23.12.2016   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

L 352/1

(1)

Directive 2012/34/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council (4) establishes a single European railway area with common rules on the governance of railway undertakings and infrastructure managers, on infrastructure financing and charging, on conditions of access to railway infrastructure and services and on regulatory oversight of the rail market. The completion of the single European railway area should be achieved by extending the principle of open access to domestic rail markets and reforming the governance of infrastructure managers with the objective of ensuring equal access to the infrastructure.

(2)

The growth of passenger traffic by rail has not kept pace with the evolution of other modes of transport. The completion of the single European railway area should contribute to the further development of rail transport as a credible alternative to other modes of transport. In this context, it is vital that the legislation establishing the single European railway area is effectively applied within the prescribed time limits.

(3)

The Union markets for rail freight services and international passenger transport services by rail have been opened to competition since 2007 and 2010 respectively, in accordance with Directive 2004/51/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council (5) and Directive 2007/58/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council (6). Furthermore, some Member States have also opened their domestic passenger services to competition, by introducing open access rights, tendering for public service contracts, or both. Such opening of the market should have a positive impact on the functioning of the single European railway area, leading to better services for users.

(4)

Specific exemptions from the scope of Directive 2012/34/EU should allow Member States to take into account specific characteristics of the structure and organisation of rail systems on their territory, while ensuring the integrity of the single European railway area.

(5)

The operation of railway infrastructure on a network includes control-command and signalling. So long as a line is in operation, the infrastructure manager should ensure in particular that the infrastructure is suitable for its designated use.

(6)

In order to establish whether an undertaking should be considered to be vertically integrated, the notion of control within the meaning of Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 (7) should be applied. Where an infrastructure manager and a railway undertaking are fully independent of one another, but both are controlled directly by the State without an intermediary entity, they should be considered to be separate. A government ministry exercising control over both a railway undertaking and an infrastructure manager should not be considered to be an intermediary entity.

(7)

This Directive introduces further requirements to ensure the independence of the infrastructure manager. Member States should be free to choose between different organisational models, ranging from full structural separation to vertical integration, subject to appropriate safeguards to ensure the impartiality of the infrastructure manager as regards the essential functions, traffic management and maintenance planning. Member States should ensure that, within the limits of the established charging and allocation frameworks, the infrastructure manager enjoys organisational and decision-making independence as regards the essential functions.

(8)

Safeguards should apply in vertically integrated undertakings to ensure that other legal entities within those undertakings do not have a decisive influence on appointments and dismissals of persons in charge of taking decisions on the essential functions. In this context, Member States should ensure that there are complaints procedures in place.

(9)

Member States should put in place a national framework for the assessment of conflict of interests. Within this framework, the regulatory body should take into account any personal financial, economic or professional interests which could improperly influence the impartiality of the infrastructure manager. Where an infrastructure manager and a railway undertaking are independent of one another the fact that they are directly controlled by the same Member State authority should not be considered to give rise to a conflict of interest within the meaning of this Directive.

(10)

Decision-making by infrastructure managers with respect to train path allocation and decision-making with respect to infrastructure charging are essential functions that are vital for ensuring equitable and non-discriminatory access to rail infrastructure. Stringent safeguards should be put in place to avoid any undue influence being brought to bear on decisions taken by the infrastructure manager relating to such functions. Those safeguards should be adapted to take into account the different governance structures of railway entities.

(11)

Appropriate measures should also be taken to ensure that the functions of traffic management and maintenance planning are exercised in an impartial manner to avoid any distortion of competition. Within this framework, infrastructure managers should ensure that railway undertakings have access to relevant information. In this context, where railway undertakings have been granted further access to the traffic management process by the infrastructure managers, such access should be granted on equal terms to all railway undertakings concerned.

(12)

Where the essential functions are performed by an independent charging and/or allocation body, the impartiality of the infrastructure manager as regards the functions of traffic management and maintenance should be ensured without the need for transferring these functions to an independent entity.

(13)

Regulatory bodies should have the power to monitor traffic management, renewal planning, as well as scheduled and unscheduled maintenance works, in order to ensure that they do not lead to discrimination.

(14)

Member States should, as a general rule, ensure that the infrastructure manager is responsible for the operation, maintenance and renewal on a network and is entrusted with the development of the railway infrastructure on that network. Where those functions are outsourced to different entities, the infrastructure manager should nevertheless retain supervisory power and bear ultimate responsibility for their exercise.

(15)

Infrastructure managers that are part of a vertically integrated undertaking may outsource within that undertaking functions other than the essential functions subject to the conditions set out in this Directive, provided that this does not give rise to a conflict of interest and that the confidentiality of commercially sensitive information is guaranteed. Essential functions should not be outsourced to any other entity of the vertically integrated undertaking, unless such entity exclusively performs essential functions.

(16)

Where appropriate, in particular for reasons of efficiency, including in cases of public-private partnerships, the functions of infrastructure management may be shared between different infrastructure managers. Infrastructure managers should each bear full responsibility for the functions they exercise.

(17)

Financial transfers between the infrastructure manager and railway undertakings, and in vertically integrated undertakings between the infrastructure manager and any other legal entity of the integrated undertaking, should be prevented, where they could lead to a distortion of competition on the market, in particular as a result of cross-subsidisation.

(18)

Infrastructure managers may use income from infrastructure network management activities that involve the use of public funds to finance their own business or to pay dividends to their investors, as a return on their investments in railway infrastructure. Such investors may include the State and any private shareholders, but may not include undertakings which are part of a vertically integrated undertaking and which exercise control over both a railway undertaking and that infrastructure manager. Dividends generated by activities that do not involve the use of public funds or revenues from charges for the use of railway infrastructure may also be used by undertakings which are part of a vertically integrated undertaking and which exercise control over both a railway undertaking and that infrastructure manager.

(19)

The principles of charging should not preclude the possibility that revenues from infrastructure charges transit through State accounts.

(20)

Where in a vertically integrated undertaking the infrastructure manager does not have distinct legal personality and the essential functions are externalised by assigning them to an independent charging and/or allocation body, the relevant provisions regarding financial transparency and the independence of the infrastructure manager should apply mutatis mutandis at the level of certain divisions within the undertaking.

(21)

In order to achieve efficient network management and an efficient use of infrastructure, better coordination between infrastructure managers and railway undertakings should be ensured through the use of appropriate coordination mechanisms.

(22)

With a view to facilitating the provision of efficient and effective rail services within the Union, a European Network of Infrastructure Managers should be established, building on existing platforms. For the purpose of participating in this network, Member States should be free to determine which body or bodies should be considered to be their main infrastructure managers.

(23)

Given the heterogeneity of networks in terms of their size and density and the variety in the organisational structures of national, local and regional authorities and their respective experiences with the process of market opening, Member States should be allowed sufficient flexibility to organise their rail networks in such a way that open access services and services under public service contracts can be performed, in order to ensure a high quality of services readily available to all passengers.

(24)

Granting Union railway undertakings the right of access to railway infrastructure in all Member States for the purpose of operating domestic passenger services might have implications for the organisation and financing of rail passenger services provided under a public service contract. Member States should have the option of limiting such right of access where it would compromise the economic equilibrium of those public service contracts based on a decision by the relevant regulatory body.

(25)

The right of railway undertakings to be granted access to the infrastructure does not affect the possibility for a competent authority to grant exclusive rights in accordance with Article 3 of Regulation (EC) No 1370/2007 of the European Parliament and of the Council (8) or to award a public service contract directly under the conditions established in Article 5 of that Regulation. The existence of such a public service contract should not entitle a Member State to limit the right of access of other railway undertakings to the railway infrastructure concerned for the provision of rail passenger services, unless such services would compromise the economic equilibrium of the public service contract.

(26)

Regulatory bodies should assess, on the basis of an objective economic analysis, whether the economic equilibrium of existing public service contracts would be compromised, following a request made by the interested parties.

(27)

The assessment process should take into account the need to provide all market players with sufficient legal certainty to develop their activities. The procedure should be as simple, as efficient and as transparent as possible as well as being coherent with the process for the allocation of infrastructure capacity.

(28)

Provided that non-discriminatory access is ensured, Member States may attach specific conditions to the right of access to the infrastructure in order to allow for the implementation of an integrated timetable scheme for domestic passenger services by rail.

(29)

The development of railway infrastructure and the improvement of the quality of rail passenger services are key priorities in the promotion of a sustainable transport and mobility system in Europe. In particular, the development of a high-speed rail network has the potential to create better and faster connections between Europe's economic and cultural centres. High-speed rail services link people and markets in a fast, reliable, environmentally friendly and cost-effective way and encourage a shift of passengers to rail. It is therefore of particular importance to encourage both public and private investment in high speed rail infrastructure, to create favourable conditions for a positive return on investment, and to maximise the economic and social benefits from such investments. It should remain possible for Member States to opt for different ways of promoting investment in high speed rail infrastructure and the use of high speed lines.

(30)

With a view to developing the market for high-speed passenger services, promoting optimal use of available infrastructure, and in order to encourage the competitiveness of high-speed passenger services resulting in beneficial effects for passengers, open access for high-speed passenger services should be limited only in specific circumstances and following an objective economic analysis by the regulatory body.

(31)

In order to enable passengers to access the data needed to plan journeys and to book tickets within the Union, common information and through-ticketing systems that have been developed by the market should be promoted. Given the importance of promoting seamless public transport systems, railway undertakings should be encouraged to work on the development of such systems, making multimodal, cross-border and door-to-door mobility options possible.

(32)

Through-ticketing systems should be interoperable and non-discriminatory. Railway undertakings should contribute to the development of such systems by making available in a non-discriminatory manner and in an interoperable format all relevant data necessary to plan journeys and book tickets. Member States should ensure that such systems do not discriminate between railway undertakings and that they respect the need to ensure the confidentiality of commercial information, the protection of personal data and compliance with competition rules. The Commission should monitor and report on the development of such systems and, where appropriate, submit legislative proposals.

(33)

Member States should ensure that the provision of railway services reflects requirements linked to the guarantee of adequate social protection, whilst ensuring smooth progress towards the completion of the single European railway area. In this context, obligations arising in accordance with national law from binding collective agreements or agreements concluded between social partners and relevant social standards should be respected. Those obligations should be without prejudice to Union legislation in the field of social and labour law. The Commission should actively support the work undertaken by the sectoral social dialogue on railways.

(34)

In the framework of the ongoing review of Directive 2007/59/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council (9), the Commission should assess whether new legislative acts on the certification of on-board railway staff are necessary.

(35)

Member States should be free to decide on the appropriate financing strategies to accelerate the deployment of the European Train Control System (ETCS), and in particular whether to apply differentiation of track access charges.

(36)

Infrastructure managers should cooperate concerning incidents or accidents with an impact on cross-border traffic with a view to sharing any relevant information enabling swift restoration of normal traffic.

(37)

With a view to achieving the objectives of the single European railway area, regulatory bodies should cooperate to ensure non-discriminatory access to rail infrastructure.

(38)

In particular, it is essential that regulatory bodies cooperate where matters concerning international rail services or bi-national rail infrastructure require decisions of two or more regulatory bodies, for the purpose of coordinating their decision-making, with a view to avoiding legal uncertainty and ensuring the efficiency of international rail services.

(39)

In the process of opening national rail markets to competition by granting access to the networks to every railway undertaking, Member States should have a sufficient transitional period to adapt their national law and organisational structures. As a consequence, Member States should be able to maintain their existing national rules on market access until the end of the transitional period.

(40)

In accordance with the Joint Political Declaration of 28 September 2011 of Member States and the Commission on explanatory documents (10), Member States have undertaken to accompany, in justified cases, the notification of their transposition measures with one or more documents explaining the relationship between the components of a Directive and the corresponding parts of national transposition instruments. With regard to this Directive, the legislator considers the transmission of such documents to be justified,

(1)

Article 2 is amended as follows:

(2)

Article 3 is amended as follows:

(3)

in Article 6, paragraph 2 is replaced by the following:

‘2.   For the purpose of this Article, Member States which apply Article 7a(3) shall require the undertaking to be organised in distinct divisions that do not have a distinct legal personality within a single undertaking.’;

(4)

Article 7 is replaced by the following:

‘Article 7

Independence of the infrastructure manager

1.   Member States shall ensure that the infrastructure manager is responsible for operation, maintenance and renewal on a network and is entrusted with the development of the railway infrastructure of that network in accordance with national law.

Member States shall ensure that none of the other legal entities within the vertically integrated undertaking has a decisive influence on the decisions taken by the infrastructure manager in relation to the essential functions.

Member States shall ensure that the members of the supervisory board and of the management board of the infrastructure manager and the managers directly reporting to them act in a non-discriminatory manner and that their impartiality is not affected by any conflict of interest.

2.   Member States shall ensure that the infrastructure manager is organised as an entity that is legally distinct from any railway undertaking and, in vertically integrated undertakings, from any other legal entities within the undertaking.

3.   Member States shall ensure that the same individuals cannot be concurrently appointed or employed:

4.   In vertically integrated undertakings, the members of the management board of the infrastructure manager and the persons in charge of taking decisions on the essential functions shall not receive any performance-based remuneration from any other legal entities within the vertically integrated undertaking, nor shall they receive any bonuses principally related to the financial performance of particular railway undertakings. They may however be offered incentives related to the overall performance of the railway system.

5.   Where information systems are common to different entities within a vertically integrated undertaking, access to sensitive information relating to essential functions shall be restricted to authorised staff of the infrastructure manager. Sensitive information shall not be passed on to other entities within a vertically integrated undertaking.

6.   The provisions of paragraph 1 of this Article shall be without prejudice to the decision-making rights of Member States as regards the development and funding of railway infrastructure and the competences of Member States as regards infrastructure financing and charging, as well as capacity allocation, as defined in Article 4(2), and Articles 8, 29 and 39.’;

(5)

the following Articles are inserted:

‘Article 7a

Independence of the essential functions

1.   Member States shall ensure that the infrastructure manager has organisational and decision-making independence within the limits set out in Article 4(2), and Articles 29 and 39, as regards the essential functions.

2.   For the application of paragraph 1, Member States shall ensure in particular that:

3.   Member States may decide that infrastructure charging and path allocation shall be performed by a charging body and/or by an allocation body that are independent in their legal form, organisation and decision-making from any railway undertaking. In such a case, Member States may decide not to apply the provisions of Article 7(2) and points (c) and (d) of Article 7(3).

Point (a) of Article 7(3) and Article 7(4) shall apply mutatis mutandis to the heads of divisions in charge of management of the infrastructure and provision of railway services.

4.   The provisions of this Directive referring to the essential functions of an infrastructure manager shall apply to the independent charging and/or allocation body.

Article 7b

Impartiality of the infrastructure manager in respect of traffic management and maintenance planning

1.   Member States shall ensure that the functions of traffic management and maintenance planning are exercised in a transparent and non-discriminatory manner and that the persons in charge of taking decisions in respect of those functions are not affected by any conflict of interest.

2.   As regards traffic management, Member States shall ensure that railway undertakings, in cases of disruption concerning them, have full and timely access to relevant information. Where the infrastructure manager grants further access to the traffic management process, it shall do so for the railway undertakings concerned in a transparent and non-discriminatory way.

3.   As regards the long-term planning of major maintenance and/or renewal of the railway infrastructure, the infrastructure manager shall consult applicants and, to the best possible extent, take into account the concerns expressed.

The scheduling of maintenance works shall be carried out by the infrastructure manager in a non-discriminatory way.

Article 7c

Outsourcing and sharing the infrastructure manager's functions

1.   Provided that no conflicts of interest arise and that the confidentiality of commercially sensitive information is guaranteed, the infrastructure manager may:

The infrastructure manager shall retain the supervisory power over, and bear ultimate responsibility for, the exercise of the functions described in Article 3(2). Any entity carrying out essential functions shall comply with Articles 7, 7a, 7b and 7d.

2.   By way of derogation from Article 7(1), infrastructure management functions may be performed by different infrastructure managers, including parties to public-private partnership arrangements provided that they all fulfil the requirements of Article 7(2) to (6) and Articles 7a, 7b and 7d and assume full responsibility for the exercise of the functions concerned.

3.   Where essential functions are not assigned to a power supply operator, it shall be exempted from the rules applicable to infrastructure managers, provided that compliance with the relevant provisions concerning development of the network, in particular Article 8, is ensured.

4.   Subject to supervision by the regulatory body or any other independent competent body determined by the Member States, an infrastructure manager may conclude cooperation agreements with one or more railway undertakings in a non-discriminatory way and with a view to delivering benefits to customers such as reduced costs or improved performance on the part of the network covered by the agreement.

That body shall monitor the execution of such agreements and may, where justified, advise that they should be terminated.

Article 7d

Financial transparency

1.   While respecting national procedures applicable in each Member State, income from infrastructure network management activities, including public funds, may be used by the infrastructure manager only to finance its own business, including the servicing of its loans. The infrastructure manager may also use such income to pay dividends to owners of the company, which may include any private shareholders, but excludes undertakings which are part of a vertically integrated undertaking and which exercise control over both a railway undertaking and that infrastructure manager.

2.   Infrastructure managers shall not grant loans to railway undertakings, either directly or indirectly.

3.   Railway undertakings shall not grant loans to infrastructure managers, either directly or indirectly.

4.   Loans between legal entities of a vertically integrated undertaking, shall only be granted, disbursed and serviced at market rates and conditions which reflect the individual risk profile of the entity concerned.

5.   Loans between legal entities of a vertically integrated undertaking granted before 24 December 2016 shall continue until their maturity, provided that they were contracted at market rates and that they are actually disbursed and serviced.

6.   Any services offered by other legal entities of a vertically integrated undertaking to the infrastructure manager shall be provided on the basis of contracts and be paid either at market prices or at prices which reflect the cost of production, plus a reasonable margin of profit.

7.   Debts attributed to the infrastructure manager shall be clearly separated from debts attributed to other legal entities within vertically integrated undertakings. Such debts shall be serviced separately. This does not prevent the final payment of debts being made via an undertaking which is part of a vertically integrated undertaking and which exercises control over both a railway undertaking and an infrastructure manager, or via another entity within the undertaking.

8.   The accounts of the infrastructure manager and of the other legal entities within a vertically integrated undertaking shall be kept in a way that ensures the fulfilment of this Article and allows for separate accounting and transparent financial circuits within the undertaking.

9.   Within vertically integrated undertakings, the infrastructure manager shall keep detailed records of any commercial and financial relations with the other legal entities within that undertaking.

10.   Where essential functions are performed by an independent charging and/or allocation body in accordance with Article 7a(3) and Member States are not applying Article 7(2), the provisions of this Article shall apply mutatis mutandis. References to infrastructure manager, railway undertaking and other legal entities of a vertically integrated undertaking in this Article shall be understood as referring to the respective divisions of the undertaking. Compliance with the requirements set out in this Article shall be demonstrated in the separate accounts of the respective divisions of the undertaking.

Article 7e

Coordination mechanisms

Member States shall ensure that appropriate coordination mechanisms are put in place to ensure coordination between their main infrastructure managers and all interested railway undertakings as well as applicants referred to in Article 8(3). Where relevant, representatives of users of the rail freight and passenger transport services, and national, local or regional authorities, shall be invited to participate. The regulatory body concerned may participate as an observer. The coordination shall concern inter alia:

The infrastructure manager shall draw up and publish guidelines for coordination, in consultation with interested parties. Coordination shall take place at least annually and the infrastructure manager shall publish on its website an overview of the activities undertaken pursuant to this article.

Coordination under this Article shall be without prejudice to the right of applicants to appeal to the regulatory body and the powers of the regulatory body as set out in Article 56.

Article 7f

European Network of Infrastructure Managers

1.   With the view to facilitating the provision of efficient and effective rail services within the Union, Member States shall ensure that their main infrastructure managers participate and cooperate in a network, that meets at regular intervals to:

For the purpose of point (d), the network shall identify common principles and practices for the monitoring and benchmarking of performance in a consistent manner.

Coordination under this paragraph shall be without prejudice to the right of applicants to appeal to the regulatory body and the powers of the regulatory body as set out in Article 56.

2.   The Commission shall be a member of the network. It shall support the work of the network and facilitate coordination.’;

(6)

Article 10 is amended as follows:

(7)

Article 11 is amended as follows:

(8)

the following Articles are inserted:

‘Article 11a

High-speed passenger services

1.   With a view to developing the market for high-speed passenger services, promoting optimal use of available infrastructure, and in order to encourage the competitiveness of high-speed passenger services resulting in beneficial effects for passengers, without prejudice to Article 11(5), the exercise of the right of access provided for in Article 10 as regards high speed passenger services may only be subject to the requirements established by the regulatory body in accordance with this Article.

2.   Where the regulatory body, following the analysis foreseen in Article 11(2), (3) and (4), determines that the intended high speed passenger service between a given place of departure and a given destination compromises the economic equilibrium of a public service contract that covers the same route or an alternative route, the regulatory body shall indicate possible changes to the service which would ensure that the conditions to grant the right of access provided for in Article 10(2) are met. Such changes may include a modification of the intended service.’;

‘Article 13a

Common information and through-ticketing schemes

1.   Without prejudice to Regulation (EC) No 1371/2007 of the European Parliament and of the Council (*2) and Directive 2010/40/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council (*3), Member States may require railway undertakings operating domestic passenger services to participate in a common information and integrated ticketing scheme for the supply of tickets, through-tickets and reservations or give the power to competent authorities to establish such a scheme. If such a scheme is established, Member States shall ensure that it does not create market distortion or discriminate between railway undertakings and that it is managed by a public or private legal entity or an association of all railway undertakings operating passenger services.

2.   The Commission shall monitor rail market developments concerning the introduction and use of common information and through-ticketing systems and shall assess the need for action at Union level, taking into account market initiatives. It shall in particular consider non-discriminatory access for rail passengers to data necessary to plan journeys and book tickets. By 31 December 2022, it shall present a report to the European Parliament and the Council on the availability of such common information and through-ticketing systems, to be accompanied, if appropriate, by legislative proposals.

3.   Member States shall require railway undertakings operating passenger services to put in place contingency plans and shall ensure that these contingency plans are properly coordinated to provide assistance to passengers, in the sense of Article 18 of Regulation (EC) No 1371/2007, in the event of a major disruption to services.

(*2)  Regulation (EC) No 1371/2007 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 October 2007 on rail passengers' rights and obligations (OJ L 315, 3.12.2007, p. 14)."

(*3)  Directive 2010/40/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 July 2010 on the framework for the deployment of Intelligent Transport Systems in the field of road transport and for interfaces with other modes of transport (OJ L 207, 6.8.2010, p. 1).’;"

(9)

in Article 19, the following point is added:

(10)

in Article 32, paragraph 4 is replaced by the following:

‘4.   The infrastructure charges for the use of railway corridors which are specified in Commission Regulation (EU) 2016/919 (*4) may be differentiated to give incentives to equip trains with the ETCS that is compliant with the version adopted by the Commission Decision 2008/386/EC (*5) and with successive versions. Such differentiation shall not result in any overall increase in revenue for the infrastructure manager.

Member States may decide that this differentiation of infrastructure charges does not apply to railway lines specified in Regulation (EU) 2016/919 on which only ETCS equipped trains run.

Member States may decide to extend this differentiation to railway lines not specified in Regulation (EU) 2016/919.

(*4)  Commission Regulation (EU) 2016/919 of 27 May 2016 on the technical specification for interoperability relating to the “control-command and signalling” subsystems of the rail system in the European Union (OJ L 158, 15.6.2016, p. 1)."

(*5)  Commission Decision 2008/386/EC of 23 April 2008 modifying Annex A to Decision 2006/679/EC concerning the technical specification for interoperability relating to the control-command and signalling subsystem of the trans-European conventional rail system and Annex A to Decision 2006/860/EC concerning the technical specification for interoperability relating to the control-command and signalling subsystem of the trans-European high-speed rail system (OJ L 136, 24.5.2008, p. 11).’;"

(11)

in Article 38, paragraph 4 is replaced by the following:

‘4.   Where an applicant intends to request infrastructure capacity with a view to operating a passenger service, in a Member State where the right of access to railway infrastructure is limited in accordance with Article 11, it shall inform the infrastructure managers and the regulatory bodies concerned no less than 18 months before the entry into force of the working timetable to which the request for capacity relates. In order to enable the regulatory bodies concerned to assess the potential economic impact on existing public service contracts, regulatory bodies shall ensure that any competent authority that has awarded a rail passenger service on that route defined in a public service contract, any other interested competent authority with the right to limit access under Article 11 and any railway undertaking performing the public service contract on the route of that passenger service is informed without undue delay and at the latest within 10 days.’;

(12)

in Article 53, in paragraph 3, the following subparagraph is added:

‘The regulatory body may require the infrastructure manager to make such information available to it, if it deems that this is necessary.’;

(13)

in Article 54, paragraph 1 is replaced by the following:

‘1.   In the event of disturbance to train movements caused by technical failure or accident, the infrastructure manager shall take all necessary steps to restore the situation to normal. To that end, it shall draw up a contingency plan listing the various bodies to be informed in the event of serious incidents or serious disturbances to train movements. In the event of a disturbance which has a potential impact on cross-border traffic, the infrastructure manager shall share any relevant information with other infrastructure managers the network and traffic of which may be affected by that disturbance. The infrastructure managers concerned shall cooperate to restore the cross-border traffic to normal.’;

(14)

Article 56 is amended as follows:

(15)

Article 57 is amended as follows:

(16)

in Article 63, paragraph 1 is replaced by the following:

‘1.   By 31 December 2024, the Commission shall evaluate the impact of this Directive on the rail sector and shall submit to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions a report on its implementation.

In particular, the report shall evaluate the development of high-speed rail services and assess the existence of discriminatory practices regarding access to high-speed lines. The Commission shall consider whether it is necessary to submit legislative proposals.

By the same date, the Commission shall assess whether discriminatory practices or other types of distortion of competition persist in relation to infrastructure managers which are part of a vertically integrated undertaking. The Commission shall, if appropriate, submit legislative proposals.’.

23.12.2016   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

L 352/18

(1)

Relations between the European Union (the ‘Union’) and the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan (‘Jordan’) are developing within the framework of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP). Jordan signed an Association Agreement (2) with the Union on 24 November 1997, which came into force on 1 May 2002. Under that agreement, the Union and Jordan gradually established a free trade area over a transitional period of 12 years. In addition, an agreement on further liberalisation of agricultural products (3) entered into force in 2007. In 2010, an Advanced Status partnership was agreed between the EU and Jordan that entails expanded areas of cooperation. A protocol on Dispute Settlement Mechanisms for trade between the EU and Jordan initialled in December 2009 entered into force on 1 July 2011. Bilateral political dialogue and economic cooperation have been further developed within the framework of the Association Agreement and the Single Support Framework adopted for 2014-2017.

(2)

Since 2011, Jordan has embarked on a number of political reforms to strengthen parliamentary democracy and the rule of law. A Constitutional Court and an Independent Election Commission have been set up and a number of major laws, including the Election Law and the Law on Political Parties as well as laws on decentralisation and municipalities, have been passed by the Jordanian Parliament.

(3)

The Jordanian economy has suffered significantly from the ongoing regional unrest, notably in neighbouring Iraq and Syria. Together with a weaker global environment, this regional unrest has taken a heavy toll on external receipts and has strained public finances. Tourism and foreign direct investment inflows have been negatively affected, trading routes blocked and the flow of natural gas from Egypt disrupted. In addition, the Jordanian economy has also been impacted by a large inflow of Syrian refugees, which has increased pressure on its fiscal position, public services and infrastructure.

(4)

Since the outbreak of the conflicts in Syria in 2011, the Union has expressed its unequivocal commitment to supporting Jordan as it addresses the economic and social consequences of the Syrian crisis, and in particular of the presence of a large number of Syrian refugees in its territory. It has increased its financial support to Jordan, strengthening its cooperation in many fields, including the civil society, the electoral system, security, regional development and social and economic reforms. In addition, the Union has offered the possibility to Jordan of concluding a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area agreement.

(5)

In this difficult economic and financial context, the Jordanian authorities and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) agreed in August 2012 on a first economic adjustment programme, which was supported by a 3-year Stand-By Arrangement (SBA) in the amount of USD 2 000 million. That programme was successfully completed in August 2015. Under that programme, Jordan made considerable progress with fiscal consolidation, also helped by the decline in oil prices, and with a number of structural reforms.

(6)

In December 2012, Jordan requested complementary macro-financial assistance from the Union. In response, a decision providing macro-financial assistance of EUR 180 million in the form of loans was adopted in December 2013 (4) (MFA-I). The Memorandum of Understanding defining the policy conditions related to this first macro-financial assistance entered into force on 18 March 2014. Following the implementation of the agreed policy measures, the first tranche of MFA-I was disbursed on 10 February 2015 and the second tranche was disbursed on 15 October 2015.

(7)

Since the outbreak of the Syrian crisis, the Union has allocated almost EUR 1 130 million to Jordan. This includes, in addition to the EUR 180 million from the first macro-financial assistance operation, EUR 500 million in regular programmed bilateral cooperation for Jordan financed under the European Neighbourhood Instrument, about EUR 250 million from the humanitarian budget and more than EUR 30 million from the Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace. Moreover, the European Investment Bank has made loans in the amount of EUR 264 million available since 2011.

(8)

The intensification of the Syrian crisis in 2015 severely affected Jordan through its effects on trade, tourism and investor confidence. Jordan was also affected by a decline in financial support from the Gulf Cooperation Council countries, affected by the decline in oil prices. As a result, economic growth has slowed down again, unemployment has increased and new fiscal and external financing needs have emerged.

(9)

In this challenging context, the Union has reaffirmed its commitment to supporting Jordan in its economic and social challenges and reform process. In particular, this commitment was expressed at the conference ‘Supporting Syria and the Region’, held in London on 4 February 2016, where the Union pledged EUR 2 390 million in 2016-2017 in financial support for the countries most affected by the refugee crisis, including Jordan. Political and economic support from the Union to Jordan's reform process is consistent with the Union's policy towards the Southern Mediterranean region, as set out in the context of the ENP.

(10)

Following the deterioration in Jordan's economic and financial situation, the IMF and Jordan have also started discussions on a successor arrangement, which could take the form of an Extended Fund Facility (‘IMF programme’) and would likely cover a period of 3 years, starting in the second semester of 2016. The new IMF programme would aim to alleviate Jordan's short-term balance of payment difficulties while encouraging the implementation of strong adjustment measures.

(11)

In March 2016, in view of the worsening economic situation and outlook, Jordan requested additional macro-financial assistance from the Union.

(12)

Given that Jordan is a country covered by the ENP, it should be considered to be eligible to receive macro-financial assistance from the Union.

(13)

The Union's macro-financial assistance should be an exceptional financial instrument of untied and undesignated balance-of-payments support, which aims to address the beneficiary's immediate external financing needs and should underpin the implementation of a policy programme containing strong immediate adjustment and structural reform measures designed to improve the balance-of-payments position in the short term.

(14)

Given that there is still a significant residual external financing gap in Jordan's balance of payments over and above the resources provided by the IMF and other multilateral institutions, the Union's macro-financial assistance to be provided to Jordan is, under the current exceptional circumstances, considered to be an appropriate response to Jordan's request to support economic stabilisation, in conjunction with the IMF programme. The Union's macro-financial assistance would support the economic stabilisation and the structural reform agenda of Jordan, supplementing resources made available under the IMF's financial arrangement.

(15)

The Union's macro-financial assistance should aim to support the restoration of a sustainable external financing situation for Jordan, thereby supporting its economic and social development.

(16)

The determination of the amount of the Union's macro-financial assistance is based on a complete quantitative assessment of Jordan's residual external financing needs, and takes into account its capacity to finance itself with its own resources, in particular the international reserves at its disposal. The Union's macro-financial assistance should complement the programmes and resources provided by the IMF and the World Bank. The determination of the amount of the assistance also takes into account expected financial contributions from multilateral donors and the need to ensure fair burden sharing between the Union and other donors, as well as the pre-existing deployment of the Union's other external financing instruments in Jordan and the added value of the overall Union involvement.

(17)

The Commission should ensure that the Union's macro-financial assistance is legally and substantially in line with the key principles and objectives of the different areas of external action, with the measures taken in respect of those areas, and with other relevant Union policies.

(18)

The Union's macro-financial assistance should support the Union's external policy towards Jordan. Commission services and the European External Action Service should work closely together throughout the macro-financial assistance operation in order to coordinate, and to ensure the consistency of, Union external policy.

(19)

The Union's macro-financial assistance should support Jordan's commitment to values shared with the Union, including democracy, the rule of law, good governance, respect for human rights, sustainable development and poverty reduction, as well as its commitment to the principles of open, rule-based and fair trade.

(20)

A pre-condition for granting the Union's macro-financial assistance should be that Jordan respects effective democratic mechanisms, including a multi-party parliamentary system, and the rule of law, and guarantees respect for human rights. In addition, the specific objectives of the Union's macro-financial assistance should strengthen the efficiency, transparency and accountability of the public finance management systems in Jordan and should promote structural reforms aimed at supporting sustainable and inclusive growth, employment creation and fiscal consolidation. Both the fulfilment of the preconditions and the achievement of those objectives should be regularly monitored by the Commission and the European External Action Service.

(21)

In order to ensure that the Union's financial interests linked to the Union's macro-financial assistance are protected efficiently, Jordan should take appropriate measures relating to the prevention of, and fight against, fraud, corruption and any other irregularities linked to the assistance. In addition, provision should be made for the Commission to carry out checks and for the Court of Auditors to carry out audits.

(22)

Release of the Union's macro-financial assistance is without prejudice to the powers of the European Parliament and of the Council, as budgetary authority.

(23)

The amounts of provisioning required for macro-financial assistance should be consistent with the budgetary appropriations provided for in the multi-annual financial framework.

(24)

The Union's macro-financial assistance should be managed by the Commission. In order to ensure that the European Parliament and the Council are able to follow the implementation of this Decision, the Commission should regularly inform them of developments relating to the assistance and provide them with relevant documents.

(25)

In order to ensure uniform conditions for the implementation of this Decision, implementing powers should be conferred on the Commission. Those powers should be exercised in accordance with Regulation (EU) No 182/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council (5).

(26)

The Union's macro-financial assistance should be subject to economic policy conditions, to be laid down in a Memorandum of Understanding. In order to ensure uniform conditions of implementation and for reasons of efficiency, the Commission should be empowered to negotiate such conditions with the Jordanian authorities under the supervision of the committee of representatives of the Member States in accordance with Regulation (EU) No 182/2011. Under that Regulation, the advisory procedure should, as a general rule, apply in all cases other than as provided for in that Regulation. Considering the potentially important impact of assistance of more than EUR 90 million, it is appropriate that the examination procedure be used for operations above that threshold. Considering the amount of the Union's macro-financial assistance to Jordan, the examination procedure should apply to the adoption of the Memorandum of Understanding, and to any reduction, suspension or cancellation of the assistance,

(a)

the pre-condition set out in Article 2;

(b)

a continuous satisfactory track record of implementing a policy programme that contains strong adjustment and structural reform measures supported by a non-precautionary IMF credit arrangement; and

(c)

the satisfactory implementation of the economic policy and financial conditions agreed in the Memorandum of Understanding.

(a)

ensuring that Jordan regularly checks that financing provided from the budget of the Union has been properly used, takes appropriate measures to prevent irregularities and fraud, and, if necessary, takes legal action to recover any funds provided under this Decision that have been misappropriated;

(b)

ensuring the protection of the Union's financial interests, in particular providing for specific measures in relation to the prevention of, and fight against, fraud, corruption and any other irregularities affecting the Union's macro-financial assistance, in accordance with Council Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 2988/95 (10), Council Regulation (Euratom, EC) No 2185/96 (11) and Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 883/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council (12);

(c)

expressly authorising the Commission, including the European Anti-Fraud Office, or its representatives to carry out checks, including on-the-spot checks and inspections;

(d)

expressly authorising the Commission and the Court of Auditors to perform audits during and after the availability period of the Union's macro-financial assistance, including document audits and on-the-spot audits, such as operational assessments; and

(e)

ensuring that the Union is entitled to early repayment of the loan where it has been established that, in relation to the management of the Union's macro-financial assistance, Jordan has engaged in any act of fraud or corruption or any other illegal activity detrimental to the financial interests of the Union.

(a)

examine the progress made in implementing the Union's macro-financial assistance;

(b)

assess the economic situation and prospects of Jordan, as well as progress made in implementing the policy measures referred to in Article 3(1);

(c)

indicate the connection between the economic policy conditions laid down in the Memorandum of Understanding, Jordan's ongoing economic and fiscal performance and the Commission's decisions to release the instalments of the Union's macro-financial assistance.

23.12.2016   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

L 352/26

(1)

Article 43(3) of the Treaty provides that the Council, on a proposal from the Commission, is to adopt measures on the fixing and allocation of fishing opportunities.

(2)

Regulation (EU) No 1380/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council (1) requires that conservation measures be adopted taking into account available scientific, technical and economic advice, including, where relevant, reports drawn up by the Scientific, Technical and Economic Committee for Fisheries (STECF).

(3)

It is incumbent upon the Council to adopt measures on the fixing and allocation of fishing opportunities by fishery or group of fisheries in the Black Sea including, as appropriate, certain conditions functionally linked thereto. In accordance with Article 16(1) and (4) of Regulation (EU) No 1380/2013, fishing opportunities are to be distributed among Member States in such a way as to ensure relative stability of fishing activities of each Member State for each fish stock or fishery and in accordance with the objectives of the Common Fisheries Policy established in Article 2(2) of that Regulation.

(4)

The fishing opportunities should be established on the basis of the available scientific advice, taking into account biological and socioeconomic aspects whilst ensuring fair treatment between fishing sectors, as well as in the light of the opinions expressed during the consultation of stakeholders.

(5)

For sprat fisheries, the landing obligation referred to in Article 15(1) of Regulation (EU) No 1380/2013 applies from 1 January 2015. Article 16(2) of that Regulation provides that, when the landing obligation is introduced in respect of a fish stock, fishing opportunities are to be fixed taking into account the change from fixing fishing opportunities that reflect landings to fixing fishing opportunities that reflect catches.

(6)

The use of fishing opportunities set out in this Regulation is subject to Council Regulation (EC) No 1224/2009 (2) and in particular to Articles 33 and 34 thereof concerning the recording of catches and the notification of data on the exhaustion of fishing opportunities. It is therefore necessary to specify the codes to be used by the Member States when sending data to the Commission relating to landings of stocks subject to this Regulation.

(7)

In accordance with Article 2 of Council Regulation (EC) No 847/96 (3), the stocks that are subject to the various measures referred to therein must be identified.

(8)

Fishing opportunities should be used in full compliance with the applicable law of the Union.

(9)

In order to avoid interruption of fishing activities and to ensure the livelihood of Union fishermen, it is important to open the fisheries concerned in the Black Sea on 1 January 2017. For reasons of urgency, this Regulation should enter into force immediately after its publication,

(a)

Turbot (Psetta maxima);

(b)

Sprat (Sprattus sprattus).

(a)

‘GFCM’ means General Fisheries Commission for the Mediterranean;

(b)

‘Black Sea’ means the geographical sub-area 29 as defined in Annex I to Regulation (EU) No 1343/2011 of the European Parliament and the Council (4);

(c)

‘fishing vessel’ means any vessel equipped for commercial exploitation of marine biological resources;

(d)

‘Union fishing vessel’ means a fishing vessel flying the flag of a Member State and registered in the Union;

(e)

'stock. means a marine biological resource that occurs in a given management area;

(f)

‘Union autonomous quota’ means a limit of the catches autonomously allocated to the Union fishing vessels in the absence of an agreed TAC;

(g)

‘analytical assessments’ means a quantitative evaluation of trends in a given stock, based on data about the stock's biology and exploitation, which scientific review has indicated to be of sufficient quality to provide scientific advice on options for future catches.

(a)

exchanges made pursuant to Article 16(8) of Regulation (EU) No 1380/2013;

(b)

deductions and reallocations made pursuant to Article 37 of Regulation (EC) No 1224/2009;

(c)

deductions made pursuant to Articles 105 and 107 of Regulation (EC) No 1224/2009.

23.12.2016   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

L 352/31

(1)

On 12 July 2016, the Council adopted Implementing Regulation (EU) 2016/1127 (2), implementing Article 2(3) of Regulation (EC) No 2580/2001 by establishing an updated list of persons, groups and entities to which Regulation (EC) No 2580/2001 applies.

(2)

The Council has determined that an additional three persons have been involved in terrorist acts within the meaning of Article 1(2) and (3) of Council Common Position 2001/931/CFSP (3), that a decision has been taken with respect to them by a competent authority within the meaning of Article 1(4) of that Common Position, and that they should be subject to the specific restrictive measures provided for in Regulation (EC) No 2580/2001.

(3)

The list of persons, groups and entities to which Regulation (EC) No 2580/2001 applies should be amended accordingly,

23.12.2016   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

L 352/33

(1)

Regulation (EU) No 1380/2013 aims to progressively eliminate discards in all Union fisheries through the introduction of a landing obligation for catches of species subject to catch limits.

(2)

Article 15(6) of Regulation (EU) No 1380/2013 empowers the Commission to adopt discard plans by means of a delegated act for a period of no more than 3 years on the basis of joint recommendations developed by Member States in consultation with the relevant Advisory Councils.

(3)

By Delegated Regulation (EU) 2015/2439 (2), the Commission established a discard plan for certain demersal fisheries in South-Western waters for the period 2016-2018 following a joint recommendation submitted by Member States in 2015.

(4)

Belgium, Spain, France, the Netherlands and Portugal have a direct fisheries management interest in the South-Western waters. On 31 May 2016 those Member States submitted a joint recommendation to the Commission after consultation of the South Western Waters Advisory Council. Scientific contributions were obtained from relevant scientific bodies and reviewed by the Scientific, Technical and Economic Committee for Fisheries (STECF). The measures included in the joint recommendation comply with Article 18(3) of Regulation (EU) No 1380/2013, they may be included in this Regulation.

(5)

As regards the South-Western waters, according to Article 15(1)(c) of Regulation (EU) No 1380/2013 the landing obligation applies to the species that define the fisheries at the latest from 1 January 2016.

(6)

Delegated Regulation (EU) 2015/2439 established provisions for introduction of the landing obligation for certain demersal fisheries in South-Western waters for the period 2016-2018.

(7)

In accordance with the new joint recommendation submitted by Member States in 2016, the discard plan from 2017 should cover the fisheries of common sole, hake, anglerfish and Norway lobster (only inside the stocks' distribution areas referred to as ‘functional units’) in ICES divisions VIIIa, b, d, e, Norway lobster in ICES divisions VIIIc and IXa (only inside functional units), common sole and plaice in ICES division IXa, hake in ICES divisions VIIIc and IXa, anglerfish in ICES divisions VIIIa, b, c, d, e and IXa.

(8)

The joint recommendation suggested that an exemption from the landing obligation be applied to Norway lobster caught by trawls in ICES subareas VIII and IX, as existing scientific evidence indicates possible high survival rates, taking into account the characteristics of the gears targeting this species, the fishing practices and the ecosystem. The STECF in its evaluation concluded that the latest experiments show survival rates in the range of the survival rate observed in the previous work. Further studies are planned and should provide further information on likely survival rates in this fishery. Therefore, this exemption should be included in this Regulation for the year 2017, with a provision asking the Member States concerned to submit further data from ongoing trials to the Commission to allow the STECF to fully assess the justification for the exemption.

(9)

The joint recommendation includes three de minimis exemptions from the landing obligation for certain fisheries and up to certain levels. The evidence provided by the Member States was reviewed by the STECF. The STECF concludes that the joint recommendation contained reasoned arguments related to the difficulty of increasing selectivity combined with disproportionate costs of handling unwanted catches. In light of the above it is appropriate to establish the de minimis exemptions in accordance with the percentage level proposed in the joint recommendation and at levels not exceeding those allowed under Article 15(1) of Regulation (EU) No 1380/2013.

(10)

The de minimis exemption for common sole, up to a maximum of 5 % of the total annual catches of this species by vessels targeting this species in ICES divisions VIIIa and VIIIb with beam trawls and bottom trawls, is based on the fact that viable increases in selectivity are very difficult to achieve. The STECF concluded that the supporting information is sufficient to justify this exemption. Therefore, this exemption should be included in this Regulation.

(11)

The de minimis exemption for common sole, up to a maximum of 3 % of the total annual catches of this species by vessels targeting this species in ICES divisions VIIIa and VIIIb with trammel nets and gillnets, is based on the fact that viable increases in selectivity are very difficult to achieve. The STECF concluded that the supporting information is sufficient to justify the exemption claimed. Therefore, this exemption should be included in this Regulation.

(12)

The de minimis exemption for hake, up to a maximum of 7 % in 2017 and 6 % in 2018 of the total annual catches of this species by vessels targeting this species in ICES subareas VIII and IX with trawls, is based on the fact that viable increases in selectivity are very difficult to achieve. The STECF concluded that additional selectivity information provided did not contain additional evidence to demonstrate that selectivity is very difficult to achieve for the métiers involved. Therefore, additional work should be carried out in order to improve the justification for this exemption. This exemption should therefore be included in this Regulation for 2017, i.e. for 1 year only, and under the condition that Member States provide improved information to support this exemption that would be assessed by the STECF.

(13)

Delegated Regulation (EU) 2015/2439 should therefore be repealed and replaced by a new Regulation.

(14)

Since the measures provided for in this Regulation impact directly on the economic activities linked to and the planning of the fishing season of Union vessels, this Regulation should enter into force immediately after its publication. It should apply from 1 January 2017,

(a)

for hake (Merluccius merluccius), up to a maximum of 7 % in 2017 and up to 6 % in 2018 of the total annual catches of this species by vessels using trawls and seins (gear codes: OTT, OTB, PTB, OT, PT, TBN, TBS, TX, SSC, SPR, TB, SDN, SX and SV) targeting that species in ICES subareas VIII and IX;

(b)

for common sole (Solea solea), up to a maximum of 5 % of the total annual catches of this species by vessels using beam trawl (gear code: TBB) and bottom trawls (gear codes: OTB, OTT, PTB, TBN, TBS, TBB, OT, PT and TX) targeting that species in ICES divisions VIIIa and VIIIb;

(c)

for common sole (Solea solea), up to a maximum of 3 % of the total annual catches of this species by vessels using trammel nets and gillnets (gear codes: GNS, GN, GND, GNC, GTN, GTR and GEN) targeting that species in ICES divisions VIIIa and VIIIb.

23.12.2016   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

L 352/39

(1)

Regulation (EU) No 1380/2013 aims to progressively eliminate discards in all Union fisheries through the introduction of a landing obligation for catches of species subject to catch limits.

(2)

Article 15(6) of Regulation (EU) No 1380/2013 empowers the Commission to adopt discard plans by means of a delegated act for a period of no more than three years on the basis of joint recommendations developed by Member States in consultation with the relevant Advisory Councils.

(3)

By Delegated Regulation (EU) 2015/2438 (2), the Commission established a discard plan for certain demersal fisheries in North-Western waters for the period 2016-2018 following a joint recommendation submitted by the Member States in 2015.

(4)

Belgium, Ireland, Spain, France, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom have a direct fisheries management interest in the North-Western waters. On 3 June 2016, those Member States submitted a new joint recommendation to the Commission after consultation of the North Western Waters Advisory Council. Scientific contributions were obtained from relevant scientific bodies and reviewed by the Scientific, Technical and Economic Committee for Fisheries (STECF). The measures included in the joint recommendation comply with Article 18(3) of Regulation (EU) No 1380/2013 and may be included in this Regulation.

(5)

As regards the North-Western waters, according to Article 15(1)(c) of Regulation (EU) No 1380/2013 the landing obligation applies to the species that define the fisheries which are subject to catch limits at the latest from 1 January 2016. The joint recommendation established the fleets that would be subject to the landing obligation in the mixed fisheries for cod, haddock, whiting and saithe; in the fisheries for Norway lobster; in the mixed fishery for common sole and plaice; in hake and pollack fisheries.

(6)

Delegated Regulation (EU) 2015/2438 established provisions for introduction of the landing obligation for certain demersal fisheries in North-Western waters for the period 2016-2018.

(7)

In accordance with the new joint recommendation submitted by Member States in 2016, the discard plan should cover from 2017 further species which define the highly mixed cod, haddock, whiting and saithe fishery, Norway lobster fishery, mixed common sole and plaice fishery, hake and pollack fisheries. By-catch species should also be covered in certain fisheries.

(8)

The joint recommendation suggested that an exemption from the landing obligation be applied to Norway lobster caught by pots, traps or creels in ICES division VI and subarea VII, for which scientific evidence demonstrates high survival rates, taking into account the characteristics of the gear, of the fishing practices and of the ecosystem. The STECF concluded that the exemption is grounded. Therefore, this exemption should continue to be included in this Regulation.

(9)

The joint recommendation suggested that an exemption from the landing obligation be applied to catches of sole below the minimum conservation reference size caught by 80-99 mm otter trawl gears in ICES division VIId within six nautical miles from the coast and outside identified nurseries areas in the fishing operations meeting certain specific conditions. The scientific evidence demonstrates high survival rates, taking into account the characteristics of gear and of the ecosystem. The STECF noted that survival is dependent on a number of factors and recommended caution in extending the trial results to other fisheries and that further relevant trials should be undertaken to support this request. Therefore, this exemption should be included in this Regulation for 2017 under the condition that the fleet using this exemption operates under comparable conditions to those of the trial, and that Member States concerned undertake additional trials. The results of these additional trials should be assessed by the STECF in 2017.

(10)

The joint recommendation includes seven de minimis exemptions from the landing obligation for certain fisheries and up to certain levels. The evidence provided by the Member States was reviewed by the STECF, which in general concluded that the joint recommendation contained reasoned arguments that further improvements in selectivity are difficult to achieve and/or regarding disproportionate costs in handling unwanted catches, supported in some cases with a qualitative assessment of the costs. In light of the above and in the absence of differing scientific information, it is appropriate to include these de minimis exemptions in this Regulation in accordance with the percentage level proposed in the joint recommendation and at levels not exceeding those allowed under Article 15(1) of Regulation (EU) No 1380/2013.

(11)

The de minimis exemption for common sole, up to a maximum of 3 % in 2017-2018 of the total annual catches of this species by vessels using trammel and gill nets to catch common sole in ICES divisions VIId, VIIe, VIIf and VIIg, is based on the fact that increases in selectivity are very difficult to achieve. STECF concluded that the exemption is well defined and therefore, this exemption should be included in this Regulation.

(12)

The de minimis exemption for whiting, up to a maximum of 7 % in 2017 and up to a maximum of 6 % in 2018 of the total annual catches of this species by vessels obliged to land whiting and using bottom trawls and seines of less than 100 mm and pelagic trawls to catch whiting in ICES divisions VIId and VIIe, is based on the fact that increases in selectivity are very difficult to achieve.

(13)

The de minimis exemption for whiting, up to a maximum of 7 % in 2017 and up to a maximum of 6 % in 2018 of the total annual catches of this species by vessels obliged to land whiting and using bottom trawls and seines of not less than 100 mm to catch whiting in ICES divisions VIIb-VIIj, is based on the fact that increases in selectivity are very difficult to achieve.

(14)

The de minimis exemption for whiting, up to a maximum of 7 % in 2017 and up to a maximum of 6 % in 2018 of the total annual catches of this species by vessels obliged to land whiting and using bottom trawls and seines of less than 100 mm to catch whiting in ICES subarea VII (excluding VIIa, VIId and VIIe), is based on the fact that increases in selectivity are very difficult to achieve.

(15)

As regards the three de minimis exemptions for whiting, Delegated Regulation (EU) 2015/2438 required Member States concerned to submit to the Commission additional scientific information supporting the exemption. The STECF commented that, while complete evidence is still required, the additional information addresses some concerns of the STECF. The STECF highlighted the need for a more coherent approach to this stock. Based on the scientific evidence reviewed by STECF and considering that the further evidence supporting the exemption has improved, this exemption can be continued and should be included in this Regulation.

(16)

The de minimis exemption for Norway lobster, up to a maximum of 7 % in 2017 and up to a maximum of 6 % in 2018 of the total annual catches of this species by vessels obliged to land Norway lobster in ICES subarea VII, is based on the fact that increases in selectivity are very difficult to achieve. STECF concluded that the exemption was grounded. Therefore, this exemption should be included in this Regulation.

(17)

The de minimis exemption for Norway lobster, up to a maximum of 7 % in 2017 and up to a maximum of 6 % in 2018 of the total annual catches of this species by vessels obliged to land Norway lobster in ICES subarea VI, is based on the fact that increases in selectivity are very difficult to achieve and there is supporting quantitative information on disproportionate costs of handling unwanted catches. STECF concluded that the exemption was grounded. Therefore, this exemption should be included in this Regulation.

(18)

The de minimis exemption for common sole, up to a maximum of 3 % in 2017 and 2018 of the total annual catches of this species by vessels using TBB gear with mesh size of 80-119 mm with increased selectivity in ICES divisions VIId, VIIe, VIIf, VIIg and VIIh, is based on the fact that increases in selectivity are very difficult to achieve. STECF noted that the exemption is to compensate for the use of a more selective gear and the de minimis exemption requested is to cover residual discards. Therefore, this exemption should be included in this Regulation.

(19)

Delegated Regulation (EU) 2015/2438 should therefore be repealed and replaced by a new Regulation.

(20)

Since the measures provided for in this Regulation impact directly on the economic activities linked to and the planning of the fishing season of Union vessels, this Regulation should enter into force immediately after its publication. It should apply from 1 January 2017,

(a)

to Norway lobster (Nephrops norvegicus) caught in pots, traps or creels (Gear codes (3) FPO and FIX) in ICES subareas VI and VII;

(b)

in 2017 to catches of common sole (Solea solea) below the minimum conservation reference size caught with otter trawl gears (Gear codes OTT, OTB, TBS, TBN, TB, PTB, OT, PT, TX) with cod end mesh size of 80-99 mm in ICES division VIId within six nautical miles of the coast and outside identified nursery areas in the fishing operations meeting the following conditions: vessels with the maximum length of 10 meters, maximum engine power of 180 kW, when fishing in waters with the depth of 15 meters or less and with limited tow durations of no more than 1:30 hours. Such catches of common sole shall be released immediately.

(a)

for whiting (Merlangius merlangus), up to a maximum of 7 % in 2017 and up to a maximum of 6 % in 2018 of the total annual catches of that species by vessels obliged to land whiting and using bottom trawls and seines of less than 100 mm (OTB, SSC, OTT, PTB, SDN, SPR, TBN, TBS, TB, SX, SV OT, PT and TX) and pelagic trawls (OTM, PTM) to catch whiting in ICES divisions VIId and VIIe.

(b)

for whiting (Merlangius merlangus), up to a maximum of 7 % in 2017 and up to a maximum of 6 % in 2018 of the total annual catches of that species by vessels obliged to land whiting and using bottom trawls and seines of not less than 100 mm (OTB, SSC, OTT, PTB, SDN, SPR, TBN, TBS, TB, SX, SV OT, PT and TX) and pelagic trawls (OTM, PTM) to catch whiting in ICES divisions VIIb-VIIj.

(c)

for whiting (Merlangius merlangus), up to a maximum of 7 % in 2017 and up to a maximum of 6 % in 2018 of the total annual catches of that species by vessels obliged to land whiting and using bottom trawls and seines of less than 100 mm (OTB, SSC, OTT, PTB, SDN, SPR, TBN, TBS, TB, SX, SV OT, PT and TX) and pelagic trawls (OTM, PTM) to catch whiting in ICES subarea VII, except divisions VIIa, VIId and VIIe.

(d)

for Norway lobster (Nephrops norvegicus), up to a maximum of 7 % in 2017 and up to a maximum of 6 % in 2018 of the total annual catches of that species by vessels obliged to land Norway lobster in ICES subarea VII;

(e)

for Norway lobster (Nephrops norvegicus), up to a maximum of 7 % in 2017 and up to a maximum of 6 % in 2018 of the total annual catches of that species by vessels obliged to land Norway lobster in ICES subarea VI;

(f)

for common sole (Solea solea), up to a maximum of 3 % in 2017 and 2018 of the total annual catches of that species by vessels using trammel and gill nets to catch common sole in ICES divisions VIId, VIIe, VIIf and VIIg;

(g)

for common sole (Solea solea), up to a maximum of 3 % in 2017 and 2018 of the total annual catches of that species by vessels obliged to land common sole and using TBB gear with mesh size of 80-119 mm with increased selectivity, such as a large mesh extension, in ICES divisions VIId, VIIe, VIIf, VIIg and VIIh.

23.12.2016   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

L 352/48

(1)

Regulation (EU) No 1380/2013 aims to progressively eliminate discards in all Union fisheries through the introduction of a landing obligation for catches of species subject to catch limits.

(2)

Article 15(6) of Regulation (EU) No 1380/2013 empowers the Commission to adopt discard plans by means of delegated acts for a period of no more than 3 years on the basis of joint recommendations developed by Member States in consultation with the relevant Advisory Councils. Discard plans may also include technical measures regarding fisheries.

(3)

Italy, as the single Member State with a direct management interest in the mollusc bivalve Venus spp. fisheries, in the Italian territorial waters, submitted a recommendation to the Commission in line with the procedure of Article 18 of Regulation (EU) No 1380/2013. This recommendation was submitted in the form of a national management plan for discard of the Venus spp. stock, after consultation of the Mediterranean Advisory Council (MEDAC). Upon submission of this recommendation, the Scientific, Technical and Economic Committee for Fisheries (STECF) reviewed the scientific contributions presented by Italy. The measures included in the joint recommendation comply with the provisions of Article 18(3) of Regulation (EU) No 1380/2013.

(4)

Article 15a of Regulation (EC) No 1967/2006 empowers the Commission to establish, for the purpose of adopting discard plans and for the species subject to the landing obligation, a minimum conservation reference size with the aim of ensuring the protection of juveniles of marine organisms. Minimum conservation reference sizes may derogate, where appropriate, from the sizes established in Annex III to that Regulation.

(5)

According to the conclusions of the STECF on the national management plan for discard of the Venus spp. stock, Venus spp. is among the species with a high survival rate, which justifies for a request for derogation form the landing obligation for the discarded fraction of the catch. A reduction of a minimum conservation reference size from 25 mm to 22 mm is not incompatible with the length at maturity, so it should not have a significant impact on the protection of the juvenile organisms. It is predicted to lead to only a small reduction of the reproductive potential of the stock, which is not considered to have any important impact on the stock. Finally, it was concluded that the proposed scientific monitoring program is likely to provide sufficient data to evaluate the effects of the discard plan.

(6)

In order to ensure appropriate control over the implementation of the landing obligation, the Member State should establish a list of vessels covered by the present Regulation.

(7)

As the measures provided for in this Regulation have a direct impact on the economic activities linked to fisheries and the planning of the fishing season for Union vessels, it should enter into force on the third day following its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union. In accordance with Article 15(6) of Regulation (EU) No 1380/2013, this Regulation should apply for a period of no more than 3 years,

23.12.2016   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

L 352/50

(1)

Regulation (EU) No 1380/2013 aims to progressively eliminate discards in all Union fisheries through the introduction of a landing obligation for catches of species subject to catch limits.

(2)

Article 15(6) of Regulation (EU) No 1380/2013 empowers the Commission to adopt discard plans by means of a delegated act for a period of no more than three years on the basis of joint recommendations developed by Member States in consultation with the relevant Advisory Councils.

(3)

Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) No 1394/2014 (2) establishes a discard plan for certain pelagic fisheries in South-Western waters in order to facilitate the implementation of the landing obligation by means of certain flexibility mechanisms.

(4)

In accordance with Article 15(5)(e) of Regulation (EU) No 1380/2013, discard plans may contain the fixing of minimum conservation reference sizes.

(5)

Belgium, Spain, France, the Netherlands and Portugal have a direct fisheries management interest in the South-Western waters. After having consulted the South Western Waters Advisory Council and the Pelagic Advisory Council, those Member States submitted on 30 May 2016 a joint recommendation to the Commission suggesting that, by way of derogation from Annex XII to Council Regulation (EC) No 850/98 (3), the minimum conservation reference size for horse mackerel (Trachurus spp.) in ICES division VIIIc and subarea IX be fixed at 12 cm for 5 % of the respective quotas of Spain and Portugal. In addition, the joint recommendation suggested that within that limit of 5 % of the quota of horse mackerel, in the xávega artisanal beach sein fishery in ICES division IXa, 1 % of the quota of Portugal may be caught with the size below 12 cm.

(6)

Scientific contribution was obtained from relevant scientific bodies and reviewed by the Scientific, Technical and Economic Committee for Fisheries (STECF). The STECF concluded that reducing the minimum conservation reference size as suggested by the joint recommendation is associated with a low risk of changing the long-established exploitation pattern the fisheries concerned. That exploitation pattern combined with moderate exploitation rates does not seem to be detrimental to the dynamics of the relevant stocks. At the same time the STECF pointed out that the control of catches with different size limits may be challenging and, if not properly controlled, mortality may increase. In addition, it is important that the percentage limits established for the lower sizes are respected. Therefore, it is important that the Member States concerned put in place appropriate control measures regarding the fisheries concerned.

(7)

The measures included in the joint recommendation comply with Article 18(3) of Regulation (EU) No 1380/2013 and may therefore be included in the discard plan for certain pelagic fisheries in the South-Western Waters.

(8)

Delegated Regulation (EU) No 1394/2014 should therefore be amended accordingly.

(9)

Since the measures provided for in this Regulation impact directly on the economic activities linked to, and the planning of, the fishing season of Union vessels, this Regulation should enter into force immediately after its publication. It should apply from 1 January 2017,

23.12.2016   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

L 352/52

(1)

Commission Regulation (EC) No 1484/95 (3) lays down detailed rules for implementing the system of additional import duties and fixes representative prices in the poultrymeat and egg sectors and for egg albumin.

(2)

Regular monitoring of the data used to determine representative prices for poultrymeat and egg products and for egg albumin shows that the representative import prices for certain products should be amended to take account of variations in price according to origin.

(3)

Regulation (EC) No 1484/95 should be amended accordingly.

(4)

Given the need to ensure that this measure applies as soon as possible after the updated data have been made available, this Regulation should enter into force on the day of its publication,

23.12.2016   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

L 352/55

(1)

Implementing Regulation (EU) No 543/2011 lays down, pursuant to the outcome of the Uruguay Round multilateral trade negotiations, the criteria whereby the Commission fixes the standard values for imports from third countries, in respect of the products and periods stipulated in Annex XVI, Part A thereto.

(2)

The standard import value is calculated each working day, in accordance with Article 136(1) of Implementing Regulation (EU) No 543/2011, taking into account variable daily data. Therefore this Regulation should enter into force on the day of its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union,

23.12.2016   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

L 352/57

(1)

Pursuant to Decision 2010/452/CFSP, the Political and Security Committee (PSC) is authorised, in accordance with the third paragraph of Article 38 of the Treaty, to take the relevant decisions concerning the political control and strategic direction of the European Union Monitoring Mission in Georgia (EUMM Georgia), including the decision to appoint a Head of Mission.

(2)

On 19 December 2014, the PSC adopted Decision EUMM GEORGIA/1/2014 (2), appointing Mr Kęstutis JANKAUSKAS as Head of Mission of EUMM Georgia from 15 December 2014 to 14 December 2015.

(3)

On 13 November 2015, the PSC adopted Decision (CFSP) 2015/2200 (EUMM GEORGIA/1/2015) (3), extending the mandate of Mr Kęstutis JANKAUSKAS as Head of Mission of EUMM Georgia from 15 December 2015 to 14 December 2016.

(4)

On 12 December 2016, the Council adopted Decision (CFSP) 2016/2238 (4), extending the mandate of EUMM Georgia from 15 December 2016 to 14 December 2018.

(5)

The High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy has proposed to extend the mandate of Mr Kęstutis JANKAUSKAS as Head of Mission of EUMM Georgia from 15 December 2016 to 14 December 2017,

23.12.2016   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

L 352/59

(1)

Pursuant to Decision 2014/219/CFSP, the Political and Security Committee (PSC) is authorised, in accordance with Article 38 of the Treaty, to take the relevant decisions for the purpose of exercising the political control and strategic direction of the EUCAP Sahel Mali mission, including the decision to appoint a Head of Mission.

(2)

On 26 May 2014, the PSC adopted Decision EUCAP Sahel Mali/1/2014 (3), appointing Mr Albrecht CONZE as Head of Mission of EUCAP Sahel Mali from 26 May 2014 to 14 January 2015.

(3)

The mandate of Mr Albrecht CONZE as Head of Mission of EUCAP Sahel Mali has been extended several times, most recently by PSC Decision (CFSP) 2016/938 (4), which extended his mandate as Head of Mission of EUCAP Sahel Mali until 14 January 2017.

(4)

The High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy has proposed to extend the mandate of Mr Albrecht CONZE as Head of Mission of EUCAP Sahel Mali from 15 January 2017 to 14 July 2017,

23.12.2016   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

L 352/60

(1)

On 18 July 2005, the Council adopted Joint Action 2005/575/CFSP establishing the European Security and Defence College (‘ESDC’) (1). That Joint Action was replaced by Joint Action 2008/550/CFSP (2). In turn, that Joint Action was repealed by Council Decision 2013/189/CFSP (3).

(2)

In November 2008, the Council adopted the European Young Officers Exchange Scheme, modelled on Erasmus (4) and agreed that an implementing working party would meet within the framework of the Executive Academic Board of the ESDC.

(3)

On 15 July 2016, the ESDC Steering Committee agreed on recommendations on the future perspectives of the ESDC.

(4)

The training and education activities within the ESDC framework are to be carried out in the field of CSDP/CFSP including in the areas of conflict stabilisation, conflict resolution and the conditions necessary for sustainable development.

(5)

Whilst the staff of the ESDC should consist mainly of secondees it may be necessary to fill the post of administrative and financial assistant by a contracted staff member.

(6)

Pursuant to Council Decision 2010/427/EU (5), the EEAS should provide the ESDC with the support previously provided by the General Secretariat of the Council,

(a)

to further enhance the common European security and defence culture within the Union and to promote the principles laid down in Article 21(1) TEU outside the Union;

(b)

to promote a better understanding of CSDP as an essential part of CFSP;

(c)

to provide Union instances with knowledgeable personnel able to work efficiently on all CSDP and CFSP matters;

(d)

to provide Member States' administrations and staff with knowledgeable personnel familiar with Union policies, institutions and procedures in the field of CSDP and CFSP;

(e)

to provide CSDP Missions' and Operations' personnel with a common understanding of CSDP Missions' and Operations' functioning principles and a sense of common European identity;

(f)

to provide training and education responding to training and educational needs of CSDP Missions and Operations;

(g)

to support Union partnerships in the field of CSDP and CFSP in particular partnerships with those countries participating in CSDP missions;

(h)

to support civilian crisis management including in the field of conflict prevention, and establishing or preserving the conditions necessary for sustainable development;

(i)

to promote the European Initiative for the Exchange of Young Officers;

(j)

to help promote professional relations and contacts among the participants in the training and education activities.

(a)

basic and advanced level courses promoting generic understanding of CSDP and CFSP;

(b)

courses developing leadership;

(c)

courses directly supporting CSDP Missions and Operations, including pre-deployment and in-mission or in-operation training and education;

(d)

courses supporting EU partnerships and countries participating in CSDP Missions and Operations;

(e)

modules supporting civilian and military training and education in the field of CSDP and CFSP;

(f)

CSDP and CFSP courses, seminars, programmes and conferences for specialised audiences or with specific focus;

(g)

common modules run under the European Initiative for the Exchange of Young Officers, inspired by the Erasmus Programme.

(a)

support the relations to be established between the institutes referred to in Article 5(1) engaged in the network referred to in that paragraph (‘the network’);

(b)

run and further develop an e-Learning system to support CSDP and CFSP training and education activities or, in exceptional circumstances, to be used as stand-alone training and education activities;

(c)

develop and produce training and educational material in the field of CSDP and CFSP also drawing on already existing relevant material;

(d)

support an Alumni Association between former training participants;

(e)

support exchange programmes in the field of CSDP and CFSP between the Member States' training and educational institutes;

(f)

act as compartment administrator of the Schoolmaster module of the Goalkeeper project and provide contributions to the annual Union Training Programme in CSDP through this module;

(g)

provide support to the management of training and education in the field of conflict prevention, civilian crisis management, establishing or preserving the conditions necessary for sustainable development and Security Sector Reform initiatives, as well as promotion of cyber security and hybrid threats' awareness;

(h)

organise and run an annual network conference bringing together civilian and military training and education experts in CSDP from Member States' training and educational institutes and ministries, and relevant external training and education actors as appropriate and;

(i)

maintain relationships with relevant actors in the field of Freedom Security and Justice, in the field of Development and Cooperation, and with relevant International Organisations.

(a)

with the EU Agency for law enforcement training (‘CEPOL’);

(b)

with the European Border and Coast Guard Agency (‘Frontex’);

(c)

with the European Defence Agency (‘EDA’);

(d)

with the European Satellite Centre (‘EU SatCen’); and

(e)

with the European Police Office (Europol).

(a)

fulfil its tasks and meet its objectives;

(b)

enter into contracts and administrative arrangements necessary for its functioning including to implement staff secondments and recruit contract staff; acquire equipment, notably teaching equipment;

(c)

hold bank accounts; and

(d)

be a party to legal proceedings.

(a)

the Steering Committee with responsibility for the overall coordination and direction of the ESDC training and education activities;

(b)

the Executive Academic Board (‘the Board’) with responsibility for ensuring the quality and coherence of the ESDC training and education activities;

(c)

the Head of the ESDC (‘the Head’), sole legal representative of the ESDC, with responsibility for the financial and administrative management of the ESDC, as well as advising the Committee and the Board on the organisation and management of ESDC activities;

(d)

the ESDC Secretariat (‘the Secretariat’) which is to assist the Head in fulfilling his tasks and in particular in assisting the Board to ensure the overall quality and coherence of the ESDC training and education activities.

(a)

approve and keep under regular review the ESDC training and education activities reflecting the agreed ESDC training and education requirements;

(b)

approve the annual academic programme of the ESDC;

(c)

select and prioritise the training and education activities to be run under the ESDC, taking into account the resources available to the ESDC and the training and education requirements identified;

(d)

select the Member State(s) hosting the ESDC training and education activities and the institutes conducting them;

(e)

decide on opening specific ESDC training activities and education to third-country participation within the general political framework set by the Political and Security Committee;

(f)

adopt the curricula for all ESDC training and education activities;

(g)

take note of the course evaluation reports;

(h)

take note of the general annual report on ESDC training and education activities and adopt the recommendations therein, to be forwarded to the relevant Council bodies;

(i)

provide overall guidance to the work of the Board;

(j)

appoint the Chairpersons of the Executive Academic Board and its different configurations;

(k)

take the necessary decisions with regard to the functioning of the ESDC in so far as these are not attributed to other bodies;

(l)

approve the annual budget and any amending budget, acting on proposals from the Head;

(m)

approve the annual accounts and give a discharge to the Head;

(n)

approve additional rules applicable to expenditure managed by the ESDC;

(o)

approve any financing agreement and technical arrangements with the Commission, the EEAS, a Union Agency or a Member State regarding the financing or the implementation of the ESDC's expenditure;

(p)

contribute to the selection process of the Head as defined in Article 11(3).

(a)

provide academic advice and recommendations to the Steering Committee;

(b)

implement, through the network, the agreed annual academic programme;

(c)

oversee the e-Learning system;

(d)

develop curricula for all ESDC training and education activities;

(e)

ensure general coordination of ESDC training and education activities among all institutes;

(f)

review standards of the training and education activities undertaken in the previous academic year;

(g)

submit proposals to the Steering Committee for training and education activities in the next academic year;

(h)

ensure a systematic evaluation of all ESDC training and education activities and approve the course evaluation reports;

(i)

contribute to the draft general annual report on ESDC activities;

(j)

support the implementation of the European Initiative for the Exchange of Young Officers, inspired by the Erasmus Programme.

(a)

be responsible for the ESDC activities;

(b)

be the sole legal representative of the ESDC;

(c)

be responsible for the financial and administrative management of the ESDC;

(d)

advise the Steering Committee and the Board and support their work; and

(e)

act as the representative of the ESDC for training and education activities within and outside the network.

(a)

take all necessary steps, including the adoption of internal administrative instructions and the publication of notices, to ensure the effective functioning of ESDC activities;

(b)

draw up the preliminary draft annual report of the ESDC and its preliminary draft work programme to be submitted to the Steering Committee on the basis of the proposals submitted by the Board;

(c)

coordinate the implementation of the ESDC work programme;

(d)

maintain contacts with the relevant authorities in the Member States;

(e)

maintain contacts with relevant external training and education actors in the field of CFSP and CSDP;

(f)

conclude where necessary technical arrangements on ESDC training and education activities with the relevant authorities and training and education actors in the field of CFSP and CSDP;

(g)

perform any other task attributed to him or her by the Steering Committee.

(a)

draw up and submit to the Steering Committee any draft budget;

(b)

adopt the budgets after their approval by the Steering Committee;

(c)

be the authorising officer for the ESDC's budget;

(d)

open one or more bank accounts on behalf of the ESDC;

(e)

negotiate, submit to the Steering Committee and conclude any financing agreement and/or technical arrangement with the Commission, the EEAS or a Member State regarding the financing and/or the implementation of the ESDC's expenditure;

(f)

select the staff of the Secretariat, assisted by a selection panel;

(g)

negotiate and sign on behalf of the ESDC any Exchange of Letters for the secondment to the ESDC of Secretariat staff;

(h)

negotiate and sign on behalf of the ESDC any contract of employment for staff paid from the ESDC budget;

(i)

generally, represent the ESDC for the purpose of all legal acts with financial implications;

(j)

submit to the Steering Committee the ESDC's annual accounts.

(a)

staff seconded to the ESDC by Union institutions, the EEAS and Union agencies;

(b)

national experts seconded to the ESDC by Member States;

(c)

contracted staff when no national expert has been identified for the position of administrative and financial assistant and following approval by the Steering Committee.

23.12.2016   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

L 352/74

(1)

On 12 December 2003, the European Council adopted the European Union Strategy against the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (‘the Strategy’), Chapter III of which contains a list of measures that need to be taken both within the Union and in third countries to combat such proliferation.

(2)

The Union is actively implementing the Strategy and is giving effect to the measures listed in Chapter III thereof, in particular through releasing financial resources to support specific projects conducted by multilateral institutions, such as the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

(3)

On 17 November 2003, the Council adopted Common Position 2003/805/CFSP (1) on the universalisation and reinforcement of multilateral agreements in the field of non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and means of delivery. That Common Position calls, inter alia, for the promotion of the conclusion of IAEA comprehensive safeguards agreements and Additional Protocols and commits the Union to work towards making the comprehensive safeguards agreements and Additional Protocols the standard for the IAEA verification system.

(4)

On 17 May 2004, the Council adopted Joint Action 2004/495/CFSP (2) on support for IAEA activities under its Nuclear Security Programme and in the framework of the implementation of the Strategy.

(5)

On 18 July 2005, the Council adopted Joint Action 2005/574/CFSP (3) on support for IAEA activities in the areas of nuclear security and verification and in the framework of the implementation of the Strategy.

(6)

On 12 June 2006, the Council adopted Joint Action 2006/418/CFSP (4) on support for IAEA activities in the areas of nuclear security and verification and in the framework of the implementation of the Strategy.

(7)

On 14 April 2008, the Council adopted Joint Action 2008/314/CFSP (5) on support for IAEA activities in the areas of nuclear security and verification and in the framework of the implementation of the Strategy.

(8)

On 27 September 2010, the Council adopted Decision 2010/585/CFSP (6) on support for IAEA activities in the areas of nuclear security and verification and in the framework of the implementation of the Strategy.

(9)

On 21 October 2013, the Council adopted Decision 2013/517/CFSP (7) on Union support for the activities of the IAEA in the areas of nuclear security and verification and in the framework of the implementation of the Strategy.

(10)

On 8 May 2016, the Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (ACPPNM) entered into force. The Union and its Member States promoted the Amendment through diplomatic outreach and financing of the IAEA activities in that regard. Following its entry into force, sustained efforts will be required to ensure national enforcement and universalization of the ACPPNM.

(11)

The IAEA pursues the same objectives set out in Recitals (3) to (10) through the implementation of its Nuclear Security Plan which is financed entirely through voluntary contributions to the IAEA Nuclear Security Fund.

(12)

The Union is committed to strengthening nuclear security worldwide and is ready to continue assisting third countries in that regard. The Union welcomes recent steps to strengthen the IAEA Nuclear Security Programme as well as the International Conference on Nuclear Security: Commitments and Actions, hosted by the IAEA from 5 to 9 December 2016. The Union aims at maintaining the sustainability and effectiveness of the implementation of Joint Actions 2004/495/CFSP, 2005/574/CFSP, 2006/418/CFSP, 2008/314/CFSP and Decision 2010/585/CFSP in support of the IAEA Nuclear Security Plans (‘previous Joint Actions and Decisions’) and is committed to providing further support in view of the adoption of the IAEA Nuclear Security Plan 2018-2021. Close coordination with the EU Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) Centres of Excellence Initiative, as well as other initiatives and programs will be undertaken to avoid duplication and to maximise cost effectiveness and continued risk reduction.

(13)

The technical implementation of this Decision should be entrusted to the IAEA which, on the basis of its longstanding and broadly recognised expertise in the area of nuclear security, could significantly strengthen relevant capabilities in the target countries. The projects as supported by the Union can only be financed through voluntary contributions to the IAEA Nuclear Security Fund. Such contributions to be provided by the Union will be instrumental in enabling the IAEA to play a key role in the area of nuclear security by supporting the efforts of countries to fulfil their nuclear security responsibilities.

(14)

The responsibility for nuclear security within a State rests entirely with the State,

(a)

achieving progress towards the universalisation of international non-proliferation and nuclear security instruments;

(b)

assisting States in the establishment of indigenous technical, scientific and human capacity necessary for effective, sustainable nuclear security;

(c)

strengthening capacities to prevent, detect, respond and protect people, property, environment and society from criminal or intentional unauthorised acts involving nuclear or other radioactive material out of regulatory control;

(d)

strengthening the detection of, and response to, illicit trafficking of nuclear and other radioactive material;

(e)

contributing to computer security in the nuclear field;

(f)

strengthening the security of radioactive sources, to bring them to a safe and secure storage in the countries in need of support, including repatriation to the country of origin or supplier;

(g)

strengthening physical protection of nuclear and other radioactive material.

(a)

ensuring the sustainability and effectiveness of support provided through previous Joint Actions and Decisions;

(b)

strengthening States' Indigenous Nuclear Security Support Infrastructure;

(c)

strengthening States' Legislative and Regulatory Framework;

(d)

strengthening Nuclear Security Systems and Measures for Nuclear and other Radioactive Materials;

(e)

strengthening States' Institutional Infrastructure and Capabilities to Deal with Nuclear and Radioactive Materials out of Regulatory Control;

(f)

strengthening States' Response and Resilience to Cyber Crime and Mitigating its Impact on Nuclear Security;

(g)

enhancing education and training capacities in the field of Nuclear Security;

(h)

ensuring focused and continuing support for the implementation and the universalization of the Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material.