ANNEX

to Commission Regulation of 2 May 2007 establishing the standard import values for determining the entry price of certain fruit and vegetables

(EUR/100 kg)
CN code	Third country code (1)	Standard import value
0702 00 00	MA	48,6
	TN	127,8
	TR	140,3
	ZZ	105,6
0707 00 05	JO	196,3
	MA	69,3
	MK	53,2
	TR	109,7
	ZZ	107,1
0709 90 70	TR	106,1
	ZZ	106,1
0805 10 20	EG	41,7
	IL	69,7
	MA	44,8
	TN	50,1
	ZZ	51,6
0805 50 10	IL	61,4
	ZZ	61,4
0808 10 80	AR	80,6
	BR	80,3
	CA	99,8
	CL	86,1
	CN	100,5
	NZ	129,9
	US	109,5
	UY	65,9
	ZA	85,9
	ZZ	93,2

---

(1)  Country nomenclature as fixed by Commission Regulation (EC) No 1833/2006 (OJ L 354, 14.12.2006, p. 19). Code ‘ZZ’ stands for ‘of other origin’.

ANNEX I

Guidelines on the implementation of surveillance programmes for avian influenza in poultry to be carried out in the Member States

A.   Objectives, general requirements and criteria for surveillance

A.1.   Objectives

Serological surveillance for LPAI subtypes H5 and H7 in poultry shall aim at:

1.	Detecting sub-clinical infections with LPAI of subtypes H5 and H7 thereby complementing early detection systems and subsequently preventing possible mutation of these viruses to HPAI.

2.	Detecting infections of LPAI H5 and H7 subtypes in specifically targeted poultry populations at specific risk for infection due to their husbandry system or the susceptibility of specific species.

3.	Contributing to the demonstration of a free status of a certain country, region or compartment from notifiable avian influenza in the frame of international trade according to OIE rules.

A.2.   General requirements and criteria

1.	Sampling shall not extend beyond 31 December of the year of implementation of the programme. For poultry, sampling shall cover a period appropriate to production periods for each poultry category as required.

2.	In order to save resources, samples collected for other purposes are recommended.

3.	Testing of samples shall be carried out at national laboratories for avian influenza (NL) in Member States or by other laboratories authorised by the competent authorities and under the control of the NL.

4.	All results (both serological and virological) shall be sent to the Community Reference Laboratory for Avian Influenza (CRL) for collation. A good flow of information must be ensured. The CRL shall provide technical support and keep an enlarged stock of diagnostic reagents.

5.

All avian influenza virus isolates shall be submitted to the CRL in accordance with Community legislation, unless a derogation according to paragraph 4 of Chapter V (Differential diagnosis) in the diagnostic manual laid down in Decision 2006/437/EC (1) is granted. Viruses of H5/H7 subtype shall be submitted without delay and shall be subjected to the standard characterisation tests (nucleotide sequencing/IVPI) according to that Diagnostic Manual.

6.	Whenever possible, NLs shall submit to the CRL, H5 or H7 positive sera collected from Anseriformes in order that an archive be established to facilitate future test development.

B.   Surveillance for avian influenza in poultry

1.	All positive findings shall be retrospectively investigated at the holding and the conclusions of this investigation shall be reported to the Commission and the CRL.

2.	Specific protocols to accompany the sending of material to the CRL and reporting tables for collection of surveillance data shall be provided by the CRL. In those tables the laboratory testing methods used shall be indicated. The tables provided shall be used to submit results in a single document.

3.

Blood samples for serological examination shall be collected from all species of poultry including those reared in free-range systems, from at least 5 to 10 birds (except ducks geese and quail) per holding, and from the different sheds, if more than one shed is present on a holding. In case of several sheds the sample size per holding should be increased appropriately. It is recommended to take at least five birds per shed.

4.

Sampling shall be stratified throughout the territory of the whole Member State, so that samples can be considered as representative for the whole of the Member State, taking into account: (a) the number of holdings to be sampled (excluding ducks, geese and turkeys); that number shall be defined so as to ensure the identification of at least one infected holding if the prevalence of infected holdings is at least 5 %, with a 95 % confidence interval (see Table 1); and (b) the number of birds sampled from each holding shall be defined so as to ensure 95 % probability of identifying at least one positive bird if the prevalence of sero-positive birds is ≥ 30 %.

5.

Based on a risk assessment and the specific situation in the Member State concerned, the sampling design shall also consider: (a) the types of production and their specific risks, shall be targeted to free range production, outdoor keeping and backyard flocks plus taking into account other factors such as multi-age, use of surface water, a relatively longer life span, the presence of more than one species on the holding or other relevant factors; (b) the number of turkey, duck and goose holdings to be sampled shall be defined to ensure the identification of at least one infected holding if the prevalence of infected holdings is at least 5 %, with a 99 % confidence interval (see Table 2); (c) where significant number of holdings producing game, ratites and quails are present in a Member State they shall be included in the programme. With regard to quails only adult (or laying) breeders shall be sampled; (d) the time period for sampling shall coincide with seasonal production. However, where appropriate, sampling can be adapted to other identified periods at local level, during which time the presence of other poultry hosts on a holding might pose a greater risk for disease introduction; (e) in case a significant number of backyard flocks are present, surveillance could be extended to them; (f) Member States that must carry out sampling for Newcastle disease to maintain their status as Newcastle disease non-vaccinating countries in accordance with Commission Decision 94/327/EC (2) may utilise these samples from breeding flocks for the surveillance of H5/H7 antibodies.

Table 1

Number of holdings to be sampled of each poultry category (except turkey, duck and goose holdings)

Number of holdings per poultry category per Member State	Number of holdings to be sampled
Up to 34	All
35-50	35
51-80	42
81-250	53
> 250	60

Table 2

Number of turkey, duck and goose holdings to be sampled

Number of holdings per Member State	Number of holdings to be sampled
Up to 46	All
47-60	47
61-100	59
101-350	80
> 350	90

C.   Specific requirements for detection of infections with H5/H7 subtypes of avian influenza in ducks, geese and quail

1.	Blood samples for serological testing shall be taken preferably from birds which are kept outside in fields.

2.	From each selected holding 40-50 blood samples shall be taken for serological testing.

3.	In case commercial flocks are not present, surveillance could be carried out on backyard flocks.

D.   Laboratory testing

1.

Laboratory tests shall be carried out in accordance with the avian influenza diagnostic manual (Commission Decision 2006/437/EC) laying down the procedures for the confirmation and differential diagnosis of avian influenza (including examination of sera from ducks and geese by haemagglutination-inhibition (HI) test).

2.	However, if laboratory tests not laid down in the avian influenza diagnostic manual nor described in the OIE Terrestrial Manual are envisaged, Member States shall provide the necessary validation data to the CRL, in parallel to submitting their programme to the Commission for approval.

3.

All positive serological findings shall be confirmed by the National Laboratories for avian influenza by a haemagglutination-inhibition test, using designated strains supplied by the Community Reference Laboratory for Avian Influenza: H5 (a) initial test using Ostrich/Denmark/72420/96 (H5N2); (b) test all positives with Duck/Denmark/64650/03 (H5N7) to eliminate N2 cross reactive antibody. H7 (a) initial test using Turkey/England/647/77 (H7N7); (b) test all positives with African Starling/983/79 (H7N1) to eliminate N7 cross reactive antibody.

---

(1)  OJ L 237, 31.8.2006, p. 1.

(2)  OJ L 146, 11.6.1994, p. 17.

ANNEX II

Guidelines on the implementation of surveillance programmes for avian influenza in wild birds to be carried out in the Member States

A.   Objectives, general requirements and criteria for surveillance

A1.   Objectives

Virological surveillance for avian influenza in wild birds aim to identify the risk of introduction of AI viruses (LPAI and HPAI) to domestic poultry by:

—	ensuring early detection of HPAI H5N1 by investigating increased incidence of morbidity and mortality in wild birds, in particular in selected ‘higher risk’ species.

—	in the event that HPAI H5N1 is detected in wild birds, then surveillance of live and dead wild birds shall be enhanced to determine whether wild birds of other species can act as asymptomatic carriers or ‘bridge species’ (see Part E of this Annex).

—

continuing a ‘baseline’ surveillance of different species of free living migratory birds as part of continuous monitoring of LPAI viruses. Anseriformes (water fowl) and Charadriiformes (shorebirds and gulls) shall be the main sampling targets to assess if they carry LPAI viruses of H5 and H7 subtypes (which would in any case also detect HPAI H5N1 and other HPAI, if present). ‘Higher risk species’ must be targeted in particular.

A2.   General requirements and criteria

1.	Sampling shall not extend beyond 31 December of the year of implementation of the programme.

2.	Testing of samples shall be carried out at national laboratories for avian influenza (NL) in Member States or by other laboratories authorised by the competent authorities and under the control of the NL.

3.	All results shall be sent to the Community Reference Laboratory for Avian Influenza (CRL) for collation. A good flow of information must be ensured. The CRL shall provide technical support and keep an enlarged stock of diagnostic reagents.

4.

All avian influenza virus isolates of cases in wild birds shall be submitted to the CRL in accordance with Community legislation, unless a derogation according to paragraph 4 of Chapter V under Differential diagnosis in the avian influenza Diagnostic Manual laid down in Decision 2006/437/EC is granted. Viruses of H5/H7 subtype shall be submitted without delay and shall be subjected to the standard characterisation tests (nucleotide sequencing/IVPI) according to the said diagnostic manual.

B.   Surveillance for avian influenza in wild birds

Design and implementation

Close cooperation with epidemiologists and ornithologists and the competent authority for nature conservation shall be ensured for designing the surveillance, assisting in species identification and optimising sampling. The design of the surveillance shall be adapted to the national situation as regards selection of species to be sampled according to species predominance and bird population sizes. Sampling must consider the seasonality of migration patterns, which may vary in different Member States. It shall take into account the behaviour of bird species as regards migratory flyways, main habitats, gregariousness and degree of mixing during migration and the results obtained from previous surveillance during 2003-2006. In addition, continuous review and feedback will be provided through the AI wild bird surveillance working group who are analysing new data as they become available.

For H5N1 HPAI, all those factors shall be considered in relation to the probability of wild bird exposure to infected poultry and wild birds in outbreak areas and the probability of contact of wild birds with domestic poultry in the poultry husbandry systems in the different Member States.

To assess those probabilities, the decision trees and tables in the opinion of EFSA (1), which were drawn up in collaboration with the European Commission's Environment Directorate-General can provide an effective tool for Member States’ local risk assessments to adapt to an evolving situation based on a close collaboration and exchange of views between Member States.

Liaisons with bird conservation/watching institutions and ringing stations shall be encouraged. Sampling, where appropriate, shall be carried out under the supervision of staff from these groups/stations, by hunters and other ornithologically skilled persons.

1.

Passive surveillance of sick and dead wild birds shall be targeted on: (a) areas where increased incidence of morbidity and mortality in wild birds occurs; (b) areas close to the sea, lakes and waterways where birds were found dead; and in particular when these areas are in proximity to domestic poultry farms; (c) birds belonging to identified ‘higher risk’ species listed in part D and other wild birds living in close proximity with them.

2.

In addition, investigations of living and dead wild birds in areas where H5N1 cases have been detected shall ideally be targeted on birds: (a) wild birds or poultry to possibly identify asymptomatic carriers; (b) in areas epidemiologically linked to these cases; (c) coming possibly in close contact to domestic poultry holdings (Protection zone, surveillance zone and area B), which might function as ‘bridge species’, in particular those that are listed in part E.

3.

Active surveillance on living and clinically healthy and/or clinically diseased, injured or hunted (2) birds shall be targeted on: (a) migratory birds belonging to the orders of Anseriformes (water fowl) and Charadriiformes (shorebirds and gulls); (b) at identified areas for concentration and mixing of high number of migratory birds involving different species and in particular when these areas are in proximity to domestic poultry farms; (c) a selection of higher risk species (3).

Sampling procedures

1.

Oropharyngeal and cloacal swabs for virological examination shall be taken from apparently healthy free living birds. If for any reason it is impractical to take cloacal swabs from live birds carefully collected fresh faeces samples may serve as an alternative. However, traceability in case of mixed sites frequented by different bird species must be ensured.

2.	Cloacal and tracheal/oropharyngeal swabs and/or tissues (namely the brain, heart, lung, trachea, kidney and intestines) from wild birds found dead or shot shall be sampled for virus isolation and molecular detection (PCR).

3.

Specific care has to be taken for the storage and transport of samples. Swabs must be chilled immediately on ice or with frozen gel packs and submitted to the laboratory as quickly as possible. Samples must not be frozen unless absolutely necessary. If available, swabs must be placed in antibiotic or specific virus transport medium so that they are fully immersed. Placing samples in medium for transportation must be done in addition to chilling and not as an alternative to chilling. In the absence of such medium, swabs must be returned to their casing and submitted dry. If rapid transport within 48 hours to the laboratory (in transport medium at 4° Celsius) is not guaranteed, samples shall be immediately frozen, stored and then transported on dry ice. Storage and transport of samples may be affected by a variety of factors so the method selected must be fit for purpose.

4.	Sampling procedures shall be carried out in accordance with the avian influenza diagnostic manual (Commission Decision 2006/437/EC) laying down the procedures for the confirmation and differential diagnostic of avian influenza.

C.   Laboratory testing

1.	Laboratory tests shall be carried out in accordance with the avian influenza diagnostic manual (Commission Decision 2006/437/EC) laying down the procedures for the confirmation and differential diagnostic of avian influenza.

2.	However, if laboratory tests not laid down in the avian influenza diagnostic manual nor described in the OIE Terrestrial Manual are envisaged, Member States shall provide the necessary validation data to the CRL, in parallel to submitting their programme to the Commission for approval.

3.

All samples collected in the surveillance for avian influenza in wild birds shall be tested as soon as possible by molecular techniques if available and according to the diagnostic manual (Commission Decision 2006/437/EC). These tests shall only be carried out in laboratories able to guarantee quality assurance and using methods recognised by the CRL for avian influenza. In addition, methods used must have produced acceptable results in the most recent comparative ring test of national laboratories. Initial screening using M gene PCR is recommended, with rapid testing of positives for H5 (but within two weeks) and in case of a positive finding analysis of the cleavage site must be undertaken as soon as possible to determine whether or not it has a highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) or a low pathogenic avian influenza (LPAI) motif. If H5 HPAI is confirmed further analysis to determine the N type must be done rapidly (even this can only provide evidence eliminating N1).

4.	At the laboratory, pooling of up to five samples taken from the same species collected at the same site and same time may be permitted when it can be ensured that, in case of a positive finding, the individual samples can be identified and retested.

5.

Serological surveillance shall not be applied for avian influenza investigations in wild birds because serological methods cannot distinguish between HP and LP strains and antibody findings do not allow inference in relation to the likely location where wild birds might have become infected. However, serological surveillance might be important to study in which resident or migrating bird species H5/H7 viruses are/were prevalent (or endemic). Such analysis shall only be performed by specialised laboratories using a carefully selected panel of antigens to ensure the detection of haemagglutinin specific antibodies (i.e. to eliminate the possibility of interference from N specific antibodies).

List of wild bird species presenting a higher risk in relation to avian influenza (4)

Common name	Scientific name
Bewick's Swan	Cygnus columbianus
Whooper Swan	Cygnus cygnus
Mute Swan	Cygnus olor
Geese
Pink-footed Goose	Anser brachyrhynchus
Bean Goose	Anser fabalis
Greater White-fronted Goose (European race)	Anser albifrons albifrons
Lesser White-fronted Goose	Anser erythropus
Greylag Goose	Anser anser
Barnacle Goose	Branta leucopsis
Brent Goose	Branta bernicla
Red-breasted Goose	Branta ruficollis
Canada Goose	Branta canadensis
Ducks
Eurasian Wigeon	Anas penelope
Common Teal	Anas crecca
Mallard	Anas platyrhynchos
Northern Pintail	Anas acuta
Garganey	Anas querquedula
Northern Shoveler	Anas clypeata
Marbled Teal	Marmaronetta angustirostris
Red-crested Pochard	Netta rufina
Common Pochard	Aythya ferina
Tufted Duck	Aythya fuligula
Waders
Northern Lapwing	Vanellus vanellus
Eurasian Golden Plover	Pluvialis apricaria
Black-tailed Godwit	Limosa limosa
Ruff	Philomachus pugnax
Gulls
Black-headed Gull	Larus ridibundus
Common Gull	Larus canus

List of birds living in proximity to domestic poultry (5)

Common name	Scientific name	Probability of contact with poultry
Group 1.    Species intimately associated with poultry production in Europe
Domestic Goose	Anser anser domesticus	High
Domestic Mallard	Anas platyrhynchos	High
Domestic Muscovy Duck	Cairina moschata	High
Feral Pigeon	Columba livia	High
House Sparrow	Passer domesticus	High
Group 2.    Species which may share farmland also used by domesticated poultry in north Europe
Eurasian Golden Plover	Pluvialis apricaria	Low
Northern Lapwing	Vanellus vanellus	Medium
Black-headed Gull	Larus ridibundus	High
Common Gull	Larus canus	High
Herring Gull	Larus argentatus	Low
Wood Pigeon	Columba palumbus	High
Eurasian Collared Dove	Streptopelia decaocto	High
Ring-necked Pheasant	Phasianus colchicus	High
Larks species	Alauda & Galerida spp	Low
Pipits		Low
Wagtails		Medium
Fieldfare	Turdus pilaris	Medium
Redwing	Turdus iliacus	Medium
Black-billed Magpie	Pica pica	High
Eurasian Jackdaw	Corvus monedula	High
Rook	Corvus frugilegus	Medium
Carrion Crow	Corvus corone	Medium
Raven	Corvus corax	Low
Starling	Sturnus vulgaris	High
Spotless Starling	Sturnus unicolor	High
House Sparrow	Passer domesticus	High
Eurasian Tree Sparrow	Passer montanus	High
Finches		Medium
Buntings	Miliaria, Emberiza spp	Medium
Group 3.    Species which may share wetlands also used by domesticated water birds in Northern Europe
Egrets	Egretta spp.	Low
Herons	Ardea and other spp.	Medium
Cormorant	Phalacrocorax carbo	Medium
Storks	Ciconia spp.	Low
Mute Swan	Cygnus olor	Medium
Greylag Goose	Anser anser	Medium
Canada Goose	Branta canadensis	Low
Ducks	Anas & Aythya spp.	Low
Mallard	Anas platyrhynchos	High
Common Coot	Fulica atra	Medium
Moorhen	Gallinula chloropus	Medium

---

(1)  Scientific opinion on ‘Migratory birds and their possible role in the spread of highly pathogenic avian influenza’ (EFSA 12 May 2006).

(2)  Hunting by respecting the requirements of Council Directive 79/409/EEC on the protection and conservation of all naturally occurring wild birds.

(3)  To be provided by the European Commission’s Environment Directorate-General.

(4)  This list is not a limitating list but is only meant to identify migratory species that may pose a high risk for introduction of avian influenza into the Community based on their migratory pattern involving areas where H5N1 HPAI has either occurred in wild birds or poultry. It is based on the Scientific opinion on ‘Migratory birds and their possible role in the spread of highly pathogenic avian influenza’ adopted by the Animal Health and Welfare Panel of EFSA on 12 May 2006 and the work carried out by ORNIS Committee and contractors to European Commission’s Environment Directorate-General. However, this list could be updated following results of further scientific studies as they become available and based on the risk assessment carried out by national authorities taking into account their specific ornithological situation.

(5)  This list is not an exhaustive list but is only meant to identify resident or non-migratory European bird species that live in proximity to domestic poultry (especially in NW Europe) and which have the theoretical potential to transfer HPAI H5N1 from potential asymptomatically infected wild birds (‘bridge species’). It is based on the Scientific opinion on ‘Migratory birds and their possible role in the spread of highly pathogenic avian influenza’ adopted by the Animal Health and Welfare Panel of EFSA on 12 May 2006 and the work carried out by ORNIS Committee and contractors by European Commission’s Environment Directorate-General (DG ENV). However, this list could be updated and expanded following results of further scientific studies as they become available. In particular, DG ENV has commissioned Wetland international and EURING to review, update and expand the preliminary analysis of higher risk species and sites in the light of H5N1 outbreaks in Europe in 2006, and to identify other High Risk bird species which might act as ‘bridge species’ between wild birds and poultry and/or humans in different parts of Europe. The results should be available by end of June 2007.

(http://ec.europa.eu/environment/nature/nature_conservation/focus_wild_birds/avian_influenza/pdf/avian_influenza_report.pdf). It should provide a much more reliable preliminary list of higher risk species and contact risk with poultry within the EU and provides for a more targeted approach.

ANNEX III

AGREEMENT

between the European Union and the government of the United States of America on the security of classified information

THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, hereafter referred to as ‘the USG’

and

THE EUROPEAN UNION, hereafter referred to as ‘the EU’, hereafter referred to as ‘the Parties’,

CONSIDERING THAT the USG and the EU share the objectives to strengthen their own security in all ways and to provide their citizens with a high level of safety within an area of security,

CONSIDERING THAT the USG and the EU agree that consultations and co-operation should be developed between them on questions of common interest relating to security,

CONSIDERING THAT, in this context, a permanent need therefore exists to exchange classified information between the USG and the EU,

RECOGNISING THAT full and effective consultation and co-operation may require access to USG and EU classified information, as well as the exchange of classified information between the USG and the EU,

CONSCIOUS THAT such access to and exchange of classified information requires appropriate security measures,

HAVE AGREED AS FOLLOWS:

Article 1

Scope

1.   This Agreement shall apply to classified information provided or exchanged between the Parties.

2.   Each Party shall protect classified information received from the other Party, in particular against unauthorised disclosure, in accordance with the terms set forth herein and in accordance with the Parties’ respective laws and regulations.

Article 2

Definitions

1.   For the purpose of this Agreement ‘the EU’ shall mean the Council of the European Union (hereafter referred to as ‘the Council’), the Secretary-General/High Representative and the General Secretariat of the Council, and the Commission of the European Communities (hereafter referred to as ‘the European Commission’).

2.   For the purpose of this Agreement ‘classified information’ shall mean information and material subject to this Agreement (i) the unauthorised disclosure of which could cause varying degrees of damage or harm to the interests of the USG, or of the EU or one or more of its Member States; (ii) which requires protection against unauthorised disclosure in the security interests of the USG or the EU; and (iii) which bears a security classification assigned by the USG or the EU. The information may be in oral, visual, electronic, magnetic or documentary form, or in the form of material, including equipment or technology.

Article 3

Security classifications

1.   Classified information shall be marked as follows:

(a)	For the USG, classified information shall be marked TOP SECRET, SECRET or CONFIDENTIAL.

(b)	For the EU, classified information shall be marked TRES SECRET UE/EU TOP SECRET, SECRET UE, CONFIDENTIEL UE or RESTREINT UE.

2.   The corresponding security classifications are:

In the European Union	In the United States of America
TRES SECRET UE/EU TOP SECRET	TOP SECRET
SECRET UE	SECRET
CONFIDENTIEL UE	CONFIDENTIAL
RESTREINT UE	(No US equivalent)

3.   Classified information provided by one Party to the other shall be stamped, marked or designated with the name of the releasing Party. Classified information provided by one Party shall be protected by the recipient Party in a manner at least equivalent to that afforded to it by the releasing Party.

Article 4

Protection of classified information

1.   Each Party shall have a security system and security measures in place based on the basic principles and minimum standards of security laid down in its respective laws and regulations, in order to ensure that an equivalent level of protection is applied to classified information. On request, each Party shall provide the other Party with information about its security standards, procedures and practices, including training, for safeguarding classified information.

2.   The recipient Party shall afford classified information received from the releasing Party a degree of protection at least equivalent to that afforded it by the releasing Party.

3.   The recipient Party shall not use or permit the use of classified information for any other purpose than that for which it was provided without the prior written approval of the releasing Party.

4.   The recipient Party shall not further release or disclose classified information without the prior written approval of the releasing Party.

5.   The recipient Party shall comply with any limitations on the further release of classified information as may be specified by the releasing Party when it discloses it.

6.   The recipient Party shall ensure that the rights of the originator of classified information provided or exchanged under this Agreement, as well as intellectual property rights such as patents, copyrights or trade secrets, are adequately protected.

7.   No individual shall be entitled to have access to classified information received from the other Party solely by virtue of rank, appointment, or security clearance. Access to classified information shall be granted only to those individuals whose official duties require such access and who, where needed, have been granted the requisite personnel security clearance in accordance with the prescribed standards of the Parties.

8.   The recipient Party shall ensure that all individuals having access to classified information are informed of their responsibilities to protect the information in accordance with applicable laws and regulations.

Article 5

Personnel security clearances

1.   The Parties shall ensure that all persons who in the conduct of their official duties require access, or whose duties or functions may afford access, to information classified CONFIDENTIEL UE or CONFIDENTIAL or above provided or exchanged under this Agreement are appropriately security-cleared before they are granted access to such information.

2.   The determination by a Party on the granting of a personnel security clearance to an individual shall be consistent with that Party’s security interests and shall be based upon all available information indicating whether the individual is of unquestionable loyalty, integrity, and trustworthiness.

3.   Each Party’s security clearances shall be based on an appropriate investigation conducted in sufficient detail to provide assurance that the criteria referred to in paragraph 2 have been met with respect to any individual to be granted access to classified information. For the EU, the parent government National Security Authority (NSA) of the individual concerned is the competent authority responsible for conducting the necessary security investigations on its nationals.

Article 6

Transfer of custody

The releasing Party shall ensure that all classified information is adequately protected until custody of the information is transferred to the recipient Party. The recipient Party shall ensure that all classified information of the other Party is adequately protected as soon as it has custody of the information released to it.

Article 7

Security of facilities and establishments of the Parties where classified information is kept

In accordance with applicable laws and regulations, each Party shall ensure the security of facilities and establishments where classified information released to it by the other Party is kept, and shall ensure for each such facility or establishment that all necessary measures are taken to control and protect the information.

Article 8

Release of classified information to contractors

1.   Classified information received from the other Party may be provided to a contractor or prospective contractor with the prior written consent of the releasing Party. Prior to the release or disclosure to a contractor or prospective contractor of any classified information received from the other Party, the recipient Party shall ensure that such contractor or prospective contractor, and the contractor’s facility, have the capability to protect the information and have an appropriate clearance.

2.   This Article shall not apply to personnel engaged by the European Union under a contract of employment or by the United States under a personal services contract.

Article 9

Transmission

1.   Classified information shall be transmitted between the Parties through mutually agreed channels.

For the purposes of this Agreement:

(a)

As regards the EU, all classified information in written form shall be sent to the Chief Registry Officer of the Council of the European Union. All such information shall be forwarded by the Chief Registry Officer of the Council to the Member States and to the European Commission, subject to paragraph 3;

(b)

As regards the USG, all classified information in written form shall be sent, unless otherwise provided for, via the Mission of the United States of America to the European Union, at the following address: Mission of the United States of America to the European Union Registry Officer Rue Zinner 13 B-1000 Brussels

2.   The electronic transmission of classified information up to the level CONFIDENTIAL/CONFIDENTIEL UE between the USG and the EU and between the EU and the USG shall be encrypted in accordance with the releasing Party’s requirements as outlined in its security policies and regulations. The releasing Party’s requirements shall be met when transmitting, storing and processing classified information in internal networks of the Parties.

3.   Exceptionally, classified information from one Party which is accessible to only specific competent officials, organs or services of that Party may, for operational reasons, be addressed and be accessible to only specific officials, organs or services of the other Party specifically designated as recipients, taking into account their competences and according to the need-to-know principle. As far as the EU is concerned, such information shall be transmitted through the Chief Registry Officer of the Council, or the Chief Registry Officer of the European Commission Security Directorate when such information is addressed to the European Commission.

Article 10

Visits to facilities and establishments of the Parties

When required, the Parties shall confirm personnel security clearances through mutually agreed channels for visits by representatives of one Party to facilities and establishments of the other Party.

Article 11

Reciprocal security visits

Implementation of the security requirements set out in this Agreement may be verified through reciprocal visits by security personnel of the Parties with a view to evaluating the effectiveness of measures taken under this Agreement and the technical security arrangement to be established pursuant to Article 13 to protect classified information provided or exchanged between the Parties. Accordingly, security representatives of each Party, after prior consultation, may be permitted to visit the other Party and to discuss and observe the implementing procedures of the other Party. The host Party shall assist the visiting security representatives in determining whether classified information received from the visiting Party is being protected adequately.

Article 12

Oversight

1.   For the USG, the Secretaries of State and Defense and the Director of National Intelligence shall oversee the implementation of this Agreement.

2.   For the EU, the Secretary-General of the Council and the Member of the Commission responsible for security matters shall oversee the implementation of this Agreement.

Article 13

Technical security arrangement

1.   In order to implement this Agreement, a technical security arrangement shall be established among the three authorities designated in paragraphs 2 to 4 in order to lay down the standards for the reciprocal security protection of classified information provided or exchanged between the Parties under this Agreement.

2.   The U.S. Department of State, acting in the name of the USG and under its authority, shall be responsible for developing the technical security arrangement mentioned in paragraph 1 for the protection and safeguarding of classified information provided to or exchanged with the USG under this Agreement.

3.   The Security Office of the General Secretariat of the Council, under the direction and on behalf of the Secretary-General of the Council, acting in the name of the Council and under its authority, shall be responsible for developing the technical security arrangement mentioned in paragraph 1 for the protection and safeguarding of classified information provided to or exchanged with the Council or the General Secretariat of the Council under this Agreement.

4.   The European Commission Security Directorate, acting under the authority of the Member of the Commission responsible for security matters, shall be responsible for developing the technical security arrangement mentioned in paragraph 1 for the protection of classified information provided or exchanged under this Agreement with the European Commission.

5.   For the EU, the arrangement shall be subject to approval by the Council Security Committee.

Article 14

Downgrading and declassification

1.   The Parties agree that classified information should be downgraded in classification as soon as information ceases to require that higher degree of protection or should be declassified as soon as the information no longer requires protection against unauthorised disclosure.

2.   The releasing Party has complete discretion concerning downgrading or declassification of its own classified information. The recipient Party shall not downgrade the security classification or declassify classified information received from the other Party, notwithstanding any apparent declassification instructions on the document, without the prior written consent of the releasing Party.

Article 15

Loss or compromise

The releasing Party shall be informed upon discovery of any proven or suspected loss or compromise of its classified information, and the recipient Party shall initiate an investigation to determine the circumstances. The results of the investigation and information regarding measures taken to prevent recurrence shall be forwarded to the releasing Party. The authorities referred to in Article 13 may establish procedures to that effect.

Article 16

Dispute settlement

Any differences between the Parties arising under or relating to this Agreement shall be settled solely through consultations between the Parties.

Article 17

Costs

Each Party shall be responsible for bearing its own costs incurred in implementing this Agreement.

Article 18

Ability to protect

Prior to the provision or exchange of classified information between the Parties, the responsible security authorities referred to in Article 12 must agree that the recipient Party is able to protect and safeguard the information subject to this Agreement in a way consistent with the technical security arrangement to be established pursuant to Article 13.

Article 19

Other agreements

Nothing in this Agreement shall alter existing agreements or arrangements between the Parties, nor agreements between the USG and Member States of the European Union. This Agreement shall not preclude the Parties from concluding other Agreements relating to the provision or exchange of classified information subject to this Agreement provided they are not incompatible with the obligations under this Agreement.

Article 20

Entry into force, amendment and denunciation

1.   This Agreement shall enter into force on the date of the last signature by the Parties.

2.   Each Party shall notify the other Party of any changes in its laws and regulations that could affect the protection of classified information referred to in this Agreement. In such cases, the Parties shall consult with a view to amending this Agreement as necessary in accordance with paragraph 3.

3.   Amendments to the present Agreement shall be made by mutual written agreement of the Parties.

4.   Either Party may denounce this Agreement by notifying the other Party, in writing, ninety days in advance of its intention to denounce the Agreement. Notwithstanding the denunciation of this Agreement, all classified information provided pursuant to this Agreement shall continue to be protected in accordance with this Agreement. The Parties shall consult immediately on the disposition of such classified information.