(1)

As the single currency shared by the Member States of the euro area, the euro has become an important factor in the Union's economy and the everyday life of its citizens. However, since its introduction in 2002, as a currency continuously targeted by organised crime groups active in money counterfeiting, counterfeiting of the euro has caused financial damage of at least EUR 500 million. It is in the interests of the Union as a whole to oppose and pursue any activity that is likely to jeopardise the authenticity of the euro by counterfeiting.

(2)

Counterfeit money has a considerable ill-effect on society. It harms citizens and businesses that are not reimbursed for counterfeits even if received in good faith. It could lead to consumer concerns regarding the sufficient protection of cash and to the fear of receiving counterfeit notes and coins. It is therefore of fundamental importance to ensure trust and confidence in the authenticity of notes and coins for citizens, businesses and financial institutions in all Member States as well as in third countries.

(3)

It is essential to ensure that effective and efficient criminal law measures protect the euro and any other currency whose circulation is legally authorised in an appropriate way in all Member States.

(4)

Council Regulation (EC) No 974/98 (4) obliges the Member States whose currency is the euro to ensure adequate sanctions against counterfeiting and falsification of euro notes and coins.

(5)

Council Regulations (EC) No 1338/2001 (5) and (EC) No 1339/2001 (6) lay down measures necessary for the protection of the euro against counterfeiting, in particular measures to withdraw counterfeit euro notes and coins from circulation.

(6)

The International Convention for the Suppression of Counterfeiting Currency signed at Geneva on 20 April 1929 and its Protocol (the ‘Geneva Convention’) (7) lays down rules to effectively prevent, prosecute and punish the offence of counterfeiting currency. In particular, it aims at ensuring that severe criminal penalties and other sanctions can be imposed for offences of counterfeiting currency. All contracting parties to the Geneva Convention have to apply the principle of non-discrimination to currencies other than their domestic currency.

(7)

This Directive supplements the provisions and facilitates the application of the Geneva Convention by the Member States. To that end, it is important that the Member States are parties to the Geneva Convention.

(8)

This Directive builds on and updates Council Framework Decision 2000/383/JHA (8). It complements that Framework Decision with further provisions on the level of sanctions, on investigative tools and on the analysis, identification and detection of counterfeit euro notes and coins during judicial proceedings.

(9)

This Directive should protect any note and coin whose circulation is legally authorised, irrespective of whether it is made of paper, metal or any other material.

(10)

The protection of the euro and other currencies calls for a common definition of the criminal offences related to the currency counterfeiting as well as for common, effective, proportionate and dissuasive sanctions both for natural and legal persons. In order to ensure consistency with the Geneva Convention, this Directive should provide for the same offences to be punishable as in the Geneva Convention. Therefore, the production of counterfeit notes and coins and their distribution should be a criminal offence. Important preparatory work to those offences, for example the production of counterfeiting instruments and components, should be punished independently. The common aim of those definitions of offences should be to act as a deterrent to any handling of counterfeit notes and coins, instruments and other means for counterfeiting.

(11)

The misuse of legal facilities or material of authorised printers or mints for the production of unauthorised notes and coins for fraudulent use should also be a criminal offence. Such misuse covers the situation where a national central bank or mint or other authorised industry produces notes or coins exceeding the quota authorised by the European Central Bank (ECB). It also covers the situation where an employee of an authorised printer or mint abuses the facilities for his or her own purposes. That conduct should be punishable as a criminal offence even if the authorised quantities have not been exceeded, because the notes and coins produced would, once circulated, not be distinguishable from authorised currency.

(12)

Notes and coins which the ECB or the national central banks and mints have not yet formally issued should also fall under the protection of this Directive. Thus, for instance, euro coins with new national sides or new series of euro notes should be protected before they have officially been put into circulation.

(13)

Incitement, aiding and abetting and attempt to commit the main counterfeiting offences, including the misuse of legal facilities or material and including the counterfeiting of notes and coins not yet issued but designated for circulation, should also be penalised where appropriate. This Directive does not require Member States to render punishable an attempt to commit an offence relating to an instrument or component for counterfeiting.

(14)

Intention should be a part of all the elements constituting the offences laid down in this Directive.

(15)

Currency counterfeiting is traditionally a crime subject to a high level of sanctions in the Member States. That is due to the serious nature and the impact of the crime on citizens and businesses, and due to the need to ensure the trust of citizens and businesses in the genuine character of the euro and other currencies. That holds particularly true for the euro, which is the single currency of over 330 million people in the euro area and which is the second most important international currency.

(16)

Member States should provide for criminal sanctions in their national law in respect of the provisions of Union law on combating currency counterfeiting. Those sanctions should be effective, proportionate and dissuasive and should include imprisonment. The minimum level of the maximum term of imprisonment provided for in this Directive for the offences laid down herein should apply at least to the most serious forms of those offences.

(17)

The levels of the sanctions should be effective and dissuasive but should not go beyond what is proportionate to the offences. Although intentionally passing on counterfeit currency which has been received in good faith could be sanctioned with a different type of criminal sanction, including fines, in the national law of the Member States, those national laws should provide for imprisonment as a maximum sanction. Imprisonment sanctions for natural persons will serve as a strong deterrent for potential criminals, with effect all over the Union.

(18)

As this Directive establishes minimum rules, Member States can adopt or maintain more stringent rules for currency counterfeiting offences.

(19)

This Directive is without prejudice to the general rules and principles of national criminal law on the application and execution of sentences in accordance with the concrete circumstances in each individual case.

(20)

Since confidence in the genuine character of notes and coins can also be harmed or threatened by the conduct of legal persons, legal persons should be liable for the offences committed on their behalf.

(21)

To ensure the success of investigations and the prosecution of currency counterfeiting offences, those responsible for investigating and prosecuting such offences should have the possibility to make use of effective investigative tools such as those which are used in combating organised crime or other serious crimes. Such tools could, where appropriate, include, for example, the interception of communications, covert surveillance including electronic surveillance, the monitoring of bank accounts and other financial investigations. Taking into account, inter alia, the principle of proportionality, the use of such tools in accordance with national law should be commensurate with the nature and gravity of the offences under investigation. The right to the protection of personal data should be respected.

(22)

Member States should establish their jurisdiction in a manner consistent with the Geneva Convention and the provisions on jurisdiction in other Union criminal law, that is to say, over offences committed on their territory and over offences committed by their nationals, noting that in general offences are best dealt with by the criminal justice system of the country in which they occur.

(23)

The pre-eminent role of the euro for the economy and society of the Union, as well as the specific threat to the euro as a currency of worldwide importance as manifested by the existence of a considerable number of print-shops located in third countries, calls for an additional measure to protect it. Therefore, jurisdiction should be established over offences relating to the euro committed outside the territory of a given Member State if either the offender is in the territory of that Member State and is not extradited, or counterfeit euro notes or coins relating to the offence are detected in that Member State.

Given the objectively different situation of the Member States whose currency is the euro, it is appropriate that the obligation to establish such jurisdiction only applies to those Member States. For the purpose of prosecution of the offences laid down in point (a) of Article 3(1), Article 3(2) and (3), where they relate to point (a) of Article 3(1), as well as incitement, aiding and abetting, and attempt to commit those offences, jurisdiction should not be subordinated to the condition that the acts constitute an offence at the place where they were committed. When exercising such jurisdiction, Member States should take into account whether the offences are being dealt with by the criminal justice system of the country where they were committed, and should respect the principle of proportionality, in particular with regard to convictions by a third country for the same conduct.

(24)

For the euro, the identification of counterfeit euro notes and coins is centralised at the National Analysis Centres and the Coin National Analysis Centres respectively, which are designated or established in accordance with Regulation (EC) No 1338/2001. The analysis, identification and detection of counterfeit euro notes and coins should also be possible during on-going judicial proceedings in order to accelerate the detection of the source of production of counterfeits in a given criminal investigation or prosecution and to avoid and stop such types of counterfeits from further circulation, with due respect for the principle of a fair and effective trial. That would contribute to the efficiency of combating counterfeiting offences and would at the same time increase the number of transmissions of seized counterfeits during on-going criminal proceedings, subject to limited exceptions where only access to counterfeits should be provided. In general, the competent authorities should authorise the physical transmission of the counterfeits to the National Analysis Centres and Coin National Analysis Centres. In certain circumstances, for example where only a few counterfeit notes or coins constitute the evidence for the criminal proceedings, or where physical transmission would result in the risk of destruction of evidence, such as fingerprints, the competent authorities should instead be able to decide to give access to the notes and coins.

(25)

There is a need to collect comparable data on the offences laid down in this Directive. In order to gain a more complete picture of the problem of counterfeiting at Union level and thereby contribute to formulating a more effective response, Member States should transmit to the Commission relevant statistical data relating to the number of offences concerning counterfeit notes and coins and the number of persons prosecuted and sentenced.

(26)

In order to pursue the objective of fighting the counterfeiting of euro notes and coins, the conclusion of agreements with third countries, in particular those countries that use the euro as a currency, should be pursued in accordance with the relevant Treaty procedures.

(27)

This Directive respects fundamental rights and observes the principles recognised in particular by the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union and notably the right to liberty and security, the respect for private and family life, the freedom to choose an occupation and right to engage in work, the freedom to conduct a business, the right to property, the right to an effective remedy and to a fair trial, the presumption of innocence and right of defence, the principles of the legality and proportionality of criminal offences and penalties, as well as the right not to be tried or punished twice in criminal proceedings for the same criminal offence. This Directive seeks to ensure full respect for those rights and principles and should be implemented accordingly.

(28)

This Directive aims to amend and expand the provisions of Framework Decision 2000/383/JHA. Since the amendments to be made are of a substantial number and nature, that Framework Decision should in the interests of clarity be replaced in its entirety for the Member States bound by this Directive.

(29)

Since the objective of this Directive, namely to protect the euro and other currencies against counterfeiting, cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States but can rather, by reasons of its scale and effects, be better achieved at Union level, the Union may adopt the measures, in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity as set out in Article 5 of the Treaty on European Union (‘TEU’). In accordance with the principle of proportionality, as set out in that Article, this Directive does not go beyond what is necessary to achieve that objective.

(30)

In accordance with Articles 1 and 2 of Protocol No 22 on the position of Denmark annexed to the TEU and to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (‘TFEU’), Denmark is not taking part in the adoption of this Directive and is not bound by it or subject to its application.

(31)

In accordance with Article 3 of Protocol No 21 on the position of the United Kingdom and Ireland in respect of the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice, annexed to the TEU and to the TFEU, Ireland has notified its wish to take part in the adoption and application of this Directive.

(32)

In accordance with Articles 1, 2 and 4a(1) of Protocol No 21 on the position of the United Kingdom and Ireland in respect of the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice, annexed to the TEU and to the TFEU, and without prejudice to Article 4 of that Protocol, the United Kingdom is not taking part in the adoption of this Directive and is not bound by it or subject to its application,

(1)

Relations between the European Union and the Republic of Tunisia (‘Tunisia’) are developing within the framework of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP). The Euro-Med Association Agreement between the European Communities and their Member States, on the one hand, and Tunisia, on the other hand (2) (‘the EU-Tunisia Association Agreement’), entered into force on 1 March 1998. Under the EU-Tunisia Association Agreement, Tunisia finalised dismantling tariffs for industrial products in 2008, thereby making Tunisia the first Southern Mediterranean country to enter into a free trade area with the Union. Bilateral political dialogue and economic cooperation have been further developed within the framework of ENP Action Plans, of which the most recent under discussion would cover the period 2013-2017.

(2)

Tunisia's economy has been significantly affected by domestic events related to the events in the Southern Mediterranean since the end of 2010, known as the ‘Arab Spring’, and by the regional unrest that followed, particularly in neighbouring Libya. Those events and the weak global economic environment, in particular the recession in the euro area, which is Tunisia's main trading and financial partner, have had a very negative impact on the Tunisian economy, leading to a slowdown in growth and generating large external and budgetary financing gaps.

(3)

Following the ousting of President Ben Ali on 14 January 2011, Tunisia's first free and democratic elections took place on 23 October 2011. A National Constituent Assembly has been in place since then, and although the political transition has not been without difficulties, there have been concerted efforts by the main political actors to proceed with reforms towards a fully-fledged democratic system.

(4)

The Constitution adopted by the National Constituent Assembly of Tunisia includes some advances in the field of individual rights and freedoms and gender equality, which set Tunisia on the path towards democracy and the rule of law.

(5)

Since the Arab Spring began, the Union has, on various occasions, declared its commitment to supporting Tunisia in its economic and political reform process. That commitment was reaffirmed in November 2012, in the conclusions of the meeting of the Association Council between the Union and Tunisia. The Union's political and economic support for Tunisia's reform process is consistent with the Union's policy towards the Southern Mediterranean region, as set out in the context of the ENP.

(6)

In line with the Joint Declaration by the European Parliament and the Council adopted together with Decision No 778/2013/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council (3), Union macro-financial assistance should be an exceptional financial instrument of untied and undesignated balance-of-payments support, which aims at restoring a beneficiary's sustainable external finance situation and should underpin the implementation of a policy programme containing strong adjustment and structural reform measures designed to improve the balance of payment position, in particular over the programme period, and reinforce the implementation of relevant agreements and programmes with the Union.

(7)

In April 2013, the Tunisian authorities and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) agreed on a non-precautionary three-year Stand-By-Arrangement (‘IMF programme’) of SDR 1 146 million (Special Drawing Rights) in support of Tunisia's economic adjustment and reform programme. The objectives of the IMF programme are consistent with the purpose of the Union macro-financial assistance, namely to alleviate short-term balance of payment difficulties, and the implementation of strong adjustment measures is consistent with the aim of Union macro-financial assistance.

(8)

The Union has made available EUR 290 million in grants for the period 2011-2013 under its regular cooperation programme in support of Tunisia's economic and political reform agenda. In addition, EUR 155 million has been allocated to Tunisia for the period 2011-2013 under the ‘Support for partnership, reforms and inclusive growth’ (SPRING) programme.

(9)

In August 2013, in view of the worsening economic situation and outlook, Tunisia requested Union macro-financial assistance.

(10)

Given that Tunisia is a country covered by the ENP, it should be considered to be eligible to receive Union macro-financial assistance.

(11)

Given that there is still a significant residual external financing gap in Tunisia's balance of payments over and above the resources provided by the IMF and other multilateral institutions, and despite the implementation of strong economic stabilisation and reform programmes by Tunisia, the Union macro-financial assistance to be provided to Tunisia (‘the Union's macro-financial assistance’) is, under the current exceptional circumstances, considered to be an appropriate response to Tunisia's request to support economic stabilisation in conjunction with the IMF programme. The Union's macro-financial assistance would support the economic stabilisation and the structural reform agenda of Tunisia, supplementing resources made available under the IMF financial arrangement.

(12)

The Union's macro-financial assistance should aim to support the restoration of a sustainable external financing situation for Tunisia thereby supporting its economic and social development.

(13)

The determination of the amount of the Union's macro-financial assistance is based on a complete quantitative assessment of Tunisia's residual external financing needs, and takes into account its capacity to finance itself with its own resources, in particular the international reserves at its disposal. The Union's macro-financial assistance should complement the programmes and resources provided by the IMF and the World Bank. The determination of the amount of the assistance also takes into account expected financial contributions from multilateral donors and the need to ensure fair burden sharing between the Union and other donors, as well as the pre-existing deployment of the Union's other external financing instruments in Tunisia and the added value of the overall Union involvement.

(14)

The Commission should ensure that the Union's macro-financial assistance is legally and substantially in line with the key principles, objectives and measures taken within the different areas of external action and other relevant Union policies.

(15)

The Union's macro-financial assistance should support the Union's external policy towards Tunisia. Commission services and the European External Action Service should work closely together throughout the macro-financial assistance operation in order to coordinate, and to ensure the consistency of, Union external policy.

(16)

The Union's macro-financial assistance should support Tunisia's commitment to values shared with the Union, including democracy, the rule of law, good governance, respect for human rights, sustainable development and poverty reduction, as well as its commitment to the principles of open, rule-based and fair trade.

(17)

A pre-condition for granting the Union's macro-financial assistance should be that Tunisia respects effective democratic mechanisms, including a multi-party parliamentary system and the rule of law, and guarantees respect for human rights. In addition, the specific objectives of the Union's macro-financial assistance should strengthen the efficiency, transparency and accountability of the public finance management systems in Tunisia and promote structural reforms aimed at supporting sustainable and inclusive growth, employment creation and fiscal consolidation. Both fulfilment of the pre-condition and the achievement of those objectives should be regularly monitored by the Commission.

(18)

In order to ensure that the Union's financial interests linked to the Union's macro-financial assistance are protected efficiently, Tunisia should take appropriate measures relating to the prevention of, and fight against, fraud, corruption and any other irregularities linked to the assistance. In addition, provision should be made for the Commission to carry out checks and for the Court of Auditors to carry out audits.

(19)

Release of the Union's macro-financial assistance is without prejudice to the powers of the European Parliament and of the Council.

(20)

The amounts of the provision required for the Union's macro-financial assistance should be consistent with the budgetary appropriations provided for in the multi-annual financial framework.

(21)

The Union's macro-financial assistance should be managed by the Commission. In order to ensure that the European Parliament and the Council are able to follow the implementation of this Decision, the Commission should regularly inform them of developments relating to the assistance and provide them with relevant documents.

(22)

In order to ensure uniform conditions for the implementation of this Decision, implementing powers should be conferred on the Commission. Those powers should be exercised in accordance with Regulation (EU) No 182/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council (4).

(23)

The Union's macro-financial assistance should be subject to economic policy conditions, to be laid down in a Memorandum of Understanding. In order to ensure uniform conditions of implementation and for reasons of efficiency, the Commission should be empowered to negotiate such conditions with the Tunisian authorities under the supervision of the committee of representatives of the Member States in accordance with Regulation (EU) No 182/2011. Under that Regulation, the advisory procedure should, as a general rule, apply in all cases other than as provided for in that Regulation. Considering the potentially important impact of assistance of more than EUR 90 million, it is appropriate that the examination procedure be used for operations above that threshold. Considering the amount of the Union's macro-financial assistance to Tunisia, the examination procedure should apply to the adoption of the Memorandum of Understanding, and to any reduction, suspension or cancellation of the assistance,

(1)

Article 8(3) of Council Decision 2013/34/CFSP of 17 January 2013 on a European Union military mission to contribute to the training of the Malian Armed Forces (EUTM Mali) (1) provides that detailed arrangements regarding the participation of third States shall be covered by agreements concluded pursuant to Article 37 of the Treaty on European Union and in accordance with the procedure laid down in Article 218 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union.

(2)

On 10 February 2014, the Council adopted a Decision authorising the opening of negotiations for a Participation Agreement between the European Union and the Swiss Confederation on the participation of the Swiss Confederation in the European Union military mission to contribute to the training of the Malian armed forces (EUTM Mali), (‘the Agreement’).

(3)

The Agreement should be approved,

—

Council Decision 2013/34/CFSP of 17 January 2013 on a European Union military mission to contribute to the training of the Malian Armed Forces (EUTM Mali) (1),

—

the letter dated 18 September 2013 from the Head of the Federal Department of Foreign Affairs of the Swiss Confederation, offering a contribution to the European Union military mission to contribute to the training of the Malian Armed Forces (EUTM Mali) limited to a civilian capacity,

—

Political and Security Committee Decision EUTM Mali/3/2013 of 12 November 2013 on the acceptance of third States' contributions to the European Union military mission to contribute to the training of the Malian Armed Forces (EUTM Mali) (2),

—

Political and Security Committee Decision EUTM Mali/2/2013 of 12 November 2013 on the establishment of the Committee of Contributors for the European Union military mission to contribute to the training of the Malian Armed Forces (EUTM Mali) (3),

(1)

Implementing Regulation (EU) No 543/2011 lays down, pursuant to the outcome of the Uruguay Round multilateral trade negotiations, the criteria whereby the Commission fixes the standard values for imports from third countries, in respect of the products and periods stipulated in Annex XVI, Part A thereto.

(2)

The standard import value is calculated each working day, in accordance with Article 136(1) of Implementing Regulation (EU) No 543/2011, taking into account variable daily data. Therefore this Regulation should enter into force on the day of its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union,

(1)

On 22 May 2013, the Council adopted Decision 2013/233/CFSP (1) establishing the European Union Integrated Border Management Assistance Mission in Libya (EUBAM Libya). Decision 2013/233/CFSP expires on 21 May 2015. The financial reference amount set therein covers the period from 22 May 2013 until 21 May 2014.

(2)

Decision 2013/233/CFSP should be amended to extend the period covered by the financial reference amount until 21 May 2015.

(3)

EUBAM Libya will be conducted in the context of a situation which may deteriorate and could impede the achievement of the objectives of the Union's external action as set out in Article 21 of the Treaty,