(1)

Regulation (EU) 2019/876 of the European Parliament and of the Council (4), Regulation (EU) 2019/877 of the European Parliament and of the Council (5) and Directive (EU) 2019/879 of the European Parliament and of the Council (6) amended the Union resolution framework for credit institutions and investment firms through amendments to Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council (7), Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council (8) and Directive 2014/59/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council (9), respectively. Those amendments were necessary to implement in the Union the international ‘Total Loss-absorbing Capacity (TLAC) Term Sheet’, published by the Financial Stability Board on 9 November 2015 (the ‘TLAC standard’), for global systemically important banks, referred to in the Union framework as global systemically important institutions (G-SIIs), and to enhance the application of the minimum requirement for own funds and eligible liabilities (MREL) for all banks. The revised Union bank resolution framework should better ensure that the loss absorption and recapitalisation of banks occurs through private means when those banks become financially unviable and are, subsequently, placed in resolution.

(2)

Article 12a of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 provides that G-SIIs with a resolution strategy under which more than one group entity might be resolved (‘multiple-point-of-entry resolution strategy’ or ‘MPE resolution strategy’) are to calculate their risk-based requirement for own funds and eligible liabilities on the theoretical assumption that only one entity of the group would be resolved, with the losses and recapitalisation needs of any subsidiaries of that group being transferred to the resolution entity (‘single-point-of-entry resolution strategy’ or ‘SPE resolution strategy’). A similar requirement is provided for in Article 45d(4) of Directive 2014/59/EU, regarding the additional requirement for own funds and eligible liabilities that may be imposed by resolution authorities pursuant to paragraph 3 of that Article. In line with the TLAC standard, those calculations should take into account all third-country entities that are part of a G-SII that would be resolution entities if they were established in the Union.

(3)

In accordance with Article 45h(2), third subparagraph, of Directive 2014/59/EU, and in line with the TLAC standard, the sum of the actual requirements for own funds and eligible liabilities of a G-SII with an MPE resolution strategy is not to be lower than that group’s theoretical requirement under an SPE resolution strategy. In order to align the provisions of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 with those of Directive 2014/59/EU and to ensure that resolution authorities always act in accordance with that Directive and consider both the requirements for own funds and eligible liabilities laid down in Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 and any additional requirement for own funds and eligible liabilities determined in accordance with Article 45d of Directive 2014/59/EU, Article 12a of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 should be amended and Article 92a(3) of that Regulation should be deleted. This should not prevent resolution authorities from concluding that any adjustment to minimise or eliminate the difference between the sum of the actual requirements for own funds and eligible liabilities of a G-SII with an MPE resolution strategy and that group’s theoretical requirement under an SPE resolution strategy, when the former is higher than the latter, would be inappropriate or inconsistent with the G-SII’s resolution strategy. To ensure consistency between Article 12a of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 and Article 45h(2) of Directive 2014/59/EU, the calculation referred to in Article 45h(2) of that Directive should also take into account all third-country entities that are part of a G-SII that would be resolution entities if they were established in the Union.

(4)

Article 92b of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 sets out that the requirement for own funds and eligible liabilities for material subsidiaries of non-EU G-SIIs that are not resolution entities may be met, inter alia, with eligible liabilities instruments. However, the criteria for eligible liabilities instruments laid down in Article 72b(2), points (c), (k), (l) and (m), of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 presuppose the issuing entity to be a resolution entity. It should be ensured that those material subsidiaries can issue debt instruments that meet all eligibility criteria, as originally intended.

(5)

In accordance with Article 72e(4), first subparagraph, of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013, it is possible for resolution authorities to permit a G-SII with an MPE resolution strategy to deduct certain holdings of own funds and eligible liabilities instruments of its subsidiaries that do not belong to the same resolution group by deducting a lower, adjusted amount specified by the resolution authority. Article 72e(4), second subparagraph, of that Regulation requires that in such cases the difference between the adjusted amount and the original amount be deducted from the loss absorbing and recapitalisation capacity of the subsidiaries concerned. In line with the TLAC standard, that approach should take into account the risk-based and non-risk-based requirements for own funds and eligible liabilities of the subsidiary concerned. Furthermore, that approach should be applicable to all third-country subsidiaries that are part of that G-SII, as long as those subsidiaries are subject to a resolution regime that, according to the relevant resolution authority in the Union, is legally enforceable and implements internationally agreed standards, more specifically the Financial Stability Board’s document ‘Key Attributes of Effective Resolution Regimes for Financial Institutions’, published in October 2011, and the TLAC standard.

(6)

Directive (EU) 2019/879 amended Directive 2014/59/EU to introduce specific rules on the indirect subscription of internal MREL eligible resources, that is of own funds and liabilities that meet the conditions of Article 45f(2) of Directive 2014/59/EU, within resolution groups. In order to operationalise those rules and to ensure that that indirect subscription is carried out in a prudentially sound manner, the European Supervisory Authority (European Banking Authority) (EBA), established by Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council (10), was mandated under Article 45f(6) of Directive 2014/59/EU to develop draft regulatory technical standards to specify methods for such an indirect subscription of eligible resources. However, as highlighted by the EBA in its letter to the Commission dated 25 January 2021, there were several inconsistencies between the requirements for the delegation laid down in Directive 2014/59/EU and the existing prudential rules laid down in Regulation (EU) No 575/2013, which did not allow the application of the prudential treatment needed for the mandate to be fulfilled as originally intended. More precisely, the EBA noted that Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 did not allow for the deduction of internal MREL eligible resources and, subsequently, for the application of an appropriate risk weight in all the cases relevant for the mandate under Directive 2014/59/EU. Similar issues were identified in the area of the leverage ratio requirement laid down in Regulation (EU) No 575/2013. In light of those legal constraints, the methods developed by the EBA should be incorporated directly into Regulation (EU) No 575/2013. Consequently, Article 45f(6) of Directive 2014/59/EU should be deleted.

(7)

In the context of the indirect subscription of internal MREL eligible resources by resolution entities pursuant to the revised Union bank resolution framework, intermediate entities should be required to deduct the full holding of internal MREL eligible resources issued by entities that are not themselves resolution entities and which belong to the same resolution group. That ensures the proper functioning of the internal loss-absorbing and recapitalisation mechanisms within a group and avoids the double-counting of the internal MREL eligible resources of those entities for the purposes of compliance by the intermediate entity with its own internal MREL. Without those deductions, the proper implementation of the chosen resolution strategy could be compromised since the intermediate entity could use up, not only its own loss absorption and recapitalisation capacity but also that of other entities that are not themselves resolution entities and which belong to the same resolution group, before the intermediate entity or those other entities are no longer viable. To ensure that the obligation to deduct is aligned with the scope of entities that may be used by the resolution entity for the indirect subscription of internal MREL eligible resources, and to avoid regulatory arbitrage, intermediate entities should deduct their holdings of internal MREL eligible resources issued by all entities belonging to the same resolution group and that may be subject to compliance with internal MREL, and not just the holdings of resources issued by their subsidiaries. The same obligations should apply in the case of indirect issuance of resources eligible for compliance with the requirement for own funds and eligible liabilities for material subsidiaries of non-EU G-SIIs laid down in Article 92b of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013, where relevant.

(8)

To ensure that the deduction regime remains proportionate, intermediate entities should be able to choose the mix of instruments, consisting of own funds or eligible liabilities, with which they fund the acquisition of ownership of internal MREL eligible resources. That would allow intermediate entities to completely avoid any own funds-related deductions as long as they have issued sufficient eligible liabilities. The deductions should therefore first be applied to the eligible liabilities items of the intermediate entities. Where the intermediate entity is required to comply with internal MREL pursuant to Directive 2014/59/EU on an individual basis, the deductions should be applied to the eligible liabilities meeting the conditions of Article 45f(2) of that Directive. In case the amount to be deducted exceeds the amount of the eligible liabilities items of the intermediate entities, the remaining amount should be deducted from their Common Equity Tier 1, Additional Tier 1 and Tier 2 items, starting with Tier 2 items in accordance with Article 66, point (e), of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013. In such a case, it is necessary that the deductions corresponding to the remaining amount are also applied when calculating own funds for the purposes of the requirements laid down in Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 and Directive 2013/36/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council (11). Otherwise, the solvency ratios of intermediate entities that have issued own funds, rather than eligible liabilities, to fund the acquisition of ownership of internal MREL eligible resources may be overstated. Additionally, by keeping the treatment of holdings of internal MREL eligible resources aligned for prudential and resolution purposes, an undue increase in complexity is avoided, as institutions would be able to continue to calculate, report and disclose one set of total risk exposure amount and total exposure measure for prudential and resolution purposes. Article 49(2) of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 should therefore be amended accordingly.

(9)

To further enhance the proportionality of the deduction regime, that regime should not be applicable in the exceptional cases where, pursuant to Article 45f(1), third subparagraph, and (4) of Directive 2014/59/EU, internal MREL is applied on a consolidated basis only, as regards the holdings of internal MREL eligible resources issued by entities included in the perimeter of consolidation. The same exception should apply when the requirement for own funds and eligible liabilities for material subsidiaries of non-EU G-SIIs laid down in Article 92b of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 is complied with on a consolidated basis, pursuant to Article 11(3a) of that Regulation.

(10)

The indirect subscription of internal MREL eligible resources should ensure that, when a subsidiary reaches the point of non-viability, losses are effectively passed on to, and the subsidiary concerned is recapitalised by, the resolution entity. Those losses should thus not be absorbed by the intermediate entity, which should become a mere vehicle through which those losses are passed on to the resolution entity. Consequently, and to ensure that the outcome of the indirect subscription is equivalent to that of a full direct subscription, as envisaged under the mandate set out in Article 45f(6) of Directive 2014/59/EU, for the purposes of calculating the total risk exposure amount of the intermediate entity, risk weights should not be applied to the exposures deducted under the new deduction regime to be introduced in Article 72e of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013. In the same vein, those exposures should be excluded from the calculation of the total exposure measure of the intermediate entity. The treatment consisting of not applying risk weights and excluding those exposures from the total exposure measure should be strictly limited to exposures that are deducted in accordance with the new deduction regime to be introduced in Article 72e of that Regulation for the sake of operationalising the approach of indirect subscription of internal MREL eligible resources.

(11)

The templates for the public disclosure of harmonised information on MREL and on the requirement for own funds and eligible liabilities for material subsidiaries of non-EU G-SIIs set out in Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2021/763 (12) should be amended to reflect the new deduction regime for internal MREL eligible resources. The disclosure templates should also be amended to include the total risk exposure amount and the total exposure measure that intermediate entities would have if they did not exclude the exposures deducted under that new deduction regime.

(12)

Since the objectives of this Regulation, namely to fully harmonise the prudential treatment of the holdings by intermediate entities of internal MREL eligible resources of entities in the same resolution group and to revise in a targeted manner the requirements for own funds and eligible liabilities for G-SIIs and for material subsidiaries of non-EU G-SIIs, cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States but can rather, by reason of the scale of the action, be better achieved at Union level, the Union may adopt measures, in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity as set out in Article 5 of the Treaty on European Union. In accordance with the principle of proportionality as set out in that Article, this Regulation does not go beyond what is necessary in order to achieve those objectives.

(13)

In order to duly assess potential unintended consequences of the indirect subscription of internal MREL eligible resources, including the new deduction regime, and to ensure a proportionate treatment and level playing field between different types of banking group structures, especially institutions that have an operating company between the holding company and its subsidiaries, and for entities whose resolution plan provides for their winding up under normal insolvency proceedings in the case of failure, the Commission should review the implementation of the indirect subscription of internal MREL eligible resources by the different types of banking group structures as soon as possible. The Commission should duly assess possible structural solutions to any identified issues such as enlarging the possibility for entities that are not themselves resolution entities to comply with their MREL on a consolidated basis. The accompanying legislative proposal that the Commission may adopt should duly consider the date of application of the dedicated treatment for the indirect subscription of internal MREL eligible resources, so that it can be implemented before Article 72e(5) of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 becomes applicable. Such a legislative proposal should preferably be a dedicated one.

(14)

In order to ensure that institutions have sufficient time to implement the dedicated treatment for the indirect subscription of internal MREL eligible resources, including the new deduction regime, and that markets can absorb additional issuances of internal MREL eligible resources, where needed, the provisions laying down that treatment should become applicable on 1 January 2024, in line with the deadline for compliance with MREL.

(15)

Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 and Directive 2014/59/EU should therefore be amended accordingly,

(1)

Regulation (EU) 2019/833 of the European Parliament and of the Council (3) was adopted in order to implement into Union law the most up-to-date rules for conservation and enforcement measures applicable in the Regulatory Area of the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Organization (NAFO). That Regulation was subsequently amended by Regulation (EU) 2021/1231 of the European Parliament and of the Council (4), in order to implement into Union law the NAFO measures adopted at its annual meetings in 2019 and 2020.

(2)

NAFO subsequently adopted at its 43rd annual meeting, in September 2021, a number of legally binding decisions for the conservation of fishery resources under its purview as regards catch retention for the ‘Others’ quota, port inspection of landings of cod in Division 3M and of Greenland halibut, and reinforced provisions on monitoring, infringements and enforcement (‘the NAFO decisions’).

(3)

The NAFO decisions are addressed to the NAFO Contracting Parties, but also contain obligations for operators. Following their entry into force on 2 December 2021, NAFO conservation and enforcement measures (‘CEMs’) are binding on all NAFO Contracting Parties. Therefore, they are to be incorporated into Union law to the extent that they are not already provided for by Union law.

(4)

Regulation (EU) 2019/833 should therefore be adapted in order to apply those new CEMs to Union fishing vessels.

(5)

Certain provisions of the CEMs are likely to be amended at future NAFO annual meetings following the introduction of new technical measures in relation to changing stock biomass and a review of area restrictions for bottom-fishing activities. Therefore, in order to swiftly incorporate into Union law such future amendments to the CEMs, before the start of fishing season, the power to adopt acts in accordance with Article 290 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union should be delegated to the Commission in respect of landing and inspection measures for Greenland halibut and control measures for cod in Division 3M. It is of particular importance that the Commission carry out appropriate consultations during its preparatory work, including at expert level, and that those consultations be conducted in accordance with the principles laid down in the Interinstitutional Agreement of 13 April 2016 on Better Law-Making (5). In particular, to ensure equal participation in the preparation of delegated acts, the European Parliament and the Council receive all documents at the same time as Member States’ experts, and their experts systematically have access to meetings of Commission expert groups dealing with the preparation of delegated acts.

(6)

Regulation (EU) 2019/833 should therefore be amended accordingly,

(1)

Council Regulation (EEC) No 95/93 (3) was amended several times since the beginning of the COVID-19 crisis as the requirement set by that Regulation to operate at least 80 % of a series of slots to maintain the right to the same series of slots in the next equivalent scheduling period became unsustainable for air carriers in light of highly reduced air traffic levels.

(2)

Figures published by Eurocontrol, which is the network manager for the air traffic network functions of the single European sky, show that air traffic has had a strong recovery since the beginning of the summer 2022 scheduling period and that the air traffic at the start of the winter 2022/2023 scheduling period is expected to be approximately 90 % of 2019 levels under the base forecast. Those figures justify a return to the 80 % requirement for slot use as a general rule for the summer scheduling period 2023, complemented with specific slot use alleviation in cases of justified non-use of slots.

(3)

Nevertheless, due to the COVID-19 crisis, the situation in the aviation sector remains highly uncertain. As was the case at the end of 2021, new COVID-19 variants can appear and cause sudden reactions from both national authorities and consumers that can in turn negatively affect air traffic. Furthermore, certain long-haul markets continue to be affected by sanitary measures which severely impede air traffic.

(4)

Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine is also having an impact on air traffic and air carriers’ ability to operate their slots as Union air carriers are prevented from entering the airspace of Belarus, Russia and Ukraine.

(5)

State-imposed travel restrictions for sanitary reasons and the impossibility of entering the airspace of what has become a war zone are beyond the control of air carriers. These circumstances can lead to the voluntary or obligatory cancellation of their air services or adjustment of schedules. In particular, voluntary cancellations protect the financial health of air carriers and at the same time avoid the negative environmental impact caused by operating flights only to retain their slots.

(6)

Under those circumstances, air carriers that fail to use their slots in accordance with the slot utilisation rate set out in Regulation (EEC) No 95/93 should not automatically lose the precedence in respect of the series of slots, laid down in Articles 8(2) and 10(2) of that Regulation, that they might otherwise enjoy. This Regulation should establish specific rules to this effect.

(7)

At the same time, it is important to recall the objectives of Regulation (EEC) No 95/93, which are namely to ensure the efficient use of airport capacity and to ensure fair access for all air carriers to limited airport capacity, thereby promoting competition. The adjustment of normal slot use requirements through a lower use-rate or extended justified non-use exceptions should be strictly limited to situations where slot relief is necessary and should not lead to unfair competitive advantages for those air carriers holding historic slots.

(8)

In particular, it is necessary to ensure that air carriers prepared to provide services are allowed to take up unused capacity and that they have the prospect of maintaining such slots in the long term. That should maintain air carriers’ incentives to make use of airport capacity, which in turn would benefit consumers in terms of connectivity.

(9)

It is therefore necessary to lay down, in accordance with those principles and for a limited period, the conditions under which air carriers continue to be entitled to series of slots under Articles 8(2) and 10(2) of Regulation (EEC) No 95/93, and to establish requirements for air carriers concerned to release unused capacity. The period should run from 30 October 2022 until 28 October 2023 in line with the recovery forecast of Eurocontrol.

(10)

During that period, the definition of the term ‘new entrant’ should remain broad in order to increase the number of air carriers covered, thereby giving more air carriers the opportunity to establish and expand their operations.

(11)

From 30 October 2022 until 28 October 2023, the system of slot allocation should continue to recognise the efforts of the air carriers that have operated flights using slots which are part of a series that another air carrier is entitled to under Articles 8(2) and 10(2) of Regulation (EEC) No 95/93, but which have been made available to the slot coordinator for temporary reallocation. Therefore, air carriers that have operated at least five slots of a series should receive priority for the allocation of those series in the next equivalent scheduling period, subject to airport capacity availability.

(12)

To address the effects of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine and to support the recovery of connectivity between the Union and Ukraine, it is necessary to extend the period during which operators are able to rely on the reason set out in Article 10(4), point (a), of Regulation (EEC) No 95/93 to justify the non-utilisation of the series of slots on the routes between the Union and Ukraine.

(13)

Without prejudice to the obligation of Member States to comply with Union law, in particular with the rules laid down in the Treaties and in Regulation (EC) No 1008/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council (4), the negative consequences on passengers’ ability to travel due to possible restrictions adopted by public authorities of Member States or third countries addressing epidemiological situations, natural disasters or political unrest, such as rebellions, riots or severe public disorder, cannot be imputed to air carriers and should be mitigated where those measures significantly impact the viability, or the possibility, of travel or the demand on the routes concerned. Mitigation measures should ensure that air carriers are not penalised for failure to use slots where that failure is the result of such restrictions.

(14)

To reduce the risk of distortions of competition and to ensure the efficient use of airport capacity, specific relief from the effects of the imposition of those restrictions should be of limited duration and scope, thus ensuring that the effect of the mitigation measures is limited to the period for which they were justified. Slots covered by such measures mitigating the effect of restrictions should be deemed to have been operated for the purposes of Regulation (EEC) No 95/93.

(15)

It is necessary to clarify that the provisions on the justified non-use of slots exceptions do not apply to air carriers that are the object of restrictive measures adopted pursuant to Article 29 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) or Article 215 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), or to air carriers subject to an operating ban within the Union which are listed in Annex A or B to Commission Regulation (EC) No 474/2006 (5). In order to ensure the effective application of those measures, the impossibility to invoke the provisions on the justified non-use of slots exceptions should apply also to the air carriers that are already the object of such restrictive measures in force on the date of entry into force of this Regulation.

(16)

The cooperation between coordinators should be strengthened to ensure uniform implementation of Regulation (EEC) No 95/93 across the Union.

(17)

Coordinators should exchange best practices on the implementation of Regulation (EEC) No 95/93, including through the European Airport Coordinators Association (EUACA). The EUACA is encouraged to continue issuing guidance to ensure a harmonised implementation of Union rules, in particular regarding the provision on the mitigation of the restrictions. Moreover, whether the mitigation is applied or not is an important piece of information for air carriers when planning their schedules. Therefore, it is necessary to ensure transparent communication from the coordinators.

(18)

While measures mitigating the restrictions should be interpreted strictly since they represent an exception to the normal slot use requirements, in certain instances it should be possible to require common action by all coordinators to ensure a level playing field across the Union. Under certain conditions, and based on a unanimous decision, coordinators should be able to apply that provision to all slots held at coordinated airports.

(19)

The robustness of traffic forecasts for the winter 2022/2023 scheduling period is negatively affected by uncertainty concerning the evolution of various crises, in particular the situation in Ukraine and the COVID-19 crisis. Consequently, air carriers should be released, to the extent necessary, from the requirements to operate slots in order to retain entitlement to the same slots in the next equivalent scheduling period. This would enable air carriers to increase the provision of services when circumstances allow, with a view to applying the regular rules for the operation of slots from the summer 2023 scheduling period, subject to those adaptations made by the Commission in specific circumstances to react to certain challenges to the air transport sector.

(20)

In order to address the evolving impact of the COVID-19 crisis or of other epidemiological situations, as well as the direct devastating impact of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine on air traffic and to support connectivity to or from Ukraine, and to respond flexibly, where strictly necessary and justified, to the challenges that the air transport sector is facing in consequence, the power to adopt acts in accordance with Article 290 TFEU should be delegated to the Commission in respect of amending the percentage values of the minimum usage rate within a certain range and for any scheduling period within the period from 30 October 2022 until 28 October 2023 in line with the recovery forecast of Eurocontrol and in respect of amending the percentage values of the minimum usage rate within a certain range for the routes between the Union and Ukraine and for any scheduling period from 30 October 2022 until 28 October 2023. It is of particular importance that the Commission carries out appropriate consultations during its preparatory work, including at expert level, and that those consultations are conducted in accordance with the principles laid down in the Interinstitutional Agreement of 13 April 2016 on Better Law-Making (6). In particular, to ensure equal participation in the preparation of delegated acts, the European Parliament and the Council receive all documents at the same time as Member States’ experts, and their experts systematically have access to meetings of Commission expert groups dealing with the preparation of delegated acts.

(21)

Airports, airport services providers and air carriers need to have information on available capacity for the purpose of adequate planning. Air carriers should continue to make available to the coordinator for possible reallocation to other air carriers any slot that they do not intend to use at the earliest possible opportunity and no later than 3 weeks before the planned date of their operation. Where air carriers repeatedly fail to comply with that requirement, they should not benefit from a reduced slot operation rate.

(22)

Where a coordinator is satisfied that an air carrier has ceased operations at an airport, the coordinator should withdraw the slots from the air carrier in question and place them in the pool for reallocation to other carriers.

(23)

The prohibition on air carriers to fly into Union airspace in application of restrictive measures adopted pursuant to Article 29 TEU or Article 215 TFEU or of an operating ban pursuant to Regulation (EC) No 474/2006 could result in the unjustified blocking of slots at Union airports. While slots previously used by such air carriers can be re-allocated on an ad hoc basis during the scheduling period, this does not sufficiently encourage the efficient use of slots enabling airlines to increase long-term competition and connectivity for the benefit of consumers. The slots should therefore be immediately withdrawn from the air carriers concerned.

(24)

Since the objective of this Regulation, namely the establishment of specific rules and the relief from the general slot utilisation rules for a limited period of time in order to mitigate the effects of an epidemiological crisis and Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine on air traffic, cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States but can rather, by reason of the scale and effects of the proposed action, be better achieved at Union level, the Union may adopt measures, in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity as set out in Article 5 of the Treaty on European Union. In accordance with the principle of proportionality as set out in that Article, this Regulation does not go beyond what is necessary to achieve that objective.

(25)

In view of the urgency entailed by the exceptional circumstances related to the COVID-19 crisis and Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, it is considered to be appropriate to invoke the exception to the 8-week period provided for in Article 4 of Protocol No 1 on the role of national Parliaments in the Union, annexed to the Treaty on European Union, to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and to the Treaty establishing the European Atomic Energy Community.

(26)

In order to allow for the prompt application of the measures provided for in this Regulation, it should enter into force as a matter of urgency on the day following that of its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union,

(1)

Member States, and in particular the central and eastern regions of the European Union, have been severely affected by the consequences of the military aggression by the Russian Federation against Ukraine, at a time when Member States’ economies are still recovering from the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic. While facing a continuous inflow of persons fleeing Russian aggression, many Member States are also affected by shortages of labour, supply chain difficulties and rising prices and energy costs. On the one hand, this generates challenges for public budgets and, on the other, delays the implementation of investments. Such circumstances have created an exceptional situation which needs to be addressed with specific, well-targeted measures, in order not to require changes in the multiannual financial framework annual ceilings for commitments and payments set out in Annex I to Council Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2020/2093 (2), as well as to avoid undermining the ongoing green, digital and resilient recovery of the economy.

(2)

With a view to alleviating the increasing burden on national budgets, Regulation (EU) 2022/562 of the European Parliament and of the Council (3) made a number of targeted amendments to Regulations (EU) No 1303/2013 (4) and (EU) No 223/2014 (5) of the European Parliament and of the Council in order to make it easier for Member States to use their remaining allocations of the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF), the European Social Fund (ESF) and the Fund for European Aid to the Most Deprived (FEAD) under the 2014–2020 multiannual financial framework, as well as to use REACT-EU resources to address the migratory challenges resulting from the military aggression by the Russian Federation as effectively and as rapidly as possible.

(3)

In addition, Regulation (EU) 2022/613 of the European Parliament and of the Council (6) provided additional possibilities to mobilise resources quickly to offset the immediate budgetary costs borne by Member States and established a unit cost to facilitate the financing of basic needs and support of persons fleeing Russian aggression who are granted temporary protection.

(4)

Additional exceptional arrangements to enable Member States to concentrate on the necessary response to the unprecedented socioeconomic situation should nevertheless be provided to Member States, given the extended nature of the Russian invasion, especially with regard to operations addressing the migratory challenges as a result of the military aggression by the Russian Federation.

(5)

Given the additional strain on public budgets caused by the military aggression by the Russian Federation, the flexibility regarding the use of the ERDF and the ESF provided for in Article 98(4) of Regulation (EU) No 1303/2013 for such operations should be extended to also cover the Cohesion Fund so that its resources can also be used to support operations falling within the scope of the ERDF or the ESF in accordance with the rules applicable to those Funds. In addition, it is appropriate to extend the simplified monitoring requirements set out in Article 98(4) of Regulation (EU) No 1303/2013 to operations supported by the ESF which address migratory challenges, where these operations are programmed in a priority axis which only addresses those challenges. Furthermore, the possibility should be introduced that priorities promoting the socioeconomic integration of third country nationals, including those dedicated to operations addressing migratory challenges resulting from the Russian aggression, benefit from a co-financing rate of up to 100 % in both programming periods, in order to support Member States in addressing displaced persons both now and in the future. In the same vein, the amount for the unit cost to facilitate the financing of basic needs and the support of refugees should be increased and its application in time extended.

(6)

In addition, the setting of the start of the eligibility date on 24 February 2022 for operations addressing migratory challenges as a result of the military aggression by the Russian Federation has not proved sufficient to ensure that all relevant operations addressing these challenges could be supported by the Funds. It is therefore appropriate to exceptionally allow for the selection of such operations prior to the approval of a related programme amendment and for the eligibility of expenditure for such operations which are physically completed or fully implemented, also extending these flexibilities to operations supported by the European Maritime and Fisheries Fund (EMFF) which address the consequences on the fishery and aquaculture sector resulting from the Russian aggression. Furthermore, taking into account the limited funding available in the regions most affected, it should be possible to support such operations beyond the limits of the programme area within a given Member State, given that the situation of persons fleeing Russian aggression and moving within and across Member States poses a challenge to the economic, social and territorial cohesion of the Union as a whole. Such operations should therefore be eligible irrespective of where they are implemented within a given Member State, as their location is ultimately not a decisive criterion when addressing the immediate needs.

(7)

Moreover, given that the burden placed on local authorities and civil society organisations operating in local communities for addressing migratory challenges as a result of the military aggression by the Russian Federation is high, a minimum level of support of 30 % should be set aside for such bodies in the context of the resources being used to support operations within the scope of the ERDF or the ESF in accordance with Article 98(4), first and second subparagraphs, of Regulation (EU) No 1303/2013.

(8)

With a view to alleviating the administrative burden on Member States to take account of the evolving needs and compliance with the financial allocations in an operational programme, the requirement under the 2014–2020 programming period for a formal amendment of a programme in respect of transfers between thematic objectives within a priority of the same Fund and category of region should be removed.

(9)

Lastly, in order to optimise the use of the 2014–2020 allocations in the context of the closure of programmes under the 2014–2020 programming period, the ceiling of the flexibility between priorities for calculating the final balance of the contribution from the Funds should be raised.

(10)

Certain flexibilities to address the unprecedented situation should also be provided for in the legal framework governing programmes under the 2021–2027 programming period. Again with a view to alleviating the burden on national budgets, pre-financing payments for programmes under the Investment for jobs and growth goal should be increased. Furthermore, given the challenges posed by the displacement of people and the integrated responses required from Member States, where a Member State dedicates a priority under one of its 2021–2027 cohesion programmes to supporting operations that promote the socioeconomic integration of third country nationals, a co-financing rate of up to 100 % for that priority should be possible until 30 June 2024, provided that an appropriate level of support is directed to local authorities and civil society organisations operating in local communities and that the total amount programmed under such priorities in a Member State does not exceed 5 % of the initial national allocation of that Member State from the ERDF and the European Social Fund Plus (ESF+) combined. This is without prejudice to the possibility for Member States to programme additional amounts for such priorities with regular co-financing rates. Also, taking into account disruptions to the end of the 2014–2020 programming period caused by the military aggression by the Russian Federation, on top of the long-lasting consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic on project implementation and continuing disruptions of value chains, additional flexibility should also be provided to enable the direct granting of support and completion of operations for which implementation had started in accordance with the 2014–2020 legislative framework before the date of the legislative proposal for this Regulation, even where such operations would not fall within the scope of the Fund concerned under the 2021–2027 programming period, with the exception of cases where the Funds were used under Article 98(4), first and second subparagraph, of Regulation (EU) No 1303/2013. To ensure that such operations can be attributed to types of interventions, Annex I to Regulation (EU) 2021/1060 of the European Parliament and of the Council (7) should be adjusted accordingly. Support for such operations should not affect Member States’ obligations to comply with thematic concentration requirements and climate contribution targets.

(11)

Since the objectives of this Regulation, namely to assist Member States in addressing the challenges created by the exceptionally high number of arrivals of people fleeing the military aggression by the Russian Federation against Ukraine and to support Member States’ continued efforts to move towards a resilient recovery of the economy from the COVID-19 pandemic, cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States but can rather, by reason of the scale and effects of the proposed action, be better achieved at Union level, the Union may adopt measures, in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity as set out in Article 5 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU). In accordance with the principle of proportionality as set out in that Article, this Regulation does not go beyond what is necessary to achieve those objectives.

(12)

Regulations (EU) No 1303/2013 and (EU) 2021/1060 should therefore be amended accordingly.

(13)

In view of the need to provide rapid relief to public budgets with a view to preserving Member States’ capacity to sustain the economic recovery process as well as to enable the speedy programming of the phasing of operations to the 2021–2027 programming period, this Regulation should enter into force as a matter of urgency on the day following that of its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union,

(1)

The Treaty of Lisbon modified the legal framework governing the powers conferred on the Commission by the legislator, introducing a distinction between powers delegated to the Commission to adopt non-legislative acts of general application to supplement or amend certain non-essential elements of a legislative act (delegated acts) and powers conferred on the Commission to adopt acts to ensure uniform conditions for implementing legally binding Union acts (implementing acts).

(2)

Legislative acts adopted before the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon confer powers on the Commission to adopt measures under the regulatory procedure with scrutiny established by Article 5a of Council Decision 1999/468/EC (2).

(3)

Earlier proposals relating to the alignment of legislation referring to the regulatory procedure with scrutiny with the legal framework introduced by the Treaty of Lisbon were withdrawn (3) due to the stagnation of the interinstitutional negotiations.

(4)

The European Parliament, the Council and the Commission subsequently agreed on a new framework for delegated acts in the Interinstitutional Agreement of 13 April 2016 on Better Law-Making (4), and acknowledged the need to align all existing legislation to the legal framework introduced by the Treaty of Lisbon. In particular, they agreed on the need to give high priority to the prompt alignment of all basic acts which still refer to the regulatory procedure with scrutiny. The Commission gave a commitment to prepare a proposal for that alignment by the end of 2016.

(5)

The empowerment for the Commission to amend the standard forms set out in the Annexes to Regulation (EC) No 805/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council (5) provides for the use of the regulatory procedure with scrutiny. As that empowerment fulfils the criteria under Article 290 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), it should be adapted to that provision.

(6)

In order to update Regulation (EC) No 805/2004, the power to adopt acts in accordance with Article 290 TFEU should be delegated to the Commission so that it can amend the Annexes to that Regulation in order to update the standard forms. It is of particular importance that the Commission carry out appropriate consultations during its preparatory work, including at expert level, and that those consultations be conducted in accordance with the principles laid down in the Interinstitutional Agreement of 13 April 2016 on Better Law-Making. In particular, to ensure equal participation in the preparation of delegated acts, the European Parliament and the Council receive all documents at the same time as Member States’ experts, and their experts systematically have access to meetings of Commission expert groups dealing with the preparation of delegated acts.

(7)

This Regulation should not affect pending procedures in which the committee has already delivered its opinion in accordance with Article 5a of Decision 1999/468/EC before the entry into force of this Regulation.

(8)

In accordance with Article 3 and Article 4a(1) of Protocol No 21 on the position of the United Kingdom and Ireland in respect of the area of freedom, security and justice, annexed to the Treaty on European Union (TEU) and to the TFEU, Ireland has notified its wish to take part in the adoption and application of this Regulation.

(9)

In accordance with Articles 1 and 2 of Protocol No 22 on the position of Denmark, annexed to the TEU and to the TFEU, Denmark is not taking part in the adoption of this Regulation and is not bound by it or subject to its application.

(10)

Regulation (EC) No 805/2004 should therefore be amended accordingly,

(1)

Pursuant to Article 3 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU), the aims of the Union are, inter alia, to promote the well-being of its peoples and to work for the sustainable development of Europe based on a highly competitive social market economy, aiming to ensure full employment and social progress, a high level of protection and improvement of the quality of the environment, while promoting social justice and equality between women and men. Pursuant to Article 9 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), the Union is to take into account, inter alia, requirements linked to the promotion of a high level of employment, the guarantee of adequate social protection, and the fight against social exclusion.

(2)

Article 151 TFEU provides that the Union and the Member States, having in mind fundamental social rights such as those set out in the European Social Charter (ESC), have as their objectives, inter alia, the promotion of employment, improved living and working conditions, so as to make possible their harmonisation while the improvement is being maintained, proper social protection and dialogue between management and labour.

(3)

Article 31 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (4) (the ‘Charter’) provides for the right of every worker to working conditions which respect his or her health, safety and dignity. Article 27 of the Charter provides for the right of workers to information and consultation. Article 28 of the Charter provides for the right of workers and employers, or their respective organisations, in accordance with Union law and national laws and practices, to negotiate and conclude collective agreements at the appropriate levels. Article 23 of the Charter provides for the right to equality between women and men in all areas, including employment, work and pay.

(4)

The ESC establishes that all workers have the right to just conditions of work. It recognises the right of all workers to a fair remuneration sufficient for a decent standard of living for themselves and their families. It also recognises the role of freely concluded collective agreements, as well as of statutory minimum wage-setting mechanisms, to ensure the effective exercise of this right, the right of all workers and employers to organise in local, national and international organisations for the protection of their economic and social interests and the right to bargain collectively.

(5)

Chapter II of the European Pillar of Social Rights (the ‘Pillar’), proclaimed at Gothenburg on 17 November 2017, establishes a set of principles to serve as a guide towards ensuring fair working conditions. Principle No 6 of the Pillar reaffirms workers’ right to fair wages that provide for a decent standard of living. It also provides that adequate minimum wages are to be ensured, in a way that provides for the satisfaction of the needs of the worker and his or her family in light of national economic and social conditions, while safeguarding access to employment and incentives to seek work. Furthermore, it recalls that in-work poverty is to be prevented and that all wages are to be set in a transparent and predictable way, according to national practices and respecting the autonomy of the social partners. Principle No 8 of the Pillar provides that the social partners are to be consulted on the design and implementation of economic, employment and social policies according to national practices and that they are to be encouraged to negotiate and conclude collective agreements in matters relevant to them, while respecting their autonomy and the right to collective action.

(6)

Guideline 5 in the annex to Council Decision (EU) 2020/1512 (5) calls on Member States that have in place national mechanisms for the setting of statutory minimum wages to ensure an effective involvement of social partners in wage-setting, providing for fair wages that enable a decent standard of living, while paying particular attention to lower and middle income groups with a view to upward convergence. That Guideline also calls on Member States to promote social dialogue and collective bargaining with a view to wage-setting. It also calls on Member States and the social partners to ensure that all workers have adequate and fair wages by benefitting from collective agreements or adequate statutory minimum wages, and taking into account their impact on competitiveness, job creation and in-work poverty, while respecting national practices. The Commission communication of 17 September 2020 entitled ‘Annual Sustainable Growth Strategy 2021’ states that Member States should adopt measures to ensure fair working conditions. Moreover, the Commission communication of 17 December 2019 entitled ‘Annual Sustainable Growth Strategy 2020’ recalled that, in the context of growing social divides, it is important to ensure that each worker earns a fair wage. Country-specific recommendations have been issued to a number of Member States in the field of minimum wages with the aim of improving the setting and updating of minimum wages.

(7)

Better living and working conditions, including through adequate minimum wages, benefit workers and businesses in the Union as well as society and the economy in general and are a prerequisite for achieving fair, inclusive and sustainable growth. Addressing large differences in the coverage and adequacy of minimum wage protection contributes to improving the fairness of the Union’s labour market, to preventing and reducing wage and social inequalities, and to promoting economic and social progress and upward convergence. Competition in the internal market should be based on high social standards, including a high level of worker protection and the creation of quality jobs, as well as on innovation and improvements in productivity, while ensuring a level playing field.

(8)

When set at adequate levels, minimum wages, as provided for in national law or collective agreements, protect the income of workers, in particular of disadvantaged workers, help ensure a decent living, as pursued by International Labour Organization (ILO) Minimum Wage Fixing Convention No 131 (1970). Minimum wages that provide for a decent standard of living and thus meet a threshold of decency can contribute to the reduction of poverty at national level and to sustaining domestic demand and purchasing power, strengthen incentives to work, reduce wage inequalities, the gender pay gap and in-work poverty, and limit the fall in income during economic downturns.

(9)

In-work poverty in the Union has increased over the past decade and more workers are experiencing poverty. During economic downturns, the role of adequate minimum wages in protecting low-wage workers is particularly important, as they are more vulnerable to the consequences of such downturns, and is essential for the purpose of supporting a sustainable and inclusive economic recovery, which should lead to an increase in quality employment. To ensure sustainable recovery, it is vital that businesses, in particular microenterprises and small enterprises, thrive. In view of the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic, it is important to assess the adequacy of wages in low-paid sectors that have proven to be essential and of great social value during the crisis.

(10)

Women, younger workers, migrant workers, single parents, low-skilled workers, persons with disabilities, and in particular persons who suffer from multiple forms of discrimination, still have a higher probability of being minimum wage or low wage earners than other groups. Given the over-representation of women in low-paid jobs, improving the adequacy of minimum wages contributes to gender equality, closing the gender pay and pension gap, as well as elevating women and their families out of poverty, and contributes to sustainable economic growth in the Union.

(11)

The crisis caused by the COVID-19 pandemic is having a significant impact on the services sector, microenterprises and small enterprises, which have a high share of low-wage and minimum-wage earners. Minimum wages are therefore also important in view of the structural trends that are reshaping labour markets and which are increasingly characterised by high shares of precarious and non-standard forms of work, often including part-time, seasonal, platform and temporary agency workers. Those trends have led, in many cases, to an increased job polarisation resulting in an increasing share of low-paid and low-skilled occupations and sectors in most Member States, as well as to higher wage inequality in some of them. It is more difficult for workers with non-standard contracts to organise and negotiate for collective agreements.

(12)

While minimum wage protection exists in all Member States, in some that protection stems from legislative or administrative provisions and from collective agreements while in others it is provided exclusively through collective agreements. The different national traditions in the Member States should be respected.

(13)

Minimum wage protection provided for in collective agreements in low-paid occupations is adequate and therefore provides a decent standard of living in most cases, and has proven to be an effective means by which to reduce in-work poverty. In several Member States, statutory minimum wages are usually low compared to other wages in the economy. In 2018, the statutory minimum wage did not provide sufficient income for a single minimum-wage earner to reach the at-risk-of-poverty threshold in nine Member States.

(14)

Not all workers in the Union are effectively protected by minimum wages, as in some Member States some workers, even though they are covered, receive a lower remuneration than the statutory minimum wage in practice, due to non-compliance with existing rules. Such non-compliance has been found to affect, in particular, women, young workers, low-skilled workers, migrant workers, single parents, persons with disabilities, workers in non-standard forms of employment such as temporary workers and part-time workers, and agricultural and hospitality workers, which as a consequence drives down wages. In Member States where minimum wage protection is provided for in collective agreements alone, the share of workers not covered is estimated to vary from 2 % to 55 % of all workers.

(15)

The United Nations’ Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities requires that workers with disabilities, including those in sheltered employment, receive equal remuneration for work of equal value. That principle is also relevant with regard to minimum wage protection.

(16)

While strong collective bargaining, in particular at sector or cross-industry level, contributes to ensuring adequate minimum wage protection, traditional collective bargaining structures have been eroding during recent decades, due, inter alia, to structural shifts in the economy towards less unionised sectors and to the decline in trade union membership, in particular as a consequence of union-busting practices and the increase of precarious and non-standard forms of work. In addition, sectoral and cross-industry level collective bargaining came under pressure in some Member States in the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis. However, sectoral and cross-industry level collective bargaining is an essential factor for achieving adequate minimum wage protection and therefore needs to be promoted and strengthened.

(17)

The Commission has consulted management and labour in a two-stage process with regard to possible action to address the challenges related to adequate minimum wage protection in the Union, in accordance with Article 154 TFEU. There was no agreement among the social partners to enter into negotiations with regard to those matters. It is, however, important to take action at Union level, while respecting the principle of subsidiarity, to improve living and working conditions in the Union, in particular the adequacy of minimum wages, taking into account the outcomes of the consultation of the social partners.

(18)

With a view to improving living and working conditions as well as upward social convergence in the Union, this Directive establishes minimum requirements at Union level and sets out procedural obligations for the adequacy of statutory minimum wages, and enhances effective access of workers to minimum wage protection, in the form of a statutory minimum wage where it exists, or provided for in collective agreements as defined for the purposes of this Directive. This Directive also promotes collective bargaining on wage-setting.

(19)

In accordance with Article 153(5) TFEU, this Directive neither aims to harmonise the level of minimum wages across the Union nor does it aim to establish a uniform mechanism for setting minimum wages. It does not interfere with the freedom of Member States to set statutory minimum wages or to promote access to minimum wage protection provided for in collective agreements, in accordance with national law and practice and the specificities of each Member State and in full respect for national competences and the social partners’ right to conclude agreements. This Directive does not impose and should not be construed as imposing an obligation on the Member States where wage formation is ensured exclusively via collective agreements to introduce a statutory minimum wage or to declare collective agreements universally applicable. Moreover, this Directive does not establish the level of pay, which falls within the right of the social partners to conclude agreements at national level and within the relevant competence of Member States.

(20)

This Directive takes into account that, in accordance with ILO Maritime Labour Convention (2006) (6), as amended, Member States who ratified that Convention are, after consulting representative ship-owners’ and seafarers’ organisations, to establish procedures for determining minimum wages for seafarers. Representative ship-owners’ and seafarers’ organisations are to participate in such procedures. In light of their specific nature, the acts of Member States resulting from such procedures should not be subject to the rules on statutory minimum wages set out in Chapter II of this Directive. Such acts should not interfere with free collective bargaining between ship-owners or their organisations and seafarers’ organisations.

(21)

While complying with Regulation (EC) No 593/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council (7), this Directive should apply to workers who have an employment contract or employment relationship as defined by the law, collective agreements or practice in force in each Member State, with consideration to the criteria established by the Court of Justice of the European Union (Court of Justice) for determining the status of a worker. Provided that they fulfil those criteria, workers in both the private and the public sectors, as well as domestic workers, on-demand workers, intermittent workers, voucher-based workers, platform workers, trainees, apprentices and other non-standard workers, as well as bogus self-employed and undeclared workers could fall within the scope of this Directive. Genuinely self-employed persons do not fall within the scope of this Directive since they do not fulfil those criteria. The abuse of the status of self-employed persons, as defined in national law, either at national level or in cross-border situations, is a form of falsely declared work that is frequently associated with undeclared work. Bogus self-employment occurs when a person is declared to be self-employed while fulfilling the conditions characteristic of an employment relationship, in order to avoid certain legal or fiscal obligations. Such persons should fall within the scope of this Directive. The determination of the existence of an employment relationship should be guided by the facts relating to the actual performance of the work and not by the parties’ description of the relationship.

(22)

Well-functioning collective bargaining on wage-setting is an important means by which to ensure that workers are protected by adequate minimum wages that therefore provide for a decent standard of living. In the Member States with statutory minimum wages, collective bargaining supports general wage developments and therefore contributes to improving the adequacy of minimum wages as well as the living and working conditions of workers. In the Member States where minimum wage protection is provided for exclusively by collective bargaining, their level as well as the share of protected workers are directly determined by the functioning of the collective bargaining system and the collective bargaining coverage. Strong and well-functioning collective bargaining together with a high coverage of sectorial or cross-industry collective agreements strengthen the adequacy and the coverage of minimum wages.

(23)

Minimum wage protection through collective agreements is beneficial to workers and employers as well as businesses. In some Member States there are no statutory minimum wages. In those Member States, wages, including minimum wage protection, are provided for exclusively by collective bargaining between the social partners. Average wages in those Member States are among the highest in the Union. Those systems are characterised by very high collective bargaining coverage as well as high levels of affiliation to both the employer associations and trade unions. Minimum wages that are provided for in collective agreements that have been declared universally applicable without any discretion of the declaring authority as to the content of the applicable provisions should not be considered to be statutory minimum wages.

(24)

In a context of declining collective bargaining coverage, it is essential that the Member States promote collective bargaining, facilitate the exercise of the right of collective bargaining on wage-setting and thereby enhance the wage-setting provided for in collective agreements to improve workers’ minimum wage protection. Member States have ratified ILO Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise Convention No 87 (1948) and ILO Right to Organise and Collective Bargaining Convention No 98 (1949). The right to bargain collectively is recognised under those ILO conventions, under ILO Labour Relations (Public Services) Convention No 151 (1978) and ILO Collective Bargaining Convention No 154 (1981), as well as under the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and the ESC. Articles 12 and 28 of the Charter guarantee, respectively, the freedom of assembly and association and the right of collective bargaining and action. According to its preamble, the Charter reaffirms those rights as they result, in particular, from the Convention on the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and the Social Charters adopted by the Union and by the Council of Europe. Member States should take, as appropriate and in accordance with national law and practice, measures promoting collective bargaining on wage-setting. Such measures might include, among others, measures easing the access of trade union representatives to workers.

(25)

Member States with a high collective bargaining coverage tend to have a small share of low-wage workers and high minimum wages. Member States with a small share of low-wage earners have a collective bargaining coverage rate above 80 %. Similarly, the majority of the Member States with high levels of minimum wages relative to the average wage have a collective bargaining coverage above 80 %. Therefore, each Member State with a collective bargaining coverage rate below 80 % should adopt measures with a view to enhancing such collective bargaining. Each Member State with a collective bargaining coverage below a threshold of 80 % should provide a framework of enabling conditions for collective bargaining, and establish an action plan to promote collective bargaining to progressively increase the collective bargaining coverage rate. In order to respect the autonomy of the social partners, which includes their right to collective bargaining and excludes any obligation to conclude collective agreements, the threshold of 80 % of collective bargaining coverage should only be construed as an indicator triggering the obligation to establish an action plan.

The action plan should be reviewed on a regular basis, at least every five years, and, if needed, revised. The action plan and any update thereof should be notified to the Commission and be made public. Each Member State should be able to decide on the appropriate form of its action plan. An action plan that a Member State has adopted before the entry into force of this Directive may be considered to be an action plan under this Directive provided that it contains actions to effectively promote collective bargaining and fulfils the obligations under this Directive. Each Member State should establish such an action plan after consulting the social partners or by agreement with them, or, following a joint request by the social partners, as agreed between them. Member States’ collective bargaining coverage rates vary significantly owing to a number of factors, including national tradition and practice as well as historic context. This should be taken into account when analysing progress towards a higher collective bargaining coverage, particularly with regard to the action plan provided for in this Directive.

(26)

Sound rules, procedures and effective practices for setting and updating statutory minimum wages are necessary to deliver adequate minimum wages, while safeguarding existing and creating new employment opportunities, a level playing field and the competitiveness of firms including microenterprises, small enterprises and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). Those rules, procedures and practices include a number of components to contribute to the adequacy of statutory minimum wages, including criteria to guide Member States in setting and updating statutory minimum wages and indicators to assess their adequacy, regular and timely updates, the existence of consultative bodies and the involvement of the social partners. A timely and effective involvement of the latter in the setting and updating of statutory minimum wages as well as in the establishment or modification of automatic indexation mechanisms, where they exist, is another element of good governance that allows for an informed and inclusive decision-making process. Member States should provide the social partners with relevant information on statutory minimum wage-setting and updating. Giving the social partners the possibility to provide opinions, and to receive a reasoned response to opinions expressed prior to the presentation of proposals, on statutory minimum wage-setting and updating and before any decisions are taken could contribute to the proper involvement of the social partners in that process.

(27)

Member States which use an automatic indexation mechanism, including semi-automatic mechanisms in which a minimal obligatory increase of statutory minimum wage is at least guaranteed, should also carry out the procedures for updating the statutory minimum wages, at least every four years. Those regular updates should consist of an evaluation of the minimum wage taking into account the guiding criteria, followed, if necessary, by a modification of the amount. The frequency of the automatic indexation adjustments on the one hand, and the updates of the statutory minimum wages on the other might differ. Member States where automatic or semi-automatic indexation mechanisms do not exist should update their statutory minimum wage at least every two years.

(28)

Minimum wages are considered to be adequate if they are fair in relation to the wage distribution in the relevant Member State and if they provide a decent standard of living for workers based on a full-time employment relationship. The adequacy of statutory minimum wages is determined and assessed by each Member State in view of its national socioeconomic conditions, including employment growth, competitiveness and regional and sectoral developments. For the purpose of that determination, Member States should take into account purchasing power, long-term national productivity levels and developments, as well as wage levels wage distribution and wage growth.

Among other instruments, a basket of goods and services at real prices established at national level can be instrumental to determining the cost of living with the aim of achieving a decent standard of living. In addition to material necessities such as food, clothing and housing, the need to participate in cultural, educational and social activities could also be taken into consideration. It is appropriate to consider the setting and updating of statutory minimum wages separately from income support mechanisms. Member States should use indicators and associated reference values to guide their assessment of statutory minimum wage adequacy. The Member States might choose among indicators commonly used at international level and/or indicators used at national level. The assessment might be based on reference values commonly used at international level such as the ratio of the gross minimum wage to 60 % of the gross median wage and the ratio of the gross minimum wage to 50 % of the gross average wage, which are currently not met by all Member States, or the ratio of the net minimum wage to 50 % or 60 % of the net average wage. The assessment might also be based on reference values associated to indicators used at national level, such as the comparison of the net minimum wage with the poverty threshold and the purchasing power of minimum wages.

(29)

Without prejudice to the competence of Member States to set the statutory minimum wage and to allow for variations and deductions, it is important to avoid variations and deductions being used widely, as they risk having a negative impact on the adequacy of minimum wages. It should be ensured that variations and deductions respect the principles of non-discrimination and proportionality. Variations and deductions should therefore pursue a legitimate aim. Examples of such deductions might be the recovery of overstated amounts paid or deductions ordered by a judicial or administrative authority. Other deductions, such as those related to the equipment necessary to perform a job or deductions of allowances in kind, such as accommodation, present a high risk of being disproportionate. Moreover, nothing in this Directive should be construed as imposing an obligation on Member States to introduce any variations of or deductions from minimum wages.

(30)

An effective enforcement system, including reliable monitoring, controls and field inspections, is necessary to ensure the functioning of and compliance with national statutory minimum wage frameworks. To strengthen the effectiveness of enforcement authorities, close cooperation with the social partners is also needed, including to address critical challenges such as those related to abusive sub-contracting, bogus self-employment, non-recorded overtime or health and safety risks linked to an increase in work intensity. The capabilities of enforcement authorities should also be developed, in particular through training and guidance. Routine and unannounced visits, judicial and administrative proceedings and penalties in the case of infringements are important means by which to dissuade employers from effecting infringements.

(31)

The effective implementation of minimum wage protection set out by legal provisions or provided for in collective agreements is essential in the awarding and the performance of public procurement and concession contracts. Non-respect for collective agreements providing for minimum wage protection may indeed occur in the execution of such contracts or in the sub-contracting chain thereafter, resulting in workers being paid less than the wage level agreed in the sectoral collective agreements. To prevent such situations, in accordance with Articles 30(3) and 42(1) of Directive 2014/23/EU (8), Articles 18(2) and 71(1) of Directive 2014/24/EU (9) and Articles 36(2) and 88(1) of Directive 2014/25/EU (10), of the European Parliament and the Council, public procurement contracting authorities and contracting entities are to take appropriate measures, including the possibility to introduce contract performance conditions, and ensure that economic operators apply to their workers the wages provided for in collective agreements for the relevant sector and geographical area and respect the rights of workers and trade unions arising from ILO Freedom of Association and the Protection of the Right to Organise Convention No 87 (1948) and ILO Right to Organise and Collective Bargaining Convention No 98 (1949), as referred to in those Directives, in order to abide by applicable obligations in the field of labour law. However, this Directive does not create any additional obligation in relation to those Directives.

(32)

For applicants for financial support from Union funds and programmes under Regulation (EU) 2021/1060 of the European Parliament and of the Council (11)and the enabling conditions therein, the rules for public procurement and concessions should be applied adequately, including with regard to compliance with collective agreements provisions.

(33)

Reliable monitoring and data collection are essential for effective minimum wage protection. For the purposes of data collection, Member States may rely on sufficiently representative sample surveys, national databases, harmonised data from Eurostat and other publicly accessible sources such as the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development. In exceptional cases where accurate data is not available, Member States might use estimates. Employers, in particular microenterprises and other SMEs, should not bear an unnecessary administrative burden with regard to the implementation of data collection requirements. The Commission should report every second year to the European Parliament and to the Council its analysis of levels and developments in the adequacy and coverage of statutory minimum wages as well as the collective bargaining coverage on the basis of data and information to be provided by Member States.

In addition, progress should be monitored in the framework of the process of economic and employment policy coordination at Union level. In that context, the Council or the Commission can request the Employment Committee and the Social Protection Committee, in accordance with Articles 150 and 160 TFEU respectively, to examine, in their respective area of competence, the development of the collective bargaining coverage and the adequacy of statutory minimum wages in the Member States on the basis of the report produced by the Commission and other multilateral surveillance tools such as benchmarking. During such an examination, the Committees are to involve the social partners at Union level, including cross-sectoral social partners, in accordance with Articles 150 and 160 TFEU respectively.

(34)

Workers should have easy access to comprehensive information on statutory minimum wages as well as on minimum wage protection provided for in universally applicable collective agreements to ensure transparency and predictability as regards their working conditions, including for persons with disabilities in accordance with Directive (EU) 2016/2102 of the European Parliament and of the Council (12).

(35)

Workers and workers’ representatives, including those who are trade union members or representatives, should be in a position to exercise their right of defence when their rights relating to minimum wage protection are provided for in national law or collective agreements and have been violated. In order to prevent workers from being deprived of their rights provided for in national law or collective agreements and without prejudice to specific forms of redress and dispute resolution provided for in collective agreements, including systems of collective dispute resolution, Member States should take the necessary measures to ensure that workers have access to effective, timely and impartial dispute resolution and a right to redress, as well as effective judicial and/or administrative protection from any form of detriment, if they decide to exercise their right of defence. Social partners’ involvement in the further development of impartial dispute resolution mechanisms in Member States can be beneficial. Workers should be informed about the redress mechanisms for the purpose of exercising their right to redress.

(36)

The Commission should conduct an evaluation providing the basis for a review on the effective implementation of this Directive. The European Parliament and the Council should be informed of the results of that review.

(37)

The reforms and measures adopted by the Member States to promote adequate minimum wage protection of workers, while being steps in the right direction, have not always been comprehensive and systematic. Moreover, action taken at Union level to improve the adequacy and coverage of minimum wages can contribute to further improving living and working conditions in the Union and mitigating concerns about possible adverse economic effects resulting from isolated measures of Member States. Since the objectives of this Directive cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States, but can rather, by reason of their scale and effects, be better achieved at Union level, the Union may adopt measures, in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity as set out in Article 5 TEU. In accordance with the principle of proportionality, as set out in that Article, this Directive does not go beyond what is necessary in order to achieve those objectives.

(38)

This Directive lays down procedural obligations as minimum requirements, thus leaving untouched Member States’ prerogative to introduce and maintain more favourable provisions. Rights acquired under the existing national legal framework should continue to apply, unless more favourable provisions are introduced by this Directive. The implementation of this Directive cannot be used to reduce existing rights for workers, nor can it constitute valid grounds for reducing the general level of protection afforded to workers in the field covered by this Directive, including, in particular, with regard to the lowering or abolition of minimum wages.

(39)

In implementing this Directive Member States should avoid imposing unnecessary administrative, financial and legal constraints, in particular if they hold back the creation and development of SMEs. Member States are therefore encouraged to assess the impact of their transposition measures on SMEs in order to ensure that they are not disproportionately affected, paying particular attention to microenterprises and to the administrative burden, and to publish the results of such assessments. If Member States find that SMEs are disproportionately affected by the transposition measures, they should consider introducing measures to support SMEs to adjust their remuneration structures to the new requirements.

(40)

Regulations (EU) 2021/240 (13) and (EU) 2021/1057 (14) of the European Parliament and of the Council are available to Member States to develop or improve the technical aspects of minimum wage frameworks, including on the assessment of adequacy, monitoring and data collection, broadening access, as well as on enforcement and on general capacity building relating to the implementation of those frameworks. In accordance with Regulation (EU) 2021/1057, Member States are to allocate an appropriate amount to the capacity building of the social partners,

(1)

Council Regulation (EU) No 1284/2009 (2) gives effect to the measures provided for in Council Decision 2010/638/CFSP concerning restrictive measures against the Republic of Guinea.

(2)

Decision (CFSP) 2022/2052 introduces a modification to the title of Decision 2010/638/CFSP.

(3)

Regulatory action at the level of the Union is therefore necessary to give effect to Decision (CFSP) 2022/2052, in particular with a view to ensuring its uniform application by economic operators in all Member States.

(4)

Regulation (EU) No 1284/2009 should therefore be amended accordingly,

(1)

On 1 October 2015, the Council adopted Regulation (EU) 2015/1755.

(2)

On the basis of a review by the Council, three persons should be removed from the list of natural and legal persons, entities and bodies subject to restrictive measures, as set out in Annex I to Regulation (EU) 2015/1755.

(3)

Annex I to Regulation (EU) 2015/1755 should therefore be amended accordingly,

(1)

The Commission has examined the application for the approval of amendments to the specification for the Protected Designation of Origin ‘Roero’, forwarded by Italy in accordance with Article 105 of Regulation (EU) No 1308/2013.

(2)

The Commission has published the application for the approval of the amendments to the specification in the Official Journal of the European Union (2), as required by Article 97(3) of Regulation (EU) No 1308/2013.

(3)

No statement of objection has been received by the Commission under Article 98 of Regulation (EU) No 1308/2013.

(4)

The amendments to the specification should therefore be approved in accordance with Article 99 of Regulation (EU) No 1308/2013.

(5)

The measures provided for in this Regulation are in accordance with the opinion of the Committee for the Common Organisation of the Agricultural Markets,

(1)

Pursuant to the first subparagraph of Article 53(1) of Regulation (EU) No 1151/2012, the Commission has examined Italy’s application for the approval of amendments to the specification for the protected designation of origin ‘Chianti Classico’, registered under Commission Regulation (EC) No 2446/2000 (2), as amended by Regulation (EU) No 216/2011 (3) and Implementing Regulation (EU) No 267/2013 (4).

(2)

Since the amendments in question are not minor within the meaning of Article 53(2) of Regulation (EU) No 1151/2012, the Commission published the amendment application in the Official Journal of the European Union (5) as required by Article 50(2)(a) of that Regulation.

(3)

As no statement of opposition under Article 51 of Regulation (EU) No 1151/2012 has been received by the Commission, the amendments to the specification should be approved,

(1)

Annexes I and II to Commission Regulation (EU) No 1408/2013 (2) set out the maximum cumulative amounts of de minimis aid granted per Member State to undertakings active in the primary production of agricultural products over any period of 3 fiscal years referred to, respectively, in Article 3(3) and Article 3(3a) of that Regulation.

(2)

The Agreement on the withdrawal of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland from the European Union and the European Atomic Energy Community (3) (‘the Withdrawal Agreement’), of which the Protocol on Ireland/Northern Ireland (‘the Protocol’) forms an integral part, entered into force on 1 February 2020.

(3)

The transition period provided for in Article 126 of the Withdrawal Agreement, during which Union law remained to a large extent applicable to and in the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, ended on 31 December 2020.

(4)

However, Article 10 of the Protocol provides that certain provisions of Union law listed in Annex 5 to that Protocol shall apply to the United Kingdom in respect of measures affecting the trade in agricultural products between Northern Ireland and the Union.

(5)

Regulation (EU) No 1408/2013 is listed among those provisions.

(6)

In order to ensure compliance with the provisions of the Withdrawal Agreement and the Protocol, it is necessary to replace the maximum cumulative amounts for the entire United Kingdom set out in the Annexes to Regulation (EU) No 1408/2013 with the corresponding amounts for Northern Ireland alone.

(7)

In order to ensure a level playing field, the maximum cumulative amounts for Northern Ireland should be based on the same calculation method as that which was used for the Member States at the time when those Annexes were established.

(8)

Regulation (EU) No 1408/2013 should therefore be amended accordingly,

(1)

Annex II to Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2021/2325 (2) sets out the list of control authorities and control bodies recognised for the purpose of equivalence and competent to carry out controls and issue certificates in third countries.

(2)

Annex IV to Commission Regulation (EC) No 1235/2008 (3) had originally recognised ‘Ecocert SA’ for Bahrain as regards product category D. Annex II to Implementing Regulation (EU) 2021/2325 erroneously left blank the row relating to Bahrain for product category D. That error needs to be corrected.

(3)

Annex II to Implementing Regulation (EU) 2021/2325 erroneously listed ‘Florida Certified Organic Growers and Consumers, Inc. (FOG), DBA as Quality Certification Services (QCS)’ as a recognised body in Costa Rica for product category A. In addition, the control body had not provided details on the type of products it would like to certify for product category D in Costa Rica, therefore its recognition for that product category was granted erroneously. The relevant entry needs to be corrected.

(4)

Implementing Regulation (EU) 2021/2325 should therefore be corrected accordingly.

(5)

The geographical scope of the recognition of ‘Ecocert SA’ was erroneously limited. That error relating to Bahrain for product category D should therefore be corrected retroactively from the date of entry into force of Implementing Regulation (EU) 2021/2325. The recognition of ‘Florida Certified Organic Growers and Consumers, Inc. (FOG), DBA as Quality Certification Services (QCS)’ was erroneously extended to product categories A and D in Costa Rica. That error should therefore be corrected retroactively from the date of application of Implementing Regulation (EU) 2021/2325.

(6)

The measures provided for in this Regulation are in accordance with the opinion of the Organic Production Committee,

(1)

Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) No 1062/2014 (2) establishes a list of existing active substances to be evaluated for their possible approval for use in biocidal products. That list includes L-(+)-lactic acid.

(2)

L-(+)-lactic acid has been evaluated for use in biocidal products of product-type 6, preservatives for products during storage, as described in Annex V to Regulation (EU) No 528/2012.

(3)

Germany was designated as the rapporteur Member State and its evaluating competent authority submitted the assessment report together with its conclusions to the European Chemicals Agency (‘the Agency’) on 3 September 2020.

(4)

In accordance with Article 75(1), point (a), of Regulation (EU) No 528/2012, the Biocidal Products Committee prepares the opinion of the Agency regarding the applications for approval of active substances. In accordance with Article 7(2) of Delegated Regulation (EU) No 1062/2014, the Biocidal Products Committee adopted the opinion of the Agency (3) on 15 June 2021, having regard to the conclusions of the evaluating competent authority.

(5)

According to that opinion, the biocidal products of product-type 6 containing L-(+)-lactic acid may be expected to satisfy the criteria laid down in Article 19(1), point (b), of Regulation (EU) No 528/2012, provided that conditions concerning their use are complied with.

(6)

Taking into account the opinion of the Agency, it is appropriate to approve L-(+)-lactic acid for use in biocidal products of product-type 6 subject to compliance with certain conditions.

(7)

In particular, since L-(+)-lactic acid is classified for skin corrosion/irritation, sub-category 1C, and eye damage and irritation, Category 1, as specified in Part 3 of Annex VI to Regulation (EC) No 1272/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council (4), the person responsible for placing on the market of substances or mixtures treated with or incorporating the active substance at concentrations leading to classification for skin corrosion/irritation or eye damage/eye irritation should ensure that exposure to the general public is minimised by appropriate risk mitigation measures.

(8)

Since L-(+)-lactic acid meets the criteria for classification as corrosive to the respiratory tract as specified in Part 3 of Annex VI to Regulation (EC) No 1272/2008, the person responsible for placing on the market of substances or mixtures treated with or incorporating the active substance at a concentration leading to classification for corrosion of the respiratory tract should ensure that exposure to the general public is minimised by appropriate risk mitigation measures.

(9)

In order to guarantee a safe use of biocidal products containing L-(+)-lactic acid in treated articles and enable users of treated articles to make informed choices, the person responsible for the placing on the market of a treated article treated with or incorporating L-(+)-lactic acid should ensure that the label of that treated article provides the information listed in Article 58(3), second subparagraph, of Regulation (EU) No 528/2012. Furthermore, Member States competent authorities or, in the case of a Union authorisation, the Commission should specify in the summary of the biocidal product characteristics of a biocidal product containing L-(+)-lactic acid the relevant instructions for use and precautions to be included on the label of the treated articles under Article 58(3), point (e), of Regulation (EU) No 528/2012.

(10)

A reasonable period should be allowed to elapse before an active substance is approved in order to permit interested parties to take the preparatory measures necessary to meet the new requirements.

(11)

The measures provided for in this Regulation are in accordance with the opinion of the Standing Committee on Biocidal Products,

(1)

Annex I to Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2021/2325 (2) sets out the list of third countries whose systems of production and control measures for organic production of agricultural products are recognised as equivalent to those laid down in Council Regulation (EC) No 834/2007 (3).

(2)

India has informed the Commission that its competent authority suspended the control body ‘TQ Cert Services Private Limited’ and therefore that control body should be removed from the list of control bodies recognised by India.

(3)

Annex II to Implementing Regulation (EU) 2021/2325 sets out the list of control authorities and control bodies recognised for the purpose of equivalence and competent to carry out controls and issue certificates in third countries. In the light of new information and requests received by the Commission since the adoption of Implementing Regulation (EU) 2021/2325, certain changes should be made to that list.

(4)

Notifications of cases of non-compliance have been made in the Organic Farming Information System (OFIS) of ‘Control Union Certifications’ (BIO-149), ‘Ecocert SA’ (BIO-154), ‘Lacon GmbH’ (BIO-134) and ‘OneCert International PVT Ltd’ (BIO-152). Those notifications concern the contamination of a large number of consignments of products, produced in India and certified as organic by those control bodies. The contaminations were with products and substances not allowed in organic production and/or conventional production in the Union, at levels above and often far above the Maximum Residue Levels as set in Regulation (EC) No 396/2005 of the European Parliament and of the Council (4). Those contaminations include, but are not limited to, contaminations with ethylene oxide, which is carcinogenic, mutagenic, and toxic for reproduction.

(5)

Moreover, those control bodies have failed to demonstrate that organic products imported under their control have been produced in accordance with production rules and subject to control arrangements equivalent to those laid down in Regulation (EC) No 834/2007 and in Commission Regulations (EC) No 889/2008 (5) and (EC) No 1235/2008 (6).

(6)

In addition, those control bodies have failed to take corrective measures in response to the irregularities and infringements observed.

(7)

For each of those reasons, and in accordance with Article 4(1), points (d)(iv), (d)(v) and (d)(vii) of Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2021/1342 (7), the control bodies ‘Control Union Certifications’, ‘Ecocert SA’, ‘Lacon GmbH’ and ‘OneCert International PVT Ltd’ should be withdrawn from the list of control authorities and control bodies recognised for India for the purpose of equivalence under Article 33(3) of Regulation (EC) No 834/2007.

(8)

‘A CERT European Organization for Certification S.A.’ has notified the Commission of the change of its address.

(9)

The Commission has received and examined a request from ‘BioGro New Zealand Limited’ to withdraw its recognition for all third countries for which it is recognised in accordance with Implementing Regulation (EU) 2021/2325.

(10)

‘Bureau Veritas Certification France SAS’ has notified the Commission regarding the change of its internet address.

(11)

The Commission has received and examined a request from ‘Ecocert SA’ to change its name. Based on the information received, the Commission has concluded that it is justified to replace the name of that control body by ‘Ecocert SAS’.

(12)

The accreditation body IOAS has informed the Commission about the withdrawal of its accreditation relating to the control body ‘FairCert Certification Services Pvt Ltd’. The Commission has also invited the control body to provide a valid accreditation certificate and to take appropriate and timely remedial action. However, ‘FairCert Certification Services Pvt Ltd’ failed to reply satisfactorily within the deadline set for the purpose. Finally, ‘FairCert Certification Services Pvt Ltd’ did not communicate to the Commission all of the information related to its technical dossier. For each of those three reasons, and in accordance with Article 4(1), point (d)(iii), of Delegated Regulation (EU) 2021/1342, ‘FairCert Certification Services Pvt Ltd’ should be withdrawn from the list of control authorities and control bodies set out in Annex II to Implementing Regulation (EU) 2021/2325 for all third countries.

(13)

‘Kiwa Sativa’ has notified the Commission of the change of its internet address.

(14)

The Commission has received and examined a request from ‘Lacon GmbH’ to withdraw its recognition for all third countries for which it is recognised in Implementing Regulation (EU) 2021/2325.

(15)

The Commission has received and examined a request by ‘LETIS S.A.’ to withdraw its recognition for Afghanistan, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Côte d’Ivoire, Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Morocco, Pakistan, Russia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, the United Arab Emirates and Uzbekistan.

(16)

The accreditation body IOAS has informed the Commission about the withdrawal of its accreditation relating to ‘LETIS S.A.’ in Turkey. The Commission has also invited the control body to provide a valid accreditation certificate concerning Turkey and to take appropriate and timely remedial action. However, ‘LETIS S.A.’ failed to reply satisfactorily within the deadline set for the purpose. For each of those two reasons, and in accordance with Article 4(1), point (d)(iii), of Delegated Regulation (EU) 2021/1342, it is justified to withdraw the recognition of ‘LETIS S.A.’ for Turkey.

(17)

‘OneCert International PVT Ltd’ has notified the Commission of the change of its address and internet address.

(18)

The Commission has received a request from ‘Oregon Tilth’ to withdraw its recognition for Panama.

(19)

The Commission has received a request from ‘Organic Standard’ to withdraw its recognition for Russia.

(20)

The Commission has received and examined a request from ‘Soil Association Certification Limited’ to voluntarily cease its activities for all third countries for which it is recognised in accordance with Implementing Regulation (EU) 2021/2325.

(21)

‘Tse-Xin Organic Certification Corporation’ has notified the Commission of the change of its address.

(22)

Implementing Regulation (EU) 2021/2325 should therefore be amended accordingly.

(23)

The measures provided for in this Regulation are in accordance with the opinion of the Organic Production Committee,

(1)

Pursuant to Article 300(3) of the Treaty, the Committee of the Regions is to consist of representatives of regional and local bodies who either hold a regional or local authority electoral mandate or are politically accountable to an elected assembly.

(2)

On 17 February 2020, the Council adopted Decision (EU) 2020/235 (2), appointing a member and an alternate member, proposed by the Republic of Austria, of the Committee of the Regions. On 21 June 2022, the Council adopted Decision (EU) 2022/1000 (3), appointing a member, proposed by the Republic of Austria, of the Committee of the Regions.

(3)

A member’s seat on the Committee of the Regions has become vacant following the resignation of Mr Christopher DREXLER.

(4)

An alternate member’s seat has become vacant following the appointment of Mr Hannes WENINGER as a member of the Committee of the Regions.

(5)

The Austrian Government has proposed Mr Werner AMON, representative of a regional body who holds a regional authority electoral mandate, Landesrat, Steiermärkische Landesregierung (Member of the Provincial Government, Provincial Government of Styria), as a member of the Committee of the Regions for the remainder of the current term of office, which runs until 25 January 2025.

(6)

The Austrian Government has proposed Mr Thomas STEINER, representative of a local body who holds a local authority electoral mandate, Mitglied des Gemeinderats von Eisenstadt (Member of the Municipal Council of Eisenstadt), as an alternate member of the Committee of the Regions for the remainder of the current term of office, which runs until 25 January 2025,

(1)

On 1 October 2015, the Council adopted Decision (CFSP) 2015/1763 (1) concerning restrictive measures in view of the situation in Burundi.

(2)

On the basis of a review by the Council of Decision (CFSP) 2015/1763, the restrictive measures should be renewed until 31 October 2023 and three persons should be removed from the list of natural and legal persons, entities and bodies subject to restrictive measures, as set out in the Annex to Decision (CFSP) 2015/1763.

(3)

Decision (CFSP) 2015/1763 should therefore be amended accordingly,

(1)

On 25 October 2010, the Council adopted Decision 2010/638/CFSP (1) concerning restrictive measures against the Republic of Guinea.

(2)

On the basis of a review of Decision 2010/638/CFSP, those restrictive measures should be extended until 27 October 2023.

(3)

The Council considers that the title of Decision 2010/638/CFSP should be amended.

(4)

Decision 2010/638/CFSP should therefore be amended accordingly,

(1)

A request for registration of a European citizens’ initiative entitled ‘European citizens’ initiative for vegan meal’ was submitted to the Commission on 30 August 2022.

(2)

The objective of the initiative as expressed by the organisers is to ‘explicitly make the vegan alternative always present in the private and public spaces selling food and drinks in Europe. The EU Citizens’ Initiative for VEGAN MEAL for those who are vegan and for those who respect the right to the vegan alternative and also to take action for climate change offering more easily plant-based food to the EU consumers in their daily life. Cruelty-free vegan diet does not imply the exploitation and killing of animals, responding to the emerging collective awareness of animal rights. Furthermore the vegan diet changes the territory in the choice of production and employment activities, structures and logistics with less pollution. The European Citizens’ Initiative for VEGAN MEAL asks for the introduction of the vegan alternative in the sale of food and beverages to the public in Europe by law with the hope the participation of European citizens leads to the approval of an EU law with great benefits for the planet, i.e. in mitigation of the climate crisis, extinction of wild species, deforestation, better of use of land, defence of marine life, food waste and malnutrition.’

(3)

An annex, as well as an additional document, provide further details on the subject matter, objectives and background to the initiative, by setting out and specifying the reasons to support the initiative. The organisers claim that making available the vegan alternative in the sale of food and drinks to the public in private and public spaces allows to make easier the access to the vegan alternative, to help fight the climate crisis by increasing the consumption of plant-based food and to reduce the cost of food. ‘Facilitating the availability of vegan food in public and private sectors of food and beverage sales concern less pollution in CO2 emissions, less environmental contamination, less water use and generate less suffering for animals’ according to organisers.

(4)

As regards the objective of the initiative asking for the introduction of a legal obligation for operators in the retail market of food and beverages to offer vegan products, the Commission has the power to present a proposal for a legal act on the basis of Article 114 TFEU. In addition, inasmuch as the initiative may affect or require specific measures under the common agricultural policy, the Commission has the power to present proposals for legal acts on the basis of Article 43 TFEU.

(5)

For those reasons, none of the parts of the initiative manifestly fall outside the framework of the Commission’s powers to submit a proposal for a legal act of the Union for the purpose of implementing the Treaties.

(6)

This conclusion is without prejudice to the assessment of whether the concrete substantive conditions required for the Commission to act, including compliance with the principles of proportionality and subsidiarity and compatibility with fundamental rights, would be met in this case.

(7)

The group of organisers has provided appropriate evidence that it fulfils the requirements laid down in Article 5(1) and (2) of Regulation (EU) 2019/788 and has designated the contact persons in accordance with Article 5(3), first subparagraph, of that Regulation.

(8)

The initiative is not manifestly abusive, frivolous or vexatious, nor is it manifestly contrary to the values of the Union as set out in Article 2 of the Treaty on European Union and rights enshrined in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union.

(9)

The initiative entitled ‘European citizens’ initiative for vegan meal’ should therefore be registered.

(10)

The conclusion that the conditions for registration under Article 6(3) of Regulation (EU) 2019/788 are fulfilled does not imply that the Commission in any way confirms the factual correctness of the content of the initiative, which is the sole responsibility of the group of organisers of the initiative. The content of the initiative only expresses the views of the group of organisers, and can in no way be taken to reflect the views of the Commission,

(1)

On 29 November 2016, the company Lanxess Deutschland GmbH (‘the applicant’) submitted an application for the mutual recognition in parallel in accordance with Article 34 of Regulation (EU) No 528/2012 of the biocidal product Preventol A 12 TK 50 (‘the biocidal product’) to the competent authorities of a number of Member States, including France, Sweden and Germany. The biocidal product, containing propiconazole as an active substance, is a film preservative of product-type 7, to be used by industrial users to preserve water-based and solvent-based paints and coatings. The Netherlands is the reference Member State responsible for the evaluation of the application as referred to in Article 34(1) of Regulation (EU) No 528/2012.

(2)

On 16 September 2020, Germany referred objections to the coordination group indicating that the conditions of the authorisation set by the Netherlands do not ensure that the biocidal product meets the requirements laid down in Article 19(1), point (b)(iii), of Regulation (EU) No 528/2012.

(3)

On 17 September 2020, the secretariat of the coordination group invited the other concerned Member States and the applicant to submit written comments on the referral. The applicant submitted written comments on 29 September 2020. The referral was discussed in the coordination group on 21 October 2020 with the participation of the applicant.

(4)

Germany considers that risk mitigation measures for placing on the market of treated articles treated with or incorporating the product can only be included in an authorisation of a biocidal product if they were referred to in the conditions of approval of the active substance. As Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2015/1609 (2) does not include the necessary risk mitigation measures for placing on the market of treated articles treated with or incorporating the product, Germany considers that the risk mitigation measures for placing on the market of treated articles proposed by the Netherlands cannot be included in the authorisation of the biocidal product. Consequently, according to Germany, as unacceptable effects on human health and the environment from the use of the biocidal product cannot be properly addressed in the authorisation of the product, the product therefore should not be authorised.

(5)

As no agreement was reached by the coordination group on the objection raised by Germany, on 16 December 2021 the Netherlands referred the unresolved objection to the Commission pursuant to Article 36(1) of Regulation (EU) No 528/2012. It thereby provided the Commission with a detailed statement of the matter on which Member States were unable to reach agreement and the reasons for their disagreement. That statement was forwarded to the Member States concerned and to the applicant.

(6)

Article 19(1), points (b)(iii) and (b)(iv), of Regulation (EU) No 528/2012 provides that one of the conditions for granting an authorisation is that it is established, according to the common principles for the evaluation of dossiers for biocidal products laid down in Annex VI to that Regulation, that the biocidal product has no unacceptable effects itself, or as a result of its residues, on the health of humans and animals, and on the environment.

(7)

Article 19(2), point (b), of Regulation (EU) No 528/2012 provides that the evaluation of whether a biocidal product fulfils the criteria set out in paragraph 1, point (b), of that Article is to take into account the way in which treated articles treated with the biocidal product or containing the biocidal product may be used.

(8)

Article 58(2) of Regulation (EU) No 528/2012 provides that a treated article is not to be placed on the market unless all active substances contained in the biocidal product that it was treated with or incorporates are included in the list drawn up in accordance with Article 9(2) of that Regulation, for the relevant product-type and use, or in Annex I to that Regulation, and any conditions or restrictions specified therein are met. The Netherlands concluded that there would be unacceptable effects on human health and the environment arising from the use of the biocidal product which necessitate risk mitigation measures on the placing on the market and use of treated articles treated with or incorporating the biocidal product to be included in the authorisation of the biocidal product. The conditions set in Implementing Regulation (EU) 2015/1609 do not include specific risk mitigation measures related to placing on the market of treated articles treated with or incorporating propiconazole, and that Implementing Regulation does not provide the possibility for the competent authorities of Member States to set those risk mitigation measures in the authorisation of biocidal products containing propiconazole for product-type 7, which would be needed to address the unacceptable risks identified for human health and the environment from the use of treated articles treated with or incorporating the biocidal product.

(9)

After having carefully examined all the information the Commission understands that the fulfilment of the conditions in Article 19(1), points (b)(iii) and (b)(iv), of Regulation (EU) No 528/2012 for the biocidal product cannot be ensured by imposing conditions on the use of the biocidal products in the treated articles without simultaneously imposing obligations on the persons placing on the market treated articles incorporating those biocidal products. However, as the necessary conditions or restrictions for ensuring a safe use of the biocidal product taking into account the way in which treated articles treated with or containing the biocidal product may be used were not set in Implementing Regulation (EU) 2015/1609 and cannot be laid down in the authorisation of the biocidal product, the use of the biocidal product in the treated articles would have unacceptable effects on human health and the environment.

(10)

Consequently, the Commission considers that given that the safe use of the biocidal product in treated articles cannot be ensured only by imposing conditions on the use of the biocidal products in the treated articles without simultaneously imposing obligations on the persons placing on the market of treated articles, the product does not meet the conditions laid down in Article 19(1), points (b)(iii) and (b)(iv), of Regulation (EU) No 528/2012.

(11)

On 21 June 2022, the Commission provided the applicant with the opportunity to provide written comments in accordance with Article 36(2) of Regulation (EU) No 528/2012. On 18 July 2022 the applicant provided written comments that the Commission has taken into account.

(12)

The measures provided for in this Decision are in accordance with the opinion of the Standing Committee on Biocidal Products,

1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

7.

8.

9.

10.

11.

12.

13.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1.1.

1.2.

1.3.

1.3.1.

1.3.2.

1.3.3.

1.4.

2.1.

2.1.1.

2.2.

2.3.

2.4.

2.5.

This Regulation applies to towing frames which are separate units, not a structural part of the tractor.

2.6.

2.7.

2.8.

2.9.

2.9.1.

2.9.2.

2.9.3.

2.9.4.

2.10.

2.10.1.

For mechanical coupling devices and components not designed to support imposed vertical loads, the value is:

For mechanical coupling devices and components for rigid drawbar trailers as defined in 2.12., the value is:

Where:

2.10.2.

2.10.3.

2.10.4.

2.11.