(1)

An association agreement between the Union and Ukraine (2), including a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area, entered into force on 1 September 2017.

(2)

In spring 2014, Ukraine embarked on an ambitious reform programme with the aim of stabilising its economy and improving the livelihoods of its citizens. The fight against corruption, as well as constitutional, electoral and judicial reforms, are among the top priorities on the agenda. The implementation of those reforms was supported by consecutive macro-financial assistance programmes, under which Ukraine has received assistance in the form of loans for a total of EUR 6,6 billion. The emergency macro-financial assistance, which was made available in the context of mounting tensions at the border with Russia, pursuant to Decision (EU) 2022/313 of the European Parliament and of the Council (3), provided EUR 1,2 billion in loans to Ukraine, disbursed in two instalments, each of EUR 600 million, in March and May 2022. The Union’s exceptional macro-financial assistance of up to EUR 1 billion pursuant to Decision (EU) 2022/1201 of the European Parliament and of the Council (4), provided swift and urgent support to the Ukrainian budget and was fully disbursed in two tranches on 1 and 2 August 2022. That assistance constituted the first stage of the planned full Union’s exceptional macro-financial assistance to Ukraine for up to EUR 9 billion, announced by the Commission in its communication of 18 May 2022 entitled ‘Ukraine Relief and Reconstruction’ and endorsed by the European Council of 23-24 June 2022. This Decision constitutes the second stage in the implementation of that envisaged Union’s exceptional macro-financial assistance. It establishes the basis for providing to Ukraine a further amount of up to EUR 5 billion of macro-financial assistance in the form of loans on highly concessional terms. This Decision should be followed swiftly by the adoption of a further decision implementing the third stage of the planned full Union’s exceptional macro-financial assistance for a further amount of up to EUR 3 billion once the design of that assistance has been determined.

(3)

Russia’s unprovoked and unjustified war of aggression against Ukraine since 24 February 2022 has caused Ukraine a loss of market access and a drastic drop in public revenues, while public expenditure to address the humanitarian situation and to maintain the continuity of State services has increased markedly. In that very uncertain and volatile situation, the best estimates of Ukraine’s funding needs by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) point to an extraordinary financing gap of around USD 39 billion in 2022, of which around half could be met if the international support pledged thus far were fully disbursed. The swift provision by the Union of the macro-financial assistance to Ukraine under this Decision is, under the current extraordinary circumstances, considered to be an appropriate short-term response to the sizeable risks to Ukraine’s macro-financial stability. The further amount of up to EUR 5 billion of Union’s exceptional macro-financial assistance under this Decision is to support Ukraine’s macro-financial stabilisation, strengthen the immediate resilience of the country and sustain its capacity towards recovery, thereby contributing to the public debt sustainability of Ukraine and its ability to ultimately be in a position to repay its financial obligations.

(4)

The Union’s exceptional macro-financial assistance under this Decision will contribute significantly to satisfying Ukraine’s funding needs as estimated by the IMF and other international financial institutions, taking into account Ukraine’s capacity to finance itself with its own resources. The determination of the amount of the Union’s exceptional macro-financial assistance also takes into account expected financial contributions from bilateral and multilateral donors, the need to ensure fair burden-sharing between the Union and other donors, as well as the pre-existing deployment of the Union’s other external financing instruments in Ukraine and the added value of the overall Union involvement. The Ukrainian authorities’ commitment to close cooperation with the IMF on the design and implementation of short-term emergency measures and their intent to work with the IMF on an appropriate economic programme when conditions permit should be acknowledged. Such a programme was formally requested in August 2022. The Union’s exceptional macro-financial assistance should aim to maintain macro-financial stability and resilience under the war circumstances. The Commission should ensure that the Union’s exceptional macro-financial assistance is legally and substantially in accordance with the key principles and objectives of the measures taken within the different areas of external action and other relevant Union policies.

(5)

The Union’s exceptional macro-financial assistance should support the Union’s external policy towards Ukraine. The Commission and the European External Action Service should work closely together throughout the macro-financial assistance operation in order to coordinate, and ensure the consistency of, Union external policy.

(6)

A precondition for granting the Union’s exceptional macro-financial assistance should be that Ukraine respect effective democratic mechanisms, including a multi-party parliamentary system, and the rule of law, and guarantee respect for human rights. The ongoing war, and in particular the current state of martial law, should not encroach on those principles, despite the concentration of power in the executive branch.

(7)

In order to ensure that the Union’s financial interests linked to the Union’s exceptional macro-financial assistance are protected efficiently, Ukraine should take appropriate measures relating to the prevention of, and fight against, fraud, corruption and any other irregularities linked to that assistance. In addition, provision should be made in the loan agreement for the Commission to carry out checks, for the Court of Auditors to carry out audits and for the European Public Prosecutor’s Office to exercise its competences, in accordance with Articles 129 and 220 of Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2018/1046 of the European Parliament and of the Council (5) (the ‘Financial Regulation’).

(8)

The Union’s exceptional macro-financial assistance should be linked to stringent reporting requirements and policy conditions, to be set out in a memorandum of understanding (the ‘MoU’). Those stringent reporting requirements should aim, under the current war circumstances, to ensure that the funds are used in an efficient, transparent and accountable manner. The policy conditions should aim to strengthen the immediate resilience of Ukraine and its longer-term debt sustainability, thereby reducing risks linked to the repayment of its outstanding and future financial obligations.

(9)

In order to ensure uniform conditions for the implementation of this Decision, implementing powers should be conferred on the Commission. Those powers should be exercised in accordance with Regulation (EU) No 182/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council (6).

(10)

The loans provided under this Decision and Decision (EU) 2022/1201 should together have a maximum average maturity of 25 years.

(11)

Given that the loans under this Decision and Decision (EU) 2022/1201 imply the same risks for the Union budget and should have together a maximum average maturity of 25 years, the total amount of EUR 6 billion of the Union’s macro-financial assistance to Ukraine under this Decision and Decision (EU) 2022/1201 should be covered by a common methodology for managing the financial and budgetary implications. In particular, the same level of budgetary cover should be established as adequate protection against the possibility of potential non-repayment by Ukraine of some or all of the loans at the scheduled time. The provisions made available from the Union budget against the two sets of loans of the Union’s exceptional macro-financial assistance should be managed as an integrated set of provisions. Such management will enhance the resilience and flexibility of the Union budget in response to any situation of non-payment. Decision (EU) 2022/1201 should therefore be amended accordingly.

(12)

The exceptional macro-financial assistance under this Decision and Decision (EU) 2022/1201 constitutes a financial liability for the Union within the overall volume of the External Action Guarantee under Regulation (EU) 2021/947 of the European Parliament and of the Council (7). The total amount of up to EUR 6 billion of Union’s exceptional macro-financial assistance loans to Ukraine should benefit from 9 % of paid-in provisioning available for macro-financial assistance loans under the External Action Guarantee. The amount of provisioning should be financed from the financial envelope programmed for macro-financial assistance under Regulation (EU) 2021/947 for a total amount of EUR 540 million. That amount should be committed and paid into the common provisioning fund under the multiannual financial framework 2021–2027, laid down in Council Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2020/2093 (8).

(13)

In accordance with Article 210(3) of the Financial Regulation, the contingent liabilities arising from budgetary guarantees or financial assistance borne by the Union budget are to be deemed sustainable if their forecast multiannual evolution is compatible with the limits set by Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2020/2093 and the ceiling on annual payment appropriations set out in Article 3(1) of Council Decision (EU, Euratom) 2020/2053 (9). In order to enable the Union to provide substantial support to Ukraine through the Union’s exceptional macro-financial assistance in unprecedented amounts in a financially safe manner, while preserving the high credit standing of the Union and, hence, its capacity to deliver effective financing in the context of both its internal and external policies, it is essential to adequately protect the Union budget from the materialisation of those contingent liabilities and to ensure they are financially sustainable within the meaning of Article 210(3) of the Financial Regulation.

(14)

In accordance with the principle of sound financial management, the common provisioning fund should be reinforced with means commensurate to the risks arising from the contingent liabilities linked to this unprecedently large Union’s exceptional macro-financial assistance to a single beneficiary. Without such a reinforcement, the Union budget would not be able to provide, on financially safe grounds, the unprecedentedly large assistance that the war-related needs of Ukraine require. To protect the Union budget, the Union’s exceptional macro-financial assistance loans to Ukraine of up to EUR 6 billion should benefit from a 70 % coverage through paid-in provisioning (at the level of 9 %), which may be supplemented with Member States’ guarantees to provide budgetary cover for losses of up to a further 61 % of the loan values.

(15)

Resources under Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2020/2093 are under high pressure in view of the Union’s overall spending priorities. It is therefore appropriate to seek an alternative solution for additional resources which does not affect the regular expenditure foreseen in the financial programming of the multiannual financial framework 2021–2027.

(16)

Voluntary contributions by Member States in the form of guarantees have been identified as an appropriate tool to provide protection on top of the initial paid-in provisioning. The Member States’ guarantees should be provided voluntarily and should constitute an appropriate backstop supporting the Union budget, after the provisions in the common provisioning fund in respect of financial liabilities under this Decision and Decision (EU) 2022/1201 have been or are to be fully drawn down. The contributions under those guarantees should be included into the amount of authorised financial liability by derogation from Article 211(1), first subparagraph, of the Financial Regulation. Those amounts should be taken into account for calculating the provisioning resulting from the provisioning rate referred to in Article 211(1) of the Financial Regulation, by derogation from Article 211(4), second subparagraph, of the Financial Regulation.

(17)

The guarantees provided by Member States should cover the exceptional macro-financial assistance loans under this Decision and Decision (EU) 2022/1201 (the ‘covered MFAs’). Those guarantees should be irrevocable, unconditional and on demand. Those guarantees should ensure the Union’s ability to repay the funds borrowed on the capital markets or from financial institutions. They should be called only when strict conditions, relating to the adequacy of the available provisions, are met and in the event that the Union does not receive a payment from Ukraine of the exceptional macro-financial assistance loans granted under the covered MFAs in time to satisfy the Union’s financial obligations from bonds or in the event that the payment schedule of the loans granted under the covered MFAs were to be changed. A call on the guarantees provided by Member States should be made for an amount corresponding to the amount arising from losses on financial assistance to Ukraine under the covered MFAs and to replenish the common provisioning fund to the required level of paid-in provisioning. The calls on the Member States’ guarantees should only be made after the amount of initial provisioning set aside in respect of the exceptional macro-financial assistance under the covered MFAs has been or is to be fully drawn down. Amounts recovered under the loan agreements in respect of the exceptional macro-financial assistance to Ukraine under the covered MFAs should be reimbursed to the Member States that have honoured the guarantee calls, by derogation from Article 211(4), point (c), of the Financial Regulation.

(18)

In the event that payment of the Union’s financial obligations arising from bonds for the exceptional macro-financial assistance to Ukraine under the covered MFAs were met temporarily from provisions set aside in the common provisioning fund to cover other financial liabilities of the Union, the call on the guarantees provided by Member States could be used to replenish the provisioning of those financial liabilities.

(19)

Given the exceptional nature of the macro-financial assistance backed by the guarantees, it is appropriate to manage the provisions held against the financial liabilities arising from the macro-financial assistance under the covered MFAs and for any disbursements after 15 July 2022 of loans guaranteed under Decision No 466/2014/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council (10) separately from other financial liabilities under the External Action Guarantee and the Guarantee Fund for external actions. It is therefore appropriate to use the provisioning set aside in the common provisioning fund solely for financial liabilities from the exceptional macro-financial assistance under the covered MFAs, instead of applying the general rule set out in Article 31(6) of Regulation (EU) 2021/947. Furthermore, it is appropriate to use the provisioning set aside in the common provisioning fund in respect of the loans guaranteed under Decision No 466/2014/EU disbursed after 15 July 2022 solely for the financial liabilities from those loans and to apply the rules of the Financial Regulation to the provisioning, instead of applying the general rule set out in Article 31(8) of Regulation (EU) 2021/947. That should be complemented by the exclusion of the provisioning set aside in respect of the exceptional macro-financial assistance under this Decision from the application of the effective provisioning rate, by derogation from Article 213 of the Financial Regulation.

(20)

The relative share of the contributions of each Member State (contribution key) to the overall guaranteed amount should correspond to the relative shares of Member States in the total gross national income of the Union. The calls on the guarantees should be made pro rata, applying that contribution key.

(21)

It is important that Member States complete their national procedures for the guarantees to enter into force as a matter of the utmost priority. Given the urgency of the situation, the time needed for the completion of those procedures should not delay the disbursement of the urgently needed exceptional macro-financial assistance to Ukraine under this Decision. The macro-financial assistance loans under this Decision will be arranged swiftly upon the entry into force of this Decision, adoption of the MoU and signing of the loan agreement.

(22)

Given the difficult situation caused by Russia’s war of aggression, and to support Ukraine on its long-term stability path, it is appropriate to derogate from Article 220(5), point (e), of the Financial Regulation and to allow the Union the possibility to cover the interest rate costs related to the loans under this Decision and to waive the administrative costs that would otherwise be borne by Ukraine. The interest rate subsidy should be granted as an instrument deemed appropriate to ensure the effectiveness of the support within the meaning of Article 220(1) of the Financial Regulation and should be borne by the Union budget at least during the period of the multiannual financial framework 2021–2027. During the period from 2021 to 2027, the interest rate subsidy should be borne by the financial envelope referred to in Article 6(2), point (a), first indent, of Regulation (EU) 2021/947.

(23)

It should be possible for Ukraine to request the interest rate subsidy and the waiver of administrative costs each year by the end of March. To allow for flexibility in the repayment of the principal, it should also be possible to roll over the associated borrowings contracted on behalf of the Union, by derogation from Article 220(2) of the Financial Regulation.

(24)

Faced with Ukraine’s urgent financing needs, the Commission agreed in July 2022 to the repurposing and disbursement of a further EUR 1,59 billion of the European Investment Bank loans to Ukraine guaranteed under the External Lending Mandate 2014–2020 (ELM). However, as those loans are for the Ukrainian sovereign and state-owned entities, they embody the same level of risk for the Union budget as the macro-financial assistance loans. The Union budget should consequently apply the same precautionary approach to those exposures as it does to the macro-financial assistance loans under the covered MFAs. This Decision therefore applies a 70 % provisioning rate to the repurposed ELM loans of EUR 1,59 billion as well as to any further disbursements of ELM loans to Ukraine. That provisioning rate should apply instead of the provisioning rate set out in Article 31(8), third sentence, of Regulation (EU) 2021/947. The 70 % provisioning for the EUR 1,59 billion ELM loans disbursements to Ukraine will be financed from the Union budget.

(25)

A regular review of the provisioning for the respective macro-financial assistance loans and ELM loans should be undertaken every six months, starting on 30 June 2023 or earlier, if appropriate. That review should in particular assess whether the situation of Ukraine has evolved in a way that would warrant an increase or decrease of the provisioning rate. The Commission might re-assess the provisioning rate on an ad hoc basis, in particular if justified by a notable relevant event. In order to ensure that the provisioning rate remains adequate to the financial risks, the power to adopt acts in accordance with Article 290 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union should be delegated to the Commission in respect of increasing or decreasing the provisioning rate, as appropriate. It is of particular importance that the Commission carry out appropriate consultations during its preparatory work, including at expert level, and that those consultations be conducted in accordance with the principles laid down in the Interinstitutional Agreement of 13 April 2016 on Better Law-Making (11). In particular, to ensure equal participation in the preparation of delegated acts, the European Parliament and the Council receive all documents at the same time as Member States’ experts, and their experts systematically have access to meetings of Commission expert groups dealing with the preparation of delegated acts.

(26)

Since the objective of this Decision, namely to provide the Union’s exceptional macro-financial assistance to Ukraine with a view to supporting, in particular, its economic resilience and stability, cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States but can rather, by reason of its scale and effects, be better achieved at Union level, the Union may adopt measures, in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity as set out in Article 5 of the Treaty on European Union. In accordance with the principle of proportionality, as set out in that Article, this Decision does not go beyond what is necessary in order to achieve that objective.

(27)

In view of the urgency entailed by the exceptional circumstances caused by Russia’s unprovoked and unjustified war of aggression, it is considered to be appropriate to invoke the exception to the eight-week period provided for in Article 4 of Protocol No 1 on the role of national Parliaments in the European Union, annexed to the Treaty on European Union, to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and to the Treaty establishing the European Atomic Energy Community.

(28)

In light of the situation in Ukraine, this Decision should enter into force as a matter of urgency on the day following that of its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union,

(1)

Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/2072 (2) lays down, in Part B of Annex II, the list of Union quarantine pests known to occur in the Union territory.

(2)

Ceratocystis platani (J.M. Walter) Engelbr. & T.C. Harr. (‘the specified pest’) is included in that list, as it is known to occur in certain parts of the Union territory, having significant impact on Platanus L. plants (‘the specified plants’) and on wood of Platanus L. (‘the specified wood’), the main hosts for that pest.

(3)

The surveys carried out pursuant to Article 19 of Regulation (EU) 2016/2031 show that the eradication of the specified pest in certain demarcated areas is no longer possible.

(4)

Therefore, measures should be established for the containment of the specified pest within those demarcated areas, consisting of infected zones and buffer zones. Those measures should be in line with the available technical and scientific evidence with regard to the specified plants and the specified wood.

(5)

The competent authorities should raise public awareness to ensure that the general public and professional operators, concerned by the containment measures in the demarcated areas, are aware of the applied measures and the delimitation of the demarcated areas for that purpose.

(6)

Nevertheless, if the specified pest is found in a buffer zone surrounding an infected zone subject to measures for the containment of the specified pest, that new finding should result in the establishment of a new demarcated area by the competent authority, where eradication is pursued.

(7)

Annual surveys for the presence of the specified pest as set out in Article 22 of Regulation (EU) 2016/2031 and Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2020/1231 (3) should be carried out to ensure the early detection of the specified pest in areas of the Union territory where the specified pest is not known to be present. Those surveys should be based on the pest survey card on the specified pest published by the European Food Safety Authority, as it takes into account the latest scientific and technical developments.

(8)

The measures provided for in this Regulation are in accordance with the opinion of the Standing Committee on Plants, Animals, Food and Feed,

(1)

Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/2072 (2) lays down, in Part B of Annex II, the list of Union quarantine pests known to occur in the Union territory.

(2)

Grapevine flavescence dorée phytoplasma (‘the specified pest’) is included in that list, as it is known to occur in certain parts of the Union territory, having significant impact on the cultivation of plants of Vitis L. (‘specified plants’), the main host for that pest.

(3)

Scaphoideus titanus Ball (‘the specified vector’) has been identified as an efficient vector of the specified pest. This vector plays an important role in the establishment and further spread of Grapevine flavescence dorée phytoplasma (3) in the Union territory, therefore measures for its identification and control should be established.

(4)

The surveys carried out pursuant to Article 19 of Regulation (EU) 2016/2031 show that eradication of the specified pest in certain demarcated areas is no longer possible.

(5)

Therefore, measures should be established for the containment of the specified pest within those demarcated areas, consisting of infected zones and buffer zones. Those measures should consist of destruction and removal of the infected specified plants and application of appropriate treatments in order to prevent the spread of the specified pest to the rest of the Union territory.

(6)

The competent authorities should raise public awareness to ensure that the general public and professional operators, concerned by the containment measures in the demarcated areas, are aware of the applied measures and the delimitation of the demarcated areas for that purpose.

(7)

Nevertheless, if the specified pest is found in a buffer zone surrounding an infected zone subject to measures for the containment of the specified pest, that new finding should result in the establishment of a new demarcated area by the competent authority, where eradication is pursued.

(8)

Annual surveys for the presence of the specified pest and the specified vector as set out in Article 22 of Regulation (EU) 2016/2031 and in Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2020/1231 (4) should be carried out to ensure the early detection of the specified pest in areas of the Union territory where the specified pest is not known to be present. Those surveys should be based on the pest survey card on the specified pest and its vector published by the European Food Safety Authority, as it takes into account the latest scientific and technical developments.

(9)

The measures provided for in this Regulation are in accordance with the opinion of the Standing Committee on Plants, Animals, Food and Feed,

(1)

Directive 2011/65/EU requires Member States to ensure that electrical and electronic equipment placed on the market does not contain the hazardous substances listed in Annex II to that Directive. That restriction does not apply to certain exempted applications, which are specific to medical devices and monitoring and control instruments, and are listed in Annex IV to that Directive.

(2)

The categories of electrical and electronic equipment (EEE) to which Directive 2011/65/EU applies are listed in Annex I to that Directive.

(3)

Lead is a restricted substance listed in Annex II to Directive 2011/65/EU.

(4)

On 25 March 2019, the Commission received an application made in accordance with Article 5(3) of Directive 2011/65/EU for an exemption to be listed in Annex IV to that Directive, for the use of lead in bismuth strontium calcium copper oxide superconductor for use in cables and wires and lead in related electrical connections to other EEE components (‘the requested exemption’). Lead-doped BSCCO can be used to create superconducting magnetic circuits for medical devices and monitoring and control instruments.

(5)

The evaluation of the requested exemption included stakeholder consultations in accordance with Article 5(7) of Directive 2011/65/EU. The comments received during those consultations were made publicly available on a dedicated website.

(6)

Lead-containing solders are used to connect the superconducting wires and cables to other EEE components. There is currently no lead-free alternative available on the market that would provide a sufficient level of reliability for applications, where properties such as ductility and low electrical resistivity at low temperatures are required.

(7)

The evaluation of the requested exemption, which included a technical and scientific assessment study (2), concluded that the addition of lead to BSCCO provides technical and functional advantages that cannot be achieved without the use of lead. Those technical and functional advantages consist in higher resolution images for medical diagnosis or for research and innovation, and allow a more stable operation mode of the relevant applications. The addition of lead to BSCCO makes it possible to produce more efficient and reliable equipment, which is beneficial for health care and innovation.

(8)

It is currently not possible to substitute or otherwise eliminate lead in the superconducting material and the related solders with the same technical performance, nor is it expected to be so in the foreseeable future. The requested exemption is consistent with Regulation (EC) No 1907/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council (3) and does not weaken the environmental and health protection afforded by it.

(9)

It is, therefore, appropriate to grant the requested exemption.

(10)

The technical advantages of the lead-doped BSCCO-material have the potential to promote improvements and innovation in medical diagnostics and in research. The duration of the exemption is unlikely to have adverse impacts on innovation. Therefore, it is appropriate to grant the exemption for an extensive validity period, in accordance with Article 5(2), first subparagraph, of Directive 2011/65/EU.

(11)

Directive 2011/65/EU should therefore be amended accordingly,

(1)

Directive 2011/65/EU requires Member States to ensure that electrical and electronic equipment placed on the market does not contain the hazardous substances listed in Annex II to that Directive. That restriction does not apply to certain exempted applications, which are specific to medical devices and monitoring and control instruments, and are listed in Annex IV to that Directive.

(2)

The categories of electrical and electronic equipment to which Directive 2011/65/EU applies are listed in Annex I to that Directive.

(3)

Lead is a restricted substance listed in Annex II to Directive 2011/65/EU.

(4)

By Delegated Directive 2014/7/EU (2), the Commission granted an exemption for the use of lead in solders, termination coatings of electrical and electronic components and printed circuit boards, connections of electrical wires, shields and enclosed connectors that are used in certain medical magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) equipment (‘the exemption’), by including those applications in Annex IV to Directive 2011/65/EU. The exemption was to expire on 30 June 2020.

(5)

On 12 December 2018, the Commission received an application for renewal of the exemption (‘the renewal request’) that is within the time limit laid down in Article 5(5) of Directive 2011/65/EU. In accordance with that provision, the exemption remains valid until a decision on the renewal request has been adopted.

(6)

The evaluation of the renewal request included stakeholder consultations in accordance with Article 5(7) of Directive 2011/65/EU. The comments received during those consultations were made publicly available on a dedicated website.

(7)

The evaluation of the renewal request, which included a technical and scientific assessment study (3), concluded that old design MRI devices depend on lead-containing MRI components and are highly limited in their compatibility with new lead-free MRI components. That evaluation further concluded that lead-free models of non-integrated MRI coils are already available. However, as concerns MRI devices with integrated coils, the technical development and the approval procedure to develop lead-free solutions require additional time.

(8)

The use of lead in newly designed non-integrated MRI coils and in upcoming lead-free MRI devices with integrated coils should be excluded from the exemption with specific dates.

(9)

Not granting the renewal request could result in premature wastage of MRI devices due to a lack of compatible components or redesigning options. This could result in a supply gap of MRI equipment, which could in turn adversely affect health care for patients.

(10)

The total negative environmental, health and consumer safety impacts of substitution are likely to outweigh the total environmental, health and consumer safety benefits thereof. The exemption is consistent with Regulation (EC) No 1907/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council (4) and thus does not weaken the environmental and health protection afforded by it.

(11)

It is, therefore, appropriate to grant the renewal of the exemption.

(12)

In order to provide compatible MRI equipment for health services and to allow time for the development of lead-free alternatives, it is appropriate to grant the renewal of the exemption, with a revised scope, for the maximum duration of 7 years until 30 June 2027, in accordance with Article 5(2), first subparagraph, of Directive 2011/65/EU. In view of the results of the ongoing efforts to find a reliable substitution, the duration of the exemption is unlikely to have adverse impacts on innovation.

(13)

Directive 2011/65/EU should therefore be amended accordingly,

(1)

Further to a request from Bulgaria on 7 August 2020, the Council, by means of Implementing Decision (EU) 2020/1343 (2), granted financial assistance to Bulgaria in the form of a loan amounting to a maximum of EUR 511 000 000 with a maximum average maturity of 15 years, and with an availability period of 18 months, with a view to complementing Bulgaria’s national efforts to address the impact of the COVID-19 outbreak and respond to the socio-economic consequences of that outbreak for workers and the self-employed.

(2)

The loan was to be used by Bulgaria to finance the short-time work schemes and similar measures, as referred to in Article 3 of Implementing Decision (EU) 2020/1343.

(3)

The COVID-19 outbreak continues to immobilise a substantial part of the labour force in Bulgaria. This has led to repeated sudden and severe increase in public expenditure in Bulgaria in respect of the measure referred to in Article 3, point (b), of Implementing Decision (EU) 2020/1343.

(4)

The COVID-19 outbreak and the extraordinary measures implemented by Bulgaria in 2020, 2021 and 2022 to contain that outbreak and its socioeconomic and health-related impact had and are still having a dramatic impact on public finances. In 2020, Bulgaria had a general government deficit and debt of 4,0 % and 24,7 % of gross domestic product (GDP) respectively, which increased to 4,1 % and 25,1 % respectively at the end of 2021. According to the Commission’s 2022 spring forecast, Bulgaria is forecast to have a general government deficit and debt of 3,7 % and 25,3 % of GDP respectively by the end of 2022. Bulgaria’s GDP is projected to increase by 2,1 % in 2022.

(5)

On 23 June 2022 Bulgaria requested further financial assistance from the Union in the amount of EUR 460 170 000 with a view to continuing to complement its national efforts undertaken in 2020, 2021 and 2022 to address the impact of the COVID-19 outbreak and respond to the socio-economic consequences of the outbreak for workers. In particular, Bulgaria further extended and amended the short-time work schemes and similar measures referred to in recital (6).

(6)

The extended wage subsidy is provided to undertakings, which, due to the COVID-19 outbreak, have suffered a revenue reduction of at least 30 % due to restrictions on their activities between 13 March 2020 and 31 December 2020. The employment of employees is required to be maintained during the period of participation in the measure and for an equal period afterwards. The monthly wage subsidy to the eligible undertakings amounts to between 50 and 60 % of the employee’s monthly gross salary (including employers’ social security contributions), depending on the size of the decrease in revenue. This measure is an extension of the measure described in Article 3, point (b), of Implementing Decision (EU) 2020/1343 and provided for in Decree No 151 of 3 July 2020 of the Council of Ministers, as amended by Decree No 278 of 12 October 2020, Decree No 416 of 30 December 2020, Decree No 93 of 18 March 2021, Decree No 213 of 1 July 2021, Decree No 322 of 7 October 2021, Decree No 482 of 30 December 2021 and Decree No 40 of 31 March 2022 (3).

(7)

Bulgaria fulfils the conditions for requesting financial assistance set out in Article 3 of Regulation (EU) 2020/672. Bulgaria has provided the Commission with appropriate evidence that the actual and planned public expenditure has increased by EUR 1 015 050 000 as of 1 February 2020 as a result of the national measures taken to address the socioeconomic effects of the COVID-19 outbreak. This constitutes a sudden and severe increase because it is related to the extension or amendment of existing national measures directly related to short-time work scheme and similar measures that cover a significant proportion of undertakings and of the labour force in Bulgaria. Bulgaria intends to finance EUR 43 880 000 of the increased amount of expenditure through its own financing.

(8)

The Commission has consulted Bulgaria and verified the sudden and severe increase in the actual and planned public expenditure directly related to short-time work schemes and similar measures, as referred to in the request of 23 June 2022, in accordance with Article 6 of Regulation (EU) 2020/672.

(9)

Financial assistance should therefore be provided with a view to helping Bulgaria to address the socioeconomic effects of the severe economic disturbance caused by the COVID-19 outbreak. The Commission should take the decisions concerning maturities, size and release of instalments and tranches in close cooperation with national authorities.

(10)

Given that the availability period indicated in Implementing Decision (EU) 2020/1343 has expired, a new availability period for the additional financial assistance is needed. The availability period for financial assistance granted by Implementing Decision (EU) 2020/1343 should be extended by 21 months and, as a consequence, the total availability period should be 39 months starting from the first day after Implementing Decision (EU) 2020/1343 has taken effect.

(11)

Bulgaria and the Commission should take this Decision into account in the loan agreement referred to in Article 8(2) of Regulation (EU) 2020/672.

(12)

This Decision should be without prejudice to the outcome of any procedures relating to distortions of the operation of the internal market that may be undertaken, in particular pursuant to Articles 107 and 108 of the Treaty. It does not override the requirement for Member States to notify instances of potential State aid to the Commission under Article 108 of the Treaty.

(13)

Bulgaria should inform the Commission on a regular basis of the implementation of the planned public expenditure, in order to enable the Commission to assess the extent to which Bulgaria has implemented that expenditure.

(14)

The decision to provide financial assistance has been reached taking into account existing and expected needs of Bulgaria, as well as requests for financial assistance pursuant to Regulation (EU) 2020/672 already submitted or planned to be submitted by other Member States, while applying the principles of equal treatment, solidarity, proportionality and transparency,

(1)

Independent media services play a unique role in the internal market. They represent a fast-changing and economically important sector and at the same time provide access to a plurality of views and reliable sources of information to citizens and businesses alike, thereby fulfilling the general interest function of ‘public watchdog’.

(2)

Media services play a crucial role in democratic societies as they provide information which is a public good. To fulfil such an essential societal role and to thrive on the market, media service providers need to be able to provide their services freely and independently in a market that is open and transparent, and that allows for a plurality of media actors and views.

(3)

Media service providers enjoy not only protection under the Union rules governing the internal market but also under Article 11 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (‘the Charter’) as they are important for the enjoyment of the right to freedom of expression and information. Article 11 of the Charter also provides that the freedom and pluralism of media shall be respected and that the right to freedom of expression includes freedom to receive and impart information without interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers of Member States. Moreover, the proper functioning of the internal market for media services has a direct impact on the rule of law and on democracy, which are fundamental Union values enshrined in Article 2 of the Treaty on European Union.

(4)

The loss of advertising revenues over the last decade, due in particular to the rise of online distribution of media content and change of consumption habits, has drained financial resources from the traditional media sector affecting its sustainability, and in turn the quality and diversity of content on offer. This trend indicates how the market is failing to provide sustainable returns for independent news and quality journalism, which are public goods, and help counter disinformation.

(5)

As outlined in the European democracy action plan (1), the Commission has put forward a series of initiatives in order to support media freedom and pluralism. It adopted a Recommendation on ensuring the protection, safety and empowerment of journalists and other media professionals in the European Union (2). It has also presented a proposal for a Directive (3) and a Recommendation (4) on protecting persons who engage in public participation from manifestly unfounded or abusive court proceedings (‘Strategic lawsuits against public participation’). Furthermore, the Commission has implemented several actions to support the recovery and transformation of the media and audiovisual sector, as part of the media and audiovisual action plan (5). The Commission also closely monitors the transposition and implementation of important pieces of legislation for the media sector, in particular the Audiovisual Media Services Directive (6) and the Copyright Directive (7).

(6)

The Commission has put forward a legislative proposal for a Regulation establishing a common framework for media services in the internal market (European Media Freedom Act). That proposal foresees a series of safeguards in Union law in order to protect media pluralism and editorial independence in the internal market. This Recommendation accompanies the proposed Regulation as a tool with immediate effect to foster editorial independence and media ownership transparency.

(7)

At the same time, complementary to legislation and as underlined in the European democracy action plan, the Commission has been actively supporting self-regulatory initiatives by the media sector itself. This Recommendation is part of these efforts.

(8)

The media industry has a long-standing tradition of self-regulation and has taken a number of initiatives in the field. Building on those initiatives and taking into account the diversity of legal traditions and approaches in the Member States, voluntary practices can be identified that could be followed by media service providers to improve their resilience and better withstand political and economic pressure. The sector could engage in a discussion on such voluntary practices while leaving it for the media service providers to decide freely which practices can fit into their individual needs and business models, particularly taking into account the specific needs of micro, small and medium-sized enterprises within the meaning of Article 3 of Directive 2013/34/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council (8).

(9)

Citizens need to be able to trust the information they receive in order to exercise their democratic rights. They need to have access to a plurality of views and reliable sources of information in order to form their own opinions and contribute to the democratic processes. Access to trustworthy information is equally important for businesses to be able to take informed decisions.

(10)

European media service providers are increasingly subject to undue interference in the individual editorial decisions, including from private owners and shareholders, with adverse effects on editorial freedom, capacity to provide independent news and thus the availability of trustworthy information for media audiences. The 2022 Media Pluralism Monitor shows a high risk of undue commercial and owner influence in several Member States (9). In the digital age, because of the increased possibility to easily access information provided by media service providers established in other Member States, it is essential to foster good practices at EU level to ensure that Union citizens and businesses receive independent and diverse news and current affairs content to form their views and make informed choices, contributing to a public sphere in the internal market.

(11)

Editorial independence shields editors and journalists from conflicts of interest and helps them to resist undue interference and pressure. Therefore, it is a prerequisite for the production and circulation of unbiased information and an essential facet of media freedom. It enables the provision and reception of independent and pluralistic media services by citizens and businesses across the Union. This is particularly relevant for media service providers providing news and current affairs content, irrespective of its format (including documentaries or magazines covering such issues). Therefore, the recommendations relating to voluntary measures on editorial independence are addressed to such providers.

(12)

In this context, some media service providers have already put in place corporate governance measures, standards or mechanisms, such as editorial charters or codes or committees of ethics to protect editorial independence. In some news outlets, journalists have a say on the selection of their editor-in-chief or even on media ownership changes. In certain media companies, journalists have the status of shareholders, and can participate in the strategic decision-making and in the division of the economic gains. In a few Member States, some of those corporate measures are legally required for specific types of media service providers (10). Those and other examples of safeguards should be used as sources of inspiration for voluntary measures and a basis for continuing stakeholder-led discussions on how to improve the protection of editorial independence.

(13)

While it is legitimate for private media owners to choose and decide the long-term editorial direction, it is important to ensure that editors can cover independently news and current affairs in their daily work. Indeed, editors should base individual editorial decisions on the journalistic research and assessment and on the relevance of the information for the readers; they should also be able to freely express critical views without fear of retribution. There is a need for a balanced industry-led approach, with a view to fostering editorial independence, while recognising the legitimate rights and interests of private owners of media service providers from the perspective of both business freedom and their own freedom of expression.

(14)

Media self-regulation and standards of journalistic ethics are effective tools to empower journalists and help them to resist undue pressure, including of a political and commercial nature, thus enhancing public trust in the media (11). However, the application of journalistic standards across the Union can be improved. The 2022 Media Pluralism Monitor points to the deficiencies in the effective implementation of self-regulation (12).

(15)

Moreover, as identified by the Union-funded project ‘Media Councils in the Digital Age’, media or press councils operate in only over half of Member States (13). In those Member States, they differ with regard to their size, scope of activities as well as type of legal identity or recognition under national law, which can have a bearing on their effective role. In those Member States where media or press councils are not yet established, representatives of the media community often lack incentives to develop them.

(16)

This Recommendation proposes to media service providers a non-exhaustive and non-cumulative catalogue of voluntary measures and strategies with a view to guaranteeing the independent process of news content production. The recommended measures concern key elements of that process, starting from the conditions for independent creation of editorial content, through empowering journalists to participate in crucial decisions for the functioning of media outlets, to strategies for ensuring long-term stability of news content production.

(17)

Nothing in this Recommendation, which by definition is non-binding, should be interpreted as affecting the freedom to provide services in the internal market or the freedom of expression and information, including freedom of the press, or interfering in editorial freedom or freedom to conduct business. The internal safeguards should in no way be considered as depriving media owners of their role in setting strategic goals and fostering the growth and financial viability of their companies. In addition, the leading role played by media service providers and journalists in developing internal safeguards and self-regulatory instruments should be recognised.

(18)

This Recommendation is based on exchanges with concerned stakeholders, notably journalists, media companies and their associations. It builds on the discussions at the European News Media Forum (14), in particular the second edition held on 29 November 2021, which discussed the media sector’s industrial transformation and related challenges (15). It also takes account of the existing industry initiatives, including the Journalism Trust Initiative (JTI) by Reporters without Borders and its partners, which aim to foster a healthier information space supported by industry standards.

(19)

The recommended measures build on initiatives that test new business models and collaborations, such as those financed under the journalism partnerships action supported by the Creative Europe programme (16). They also build on the financial support schemes and priorities outlined in the Media and audiovisual action plan, as part of EU-level efforts to support an industrial ecosystem for news media. Furthermore, certain media service providers have resorted to governance structures where non-profit entities, such as trusts or foundations, hold the entirety or a part of their capital and, in some cases, have an important role in appointing the management boards and the editors-in-chief, which are considered to serve to preserve the editorial independence of the provider in a long term. Other governance mechanisms with similar goals include journalistic shareholdership arrangements where members of the editorial staff or their representative bodies control part of the shares or have the power to refuse the entry of a new controlling shareholder that may affect editorial independence. Based on this, the recommended measures reference possible approaches that media service providers may consider to increase their sustainability, and thus resilience to political and market pressures, noting that they remain best placed, as economic operators, to develop the business models that fit their objectives and capacities, according to the market segments they target.

(20)

This Recommendation also aims to further promote media ownership transparency across the Union. Currently, international standards (17) and Union media legislation encourage Member States to adopt sector-specific measures to increase media ownership transparency. In particular, Article 5(2) of the Directive 2010/13/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council (18) recognises that Member States may require media service providers under their jurisdiction to make accessible information concerning their ownership structure, including information on their beneficial owners, consistent with the general rules on beneficial ownership transparency set out in Directive (EU) 2015/849 of the European Parliament and of the Council (19). The 2018 Council of Europe Recommendation on media pluralism and transparency of media ownership calls on member States to put in place frameworks for the disclosure of accurate and up-to-date information concerning direct and beneficial media ownership. Moreover, the Commission is co-financing the development of the Euromedia Ownership Monitor, which aims to design a searchable and scalable database to provide free and user-friendly information about media ownership across the Union.

(21)

Measures enhancing media ownership transparency vis-à-vis the general public would be important in light of the specific nature of media services as a public good (20). Since media have a role in reporting on and holding to account political and economic interests, media ownership transparency is a necessary component of any ecosystem aiming at fostering investigative journalism, media diversity and public confidence in media reporting. The lack of media-specific transparency information has been flagged by stakeholders in the consultations carried out in the context of the preparation of this Recommendation.

(22)

It follows from the above that a comprehensive approach to media ownership transparency is appropriate. It would promote availability of information on media ownership (or its exercise) by the government, a state institution, state-owned enterprise or other public body, on the interests, links or activities of owners in other media or non-media businesses as well as any other interests that could influence the strategic decision-making of the media company or its editorial line. It is also appropriate to recommend publication of information on any changes to ownership or control over media, reflecting the importance of up-to-date information concerning the ownership structure for service recipients. The recommended approach should be adjusted depending on the type of media outlet and the nature of its ownership. In particular, in the case of journalist-owned media outlets, only information on the owners with a leadership role, for example, members of the board of directors, should be made available.

(23)

Consequently, this Recommendation seeks to promote high levels of media ownership transparency across the Union through voluntary actions that could be taken both directly by media service providers as well as by the Member States, without prejudice to the Union-level horizontal ownership transparency rules under Directive (EU) 2015/849 and the disclosure rules for companies under Directive (EU) 2017/1132 of the European Parliament and of the Council (21), as well as the existing Union-level systems of interconnection of registers.

(24)

In order to foster the follow-up on this Recommendation, the Commission will facilitate a regular dialogue with Member States and the representatives of media service providers and journalists in the relevant fora, in particular the European News Media Forum. The Commission will closely monitor actions taken by Member States and follow relevant measures taken by media service providers under the Recommendation. For this purpose, Member States should be invited to provide the Commission with the relevant information they can reasonably be expected to supply, to allow the Commission to monitor compliance with the relevant parts of the Recommendation addressed to them. The findings of the monitoring can feed into the stakeholder-led discussions,

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

(8)

(9)

(10)

(11)

(12)

(13)

(14)

(15)

(16)

(17)

(18)

(19)

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(25)

(1)

In accordance with Article 5(2) of Protocol 2 to the Agreement, the Union and the Swiss Confederation, as Contracting Parties, provided to the Joint Committee the 2021 domestic reference prices of all raw materials for which price compensation measures are applied. It follows from those prices that the actual price situation regarding those raw materials in the territory of the Contracting Parties has changed.

(2)

It is therefore necessary to update the domestic reference prices and the price differences for agricultural raw materials listed in Table III of Protocol 2 to the Agreement, as well as to adapt the basic amounts of the agricultural raw materials listed in Table IV of that Protocol,

‘(b)

from 2023: as set pursuant to Article 6a(4).’,

‘(b)

from 2023: as set pursuant to Article 6a(7).’.