisations have found a way to spread their propaganda, obtain finance and become truly global networks without the need for a physical base;

L. whereas in the regions affected, peacekeeping missions have increasingly contributed to anti-terrorism actions, including the protection of civilians and the deterrence against potential threats; whereas there have been concerns that increased military assistance might be at the expense of development aid efforts;

M. whereas terrorism and violent extremism cannot be defeated by military or police force alone; whereas counter-terrorism efforts can only be effective if they are part of a more comprehensive approach combining crisis management and prevention, mediation and political dialogue, capacity- and institution-building, and development efforts;

N. whereas prevention strategies to combat terrorism should focus on addressing the root causes of terrorism and radicalisation, including bad governance, corruption, absence of the rule of law, impunity, as well as socio-economic factors such as poverty, food insecurity, severe social and economic inequality, lack of access to education, unemployment, discrimination on the basis of race or ethnicity and social exclusion;

O. whereas development co-operation has a key role to play in addressing the conditions that terrorist leaders feed on and exploit;
P. whereas respect for fundamental rights and an appropriate balance between repressive measures, prevention and rehabilitation are essential elements in successful counter-terrorism policies;

1. Strongly condemns all terrorist acts and their perpetrators; expresses its condolences to all victims of terrorist acts; stresses that care for the victims of terrorism is an essential duty of governments; reiterates that there can be no justification for acts of terrorism or for supporting and financing terrorist acts and networks irrespective of social, economic, religious or political motivations;

2. Considers it paramount for EU and ACP countries to implement a comprehensive strategy that addresses the root causes of terrorism, through an effective and independent judiciary and appropriate policies in the areas of criminal justice, education, economic and social inclusion, law enforcement and border control, ensuring coherence between security, defence, trade, economic development and humanitarian policies;

3. Recalls the strong link between development and security; recalls the urgent need to reduce economic inequality and to put states in a position to fulfil their sovereign tasks, notably ensuring access to education, employment, justice and health, thereby providing the young people of the partner countries with a positive perspective for their future;

4. Draws particular attention to the challenges of good governance, state-building, impunity and human rights in the countries most affected by terrorism and instability; encourages all partners to work together to tackle the root causes of instability which can lead to conflicts and to develop a coherent strategy aimed at improving governance, the rule of law and the accountability of state and regional institutions;

5. Recalls that radicalisation and recruitment of individuals by terrorist networks is a global phenomenon; calls on EU and ACP countries to strengthen their efforts to combat radicalisation by addressing its root causes, including through educational and social integration and programmes empowering ethnic and religious minorities and marginalised communities;

6. Asserts that religious extremism creates distorted narratives that push alienated people towards terrorism; stresses the importance of developing powerful counter-narratives and measures promoting interfaith dialogue in ACP and EU countries, especially among young people, in order to increase mutual understanding and respect;

7. Believes that women, young people, civil society and local communities should be actively involved in counter-terrorist efforts, especially de-radicalisation and in the prevention of radicalisation; highlights the positive role played by religious leaders in de-radicalisation, as seen in Cameroon and Mauritania; calls on EU and ACP countries to build on these initiatives and continue to exchange best practices on this matter;

8. Reiterates that the purpose of our criminal justice systems should be to rehabilitate individuals so that they no longer pose a risk to society when they return to it; therefore calls for rehabilitation and reintegration strategies;

9. Expresses serious concerns about the phenomenon of radicalisation in prisons, and calls on EU and ACP countries to address this issue, notably through better funding of prison systems, avoiding prison overcrowding and improving administrative systems so as to identify radicalised detainees, monitor and prevent radicalisation processes, provide specific training for prison staff, and set up educational programmes in order to ensure de-radicalisation and a better social rehabilitation of ex-offenders at risk of radicalisation;

10. Insists on the need to prevent, combat and prosecute the financing of terrorism, in accordance with Directive (EU) 2017/541 and the recommendations made by the European Parliament; considers that enhanced checks and tracking of financial operations, as well as closer cooperation and exchange of law-enforcement information would help to cut off funding for terrorism-related activities and help to identify terrorist networks and support structures; underlines the fact that money laundering, illicit trade, tax evasion and other fiscal crimes are major sources of terrorism funding and that tracking and combating them must be a priority; commends initiatives by the EU and by ACP countries to stem the illicit trade in arms, drugs, cultural goods, etc., the profits of which often go towards financing terrorism;
11. Calls on EU and ACP countries to intensify the fight against transnational organised crime, including criminal networks involved in the smuggling of migrants and trafficking in human beings, drugs and arms; believes that, in particular, cooperation needs to be strengthened further as regards information exchange and the traceability and destruction of prohibited weapons;

12. Calls on EU and ACP countries to strengthen cooperation to address the use of ICT by terrorists; in particular to tackle propaganda and recruitment on social media; encourages governments to involve the private sector; commends the industry-led Global Internet Forum to Counter Terrorism; calls on the Commission to update the Cybersecurity Strategy of 2013 and review the existing cybercrime legislation;

13. Emphasises the importance of regional and interregional cooperation in the fight against terrorism and expresses its strong support for regional initiatives undertaken, such as the African Union Counter Terrorism Framework; welcomes, furthermore, the political leadership demonstrated by the Sahel G5 countries and calls on the EU to strengthen the EU-Sahel G5 partnership, in particular as regards financing and capacity-building, in all areas where the G5 intends to integrate policies;

14. Calls for enhanced EU-ACP and regional cooperation, including better exchange of information and best practices aimed at preventing impunity and promoting the rule of law and the expansion of police and judicial capacities; calls on the EU and its Member States and the ACP countries to invest more in capacity-building for better exchange of information and best practices among border-control agencies to combat cross-border terrorist activity; calls on the international community to support the initiative based on the decision of Libya, Niger, Sudan and Chad at their meeting in Niamey on 3 April 2018 to control their common borders;

15. Believes that the international community and regional partners should focus their actions on supporting the restoration of state authority in the regions most affected by terrorism, and particularly the Sahel and the Lake Chad and Horn of Africa regions; is convinced that the EU should play a mediation role and contribute to the peaceful resolution of conflicts; calls on the African Union, the European Union and the United Nations to unite their efforts and to establish international coordination in order to help Libya end its continuing chaotic situation, while engaging with other key players such as the Arab League, the USA and countries of the Maghreb;

16. Calls on EU and ACP countries to cooperate fully with UN and regional bodies involved in counter-terrorism; calls on all EU and ACP states to sign and ratify the 19 UN Conventions on counter-terrorism; welcomes the holding of the first UN Summit of Counter-terrorism Agencies in June 2018 announced by the UN Secretary-General at the AU-UN Summit in January;

17. Emphasises the need for ACP and EU countries to base their strategy for combating terrorism, as with all other forms of crime, on the rule of law and respect for fundamental rights; insists on the need for democratic and judicial oversight of counter-terrorism policies and regular evaluation of their effectiveness and proportionality;

18. Recalls that torture must be prohibited in all circumstances as enshrined in the UN Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment;

19. Stresses firmly that counter-terrorism agendas must not undermine the ability of humanitarian actors to deliver assistance; points out that to obtain access to populations in need humanitarian aid must not only be neutral but also be perceived as such;

20. Instructs its Co-Presidents to forward this Resolution to the Council, the Commission, the Vice-President of the Commission/High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the ACP Council, the African Union and the Secretary-General of the United Nations.
RESOLUTION (1)

on the humanitarian crisis in South Sudan

(2018/C 415/05)

The ACP-EU Joint Parliamentary Assembly,

— meeting in Brussels (Belgium) from 18 to 20 June 2018,
— having regard to Article 18(2) of its Rules of Procedure,
— having regard to the final report of 12 April 2018 of the UN Security Council Panel of Experts on South Sudan,
— having regard to the 26 March 2018 Communiqué of the 61st extraordinary session of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) Council of Ministers on the situation in South Sudan,
— having regard to the UN Security Council’s resolution on South Sudan 2406 (2018) as well as all previous UN Security Council resolutions on South Sudan,
— having regard to the statement of 8 May 2017 issued by the Troika (the US, the UK and Norway) and the EU on the security situation in South Sudan,
— having regard to the conclusions of the Council of the European Union of 16 April 2018 on South Sudan,
— having regard to the statements of 23 March 2017 and 14 December 2017 issued by the President of the UN Security Council on South Sudan,
— having regard to the joint press statement of 29 January 2017 by the African Union (AU), IGAD and the UN on South Sudan,
— having regard to the European Parliament resolution on South Sudan (2017/2683(RSP)) as well as all previous resolutions of the European Parliament on South Sudan,
— having regard to the signature of the Cessation of Hostilities, Protection of Civilians and Humanitarian Access Agreement (CoHA) on 21 December 2017,
— having regard to the IGAD Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan (ARCSS) of 17 August 2015,
— having regard to the Global Report on Food Crises 2018,
— having regard to the revised Cotonou Agreement,
— having regard to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
— having regard to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
— having regard to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights,
— having regard to the Arms Trade Treaty regulating the international trade in conventional arms,

A. whereas since December 2013, South Sudan has been in a state of civil war between forces loyal to President Salva Kiir and rebels led by former Vice President Riek Machar;

B. whereas all parties to the conflict continue warfare, in violation of the Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan (ARCSS) signed in August 2015; whereas there continues to be a total disregard for international human rights and humanitarian law and a lack of accountability for violations and abuses committed in the conflict, even concerning war crimes, and whereas the conflict is increasingly escalating into an outright ethnic war;

C. whereas attempts to revive the 2015 peace deal led to an IGAD-brokered ‘Agreement on Cessation of Hostilities, Protection of Civilians, and Humanitarian Access’ (ACOH) in December 2017, but whereas violations of the ceasefire have been perpetrated by all parties;

(1) Adopted by the ACP-EU Joint Parliamentary Assembly on 20 June 2018 in Brussels (Belgium).
D. whereas according to the UN, 7 million South Sudanese will need humanitarian assistance in 2018; whereas famine warnings have been persistent since early 2017, with up to 2.4 million on the brink of starvation, more than 260,000 children severely malnourished and the number of people facing severe food insecurity reaching 7.1 million in 2018;

E. whereas the worsening food insecurity is primarily driven by continued conflict and displacements, which have contributed to reduced crop production; whereas the famine is considered to be entirely man-made and the result of war tactics, as highlighted in a UN report;

F. whereas as a result of the conflict there are now over 2.4 million South Sudanese refugees in neighbouring countries and another 2 million internally displaced, with 85% estimated to be children and women;

G. whereas more than 14,000 soldiers, police, security and civilian personnel are currently deployed in the UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS); whereas as of February 2018, UNMISS was protecting 204,247 internally-displaced persons in protection sites;

H. whereas according to the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, due to the conflict only 22% of medical facilities in South Sudan are operational; whereas cholera, malaria, and other illnesses have already caused the death of many people as a result of extreme poverty and lack of access to health care;

I. whereas all parties to the conflict have attempted to disrupt the distribution of humanitarian assistance and extract taxes and fees from humanitarian partners, leading to their operations being hindered and fuelling warfare; whereas at least 101 humanitarian personnel have been killed since 2013;

J. whereas in spite of these difficulties, humanitarian aid operations reached some 5.4 million people in 2017 against a target of 6.2 million people deemed to be in need of assistance, mainly through the presence of the United Nations Mission in South Sudan;

K. whereas women and children have been most affected by the conflict; whereas rape and sexual violence have been used as a weapon of war by all sides; whereas 70% of children are out of school; whereas child abduction by armed groups is on the increase; whereas an estimated number of 19,000 children, mostly boys, have been recruited or used as soldiers by armed forces and groups in the country;

L. whereas there is a chronic lack of women's representation in South Sudan, with women playing no role in peace talks;

M. whereas the EU and its Member States have contributed more than 43% of the humanitarian funding for South Sudan; whereas in 2017 the Commission mobilised EUR 248 million to address the crisis inside South Sudan and in neighbouring countries of asylum;

N. whereas the EDF-financed African Peace Facility constitutes the main source of funding to support the African Union's and the African Regional Economic Communities' efforts in the area of peace and security;

O. whereas the UN Security Council has failed to impose an arms embargo; whereas the EU imposed such an embargo in 2011; whereas brokers in EU Member States and in third countries, including state-owned companies, have transferred helicopters, machine guns, mortars and other arms to various factions in the conflict, in violation of the EU embargo and the Arms Trade Treaty, thus prolonging warfare and increasing its destructiveness;

P. whereas South Sudan has not ratified the revised Cotonou Agreement;

1. Expresses its deep concern about the continuing conflict and the deteriorating humanitarian situation in South Sudan; calls on all parties to immediately cease hostilities, keep their obligations under the ARCSS and ACOH and to resume their dialogue on national conciliation; insists that there can be no military solution to the conflict;
2. Insists that in order to be meaningful and inclusive, the process of national dialogue should feature neutral leadership, the inclusion of opposition groups, women's representation and south Sudanese citizens outside of the country;

3. Underlines that the AU, supported by the EU and its Member States, must take an active role in mediating a political solution to achieve lasting peace in South Sudan, including by devoting more resources to the AU's envoy to South Sudan; urges the EU and its Member States to scale up non-military humanitarian support, the main priority being to answer the UN's call for funding and stop the food insecurity, in accordance with UN actions and the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs);

4. Welcomes the recent advances made in establishing a hybrid court for South Sudan and recalls that this is a fundamental part of the 2016 peace agreement and essential in bringing war criminals to justice; calls on the AU, with assistance from the UN and the EU, to finalise its establishment, with priority being given to the creation of its investigative branch, as a matter of urgency;

5. Condemns human rights abuses perpetrated by all parties to the conflict, including killings and torture, rape and other acts of sexual violence, as well as child abductions, attacks on schools, conscription and abuse; underlines that recruitment of children by parties to a conflict and rape as a weapon of war constitute war crimes punishable under international law;

6. Acknowledges the contribution of neighbouring countries in providing humanitarian corridors; urges the continued granting of free, safe and unhindered access to all areas, in accordance with international humanitarian law, which is indispensable to prevent a recurrence of famine in 2018;

7. Condemns all attacks conducted on humanitarian personnel and facilities and calls on all parties to the conflict in South Sudan to ensure a safe and secure environment, enabling the delivery of humanitarian assistance; calls for strong collective actions by all donors, UN agencies and NGOs in order to respond in a more systematic and resolute manner;

8. Calls on the authorities to ensure that any return or relocation of internally-displaced persons is conducted in a safe and dignified manner; calls for the use of targeted sanctions against any key political or military figures in the government or opposition who commit human rights abuses;

9. Welcomes the decision of the 61st Council of Ministers of IGAD on 26 March 2018 to take targeted sanctions against individual violators of the CoHA and encourages the AU to implement this decision;

10. Deeply regrets that all attempts to establish a UN Security Council weapons' transfer embargo to South Sudan have failed; calls on all Security Council members to support such a ban;

11. Calls on the EU to continue applying its autonomous arms embargo against South Sudan; deplores any brokering or transfer of arms and technology carried out in the EU or its partners' territories to warring parties in South Sudan; calls urgently on the Member States to investigate any such accusations and to punish those responsible in an appropriate way;

12. Welcomes the decision of the UN Security Council to strengthen the mandate of the UNMISS and to increase the maximum personnel and resources available to it, including to the Regional Police Force;

13. Calls on the European External Action Service (EEAS) and the EU Member States to step up their efforts within the framework of the Common Foreign and Security Policy/Common Security and Defence Policy (CFSP/CSDP) and the IGAD+ group in order to bring about a resolution of the conflict, including strengthening the capacity of UNMISS;

14. Strongly condemns the high levels of corruption and illicit financial flows that fuel the conflict; calls on the Sudanese authorities to take action on greater financial accountability and transparency, notably in the oil sector, adherence to international financial standards and responsible engagement with the regional and international financial sectors and encourages South Sudan to join the Eastern and Southern African Anti-Money Laundering Group;
15. Instructs its Co-Presidents to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the Vice-President of the Commission/High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the Secretary-General of the United Nations and the President of the General Assembly, the African Union, the ACP-EU Council and the Government of South Sudan.
IV

(Notices)

NOTICES FROM EUROPEAN UNION INSTITUTIONS, BODIES, OFFICES AND AGENCIES


35th session — Brussels (Belgium), 18-20 June 2018

Answers from the Commission to written questions

(2018/C 415/06)

Questions 1-11

QUESTION 2/COM 1

by Michela Giuffrida

Subject: ACP-EU relations

Our partnership is solid and fundamental for the growth of both the ACP and the EU countries, but I would like to reiterate that the main focus in our relationship is, above all, the economic aspect. Sensitive issues such as respect for human rights, the rule of law, democracy, the management of migratory flows, sustainable growth and poverty reduction are often considered less important than economic topics.

Therefore, will the Commission consider the need for a broader agreement which not only pays attention to economic growth, but also assigns the abovementioned elements more significance, subject to the principle of conditionality?

REPLY TO QUESTION 2/COM 1

The new agreement is envisaged as a comprehensive agreement covering several aspects of the relations between the EU and the 79 ACP countries, the economic dimension being one of them.

Issues related to human rights, fundamental freedoms, democracy, rule of law and good governance, as well as migration and mobility will continue to occupy a central place in the partnership, as shown by the EU negotiating mandate, where they feature as strategic priorities.

In our view, the future agreement should include provisions whereby the Parties will reiterate their commitment to promote, protect and fulfil human rights and fundamental freedoms, which are universal and indivisible, as well as to promote the values of democracy, good governance, the rule of law, and the principles of non-discrimination, equality and solidarity. Further, the Parties will commit to turn migration and mobility into opportunities and address together challenges in this field.
QUESTION 3/COM 2

by Sabine Lösing

Subject: The future set-up and implementation of Economic Partnership Agreements

Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) are a central aspect of the Cotonou Agreement between the EU and ACP states. However, the terms of the EPAs further EU interests and are often detrimental to the economies of partner countries. To boost sustainable development, it is fundamental that there are fair terms of trade facilitating the emergence of local supply chains generating added value within ACP countries. Historically, no country has developed on the basis of trade liberalisation in the form demanded by the EU.

Will the Commission strive to review the framework for design and implementation of EPAs so as to guarantee fair terms of trade for ACP countries?

REPLY TO QUESTION 3/COM 2

The Cotonou Agreement establishes the overarching objectives of poverty eradication and sustainable development, and the essential elements of democracy, human rights and the rule of law. The Cotonou framework also provides for development cooperation, including Aid for Trade. The Commission has proposed that these elements continue to be the framework for the Economic Partnership Agreements.

The Commission shares the goals of promoting the supply capacity and value addition in ACP countries and regions. The Economic Partnership Agreements contribute to this by creating trade and investment opportunities, flexible rules of origin, and targeted development support. Nevertheless, if trade agreements can set the right incentives, they cannot by themselves generate economic activity. That is why, pursuant to the new European Consensus on Development and to the updated EU Aid for Trade strategy, comprehensive approaches to sustainable investment and job creation are being designed at country and region levels.

To see how these objectives are being met, the Commission is monitoring the implementation of Economic Partnership Agreements. Likewise, there are also provisions for the regular review of Economic Partnership Agreements to examine their implementation. These are carried out with our partner countries and with the involvement of stakeholders.

QUESTION 7/COM 3

by Jo Leinen

Subject: China’s ‘One Belt One Road’ initiative and EU-ACP relations

Now that the shape and goals of China’s ‘Belt and Road Initiative’ (BRI) are becoming clearer, the European Commission is developing a ‘Connectivity Strategy towards Asia’ as a response.

Since the BRI is also clearly targeted at African countries and will therefore have an impact on ACP-EU relations, is the Commission planning a similar strategy towards Africa? If so, with what goals?

If not, what steps are being taken to either mitigate or take advantage of the BRI’s effects on the countries concerned?

REPLY TO QUESTION 7/COM 3

The EU’s Global Strategy (1) recognised the growing economic weight of Asia and called for a coherent approach to China’s connectivity drives westwards.

The EU has been working towards an EU strategy on Connecting Europe and Asia, first with a Joint Communication, which ought to be followed by Council conclusions.

The Strategy will outline a European vision of connectivity and partnership with the region, from regulation to policy dialogue and from technical to financial assistance, in the fields of transport, electricity grids, digital links, and people-to-people exchanges. It strives towards sustainable connectivity, helping countries meet the Sustainable Development Goals and Paris Climate Agreement targets.

Financial mechanisms will be put in place to achieve those aims, combining policy dialogue with public financial incentives and private capital mobilisation.

Geographically, the Joint Communication will focus on Europe and Asia, but it will have implications for the wider world: better economic management and more sustainable investment locally will have a positive impact globally.

China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) raised strong expectations in Africa as a possible launch pad for several major infrastructure projects in line with the African Union’s own Agenda 2063, to promote the development of the continent.

In the absence of a transparent framework and information related to China’s engagement in Africa, it remains a challenge to assess the impact of BRI in Africa and to engage China in established coordination mechanisms. The EU is strengthening its partnerships with various actors to enhance cooperative approaches to connectivity and to provide new tools to address e.g. debt risks and impact assessments of investment projects.

At the same time, the EU pursues constructive engagement with China bilaterally through the planned establishment of a Dialogue on Development issues and has re-started the dialogue on Africa. This allows more detailed exchanges about respective approaches to development and Africa.

QUESTION 1/COM 4

by Thierry Cornillet

Subject: The need to improve communication on EU funding and provide training for local stakeholders in making applications for their projects

Working documents produced by the Commission as part of the mid-term review of external financing instruments show that a large proportion of the earmarked funding has not yet been disbursed. Although some streamlining has been done, the procedures remain cumbersome. This situation could result in a loss of credibility for the EU: our partners sometimes think that it is our intention not to disburse the funding that has been earmarked.

In the next multiannual financial framework, could the Commission propose a communication and training programme aimed at local stakeholders, focusing on how to put together applications? This would put them in a better position to comply with the relevant criteria, and increase their chances of having their projects accepted.

REPLY TO QUESTION 1/COM 4

The Commission Report on the Mid-Term Review of the External Financing Instruments considers that the budget implementation is efficient. In particular as stated in the Staff Working Document on the European Development Fund (EDF), its implementation is deemed efficient with 50% of its budget committed, 31% contracted and 13% paid (as of June 2017), and considering the fact that the 11th EDF reached its cruising speed only towards the end of 2016.

In the frame of the Development Cooperation Instrument (DCI) thematic programme for Civil Society Organisations, EU Delegations often organise information sessions for grassroots local actors on the relevant calls for proposals, their objectives and submission requirements.

This is complemented by tailor-made specific training sessions. The EU intends to further pursue these efforts during the 2018/2020 period.

Furthermore, since 16 April 2018, the DEVCO Academy(1) provides free access to online training on international cooperation and development, including courses on financial and contractual management.

Regarding the next Multi-annual Financial Framework (MFF), the Commission takes good note of the recommendations expressed and will reflect on and propose the most efficient ways to improve outreach, information and training activities intended for local actors in partner countries.

(1) https://webgate.ec.europa.eu/devco-academy/
QUESTION 4(COM 5)

by Nathalie Griesbeck

Subject: Bringing stability and development to the Sahel region

At the high-level conference on the Sahel of 23 February 2018 held in Brussels, EUR 414 million was earmarked for assistance to the G5 Sahel joint force. The G5 force is committed to bringing stability to the region by combating terrorism and organised crime.

How can we ensure that this financial aid contributes not only to the region’s security, but also to its sustainable development of the Sahel, which is fertile ground for the growth of violent extremist ideologies?

REPLY TO QUESTION 4(COM 5)

The EU is already very committed in the Sahel region, with a particular focus on fragile and trans-borders areas. The overall EU development assistance provided to G5 Sahel countries amounts to EUR 3.8 billion (2014-2020), including EUR 1.7 billion in budget support. Together with its Member States, the EU development assistance to the region amounts to EUR 8 billion.

The security situation in the Sahel region continues to worsen, as seen recently with the large-scale terrorist attack in the heart of Ouagadougou on 2 March, and continuous attacks on defence and security forces in the tri-border area between Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger and on Operation Barkhane and MINUSMA (United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilisation Mission in Mali). State authority remains absent in large areas of central and northern Mali, as well as in northern Burkina Faso. The local population lacks access to basic social services. The underlying root causes of instability, notably weak political, financial and security governance continue to fuel this trend.

Over recent years, in order to help tackling these challenges, the EU has developed a Comprehensive Approach and subsequently an Integrated Approach, combining security and development aspects. Within the framework of the EU Sahel Strategy and its Regional Action Plan, the Sahel has been a real test-bed for developing integrated EU policies and strategies using instruments and actions within the entire range of diplomacy, development, stabilisation, humanitarian aid and security policy.

The EU is very pleased with the outcome of the Sahel Conference held in Brussels on 23 February 2018. With a total of EUR 414 million pledged for the G5 Sahel Joint Force, the Conference marked a milestone with regards to our integrated efforts to mobilise support to the Sahel. The EU provided EUR 100 million from the African Peace Facility in support of the G5 Sahel Joint Force.

In order to ensure long-term stabilisation and sustainable development in the region, the EU objective is also to accompany the security actions with continuing development effort, for a return to the Rule of Law and basic social services, particularly in fragile areas.

QUESTION 9(COM 6)

by Alpha Ousmane (Burkina Faso)

Subject: Future of the EDF

Three specific memoranda of understanding with ACP countries are currently in the pipeline. But what will become of the European Development Fund (EDF)?

The European Union’s approach raises three concerns:

1. Where will the regional indicative programmes (RIPs) be based, and how will they be managed?

2. Is there an RIP managed by the African Union for the benefit of all countries or will each region retain its RIP?

3. How will the situation in the Maghreb be managed, which, although it has a specific agreement with the European Union, does not have an RIP?
REPLY TO QUESTION 9/COM 6

The Commission recently adopted its proposal for the post-2020 Multi-Annual Financial Framework (MFF) and will issue its sectoral proposals for external action on 14 June.

For external action, including development cooperation, the European Commission envisages significant simplification, in order to gain in coherence and effectiveness without downgrading what makes the cooperation between the EU and its partners so special: its predictability, its policy-driven nature and its level of funding.

In this overall coherence-enhancing exercise, the European Development Fund (EDF) is proposed to be integrated in a broad neighbourhood, development and cooperation instrument under the EU budget, and key features should be promoted across a broad instrument.

The proposed broad instrument would have a dominant geographic component, which would be broken down by areas of the world.

The funding for regional actions, or what is currently known as Regional Indicative Programmes (RIPs), will be addressed in the programming phase.

Without prejudging the upcoming discussions and decisions, regional integration and cooperation between partner countries could continue to be supported at different levels. Inside the sub-components foreseen in the future regulation, regional programmes could be designed while ensuring continental coherence for Africa, where relevant.

Under the broad instrument, the Maghreb would be covered by the ‘Neighbourhood’ component. Here again, the question of regional programming is primarily a programming matter, to be defined at a later stage.

QUESTION 10/COM 7

by Marlene Mizzi

Subject: The Sustainable Development Goals

The Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) are goals agreed upon by 193 countries, involving a commitment by all to meet 17 goals linked to 169 targets.

In view of this, can the Commission shed light on its plans to invest in the implementation of the SDGs, both at EU level and among our partner countries?

The matter is even more important considering that these goals tackle more than just economic policy, since they also touch on the issues of social inequality, the need for a greener economy, and a safer environment for all generations.

REPLY TO QUESTION 10/COM 7

The European Commission has chosen a two-step approach towards implementation: (i) to mainstream the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) in the European policy framework and Commission priorities; and (ii) a reflection work on our longer-term vision and the focus of sectoral policies after 2020. The reflection paper ‘Towards a Sustainable Europe by 2030’, on the follow-up to the UN SDGs, including on the Paris Agreement on Climate Change, is expected in the second half of 2018. It will form part of the discussion on the Future of Europe and will be supported by a ‘distance-to-SDGs’ analysis and stocktaking of the achievements of the EU in the implementation of the SDGs. A multi-stakeholder platform has been set up to follow up and exchange on best practices on SDGs implementation, and an overview of their engagement and input will also be included as an Annex.

As regards specifically the implementation of the SDGs through development cooperation, the EU and its Member States agreed in June 2017 a new European Consensus on Development. This provides a new common framework for development policy for the EU institutions and Member States, with the focus remaining centred on poverty eradication, while at the same time recognising the nexus between development policies and humanitarian aid, environment, climate change, migration and security policies. Efforts will be targeted towards addressing inequalities to ensure that no-one is left behind. The European Consensus has already informed the proposals for negotiation directives to the Council on a renewed partnership with the ACP countries.
Policy commitments should be followed by investments. In this regard, the SDGs are guiding the EU’s thinking on the next Multianual Financial Framework and future instruments. The Commission is already investing in achieving the SDGs in partner countries through a range of initiatives. Last year, the EU-UN Spotlight Initiative was launched with the EU’s contribution in the order of EUR 500 million to eliminate all forms of violence against women and girls. The EU External Investment Plan is expected to leverage more than EUR 44 billion of investments in partner countries by 2020, in Africa and the EU Neighbourhood, with a contribution of EUR 4.1 billion from the European Commission. Furthermore, the Commission will contribute EUR 30 million to the new UN Joint Fund on the 2030 Agenda.

Looking forward, the European Commission is committed to strengthening its policy dialogue with partner countries based on the SDGs, and to supporting its partner countries in achieving the 2030 Agenda at national level, including by aligning their national development plans to the SDGs.

QUESTION 6/COM 8

by Catherine Bearder

Subject: Wildlife trafficking and ACP-EU relations

The Commission adopted, two years ago, the Action Plan against Wildlife Trafficking, whose objective 3.2 calls for strengthened global partnerships involving source, transit and market countries.

Which ACP countries has the Commission identified as priority countries for establishing enhanced dialogue and technical cooperation on wildlife trafficking?

What steps have been taken to include the topic in high-level meetings with regional organisations such as the AU, SADC and EAC?

What progress has been made towards using trade instruments to press for actions against wildlife trafficking? Are such provisions included in current and future ACP-EU FTA negotiations?

REPLY TO QUESTION 6/COM 8

As part of the implementation of the 2016 Action Plan against wildlife trafficking, the EU and its Member States are investing significant resources in favour of actions reinforcing partnerships involving source, transit and market countries. For instance, around EUR 340 million of EU external development cooperation was committed in 2016 and 2017 and directly contributes to achieving the objectives of the Action Plan.

Since wildlife trafficking is present in all ACP countries through various products (ivory, rosewood, pangolins, turtles, birds, etc.), all countries have received specific support in the fight against this crime, but priorities have focused on the main supply regions: Madagascar, Central Africa, East Africa, West Africa and Southern Africa.

Programmes mobilised against wildlife trafficking include support to international organisations specialised in the fight against wildlife crime, such as the International Consortium on Combating Wildlife Crime (ICCCWC). Promoting the role of local communities in wildlife protection has also been a priority for the EU and its Member States. Programs therefore involve multiple partners at global, regional, national and local levels and comprise a full spectrum of activities: sustainable management of protected areas, livelihood improvement of local communities by economic activities and provision of ecosystem services provided by (water, energy, green jobs, wild meat, etc.), dismantling of criminal networks.

The EU has been very active in engaging with ACP countries in meetings with regional actors such as the African Union, the Association of South East Asian Nations, the Southern African Development Community, and the Economic Community of Central Africa States, but also fora such as the Congo Basin Forest Partnership. Furthermore, regional programming related to the environment and wildlife involves partnerships with and the involvement of the relevant regional authorities.

Environmental safeguards and sustainability are an integral part of trade and economic partnership agreement discussions involving the EU. The EU ensures, for instance, an increasing focus on compliance to the Convention on International Trade of Endangered Species.
QUESTION 5/COM 9

by György Hölvényi

Subject: Role of religious communities in conflict management in ACP countries

Religious communities have an indispensable potential for conflict management in crisis-hit ACP countries. Religious communities and institutions are necessarily stakeholders, not exclusively spiritually but also as a major contributor to social stability by reason of their leadership and legitimacy, as shown by recent examples such as the role of the Catholic Bishops’ Conference of Congo as a key mediator in negotiations towards a political transition in the DRC.

How does the Commission ensure the participation of religious communities in EU conflict management efforts? How does it consider their recommendations when implementing external actions? Will religious organisations be involved in EU-ACP cooperation structures and policy dialogue for the long term?

REPLY TO QUESTION 5/COM 9

Religious communities and more broadly religion may play an important role in conflict prevention, management and resolution. They have often unique spiritual, moral, social and sometimes political assets to bring to peace process engagements.

The EEAS and the European Commission services are thus often engaging with them to contribute to conflict prevention, management and resolution efforts.

In the ACP countries, the Commission is in contact with a wide number of different mediation support organisations, actors and stakeholders, including working on religious dimension, such as the Network for religious and traditional peacemakers, the King Abdullah Bin Abdulaziz International Centre for Interreligious and Intercultural Dialogue (KAICIID), as well as the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation. For example, we are interacting with the Sant’Egidio community in the Central African Republic.

In some cases, such as in the Democratic Republic of Congo, the Catholic Bishops' Conference indeed played a significant part in reaching an agreement, while in other cases the role of religious leaders may be overstated, or even instrumentalised.

Depending on the situation and the local context, the European Commission can support the participation of religious communities in dialogues and consultations. It can also provide technical support to religious actors who are engaged in peace processes.

The religious dimension, however, needs to be assessed through a careful analysis of issues at stake and actors involved. The EU needs to ensure that its assessment of the role of religion includes sufficient nuance, to recognise the complex relationship among all drivers of conflict and their evolving patterns. As emphasised in the 2015 report of the United Nations Rapporteur on Freedom of Religion or Belief, the role of human agency in exploiting religion for political purposes is particularly important to understand.

Concretely, through the program ‘Intercultural Dialogue and Culture’ (Development Cooperation Instrument, DCI), cultural pluralism and intercultural understanding, including aspects relating to religion or belief will be enhanced in selected ACP countries. Five projects were selected and started implementation in the beginning of 2018, for a total amount of EUR 10 million.

Priority was given to actions taking place in countries with fragile situations or affected by important flows of displaced people or irregular migrants: the selected proposals will take place in Benin, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Côte d’Ivoire, Democratic Republic of Congo, Egypt, Kenya, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, South Sudan, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda and Zimbabwe; Syria, Iraq and Lebanon.

The projects leverage the influence of religious leaders to promote cultural diversity and respect for equal dignity of all men and women through interfaith and intercultural dialogue and cooperation. As such, religious leaders and communities are among the target groups of capacity-building actions.
In addition, the ongoing call for proposal under the European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR) aims at enhancing ‘mutual understanding and respect between individuals of different faith or none, contributing to inclusive communities and societies accepting diversity and capable of addressing potential conflicts in a peaceful manner’. Civil society actions targeting ACP countries are eligible for support. Projects will be selected in the course of 2018 (indicative amount EUR 5 million).

QUESTION 8/COM 10

by Laura Agea

Subject: Future CAP reform and impact in ACP countries

Multiple studies confirm the direct impact of the EU’s common agricultural policy (CAP) in ACP countries. Unfortunately, the impact is not always positive. The EU plays a key role regarding the international agriculture market and global food security, as the most important importer of agricultural products from ACP countries. Our key challenge is to align the future CAP reform with the EU’s commitments under the global agenda on sustainable development (SDGs, Paris Agreement, etc.).

What instruments are foreseen in the architecture of the future CAP to improve the positive impact on developing countries and to further respect of our commitments to sustainable development and to food security in particular?

REPLY TO QUESTION 8/COM 10

The new European Consensus on Development of June 2017 confirmed the importance of Policy Coherence for Development (PCD) to achieve SDGs.

Agriculture is intrinsically linked to issues such as jobs, food, air, climate change, water, soil and biodiversity, and hence plays a substantial role in Agenda 2030. The long journey to achieve the Sustainable Development Goals (SDG) has just started and the agriculture sector has an opportunity to demonstrate it can be part of the solution.

Successive reforms of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) over the last 25 years have progressively increased the CAP’s market orientation (1), while improving its environmental and climate performance (2). These reforms have emphasised the CAP’s main objectives, which are to ensure viable food production, sustainable management of natural resources and climate action, and a balanced territorial development within the European Union.

The current revision of the CAP also aims to further contribute to the EU’s international commitments. The Communication on ‘The Future of Food and Farming’ of November 2017, laid down broad policy orientations (3), including on the CAP’s international dimension. Those are further specified in the legislative proposal on the Common Agricultural Policy post-2020, which the Commission recently adopted.

The EU is evidently committed to helping developing countries integrate their agricultural sectors into the world’s trading system and share in the benefits of the global economy (4). It is aware that this can happen only when partner countries are in the driving seat. The EU is currently working with more than 60 partner countries on sustainable agriculture and food security (5). The focus in Africa is on policy support, fostering responsible investments in rural areas and supporting the agri-food sector, ultimately to help African countries harness the potential of their agricultural sector and respond to the needs of their citizens.

(1) This has been achieved by minimising measures with production and trade distorting effects. Currently, over 90% of the support that the EU grants to farmers is no longer linked to the quantity or product produced and therefore has no distorting effect on trade. Market measures are limited to safety net levels for crisis only and export refunds have been eliminated since December 2015.

(2) The specific CAP instruments addressing sustainable food production include both mandatory (cross-compliance, greening) and voluntary measures (under rural development policy). The support granted to EU farmers therefore reflects their efforts and implementation of measures that guarantee a sustainable agriculture.

(3) It also contains a clear indication that that the future CAP must play a larger role in implementing the outcome of the Valetta Summit, addressing the root causes of migration. For example, capitalise on knowledge and innovation and deepen cooperation on agricultural research and innovation, explore training and exchange projects and enhancing strategic policy cooperation and dialogue with the African Union on issues related to agriculture and rural development.

(4) The EU gives duty-free and quota-free access to all Least Developed Countries (LDCs) and the Economic Partnership Agreements (EPA) allow partner countries to protect their sensitive agricultural products from liberalisation, either by excluding them entirely or by allowing robust safeguards that can be used to guard against sudden increases in imports.

(5) EUR 8.5 billion of EU Development assistance allocated to this purpose over the 2014-2020 period.
In April, the Commission also set up a Task Force composed of EU and African experts to advise and come up with recommendations to strengthen the partnership between the EU and the African Union in food and farming and in enhancing the role of the EU in African job-creating economic development in agriculture, agri-business and agro-industries.

QUESTION 11/COM 11
by Neena Gill

Subject: Humanitarian aid to the DRC

Humanitarian assistance to the DRC in 2017 was at the lowest level of the past decade.

EU humanitarian aid to the country last year was EUR 4 million less than in 2016.

In October 2017, a level 3 emergency was officially activated in the DRC by the UN, with a geographical focus on the Kasai, Tanganyika and South Kivu regions.

1. What is the current global funding gap for the humanitarian situation in the DRC?

2. Has the Commission taken measures to step up humanitarian assistance to the DRC since October 2017?

REPLY TO QUESTION 11/COM 11

Given the deteriorating humanitarian situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), the first ever international humanitarian conference on the DRC was held in Geneva on 13 April 2018. The conference was co-hosted by the UN, the EU and the Netherlands. 101 Delegations attended, including 22 EU Member States. It resulted in pledges and announcements of USD 528.1 million for the humanitarian response in the DRC in 2018. The European Commission announced assistance worth EUR 77.1 million for the DRC in 2018 and EU Member States announced a further USD 246 million, so that the EU pledge totals two thirds of the overall amount.

The Humanitarian Response Plan for the DRC for 2018 requires USD 1.68 billion with 13.1 million people in need of assistance, according to the UN.

A ‘level 3’ emergency response — the highest response level possible — was activated by the UN on 20 October 2017 for six months with a geographical focus on the provinces of South Kivu, Tanganyika and the Kasais. The level 3 status has been de-activated on 20 April 2018, as the benchmarks for an effective mobilisation of international capacity to scale up the humanitarian support have largely been met, according to the UN.

The European Commission has been supporting humanitarian operations in the DRC since 1994 and continues to do so. It supports the response to basic humanitarian needs including food assistance, nutrition, health services, protection, shelter, water, sanitation and hygiene, education in emergencies, but also logistics and the coordination of humanitarian aid. It will be complemented in 2018 by mediation, reconciliation and resilience building activities funded by other instruments at the disposal of the European Commission, in addition to the already significant development funding in the DRC.