9.3.2005   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

L 62/1

(1)

Regulation (EC) No 3223/94 lays down, pursuant to the outcome of the Uruguay Round multilateral trade negotiations, the criteria whereby the Commission fixes the standard values for imports from third countries, in respect of the products and periods stipulated in the Annex thereto.

(2)

In compliance with the above criteria, the standard import values must be fixed at the levels set out in the Annex to this Regulation,

9.3.2005   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

L 62/3

(1)

Commission Regulation (EC) No 1810/2004 of 7 September 2004 amending Annex I to Council Regulation (EEC) No 2658/87 on the tariff and statistical nomenclature and on the Common Customs Tariff (2) provides for amendments to the combined nomenclature for certain fruit and vegetables and certain products processed from fruit and vegetables.

(2)

Regulations amending Annex I to Council Regulation (EEC) No 2658/87 (3) in previous years have also introduced changes to the combined nomenclature for certain fruit and vegetables and certain products processed from fruit and vegetables, and not all of these amendments are reflected in the following Regulations governing the common organisation of the market in fruit and vegetables and of products processed from fruit and vegetables: Commission Regulation (EEC) No 1591/87 of 5 June 1987 laying down quality standards for cabbages, Brussels sprouts, ribbed celery, spinach and plums (4); Commission Regulation (EEC) No 1677/88 of 15 June 1988 laying down quality standards for cucumbers (5); Council Regulation (EC) No 399/94 of 21 February 1994 concerning specific measures for dried grapes (6); Commission Regulation (EC) No 3223/94 of 21 December 1994 on detailed rules for the application of the import arrangements for fruit and vegetables (7); Commission Regulation (EC) No 1555/96 of 30 July 1996 on rules of application for additional import duties on fruit and vegetables (8) and Commission Regulation (EC) No 1961/2001 of 8 October 2001 laying down detailed rules for implementing Council Regulation (EC) No 2200/96 as regards export refunds on fruit and vegetables (9).

(3)

Regulations (EEC) No 1591/87, (EEC) No 1677/88, (EC) No 399/94, (EC) No 3223/94, (EC) No 1555/96 and (EC) No 1961/2001 should therefore be amended accordingly.

(4)

The amendments should apply at the same time as Regulation (EC) No 1810/2004.

(5)

The measures provided for in this Regulation are in accordance with the opinion of the Management Committee for Fresh Fruit and Vegetables and of the Management Committee for Products Processed from Fruit and Vegetables,

1.

In the fifth row of the table, the CN codes for sweet oranges, fresh ‘ex 0805 10 10, ex 0805 10 30 and ex 0805 10 50’ are replaced by the CN code ‘ex 0805 10 20’.

2.

In the 10th row of the table, the CN codes for apples ‘ex 0808 10 20, ex 0808 10 50 and ex 0808 10 90’ are replaced by the CN code ‘ex 0808 10 80’.

1.

In the fifth row of the table, the CN codes for oranges ‘ex 0805 10 10, ex 0805 10 30 and ex 0805 10 50’ are replaced by the CN code ‘ex 0805 10 20’.

2.

In the 10th row of the table, the CN codes for apples ‘ex 0808 10 20, ex 0808 10 50 and ex 0808 10 90’ are replaced by the CN code ‘ex 0808 10 80.’

1.

The fifth indent is replaced by the following:

2.

The 11th and 12th indents are replaced by the following:

3.

The 14th indent is replaced by the following:

9.3.2005   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

L 62/5

(1)

The Working Party on Standardisation of Perishable Produce and Quality Development of the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UN/ECE) has recently amended standard FFV-42 concerning the marketing and commercial quality control of avocados. For the sake of clarity and international transparency, account should be taken of such amendments in Commission Regulation (EC) No 831/97 (2).

(2)

Maturity and development of avocados can be assessed by their dry matter contents. In order to exclude fruit unable to ripen, a requirement as to the minimum dry matter content should be introduced.

(3)

Trade in small-sized Hass avocados is growing and meets the demand of certain consumers. It is therefore necessary to decrease the minimum size for avocados of this variety.

(4)

Regulation (EC) No 831/97 should therefore be amended accordingly.

(5)

The measures provided for in this Regulation are in accordance with the opinion of the Management Committee for Fresh Fruit and Vegetables,

9.3.2005   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

L 62/7

(1)

Commission Regulation (EC) No 246/2003 of 10 February 2003 adopting the programme of ad hoc modules, covering the years 2004 to 2006, to the labour force sample survey provided by Council Regulation (EC) No 577/98 (2) includes an ad hoc module on transition from work into retirement.

(2)

There is a need for a comprehensive and comparable set of data on transition from work into retirement in order to monitor progress towards the common objectives of the Community’s Employment Strategy and of the open method of coordination in the area of pensions that was launched by the Laeken European Council in December 2001. Both processes identify the promotion of active ageing and prolongation of working life as priorities for action, in particular through guideline 5 of the Employment Guidelines 2003 ‘Increase labour supply and promote active ageing’ as adopted by the Council on 22 July 2003 (3) and through objective 5 of the pensions process as developed in the Joint report on objectives and working methods in the area of pensions approved by the Council of Laeken of 14 and 15 December of 2001 and in the Joint report by the Commission and the Council on adequate and sustainable pensions adopted by the Council of Brussels, 20 and 21 March 2003.

(3)

In accordance with Decision No 1145/2002/EC (4) of the European Parliament and of the Council of 10 June 2002 on Community incentive measures in the field of employment, Community activities concerning analysis, research and cooperation among the Member States in the field of employment and the labour market shall be carried out in the period from 1 January 2002 to 31 December 2006 and one of the objectives of these activities is to develop, follow up and evaluate the European Employment Strategy with a strong forward-looking emphasis.

(4)

It is also necessary to update the specification of the sample set out in section 3 of the Annex to Regulation (EC) No 246/2003, in order to maximise the potentiality of the sample for the ad hoc module in terms of analysis.

(5)

The measures provided for in this Regulation are in accordance with the opinion of the Statistical Programme Committee,

9.3.2005   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

L 62/12

(1)

Articles 16 and 18 of Regulation (EC) No 2201/96 and Commission Regulation (EC) No 800/1999 of 15 April 1999 laying down common detailed rules for the application of the system of export refunds on agricultural products (2) apply as regards exports of certain sugars used in certain products processed from fruit and vegetables.

(2)

Article 18(6) of Regulation (EC) No 2201/96 provides that, in the case of a differentiated refund, the refund shall be paid upon proof that the products have reached the destination indicated on the licence or another destination for which the refund was fixed. It provides also that exceptions may be made to this rule, provided conditions are laid down which offer equivalent guarantees.

(3)

Article 3 of Regulation (EC) No 800/1999 provides that entitlement to the export refund is acquired on importation into a specific third country when a differentiated refund applies for that third country. Articles 14, 15 and 16 of that Regulation lay down the conditions for the payment of the differentiated refund, in particular the documents to be supplied as proof of the arrival of the good at destination.

(4)

In the case of a differentiated refund, Article 18(1) and (2) of Regulation (EC) No 800/1999 provides that part of the refund, calculated using the lowest refund rate, is paid on application by the exporter once proof is furnished that the product has left the customs territory of the Community.

(5)

The Agreement between the European Community and the Swiss Confederation amending the Agreement between the European Economic Community and the Swiss Confederation of 22 July 1972 as regards the provisions applicable to processed agricultural products (3), which was signed in October 2004, is provisionally applicable from 1 February 2005 by virtue of Council Decision 2005/45/EC (4) concerning the conclusion and the provisional application of that Agreement.

(6)

Pursuant to Decision 2005/45/EC, sugar (HS headings 1701, 1702 and 1703) used in the manufacture of certain processed agricultural goods exported to Switzerland and Liechtenstein is, from 1 February 2005, no longer eligible for export refunds.

(7)

The Agreement approved by Decision 2005/45/EC introduces special provisions on administrative cooperation aimed at combating irregularities and fraud in customs and export refund related matters.

(8)

In the light of those provisions and in order to avoid the imposition of unnecessary costs on operators in their commercial trade with other third countries, it is appropriate to derogate from Regulation (EC) No 2201/96 and Regulation (EC) No 800/1999 in so far as it requires proof of import in the case of differentiated refunds. It is also appropriate, where no export refunds have been fixed for the particular countries of destination in question, not to take account of that fact when the lowest rate of refund is determined.

(9)

Since the measures laid down in the Agreement between the European Community and the Swiss Confederation, approved by Decision 2005/45/EC, will apply from 1 February 2005, this Regulation should apply from the same date.

(10)

The measures provided for in this Regulation are in accordance with the opinion of the Management Committee for Products Processed from Fruit and Vegetables,

9.3.2005   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

L 62/14

(1)

Directive 2001/25/EC defines minimum training, certification and watchkeeping requirements for seafarers serving on board Community ships. Those requirements are based on the standards laid down in the International Convention on Standards of Training, Certification and Watchkeeping for Seafarers (STCW Convention) and the Seafarers’ Training, Certification and Watchkeeping Code (STCW Code).

(2)

The STCW Convention and the STCW Code have been amended by Resolutions MSC.66(68) and MSC.67(68) of the Maritime Safety Committee of the International Maritime Organisation, which entered into force on 1 January 1999, Resolution MSC.78(70), which entered into force on 1 January 2003, and circulars STCW.6/Circ.3 and STCW.6/Circ.5, which became effective on 20 May 1998 and 26 May 2000, respectively.

(3)

The new Regulation V/3 of the SCTW Convention, which was added by Resolution MSC.66(68), prescribes mandatory minimum requirements of training and qualifications for masters, officers, ratings and other personnel on passenger ships other than ro-ro passenger ships.

(4)

Directive 2001/25/EC should therefore be amended accordingly.

(5)

The measures provided for in this Directive are in accordance with the opinion of the Committee on Safe Seas, set up by Regulation (EC) No 2099/2002 of the European Parliament and of the Council (2),

1.

In paragraph 3 of Regulation V/2, the following text is added:

‘… or be required to provide evidence of having achieved the required standard of competence within the previous five years.’

2.

The following text is added at the end of the Chapter:

‘Regulation V/3

Mandatory minimum requirements for the training and qualifications of masters, officers, ratings and other personnel on passenger ships other than ro-ro passenger ships

9.3.2005   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

L 62/16

(1)

According to Article 104 of the Treaty, Member States are to avoid excessive government deficits; this applies also to Member States with a derogation, the case of all countries that joined the European Union on 1 May 2004.

(2)

The Stability and Growth Pact is based on the objective of sound government finances as a means of strengthening the conditions for price stability and for strong sustainable growth conducive to employment creation.

(3)

The excessive deficit procedure under Article 104 provides for a decision on the existence of an excessive deficit and the Protocol on the excessive deficit procedure annexed to the Treaty sets out further provisions relating to the implementation of the excessive deficit procedure. Council Regulation (EC) No 3605/93 (1) lays down detailed rules and definitions for the application of the provision of the said Protocol.

(4)

Article 104(5) of the Treaty requires the Commission to address an opinion to the Council if the Commission considers that an excessive deficit in a Member State exists or may occur. Having examined all relevant factors taken into account in its report in accordance with Article 104(3) and having regard to the opinion of the Economic and Financial Committee in accordance with Article 104(4), the Commission concluded in its opinion of 24 June 2004 that there exists an excessive deficit in Slovakia.

(5)

Article 104(6) of the Treaty lays down that the Council should consider any observations which the Member State concerned may wish to make before deciding, after an overall assessment, whether an excessive deficit exists.

(6)

The overall assessment leads to the following conclusions. The general government deficit reached 3,6 % of GDP in 2003 in Slovakia, above the 3 % of GDP Treaty reference value. The excess of the general government deficit over the reference value did not result from an unusual event outside the control of the Slovak authorities, nor was it the result of a severe economic downturn, in the sense of the Stability and Growth Pact. The general government deficit is likely to remain above 3 % of GDP in 2004. In particular, according to the Commission Spring 2004 forecast, the deficit is projected to reach 4,1 % of GDP in 2004, while the convergence programme of Slovakia expects a deficit of 4,0 % of GDP. The debt ratio, which was 42,8 % in 2003, is likely to remain below the 60 % of GDP Treaty reference value in 2004,

9.3.2005   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

L 62/18

(1)

According to Article 104 of the Treaty Member States are to avoid excessive government deficits; this applies also to Member States with a derogation, the case of all countries that joined the European Union on 1 May 2004.

(2)

The Stability and Growth Pact is based on the objective of sound government finances as a means of strengthening the conditions for price stability and for strong sustainable growth conducive to employment creation.

(3)

The excessive deficit procedure under Article 104 provides for a decision on the existence of an excessive deficit and the Protocol on the excessive deficit procedure annexed to the Treaty sets out further provisions relating to the implementation of the excessive deficit procedure. Council Regulation (EC) No 3605/93 of 22 November 1993 on the application of the Protocol on the excessive deficit procedure annexed to the Treaty establishing the European Community (1), lays down detailed rules and definitions for the application of the provision of the said Protocol.

(4)

Article 104(5) of the Treaty requires the Commission to address an opinion to the Council if the Commission considers that an excessive deficit in a Member State exists or may occur. Having examined all relevant factors taken into account in its report in accordance with Article 104(3) and having regard to the opinion of the Economic and Financial Committee in accordance with Article 104(4), the Commission concluded in its opinion of 24 June 2004 that there exists an excessive deficit in Poland.

(5)

Article 104(6) of the Treaty lays down that the Council should consider any observations which the Member State concerned may wish to make before deciding, after an overall assessment, whether an excessive deficit exists.

(6)

The overall assessment leads to the following conclusions: the general government deficit reached 4,1 % of GDP in 2003 in Poland, above the 3 % of GDP Treaty reference value. The excess of the general government deficit over the reference value did not result from an unusual event outside the control of the Polish authorities, nor was it the result of a severe economic downturn, in the sense of the Stability and Growth Pact. The general government deficit is likely to remain above 3 % of GDP in 2004. In particular, according to the Commission Spring 2004 forecasts, the deficit is projected to reach 6 % of GDP in 2004, while the convergence programme of Poland expects a deficit of 5,7 % of GDP. The debt ratio, which was 45,4 % in 2003, is likely to remain below the 60 % of GDP Treaty reference value in 2004. The deficit and the debt figures will have to be adjusted upward if the open pension funds are excluded from the general government sector following the Eurostat decision on the classification of the funded pension schemes,

9.3.2005   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

L 62/19

(1)

According to Article 104 of the Treaty, Member States are to avoid excessive government deficits; this applies also to Member States with a derogation, the case of all countries that joined the European Union on 1 May 2004.

(2)

The Stability and Growth Pact is based on the objective of sound government finances as a means of strengthening the conditions for price stability and for strong sustainable growth conducive to employment creation.

(3)

The excessive deficit procedure under Article 104 provides for a decision on the existence of an excessive deficit and the Protocol on the excessive deficit procedure annexed to the Treaty sets out further provisions relating to the implementation of the excessive deficit procedure. Council Regulation (EC) No 3605/93 (1) of 22 November 1993 on the application of the Protocol on the excessive deficit procedure annexed to the Treaty establishing the European Community lays down detailed rules and definitions for the application of the provision of the said Protocol.

(4)

Article 104(5) of the Treaty requires the Commission to address an opinion to the Council if the Commission considers that an excessive deficit in a Member State exists or may occur. Having examined all relevant factors taken into account in its report in accordance with Article 104(3) and having regard to the opinion of the Economic and Financial Committee in accordance with Article 104(4), the Commission concluded in its opinion of 24 June 2004 that there exists an excessive deficit in Cyprus.

(5)

Article 104(6) of the Treaty lays down that the Council should consider any observations which the Member State concerned may wish to make before deciding, after an overall assessment, whether an excessive deficit exists.

(6)

The overall assessment leads to the following conclusions. The general government deficit reached 6,3 % of GDP in 2003 in Cyprus, above the 3 % of GDP Treaty reference value. The excess of the general government deficit over the reference value did not result from an unusual event outside the control of the Cypriot authorities, nor was it the result of a severe economic downturn, within the meaning of the Stability and Growth Pact. The general government deficit is likely to remain above 3 % of GDP in 2004. In particular, according to the Commission Spring 2004 forecast, the deficit is projected to reach 4,6 % of GDP in 2004, while the convergence programme of Cyprus forecasts a deficit of 5,2 % of GDP. The debt ratio, which was 72,2 % in 2003, is likely to further diverge from the 60 % of GDP Treaty reference value in 2004,

9.3.2005   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

L 62/20

(1)

According to Article 104 of the Treaty, Member States are to avoid excessive government deficits; this applies also to Member States with a derogation, the case of all countries that joined the European Union on 1 May 2004.

(2)

The Stability and Growth Pact is based on the objective of sound government finances as a means of strengthening the conditions for price stability and for strong sustainable growth conducive to employment creation.

(3)

The excessive deficit procedure under Article 104 provides for a decision on the existence of an excessive deficit and the Protocol on the excessive deficit procedure annexed to the Treaty sets out further provisions relating to the implementation of the excessive deficit procedure. Council Regulation (EC) No 3605/93 of 22 November 1993 on the application of the Protocol on the excessive deficit procedure annexed to the Treaty establishing the European Community (1), lays down detailed rules and definitions for the application of the provision of the said Protocol.

(4)

Article 104(5) of the Treaty requires the Commission to address an opinion to the Council if the Commission considers that an excessive deficit in a Member State exists or may occur. Having examined all relevant factors taken into account in its report in accordance with Article 104(3) and having regard to the opinion of the Economic and Financial Committee in accordance with Article 104(4), the Commission concluded in its opinion of 24 June 2004 that there exists an excessive deficit in the Czech Republic.

(5)

Article 104(6) of the Treaty lays down that the Council should consider any observations which the Member State concerned may wish to make before deciding, after an overall assessment, whether an excessive deficit exists.

(6)

The overall assessment leads to the following conclusions. The general government deficit reached 12,9 % of GDP in 2003 (5,9 % of GDP excluding a major one-off operation related to imputed state guarantees) in the Czech Republic, above the 3 % of GDP Treaty reference value. The excess of the general government deficit over the reference value did not result from an unusual event outside the control of the Czech authorities, nor was it the result of a severe economic downturn, within the meaning of the Stability and Growth Pact. The general government deficit is likely to remain above 3 % of GDP in 2004. In particular, according to the Commission Spring 2004 forecast, the deficit is projected to reach 5,9 % of GDP in 2004, while the convergence programme of the Czech Republic forecasts a deficit of 5,3 % of GDP. The debt ratio, which was 37,6 % in 2003, is likely to remain below the 60 % of GDP Treaty reference value in 2004,

9.3.2005   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

L 62/21

(1)

According to Article 104 of the Treaty Member States are to avoid excessive government deficits; this applies also to Member States with a derogation, the case of all countries that joined the European Union on 1 May 2004.

(2)

The Stability and Growth Pact is based on the objective of sound government finances as a means of strengthening the conditions for price stability and for strong sustainable growth conducive to employment creation.

(3)

The excessive deficit procedure under Article 104 provides for a decision on the existence of an excessive deficit and the Protocol on the excessive deficit procedure annexed to the Treaty sets out further provisions relating to the implementation of the excessive deficit procedure. Council Regulation (EC) No 3605/93 of 22 November 1993 on the application of the Protocol on the excessive deficit procedure annexed to the Treaty establishing the European Community (1), lays down detailed rules and definitions for the application of the provision of the said Protocol.

(4)

Article 104(5) of the Treaty requires the Commission to address an opinion to the Council if the Commission considers that an excessive deficit in a Member State exists or may occur. Having examined all relevant factors taken into account in its report in accordance with Article 104(3) and having regard to the opinion of the Economic and Financial Committee in accordance with Article 104(4), the Commission concluded in its opinion of 24 June 2004 that there exists an excessive deficit in Malta.

(5)

Article 104(6) of the Treaty lays down that the Council should consider any observations which the Member State concerned may wish to make before deciding, after an overall assessment, whether an excessive deficit exists.

(6)

The overall assessment leads to the following conclusions. The general government deficit reached 9,7 % of GDP in 2003 in Malta (of which 3,2 % of GDP was due to one-off operation), above the 3 % of GDP Treaty reference value. The excess of the general government deficit over the reference value did not result from an unusual event outside the control of the Maltese authorities, nor was it the result of a severe economic downturn, within the meaning of the Stability and Growth Pact. The general government deficit will remain above 3 % of GDP in 2004. In particular, according to the Commission Spring 2004 forecast, the deficit is projected to reach 5,9 % of GDP in 2004, while the convergence programme of Malta forecasts a deficit of 5,2 % of GDP. The debt ratio, which was 72,0 % in 2003, is likely to further diverge from the 60 % of GDP Treaty reference value in 2004,

9.3.2005   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

L 62/22

(1)

In 2004 Member States identified certain issues as worthy of a coordinated inspection programme to be carried out in the year 2005.

(2)

Although Directive 2002/32/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 May 2002 on undesirable substances in animal feed (2) establishes maximum contents of aflatoxin B1 in feedingstuffs, there are no Community rules for other mycotoxins, such as ochratoxin A, zearalenone, deoxynivalenol and fumonisins. Gathering information on the presence of those mycotoxins through random sampling could provide useful data for an assessment of the situation with a view to the development of the legislation. Furthermore, certain feed materials such as cereals and oil seeds are particularly exposed to mycotoxin contamination because of harvesting, storage and transport conditions. As mycotoxin concentration varies from year to year, it is appropriate to collect data from consecutive years for all mycotoxins mentioned.

(3)

Antibiotics, other than coccidiostats and histomonostats, may be marketed and used as feed additives only until 31 December 2005. Previous checks for the presence of antibiotics and coccidiostats in certain feedingstuffs where some of those substances are not authorised indicate that this type of infringement still occurs. The frequency of such findings and the sensitivity of this matter justify the continuation of checks.

(4)

It is important to ensure that the restrictions on the use of feed materials of animal origin in feedingstuffs, as laid down in the relevant Community legislation, are effectively enforced.

(5)

It is appropriate to ensure that the levels of the trace elements copper and zinc in compound feedingstuffs for pigs do not exceed the maximum content laid down by Commission Regulation (EC) No 1334/2003 of 25 July 2003 amending the conditions for authorisation of a number of additives in feedingstuffs belonging to the group of trace elements (3).

(6)

The measures provided for in this Recommendation are in accordance with the opinion of the Standing Committee on the Food Chain and Animal Health,

1.

It is recommended that Member States carry out during the year 2005 a coordinated inspection programme aimed to check:

2.

It is recommended that Member States include the results of the coordinated inspection programme provided for in paragraph 1 in a separate chapter in the annual report on inspection activities to be transmitted by 1 April 2006 in accordance with Article 22(2) of Directive 95/53/EC and the latest version of the harmonised reporting model.

9.3.2005   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

L 62/30

(1)

On 9 January 2004, the Commission received a notification under Article 4 of Regulation (EEC) No 4064/89 (the Merger Regulation) of a transaction whereby Bertelsmann AG (Bertelsmann) and Sony Corporation of America, belonging to the Sony group (Sony), contribute the global recorded music businesses of the parties (excluding Sony’s activities in Japan) into a joint venture. This joint venture shall be operated under the name Sony BMG and will be active in the discovery and the development of artists (so-called A&R (2)) and the subsequent marketing and sale of recorded music. Sony BMG will not engage in related activities such as music publishing, manufacturing and distribution.

(2)

Bertelsmann is an international media company with world-wide activities in music recording and publishing, television, radio, book and magazine publishing, print services and book and music clubs. Bertelsmann is active in recorded music through its wholly owned subsidiary Bertelsmann Music Group (BMG). BMG’s record labels include Arista Records, Jive Records, Zomba and RCA.

(3)

Sony is globally active in music recording and publishing, industrial and consumer electronics, and entertainment. In recorded music it acts through Sony Music Entertainment. Sony’s labels include Columbia Records Group, Epic Records Group and Sony Classical.

(4)

The Advisory Committee on Concentrations, at its 127th meeting, on 9 July 2004, delivered a favourable opinion on a draft Decision granting clearance submitted to it by the Commission.

(5)

The Hearing Officer, in a report dated 5 July 2004, took the view that the right of the parties to be heard had been respected.

(6)

The Commission found that the relevant product market for recorded music (including A&R and the promotion, sales and marketing of recorded music) might be subdivided into distinct product markets based on genre (such as international pop, local pop, classical music) or for compilations. For the purpose of the present case, however, it could be left open whether the abovementioned genres or categories constitute separate markets, as the concentration would not lead to a creation or strengthening of a dominant position under any market definition considered.

(7)

The market investigation confirmed a number of factors (e.g. A&R, pricing, sales and marketing mainly taking place nationally, strong demand for local repertoire, and limited international presence of independent record companies) for the relevant geographic markets for recorded music being considered as national.

(8)

Supported by its findings in the market investigation, the Commission considers that online music is not part of the market for physical recorded music, in particular due to differences in the product and its distribution. It identified two distinct product markets for online music: (i) the wholesale market for licences for online music and (ii) the retail market for distribution of online music.

(9)

For the purpose of the present case the Commission considers that both the wholesale market for licences for online music and the retail market for distribution of online music are national in scope. This may change in the future, depending on further cross-border developments in online music licensing and music distribution.

(10)

Based on both demand and supply-side considerations the Commission found indications for the existence of separate product markets for music publishing according to the exploitation of the different rights categories (i.e. mechanical, performance, synchronisation, print and other rights). However, the exact scope of the relevant product market could be left open as the competitive assessment is the same under any market definition considered.

(11)

The market investigation has confirmed that the geographic scope of the market is essentially, and in spite of some cross-border elements, national, given that licence fees for mechanical and performance rights are generally collected on a national basis. For the purpose of the present case the exact scope of the relevant geographic market could be left open as the competitive assessment is the same under any market definition considered.

(12)

The Commission’s investigation has not provided sufficiently conclusive evidence for the existence of a collective dominant position of the five ‘majors’ (Sony, BMG, Universal, EMI and Warner) in the markets for music recording.

(13)

Based on the case law of the European courts, in particular the Airtours judgment, a prerequisite for the existence of a collective dominant position among market players is: (i) a common understanding about the terms of coordination; (ii) the ability to monitor whether such terms are adhered to; (iii) the existence of a deterrent mechanism in case of deviations; and (iv) third parties (actual and potential competitors, customers) not being able to effectively jeopardise the benefits expected from coordination.

(14)

In assessing whether there exists a collective dominant position in the markets for recorded music among the five music majors, the Commission analysed whether during the last three to four years a coordinated price policy of the majors could be established in the EEA Member States.

(15)

For this purpose the Commission investigated the development of the five majors’ wholesale prices to wholesalers and retailers in each Member State in the period 1998 to 2003. In particular, the Commission’s analysis focused on the development of average net wholesale prices, PPDs (Published Prices to Dealers), gross and net price ratios as well as invoice discounts and retrospective discounts.

(16)

To assess a possible coordination of the majors’ wholesale prices, the Commission analysed the parallelism of the development of (inflation-corrected) average net prices for the top 100 single albums of each major in the five largest Member States (this is considered a representative sample as the top 100 single albums account for approximately 70 to 80 % of the majors’ respective total music sales). Secondly, the Commission examined whether any price coordination could have been reached in using list prices (PPDs) as focal points. Thirdly, the Commission analysed whether the different majors’ discounts were aligned and sufficiently transparent in order to allow effective monitoring of competitive behaviour.

(17)

On the basis of the net average prices, the Commission found some parallelism and a relatively similar development of the majors’ prices in the five larger markets, France, Germany, Italy, Spain and the UK. However, these observations as such are not sufficient to conclude that coordinated pricing behaviour existed in the past.

(18)

Therefore, the Commission further investigated whether additional elements, namely list prices and discounts, were aligned and sufficiently transparent to provide sufficient evidence for coordination.

(19)

The Commission found some indications that PPDs could have been used as focal points for an alignment of the majors’ list prices in all five Member States. Regarding discounts, the investigation indicated that the level of discounts varied to some extent among the different majors and that certain types of discounts were not sufficiently transparent to establish existing collusion.

(20)

Furthermore, the Commission analysed whether the markets for recorded music were characterised by features facilitating collective dominance, in particular by considering product homogeneity, transparency and retaliation mechanisms.

(21)

As to product homogeneity, the Commission found that the content of individual albums is differentiated but also that pricing and marketing are standardised to some extent. However, the heterogeneity of content has some implications for pricing and reduces transparency in the market and makes tacit collusion more difficult as it requires monitoring at the individual album level.

(22)

With respect to transparency, the Commission found that the publication of weekly charts, the stability of the common customer base and the majors’ monitoring of the retail market by means of weekly reports increase the market transparency and facilitate the monitoring of a coordinated policy. However, the investigation also indicated that the monitoring of campaign discounts requires monitoring on an album level, which reduces the transparency in the market and makes tacit collusion more difficult. On balance, the Commission has not found sufficient evidence that the majors have overcome this transparency deficit in the past.

(23)

As to retaliation, the Commission explored whether majors could retaliate against any ‘cheating’ major, in particular by a (temporary) return to competitive behaviour or by exclusion of the deviator from compilation joint ventures and agreements. However, the Commission has not found sufficient evidence that such retaliation mechanisms have been applied or used as a threat in the past.

(24)

In the smaller Member States the Commission equally found a considerable degree of parallelism between the PPDs of the majors which, in principle, could be have been used as focal points by the majors to align prices. However, the investigation revealed, also in the smaller Member States, some differences in the level of discounts and deficits of transparency with respect to certain discounts.

(25)

The Commission’s considerations as to homogeneity of the product, transparency of the market and the possibility to retaliate, as specified above for the larger Member States, are also valid for the smaller Member States.

(26)

The Commission considers that it has not found sufficient evidence for an existing collective dominant position of the five music majors in the markets for recorded music in any EEA Member State.

(27)

The Commission has also considered whether the merger would lead to the creation of collective dominance of the music majors in any EEA Member State. However, in the light of the above remarks, in particular regarding market transparency, product content heterogeneity and retaliation, the Commission considers that the effect of a reduction from five to four majors following the merger would not be substantial enough to lead to the creation of a collective dominant position of the majors in the recorded music markets.

(28)

Third parties raised concerns that the joint venture would achieve a position of single dominance in the markets for recorded music due to the joint venture’s vertical relationship to Bertelsmann’s media interests. It is argued that Bertelsmann could use its position in television and radio stations to foreclose competitors and favour Sony BMG, in particular by granting preferential rates or treatment or by foreclosure of competitors from promoting their artists via these channels.

(29)

The Commission concludes that it is not likely that the proposed joint venture would achieve single dominance on the markets for recorded music in Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg and France, where Bertelsmann is active via RTL TV and radio stations. The advantages derived from the vertical integration in Bertelsmann’s media group (e.g. through the Pop Idol format which, according to industry experts has already passed its peak) are already incorporated in BMG’s market shares for 2003. On the basis of these market shares the proposed joint venture does not reach the threshold of single dominance. Furthermore, the Commission has not found any evidence that it could be a profitable strategy for Bertelsmann to foreclose competitors from access to its TV channels and radio stations.

(30)

The Commission notes that the market for legal online music is currently in a state of infancy as most of the sites for online music have only recently started operations in the EEA. It is therefore difficult to definitively conclude on the market positions of the major record companies, particularly in relation to national markets. In addition, the information on actually downloaded or streamed songs does not appear to give a clear picture of the different players’ market positions and no public industry data is available. However, on the basis of the information received by the Commission, it can be concluded that the market position of the major record companies on the wholesale market for licences for online music appears to be by and large similar to their position on the markets for recorded music.

(31)

Given the emerging state of the markets and the differences in pricing and conditions in the current agreements, the Commission has concluded that no sufficient evidence could be found for an existing collective dominant position of the majors on the national markets for licences for online music and that the concentration would not result in the creation of a collective dominant position on these markets.

(32)

Third parties have raised concerns that, as a result of the transaction, Sony could obtain a position of single dominance on the national markets for distribution of online music via its Sony Connect music downloading service. It has been submitted that Sony could use the control of the joint venture to foreclose competitors in the downstream market for distribution of online music, in particular by denying competing online platforms access to the joint venture’s library or by engaging in discriminatory behaviour vis-à-vis its competitors, e.g. by means of usage rules, time of release of new songs and the track format.

(33)

The Commission considers that Sony Connect is currently only in the process of being launched in Europe, after having been launched in the US in May 2004. It therefore currently does not have a share of the market. Also, other players have already gained a certain position in the market (e.g. OD2) and further players have recently entered the market or announced that they would do so soon. Furthermore, by foreclosing competitors, the proposed joint venture Sony BMG would forego considerable licence revenues for the tracks sold by competitors and it appears doubtful whether such a strategy would be profitable.

(34)

Third parties have raised concerns that the creation of the joint venture would have as its effect the coordination of the parties’ competitive behaviour in the closely related markets for music publishing.

(35)

The Commission considers that any coordination could only materialise to a rather limited extent since the administration of publishing rights is mainly carried out by the collecting societies (at least for the important mechanical and performance rights). The collecting societies grant, on the basis of prevailing legislation, licences on non-discriminatory terms and agree on royalties with publishers, authors and composers. The Commission also considers that, contrary to some third parties’ concerns, the concentration would not lead to the bypassing of the collecting societies by the majors as there is no sufficiently concrete evidence for such a strategy.

(36)

The Decision concludes that the proposed concentration does not create or strengthen a single or collective dominant position in the national markets for recorded music, licences for online music, or distribution of online music as a result of which effective competition would be significantly impeded in the common market or in a substantial part of it. The Decision further concludes that the transaction does not have as its object or effect the coordination of the competitive behaviour of the joint venture’s parent companies, Sony and Bertelsmann, in the music publishing markets. Consequently, the Decision declares the concentration compatible with the Common Market and the EEA Agreement, in accordance with Articles 2(2) and (4) and Article 8(2) of the Merger Regulation and Article 57 of the EEA Agreement.

9.3.2005   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

L 62/34

(1)

Annex XIV, Chapter 5, Section B, paragraph (a) to the 2003 Act of Accession provides that the structural requirements laid down in Annex I to Council Directive 64/433/EEC of 26 June 1964 on health conditions for the production and marketing of fresh meat (2) and in Annexes A and B to Council Directive 77/99/EEC of 21 December 1976 on health problems affecting the production and marketing of meat products and certain other products of animal origin (3) are not to apply to establishments in Slovakia listed in the Appendix (4) to Annex XIV to the Act of Accession until 31 December 2006, subject to certain conditions.

(2)

The Appendix to Annex XIV to the 2003 Act of Accession has been amended by Commission Decision 2004/463/EC (5).

(3)

According to an official declaration from the Slovak competent authority, three meat establishments have completed their upgrading process and are now in full compliance with Community legislation. Furthermore, two meat establishments from that list have ceased their activities. Those establishments should therefore be deleted from the list of establishments in transition.

(4)

Three meat establishments on the list of establishments in transition have made considerable efforts to comply with structural requirements laid down by Community legislation. However, those establishments are not in position to finish their upgrading process by the prescribed deadline due to exceptional technical constraints. Therefore it is justified to allow them further time to complete the upgrading process.

(5)

The Appendix to Annex XIV to the 2003 Act of Accession should therefore be amended accordingly. For the sake of clarity, it should be replaced.

(6)

The Standing Committee on the Food Chain and Animal Health has been informed of the measures provided for in this Decision,

9.3.2005   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

L 62/37

(1)

The European Union is committed to a secure, stable, unified, prosperous and democratic Iraq that will make a positive contribution to the stability of the region. The EU supports the people of Iraq and the Iraqi Interim Government in their efforts towards the economic, social and political reconstruction of Iraq in the framework of the implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1546 of 8 June 2004.

(2)

The European Council on 5 November 2004 welcomed the Joint Fact Finding Mission for a possible integrated police, rule of law and civilian administration mission for Iraq and considered its report. The European Council recognised the importance of strengthening the criminal justice system, consistent with the respect for the rule of law, human rights and fundamental freedoms. It noted the wish of the Iraqi authorities for the EU to become more actively involved in Iraq and that strengthening the criminal justice sector would respond to Iraqi needs and priorities.

(3)

The European Council agreed that the EU could usefully contribute to the reconstruction and the emergence of a stable, secure and democratic Iraq through an integrated mission, which could inter alia promote closer collaboration between the different actors across the criminal justice system and strengthen the management capacity of senior and high-potential officials from the police, judiciary and penitentiary and improve skills and procedures in criminal investigation in full respect for the rule of law and human rights.

(4)

As agreed by the European Council, by Joint Action 2004/909/CFSP (1) the Council decided to send an expert team to continue the dialogue with the Iraqi authorities, to start initial planning for a possible integrated police, rule of law and civilian administration mission to be launched after the elections, and in particular assess the urgent security needs for such a mission.

(5)

The Council decided on 21 February 2005 to launch an integrated rule of law mission for Iraq, which would become operational as soon as possible, subject to an official invitation from the Iraqi authorities.

(6)

The success of the mission will depend on an effective strategic and technical partnership with the Iraqis throughout the operation, in the framework of European Security and Defense Policy and in complementarity with the United Nations.

(7)

The EU will use its dialogue with Iraq and its neighbours to encourage continuous regional engagement and support for improved security and for the political and reconstruction process in Iraq based on inclusiveness, democratic principles, respect for human rights and the rule of law, as well as support for security and cooperation in the region.

(8)

EUJUST LEX will implement its mandate in the context of a situation posing a threat to law and order, the security and safety of individuals, and to the stability of Iraq and which could harm the objectives of the Common Foreign and Security Policy as set out in Article 11 of the Treaty.

(9)

In conformity with the guidelines of the European Council meeting in Nice on 7 to 9 December 2000, this Joint Action should determine the role of the Secretary General/High Representative, hereinafter referred to as ‘SG/HR’, in accordance with Articles 18 and 26 of the Treaty.

(10)

Article 14(1) of the Treaty calls for the indication of a financial reference amount for the whole period of implementation of the Joint Action. The indication of amounts to be financed by the Community budget illustrates the will of the legislative authority and is subject to the availability of commitment appropriations during the respective budget year. EUJUST LEX will also receive contributions in kind from Member States,

(a)

the Head of Mission;

(b)

a Coordinating Office in Brussels;

(c)

a Liaison Office in Baghdad;

(d)

Training Facilities and trainers provided by the Member States and coordinated by EUJUST LEX.