1.   As soon as possible and in any event by 5 January 2020, each Member State shall designate a national governmental or regulatory authority as its competent authority. The competent authorities shall be responsible for, and shall cooperate with each other for the purposes of, carrying out the tasks provided for in this Regulation. Where appropriate, until the competent authority has been designated, the national entities responsible for the security of electricity supply shall carry out the tasks of the competent authority in accordance with this Regulation.

2.   Member States shall, without delay, notify the Commission and the ECG and make public the name and the contact details of their competent authorities designated pursuant to paragraph 1 and any changes to their name or contact details.

3.   Member States may allow the competent authority to delegate the operational tasks regarding risk-preparedness planning and risk management set out in this Regulation to other bodies. Delegated tasks shall be performed under the supervision of the competent authority and shall be specified in the risk-preparedness plan in accordance with point (b) of Article 11(1).

1.   By 5 January 2020, the ENTSO for Electricity shall submit to ACER a proposal for a methodology for identifying the most relevant regional electricity crisis scenarios.

2.   The proposed methodology shall identify electricity crisis scenarios in relation to system adequacy, system security and fuel security on the basis of at least the following risks:

3.   The proposed methodology shall include at least the following elements:

4.   When considering the risks of disruption of gas supply in the context of identifying the risks pursuant to point (c) of paragraph 2 of this Article, the ENTSO for Electricity shall use the natural gas supply and infrastructure disruption scenarios developed by ENTSOG pursuant to Article 7 of Regulation (EU) 2017/1938.

5.   Before submitting the proposed methodology to ACER, the ENTSO for Electricity shall conduct a consultation involving at least the regional coordination centres, industry and consumer organisations, producers or their trade bodies, transmission system operators and relevant distribution system operators, competent authorities, regulatory authorities and other relevant national authorities. The ENTSO for Electricity shall duly take into account the results of the consultation and present them, together with the proposed methodology, at a meeting of the ECG.

6.   Within two months of receipt of the proposed methodology, ACER shall, after consulting the ECG, in its formation composed only of representatives of the Member States, approve or amend the proposal. The ENTSO for Electricity and ACER shall publish the final version of the methodology on their websites.

7.   The ENTSO for Electricity shall update and improve the methodology in accordance with paragraphs 1 to 6 where significant new information becomes available. The ECG in its formation composed only of representatives of the Member States may recommend, and ACER or the Commission may request, such updates and improvements with due justification. Within six months of receipt of the request, the ENTSO for Electricity shall submit to ACER a draft of the proposed changes. Within two months of receipt of such a draft, ACER shall, after consulting the ECG, in its formation composed only of representatives of the Member States, approve or amend the proposed changes. The ENTSO for Electricity and ACER shall publish the final version of the updated methodology on their websites.

1.   Within six months of the approval of a methodology pursuant to Article 5(6), the ENTSO for Electricity shall, on the basis of that methodology and in close cooperation with the ECG, regional coordination centres, competent authorities and regulatory authorities, identify the most relevant electricity crisis scenarios for each region. It may delegate tasks relating to the identification of regional electricity crisis scenarios to the regional coordination centres.

2.   The ENTSO for Electricity shall submit the regional electricity crisis scenarios to the relevant transmission system operators, regional coordination centres, competent authorities and regulatory authorities as well as to the ECG. The ECG may recommend amendments.

3.   The ENTSO for Electricity shall update the regional electricity crisis scenarios every four years, unless circumstances warrant more frequent updates.

1.   Within four months of the identification of the regional electricity crisis scenarios in accordance with Article 6(1), the competent authority shall identify the most relevant national electricity crisis scenarios.

2.   In identifying the national electricity crisis scenarios, the competent authority shall consult the transmission system operators, the distribution system operators that the competent authority considers to be relevant, the relevant producers or their trade bodies, and the regulatory authority where it is not the competent authority.

3.   The national electricity crisis scenarios shall be identified on the basis of at least the risks referred to in Article 5(2) and shall be consistent with the regional electricity crisis scenarios identified in accordance with Article 6(1). Member States shall update the national electricity crisis scenarios every four years, unless circumstances warrant more frequent updates.

4.   Within four months of identification of regional electricity crisis scenarios in accordance with Article 6(1), Member States shall inform the ECG and the Commission of their assessment of the risks in relation to the ownership of infrastructure relevant for security of electricity supply, and any measures taken to prevent or mitigate such risks, with an indication of why such measures are considered necessary and proportionate.

1.   By 5 January 2020, the ENTSO for Electricity shall submit to ACER a proposal for a methodology for assessing seasonal and short-term adequacy, namely monthly, week-ahead to at least day-ahead adequacy, which shall cover at least the following:

2.   The methodology referred to in paragraph 1 shall provide for a probabilistic approach, including multiple scenarios, and shall take into account the national, regional and Union context, including the level of interconnection between Member States and, to the extent possible, third countries within synchronous areas of the Union. The methodology shall take into account the specificities of each Member State's energy sector, including specific weather conditions and external circumstances.

3.   Before submitting the proposed methodology, the ENTSO for Electricity shall conduct a consultation involving at least the regional coordination centres, industry and consumer organisations, producers or their trade bodies, transmission system operators, relevant distribution system operators, competent authorities, regulatory authorities and other relevant national authorities. The ENTSO for Electricity shall duly take into account the results of the consultation and present them, together with the proposed methodology, at a meeting of the ECG.

4.   Within two months of receipt of the proposed methodology, ACER shall, after consulting the ECG in its formation composed only of representatives of the Member States, approve or amend the proposal. The ENTSO for Electricity and ACER shall publish the final version of the methodology on their websites.

5.   The ENTSO for Electricity shall update and improve the methodology in accordance with paragraphs 1 to 4 where significant new information becomes available. The ECG in its formation composed only of representatives of the Member States may recommend, and ACER or the Commission may request, such updates and improvements with due justification. Within six months of receipt of the request, the ENTSO for Electricity shall submit to ACER a draft of the proposed changes. Within two months of receipt of such a draft, ACER shall, after consulting the ECG, in its formation composed only of representatives of the Member States, approve or amend the proposed changes. The ENTSO for Electricity and ACER shall publish the final version of the updated methodology on their websites.

1.   All short-term adequacy assessments, whether carried out at national, regional or Union level, shall be carried out in accordance with the methodology developed pursuant to Article 8.

2.   The ENTSO for Electricity shall carry out seasonal adequacy assessments in accordance with the methodology developed pursuant to Article 8. It shall publish the results for the winter adequacy assessment by 1 December each year and for the summer adequacy assessment by 1 June each year. It may delegate tasks relating to the adequacy assessments to regional coordination centres. It shall present the adequacy assessment at a meeting of the ECG, which may make recommendations where appropriate.

3.   The regional coordination centres shall carry out week-ahead to at least day ahead adequacy assessments in accordance with Regulation (EU) 2017/1485 on the basis of the methodology adopted pursuant to Article 8 of this Regulation.

1.   On the basis of the regional and national electricity crisis scenarios identified pursuant to Articles 6 and 7, the competent authority of each Member State shall establish a risk-preparedness plan, after consulting distribution system operators considered relevant by the competent authority, the transmission system operators, the relevant producers or their trade bodies, the electricity and natural gas undertakings, the relevant organisations that represent the interests of industrial and non-industrial electricity customers, and the regulatory authority where it is not the competent authority.

2.   The risk-preparedness plan shall consist of national measures, regional and, where applicable, bilateral measures as provided for in Articles 11 and 12. In accordance with Article 16, all measures that are planned or taken to prevent, prepare for and mitigate electricity crises shall fully comply with the rules governing the internal electricity market and system operation. Those measures shall be clearly defined, transparent, proportionate and non-discriminatory.

3.   The risk-preparedness plan shall be developed in accordance with Articles 11 and 12 and with the template set out in the Annex. If necessary, Member States may include additional information in the risk-preparedness plan.

4.   In order to ensure consistency of risk-preparedness plans, competent authorities shall, before adopting their risk-preparedness plans, submit the draft plans, for consultation, to the competent authorities of the relevant Member States in the region and, where they are not in the same region, to the competent authorities of directly connected Member States, as well as to the ECG.

5.   Within six months of receipt of the draft risk-preparedness plans, the competent authorities referred to in paragraph 4 and the ECG may issue recommendations relating to the draft plans submitted pursuant to paragraph 4.

6.   Within nine months of submitting their draft plans, the competent authorities concerned shall adopt their risk-preparedness plans, taking into account the results of the consultation pursuant to paragraph 4 and any recommendations issued pursuant to paragraph 5. They shall notify their risk-preparedness plans to the Commission without delay.

7.   The competent authorities and the Commission shall publish the risk-preparedness plans on their websites, while ensuring confidentiality of sensitive information, in particular information on measures relating to the prevention or mitigation of consequences of malicious attacks. The protection of the confidentiality of sensitive information shall be based on the principles determined pursuant to Article 19.

8.   The competent authorities shall adopt and publish their first risk-preparedness plans by 5 January 2022. They shall update them every four years thereafter, unless circumstances warrant more frequent updates.

1.   The risk-preparedness plan of each Member State shall set out all national measures that are planned or taken to prevent, prepare for and mitigate electricity crises as identified pursuant to Articles 6 and 7. It shall at least:

2.   National measures shall take full account of the regional and, where applicable, bilateral measures agreed pursuant to Article 12 and shall endanger neither the operational security or safety of the transmission system, nor the security of electricity supply of other Member States.

1.   In addition to the national measures referred to in Article 11, the risk-preparedness plan of each Member State shall include regional and, where applicable, bilateral measures to ensure that electricity crises with a cross-border impact are properly prevented or managed. Regional measures shall be agreed within the region concerned between Member States that have the technical ability to provide each other assistance in accordance with Article 15. For that purpose, Member States may also form subgroups within a region. Bilateral measures shall be agreed between Member States which are directly connected but are not within the same region. Member States shall ensure consistency between regional and bilateral measures. Regional and bilateral measures shall include at least:

2.   The Member States concerned shall agree the regional and bilateral measures to be included in the risk-preparedness plan after consulting the relevant regional coordination centres. The Commission may have a facilitating role in the preparation of the agreement on regional and bilateral measures. The Commission may request ACER and the ENTSO for Electricity to provide technical assistance to Member States with a view to facilitating such an agreement. At least eight months before the deadline for the adoption or the updating of the risk-preparedness plan, the competent authorities shall report on the agreements reached to the ECG. If the Member States are not able to reach an agreement, the competent authorities concerned shall inform the Commission of the reasons for such disagreement. In such a case the Commission shall propose measures including a cooperation mechanism for the conclusion of an agreement on regional and bilateral measures.

3.   With the involvement of relevant stakeholders, the competent authorities of the Member States of each region shall periodically test the effectiveness of the procedures developed in risk-preparedness plans for preventing electricity crises, including the mechanisms referred to in point (b) of paragraph 1, and carry out biennial simulations of electricity crises, in particular testing those mechanisms.

1.   Within four months of the notification of the adopted risk-preparedness plan by the competent authority, the Commission shall assess the plan taking duly into account the views expressed by the ECG.

2.   The Commission shall, after consulting the ECG, issue a non-binding opinion, setting out detailed reasons, and submit it to the competent authority, with a recommendation to review its risk-preparedness plan where that plan:

3.   Within three months of receipt of the Commission's opinion referred to in paragraph 2, the competent authority concerned shall take full account of the Commission's recommendation and shall either notify the amended risk-preparedness plan to the Commission or notify the Commission of the reasons why it objects to the recommendation.

4.   In the event that the competent authority objects to the Commission's recommendation, the Commission may, within four months of receipt of the notification of the competent authority's reasons for objection, withdraw its recommendation or convene a meeting with the competent authority and, where the Commission considers it to be necessary, the ECG, in order to assess the issue. The Commission shall set out detailed reasons for requesting any modifications to the risk-preparedness plan. Where the final position of the competent authority concerned diverges from the Commission's detailed reasons, that competent authority shall provide the Commission with the reasons for its position within two months of receipt of the Commission's detailed reasons.

1.   Where a seasonal adequacy assessment or other qualified source provides concrete, serious and reliable information that an electricity crisis may occur in a Member State, the competent authority of that Member State shall, without undue delay, issue an early warning to the Commission, the competent authorities of the Member States within the same region and, where they are not in the same region, the competent authorities of the directly connected Member States. The competent authority concerned shall also provide information on the causes of the possible electricity crisis, on measures planned or taken to prevent an electricity crisis and on the possible need for assistance from other Member States. The information shall include the possible impacts of the measures on the internal electricity market. The Commission shall provide that information to the ECG.

2.   When confronted with an electricity crisis, the competent authority shall, after consulting the transmission system operator concerned, declare an electricity crisis and inform the competent authorities of the Member States within the same region and, where they are not in the same region, the competent authorities of directly connected Member States, as well as the Commission, without undue delay. That information shall include the causes of the deterioration of the electricity supply situation, the reasons for declaring an electricity crisis, the measures planned or taken to mitigate it and the need for any assistance from other Member States.

3.   Where they consider the information provided pursuant to paragraph 1 or 2 to be insufficient, the Commission, the ECG or the competent authorities of the Member States within the same region and, where they are not in the same region, the competent authorities of directly connected Member States may request the Member State concerned to provide additional information.

4.   Where a competent authority issues an early warning or declares an electricity crisis, the measures set out in the risk-preparedness plan shall be followed to the fullest extent possible.

1.   Member States shall act and cooperate in a spirit of solidarity in order to prevent or manage electricity crises.

2.   Where they have the necessary technical ability, Member States shall offer each other assistance by means of regional or bilateral measures that have been agreed pursuant to this Article and to Article 12 before that assistance is provided. To that end, and with the purpose of protecting public safety and personal security, Member States shall agree on regional or bilateral measures of their choice in order to deliver electricity in a coordinated manner.

3.   Member States shall agree on the necessary technical, legal and financial arrangements for the implementation of the regional or bilateral measures before assistance is offered. Such arrangements shall specify, inter alia, the maximum quantity of electricity to be delivered at regional or bilateral level, the trigger for any assistance and for suspension of assistance, how the electricity will be delivered, and provisions on fair compensation between Member States in accordance with paragraphs 4, 5 and 6.

4.   Assistance shall be subject to a prior agreement between the Member States concerned with regard to fair compensation, which shall cover at least:

5.   Fair compensation pursuant to paragraph 4 shall include, inter alia, all reasonable costs that the Member State providing assistance incurs from an obligation to pay compensation by virtue of fundamental rights guaranteed by Union law and by virtue of the applicable international obligations when implementing the provisions of this Regulation on assistance and further reasonable costs incurred from the payment of compensation pursuant to national compensation rules.

6.   The Member State requesting assistance shall promptly pay, or ensure the prompt payment of fair compensation to the Member State providing assistance.

7.   The Commission shall, by 5 January 2020, after consulting the ECG and ACER, provide for non-binding guidance on the key elements of the fair compensation referred to in paragraphs 3 to 6 and other key elements of the technical, legal and financial arrangements referred to in paragraph 3 as well as on general principles of mutual assistance referred to in paragraph 2.

8.   In the event of an electricity crisis in which Member States have not yet agreed on regional or bilateral measures and technical, legal and financial arrangements pursuant to this Article, Member States shall agree on ad hoc measures and arrangements in order to apply this Article, including as regards fair compensation pursuant to paragraphs 4, 5 and 6. Where a Member State requests assistance before such ad hoc measures and arrangements have been agreed, it shall undertake, prior to receiving assistance, to pay fair compensation in accordance with paragraphs 4, 5 and 6.

9.   Member States shall ensure that the provisions of this Regulation on assistance are implemented in accordance with the Treaties, the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union and other applicable international obligations. They shall take the necessary measures to that end.

1.   Measures taken to prevent or mitigate electricity crises shall comply with the rules governing the internal electricity market and system operation.

2.   Non-market-based measures shall be activated in an electricity crisis only as a last resort if all options provided by the market have been exhausted or where it is evident that market-based measures alone are not sufficient to prevent a further deterioration of the electricity supply situation. Non-market-based measures shall not unduly distort competition and the effective functioning of the internal electricity market. They shall be necessary, proportionate, non-discriminatory and temporary. The competent authority shall inform relevant stakeholders in its Member State of the application of any non-market-based measures.

3.   Transaction curtailment including curtailment of already allocated cross zonal capacity, limitation of provision of cross zonal capacity for capacity allocation or limitation of provision of schedules shall be initiated only in accordance with Article 16(2) of Regulation (EU) 2019/943, and the rules adopted to implement that provision.

1.   As soon as possible and in any event three months after the end of an electricity crisis, the competent authority of the Member State that declared the electricity crisis shall provide the ECG and the Commission with an ex post evaluation report, after having consulted the regulatory authority, where the regulatory authority is not the competent authority.

2.   The ex post evaluation report shall include at least:

3.   Where they consider the information provided in the ex post evaluation report to be insufficient, the ECG and the Commission may request the competent authority concerned to provide additional information.

4.   The competent authority concerned shall present the results of the ex post evaluation at a meeting of the ECG. Those results shall be reflected in the updated risk-preparedness plan.

1.   In addition to carrying out other tasks set out in this Regulation, the ECG shall discuss:

2.   The ECG may issue recommendations to the Member States as well as to the ENTSO for Electricity related to the matters referred to in paragraph 1.

3.   ACER shall, on an ongoing basis, monitor the security of electricity supply measures and shall report regularly to the ECG.

4.   By 1 September 2025, the Commission shall, on the basis of the experience gained in the application of this Regulation, evaluate the possible means by which to enhance security of electricity supply at Union level and submit a report to the European Parliament and to the Council on the application of this Regulation, including, where necessary, legislative proposals to amend this Regulation.

1.   Member States and competent authorities shall implement the procedures referred to in this Regulation in accordance with the applicable rules, including national rules relating to the handling of confidential information and processes. If the implementation of those rules results in information not being disclosed, inter alia as part of risk-preparedness plans, the Member State or authority may provide a non-confidential summary thereof, and shall do so upon request.

2.   The Commission, ACER, the ECG, the ENTSO for Electricity, Member States, competent authorities, regulatory authorities and other relevant bodies, entities or persons, which receive confidential information pursuant to this Regulation, shall ensure the confidentiality of sensitive information.

1.   This Regulation establishes a European Union Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators (ACER).

2.   The purpose of ACER shall be to assist the regulatory authorities referred to in Article 57 of Directive (EU) 2019/944 and Article 39 of Directive 2009/73/EC in exercising, at Union level, the regulatory tasks performed in the Member States and, where necessary, to coordinate their action and to mediate and settle disagreements between them in accordance with Article 6(10) of this Regulation. ACER shall also contribute to the establishment of high-quality common regulatory and supervisory practices, thus contributing to the consistent, efficient and effective application of Union law in order to achieve the Union's climate and energy goals.

3.   When carrying out its tasks, ACER shall act independently, objectively, and in the interest of the Union. ACER shall take autonomous decisions, independently of private and corporate interests.

1.   ACER may, upon a request of the European Parliament, the Council or the Commission, or on its own initiative, provide an opinion or a recommendation to the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission on any of the issues relating to the purpose for which it has been established.

2.   At ACER's request, the regulatory authorities, the ENTSO for Electricity, the ENTSO for Gas, the regional coordination centres, the EU DSO entity, the transmission system operators and the nominated electricity market operators shall provide to ACER the information necessary for the purpose of carrying out ACER's tasks under this Regulation, unless ACER has already requested and received such information.

For the purpose of information requests as referred to in the first subparagraph, ACER shall have the power to issue decisions. In its decisions, ACER shall specify the purpose of its request, shall make a reference to the legal basis under which the information is requested, and shall state a time limit within which the information is to be provided. That time limit shall be proportionate to the request.

ACER shall use confidential information received pursuant to this Regulation only for the purpose of carrying out the tasks assigned to it in this Regulation. ACER shall ensure the appropriate data protection of the information pursuant to Article 41.

1.   ACER shall provide an opinion to the Commission on the draft statutes, list of members and draft rules of procedure of the ENTSO for Electricity in accordance with Article 29(2) of Regulation (EU) 2019/943 and on those of the ENTSO for Gas in accordance with Article 5(2) of Regulation (EC) No 715/2009 and on those of the EU DSO entity in accordance with Article 53(3) of Regulation (EU) 2019/943.

2.   ACER shall monitor the execution of the tasks of the ENTSO for Electricity in accordance with Article 32 of Regulation (EU) 2019/943, of the ENTSO for Gas in accordance with Article 9 of Regulation (EC) No 715/2009 and of the EU DSO entity as set out in Article 55 of Regulation (EU) 2019/943.

3.   ACER may provide an opinion:

4.   ACER, where appropriate, after requesting updates to the drafts submitted by transmission system operators, shall approve the methodology regarding the use of revenues from congestion income pursuant to Article 19(4) of Regulation (EU) 2019/943.

5.   ACER shall, based on matters of fact, provide a duly reasoned opinion as well as recommendations to the ENTSO for Electricity, the ENTSO for Gas, the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission, where it considers that the draft annual work programme or the draft Union-wide network development plan submitted to it in accordance with the second subparagraph of Article 32(2) of Regulation (EU) 2019/943 and the second subparagraph of Article 9(2) of Regulation (EC) No 715/2009 do not contribute to non-discrimination, effective competition and the efficient functioning of the market or a sufficient level of cross-border interconnection open to third-party access, or do not comply with the relevant provisions of Regulation (EU) 2019/943 and Directive (EU) 2019/944 or Regulation (EC) No 715/2009 and Directive 2009/73/EC.

6.   The relevant regulatory authorities shall coordinate in order to jointly identify whether there is non-compliance of the EU-DSO entity, the ENTSO for Electricity or regional coordination centres with their obligations under Union law, and shall take appropriate action in accordance with point (c) of Article 59(1) and point (f) of Article 62(1) of Directive (EU) 2019/944.

At the request of one or more regulatory authorities or at its own initiative, ACER shall issue a reasoned opinion as well as a recommendation to the ENTSO for Electricity, the EU DSO entity or the regional coordination centres with regard to compliance with their obligations.

7.   Where a reasoned opinion of ACER identifies a case of potential non-compliance of the ENTSO for Electricity, the EU DSO entity or a regional coordination centre with their respective obligations, the regulatory authorities concerned shall unanimously take coordinated decisions establishing whether there is non-compliance with the relevant obligations and, where applicable, determining the measures to be taken by the ENTSO for Electricity, the EU DSO entity or the regional coordination centre to remedy that non-compliance. Where the regulatory authorities fail to take such coordinated decisions unanimously within four months of the date of receipt of ACER's reasoned opinion, the matter shall be referred to ACER for a decision pursuant to Article 6(10).

8.   Where the non-compliance by the ENTSO for Electricity, the EU DSO entity or a regional coordination centre that was identified pursuant to paragraph 6 or 7 of this Article has not been remedied within three months, or where the regulatory authority in the Member State in which the entity has its seat has not taken action to ensure compliance, ACER shall issue a recommendation to the regulatory authority to take action in accordance with point (c) of Article 59(1) and point (f) of Article 62(1) of Directive (EU) 2019/944, in order to ensure that the ENTSO for Electricity, the EU DSO entity or the regional coordination centre comply with their obligations, and shall inform the Commission.

1.   ACER shall participate in the development of network codes in accordance with Article 59 of Regulation (EU) 2019/943 and Article 6 of Regulation (EC) No 715/2009 and of guidelines in accordance with Article 61(6) of Regulation (EU) 2019/943 It shall in particular:

2.   Where one of the following legal acts provides for the development of proposals for common terms and conditions or methodologies for the implementation of network codes and guidelines which require the approval of all regulatory authorities, those proposals for common terms and conditions or methodologies shall be submitted to ACER for revision and approval:

3.   Where one of the following legal acts provides for the development of proposals for terms and conditions or methodologies for the implementation of network codes and guidelines which require the approval of all the regulatory authorities of the region concerned, those regulatory authorities shall agree unanimously on the common terms and conditions or methodologies to be approved by each of those regulatory authorities:

The proposals referred to in the first subparagraph shall be notified to ACER within one week of their submission to those regulatory authorities. The regulatory authorities may refer the proposals to ACER for approval pursuant to point (b) of the second subparagraph of Article 6(10) and shall do so pursuant to point (a) of the second subparagraph of Article 6(10) where there is no unanimous agreement as referred to in the first subparagraph.

The Director or the Board of Regulators, acting on its own initiative or on a proposal from one or more of its members, may require the regulatory authorities of the region concerned to refer the proposal to ACER for approval. Such a request shall be limited to cases in which the regionally agreed proposal would have a tangible impact on the internal energy market or on security of supply beyond the region.

4.   Without prejudice to paragraphs 2 and 3, ACER shall be competent to take a decision pursuant to Article 6(10) where the competent regulatory authorities fail to agree on terms and conditions or methodologies for the implementation of new network codes and guidelines adopted after 4 July 2019 as delegated acts, where those terms and conditions or methodologies require the approval of all the regulatory authorities or of all the regulatory authorities of the region concerned.

5.   By 31 October 2023, and every three years thereafter, the Commission shall submit a report to the European Parliament and to the Council on ACER's involvement in the development and adoption of terms and conditions or methodologies for the implementation of network codes and guidelines adopted as delegated acts after 4 July 2019. Where appropriate, the report shall be accompanied by a legislative proposal to transfer or modify the necessary powers to ACER.

6.   Before approving the terms and conditions or methodologies referred to in paragraphs 2 and 3, the regulatory authorities, or, where competent, ACER, shall revise them where necessary, after consulting the ENTSO for Electricity, the ENTSO for Gas or the EU DSO entity, in order to ensure that they are in line with the purpose of the network code or guideline and contribute to market integration, non-discrimination, effective competition and the proper functioning of the market. ACER shall take a decision on the approval within the period specified in the relevant network codes and guidelines. That period shall begin on the day following that on which the proposal was referred to ACER.

7.   ACER shall carry out its tasks as regards the bidding zone review pursuant to Article 14(5) of Regulation (EU) 2019/943.

8.   ACER shall monitor the regional cooperation of transmission system operators referred to in Article 34 of Regulation (EU) 2019/943 and Article 12 of Regulation (EC) No 715/2009, and shall take into account the outcome of that cooperation when formulating its opinions, recommendations and decisions.

1.   ACER shall adopt individual decisions on technical issues where those decisions are provided for in Regulation (EU) 2019/943, Regulation (EC) No 715/2009, Directive (EU) 2019/944 or Directive 2009/73/EC.

2.   ACER may, in accordance with its work programme, at the request of the Commission or on its own initiative, make recommendations to assist regulatory authorities and market participants in sharing good practices.

3.   By 5 July 2022, and every four years thereafter the Commission shall submit a report to the European Parliament and the Council on the independence of regulatory authorities pursuant to Article 57(7) of Directive (EU) 2019/944.

4.   ACER shall provide a framework within which the regulatory authorities can cooperate in order to ensure efficient decision-making on issues with cross-border relevance. It shall promote cooperation between the regulatory authorities and between regulatory authorities at regional and Union level and shall take into account the outcome of such cooperation when formulating its opinions, recommendations and decisions. Where ACER considers that binding rules on such cooperation are required, it shall make the appropriate recommendations to the Commission.

5.   ACER shall provide a factual opinion at the request of one or more regulatory authorities or of the Commission, on whether a decision taken by a regulatory authority complies with the network codes and guidelines referred to in Regulation (EU) 2019/943, Regulation (EC) No 715/2009, Directive (EU) 2019/944 or Directive 2009/73/EC or with other relevant provisions of those directives or regulations.

6.   Where a regulatory authority does not comply with the opinion of ACER referred to in paragraph 5 within four months of the date of receipt, ACER shall inform the Commission and the Member State concerned accordingly.

7.   Where, in a specific case, a regulatory authority encounters difficulties with the application of the network codes and guidelines referred to in Regulation (EU) 2019/943, Regulation (EC) No 715/2009, Directive (EU) 2019/944 or Directive 2009/73/EC it may request ACER to provide an opinion. ACER shall deliver its opinion, after consulting the Commission, within three months of the date of receipt of such a request.

8.   Upon the request of a regulatory authority, ACER may provide operational assistance to that regulatory authority regarding investigations pursuant to Regulation (EU) No 1227/2011.

9.   ACER shall submit opinions to the relevant regulatory authority and to the Commission pursuant to Article 16(3) of Regulation (EU) 2019/943.

10.   ACER shall be competent to adopt individual decisions on regulatory issues having effects on cross-border trade or cross-border system security which require a joint decision by at least two regulatory authorities, where such competences have been conferred on the regulatory authorities under one of the following legal acts:

ACER shall be competent to adopt individual decisions as specified in the first subparagraph in the following situations:

The competent regulatory authorities may jointly request that the period referred to in point (a) of the second subparagraph of this paragraph be extended by a period of up to six months, except in cases under Article 4(7) of this Regulation or under point (c) of Article 59(1) or point (f) of Article 62(1) of Directive (EU) 2019/944.

Where the competences to decide on cross-border issues referred to in the first subparagraph have been conferred on the regulatory authorities in new network codes or guidelines adopted as delegated acts after 4 July 2019, ACER shall only be competent on a voluntary basis pursuant to point (b) of the second subparagraph of this paragraph, upon a request from at least 60 % of the competent regulatory authorities. Where only two regulatory authorities are involved, either one may refer the case to ACER.

By 31 October 2023, and every three years thereafter, the Commission shall submit a report to the European Parliament and to the Council on the possible need to further enhance ACER's involvement in solving cases of disagreement between regulatory authorities concerning joint decisions on matters for which the competences were conferred on those regulatory authorities by a delegated act after 4 July 2019. Where appropriate, the report shall be accompanied by a legislative proposal to modify such powers or to transfer the necessary powers to ACER.

11.   When preparing its decision pursuant to paragraph 10, ACER shall consult the regulatory authorities and transmission system operators concerned and shall be informed of the proposals and observations of all the transmission system operators concerned.

12.   Where a case has been referred to ACER under paragraph 10, ACER:

13.   Where the regulatory issues referred to in paragraph 10 include exemptions within the meaning of Article 63 of Regulation (EU) 2019/943, or Article 36 of Directive 2009/73/EC, the deadlines provided for in this Regulation shall not be cumulative with the deadlines provided for in those provisions.

1.   ACER, in close cooperation with the regulatory authorities and the ENTSO for Electricity, shall monitor and analyse the performance of regional coordination centres, taking into account the reports provided for in Article 46(3) of Regulation (EU) 2019/943.

2.   To carry out the tasks referred to in paragraph 1 in an efficient and expeditious manner, ACER shall in particular:

1.   ACER shall approve and amend where necessary:

2.   ACER shall provide an opinion pursuant to Article 24(3) of Regulation (EU) 2019/941 on whether the differences between the national resource adequacy assessment and the European resource adequacy assessment are justified.

3.   ACER shall approve and amend where necessary the methodologies for:

4.   With respect to the security of gas supply, ACER shall be represented in the Gas Coordination Group in accordance with Article 4 of Regulation (EU) 2017/1938, and shall carry out its obligations regarding permanent bi-directional capacity of interconnections for gas under Annex III to Regulation (EU) 2017/1938.

1.   In carrying out its tasks, in particular in the process of developing framework guidelines in accordance with Article 59 of Regulation (EU) 2019/943 or Article 6 of Regulation (EC) No 715/2009, and in the process of proposing amendments of network codes under Article 60 of Regulation (EU) 2019/943 or Article 7 of Regulation (EC) No 715/2009 ACER shall, extensively consult at an early stage market participants, transmission system operators, consumers, end-users and, where relevant, competition authorities, without prejudice to their respective competence, in an open and transparent manner, in particular when its tasks concern transmission system operators.

2.   ACER shall ensure that the public and any interested parties are, where appropriate, given objective, reliable and easily accessible information, in particular with regard to the results of its work.

All documents and minutes of consultation meetings conducted during the development of framework guidelines in accordance with Article 59 of Regulation (EU) 2019/943 or Article 6 of Regulation (EC) No 715/2009, or during the amendment of network codes referred to in paragraph 1 shall be made public.

3.   Before adopting framework guidelines, or proposing amendments to network codes as referred to in paragraph 1, ACER shall indicate how the observations received during the consultation have been taken into account and shall provide reasons where those observations have not been followed.

4.   ACER shall make public, on its own website, at least the agenda, the background documents and, where appropriate, the minutes of the meetings of the Administrative Board, of the Board of Regulators and of the Board of Appeal.

5.   ACER shall adopt and publish adequate and proportionate rules of procedure in accordance with the procedure set out in point (t) of Article 19(1). Those rules shall include provisions which ensure a transparent and reasonable decision-making process guaranteeing fundamental procedural rights based on the rule of law, including the right to be heard, rules on access to files and the standards specified in paragraphs 6, 7 and 8.

6.   Before taking any individual decision as provided for in this Regulation, ACER shall inform any party concerned of its intention to adopt that decision, and shall set a time limit within which the party concerned may express its views on the matter, taking full account of the urgency, complexity and potential consequences of the matter.

7.   Individual decisions of ACER shall state the reasons on which they are based for the purpose of allowing an appeal on the merits.

8.   The parties concerned by individual decisions shall be informed of the legal remedies available under this Regulation.

1.   ACER, in close cooperation with the Commission, the Member States and the relevant national authorities, including the regulatory authorities, and without prejudice to the competences of competition authorities, shall monitor the wholesale and retail markets in electricity and natural gas, in particular the retail prices of electricity and natural gas, compliance with the consumer rights laid down in Directive (EU) 2019/944 and Directive 2009/73/EC, the impact of market developments on household customers, access to the networks including access of electricity produced from renewable energy sources, the progress made with regard to interconnectors, potential barriers to cross-border trade, regulatory barriers for new market entrants and smaller actors, including citizen energy communities, state interventions preventing prices from reflecting actual scarcity, such as those set out in Article 10(4) of Regulation (EU) 2019/943, the performance of the Member States in the area of security of supply of electricity based on the results of the European resource adequacy assessment as referred to in Article 23 of that Regulation, taking into account, in particular, the ex-post evaluation referred to in Article 17 of Regulation (EU) 2019/941.

2.   ACER shall publish annually a report on the results of the monitoring referred to in paragraph 1. In that report, it shall identify any barriers to the completion of the internal markets for electricity and natural gas.

3.   When publishing its annual report, ACER may submit to the European Parliament and to the Commission an opinion on the possible measures to remove the barriers referred to in paragraph 2.

4.   ACER shall issue a best practices report on transmission and distribution tariffs methodologies pursuant to Article 18(9) of Regulation (EU) 2019/943.

1.   ACER shall be a Union body with legal personality.

2.   In each Member State, ACER shall enjoy the most extensive legal capacity accorded to legal persons under national law. It shall, in particular, be able to acquire or dispose of movable and immovable property and be a party to legal proceedings.

3.   ACER shall be represented by its Director.

4.   The seat of ACER shall be Ljubljana, Slovenia.

1.   The Administrative Board shall be composed of nine members. Each member shall have an alternate. Two members and their alternates shall be appointed by the Commission, two members and their alternates shall be appointed by the European Parliament and five members and their alternates shall be appointed by the Council. No Member of the European Parliament shall be a member of the Administrative Board. A member of the Administrative Board shall not be a member of the Board of Regulators.

2.   The term of office of the members of the Administrative Board and their alternates shall be four years, renewable once. For the first mandate, the term of office of half of the members of the Administrative Board and their alternates shall be six years.

3.   The Administrative Board shall elect its Chair and its Vice-Chair from among its members by a two-thirds majority. The Vice-Chair shall automatically replace the Chair if the latter is not in a position to perform his or her duties. The term of office of the Chair and of the Vice-Chair shall be two years, renewable once. The term of office of the Chair and that of the Vice-Chair shall expire when they cease to be members of the Administrative Board.

4.   The meetings of the Administrative Board shall be convened by its Chair. The Chair of the Board of Regulators or the nominee of the Board of Regulators, and the Director shall participate, without the right to vote, in the deliberations unless the Administrative Board decides otherwise as regards the Director. The Administrative Board shall meet at least twice a year in ordinary session. It shall also meet at the initiative of its Chair, at the request of the Commission or at the request of at least a third of its members. The Administrative Board may invite any person who may have a relevant opinion to attend its meetings in the capacity of an observer. The members of the Administrative Board may, subject to its rules of procedure, be assisted by advisers or experts. The Administrative Board's secretarial services shall be provided by ACER.

5.   Decisions of the Administrative Board shall be adopted on the basis of a two-thirds majority of the members present, unless provided otherwise in this Regulation. Each member of the Administrative Board or alternate shall have one vote.

6.   The rules of procedure shall set out in greater detail:

7.   Without prejudice to the role of the members appointed by the Commission, the members of the Administrative Board shall undertake to act independently and objectively in the interest of the Union as a whole, and shall neither seek nor follow instructions from Union institutions, bodies, offices or agencies, from any government of a Member State or from any other public or private body. For that purpose, each member shall make a written declaration of commitments and a written declaration of interests, indicating either the absence of any interest which might be considered to be prejudicial to his or her independence or any direct or indirect interest which might be considered prejudicial to his or her independence. ACER shall make those declarations public on an annual basis.

1.   The Administrative Board shall:

2.   The Administrative Board shall adopt, in accordance with Article 110 of the Staff Regulations, a decision based on Article 2(1) of the Staff Regulations and on Article 6 of the Conditions of Employment, delegating relevant appointing authority powers to the Director and defining the conditions under which that delegation of powers can be suspended. The Director shall be authorised to sub-delegate those powers.

3.   Where exceptional circumstances so require, the Administrative Board may by way of a decision temporarily suspend the delegation of the appointing authority powers to the Director and those sub-delegated by the latter and in favour of itself or delegate them to one of its members or to a staff member other than the Director. The exceptional circumstances shall be strictly limited to administrative, budgetary or managerial matters, without prejudice to the Director's full independence concerning his or her tasks pursuant to point (c) of Article 24(1).

1.   Each year, the Director shall prepare a draft programming document containing annual and multi-annual programming, and shall submit the draft programming document to the Administrative Board and to the Board of Regulators.

The Administrative Board shall adopt the draft programming document after receipt of a favourable opinion of the Board of Regulators, and shall submit the draft programming document to the European Parliament, to the Council and to the Commission no later than 31 January.

The draft programming document shall be in accordance with the provisional draft estimate established in accordance with Article 33(1), (2) and (3).

The Administrative Board shall adopt the programming document, taking into account the opinion of the Commission, after receipt of a favourable opinion from the Board of Regulators, and after the Director has presented it to the European Parliament. The Administrative Board shall submit the programming document to the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission by 31 December.

The programming document shall be adopted without prejudice to the annual budgetary procedure and shall be made public.

The programming document shall become definitive after the final adoption of the general budget and, if necessary, shall be adjusted accordingly.

2.   The annual programming in the programming document shall comprise detailed objectives and expected results, including performance indicators. It shall also contain a description of the actions to be financed and an indication of the financial and human resources allocated to each action, including a reference to ACER's working groups tasked with contributing to the drafting of the respective documents, in accordance with the principles of activity-based budgeting and management. The annual programming shall be coherent with the multi-annual programming referred to in paragraph 4. It shall clearly indicate the tasks that have been added, changed or deleted in comparison with the previous financial year.

3.   The Administrative Board shall amend the adopted programming document where a new task is assigned to ACER.

Any substantial amendment to the programming document shall be adopted by the same procedure set out for the initial programming document. The Administrative Board may delegate the power to make non-substantial amendments to the programming document to the Director.

4.   The multi-annual programming in the programming document shall set out the overall strategic programming, including objectives, expected results and performance indicators. It shall also set out resource programming, including the multi-annual budget and staff.

The resource programming shall be updated annually. The strategic programming shall be updated where appropriate, in particular to address the outcome of the evaluation referred to in Article 45.

1.   The Board of Regulators shall be composed of:

Only one representative per Member State from the regulatory authority may be admitted to the Board of Regulators.

2.   The Board of Regulators shall elect a Chair and a Vice-Chair from among its members. The Vice-Chair shall replace the Chair if the latter is not in a position to perform his or her duties. The term of office of the Chair and of the Vice-Chair shall be two-and-a-half years and shall be renewable. In any event, however, the term of office of the Chair and that of the Vice-Chair shall expire when they cease to be members of the Board of Regulators.

1.   The Board of Regulators shall act by a two-thirds majority of the members present, with one vote for each member.

2.   The Board of Regulators shall adopt and publish its rules of procedure, which shall set out in greater detail the arrangements governing voting, in particular the conditions on the basis of which one member may act on behalf of another and also, where appropriate, the rules governing quorums. The rules of procedure may provide for specific working methods for the consideration of issues arising in the context of regional cooperation initiatives.

3.   When carrying out the tasks conferred upon it by this Regulation and without prejudice to its members acting on behalf of their respective regulatory authority, the Board of Regulators shall act independently and shall not seek or follow instructions from any government of a Member State, from the Commission, or from another public or private entity.

4.   The secretarial services of the Board of Regulators shall be provided by ACER.

5.   The Board of Regulators shall:

6.   The European Parliament shall be informed of the draft agenda of upcoming meetings of the Board of Regulators at least two weeks in advance. Within two weeks of those meetings, the draft minutes shall be sent to the European Parliament. The European Parliament may invite, while fully respecting his or her independence, the Chair of the Board of Regulators or the Vice-Chair to make a statement before its competent committee and answer questions put by the members of that committee.

1.   ACER shall be managed by its Director, who shall act in accordance with the guidance referred to in point (b) of Article 22(5) and, where provided for in this Regulation, the opinions of the Board of Regulators. Without prejudice to the respective roles of the Administrative Board and the Board of Regulators in relation to the tasks of the Director, the Director shall neither seek nor follow any instruction from any government, from the Union institutions, or from any other public or private entity or person. The Director shall be accountable to the Administrative Board with respect to administrative, budgetary and managerial matters, but remain fully independent concerning his or her tasks under point (c) of Article 24(1). The Director may attend the meetings of the Board of Regulators as an observer.

2.   The Director shall be appointed by the Administrative Board following a favourable opinion of the Board of Regulators, on the basis of merit as well as skills and experience relevant to the energy sector, from a list of at least three candidates proposed by the Commission, following an open and transparent selection procedure. Before appointment, the candidate selected by the Administrative Board shall make a statement before the competent committee of the European Parliament and answer questions put by its members. For the purpose of concluding the contract with the Director, ACER shall be represented by the Chair of the Administrative Board.

3.   The Director's term of office shall be five years. In the course of the nine months preceding the end of that period, the Commission shall undertake an assessment. In the assessment, the Commission shall examine in particular:

4.   The Administrative Board, acting on a proposal from the Commission, after consulting the Board of Regulators and giving the utmost consideration to the assessment and opinion of the Board of Regulators, and only where justified on the basis of the duties and requirements of ACER, may extend the term of office of the Director once by no more than five years. A Director whose term of office has been extended shall not participate in another selection procedure for the same post at the end of the extended period.

5.   The Administrative Board shall inform the European Parliament of its intention to extend the Director's term of office. Within one month before the extension of his or her term of office, the Director may be invited to make a statement before the competent committee of the European Parliament and to answer questions put by the members of that committee.

6.   If his or her term of office is not extended, the Director shall remain in office until the appointment of his or her successor.

7.   The Director may be removed from office only upon a decision of the Administrative Board, after having obtained a favourable opinion of the Board of Regulators. The Administrative Board shall reach that decision on the basis of a two-thirds majority of its members.

8.   The European Parliament and the Council may call upon the Director to submit a report on the performance of his or her duties. The European Parliament may also invite the Director to make a statement before its competent committee and answer questions put by the members of that committee.

1.   The Director shall:

For the purpose of point (k) of the first subparagraph, before deciding to establish a local office the Director shall seek the opinion of the Member States concerned, including the Member State in which ACER's seat is located, and shall obtain the prior consent of the Commission and the Administrative Board. The decision shall be based on an appropriate cost-benefit analysis and shall specify the scope of the activities to be carried out at that local office in a manner that avoids unnecessary costs and duplication of ACER's administrative functions.

2.   For the purposes of point (c) of paragraph 1 of this Article, opinions, recommendations and decisions referred to in Article 3(1), Articles 4 to 8, Article 9(1) and (3), Article 10, point (c) of Article 11, Article 13, Article 15(4), and Articles 30 and 43 shall be adopted only after having obtained the favourable opinion of the Board of Regulators.

Before submitting draft opinions, recommendations or decisions to a vote by the Board of Regulators, the Director shall submit proposals for the draft opinions, recommendations or decisions to the relevant working group for consultation sufficiently in advance.

The Director:

In the case of a withdrawal of a draft opinion, recommendation or decision, the Director may issue a new draft opinion, recommendation or decision following the procedure set out in point (a) of Article 22(5) and in the second subparagraph of this paragraph. For the purposes of point (a) of the third subparagraph of this paragraph, where the Director deviates from or rejects the comments and amendments received from the Board of Regulators, the Director shall also provide a duly justified written explanation.

If the Board of Regulators does not give a favourable opinion on the resubmitted text of the draft opinion, recommendation or decision because its comments and amendments were not adequately reflected in the resubmitted text, the Director may revise the text of the draft opinion, recommendation or decision further in accordance with the amendments and comments proposed by the Board of Regulators in order to obtain its favourable opinion, without having to consult the relevant working group again or having to provide additional written reasons.

1.   ACER shall establish a Board of Appeal.

2.   The Board of Appeal shall be composed of six members and six alternates selected from among current or former senior staff of the regulatory authorities, competition authorities or other Union or national institutions with relevant experience in the energy sector. The Board of Appeal shall designate its Chair.

The members of the Board of Appeal shall be formally appointed by the Administrative Board, on a proposal from the Commission, following a public call for expression of interest, and after consulting the Board of Regulators.

3.   The Board of Appeal shall adopt and publish its rules of procedure. Those rules shall set out in detail the arrangements governing the organisation and functioning of the Board of Appeal and the rules applicable to appeals before the Board, pursuant to Article 28. The Board of Appeal shall notify the Commission of its draft rules of procedure as well as any significant change to those rules. The Commission may provide an opinion on those rules within three months of the date of receipt of the notification.

ACER's budget shall comprise a separate budget line for the financing of the registry of the Board of Appeal.

4.   The decisions of the Board of Appeal shall be adopted on the basis of a majority of at least four of its six members. The Board of Appeal shall be convened when necessary.

1.   The term of office of the members of the Board of Appeal shall be five years. That term shall be renewable once.

2.   The members of the Board of Appeal shall be independent in making their decisions. They shall not be bound by any instructions. They shall not perform any other duties in ACER, in its Administrative Board, in its Board of Regulators or in any of its working groups. A member of the Board of Appeal shall not be removed during his or her term of office, unless he or she has been found guilty of serious misconduct, and the Administrative Board, after consulting the Board of Regulators, takes a decision to that effect.

1.   Members of the Board of Appeal shall not take part in any appeal proceedings if they have any personal interest therein, if they have previously been involved as representatives of one of the parties to the proceedings, or if they participated in the decision under appeal.

2.   A member of the Board of Appeal shall inform the Board in the event that, for one of the reasons referred to in paragraph 1 or for any other reason, he or she considers that a fellow member should not take part in any appeal proceedings. Any party to the appeal proceedings may object to the participation of a member of the Board of Appeal on any of the grounds referred to in paragraph 1, or in the case of suspected bias. Such an objection shall be inadmissible if it is based on the nationality of a member or if, while being aware of a reason for objecting, the objecting party to the appeal proceedings has taken a procedural step in the appeal proceedings other than objecting to the composition of the Board of Appeal.

3.   The Board of Appeal shall decide on the action to be taken in the cases specified in paragraphs 1 and 2 without the participation of the member concerned. For the purpose of taking that decision, the member concerned shall be replaced on the Board of Appeal by his or her alternate. If the alternate finds him or herself in a similar situation to that of the member, the Chair shall designate a replacement from among the available alternates.

4.   The members of the Board of Appeal shall undertake to act independently and in the public interest. For that purpose, they shall make a written declaration of commitments and a written declaration of interests indicating either the absence of any interest which might be considered prejudicial to their independence or indicating any direct or indirect interest which might be considered prejudicial to their independence. Those declarations shall be made public annually.

1.   Any natural or legal person, including the regulatory authorities, may appeal against a decision referred to in point (d) of Article 2 which is addressed to that person, or against a decision which, although in the form of a decision addressed to another person, is of direct and individual concern to that person.

2.   The appeal shall include a statement of the grounds for appeal and shall be filed in writing at ACER within two months of the notification of the decision to the person concerned, or, in the absence thereof, within two months of the date on which ACER published its decision. The Board of Appeal shall decide upon the appeal within four months of the lodging of the appeal.

3.   An appeal lodged pursuant to paragraph 1 shall not have suspensory effect. The Board of Appeal may, however, if it considers that circumstances so require, suspend the application of the contested decision.

4.   If the appeal is admissible, the Board of Appeal shall examine whether it is well-founded. It shall invite the parties to the appeal proceedings as often as necessary to file observations on notifications issued by itself or on communications from the other parties to the appeal proceedings, within specified time limits. Parties to the appeal proceedings shall be entitled to make an oral presentation.

5.   The Board of Appeal may confirm the decision, or it may remit the case to the competent body of ACER. The latter shall be bound by the decision of the Board of Appeal.

6.   ACER shall publish the decisions taken by the Board of Appeal.

1.   Where justified, and in particular to support the work of the Director and of the Board of Regulators on regulatory issues and for the purpose of preparing the opinions, recommendations and decisions referred to in Article 3(1), Articles 4 to 8, Article 9(1) and (3), Article 10, point (c) of Article 11, Article 13, Article 15(4), and Articles 30 and 43, the Administrative Board shall establish or remove working groups on the basis of a joint proposal from the Director and the Board of Regulators.

The establishment and the removal of a working group shall require a favourable opinion of the Board of Regulators.

2.   The working groups shall be composed of experts from among ACER's and the regulatory authorities' staff. Experts from the Commission may participate in working groups. ACER shall not be responsible for the costs of the participation of experts from the staff of regulatory authorities in ACER's working groups. Working groups shall take into consideration the views of experts from other relevant national authorities where those authorities are competent.

3.   The Administrative Board shall adopt and publish internal rules of procedure for the functioning of the working groups on the basis of a proposal from the Director, after consulting the Board of Regulators and obtaining its favourable opinion.

4.   ACER's working groups shall carry out the activities assigned to them in the programming document adopted pursuant to Article 20 and any activities under this Regulation assigned to them by the Board of Regulators and the Director.

1.   Without prejudice to other resources the revenues of ACER shall be made up of:

2.   ACER's expenditure shall include staff, administrative, infrastructure, and operational expenses.

3.   ACER's revenue and expenditure shall be in balance.

4.   All ACER's revenue and expenditure shall be the subject of forecasts for each financial year, coinciding with the calendar year, and shall be entered in its budget.

5.   The revenue received by ACER shall not compromise its neutrality, independence or objectivity.

1.   Fees shall be due to ACER for the following:

2.   The fees referred to in paragraph 1, and the way in which they are to be paid, shall be set by the Commission after carrying out a public consultation and after consulting the Administrative Board and the Board of Regulators. The fees shall be proportionate to the costs of the relevant services as provided in a cost-effective way and shall be sufficient to cover those costs. Those fees shall be set at such a level as to ensure that they are non-discriminatory and that they avoid placing an undue financial or administrative burden on market participants or entities acting on their behalf.

The Commission shall regularly examine the level of those fees on the basis of an evaluation and, if necessary, shall adapt the level of those fees and the way in which they are to be paid.

1.   Each year, the Director shall draw up a provisional draft estimate covering the operational expenditure and the programme of work anticipated for the following financial year, and shall submit that provisional draft estimate to the Administrative Board, together with a list of provisional posts.

2.   The provisional draft estimate shall be based on the objectives and expected results of the programming document referred to in Article 20(1), and shall take into account the financial resources that are necessary to achieve those objectives and expected results.

3.   Each year, the Administrative Board shall, on the basis of the provisional draft estimate prepared by the Director, adopt a provisional draft estimate of revenue and expenditure of ACER for the following financial year.

4.   The provisional draft estimate, including a draft establishment plan, shall be transmitted by the Administrative Board to the Commission by 31 January each year. Prior to adoption of the estimate, the draft prepared by the Director shall be transmitted to the Board of Regulators, which may deliver a reasoned opinion on the draft.

5.   The estimate referred to in paragraph 3 shall be transmitted by the Commission to the European Parliament and to the Council, together with the draft general budget of the Union.

6.   On the basis of the draft estimate, the Commission shall enter into the draft general budget of the Union the estimates it considers necessary in respect of the establishment plan and the amount of the grant to be charged to the general budget of the Union in accordance with Articles 313 to 316 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU).

7.   The Council in its role as budgetary authority shall adopt the establishment plan for ACER.

8.   ACER's budget shall be adopted by the Administrative Board. It shall become final after the final adoption of the general budget of the Union. Where necessary, it shall be adjusted accordingly.

9.   Any modification to the budget, including the establishment plan, shall follow the same procedure.

10.   By 5 July 2020, the Commission shall assess whether the financial and human resources available to ACER allow it to fulfil its role under this Regulation of working towards an internal energy market and of contributing to energy security to the benefit of consumers in the Union.

11.   The Administrative Board shall, without delay, notify the budgetary authority of its intention to implement any project which may have significant financial implications for the funding of ACER's budget, in particular any project relating to property. The Administrative Board shall also inform the Commission of its intention. If either branch of the budgetary authority intends to issue an opinion, it shall, within two weeks of receipt of the information on the project, notify ACER of its intention thereof. In the absence of a reply, ACER may proceed with the planned project.

1.   The Director shall act as authorising officer and shall implement ACER's budget.

2.   By 1 March following the completion of each financial year, ACER's accounting officer shall submit the provisional accounts, accompanied by the report on budgetary and financial management over the financial year to the Commission's accounting officer and to the Court of Auditors. ACER's accounting officer shall also submit the report on budgetary and financial management to the European Parliament and the Council by 31 March of the following year. The Commission's accounting officer shall then consolidate the provisional accounts of the institutions and decentralised bodies in accordance with Article 245 of Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2018/1046 of the European Parliament and of the Council (22) (‘the Financial Regulation’).

1.   ACER's accounting officer shall submit the provisional accounts for the financial year (year N) to the Commission's Accounting Officer and to the Court of Auditors by 1 March of the following financial year (year N + 1).

2.   ACER shall submit a report on the budgetary and financial management for year N to the European Parliament, the Council, the Commission and the Court of Auditors by 31 March of year N + 1.

By 31 March of year N + 1, the Commission's accounting officer shall submit the provisional accounts of ACER to the Court of Auditors. The Commission shall also submit the report on budgetary and financial management over the financial year to the European Parliament and to the Council.

3.   After receipt of the observations of the Court of Auditors on ACER's provisional accounts for year N in accordance with the provisions of Article 246 of the Financial Regulation, the accounting officer, acting on his or her own responsibility, shall draw up ACER's final accounts for that year. The Director shall submit them to the Administrative Board for an opinion.

4.   The Administrative Board shall deliver an opinion on ACER's final accounts for year N.

5.   ACER's accounting officer shall submit the final accounts for year N, accompanied by the opinion of the Administrative Board, by 1 July of year N + 1, to the European Parliament, the Council, the Commission and the Court of Auditors.

6.   The final accounts shall be published in the Official Journal of the European Union by 15 November of year N + 1.

7.   The Director shall submit a reply to the Court of Auditors' observations by 30 September of year N + 1. The Director shall also submit a copy of that reply to the Administrative Board and the Commission.

8.   The Director shall submit to the European Parliament, at the latter's request, any information necessary for the smooth application of the discharge procedure for year N in accordance with Article 109(3) of Delegated Regulation (EU) No 1271/2013.

9.   The European Parliament, following a recommendation by the Council, acting by qualified majority, shall, before 15 May of the year N + 2, grant a discharge to the Director for the implementation of the budget for the financial year N.

1.   In order to facilitate the combating of fraud, corruption and other unlawful activities under Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 883/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council (23), ACER shall accede to the Interinstitutional Agreement of 25 May 1999 concerning internal investigations by OLAF (24) and shall adopt appropriate provisions applicable to the employees of ACER, using the template set out in the Annex to that Agreement.

2.   The Court of Auditors shall have the power to carry out on-the-spot audits, as well as auditing on the basis of documents, with respect to the grant beneficiaries, contractors and subcontractors that have received Union funds from ACER.

3.   OLAF may carry out investigations, including on-the-spot checks and inspections, with a view to establishing whether there has been fraud, corruption or any other illegal activity affecting the financial interests of the Union in connection with a grant or a contract funded by ACER, in accordance with the provisions and procedures laid down in Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 883/2013 and Council Regulation (Euratom, EC) No 2185/96 (25).

4.   Without prejudice to paragraphs 1, 2 and 3, cooperation agreements with third countries and international organisations, contracts, grant agreements and grant decisions of ACER shall contain provisions expressly empowering the Court of Auditors and OLAF to conduct the audits and investigations referred to in this Article, in accordance with their respective competences.

1.   Protocol No 7 on Privileges and Immunities of the European Union annexed to the TEU and to the TFEU shall apply to ACER and to its staff.

2.   The necessary arrangements concerning the accommodation to be provided for ACER in the host Member State and the facilities to be made available by that Member State, together with the specific rules applicable in the host Member State to the Director, members of the Administrative Board, ACER's staff and members of their families, shall be laid down in a Headquarters Agreement between ACER and the Member State where the seat is located. That agreement shall be concluded after obtaining the approval of the Administrative Board.

1.   The Staff Regulations and the Conditions of Employment and the rules adopted jointly by the Union institutions for the purpose of applying the Staff Regulations and the Conditions of Employment shall apply to ACER's staff, including its Director.

2.   The Administrative Board, in agreement with the Commission, shall adopt appropriate implementing rules, in accordance with Article 110 of the Staff Regulations.

3.   In respect of its staff, ACER shall exercise the powers conferred on the appointing authority by the Staff Regulations and on the authority entitled to conclude contracts by the Conditions of Employment.

4.   The Administrative Board may adopt provisions to allow national experts from Member States to be employed on secondment at ACER.

1.   The contractual liability of ACER shall be governed by the law applicable to the contract in question.

Any arbitration clause contained in a contract concluded by ACER shall be subject to the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice.

2.   In the case of non-contractual liability, ACER shall, in accordance with the general principles common to the laws of the Member States, make good any damage caused by it or by its staff in the performance of their duties.

3.   The Court of Justice shall have jurisdiction in disputes over compensation for damages referred to in paragraph 2.

4.   The personal financial liability and disciplinary liability of ACER's staff towards it shall be governed by the relevant provisions applying to ACER's staff.

1.   Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council (26) shall apply to documents held by ACER.

2.   The Administrative Board shall adopt practical measures for applying Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001.

3.   Decisions taken by ACER pursuant to Article 8 of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001 may be the subject of a complaint to the Ombudsman or of proceedings before the Court of Justice, in accordance with the conditions laid down in Articles 228 and 263 TFEU.

4.   The processing of personal data by ACER shall be subject to the Regulation (EU) 2018/1725 of the European Parliament and of the Council (27). The Administrative Board shall establish measures for the application of Regulation (EU) 2018/1725 by ACER, including measures concerning the appointment of ACER's Data Protection Officer. Those measures shall be established after consulting the European Data Protection Supervisor.

5.   ACER may engage in communication activities on its own initiative within its field of competence. The allocation of resources to communication activities shall not be detrimental to the effective exercise of the tasks referred to in Article 3 to 13. Communication activities shall be carried out in accordance with relevant communication and dissemination plans adopted by the Administrative Board.

1.   ACER shall adopt its own security rules, which shall be equivalent to the Commission's security rules for protecting European Union Classified Information (EUCI) and sensitive non-classified information, including provisions for the exchange, processing and storage of such information, as set out in the Commission Decisions (EU, Euratom) 2015/443 (28) and (EU, Euratom) 2015/444 (29).

2.   ACER may also decide to apply the Commission's Decisions referred to in paragraph 1, mutatis mutandis. ACER's security rules shall cover, inter alia, provisions for the exchange, processing and storage of EUCI and sensitive non-classified information.

1.   ACER shall be open to the participation of third countries which have concluded agreements with the Union and which have adopted and are applying the relevant rules of Union law in the field of energy including, in particular, the rules on independent regulatory authorities, third-party access to infrastructure and unbundling, energy trading and system operation and consumer participation and protection, as well as the relevant rules in the fields of environment and competition.

2.   Subject to the conclusion of an agreement to that effect between the Union and third countries as referred to in paragraph 1, ACER may also exercise its tasks under Articles 3 to 13 with regard to third countries, provided that those third countries have adopted and apply the relevant rules in accordance with paragraph 1 and have mandated ACER to coordinate the activities of their regulatory authorities with those of the regulatory authorities of Member States. Only in such cases the references to issues of cross-border character shall relate to borders between the Union and third countries, and not to borders between two Member States.

3.   The agreements referred to in paragraph 1 shall provide for arrangements specifying, in particular, the nature, scope and procedural aspects of the involvement of those countries in ACER's work, including provisions relating to financial contributions and to staff.

4.   The Administrative Board shall adopt rules of procedures for relations with third countries referred to in paragraph 1 after receipt of a positive opinion by the Board of Regulators. The Commission shall ensure that ACER operates within its mandate and the existing institutional framework by concluding an appropriate working arrangement with ACER's Director.

1.   The provisions of Council Regulation No 1 (30) shall apply to ACER.

2.   The Administrative Board shall decide on ACER's internal language arrangements.

3.   The translation services required for ACER's functioning shall be provided by the Translation Centre for the Bodies of the European Union.

1.   By 5 July 2024, and every five years thereafter, the Commission, with the assistance of an independent external expert, shall carry out an evaluation to assess ACER's performance in relation to its objectives, mandate and tasks. The evaluation shall in particular address the possible need to modify ACER's mandate, and the financial implications of any such modification.

2.   Where the Commission considers that the continued existence of ACER is no longer justified with regard to its assigned objectives, mandate and tasks, it may propose that this Regulation be amended accordingly or repealed after carrying out an appropriate consultation of stakeholders and of the Board of Regulators.

3.   The Commission shall submit the evaluation findings referred to in paragraph 1 together with its conclusions to the European Parliament, to the Council and to ACER's Board of Regulators. The findings of the evaluation should be made public.

4.   By 31 October 2025, and at least every five years thereafter, the Commission shall submit to the European Parliament and the Council a report evaluating this Regulation and, in particular, ACER's tasks involving individual decisions. That reports shall, as appropriate, take into account the results of the assessment pursuant to Article 69(1) of Regulation (EU) 2019/943.

The Commission, where appropriate, shall submit a legislative proposal together with its report.

1.   All market participants shall be responsible for the imbalances they cause in the system (‘balance responsibility’). To that end, market participants shall either be balance responsible parties or shall contractually delegate their responsibility to a balance responsible party of their choice. Each balance responsible party shall be financially responsible for its imbalances and shall strive to be balanced or shall help the electricity system to be balanced.

2.   Member States may provide derogations from balance responsibility only for:

Member States may, without prejudice to Articles 107 and 108 TFEU, provide incentives to market participants which are fully or partly exempted from balancing responsibility to accept full balancing responsibility.

3.   When a Member State provides a derogation in accordance with paragraph 2, it shall ensure that the financial responsibility for imbalances is fulfilled by another market participant.

4.   For power-generating facilities commissioned from 1 January 2026, point (b) of paragraph 2 shall apply only to generating installations using renewable energy sources with an installed electricity capacity of less than 200 kW.

1.   Balancing markets, including prequalification processes, shall be organised in such a way as to:

2.   The price of balancing energy shall not be pre-determined in contracts for balancing capacity. Procurement processes shall be transparent in accordance with Article 40(4) of Directive (EU) 2019/944, while protecting the confidentiality of commercially sensitive information.

3.   Balancing markets shall ensure operational security whilst allowing for maximum use and efficient allocation of cross-zonal capacity across timeframes in accordance with Article 17.

4.   The settlement of balancing energy for standard balancing products and specific balancing products shall be based on marginal pricing (pay-as-cleared) unless all regulatory authorities approve an alternative pricing method on the basis of a joint proposal by all transmission system operators following an analysis demonstrating that that alternative pricing method is more efficient.

Market participants shall be allowed to bid as close to real time as possible, and balancing energy gate closure times shall not be before the intraday cross-zonal gate closure time.

Transmission system operators applying a central dispatching model may establish additional rules in accordance with the guideline on electricity balancing adopted on the basis of Article 6(11) of Regulation (EC) No 714/2009.

5.   The imbalances shall be settled at a price that reflects the real-time value of energy.

6.   Each imbalance price area shall be equal to a bidding zone, except in the case of a central dispatching model where an imbalance price area may constitute a part of a bidding zone.

7.   The dimensioning of reserve capacity shall be performed by the transmission system operators and shall be facilitated at regional level.

8.   The procurement of balancing capacity shall be performed by the transmission system operator and may be facilitated at a regional level. Reservation of cross-border capacity to that end may be limited. The procurement of balancing capacity shall be market-based and organised in such a way as to be non-discriminatory between market participants in the prequalification process in accordance with Article 40(4) of Directive (EU) 2019/944 whether market participants participate individually or through aggregation.

Procurement of balancing capacity shall be based on a primary market unless and to the extent that the regulatory authority has provided for a derogation to allow the use of other forms of market-based procurement on the grounds of a lack of competition in the market for balancing services. Derogations from the obligation to base the procurement of balancing capacity on use of primary markets shall be reviewed every three years.

9.   The procurement of upward balancing capacity and downward balancing capacity shall be carried out separately, unless the regulatory authority approves a derogation from this principle on the basis that this would result in higher economic efficiency as demonstrated by an evaluation performed by the transmission system operator. Contracts for balancing capacity shall not be concluded more than one day before the provision of the balancing capacity and the contracting period shall be no longer than one day, unless and to the extent that the regulatory authority has approved the earlier contracting or longer contracting periods to ensure the security of supply or to improve economic efficiency.

Where a derogation is granted, for at least 40 % of the standard balancing products and a minimum of 30 % of all products used for balancing capacity, contracts for the balancing capacity shall be concluded for no more than one day before the provision of the balancing capacity and the contracting period shall be no longer than one day. The contracting of the remaining part of the balancing capacity shall be performed for a maximum of one month in advance of the provision of balancing capacity and shall have a maximum contractual period of one month.

10.   At the request of the transmission system operator, the regulatory authority may decide to extend the contractual period of the remaining part of balancing capacity referred to in paragraph 9 to a maximum period of twelve months provided that such a decision is limited in time, and the positive effects in terms of lowering of costs for final customers exceed the negative impacts on the market. The request shall include:

11.   Notwithstanding paragraph 10, from 1 January 2026 contract periods shall not be longer than six months.

12.   By 1 January 2028, regulatory authorities shall report to the Commission and ACER on the share of the total capacity covered by contracts with a duration or a procurement period of longer than one day.

13.   Transmission system operators or their delegated operators shall publish, as close to real time as possible but with a delay after delivery of no more than 30 minutes, the current system balance of their scheduling areas, the estimated imbalance prices and the estimated balancing energy prices.

14.   Transmission system operators may, where standard balancing products are not sufficient to ensure operational security or where some balancing resources cannot participate in the balancing market through standard balancing products, propose, and the regulatory authorities may approve, derogations from paragraphs 2 and 4 for specific balancing products which are activated locally without exchanging them with other transmission system operators.

Proposals for derogations shall include a description of measures proposed to minimise the use of specific products, subject to economic efficiency, a demonstration that the specific products do not create significant inefficiencies and distortions in the balancing market either inside or outside the scheduling area, as well as, where applicable, the rules and information for the process for converting the balancing energy bids from specific balancing products into balancing energy bids from standard balancing products.

1.   Transmission system operators and NEMOs shall jointly organise the management of the integrated day-ahead and intraday markets in accordance with Regulation (EU) 2015/1222. Transmission system operators and NEMOs shall cooperate at Union level or, where more appropriate, at a regional level in order to maximise the efficiency and effectiveness of Union electricity day-ahead and intraday trading. The obligation to cooperate shall be without prejudice to the application of Union competition law. In their functions relating to electricity trading, transmission system operators and NEMOs shall be subject to regulatory oversight by the regulatory authorities pursuant to Article 59 of Directive (EU) 2019/944 and ACER pursuant to Articles 4 and 8 of Regulation (EU) 2019/942.

2.   Day-ahead and intraday markets shall:

1.   NEMOs shall allow market participants to trade energy as close to real time as possible and at least up to the intraday cross-zonal gate closure time.

2.   NEMOs shall provide market participants with the opportunity to trade in energy in time intervals which are at least as short as the imbalance settlement period for both day-ahead and intraday markets.

3.   NEMOs shall provide products for trading in day-ahead and intraday markets which are sufficiently small in size, with minimum bid sizes of 500 kW or less, to allow for the effective participation of demand-side response, energy storage and small-scale renewables including direct participation by customers.

4.   By 1 January 2021, the imbalance settlement period shall be 15 minutes in all scheduling areas, unless regulatory authorities have granted a derogation or an exemption. Derogations may be granted only until 31 December 2024.

From 1 January 2025, the imbalance settlement period shall not exceed 30 minutes where an exemption has been granted by all the regulatory authorities within a synchronous area.

1.   In accordance with Regulation (EU) 2016/1719, transmission system operators shall issue long-term transmission rights or have equivalent measures in place to allow for market participants, including owners of power-generating facilities using renewable energy sources, to hedge price risks across bidding zone borders, unless an assessment of the forward market on the bidding zone borders performed by the competent regulatory authorities shows that there are sufficient hedging opportunities in the concerned bidding zones.

2.   Long-term transmission rights shall be allocated in a transparent, market based and non-discriminatory manner through a single allocation platform.

3.   Subject to compliance with Union competition law, market operators shall be free to develop forward hedging products, including long-term forward hedging products, to provide market participants, including owners of power-generating facilities using renewable energy sources, with appropriate possibilities for hedging financial risks against price fluctuations. Member States shall not require that such hedging activity be limited to trades within a Member State or bidding zone.

1.   There shall be neither a maximum nor a minimum limit to the wholesale electricity price. This provision shall apply, inter alia, to bidding and clearing in all timeframes and shall include balancing energy and imbalance prices, without prejudice to the technical price limits which may be applied in the balancing timeframe and in the day-ahead and intraday timeframes in accordance with paragraph 2.

2.   NEMOs may apply harmonised limits on maximum and minimum clearing prices for day-ahead and intraday timeframes. Those limits shall be sufficiently high so as not to unnecessarily restrict trade, shall be harmonised for the internal market and shall take into account the maximum value of lost load. NEMOs shall implement a transparent mechanism to adjust automatically the technical bidding limits in due time in the event that the set limits are expected to be reached. The adjusted higher limits shall remain applicable until further increases under that mechanism are required.

3.   Transmission system operators shall not take any measures for the purpose of changing wholesale prices.

4.   Regulatory authorities or, where a Member State has designated another competent authority for that purpose, such designated competent authorities, shall identify policies and measures applied within their territory that could contribute to indirectly restricting wholesale price formation, including limiting bids relating to the activation of balancing energy, capacity mechanisms, measures by the transmission system operators, measures intended to challenge market outcomes, or to prevent the abuse of dominant positions or inefficiently defined bidding zones.

5.   Where a regulatory authority or designated competent authority has identified a policy or measure which could serve to restrict wholesale price formation it shall take all appropriate actions to eliminate or, if not possible, to mitigate the impact of that policy or measure on bidding behaviour. Member States shall provide a report to the Commission by 5 January 2020 detailing the measures and actions they have taken or intend to take.

1.   By 5 July 2020 where required for the purpose of setting a reliability standard in accordance with Article 25 regulatory authorities or, where a Member State has designated another competent authority for that purpose, such designated competent authorities shall determine a single estimate of the value of lost load for their territory. That estimate shall be made publically available. Regulatory authorities or other designated competent authorities may determine different estimates per bidding zone if they have more than one bidding zone in their territory. Where a bidding zone consists of territories of more than one Member State, the concerned regulatory authorities or other designated competent authorities shall determine a single estimate of the value of lost load for that bidding zone. In determining the single estimate of the value of lost load, regulatory authorities or other designated competent authorities shall apply the methodology referred to in Article 23(6).

2.   Regulatory authorities and designated competent authorities shall update their estimate of the value of lost load at least every five years, or earlier where they observe a significant change.

1.   The dispatching of power-generating facilities and demand response shall be non-discriminatory, transparent and, unless otherwise provided under paragraphs 2 to 6, market based.

2.   Without prejudice to Articles 107, 108 and 109 TFEU, Member States shall ensure that when dispatching electricity generating installations, system operators shall give priority to generating installations using renewable energy sources to the extent permitted by the secure operation of the national electricity system, based on transparent and non-discriminatory criteria and where such power-generating facilities are either:

3.   A Member State may decide not to apply priority dispatch to power-generating facilities as referred to in point (a) of paragraph 2 with a start of operation at least six months after that decision, or to apply a lower minimum capacity than that set out under point (a) of paragraph 2, provided that:

Any derogation shall avoid retroactive changes that affect generating installations already benefiting from priority dispatch, notwithstanding any agreement between a Member State and the operator of a generating installation on a voluntary basis.

Without prejudice to Articles 107, 108 and 109 TFEU, Member States may provide incentives to installations eligible for priority dispatch to voluntarily give up priority dispatch.

4.   Without prejudice to Articles 107, 108 and 109 TFEU, Member States may provide for priority dispatch for electricity generated in power-generating facilities using high-efficiency cogeneration with an installed electricity capacity of less than 400 kW.

5.   For power-generating facilities commissioned as from 1 January 2026, point (a) of paragraph 2 shall apply only to power-generating facilities that use renewable energy sources and have an installed electricity capacity of less than 200 kW.

6.   Without prejudice to contracts concluded before 4 July 2019, power-generating facilities that use renewable energy sources or high-efficiency cogeneration and were commissioned before 4 July 2019 and, when commissioned, were subject to priority dispatch under Article 15(5) of Directive 2012/27/EU or Article 16(2) of Directive 2009/28/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council (20) shall continue to benefit from priority dispatch. Priority dispatch shall no longer apply to such power-generating facilities from the date on which the power-generating facility becomes subject to significant modifications, which shall be deemed to be the case at least where a new connection agreement is required or where the generation capacity of the power-generating facility is increased.

7.   Priority dispatch shall not endanger the secure operation of the electricity system, shall not be used as a justification for curtailment of cross-zonal capacities beyond what is provided for in Article 16 and shall be based on transparent and non-discriminatory criteria.

1.   The redispatching of generation and redispatching of demand response shall be based on objective, transparent and non-discriminatory criteria. It shall be open to all generation technologies, all energy storage and all demand response, including those located in other Member States unless technically not feasible.

2.   The resources that are redispatched shall be selected from among generating facilities, energy storage or demand response using market-based mechanisms and shall be financially compensated. Balancing energy bids used for redispatching shall not set the balancing energy price.

3.   Non-market-based redispatching of generation, energy storage and demand response may only be used where:

4.   The transmission system operators and distribution system operators shall report at least annually to the competent regulatory authority, on:

The regulatory authority shall submit the report to ACER and shall publish a summary of the data referred to in points (a), (b) and (c) of the first subparagraph together with recommendations for improvement where necessary.

5.   Subject to requirements relating to the maintenance of the reliability and safety of the grid, based on transparent and non-discriminatory criteria established by the regulatory authorities, transmission system operators and distribution system operators shall:

6.   Where non-market-based downward redispatching is used, the following principles shall apply:

7.   Where non-market based redispatching is used, it shall be subject to financial compensation by the system operator requesting the redispatching to the operator of the redispatched generation, energy storage or demand response facility except in the case of producers that have accepted a connection agreement under which there is no guarantee of firm delivery of energy. Such financial compensation shall be at least equal to the higher of the following elements or a combination of both if applying only the higher would lead to an unjustifiably low or an unjustifiably high compensation:

1.   Member States shall take all appropriate measures to address congestions. Bidding zone borders shall be based on long-term, structural congestions in the transmission network. Bidding zones shall not contain such structural congestions unless they have no impact on neighbouring bidding zones, or, as a temporary exemption, their impact on neighbouring bidding zones is mitigated through the use of remedial actions and those structural congestions do not lead to reductions of cross-zonal trading capacity in accordance with the requirements of Article 16. The configuration of bidding zones in the Union shall be designed in such a way as to maximise economic efficiency and to maximise cross-zonal trading opportunities in accordance with Article 16, while maintaining security of supply.

2.   Every three years, the ENTSO for Electricity shall report on structural congestions and other major physical congestions between and within bidding zones, including the location and frequency of such congestions, in accordance with the capacity allocation and congestion management guideline adopted on the basis of Article 18(5) of Regulation (EC) No 714/2009. That report shall contain an assessment of whether the cross-zonal trade capacity reached the linear trajectory pursuant to Article 15 or the minimum capacity pursuant to Article 16 of this Regulation.

3.   In order to ensure an optimal configuration of bidding zones, a bidding zone review shall be carried out. That review shall identify all structural congestions and shall include an analysis of different configurations of bidding zones in a coordinated manner with the involvement of affected stakeholders from all relevant Member States, in accordance with the capacity allocation and congestion management guideline adopted on the basis of Article 18(5) of Regulation (EC) No 714/2009. Current bidding zones shall be assessed on the basis of their ability to create a reliable market environment, including for flexible generation and load capacity, which is crucial to avoiding grid bottlenecks, balancing electricity demand and supply, securing the long-term security of investments in network infrastructure.

4.   For the purposes of this Article and of Article 15 of this Regulation, relevant Member States, transmission system operators or regulatory authorities are those Member States, transmission system operators or regulatory authorities participating in the review of the bidding zone configuration and also to those in the same capacity calculation region pursuant to the capacity allocation and congestion management guideline adopted on the basis of Article 18(5) of Regulation (EC) No 714/2009.

5.   By 5 October 2019 all relevant transmission system operators shall submit a proposal for the methodology and assumptions that are to be used in the bidding zone review process and for the alternative bidding zone configurations to be considered to the relevant regulatory authorities for approval. The relevant regulatory authorities shall take a unanimous decision on the proposal within 3 months of submission of the proposal. Where the regulatory authorities are unable to reach a unanimous decision on the proposal within that time frame, ACER shall, within an additional three months, decide on the methodology and assumptions and the alternative bidding zone configurations to be considered. The methodology shall be based on structural congestions which are not expected to be overcome within the following three years, taking due account of tangible progress on infrastructure development projects that are expected to be realised within the following three years.

6.   On the basis of the methodology and assumptions approved pursuant to paragraph 5, the transmission system operators participating in the bidding zone review shall submit a joint proposal to the relevant Member States or their designated competent authorities to amend or maintain the bidding zone configuration no later than 12 months after approval of the methodology and assumptions pursuant to paragraph 5. Other Member States, Energy Community Contracting Parties or other third countries sharing the same synchronous area with any relevant Member State may submit comments.

7.   Where structural congestion has been identified in the report pursuant to paragraph 2 of this Article or in the bidding zone review pursuant to this Article or by one or more transmission system operators in their control areas in a report approved by the competent regulatory authority, the Member State with identified structural congestion shall, in cooperation with its transmission system operators, decide, within six months of receipt of the report, either to establish national or multinational action plans pursuant to Article 15, or to review and amend its bidding zone configuration. Those decisions shall be immediately notified to the Commission and to ACER.

8.   For those Member States that have opted to amend the bidding zone configuration pursuant to paragraph 7, the relevant Member States shall reach a unanimous decision within six months of the notification referred to in paragraph 7. Other Member States may submit comments to the relevant Member States, who should take account of those comments when reaching their decision. The decision shall be reasoned and shall be notified to the Commission and ACER. In the event that the relevant Member States fail to reach a unanimous decision within those six months, they shall immediately notify the Commission thereof. As a measure of last resort, the Commission after consulting ACER shall adopt a decision whether to amend or maintain the bidding zone configuration in and between those Member States by six months after receipt of such a notification.

9.   Member States and the Commission shall consult relevant stakeholders before adopting a decision under this Article.

10.   Any decision adopted under this Article shall specify the date of implementation of any changes. That implementation date shall balance the need for expeditiousness with practical considerations, including forward trade of electricity. The decision may establish appropriate transitional arrangements.

11.   Where further bidding zone reviews are launched under the capacity allocation and congestion management guideline adopted on the basis of Article 18(5) of Regulation (EC) No 714/2009, this Article shall apply.

1.   Following the adoption of a decision pursuant to Article 14(7), the Member State with identified structural congestion shall develop an action plan in cooperation with its regulatory authority. That action plan shall contain a concrete timetable for adopting measures to reduce the structural congestions identified within four years of the adoption of the decision pursuant to Article 14(7).

2.   Irrespective of the concrete progress of the action plan, Member States shall ensure that without prejudice to derogations granted under Article 16(9) or deviations under Article 16(3), the cross-zonal trade capacity is increased on an annual basis until the minimum capacity provided for in Article 16(8) is reached. That minimum capacity shall be reached by 31 December 2025.

Those annual increases shall be achieved by means of a linear trajectory. The starting point of that trajectory shall be either the capacity allocated at the border or on a critical network element in the year before adoption of the action plan or the average during the three years before adoption of the action plan, whichever is higher. Member States shall ensure that, during the implementation of their action plans the capacity made available for cross-zonal trade to be compliant with Article 16(8) is at least equal to the values of the linear trajectory, including by use of remedial actions in the capacity calculation region.

3.   The cost of the remedial actions necessary to achieve the linear trajectory referred to in paragraph 2 or make available cross-zonal capacity at the borders or on critical network elements concerned by the action plan shall be borne by the Member State or Member States implementing the action plan.

4.   On an annual basis, during the implementation of the action plan and within six months of its expiry, the relevant transmission system operators shall assess for the previous 12 months whether the available cross-border capacity has reached the linear trajectory or, from 1 January 2026, the minimum capacities provided for in Article 16(8) have been achieved. They shall submit their assessments to ACER and to the relevant regulatory authorities. Before drafting the report, each transmission system operator shall submit its contribution to the report, including all the relevant data, to its regulatory authority for approval.

5.   For those Member States for which the assessments referred to in paragraph 4 demonstrate that a transmission system operator has not complied with the linear trajectory, the relevant Member States shall, within six months of receipt of the assessment report referred to in paragraph 4, decide unanimously whether to amend or maintain the bidding zone configuration within and between those Member States. In their decision, the relevant Member States should take account of any comments submitted by other Member States. The relevant Member States' decision shall be substantiated and shall be notified to the Commission and to ACER.

The relevant Member States shall notify the Commission immediately if they fail to reach a unanimous decision within the timeframe laid down. Within six months of receipt of such notification, the Commission, as a last resort and after consulting ACER and the relevant stakeholders shall adopt a decision whether to amend or maintain the bidding zone configuration in and between those Member States.

6.   Six months before the expiry of the action plan, the Member State with identified structural congestion shall decide whether to address remaining congestion by amending its bidding zone or whether to address remaining internal congestion with remedial actions for which it shall cover the costs.

7.   Where no action plan is established within six months of identification of structural congestion pursuant to Article 14(7), the relevant transmission system operators shall, within 12 months of identification of such structural congestion, assess whether the available cross-border capacity has reached the minimum capacities provided for in Article 16(8) during the previous 12 months and shall submit an assessment report to the relevant regulatory authorities and to ACER.

Before drafting the report, each transmission system operator shall send its contribution to the report, including all relevant data, to its national regulatory authority for approval. Where the assessment demonstrates that a transmission system operator has not complied with the minimum capacity, the decision-making process laid down in paragraph 5 of this Article shall apply.

1.   Network congestion problems shall be addressed with non-discriminatory market-based solutions which give efficient economic signals to the market participants and transmission system operators involved. Network congestion problems shall be solved by means of non-transaction-based methods, namely methods that do not involve a selection between the contracts of individual market participants. When taking operational measures to ensure that its transmission system remains in the normal state, the transmission system operator shall take into account the effect of those measures on neighbouring control areas and coordinate such measures with other affected transmission system operators as provided for in Regulation (EU) 2015/1222.

2.   Transaction curtailment procedures shall be used only in emergency situations, namely where the transmission system operator must act in an expeditious manner and redispatching or countertrading is not possible. Any such procedure shall be applied in a non-discriminatory manner. Except in cases of force majeure, market participants that have been allocated capacity shall be compensated for any such curtailment.

3.   Regional coordination centres shall carry out coordinated capacity calculation in accordance with paragraphs 4 and 8 of this Article, as provided for in point (a) of Article 37(1) and in Article 42(1).

Regional coordination centres shall calculate cross-zonal capacities respecting operational security limits using data from transmission system operators including data on the technical availability of remedial actions, not including load shedding. Where regional coordination centres conclude that those available remedial actions in the capacity calculation region or between capacity calculation regions are not sufficient to reach the linear trajectory pursuant to Article 15(2) or the minimum capacities provided for in paragraph 8 of this Article while respecting operational security limits, they may, as a measure of last resort, set out coordinated actions reducing the cross-zonal capacities accordingly. Transmission system operators may deviate from coordinated actions in respect of coordinated capacity calculation and coordinated security analysis only in accordance with Article 42(2).

By 3 months after the entry into operation of the regional coordination centres pursuant to Article 35(2) of this Regulation and every three months thereafter, the regional coordination centres shall submit a report to the relevant regulatory authorities and to ACER on any reduction of capacity or deviation from coordinated actions pursuant to the second subparagraph and shall assess the incidences and make recommendations, if necessary, on how to avoid such deviations in the future. If ACER concludes that the prerequisites for a deviation pursuant to this paragraph are not fulfilled or are of a structural nature, ACER shall submit an opinion to the relevant regulatory authorities and to the Commission. The competent regulatory authorities shall take appropriate action against transmission system operators or regional coordination centres pursuant to Article 59 or 62 of Directive (EU) 2019/944 if the prerequisites for a deviation pursuant to this paragraph were not fulfilled.

Deviations of a structural nature shall be addressed in an action plan referred to in Article 14(7) or in an update of an existing action plan.

4.   The maximum level of capacity of the interconnections and the transmission networks affected by cross-border capacity shall be made available to market participants complying with the safety standards of secure network operation. Counter-trading and redispatch, including cross-border redispatch, shall be used to maximise available capacities to reach the minimum capacity provided for in paragraph 8. A coordinated and non-discriminatory process for cross-border remedial actions shall be applied to enable such maximisation, following the implementation of a redispatching and counter-trading cost-sharing methodology.

5.   Capacity shall be allocated by means of explicit capacity auctions or implicit auctions including both capacity and energy. Both methods may coexist on the same interconnection. For intraday trade, continuous trading, which may be complemented by auctions, shall be used.

6.   In the case of congestion, the valid highest value bids for network capacity, whether implicit or explicit, offering the highest value for the scarce transmission capacity in a given timeframe, shall be successful. Other than in the case of new interconnectors which benefit from an exemption under Article 7 of Regulation (EC) No 1228/2003, Article 17 of Regulation (EC) No 714/2009 or Article 63 of this Regulation, establishing reserve prices in capacity-allocation methods shall be prohibited.

7.   Capacity shall be freely tradable on a secondary basis, provided that the transmission system operator is informed sufficiently in advance. Where a transmission system operator refuses any secondary trade (transaction), this shall be clearly and transparently communicated and explained to all the market participants by that transmission system operator and notified to the regulatory authority.

8.   Transmission system operators shall not limit the volume of interconnection capacity to be made available to market participants as a means of solving congestion inside their own bidding zone or as a means of managing flows resulting from transactions internal to bidding zones. Without prejudice to the application of the derogations under paragraphs 3 and 9 of this Article and to the application of Article 15(2), this paragraph shall be considered to be complied with where the following minimum levels of available capacity for cross-zonal trade are reached:

The total amount of 30 % can be used for the reliability margins, loop flows and internal flows on each critical network element.

9.   At the request of the transmission system operators in a capacity calculation region, the relevant regulatory authorities may grant a derogation from paragraph 8 on foreseeable grounds where necessary for maintaining operational security. Such derogations, which shall not relate to the curtailment of capacities already allocated pursuant to paragraph 2, shall be granted for no more than one-year at a time, or, provided that the extent of the derogation decreases significantly after the first year, up to a maximum of two years. The extent of such derogations shall be strictly limited to what is necessary to maintain operational security and they shall avoid discrimination between internal and cross-zonal exchanges.

Before granting a derogation, the relevant regulatory authority shall consult the regulatory authorities of other Member States forming part of the affected capacity calculation regions. Where a regulatory authority disagrees with the proposed derogation, ACER shall decide whether it should be granted pursuant to point (a) of Article 6(10) of Regulation (EU) 2019/942. The justification and reasons for the derogation shall be published.

Where a derogation is granted, the relevant transmission system operators shall develop and publish a methodology and projects that shall provide a long-term solution to the issue that the derogation seeks to address. The derogation shall expire when the time limit for the derogation is reached or when the solution is applied, whichever is earlier.

10.   Market participants shall inform the transmission system operators concerned within a reasonable period in advance of the relevant operational period whether they intend to use allocated capacity. Any allocated capacity that is not going to be used shall be made available again to the market, in an open, transparent and non-discriminatory manner.

11.   As far as technically possible, transmission system operators shall net the capacity requirements of any power flows in opposite directions over the congested interconnection line in order to use that line to its maximum capacity. Having full regard to network security, transactions that relieve the congestion shall not be refused.

12.   The financial consequences of a failure to honour obligations associated with the allocation of capacity shall be attributed to the transmission system operators or NEMOs who are responsible for such a failure. Where market participants fail to use the capacity that they have committed to use, or, in the case of explicitly auctioned capacity, fail to trade capacity on a secondary basis or give the capacity back in due time, those market participants shall lose the rights to such capacity and shall pay a cost-reflective charge. Any cost-reflective charges for the failure to use capacity shall be justified and proportionate. If a transmission system operator does not fulfil its obligation of providing firm transmission capacity, it shall be liable to compensate the market participant for the loss of capacity rights. Consequential losses shall not be taken into account for that purpose. The key concepts and methods for the determination of liabilities that accrue upon failure to honour obligations shall be set out in advance in respect of the financial consequences, and shall be subject to review by the relevant regulatory authority.

13.   When allocating costs of remedial actions between transmission system operators, regulatory authorities shall analyse to what extent flows resulting from transactions internal to bidding zones contribute to the congestion between two bidding zones observed, and allocate the costs based on the contribution to the congestion to the transmission system operators of the bidding zones creating such flows except for costs induced by flows resulting from transactions internal to bidding zones that are below the level that could be expected without structural congestion in a bidding zone.

That level shall be jointly analysed and defined by all transmission system operators in a capacity calculation region for each individual bidding zone border, and shall be subject to the approval of all regulatory authorities in the capacity calculation region.

1.   Transmission system operators shall recalculate available cross-zonal capacity at least after day-ahead gate closure times and after intraday cross-zonal gate closure times. Transmission system operators shall allocate the available cross-zonal capacity plus any remaining cross-zonal capacity not previously allocated and any cross-zonal capacity released by physical transmission right holders from previous allocations in the following cross-zonal capacity allocation process.

2.   Transmission system operators shall propose an appropriate structure for the allocation of cross-zonal capacity across timeframes, including day-ahead, intraday and balancing. That allocation structure shall be subject to review by the relevant regulatory authorities. In drawing up their proposal, the transmission system operators shall take into account:

3.   Where cross-zonal capacity is available after the intraday cross-zonal gate closure time, transmission system operators shall use the cross-zonal capacity for the exchange of balancing energy or for the operation of the imbalance netting process.

4.   Where cross-zonal capacity is allocated for the exchange of balancing capacity or sharing of reserves pursuant to Article 6(8) of this Regulation, transmission system operators shall use the methodologies developed in the guideline on electricity balancing adopted on the basis of Article 6(11) of Regulation (EC) No 714/2009.

5.   Transmission system operators shall not increase the reliability margin calculated pursuant to Regulation (EU) 2015/1222 due to the exchange of balancing capacity or sharing of reserves.

1.   Charges applied by network operators for access to networks, including charges for connection to the networks, charges for use of networks, and, where applicable, charges for related network reinforcements, shall be cost-reflective, transparent, take into account the need for network security and flexibility and reflect actual costs incurred insofar as they correspond to those of an efficient and structurally comparable network operator and are applied in a non-discriminatory manner. Those charges shall not include unrelated costs supporting unrelated policy objectives.

Without prejudice to Article 15(1) and (6) of Directive 2012/27/EU and the criteria in Annex XI to that Directive the method used to determine the network charges shall neutrally support overall system efficiency over the long run through price signals to customers and producers and in particular be applied in a way which does not discriminate positively or negatively between production connected at the distribution level and production connected at the transmission level. The network charges shall not discriminate either positively or negatively against energy storage or aggregation and shall not create disincentives for self-generation, self-consumption or for participation in demand response. Without prejudice to paragraph 3 of this Article, those charges shall not be distance-related.

2.   Tariff methodologies shall reflect the fixed costs of transmission system operators and distribution system operators and shall provide appropriate incentives to transmission system operators and distribution system operators over both the short and long run, in order to increase efficiencies, including energy efficiency, to foster market integration and security of supply, to support efficient investments, to support related research activities, and to facilitate innovation in interest of consumers in areas such as digitalisation, flexibility services and interconnection.

3.   Where appropriate, the level of the tariffs applied to producers or final customers, or both shall provide locational signals at Union level, and take into account the amount of network losses and congestion caused, and investment costs for infrastructure.

4.   When setting the charges for network access, the following shall be taken into account:

5.   Setting the charges for network access under this Article shall be without prejudice to charges resulting from congestion management referred to in Article 16.

6.   There shall be no specific network charge on individual transactions for cross-zonal trading of electricity.

7.   Distribution tariffs shall be cost-reflective taking into account the use of the distribution network by system users including active customers. Distribution tariffs may contain network connection capacity elements and may be differentiated based on system users' consumption or generation profiles. Where Member States have implemented the deployment of smart metering systems, regulatory authorities shall consider time-differentiated network tariffs when fixing or approving transmission tariffs and distribution tariffs or their methodologies in accordance with Article 59 of (EU) 2019/944 and, where appropriate, time-differentiated network tariffs may be introduced to reflect the use of the network, in a transparent, cost efficient and foreseeable way for the final customer.

8.   Distribution tariff methodologies shall provide incentives to distribution system operators for the most cost-efficient operation and development of their networks including through the procurement of services. For that purpose regulatory authorities shall recognise relevant costs as eligible, shall include those costs in distribution tariffs, and may introduce performance targets in order to provide incentives to distribution system operators to increase efficiencies in their networks, including through energy efficiency, flexibility and the development of smart grids and intelligent metering systems.

9.   By 5 October 2019 in order to mitigate the risk of market fragmentation ACER shall provide a best practice report on transmission and distribution tariff methodologies while taking account of national specificities. That best practice report shall address at least:

ACER shall update the best practice report at least once every two years.

10.   Regulatory authorities shall duly take the best practice report into consideration when fixing or approving transmission tariffs and distribution tariffs or their methodologies in accordance with Article 59 of Directive (EU) 2019/944.

1.   Congestion-management procedures associated with a pre-specified timeframe may generate revenue only in the event of congestion which arises for that timeframe, except in the case of new interconnectors which benefit from an exemption under Article 63 of this Regulation, Article 17 of Regulation (EC) No 714/2009 or Article 7 of Regulation (EC) No 1228/2003. The procedure for the distribution of those revenues shall be subject to review by the regulatory authorities and shall neither distort the allocation process in favour of any party requesting capacity or energy nor provide a disincentive to reduce congestion.

2.   The following objectives shall have priority with the respect to the allocation of any revenues resulting from the allocation of cross-zonal capacity:

3.   Where the priority objectives set out in paragraph 2 have been adequately fulfilled, the revenues may be used as income to be taken into account by the regulatory authorities when approving the methodology for calculating network tariffs or fixing network tariffs, or both. The residual revenues shall be placed on a separate internal account line until such a time as it can be spent for the purposes set out in paragraph 2.

4.   The use of revenues in accordance with point (a) or (b) of paragraph 2 shall be subject to a methodology proposed by the transmission system operators after consulting regulatory authorities and relevant stakeholders and after approval by ACER. The transmission system operators shall submit the proposed methodology to ACER by 5 July 2020 and ACER shall decide on the proposed methodology within six months of receiving it.

ACER may request transmission system operators to amend or update the methodology referred to in the first subparagraph. ACER shall decide on the amended or updated methodology not later than six months after its submission.

The methodology shall set out at least the conditions under which the revenues can be used for the purposes referred to in paragraph 2, the conditions under which those revenues may be placed on a separate internal account line for future use for those purposes, and for how long those revenues may be placed on such an account line.

5.   Transmission system operators shall clearly establish, in advance, how any congestion income will be used, and shall report to the regulatory authorities on the actual use of that income. By 1 March each year, the regulatory authorities shall inform ACER and shall publish a report setting out:

Where some of the congestion revenues are used when calculating network tariffs, the report shall set out how the transmission system operators fulfilled the priority objectives set out in paragraph 2 where applicable.

1.   Member States shall monitor resource adequacy within their territory on the basis of the European resource adequacy assessment referred to in Article 23. For the purpose of complementing the European resource adequacy assessment, Member States may also carry out national resource adequacy assessments pursuant to Article 24.

2.   Where the European resource adequacy assessment referred to in Article 23 or national resource adequacy assessment referred to in Article 24 identifies a resource adequacy concern, the Member State concerned shall identify any regulatory distortions or market failures that caused or contributed to the emergence of the concern.

3.   Member States with identified resource adequacy concerns shall develop and publish an implementation plan with a timeline for adopting measures to eliminate any identified regulatory distortions or market failures as a part of the State aid process. When addressing resource adequacy concerns, the Member States shall in particular take into account the principles set out in Article 3 and shall consider:

4.   The Member States concerned shall submit their implementation plans to the Commission for review.

5.   Within four months of receipt of the implementation plan, the Commission shall issue an opinion on whether the measures are sufficient to eliminate the regulatory distortions or market failures that were identified pursuant to paragraph 2, and may invite the Member States to amend their implementation plans accordingly.

6.   The Member States concerned shall monitor the application of their implementation plans and shall publish the results of the monitoring in an annual report and shall submit that report to the Commission.

7.   The Commission shall issue an opinion on whether the implementation plans have been sufficiently implemented and whether the resource adequacy concern has been resolved.

8.   Member States shall continue to adhere to the implementation plan after the identified resource adequacy concern has been resolved.

1.   To eliminate residual resource adequacy concerns, Member States may, as a last resort while implementing the measures referred to in Article 20(3) of this Regulation in accordance with Article 107, 108 and 109 of the TFEU, introduce capacity mechanisms.

2.   Before introducing capacity mechanisms, the Member States concerned shall conduct a comprehensive study of the possible effects of such mechanisms on the neighbouring Member States by consulting at least its neighbouring Member States to which they have a direct network connection and the stakeholders of those Member States.

3.   Member States shall assess whether a capacity mechanism in the form of strategic reserve is capable of addressing the resource adequacy concerns. Where this is not the case, Member States may implement a different type of capacity mechanism.

4.   Member States shall not introduce capacity mechanisms where both the European resource adequacy assessment and the national resource adequacy assessment, or in the absence of a national resource adequacy assessment, the European resource adequacy assessment have not identified a resource adequacy concern.

5.   Member States shall not introduce capacity mechanisms before the implementation plan as referred to in Article 20(3) has received an opinion by the Commission as referred to in Article 20(5).

6.   Where a Member State applies a capacity mechanism, it shall review that capacity mechanism and shall ensure that no new contracts are concluded under that mechanism where both the European resource adequacy assessment and the national resource adequacy assessment, or in the absence of a national resource adequacy assessment, the European resource adequacy assessment have not identified a resource adequacy concern or the implementation plan as referred to in Article 20(3) has not received an opinion by the Commission as referred to in Article 20(5).

7.   When designing capacity mechanisms Member States shall include a provision allowing for an efficient administrative phase-out of the capacity mechanism where no new contracts are concluded under paragraph 6 during three consecutive years.

8.   Capacity mechanisms shall be temporary. They shall be approved by the Commission for no longer than 10 years. They shall be phased out or the amount of the committed capacities shall be reduced on the basis of the implementation plans referred to in Article 20. Member States shall continue to apply the implementation plan after the introduction of the capacity mechanism.

1.   Any capacity mechanism shall:

2.   The design of strategic reserves shall meet the following requirements:

The requirement referred to in point (a) of the first subparagraph shall be without prejudice to the activation of resources before actual dispatch in order to respect the ramping constraints and operating requirements of the resources. The output of the strategic reserve during activation shall not be attributed to balance groups through wholesale markets and shall not change their imbalances.

3.   In addition to the requirements laid down in paragraph 1, capacity mechanisms other than strategic reserves shall:

4.   Capacity mechanisms shall incorporate the following requirements regarding CO2 emission limits:

The emission limit of 550 g CO2 of fossil fuel origin per kWh of electricity and the limit of 350 kg CO2 of fossil fuel origin on average per year per installed kWe referred to in points (a) and (b) of the first subparagraph shall be calculated on the basis of the design efficiency of the generation unit meaning the net efficiency at nominal capacity under the relevant standards provided for by the International Organization for Standardization.

By 5 January 2020, ACER shall publish an opinion providing technical guidance related to the calculation of the values referred in the first subparagraph.

5.   Member States that apply capacity mechanisms on 4 July 2019 shall adapt their mechanisms to comply with Chapter 4 without prejudice to commitments or contracts concluded by 31 December 2019.

1.   The European resource adequacy assessment shall identify resource adequacy concerns by assessing the overall adequacy of the electricity system to supply current and projected demands for electricity at Union level, at the level of the Member States, and at the level of individual bidding zones, where relevant. The European resource adequacy assessment shall cover each year within a period of 10 years from the date of that assessment.

2.   The European resource adequacy assessment shall be conducted by the ENTSO for Electricity.

3.   By 5 January 2020, the ENTSO for Electricity shall submit to the Electricity Coordination Group set up under Article 1 of Commission Decision of 15 November 2012 (21) and ACER a draft methodology for the European resource adequacy assessment based on the principles provided for in paragraph 5 of this Article.

4.   Transmission system operators shall provide the ENTSO for Electricity with the data it needs to carry out the European resource adequacy assessment.

The ENTSO for Electricity shall carry out the European resource adequacy assessment on an annual basis. Producers and other market participants shall provide transmission system operators with data regarding expected utilisation of the generation resources, taking into account the availability of primary resources and appropriate scenarios of projected demand and supply.

5.   The European resource adequacy assessment shall be based on a transparent methodology which shall ensure that the assessment:

6.   By 5 January 2020, the ENTSO for Electricity shall submit to ACER a draft methodology for calculating:

The methodology shall be based on transparent, objective and verifiable criteria.

7.   The proposals under paragraphs 3 and 6 for the draft methodology, the scenarios, sensitivities and assumptions on which they are based, and the results of the European resource adequacy assessment under paragraph 4 shall be subject to the prior consultation of Member States, the Electricity Coordination Group and relevant stakeholders and approval by ACER under the procedure set out in Article 27.

1.   National resource adequacy assessments shall have a regional scope and shall be based on the methodology referred in Article 23(3) in particular in points (b) to (m) of Article 23(5).

National resource adequacy assessments shall contain the reference central scenarios as referred to in point (b) of Article 23(5).

National resource adequacy assessments may take into account additional sensitivities to those referred in point (b) of Article 23(5). In such cases, national resource adequacy assessments may:

In addition, the national resource adequacy assessments, in assessing the contribution of capacity providers located in another Member State to the security of supply of the bidding zones that they cover, shall use the methodology as provided for in point (a) of Article 26(11).

2.   National resource adequacy assessments and, where applicable, the European resource adequacy assessment and the opinion of ACER pursuant to paragraph 3 shall be made publicly available.

3.   Where the national resource adequacy assessment identifies an adequacy concern with regard to a bidding zone that was not identified in the European resource adequacy assessment, the national resource adequacy assessment shall include the reasons for the divergence between the two resource adequacy assessments, including details of the sensitivities used and the underlying assumptions. Member States shall publish that assessment and submit it to ACER.

Within two months of the date of the receipt of the report, ACER shall provide an opinion on whether the differences between the national resource adequacy assessment and the European resource adequacy assessment are justified.

The body that is responsible for the national resource adequacy assessment shall take due account of ACER's opinion, and where necessary shall amend its assessment. Where it decides not to take ACER's opinion fully into account, the body that is responsible for the national resource adequacy assessment shall publish a report with detailed reasons.

1.   When applying capacity mechanisms Member States shall have a reliability standard in place. A reliability standard shall indicate the necessary level of security of supply of the Member State in a transparent manner. In the case of cross-border bidding zones, such reliability standards shall be established jointly by the relevant authorities.

2.   The reliability standard shall be set by the Member State or by a competent authority designated by the Member State, following a proposal by the regulatory authority. The reliability standard shall be based on the methodology set out in Article 23(6).

3.   The reliability standard shall be calculated using at least the value of lost load and the cost of new entry over a given timeframe and shall be expressed as ‘expected energy not served’ and ‘loss of load expectation’.

4.   When applying capacity mechanisms, the parameters determining the amount of capacity procured in the capacity mechanism shall be approved by the Member State or by a competent authority designated by the Member State, on the basis of a proposal of the regulatory authority.

1.   Capacity mechanisms other than strategic reserves and where technically feasible, strategic reserves shall be open to direct cross-border participation of capacity providers located in another Member State, subject to the conditions laid down in this Article.

2.   Member States shall ensure that foreign capacity capable of providing equivalent technical performance to domestic capacities has the opportunity to participate in the same competitive process as domestic capacity. In the case of capacity mechanisms in operation on 4 July 2019, Member States may allow interconnectors to participate directly in the same competitive process as foreign capacity for a maximum of four years from 4 July 2019 or two years after the date of approval of the methodologies referred to in paragraph 11, whichever is earlier.

Member States may require foreign capacity to be located in a Member State that has a direct network connection with the Member State applying the mechanism.

3.   Member States shall not prevent capacity which is located in their territory from participating in capacity mechanisms of other Member States.

4.   Cross-border participation in capacity mechanisms shall not change, alter or otherwise affect cross-zonal schedules or physical flows between Member States. Those schedules and flows shall be determined solely by the outcome of capacity allocation pursuant to Article 16.

5.   Capacity providers shall be able to participate in more than one capacity mechanism.

Where capacity providers participate in more than one capacity mechanism for the same delivery period, they shall participate up to the expected availability of interconnection and the likely concurrence of system stress between the system where the mechanism is applied and the system in which the foreign capacity is located, in accordance with the methodology referred to in point (a) of paragraph 11.

6.   Capacity providers shall be required to make non-availability payments where their capacity is not available.

Where capacity providers participate in more than one capacity mechanism for the same delivery period, they shall be required to make multiple non-availability payments where they are unable to fulfil multiple commitments.

7.   For the purposes of providing a recommendation to transmission system operators, regional coordination centres established pursuant to Article 35 shall calculate on an annual basis the maximum entry capacity available for the participation of foreign capacity. That calculation shall take into account the expected availability of interconnection and the likely concurrence of system stress in the system where the mechanism is applied and the system in which the foreign capacity is located. Such a calculation shall be required for each bidding zone border.

Transmission system operators shall set the maximum entry capacity available for the participation of foreign capacity based on the recommendation of the regional coordination centre on an annual basis.

8.   Member States shall ensure that the entry capacity referred to in paragraph 7 is allocated to eligible capacity providers in a transparent, non-discriminatory and market-based manner.

9.   Where capacity mechanisms allow for cross-border participation in two neighbouring Member States, any revenues arising through the allocation referred to in paragraph 8 shall accrue to the transmission system operators concerned and shall be shared between them in accordance with the methodology referred in point (b) of paragraph 11 of this Article or in accordance with a common methodology approved by both relevant regulatory authorities. If the neighbouring Member State does not apply a capacity mechanism or applies a capacity mechanism which is not open to cross-border participation, the share of revenues shall be approved by the competent national authority of the Member State in which the capacity mechanism is implemented after having sought the opinion of the regulatory authorities of the neighbouring Member States. Transmission system operators shall use such revenues for the purposes set out in Article 19(2).

10.   The transmission system operator where the foreign capacity is located shall:

The relevant capacity provider shall notify the transmission system operator of its participation in a foreign capacity mechanism without delay.

11.   By 5 July 2020 the ENTSO for Electricity shall submit to ACER:

The proposal shall be subject to prior consultation and approval by ACER in accordance with Article 27.

12.   The regulatory authorities concerned shall verify whether the capacities have been calculated in accordance with the methodology referred to in point (a) of paragraph 11.

13.   Regulatory authorities shall ensure that cross-border participation in capacity mechanisms is organised in an effective and non-discriminatory manner. They shall in particular provide for adequate administrative arrangements for the enforcement of non-availability payments across borders.

14.   The capacities allocated in accordance with paragraph 8 shall be transferable between eligible capacity providers. Eligible capacity providers shall notify the registry as referred to in point (a) of paragraph 10 of any such transfer.

15.   By 5 July 2021 the ENTSO for Electricity shall set up and operate the registry referred to in point (a) of paragraph 10. The registry shall be open to all eligible capacity providers, the systems implementing capacity mechanisms and their transmission system operators.

1.   Where reference is made to this Article, the procedure set out in paragraphs 2, 3 and 4 shall apply to the approval of proposals submitted by the ENTSO for Electricity.

2.   Before submitting a proposal, the ENTSO for Electricity shall carry out a consultation involving all relevant stakeholders, including regulatory authorities and other national authorities. It shall duly take the results of that consultation into consideration in its proposal.

3.   Within three months of the date of receipt of the proposal referred to in paragraph 1, ACER shall either approve or amend it. In the latter case, ACER shall consult the ENTSO for Electricity before approving the amended proposal. ACER shall publish the approved proposal on its website within three months of the date of receipt of the proposed documents.

4.   ACER may request changes to the approved proposal at any time. Within six months of the date of receipt of such a request, the ENTSO for Electricity shall submit a draft of the proposed changes to ACER. Within three months of the date of receipt of the draft, ACER shall amend or approve the changes and publish those changes on its website.

1.   Transmission system operators shall cooperate at Union level through the ENTSO for Electricity, in order to promote the completion and functioning of the internal market for electricity and cross-zonal trade and to ensure the optimal management, coordinated operation and sound technical evolution of the European electricity transmission network.

2.   In performing its functions under Union law, the ENTSO for Electricity shall act with a view to establishing a well-functioning and integrated internal market for electricity and shall contribute to the efficient and sustainable achievement of the objectives set out in the policy framework for climate and energy covering the period from 2020 to 2030, in particular by contributing to the efficient integration of electricity generated from renewable energy sources and to increases in energy efficiency while maintaining system security. The ENTSO for Electricity shall be equipped with adequate human and financial resources to carry out its duties.

1.   The transmission system operators for electricity shall submit to the Commission and to ACER any draft amendments to the statutes, list of members or rules of procedure of the ENTSO for Electricity.

2.   Within two months of receipt of the draft amendments to the statutes, list of members or rules of procedure, ACER, after consulting the organisations representing all stakeholders, in particular the system users, including customers, shall provide an opinion to the Commission on these draft amendments to the statutes, list of members or rules of procedure.

3.   The Commission shall deliver an opinion on the draft amendments to the statutes, list of members or rules of procedures taking into account ACER's opinion as provided for in paragraph 2 and within three months of receipt of ACER's opinion.

4.   Within three months of receipt of the Commission's favourable opinion, the transmission system operators shall adopt and publish the amended statutes or rules of procedure.

5.   The documents referred to in paragraph 1 shall be submitted to the Commission and to ACER where there are changes thereto or upon the reasoned request of either of them. The Commission and ACER shall deliver an opinion in accordance with paragraphs 2, 3 and 4.

1.   The ENTSO for Electricity shall: