20.11.2009   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

L 306/1

20.11.2009   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

L 306/3

(1)

Council Regulation (EC) No 43/2009 of 16 January 2009 fixing for 2009 the fishing opportunities and associated conditions for certain fish stocks and groups of fish stocks applicable in Community waters and for Community vessels, in waters where catch limitations are required (3), lays down quotas for 2009.

(2)

According to the information received by the Commission, catches of the stock referred to in the Annex to this Regulation by vessels flying the flag of or registered in the Member State referred to therein have exhausted the quota allocated for 2009.

(3)

It is therefore necessary to prohibit fishing for that stock and its retention on board, transhipment and landing,

20.11.2009   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

L 306/5

(1)

In accordance with Article 2 of Commission Regulation (EEC) No 3149/92 of 29 October 1992 laying down detailed rules for the supply of food from intervention stocks for the benefit of the most deprived persons in the Community (3), the Commission should adopt a distribution plan to be financed from resources available in the 2010 budget year. That plan should lay down, in particular, for each of the Member States applying the measure, the maximum financial resources available to carry out its part of the plan, and the quantity of each type of product to be withdrawn from the stocks held by the intervention agencies.

(2)

The Member States involved in the distribution plan for the 2010 budget year have supplied the Commission with the information required in accordance with Article 1 of Regulation (EEC) No 3149/92.

(3)

For the purposes of resource allocation, account must be taken of experience and of the degree to which the Member States used the resources allocated to them in previous years.

(4)

Point 1(c) of Article 2(3) of Regulation (EEC) No 3149/92 provides for the allocation of resources for the purchase on the market of products temporarily unavailable in intervention stocks. Given that the stocks of cereals currently held by the intervention agencies are not sufficient to cover the allocations corresponding to the requests for cereals and rice, resource allocations should be fixed to enable the purchase on the market of cereals or rice as required to implement the distribution plan for the 2010 budget year.

(5)

Article 7(1) of Regulation (EEC) No 3149/92 provides for the transfer between Member States of products unavailable in the intervention stocks of the Member State in which such products are required to implement the annual distribution plan. Accordingly, the intra-Community transfers necessary to implement that plan for 2010 should be authorised, subject to the conditions laid down in Article 7 of Regulation (EEC) No 3149/92.

(6)

Article 7(3) of Regulation (EEC) No 3149/92 provides the option, in cases where transfer of products from the Member State in which they are held in intervention to another Member State is foreseen, for operators to submit a bid without transferring the products released from intervention stocks to the applicant Member State. Article 25 of Regulation (EC) No 1234/2007 provides that disposal of products bought into public intervention should take place in such a way as to avoid disturbances in the market.

(7)

Due to the current market situation in the dairy sector, which is marked by low price levels, the use of the option provided in Article 7(3) of Regulation (EEC) No 3149/92 should not be allowed in the 2010 distribution plan for butter and skimmed milk powder in order to avoid possible disturbances in the market following the release of those products in certain markets that are already well supplied. For the same reason, the use of the possibilities offered to operators in paragraphs 2 and 2a of Article 4 of that Regulation should be limited so that dairy products intended for distribution to the most deprived persons in the Community comply with certain requirements concerning their composition and quantity of milk used in their manufacturing. In order to monitor the compliance with that rule, the Member States should provide in their progress reports a detailed list of distributed products placed under the categories ‘high fat content’ or ‘other’.

(8)

In order to ensure that the dairy products from the intervention stocks do not enter the market at an inappropriate moment during the year, the time period provided in the third subparagraph of Article 3(2) of Regulation (EEC) No 3149/92 during which butter and skimmed milk powder may be withdrawn from the intervention stocks should be shortened.

(9)

Taking into account the complexity of the implementation of the 2010 distribution plan requiring a high volume of intra-Community transfers, it is appropriate to increase the 5 % margin provided in Article 3(3) of Regulation (EEC) No 3149/92.

(10)

To implement the annual distribution plan, the operative event within the meaning of Article 3 of Regulation (EC) No 2799/98 should be the date on which the financial year for administration of stocks in public storage starts.

(11)

In accordance with Article 2(2) of Regulation (EEC) No 3149/92, the Commission has consulted the major organisations familiar with the problems of the most deprived persons in the Community when drawing up the annual distribution plan.

(12)

Article 2(1) of Regulation (EEC) No 3149/92 provides that the Commission adopts the annual distribution plan before 1 October of each year. Due to the current market situation in the dairy sector and taking into account the need for further consultations with the Member States on their requests, it still has not been possible for the Commission to adopt the distribution plan. Therefore, in order to ensure timely execution of the annual distribution plan this Regulation should enter into force immediately after its publication.

(13)

The Management Committee for the Common Organisation of Agricultural Markets has not delivered an opinion within the time limit set by its Chair,

20.11.2009   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

L 306/14

(1)

Quantities covered by applications for import licences submitted to the competent authorities from 1 to 7 November 2009 in accordance with Regulation (EC) No 891/2009, are equal to the quantity available under order number 09.4321.

(2)

Submission of further applications for licences for order number 09.4321 should be suspended until the end of the marketing year, in accordance with Regulation (EC) No 891/2009,

20.11.2009   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

L 306/16

(1)

Article 162(1) of Regulation (EC) No 1234/2007 provides that the difference between prices on the world market for the products listed in Part XVI of Annex I to that Regulation and prices for those products on the Community market may be covered by an export refund.

(2)

Given the present situation on the market in milk and milk products, export refunds should be fixed in accordance with the rules and certain criteria provided for in Articles 162, 163, 164, 167, 169 and 170 of Regulation (EC) No 1234/2007.

(3)

Article 164(1) of Regulation (EC) No 1234/2007 provides that export refunds may vary according to destination, especially where the world market situation, the specific requirements of certain markets or obligations resulting from agreements concluded in accordance with Article 300 of the Treaty make this necessary.

(4)

Export refunds for the Dominican Republic have been differentiated to take into account the reduced custom duties applied on imports under the import tariff quota under the Memorandum of Understanding between the European Community and the Dominican Republic on import protection for milk powder in the Dominican Republic (2), approved by Council Decision 98/486/EC (3). Due to a changed market situation in the Dominican Republic, characterised by increased competition for milk powder, the quota is no longer fully used. In order to maximise the use of the quota, the differentiation of export refunds for the Dominican Republic should be abolished.

(5)

The Management Committee for the Common Organisation of Agricultural Markets has not delivered an opinion within the time limit set by its Chair,

20.11.2009   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

L 306/20

(1)

Commission Regulation (EC) No 619/2008 of 27 June 2008 opening a standing invitation to tender for export refunds concerning certain milk products (2) provides for a standing invitation to tender procedure.

(2)

Pursuant to Article 6 of Commission Regulation (EC) No 1454/2007 of 10 December 2007 laying down common rules for establishing a tender procedure for fixing export refunds for certain agricultural products (3) and following an examination of the tenders submitted in response to the invitation to tender, it is appropriate not to grant any refund for the tendering period ending on 17 November 2009.

(3)

The Management Committee for the Common Organisation of Agricultural Markets has not delivered an opinion within the time limit set by its Chair,

20.11.2009   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

L 306/21

(1)

Commission Regulation (EC) No 1484/95 (3) lays down detailed rules for implementing the system of additional import duties and fixes representative prices for poultrymeat and egg products and for egg albumin.

(2)

Regular monitoring of the data used to determine representative prices for poultrymeat and egg products and for egg albumin shows that the representative import prices for certain products should be amended to take account of variations in price according to origin. The representative prices should therefore be published.

(3)

In view of the situation on the market, this amendment should be applied as soon as possible.

(4)

The measures provided for in this Regulation are in accordance with the opinion of the Management Committee for the Common Organisation of Agricultural Markets,

20.11.2009   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

L 306/23

(1)

Article 162(1)b of Regulation (EC) No 1234/2007 provides that the difference between prices in international trade for the products referred to in Article 1(1)(p) and listed in Part XVI of Annex I to that Regulation and prices within the Community may be covered by an export refund where these goods are exported in the form of goods listed in Part IV of Annex XX to that Regulation.

(2)

Commission Regulation (EC) No 1043/2005 of 30 June 2005 implementing Council Regulation (EC) No 3448/93 as regards the system of granting export refunds on certain agricultural products exported in the form of goods not covered by Annex I to the Treaty, and the criteria for fixing the amount of such refunds (2), specifies the products for which a rate of refund is to be fixed, to be applied where these products are exported in the form of goods listed in Part IV of Annex XX to Regulation (EC) No 1234/2007.

(3)

In accordance with the second paragraph, subparagraph (a) of Article 14 of Regulation (EC) No 1043/2005, the rate of the refund per 100 kilograms for each of the basic products in question is to be fixed for a period of the same duration as that for which refunds are fixed for the same products exported unprocessed.

(4)

Article 162(2) of Regulation (EC) No 1234/2007 lays down that the export refund for a product contained in a good may not exceed the refund applicable to that product when exported without further processing.

(5)

In the case of certain milk products exported in the form of goods not covered by Annex I to the Treaty, there is a danger that, if high refund rates are fixed in advance, the commitments entered into in relation to those refunds may be jeopardised. In order to avert that danger, it is therefore necessary to take appropriate precautionary measures, but without precluding the conclusion of long-term contracts. The fixing of specific refund rates for the advance fixing of refunds in respect of those products should enable those two objectives to be met.

(6)

Article 15(2) of Regulation (EC) No 1043/2005 provides that, when the rate of the refund is being fixed, account is to be taken, where appropriate, of aids or other measures having equivalent effect applicable in all Member States in accordance with the Regulation on the common organisation of the agricultural markets to the basic products listed in Annex I to Regulation (EC) No 1043/2005 or to assimilated products.

(7)

Article 100(1) of Regulation (EC) No 1234/2007 provides for the payment of aid for Community-produced skimmed milk processed into casein if such milk and the casein manufactured from it fulfil certain conditions.

(8)

The Management Committee for the Common Organisation of Agricultural Markets has not delivered an opinion within the time limit set by its Chair,

20.11.2009   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

L 306/26

(1)

By letters dated 2 August 2002 (2) and 23 August 2003 (3), a privately owned Austrian bus company filed a complaint with the Commission regarding alleged State aid granted in 2002 by the Tyrolean public transport authority (Verkehrsverbund Tirol GmbH, hereinafter: Verkehrsverbund Tirol) to its publicly owned competitor Postbus AG (hereinafter Postbus). By letter dated 14 July 2005 (4), the Commission requested information from Austria regarding this complaint. By letter dated 3 October 2005 (5), Austria provided the Commission with the information requested.

(2)

By letter dated 30 May 2007 (6), the Commission informed Austria that it had decided to initiate the procedure laid down in Article 88(2) of the EC Treaty in respect of the measure in question.

(3)

The Commission decision to initiate the procedure was published in the Official Journal of the European Union. The Commission invited third parties to submit their comments (7).

(4)

Austria submitted its observations by letter dated 18 July 2007 (8).

(5)

By letter dated 24 July 2007 (9) the complainant informed the Commission that it was no longer interested in pursuing the matter.

(6)

The Commission received no comments from other third parties.

(7)

Verkehrsverbund Tirol is a publicly owned company governed by private law. Similar bodies exist in all other regions and are commonly referred to as Verkehrsverbundgesellschaften. These bodies are responsible for planning and coordinating bus transport within their respective region. According to the Bundesgesetz über die Ordnung des öffentlichen Personennah- und Regionalverkehrs (Federal act on the organisation of local and regional public passenger transport, hereafter: ÖPNRV-G), these bodies receive annual grants from the respective Bundesland in order to ensure adequate public passenger transport in the region.

(8)

On 12 July 2002Verkehrsverbund Tirol and Postbus agreed on a public service contract for public passenger transport on the bus routes numbered 5002, 5008, 5010, 5012, 5014, 5050 and 5052 in the district of Lienz.

(9)

Under Austrian administrative law, a bus operator needs to hold a licence in order to be allowed to operate a bus route. The award of the licence is independent of the conclusion of a public service contract.

(10)

Postbus already held the licences to operate the seven routes covered by the contract prior to the conclusion of the public service contract. Postbus had applied for the licences on its own initiative, without being sure of receiving compensation. Therefore, the routes in question are considered under Austrian legislation as being operated ‘eigenwirtschaftlich’ (in the commercial interest). The distinction between eigenwirtschaftlich and gemeinwirtschaftlich (in the common interest) is important under Austrian public procurement rules, as only public service contracts for routes operated as gemeinwirtschaftlich are subject to public procurement rules. Therefore, the public service contract which is the object of the present decision was awarded without a public procurement procedure.

(11)

The contract covers the provision of bus transport services by Postbus in return for remuneration. It entered into force retroactively on 1 January 2002 and was concluded for an indefinite period. Each of the parties has the right to terminate the contract subject to six months’ notice as from December 2006.

(12)

To calculate the remuneration, the contract distinguishes between Bestellleistungen and Bestandsleistungen.

(13)

The contract defines Bestellleistungen as the core provision of bus transport services for which fixed compensation is paid. Part IV(3) of the contract provides that 204 807 km are accounted for by the Bestellleistungen. Part XIII of the contract provides that Postbus receives an annual payment of EUR 527 000, plus VAT. Payment is made in twelve instalments spread over the year.

(14)

The contract defines Bestandsleistungen as the provision of bus transport services for which compensation is paid which is the sum of three different components. Part IV(3) of the contract provides that 952 761 km are accounted for by the Bestandsleistungen. Part X(2) fixes the payment for the Bestandsleistungen at EUR 1 690 000 for the year 2002. Part X(3) provides that this remuneration is made up as follows:

(15)

For the first year of the contract, the Verbundabgeltung is fixed at EUR 1 690 000 minus the revenue from ticket sales and minus the compensation for fare obligations. At the time of concluding the contract, the parties did not yet know what revenue there would be from the compensation for fare obligations. The contract therefore does not fix the absolute amount of the Verbundabgeltung.

(16)

The cost paid by Verkehrsverbund Tirol to Postbus for 2002 was therefore EUR 2 217 000 (including the proceeds returned from ticket sales). In return, Postbus was obliged to provide 1 157 568 km of bus services based on the timetables and routes set out in the contract. The average price paid per kilometre was EUR 1,92.

(17)

The distinction between Bestellleistungen and Bestandsleistungen is primarily due to the historical development of the ÖPNRV-G, which lays down the arrangements for the organisation and funding of local public transport in the rural parts of Austria.

(18)

Section 10(1) ÖPNRV-G provides that bus transport companies owned by the Austrian State, such as Postbus, can claim compensation for their operating losses on public transport (Alteinnahmegarantie) from the Federal Government up to 1 June 1999.

(19)

For the period starting on 1 June 1999, the Federal Government will pay an amount equivalent to the sum paid each year under the Alteinnahmegarantie to the regional bodies responsible for the organisation of public transport, the Verkehrsverbundgesellschaften. The latter use these sums to commission bus transport services from bus companies. Before commissioning these services, the Verkehrsverbundgesellschaften have to plan the public transport in their region in accordance with sections 11, 20 and 31 ÖPNRV-G, which define the economic and quality-related criteria with which public transport must comply (section 10(2) ÖPNRV-G).

(20)

As from 2001, the Federal Government will reduce the amounts it pays to the Verkehrsverbundgesellschaften by one fifth each year (section 10(3) ÖPNRV-G).

(21)

Sections 14 et seq. ÖPNRV-G lay down the requirements for the setting-up and organisation of the Verkehrsverbundgesellschaften. In particular, section 19(1) ÖPNRV-G requires the Verkehrsverbundgesellschaften to replace the Alteinnahmegarantie system by a system of public service contracts within a period of five years starting in 1999.

(22)

Prior to signing the public service contract, Verkehrsverbund Tirol used three different methods to verify whether the public service compensation provided for in the contract was justified. The three methods were: costs per kilometre (Prüfung nach Kilometersätzen), costs per cost item (Prüfung nach Kostensätzen) and costs according to the different cost categories (Prüfung nach Einzelkostenpositionen).

(23)

In its decision to initiate the procedure, the Commission raised doubts as to whether the public service contract concluded between Verkehrsverbund Tirol and Postbus met the second of the so-called Altmark criteria (10). The four Altmark criteria being cumulative, it has not assessed in detail whether the third and fourth criteria are fulfilled, but concluded that the presence of State aid cannot be excluded.

(24)

With respect to possible compatibility of such State aid with the common market, the decision to initiate the procedure considers that the aid may be compatible with the common market on the basis of Article 73 of the EC Treaty and Article 14 of Regulation (EEC) No 1191/69 of the Council of 26 June 1969 on action by Member States concerning the obligation inherent in the concept of a public service in transport by rail, road and inland waterway (11). In particular, the Commission considered that the amount of compensation paid to Postbus appeared not to exceed what was necessary to cover the costs incurred in the discharge of the public service obligations of the contract, taking into account the related receipts and a reasonable profit for discharging the obligations.

(25)

However, the Commission considered that, since there was no public tender, and a direct competitor of Postbus alleged that Postbus was receiving overcompensation, the competitor in question and all other interested third parties should be given the opportunity to comment on the methods used by Austria to check costs and avoid overcompensation before taking a definitive view on whether Postbus was receiving overcompensation or not. On these grounds, the Commission raised doubts as to whether Postbus received overcompensation for providing a public service under a public service contract.

(26)

The comments of Austria concern:

(27)

Austria considers that Article 73 of the EC Treaty and Regulation (EEC) No 1191/69, which is based on it, constitute a lex specialis to Article 87(1) of the EC Treaty. Therefore, whenever a public service contract meets the criteria set out in Article 14 of Regulation (EEC) No 1191/69, there is no State aid, and therefore no need to assess the public service contract in question under Article 87(1) of the EC Treaty and the Altmark criteria. Austria bases this interpretation on point 37 of the Altmark judgement, which states:

‘The first point to examine is whether Regulation (EEC) No 1191/69 is applicable to the transport services at issue in the main proceedings. Only if that is not the case will the application of the general provisions of the Treaty on State aid to the subsidies at issue in the main proceedings have to be considered.’

(28)

Austria argues that even if Council Regulation (EEC) No 1191/69 does not address the existence of State aid, but merely its compatibility with the common market, the public service contract concluded between Verkehrsverbund Tirol and Postbus in any event meets the four Altmark criteria.

(29)

As far as the second Altmark criterion is concerned, Austria explains that both the remuneration for the Bestellleistungen and the remuneration for the Bestandsleistungen have been established in advance in an objective and transparent manner. With respect to the Bestellleistungen, Austria explains that the contract is a net contract, whereby Postbus receives a fixed price for each bus kilometre driven of EUR 2,57/km (12). Therefore, the price had been fixed in advance, using the objective and transparent criterion of the ‘price per km driven’.

(30)

With respect to the Bestandsleistungen, Austria explains that the price had also been agreed in advance by the parties as a fixed price, namely EUR 1 690 000 for 952 761 km to be driven. What had not been fixed in advance was the exact split between the three components of payment, namely ticketing revenues, compensation for tariff obligations and compensation for integrated transport systems. Austria explains that the explanation lies in the very nature of the three components, two of which depend on the number of passengers transported, the third one being the difference between the total agreed price and the sum of the first two elements.

(31)

Also in this regard, Austria concludes that the contract is a net contract, whereby Postbus receives a fixed price for each bus kilometre driven of EUR 1,77/km, and that therefore, the price had been fixed in advance, using the objective and transparent criterion of the ‘price per km driven’.

(32)

Austria argues that Verkehrsverbund Tirol ruled out the possibility of overcompensation being paid to Postbus by checking the price paid to Postbus per kilometre against the industry average, using three different methods: a check per cost per kilometre; a check of costs per cost item; and a check of costs according to different cost categories.

(33)

In its reply to the decision to initiate the procedure, Austria provided the Commission with further information regarding two of the methods used to check costs for providing transport services and avoid overcompensation, namely the checking of costs per cost item and the checking of costs according to different cost categories. It considers that no further explanation is necessary with regard to the checking of costs per kilometre (13).

(34)

Austria considers that these three cost checks ensure compliance with both the third Altmark criterion (absence of overcompensation) and the fourth Altmark criterion (average, well-run undertaking).

(35)

Through the method ‘checking of costs per item’, Verkehrsverbund Tirol compared the costs per item of Postbus with the average costs in the industry sector.

(36)

Based on the average costs in the industry sector, Postbus should meet the following cost targets for the public service contract in the Lienz district:

(37)

Austria provides the following detailed explanation for these cost items.

(38)

Austria based the calculation of personnel costs on 54 290 driving hours (Lenkerstunden) for scheduled route operation. Austria clarified that this amount is based on the number of kilometres needed to operate according to the schedule including dwell-time, but excluding round-trips to terminal bus stops/garages, rest periods etc. According to Austria, at 21 km per hour Verkehrsverbund Tirol assumed a relatively high number of driven kilometres per hour (15), as the average for Austria is 16-18 km per hour.

(39)

Austria stated that the gross hourly rate for a driving hour (including all duties, taxes, garage, maintenance, administration and additional personnel costs) is valued at EUR […]. This amount is composed as follows: the 2002 Austrian collective agreement for employees in private-law governed bus undertakings provided for a net average hourly rate of EUR 7,55. To this amount, one has to add as a first step surcharges for Sunday and holiday work; overtime payment; taxes and social security. If these additional costs are taken into consideration, the average hourly rate is EUR 16,30.

(40)

On top of this hourly rate, there is an additional charge of approximately […] % for the costs of personnel for garage services, planning and administration. Taking into account these overheads, one hour of bus operation generates costs of EUR […].

(41)

Multiplication of the annual number of driving hours by the average hourly rate results in total personnel costs of EUR […] (16).

(42)

Concerning the costs for fuel and maintenance, Verkehrsverbund Tirol assumes there will be a cost of EUR […] for every scheduled kilometre (1 157 568 km), which totals EUR […]. This amount includes all vehicle-related costs, except costs for financing, depreciation and controlling.

(43)

Austria explains its calculation in detail. It is based on the assumption that, for the routes in the district of Lienz, four 15-metre buses with a fuel consumption of 45 l/100 km and twenty-one 12-metre buses with a fuel consumption of 36 l/100 km will be needed. The total estimated fuel consumption of this fleet is 478 000 litres. Based on a diesel price of EUR […]/litre, the total fuel costs are therefore EUR […].

(44)

Maintenance costs are estimated at EUR […] per bus (personnel and material costs), totalling EUR […] for 25 buses. The costs for fuel and maintenance together equal EUR […].

(45)

This is already more than the EUR […] that had been taken as a benchmark. Therefore, the Austrian authorities conclude that the cost item ‘fuel and maintenance’ is a very conservative estimate.

(46)

The costs for the purchase and depreciation of vehicles of EUR […] are based on the following assumptions:

(47)

Based on these assumptions, the annual costs for purchase and depreciation of vehicles are EUR […] (17).

(48)

Concerning the administrative costs of EUR […], Verkehrsverbund Tirol assumed […] % of all the other costs per cost item for its calculations (18). This amount covers the office rental fee and office equipment.

(49)

The check of costs according to the different cost categories is a calculation of plausibility of the different cost categories. Verkehrsverbund Tirol has established the following costs as a benchmark:

(50)

These benchmarks are again explained in more detail.

(51)

Verkehrsverbund Tirol based the calculation of driver costs on 28 drivers which, according to Austria, is a low base figure for 25 buses, if holidays, non-working periods due to sick leave etc. are taken into account. Although the Austrian collective agreement for employees in private-law governed bus undertakings provides for an annual gross wage of EUR […] (without any surcharges or taxes), Verkehrsverbund Tirol assumed only EUR […]. Hence, the personnel costs amount to EUR […].

(52)

Concerning the other personnel costs for the personnel in administration, planning and garage services, Verkehrsverbund Tirol assumed an annual gross wage of EUR […] per employee. The number of employees was set at 8. Thus, other personnel costs account for EUR […].

(53)

The vehicle costs are based on the same assumption as used for the check of costs per item.

(54)

Concerning the fuel costs, Verkehrsverbund Tirol based the calculation on a fuel consumption of 465 000 litres. The average price for fuel was assumed to be EUR […] per litre. Therefore, the overall fuel costs are EUR […] (18).

(55)

With regard to tyre costs, Verkehrsverbund Tirol assumed a purchase price of EUR […] for 2 pairs of tyres every year for 25 buses, resulting in costs of EUR […].

(56)

The material costs for vehicles, maintenance, insurance, tax etc., are estimated to be about EUR […] per year. This includes insurance for every vehicle at about EUR […] per year and material costs of EUR […] per kilometre driven. Maintenance for 25 buses totals EUR […] per year. The rent for garage space with a surface area of 1 500 m2 is EUR […] per year.

(57)

The administrative costs are estimated to be about EUR […] per month, hence EUR […] per year.

(58)

Austria concludes that Verkehrsverbund Tirol has assessed the price paid to Postbus against adequate, realistic and conservative estimates of how much an average bus undertaking would have spent for executing a comparable contract. Austria underlines that the price paid to Postbus, namely EUR 2 217 000, is well within the range between the two cost checks, which give results of EUR 2 224 965 and EUR 2 205 619 respectively.

(59)

Therefore, Austria considers that the likelihood of overcompensation being paid to Postbus can be ruled out, and that the price paid to Postbus corresponds to the price that an average, well-run undertaking adequately equipped with means of transport would have demanded to provide the transport services in question.

(60)

For the reasons set out in section 3.3, Austria considers that the public service contract also fully complies with Article 14 of Regulation (EEC) No 1191/69.

(61)

First of all, Austria’s argument that Article 87(1) of the EC Treaty does not apply to a public service contract covered by Regulation (EEC) No 1191/69 must be rejected.

(62)

Amongst other things, Regulation (EEC) No 1191/69 enables certain aid granted by Member States in the form of compensation for the imposition of a public service obligation to be deemed to be compatible with the common market and exempts Member States from the requirement in Article 88(3) to notify the aid to the Commission before it is granted.

(63)

However, the State aid rules in Regulation (EEC) No 1191/69 apply only to measures which constitute State aid within the meaning of Article 87(1) of the EC Treaty. In other words, Regulation (EEC) No 1191/69 is concerned with compatibility.

(64)

It is therefore necessary, in the first instance, to consider whether the payments provided for in the contract between Postbus and Verkehrsverbund Tirol constitute State aid within the meaning of Article 87(1) of the EC Treaty. If they do, it is necessary, in the second instance, to consider whether they are compatible with the common market.

(65)

According to Article 87(1) of the EC Treaty, ‘save as otherwise provided in this Treaty, any aid granted by a Member State or through State resources in any form whatsoever which distorts or threatens to distort competition by favouring certain undertakings or the production of certain goods shall, insofar as it affects trade between Member States, be incompatible with the common market’.

(66)

Bus operators such as Postbus are performing an economic activity, namely the transportation of passengers in return for payment; they are therefore undertakings within the meaning of Article 87(1) of the EC Treaty.

(67)

The subsidies to Postbus are paid by Verkehrsverbund Tirol, which is financed by the Land of Tyrol and the Federal Government. These sums are therefore paid from State resources.

(68)

The next question is whether Postbus gains a selective economic advantage through the public service contract which is the subject of this decision. In its judgment in Altmark Trans  (19) the Court set out the criteria which must be applied when assessing whether compensation has been given for a public service:

‘… public subsidies intended to enable the operation of urban, suburban or regional scheduled transport services are not caught by that provision where such subsidies are to be regarded as compensation for the services provided by the recipient undertakings in order to discharge public service obligations. […]:’

According to the Court, that is the case if the following four criteria have been met:

(69)

Article 2(1) of Regulation (EEC) No 1191/69 defines public service obligations as follows: ‘Public service obligations’ means obligations which the transport undertaking in question, if it were considering its own commercial interests, would not assume or would not assume to the same extent or under the same conditions’.

(70)

The contract concluded between Postbus and Verkehrsverbund Tirol formalises specific requirements which are imposed on the service provider to ensure that a balanced transport network exists given the rural nature, the low population density and the geographical characteristics of the areas served. These factors are likely to discourage an operator from offering such services on a strictly commercial basis. Postbus is obliged to offer such services and to propose the relevant timetables; the routes on which the services must be offered are clearly set out in a contractual manner as specified in point 2 of the contract.

(71)

It is therefore clear from the contract concluded between Postbus and Verkehrsverbund Tirol that Postbus is actually responsible for the public transport service in the district of Lienz. The first Altmark criterion is therefore met.

(72)

Secondly, it must be determined whether the parameters on the basis of which the compensation is calculated have been established beforehand in an objective and transparent manner.

(73)

The contract distinguishes between payment for Bestellleistungen and payment for Bestandsleistungen. As explained by Austria in its reply to the decision opening the formal investigation procedure, the contract provides for remuneration per kilometre of transport supplied for both categories of transport service. The price is EUR 2,57/km for Bestellleistungen and EUR 1,77/km for Bestandsleistungen. The only difference between the Bestandsleistungen and the Bestellleistungen is that one of the components of the compensation is adjusted so that the sum of EUR 1,77/km is systematically complied with.

(74)

It should be noted that it is common practice in bus transport contracts to fix the compensation on the basis of a price per kilometre driven and the total number of kilometres driven, in particular where the public authority responsible for the organisation of public transport bears the risk as regards ticket sales revenue. Having re-examined the content of the contracts on the basis of the additional explanations given by Austria, the Commission notes that, contrary to the findings of its preliminary analysis in points 64 to 71 of the decision to open the formal investigation procedure, the contract concluded between Postbus and Verkehrsverbund Tirol is a contract of this type.

(75)

Fixing the compensation on the basis of a price per kilometre to be driven and the total number of kilometres to be driven meets the second Altmark criterion since the price per kilometre and the total number of kilometres to be driven are established beforehand in an objective and transparent manner.

(76)

The second Altmark criterion is therefore met.

(77)

On the basis of paragraphs 96 to 102 of the decision to open the formal investigation procedure, the Commission considers that the method which Verkehrsverbund Tirol has chosen to ensure that there is no overcompensation, namely the use of three different ways of comparing the price asked by the bus undertaking with the averages found in the sector concerned, can be accepted as proof that there is no overcompensation.

(78)

In the present case, the Commission considers that since there was no public tender, and that a direct competitor of Postbus stated that Postbus received overcompensation, the competitor in question and all interested third parties should be given the opportunity to comment on the methods used by Austria to check costs before it can be decided with certainty whether or not Postbus is receiving overcompensation.

(79)

It should firstly be noted that the Commission has been informed by the complainant that the latter is no longer interested in the present case. Secondly, no third party has challenged the finding that there is no overcompensation.

(80)

The Commission furthermore considers that Austria has provided additional information which shows that the price paid by Verkehrsverbund Tirol to Postbus is fair and adequate given the average costs observed in the sector of the industry in question and the experience of public authorities. Sections 3.3.1 to 3.3.3 above summarise the methods of calculation used and the resulting comparisons and conclusions. More generally, a method such as that in the case in question which systematically compares the compensation with the costs in the sector a posteriori and in three different ways ensures that there is no overcompensation. If such a comparison were to lead to the finding that there is overcompensation, Austria would have to demand its recovery.

(81)

On this basis, it can be concluded that Postbus is not receiving overcompensation for the performance of the public service contract which is the subject of this decision and that the third Altmark criterion is therefore met.

(82)

It still has to be checked whether the price paid by Verkehrsverbund Tirol to Postbus corresponds to the cost in an average undertaking that is well-managed and is adequately furnished with means of transport. To check whether this criterion is met, the three components in question should be analysed separately.

(83)

In this regard, it should firstly be noted that Austria has based its checks on standard parameters, the averages found in the sector of the industry in question. They can therefore be regarded as reflecting the average in the sector in question.

(84)

Consequently, the costs in Postbus correspond to the costs in an average Austrian undertaking.

(85)

The next question is whether the costs in Postbus also correspond to the costs in a well-managed undertaking. In the bus transport sector, which has been dominated by monopolies and in which contracts have been awarded without tenders for a long time, an undertaking operating in the market is not necessarily a well-managed undertaking.

(86)

In this regard, it should firstly be noted that Austria has not explained how these parameters also represent the average in a well-managed undertaking. By way of example, the Commission considers that Austria could have taken as a basis the average costs in undertakings which have won a significant number of tenders in the sector in the last few years.

(87)

It should also be noted that there is a difference of EUR 0,80 per km between the price for the Bestellleistungen and the price for the Bestandsleistungen. This seems to imply that Postbus has a certain margin for improving its efficiency as regards the Bestellleistungen.

(88)

It must be concluded that Austria has not demonstrated that the price paid by Verkehrsverbund Tirol to Postbus corresponds to the cost in a well-managed undertaking. The fourth Altmark criterion is therefore not met.

(89)

As the four criteria are cumulative, the fact that one of the four criteria has not been met leads the Commission automatically to conclude that the payments in question should be regarded as granting a selective economic advantage to the undertaking Postbus.

(90)

The undertaking Postbus operates in the bus transport market throughout Austria and has a large share of the market. Giving an economic advantage to this undertaking could therefore distort competition.

(91)

In the case in hand, competition could in particular be distorted by the fact that the public funding is granted to the undertaking which holds the bus transport licence in the district in question. Public financing might therefore prevent other firms from securing licences for operating public transport routes, since it strengthens the position of the recipient undertakings and allows them to offer more attractive business terms when they come to renew their licences.

(92)

With regard to the potential of the measure in question to affect trade between the Member States, it should firstly be noted that the local and regional public transport market is open to competition in Austria and other Member States in that there is no national monopoly for one or more companies in this market.

(93)

In this context, attention is drawn to paragraphs 77 et seq. of the judgment in Altmark Trans, in which the Court ruled that:

‘… it is not impossible that a public subsidy granted to an undertaking which provides only local or regional transport services and does not provide any transport services outside its State of origin may none the less have an effect on trade between Member States.

Where a Member State grants a public subsidy to an undertaking, the supply of transport services by that undertaking may for that reason be maintained or increased with the result that undertakings established in other Member States have less chance of providing their transport services in the market in that Member State (see, to that effect, Case 102/87 France v Commission [1988] ECR 4067, paragraph 19;’ Case C-305/89 Italy v Commission [1991] ECR I-1603, paragraph 26; and Spain v Commission, as referred to above, paragraph 40).

[…]

The second condition for the application of Article 92(1) of the Treaty, namely that the aid must be capable of affecting trade between Member States, does not therefore depend on the local or regional character of the transport services supplied or on the scale of the field of activity concerned.’

(94)

It therefore cannot be ruled out that undertakings established in other Member States have less chance of providing their transport services in the Austrian market as a result of the measure in question.

(95)

Consequently, the public funding granted by Verkehrsverbund Tirol to Postbus could distort competition and affect trade between Member States.

(96)

As the fourth Altmark criterion is not met but all the other conditions of Article 87(1) of the EC Treaty are met, the payments in question constitute State aid within the meaning of Article 87(1) of the EC Treaty.

(97)

It is therefore necessary to examine whether this aid can be considered compatible with the common market.

(98)

Article 73 of the EC Treaty provides for overland transport that ‘aids shall be compatible with this Treaty if they meet the needs of coordination of transport or if they represent reimbursement for the discharge of certain obligations inherent in the concept of a public service.’

(99)

According to the Court, ‘Article 77 of the EC Treaty (now Article 73 EC) provides that aids which meet the needs of coordination of transport or represent reimbursement for the discharge of certain obligations inherent in the concept of a public service are compatible with the Treaty. … Following the adoption of Regulation No 1107/70 on the granting of aids for transport by rail, road and inland waterway, Member States are no longer authorised to rely on Article 77 of the Treaty, which provides that aids which meet the needs of coordination of transport or represent reimbursement for the discharge of certain obligations inherent in the concept of a public service are compatible with the Treaty, outside the cases referred to in secondary Community legislation. To the extent that Regulation (EEC) No 1191/69 on action by the Member States concerning the obligations inherent in the concept of a public service in transport by rail, road and inland waterway does not apply and the subsidies at issue fall within Article 92(1) of the Treaty (now, after amendment, Article 87(1) EC), Regulation (EEC) No 1107/70 lists exhaustively the circumstances in which the authorities of the Member States may grant aids under Article 77 of the Treaty.’ (20)

(100)

The question therefore is whether Regulation (EEC) No 1191/69 or Regulation (EEC) No 1107/70 contain rules on the compatibility of State aid which are applicable in the present case.

(101)

The scope of Regulation (EEC) No 1191/69 is defined as follows in Article 1(1) and (2) of the Regulation:

‘1.   This Regulation shall apply to transport undertakings which operate services in transport by rail, road and inland waterway. Member States may exclude from the scope of this Regulation any undertakings whose activities are confined exclusively to the operation of urban, suburban or regional services.

2.   For the purpose of this Regulation:

(102)

Austria has availed itself of the option of excluding certain undertakings from the scope of the Regulation: according to Article 2 of the Privatbahnunterstützungsgesetz 1998 (1998 Private Railways Support Act) (21), undertakings which operate exclusively in the field of urban or suburban services are excluded from the scope of Regulation (EEC) No 1191/69.

(103)

However, in the present case the services concerned are regional services. Regulation (EEC) No 1191/69 does therefore apply to them.

(104)

Article 1(3) to (5) of Regulation (EEC) No 1191/69 describe the two different schemes between which Member States can choose as regards the organisation and financing of public transport, namely the scheme under which public service obligations are imposed and the contractual scheme.

‘3.   The competent authorities of the Member States shall terminate all obligations inherent in the concept of a public service as defined in this Regulation imposed on transport by rail, road and inland waterway.

4.   In order to ensure adequate transport services which in particular take into account social and environmental factors and town and country planning, or with a view to offering particular fares to certain categories of passenger, the competent authorities of the Member States may conclude public service contracts with a transport undertaking. The conditions and details of operation of such contracts are laid down in Section V.

5.   However, the competent authorities of the Member States may maintain or impose the public service obligations referred to in Article 2 for urban, suburban and regional passenger transport services. The conditions and details of operation, including methods of compensation, are laid down in Sections II, III and IV. Where a transport undertaking not only operates services subject to public service obligations but also engages in other activities, the public services must be operated as separate divisions meeting at least the following conditions:

(105)

Austria has opted for the contractual scheme (section 19 ÖPNRV-G). Consequently, the provisions applicable to the measures in question are those in Section V of Regulation (EEC) No 1191/69.

(106)

Section V of Regulation (EEC) No 1191/69 consists of a single article, Article 14, which provides:

‘1.   A “public service contract” shall mean a contract concluded between the competent authorities of a Member State and a transport undertaking in order to provide the public with adequate transport services.

A public service contract may cover notably:

2.   A public service contract shall cover, inter alia, the following points:

3.   Those assets involved in the provision of transport services which are the subject of a public service contract may belong to the undertaking or be placed at its disposal.

4.   Any undertaking which intends to discontinue or make substantial modifications to a transport service which it provides to the public on a continuous and regular basis and which is not covered by the contract system or the public service obligation shall notify the competent authorities of the Member State thereof at least three months in advance. The competent authorities may decide to waive such notification. This provision shall not affect other national procedures applicable as regards entitlement to terminate or modify transport services.

5.   After receiving the information referred to in paragraph 4 the competent authorities may insist on the maintenance of the service concerned for up to one year from the date of notification and they shall inform the undertaking at least one month before the expiry of the notification. They may also take the initiative of negotiating the establishment or modification of such a transport service.

6.   Expenditure arising for transport undertakings from the obligations referred to in paragraph 5 shall be compensated in accordance with the common procedures laid down in Sections II, III and IV’.

(107)

The contract concluded between Postbus and Verkehrsverbund Tirol is a contract concluded between a competent authority of a Member State and a transport undertaking in order to provide the public with adequate transport services.

(108)

This contract includes in particular: transport services satisfying fixed standards of continuity, regularity, capacity and quality; transport services at specified rates and subject to specified conditions, in particular for certain categories of passenger; adjustments of services to actual requirements.

(109)

This contract may therefore be considered to be a public service contract within the meaning of Article 14 of Regulation (EEC) No 1191/69.

(110)

It should be noted that both the intended purpose (to provide the public with adequate transport services) and the content of the public service contracts (‘fixed standards of continuity, regularity, capacity and quality’, determination of fares, conditions of service ‘for certain categories of passenger or on certain routes’, ‘adjustment of services to actual requirements’ etc.) do not differ from those which may be the subject of public service obligations imposed by the State or public bodies. However, it has already been explained that compensation for such services constitutes aid to the provider.

(111)

In this respect, it should firstly be noted that the legislator’s aim when adopting Regulation (EEC) No 1191/69 was to define under which conditions ‘aid […] which corresponds to the reimbursement of certain obligations inherent in the notion of public services’ as referred to in Article 73 of the Treaty is compatible with the common market. Both the application of Article 73 of the Treaty and the application of Regulation (EEC) No 1191/69 presuppose the existence of State aid within the meaning of Article 87(1) of the Treaty. If the content of contracts can be covered by the concept in Article 73 of the EC Treaty of ‘obligations inherent in the concept of public services’, the type of instrument, a contract and not a unilaterally imposed obligation, should not per se prevent aid which might be contained in the price from being deemed to be compatible. The decisive factor when determining the nature of a service, whether imposed by the State or approved by the parties to a contract, as a public service obligation is its content and not the form in which it originates (22). It can therefore be concluded that there is no legal obstacle to aid included in the cost of services provided for by a public service contract being deemed by the Commission to be compatible with the common market. It should be noted that this solution was also chosen by the co-legislators in the new Regulation (EC) No 1370/2007 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 October 2007 on public passenger transport services by rail and by road (23). However, Article 12 of that Regulation stipulates that it does not enter into force until 1 December 2009. It is therefore not applicable to the contract in question which has been concluded before the Regulation enters into force.

(112)

In the absence of specific conditions regarding compatibility in Regulation (EEC) No 1191/69, the Commission considers that the general principles which flow from the Treaty, the case-law and the decision-making practice in other fields should apply when determining whether such aid is compatible.

(113)

The Commission provided a general summary of those principles in part 2,4 of the above-mentioned Framework (24). As regards the compatibility of the aid included in the cost paid by a public authority to a public service provider, paragraph 14 of the Framework provides:

‘The amount of compensation may not exceed what is necessary to cover the costs incurred in discharging the public service obligations, taking into account the relevant receipts and reasonable profit for discharging those obligations. The amount of compensation includes all the advantages granted by the State or through State resources in any form whatsoever.’

(114)

The payments from Verkehrsverbund Tirol to Postbus must therefore be deemed to be compatible with the common market if they satisfy these requirements.

(115)

These requirements correspond very precisely to the third Altmark criterion which – as stated above – has been met in the case in question.

(116)

It can therefore be concluded that the State aid granted by Verkehrsverbund Tirol to Postbus in the framework of the public service obligation is compatible with the common market on the basis of Article 14 of Regulation (EEC) No 1191/69.

(117)

Austria considers that, on the basis of Article 17(2) of Regulation (EEC) No 1191/69, the public service contract between Verkehrsverbund Tirol and Postbus is exempt from compulsory notification under Article 88(3) of the EC Treaty.

(118)

Article 17(2) of Regulation (EEC) No 1191/69 states that ‘compensation paid pursuant to this Regulation shall be exempt from the preliminary information procedure laid down in Article 93(3) of the Treaty establishing the European Economic Community’.

(119)

The question therefore is whether the payments which Verkehrsverbund Tirol makes under the public service contract with Postbus constitute compensation within the meaning of Article 17(2) of Regulation (EEC) No 1191/69.

In the above-mentioned judgment in Danske Busvognmænd, the Court of First Instance of the European Communities considered that ‘the contractual relationships established following a tender procedure between the transport undertaking and the competent authority include, by virtue of Article 14(1) and (2) of Regulation (EEC) No 1191/69, a specific financing scheme which leaves no room for compensation according to the methods laid down in Sections II, III and IV of that Regulation’ (25).

(120)

It emerges from this judgment that the concept of ‘public service compensation’ within the meaning of Article 17(2) of Regulation (EEC) No 1191/69 must be interpreted in a very narrow manner. It therefore covers only compensation for public service obligations imposed unilaterally on an undertaking pursuant to Article 2 of the Regulation which are calculated using the method described in Articles 10 to 13 of the Regulation and which do not have to be notified to the Commission under the procedure provided for in Article 88(3) of the EC Treaty.

(121)

However, payments provided for in a transport services contract based on public service oblligations within the meaning of Article 14 of Regulation (EEC) No 1191/69 do not constitute compensation within the meaning of Article 17(2) of the Regulation.

(122)

Payments provided for in a transport services contract based on a public service contract within the meaning of Article 14 of Regulation (EEC) No 1191/69, such as in the contract between Verkehrsverbund Tirol and Postbus, are therefore not exempt from the notification requirement provided for in Article 88(3) of the EC Treaty. Their compatibility therefore has to be assessed by the Commission.

(123)

Austria has unlawfully implemented the public service contract between Verkehrsverbund Tirol and Postbus which is the subject of this Decision in violation of Article 88(3) of the Treaty. However, the State aid provided for in that contract can be deemed compatible therewith on the basis of Article 73 of the EC Treaty,

20.11.2009   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

L 306/39

(1)

Pursuant to Article 12(1) of Regulation (EC) No 683/2008, public governance of the two programmes is based on the principle of a strict division of responsibilities between the European Community, represented by the Commission, the European GNSS Supervisory Authority established under Council Regulation (EC) No 1321/2004 (2) and the European Space Agency. The Commission is responsible for the management of the programmes.

(2)

Article 13 of Regulation (EC) No 683/2008, concerning governance of the security aspects of the European satellite radio navigation programmes, lays down in particular that the Commission is to manage all the security aspects of the systems resulting from these programmes.

(3)

Pursuant to Article 16 of that Regulation, where programme security is concerned the European GNSS Supervisory Authority is responsible for security accreditation and the operation of the Galileo Security Centre on the basis of guidelines adopted by the Commission.

(4)

The tasks assigned to the Commission and the European GNSS Supervisory Authority respectively pursuant to the abovementioned provisions in the context of the Galileo and EGNOS programmes entail the exchange of classified information between those two entities. They also entail the exchange of classified information between the European GNSS Supervisory Authority on the one hand and the European Space Agency, Council and Member States on the other, via the Commission.

(5)

In Decision 2001/844/EC, ECSC, Euratom (3), the Commission amended its internal Rules of Procedure to include rules setting out basic principles and minimum standards of security, particularly with regard to EU classified information.

(6)

Pursuant to Article 20 of Regulation (EC) No 1321/2004, the European GNSS Supervisory Authority has the task of applying the security principles contained in Decision 2001/844/EC, ECSC, Euratom. This covers, inter alia, provisions for the exchange, handling and storage of classified information.

(7)

At present there is no framework for the exchange of classified information between the Commission and the European GNSS Supervisory Authority or between the European GNSS Supervisory Authority on the one hand and the European Space Agency, Council and Member States on the other, via the Commission.

(8)

It is therefore necessary to conclude an Agreement between the Commission and the European GNSS Supervisory Authority on the security and exchange of classified information. Such an Agreement has been negotiated by the Commission and the European GNSS Supervisory Authority and should therefore be approved and signed,

20.11.2009   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

L 306/45

(1)

Following the amendment of the framework Financial Regulation by Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 652/2008, it is necessary to adapt Eurojust’s financial rules in order to align its provisions with the amended Framework Financial Regulation.

(2)

Eurojust has legal personality and has the full responsibility to draw up and to implement its own budget.

(3)

It is necessary to define the rules on drawing up and implementing Eurojust’s budget, as well as the rules governing the presentation and the auditing of the accounts.

(4)

It is also necessary to define the powers and responsibilities of the College of Eurojust, the Authorising Officer, the accounting officer, the imprest administrator and the internal auditor.

(5)

Effective control systems must be established to protect the financial interest of the European Community.

(6)

Since Eurojust is financed by an annual subsidy charged to the Community budget, the timetable for establishing the budget, presenting the accounts and granting discharge should be aligned to the equivalent provisions of the general Financial Regulation.

(7)

For the same reason, Eurojust must observe the same requirement as the institutions of the Community in the award of public contracts and grants; in this respect, a reference to the relevant provisions of the general Financial Regulation will suffice.

(8)

The Financial Regulation must reflect the specific requirements of Eurojust as a judicial cooperation unit. It should take full account of the sensitive operations carried out by Eurojust, in particular in relation to investigations and prosecutions.

(9)

The amended Financial Regulation applicable to Eurojust’s budget must be adopted unanimously by the College after the Commission has consented to the changes.

(10)

The Commission has consented to this Regulation including the departure from the framework Financial Regulation,

1.

‘Eurojust Decision’ shall mean the Council Decision of 28 February 2002 setting up Eurojust with a view to reinforcing the fight against serious crime (2002/187/JHA), as amended by Decision of the Council of 18 June 2003 (2003/659/JHA);

2.

‘Eurojust’ shall mean the judicial cooperation unit set up by the Eurojust Decision as a body of the European Union;

3.

‘College’ shall mean the unit referred to in Article 10(1) of the Eurojust Decision;

4.

‘Administrative Director’ shall mean the person referred to in Articles 29 and 36(1) of the Eurojust Decision;

5.

‘Staff’ shall mean the Administrative Director as well as the staff referred to in Article 30 of the Eurojust Decision;

6.

‘Budget’ shall mean the budget of Eurojust as referred to in Article 34 of the Eurojust Decision;

7.

‘Budgetary Authority’ shall mean the European Parliament and the Council of the European Union;

8.

‘General Financial Regulation’ shall mean the Council Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 1605/2002 of 25 June 2002 on the Financial Regulation applicable to the general budget of the European Communities;

9.

‘Framework Financial Regulation’ shall mean the Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 2343/2002;

10.

‘Implementing Rules to the general Financial Regulation’ shall mean the Commission Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 2342/2002 of 23 December 2002 laying down detailed rules for the implementation of Council Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 1605/2002 on the Financial Regulation applicable to the general budget of the European Communities (5);

11.

‘Eurojust Financial Implementing Rules’ shall mean the implementing rules to this Financial Regulation;

12.

‘Eurojust Financial Rules’ shall mean the Eurojust Decision, this Financial Regulation and the Eurojust Financial Implementing Rules;

13.

‘Staff Regulations’ shall mean regulations and rules applicable to officials and other servants of the European Communities.

(a)

own revenue consisting of all fees, charges and, without prejudice to Article 51, interest which Eurojust may receive for services supplementary to the tasks entrusted to it, and any other revenue;

(b)

revenue made up of any financial contributions of the host Member State;

(c)

a subsidy granted by the European Communities;

(d)

revenue assigned to specific items of expenditure in accordance with Article 19(1);

(e)

the expenditure of Eurojust, including administrative expenditure.

(a)

revenue earmarked for a specific purpose, such as income from foundations, subsidies, gifts and bequests;

(b)

contributions to Eurojust’s activities from Member States, non-member countries or miscellaneous bodies, in so far as this is provided for in the agreement concluded between Eurojust and the Member States, non-member countries or bodies in question;

(c)

revenue from third parties in respect of goods, services and works supplied at their request, with the exception of fees and charges referred to in Article 5(a);

(d)

proceeds from the supply of goods, services and works for Community institutions or other Community bodies;

(e)

revenue arising from the repayment of amounts wrongly paid;

(f)

proceeds from the sale of vehicles, equipment, installations, materials, and scientific and technical apparatus, which are being replaced or scrapped when the book value is fully depreciated;

(g)

insurance payments received;

(h)

revenue from payments connected with lettings;

(i)

revenue from the sale of publications and films, including those on an electronic medium.

(a)

penalties imposed on parties to procurement contracts or beneficiaries of a grant;

(b)

discounts, refunds and rebates on individual invoices and payment requests;

(c)

interest generated by pre-financing payments.

(a)

either by the Member States pursuant to the Protocol on Privileges and Immunities of the European Communities, by the Host State on the basis of the Seat Agreement or on the basis of other relevant agreements;

(b)

or by a Member State or non-member country on the basis of other relevant agreements.

(a)

effectiveness, efficiency and economy of operations;

(b)

reliability of reporting;

(c)

safeguarding of assets and information;

(d)

prevention and detection of fraud and irregularities;

(e)

adequate management of the risks relating to the legality and regularity of the underlying transactions, taking into account the multi-annual character of programmes as well as the nature of the payments concerned.

(a)

an establishment plan setting the number of permanent and temporary posts authorised within the limits of the budget appropriations, by grade and by category;

(b)

where there is a change in the number of posts, a statement justifying the request for new posts;

(c)

a quarterly estimate of cash payments and receipts;

(d)

information on the achievement of all previously set objectives for the various activities as well as new objectives measured by indicators.

(a)

its draft work programme;

(b)

its updated multi-annual staff policy plan, established in line with the guidelines set by the Commission;

(c)

information on the number of officials, temporary and contract staff as defined in the Staff Regulations for the years N – 1 and N as well as an estimate for the year N + 1;

(d)

information on contributions in kind granted by the host Member State to Eurojust;

(e)

an estimate of the balance of the outturn account within the meaning of Article 81 for the year N – 1.

1.

in the statement of revenue: