1.12.2007   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

L 314/1

(1)

Regulation (EC) No 3223/94 lays down, pursuant to the outcome of the Uruguay Round multilateral trade negotiations, the criteria whereby the Commission fixes the standard values for imports from third countries, in respect of the products and periods stipulated in the Annex thereto.

(2)

In compliance with the above criteria, the standard import values must be fixed at the levels set out in the Annex to this Regulation,

1.12.2007   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

L 314/3

(1)

Article 10(2) of Regulation (EC) No 1784/2003 states that the import duty on products falling within CN codes 1001 10 00, 1001 90 91, ex 1001 90 99 (high quality common wheat), 1002, ex 1005 other than hybrid seed, and ex 1007 other than hybrids for sowing, is to be equal to the intervention price valid for such products on importation and increased by 55 %, minus the cif import price applicable to the consignment in question. However, that duty may not exceed the rate of duty in the Common Customs Tariff.

(2)

Article 10(3) of Regulation (EC) No 1784/2003 lays down that, for the purposes of calculating the import duty referred to in paragraph 2 of that Article, representative cif import prices are to be established on a regular basis for the products in question.

(3)

Under Article 2(2) of Regulation (EC) No 1249/96, the price to be used for the calculation of the import duty on products of CN codes 1001 10 00, 1001 90 91, ex 1001 90 99 (high quality common wheat), 1002 00, 1005 10 90, 1005 90 00 and 1007 00 90 is the daily cif representative import price determined as specified in Article 4 of that Regulation.

(4)

Import duties should be fixed for the period from 1 December 2007, and should apply until new import duties are fixed and enter into force,

1.12.2007   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

L 314/6

(1)

Article 89(1) of Regulation (EC) No 1782/2003 establishes a maximum guaranteed area of 2 000 000 ha eligible for aid for energy crops under Article 88 of that Regulation. Article 89(2) states that where the area for which aid is claimed exceeds the maximum guaranteed area, the area per farmer for which aid is claimed shall be reduced proportionately in that year.

(2)

Under Article 4 of Commission Regulation (EC) No 1973/2004 of 29 October 2004 laying down detailed rules for the application of Council Regulation (EC) No 1782/2003 as regards the support schemes provided for in Titles IV and IVa of that Regulation and the use of land set aside for the production of raw materials (2), the coefficient of reduction of areas is to be fixed before the payments are granted to the farmers and at the latest by 31 January of the following year on the basis of the data communicated in accordance with Article 3(1)(b) of that Regulation.

(3)

In accordance with Article 3(1)(b) of Regulation (EC) No 1973/2004, Member States have communicated to the Commission data on the total area for which aid for energy crops under Article 88 of Regulation (EC) No 1782/2003 was fixed for 2007. Based on those communications, it has been established that the total area for 2007 was 2 843 450 ha.

(4)

Since the above amount of 2 843 450 ha exceeds the maximum guaranteed area of 2 000 000 ha eligible for aid, it is necessary to fix the coefficient of reduction to be applied to the area per farmer for which aid is claimed for 2007.

(5)

The measures provided for in this Regulation are in accordance with the opinion of the Management Committee for Direct Payments,

1.12.2007   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

L 314/7

(1)

Council Regulation (EC) No 41/2007 of 21 December 2006 fixing for 2007 the fishing opportunities and associated conditions for certain fish stocks and groups of fish stocks applicable in Community waters and for Community vessels, in waters where catch limitations are required (3), lays down quotas for 2007.

(2)

According to the information received by the Commission, catches of the stock referred to in the Annex to this Regulation by vessels flying the flag of or registered in the Member State referred to therein have exhausted the quota allocated for 2007.

(3)

It is therefore necessary to prohibit fishing for that stock and its retention on board, transhipment and landing,

1.12.2007   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

L 314/9

(1)

A number of substantial changes are to be made to Council Decision 2001/792/EC, Euratom of 23 October 2001 establishing a Community mechanism to facilitate reinforced cooperation in civil protection assistance interventions (3) (hereinafter the Mechanism) in order to make the European Union’s emergency response more consistent and efficient. In the interests of clarity, that Decision should be recast.

(2)

Recent years have witnessed a significant increase in the occurrence and severity of natural and man-made disasters, resulting in the loss of human lives and property, including cultural heritage, the destruction of economic and social infrastructure and damage to the environment.

(3)

Action by the Community to implement the resolution of the Council and of the representatives of the Governments of the Member States, meeting within the Council, of 8 July 1991 on improving mutual aid between Member States in the event of natural or technological disaster (4) has helped protect people, the environment and property. The Convention of the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe of 17 March 1992 on the Transboundary Effects of Industrial Accidents, approved by the Community by Council Decision 98/685/EC (5), has helped to further improve the prevention and management of industrial disasters.

(4)

The general purpose of the Mechanism is to provide, on request, support in the event of major emergencies and to facilitate improved coordination of assistance intervention provided by the Member States and the Community, taking into account the special needs of the isolated, outermost and other regions or islands of the Community. Recent years have seen a considerable growth in the number of countries calling upon the Mechanism for civil protection assistance. The Mechanism should be strengthened to ensure a more effective and visible demonstration of European solidarity and to allow for the development of a European rapid response capability based on the civil protection modules of the Member States, as called for by the European Council held on 16 and 17 June 2005 and by the European Parliament in its Resolution of 13 January 2005 on the tsunami disaster.

(5)

The Mechanism would take due account of relevant Community legislation and international commitments. This Decision should therefore not affect the reciprocal rights and obligations of the Member States under bilateral or multilateral treaties, which relate to the matters covered by this Decision.

(6)

The Mechanism should facilitate the civil protection response to all types of major emergencies occurring inside or outside the Community, including natural and man-made disasters, acts of terrorism and technological, radiological and environmental accidents, including accidental marine pollution. Civil protection assistance may be required in all of these emergencies to complement the response capabilities of the affected country.

(7)

Prevention is of significant importance for protection against natural, technological and environmental disasters and would require further action to be considered. By contributing to the further development of detection and early warning systems, the Community should assist Member States in minimising the lead time to respond to disasters and in alerting EU citizens. These systems should take into account and build upon existing information sources.

(8)

Preparatory measures need to be taken at Member State and Community level to enable assistance intervention teams in emergencies to be mobilised rapidly and coordinated with the requisite flexibility and to ensure, through a training programme, the effective response capability and complementarity of assessment and/or coordination teams, intervention teams and other resources, as appropriate.

(9)

Other preparatory measures include pooling of information related to necessary medical resources and stimulation of the use of new technologies. That information concerns medical resources which Member States might make available on a voluntary basis for the protection of public health following a request for intervention under the Mechanism. In accordance with Article 296 of the Treaty establishing the European Community, no Member State is to be obliged to supply information the disclosure of which it considers contrary to the essential interests of its security.

(10)

The development of additional civil protection assistance intervention modules, consisting of resources of one or more Member States which aim to be fully interoperable, should be considered in order to contribute to the development of a civil protection rapid response capability. Modules are organised at the level of the Member States and subject to their direction and command.

(11)

In the event of a major emergency within the Community, or imminent threat thereof, which causes, or is capable of causing, transboundary effects or which may result in a call for assistance from one or more Member States, there is a need for relevant notification to be made as appropriate through an established reliable common emergency communication and information system.

(12)

The Mechanism should make it possible to mobilise, and facilitate coordination of, assistance interventions in order to help ensure better protection primarily of people but also of the environment and property, including cultural heritage, thereby reducing loss of human life, injury, material damage, economic and environmental damage, and making achievement of the objectives of social cohesion and solidarity more tangible. The reinforced cooperation in civil protection assistance interventions should be based on a Community civil protection structure consisting of a monitoring and information centre and a common emergency communication and information system managed by the Commission and contact points in the Member States. It should provide a framework for collecting validated emergency information, for disseminating that information to the Member States and for sharing lessons learnt from interventions.

(13)

The contact points in the Member States should be in a position to provide information on the availability of the civil protection assistance requested by the affected country, including information on the availability of military assets and capabilities.

(14)

The availability of adequate means of transport needs to be improved to support the development of a rapid response capability at Community level. The Community should support and complement the efforts of Member States by facilitating the pooling of transport resources of Member States and contributing, where necessary, to the financing of additional means of transport.

(15)

With respect to civil protection assistance interventions outside the Community, the Mechanism should facilitate and support the actions undertaken by the Community and the Member States. Assistance interventions outside the Community can either be conducted autonomously or as a contribution to an operation led by an international organisation, for which case the Community should develop its relations with relevant international organisations.

(16)

The United Nations, where present, have an overall coordinating role for relief operations in third countries. The civil protection assistance provided under the Mechanism should be coordinated with the United Nations and other relevant international actors to maximise the use of available resources and avoid any unnecessary duplication of effort. Enhanced coordination of civil protection assistance through the Mechanism is a prerequisite to supporting the overall coordination effort and ensuring a comprehensive European contribution to the overall relief effort. In major emergencies where assistance is provided under both the Mechanism and Council Regulation (EC) No 1257/96 of 20 June 1996 concerning humanitarian aid (6), the Commission should ensure the effectiveness, coherence and complementarity of the overall Community response.

(17)

The Mechanism could also be a tool for facilitating and supporting crisis management in accordance with the Joint Declaration by the Council and the Commission of 29 September 2003 on the use of the Community Civil Protection Mechanism in crisis management referred to in Title V of the Treaty on the European Union. This Decision is without prejudice to the competences and role of the Presidency in crisis management under the said Title.

(18)

The Mechanism could also be used for supporting consular assistance to EU citizens in major emergencies in third countries, regarding civil protection activities, if requested by the consular authorities of the Member States.

(19)

Where the use of military assets and capabilities is considered to be appropriate, cooperation with the military will follow the modalities, procedures and criteria established by the Council or its competent bodies for making available to the Mechanism military assets and capabilities relevant to the protection of civilian populations.

(20)

The use of military assets and capabilities should also be consistent with the principles of relevant United Nations Guidelines.

(21)

Participation of candidate countries and cooperation with other third countries and with international and regional organisations should be possible.

(22)

The measures necessary for the implementation of this Decision should be adopted in accordance with Council Decision 1999/468/EC of 28 June 1999 laying down the procedures for the exercise of implementing powers conferred on the Commission (7).

(23)

The objective of this Decision, namely to facilitate reinforced cooperation between the Community and the Member States in civil protection assistance intervention in the event of major emergencies or the imminent threat thereof, cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States, and can therefore, by reason of the scale or effects of the proposed action, taking into account the benefits resulting from the operation of the Mechanism in terms of reducing the loss of human life and damage, be better achieved at Community level.

If a major emergency overwhelms the response capabilities of an affected Member State, this State should be able to appeal to the Mechanism to supplement its own civil protection resources. The Community may therefore adopt measures, in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity as set out in Article 5 of the Treaty establishing the European Community. In accordance with the principle of proportionality as set out in that Article, this Decision does not go beyond what is necessary in order to achieve that objective.

(24)

The Treaty establishing the European Community and the Treaty establishing the European Atomic Energy Community do not provide powers for adopting this Decision other than those of Articles 308 and 203, respectively,

1.

the identification of intervention teams and other intervention support available in Member States for assistance intervention in the event of emergencies;

2.

the setting-up and implementation of a training programme for intervention teams and other intervention support, and for experts for the teams responsible for assessment and/or coordination (hereinafter assessment and/or coordination teams);

3.

workshops, seminars and pilot projects on major aspects of interventions;

4.

the establishment and dispatch of assessment and/or coordination teams;

5.

the establishment and management of a Monitoring and Information Centre (MIC), which is accessible and able to react immediately 24 hours a day and serving the Member States and the Commission for the purposes of the Mechanism;

6.

the establishment and management of a Common Emergency Communication and Information System (CECIS) to enable communication and sharing of information between the MIC and the contact points of the Member States;

7.

contributing to the development of detection and early warning systems for disasters which may affect the territory of the Member States, in order to enable a rapid response by the Member States and the Community, as well as to their establishment through studies and assessments on the need for and feasibility of those systems and through actions to promote their interlinkage and their linkage to the MIC and the CECIS. Those systems shall take into account and build upon existing information, monitoring and detection sources;

8.

supporting Member States in obtaining access to equipment and transport resources by:

9.

complementing the transport provided by Member States by providing additional transport resources necessary for ensuring a rapid response to major emergencies;

10.

supporting consular assistance to EU citizens in major emergencies in third countries regarding civil protection activities if requested by the consular authorities of the Member States;

11.

other supporting and complementary action necessary in the framework of the Mechanism as mentioned in Article 4 of Council Decision 2007/162/EC, Euratom of 5 March 2007 establishing a Civil Protection Financial Instrument (8).

1.

‘major emergency’ means any situation which has or may have an adverse impact on people, the environment or property and which may result in a call for assistance under the Mechanism;

2.

‘response’ means any action taken under the Mechanism during or after a major emergency to address its immediate consequences;

3.

‘preparedness’ means a state of readiness and capability of human and material means enabling them to ensure an effective rapid response to an emergency, obtained as a result of action taken in advance;

4.

‘early warning’ means the timely and effective provision of information that allows action to be taken to avoid or reduce risks and ensure preparedness for an effective response;

5.

‘module’ means a self-sufficient and autonomous predefined task- and needs-driven arrangement of Member States’ capabilities or a mobile operational team of the Member States representing a combination of human and material means, that can be described in terms of its capacity for intervention or by the task(s) it is able to undertake.

(a)

are made up of the resources of one or more States participating in the Mechanism;

(b)

are able to perform tasks in the areas of response;

(c)

are able to perform their tasks in accordance with acknowledged international guidelines and therefore able:

(d)

are interoperable with other modules;

(e)

have undertaken training and exercises in order to meet the interoperability requirements under points (a) and (d);

(f)

are placed under the authority of a person who is responsible for their operation;

(g)

are able to provide assistance to other EU bodies and/or international institutions, especially the United Nations.

1.

establishing and managing the MIC;

2.

establishing and managing the CECIS;

3.

contributing to the development detection and early warning systems for disasters as provided for in Article 2(7);

4.

establishing the capability to mobilise and dispatch, as quickly as possible, small teams of experts responsible for:

5.

setting up a training programme, with a view to enhancing the coordination of civil protection assistance intervention by ensuring compatibility and complementarity between the intervention teams and modules referred to in Article 4(1) or as appropriate other intervention support as referred to in Article 4(4), and by improving the competence of the experts referred to in Article 4(2). The programme shall include joint courses and exercises and an exchange system whereby individuals may be seconded to other Member States;

6.

pooling and compiling in the event of a major emergency, information on the capabilities of the Member States for maintaining a production of serums and vaccines or other necessary medical resources and on the stocks thereof which might be available for intervention;

7.

setting up a programme of lessons learned from the interventions conducted within the framework of the Mechanism and disseminating these lessons through the information system;

8.

stimulating and encouraging the introduction and use of new technologies for the purpose of the Mechanism;

9.

taking the measures listed in Article 2(8) and (9);

10.

establishing the capability to provide basic logistical support for assessment and/or coordination experts;

11.

taking any other supporting and complementary action necessary in the framework of the Mechanism as mentioned in Article 4 of Decision 2007/162/EC, Euratom.

(a)

forward the request to the contact points of the other Member States;

(b)

facilitate the mobilisation of teams, experts, modules and other intervention support;

(c)

collect validated information on the emergency and disseminate it to the Member States.

(a)

assess the appropriateness of the possible use of the Mechanism as a tool for facilitating and supporting crisis management;

(b)

where it deems it necessary, establish relations with the affected third country at political level and liaise with that country at all stages of the emergency in respect of the overall political and strategic framework of the assistance intervention.

(a)

maintaining a continuous dialogue with Member States’ contact points in order to ensure an effective and coherent European civil protection contribution through the Mechanism to the overall relief effort, in particular:

(b)

liaising with the affected third country on technical details such as the precise needs for assistance, the acceptance of offers and the practical arrangements for the local reception and distribution of assistance;

(c)

liaising or cooperating with the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA) when present and other relevant actors contributing to the overall relief effort in order to maximise synergies, seek complementarities and avoid duplication and gaps;

(d)

liaising with all relevant actors, in particular in the closing phase of the assistance intervention under the Mechanism, to facilitate a smooth handover.

(a)

all Member States providing civil protection assistance as referred to in paragraph 1 in response to a request distributed through the MIC shall keep the MIC fully informed of their activities; and

(b)

Member States’ teams and modules on site participating in the intervention through the Mechanism shall liaise closely with the MIC coordination and/or assessment teams on site.

1.

resources available for assistance intervention, as provided for in Article 4;

2.

the MIC, as provided for in Article 2(5);

3.

the CECIS, as provided for in Article 2(6);

4.

the assessment and/or coordination teams, as provided for in Article 2(4), including criteria for the selection of experts;

5.

the training programme, as provided for in Article 2(2);

6.

the modules as provided for in Article 4(3);

7.

the detection and early warning systems as provided for in Article 2(7);

8.

information on medical resources, as provided for in Article 5(6);

9.

the interventions inside the Community, as provided for in Article 7 as well as the interventions outside the Community, as provided for in Article 8.

1.12.2007   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

L 314/20

(1)

Council Decision 2003/17/EC (5) provides that for a limited period field inspections carried out in third countries on seed-producing crops of certain species are considered as equivalent to field inspections carried out in accordance with Community legislation and that seed of certain species produced in third countries is considered as equivalent to seed produced in accordance with Community legislation.

(2)

It appears that those field inspections continue to afford the same guarantees as those carried out by the Member States. Those field inspections should therefore continue to be considered as equivalent.

(3)

As Decision 2003/17/EC will expire on 31 December 2007, the period for which equivalence is recognised under that Decision should be extended. It appears desirable to limit that period to five years.

(4)

Decision 2003/17/EC should therefore be amended accordingly,

1.12.2007   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

L 314/21

(1)

Travelport LLC, a subsidiary of the Blackstone Group (Blackstone, USA), operates Galileo — a global distribution system (GDS) and Gulliver's Travel Associates. In addition, Travelport operates a number of online travel agencies and websites, including ebookers, Orbitz, Cheaptickets, Octopus Travel, HotelClub and RatesToGo.

(2)

Worldspan Technologies Inc. (Worldspan) provides travel distribution services through the Worldspan GDS. The company focuses on providing GDS services to on-line and, more recently also traditional travel agencies, primarily in the leisure sector. Furthermore, Worldspan provides IT services to airlines (e.g. internal reservation systems and flight operations technology services).

(3)

Pursuant to the operation, based on a referral pursuant to Article 4(5) of Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 (the Merger Regulation) Travelport acquires within the meaning of Article 3(1)(b) of the Merger Regulation control of the whole of Worldspan by way of purchase of shares.

(4)

The Commission’s market investigation has revealed that the proposed concentration will not give raise to any competition concerns as a result of which effective competition would be significantly impeded in the Common Market or in a substantial part of it.

(5)

In previous cases, the Commission has defined a GDS as a tool provided to travel agencies (TAs) in order to allow them to obtain information and make reservations related to travel service providers (TSPs), i.e. airlines, hotels and rental car firms, who in turn supply the GDS with data on the products they provide.

(6)

The product market affected by this transaction is defined in the Decision as the market for electronic travel distribution services through a GDS. This market is of a two-sided nature, with two separate customer categories. GDS providers act as intermediaries, allowing on the one hand TSPs, (upstream of the GDS provider) to distribute their travel content to TAs and ultimately to end-consumers and on the other hand TAs (downstream of the GDS provider) to access and book travel content for the end-consumers. The in-depth investigation has confirmed these characteristics of the product market.

(7)

The Commission has assessed whether — as the notifying party has stated — the relevant product market consists not only of the GDS providers themselves but also of alternative technologies by which GDS providers can be by-passed and their use avoided. These alternatives are (i) meta search engines, (ii) direct links, (iii) so-called ‘GDS New Entrants’ (GNEs) and the (iv) ‘supplier.com’.

(8)

The inclusion of the first three in the relevant product market is dismissed in the Decision, since the in-depth investigation has clearly shown that they are either not real GDS substitutes, or that their presence and/or impact in the EEA is very limited. In order to determine whether the services provided via ‘supplier.com’ are substitutable to GDS services and would be part of the same product market, a complex assessment covering both sides of the market has been carried out.

(9)

On the upstream side of the market, ‘supplier.com’ allow TSPs to significantly reduce their average and marginal distribution costs, since they ultimately save the booking fee charged by the GDS as well as the possible booking commission paid to the TA doing the GDS booking.

(10)

Conventional airlines are thus able to compete better with Low Cost Carriers (LCCs), whose main channel is ‘supplier.com’. An additional incentive for TSPs to promote ‘supplier.com’ is the fact that comparison-shopping between TSPs by the end user becomes more difficult as individual web-sites have to be consulted. This partially explains the growth of supplier.com in recent years. According to IATA data, on average, 25 % of all bookings of the 20 largest airlines in the EEA were direct bookings in 2005 (compared to 20 % in 2004 and 16 % in 2003).

(11)

The in-depth investigation has shown that the extent to which TSPs are able to shift bookings away from GDS providers to their ‘supplier.com’ varies considerably, according to the business model chosen by the TSP. It is also dependent on the size and behavioural profile of its end-consumer base, which is to some extent ‘captive’ to travel content distribution through a GDS.

(12)

On the downstream side of the market, when booking through a GDS, TAs receive substantial incentive payments by the GDS providers but also possible booking commissions paid by the TSPs. This revenue will be lost if TAs book though a ‘supplier.com’. In order to compensate this loss of revenue, TAs would need to charge the end-user a service fee (which in its turn gives the end-user the incentive to book his tickets himself via ‘supplier.com’ instead of the TA, further decreasing the revenues of the TA). Therefore, the Commission concludes in the Decision that TAs have strong incentives to keep using a GDS and not to substitute bookings via GDS with bookings via ‘supplier.com’. The Commission in-depth investigation has also confirmed that TAs consider that using ‘supplier.com’ is cumbersome and lacks the versatility of inventory and price comparability offered by GDSs.

(13)

Considering that substitution upstream is only partial, leaving substantial volumes of TSP's bookings ‘captive’ for the GDS providers and the fact that downstream substitution is very limited, the Decision concludes that ‘supplier.com’ should not be included in the relevant product market in which GDS-providers are active.

(14)

The Decision recognises however that the rapid uptake of ‘supplier.com’ has an impact on the competitive conditions in the market for GDS services and constrains the market behaviour of the merged firms.

(15)

The Decision defines the geographic market delineation of the upstream side of the market as EEA-wide. The global agreements between TSPs and GDSs normally include separate regional pricing schemes for the EEA, the US and other parts of the world. Booking fees paid by TSPs for a booking made in a GDS are substantially higher in the EEA than in the U.S. Moreover, the EEA market is regulated by the EU Code of Conduct, whereas the US market was deregulated in 2006. Finally, the market shares of the GDS providers vary substantially depending on the region and the country concerned. Therefore, the Commission concludes in the Decision that the competitive conditions in the EEA and the US differ significantly.

(16)

The Decision defines the downstream side of the market as national in scope, since market shares of the GDS providers vary significantly between Member States. This is in line with previous Commission Decisions and is confirmed by the market investigation. Almost all TAs — often including online TAs — are still active in only one country, with the exception of a few TAs which have pan-European (or worldwide) activities. The subscription fees that TAs pay for the use of a GDS and the incentive payments they receive also vary between countries within the EEA. In addition, Amadeus and Galileo have established national sales and service points in almost all EEA Member States, in order to better serve the specific national markets.

(17)

In its Decision of 3 May 2007, the Commission found that the notified concentration raised serious doubts as to its compatibility with the common market and the functioning of the EEA agreement. The Commission accordingly initiated proceedings pursuant to Article 6(1)(c) of the Merger Regulation.

(18)

In the Article 6(1)(c) Decision it was argued that the merger could theoretically lead to non-coordinated as well as coordinated effects. As regards non-coordinated effects, the Commission identified three theories of harm which it considered prima facie plausible. In addition to assessing the risk for coordinated effects, the Commission focused its in-depth investigation of non-coordinated effects on assessing whether:

(19)

During the initial stage of the investigation, concerns were raised that Galileo/Worldspan would be able to leverage its post-merger market power vis à vis TAs in a number of national downstream markets, in order to strengthen its bargaining power in relation to TSPs operating on the upstream EEA market. This possibility to leverage market power may be labelled as a ‘vertical cross-market effect’. Such an effect could be described as follows.

(20)

After the merger, Galileo/Worldspan would obtain large market shares with significant increments on the downstream side of the market in Ireland, the UK, Italy, the Netherlands, Hungary and Belgium (see section on the downstream side of the market below).

(21)

If a TSP has a particular interest in having an extensive distribution network in a Member State where the merged firm would have a broad TA network, Galileo/Worldspan could possibly leverage its downstream market share in that Member State in order to gain concessions from the TSP when negotiating a worldwide agreement. In other words, the bargaining position of the merged firm vis à vis TSPs could result in greater market power than Galileo/Worldspan's upstream market share of (20 to 30 %) in the EEA would suggest. This bargaining power could possibly allow the combined entity to raise prices unilaterally post merger.

(22)

The market for GDS services is characterised by a platform facing ‘multi-homing’ on one side and ‘single-homing’ on the other. TSPs generally use ‘multi-homing’, as they have to distribute their content via all four GDSs in order to obtain the desired market coverage, whereas most TAs use ‘single-homing’, as one GDS suffices in most cases to provide them with the needed TSP content.

(23)

As long as TAs use ‘single-homing’, GDS providers have exclusive access to TAs belonging to their respective TA networks. Each GDS provider therefore has a certain degree of monopoly power in relation to TSPs that need to reach the TAs exclusively connected to one GDS. This monopoly power allows the GDS provider to charge higher prices to TSPs. These ‘monopoly rents’ extracted from TSPs are to a large extent used to cover the financial incentives granted to TAs.

(24)

The Commission has however found that the bargaining interaction between GDS providers and customers on both sides of the market has started to change. TSPs and TAs have recently increased their bargaining strength relative to GDS providers. These changes in the relative bargaining power result from (i) a consolidation among TAs, (ii) the introduction of direct bookings via ‘supplier.com’ and (iii) surcharges imposed by TSPs.

(25)

Apart from the threat to withhold travel content via ‘supplier.com’, TSPs have developed an additional tool to put pressure on GDSs. By applying, or threatening to apply surcharges to TAs, TSPs may influence the use of a specific GDS and make it lose volumes in favour of either ‘supplier.com’ or another GDS.

(26)

The reduction in the number of GDS providers is unlikely to lead to price increases as a result of ‘vertical cross-market effects’ of the market for the following reasons.

(27)

On the TSP side, the in-depth investigation confirms that TSPs are capable to force GDS providers to lower their prices in exchange for full content, or alternatively, in order to avoid surcharges being applied on their contracted TAs. Airlines in particular have developed a number of bargaining tools (especially, but not only, ‘supplier.com’) allowing them to retain part of their surplus in the negotiation with GDS providers. Even in a situation with only three GDS providers, none of them will be able to increase prices because TSPs will maintain a strong enough bargaining power, based on (i) the capacity to channel bookings towards the ‘supplier.com’ websites, (ii) the surcharges imposed on TAs, (iii) the brand recognition in the home market(s) and (iv) the possibility to develop new bargaining tools in the future. Therefore, the Commission concludes in the Decision that a reduction in the number of GDS providers from four to three does not increase the likelihood of unilateral price increases as a result of ‘vertical cross-market effects’.

(28)

This conclusion also applies to other TSPs, such as rental car companies and hotel chains.

(29)

On the TA side, a sufficient number of GDS platforms will remain available to TAs and switching costs are not an insurmountable obstacle to choosing another GDS provider. The fact that GDS providers need to create and maintain a sufficiently broad network of TAs in order to generate demand on the TSP side, leaves TAs in a favourable bargaining position vis à vis GDS providers even after the elimination of one of them.

(30)

In the Decision, the Commission concludes that these elements (effective bargaining power of the TSPs and on-going or possible development of additional bargaining tools) suffice to counter the potentially detrimental effect of the merger in terms of the reduction from four to three GDS providers as well as the potential occurrence of vertical cross-market effects.

(31)

A second theory of harm investigated by the Commission relates to Worldspan acting as a ‘price maverick’ in the EEA, charging lower prices than its competitors (Galileo, Sabre and Amadeus). During the market investigation, concerns had been expressed that, following the loss of competition between the merging firms, Worldspan's prices would be increased and aligned to those charged by Galileo.

(32)

The Commission's in-depth investigation shows however, that this theory of harm cannot be upheld. In order to conclude that the merger would be likely to lead to significant post-merger price increases by Worldspan it would have to be shown that pre-merger Worldspan's prices are significantly lower than those of its competitors, in particular Galileo, and that the merging parties would have the incentives and ability to increase Worldspan's prices post-merger.

(33)

The notifying party submitted a comparison of the merging parties' most basic types of booking for 2006: Galileo’s ‘Active Net Segment’ with Worldspan’s ‘Full Service’. This shows that Worldspan’s list price is actually […] than Galileo’s list price for […] types of ‘Full Service’ booking alternatives. Further, if Worldspan's fees for each booking category are weighted as an average across all bookings according to the relative weight of each of the four categories of Worldspan pricing under its ‘Full Service’ functionality level, the result is USD […], while Galileo’s Active Net Segment price for 2006 is USD […].

(34)

The Commission therefore concludes in the Decision that in most cases Worldspan is not the lowest priced GDS for TSPs. Generally, there is always a cheaper alternative present on the market than Worldspan.

(35)

Another reason why, according to the notifying party, Worldspan does not qualify as a price maverick, is because its alleged low pricing policy has not allowed Worldspan to aggressively expand its market presence. The notifying party argues that, on the contrary, as the smallest GDS in the EEA for more than five years, Worldspan's market share in the EEA has not showed any signs of growth.

(36)

The evolution of Worldspan's market share between 2003 and 2006 shows a decrease by (0 to 5 %) in the upstream market (EEA). In relation to the downstream market, Worldspan's market shares have remained relatively stable, with annual average increases/decreases of approximately (0 to 5 %) or less, with the exception of Hungary, where growth took place between 2004 and 2005. Contrary to what one would expect from a company which is alleged to be a maverick, Worldspan's markets shares do not show general signs of growth.

(37)

Finally, according to the notifying party, Worldspan can not be considered as a price maverick in the EEA, since it acts rather as a price taker than as a price setter. The notifying party refers inter alia to the fact that other GDSs were first in the EEA in concluding full content agreements with five of the major EEA airlines. This is confirmed by the in-depth investigation.

(38)

The notifying party considers that the scope for price increases by Worldspan's prices post merger is further decreased by the fact that Galileo and Worldspan are not each others' closest competitors on the EEA market.

(39)

The in-depth investigation confirms that Galileo is generally perceived by TSPs as stronger in corporate travel, while Worldspan is stronger in leisure travel and on-line TAs. Downstream, the vast majority of the TAs considers Amadeus as the closest competitor of both Galileo and Worldspan.

(40)

The fact that the merging parties are not each others' closest competitors reduces the incentives for the parties to increase Worldspan's prices post-merger. Moreover, the decreasing pre-merger margins of the parties indicate that the scope for higher post-merger prices is limited.

(41)

The likelihood of higher post-merger prices upstream is further reduced by the fact that such a price increase would trigger a potential withdrawal of content from Worldspan's GDS by the TSPs or the imposition of surcharges by the TSPs on TAs which use Worldspan.

(42)

In summary, the Commission's in-depth investigation shows that there is insufficient evidence to conclude that Worldspan charges lower prices than its competitors and that it would act as a price maverick. As a result, the Decision concludes that it is unlikely that the transaction would lead to an increase of Worldspan's prices.

(43)

As regards the downstream side of the market, the transaction would lead to high market shares (above 40 %) in six Member States, with significant increments. In these six Member States the market shares in 2006 range from (40 to 50 %) to (70 to 80 %).

(44)

The size of the high combined market shares in these six Member States could potentially allow the parties to behave independently of their competitors and customers post-merger and exploit their commercial relationship with TAs.

(45)

However, the in-depth investigation shows that the merger will not allow the merged firms to exert market power on the TAs in those national markets where the transaction will lead to high joint market shares.

(46)

The notifying party argues that Galileo has lost significant market shares in each of the Member States where traditionally it had an important share, due to historical links with national carriers.

(47)

The decrease in Galileo's market shares would, according to the notifying party, demonstrate that Galileo's above average market share does not reflect market power. The transaction is unlikely to reverse the declining trend in Galileo's market share, especially given Worldspan’s marginal role at an EEA level and its documented inability to improve its market position on the EEA market over the years.

(48)

The trend in Galileo's market shares as well as the marginal role played by Worldspan at EEA level have been confirmed by the in-depth investigation.

(49)

TAs are in general net receivers as they receive more financial incentives from GDSs than they pay in subscription fees to the GDSs. Incentive payments have consistently increased over the last five years, including in those Member States where the parties have high market shares (above 40 %). The in-depth investigation showed that during the period 2003/2006 TA revenues have in general increased whereas the evolution of their gross margins is positive.

(50)

This development shows the importance of TAs to GDSs and reflects the general view among the respondents to the in-depth investigation that competition between GDSs on the downstream market is strong.

(51)

An additional reason why the transaction is unlikely to result in price increases on the downstream market is related to the fact, as confirmed by the in-depth investigation, that switching costs are not insurmountable impediments to switching.

(52)

Although the quantification of switching costs is difficult, both in terms of time and training needed, as well as in financial terms, some general conclusions may be drawn from the in-depth investigation. Small TAs need one or several weeks to change from one GDS to another; the training needs are not significant and their productivity is not negatively affected by the change. However, large TAs estimate the time needed to switch to approximately 12 months at a significant financial cost (more than EUR 1 million). Also the needs in terms of training are higher. In particular cases (e.g. because of technical aspects of the change), the financial cost as well as the timing needed may be even higher.

(53)

Whereas the in-depth investigation confirmed that switching costs exist, it also showed that they have not prevented significant switching in the past. In the period 2003 to 2006, several TAs moved from Galileo to Amadeus. In addition, Worldspan lost two of its major customers in this period, […] and […].

(54)

Even if switching cost exist, it seems unlikely that the transaction would lead to competition concerns due to the parties' high combined market shares downstream. This is because of (i) the negative evolution of the parties' joint market shares, (ii) the intense competition between GDSs, even on national markets where they have high market shares downstream, as evidenced by the increase over time in incentives paid to TAs in such national markets and (iii) the generally positive views of the TAs on the merger which is based on their conviction that the merger will create a strong alternative to Amadeus.

(55)

Therefore, the Commission concludes in the Decision that non-coordinated effects are unlikely to be created as a result of the merger with respect to the downstream markets.

(56)

Furthermore, the in-depth investigation further analysed the possibility of coordinated effects on both the upstream and downstream side of the GDS market.

(57)

Generally, the less complex and the more stable the economic environment, the easier it is for companies to reach a common understanding on the terms of coordination. In this context volatile demand, substantial internal growth by some firms in the market or frequent entry by new firms may indicate that the situation is not sufficiently stable to make coordination likely.

(58)

Although during the last five years no significant GDS market entry took place, the market share evolution of the last five years confirms that the economic environment in which the GDSs compete in the EEA has been subject to considerable change.

(59)

Further, the growth of ‘supplier.com’ during the last five years should be taken into account as a destabilising factor in reaching terms of coordination in the GDS market. The market investigation also confirmed that most airlines foresee a further growth of their direct sales via ‘supplier.com’. For rental car companies and hotels the distribution of travel content by means of GDS represents a relatively small part of their bookings.

(60)

Even if the above circumstances do not totally rule out the possibility of reaching terms of coordination between the three remaining GDSs on the upstream market, the Commission concludes in the Decision that these circumstances would render such coordination more difficult and thus unlikely.

(61)

Only the credible threat of timely and sufficient retaliation keeps companies away from deviating from terms of coordination. This requires that markets are sufficiently transparent to allow coordinating companies to monitor to a sufficient degree whether companies are deviating.

(62)

Although, the services offered by a GDS are of a rather homogeneous nature, the pricing structure and the product offerings of all GDSs are complex. Currently, in the EEA, GDSs apply different types of agreements in parallel, i.e. standard Participating Carrier Agreements (PCAs) and full content agreements, sometimes complemented by ‘opt-in’ agreements. The differences in and variety of both the pricing structures and the product offerings in these agreements make sustained coordination impracticable. The transparency on the market that remains is further reduced by the fact that GDSs modify product offerings and price structures on a regular basis.

(63)

Although it would appear from the market investigation that the contracts between GDSs and rental car companies and hotels seem less complex in structure, they would still not provide the level of transparency which would make coordination feasible.

(64)

A number of respondents to the market investigation pointed to the existence of so-called ‘Most Favoured Nation’ (MFN) clauses in their agreements with GDSs. The use of these clauses might increase price transparency. It was confirmed however by the market investigation, that in most cases the MFN clauses relate to the obligation on the TSPs to provide the GDS content parity, and are therefore merely a reflection of the obligations laid down in the Code of Conduct.

(65)

Considering the characteristics of the relevant markets, and in particular, the limited degree of transparency, the Commission considers in the Decision that it would be difficult for the three remaining GDSs to effectively monitor deviations from the coordinated behaviour.

(66)

Coordination is not sustainable unless the consequences of deviation are sufficiently severe to convince coordinating companies that it is in their best interest to adhere to the terms of the coordination.

(67)

Immediate retaliation through the reduction by the coordinating GDSs of the fees charged to TSPs would be ineffective to retaliate against the deviating GDS, since it would not provoke switching behaviour by TSPs, considering that they need the services of all four GDSs.

(68)

A more realistic retaliatory measure would be for a GDS to offer certain important TAs who use the services of the deviating GDS higher incentives or direct lump sum payments in order to provoke a switch from the deviating GDS to a different GDS. Although such measures would be possible, it would be a costly strategy as the incentive payments offered to the TAs has to be sufficiently large to provoke TAs to switch of GDSs.

(69)

The Commission therefore concludes in the Decision that retaliation by means of increased incentive payments to TAs cannot be excluded by itself.

(70)

For coordination to be successful, the actions of non-coordinating companies and potential competitors, as well as customers, should not be able to jeopardise the outcome expected from the coordination.

(71)

In the present case there would seem to be significant competitive constraints present on the market which would destabilise any attempt at coordination. These constraints would in particular stem from the possibility of TSPs to withhold content and make this content only available via a direct distribution channel such as ‘supplier.com’. In addition, coordination leading to price increases could provoke TSPs in the EEA to invest more in the development of alternatives to GDSs such as GNE's and direct links.

(72)

Considering the circumstances described above and the fact that the criteria that have to be fulfilled in order to show coordinated effects are cumulative, the merger is unlikely to result in coordinated effects on the EU market for the supply of GDS services to TSPs.

(73)

The issue of coordination could in principle also arise on the downstream market which covers the relationship between GDSs and TAs. The downstream markets in the EEA are characterised by significant differences in market shares between the four GDSs on a country by country basis.

(74)

Competition between GDSs on the downstream market is strong and does not show signs of coordinated behaviour. During the last […] years Galileo and Worldspan have lost […] market shares to Amadeus. Moreover, the market investigation confirms that competition between GDSs for contracts with TAs is currently intense, a fact which is reflected by the increase of the incentive payments by GDSs to TAs over the last five years.

(75)

The above suggests that the market positions of the merging firms on most downstream markets are relatively unstable, a circumstance which would complicate reaching agreement on terms of coordination.

(76)

The terms and conditions of TA contracts are generally non-transparent since they are negotiated individually between TAs and GDSs. GDSs have no visibility into the complex terms and conditions offered by competing GDSs. Although some price transparency may exist as a result of a possible exchange of information between TAs and GDSs in the context of contract negotiations, the fact that most contracts are individually negotiated would significantly limit the degree of transparency that might result of this. Therefore, the possibilities to successfully monitor coordinated behaviour would seem very limited, because it would require a monitoring of the level of content, functionalities, services, financial assistance, bonuses and other terms and conditions that each GDS offers to individual travel agencies.

(77)

Considering the limited degree of transparency on the downstream side of the market, the Commission concludes in the Decision that it would be difficult for the three remaining GDSs to monitor deviations from the coordinated behaviour.

(78)

The deterrent mechanisms that can be applied are essentially the same as the ones discussed in relation to the upstream market.

(79)

In case of coordinated behaviour, there are not many readily available alternatives for TAs to turn to. The use of ‘supplier.com’ is too burdensome for TAs and the other alternatives to GDSs are currently not well developed enough in the EEA to constitute adequate alternatives.

(80)

Considering the fact that the criteria that have to be fulfilled in order to show coordinated effects are cumulative, the Commission concludes in the Decision that also on the downstream side of the market the merger is unlikely to result in coordinated effects.

(81)

The Commission concludes in the Decision that the proposed concentration will not give raise to any competition concerns as a result of which effective competition would be significantly impeded in the Common Market or in a substantial part of it. Consequently, the Commission intends to declare the concentration compatible with the Common Market and the EEA Agreement, in accordance with Article 8(1) of the Merger Regulation and Article 57 of the EEA Agreement.

1.12.2007   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

L 314/29

(1)

Decision 90/424/EEC lays down the procedures governing the Community's financial contribution for programmes for the eradication, control and monitoring of animal diseases and zoonoses.

(2)

In addition, Article 24(1) of Decision 90/424/EEC provides that a Community financial measure is to be introduced to reimburse the expenditure incurred by the Member States for the financing of national programmes for the eradication, control and monitoring of the animal diseases and zoonoses listed in that Decision.

(3)

Council Decision 2006/965/EC of 19 December 2006 amending Decision 90/424/EEC on expenditure in the veterinary field (2) replaced Article 24 to that Decision by a new provision. By way of transitional measures, Decision 2006/965/EC provided that programmes for enzootic bovine leucosis and for Aujeszky's disease could continue to be funded until 31 December 2010.

(4)

Council Decision 90/638/EEC of 27 November 1990 laying down Community criteria for the eradication and monitoring of certain animal diseases (3) provides that in order to be approved under the measures provided for in Article 24(1) of Decision 90/424/EEC, programmes submitted by the Member States must meet the criteria set out in the Annexes to Decision 90/638/EEC.

(5)

Regulation (EC) No 999/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 May 2001 laying down rules for the prevention, control and eradication of certain transmissible spongiform encephalopathies (4), provides for annual programmes by Member States for monitoring of transmissible spongiform encephalopathies (TSEs) in bovine, ovine and caprine animals.

(6)

Council Directive 2005/94/EC (5) on Community measures for the control of avian influenza also provides for surveillance programmes by Member States to be carried out in respect of poultry and wild birds in order to contribute, interalia, on the basis of regularly updated risk-assessments, to the knowledge on the threats posed by the wild birds in relation to any influenza virus of avian origin in birds. Those annual programmes, and their financing, for monitoring should also be approved.

(7)

Certain Member States have submitted to the Commission annual programmes for the eradication, control and monitoring of animal diseases, programmes of checks aimed at the prevention of zoonoses, and annual monitoring programmes for the eradication and monitoring of certain TSEs for which they wish to receive a financial contribution from the Community.

(8)

Certain Member States have also submitted to the Commission multi-annual programmes for the eradication, control and monitoring of the animal diseases, for which they wish to receive a financial contribution from the Community. The Commitment of the expenditure for the multi-annual programmes shall be adopted in accordance with Article 76(3) of Council Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 1605/2002 of 25 June 2002 on the Financial Regulation applicable to the general budget of the European Union (6). For multi-annual programmes the first budget commitment shall be made after their approval. Each subsequent commitment shall be made by the Commission on the basis of the decision to grant a contribution referred to in Article 24(5) of Decision 90/424/EEC.

(9)

The Commission has assessed the annual and multi-annual programmes submitted by the Member States from both the veterinary and the financial point of view. Those programmes were found to comply with relevant Community veterinary legislation, and in particular with the criteria set out in Decision 90/638/EEC.

(10)

In the light of the importance of those programmes for the achievement of Community objectives in the field of animal and public health, as well as the obligatory application in all Member States in the case of the TSE and avian influenza programmes, it is appropriate to fix the appropriate rate of financial contribution of the Community to reimburse the costs to be incurred by the Member States concerned for the measures referred to in this Decision up to a maximum amount for each programme.

(11)

For the sake of better management, more efficient use of Community funds and improved transparency, it is also necessary to fix for each programme, where appropriate, maximum amounts to be reimbursed to the Member States for certain costs, such as the tests used in the Member States and compensation to owners for their losses due to the slaughter or culling of animals.

(12)

Under Council Regulation (EC) No 1290/2005 of 21 June 2005 on the financing of the common agricultural policy (7), programmes for the eradication and control of animal diseases are to be financed under the European Agricultural Guarantee Fund. For financial control purposes, Articles 9, 36 and 37 of that Regulation are to apply.

(13)

The financial contribution from the Community should be granted subject to the condition that the actions planned are efficiently carried out and that the competent authorities supply all the necessary information within the time limits laid down in this Decision. In particular, it appears appropriate to require more frequent intermediates technical reporting in order to evaluate the efficiency of the implementation of the programmes approved.

(14)

For reasons of administrative efficiency all expenditure submitted for a financial contribution by the Community should be expressed in euro. In accordance with Regulation (EC) No 1290/2005, the conversion rate for expenditure in a currency other than the euro should be the most recent exchange rate set by the European Central Bank prior to the first day of the month in which the application is submitted by the Member State concerned.

(15)

The measures provided for in this Decision are in accordance with the opinion of the Standing Committee on the Food Chain and Animal Health,

(a)

EUR 1 200 000 for Ireland;

(b)

EUR 4 400 000 for Spain;

(c)

EUR 2 100 000 for Italy;

(d)

EUR 153 000 for Cyprus;

(e)

EUR 1 900 000 for Portugal;

(f)

EUR 1 200 000 for the United Kingdom.

(a)

for a rose bengal test

EUR 0,2 per test;

(b)

for a SAT test

EUR 0,2 per test;

(c)

for a complement fixation test

EUR 0,4 per test;

(d)

for an ELISA test

EUR 1 per test.

(a)

EUR 24 000 for Estonia;

(b)

EUR 6 100 000 for Spain;

(c)

EUR 2 700 000 for Italy;

(d)

EUR 1 100 000 for Poland;

(e)

EUR 347 000 for Portugal.

(a)

for a tuberculin test

EUR 1 per test;

(b)

for a gamma-interferon test

EUR 5 per test.

(a)

EUR 5 600 000 for Spain;

(b)

EUR 2 800 000 for Italy;

(c)

EUR 93 000 for Cyprus;

(d)

EUR 1 100 000 for Portugal.

(a)

for a rose bengal test

EUR 0,2 per test;

(b)

for a complement fixation test

EUR 0,4 per test.

(a)

EUR 377 000 for Belgium;

(b)

EUR 5 400 for Bulgaria;

(c)

EUR 3 100 000 for Germany;

(d)

EUR 100 000 for Greece;

(e)

EUR 4 100 000 for Spain;

(f)

EUR 351 000 for France;

(g)

EUR 1 300 000 for Italy;

(h)

EUR 70 000 for Luxemburg;

(i)

EUR 527 000 for the Netherlands;

(j)

EUR 245 000 for Austria;

(k)

EUR 1 004 000 for Portugal;

(l)

EUR 43 000 for Romania;

(m)

EUR 61 000 for Slovenia.

(a)

EUR 550 000 for Belgium;

(b)

EUR 10 000 for Bulgaria;

(c)

EUR 200 000 for the Czech Republic;

(d)

EUR 75 000 for Denmark;

(e)

EUR 600 000 for Germany;

(f)

EUR 120 000 for Ireland;

(g)

EUR 150 000 for Greece;

(h)

EUR 800 000 for Spain;

(i)

EUR 500 000 for France;

(j)

EUR 470 000 for Italy;

(k)

EUR 45 000 for Cyprus;

(l)

EUR 60 000 for Latvia;

(m)

EUR 400 000 for Hungary;

(n)

EUR 1 300 000 for the Netherlands;

(o)

EUR 50 000 for Austria;

(p)

EUR 2 000 000 for Poland;

(q)

EUR 600 000 for Portugal;

(r)

EUR 400 000 for Romania;

(s)

EUR 275 000 for Slovakia.

(a)

for a bacteriological test (cultivation)

EUR 5,0 per test;

(b)

for the purchase of one vaccine dose

EUR 0,05 per dose;

(c)

for serotyping of relevant isolates of Salmonella spp.

EUR 20,0 per test.

(a)

EUR 750 000 for Belgium;

(b)

EUR 20 000 for Bulgaria;

(c)

EUR 1 000 000 for the Czech Republic;

(d)

EUR 2 000 000 for Germany;

(e)

EUR 20 000 for Estonia;

(f)

EUR 500 000 for Greece;

(g)

EUR 3 500 000 for Spain;

(h)

EUR 2 500 000 for France;

(i)

EUR 1 000 000 for Italy;

(j)

EUR 80 000 for Cyprus;

(k)

EUR 300 000 for Latvia;

(l)

EUR 10 000 for Luxembourg;

(m)

EUR 2 000 000 for Hungary;

(n)

EUR 2 000 000 for the Netherlands;

(o)

EUR 1 000 000 for Austria;

(p)

EUR 2 000 000 for Poland;

(q)

EUR 1 000 000 for Portugal;

(r)

EUR 500 000 for Romania;

(s)

EUR 1 000 000 for Slovakia;

(t)

EUR 80 000 for United Kingdom.

(a)

for a bacteriological test (cultivation)

EUR 5,0 per test;

(b)

for the purchase of one vaccine dose

EUR 0,05 per dose;

(c)

for serotyping of relevant isolates of Salmonella spp.

EUR 20,0 per test.

(a)

Classical swine fever submitted by Bulgaria, Germany, France, Luxembourg, Romania, Slovenia and Slovakia are hereby approved for the period from 1 January 2008 to 31 December 2008.

(b)

Classical swine fever and African swine fever submitted by Italy are hereby approved for the period from 1 January 2008 to 31 December 2008.

(a)

EUR 400 000 for Bulgaria;

(b)

EUR 1 000 000 for Germany;

(c)

EUR 650 000 for France;

(d)

EUR 100 000 for Italy;

(e)

EUR 15 000 for Luxembourg;

(f)

EUR 2 500 000 for Romania;

(g)

EUR 40 000 for Slovenia;

(h)

EUR 525 000 for Slovakia.

(a)

EUR 127 000 for Belgium;

(b)

EUR 76 000 for Bulgaria;

(c)

EUR 65 000 for the Czech Republic;

(d)

EUR 202 000 for Denmark;

(e)

EUR 580 000 for Germany;

(f)

EUR 8 000 for Estonia;

(g)

EUR 58 000 for Ireland;

(h)

EUR 72 000 for Greece;

(i)

EUR 306 000 for Spain;

(j)

EUR 155 000 for France;

(k)

EUR 380 000 for Italy;

(l)

EUR 15 000 for Cyprus;

(m)

EUR 33 000 for Latvia;

(n)

EUR 43 000 for Lithuania;

(o)

EUR 12 000 for Luxembourg;

(p)

EUR 184 000 for Hungary;

(q)

EUR 444 000 for the Netherlands;

(r)

EUR 55 000 for Austria;

(s)

EUR 81 000 for Poland;

(t)

EUR 165 000 for Portugal;

(u)

EUR 465 000 for Romania;

(v)

EUR 43 000 for Slovenia;

(w)

EUR 50 000 for Slovakia;

(x)

EUR 35 000 for Finland;

(y)

EUR 290 000 for Sweden;

(z)

EUR 400 000 for the United Kingdom.

(a)

ELISA test:

EUR 1 per test;

(b)

agar gel immune diffusion test:

EUR 1,2 per test;

(c)

HI test for H5/H7:

EUR 12 per test;

(d)

virus isolation test:

EUR 30 per test;

(e)

PCR test:

EUR 15 per test;

(f)

sampling wild birds

EUR 20 per bird.

(a)

EUR 1 950 000 for Belgium;

(b)

EUR 850 000 for Bulgaria;

(c)

EUR 950 000 for the Czech Republic;

(d)

EUR 1 600 000 for Denmark;

(e)

EUR 9 500 000 for Germany;

(f)

EUR 250 000 for Estonia;

(g)

EUR 5 000 000 for Ireland;

(h)

EUR 950 000 for Greece;

(i)

EUR 4 700 000 for Spain;

(j)

EUR 14 750 000 for France;

(k)

EUR 3 050 000 for Italy;

(l)

EUR 250 000 for Cyprus;

(m)

EUR 300 000 for Latvia;

(n)

EUR 550 000 for Lithuania;

(o)

EUR 150 000 for Luxembourg;

(p)

EUR 700 000 for Hungary;

(q)

EUR 37 000 for Malta;

(r)

EUR 3 150 000 for the Netherlands;

(s)

EUR 1 250 000 for Austria;

(t)

EUR 3 250 000 for Poland;

(u)

EUR 1 250 000 for Portugal;

(v)

EUR 7 500 for Romania;

(w)

EUR 200 000 for Slovenia;

(x)

EUR 750 000 for Slovakia;

(y)

EUR 650 000 for Finland;

(z)

EUR 1 150 000 for Sweden;

(za)

EUR 5 300 000 for the United Kingdom.

(a)

EUR 5 per test, for tests carried out in bovine animals referred to in Annex III to Regulation (EC) No 999/2001;

(b)

EUR 30 per test, for tests carried out in ovine and caprine animals referred to in Annex III to Regulation (EC) No 999/2001;

(c)

EUR 50 per test, for tests carried out in cervid animals referred to in Annex III to Regulation (EC) No 999/2001;

(d)

EUR 175 per test, for primary molecular discriminatory tests carried out as referred to in point 3.2(c)(i) of Chapter C of Annex X to Regulation (EC) No 999/2001.

(a)

EUR 50 000 for Belgium;

(b)

EUR 50 000 for Bulgaria;

(c)

EUR 150 000 for the Czech Republic;

(d)

EUR 50 000 for Denmark;

(e)

EUR 145 000 for Germany;

(f)

EUR 50 000 for Estonia;

(g)

EUR 430 000 for Ireland;

(h)

EUR 50 000 for Greece;

(i)

EUR 500 000 for Spain;

(j)

EUR 100 000 for France;

(k)

EUR 150 000 for Italy;

(l)

EUR 50 000 for Luxembourg;

(m)

EUR 50 000 for the Netherlands;

(n)

EUR 50 000 for Austria;

(o)

EUR 100 000 for Poland;

(p)

EUR 232 000 for Portugal;

(q)

EUR 10 000 for Slovenia;

(r)

EUR 125 000 for Slovakia;

(s)

EUR 25 000 for Finland;

(t)

EUR 176 000 for the United Kingdom.

(a)

EUR 66 000 for Belgium;

(b)

EUR 26 000 for Bulgaria;

(c)

EUR 88 000 for the Czech Republic;

(d)

EUR 204 000 for Denmark;

(e)

EUR 1 000 000 for Germany;

(f)

EUR 12 100 for Estonia;

(g)

EUR 550 000 for Ireland;

(h)

EUR 700 000 for Greece;

(i)

EUR 3 800 000 for Spain;

(j)

EUR 3 000 000 for France;

(k)

EUR 1 500 000 for Italy;

(l)

EUR 1 100 000 for Cyprus;

(m)

EUR 1 100 for Latvia;

(n)

EUR 3 000 for Lithuania;

(o)

EUR 27 000 for Luxembourg;

(p)

EUR 343 000 for Hungary;

(q)

EUR 258 000 for the Netherlands;

(r)

EUR 26 000 for Austria;

(s)

EUR 35 000 for Portugal;

(t)

EUR 881 000 for Romania;

(u)

EUR 61 000 for Slovenia;

(v)

EUR 302 000 for Slovakia;

(w)

EUR 201 000 for Finland;

(x)

EUR 4 000 000 for the United Kingdom.

(a)

EUR 700 000 for Bulgaria;

(b)

EUR 700 000 for Lithuania;

(c)

EUR 1 500 000 for Hungary;

(d)

EUR 290 000 for Austria;

(e)

EUR 3 900 000 for Poland;

(f)

EUR 2 500 000 for Romania;

(g)

EUR 575 000 for Slovakia.

(a)

for an ELISA test

EUR 8 per test;

(b)

for a test to detect tetracycline in bone

EUR 8 per test.

(a)

EUR 15 000 for Estonia;

(b)

EUR 200 000 for Lithuania;

(c)

EUR 800 000 for Poland.

(a)

for an ELISA test

EUR 0,5 per test;

(b)

for an agar gel immune diffusion test

EUR 0,5 per test.

(a)

EUR 450 000 for Spain;

(b)

EUR 60 000 for Hungary;

(c)

EUR 5 000 000 for Poland.

(a)

1 January 2008 to 31 December 2009 for the Czech Republic and Germany;

(b)

1 January 2008 to 31 December 2010 for Latvia and Finland;

(c)

1 January 2008 to 31 December 2011 for Estonia;

(d)

1 January 2008 to 31 December 2012 for Slovenia.

(a)

for an ELISA test

EUR 8 per test;

(b)

for a test to detect tetracycline in bone

EUR 8 per test.

(a)

EUR 1 000 000 for the Czech Republic;

(b)

EUR 800 000 for Germany;

(c)

EUR 4 750 000 for Estonia;

(d)

EUR 3 700 000 for Latvia;

(e)

EUR 1 750 000 for Slovenia;

(f)

EUR 300 000 for Finland.

(a)

EUR 500 000 for the Czech Republic;

(b)

EUR 475 000 for Germany;

(c)

EUR 1 000 000 for Estonia;

(d)

EUR 1 200 000 for Latvia;

(e)

EUR 350 000 for Slovenia;

(f)

EUR 100 000 for Finland.

(a)

for an ELISA test

EUR 0,5 per test;

(b)

for an agar gel immune diffusion test

EUR 0,5 per test.

(a)

EUR 2 000 000 for Italy;

(b)

EUR 170 000 for Latvia;

(c)

EUR 1 000 000 for Portugal.

(a)

EUR 400 000 for Italy;

(b)

EUR 60 000 for Latvia;

(c)

EUR 300 000 for Portugal.

(a)

for bovine animals, up to a maximum of

EUR 375 per animal;

(b)

for sheep and goats, up to a maximum of

EUR 50 per animal;

(c)

for breeding bird of Gallus gallus, up to a maximum of

EUR 3,5 per bird;

(d)

for laying bird of Gallus gallus, up to a maximum of

EUR 1,5 per bird.

(a)

implement the programmes in accordance with the relevant provisions of Community law, including rules on competition and on the award of public contracts;

(b)

bring into force by 1 January 2008 at the latest the laws, regulations and administrative provisions necessary for implementing the programmes referred to in Articles 1 to 18;

(c)

forward to the Commission by 1 June 2008 at the latest the intermediate technical and financial reports for the programmes referred to in Articles 1 to 18, in accordance with Article 24(7) (a) of Decision 90/424/EEC;

(d)

for the programmes referred to in Article 9, report to the Commission the positive and negative results of investigations detected during their surveillance of poultry and wild birds through the Commission on-line system every three months by forwarding within a period of four weeks following the end of the month covered by the report;

(e)

for the programmes referred to in Articles 10 to 12, forward a report to the Commission every month on the results of the TSE monitoring programme by forwarding within a period of four weeks following the end of the month covered by the report;

(f)

for the programmes referred to in Articles 1 to 18, forward a final report to the Commission in accordance with Article 24(7)(b) of Decision 90/424/EEC by 30 April 2009 at the latest on the technical execution of the programme accompanied by justifying evidence as to the costs paid by the Member State and the results attained during the period from 1 January 2008 to 31 December 2008;

(g)

for programmes referred to in Articles 1 to 18, implement the programme efficiently;

(h)

do not for the programmes referred to in Articles 1 to 18, submit further requests for other Community contributions for these measures, and have not previously submitted such requests.