19.7.2016   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

L 193/1

(1)

The current political priorities in international taxation highlight the need for ensuring that tax is paid where profits and value are generated. It is thus imperative to restore trust in the fairness of tax systems and allow governments to effectively exercise their tax sovereignty. These new political objectives have been translated into concrete action recommendations in the context of the initiative against base erosion and profit shifting (BEPS) by the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). The European Council has welcomed this work in its conclusions of 13-14 March 2013 and 19-20 December 2013. In response to the need for fairer taxation, the Commission, in its communication of 17 June 2015 sets out an action plan for fair and efficient corporate taxation in the European Union.

(2)

The final reports on the 15 OECD Action Items against BEPS were released to the public on 5 October 2015. This output was welcomed by the Council in its conclusions of 8 December 2015. The Council conclusions stressed the need to find common, yet flexible, solutions at the EU level consistent with OECD BEPS conclusions. In addition, the conclusions supported an effective and swift coordinated implementation of the anti-BEPS measures at the EU level and considered that EU directives should be, where appropriate, the preferred vehicle for implementing OECD BEPS conclusions at the EU level. It is essential for the good functioning of the internal market that, as a minimum, Member States implement their commitments under BEPS and more broadly, take action to discourage tax avoidance practices and ensure fair and effective taxation in the Union in a sufficiently coherent and coordinated fashion. In a market of highly integrated economies, there is a need for common strategic approaches and coordinated action, to improve the functioning of the internal market and maximise the positive effects of the initiative against BEPS. Furthermore, only a common framework could prevent a fragmentation of the market and put an end to currently existing mismatches and market distortions. Finally, national implementing measures which follow a common line across the Union would provide taxpayers with legal certainty in that those measures would be compatible with Union law.

(3)

It is necessary to lay down rules in order to strengthen the average level of protection against aggressive tax planning in the internal market. As these rules would have to fit in 28 separate corporate tax systems, they should be limited to general provisions and leave the implementation to Member States as they are better placed to shape the specific elements of those rules in a way that fits best their corporate tax systems. This objective could be achieved by creating a minimum level of protection for national corporate tax systems against tax avoidance practices across the Union. It is therefore necessary to coordinate the responses of Member States in implementing the outputs of the 15 OECD Action Items against BEPS with the aim to improve the effectiveness of the internal market as a whole in tackling tax avoidance practices. It is therefore necessary to set a common minimum level of protection for the internal market in specific fields.

(4)

It is necessary to establish rules applicable to all taxpayers that are subject to corporate tax in a Member State. Considering that it would result in the need to cover a broader range of national taxes, it is not desirable to extend the scope of this Directive to types of entities which are not subject to corporate tax in a Member State; that is, in particular, transparent entities. Those rules should also apply to permanent establishments of those corporate taxpayers which may be situated in other Member State(s). Corporate taxpayers may be resident for tax purposes in a Member State or be established under the laws of a Member State. Permanent establishments of entities resident for tax purposes in a third country should also be covered by those rules if they are situated in one or more Member State.

(5)

It is necessary to lay down rules against the erosion of tax bases in the internal market and the shifting of profits out of the internal market. Rules in the following areas are necessary in order to contribute to achieving that objective: limitations to the deductibility of interest, exit taxation, a general anti-abuse rule, controlled foreign company rules and rules to tackle hybrid mismatches. Where the application of those rules gives rise to double taxation, taxpayers should receive relief through a deduction for the tax paid in another Member State or third country, as the case may be. Thus, the rules should not only aim to counter tax avoidance practices but also avoid creating other obstacles to the market, such as double taxation.

(6)

In an effort to reduce their global tax liability, groups of companies have increasingly engaged in BEPS, through excessive interest payments. The interest limitation rule is necessary to discourage such practices by limiting the deductibility of taxpayers' exceeding borrowing costs. It is therefore necessary to fix a ratio for deductibility which refers to a taxpayer's taxable earnings before interest, tax, depreciation and amortisation (EBITDA). Member States could decrease this ratio or place time limits or restrict the amount of unrelieved borrowing costs that can be carried forward or back to ensure a higher level of protection. Given that the aim is to lay down minimum standards, it could be possible for Member States to adopt an alternative measure referring to a taxpayer's earnings before interest and tax (EBIT) and fixed in a way that it is equivalent to the EBITDA-based ratio. Member States could in addition to the interest limitation rule provided by this Directive also use targeted rules against intra-group debt financing, in particular thin capitalisation rules. Tax exempt revenues should not be set off against deductible borrowing costs. This is because only taxable income should be taken into account in determining how much interest may be deducted.

(7)

Where the taxpayer is part of a group which files statutory consolidated accounts, the indebtedness of the overall group at worldwide level may be considered for the purpose of granting taxpayers entitlement to deduct higher amounts of exceeding borrowing costs. It may also be appropriate to lay down rules for an equity escape provision, where the interest limitation rule does not apply if the company can demonstrate that its equity over total assets ratio is broadly equal to or higher than the equivalent group ratio. The interest limitation rule should apply in relation to a taxpayer's exceeding borrowing costs without distinction of whether the costs originate in debt taken out nationally, cross-border within the Union or with a third country, or whether they originate from third parties, associated enterprises or intra-group. Where a group includes more than one entity in a Member State, the Member State may consider the overall position of all group entities in the same State, including a separate entity taxation system to allow the transfer of profits or interest capacity between entities within a group, when applying rules that limit the deductibility of interest.

(8)

To reduce the administrative and compliance burden of the rules without significantly diminishing their tax effect, it may be appropriate to provide for a safe harbour rule so that net interest is always deductible up to a fixed amount, when this leads to a higher deduction than the EBITDA-based ratio. Member States could reduce the fixed monetary threshold in order to ensure a higher level of protection of their domestic tax base. Since BEPS in principle takes place through excessive interest payments among entities which are associated enterprises, it is appropriate and necessary to allow the possible exclusion of standalone entities from the scope of the interest limitation rule given the limited risks of tax avoidance. In order to facilitate the transition to the new interest limitation rule, Member States could provide for a grandfathering clause that would cover existing loans to the extent that their terms are not subsequently modified, i.e. in case of a subsequent modification, the grandfathering would not apply to any increase in the amount or duration of the loan but would be limited to the original terms of the loan. Without prejudice to State aid rules, Member States could also exclude exceeding borrowing costs incurred on loans used to fund long-term public infrastructure projects considering that such financing arrangements present little or no BEPS risks. In this context, Member States should properly demonstrate that financing arrangements for public infrastructure projects present special features which justify such treatment vis-à-vis other financing arrangements subject to the restrictive rule.

(9)

Although it is generally accepted that financial undertakings, i.e. financial institutions and insurance undertakings, should also be subject to limitations to the deductibility of interest, it is equally acknowledged that these two sectors present special features which call for a more customised approach. As the discussions in this field are not yet sufficiently conclusive in the international and Union context, it is not yet possible to provide specific rules in the financial and insurance sectors and Member States should therefore be able to exclude them from the scope of interest limitation rules.

(10)

Exit taxes have the function of ensuring that where a taxpayer moves assets or its tax residence out of the tax jurisdiction of a State, that State taxes the economic value of any capital gain created in its territory even though that gain has not yet been realised at the time of the exit. It is therefore necessary to specify cases in which taxpayers are subject to exit tax rules and taxed on unrealised capital gains which have been built in their transferred assets. It is also helpful to clarify that transfers of assets, including cash, between a parent company and its subsidiaries fall outside the scope of the envisaged rule on exit taxation. In order to compute the amounts, it is critical to fix a market value for the transferred assets at the time of exit of the assets based on the arm's length principle. In order to ensure the compatibility of the rule with the use of the credit method, it is desirable to allow Member States to refer to the moment when the right to tax the transferred assets is lost. The right to tax should be defined at national level. It is also necessary to allow the receiving State to dispute the value of the transferred assets established by the exit State when it does not reflect such a market value. Member States could resort to this effect to existing dispute resolution mechanisms. Within the Union, it is necessary to address the application of exit taxation and illustrate the conditions for being compliant with Union law. In those situations, taxpayers should have the right to either immediately pay the amount of exit tax assessed or defer payment of the amount of tax by paying it in instalments over a certain number of years, possibly together with interest and a guarantee.

Member States could request, for this purpose, the taxpayers concerned to include the necessary information in a declaration. Exit tax should not be charged when the transfer of assets is of a temporary nature and the assets are set to revert to the Member State of the transferor, where the transfer takes place in order to meet prudential capital requirements or for the purpose of liquidity management or when it comes to securities' financing transactions or assets posted as collateral.

(11)

General anti-abuse rules (GAARs) feature in tax systems to tackle abusive tax practices that have not yet been dealt with through specifically targeted provisions. GAARs have therefore a function aimed to fill in gaps, which should not affect the applicability of specific anti-abuse rules. Within the Union, GAARs should be applied to arrangements that are not genuine; otherwise, the taxpayer should have the right to choose the most tax efficient structure for its commercial affairs. It is furthermore important to ensure that the GAARs apply in domestic situations, within the Union and vis-à-vis third countries in a uniform manner, so that their scope and results of application in domestic and cross-border situations do not differ. Member States should not be prevented from applying penalties where the GAAR is applicable. When evaluating whether an arrangement should be regarded as non-genuine, it could be possible for Member States to consider all valid economic reasons, including financial activities.

(12)

Controlled foreign company (CFC) rules have the effect of re-attributing the income of a low-taxed controlled subsidiary to its parent company. Then, the parent company becomes taxable on this attributed income in the State where it is resident for tax purposes. Depending on the policy priorities of that State, CFC rules may target an entire low-taxed subsidiary, specific categories of income or be limited to income which has artificially been diverted to the subsidiary. In particular, in order to ensure that CFC rules are a proportionate response to BEPS concerns, it is critical that Member States that limit their CFC rules to income which has been artificially diverted to the subsidiary precisely target situations where most of the decision-making functions which generated diverted income at the level of the controlled subsidiary are carried out in the Member State of the taxpayer. With a view to limiting the administrative burden and compliance costs, it should also be acceptable that those Member States exempt certain entities with low profits or a low profit margin that give rise to lower risks of tax avoidance. Accordingly, it is necessary that the CFC rules extend to the profits of permanent establishments where those profits are not subject to tax or are tax exempt in the Member State of the taxpayer. However, there is no need to tax, under the CFC rules, the profits of permanent establishments which are denied the tax exemption under national rules because these permanent establishments are treated as though they were controlled foreign companies. In order to ensure a higher level of protection, Member States could reduce the control threshold, or employ a higher threshold in comparing the actual corporate tax paid with the corporate tax that would have been charged in the Member State of the taxpayer. Member States could, in transposing CFC rules into their national law, use a sufficiently high tax rate fractional threshold.

It is desirable to address situations both in third countries and within the Union. To comply with the fundamental freedoms, the income categories should be combined with a substance carve-out aimed to limit, within the Union, the impact of the rules to cases where the CFC does not carry on a substantive economic activity. It is important that tax administrations and taxpayers cooperate to gather the relevant facts and circumstances to determine whether the carve-out rule is to apply. It should be acceptable that, in transposing CFC rules into their national law, Member States use white, grey or black lists of third countries, which are compiled on the basis of certain criteria set out in this Directive and may include the corporate tax rate level, or use white lists of Member States compiled on that basis.

(13)

Hybrid mismatches are the consequence of differences in the legal characterisation of payments (financial instruments) or entities and those differences surface in the interaction between the legal systems of two jurisdictions. The effect of such mismatches is often a double deduction (i.e. deduction in both states) or a deduction of the income in one state without inclusion in the tax base of the other. To neutralise the effects of hybrid mismatch arrangements, it is necessary to lay down rules whereby one of the two jurisdictions in a mismatch should deny the deduction of a payment leading to such an outcome. In this context, it is useful to clarify that measures aimed to tackle hybrid mismatches in this Directive are aimed to tackle mismatch situations attributable to differences in the legal characterisation of a financial instrument or entity and are not intended to affect the general features of the tax system of a Member State. Although Member States have agreed guidance, in the framework of the Group of the Code of Conduct on Business Taxation, on the tax treatment of hybrid entities and hybrid permanent establishments within the Union as well as on the tax treatment of hybrid entities in relations with third countries, it is still necessary to enact binding rules. It is critical that further work is undertaken on hybrid mismatches between Member States and third countries, as well as on other hybrid mismatches such as those involving permanent establishments.

(14)

It is necessary to clarify that the implementation of the rules against tax avoidance provided in this Directive should not affect the taxpayers' obligation to comply with the arm's length principle or the Member State's right to adjust a tax liability upwards in accordance with the arm's length principle, where applicable.

(15)

The European Data Protection Supervisor was consulted in accordance with Article 28(2) of Regulation (EC) No 45/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council (3). The right to protection of personal data according to Article 8 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union as well as Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council (4) applies to the processing of personal data carried out within the framework of this Directive.

(16)

Considering that a key objective of this Directive is to improve the resilience of the internal market as a whole against cross-border tax avoidance practices, this cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States acting individually. National corporate tax systems are disparate and independent action by Member States would only replicate the existing fragmentation of the internal market in direct taxation. It would thus allow inefficiencies and distortions to persist in the interaction of distinct national measures. The result would be lack of coordination. Rather, by reason of the fact that much inefficiency in the internal market primarily gives rise to problems of a cross-border nature, remedial measures should be adopted at Union level. It is therefore critical to adopt solutions that function for the internal market as a whole and this can be better achieved at Union level. Thus, the Union may adopt measures, in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity as set out in Article 5 of the Treaty on European Union. In accordance with the principle of proportionality, as set out in that Article, this Directive does not go beyond what is necessary in order to achieve that objective. By setting a minimum level of protection for the internal market, this Directive only aims to achieve the essential minimum degree of coordination within the Union for the purpose of materialising its objectives.

(17)

The Commission should evaluate the implementation of this Directive four years after its entry into force and report to the Council thereon. Member States should communicate to the Commission all information necessary for this evaluation.

(1)

‘borrowing costs’ means interest expenses on all forms of debt, other costs economically equivalent to interest and expenses incurred in connection with the raising of finance as defined in national law, including, without being limited to, payments under profit participating loans, imputed interest on instruments such as convertible bonds and zero coupon bonds, amounts under alternative financing arrangements, such as Islamic finance, the finance cost element of finance lease payments, capitalised interest included in the balance sheet value of a related asset, or the amortisation of capitalised interest, amounts measured by reference to a funding return under transfer pricing rules where applicable, notional interest amounts under derivative instruments or hedging arrangements related to an entity's borrowings, certain foreign exchange gains and losses on borrowings and instruments connected with the raising of finance, guarantee fees for financing arrangements, arrangement fees and similar costs related to the borrowing of funds;

(2)

‘exceeding borrowing costs’ means the amount by which the deductible borrowing costs of a taxpayer exceed taxable interest revenues and other economically equivalent taxable revenues that the taxpayer receives according to national law;

(3)

‘tax period’ means a tax year, calendar year or any other appropriate period for tax purposes;

(4)

‘associated enterprise’ means:

If an individual or entity holds directly or indirectly a participation of 25 percent or more in a taxpayer and one or more entities, all the entities concerned, including the taxpayer, shall also be regarded as associated enterprises.

For the purposes of Article 9 and where the mismatch involves a hybrid entity, this definition is modified so that the 25 percent requirement is replaced by a 50 percent requirement.

(5)

‘financial undertaking’ means any of the following entities:

(6)

‘transfer of assets’ means an operation whereby a Member State loses the right to tax the transferred assets, whilst the assets remain under the legal or economic ownership of the same taxpayer;

(7)

‘transfer of tax residence’ means an operation whereby a taxpayer ceases to be resident for tax purposes in a Member State, whilst acquiring tax residence in another Member State or third country;

(8)

‘transfer of a business carried on by a permanent establishment’ means an operation whereby a taxpayer ceases to have taxable presence in a Member State whilst acquiring such presence in another Member State or third country without becoming resident for tax purposes in that Member State or third country;

(9)

‘hybrid mismatch’ means a situation between a taxpayer in one Member State and an associated enterprise in another Member State or a structured arrangement between parties in Member States where the following outcome is attributable to differences in the legal characterisation of a financial instrument or entity:

(a)

an entity which is permitted or required to apply the rules on behalf of a group, as defined according to national tax law;

(b)

an entity in a group, as defined according to national tax law, which does not consolidate the results of its members for tax purposes.

(a)

to deduct exceeding borrowing costs up to EUR 3 000 000;

(b)

to fully deduct exceeding borrowing costs if the taxpayer is a standalone entity.

(a)

loans which were concluded before 17 June 2016, but the exclusion shall not extend to any subsequent modification of such loans;

(b)

loans used to fund a long-term public infrastructure project where the project operator, borrowing costs, assets and income are all in the Union.

(a)

fully deduct its exceeding borrowing costs if it can demonstrate that the ratio of its equity over its total assets is equal to or higher than the equivalent ratio of the group and subject to the following conditions:

or

(b)

deduct exceeding borrowing costs at an amount in excess of what it would be entitled to deduct under paragraph 1. This higher limit to the deductibility of exceeding borrowing costs shall refer to the consolidated group for financial accounting purposes in which the taxpayer is a member and be calculated in two steps:

(a)

to carry forward, without time limitation, exceeding borrowing costs which cannot be deducted in the current tax period under paragraphs 1 to 5;

(b)

to carry forward, without time limitation, and back, for a maximum of three years, exceeding borrowing costs which cannot be deducted in the current tax period under paragraphs 1 to 5; or

(c)

to carry forward, without time limitation, exceeding borrowing costs and, for a maximum of five years, unused interest capacity, which cannot be deducted in the current tax period under paragraphs 1 to 5.

(a)

a taxpayer transfers assets from its head office to its permanent establishment in another Member State or in a third country in so far as the Member State of the head office no longer has the right to tax the transferred assets due to the transfer;

(b)

a taxpayer transfers assets from its permanent establishment in a Member State to its head office or another permanent establishment in another Member State or in a third country in so far as the Member State of the permanent establishment no longer has the right to tax the transferred assets due to the transfer;

(c)

a taxpayer transfers its tax residence to another Member State or to a third country, except for those assets which remain effectively connected with a permanent establishment in the first Member State;

(d)

a taxpayer transfers the business carried on by its permanent establishment from a Member State to another Member State or to a third country in so far as the Member State of the permanent establishment no longer has the right to tax the transferred assets due to the transfer.

(a)

a taxpayer transfers assets from its head office to its permanent establishment in another Member State or in a third country that is party to the Agreement on the European Economic Area (EEA Agreement);

(b)

a taxpayer transfers assets from its permanent establishment in a Member State to its head office or another permanent establishment in another Member State or a third country that is party to the EEA Agreement;

(c)

a taxpayer transfers its tax residence to another Member State or to a third country that is party to the EEA Agreement;

(d)

a taxpayer transfers the business carried on by its permanent establishment to another Member State or a third country that is party to the EEA Agreement.

(a)

the transferred assets or the business carried on by the permanent establishment of the taxpayer are sold or otherwise disposed of;

(b)

the transferred assets are subsequently transferred to a third country;

(c)

the taxpayer's tax residence or the business carried on by its permanent establishment is subsequently transferred to a third country;

(d)

the taxpayer goes bankrupt or is wound up;

(e)

the taxpayer fails to honour its obligations in relation to the instalments and does not correct its situation over a reasonable period of time, which shall not exceed 12 months.

(a)

in the case of an entity, the taxpayer by itself, or together with its associated enterprises holds a direct or indirect participation of more than 50 percent of the voting rights, or owns directly or indirectly more than 50 percent of capital or is entitled to receive more than 50 percent of the profits of that entity; and

(b)

the actual corporate tax paid on its profits by the entity or permanent establishment is lower than the difference between the corporate tax that would have been charged on the entity or permanent establishment under the applicable corporate tax system in the Member State of the taxpayer and the actual corporate tax paid on its profits by the entity or permanent establishment.

(a)

the non-distributed income of the entity or the income of the permanent establishment which is derived from the following categories:

This point shall not apply where the controlled foreign company carries on a substantive economic activity supported by staff, equipment, assets and premises, as evidenced by relevant facts and circumstances.

Where the controlled foreign company is resident or situated in a third country that is not party to the EEA Agreement, Member States may decide to refrain from applying the preceding subparagraph.

or

(b)

the non-distributed income of the entity or permanent establishment arising from non-genuine arrangements which have been put in place for the essential purpose of obtaining a tax advantage.

For the purposes of this point, an arrangement or a series thereof shall be regarded as non-genuine to the extent that the entity or permanent establishment would not own the assets or would not have undertaken the risks which generate all, or part of, its income if it were not controlled by a company where the significant people functions, which are relevant to those assets and risks, are carried out and are instrumental in generating the controlled company's income.

(a)

with accounting profits of no more than EUR 750 000, and non-trading income of no more than EUR 75 000; or

(b)

of which the accounting profits amount to no more than 10 percent of its operating costs for the tax period.

19.7.2016   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

L 193/15

(1)

Council Regulation (EC) No 1183/2005 (2) gives effect to Decision 2010/788/CFSP and provides for certain measures directed against persons acting in violation of the arms embargo with regard to the Democratic Republic of the Congo, including a freezing of their assets.

(2)

United Nations Security Council Resolution 2293 (2016) of 21 June 2016 amended the criteria for the designation of persons and entities to be subject to the restrictive measures set out in paragraphs 9 and 11 of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1807 (2008) and extended the provisions on the arms embargo. In Council Decision (CFSP) 2016/1173 (3) the Council decided to extend the scope of the criteria accordingly.

(3)

Regulatory action at the level of the Union is therefore necessary in order to give effect to it, in particular with a view to ensuring its uniform application by economic operators in all Member States.

(4)

Regulation (EC) No 1183/2005 should therefore be amended accordingly,

(1)

The following point is added to Article 1b(1):

(2)

Article 2a(1) is amended as follows:

19.7.2016   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

L 193/17

(1)

In accordance with Article 125 of Regulation (EU) No 1308/2013, sugar beet growers and sugar undertakings are to conclude written agreements within the trade. Annex XI to that Regulation sets out certain purchase terms for beet until the end of the 2016/2017 marketing year, while Annex X to that Regulation sets out those terms as from 1 October 2017, when the quota system will have ended.

(2)

In order to take account of the specific characteristics of the sugar sector and the expected development of the sector in the period following the end of the quota system, the purchase terms for beet referred to in Annex X should be amended.

(3)

As from 1 October 2017 the beet sugar sector will need to adapt to the end of the quota system, including the end of the minimum beet price and regulation of domestic production quantities. Therefore, the sector needs a clear legal framework in this transition from a highly regulated sector to a more liberalised one. Growers and sugar undertakings have requested further legal certainty as regards the applicable rules for value sharing mechanisms, including market bonuses and losses based on relevant market prices.

(4)

The Union beet sugar supply chain is characterised by many mostly small sugar beet growers and a limited number of mostly large sugar undertakings. Given the need for the beet suppliers to plan and organise their beet supplies to sugar factories during beet harvesting periods, there is an interest for growers to negotiate certain terms relating to value sharing clauses for the purchase of beet by the concerned undertakings. This is an inherent feature of the sugar supply chain, which continues to exist independently of whether there is a quota system in place or not. The value sharing clauses referred to in Point XI of Annex XI to Regulation (EU) No 1308/2013 currently enable beet growers and sugar undertakings to secure their supplies on pre-defined purchase terms with certainty of sharing the profits and costs generated by the supply chain to the benefit of the beet growers. The benefit of value sharing also transmits the price signals in the market directly to the growers.

(5)

The expected development of the sector in the period following the end of the quota system in combination with the relatively low sugar prices recently observed, are unlikely to lead to new beet sugar processors entering the market, because the investments necessary for creating a sugar processing facility would require a higher sugar price than the market price foreseen in the next marketing years to be profitable. The Commission's medium-term outlook foresees prices adjusting rather to the downside after the end of the quota system. Thus, the current structure of the EU sugar industry, including the relationship between beet growers and sugar undertakings, is expected to persist in the marketing years following the abolition of the quota system since it is foreseeable that few new undertakings will enter the market.

(6)

In the absence of the preservation of the value sharing clauses, the position of beet growers in the food chain could be compromised. When losing the possibility of negotiating value sharing clauses, and especially in a situation of low prices, beet growers could be in a clear economic disadvantage.

(7)

Therefore, the rationale for amending Annex X to Regulation (EU) No 1308/2013 to allow the negotiation of value sharing clauses remains valid. Consequently, the possibility of negotiating such clauses would continue to be necessary after 1 October 2017.

(8)

In order to facilitate the negotiation of the value sharing clauses, it is appropriate that such negotiations are only possible between one undertaking and its current or potential suppliers.

(9)

In order to ensure a flexible negotiation process, the introduction of a value sharing clause should be optional.

(10)

Annex X to Regulation (EU) No 1308/2013 should therefore be amended accordingly,

19.7.2016   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

L 193/19

(1)

By Council Regulation (EC) No 1796/1999 (2), the Council imposed a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of steel ropes and cables originating, inter alia, in the People's Republic of China. Following two expiry reviews under Article 11(2) of the basic Regulation, the anti-dumping measures were maintained by Council Regulation (EC) No 1858/2005 (3) and Council Implementing Regulation (EU) No 102/2012 (4).

(2)

By Council Implementing Regulation (EU) No 400/2010 (5), the Council extended the anti-dumping duty on imports of steel ropes and cables originating, inter alia, in the People's Republic of China to imports of the same product consigned from the Republic of Korea, whether declared as originating in the Republic of Korea or not, following an anti-circumvention investigation under Article 13 of the basic Regulation. By the same Regulation, certain Korean exporting producers were exempted from these extended measures.

(3)

The measures currently in force are an anti-dumping duty imposed by Implementing Regulation (EU) No 102/2012 on imports of steel ropes and cables originating, inter alia, in the People's Republic of China as extended, inter alia, to imports of steel ropes and cables consigned from the Republic of Korea whether declared as originating in the Republic of Korea or not, as last amended by Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2016/90 (6) (‘the measures in force’). Imports into the Union of the product under review consigned from the Republic of Korea are subject to a duty of 60,4 %, with the exception of the product manufactured by companies which were exempted.

(4)

The European Commission (‘the Commission’) received a request for an exemption from the anti-dumping measures applicable to imports of steel ropes and cables originating in the People's Republic of China, as extended to imports consigned from the Republic of Korea, whether declared as originating in the Republic of Korea or not, under Articles 11(4) and 13(4) and of the basic Regulation.

(5)

The request was lodged on 7 September 2015 by Daechang Steel Co. Ltd (‘the applicant’), an exporting producer of steel ropes and cables in the Republic of Korea (‘the country concerned’) and it was limited to the applicant.

(6)

The applicant provided prima facie evidence that it did not export the product under review to the Union during the investigation period used in the investigation that led to the extended measures (1 July 2008 to 30 June 2009), that it is not related to any of the exporting producers of the product under review which are subject to the anti-dumping duties in force, that it has not circumvented the measures applicable to steel ropes and cables of Chinese origin and that it has entered into an irrevocable contractual obligation to export a significant quantity to the Union.

(7)

Having examined the evidence submitted by the applicant and following consultation of the Member States, and after the Union industry was given the opportunity to comment, the Commission initiated the investigation on 26 November 2015 by Implementing Regulation (EU) 2015/2179 (7). Furthermore, pursuant to Article 3 of that Regulation, the Commission directed customs authorities to take the appropriate steps to register imports of the product under review consigned from the Republic of Korea and produced and sold for export to the Union by the applicant, in accordance with Article 14(5) of the basic Regulation.

(8)

The product subject to the review is steel ropes and cables, including locked coil ropes, excluding ropes and cables of stainless steel, with a maximum cross-sectional dimension exceeding 3 mm, consigned from the Republic of Korea, whether declared as originating in the Republic of Korea or not (‘the product under review’), currently falling within CN codes ex 7312 10 81, ex 7312 10 83, ex 7312 10 85, ex 7312 10 89 and ex 7312 10 98 (TARIC codes 7312108113, 7312108313, 7312108513, 7312108913 and 7312109813).

(9)

The reporting period covered the period from 1 October 2014 to 30 September 2015. Data was collected from 2008 until the end of the reporting period (‘the investigation period’).

(10)

The Commission officially advised the applicant and the representatives of the Republic of Korea of the initiation of the review. Interested parties were invited to make their views known and were informed of the possibility to request a hearing. No requests were received.

(11)

The Commission sent a questionnaire to the applicant and received a reply within the given deadline. The Commission sought and verified on the spot all the information deemed necessary for the purposes of the review. A verification visit was carried out at the premises of the applicant.

(12)

The Commission examined whether the conditions for granting an exemption under Article 11(4) and 13(4) were fulfilled, namely whether:

(13)

The investigation confirmed that the applicant had not exported the product under review to the Union during the investigation period of the anti-circumvention investigation that led to the extended measures, that is 1 July 2008 to 30 June 2009. The applicant's first exports of the product under review occurred subsequent to the extension of measures to the Republic of Korea, more precisely in the second half of 2015.

(14)

Next, the investigation confirmed that the applicant was not related to any Chinese exporters or producers subject to the anti-dumping measures imposed by Implementing Regulation (EU) No 102/2012.

(15)

Furthermore, the investigation confirmed that the applicant is a genuine producer of the product under review not engaged in circumvention practices. The applicant purchases domestically produced steel wire rod and sub-materials (such as zinc and lead) but also imports steel wire rod from the People's Republic of China, which is subsequently pickled, drawn, galvanised, drawn a second time, stranded and closed at its manufacturing facilities in the Republic of Korea. The finished product is sold domestically and also exported to the United States, Asia and the Union.

(16)

The production activities can be considered as an assembly or completion operation. Article 13(2) of the basic Regulation lays down the conditions under which an assembly operation will be considered to be circumventing the measures. Under point (b) of that Article, one condition is that the parts in question constitute more than 60 % of the total value of the parts of the assembled product. During the investigation it was established that the proportion of Chinese raw materials used by the applicant was significantly below the threshold of 60 % required under Article 13(2)(b) of the basic Regulation. The percentage of Chinese parts (namely raw materials) used was 38 %. Where that threshold is exceeded, Article 13(2)(b) requires that it is established whether the 25 % threshold of value added was reached (the ‘value-added test’). The 60 % threshold of the total value of the parts was not exceeded. Hence, on the basis of the actual costs incurred during the reporting period, it was not necessary to establish whether the 25 % threshold of value added was reached within the meaning of Article 13(2)(b) of the basic Regulation.

(17)

The applicant started with the production of the product under review mid-2015. Due to the exceptional manufacturing costs incurred during the start-up production phase, another calculation was performed on the basis of standard costs of manufacturing (excluding start-up costs and anticipating a high production capacity utilisation rate). It was established that the proportion of Chinese-origin raw materials then constituted more than the 60 % of the total value of the parts of the final product (69 %). For that reason the value-added test under Article 13(2) of the basic Regulation was carried out. That test demonstrated that the value added to the parts brought in from the People's Republic of China was significantly above the 25 % of the manufacturing costs threshold as stipulated in Article 13(2)(b) of the basic Regulation. Therefore, the applicant's production activities are not considered to constitute circumvention in the sense of Article 13(2) of the basic Regulation.

(18)

Last, the investigation confirmed that the applicant was not purchasing the finished product under review from the People's Republic of China in order to resell or tranship to the Union and that the company could justify all its exports during the reporting period.

(19)

In light of the findings described in recitals 13 to 18, the Commission concludes that the applicant fulfils the conditions for an exemption under Articles 11(4) and 13(4) of the basic Regulation.

(20)

The findings above were disclosed to the applicant and the Union industry, which were given the opportunity to provide comments. The applicant submitted that it agreed to the Commission's findings. No further comments were submitted.

(21)

In accordance with the above findings, the applicant should be added to the list of companies that are exempted from the anti-dumping duty imposed by Implementing Regulation (EU) No 102/2012.

(22)

As laid down in Article 1(2) of Regulation (EU) No 400/2010, the application of the exemption is to be conditional upon presentation to the customs authorities of the Member States of a valid commercial invoice, which shall conform to the requirements set out in the Annex to that Regulation. If no such an invoice is presented, the anti-dumping duty continues to apply.

(23)

In addition, the exemption from the extended measures granted to imports of steel ropes and cables produced by the applicant, in accordance with Article 13(4) of the basic Regulation, remains valid on condition that the facts as finally ascertained justify the exemption. Should new prima facie evidence indicate otherwise, an investigation may be initiated by the Commission to establish whether withdrawal of the exemption is warranted.

(24)

The exemption from the extended measures granted to imports of steel ropes and cables produced by the applicant is made on the basis of the findings of the present review. This exemption is thus exclusively applicable to imports of steel ropes and cables consigned from the Republic of Korea and produced by the abovementioned specific legal entity. Imported steel ropes and cables produced by any company not specifically mentioned in Article 1(4) of Implementing Regulation (EU) No 102/2012 with its name, including entities related to those specifically mentioned, should not benefit from the exemption and should be subject to the residual duty rate as imposed by that Regulation.

(25)

Implementing Regulation (EU) No 102/2012, as last amended by Implementing Regulation (EU) 2016/90, should be amended to include Daechang Steel Co. Ltd in the table set out in its Article 1(4).

(26)

The measures provided for in this Regulation are in accordance with the opinion of the Committee established by Article 15(1) of Regulation (EC) No 1225/2009,

19.7.2016   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

L 193/25

(1)

Implementing Regulation (EU) No 543/2011 lays down, pursuant to the outcome of the Uruguay Round multilateral trade negotiations, the criteria whereby the Commission fixes the standard values for imports from third countries, in respect of the products and periods stipulated in Annex XVI, Part A thereto.

(2)

The standard import value is calculated each working day, in accordance with Article 136(1) of Implementing Regulation (EU) No 543/2011, taking into account variable daily data. Therefore this Regulation should enter into force on the day of its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union,

19.7.2016   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

L 193/27

(1)

Commission Regulation (EC) No 341/2007 (2) opened annual tariff quotas for imports of garlic.

(2)

The quantities covered by the applications for ‘A’ import licences lodged in the first seven calendar days of July 2016, for the subperiod from 1 September 2016 to 30 November 2016, for certain quotas, exceed those available. The extent to which ‘A’ import licences may be issued should therefore be determined by establishing the allocation coefficient to be applied to the quantities requested, calculated in accordance with Article 7(2) of Commission Regulation (EC) No 1301/2006 (3).

(3)

In order to ensure the efficient management of the measure, this Regulation should enter into force on the day of its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union,

19.7.2016   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

L 193/29

(1)

The Framework Agreement on Comprehensive Partnership and Cooperation between the European Community and its Member States, of the one part, and the Republic of Indonesia, of the other part (1) (the ‘Agreement’) entered into force on 1 May 2014.

(2)

In accordance with Article 41 of the Agreement, a Joint Committee was established in order to ensure, inter alia, the proper functioning and implementation of the Agreement (the ‘Joint Committee’).

(3)

In order to contribute to the effective implementation of the Agreement, the rules of procedure of the Joint Committee should be adopted.

(4)

Pursuant to Article 41 of the Agreement, the Joint Committee may set up specialised working groups in order to assist it in the performance of its tasks.

(5)

Therefore, the position of the Union within the Joint Committee as regards the adoption of the rules of procedure of the Joint Committee and the setting up of specialised working groups should be based on the attached draft Decisions of the Joint Committee,

(a)

the adoption of the rules of procedure of the Joint Committee; and

(b)

the setting up of specialised working groups,

19.7.2016   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

L 193/38

(1)

The Agreement on the European Economic Area (2) (‘the EEA Agreement’) entered into force on 1 January 1994.

(2)

Pursuant to Article 98 and, in particular, Article 102 of the EEA Agreement, the EEA Joint Committee may decide to amend, inter alia, Annex IX to the EEA Agreement which contains provisions on financial services.

(3)

The following acts concern financial services and are to be incorporated into the EEA Agreement:

(4)

Annex IX to the EEA Agreement should therefore be amended accordingly.

(5)

The position of the Union within the EEA Joint Committee should therefore be based on the attached draft decisions,