27.1.2023

Official Journal of the European Union

C 32/6

P9_TA(2022)0257

Genetically modified maize DP4114 × MON 810 × MIR604 × NK603 and genetically modified maize combining two or three of the single events DP4114, MON 810, MIR604 and NK603

European Parliament resolution of 23 June 2022 on the draft Commission implementing decision authorising the placing on the market of products containing, consisting of or produced from genetically modified maize DP4114 × MON 810 × MIR604 × NK603 and genetically modified maize combining two or three of the single events DP4114, MON 810, MIR604 and NK603, pursuant to Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003 of the European Parliament and of the Council (D081155/01 — 2022/2694(RSP))

(2023/C 32/02)

The European Parliament,

—

having regard to the draft Commission implementing decision authorising the placing on the market of products containing, consisting of or produced from genetically modified maize DP4114 × MON 810 × MIR604 × NK603 and genetically modified maize combining two or three of the single events DP4114, MON 810, MIR604 and NK603, pursuant to Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003 of the European Parliament and of the Council (D081155/01,

—	having regard to Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 September 2003 on genetically modified food and feed (1), and in particular Article 7(3) and Article 19(3) thereof,

—	having regard to the vote of the Standing Committee on Plants, Animals, Food and Feed referred to in Article 35 of Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003, on 16 May 2022, at which no opinion was delivered,

—	having regard to Articles 11 and 13 of Regulation (EU) No 182/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 February 2011 laying down the rules and general principles concerning mechanisms for control by Member States of the Commission’s exercise of implementing powers (2),

—	having regard to the opinion adopted by the European Food Safety Authority (EFSA) on 26 January 2022, and published on 7 March 2022 (3),

—	having regard to its previous resolutions objecting to the authorisation of genetically modified organisms (‘GMOs’) (4),

—	having regard to Rule 112(2) and (3) of its Rules of Procedure,

—	having regard to the motion for a resolution by the Committee on the Environment, Public Health and Food Safety,

whereas on 2 May 2018, Pioneer Overseas Corporation, based in Belgium, submitted, on behalf of Pioneer Hi-Bred International, Inc., based in the United States, an application for the placing on the market of foods, food ingredients and feed containing, consisting of or produced from genetically modified maize DP4114 × MON 810 × MIR604 × NK603 (‘the GM maize’), in accordance with Articles 5 and 17 of Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003 (‘the application’); whereas the application also covered the placing on the market of products containing or consisting of the GM maize for uses other than food and feed, with the exception of cultivation;

B.	whereas, in addition, the application covered the placing on the market of products containing, consisting of or produced from 10 sub-combinations of the single transformation events constituting the GM maize;

C.	whereas the sub-combination MON 810 × NK603, has already been authorised by Commission Implementing Decision (EU) 2018/2045 (5); whereas the draft implementing decision therefore covers the GM maize and the 9 remaining sub-combinations in the application (6);

D.	whereas, on 26 January 2022, EFSA adopted a favourable opinion in relation to the authorisation of the GM maize, which was published on 7 March 2022;

E.	whereas the GM maize was produced by conventional crossing to combine four single GM maize events: DP4114, MON 810, MIR604 and NK603; whereas the GM maize confers tolerance to two herbicides (glufosinate and glyphosate) and produces five insecticidal proteins (7) (‘Bt toxins’);

F.	whereas no experimental data were submitted by the applicant for the 9 sub-combinations, which have not previously been assessed by EFSA (8); whereas despite that lack of experimental data, EFSA concluded that those sub-combinations would not raise safety concerns;

Lack of assessment of the complementary herbicide

G.	whereas Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) No 503/2013 (9) requires an assessment of whether the expected agricultural practices influence the outcome of the studied endpoints; whereas, according to that Implementing Regulation, this is especially relevant for herbicide-tolerant plants;

whereas a number of studies show that herbicide-tolerant GM crops result in a higher use of complementary herbicides, in large part because of the emergence of herbicide-tolerant weeds (10); whereas, as a consequence, it has to be expected that the GM maize will be exposed to both higher and repeated doses of glyphosate and glufosinate herbicides and that therefore a higher quantity of residues and their breakdown products (‘metabolites’) may be present in the harvest;

I.	whereas glufosinate is classified as toxic to reproduction 1B and therefore meets the ‘cut-off criteria’ set out in Regulation (EC) No 1107/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council (11); whereas the approval of glufosinate for use in the Union expired on 31 July 2018 (12);

whereas EFSA concluded in November 2015 that glyphosate was unlikely to be carcinogenic and the European Chemicals Agency concluded in March 2017 that no classification was warranted; whereas, on the contrary, in 2015, the International Agency for Research on Cancer, the specialised cancer agency of the World Health Organization, classified glyphosate as a probable carcinogen for humans; whereas a number of other recent scientific peer-reviewed studies confirm the carcinogenic potential of glyphosate (13);

whereas assessment of herbicide residues and metabolites found on GM plants is considered outside the remit of the EFSA Panel on Genetically Modified Organisms (EFSA GMO Panel) and is therefore not undertaken as part of the authorisation process for GMOs; whereas this is problematic since the way in which complementary herbicides are broken down by the GM plant concerned, and the composition and thus toxicity of the metabolites, can be impacted by the genetic modification itself (14);

Outstanding questions concerning Bt toxins

whereas the toxicity of the Bt toxins was assessed on the basis of feeding studies, using only isolated Bt proteins produced by bacteria; whereas little significance can be attributed to toxicological tests conducted with proteins in isolation, due to the fact that Bt toxins in GM crops, such as maize, cotton and soybeans, are inherently more toxic than isolated Bt toxins; whereas this is because protease inhibitors (PI), present in the plant tissue, can increase the toxicity of the Bt toxins by delaying their degradation; whereas this phenomenon has been demonstrated in a number of scientific studies, including one conducted for Monsanto thirty years ago which showed that even the presence of extremely low levels of PI enhanced the toxicity of Bt toxins up to 20-fold (15);

whereas this enhanced toxicity is not taken into account in EFSA risk assessments, even though it is relevant for all Bt plants approved for import or cultivation in the Union; whereas risks to humans and animals that consume food and feed containing Bt toxins and which arise from this enhanced toxicity due to the interaction between PI and Bt toxins cannot, therefore, be ruled out;

N.	whereas a number of studies show that side effects have been observed that may affect the immune system following exposure to Bt toxins and that some Bt toxins may have adjuvant properties (16), meaning that they can increase the allergenicity of other proteins with which they come into contact;

whereas a scientific study found that the toxicity of Bt toxins may also be increased through interaction with residues from spraying with herbicides, and that further studies are needed on the combinatorial effects of ‘stacked’ events (GM crops which have been modified to be herbicide tolerant and to produce insecticides in the form of Bt toxins) (17); whereas assessment of the potential interaction of herbicide residues and their metabolites with Bt toxins is, however, considered to be outside the remit of the EFSA GMO Panel and is, therefore, not undertaken as part of the risk assessment;

Bt crops: effects on non-target organisms

P.	whereas, unlike the use of insecticides, where exposure is at the time of spraying and for a limited time afterwards, the use of Bt GM crops leads to continuous exposure of the target and non-target organisms to Bt toxins;

whereas the assumption that Bt toxins exhibit a single target-specific mode-of-action can no longer be considered correct and effects on non-target organisms cannot be excluded (18); whereas an increasing number of non-target organisms are reported to be affected in many ways; whereas 39 peer-reviewed publications that report significant adverse effects of Bt toxins on many ‘out-of-range’ species are mentioned in a recent overview (19);

Member State competent authority and stakeholder comments

R.	whereas Member States submitted many critical comments to EFSA during the three-month consultation period (20);

whereas detailed analysis by an independent research organisation states, inter alia, that the EFSA opinion on the application for authorisation of the GM maize cannot be said to fulfil the requirements for assessment of potential synergistic or antagonistic effects resulting from the combination of the transformation events, with regard to toxicology and that, therefore, the toxicological assessment carried out by EFSA is not acceptable (21);

Upholding the Union’s international obligations

whereas a 2017 report by the United Nations (UN) Special Rapporteur on the right to food found that, particularly in developing countries, hazardous pesticides have catastrophic impacts on health (22); whereas the UN Sustainable Development Goal (‘SDG’) Target 3.9 aims by 2030 to substantially reduce the number of deaths and illnesses from hazardous chemicals and air, water and soil pollution and contamination (23); whereas authorising the import of the GM maize would increase demand for this crop, which is designed to be treated with glufosinate and glyphosate based herbicides, thereby increasing the exposure of workers and the environment in third countries; whereas the risk of increased worker and environmental exposure is of particular concern in relation to herbicide-tolerant GM crops, given the higher volumes of herbicides used;

U.	whereas, according to a peer-reviewed study published in 2020, Roundup, one of the world’s most widely used glyphosate-based herbicides, can trigger a loss of biodiversity, making ecosystems more vulnerable to pollution and climate change (24);

V.	whereas the Union, as a party to the UN Convention on Biological Diversity (‘UN CBD’), has the responsibility of ensuring that activities within its jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to the environment of other States (25);

whereas Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003 states that GM food or feed must not have adverse effects on human health, animal health or the environment, and requires the Commission to take into account any relevant provisions of Union law and other legitimate factors relevant to the matter under consideration when drafting its decision; whereas such legitimate factors should include the Union’s obligations under the UN SDGs, the Paris Climate Agreement and the UN CBD;

Undemocratic decision-making

X.	whereas the vote on 16 May 2022 of the Standing Committee on Plants, Animals, Food and Feed referred to in Article 35 of Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003 delivered no opinion, meaning that the authorisation was not supported by a qualified majority of Member States;

whereas the Commission recognises that the fact that GMO authorisation decisions continue to be adopted by the Commission without a qualified majority of Member States in favour, which is very much the exception for product authorisations as a whole but has become the norm for decision-making on GM food and feed authorisations, is problematic;

whereas, in its eighth term, Parliament adopted a total of 36 resolutions objecting to the placing on the market of GMOs for food and feed (33 resolutions) and to the cultivation of GMOs in the Union (three resolutions); whereas, in its ninth term, Parliament has already adopted 27 objections to placing GMOs on the market; whereas there was not a qualified majority of Member States in favour of authorising any of those GMOs; whereas the reasons for Member States not supporting authorisations include lack of respect for the precautionary principle in the authorisation process and scientific concerns relating to the risk assessment;

AA.	whereas despite its own acknowledgement of the democratic shortcomings, the lack of support from Member States and the objections of Parliament, the Commission continues to authorise GMOs;

AB.	whereas no change of law is required for the Commission to be able not to authorise GMOs when there is no qualified majority of Member States in favour in the Appeal Committee (26);

Considers that the draft Commission implementing decision exceeds the implementing powers provided for in Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003;

Considers that the draft Commission implementing decision is not consistent with Union law, in that it is not compatible with the aim of Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003, which is, in accordance with the general principles laid down in Regulation (EC) No 178/2002 of the European Parliament and of the Council (27), to provide the basis for ensuring a high level of protection of human life and health, animal health and welfare, and environmental and consumer interests, in relation to GM food and feed, while ensuring the effective functioning of the internal market;

Calls on the Commission to withdraw its draft implementing decision;

Calls on the Commission not to authorise the import of herbicide-tolerant GM crops, due to the associated increased use of complementary herbicides and therefore the increased risks to biodiversity, food safety and worker health;

Welcomes the fact that the Commission finally recognised, in a letter of 11 September 2020 to Members, the need to take sustainability into account when it comes to authorisation decisions on GMOs (28); expresses its deep disappointment, however, that, since then the Commission has continued to authorise GMOs for import into the Union, despite ongoing objections by Parliament and a majority of Member States voting against;

Urges the Commission, again, to take into account the Union’s obligations under international agreements, such as the Paris Climate Agreement, the UN CBD and the UN SDGs; reiterates its call for draft implementing acts to be accompanied by an explanatory memorandum explaining how they uphold the principle of ‘do no harm’ (29);

Calls on EFSA to request data on the impact of the consumption of food and feed derived from GM plants on the intestinal microbiome;

Reiterates its call on the Commission not to authorise any sub-combinations of stacked GM events unless they have been thoroughly evaluated by EFSA on the basis of complete experimental data submitted by the applicant;

Considers, more specifically, that to approve varieties of GM plants for which no experimental data have been provided, which have not been tested, or which may not even have been created yet, runs contrary to the principles of general food law, as laid down in Regulation (EC) No 178/2002;

10.

Highlights that the amendments adopted by the European Parliament on 17 December 2020 on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulation (EU) No 182/2011 (30), which were adopted in Parliament as a basis for negotiations with the Council, state that the Commission shall not authorise GMOs when there is not a qualified majority of Member States in favour; insists that the Commission respect this position and calls on the Council to proceed with its work and adopt a general approach on this file as a matter of urgency;

11.

Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council and the Commission, and to the governments and parliaments of the Member States.

(1) OJ L 268, 18.10.2003, p. 1.

(2) OJ L 55, 28.2.2011, p. 13.

(3) Scientific opinion of the EFSA Panel on Genetically Modified Organisms on the assessment of genetically modified maize DP4114 × MON 810 × MIR604 × NK603 and sub-combinations, for food and feed uses, under Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003 (application EFSA-GMO-NL-2018-150), EFSA Journal 2022,20(3):7134, https://doi.org/10.2903/j.efsa.2022.7134

(4) In its eighth term, Parliament adopted 36 resolutions objecting to the authorisation of GMOs.

Furthermore, in its ninth term Parliament has adopted the following resolutions:

—

European Parliament resolution of 10 October 2019 on the draft Commission implementing decision authorising the placing on the market of products containing, consisting of or produced from genetically modified maize MZHG0JG (SYN-ØØØJG-2), pursuant to Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003 of the European Parliament and of the Council (OJ C 202, 28.5.2021, p. 11).

—

European Parliament resolution of 10 October 2019 on the draft Commission implementing decision renewing the authorisation for the placing on the market of products containing, consisting of or produced from genetically modified soybean A2704-12 (ACS-GMØØ5-3) pursuant to Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003 of the European Parliament and of the Council (OJ C 202, 28.5.2021, p. 15).

—

European Parliament resolution of 10 October 2019 on the draft Commission implementing decision authorising the placing on the market of products containing, consisting of or produced from genetically modified maize MON 89034 × 1507 × MON 88017 × 59122 × DAS-40278-9 and genetically modified maize combining two, three or four of the single events MON 89034, 1507, MON 88017, 59122 and DAS-40278-9 pursuant to Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003 of the European Parliament and of the Council (OJ C 202, 28.5.2021, p. 20).

—

European Parliament resolution of 14 November 2019 on the draft Commission implementing decision renewing the authorisation for the placing on the market of products containing, consisting of or produced from genetically modified cotton LLCotton25 (ACS-GHØØ1-3) pursuant to Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003 of the European Parliament and of the Council (OJ C 208, 1.6.2021, p. 2).

—

European Parliament resolution of 14 November 2019 on the draft Commission implementing decision renewing the authorisation for the placing on the market of products containing, consisting of or produced from genetically modified soybean MON 89788 (MON-89788-1) pursuant to Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003 of the European Parliament and of the Council (OJ C 208, 1.6.2021, p. 7).

—

European Parliament resolution of 14 November 2019 on the draft Commission implementing decision authorising the placing on the market of products containing, consisting of or produced from genetically modified maize MON 89034 × 1507 × NK603 × DAS-40278-9 and sub-combinations MON 89034 × NK603 × DAS-40278-9, 1507 × NK603 × DAS-40278-9 and NK603 × DAS-40278-9 pursuant to Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003 of the European Parliament and of the Council (OJ C 208, 1.6.2021, p. 12).

—

European Parliament resolution of 14 November 2019 on the draft Commission implementing decision authorising the placing on the market of products containing, consisting of or produced from genetically modified maize Bt11 × MIR162 × MIR604 × 1507 × 5307 × GA21 and genetically modified maize combining two, three, four or five of the single events Bt11, MIR162, MIR604, 1507, 5307 and GA21 pursuant to Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003 of the European Parliament and of the Council (OJ C 208, 1.6.2021, p. 18).

—

European Parliament resolution of 14 May 2020 on the draft Commission implementing decision authorising the placing on the market of products containing, consisting of or produced from genetically modified soybean MON 87708 × MON 89788 × A5547-127, pursuant to Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003 of the European Parliament and of the Council (OJ C 323, 11.8.2021, p. 7).

—

European Parliament resolution of 11 November 2020 on the draft Commission implementing decision authorising the placing on the market of products containing, consisting of or produced from genetically modified maize MON 87427 × MON 89034 × MIR162 × NK603 and genetically modified maize combining two or three of the single events MON 87427, MON 89034, MIR162 and NK603, and repealing Commission Implementing Decision (EU) 2018/1111 pursuant to Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003 of the European Parliament and of the Council (OJ C 415, 13.10.2021, p. 2).

—

European Parliament resolution of 11 November 2020 on the draft Commission implementing decision authorising the placing on the market of products containing, consisting of or produced from genetically modified soybean SYHT0H2 (SYN-ØØØH2-5), pursuant to Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003 of the European Parliament and of the Council (OJ C 415, 13.10.2021, p. 8).

—

European Parliament resolution of 11 November 2020 on the draft Commission implementing decision authorising the placing on the market of products containing, consisting of or produced from genetically modified maize MON 87427 × MON 87460 × MON 89034 × MIR162 × NK603 and genetically modified maize combining two, three or four of the single events MON 87427, MON 87460, MON 89034, MIR162 and NK603, pursuant to Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003 of the European Parliament and of the Council (OJ C 415, 13.10.2021, p. 15).

—

European Parliament resolution of 17 December 2020 on the draft Commission implementing decision authorising the placing on the market of products containing, consisting of or produced from genetically modified soybean MON 87751 × MON 87701 × MON 87708 × MON 89788, pursuant to Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003 of the European Parliament and of the Council (OJ C 445, 29.10.2021, p. 36).

—

European Parliament resolution of 17 December 2020 on the draft Commission implementing decision authorising the placing on the market of products containing, consisting of or produced from genetically modified maize MON 87427 × MON 89034 × MIR162 × MON 87411 and genetically modified maize combining two or three of the single events MON 87427, MON 89034, MIR162 and MON 87411 pursuant to Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003 of the European Parliament and of the Council (OJ C 445, 29.10.2021, p. 43).

—

European Parliament resolution of 17 December 2020 on the draft Commission implementing decision renewing the authorisation for the placing on the market of products containing, consisting of or produced from genetically modified maize MIR604 (SYN-IR6Ø4-5) pursuant to Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003 of the European Parliament and of the Council (OJ C 445, 29.10.2021, p. 49).

—

European Parliament resolution of 17 December 2020 on the draft Commission implementing decision renewing the authorisation for the placing on the market of products containing, consisting of or produced from genetically modified maize MON 88017 (MON-88Ø17-3) pursuant to Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003 of the European Parliament and of the Council (OJ C 445, 29.10.2021, p. 56).

—

European Parliament resolution of 17 December 2020 on the draft Commission implementing decision renewing the authorisation for the placing on the market of products containing, consisting of or produced from genetically modified maize MON 89034 (MON-89Ø34-3) pursuant to Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003 of the European Parliament and of the Council (OJ C 445, 29.10.2021, p. 63).

—

European Parliament resolution of 11 March 2021 on the draft Commission implementing decision authorising the placing on the market of products containing, consisting of or produced from genetically modified cotton GHB614 × T304-40 × GHB119 pursuant to Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003 of the European Parliament and of the Council (OJ C 474, 24.11.2021, p. 66).

—

European Parliament resolution of 11 March 2021 on the draft Commission implementing decision authorising the placing on the market of products containing, consisting of or produced from genetically modified maize MZIR098 (SYN-ØØØ98-3), pursuant to Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003 of the European Parliament and of the Council (OJ C 474, 24.11.2021, p. 74).

—

European Parliament resolution of 7 July 2021 on the draft Commission implementing decision authorising the placing on the market of products containing, consisting of or produced from genetically modified soybean DAS-81419-2 pursuant to Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003 of the European Parliament and of the Council (OJ C 99, 1.3.2022, p. 45).

—

European Parliament resolution of 7 July 2021 on the draft Commission implementing decision authorising the placing on the market of products containing, consisting of or produced from genetically modified soybean DAS-81419-2 × DAS–44406–6, pursuant to Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003 of the European Parliament and of the Council (OJ C 99, 1.3.2022, p. 52).

—

European Parliament resolution of 7 July 2021 on the draft Commission implementing decision authorising the placing on the market of products containing, consisting of or produced from genetically modified maize 1507 ×MIR162 × MON810 × NK603 and genetically modified maize combining two or three of the single events 1507, MIR162, MON810 and NK603, pursuant to Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003 of the European Parliament and of the Council (OJ C 99, 1.3.2022, p. 59).

—

European Parliament resolution of 7 July 2021 on the draft Commission implementing decision renewing the authorisation for the placing on the market of products containing, consisting of or produced from genetically modified maize Bt 11 (SYN-BTØ11-1) pursuant to Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003 of the European Parliament and of the Council (OJ C 99, 1.3.2022, p. 66).

—

European Parliament resolution of 15 February 2022 on the draft Commission implementing decision authorising the placing on the market of products containing, consisting of or produced from genetically modified soybean GMB151 (BCS-GM151-6) pursuant to Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003 of the European Parliament and of the Council (Texts adopted, P9_TA(2022)0024).

—

European Parliament resolution of 15 February 2022 on the draft Commission implementing decision renewing the authorisation for the placing on the market of products containing, consisting of or produced from genetically modified cotton GHB614 (BCS-GHØØ2-5) pursuant to Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003 of the European Parliament and of the Council (Texts adopted, P9_TA(2022)0025).

—

European Parliament resolution of 9 March 2022 on the draft Commission implementing decision authorising the placing on the market of products containing, consisting of or produced from genetically modified cotton GHB811 (BCS-GH811-4), pursuant to Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003 of the European Parliament and of the Council (Texts adopted, P9_TA(2022)0062).

—

European Parliament resolution of 9 March 2022 on the draft Commission implementing decision authorising the placing on the market of products containing, consisting of or produced from genetically modified oilseed rape 73496 (DP-Ø73496-4) pursuant to Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003 of the European Parliament and of the Council (Texts adopted, P9_TA(2022)0063).

—

European Parliament resolution of 6 April 2022 on the draft Commission implementing decision authorising the placing on the market of products containing, consisting of or produced from genetically modified soybean MON 87769 × MON 89788 pursuant to Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003 of the European Parliament and of the Council (Texts adopted, P9_TA(2022)0115).

(5) Commission Implementing Decision (EU) 2018/2045 of 19 December 2018 renewing the authorisation for the placing on the market of products containing, consisting of or produced from genetically modified maize NK603 × MON 810 (MON-ØØ6Ø3-6 × MON-ØØ81Ø-6) pursuant to Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003 of the European Parliament and of the Council (OJ L 327, 21.12.2018, p. 65).

(6) MIR604 × NK603 × DP4114, MON 810 × NK603 × DP4114, MON 810 × MIR604 × DP4114, MON 810 × MIR604 × NK603, NK603 × DP4114, MIR604 × DP4114, MIR604 × NK603, MON 810 × DP4114 and MON 810 × MIR604.

(7) Cry1F, Cry34Ab1, Cry35Ab1, Cry1Ab and mCry3A.

(8) EFSA opinion, p. 4.

(9) Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) No 503/2013 of 3 April 2013 on applications for authorisation of genetically modified food and feed in accordance with Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003 of the European Parliament and of the Council and amending Commission Regulations (EC) No 641/2004 and (EC) No 1981/2006 (OJ L 157, 8.6.2013, p. 1).

(10) See, for example, Bonny, S., ‘Genetically Modified Herbicide-Tolerant Crops, Weeds, and Herbicides: Overview and Impact’, Environmental Management, January 2016; 57(1), pp. 31-48, https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/26296738 and Benbrook, C.M., ‘Impacts of genetically engineered crops on pesticide use in the U.S. — the first sixteen years’, Environmental Sciences Europe, 28 September 2012, Vol. 24(1), https://enveurope.springeropen.com/articles/10.1186/2190-4715-24-24

(11) Regulation (EC) No 1107/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 October 2009 concerning the placing of plant protection products on the market and repealing Council Directives 79/117/EEC and 91/414/EEC (OJ L 309, 24.11.2009, p. 1).

(12) https://ec.europa.eu/food/plant/pesticides/eu-pesticides-database/active-substances/?event=search.as

(13) See, for example, https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1383574218300887, https://academic.oup.com/ije/advance-article/doi/10.1093/ije/dyz017/5382278, https://journals.plos.org/plosone/article?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0219610, and https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC6612199/

(14) This is indeed the case for glyphosate, as stated in EFSA ‘Review of the existing maximum residue levels for glyphosate according to Article 12 of Regulation (EC) No 396/2005’, EFSA Journal 2018,16(5):5263, p. 12, https://www.efsa.europa.eu/fr/efsajournal/pub/5263

(15) MacIntosh, S.C., Kishore, G.M., Perlak, F.J., Marrone, P.G., Stone, T.B., Sims, S.R., Fuchs, R.L., ‘Potentiation of Bacillus thuringiensis insecticidal activity by serine protease inhibitors’, Journal of Agricultural and Food Chemistry, 1990, 38, pp. 1145-1152, https://pubs.acs.org/doi/abs/10.1021/jf00094a051

(16) For a review, see Rubio-Infante, N., Moreno-Fierros, L., ‘An overview of the safety and biological effects of Bacillus thuringiensis Cry toxins in mammals’, Journal of Applied Toxicology, May 2016, 36(5), pp. 630 648, https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1002/jat.3252

(17) https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0278691516300722?via%3Dihub

(18) See, for example, Hilbeck, A., Otto, M., ‘Specificity and combinatorial effects of Bacillus thuringiensis Cry toxins in the context of GMO environmental risk assessment’, Frontiers in Environmental Science 2015, 3:71, https://doi.org/10.3389/fenvs.2015.00071

(19) Hilbeck, A., Defarge, N., Lebrecht, T., Bøhn, T., ‘Insecticidal Bt crops. EFSA’s risk assessment approach for GM Bt plants fails by design’, RAGES 2020, p. 4, https://www.testbiotech.org/sites/default/files/RAGES_report-Insecticidal%20Bt%20plants.pdf

(20) Member State comments, accessible via the EFSA OpenEFSA portal: https://open.efsa.europa.eu/

(21) Testbiotech comment on EFSA assessment of genetically engineered maize DP4114 x MON810 x MIR604 x NK603 and subcombinations, for food and feed uses, under Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003 (application EFSA-GMO-NL-2018-150) from Pioneer.

(22) https://www.un.org/sustainabledevelopment/health/

(23) https://indicators.report/targets/3-9/

(24) https://www.mcgill.ca/newsroom/channels/news/widely-used-weed-killer-harming-biodiversity-320906

(25) Convention on Biological Diversity, Article 3: https://www.cbd.int/convention/articles/?a=cbd-03

(26) The Commission ‘may’, and not ‘shall’, go ahead with authorisation if there is no qualified majority of Member States in favour at the Appeal Committee, according to Regulation (EU) No 182/2011 (Article 6(3)).

(27) Regulation (EC) No 178/2002 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 28 January 2002 laying down the general principles and requirements of food law, establishing the European Food Safety Authority and laying down procedures in matters of food safety (OJ L 31, 1.2.2002, p. 1).

(28) https://tillymetz.lu/wp-content/uploads/2020/09/Co-signed-letter-MEP-Metz.pdf

(29) European Parliament resolution of 15 January 2020 on the European Green Deal (OJ C 270, 7.7.2021, p. 2), paragraph 102.

(30) OJ C 445, 29.10.2021, p. 257.

27.1.2023

Official Journal of the European Union

C 32/14

P9_TA(2022)0258

Genetically modified maize NK603 × T25 × DAS-40278-9 and its sub-combination T25 × DAS-40278-9

European Parliament resolution of 23 June 2022 on Commission Implementing Decision (EU) 2022/797 of 19 May 2022 authorising the placing on the market of products containing, consisting of or produced from genetically modified maize NK603 × T25 × DAS-40278-9 and its sub-combination T25 × DAS-40278-9, pursuant to Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003 of the European Parliament and of the Council (D080148/03 — 2022/2713(RSP))

(2023/C 32/03)

The European Parliament,

—

having regard to Commission Implementing Decision (EU) 2022/797 of 19 May 2022 authorising the placing on the market of products containing, consisting of or produced from genetically modified maize NK603 × T25 × DAS-40278-9 and its sub-combination T25 × DAS-40278-9, pursuant to Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003 of the European Parliament and of the Council (D080148/03 (1),

—	having regard to Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 September 2003 on genetically modified food and feed (2), and in particular Article 7(3) and Article 19(3) thereof,

—	having regard to the vote of the Standing Committee on Plants, Animals, Food and Feed referred to in Article 35 of Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003, on 1 April 2022, at which no opinion was delivered, and to the vote of the Appeal Committee on 26 April 2022, at which again no opinion was delivered,

—	having regard to Articles 11 and 13 of Regulation (EU) No 182/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 February 2011 laying down the rules and general principles concerning mechanisms for control by Member States of the Commission’s exercise of implementing powers (3),

—	having regard to the opinion adopted by the European Food Safety Authority (EFSA) on 29 October 2021, and published on 13 December 2021 (4),

—	having regard to its previous resolutions objecting to the authorisation of genetically modified organisms (‘GMOs’) (5),

—	having regard to Rule 112(2) and (3) of its Rules of Procedure,

—	having regard to the motion for a resolution by the Committee on the Environment, Public Health and Food Safety,

whereas, on 12 December 2019, Pioneer Overseas Corporation submitted an application for the placing on the market of foods, food ingredients and feed containing, consisting of or produced from genetically modified maize NK603 × T25 × DAS-40278-9 (the ‘GM maize’), in accordance with Articles 5 and 17 of Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003; whereas the application also covered the placing on the market of products containing or consisting of the GM maize for uses other than food and feed, with the exception of cultivation;

B.	whereas, on 29 October 2021, EFSA adopted a favourable opinion in relation to the authorisation of the GM maize, which was published on 13 December 2021;

whereas the three-event stacked GM maize was produced by conventional crossing to combine three single GM maize events: NK603 which confers tolerance to glyphosate containing herbicides; T25 conferring tolerance to glufosinate-ammonium containing herbicides; and DAS-40278-9 which catalyses the degradation of the general class of herbicides known as aryloxyphenoxypropionates (AOPP) and which confers tolerance to 2,4-D containing herbicides (6);

whereas sub-combination NK603 x T25 and sub-combination NK603 x DAS-40278-9 have previously been assessed by EFSA; whereas no experimental data were submitted by the applicant for sub-combination DAS-40278-9 x T25, which has not previously been assessed by EFSA; whereas despite this, EFSA concluded that this sub-combination would not raise safety concerns;

Lack of assessment of the complementary herbicide

E.	whereas Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) No 503/2013 (7) requires an assessment of whether the expected agricultural practices influence the outcome of the studied endpoints; whereas, according to that Implementing Regulation, this is especially relevant for herbicide-tolerant plants;

whereas a number of studies show that herbicide-tolerant GM crops result in a higher use of complementary herbicides, in large part because of the emergence of herbicide-tolerant weeds (8); whereas, as a consequence, it has to be expected that the GM maize will be exposed to both higher and repeated doses of glyphosate, glufosinate, AOPP and 2,4-D herbicides and that therefore a higher quantity of residues and their breakdown products (‘metabolites’) may be present in the harvest;

G.	whereas glufosinate is classified as toxic to reproduction 1B and therefore meets the ‘cut-off criteria’ set out in Regulation (EC) No 1107/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council (9); whereas the approval of glufosinate for use in the Union expired on 31 July 2018 (10);

I.	whereas a peer-reviewed scientific article by an expert involved in developing GM plants questions the safety of GM crops tolerant to 2,4-D because of its degradation into cytotoxic breakdown products (12);

whereas assessment of herbicide residues and metabolites found on GM plants is considered outside the remit of the EFSA Panel on Genetically Modified Organisms and is therefore not undertaken as part of the authorisation process for GMOs; whereas this is problematic since the way in which complementary herbicides are broken down by the GM plant concerned, and the composition and thus toxicity of the metabolites, can be impacted by the genetic modification itself (13);

Member State competent authority comments

whereas Member States submitted many critical comments to EFSA during the three-month consultation period (14); whereas those critical comments include that the interaction among the herbicides, their residues and metabolites used on the GM maize cannot be excluded and this chemical cocktail has never been tested from a toxicological angle before, and might affect human and animal health and the environment and whereas there is a vector-derived beta-lactamase (‘bla’) gene in the GM maize, an antibiotic resistance gene which inactivates critically important penicillins;

L.	whereas according to a Member State competent authority (15), whilst the applicant claims that the scientific information in the application is confidential, this conflicts with the Aarhus Convention that lays down the right of the public to access environmental information;

Upholding the Union’s international obligations

whereas a 2017 report by the United Nations (UN) Special Rapporteur on the right to food found that, particularly in developing countries, hazardous pesticides have catastrophic impacts on health (16); whereas the UN Sustainable Development Goal (‘SDG’) Target 3.9 aims by 2030 to substantially reduce the number of deaths and illnesses from hazardous chemicals and air, water and soil pollution and contamination (17); whereas authorising the import of the GM maize would increase demand for this crop, which is designed to be treated with glufosinate, glyphosate, AOPP and 2,4-D herbicides, thereby increasing the exposure of workers and the environment in third countries; whereas the risk of increased worker and environmental exposure is of particular concern in relation to herbicide-tolerant GM crops, given the higher volumes of herbicides used;

N.	whereas, according to a peer-reviewed study published in 2020, Roundup, one of the world’s most widely used glyphosate-based herbicides, can trigger a loss of biodiversity, making ecosystems more vulnerable to pollution and climate change (18);

O.	whereas the Union, as a party to the UN Convention on Biological Diversity (‘UN CBD’), has the responsibility of ensuring that activities within its jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to the environment of other States (19);

Undemocratic decision-making

whereas the Standing Committee on Plants, Animals, Food and Feed delivered no opinion, meaning that the authorisation was not supported by a qualified majority of Member States; whereas the vote on 26 April 2022 of the Appeal Committee referred to in Article 6 of Regulation (EU) No 182/2011, again delivered no opinion; whereas 14 Member States voted against (representing 35,72 % of the EU population) and 3 Member States abstained (representing 34,53 % of the population), only 10 member States voted in favour (representing 29,75 % of the population);

T.	whereas despite its own acknowledgement of the democratic shortcomings, the lack of support from Member States and the objections of Parliament, the Commission continues to authorise GMOs;

U.	whereas no change of law is required for the Commission to be able not to authorise GMOs when there is no qualified majority of Member States in favour in the Appeal Committee (20);

Considers that Implementing Decision (EU) 2022/797 exceeds the implementing powers provided for in Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003;

Considers that Implementing Decision (EU) 2022/797 is not consistent with Union law, in that it is not compatible with the aim of Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003, which is, in accordance with the general principles laid down in Regulation (EC) No 178/2002 of the European Parliament and of the Council (21), to provide the basis for ensuring a high level of protection of human life and health, animal health and welfare, and environmental and consumer interests, in relation to GM food and feed, while ensuring the effective functioning of the internal market;

Calls on the Commission to repeal Implementing Decision (EU) 2022/797;

Welcomes the fact that the Commission finally recognised, in a letter of 11 September 2020 to Members, the need to take sustainability into account when it comes to authorisation decisions on GMOs (22); expresses its deep disappointment, however, that, since then the Commission has continued to authorise GMOs for import into the Union, despite ongoing objections by Parliament and a majority of Member States voting against;

Highlights that the amendments adopted by the European Parliament on 17 December 2020 on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulation (EU) No 182/2011 (24), which were adopted in Parliament as a basis for negotiations with the Council, state that the Commission shall not authorise GMOs when there is not a qualified majority of Member States in favour; insists that the Commission respect this position and calls on the Council to proceed with its work and adopt a general approach on this file as a matter of urgency;

Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council and the Commission, and to the governments and parliaments of the Member States.

(1) OJ L 141, 20.5.2022, p. 116.

(2) OJ L 268, 18.10.2003, p. 1.

(3) OJ L 55, 28.2.2011, p. 13.

(4) https://www.efsa.europa.eu/en/efsajournal/pub/6942

(5) In its eighth term, Parliament adopted 36 resolutions objecting to the authorisation of GMOs. Furthermore, in its ninth term Parliament has adopted the following resolutions:

—

European Parliament resolution of 10 October 2019 on the draft Commission implementing decision authorising the placing on the market of products containing, consisting of or produced from genetically modified maize MZHG0JG (SYN-ØØØJG-2), pursuant to Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003 of the European Parliament and of the Council (OJ C 202, 28.5.2021, p. 11).

—

European Parliament resolution of 10 October 2019 on the draft Commission implementing decision authorising the placing on the market of products containing, consisting of or produced from genetically modified maize MON 89034 × 1507 × MON 88017 × 59122 × DAS-40278-9 and genetically modified maize combining two, three or four of the single events MON 89034, 1507, MON 88017, 59122 and DAS-40278-9 pursuant to Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003 of the European Parliament and of the Council (OJ C 202, 28.5.2021, p. 20).

—

European Parliament resolution of 14 November 2019 on the draft Commission implementing decision renewing the authorisation for the placing on the market of products containing, consisting of or produced from genetically modified soybean MON 89788 (MON-89788-1) pursuant to Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003 of the European Parliament and of the Council (OJ C 208, 1.6.2021, p. 7).

—

European Parliament resolution of 14 November 2019 on the draft Commission implementing decision authorising the placing on the market of products containing, consisting of or produced from genetically modified maize Bt11 × MIR162 × MIR604 × 1507 × 5307 × GA21 and genetically modified maize combining two, three, four or five of the single events Bt11, MIR162, MIR604, 1507, 5307 and GA21 pursuant to Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003 of the European Parliament and of the Council (OJ C 208, 1.6.2021, p. 18).

—

European Parliament resolution of 11 November 2020 on the draft Commission implementing decision authorising the placing on the market of products containing, consisting of or produced from genetically modified soybean SYHT0H2 (SYN-ØØØH2-5), pursuant to Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003 of the European Parliament and of the Council (OJ C 415, 13.10.2021, p. 8).

—

European Parliament resolution of 11 November 2020 on the draft Commission implementing decision authorising the placing on the market of products containing, consisting of or produced from genetically modified maize MON 87427 × MON 87460 × MON 89034 × MIR162 × NK603 and genetically modified maize combining two, three or four of the single events MON 87427, MON 87460, MON 89034, MIR162 and NK603, pursuant to Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003 of the European Parliament and of the Council (OJ C 415, 13.10.2021, p. 15).

—

European Parliament resolution of 17 December 2020 on the draft Commission implementing decision authorising the placing on the market of products containing, consisting of or produced from genetically modified maize MON 87427 × MON 89034 × MIR162 × MON 87411 and genetically modified maize combining two or three of the single events MON 87427, MON 89034, MIR162 and MON 87411 pursuant to Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003 of the European Parliament and of the Council (OJ C 445, 29.10.2021, p. 43).

—

European Parliament resolution of 17 December 2020 on the draft Commission implementing decision renewing the authorisation for the placing on the market of products containing, consisting of or produced from genetically modified maize MON 88017 (MON-88Ø17-3) pursuant to Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003 of the European Parliament and of the Council (OJ C 445, 29.10.2021, p. 56).

—

European Parliament resolution of 17 December 2020 on the draft Commission implementing decision renewing the authorisation for the placing on the market of products containing, consisting of or produced from genetically modified maize MON 89034 (MON-89Ø34-3) pursuant to Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003 of the European Parliament and of the Council (OJ C 445, 29.10.2021, p. 63).

—

European Parliament resolution of 11 March 2021 on the draft Commission implementing decision authorising the placing on the market of products containing, consisting of or produced from genetically modified maize MZIR098 (SYN-ØØØ98-3), pursuant to Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003 of the European Parliament and of the Council (OJ C 474, 24.11.2021, p. 74).

—

European Parliament resolution of 7 July 2021 on the draft Commission implementing decision authorising the placing on the market of products containing, consisting of or produced from genetically modified soybean DAS-81419-2 × DAS–44406–6, pursuant to Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003 of the European Parliament and of the Council (OJ C 99, 1.3.2022, p. 52).

—

European Parliament resolution of 7 July 2021 on the draft Commission implementing decision authorising the placing on the market of products containing, consisting of or produced from genetically modified maize 1507 ×MIR162 × MON810 × NK603 and genetically modified maize combining two or three of the single events 1507, MIR162, MON810 and NK603, pursuant to Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003 of the European Parliament and of the Council (OJ C 99, 1.3.2022, p. 59).

—

European Parliament resolution of 9 March 2022 on the draft Commission implementing decision authorising the placing on the market of products containing, consisting of or produced from genetically modified oilseed rape 73496 (DP-Ø73496-4) pursuant to Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003 of the European Parliament and of the Council (Texts adopted, P9_TA(2022)0063).

—

(6) EFSA opinion, p. 3.

(7) Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) No 503/2013 of 3 April 2013 on applications for authorisation of genetically modified food and feed in accordance with Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003 of the European Parliament and of the Council and amending Commission Regulations (EC) No 641/2004 and (EC) No 1981/2006 (OJ L 157, 8.6.2013, p. 1).

(8) See, for example, Bonny, S., ‘Genetically Modified Herbicide-Tolerant Crops, Weeds, and Herbicides: Overview and Impact’, Environmental Management, January 2016; 57(1), pp. 31-48, https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/26296738 and Benbrook, C.M., ‘Impacts of genetically engineered crops on pesticide use in the U.S. — the first sixteen years’, Environmental Sciences Europe; 28 September 2012, Vol. 24(1), https://enveurope.springeropen.com/articles/10.1186/2190-4715-24-24

(9) Regulation (EC) No 1107/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 October 2009 concerning the placing of plant protection products on the market and repealing Council Directives 79/117/EEC and 91/414/EEC (OJ L 309, 24.11.2009, p. 1).

(10) https://ec.europa.eu/food/plant/pesticides/eu-pesticides-database/active-substances/?event=search.as

(11) See, for example, https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1383574218300887, https://academic.oup.com/ije/advance-article/doi/10.1093/ije/dyz017/5382278, https://journals.plos.org/plosone/article?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0219610, and https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC6612199/

(12) Lurquin, P.F., ‘Production of a toxic metabolite in 2,4-D-resistant GM crop plants’, 3 Biotech 6, 82 (2016), https://doi.org/10.1007/s13205-016-0387-9

(13) This is indeed the case for glyphosate, as stated in EFSA ‘Review of the existing maximum residue levels for glyphosate according to Article 12 of Regulation (EC) No 396/2005’, EFSA Journal 2018; 16(5):5263, p. 12, https://www.efsa.europa.eu/fr/efsajournal/pub/5263

(14) Member State comments, accessible via the EFSA OpenEFSA portal: https://open.efsa.europa.eu/

(15) idem, p. 75.

(16) https://www.un.org/sustainabledevelopment/health/

(17) https://indicators.report/targets/3-9/

(18) https://www.mcgill.ca/newsroom/channels/news/widely-used-weed-killer-harming-biodiversity-320906

(19) Convention on Biological Diversity, Article 3: https://www.cbd.int/convention/articles/?a=cbd-03

(20) The Commission ‘may’, and not ‘shall’, go ahead with authorisation if there is no qualified majority of Member States in favour at the Appeal Committee, according to Regulation (EU) No 182/2011 (Article 6(3)).

(21) Regulation (EC) No 178/2002 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 28 January 2002 laying down the general principles and requirements of food law, establishing the European Food Safety Authority and laying down procedures in matters of food safety (OJ L 31, 1.2.2002, p. 1).

(22) https://tillymetz.lu/wp-content/uploads/2020/09/Co-signed-letter-MEP-Metz.pdf

(23) European Parliament resolution of 15 January 2020 on the European Green Deal (OJ C 270, 7.7.2021, p. 2), paragraph 102.

(24) OJ C 445, 29.10.2021, p. 257.

27.1.2023

Official Journal of the European Union

C 32/20

P9_TA(2022)0262

Illegal logging in the EU

European Parliament resolution of 23 June 2022 on illegal logging in the EU (2022/2523(RSP))

(2023/C 32/04)

The European Parliament,

—	having regard to Article 227 of the Treaty on European Union,

—	having regard to Articles 4, 191, 230 and 258 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

—	having regard to Regulation (EU) No 995/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 October 2010 laying down the obligations of operators who place timber and timber products on the market (1) (EU Timber Regulation),

—	having regard to Council Directive 92/43/EEC of 21 May 1992 on the conservation of natural habitats and of wild fauna and flora (2) (Habitats Directive),

—	having regard to Directive 2001/42/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 June 2001 on the assessment of the effects of certain plans and programmes on the environment (3) (Strategic Environmental Assessment Directive),

—

having regard to Regulation (EC) No 1367/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 September 2006 on the application of the provisions of the Aarhus Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters to Community institutions and bodies (4) (Aarhus Regulation),

—	having regard to infringement case INFR(2020)2033 included in the Commission’s infringement package of 12 February 2020,

—	having regard to the Commission communication of 20 May 2020 entitled ‘EU Biodiversity Strategy for 2030 — Bringing nature back into our lives’ (COM(2020)0380),

—	having regard to the Commission communication of 16 July 2021 entitled ‘New EU Forest Strategy for 2030’ (COM(2021)0572),

—

having regard to the Commission proposal of 17 November 2021 for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the making available on the Union market as well as export from the Union of certain commodities and products associated with deforestation and forest degradation and repealing Regulation (EU) No 995/2010 (COM(2021)0706), aiming to curb EU-driven deforestation and forest degradation,

—	having regard to the Commission proposal of 15 December 2021 for a directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the protection of the environment through criminal law and replacing Directive 2008/99/EC (COM(2021)0851), and the accompanying communication (COM(2021)0814),

—

having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/1767 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 October 2021 amending Regulation (EC) No 1367/2006 on the application of the provisions of the Aarhus Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters to Community institutions and bodies (5),

—	having regard to the question to the Commission on illegal logging in the EU (O-000020/2022 — B9-0016/2022),

—	having regard to Rules 136(5) and 132(2) of its Rules of Procedure,

—	having regard to the motion for a resolution of the Committee on Petitions,

whereas the Committee on Petitions has received Petitions Nos 0289/2015, 0625/2018, 1248/2019, 0408/2020, 0722/2020 and 1056/2021 raising concerns over increasing illegal logging and specific cases of practices in breach of EU environmental legislation in some Member States, including in Europe’s last remaining primary and old-growth forests, and calling for preventive measures to reduce the risk and magnitude of the environmental damage and threat to human life and well-being;

whereas illegal logging is an activity of serious concern that leads to environmental damage, loss of biodiversity and ecosystem degradation, desertification and soil erosion leading to natural disasters, such as landslides, and has led to the destruction or damage of several Natura 2000 sites and primary and old-growth forests; whereas illegal logging can result in the extinction of protected species and specific habitats for different plant and animal species because those engaged in illegal activities tend to disregard laws that protect valuable forest resources;

C.	whereas Europol estimates that environmental crime is as profitable as drug trafficking, but with a much lower risk of detection and punishment (6);

whereas illegal logging is a major factor in forest degradation, deforestation and climate change, contributing to the deterioration of air quality; whereas illegal logging represents between 15 % and 30 % of international timber production, and has further environmental, social and economic consequences; whereas illegal logging remains largely undetected, thereby hindering the efforts of the EU to reach the goals of the European Green Deal, the European Climate Law and the biodiversity strategy; whereas illegal logging happens very frequently in some of the highest-quality and best-preserved forests in the EU;

whereas products of illegal logging are sold in the EU as certified timber (7); whereas the main existing certification schemes are unable to fully meet the requirements of the applicable legislation; whereas the main schemes assessed in the Commission report of July 2021 on certification and verification schemes in the forest sector have gaps in their legality definitions and their legal requirements are limited in scope or ambiguous in nature; whereas while they do provide a systematic approach to transferring claims throughout the supply chain, for the most part, they do not include the systematic ability to verify — in real time or otherwise — transactions of volumes, species and qualities between entities, thus leaving the systems vulnerable to manipulation and fraud; whereas all main certification schemes are challenged when it comes to identifying and effectively handling corruption issues, the systems in place to identify cases of corruption are relatively limited and the risk of fraud is poorly covered (8);

F.	whereas forests are essential carbon sinks which help to combat climate change;

whereas illegal logging has significant negative socio-economic effects, with local and responsible communities being deprived of their economic livelihood owing to the illicit marketing of illegally cut wood, which in turn encourages delinquency and has a detrimental effect on sustainable local development and legitimate businesses; whereas illegal logging it is often associated with tax evasion, which enables illegal loggers to depress the market value of forest products, leading to market distortion and unfair competition; whereas illegal logging generates revenue loss for the government in terms of lost taxes and duties, and contributes to increased forest management and transaction costs; whereas wood is often logged in one Member State but traded in another; whereas the majority of illegal wood is traded and used as legally logged timber;

H.	whereas there is a lack of consistent, harmonised and comparable data for EU logging, as well as a common definition of illegal logging;

whereas in some cases illegal loggers have been violent towards forestry officials, forest rangers, law enforcement, environmental activists and investigative journalists, resulting in loss of life in at least six reported cases and numerous episodes of violence and harassment against those responsible for the protection of forests;

J.	whereas there are problems arising from the absence of an internationally recognised definition of the activities covered by the concept of ‘illegal logging’; whereas this lack of precision is a serious legal loophole;

whereas corruption and fraud are the main drivers of illegal logging, leading to insufficient enforcement and impunity; whereas this also exacerbates various criminal activities, such as the financing of conflicts and money laundering; whereas EU action is needed to stop illegal logging and deforestation and curb the trade in illegally harvested timber and timber products;

L.	whereas according to Eurojust, environmental crimes have become the fourth most widespread criminal activity at international level;

whereas the EU Timber Regulation lays down rules for the placing on the market of timber and timber products and should prevent illegal logging; whereas the Commission intends to repeal the EU Timber Regulation by means of its proposal for a regulation on the making available on the Union market as well as export from the Union of certain commodities and products associated with deforestation and forest degradation; whereas the European Union should support Member States where there is a lack of good forest governance in combating crime and organised crime preying on forests, and should promote environmental protection, including the protection and sustainable management of forests under Directive 2008/99/EC of 19 November 2008 on the protection of the environment through criminal law (9) and in line with the objectives of the European Green Deal, the biodiversity strategy, the Zero Pollution Action Plan and the Circular Economy Action Plan;

N.	whereas illegal activities lead to unsustainable practices, reduce the value of forests and result in the depreciation of the various environmental, economic and social services provided by forests, thereby leading to outright deforestation and forest degradation;

O.	whereas illegal logging is linked to breaches of human rights and violence, as well as crimes linked to fraud and corruption such as money laundering and tax evasion;

P.	whereas there are several infringement procedures open against Member States for alleged failure to implement EU legislation in this respect;

whereas under the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development (EAFRD) and other funds managed by Member States, forest owners are currently eligible for compensation for forest-environmental and climate services, support for forest conservation, restoration and protection, and compensation for Natura 2000 forest areas and maintenance and activities improving the resilience and environmental value of forest ecosystems;

whereas the forest management plans of the Member States should correspond to the measures necessary to protect and restore biodiversity in forests, and should be available to the public; notes that not all Natura 2000 site management plans recognise the explicit value of primary and old-growth forests, and that strictly protected forest conservation measures do not completely exclude logging, which can be incompatible with the long-term conservation of primary and old growth forests;

Urges the Member States to fully implement and comply with the obligations set out in existing EU environmental legislation; calls on the Commission to act more swiftly, effectively and transparently, including through regular follow-up of cases, and to pursue infringement procedures to remedy all cases of non-compliance; calls on the Commission to allocate sufficient resources to overcome the current delays; believes that a sufficient level of qualified staff and resources is crucial for the successful implementation and enforcement of EU policies;

Notes that illegal logging is still a problem in the EU; expresses its concern about the negative impact of cases of illegal logging on European forests, wild habitats, the internal market and EU climate action; calls on the Commission and the Member States to undertake a thorough assessment of the socio-economic causes of such phenomena and to fully implement relevant EU and national legislation in order to effectively develop concrete and immediate measures to combat illegal logging so as to prevent it from becoming a trend, taking into account the obligations under the nature directives and the targets under the biodiversity strategy which were endorsed by the Member States; expresses concern that the soaring prices of materials and energy and the zero rating for biomass emissions under the Emissions Trading Scheme could increase the pressure on forests beyond sustainable levels, including as a result of illegal logging as high profit margins stand in contrast to negligible risk, while also taking into account existing social and economic conditions for people living in remote and rural areas of the EU;

Expresses concern that the growing illegal logging in the EU will undermine the goals of the European Green Deal, the EU biodiversity strategy and the forest strategy, since it will represent a failure to protect unique ecological diversity and the last remaining primeval and old-growth forests, restore and conserve natural habitats and species of wild flora and fauna, and undermine the targets for effectively protected and strictly protected areas;

Stresses that deforestation is responsible for 20 % of global CO2 emissions; is concerned about the negative impact that illegal logging has on desertification, soil erosion and phenomena such as flooding; stresses that deforestation is also linked to the extinction of many species that lose their habitats as a result of illegal logging;

Calls on Member State prosecutors and competent authorities to investigate to the fullest extent of the law all cases of illegal logging, as well as the transportation, storage, distribution and sale of illegal timber;

Underlines that achieving sustainable forest management, protection and conservation, based on measurable indicators and thresholds, is a key issue for the future of European forestry; endorses the introduction of a close-to-nature certification scheme to maintain the full range of biological diversity, ensure long-term productivity and resilience, and respond to environmental, economic and societal challenges;

Calls on the Commission and the Member States to put in place the necessary measures to carry out a thorough control to trace the timber used by European companies in order to ensure full compliance with the EU Timber Regulation;

Strongly emphasises that the Commission should ensure that adequate amounts of financial resources within national strategic plans are dedicated to biodiversity restoration in the areas most severely affected by illegal logging; recalls that according to Parliament’s resolution of 9 June 2021 on the EU Biodiversity Strategy for 2030, Member States should reach at least 10 % annual expenditure on biodiversity under the multiannual financial framework; notes with regret that the biodiversity financing target in some Member States is far below the agreed 10 %;

Regrets the fact that in sustainable forest management, neither thresholds or ranges as benchmarks for the desirable condition of forests nor sufficient criteria relating to ecosystem health, biodiversity and climate change have yet been defined; therefore asks for the new indicators and thresholds required for implementable sustainable forest management;

10.

Calls on all Member States to ensure that timber tracking systems are fully operational and that forestry sanctions are proportional and dissuasive so as to discourage illegal logging effectively; expresses strong concern that penalties are currently not proportional to timber product value and that operators sometimes receive only admonition penalties or very low administrative penalties; calls on the Member States to provide means for improving the activities of national authorities responsible for forestry, to increase the number of law enforcement officers where necessary, to effectively proceed with legal action and to start criminal proceedings in cases of illegal logging, based on evidence gathered by the police or referred to the police by third parties; calls for criminal proceedings, including against private persons, to be provided for in the revision of the Directive on the protection of the environment through criminal law;

11.

Calls on all Member States to share best practices among law enforcement authorities in order to boost the fight against all related illegal practices;

12.

Calls on Member States to ensure that public access to environmental information, as well as public participation in decision-making and justice concerning forest management plans, is provided for in line with the Aarhus Regulation;

13.

Stresses the need to correctly assess the environmental impacts of forest management plans and for Member States to revise those which do not comply with national legislation;

14.

Deplores the attacks on forestry officials, forest rangers, law enforcement officers, environmental activists and investigative journalists, including deadly attacks, and recalls that these attacks are often committed either by individuals or well organised and well equipped gangs engaging in illegal logging, increasing violence and frequent intimidation;

15.

Calls on national and EU authorities to take dissuasive and firm action to ensure full compliance with national and EU environmental law; notes that procedural weaknesses and missing checks reduce the Timber Regulation’s effectiveness in practice; urges the EU co-legislators to seize the opportunity presented by the negotiations on the proposal for a regulation on deforestation-free products (COM(2021)0706) to learn lessons from the implementation and enforcement of the EU Timber Regulation and to improve the status of Member States’ competent authorities, the provisions on the quantity and quality of their controls, their relations and interactions with the competent authorities of other Member States and with other national authorities and the Commission; calls on the Member States to strictly implement the provisions of the relevant legislation currently in force by banning the use and placing on the EU market of illegal timber; calls for illegal logging to be treated as a criminal offence, to be subject to appropriate criminal sanctions and to be brought within the scope of the revised directive on the protection of the environment through criminal law, and calls for strengthened European cooperation to combat illegal logging; calls for a uniform definition of illegal logging as an environmental crime in all Member States so as to guarantee that harmonised procedures and penalties are applied for the same illegal logging contraventions across the whole of the EU;

16.

Emphasises the importance of preventive measures to reduce environmental and economic damages and the threat to human life caused by illegal logging; acknowledges that some recent progress has been achieved at Member State level, with reported improvements in timber tracking, and the revision and strengthening of penalties envisaged in national legislation aimed at combating illegal logging; highlights the need for adequate restoration plans for deteriorated environmental areas in the Member States concerned; recalls that a coordinated European approach and prevention measures can help to tackle illegal logging; calls on the Member States to improve the quality and completeness of their forest monitoring systems in order to be able to draw firm conclusions as to the effectiveness of the forest management plans within the Natura 2000 network; notes that to ensure a satisfactory assessment of the effectiveness of Natura 2000-related measures, monitoring should involve collecting more data on areas within and outside the network and on the quality of conservation management;

17.

Calls on the Commission to revise the EU Timber Regulation to extend its application to all timber and timber products sold on the European market in order to ensure a level playing field and avoid unfair competition;

18.

Emphasises the great public interest in combating illegal logging, as also expressed in Petitions Nos 1248/2019, 0408/2020, 0722/2020 and 1056/2021 addressed to the Committee on Petitions, which denounce the increases in illegal logging, often due to lax enforcement of EU legislation in protected areas or halted satellite surveillance systems, as well as the rising numbers of cases of aggression against forest workers, activists and journalists;

19.

Calls on Member States to adopt appropriate law enforcement measures in order to fight illegal logging, and to protect environmental defenders, journalists and whistle-blowers; calls on Member States to take the necessary measures to prevent the dismissal by the judicial authorities of cases related to illegal logging; acknowledges the active role and involvement of civil society, including non-governmental organisations and environmental defenders, in advocating for climate action and biodiversity protection, and calls for the EU to support such activities; stresses the need to guarantee civil society participation in the transparency framework laid out in Article 13 of the Paris Agreement;

20.

Calls on the Commission to lead the fight against illegal logging globally and to promote the implementation of a single, clear and internationally recognised definition of the kind of activities that fall under the concept of ‘illegal logging’ in order to address the current legal loopholes allowing for non-compliance with the standard; welcomes as a first step the proposal for a regulation on deforestation-free products;

21.

Calls on the Commission and the Member States to frequently assess the available data based on both ground-based monitoring and remote-sensing technologies, such as satellite imaging of all forested Natura 2000 sites, to take appropriate measures, including launching infringement procedures, where evidence is found of damage to or destruction of these sites, and to make these assessments and measures public; stresses that satellite imaging is more effective if combined with on-site data and therefore that on-site data should not be neglected; calls on the Member States to remedy the damage to protected forest habitats or the protected habitats of forest species in Natura 2000 sites affected by deforestation and illegal logging;

22.

Stresses that the Commission needs to enforce compliance with EU law; understands that the burden of proof to demonstrate the existence of a breach lies with the Commission, which may not rely on any presumption in infringement cases; stresses, however, that while the Commission has confirmed that the correct application of Union law remains a priority, the length of some infringement cases, even when the Commission has enough evidence, suggests otherwise; declares it to be irresponsible that at a time when environmental legislation is the legislation most breached and the European Green Deal has brought with it new initiatives, the Commission’s Directorate-General for the Environment is consistently and continuously understaffed; deplores the fact that irreplaceable assets are being lost owing to the Commission’s inaction and cuts to the EU staffing budget; proposes that the Commission and the Member States set their priorities straight;

23.

Calls on the Commission to make systematic use of all available technological developments, such as remote sensing, to ensure full compliance with the EU Timber Regulation and thus be able to comprehensively examine the state of Europe’s forests;

24.

Urges the Commission, the Council and the Member States to take the necessary measures to establish and develop police cooperation involving the competent authorities of all Member States to prevent, detect and investigate criminal offences in forestry and the trade in timber resulting from such activities; underlines that the Commission, the Council and the Member States should systematically assess the effectiveness of police cooperation and improve it periodically;

25.

Calls on the Commission and the Council to carefully evaluate the potentially negative consequences that the promotion of forest biomass as an energy driver could have on EU forests, particularly within the framework of the negotiations for the ‘Fit for 55’ package and the revision of the Renewable Energy Directive (10) (RED III);

26.

Asks the Commission to promote the sharing of best practices between Member States in fighting the phenomenon of illegal logging and its consequences, including in green public procurement and transparency for consumers as regards the names of companies trading in illegally logged wood;

27.

Calls on the Commission to be vigilant as to the proper implementation of the EU Timber Regulation, the Habitats Directive, the Strategic Environmental Assessment Directive and the Conservation of Wild Birds Directive (11), as well as the Aarhus Regulation, since the implementation gap in EU environmental legislation can represent an enabling factor leading to environmental crime; notes that breaches of these may lead to environmental and ecological disasters such as soil degradation and erosion, landslides, floods, the extinction of unique wild species, deforestation and the disappearance of the last remaining primary and old-growth forests in the EU;

28.

Calls on the Commission to review the current legislative problems and to improve its controls in order to eliminate any legal loopholes that make it possible to use illegally harvested timber in the EU, as is currently the case with techniques such as mixing legally harvested timber and illegally harvested timber in order to certify the origin of such timber;

29.

Calls on the Commission to use its trade policy to curb illegal logging at international level; stresses that importing illegally harvested timber from non-EU countries distorts the European market and creates an unfair situation for European producers; recalls that the use of this illegal timber also harms those communities in which it is harvested and promotes the continuation of the illegal harvesting of the timber and all the crimes associated with it; welcomes the set of mandatory due diligence rules for companies that want to place certain commodities on the EU market proposed by the Commission in its proposal for a regulation on deforestation-free products;

30.

Stresses the importance of the implementation of the projects aimed at promoting close-to-nature forest management and environmental protection, restoration and conservation, while supporting communities dependant on forestry resources by developing short supply chains and ecotourism; suggests the development of democratic forest governance and projects in close cooperation with local authorities, which are working closely with stakeholders and local communities, who are the most impacted directly and indirectly by environmental changes and the negative socio-economic effects of large-scale timber production and trade;

31.

Invites the EU and the Member States to explore further possibilities of cooperation in the fight against and prevention of illegal logging; recommends that the Commission provide a cooperation platform for Member States to develop and further improve national digital forest monitoring tools, for reporting cases of illegal logging and to enable rapid and effective cross-border intervention against illegal logging;

32.

Calls on the Member States to assume their primary responsibility for protecting the environment, including forests, and to ensure the safety of forestry officials; recalls that corruption within public institutions remains an important factor leading to impunity for illegal logging and offences against environmental activists;

33.

Calls on the Member States to harmonise their rules on the control of illegally harvested timber as far as possible, in order to prevent illegal timber distribution routes from being exploited under the legislation of the Member States in which controls are lax;

34.

Calls on prosecutors, investigators, rangers and financial experts to join forces and pool expertise in order to swiftly and successfully detect, investigate and prosecute organised crime;

35.

Recalls that EU funds may be available for compensation for forest-environmental and climate services, improving the resilience and environmental value of forest ecosystems, forest restoration, conservation and protection, and compensation for Natura 2000 forest areas, including for small forestry owners;

36.

Suggests the introduction of regular surveillance (including security/police patrols and air surveillance) in forests and areas in which timber is transported, or where illegal logging or the transport of and trade in timber from such activities have been reported; stresses the need to raise police awareness of the crime of illegal logging and calls on the Member States to run special training for law enforcement officers to equip them with practical tools and provide them with the skills and knowledge they need to prevent, detect and prosecute illegal logging activity, as well as protect environmental activists, whistle-blowers and staff responsible for forest management; encourages Member States to cooperate to ensure the smart use of resources for preventing the irregular implementation of this measure;

37.

Recalls that illegal logging is often linked to other forms of crime such as illicit trafficking, corruption, fraud and money laundering, predominantly with a cross-border dimension; stresses the need, therefore, to consider the information on illegal logging essential for the investigation of other types of serious crime and to share this information with Europol so as to facilitate cross-border investigations;

38.

Stresses that the establishment of an EU Green Prosecutor, through the extension of the EPPO’s mandate, in accordance with Article 86(4) TFEU, is a way to improve the implementation and enforcement of EU environmental legislation and to combat serious environmental crimes with a cross-border dimension;

39.

Calls on the Commission to allocate funding to the fight against illegal logging;

40.

Highlights the importance of increasing the availability of transparent, high-quality data and takes due note of the aim of the new EU forest strategy of improving harmonised data collection in this regard; believes that building on existing structures, particularly the national forest inventories and the Forest Information System for Europe, is essential in order to improve the operational response of police forces in tackling aspects of forestry criminality; recognises the need for timely, frequent and comparable data across all Member States for both basic and applied forest-related variables; endorses, therefore, the proposal for an EU-wide Forest Observation, Reporting and Data Collection framework; calls on the Member States to collect data on inspection activities, the number of violations established and the types and size of the sanctions imposed;

41.

Calls on the Member States to strengthen public awareness about the fight against illegal logging and the reporting tools available, i.e. through targeted communication campaigns; invites Member States to include the notion of forest preservation in academic curricula for children, as part of natural heritage conservation;

42.

Stresses that environmental litigation requires law professionals to have specific knowledge and competences; suggests, therefore, that Member States strengthen the environmental component of university studies in the field of law;

43.

Highlights that the use of remote sensing technologies such as satellite imaging to complement the collection of field inventory data and inspections can help competent authorities at EU and national level to identify large areas of illegal logging activity with greater accuracy and speed; highlights the need to calibrate this data with data gathered via ground-based monitoring to ensure that the findings are accurate; calls on the Member States to make full use of the tools made available by the EU Satellite Centre to strengthen their capacities in countering illegal logging; notes that while forest logging can be detected through satellite imaging, it remains a challenge to distinguish between legal and illegal logging; stresses that the effectiveness of the satellite-based resources for curbing illegal logging depends on the ability of the authorities to use the information and coordinate it with other (ground-based) monitoring tools and databases; believes that satellite images can complement in-the-field inspections and field inventory data as a valuable asset for detecting illegal logging and can help to indirectly infer the existence of illegal logging through the presence of roads outside the permitted areas;

44.

Recalls the essential role that technological innovation plays in combating illegal logging and environmental crime in general; calls on the Commission to dedicate funding to technological support for Member States, which would enable national law enforcement officers to use the best tools;

45.

Stresses that a fact-finding mission to the areas affected by illegal logging would help in assessing the reality on the ground, the main factors leading to illegal logging and the effects on the local population, as well as identifying the way forward in specific cases;

46.

Calls on the Commission to ensure that the EU does not support initiatives and projects that would lead to illegal logging and deforestation or have other such damaging impacts on the environment;

47.

Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, and the governments and parliaments of the Member States.

(1) OJ L 295, 12.11.2010, p. 23.

(2) OJ L 206, 22.7.1992, p. 7.

(3) OJ L 197, 21.7.2001, p. 30.

(4) OJ L 264, 25.9.2006, p. 13.

(5) OJ L 356, 8.10.2021, p. 1.

(6) https://www.europol.europa.eu/crime-areas-and-statistics/crime-areas/environmental-crime

(7) The Briefing Note for the Competent Authorities (CA) implementing the EU Timber Regulation of June-September 2020 states: ‘Although the timber supplied to IKEA by VGSM was certified by the Forest Stewardship Council (FSC), the report states that over half of the wood harvested in Velyky Bychkiv from April to June 2018 did not comply with FSC standards and was in fact illegally felled’.

(8) European Commission, Report: Study on Certification and Verification Schemes in the Forest Sector and for Wood-based Products, July 2021.

(9) OJ L 328, 6.12.2008, p. 28.

(10) Directive (EU) 2018/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 December 2018 on the promotion of the use of energy from renewable sources (OJ L 328, 21.12.2018, p. 82).

(11) Directive 2009/147/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 November 2009 on the conservation of wild birds (OJ L 20, 26.1.2010, p. 7).

27.1.2023

Official Journal of the European Union

C 32/28

P9_TA(2022)0263

Implementation and delivery of the Sustainable Development Goals

European Parliament resolution of 23 June 2022 on the implementation and delivery of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) (2022/2002(INI))

(2023/C 32/05)

The European Parliament,

—	having regard to the UN resolution entitled ‘Transforming our World — the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development’, adopted at the UN Sustainable Development Summit on 25 September 2015 in New York (the 2030 Agenda),

—	having regard to the Commission staff working document of 18 November 2020 entitled ‘Delivering on the UN’s Sustainable Development Goals — A comprehensive approach’ (SWD(2020)0400),

—	having regard to the UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs’ publication of 2022 entitled ‘SDG Good Practices — A compilation of success stories and lessons in SDG implementation — Second Edition’,

—	having regard to the 2019 UN Global Sustainable Development Report,

—	having regard to the joint communication of the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 17 February 2021 on strengthening the EU’s contribution to rules-based multilateralism (JOIN(2021)0003),

—	having regard to the joint statement by the Council and the representatives of the governments of the Member States meeting within the Council, Parliament and the Commission of 30 June 2017 on the New European Consensus on Development — ‘Our world, our dignity, our future’ (1),

—	having regard to the Commission staff working document of 28 January 2019 entitled ‘2019 EU report on Policy Coherence for Development’ (SWD(2019)0020),

—	having regard to the United Nations Framework Conventions on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and on Biological Diversity,

—	having regard to the Agreement adopted at the 21st Conference of the Parties to the UNFCCC (COP21) in Paris on 12 December 2015 (the Paris Agreement),

—	having regard to the submission on 6 March 2015 by Latvia and the Commission on behalf of the EU and its Member States to the UNFCCC of the intended nationally determined contribution of the EU and its Member States,

—	having regard to the submission on 17 December 2020 by Germany and the Commission on behalf of the EU and its Member States to the UNFCCC of the update of the nationally determined contribution of the EU and its Member States,

—	having regard to the Third International Conference on Financing for Development, held in Addis Ababa from 13 to 16 July 2015,

—	having regard to the joint statement by the Council and the representatives of the governments of the Member States meeting within the Council, Parliament and the Commission of 30 June 2017 on the New European Consensus on Development — ‘Our world, our dignity, our future’ (2),

—	having regard to the Commission work programmes of 2020 (COM(2020)0037), 2021 (COM(2020)0690) and 2022 (COM(2021)0645), and to their references to the SDGs,

—

having regard to the integration of the SDGs in the Better Regulation framework, including the Commission communication of 29 April 2021 entitled ‘Better regulation: Joining forces to make better laws’ (COM(2021)0219), the Commission staff working document of 3 November 2021 entitled ‘Better Regulation Guidelines’ (SWD(2021)0305), and the toolbox of November 2021 thereof, including the new tool #19 on the SDGs,

—	having regard to the United Nations Development Programme 2022 Special Report entitled ‘New threats to human security in the Anthropocene Demanding greater solidarity’,

—	having regard to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) Special Report on the Ocean and Cryosphere in a Changing Climate of 2019,

—	having regard to the IPCC sixth assessment report of 28 February 2022 entitled ‘Climate Change 2022: Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability’,

—

having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/947 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 June 2021 establishing the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument — Global Europe, amending and repealing Decision No 466/2014/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council and repealing Regulation (EU) 2017/1601 of the European Parliament and of the Council and Council Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 480/2009 (3),

—	having regard to the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015-2030, adopted by UN member states at the Third UN World Conference on Disaster Risk Reduction on 18 March 2015,

—	having regard to its resolution of 24 March 2022 on the need for an urgent EU action plan to ensure food security inside and outside the EU in light of the Russian invasion of Ukraine (4),

—	having regard to the UN Secretary-General’s report entitled ‘Our Common Agenda’, presented to the UN General Assembly, and given a mandate by UN General Assembly Resolution 76/6 of 15 November 2021,

—	having regard to its resolution of 21 January 2021 on the gender perspective in the COVID-19 crisis and post-crisis period (5),

—	having regard to its resolution of 14 March 2019 on the annual strategic report on the implementation and delivery of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) (6),

—	having regard to its resolution of 25 November 2014 on the EU and the global development framework after 2015 (7),

—	having regard to the Council conclusions of 10 December 2019 entitled ‘Building a sustainable Europe by 2030 — Progress thus far and next steps’,

—	having regard to the Council conclusions of 18 October 2018,

—	having regard to the Council conclusions of 20 June 2017 entitled ‘A sustainable European future: The EU response to the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development’,

—	having regard to its resolution of 6 July 2017 on EU action for sustainability (8),

—	having regard to its resolution of 9 June 2021 on the EU Biodiversity Strategy for 2030: Bringing nature back into our lives (9),

—	having regard to the Council conclusions of 9 April 2019 on ‘Towards an ever more sustainable Union by 2030’,

—	having regard to its resolution of 12 May 2016 on the follow-up to and review of the 2030 Agenda (10),

—	having regard to the Commission report of 15 May 2019 entitled ‘on the evaluation of the 7th Environment Action Programme’ (COM(2019)0233),

—	having regard to the Commission proposal for a decision of the European Parliament and of the Council on a General Union Environment Action Programme to 2030 (COM(2020)0652),

—	having regard to the European Environment Agency report of 2019 entitled ‘The European environment — state and outlook 2020: Knowledge for transition to a sustainable Europe’,

—	having regard to Eurostat’s 2021 monitoring report on progress towards the SDGs in an EU context,

—	having regard to its resolution of 11 March 2021 on the European Semester for economic policy coordination: Annual Sustainable Growth Strategy 2021 (11),

—	having regard to the opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee of 19 September 2018 entitled ‘Indicators better suited to evaluate the SDGs — the civil society contribution’ (12),

—	having regard to the 2021 Sustainable Development Report of 14 June 2021, entitled ‘The Decade of Action for the Sustainable Development Goals’,

—	having regard to the Council conclusions of 22 June 2021 entitled ‘A comprehensive approach to accelerate the implementation of the UN 2030 Agenda for sustainable development — Building back better from the COVID-19 crisis’,

—	having regard to special report 26/2020 of the European Court of Auditors entitled ‘Marine environment: EU protection is wide but not deep’,

—

having regard to the Commission reflection paper of 30 January 2019 entitled ‘Towards a Sustainable Europe by 2030’ (COM(2019)0022), in particular Annex III entitled ‘Summary of the contribution of the SDG Multi-Stakeholder Platform to the Reflection Paper “Towards a sustainable Europe by 2030”’ thereof,

—	having regard to Rule 54 of its Rules of Procedure,

—	having regard to the joint deliberations of the Committee on Development and the Committee on the Environment, Public Health and Food Safety under Rule 58 of the Rules of Procedure,

—	having regard to the letter from the Committee on Culture and Education,

—	having regard to the report of the Committee on Development and the Committee on the Environment, Public Health and Food Safety (A9-0174/2022),

whereas at European level and internationally, there will be no climate justice without environmentally, socially and economically sustainable and inclusive development; whereas achieving the SDGs is therefore an essential prerequisite to achieving a just and fair transition under the Paris Agreement and the European Green Deal;

whereas the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic is not yet fully known, but has already led to a significant degree of SDG backsliding, especially in the countries of the Global South that have weak healthcare systems and where vaccination rates remain very low, and has led to further inequalities and poverty; whereas according to the UN’s ‘2021 Financing for Sustainable Development Report’, the COVID-19 pandemic could lead to a ‘lost decade’ for sustainable development; whereas the least developed countries (LDCs) have been hit particularly hard because of their vulnerability to external shocks; whereas a healthy environment is a fundamental pillar for sustainable development; whereas the Human Development Index was estimated to suffer a ‘steep and unprecedented decline’ in 2020 for the first time in the 30 years since the measure has been computed; whereas the rate of extreme poverty rose in 2020 for the first time in 20 years; whereas, on the other hand, the aftermath of the COVID-19 pandemic presents a significant opportunity to reshape our societies to fulfil the aspirations of the SDGs; whereas prior to the COVID-19 pandemic, there was an estimated annual global financing gap of USD 2,5 trillion between funding and what was required to achieve the SDGs; whereas according to one estimate, as of early 2021, the economic uncertainty and the pandemic-related recovery spending shortfall in developing countries increased this gap by 50 % to USD 3,7 trillion; whereas Parliament’s new Special Committee on the COVID-19 pandemic: lessons learned and recommendations for the future could investigate the pandemic’s impact on the SDGs;

whereas according to the UN Global Sustainable Development Report issued in 2019 and the UN Sustainable Development Solutions Network (SDSN) 2020 SDG Index, no country, including any European country, is on track to achieve all of the SDGs by 2030; whereas according to the 2021 European Sustainable Development Report, for the first time since the adoption of the SDGs, the EU’s average SDG Index score did not increase in 2020; whereas Europe is on track to meet only 26 — or 15 % — of the 169 targets, according the UN Economic Commission for Europe; whereas according to the SDSN 2021 SDG Index, OECD countries are closest to achieving the 2030 Agenda targets, yet generate the largest negative spillovers, which undermines the ability of other countries to achieve their targets;

whereas the new geopolitical and humanitarian realities imposed by Russia’s illegal invasion of and the war in Ukraine are having a huge impact on the global achievement of the SDGs, especially as regards the fight against inequalities, poverty and hunger, and may impede the timeline for their realisation by 2030; whereas a renewed political impetus to achieve the SDGs is urgently needed in order to account for the impact of COVID-19 and the global consequences of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine; whereas there is a need, in this context, to finance renewable sources of energy in order to ensure alignment with the objectives of the 2030 Agenda and avoid future global financial pressure in the energy sector;

whereas the EU is obliged to incorporate development cooperation objectives into all internal or external policies that are likely to affect developing countries, as set out in Article 208 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union; whereas achieving alignment across all EU policies is crucial to achieving the SDGs worldwide; whereas policy coherence for sustainable development is an approach to integrate the various dimensions of sustainable development holistically at all stages of policymaking and is a key element of the EU’s effort to implement the 2030 Agenda; whereas the Commission, in its staff working document of 18 November 2021 entitled ‘Delivering on the UN’s Sustainable Development Goals — A comprehensive approach’, committed to taking a ‘whole-of-government’ approach to SDG implementation, coordinated by President von der Leyen; whereas the transition to a wellbeing economy that gives back to the planet more than it takes, embedded in the EU’s eighth environment action programme and enshrined in its 2030 and 2050 priority objectives, will require the EU to develop a more holistic approach to policymaking;

F.	whereas Parliament, the Council and the European Council have, on repeated occasions since the adoption of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development in 2015, called on the Commission to adopt an overarching strategy to fully implement the SDGs;

G.	whereas there is a strong interdependence between health crises, environmental crises and climate crises; whereas such crises will increase in the coming years, in particular as a result of climate change and biodiversity loss;

H.	whereas the ability to retrieve data to fill in the SDG indicators is limited in several developing countries, which can seriously hinder the assessment of progress;

I.	whereas the gap between the richest and poorest people and countries is continuously rising; whereas reducing inequalities (SDG 10) has strategic importance and should be at the core of the common efforts to achieve the 2030 Agenda;

J.	whereas the SDGs cover all of the major issues facing humanity and are not solely linked to development policies, but also concern wider public policies at the European level;

K.	whereas in committing to the realisation of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, the EU recognised that the dignity of the individual is fundamental and that the agenda’s goals and targets should be met for all nations, people and segments of society;

L.	whereas the European Parliament and national parliaments also have a responsibility to ensure that sustainable development is mainstreamed within their procedures, in order to break down silos;

M.	whereas rising inequalities, climate change, biodiversity loss and increasing waste production are items addressed by the SDGs; whereas all of those are detrimental to human life conditions;

whereas the EU high-level multi-stakeholder platform on the implementation of the SDGs, which ran from 2017 to 2019, was set up to support and advise the Commission and provided a forum for exchanging experiences and best practices across sectors and at local, regional, national and EU level by bringing together stakeholders from civil society, non-governmental organisations and the private and corporate sectors;

whereas considering all the above, a European governance strategy integrating the SDGs in a transversal approach would allow greater alignment between and efficiency in public policies; whereas for example SDG 14 (life below water), which calls for the conservation and sustainable use of the oceans, seas and marine resources for sustainable development, should be implemented as part of an integrated maritime policy;

P.	whereas global SDG progress is poorly understood due to insufficient monitoring capacities, in particular, in developing countries;

whereas the COVID-19 pandemic has greatly exacerbated the existing debt problems in developing countries, which has further endangered their efforts to mobilise sufficient resources to achieve the SDGs; whereas accordingly, additional efforts in terms of debt relief are urgently needed to avoid widespread defaults in developing countries and to facilitate investments in recovery and the SDGs;

R.	whereas according to the IPCC’s sixth report of 2022, climate change has reduced food and water security, which has hindered efforts to meet the SDGs;

S.	whereas the SDGs have a subnational and local dimension;

T.	whereas oceans are huge reservoirs of biodiversity and the primary regulator of the global climate; whereas their conservation is critical to sustainable development, contributes to poverty eradication and provides sustainable livelihoods and food security for billions of people;

U.	whereas the SDGs are universal and indivisible; whereas they are in common for and applicable to all actors, including the public and private sectors, civil society and social partners;

V.	whereas the 17 SDGs with their respective 169 targets and accompanying indicators represent the only globally shared and politically agreed upon framework for evidence-based policies;

Introduction

Reaffirms its commitment to the 2030 Agenda, its 17 SDGs and the pledge to leave no one and no place behind; stresses that, in the light of current and future pandemics and the aftermath of the war in Ukraine, the 2030 Agenda provides a unique pathway to a wellbeing economy to build back better a more equitable, just, inclusive, sustainable and resilient world; acknowledges that the SDGs are a common concern of humankind; encourages the Commission to take action to address climate change and to respect and promote human rights, the right to health, local communities, refugees and migrants, children, minority groups, people in vulnerable situations, the right to development, gender equality, the empowerment of women and intergenerational equity;

Recalls that there are fewer than eight years left to meet the 2030 Agenda targets for sustainable development and that the 2020s have been declared to be the UN Decade of Action on Sustainable Development;

Underlines that delivering on the 2030 Agenda will contribute to achieving a fair and inclusive green and digital transition, in line with the EU’s ambitions and actions outlined in the European Green Deal and the 2030 Digital Compass;

Governance

Welcomes the commitment by the President of the Commission to pursue a ‘whole-of-government’ approach towards the EU’s SDG implementation and to mainstream the SDGs across each Commissioner’s portfolio; calls therefore on the Commission and its President to further demonstrate how the ‘whole-of-government’ approach to the SDGs is being implemented at EU level; asserts, however, that such an approach can only be effective with leadership at the highest level and with a concrete plan to ensure comprehensive action across the Commission; regrets that, since 2019, there has been no single Commissioner responsible for the internal and external implementation and coordination of the SDGs, which has resulted in a fragmented approach, contrary to the principle of policy coherence for sustainable development; proposes, additionally, that the Commission nominate a Special Envoy for the SDGs, answerable to the Commissioner responsible, to promote consistent action on the SDGs globally through the EU’s external actions;

Reiterates that to achieve the SDGs, the 2030 Agenda requires a strong level of societal legitimacy and a genuine political reset, which can only be achieved if the SDGs are seen as an opportunity for citizens; emphasises the importance of the media in this regard; recalls that the importance of structured stakeholder engagement and multi-stakeholder partnerships are at the heart of the SDGs; deeply regrets that the mandate of the multi-stakeholder platform was not renewed in 2019 and calls for its urgent reinstatement or the set-up of a new mechanism for structured engagement, with balanced, diversified and democratic representation covering civil society organisations, community-based organisations, the private sector (including small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) and producer-led organisations), trade unions, cooperatives, academia and research institutions, regional and local governments and marginalised groups; underlines the key role of each of these stakeholders, as they closely monitor SDG implementation by governments and contribute directly to sustainable development; calls for stronger engagement and consultation with these groups; stresses that the multi-stakeholder platform should systematically liaise with the Working Party on the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development to ensure genuine Member State participation;

Recognises that a lack of accountability, transparency and good governance have a strong negative impact on the implementation of the 2030 Agenda in both developed and developing countries and stresses the need to promote anti-corruption and integrity to accelerate the implementation of the SDGs and to consistently monitor progress;

Stresses the fact that efforts to mainstream the SDGs across EU internal and external policies should go beyond a mapping exercise; recalls that many EU internal policies not only contribute to the implementation of the SDGs, but also have a very high ecological, social and economic spillover impact on developing countries and vulnerable groups and populations; insists, therefore, that in order to further progress at the global level, the EU’s internal and external action must be further coordinated; highlights the importance of an integrated approach, which would require systemic solutions; acknowledges the progress made in capacity building, but stresses the need to enhance the alignment and coordination of capacity-building activities across the EU;

Strongly encourages greater policy coherence for development in the landmark ‘Fit for 55’ legislative package (13), the common agricultural policy, the common fisheries policy, the common commercial policy and the Commission’s work in general; regrets that the lack of an SDG implementation strategy makes it more challenging to achieve policy coherence, due to the lack of clear, measurable and time-bound EU-wide targets to report on for all SDGs; calls for sustainable development to be prioritised and mainstreamed throughout the policy cycle (design, implementation and evaluation), and for all its dimensions to be systematically considered in impact assessments and disclosure and external reporting requirements; proposes an internal audit by the Commission to ensure alignment between the EU’s internal and external policies; stresses that the SDGs should form the backbone of European public policies;

Calls for the Commission to adopt a new high-level EU 2030 Agenda implementation strategy, as requested by the European Council in October 2018, building on EU resolutions and policy directives aimed at achieving the SDGs, given that there are fewer than eight years left to achieve the 2030 Agenda and, hence, urgent implementation is required, in line with the Decade of Action to deliver the Global Goals; believes that such a strategy should define, at a minimum:

(a)	a new governance framework, led by a single high-level Commissioner who is accountable for the implementation of the SDGs across all portfolios and who will systematically consult the new multi-stakeholder platform;

(b)	a revised set of concrete measurable, EU-wide, time-bound targets to bolster the EU’s ambition and concrete measures for achieving them;

(c)	an updated monitoring system and indicators, taking into account the EU’s internal and external impact on global SDG progress;

(d)	a single financial plan to achieve the EU’s SDG objectives, linked to the above targets;

(e)	a plan for the EU’s SDG diplomacy and international cooperation, led by a Special Envoy for the SDGs, to ensure fair burden sharing and a level playing field;

invites the Presidents of Parliament, the Commission and the Council to accompany this strategy with an interinstitutional statement renewing the EU’s commitment to the 2030 Agenda; stresses that this strategy should be published by June 2023 at the latest, in order for the EU to play a leading role in reinvigorating the 2030 Agenda at the SDG Summit in September 2023; stresses that the strategy should be regularly reviewed and accompanied by corrective measures in areas where progress is deemed to be stalled or insufficient;

10.

Underlines that coordination within and between the EU institutions is a prerequisite to increasing the effectiveness of the EU’s actions; calls for the creation of an interinstitutional task force to facilitate structured dialogue on the SDGs, consisting of representatives from Parliament, the Commission and the Council; considers that the task force, which should convene quarterly, should assume the responsibility of coordinating the EU’s efforts to deliver the SDGs internally and globally; trusts that the Commission will regularly update the co-legislators on the policy developments and measures undertaken for the implementation of the SDGs;

11.

Welcomes the integration of the SDGs into the 2021 revision of the Better Regulation toolbox, including the communication, the guidelines and the toolbox itself, in particular the dedicated tool on the implementation of the SDGs and the indication of relevant SDG indicators for the various types of impacts;

12.

Is of the view that the adoption of the new comprehensive implementation strategy should be based on a bottom-up approach, preceded by a mapping of the SDGs and a broad, structured, inclusive and meaningful public participatory consultation process, accompanied by a plan for significant outreach and engagement with citizens, including civil society, relevant industry representatives and, more broadly, the private sector, trade unions, academia, regional and local governments, minorities and vulnerable groups;

13.

Calls on the Commission to anticipate the next UN Agenda after 2030 with a roadmap of targets and measures to plan the next sustainable developments goals;

Monitoring

14.

Calls for Parliament to appoint a standing rapporteur on the implementation of the SDGs to work with the Bureau and across committees, as well as with the multi-stakeholder platform; further proposes that each committee should appoint a Member responsible for the fulfilment of the SDGs and that these responsible Members should meet between them and with the standing rapporteur on a quarterly basis to ensure alignment;

15.

Highlights that the European Parliament and national parliaments also have a role to play in ensuring that sustainable development is mainstreamed in procedures and that silos are broken down; emphasises the importance of Parliament’s participation and contribution to the annual High-level Political Forum on Sustainable Development (HLPF), and of the role that an annual SDG implementation report could play in this regard;

16.

Asserts that better understanding the EU’s true impact on SDG progress in the EU and globally can only be achieved through addressing existing data gaps, including the lack of disaggregated data and weaknesses in information systems, by strengthening the use of existing statistical data from a variety of sources and embracing frontier data and artificial intelligence, in line with data protection regulations and rules; believes it is crucial to monitor progress on all 169 sub-goal targets; calls for the EU to significantly step up technical cooperation with developing countries to address the global data gap created by insufficient monitoring capacities and inconsistent methodologies;

17.

Welcomes the annual Eurostat monitoring reports on the SDGs; calls for an annual review of the Eurostat SDG indicator set with the systematic participation of regional and local governments and civil society organisations, in line with the 2021 review; emphasises that sustainable development is inherently transboundary and trans-sectoral; affirms its willingness to address the negative spillover effects that the implementation of the SDGs has on other regions; welcomes the work that Eurostat has initiated to this end and the first attempt to partially quantify such spillover effects, but stresses that this methodology needs to be further developed to sufficiently account for the EU’s global footprint (14); calls for the indicator set for each goal to be extended beyond its maximum limit of six to account for EU external action, the European supply and value chains and the spillover consequences of EU consumption;

18.

Stresses the need to implement the Council conclusions of 24 October 2019 on the economy of wellbeing and calls on the Commission, in this regard, to deliver without delay the ‘Beyond GDP’ dashboard and indicator set, as laid down in the EU’s eighth environment action programme, which puts people and their wellbeing at the centre of policy design; calls on the Commission to consider implementing alternative measures of progress into their monitoring of SDG implementation, such as the Social Progress Index;

19.

Stresses that a minimum level of data and statistical disaggregation, aligned to the global SDG monitoring framework and in relation to each SDG in the EU, should be established, covering, where appropriate, geographic location, gender, sexual orientation, income, educational level, age, race, ethnicity, migratory status, impairment and other characteristics, and should take into account the principles of the human rights-based approach to data; welcomes the Commission’s initiative to establish markers to measure inequality in that regard; invites Eurostat to undertake all the preparatory work required to include this level of disaggregation in the upcoming monitoring reports, in line with the guidelines and priorities set by the Inter-agency and Expert Group on SDG Indicators and adapted to the EU context;

20.

Recalls that voluntary national reviews are the key accountability tool in the 2030 Agenda; recalls the importance of national reviews as a way to identify tensions and trade-offs between SDGs and to generate an iterative process of adjusting policies in the light of progress towards targets; encourages the EU Member States to participate in the voluntary national reviews and to meaningfully take into consideration and implement the recommendations made on this occasion; calls on the Commission to present an EU voluntary review at the 2023 HLPF and every year thereafter, and to push for further standardisation of national voluntary reviews, with a focus on each of the EU’s exclusive and shared competences, but also containing an assessment of the aggregate positive and negative impact of the EU and its Member States on global SDG progress; considers that such a review should be based on a revised SDG indicator set and should cover internal priorities, diplomacy, and international action to restore and protect the global commons and address international spillovers of EU internal policies, as well as the positive and negative aspects of EU action;

21.

Recognises the importance of voluntary local reviews and voluntary subnational reviews for the implementation of each SDG; calls on the Commission to consult and inform Parliament as to the EU voluntary review before the 2023 SDG Summit; stresses the need to develop a regular review of the implementation of the SDGs at regional and local level in the EU; welcomes, in this regard, the work of the UN Human Settlements Programme; encourages further development of the UN initiative ‘Localising the SDGs’ to accelerate and scale up efforts to achieve the SDGs by 2030; praises the work of the Joint Research Centre in relation to the localisation of the 2030 Agenda and the European Handbook for SDG Voluntary Local Reviews, which offers useful official and experimental indicators to set up an effective SDG local monitoring system specifically targeted at European cities; welcomes the pilot project ‘Monitoring the SDGs in the EU regions — Filling the data gaps’, initiated by the European Parliament, that will define and test a harmonised set of indicators for EU regions to monitor the achievement of the SDGs and pave the way for a systematic review process in the EU regions;

22.

Calls on the Commission to take stock of the progress made and of the findings of the Eurostat annual SDGs monitoring report every year during the State of the Union address; expects the annual Commission work programme to include the SDGs as an annual priority, including concrete proposals for legislative or non-legislative initiatives intended to contribute to their achievement and for the SDGs to be fully mainstreamed throughout the Commission’s annual work programme;

23.

Recognises the importance of private sector reporting for SDG implementation; highlights that corporate sustainability reporting and due diligence, when subject to relevant audits, can be an important framework to encourage greater accountability in the private sector regarding the social and environmental impact of companies and their contribution to the achievement of the SDGs; encourages all actors across society, including private entities, to engage in regular voluntary reporting on SDG implementation;

24.

Calls on the Commission to establish an online best practices sharing forum for local-level initiatives to achieve the SDGs, with the forum organised by SDG; proposes that the existence of this forum be promoted as part of EU external and internal action on SDG achievement;

Budget and financing

25.

Underlines that the EU budget, coupled with the NextGenerationEU recovery package, is a pivotal tool for implementing the SDGs, due to their combined size of EUR 1,8 trillion, long-term reach and multinational dimension (15);

26.

Notes with concern that public indebtedness in the Global South was already at unprecedented levels before COVID-19, which resulted in an increasing portion of public budgets being used to service external debts, thereby affecting the ability of governments to adequately fund and deliver basic public services; is alarmed that the current crisis has exacerbated these pre-existing debt vulnerabilities; calls for the creation of a multilateral debt handling mechanism, under UN auspices, to address the debt crisis in developing countries and the financing requirements of the 2030 Agenda;

27.

Underlines the importance of measuring the EU’s contribution to the SDGs in a precise and comprehensive manner, given that this is an essential condition for achieving policy coherence for sustainable development; welcomes the Commission’s official development assistance (ODA) expenditure targets in relation to specific SDG goals and its efforts to track EU budget expenditure on the climate, biodiversity, clean air, migration and gender equality (16); welcomes that, in a range of policies, systems are being put in place for SDG reporting, including in development cooperation; regrets, however, that, despite the Commission’s November 2020 commitment, insufficient progress has been made to track SDGs-related resources and expenditure in its entirety — apart from the external action area, as outlined in a 2019 European Court of Auditors review — and to track inconsistencies among expenditures, both of which hinder the EU’s and third countries” ability to achieve the SDGs, notably in the area of agriculture; insists, therefore, on the need for comprehensive SDG expenditure tracking using dedicated methodologies, for example, with reference to inequalities (SDG 10) and their strategic importance for the implementation of all SDGs; reiterates that this will involve going beyond the existing mapping exercise that takes place in the annual management and performance report for the EU budget; notes with concern that over the past few years, the level of ODA concessionality has gradually decreased for developing countries, in general, and for LDCs, in particular, and calls for the EU to reach its target of at least 20 % of ODA allocated to human development as an essential tool to achieve the SDGs; stresses the need for donors to prioritise grant-based financing, especially to LDCs, in view of their unsustainable debt burdens; calls on the Commission to boost the current financing tools in order to achieve net zero emissions in European operations and supply chains by 2030;

28.

Stresses the need to finance trainings for capacity building for SMEs in order to learn how to implement the SDGs in their daily activities;

29.

Welcomes efforts made to integrate the SDGs into the European Semester in a comprehensive way, including through the Annual Sustainable Growth Surveys and the integration of the annual Eurostat monitoring on SDGs as part of the spring package of the European Semester; reiterates its support for the integration of biodiversity indicators into the European Semester; urges the Member States to raise the ambition level of their national responses to the implementation of the 2030 Agenda; welcomes the centrality of the SDGs in the autumn package, particularly the recommendation that Member States pursue a “beyond GDP” strategy to fully embed the SDGs in their national responses; calls on the Commission to continue the reform of the European Semester to balance economic, social and environmental priorities, so that it drives a long-term social, environmental and economic transformation and improves the integration of the 2030 Agenda, the European Pillar of Social Rights and the European Green Deal at all levels, fully involving local and regional authorities and complementing reforms and investments in the Member States; considers that such a reform should ensure that European SDG policy coordination does not lead to a policy process parallel to the European Semester, but instead consists of an integrated and coherent approach based on a new sustainable development pact; expects the Semester process to enhance the capacities of the Member States in monitoring progress on SDG implementation;

30.

Supports the European Green Deal; calls for more understanding of the synergistic role of the SDGs in tackling climate change and highlights, in that context, the utility of the SDGs, in particular SDG 13, and the opportunity to work on trade-offs and policy coherence within the SDG framework;

31.

Requests comprehensive mapping of the financial envelopes of EU policies, programmes and funds, which have been reinforced by the additional NextGenerationEU funds, to create a greener, more digital and more resilient Europe, including mapping whether investments and structural reforms pursued under the Recovery and Resilience Facility align with and further progress the objectives of the 2030 Agenda; calls for the climate-tracking methodology and the “do no significant harm” principle in the national recovery and resilience plans, as well as the social and demographic priorities set by the SDGs and the European Pillar of Social Rights, to be fully implemented;

32.

Underlines that public and private financing must be aligned with the SDGs; urges the Commission to embed the 2030 Agenda in economic and financial policies and legislation; calls for the EU and its Member States, in a context where ODA remains a scarce resource, to focus blending operations in those areas where they can add value to the local economy; urges the Commission and the Member States to more broadly prioritise partnerships with LDC domestic enterprises that pursue sustainable and inclusive business models;

33.

Highlights the importance of the public and private sector working together to promote and finance sustainable development; stresses the necessity of financial institutions defining and adopting strategies and targets to align financial portfolios with the SDGs and regularly report on progress; calls for in-depth discussions and engagement with the private sector to encourage private financing and to enhance the creation of annual SDG(s) work guidelines for micro enterprises and SMEs, academia and civil society organisations; calls for the EU and its Member States, notably due to debt sustainability concerns, to adopt a prudent approach to blended finance and to ensure that all finance mobilised through blending meets development effectiveness, sustainability and the OECD Development Assistance Committee’s blended finance principles;

34.

Notes that the EU still has no designated plan to finance the SDGs; exhorts the Commission to urgently come up with such a plan, bearing in mind the post-COVID-19 estimated annual SDG financing gap of USD 3,7 trillion (17); underlines that the absence of such a plan, including clearly defined, quantifiable targets, prohibits comprehensive SDG expenditure tracking under the EU budget;

35.

Calls for the EU to fulfil the SDG pledges to invest in education and training of refugees and migrants to ensure that they are able to reach their potential within the communities and economies of their host nations;

36.

Takes note of the changes to the European financial architecture for development (EFAD), as outlined in the Council conclusions of 14 June 2021; calls on the Commission to put the implementation of the 2030 Agenda at the heart of the new EFAD in order to make it more impactful, efficient, coordinated and inclusive; underlines the potential of a fully functional EFAD for filling the global SDG financing gap; calls for greater cooperation and alignment between the European Investment Bank, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, national development banks and other small and medium-sized financial actors, with a particular focus on investment projects below the value of EUR 5 million, to achieve greater SDG impact; calls on the Commission to develop a common framework and guidance on holistic sustainability proofing of EU funding, following the Team Europe approach to ensure both effectiveness and efficiency in European development policies; calls for capitalising on the Team Europe approach to ensure close coordination between the EU and its Member States to achieve the 2030 Agenda; calls for the EU to take the lead in mobilising adequate financial resources from developed countries to support SDG transformations and the urgent need for climate adaptation in the most vulnerable countries; calls on the Commission to ensure that the new EFAD pursues the goal of restoring the Multilateral System of Official Finance (MSOF), in order to put an end to the unsustainable lending of some non-MSOF countries;

37.

Stresses the urgency of increasing ambition and action in relation to mitigation, adaptation and finance in this critical decade to address gaps between Member States on environmental issues;

38.

Stresses the importance of continuing efforts to achieve the SDGs and reiterates that, even in times of budgetary restrictions, education remains a fundamental right and an essential investment to enable the achievement of all SDGs and underlines the important role of the EU through its humanitarian assistance and stronger partnerships with different parts of the world, including Africa;

39.

Underlines the key role that education, culture, sports and their respective EU programmes play in achieving the SDGs and calls for the reinforcement of their international dimension while acknowledging the power of people-to-people diplomacy;

40.

Stresses the importance of SDG 4.1, which aims for a full, quality 12-year primary and secondary education cycle, provided free of charge for all; recalls that current levels of government spending in low- and lower-middle-income countries fall short of the levels required to achieve the SDGs; recalls that external financing is key to support the education opportunities of the world’s poorest; calls for the EU and its Member States to step up development assistance to deliver the objective of universal access to education through EU budget support, which has proven its efficiency in the field of education;

41.

Encourages world leaders to consider connectivity and access to digital infrastructure, such as access to an affordable and quality network, as a right derived from the fundamental right to education;

42.

Calls on the Commission to coordinate and support Member States with country-specific recommendations and the exchange of best practices to improve the quality and inclusivity of their educational systems and close gender and socio-economic gaps in the acquisition of basic skills and the uptake of science, technology, art, engineering and mathematics in line with the vision of the European Education Area, the green and digital transitions of the EU and SDG 4;

43.

Calls on the Member States to make full use of GreenComp, the European sustainability competence framework, to develop a systematic approach towards the development of a sustainability mindset across ages and educational levels that combines relevance to local, regional and national realities with a consistent approach within the European Education Area; reiterates its call to Member States to complete the European Education Area by 2025, as an essential intermediate step towards reaching the targets set under SDG 4;

44.

Encourages networking between the non-formal and formal educational sectors to create professional learning communities that support teachers as they innovate pedagogical practices, foster multiple literacies, facilitate students’ ownership and nurture their emotional intelligence and resilience in the face of fears and uncertainties; draws attention to the experience of grassroots sports and cultural associations in this regard;

45.

Insists that educational authorities invest to improve the quality of vocational education and training with state-of-the-art infrastructure, digitalisation processes and links to the knowledge triangle, which would align the sector with environmental and social sustainability goals and position it to provide alternative pathways for skills development, which would contribute to the implementation of the SDGs;

46.

Reminds educators of the essential role of early childhood education in instilling attitudes and values in young children that are conducive to the development of sustainability mindsets and engaging their families in considering ways in which they too can contribute towards sustainability, both as individuals and as a community;

47.

Encourages youth entrepreneurship as a mechanism to achieve the goals of sustainable development within the EU and beyond with European tools such as Erasmus for Young Entrepreneurs and the development education and awareness raising programme, given the potential to improve employment rates, secure decent livelihoods for vulnerable groups and develop innovative solutions;

48.

Regrets that three of the four 2020 SDG 14 (life below water) targets have not been met by the EU; regrets furthermore that in 2020, the European Court of Auditors found that, while a framework was in place to protect the marine environment, the EU’s actions had not restored seas to good environmental status, nor fishing to sustainable levels in all seas; calls on the Commission to implement the findings and recommendations of this report in its upcoming action plan to conserve fisheries resources and protect marine ecosystems, as well as in upcoming actions under the biodiversity strategy;

49.

Recalls that the climate and biodiversity crises are intertwined and need to be addressed coherently and in tandem; emphasises that legally binding nature restoration targets are urgently needed to address the drastic decline of biodiversity in the EU and to achieve SDGs 14 and 15 to help mitigate the climate crisis and build resilience; regrets, in this regard, the delay of the proposal for an EU nature restoration law and calls for its swift publication;

50.

Underlines the importance of SDG 17 (partnerships for the goals); notes, in the framework of global partnerships and capacity building, the innovative role of open source initiatives, such as the Inner Development Goals initiative, that aim to educate, inspire and empower people to be a positive force for change in society, thereby accelerating progress towards achieving the SDGs;

Multilateral cooperation

51.

Insists that renewed global political engagement and intensified multilateral cooperation will be necessary in order for the EU and its partners to make meaningful progress in the coming eight years; calls for action-oriented commitments towards achieving the SDGs by the 2023 SDG Summit, which will mark the mid-point of the 2030 Agenda’s implementation period; recalls that, as the world’s most successful integration project, with a track record of successfully championing multilateralism, and as a global standard-setter, the EU is uniquely placed to accelerate progress on SDG 17 (partnerships for the goals); calls, therefore, for the EU to assume a leadership role at the 2022 HLPF and the 2023 SDG Summit in defining this political reset; suggests that the President of the Commission be actively involved in each HLPF;

52.

Is alarmed at the fact that the loss of biodiversity and ecosystem services will undermine progress in approximately 80 % of the assessed targets for the SDGs; recalls that ecological restoration is critical for the implementation of the ‘One Health’ approach; calls for the EU to address the root causes of biodiversity loss and to mainstream obligations on conservation, restoration and the sustainable use of resources into broader development policies;

53.

Underlines that international law has evolved to embrace new concepts, such as ‘the common heritage of humanity’, ‘sustainable development’ and ‘future generations’, but stresses that there is no permanent international mechanism to monitor and address environmental damage and destruction that alters the global commons or ecosystem services;

54.

Stresses the fact that Europe faces its greatest SDG challenges in the areas of sustainable food systems, affordable and clean energy, agriculture, the climate and biodiversity (SDGs 2, 12, 13, 14 and 15); calls on the Commission to develop a robust comparative analysis of SDG 6 (clean water and sanitation) and SDG 14 (life below water), especially in view of the UN Ocean Conference in Lisbon in June 2022 and the HLPF in July 2022, as trends cannot be calculated due to insufficient comparable data over the past five years; calls on the Commission to emphasise the need for sustainable production and consumption, especially with regard to consumers’ understanding of how their consumption behaviour impacts the SDGs; stresses that best practice sharing with partner countries can provide the EU and its Member States with significant knowledge as regards individual initiatives and actions that can be taken to achieve ‘Fit for 55’ goals, and that the EU can also share its experience and best practices with partner countries; believes that, due to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and its impact on, inter alia, the food sector, progress on some of the SDGs, notably 1, 2 and 10 may not only slow, but be reversed, both within the EU and globally; is especially concerned about rising food prices, their impact on LDCs and the resulting increase in poverty, food insecurity, malnutrition and hunger;

55.

Recalls that climate change will increasingly put pressure on food production and access, especially in vulnerable regions, undermining food security and nutrition; highlights the conclusions of the IPCC 2022 report, according to which global warming will progressively weaken soil health and ecosystem services, which will undermine food productivity in many regions on land and in the oceans; urges the EU and its Member States to remain fully committed to their international engagements and obligations on the climate and biodiversity and to the Green Deal, including the biodiversity strategy and the ‘Farm to Fork’ strategy, especially in a context where the pandemic crisis and the war in Ukraine have shown how vulnerable developing countries are to the disruption of the global food market;

56.

Highlights the importance of implementing the 2030 Agenda for achieving positive spillover effects, especially in the Global South, and entering a virtuous circle in international partnerships; underlines the significance of the external dimension, as the EU only accounts for 19 % of global economic performance and 5,6 % of the world’s population, with both shares shrinking; points out that achieving SDG 10 is the strategic lever that will empower our partners to set themselves on the path to sustainable development;

57.

Stresses the fact that at least 85 % of all new external action implemented through the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument — Global Europe will be required to incorporate gender as a significant or principal objective, as defined by the gender equality policy marker of the OECD Development Assistance Committee, and at least 5 % of these actions should have gender equality and women’s and girls’ rights and empowerment as a principal objective; reiterates that the European External Action Service and the Member States should consider sexual and reproductive health and rights as a priority in the EU programming process, including in joint programming; insists on the swift and full implementation of the requirement in the EU's environment action programme to 2030 that gender be mainstreamed throughout climate and environmental policies, including by incorporating a gender perspective at all stages of the policymaking process;

58.

Calls on the Commission, the European External Action Service and Member States, as appropriate, to present the relevant results achieved on the implementation of the five priority SDGs at the upcoming 2022 HLPF, namely, SDGs 4 (quality education), 5 (gender equality), 14 (life below water), 15 (life on land), and 17 (partnerships for the goals); stresses the importance of Parliament’s active involvement in the HLPF and that it should be an integral part of the EU delegation; expects, therefore, that Members of Parliament be allowed to attend EU coordination meetings and be guaranteed access to documents throughout the summit;

o o

59.

Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development and the United Nations.

(1) OJ C 210, 30.6.2017, p. 1.

(2) OJ C 210, 30.6.2017, p. 1.

(3) OJ L 209, 14.6.2021, p. 1.

(4) Texts adopted, P9_TA(2022)0099.

(5) OJ C 456, 10.11.2021, p. 191.

(6) OJ C 23, 21.1.2021, p. 130.

(7) OJ C 289, 9.8.2016, p. 5.

(8) OJ C 334, 19.9.2018, p. 151.

(9) OJ C 67, 8.2.2022, p. 25.

(10) OJ C 76, 28.2.2018, p. 45.

(11) OJ C 474, 24.11.2021, p. 91.

(12) OJ C 440, 6.12.2018, p. 14.

(13) COM(2021)0550.

(14) Eurostat, European Commission, ‘EU SDG Indicator set 2021 — Result of the review in preparation of the 2021 edition of the EU SDG monitoring report’, 2021.

(15) Policy Department for Budgetary Affairs, Directorate-General for Internal Policies, for the Committee on Budgetary Control, ‘The Sustainable Development Goals in the EU budget’, 2021.

(16) Policy Department for Budgetary Affairs, Directorate-General for Internal Policies, for the Committee on Budgetary Control, ‘Budgetary control of the Sustainable Development Goals in the EU budget — What measures are in place to ensure effective implementation?“, 2021.

(17) OECD, “Global Outlook on Financing for Sustainable Development 2021 — A New Way to Invest for People and Planet”, Paris, 2020.

27.1.2023

Official Journal of the European Union

C 32/42

P9_TA(2022)0264

Implementation of the Recovery and Resilience Facility

European Parliament resolution of 23 June 2022 on the implementation of the Recovery and Resilience Facility (2021/2251(INI))

(2023/C 32/06)

The European Parliament,

—	having regard to Article 175 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU),

—	having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/241 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 February 2021 establishing the Recovery and Resilience Facility (1) (RRF Regulation),

—	having regard to Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2020/2092 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2020 on a general regime of conditionality for the protection of the Union budget (2) (Rule of Law Conditionality Regulation),

—	having regard to its resolution of 20 May 2021 on the right of information of the Parliament regarding the ongoing assessment of the national recovery and resilience plans (3),

—	having regard to its resolution of 10 June 2021 on the views of Parliament on the ongoing assessment by the Commission and the Council of the national recovery and resilience plans (4),

—

having regard to its resolutions of 7 April 2022 on the conclusions of the European Council meeting of 24-25 March 2022, including the latest developments of the war against Ukraine and the EU sanctions against Russia and their implementation (5), and of 19 May 2022 on the social and economic consequences for the EU of the Russian war in Ukraine — reinforcing the EU’s capacity to act (6),

—	having regard to its resolution of 9 June 2022 on the rule of law and the potential approval of the Polish national recovery plan (RRF) (7),

—

having regard to Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2021/2106 of 28 September 2021 on supplementing Regulation (EU) 2021/241 of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing the Recovery and Resilience Facility by setting out the common indicators and the detailed elements of the recovery and resilience scoreboard (8),

—	having regard to Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2021/2105 of 28 September 2021 supplementing Regulation (EU) 2021/241 of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing the Recovery and Resilience Facility by defining a methodology for reporting social expenditure (9),

—	having regard to the opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee of 20 October 2021 on the Annual Sustainable Growth Strategy 2021 (10),

—	having regard to the Commission communication of 24 November 2021 entitled ‘Annual Sustainable Growth Survey 2022’ (COM(2021)0740),

—	having regard to the Commission communication of 24 November 2021 entitled ‘2022 Draft Budgetary Plans: Overall Assessment’ (COM(2021)0900),

—	having regard to the Commission staff working document of 24 November 2021 entitled ‘Analysis of the euro area economy’, accompanying the document ‘Recommendation for a Council Recommendation on the economic policy of the euro area’ (SWD(2021)0362),

—	having regard to the opinion of the European Committee of the Regions of 1 December 2021 on the implementation of the Recovery and Resilience Facility (11),

—	having regard to the Commission’s first annual report on the implementation of the Recovery and Resilience Facility (COM(2022)0075), published on 1 March 2022,

—	having regard to the Commission communication of 8 March 2022 entitled ‘RepowerEU: joint European Action for more affordable, secure and sustainable energy’ (COM(2022)0108),

—

having regard to the joint analysis of the European Committee of the Regions and the Council of European Municipalities and Regions (CEMR) on the involvement of municipalities, cities and regions in the preparation of the national Recovery and Resilience Plans, and the results of their targeted consultation of 27 April 2022 entitled ‘Implementation of the Recovery and Resilience Facility: the perspective of local and regional authorities’,

—	having regard to its resolutions of 10 March 2022 on the rule of law and the consequences of the ECJ ruling (12), and of 5 May 2022 on ongoing hearings under Article 7(1) of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) regarding Poland and Hungary (13),

—	having regard to the recovery and resilience scoreboard and its thematic analyses as well as the presentations to Parliament (14),

—	having regard to the Commission Notice of 12 February 2021 entitled ‘Technical guidance on the application of “do no significant harm” under the Recovery and Resilience Facility Regulation’ (C(2021)1054),

—	having regard to its research services’ analyses and briefings on the RRF (15),

—	having regard to Rule 54 of its Rules of Procedure, as well as Article 1(1)(e) of, and Annex 3 to, the decision of the Conference of Presidents of 12 December 2002 on the procedure for granting authorisation to draw up own-initiative reports,

—	having regard to the opinions of the Committee on Employment and Social Affairs, the Committee on Budgetary Control and the Committee on Culture and Education,

—	having regard to the letters from the Committee on the Environment, Public Health and Food Safety, the Committee on International Trade and the Committee on Constitutional Affairs,

—	having regard to the report of the Committee on Budgets and the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs (A9-0171/2022),

A.	whereas the Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF) is the main building block of the NextGenerationEU (NGEU) stimulus package;

B.	whereas EUR 672,5 billion in grants and loans are being made available to finance national measures designed to alleviate the economic and social consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic (hereinafter ‘the pandemic’); whereas Parliament initially advocated for a higher share of grants in the RRF;

C.	whereas RRF funding supports key policy areas such as the green transition, digital transformation, economic, social and territorial cohesion, institutional resilience and crisis preparedness, as well as children and the youth, including education and skills;

whereas Russia’s invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022 has led the EU to impose unprecedented economic sanctions; whereas the conflict generated by Russia has led a high number of Ukrainian citizens to leave Ukraine and to travel to and settle in the EU; whereas the military invasion will generate economic and social consequences across the European continent, in particular in eastern European countries, including in relation to the urgent need to decrease energy dependency on imported fossil fuels;

E.	whereas the EU is suffering difficulties in accessing certain critical raw materials with possible consequences for the implementation of the RRF;

whereas the pandemic has had a devastating effect on the economic and social situation of people and businesses in Europe; whereas the EU economy saw a significant contraction during the pandemic; whereas EU businesses, and particularly small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), were affected by the pandemic with negative consequences for the growth and competitiveness of the EU as well as for their productivity and capacity to create jobs; whereas the EU single market is the main driver for growth in the EU and should be strengthened and protected from the negative effects of the pandemic, while at the same time investments in research and innovation should be promoted; whereas some countries once again saw an above-average rise in unemployment during the pandemic; whereas women, young people, older people, persons with disabilities and large families are more at risk from this development; whereas the EU health sector was pushed to its limits during the pandemic and its resilience has been seriously tested and affected; whereas the youth unemployment rate remains higher than the overall unemployment rate; whereas the youth have a higher risk of poverty and social exclusion, as well as a considerable risk for their access to quality jobs;

whereas the constant development of digital skills, as well as the development of skills with economic potential such as green or entrepreneurial skills, is key for a competitive, healthy, inclusive and future oriented European labour market and should create access and opportunities for every European to quality jobs; whereas the same applies to vocational education, trade skills and life skills; whereas the EU needs to overcome any skills mismatch in order to make effective use of its human capital; whereas access to proper digital infrastructure and training on digital skills should be available to all in order to avoid widening the gap between people on digital literacy and ensure equal opportunities for all in the education system and in the labour market;

whereas, to be eligible for financing, the National Recovery and Resilience Plans (NRRPs) must include reforms and investments that fall within the scope of the six pillars of the RRF Regulation, and that respect its general and specific objectives, horizontal principles and the 11 assessment criteria set out in the RRF Regulation;

I.	whereas dialogue and transparency between the EU institutions and the Member States is crucial for the optimal implementation of the RRF;

whereas the Commission, which is responsible for monitoring the implementation of the RRF, must regularly inform Parliament of the status of the assessment of the NRRPs, and how the targets and milestones have been implemented by the Member States, including their contribution to the progress of meeting the green and digital targets; whereas the Commission is required to take Parliament’s views into account;

K.	whereas the Member States must set up and maintain robust control systems and conduct the necessary audits to ensure the protection of the financial interests of the Union throughout the entire life-cycle of the RRF;

L.	whereas the Commission’s annual reports on the rule of law serve to identify rule of law challenges and help Member States find solutions with support from the Commission and the other Member States;

M.	whereas the Regulation provides the possibility for a Member State to make a reasoned request to amend its NRRP within the period of implementation, where objective circumstances justify such a course of action;

N.	whereas democratic control and parliamentary scrutiny over the implementation of the RRF is only possible with the full involvement of Parliament and the consideration of all its recommendations at all stages, and whereas Parliament will continue to scrutinise the implementation of the RRF;

O.	whereas the Commission will present a review report on the implementation of the RRF to Parliament and the Council by 31 July 2022;

Mitigating the social and economic impact of the crisis

Highlights that the RRF is an unprecedented instrument of solidarity and a cornerstone of the NGEU instrument, ending in 2026, as the main tool in the EU’s response to the pandemic to prepare the economies of the EU to face new challenges;

Recalls that the EU’s response to the pandemic has been determined, coordinated, comprehensive, timely and solidarity-based, leading to extensive use of existing instruments and deploying additional financing instruments; further recalls that Member States have taken sizeable fiscal measures in response to the pandemic and in support of the recovery (5,2 % of gross domestic product (GDP) in 2021 and 2,8 % of GDP in 2022);

Highlights the stabilising effect of the RRF for Member States at a time of great economic uncertainty, containing the crisis and mitigating its negative economic and social consequences and supporting governments in maintaining investment levels while responding to immense pressure on national budgets;

Furthermore underlines the RRF’s instrumental role in fostering economic, social and territorial cohesion, preventing the fragmentation of the internal market and the deepening of macroeconomic divergences;

Welcomes the fact that even if the economic effects of the RRF cannot be fully disentangled from other developments, it seems fair to conclude that, so far, the RRF has had positive effects on GDP and that its effective implementation will be key for the EU’s economic growth; highlights the RRF’s role in protecting the fiscal space of Member States from the substantial economic shock of the pandemic; recognises that while the main impact on GDP growth is expected to occur over the following years, the RRF has already helped to cushion EU economies and citizens from the most acute impacts of the pandemic and is positively contributing to the EU’s recovery and resilience, including economic and social cohesion, jobs, productivity, competitiveness, research, development and innovation, and a well-functioning internal market with strong SMEs; stresses that significant divergences exist among Member States with regard to economic, social and institutional resilience, which impact the uneven recovery dynamics; points out that the RRF catalyses the green and digital transitions and plays a paramount role in enhancing the sustainable transition and the well-being of people for a resilient, fair, inclusive, competitive and future-proof economy in relation with the implementation of ambitious reforms and investments;

Observes the sizeable impact of the NGEU instrument as estimated by the Commission, the ECB and the IMF, notably with an increase of GDP growth of up to 1,5 percentage point higher than without NGEU investment, when implemented effectively;

Notes, furthermore, that the Commission forecasts that RRF grants will fund 24 % of total recovery support measures in 2022; highlights the positive macroeconomic spillover effects and the potential of well-targeted reforms and investment; points out that the RRF grants will continue to provide substantial fiscal support to Member States and can thus enable them to pursue structural reforms and investments with long-lasting effects on the recovery and resilience of their economies and societies; calls on Member States to make the best use of this opportunity;

Points out that a successful and transparent implementation of the RRF would contribute to making EU economies and societies more sustainable, inclusive, and resilient, more competitive in the long term, more strategically autonomous and better prepared for current and upcoming challenges; stresses that a successful implementation of the NRRPs will foster economic and social convergence and territorial cohesion, and reduce social inequalities;

Believes that in order for the RRF to achieve its general objectives and support the EU in bouncing back from the crisis, and to maximise the long-term impact on the EU economy and society, it is imperative that Member States implement the agreed reforms and investments thoroughly and in a timely manner; recalls that the RRF is a performance-based mechanism, whereby funding is disbursed only upon completion of the related milestones and targets related to measures; recalls that the participation of local, regional and national authorities and those responsible for developing those policies is crucial for the success of the RRF, as stated in Article 28 of the RRF Regulation;

10.

Warns that the RRF will only mitigate the social and economic impact of the crisis if funds are effectively absorbed and spent, so that they reach the real economy and people; calls on Member States to take the appropriate decisions regarding administrative structures and human resources dedicated to ensuring the timely expenditure of RRF funds;

11.

Underlines that the pandemic has highlighted the need to increase the strategic autonomy of the Union in key supply chains and critical infrastructures and services; notes that the RRF investments in the green transition and digital transformation should contribute to increasing EU strategic autonomy and independence, notably to reducing its dependence on imported fossil fuels; notes that according to the Commission, the RRF is expected to give a major boost to the implementation of the EU industrial strategy and thereby further develop EU industries;

12.

Emphasises that the packages of reforms and investments, particularly growth-enhancing ones under the RRF, should also generate EU added value; notes that according to the Commission, the EU-wide GDP effects are around one third larger when explicitly accounting for the spillover effects from individual country measures; emphasises that the packages of reforms and investments under the RRF should also contribute to the implementation of the European Pillar of Social Rights and the priorities of the European Green Deal and the digital agenda, and to the promotion and mainstreaming of gender equality and equal opportunities for all;

13.

Calls upon the Commission to assess whether there has been unnecessary duplication of investments in the NRRPs of neighbouring Member States and to assist Member States in avoiding unnecessary overlap;

14.

Deplores the fact that women (16), children (17), young people, the elderly and vulnerable groups have been the most impacted by the COVID-19 crisis; recalls the need to ensure inclusiveness so that the EU leaves no one behind, and that it tackles gender-specific socio-economic impacts on its path to recovery, and that a number of gender-specific consequences of the crisis are not addressed by the NRRPs; welcomes the improvement of the accessibility and the quality of care facilities, but deplores that they remain too limited;

15.

Reiterates the importance of the six pillars in providing the Member States with a structure to propose and implement reforms and investments that tackle the green and digital transitions, the economy, productivity and competitiveness, social and territorial cohesion, health and institutional resilience, and measures for children and young people; highlights that all Member States are required by the RRF Regulation to include in their national recovery and resilience plans measures that address all pillars; deplores the fact that not all Member States chose to respect the pillar structure of the Regulation which would have allowed for easier monitoring;

Financing aspects of the RRF

16.

Notes that in the 26 NRRPs that have been submitted so far, Member States have requested a total of EUR 331,7 billion in grants out of the EUR 338 billion available; notes furthermore that not all Member States, in their current NRRPs, have requested the full amount of grants available to them as referred to in Article 11 of the RRF Regulation;

17.

Is concerned, however, that only seven Member States have requested loans amounting to a total of EUR 166 billion out of the EUR 385,8 billion available for loans, leaving a considerable amount available should Member States require loans at a later stage; is preoccupied that the limited interest for the loan component may lead to lost opportunities and prevent the RRF from reaching its full potential; underlines that should Member States whose NRRPs have been already approved wish to request loans, it will require amending respective NRRP, where relevant with the additional set of reforms and investments, milestones and targets, without rolling back measures already implemented; encourages Member States to use full potential of the RRF, including loans, to counter the effects of the pandemic and upcoming challenges;

18.

Tasks the Commission with analysing the reasons why the Member States have not requested loans to the full extent of their allocation, which could prevent the RRF from reaching its full potential; recalls that a Member State may request loan support at the time of the submission of a recovery and resilience plan or at a different moment in time until 31 August 2023, according to the RRF Regulation in force;

19.

Recalls that, under Article 21 of the RRF Regulation, objective circumstances allow a Member State to make a reasoned request to the Commission to make a proposal to amend or replace the approved plan; recalls that if the Commission considers that the reasons put forward by the Member State justify an amendment of the NRRP, it shall assess the amended NRRP in accordance with Article 19 and put forward a proposal for a Council implementing decision according to Article 20 of the Regulation; recalls that such a request for amendment entails an assessment and approval procedure identical to the first assessment and approval procedure, invites Member States to take carefully into account a risk of delaying the implementation of the overall NRRPs; notes that, so far, no Member State requested to amend or replace the approved plan; encourages the Member States to make use of Article 21 in the RRF Regulation, notes that the potential increase of costs of NRRPs due to the significant inflation may result in Member States’ requests to update NRRPs;

20.

Notes that the development of Member States’ GDP is currently forecast to differ from the Commission’s autumn 2020 forecast, leading to expected changes in the grant amounts available to Member States for the second 30 % funding window of the RRF; points out that significant changes in the allocated grant portion may require amendments to NRRPs;

21.

Highlights that support from the RRF shall respect the principle of additionality as referred to in Article 9 of the RRF Regulation; looks forward to more granular and disaggregated data allowing for a better understanding of the additionality impacts of the RRF; urges the Member States to provide detailed, transparent and timely information to the Commission in order to ensure effective reporting of the impact of the RRF; reiterates the importance of the Recovery and Resilience Scoreboard in providing basic information for citizens on the overall progress in the implementation of the RRPs; calls on the Commission to increase the level of transparency and data visualisation in the Scoreboard, and for more detailed reporting, focusing on outcome and impact indicators rather than output, as well as ensuring a qualitative analysis of the reforms and investments proposed;

22.

Notes that only twelve operational arrangements were signed between the Commission and Member States by mid-June 2022; calls on the Commission and the Member States to sign operational arrangements as soon as possible and requests that the Commission communicate those arrangements to Parliament; additionally, urges all Member States to publish their operational arrangements, financing and loan agreements in a timely manner, in order to ensure better transparency and reinforce accountability;

23.

Observes that 21 Member States have received pre-financing of up to 13 % of their total allocation, that one Member State has not requested pre-financing and that seven, have so far requested first payments from the RRF, while one Member State has requested the second payment;

24.

Reiterates that delays in the implementation of the Facility and NRRPs should not slow down the recovery process following the pandemic or diminish the level of resilience of the Union;

25.

Recalls that the RRF Regulation provides for the possibility to include in the NRRPs measures started from 1 February 2020 onwards and that some Member States have made use of this possibility;

26.

Welcomes the early dialogue between the Commission and the Member States in the preparation of payment requests and the Commission’s readiness in assessing payment requests; encourages it to continue thoroughly assessing whether milestones and targets are complied with, in a timely manner, consulting relevant experts where needed; urges the Commission to ensure the fast deployment of payments and to closely monitor the implementation of reforms and investments;

27.

Recalls the need to proceed swiftly with the introduction of a basket of new own resources to cover in full the repayment of the NGEU instrument and notably the RRF, by 2058 at the latest, in accordance with the roadmap set out in the interinstitutional agreement concluded in December 2020 by Parliament, the Council and the Commission; takes note of the issuance of ‘European Green Bonds’ to finance the share of climate-relevant expenditure in the RRF; notes that the first offerings of green bonds by the Commission were largely oversubscribed;

The RRF’s role in mitigating the consequences of the Russian invasion of Ukraine

28.

Highlights the need to enhance the contribution of EU funding instruments, notably the RRF, to tackle current challenges including those caused by the unprovoked and unjustified Russian military aggression and invasion of Ukraine;

29.

Is concerned that this aggression against Ukraine and the justified sanctions that the EU has taken as a response against Russia and Belarus will seriously impact the economic and social recovery and resilience strategy of the Union; notes that their impact on Member States is heterogeneous; is concerned about uneven effects on the EU economy, the entailing economic and social consequences and even further increasing social inequality, in particular caused by increased energy and food prices; emphasises that inflation can also potentially lead to a negative change in the expected outcome of the RRF and estimated costs of the Member States’ NRRPs; expects the determination, unity and speediness of the EU response to this new crisis to continue;

30.

Stresses, once again, its call for further sanctions including a full and immediate embargo on various Russian energy imports and the abandonment of the related infrastructure in accordance with its resolution of 7 April 2022, and for a plan to continue ensuring the EU’s security of energy supply, which will inter alia require a recalibration of European energy policy, taking into account the differing degrees of energy dependence on Russian fossil fuel imports across Member States;

31.

Is concerned that the current situation in Ukraine is having a heavy impact on energy prices and emphasises the need to strengthen energy independence and security, to diversify energy sources, including through EU energy sources, and to accelerate the energy transition; stresses the role of the RRF in the rollout of RePowerEU and underlines that the loans available under the RRF could be used to a large extend to supplement the RePowerEU initiative and to advance investments in the energy transition, including the development of clean energy; expects the RRF, therefore, to contribute significantly to EU energy sovereignty through energy efficiency, diversification and investments in the just green transition;

32.

Welcomes, in this regard, the various measures in NRRPs aimed at enhancing the energy transition and energy security and measures enhancing strategic autonomy, reducing Member States’ dependence on imported fossil fuel energy, and accelerating the diversification of energy sources, energy efficiency and the development of clean energies; highlights that cross-border projects, the improvement of the interconnection of European energy networks and the full synchronisation of the power grids throughout the EU should be promoted to enhance synergies and cooperation between EU countries and reflect common concerns and shared priorities;

33.

Takes note of the Commission proposal to amend the RRF Regulation in the context of the REPowerEU initiative and expresses its commitment to adopt its position on the proposal without delay; urges the Member States, in case they do not intend to use the full amount of their maximum allocation of RRF loans, to officially inform the Commission; welcomes, in this context, the proposal to incentivise the optimal use of the loans available under the RRF, including by proposing a reallocation of the loans to other Member States facing additional challenges as a consequence of the Russian invasion of Ukraine and by allowing Member States to request loans higher than 6,8 % of their gross national income (GNI), with a particular view to mitigating the economic, social and energy consequences of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine for the EU, and the side effects of EU restrictive measures against Russia and Belarus;

34.

Acknowledges the need for measures to help refugees from Ukraine, notably with accommodation, social and child care, education, healthcare and housing, helping to alleviate their socio-economic situation; stresses, therefore, that an increased level of investment in this regard must be ensured;

National recovery and resilience plans (NRRPs)

35.

Welcomes the fact that 24 NRRPs have been approved and observes that as of mid-June 2022, one Member State had not yet put forward its NRRP; further notes that one NRRP is pending assessment by the Commission; urges the country with an NRRP pending assessment to engage in constructive discussions with the Commission in order for the plan to become ready for approval without further delay; calls on the Commission to apply diligently the RRF Regulation to ensure compliance with the 11 assessment criteria as set out in the Regulation, when assessing the remaining plans;

36.

Notes the fact that the Commission’s assessments concluded that all approved NRRPs address all six pillars of the RRF and satisfactorily fulfil all assessment criteria as set out in the RRF Regulation and represent a balanced package of reforms and investments; considers that Member States could have better aligned their NRRPs to the six RRF pillars and the requirements of the RRF Regulation;

37.

Reminds the Commission that compliance with the rule of law and with Article 2 TFEU are prerequisites to have access to the fund and that the rule of law conditionality mechanism is fully applicable to the RRF; calls on the Commission and the Council to refrain from approving Hungary’s draft NRRP as long as concerns regarding the observance of the rule of law, the independence of the judiciary and the prevention and detection of and fight against fraud, conflicts of interest and corruption persist; insists that the milestones and targets related to the protection of the financial interests of the Union, the establishment of an adequate control system, the independence of the judiciary and the prevention and detection of and fight against fraud, conflicts of interest and corruption are pre-conditions and must be fulfilled before the submission of a first payment request and recalls that no payment under the RRF can be made before their fulfilment; reminds Member States that the failure to fully comply with the provisions of the RRF Regulation and the subsequent delays in the approval of the NRRPs seriously affect the capacity of local and regional authorities to adequately tackle the impact of the pandemic on their communities, businesses and citizens and can lead to a long-term worsening of the local and regional economic situation; deplores the fact that, because of the Polish and Hungarian Governments’ actions, the RRF funding has not yet reached the people and regions of Poland and Hungary;

38.

Recalls that no measures should be financed under the RRF if they are contrary to the EU values enshrined in Article 2 TEU; urges the Commission to monitor very carefully the risks to EU financial interests in the implementation of the RRF and any breach or potential breach of the principles of the rule of law and to take immediate action if the financial interests of the EU could be harmed; calls on the Commission, therefore, in accordance with Rule of Law Conditionality Regulation, to be particularly strict with the Member States in complying with the protection of the financial interests of the Union, as enshrined in Article 22 of that Regulation;

39.

Recalls, furthermore, that the observance of the rule of law and the sound financial management of EU funds are to be evaluated continuously throughout the lifecycle of the RRF and that the Commission must refrain from disbursing funding and, where applicable, recover funds, in case such conditions are no longer fulfilled;

40.

Notes that the Commission’s assessment states that all approved NRRPs expect to reach the green target of at least 37 % set out in the RRF Regulation and that the overall climate expenditure of all approved NRRPs reaches almost EUR 220 billion; points out, however, that external reviews of the spending identify lower figures with regard to green spending; highlights in this regard that the milestones and targets associated with climate-related measures should have been defined in such a way as to ensure that the implemented measures are as climate-supportive as announced; underlines that the NRRPs should contribute to the green transition, including biodiversity; notes existing concerns as to whether all relevant measures effectively contribute to the achievement of the objectives;

41.

Recalls that the NRRPs need to be consistent with the National Energy and Climate Plans (NECPs) and the updates thereof under Regulation (EU) 2018/1999 (18); calls on the Commission to assess the contribution of the investments earmarked for the green transition under the NRRPs to the achievement of the new 2030 climate and energy targets set out in the respective revised NECPs;

42.

Recalls that the RRF should contribute to the mainstreaming of biodiversity action in Union policies; notes that several NRRPs contribute to biodiversity but insists that Member States could have used the RRF more to improve biodiversity;

43.

Warns against the risk of ‘greenwashing’ in the implementation of NRRPs, particularly as regards some measures tagged as contributing to green spending requirements, including those on energy-efficient building renovation;

44.

Notes that all approved NRRPs expect to achieve the digital target of at least 20 % set out in the RRF Regulation, while some Member States have even allocated more than half of their RRF funds to measures qualifying for the digital target, and that the overall digital expenditure of all approved NRRPs reaches almost 29 % or EUR 130 billion; welcomes the strong focus in NRRPs on supporting SMEs and the digitalisation of public services, including the health sector, and digital skills, digitalisation of business, connectivity, digital research and development and advanced technologies; notes that two thirds of Member States included a security self-assessment for investments in digital capacities and connectivity in their NRRPs;

45.

Reminds the Commission and the Member States that according to the RRF Regulation, investments in digital technologies should respect the principles of interoperability, energy efficiency and personal data protection, allow for the participation of SMEs and start-ups, and promote the use of open-source solutions; stresses that digital procurement calls must be carefully designed, notably to ensure access for SMEs to relevant public investment;

46.

Notes that several NRRPs contain investment proposals for 5G connectivity; recalls that Member States should ensure coherence and complementarity in the deployment of 5G connectivity, mobile broadband and infrastructure in all areas so that no one is left behind;

47.

Underlines the importance that the NRRPs dedicate almost 50 % of total expenditure or EUR 203 billion to measures to benefit the well-functioning of the single market, improving the business environment and promoting private investments; reiterates the importance of the private sector in the successful implementation of the RRF; urges the Member States to facilitate private investments in connection to the RRF-funded projects by lifting all unnecessary obstacles that would prevent SMEs from accessing the relevant RRF funding, and to this end, calls on the Commission to provide detailed analyses of the access of the private sector to RRF funding; asks Member States to implement the NRRPs according to a transparent schedule to allow the private sector to plan their activities and projects according to the relevant measures;

48.

Notes that the Commission estimates social spending in the NRRPs to account for around 20 % of the grants and loans requested; observes that this expenditure focuses on employment incentives for specific disadvantaged groups, reforms of employment protection legislation and labour contract regulation; recalls that the social consequences of the pandemic have been manifold and have unevenly and disproportionally burdened lower income and vulnerable groups while at the same time reinforcing the need for public services; regrets that social investment measures have been rather limited to social infrastructure and that only some NRRPs contain measures for the development of proper care services and temporary support measures;

49.

Supports the Commission’s aim, through the RRF, of building a more resilient and inclusive labour market, while noting that relevant measures should promote high-quality employment;

50.

Points out that all approved NRRPs so far address social and employment challenges, including through measures for improving labour market participation, promoting upskilling and reskilling, and modernising labour market institutions and services, as well as social protection and healthcare systems; regrets that some Member States are lagging behind in strengthening the social dimension of their plans;

51.

Underlines the importance of reforms and investments in health, economic, social and institutional resilience to increase crisis preparedness and crisis response capacity, which account for more than 17 % of total NRRP allocations, representing EUR 76 billion; highlights that according to the Commission, under this RRF pillar, Member States have to implement 789 measures linked to 1 900 milestones and targets; emphasises that COVID-19 has demonstrated the importance of improving the resilience of public institutions to shocks;

52.

Notes that approved NRRPs envisage expenditure on healthcare-related measures of EUR 37 billion, which corresponds to 8 % of total NRRP expenditure; observes that the highest contribution is earmarked for renovating and expanding hospital infrastructure, followed by strengthening primary care and prevention, digital transition in healthcare and long-term care; expects these healthcare-related measures to contribute to increasing the capacity and resilience of healthcare systems and their preparedness for future crises; is concerned that many Member States did not include sufficient measures to make mental health care accessible and affordable for all age groups, and highlights that mental health should represent an integral part of the EU’s socio-economic recovery from the pandemic and an occupational health priority; is concerned that some Member States did not include sufficient measures to tackle long-standing public healthcare challenges;

53.

Observes that public administration modernisation features prominently in many NRRPs, with approximately EUR 1,8 billion expected investment in the enhancement of the public administration; stresses that NRRPs could contribute to increasing the capacity of public administrations to manage European funds effectively at national, regional and local levels; underlines that the benefits of reforms go beyond their associated costs, which should lead to concrete positive impacts for citizens;

54.

Notes that approved NRRPs envisage expenditure dedicated to children and young people, including early childhood education and care, youth unemployment and skills, of EUR 49 billion, which corresponds to approximately 11,5 % of total NRRP expenditure; notes that the amount represents a first step in ensuring that coordinated measures dedicated to the next generation are being implemented in all 27 Member States; is concerned that many NRRPs do not properly reflect the ambitions set by the European Child Guarantee and that they reflect only partially those of the reinforced Youth Guarantee; deplores the fact that two Member States chose not to include in their plans measures specifically dedicated to children and the youth but preferred to present measures that foster skills and digital skills for all citizens;

55.

Observes that almost all approved NRRPs contain investment in digital education, making up approximately 30 % of the total spending on education; welcomes the focus on the modernisation of education infrastructure and equipment in the Member States;

56.

Notes that in total, so far, Member States have put forward 228 measures with a focus on supporting children and the youth; notes that 74 % of the measures focus on general, vocational and higher education and training capacity, as well as accessibility, affordability, quality and inclusiveness, including digitisation and infrastructure; further notes that 14 % of the measures deal with early childhood education and care, early school leaving and child poverty; notes that 12 % of the measures focus on tackling youth unemployment through job creation, hiring, job transition incentives and support for self-employment; emphasises that Parliament has asked the Member States to dedicate at least 2 % of the budget of each NRRP to culture and 10 % to education; notes that 16 Member States have included culture-related measures in their NRRPs; believes that Member States could have used the RRF more to support those sectors;

57.

Calls for the Commission to continue monitoring the implementation of the six pillars and ensuring that granular data is made available in the RRF scoreboard; asks the Commission to facilitate more regional methods of monitoring implementation through the scoreboard and welcomes monitoring initiatives at EU and national level that enhance the monitoring of RRF implementation; notes positively that several Member States provide data at regional level and invites the other Member States to provide data at regional level;

58.

Underlines that the RRF must not be used to substitute recurring national budgetary expenditure, unless duly justified; notes that the Commission has only approved NRRPs to cover the initial costs of setting up and launching reforms; reminds the Member States that the RRF must be implemented in a way that it does not undermine their own responsibility for the management of public finances; calls on the Commission to provide details on the assessment of compliance with this horizontal principle and any related justification;

59.

Points out that the principle of ‘do no significant harm’ was evaluated for each measure by the Commission in accordance with its technical guidance; stresses that the application of the ‘do no significant harm’ criteria as developed in the Commission’s guidance note must prevent environmentally harmful measures; asks the Commission to disclose the submitted ‘do no significant harm’ assessments and stresses that the Commission should carefully examine and monitor the full respect of this principle during the implementation phase; notes that in order to comply with the principle, some Member States had to improve certain measures; notes that compliance with the principle further entailed initial inconsistencies between the requirements of the Commission and those of the European Investment Bank and the European Investment Fund for the countries that provisioned their InvestEU envelopes with RRF funds, which may have led to delays in the implementation process;

60.

Observes that a large majority of NRRPs include a specific section explaining how the plan addresses gender-related concerns and challenges; notes that NRRPs contain measures focusing on the participation of women in the labour market and the reduction of the gender pay gap, but expresses disappointment that they fall short of including a dedicated explanation as to how the plan addresses gender-related concerns and challenges; underlines the importance of high-quality public care services to alleviate the burden of unpaid care work which is currently largely covered by women with negative consequences on GDP; asks the Commission to provide a study to check the extent to which the RRF contributes to creating jobs in sectors where one gender is predominantly represented and the accompanying measures contribute sufficiently to increasing the presence of the least represented gender in those sectors;

61.

Notes that 20 Member States provide for cross-border projects in their NRRPs, mostly focusing on infrastructure, such as rail or electricity connections, hydrogen, quantum technology, 5G connectivity, cloud capabilities and innovation hubs; is disappointed that NRRPs did not include a higher number of cross-border projects in order to enhance spill-over effects and contribute to EU added value; notes that 20 Member States foresee cross-border projects such as Important Projects of Common European Interest in their NRRPs mostly focusing on infrastructure; calls on the Member States to clarify the role for relevant stakeholders in the roll-out and implementation of the multi-country projects, where relevant; believes that further cross-border measures should have been included in the NRRPs in order to enhance its spill-over effect and to boost its EU added value;

62.

Notes, in particular, the importance of cross-border projects related to energy transmission across Member States; believes that in the current context, NRRPs would have benefitted more from further cross-border projects, particularly in the field of energy; stresses that these investments are crucial for achieving energy sovereignty and the green transition; underlines that the current situation shows how crucial is the diversification of the EU’s energy sources and the proper functioning of the internal market for electricity between Member States; calls for the improvement of the interconnection of European energy networks and for the full synchronisation of the power grids throughout the EU; stresses, furthermore, the importance of increasing efforts to improve energy efficiency in order to limit the expected growth of electricity demand;

63.

Observes that none of the Member States proposed to transfer structural funds to its NRRP, that only two Member States plan to provision their InvestEU envelopes with RRF funds and that only four Member States intend to incorporate the costs of technical support in their NRRPs; regrets that the provision to transfer RRF funds to the InvestEU national compartments has not been used to its full potential; recalls that synergies among different EU funds are essential for a proper recovery and the consolidated resilience of the Union and reminds Member States that the use of this provision contributes to enhancing synergies;

64.

Recalls that according to the RRF Regulation, the recovery and resilience plans must also be consistent with the information included by the Member States in their Partnership Agreements and operational programmes under Union funds; reiterates that this provision is not only important to avoid double-funding or overlapping of objectives, but also to ensure a coordinated approach and maximise the benefits of EU funding; requests that the Commission provide an analysis of how this coordination is ensured; notes that the adoption of the NRRPs has led in some instances to delays in the adoption of Partnership Agreements and is concerned about the consequences of these delays; calls on the Commission and the Member States to avoid further delays in the preparation and adoption of Partnership Agreements and calls for these delays to be addressed swiftly;

65.

Highlights that synergies and coherence between the RRF and other Union funding programmes are essential in order to ensure a proper recovery and the consolidated resilience of the Union; calls on the Commission and the Member States to foster synergies between NRRPs and other Union funding programmes, in particular Partnership Agreements; questions how the Commission has encouraged Member States to foster synergies with NRRPs of other Member States;

66.

Reminds Member States that the NRRPs are expected to contribute to effectively address all or a significant subset of challenges identified in the relevant country-specific recommendations, including fiscal aspects thereof and recommendations made pursuant to Article 6 of Regulation (EU) No 1176/2011 (19) where appropriate, addressed to the Member State concerned, or challenges identified in other relevant documents officially adopted by the Commission in the context of the European Semester; notes the Commission assessment that all NRRPs address at least a significant subset of challenges identified in the relevant European Semester recommendations but that not all challenges are addressed;

67.

Recognises the positive impact of necessary tax reforms in the Member States that are included in some national plans, while deploring that none of the Member States concerned with country specific recommendations (CSR) on aggressive tax planning, tax avoidance, tax evasion and money laundering have addressed those challenges in their NRRPs;

68.

Calls on the Commission to adequately evaluate the fulfilment of all milestones and targets, including those related to CSRs in the NRRPs in the disbursement phase of the Facility and to reduce proportionally payments, based on the importance of the milestones and targets, whether agreed milestones and targets are not satisfactory met, including not rolling back on previously achieved milestones and targets; furthermore, calls on the Commission, if necessary, to make use of the provisions of the Regulation, allowing it to recover grants or ask for early repayment of loans in case of breach of the obligations of Member States under the financing agreements;

69.

Notes that, according to the Commission assessment, all Member States received an A rating for almost all criteria provisioned in the RRF Regulation; recalls that, according to the Commission assessment, all Member States received a B-rating for the criteria that evaluates whether the estimated total costs of the NRRPs are reasonable; calls on the Commission to ensure that costs are plausible and that proper cost analysis is being conducted in order to tackle fraud and corruption; urges the Commission to thoroughly assess the satisfactory fulfilment of milestones and targets before accepting payment requests, and to ensure that previously achieved milestones and targets have not been reversed;

Transparency, monitoring and control mechanisms

70.

Stresses the importance of transparency and sound procedural management throughout the procurement processes and practices; calls, in this respect, on the Member States to ensure equality and fairness, and particularly access for all, including micro, small and medium-size enterprises, in the procurement process;

71.

Urges Member States to launch public procurement for the implementation of measures in a timely fashion in order to ensure their completion in line with the calendar of milestones and targets;

72.

Stresses that transparency is key for a strong monitoring system of the NRRPs that would allow meaningful public engagement; reiterates its regret that the Council refused the creation, supported by Parliament and the Commission, of an online platform where final beneficiaries would be publicised; observes that by the nature of the instruments used, the control focuses on the achievement of results and outputs rather than the verification of costs; notes that this approach can simplify implementation and contribute to the achievement of the desired outcome; warns that, without the proper monitoring, it could make the detection of abuse of EU funds more difficult; urges the Commission, nevertheless, to take the appropriate measures to ensure early detection of abuse of EU funds; calls on it to monitor rigorously any possible occurrence of double funding and, if such occurrences are confirmed, to proceed with the recovery of funds without delay;

73.

Calls on the Commission to inform the budgetary authority about the use of the IT systems set up by the Commission for Member States to report the relevant information on the implementation of the NRRPs;

74.

Urges the Member States to collect and record data on final recipients and beneficiaries of Union funding in an electronic standardised and interoperable format and to use the single data mining and risk scoring tool provided by the Commission; urges the Commission to insist on the use of the integrated and interoperable monitoring system including a single data mining and risk scoring tool (ARACHNE) for all RRF spending, and to ensure that ARACHNE is interoperable with all relevant software and datasets to keep the administrative burden as low as possible; furthermore, reiterates the importance of digitalising all reporting, monitoring and audit;

75.

Recalls that Member States should collect and ensure access of data on beneficial owner(s) of the recipient of the funds and beneficiaries of the programme and reiterates the importance of ensuring the transparency of final beneficiaries, without providing an extra burden on the reporting; calls on the Commission and the Member States to publish periodically up-to-date data on final beneficiaries and on transferred funds, for the sake of public trust and transparency; calls on the Commission to establish an integrated, interoperable, and easy to use system which contains information on all EU co-financed projects, beneficiaries and beneficial owners, contractors and sub-contractors and which is able to aggregate all amounts received by the same beneficiary or beneficial owner;

76.

Reminds the Commission that in the evaluation of NRRPs and payment claims it can be assisted by experts and invites it to make full use of this provision, where relevant, particularly if it lacks the in-house capacity to thoroughly scrutinise the plans or the fulfilment of milestones and targets; raises doubts about the Council’s sufficient capacity to analyse NRRPs properly or payment claims and calls to ensure that they are adequately assessed;

77.

Urges the Commission to ensure that the evaluation of the milestones and targets achieved by the Member States as part of their NRRPs will be based on a comprehensive and transparent assessment of the milestones and targets in all their dimensions, in particular their quality;

78.

Recalls that Member States are required to set up robust control and audit systems in order to guarantee the protection of the financial interests of the Union and to prevent and tackle fraud, corruption and conflicts of interest and secure transparency, and that the Commission is responsible for assuring that these systems are in place and fully functioning before the first payments are approved; recalls that payments are to be disbursed upon achievement of milestones and targets;

79.

Notes that the Commission largely relies on Member States to thoroughly audit NRRP implementation; urges the Commission to ensure effective monitoring, audit and enforcement of the full implementation of these requirements and to monitor ongoing compliance with any such measures through the entire lifecycle of the RRF; calls on the Commission to ensure a strong mechanism for regular auditing of Member States’ control systems;

80.

Reiterates the important role of the European Court of Auditors, the European Public Prosecutor’s Office, the European Anti-Fraud Office, the European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Cooperation (Europol) and the European Union Agency for Criminal Justice Cooperation and other relevant EU bodies and agencies in supporting Member States and the Commission in protecting the financial interests of the Union during the implementation of the NGEU, and calls on these institutions and bodies to make full use of their prerogatives under the RRF Regulation and other relevant legislation to prevent, detect, correct and investigate fraud, corruption and conflicts of interest in order to scrutinise thoroughly all RRF spending; recalls that those EU bodies and agencies should be endowed with the adequate resources to fulfil their tasks; calls on the Commission to cooperate with these institutions and bodies and to ensure that adequate control capacities are in place and that Member States grant them full access to all relevant information to exert their prerogatives;

81.

Welcomes the NGEU Law Enforcement Forum as well as the Operation Sentinel, which in a cooperative manner shall help to prevent and counter threats against NGEU funds and, more broadly, against the financial well-being of the Union, and map vulnerabilities in national allocation systems;

82.

Reiterates the importance of the Commission undertaking a continuous, including ex-post, monitoring of the RRF expenditure, implementation and management data, ensuring full transparency together with the Member States in order to analyse the results of the RRF, and identifying and addressing any weaknesses in this regard;

83.

Reminds that in the framework of the discharge procedure to the Commission, in accordance with Article 319 TFEU, the RRF shall be subject to reporting under the integrated financial and accountability reporting referred to in Article 247 of the Financial Regulation, and, in particular, separately in the Annual Management and Performance Report;

Governance, transparency and visibility of RRF implementation

84.

Reaffirms Parliament’s role in scrutinising the implementation of the RRF, in particular through five plenary debates held in 2021, two adopted resolutions, four Recovery and Resilience Dialogues held with the Commission in 2021, 20 meetings of the dedicated working group on the scrutiny of the RRF, parliamentary questions, and the regular flow of information and ad hoc requests for information from the Commission; recalls that Article 25 of the RRF Regulation requests that the Commission transmit relevant documents and information simultaneously and on equal terms both to Parliament and the Council; notes the slow start of the proper process of document flow and the difficulties Parliament encountered regarding access to information received by the Commission and transmitted by the Member States; welcomes the fact that better communication procedures have since been put in place and calls for this information flow to be maintained;

85.

Invites the Commission to follow an open, transparent and constructive approach during the Recovery and Resilience Dialogues and to observe the provision of Article 26(1) of the RRF Regulation as regards regular interactions with Parliament; recalls that the interinstitutional cooperation established through the RRF should become a minimum standard in all funding programmes;

86.

Invites national parliaments and relevant stakeholders, in accordance with national legal frameworks, to follow Parliament’s example and scrutinise the implementation of their NRRPs in an open, transparent and democratic way;

87.

Regrets that in all Member States, local and regional authorities, civil society organisations, social partners, academia or other relevant stakeholders were not sufficiently involved, in the design and the implementation of the NRRPs, in accordance with the national legal framework, and calls for their involvement based on clear and transparent principles, in the implementation of the NRRPs to the maximum extent possible under the national legislation;

88.

Recalls that local and regional authorities, civil society organisations, social partners and the other relevant stakeholders are at the forefront of the local implementation of NRRPs and reminds the Commission and the Member States that proper involvement and coordination with local and regional authorities, civil society organisations, social partners and other relevant stakeholders in the implementation and monitoring of the plans is decisive for the success of the recovery in the Union and is essential for the effectiveness and broad ownership of NRRPs; invites the Commission to explore ways to establish a dialogue with representatives at the EU level of the relevant RRF stakeholders;

89.

Calls on the Member States to ensure clarity in the distribution of responsibilities and adequate management systems of RRF funds to take into consideration the specific needs of the citizens at regional and local levels, while respecting the principles of non-discrimination and equal treatment; recalls that implementation of NRRPs’ measures shall respect all relevant laws in accordance with national legal frameworks;

90.

Expects the review report on the implementation of the RRF prepared by the Commission to provide extensive data and analysis on the contributions of NRRPs to the implementation of the European Pillar of Social Rights, including the gender impact of NRRPs and their effective contribution to gender equality, as well as their support for SMEs and strategic autonomy;

91.

Calls on the Commission to assess whether the legally specified spending targets of 37 % green spending and 20 % digital spending are likely to be reached as planned during the implementation phase of the RRF and, where relevant, calls on the Member States to take the steps deemed necessary to achieve those targets where they anticipate that they may be missed, with the support of the Commission where necessary;

92.

Expects the review report on the implementation of the RRF prepared by the Commission to provide information on the bottlenecks, where relevant, that prevent the adequate implementation of NRRPs;

93.

Welcomes the launch in December 2021 of the recovery and resilience scoreboard, which will allow every citizen to monitor the implementation of the RRF; notes that, in line with the delegated act on common indicators, Member States must report on several indicators, including for the implementation of the European Pillar of Social Rights and SMEs supported; invites the Commission to improve and enhance the capabilities of the scoreboard to ensure a high degree of visibility and accountability for the RRF; welcomes the fact that the scoreboard contains gender-disaggregated data for indicators expressed with a headcount;

94.

Urges the Commission to enforce the provision that Member States should provide the data necessary to report on progress with regard to the six pillars of the RRF Regulation and thereby enable every citizen to monitor the implementation of the RRF; deplores the fact, however, that Member States have been reluctant to provide more granular data to feed into the recovery and resilience scoreboard; notes that more granular data would have allowed citizens to better hold their governments accountable;

95.

Emphasises that one of the aims of the RRF Regulation is to contribute to the achievement of EU social objectives and highlights the importance of having methodologies in place for displaying progress on its implementation and how this contributes to the European Pillar of Social Rights; is concerned that the delegated act on social expenditure and on the resilience scoreboard will not be sufficient to track and report on the social and gender dimensions and impacts of the RRF; calls on the Commission to better reflect the tracking of the implementation of the 20 principles of the European Pillar of Social Rights through complementary social and gender indicators included in the thematic analysis of the scoreboard;

96.

Calls on the Commission to present complementary indicators included in the thematic analysis of the scoreboard to track Member States’ performance on biodiversity and cohesion and competitiveness;

97.

Recalls that according to the RRF Regulation, the Commission must implement information and communication actions relating to the Facility; encourages the Commission, through its representation offices in the Member States and in cooperation with the European Parliament Liaison Offices in the Member States, to launch events in the Member States that promote the scoreboard and present the different analyses conducted by the Commission, including on the six pillars; encourages the Commission to publish detailed analysis of the positive effects of the RRF by highlighting good practices in the implementation of the national NRRPs and recommendations for overcoming implementation obstacles and improving the effective use of the funds;

98.

Points out that national public administrations face a considerable challenge in absorbing all RRF funding in such a short space of time; urges the Commission to actively support Member States in absorbing those funds, so that RRF funds are successfully disbursed across the Union;

99.

Remains committed and intends to make full use of the range of possibilities offered by the RRF Regulation to assess, scrutinise and promote the RRF, including through events and activities including at local, regional and national level;

100.

Welcomes the initiative of the EU ombudsman to prepare good practice principles for government transparency in the use of recovery funds;

101.

Notes that Member States’ NRRPs report on their communication strategies; deplores, however, the fact that without a clear standard, such communication campaigns are envisaged to be very different, thus limiting the visibility of the RRF and EU funding overall; welcomes the fact that most Member States have followed the Commission’s recommendations by designing specific websites where RRF-related information is displayed, but regrets the fact that there are major differences in the details of the information made public on them;

102.

Calls for further harmonisation of the information available to citizens on national implementation and on national RRF-related communication strategies in order to foster transparency and accountability, thus reinforcing ownership of implementation; invites the Commission to recommend a harmonised approach and standard for displaying information on the implementation of the RRF at national and regional level, and asks Member States to adhere to this standard or explain their deviations from it;

Lessons learned from the RRF so far

103.

Reiterates the importance of a successful implementation of the RRF by the Member States in order to ensure the long-term impact on the EU’s economy and society; highlights that the review of the EU economic governance framework will be the opportunity to draw lessons from successes but also shortcomings of the RFF; urges the Commission to explore and to present different scenarios on how lessons learned from the design and implementation of the RRF could inspire the review of the EU’s macro-economic governance framework, in particular with regard to achieving more transparency, democracy, involvement, coordination and oversight;

104.

Underlines that the RRF demonstrated the importance of a strong involvement of the European Parliament, together with the Council, in defining the EU common priorities, the response to the new challenges and the design of underlying political guidelines and governance mechanisms, as well as in scrutinising the implementation for a strong European ownership; reaffirms that Parliament should be on an equal footing with the Council in scrutinising the implementation of the Facility and calls on the Commission to ensure that equal treatment for both institutions would be applied in future EU initiatives; highlights the importance of delegated acts in enhancing the democratic accountability and legitimacy of the process;

105.

Notes positively that the EU support, provided to reforms and investments in the form of packages together with incentives, played an instrumental role in reinforcing the national ownership of the RRF and the European Semester based on common EU priorities; furthermore, highlights that meaningful social and territorial dialogues with a high level of involvement of local and regional authorities, social partners and civil society organisations, within the national legal framework, is essential for national ownership, successful implementation and democratic accountability and that these should be strengthened and more diligently applied and could inspire future initiatives and mechanisms in the EU and its Member States;

106.

Recognises, based on the good example of the RRF, as part of the NGEU, the strong added value of a common, modern and effective EU response that can be mobilised quickly to cope with crises and new challenges;

107.

Calls on the Commission to fully take into account Parliament’s views in the upcoming review report on the implementation of the RRF, which the Commission shall present to Parliament and the Council by 31 July 2022; calls on the Commission to also take into account the input of all relevant stakeholders in that report;

o o

108.

Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the European Court of Auditors, the European Economic and Social Committee, the European Committee of the Regions and the governments and parliaments of the Member States.

(1) OJ L 57, 18.2.2021, p. 17.

(2) OJ L 433 I, 22.12.2020, p. 1.

(3) OJ C 15, 12.1.2022, p. 184.

(4) OJ C 67, 8.2.2022, p. 90.

(5) Texts adopted, P9_TA(2022)0121.

(6) Text adopted, P9_TA(2022)0219.

(7) Texts adopted, P9_TA(2022)0240.

(8) OJ L 429, 1.12.2021, p. 83.

(9) OJ L 429, 1.12.2021, p. 79.

(10) OJ C 155, 30.4.2021, p. 45.

(11) OJ C 97, 28.2.2022, p. 21.

(12) Texts adopted, P9_TA(2022)0074.

(13) Texts adopted, P9_TA(2022)0204.

(14) https://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/recovery-and-resilience-scoreboard/

(15) https://www.europarl.europa.eu/thinktank/en/research/advanced-search?textualSearch=RRF&startDate=01%2F07%2F2019&endDate=&firstCameToPage=false

(16) European Parliament, Directorate-General for Internal Policies, Policy Department for Citizens’ Rights and Constitutional Affairs, COVID-19 and its economic impact on women and women’s poverty — Insights from 5 European Countries, May 2021. https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2021/693183/IPOL_STU(2021)693183_EN.pdf

(17) Eurochild, Growing up in lockdown: Europe’s children in the age of COVID-19, 17 November 2020. https://www.eurochild.org/resource/growing-up-in-lockdown-europes-children-in-the-age-of-covid-19/

(18) Regulation (EU) 2018/1999 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 December 2018 on the Governance of the Energy Union and Climate Action, amending Regulations (EC) No 663/2009 and (EC) No 715/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council, Directives 94/22/EC, 98/70/EC, 2009/31/EC, 2009/73/EC, 2010/31/EU, 2012/27/EU and 2013/30/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council, Council Directives 2009/119/EC and (EU) 2015/652 and repealing Regulation (EU) No 525/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council (OJ L 328, 21.12.2018, p. 1).

(19) Regulation (EU) No 1176/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 November 2011 on the prevention and correction of macroeconomic imbalances (OJ L 306, 23.11.2011, p. 25).

27.1.2023

Official Journal of the European Union

C 32/58

P9_TA(2022)0265

Inclusion measures within Erasmus+ 2014-2020

European Parliament resolution of 23 June 2022 on the implementation of inclusion measures within Erasmus+ 2014-2020 (2021/2009(INI))

(2023/C 32/07)

The European Parliament,

—	having regard to Articles 6, 10, 165 and 166 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

—	having regard to Regulation (EU) No 1288/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 December 2013 establishing ‘Erasmus+’: the Union programme for education, training, youth and sport and repealing Decisions No 1719/2006/EC, No 1720/2006/EC and No 1298/2008/EC (1),

—	having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/817 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 May 2021 establishing Erasmus+: the Union Programme for education and training, youth and sport and repealing Regulation (EU) No 1288/2013 (2),

—	having regard to the Commission report of 31 January 2018 entitled ‘Mid-term evaluation of the Erasmus+ programme (2014-2020)’ (COM(2018)0050),

—	having regard to the Commission communication of 14 November 2017 entitled ‘Strengthening European Identity through Education and Culture — The European Commission’s contribution to the Leaders’ meeting in Gothenburg, 17 November 2017’ (COM(2017)0673),

—	having regard to the Interinstitutional Proclamation on the European Pillar of Social Rights (3),

—	having regard to the Commission communication of 12 November 2020 entitled ‘Union of Equality: LGBTIQ Equality Strategy 2020-2025’ (COM(2020)0698), which builds on the Council conclusions of 16 June 2016 on LGBTI equality,

—

having regard to the Commission communication of 18 September 2020 entitled ‘A Union of equality: EU anti-racism action plan 2020-2025’(COM(2020)0565), which seeks to update Council Directive 2000/43/EC of 29 June 2000 implementing the principle of equal treatment between persons irrespective of racial or ethnic origin (4) (the Racial Equality Directive),

—	having regard to its resolution of 15 September 2020 on effective measures to ‘green’ Erasmus+, Creative Europe and the European Solidarity Corps (5),

—	having regard to Rule 54 of its Rules of Procedure, as well as Article 1(1)(e) of, and Annex 3 to, the decision of the Conference of Presidents of 12 December 2002 on the procedure for granting authorisation to draw up own-initiative reports,

—	having regard to the opinion of the Committee on Petitions,

—	having regard to the report of the Committee on Culture and Education (A9-0158/2022),

whereas mobility is a hugely important part of digital and in-person learning; whereas providing equal and inclusive opportunities for all is, and must continue to be, inherent to the fundamental values of the European Union, and whereas people from all backgrounds and walks of life must be able to benefit fully and equally from Erasmus+; highlights that Erasmus+ benefits not only its participants but entire communities and societies and fulfils the ambitions of UN Sustainable Development Goal 4; notes that this leads to more democratic, stronger and more cohesive and resilient societies;

whereas the Erasmus+ 2014-2020 Regulation puts emphasis on promoting social inclusion and on the participation of people with special needs or with fewer opportunities, as defined in the ‘Erasmus+ Inclusion and Diversity Strategy’, encompassing persons with disabilities, health problems, educational difficulties, cultural differences, and economical, geographical and social obstacles; underlines that the current Erasmus+ programme (2021-2027) also goes hand in hand with the green and digital transitions;

C.	whereas the COVID-19 pandemic had a severe impact on the education sector as a whole, further exacerbating existing inequalities in access to education and highlighting the need to maintain inclusion measures in Erasmus+ and to make any necessary improvements;

D.	whereas no harmonised and mandatory inclusion strategy was established at European level for the Erasmus+ programme for 2014-2020, a shortcoming that limited the impact of inclusion measures within the programme;

E.	whereas physical mobility enables immersion in and optimum interaction with other cultures, and whereas virtual exchanges and learning are a valuable complement to physical mobility, but do not provide the same quality of experience and benefits;

F.	whereas the pandemic accelerated the digital transition and highlighted the importance of having good digital skills; underlines the fact that Erasmus+ can contribute significantly to digital upskilling and reskilling;

whereas the experience of mobility offered by Erasmus+ can be transformative for participants, and can positively influence their communication skills, self-confidence, openness, critical thinking, personal and professional development, employability, well-being and understanding of the benefits of a united Europe by providing inclusive learning opportunities that enrich their lives and allow them to experience Europe’s linguistic and cultural heritage while gaining lifelong knowledge;

H.	whereas the mid-term evaluation of the Erasmus+ programme 2014-2020 published by the Commission in 2018 underlined the necessity of reaching more people with fewer opportunities and smaller organisations in all regions;

Notes with satisfaction the overall positive perception of how inclusion measures have developed over the Erasmus+ 2014-2020 programming period;

Highlights that Erasmus+ should support stakeholders’ and programme participants’ internationalisation plans that contribute to the removal of the physical, psychological, social, socio-economic, linguistic, digital and other barriers to learning mobility and European projects, offering clear and detailed information and qualitative support for participants from under-represented groups and those with specific needs;

Stresses the crucial need for tailored funding and grants such as pre-financing, top-up grants, upfront payments and lump sums to increase the participation of people with fewer opportunities or from disadvantaged backgrounds, as financial barriers continue to constitute one of the biggest obstacles in Erasmus+; stresses the need, in this regard, to apply flexible rules to provide a sufficient financial amount to cover their needs, especially their living costs;

Calls on the Commission to further develop Erasmus+ financing tools and establish synergies with other programmes;

Stresses that the amount of money disbursed through mobility grants is still insufficient in some cases, and can constitute a reason for social exclusion for those students and families who cannot afford mobility; calls for an increase in the 2023 budget for the full implementation of inclusion measures in Erasmus+ and the European Solidarity Corps;

Urges the Commission to ensure that existing digital tools are working properly and to their full extent, and to tackle without delay the serious persistent issues related to Erasmus+ IT tools, which are significantly hindering not only the participation of smaller organisations, people with fewer opportunities, older participants and staff helping with the administrative paperwork, but also the participation of all kinds of beneficiaries; calls on the Commission to make the process for the newly introduced IT tools easier and accessible for all groups and to test them on a sufficiently large scale before their implementation;

Notes that administrative barriers prevent many potential learners from taking part in the programme; urges the Commission to reduce bureaucracy and simplify the procedures to access funding with a view to streamlining the process and making it easier to understand and more accessible; underlines that the administrative burden constitutes a barrier to access for all and most affects those with fewer opportunities or with special needs; stresses the importance of providing application procedures in all European languages;

Praises the role of teachers, youth and social workers, civil society organisations, associations and educational staff as the driving forces behind participating institutions in raising awareness of the programme, by informing and supporting future learners and identifying people with fewer opportunities; notes that without them, most participants, especially those with fewer opportunities, would not be able to take part; calls on the Commission, the Member States and national agencies to value and acknowledge their often voluntary work, to support them by facilitating their own mobility and to provide them with adequate funding and support, while accompanying participants with fewer opportunities and offering them specific training adapted to their needs; notes the importance of updating various tools that they use in identifying possible participants and to better customise the Erasmus+ experience in order to address the needs of every individual participant;

Stresses the importance of providing appropriate training and support to educators on effectively navigating the challenges and opportunities and to foster the exchange of good practices in the field;

10.

Encourages the Member States and national agencies to facilitate more educational seminars for Erasmus+ staff to carry out projects, develop inclusive methods and explore new ways to reach future beneficiaries of the programme;

11.

Stresses the need for the Commission, the Member States and the national agencies to provide better support for grassroots organisations in all areas, including community-led and smaller organisations, particularly in the outermost regions, islands and remote, mountainous, rural and less accessible areas, and to ensure that resources and projects are distributed fairly in each Member State;

12.

Stresses the importance of providing adequate financial and material support to staff, in addition to further training and additional expertise, so that they can engage with participants, their families and beneficiaries, improving access and boosting the success and impact of the projects, while ensuring that mobility and projects run smoothly; notes that national agencies in the Member States can provide significant help by identifying the needs of organisations and institutions in this matter and providing the necessary support;

13.

Notes the positive effect of short-term mobility of schoolchildren in overcoming mental and psycho-social barriers, and asks the Commission and national agencies to foster mobility projects aimed at children and teenagers;

14.

Calls on the Commission and the Member States to organise targeted information campaigns, both online and offline, to increase awareness and outreach among citizens on the benefits of Erasmus+ through cooperation with media and social media outlets in public learning facilities such as libraries, schools and universities;

15.

Asks all national agencies to appoint dedicated inclusion and diversity officers in order to reach out directly to learners with special needs and/or fewer opportunities; calls, in this regard, on those organisations that were selected to implement Erasmus+ actions to designate dedicated contact persons for people with fewer opportunities, and recalls that information on support services for people with special needs must be clear, up-to-date, complete and easy to access;

16.

Calls on the Commission to improve guidelines for national policies that will enable better participation of learners facing health problems, cultural differences and economic, geographical and social obstacles, and to scrutinise and report on their implementation;

17.

Supports all EU initiatives aimed at facilitating student mobility, such as the Erasmus+ mobile application, ‘paperless Erasmus’ and the European Student Card; calls on the Commission to explore the possibility of linking Erasmus+ more closely with other programmes and to foster cross-sectoral cooperation, including Interrail, in order to foster greater inclusion and equality that will improve access to better and greener mobility options, particularly for those with fewer opportunities; calls on the Commission to also make the DiscoverEU initiative more inclusive, allowing more people to participate;

18.

Stresses that special focus should be given to linguistic competences, especially for participants with fewer opportunities; calls, therefore, for targeted and group-specific support for language learning in preparation for mobility and insists that this support should not be limited to online courses;

19.

Recognises the important role of Support, Advanced Learning and Training Opportunities (SALTO) Inclusion & Diversity for the implementation of inclusion measures for the Erasmus+ Youth strand, and notes that the extension of inclusion strategies to the Education & Training strand in the current programming period will have to be followed closely, as the target groups are different; stresses the need for national agencies to work more closely with employment agencies and other adult education stakeholders to facilitate the integration of adult learners into the Erasmus+ 2021-2027 programme;

20.

Regrets the lack of reliable data — both quantitative and qualitative — on the participation of people with fewer opportunities in the Erasmus+ programme, as such data could be used to identify at which groups inclusion measures should be targeted; underlines the need to develop evaluation schemes to produce clear statistics and appropriately assess further problematic issues in order to create a management and steering tool for inclusion measures, using methods which fully respect privacy and data protection regulations and do not add undue administrative burdens for organisations and participants; reaffirms the need for more capacity-building for staff with regard to indicators and monitoring systems for inclusion;

21.

Stresses the importance of funding more EU-wide research and studies on inclusion in the current programming period in order to assess the impact of the measures undertaken by national agencies and stakeholders in engaging organisations and people with fewer opportunities; highlights the importance of keeping records and statistics that should serve as a basis for consultations on future programmes;

22.

Asks for the specific needs of persons with disabilities to be taken into account in order to facilitate their participation in the programme by offering them hybrid mobility by way of preparation for the mobility period, giving them the opportunity to be accompanied, and providing them with suitable and accessible accommodation and specialised support services based on their needs; stresses the need to collect their feedback after the period of mobility in order to improve the participation of future beneficiaries; underlines the need for specific support, guidance and tools allowing persons with disabilities to register and participate in the Erasmus+ programme; recalls that accompanying persons should also have access to funds and grants in order to participate in the mobility programme;

23.

Stresses the importance of the Erasmus+ programme in promoting the values of tolerance and diversity; calls on the Commission to establish synergies between the EU anti-racism action plan and Erasmus+ in order to address specific needs and combat racism in all its forms;

24.

Welcomes the development of Erasmus+ projects related to and focused on improving gender equality and the inclusion of women in all sectors of education, especially in science, technology, engineering, the arts and mathematics (STEAM), and calls on the Commission and the Member States to continue to give visibility to gender equality in their policies and actions;

25.

Welcomes the projects that promote and raise awareness of sexual diversity and encourage respect for LGBTIQ+ people, and calls on the Commission to create genuine links between the EU LGBTIQ Equality Strategy and the Erasmus+ programme;

26.

Highlights the need for targeted solutions and a needs-based approach to learning-related mobility opportunities for people from marginalised groups in order to enhance their participation in the programme and ensure that they get adequate support, bearing in mind that financial and institutional barriers remain one of the biggest obstacles to their participation;

27.

Requests that the Commission and the Member States ensure that all the relevant information regarding Erasmus+ is accessible to persons with disabilities, in particular through adapted and barrier-free online tools in all European languages; recalls that planning and evaluation processes should be barrier-free; welcomes the establishment of ‘Erasmus Days’ and stresses the importance of the role of former Erasmus+ participants and alumni networks in promoting the programme widely and serving as a potential one-stop shop for all future learners;

28.

Asks the Member States to evaluate their existing policies and adopt targeted programmes and actions for learners with fewer opportunities and special needs, from all age groups and all backgrounds, in order to increase participation in Erasmus+, especially in terms of mobility, and to foster exchanges of good practices in this field; notes the key role of national agencies and voluntary organisations in facilitating this process;

29.

Underlines the positive impact of the Erasmus+ programme in third countries as a factor in the European integration process and in strengthening the visibility of the EU; stresses the need for better partnerships and increased inclusivity of Erasmus+ projects in associated countries and other eligible countries, notably in the Western Balkans and the Eastern and Southern Neighbourhoods; calls on the Commission to facilitate international consultation — both digital and in-person — between national agencies in the Member States and participating countries with a view to exchanging good practices; notes that this will further strengthen their cooperation and allow them to implement new solutions, ideas and lessons learnt on the ground that will increase the number of participants in the Erasmus+ programme;

30.

Stresses the need to give more flexibility to the Erasmus+ programme in the event of a crisis, as witnessed since the beginning of the war in Ukraine; welcomes the measures announced by the Commission allowing Ukrainian students and education staff affected by the war to continue with their education and professional activities in Ukraine and any of the Member States; calls for Ukrainian students to be given more assistance and for additional support to be provided to sustain Ukraine’s higher education institutions and academic community;

31.

Regrets the decision of the Government of the United Kingdom not to take part in Erasmus+ for the current programming period in the wake of its exit from the European Union, which constitutes a loss of opportunities for young people in both the EU and the UK;

32.

Stresses the importance of fostering mobility for vocational education and training (VET) students in order to reach young people from all backgrounds, and notes with satisfaction the increased opportunities for their long-term mobility created during the 2014-2020 programming period;

33.

Calls on the Commission and the Member States to use the European Year of Youth and related events to effectively promote the opportunities offered by the Erasmus+ programme, particularly for those with fewer opportunities and those from disadvantaged backgrounds, with a view to ensuring that the European Year of Youth has an effective impact, especially for the living conditions, education opportunities and democratic participation of young people; regrets the fact that the budget allocated to the European Year of Youth is insufficient to meet the needs of the initiative;

34.

Recalls the paramount importance of ensuring automatic recognition of qualifications and learning periods in the context of the European Education Area as a complementary tool to make inclusion measures within Erasmus+ and the European Solidarity Corps fully effective;

35.

Welcomes the Commission’s recent adoption of the 2021-2027 framework of measures aimed at increasing diversity and inclusion in the current Erasmus+ and European Solidarity Corps programmes, and calls on the Commission to closely monitor the future national implementation of this framework and to keep Parliament informed on an annual basis; highlights that the full implementation of a dedicated framework of inclusion measures can serve as a useful experience and reference for other EU programmes that have a direct impact on citizens’ lives such as Creative Europe and the Citizens, Equality, Rights and Values Programme;

36.

Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council and the Commission.

(1) OJ L 347, 20.2.2013, p. 50.

(2) OJ L 189, 28.5.2021, p. 1.

(3) OJ C 428, 13.12.2017, p. 10.

(4) OJ L 180, 19.7.2000, p. 22.

(5) OJ C 385, 22.9.2021, p. 2.

27.1.2023

Official Journal of the European Union

C 32/63

P9_TA(2022)0266

2021 Report on Montenegro

European Parliament resolution of 23 June 2022 on the 2021 Commission Report on Montenegro (2021/2247(INI))

(2023/C 32/08)

The European Parliament,

—	having regard to the Stabilisation and Association Agreement between the European Communities and their Member States of the one part, and the Republic of Montenegro, of the other part (1), which entered into force on 1 May 2010,

—	having regard to Montenegro’s application for membership of the European Union of 15 December 2008,

—

having regard to the Commission opinion of 9 November 2010 on Montenegro’s application for membership of the European Union (COM(2010)0670), the European Council’s decision of 16-17 December 2010 to grant Montenegro candidate status and the European Council’s decision of 29 June 2012 to open EU accession negotiations with Montenegro,

—	having regard to Montenegro’s accession to NATO on 5 June 2017,

—	having regard to the Presidency conclusions of the Thessaloniki European Council meeting of 19-20 June 2003,

—	having regard to the Sofia declaration of the EU-Western Balkans summit of 17 May 2018 and the Sofia Priority Agenda,

—	having regard to the Zagreb declaration of the EU-Western Balkans summit of 6 May 2020,

—	having regard to the Brdo Declaration of the EU-Western Balkans summit of 6 October 2021,

—	having regard to the Sofia Summit of 10 November 2020, the Western Balkans Leaders Declaration on Common Regional Market of 9 November 2020 and the Sofia Declaration on the Green Agenda for the Western Balkans of 10 November 2020,

—	having regard to the Berlin Process launched on 28 August 2014,

—	having regard to the Commission communication of 5 February 2020 entitled ‘Enhancing the accession process — A credible EU perspective for the Western Balkans’ (COM(2020)0057),

—	having regard to the Commission communication of 6 October 2020 entitled ‘Economic and Investment plan for the Western Balkans’ (COM(2020)0641),

—	having regard to the Regulation (EU) 2021/1529 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 September 2021 establishing the Instrument for Pre-Accession assistance (IPA III) (2),

—	having regard to special report 01/2022 of 10 January 2022 of the European Court of Auditors entitled ‘EU support for the Rule of Law in the Western Balkans: despite efforts fundamental problems persist’,

—	having regard to the Commission communication of 19 October 2021 entitled ‘2021 Communication on EU Enlargement Policy’ (COM(2021)0644), accompanied by the Commission staff working document entitled ‘Montenegro 2021 Report’ (SWD(2021)0293),

—	having regard to the Commission’s Overview & Country Assessment of the Economic Reform Programme of Montenegro of July 2021,

—	having regard to the joint conclusions of the Economic and Financial Dialogue between the EU and the Western Balkans and Turkey, adopted by the Council on 12 July 2021,

—	having regard to the Commission communication of 29 April 2020 entitled ‘Support to the Western Balkans in tackling COVID-19 and the post-pandemic recovery’ (COM(2020)0315),

—	having regard to the fifth meeting of the Accession Conference with Montenegro at deputy level of 30 June 2020 in Brussels, where negotiations on the last screened chapter, Chapter 8 (competition policy) were opened,

—	having regard to the EU-Montenegro Intergovernmental Accession Conference of 22 June 2021 and of 13 December 2021,

—	having regard to the Venice Commission’s opinions of March and May 2021 on the revised draft amendments to the law on the State Prosecution Service and to its previous opinions,

—	having regard to its recommendation of 19 June 2020 to the Council, the Commission and the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy on the Western Balkans, following the 2020 summit (3),

—	having regard to its previous resolutions on the country,

—	having regard to the declaration and recommendations adopted at the 20th meeting of the EU-Montenegro Stabilisation and Association Parliamentary Committee (SAPC), held on 2 December 2021,

—	having regard to the joint declaration of the Second European Parliament-Western Balkans Speakers’ Summit of 28 June 2021, convened by the President of the European Parliament with the leaders of the Western Balkan parliaments,

—	having regard to its resolution of 19 May 2021 on the 2019-2020 Commission Reports on Montenegro (4),

—	having regard to its resolution of 15 December 2021 on cooperation on the fight against organised crime in the Western Balkans (5),

—	having regard to Rule 54 of its Rules of Procedure,

—	having regard to the report of the Committee on Foreign Affairs (A9-0151/2022),

A.	whereas each enlargement country is judged on its own merits, and the implementation of necessary reforms, in particular in the area of rule of law, determines the timetable and progress of accession;

B.	whereas Montenegro is the most advanced of candidate countries in its negotiation process, having opened all 33 screened chapters of the EU acquis and provisionally closed three;

C.	whereas 80 % of its citizens support the country’s future membership of the EU;

D.	whereas the period after the 2020 elections was marked by deep polarisation between the new ruling majority and the opposition, as well as within the ruling majority; whereas boycotts and the lack of constructive engagement of all parliamentary actors impeded decision-making in the Parliament;

E.	whereas during the Intergovernmental Conference of 22 June 2021, Montenegro accepted the revised enlargement methodology based on thematic negotiation chapter clusters and the phasing-in of individual EU policies and programmes;

whereas the European Union is Montenegro’s biggest trading partner, accounting for 38 % of total exports and 44 % of total imports in 2020; whereas the EU is the largest provider of financial assistance to Montenegro and whereas Montenegro benefits from pre-accession assistance under the IPA, having received a total of EUR 504,9 million between 2007 and 2020;

G.	whereas the EU has continuously shown its commitment for the European perspective of Western Balkan countries and mobilised EUR 3,3 billion to address the immediate health crisis and mitigate economic and social consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic;

H.	whereas the assistance under IPA III is based on strict conditionality and provides for modulation and suspension of assistance if there is backtracking on democracy, human rights and the rule of law;

I.	whereas Montenegro is exposed to foreign interference and malicious disinformation campaigns originating from Russia and other countries;

Commitment to enlargement

Welcomes Montenegro’s continued commitment to European integration and the unwavering support of its citizens for membership of the EU; underlines that progress in the negotiations continues to depend on meeting the rule of law interim benchmarks;

Notes that all 33 screened chapters have been opened, but regrets that none have been closed since 2017, slowing down Montenegro’s positive track record and status as the most advanced Western Balkans country in its progress towards EU accession; welcomes Montenegro’s acceptance of the revised enlargement methodology; encourages Montenegro to continue specifically focusing on meeting the remaining interim benchmarks in Chapters 23 and 24 and thereafter on closing chapters;

Reiterates that cross-party political commitment and a functioning parliamentary democracy are necessary for EU-related reforms and calls for constructive and inclusive political dialogue and commitment of all parliamentary parties to overcome the current polarised political climate and strengthen the functioning and coordination between state institutions in order to achieve political stability and continue its substantial progress in key EU-related reforms, in particular electoral and judicial reforms and the fight against organised crime and corruption;

Notes the vote of no confidence in the government on 4 February 2022 and the ensuing dismissal of the Parliament’s speaker and the EU-Montenegro SAPC Co-Chair; notes that the President of Montenegro had appointed the URA party leader as prime-minister designate charged with forming a government;

Welcomes the new minority government composed of pro-European parties, which is especially welcome in light of the recent Russian invasion of Ukraine and the continuous influence of pro-Russian political parties and narratives in the country; welcomes the election of a new speaker, and calls for the appointment of the EU-Montenegro SAPC Co-Chair as soon as possible; believes that the new government’s political resolve could help accelerate the much needed reform process, reflecting both Montenegro’s work on European values and the will of an overwhelming majority of Montenegrin citizens to join the European Union;

Calls for resumption of inclusive dialogue among all parliamentary parties and relevant stakeholders with a view to building a strong pro-European and democratic platform that can ensure the necessary stability and reduce political polarisation and radicalisation in line with the constitution, respect for democratic processes, norms and standards and the pro-European aspirations of an overwhelming majority of Montenegro’s citizens;

Notes the protests against the possible formation of a minority government organised by the Democratic Front and Democratic Montenegro; invites all political parties to express their views within institutionalised democratic procedures and to refrain from escalating tensions;

Strongly condemns the support expressed for the Russian Federation by protesters and some political leaders on the day of the start of Russia’s aggression against Ukraine, but notes the relatively small scale of these demonstrations; recalls Russia’s persistent and continuous interest in destabilising the country and the whole Western Balkan region and in diverting it from its European path through the spread of manipulative disinformation and influence on state and non-state actors;

Notes that the work has intensified following the long-awaited finalisation of appointments to administrative structures in the area of rule of law; regrets that key positions in negotiating structures have remained vacant for a long time; notes the efforts to consolidate and upgrade the negotiating structure in 2021; urges the authorities to re-establish a fully functional negotiating structure as soon as possible; notes that the delayed appointment of key negotiators and heads of working groups must be followed by other steps to maintain the accession process as a political priority;

10.

Welcomes Montenegro’s continued and full alignment with EU Common Foreign and Security Policy, including its condemnation of the Russian invasion of Ukraine and its full support for the latest EU sanctions against Russia, including the ban on the Russian flights overflying its airspace and using its airports, the prohibition of transactions with Russia’s Central Bank and the ban on Russian propaganda media outlets, Russia Today and Sputnik; encourages the Commission to consider EU economic and financial assistance for Western Balkan countries that have joined EU sanctions against Russia, in order to mitigate the consequences of the crisis as it develops;

11.

Welcomes Montenegro's adoption of its own temporary protection mechanism for persons fleeing Ukraine, granting them the right to stay in the country for one year, and welcomes Montenegro’s contribution to humanitarian aid to Ukraine;

12.

Calls for the seizure of the assets of the persons sanctioned by the Montenegrin authorities and for it to be ensured that the country does not become a safe zone for hiding the assets of Russian oligarchs threatened with international sanctions; encourages the government to continue taking the steps needed to enable the competent national authorities to take the necessary decisions to implement the adopted sanctions;

13.

Welcomes Montenegro’s active participation in EU Common Security and Defence Policy missions and operations, as well as in other international missions; underlines the importance of Montenegro’s strategic alliance with the EU and with NATO; condemns attempts in the government, security and military sector to question its strategic orientation; encourages the Montenegrin authorities to cooperate with both the EU and NATO on resilience to foreign interference, manipulative foreign disinformation and cybersecurity;

14.

Encourages Montenegro to make best use of the EU funding available under the IPA III and the Economic and Investment Plan for the Western Balkans in order to strengthen institution-building and foster economic and democratic development, especially in the areas of rule of law, fundamental freedoms and the wellbeing of its citizens; highlights that any investment must be in line with the objectives of the Paris Agreement and EU decarbonisation targets; urges the Commission to closely monitor performance and ensure systematic assessment of the impact of EU funding;

Democracy and the rule of law

15.

Is deeply concerned by the continuing political tensions between and within the executive and legislative powers, and by the recent blocking of parliamentary sessions, which has a direct impact on the speed and progress of Montenegro’s EU-related reforms and continues to slow down the EU accession process; recalls that the only way to influence the decision-making process on behalf of constituents is to engage in political processes; calls on the legislative and executive authorities to improve coordination and prioritise legislative initiatives for the implementation of EU reforms; reiterates that political will, broad cross-party dialogue and functional parliamentary support, as well as the proper functioning of democratic institutions are key to Montenegro’s progress in the accession negotiations;

16.

Welcomes the recent appointments in the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals, and of new members of the Prosecutorial Council, including a member drawn from NGO representatives; is concerned about the overall lack of progress on judicial reform, including on the still pending appointments to key independent institutions and the judiciary, including the appointment of new Constitutional Court judges; encourages the Montenegrin authorities to take further steps to enhance the independence and functioning of the judiciary and other law enforcement bodies, as well as to fully implement the Venice Commission’s recommendations concerning the risks of politicisation of the Prosecutorial Council; encourages follow-up on recommendations related to the judiciary made by Council of Europe Group of States against Corruption (GRECO);

17.

Urges the Commission to seriously take into account special report 01/2022 of the European Court of Auditors and implement its recommendations, which would mean adapting its rule of law-related investments in the Western Balkans, including in Montenegro; calls on the EU and the Western Balkan countries to establish a framework for a fruitful cooperation between the European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO) and the Western Balkan countries in order to ensure that the EPPO can effectively exercise its competences in the area of EU funds;

18.

Welcomes the fact that the Parliament of Montenegro has adopted the amended Law on Local Self-Government, which provides that local elections in 14 municipalities are to be held on the same date; regrets, however, the recent decision to call elections in 12 municipalities on a different date; reiterates, once again, its calls encouraging Montenegro to hold local elections simultaneously across the country in order to bring more stability to its democracy, avoid constant campaigning and ease the tense political climate;

19.

Notes that more efforts are needed to harmonise the electoral legal framework and regulate all key aspects of elections through an inclusive process, well in advance of the next elections; welcomes the continuation of the work of the Committee on Electoral Legislation Reform despite initial interruptions, and expects it to diligently work toward achieving meaningful reform; notes that the Jean Monnet Dialogue instrument in Montenegro could be helpful in building the consensus necessary for fostering a democratic parliamentary culture;

20.

Is worried about the prevalent corruption in the country and urges Montenegro to step up the criminal justice response to high-level corruption and create conditions for the effective and independent functioning of judicial institutions and independent bodies dealing with corruption, including the Anti-Corruption Agency and the Special Prosecutors Office, to function effectively and free from political influence, in line with GRECO recommendations; calls on the Montenegrin authorities to launch thorough investigations into any wrongdoing exposed by the Pandora Papers;

21.

Welcomes progress in the fight against organised crime and on international police cooperation, in particular in improving access for law enforcement agencies to key databases and increasing the number of investigators and experts, and the increase in the number of organised crime cases investigated and prosecuted; encourages the Montenegrin authorities to continue to address the existing deficiencies in the handling of organised crime cases and the seizure and confiscation of criminal assets;

22.

Welcomes Montenegro’s constructive cooperation with EU law enforcement agencies, such as the European Border and Coast Guard Agency (Frontex), Europol, and Eurojust, which assist Montenegro in border management and the fight against cross-border crime, including trafficking of weapons, drugs, human beings and combating terrorism and extremism; notes as a positive example the police intervention in Mojkovac to tackle cigarette trafficking in Montenegro and reiterates that further measures are needed in order to tackle drug and cigarette smuggling in the country, especially in the Free Zone of the Port of Bar;

23.

Welcomes the adoption of the Strategy on Migration and Reintegration of Returnees in Montenegro for the period 2021-2025; notes that the roadmap for cooperation between Montenegro and European Union Agency for Asylum (EASO) was signed in December 2021;

24.

Regrets the limited progress made on the implementation of public administration reform and calls for the design process of the new Public Administration Reform Strategy to be inclusive and transparent; expresses concerns about changes to the Law on Civil Servants and State Employees, which lowered merit-based recruitment and the independence of civil servants, and jeopardised Montenegro’s capacity to retain staff experienced in the EU accession process; stresses the need for a merit-based recruitment system for civil servants and the importance of the depoliticisation of the public service;

25.

Welcomes the positive role of civil society in Montenegro and encourages further strengthening its meaningful participation in reforms and ensuring that there are functional consultation and cooperation mechanisms by improving the country’s legal and institutional frameworks, as well as guaranteeing the involvement of independent experts, civil society and local stakeholders in key legislation;

26.

Welcomes the first Citizens’ Assembly organised on 4 November 2021 by the Parliament of Montenegro in cooperation with the European Parliament; welcomes the active participation of citizens and their commitment for designing anti-corruption policies; calls on the Montenegrin authorities to follow up on and implement the Assembly’s conclusions on the fight against corruption, and stresses the importance of continuing this successful exercise in the future;

Respect of fundamental freedoms and human rights

27.

Notes the limited progress on freedom of expression; encourages Montenegro to step up its efforts to fight disinformation, hate speech, online harassment, politically-biased reporting and foreign influence in the Montenegrin media; underlines the importance of exchanging best practices with the EU Member States and NATO, as well as convening dialogue with Western Balkan civil society and its private sector in order to identify worrying developments at an early stage and develop appropriate adequate countermeasures against the spread of manipulative disinformation from third countries, with an emphasis on research and analysis and the inclusion of best practices in the region;

28.

Calls on the Commission to build up the infrastructure required to produce evidence-based responses to disinformation threats in the Western Balkans: calls on the European External Action Service (EEAS) to pivot to a more proactive stance, focusing on enhancing the EU’s credibility in the region and on expanding StratCom monitoring to focus on cross-border disinformation threats emanating from Western Balkan countries and their neighbours; calls on Montenegro to take decisive and systemic actions towards identifying and dismantling disinformation factories; calls on politicians and public figures to firmly condemn any messages seeking to polarise society and undermining trust in the media and core democratic values;

29.

Notes that the collection of disaggregated data relating to racism and homo/transphobic hate speech and crime remains suboptimal; recalls the 2020 conclusions from the monitoring report by the Council of Europe’s European Commission against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI), which stated that prior recommendations had not been implemented (6); recalls Parliament’s position in its last resolution on Montenegro, which called for this measure, and encourages the authorities to implement it (7);

30.

Expresses concern about the high degree of polarisation in the media landscape, in particular the growing volume of foreign and domestic disinformation campaigns and cyber and hybrid threats, including from Russia and China, spreading ethno-nationalist narratives that negatively impact democratic processes in the country thus endangering its European perspective; is worried by the increase in Montenegro's public debt to foreign financial institutions and companies from authoritarian non-EU countries; reiterates its support for the government’s readiness to implement EU sanctions against Russian propaganda outlets;

31.

Underlines the importance of media freedom and independence, high quality reporting and improving media literacy as key in fighting manipulative disinformation; calls on Montenegro, the Member States, the EEAS and the EU Delegation in Montenegro to continue pursuing more active and effective communication and visibility campaigns to emphasise the role and importance of EU assistance in Montenegro and fight anti-EU disinformation; including by setting up a regional strategic communication post in the Western Balkans; welcomes Montenegro’s interest in cooperating with the EU via the Democracy Action Plan (EDAP) and the important work of the EEAS Strategic Communication Western Balkans Task Force;

32.

Calls on the Montenegrin authorities to take concrete steps to build resilience and cybersecurity as it faces increasing pressure from third country interference that seeks to undermine its statehood and pro-Western orientation, in close cooperation with relevant EU and NATO initiatives and programmes; welcomes the new Montenegro’s Cyber Security Strategy 2022-2026 and calls for the legislative process establishing the Cyber Security Agency to move forward without delay;

33.

Strongly condemns attacks and harassment of journalists and calls for these to be investigated, sanctioned and for there to be effective judicial follow-up; welcomes the introduction of tougher penalties for threats to or attacks on journalists through the adoption of amendments to the Criminal Code; calls on all political parties to take further steps to ensure the conditions for the work of independent and free media, including support for public interest reporting, transparent funding, shared regulatory standards and a safe working environment free from attacks and threats;

34.

Welcomes some positive steps, such as an ad hoc commission for monitoring violence against the media, the strengthening of the legal framework in order to effectively protect journalists and other media workers, the revision of laws on media and on the editorial policy of the public broadcaster RTCG, which has been made more pluralistic, and public consultations on a media strategy for 2021-2025; underlines the importance of the independence of Montenegro’s media regulators and public service broadcaster, and calls for further efforts to transform the RTCG into a real public service and in general to improve access to information;

35.

Condemns all violent acts during the demonstrations in Cetinje linked to the inauguration of the Metropolitanate of Montenegro and the Littoral of the Serbian Orthodox Church; condemns Serbian interference in this regard; calls for religious tolerance in line with the Montenegrin constitution and European values and principles;

36.

Notes that foreign interference can also be pursued through the instrumentalisation of religious institutes; condemns Russia’s efforts to exploit ethnic tensions in the Western Balkans in order to inflame conflicts, divide communities and spread manipulative disinformation, which could lead to the destabilisation of the whole region;

37.

Notes another delay in the population and housing census in Montenegro, and expects that it to be conducted in the course of this year in line with EU and international standards, in an open and transparent way, without fear of intimidation for all recognised national minorities; calls on the authorities to avoid any politicisation of the process;

38.

Welcomes the multi-ethnic identity of the country and calls for further promoting it and respecting it on all levels, including the languages used, cultural heritage and the traditions of local communities, as well as for protecting their political rights; emphasises the need to protect all of the national minorities’ political rights, in particular as some of them no longer have minority party representatives in the Parliament of Montenegro;

39.

Strongly condemns verbal and physical attacks against and intimidation of any minorities, including national minorities; regrets that vulnerable groups, including Roma and Egyptians, continue to experience multiple forms of discrimination and difficulties in exercising their rights; welcomes the adoption of the strategy for the inclusion of Roma and Egyptians 2021-2025, which pays special attention to anti-gypsyism and encourages the authorities to further increase efforts to fight discrimination, ensure fair access to education, justice, housing, healthcare and the labour market, and to take effective measures against hate speech;

40.

Calls on the Montenegrin authorities to acknowledge the tradition and cultural heritage of the Croatian community in the multi-ethnic Bay of Kotor; notes with concern the notice of eviction by 15 April 2022 received by the Croatian National Assembly in Tivat;

41.

Notes that gender-based violence and violence against children continue to be of serious concern, and that this has deteriorated further during the COVID-19 pandemic; calls for improving specialist support services for women, disadvantaged groups and victims of domestic abuse, and calls on Montenegro to provide adequate funding for this, including to civil society organisations providing such support; welcomes the proposal to introduce tougher penalties for violence against women and children;

42.

Urges the Montenegrin authorities to thoroughly implement the standards of the Istanbul Convention, launch public awareness-raising campaigns, encourage reporting of domestic violence in safe conditions, and increase the number of well-trained and gender-sensitive law enforcement officers and judges so as to ensure the proper investigation and prosecution of such crimes; urges the Montenegrin authorities to implement effective measures against sexual harassment, including at the work place; remains worried by frequent hate speech and sexism directed at women in politics and public life and calls for the adoption of legal and policy measures to promote the political participation of women;

43.

Welcomes the establishment of the Council for the Rights of the Child; stresses the need to further improve the treatment of children in civil proceedings and child-friendly justice; deplores insufficient protection of victims, especially women and children including during and after custody court proceedings; calls on all state bodies to systematically approach this issue on the basis of the highest protection and support standards and best European practices;

44.

Welcomes progress on the protection and promotion of LGBTIQ rights and the first same-sex registered partnership in July 2021, and the peaceful organisation of Pride in 2021; calls on Montenegro to continue to harmonise and amend other laws and bylaws, in particular on social benefits and residence, in order to fully implement the law on registered partnership; calls for further measures against hate speech, social exclusion and discrimination of the LGBTIQ community, and to improve their access to justice, employment, housing and healthcare, inter alia by ensuring access to hormone therapy for trans people and respecting their physical and mental integrity;

45.

Calls on Montenegro to properly include LGBTIQ civil society in the work of the new legal gender recognition working group, which should work towards legal gender recognition based on self-determination;

46.

Regrets that persons with disabilities continue to face multiple forms of discrimination, which has been exacerbated by the COVID-19 pandemic, and deplores the lack of alignment of national legislation with the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities; welcomes the fact that the reform of the National Disability Determination System is under way and calls for the effective implementation of strategies to tackle gaps in upholding the rights of persons with disabilities across sectors and policies, including healthcare, the labour market and in administrative and judicial proceedings; stresses the urgent need for a de-institutionalisation strategy;

Reconciliation and good neighbourly relations

47.

Commends Montenegro’s constructive role in regional cooperation and welcomes the implementation of actions under the Western Balkans Common Regional Market; calls for concrete action to find and implement definite and binding solutions to long-running bilateral disputes in a constructive and neighbourly spirit, including border disputes with neighbouring countries and including the demarcation issues with Croatia and Serbia;

48.

Emphasises that all regional economic cooperation in the Western Balkans should be inclusive and acceptable to all six countries, establishing cooperation on an equal footing, while strengthening further alignment with EU standards and the acquis; expresses, in this context, its cautious view towards the Open Balkan Initiative, which does not encompass all six countries, and expresses its conviction that it should be based on EU rules and bring only positive impacts on the EU integration process;

49.

Welcomes the removal of roaming charges between Montenegro and five other Western Balkan states as of 1 July 2021; urges the government and the Commission to negotiate a plan that would lead to the speedy elimination of roaming charges between Montenegro and EU Member States;

50.

Notes Montenegro’s continued cooperation under the Sarajevo Declaration Process; welcomes the adoption of the resolution on Srebrenica of 17 June 2021; welcomes the first ever attendance by the Foreign Minister of Montenegro of the joint commemoration of Morinj camp victims; notes that since 2006 just eight war crime trials have been held and only low-level perpetrators have been tried; underlines there should be no tolerance for genocide denial, inflammatory rhetoric or the glorification of war criminals;

51.

Urges Montenegro to intensify its efforts in proactively prioritising and punishing war crimes and their glorification and in clarifying the fate of missing persons; recalls the need to open up former Yugoslav secret service archives and follow the legal procedures to transfer relevant files to the Montenegrin state archives;

52.

Calls on the Montenegrin authorities to comply fully with the provisions on succession of the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, especially as regards military assets;

The economy

53.

Expresses its concern about the persistently high unemployment rate, in particular among women and young people, and urges the authorities to step up efforts to improve their access to the labour market and address the brain drain, the gender gaps in employment and pay, and the availability of affordable childcare; reiterates the need for better alignment of the education system with the job market; notes the recovery of the labour market and welcomes the steps towards implementing the Youth Guarantee Programme;

54.

Notes the announcement of the ‘Europe Now’ initiative, which aims to achieve higher living standards and a more competitive economy through more sustainable and inclusive economic growth model;

55.

Expresses concern over Montenegro’s sustainable macroeconomic stability and growing vulnerability owing to the increase of its public debt, in particular to China, and the new EUR 750 million loan taken by the government without consulting the Parliament; welcomes efforts made towards decreasing these fiscal vulnerabilities, including those related to China; calls on the Commission to follow up on the macroeconomic situation and vulnerability in the next country report; notes that investments by third countries and foreign companies in strategic sectors may pose a risk of creating unwarranted economic dependencies;

56.

Notes with concern the negative impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on Montenegro’s economy; notes the encouraging signs of Montenegro’s economic recovery in 2021 following a deep recession in 2020, and welcomes Montenegro’s projected strong economic growth; calls for more sustainable economic and financial planning as well as a more timely and constructive response to minimise the damage caused by the pandemic to social groups in the most vulnerable situations; calls on the government to organise genuine social dialogue in the post-pandemic recovery process;

57.

Welcomes the disbursement of a EUR 60 million from the COVID-19 Macro-Financial Assistance package aimed at mitigating economic impacts of the pandemic and preserving macroeconomic stability, as well as the mobilisation of EUR 14,2 billion from IPA III to support Western Balkans partners in meeting the requirements for European Union membership;

58.

Welcomes the announcement of public services digitalisation and development of transactional electronic government services to enhance economic recovery; calls on the Montenegrin government to promote the digital inclusion of all social groups, and encourages the development of targeted preventive measures and incentives to legalise informal businesses and employees, as a large informal sector continues to hinder economic and social development in Montenegro;

59.

Welcomes the signing of the Association Agreement to the Horizon Europe programme 2021-2027;

60.

Strongly condemns the so-called golden passport scheme and regrets its extension until December 2022 despite previous announcements that the scheme would be phased out and without wider consultation of relevant institutions; urges Montenegro to take more action to prevent money laundering; stresses that citizenship by investment carries security risks and potential for corruption, money laundering and tax evasion; calls on Montenegro to immediately terminate the scheme; notes with concern that between December 2020 and 2022 almost 200 citizenship were granted to Russian nationals;

Environment, energy and transport

61.

Welcomes the adoption of a national climate change adaptation plan and encourages Montenegro to speed up reforms in line with the EU’s 2030 climate and energy policy framework and strengthen its implementation procedures; calls on the authorities to make the best use of available EU pre-accession assistance in this regard in order to move towards closing the benchmarks of Chapter 27 (environment and climate change);

62.

Welcomes the clean energy package adopted in November 2021; encourages the authorities to make progress in drafting its national energy and climate plan, focusing on sustainable renewable energy sources and avoiding new investments in fossil gas and coal-based infrastructure and to submit it to the Energy Community Secretariat for its recommendations; calls on Montenegro to increase its efforts to cut its electricity distribution network losses, to diversify its renewable sources and reduce its reliance on climate-vulnerable hydropower generation; welcomes the suspension of concession agreements for small hydropower plants that did now follow appropriate environmental standards and calls for all new projects to respect EU environment, State aid and concession standards; urges the authorities to improve monitoring and implementation of air quality measures in polluted areas;

63.

Regrets that the operation of the Pljevlja coal power plant continues after it exceeded the number of operating hours and reiterates its urgent call on the Montenegrin authorities to immediately bring it into compliance with the Energy Community Treaty; notes with caution the EUR 15 million cost increase for the planned reconstruction of the plant in line with environmental standards, which has not yet started; calls on the authorities to publish the feasibility study and the findings of the public prosecutor’s investigation into the tender process, and to consider a comprehensive transition plan with a view to the plant’s planned closure;

64.

Reiterates its call on Montenegro to take urgent measures to effectively conserve protected areas, and encourages it to continue identifying potential Natura 2000 sites; welcomes the proclamation of three marine protected areas (Platamuni, Katič and Stari Ulcinj) and the nomination of the beech forests in Biogradska Gora National Park for inclusion on the UNESCO world heritage list; expresses concern about damage to bodies of water and rivers related to infrastructure projects, including Lake Skadar, Sinjajevina, Komarnica and others; regrets that despite initial progress the Sinjajevina issue is still not solved; underlines the need for assessment and compliance with the Habitats Directive and the Water Framework Directive; urges the Montenegrin authorities to enforce effective, dissuasive and proportionate penalties for all environmental offences and to root out corruption in this sector;

65.

Regrets the lack of progress on key sectoral reforms in transport policy; calls on Montenegro to further implement its Transport Development Strategy and strengthen administrative capacities for the implementation of trans-European networks; underlines that in the Western Balkans, the construction sector is among the most vulnerable to organised crime and corruption; underlines that infrastructure investments need to comply with EU standards on environmental impact assessment and cost-benefit analyses while respecting EU rules on public procurement and State aid;

66.

Notes China’s increased interest in investing in the Western Balkans and transportation infrastructure projects in Montenegro as part of its Belt and Road Initiative; welcomes the Economic and Investment Plan for the Western Balkans and the EU Global Gateway Initiative as greener, transparent alternatives for financing infrastructure projects;

67.

Notes with regret the damage to the Tara River Basin Biosphere Reserve and the Durmitor National Park UNESCO heritage site linked to the building of the Bar-Boljare highway; calls on Montenegro to implement riverbed revitalisation measures and closely monitor the environmental impact of transport infrastructure construction; expresses concern that the cost of the Bar-Boljare highway was largely underestimated and that no action has been taken in spite of unclear public procurement procedures, the lack of planning documentation and ecological concerns; notes that Montenegro’s application for co-financing from the Western Balkans Investment Framework is pending;

68.

Calls on Montenegro to address illegal waste disposal and to take further steps to improve planning procedures for wastewater facilities with a view to speeding up their construction; notes the lack of progress and rising costs in building essential wastewater treatment plants to prevent sewage pollution in seven municipalities;

69.

Encourages Montenegro to step up its action on institutional and legislative reforms on hunting and fishing, with a particular focus on protected areas and protected species;

o o

70.

Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the President of the European Council, the Commission, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the governments and parliaments of the Member States, and to the President, the Government and Parliament of Montenegro.

(1) OJ L 108, 29.4.2010, p. 1.

(2) OJ L 330, 20.9.2021, p. 1.

(3) OJ C 362, 8.9.2021, p. 129.

(4) OJ C 15, 12.1.2022, p. 100.

(5) Texts adopted, P9_TA(2021)0506.

(6) ECRI conclusions on the implementation of the recommendations in respect of Montenegro subject to interim follow-up, 2 June 2020, https://rm.coe.int/ecri-conclusions-on-the-implementation-of-the-recommendations-in-respe/16809e8273

(7) Resolution of 19 May 2021 on the 2019-2020 Commission Reports on Montenegro (OJ C 15, 12.1.2022, p. 100).

27.1.2023

Official Journal of the European Union

C 32/74

P9_TA(2022)0267

Future of EU-Africa trade relations

European Parliament resolution of 23 June 2022 on the future of EU-Africa trade relations (2021/2178(INI))

(2023/C 32/09)

The European Parliament,

—	having regard to the UN 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development,

—	having regard to the Paris Agreement,

—	having regard to the joint statement following the Sixth European Union — African Union (AU) Summit of 17-18 February 2022 entitled ‘A Joint Vision for 2030’,

—	having regard to the Commission communication of 11 December 2019 entitled ‘The European Green Deal’ (COM(2019)0640),

—	having regard to the joint communication of the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 9 March 2020 entitled ‘Towards a comprehensive Strategy with Africa’ (JOIN(2020)0004),

—	having regard to its resolution of 25 March 2021 entitled ‘A new EU-Africa Strategy — a partnership for sustainable and inclusive development’ (1),

—	having regard to the AU ‘Agenda 2063: The Africa We Want’,

—	having regard to the AU initiatives launched to achieve the Agenda 2063, including Accelerated Industrial Development for Africa, the Programme for Infrastructure Development for Africa, Boosting Intra-African Trade and Africa Mining Vision,

—	having regard to the Partnership Agreement between the European Union, of the one part, and the members of the Organisation of African, Caribbean and Pacific States, of the other part,

—	having regard to the Commission communication of 18 February 2021 entitled ‘Trade Policy Review — An Open, Sustainable and Assertive Trade Policy’ (COM(2021)0066),

—	having regard to the Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs), those concluded and those under negotiation, between the EU and 14 sub-Saharan African countries and regions, and other EU free trade agreements with Northern African countries,

—	having regard to the AU Assembly of Heads of State and Government decision of 2 July 2018 on the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) (2),

—	having regard to the Kigali Decision of the AU Assembly of Heads of State and Government of July 2016 on the outcome of the retreat of the Assembly of the African Union, in particular paragraph 5 on the financing of the Union (3),

—	having regard to the Commission communication of 12 September 2018 entitled ‘A new Africa-Europe Alliance for Sustainable Investment and Jobs: Taking our partnership for investment and jobs to the next level’ (COM(2018)0643),

—	having regard to its resolution of 13 March 2018 on gender equality in EU trade agreements (4),

—	having regard to the G7 Finance Ministers’ statement of 25 September 2020 on the Debt Service Suspension Initiative and debt relief for vulnerable countries,

—	having regard to the joint communication of the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 1 December 2021 on the Global Gateway (JOIN(2021)0030),

—	having regard to the Commission proposal of 14 July 2021 for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing a carbon border adjustment mechanism (COM(2021)0564),

—

having regard to the joint communication of the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 25 November 2020 entitled ‘The EU Gender Action Plan (GAP III) — An Ambitious Agenda for Gender Equality and Women’s Empowerment in EU External Action’ (JOIN(2020)0017),

—

having regard to the joint communication of the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 9 February 2021 entitled ‘Renewed partnership with the Southern Neighbourhood: A new Agenda for the Mediterranean’ (JOIN(2021)0002) and the accompanying joint staff working document (SWD(2021)0023),

—	having regard to its resolution of 10 March 2022 on the EU Gender Action Plan III (5),

—	having regard to Council Regulation (EC) No 2173/2005 of 20 December 2005 on the establishment of a FLEGT licensing scheme for imports of timber into the European Community (6) and the associated Voluntary Partnership Agreements between the EU and partner countries,

—

—	having regard to its resolution of 10 March 2021 with recommendations to the Commission on corporate due diligence and corporate accountability (7),

—	having regard to the Kimberley Process and to its resolution of 16 December 2021 on the implementation of the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme (8),

—	having regard to Regulation (EU) 2017/821 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 May 2017 laying down supply chain due diligence obligations for Union importers of tin, tantalum and tungsten, their ores, and gold originating from conflict-affected and high-risk areas (9),

—	having regard to the Commission proposal of 22 September 2021 for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on applying a generalised scheme of tariff preferences (COM(2021)0579),

—	having regard to its resolution of 10 February 2021 on the New Circular Economy Action Plan (10),

—	having regard to its resolution of 20 October 2021 on a farm to fork strategy for a fair, healthy and environmentally-friendly food system (11),

—	having regard to its resolution of 25 November 2021 with recommendations to the Commission on legal migration policy and law (12),

—	having regard to the declaration of the Africa-Europe Forum of Local and Regional Governments of 15 February 2022,

—	having regard to the joint declaration of the business organisations of the Seventh EU-Africa Business Forum of 14 February 2022,

—	having regard to the Africa-Europe Week CSO Forum outcome document of February 2022 entitled ‘No decision about us without us!’,

—	having regard to the joint outcomes of the youth track of the Africa-Europe Week of February 2022,

—	having regard to the UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) Economic Development in Africa Report 2021 entitled ‘Reaping the potential benefits of the African Continental Free Trade Area for inclusive growth’,

—	having regard to the Africa-Europe Alliance for Sustainable Investment and Jobs,

—	having regard to the recommendations in the final report of South Africa’s Presidential Advisory Panel on Land Reform and Agriculture of 4 May 2019,

—	having regard to the report of the AU-EU Digital Economy Task Force of 13 June 2019 entitled ‘New Africa-Europe Digital Economy Partnership: Accelerating the Achievement of the Sustainable Development Goals’,

—	having regard to the EU Aid for Trade Progress Report 2021,

—	having regard to the EU multi-stakeholder dialogue for sustainable cocoa, which focuses on the cocoa sector in two of the main producing countries, Côte d’Ivoire and Ghana,

—	having regard to the address of Nana Akufo-Addo, President of Ghana, of 12 December 2021 to the European Parliament in Strasbourg,

—	having regard to the UN General Assembly resolution of 2 March 2022 on the aggression against Ukraine,

—	having regard to the Commission communication of 23 March 2022 on safeguarding food security and reinforcing the resilience of food systems (COM(2022)0133),

—	having regard the European Council conclusions of 16 December 2021,

—	having regard to Rule 54 of its Rules of Procedure,

—	having regard to the opinions of the Committee on Development and the Committee on Agriculture and Rural Development,

—	having regard to the report of the Committee on International Trade (A9-0169/2022),

whereas the European Union (EU) and Africa have an important and long-standing political, economic and cultural relationship; whereas the Sixth Summit of the EU and the African Union (AU) in 2022 led to an agreement on ‘A Joint Vision for 2030’, a new mutually beneficial joint strategy which strengthens the ties between the two unions and will allow for closer cooperation on issues of mutual convergence in the areas of trade, development, security and good governance; whereas its aim is to drive forward our common priorities by preserving together our interests and common public goods, the security and prosperity of our citizens, the protection of human rights for all, gender equality and women’s empowerment in all spheres of life, respect for democratic principles and the rule of law, actions to preserve the environment and biodiversity, sustainable and inclusive economic growth, the fight against inequalities, support for children’s rights and the inclusion of young people and the most disadvantaged; whereas both unions recognise the importance of food security and nutrition; whereas this renewed partnership will be founded on geography, acknowledgement of history, human ties, respect for sovereignty, mutual respect and accountability, shared values, equality between partners and reciprocal commitments; whereas the EU and the AU have committed to strengthening their strategic partnership in order to face new challenges together, such as climate change, post-pandemic recovery and building up resilience to future shocks;

whereas peace is a precondition for sustainable development and for a stable trade and investment environment; whereas the geopolitical global context has been subject to considerable change since the Russian Federation’s illegal, unprovoked and unjustified invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022, including when it comes to relations between the EU and Africa; whereas the UN General Assembly condemned Russia’s aggression against Ukraine with an overwhelming majority in its resolution of 2 March 2022, including support from the AU, with 28 of its member states supporting the resolution; whereas 16 of its member states abstained and nine chose not to vote; whereas Russia’s invasion and the consequences of the war are having devastating consequences for global value and supply chains, in particular for access to wheat and other commodities, which is putting many more millions of people at risk of food shortages; whereas food security on the African continent is being affected particularly badly; whereas North Africa imports 60 % of its wheat and other food crops from Ukraine and Russia, and several African countries are facing shortages in imports of fertilisers; whereas the disruption of supply chains brought about by Russia’s war against Ukraine could lead to food riots and social unrest;

C.	whereas achieving the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) by 2030 must become the central guideline and benchmark of success of EU-Africa cooperation, including the contribution of trade and investment relations to combating poverty;

D.	whereas migration is part of SDG 10.7, which aims to facilitate orderly, safe, regular and responsible migration and mobility of people;

whereas the EU Trade Policy Review acknowledges the strategic importance of deepening engagement with the African continent and African states by proposing several strands of action to strengthen trade and economic links between the EU and Africa; whereas Europe and Africa are neighbouring continents whose prosperity and stability are closely interlinked and need to be supported by closer and fairer economic integration;

whereas the EU and its Member States are the world’s largest providers of Aid for Trade (AfT), making 38 % of global contributions; whereas Africa continued to receive the largest share of AfT commitments in 2019; whereas the EU intends to increase the share of EU AfT allocated to least-developed countries (LDCs) to help to double their share of global exports, as in 2020, the LDCs’ share of global exports was still 1 % and their share of exports to the EU was still 2 %;

G.	whereas the EU should pursue a ‘Team Europe’ approach in its cooperation with Africa, including more coordination between different Commission directorates-general, European development financing institutions, European export credit agencies, commercial banks and EU Member States;

whereas the EU and its Member States constitute the most important trading partner for Africa, and whereas the value of trade increased in 2021 to EUR 288 billion from a low value of EUR 225 billion in 2020 as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic; whereas the trade deficit in favour of the EU decreased from EUR 24 billion in 2020 to EUR 4 billion in 2021; whereas under existing trade agreements and the EU’s unilateral preferences for developing countries, 90 % of African exports enjoy duty-free and quota-free access to the EU single market; whereas in 2021, over 65 % of goods imported to the EU from Africa were primary goods such as food and drink, raw materials and energy, and whereas in 2021, 68 % of goods exported from the EU to Africa were manufactured goods; whereas this trade structure reflects the structural imbalance and interdependence of the economies involved, and hence keeps the African continent at the lower value end of global value chains; whereas the EU and its Member States have long been Africa’s biggest source of investment, official development assistance, humanitarian assistance and security funding;

whereas the United States did trade in goods with Africa in 2021 of approximately USD 26,7 billion in exports and USD 37,5 billion in imports, the combined value being USD 64,2 billion; whereas despite the Prosper Africa initiative launched by the previous US administration, US trade with sub-Saharan Africa is stagnating and represents less than 1 % of all US trade in goods;

whereas Africa’s share in global trade has declined steadily over the past 50 years and accounts for 2,9 % of world trade according to UNCTAD; whereas the continent has a high level of dependence on imports and commodity-based natural resource exports; whereas interregional trade accounts for only 14,4 % of total continental trade;

K.	whereas the African Development Bank estimates the economic cost from the illicit trade in natural resources to be USD 120 billion per annum, which is 5 % of Africa’s gross domestic product (GDP) (13);

whereas the level of intra-continental trade in Africa is far below its potential, and strengthening it is essential for the continent’s sustainable economic structural transformation; whereas the African and European private sectors have a shared interest in the successful and effective implementation of the AfCFTA, notably with regard to the economic growth and job opportunities it is expected to create; whereas the entry into force of the AfCFTA on 30 May 2019 and the launch of trading under its preferences on 1 January 2021 as a flagship project of the First Ten-Year Implementation Plan (2014-2023) under the AU’s Agenda 2063 have given new momentum to pan-African trade and investment opportunities and have increased Euro-African connectivity;

whereas the AfCFTA will become the world’s largest free trade area in terms of participating countries, including 54 out of the 55 AU member states, creating a market of 1,2 billion people, including a fast-growing middle class, and making it the eighth biggest economic bloc in the world with a combined GDP of USD 3 trillion, which is expected to more than double by 2050; whereas according to the World Bank, each year Africa’s GDP could increase by 1 %, its total employment by 1,2 % and intra-African trade by 33 %; whereas the creation of the AfCFTA represents a major opportunity for the EU, but its success will depend in large part on its ability to mobilise investments and to foster trade exchanges and a corporate presence in Africa;

whereas within the AfCFTA, tariffs on 90 % of tariff lines are to be eliminated, with a commitment by non-least-developed countries to liberalise tariffs on non-sensitive goods over five years and LDCs over 10 years; whereas 7 % of tariff lines are on sensitive goods and non-least-developed countries will liberalise tariffs on sensitive goods over 10 years and LDCs over 13 years; whereas 3 % of tariff lines can be excluded from liberalisation; whereas the AfCFTA is an important step in leaving behind the current model for formal trade in Africa, which is characterised by long border crossing times, extensive regulatory requirements and high taxes;

whereas the AfCFTA aims to be, in addition to a trade-liberalising instrument, an enabler of inclusive growth and sustainable development in line with the Agenda 2063; whereas the effective and coordinated implementation of the AfCFTA as a continental regime is essential for enhancing intra-African trade and will be a major challenge, with different layers and commitments arising from trade agreements, regional economic communities and customs unions requiring extensive measures for the development of cross-border transport infrastructure and enhanced trade facilitation to better enable cross-border value chains; whereas governance reforms targeting trade facilitation, non-tariff barriers to trade, compliance with common technical and health-related product standards and labour law, trade remedies and safeguards are essential to achieve the AU’s aspirations and to make the AfCFTA an effective and predictable regime; whereas like every trade agreement, the AfCFTA will create positive and negative effects and it is essential to have proper support measures in place to mitigate any adverse effects and ensure that the AfCFTA can contribute to the advancement of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) and in particular ensure that women and youth-led companies can benefit from new opportunities;

P.	whereas with regard to trade and in particular rules of origin and cumulation, the EU’s diverse arrangements with African countries have led to a fragmentation of the African continent, thus creating tariff-related barriers and hindering the building of cross-border value chains within the AfCFTA;

whereas African states are not homogeneous; whereas the African continent is particularly vulnerable to external ‘shocks’ given its high rate of dependency, not only on external financial resources and revenue such as foreign remittances, foreign direct investment, tourism and external aid, but also on imports of manufactured goods;

whereas Africa is a continent of hope and opportunity and is perceived as such by a growing number of its young people; whereas Africa is the youngest continent in the world, with a median age of 19,8 years and 60 % of the population under the age of 25; whereas by 2050, the population of Africa will have doubled, from some 1,2 billion people to some 2,4 billion, and whereas, by the same year, 50 % of the global population under 25 years of age will be in Africa, which will be a significant challenge to the economies and democratic governance of African countries and will have an impact on geopolitics, global trade and migration; whereas Africa is today home to four times as many children as Europe and whereas 70 % of the population of sub-Saharan Africa is under 30; whereas the increase in the population and the rising number of middle-class individuals will require a proportional increase in food supplies, and therefore the agri-food sector should open up economic and employment opportunities for young Africans, whose participation in the sector will also be essential for ensuring generational replacement and for renewing the agri-food system; whereas Africa’s young people are in need of quality education and employment and business opportunities to enable them to contribute to their countries’ growth and sustainable development; whereas Europe’s population is ageing and many economic sectors are already reporting shortages in qualified labour and problems in finding apprentices; whereas economically empowering women and young people in Africa contributes both to economic growth and to advancing their position in society;

whereas the SDG of zero hunger aims to end hunger by 2030 and achieve food security and improved nutrition; whereas progress on this goal has slowed in recent years, with more than 800 million people on our planet still going to bed hungry every night; whereas the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) has forecasted that the number of people in Africa suffering from hunger will rise significantly from 280 to 300 million, placing it by 2030 on a par with Asia as the regions with the highest number of undernourished people; whereas food insecurity has worsened in the continent and 21 % of the population was malnourished in 2020; whereas the 2021 UN Food Systems Summit established that driving these unwelcome trends are the increasing frequency and intensity of conflict, climate variability and extremes, economic slowdowns and downturns, and high levels of inequality, the latter increased by economic downturns in 2020, which were mainly a consequence of COVID-19 containment measures across the world;

whereas climate change and environmental degradation are existential threats to Africa, the EU and the entire world, and require joint responsiveness and substantive investments in resilience; whereas EU-Africa trade relations must play a crucial role in addressing the climate transition and fostering common efforts to achieve sustainable growth, inclusive economic development and access to public goods, notably through the promotion of sustainable supply chains and trade diversification in the transition to a low-carbon economy; whereas the EU has committed to turning itself into the first climate-neutral continent by 2050 and to decoupling its economic growth from resource use; whereas African countries have so far contributed and are contributing very little to greenhouse gas emissions, regardless of whether this is measured through historical, current or expected emissions and in total or per capita terms, while production, lifestyle and consumption habits in the EU do contribute to climate change; whereas the effects of climate change will be catastrophic, particularly for many African states, some of which will be among the worst impacted; whereas in sub-Saharan Africa, adaptation costs to avoid the even higher costs of additional disaster relief are estimated at USD 30–50 billion per year over the next decade, or 2-3 % of regional GDP; whereas the 27th Conference of the Parties to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (COP27) will take place in the African state of Egypt in 2022; whereas the transition to a decarbonised world must be just and equitable; whereas the EU has proposed to make energy access one of the main pillars of cooperation with Africa under the European Green Deal;

whereas the EU and the AU have announced an Africa-Europe investment package of EUR 150 billion over a period of six years, an average of EUR 25 billion a year, which will support common ambitions for the 2030 Agenda and the AU Agenda 2063 and will have investment, health and education components; whereas these investments should not add to the debt burden of African countries;

whereas about 34 % of African households live below the USD 1,90 per day international poverty line, and around 40 % of the continent’s total wealth is owned by approximately 0,0001 % of its population; whereas large disparities remain in the development of African countries; whereas given the expected rapid growth of the African population, it is even more essential to ensure that it will be accompanied by sustainable development, quality education and decent job creation;

W.	whereas only around one in three African countries have decent work country programmes, which have been established as the main vehicle of delivery for International Labour Organization (ILO) support tailored to the priorities and outcomes of each country;

whereas the Commission has launched the Sustainable Cocoa Initiative, co-led by its Directorate-General for Trade and its Directorate-General for International Partnerships and focused on Ghana and Côte d’Ivoire, with Cameroon as an observer, with the main objectives being to ensure a sustainable living income for farmers, to achieve the elimination of child labour in the cocoa supply chain and to achieve the elimination of deforestation for the purposes of creating cocoa plantations;

Y.	whereas the 2021 UNICEF/ILO report on child labour indicates that child labour has been on the rise in sub-Saharan Africa since 2012 and that this upward trend will continue because of the pervasive effects of the pandemic;

whereas the COVID-19 pandemic and its economic consequences set back growth across Africa in 2020 and may have thrown an additional 30 million people into poverty and exacerbated the prevalence of child labour; whereas post-pandemic recovery packages signal a sea change in policy consensus; whereas the capacity of public funds to support recovery differs across regions, causing an imminent risk of inequalities being exacerbated; whereas the full vaccination rate was no higher than 15 % in Africa as of March 2022 (in comparison with 73 % in the EU); whereas millions of vaccines have to be destroyed before they can be used in poorer nations because of a rapidly approaching expiry date; whereas the EU and the AU have committed to supporting fully fledged African health sovereignty to enable the continent to respond to future public health emergencies, and have committed to supporting, to this end, a common agenda for manufacturing vaccines, medicines, diagnostics, therapeutics and health products in Africa, including through investment in production capacities, voluntary technology transfers and the strengthening of the regulatory framework to enable equitable access to vaccines, diagnostics and therapeutics; whereas Parliament welcomes all measures in support of the African health system and the continent’s health capacities;

AA.

whereas a sustainable and inclusive recovery in Africa from COVID-19 will require an additional USD 1 trillion annually, on top of the USD 2,5 trillion annual gap in finance for the SDGs that predated the crisis; whereas this endeavour constitutes an important investment opportunity; whereas the European Investment Bank (EIB) has stepped up its efforts to help African partners respond to the COVID-19 health and economic crisis by providing EUR 5 billion to support more than EUR 12 billion of transformational private and public investment across Africa in 2020;

AB.

whereas the Sixth EU-AU Summit underlined the urgency of the World Trade Organization’s (WTO’s) contribution to the fight against the pandemic and to the recovery of the global economy, and committed the parties to working constructively towards an agreement on a comprehensive WTO response to the pandemic that includes trade-related and intellectual-property-related aspects; whereas the European Commission and the governments of the United States, India and South Africa have reached a compromise proposal in the WTO to be presented to the WTO member states that would facilitate a waiver of certain intellectual property rules, in particular certain criteria of compulsory licensing provisions under the WTO Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), while it does not yet include provisions regarding diagnostic tools, devices and treatments as demanded by African states; whereas a broader discussion in the WTO is yet to commence;

AC.

whereas the press release for the report of the Intergovernmental Science-Policy Platform on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services Workshop on Biodiversity and Pandemics notes that ‘pandemic risk can be significantly lowered by reducing the human activities that drive the loss of biodiversity, by greater conservation of protected areas, and through measures that reduce unsustainable exploitation of high biodiversity regions’;

AD.

whereas according to the International Monetary Fund, about 60 % of low-income countries are at high risk of or are already in debt distress as a result of the COVID-19 crisis, while in 2015 that figure was below 30 %; whereas governments of highly indebted countries in both Europe and Africa find it difficult to mobilise much-needed investment in the preconditions for economic development, such as a qualified work force and modern infrastructure;

AE.

whereas the AfCFTA secretariat has established a USD 1 billion AfCFTA Adjustment Fund, funded by the African Export-Import Bank (Afreximbank), which is aimed at supporting countries that would in the short term experience revenue losses as a result of reducing or eliminating their tariffs; whereas the AfCFTA secretariat estimates the actual need to be about USD 7 billion;

AF.

whereas the EU is the world’s biggest importer and exporter of agri-food products; whereas despite the fact that Africa has the most arable land in the world, AU countries are net food importers, with farmers producing below their potential, partially due to the effects of certain European domestic policies and practices on prices that African farmers can achieve for their products on local markets, increased by tariffs that render African processed food exports uncompetitive; whereas common-agricultural-policy-supported exports of EU milk powder to West Africa have increased, and whereas the tripling of exports since the EU lifted its milk quotas in 2015 has had serious consequences for many local herders and farmers whose milk prices cannot compete with the very low prices for milk powder; whereas respecting fair conditions for EU-Africa trade in agricultural products should be the baseline for EU and African exports and imports of food and other agricultural products, in addition to the need to ensure that agricultural exports do not contradict the goal to establish a more resilient food sector in Africa; whereas to advance sustainable agriculture on both continents, room should be made for agriculture reform models in Africa and Europe that offer farmers dignity, strengthen domestic and regional resilience and can unlock the potential for both continents to ensure abundant nutrition and become self-sustaining in food, as well as contributors to food security in other regions of the world; whereas family farming provides for up to 70 % of the food supply in the continent that is actually consumed by Africans, rather than being farmed for the purpose of being exported; whereas according to the UN Development Programme’s Africa Human Development Report 2016, gender inequality is costing sub-Saharan Africa 6 % of the region’s GDP, jeopardising the continent’s efforts to achieve inclusive human development and economic growth; whereas equalising women’s access to agricultural inputs could raise crop production by up to 19 %, boost agricultural and overall GDP and lift hundreds of thousands of people out of poverty (14);

AG.

whereas in 2020, there was an almost 40 % increase in the number of people affected by food insecurity compared with the previous year; whereas the war in Ukraine demonstrates the interconnectedness of food security and the global market, and the dependency of some African countries on food imports from a small number of exporting countries or regions; whereas overdependence can leave countries vulnerable to external shocks; whereas the Food & Agriculture Resilience Mission initiative was presented at the G7 summit on 24 March 2022, with concrete measures to ensure food security globally, and notably in the African countries most impacted by the food production disruption resulting from the war in Ukraine; whereas household surveys by the International Monetary Fund found that broadening access to early warning systems and information on food prices and weather, even by means of simple text or voice message to inform farmers when to plant, irrigate or fertilise their crops, can enable climate-smart agriculture and has the potential to reduce the risk of food insecurity by 30 percentage points;

AH.

whereas micro, small and medium-sized enterprises in low and middle-income countries across Africa suffer, in terms of intra-African trade, from significant transaction costs and delays caused by limited cross-border relations between banks, issues with foreign currency availability, high service costs for intermediaries and the need to rate the selling and purchasing currencies against the US dollar; whereas technological developments and cooperation between central banks such as under the Pan-African Payment and Settlement System can offer a way out of this problem;

AI.

whereas negotiations are taking place in the AfCFTA on the planned liberalisation of services, starting with five priority sectors identified by the AU, namely transport, tourism, communications, financial and business services; whereas services account for 54 % of African GDP and 75 % of foreign direct investment;

AJ.

whereas the AU’s Digital Transformation Strategy for Africa (2020-2030) envisions a secured digital single market for Africa by 2030 where movement of persons, services and capital is ensured and individuals and businesses can seamlessly access and engage in online activities in line with the AfCFTA; whereas the digital economy in Africa offers prospects for increased job creation, particularly for SMEs, which provide an estimated 80 % of jobs across the continent and are the backbone of the African economy; whereas the digitalisation of trade and the promotion of paperless trading systems has significant potential to support small-scale traders, including women-led enterprises and young entrepreneurs; whereas substantive investment in internet infrastructure is needed to facilitate the digital participation of the African population, of which only 33 % had access to the internet in 2021; whereas our African partners are also actively seeking EU assistance in enhancing Africa’s digital infrastructure and ensuring proper connectivity and internet access across the continent; whereas Africa is trailing far behind the USA, China and to a lesser extent Europe when it comes to digital technological developments; whereas according to UNCTAD, Africa accounts for less than 1 % of global exports of digitally deliverable services;

Affirms that EU-Africa trade and investment relations form part of our joint endeavour to achieve the UN SDGs by 2030 and the objectives of the Paris Agreement; stresses that Africa is a key geographical priority in the EU’s new trade strategy, and underlines the importance of a more robust dialogue between the EU and Africa; emphasises, in this respect, that the EU should invest more efforts in taking the partnership beyond the traditional ‘donor-recipient’ relationship; stresses that the modernisation of EU-AU trade and investment relations can bring enormous benefits in terms of stimulating economic growth, regional integration, poverty reduction and job creation, can contribute to the recovery from the COVID-19 pandemic and to the green and digital transformation of the economies of countries in both the EU and the AU, as well as among our global trading partners, and must adhere to the principle of policy coherence for development as enshrined in Article 208 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union; underlines that geographical proximity and long-standing historical and cultural ties are increasingly reinforced by growing trade exchanges; stresses that the participation of civil society organisations must be a cornerstone of the EU-AU strategy to achieve the UN SDGs;

Calls on the Commission to deepen and better structure its cooperation with our African partners and therefore to establish a regular high-level policy dialogue, to include a parliamentary dimension also involving the European Parliament; calls for this dialogue to be complemented by an exchange at the level of regional groupings, as well as individual states, and by a parallel dialogue with civil society stakeholders in Africa and the EU as vital elements in advancing the EU’s equal partnership with Africa;

Stresses the importance of creating a resilient, competitive and solid infrastructure and industrial basis in Africa, as laid down in the AU’s Agenda 2063, aiming at the development of resilient value chains and high added value processing of raw materials in Africa as a major avenue towards quality job creation; calls on the Commission and European enterprises and investors, including the EIB, to apply modern, sustainable and, wherever possible, climate-neutral production technologies in African industrialisation projects; insists that social partners be involved in all stages of promoting industrialisation; stresses, in this regard, the need to support Africa in tailoring its own independent macroeconomic, fiscal, monetary and trade policies and calls on the Commission to enable Organisation of African, Caribbean and Pacific States (OACPS) countries to protect their infant industries, including through technical and financial support, and to provide for the right to legislate respectively; stresses that efforts to protect the environment should be placed at the centre of cooperation policies and programmes in support of industrialisation and the creation of decent jobs in Africa, to be established and implemented by all responsible stakeholders from the two continents;

Calls on the Commission to promote sustainable investments to move towards a carbon-free economy, in line with its pledge in the Glasgow Climate Pact, while ensuring responsible and sustainable sourcing and management of natural resources and raw materials, as well as sustainable waste management in line with its Green Deal objectives;

Underlines the fundamental role of functioning state institutions, authorities and infrastructure, and considers that their absence can be a major obstacle to trade; stresses, in this regard, that all African countries must improve legal certainty, as it is vital for any kind of trade to develop; calls on the Commission to work closely with its African counterparts to guarantee a business environment that is conducive to investment;

Stresses the need to adapt the economic and trade proposals of the new Agenda for the Mediterranean, adopted by the Commission on 9 February 2021, to the current emergency situation; calls for the smooth implementation of the trade-related projects under the Economic and Investment Plan as soon as possible;

Underlines that the EU needs an entirely new foundation for its economic partnership with Africa, on equal grounds and based on equality, mutual respect and understanding, including of the challenges African partners face in the context of trade and investment relations, taking into account the changing dynamics and addressing continuous imbalances and shortcomings; believes that this is a unique opportunity to revive trade relations between the two continents, and that the summit has established a pathway for the EU and AU to engage in a renewed, mutually beneficial, sustainable partnership based on solidarity and cooperation, and to reshape economic, commercial and trade relations with the aim of empowering Africa, including by ensuring fair and ethical trade relations which favour African continental integration; underlines that the EU-Africa trade relationship should promote human rights and labour rights, good governance, the rule of law and gender equality, and calls on the Commission to promote these elements within the context of EU-Africa trade relations;

Urges the Commission to help end the ‘fill and finish’ role of African nations by supporting a multi-stakeholder system which will allow AU nations to produce their own vaccinations, an ability already demonstrated in the production of HIV vaccines, which will open spaces for the development of scientific potential and decrease dependence on a handful of corporations worldwide;

Stresses that the EU response to global vaccination efforts to mitigate the COVID-19 pandemic led to a disruption in EU-Africa relations; underlines that the outcomes of the Sixth EU-AU Summit must be a new starting point for advancing EU-Africa relations; calls on the Commission to engage with African partners bilaterally and in a structured manner and to pursue regional and multilateral engagement to advance EU-Africa relations; calls on the Commission to engage with Parliament on a discussion on the TRIPS waiver compromise negotiated by the ‘quad’ of the EU, the US, India and South Africa; calls on the Commission to remain flexible and pragmatic in the discussions in the WTO aimed at reaching a compromise on a targeted and temporary TRIPS waiver with other WTO members so as to move towards a conclusion and meaningful results on trade- and health-related aspects by the 12th Ministerial Conference;

10.

Reiterates the importance of peace for positive social, environmental and economic development; takes note of the lack of support for the UN General Assembly resolution condemning the aggression against Ukraine among many African governments, and that African support for EU positions cannot be taken for granted; calls on the Commission and the European External Action Service to explore the variety of reasons for the scepticism, and to increase diplomatic efforts to build common positions against military aggression on both continents;

11.

Supports the objectives and aspirations of the AfCFTA as expressed in its preamble; supports also the Agenda 2063 aspirations of creating a continental market with the free movement of persons, capital, goods and services, in order to deepen the economic integration of the African continent; considers the AfCFTA an ambitious economic integration initiative which presents a major opportunity for African countries to boost inclusive growth, enable sustainable development, reduce poverty and improve living standards, generate high numbers of decent jobs, increase the competitiveness of African countries, promote green technology and energy, increase the sustainability of public finances, fight corruption and promote good governance, and achieve structural transformations within participating states; calls for the EU to actively support the AfCFTA; stresses that indicators in measuring economic success in Africa and the EU should be improved and diversified beyond GDP growth and recommends referring also to indicators such as the Gini coefficient, the Genuine Progress Indicator, the Human Development Index, the Theil index to measure export diversification, indicators pertaining to gender discrimination, and in particular the SDG progress reports;

12.

Recalls that between 2014 and 2020, the EU allocated more than EUR 74 million in funding to the establishment of the AfCFTA through its Pan-African Programme, and that the funding has been used for capacity building in the negotiation, ratification and implementation of the AfCFTA Agreement; calls for the EU and its Member States to continue their financial and technical support to the implementation of the AfCFTA; notes that for the AfCFTA to deliver on its promises and go beyond mere trade liberalisation in lifting people out of poverty, countries in Africa need the policy space to adopt policies that enhance consistency between trade measures, diversification objectives, responding to population needs, sustainability and inclusive growth;

13.

Calls on the commissions of both the AU and the EU to facilitate the development of regional value chains and better regional infrastructure in Africa; stresses the need for consistent investments and public oversight in the development of general and cross-border sustainable infrastructure; points out the need to invest significantly in transport infrastructure, connectivity and digitalisation in order to facilitate regional trade and thus the diversification and resilience of local, regional and continental value chains; notes that removing barriers to intra-African trade can facilitate the growth of regional value chains, which can facilitate means for African companies, and in particular SMEs, to internationalise; stresses that the Global Gateway should contribute to the development of infrastructure to increase intra-African trade and invites the AU partners to respond to the proposals of Team Europe for joint infrastructure projects; calls on both EU and African partners to implement the jointly identified priority projects without further delay, and to create project-related profit opportunities for local companies and job opportunities for the local population, while strictly observing high environmental and labour standards and the Paris Agreement; underlines the need for the further development of infrastructure for rural areas, and points out that in sub-Saharan Africa an estimated 40 % of staple foods being transported do not make it to the market owing to poor infrastructure and the lack of cooling and storage facilities; calls on the European Commission and the AU to map the regional value chains between the EU and Africa, beyond bilateral trade flows, and to perform a SWOT analysis, notably with a view to identifying avenues for nearshoring and areas of collaboration such as the circular economy and the greening of supply chains; stresses the importance of further developing the infrastructure and connections between sub-Saharan Africa and North Africa, and between West and East Africa;

14.

Underlines the importance of including gender equality and gender mainstreaming in EU-Africa trade relations as an essential component to foster inclusive and sustainable growth; stresses that trade and investment relations have the potential to promote gender equality and to contribute to the economic and social empowerment of women and to more equal and resilient economies and societies; considers that the EU-African partnership should provide particular support to female and youth entrepreneurship in rural and urban areas, including through small producer organisations, and that to do so it is essential to support equal access to economic and productive resources such as financial services, as well as to markets, and to safeguard land rights; welcomes the Commission’s work on data collection and analysis to better understand the impact of trade policy on women; calls on the Commission to engage with African partners to promote gender equality and women’s empowerment in EU-Africa trade relations; calls on the Commission to gender mainstream EU-Africa trade and investment relations; calls on the Commission to include standalone gender chapters in EPAs; emphasises the essential role of rural women in agricultural and rural economies across the African continent, in particular with regard to food security; recalls that almost half of agricultural work in Africa is done by women; calls for the development of exchanges between African and EU female entrepreneurs by means of platforms that enable networking, experience-sharing and the running of common projects; encourages the advancement of inheritance rights for women and girls and calls for the EU to support partner countries, particularly with regard to their recognition of women’s full entitlement to land rights;

15.

Underlines the need to establish a constructive public-private dialogue and to enable cultures to evolve with a view to the development of an intelligent network of ecosystems, and the eventual hybridisation of the public and private spheres; stresses that, against this backdrop, the EU must continue to work with African countries on facilitating and promoting private investment on the continent, as public investment is not enough on its own; calls for a further increase in public and private trilateral partnerships to develop new trade links in sectors of common interest such as energy, industry, transport;

16.

Stresses the key role attributed to the EU External Investment Plan, and in particular the European Fund for Sustainable Development as its first pillar, in shaping EU trade and investment policy towards Africa, in parallel with the EPAs; recalls its emphasis put on improving the investment climate in partner countries; stresses that the EU’s commitment to boost private-sector investment for achieving the SDGs must be tantamount to establishing mandatory human rights, social rights and environmental due diligence obligations, based on the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, which should apply to the whole value chain and include provisions on access to justice;

17.

Calls on the commissions of both the AU and the EU to create and facilitate the conditions required for African countries to change the nature of their integration into the world economy, from sources of primary commodities, to exporters of intermediate and final products, while maintaining policy space for the safeguarding of infant industries; recommends enhanced cooperation with universities and other research facilities in Africa in order to establish a platform for technology and knowledge exchange; highlights, in this context, the opportunity that developing and investing on emerging markets represents for both continents, in particular in the manufacturing sector; further stresses the importance of strengthening links between EU and African businesses in this regard, in order to help create value and raise standards and therefore improve competitiveness;

18.

Stresses that efforts geared towards supply chain diversification create opportunities for both continents and believes that the EU and the AU should work together to create the conditions and incentives required to support the diversification of investments and the production of EU and African companies;

19.

Reiterates that the EU and the AU share a common interest in a stable and rules-based multilateral trading system, which contributes to advancing economic growth in the EU and on the African continent; emphasises that the reform and modernisation of the WTO and the WTO rulebook is an important area for cooperation between the EU and the AU, and calls on the partners to work together to create a fair and equitable trade and financial global architecture through the revitalisation of the WTO, including the finalisation of the Doha Round to better take the interests of the countries in the Global South into account, as agreed on by the WTO membership;

20.

Highlights that the WTO-led Aid for Trade initiative aims to help least developed countries, in particular, to build the supply-side capacity and trade-related infrastructure they need to implement and benefit from WTO agreements and, more broadly, expand their trade; believes that, in this sense, this initiative is a key component in trade relations with Africa, particularly in the aftermath of the COVID-19 crisis;

21.

Points out that the Aid for Trade agenda should play a role in mobilising resources to address trade-related constraints, financing infrastructure needs and helping to build the capacity of African countries to establish appropriate regulatory structures;

22.

Underlines the importance of strengthening collaboration among the WTO, UNCTAD, the ILO, the UN Environment Programme, the FAO and other UN bodies to keep the multilateral vision alive by driving a common agenda for shared prosperity and in conformity with policy coherence for development;

23.

Stresses that accountable and transparent global governance should feature greater participation of parliamentary bodies, as directly elected parliamentarians can function as a crucial link between citizens and the multilateral system; emphasises the importance of the work of the Parliamentary Conference on the WTO jointly organised by the European Parliament and the Inter-Parliamentary Union, and calls for more efforts to increase the involvement of parliamentarians from Africa and in particular the Pan-African Parliament; underlines the need to ensure that parliamentarians have better access to trade negotiations and are involved in the decision-making and review processes of the WTO; calls for the strengthening of the role of both the European Parliament and the Pan-African Parliament, as well as the national parliaments of all WTO member states in the mandating phase of international trade and investment negotiations;

24.

Stresses that the renewed EU-Africa relationship should have at its heart the shared best interests of both continents and should build on a strong partnership; concludes that a partnership of equals, based on full cooperation between the AU and EU, is an appropriate response to global competitors; is convinced that, if the EU’s geopolitical competition is driven only by demarcation from other world powers, continuing the traditional policy of influence stands in the way of mutually beneficial cooperation; points out that fair competition of interests is not alien to market economies and that African partners reserve the right to benefit from a demand situation in their favour;

25.

Is convinced that EU interests, such as access to raw materials, shaping economic relations to promote the EU economy, and managing migration, i.e. by tackling its root causes, can best be pursued through a new partnership of equals; is convinced that a new partnership of equals can enable the EU to effectively strengthen its strategic autonomy;

26.

Stresses that the EU should favour constructive engagement on all aspects of migration, forced displacement and mobility, working to ensure that migration takes place in a safe and well-regulated manner; considers it essential to build a long-term shared strategy to link trade, development and migration policies, as established in several European Council conclusions, in particular those adopted on 16 December 2021, as such a strategy could play a key role in fighting human smuggling and illegal migration routes from African countries to the EU;

27.

Underlines that enhancing the quality of intercontinental trade will require regularising mobility and migration on the African continent; insists — though trade policy may, in certain circumstances, minimise forced migration through job creation — neither the EU’s trade policy nor its development assistance should be leveraged to secure non-EU countries’ cooperation on migration, which could undermine the EU’s principles and values and the primary objective of poverty reduction; recalls, in this regard, that forced migration can only be resolved by creating legal pathways, enhancing international protection and addressing the broader development, political, climate and humanitarian crises that lead to forced displacement;

28.

Notes the impact of COVID-19 on supply chains; insists on the importance of building more resilient supply chains in the post-pandemic world in both the EU and the AU by reinforcing strategic autonomy, identifying dependencies, better addressing vulnerabilities and supply disruptions, diversifying production and investing more in game-changing enterprises that have integrated social, environmental and health objectives into their business models; recalls Parliament’s commitment to the European Green Deal and trade initiatives aimed at achieving its objectives, including but not limited to the carbon border adjustment mechanism, the legislative proposal on mandatory due diligence, and the proposal on deforestation-free products; insists that the Commission must carefully monitor the impact of these initiatives on EU-Africa trade and present accompanying measures to mitigate any short-term disruption; is convinced that in the long term, these legislative initiatives will result in more resilient and sustainable global value chains, benefiting citizens and businesses in both the EU and Africa;

29.

Regrets the major impact of the unprovoked and unjustified Russian Federation invasion of Ukraine on the increased price of energy, fuels, raw materials and agricultural products, causing a severe increase in production costs which is jeopardising production continuity and may lead to supply chain disruptions; calls for reinforced action at international level to ensure that policy decision-making has food security at its core, in order to avoid scarcity and ensure nutritional security in the most vulnerable countries, particularly on the African continent, and to address food security by trade means and prevent obstacles to international trade in food and raw materials;

30.

Believes that the EU can contribute to significantly reducing Africa’s current dependence on imports of food, seeds, fertilisers and pesticides through financial and technical support, policy dialogue, knowledge exchange and new technologies and by promoting African innovation;

31.

Calls for a large-scale European-African investment offensive that provides incentives for a significant increase in private investment in African states and enables comprehensive public investment in infrastructure and in combating climate change; welcomes, in this context, the commitment made at the Sixth AU-EU Summit to mobilise EUR 150 billion as part of the Global Gateway; calls for this investment initiative to be significantly expanded, together with the EU Member States;

32.

Calls for the investment offensive to focus primarily on projects to develop and expand renewable energies, secure water supplies and climate adjustment measures, and build public infrastructure; expects all investment projects to involve African partner companies and to pay close attention to creating local employment and deepening African value chains; calls on the Commission to identify appropriate investment projects in coordination with local, regional and state partners in Africa and to ensure their implementation;

33.

Calls for the EU and its Member States to make a commitment to support African countries in implementing ambitious and just climate action; stresses that EU financing under the new Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument must be used to champion a human-rights-based approach that makes local communities and indigenous peoples central to climate, environmental and development efforts, starting with civil society and community consultation;

34.

Notes that the previous blended finance mechanisms have not succeeded in stimulating sufficient private investment; calls, therefore, for the investment initiative to include local SMEs, which make a special contribution to the diversification of the economy and to the creation of employment;

35.

Stresses that the EU should deepen its economic and trade relations with Africa through investments that create decent jobs and promote human, labour and environmental rights; underlines the discrepancy in access to finance within African regions and countries, which is due to various factors; underlines that the emphasis should be placed on investments in new infrastructure, such as digital and green infrastructure, and renewable energy production; welcomes the Framework Project Cooperation Agreement signed in October 2021 between the EIB and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD); welcomes the Memorandum of Understanding signed in 2021 between the EBRD and the African Development Bank to promote sustainable private-sector development in Africa; calls on the Commission to foster investment in the African continent through innovative financial instruments to increase capital flows and reduce risks; encourages the EU and African countries to explore the negotiation of sustainable investment facilitation agreements, as announced in the EU Trade Policy Review (15), which enhance the capacity of governments to regulate in the public interest, and balance the rights and obligations of investors and communities with environmental concerns; recalls the key importance of consistent investment in public services, in research capabilities and in the promotion of economic sectors in which countries or regions have the potential to acquire a comparative advantage; recommends boosting investment opportunities in Africa, in particular by providing more risk capital and guarantees aimed at facilitating investments; welcomes the European Fund for Sustainable Development Plus (EFSD+) which allows development finance institutions to take more risk in their investment programmes; recalls that the Addis Ababa Action Agenda on financing for development highlighted the need to mobilise more domestic resources for achieving the SDGs;

36.

Encourages African countries, at a time when UNICA reports that many of the investment treaties concluded in the 1990s and early 2000s have recently expired or are about to expire, to review and reform their investment and double taxation treaties according to their development needs; believes that the AfCFTA and the ongoing regional integration efforts provide a good opportunity to rebalance the international investment regime so that it becomes responsible, equitable and conducive to sustainable development;

37.

Highlights that the agreement between the EU and the OACPS initialled in April 2021 lacks mechanisms to enforce due diligence on environmental standards, human rights and the principle of free prior and informed consent, which are even more vital given the agreement’s commitments to facilitate international investment agreements; stresses that the EU should take into account the different levels of development and ensure that its trade agreements are consistent with the regional economic integration priorities of the partners;

38.

Urges the Commission and the EIB, as the lending arm of the EU, to prepare an effective and easily accessible microcredit scheme and, in this connection, to strengthen its capacities to support private-sector development in Africa; calls on the EIB, in this regard, to dedicate more funds to African micro, small and medium-sized enterprises through the EFSD+ blended budget; underlines, in this context, the high potential of microfinancing to further empower SMEs and local farmers; recommends establishing microcredit schemes that would offer access to credit without the need for collateral or other financial guarantees; stresses the importance of such a scheme for the empowerment of women and young people, whose access to financing needs to be significantly improved; calls, in this regard, for appropriate accompanying measures, such as technical and legal assistance and counselling, as well as alliances with local partners on the ground, in order to make such microcredits truly accessible; considers that supporting the social economy and cooperatives, as well as microcredit schemes, will contribute to the much-needed formalisation of the informal economy, through clear strategies based on ILO Recommendation 204;

39.

Calls for the EU to increase its support to African countries and the AU for combating illicit financial flows and tax evasion by companies, and calls for initiatives to ensure that corporations do not contribute to such capital outflows from African countries; recalls that Africa loses about USD 88,6 billion in illicit capital flight every year, equivalent to 3,7 % of the continent’s GDP; calls for joint efforts to ensure that taxes are paid where profits and real economic value are created, in order to stop continued tax base erosion and profit-shifting; calls for increased cooperation between the AU and the EU and their member states in the international promotion of measures addressing corporate tax transparency issues, including improved cooperation with regard to the EU’s Non-Financial Reporting Directive (16); calls on the Commission to also address illicit financial flows and tax evasion in its AfT schemes and by including respective chapters when negotiating the modernisation of EPAs;

40.

Stresses that LDCs have an interest in and are strong supporters of rules-based multilateral trading systems and that their integration into the international trading system should be improved; is aware of the fact that special and differentiated treatment is a founding principle of the WTO; calls on the Commission to ensure that developing countries can fully exercise their rights under the WTO special and differential treatment provisions, most notably to ensure their food security; is of the opinion that overdependence on a single country or geographic region for any given product can leave countries vulnerable to external shocks, which could have a hugely damaging impact on the food security of developing countries; believes, therefore, that the Commission should support our African partners in diversifying their trade flows in order to increase their resilience; calls for joint efforts with the EU’s African partners at WTO level to find multilateral solutions for major divisions in global agricultural policy issues, as discussed in the WTO Agriculture Committee;

41.

Stresses the need for multilateral trade rules that are supportive of substantial and sustainable agriculture based on comprehensive agrarian reforms in various African states to be carried out in order to guarantee food security across the continent; stresses, in this regard, the importance of the protection and promotion of the right of local communities to have access to and control natural resources such as land and water; deplores the fact that land-grabbing is rife in Africa; is concerned by the scale of land acquisition by foreign investors in Africa, which is concentrated in countries with weaker governance structures, and could represent a threat to food security and access to land and water; stresses the importance of launching an inclusive process with the aim of guaranteeing the effective participation of civil society organisations and local communities in the development, implementation and monitoring of policies and actions related to land-grabbing; calls for the Voluntary Guidelines on the Responsible Governance of Tenure to be observed in all projects that promote the protection of land rights, including in trade, and also for measures to ensure that projects do not endanger the land rights of small-scale farmers, particularly women; urges the EU and Africa, furthermore, to recognise indigenous people’s rights to customary ownership and control of their lands and natural resources under the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous People and ILO Convention 169, and to comply with the principle of free, prior and informed consent;

42.

Stresses that the trade partnership between the EU and Africa must safeguard the right of African countries to food sovereignty, ensure adherence to the principles of sustainability and should never undermine food security, food safety and food quality nor drive deforestation or degradation of the environment; stresses that this will require greater commitments on both continents and the boosting of safe, resilient and sustainable agri-food systems in order to increase the efforts to reach the SDG of zero hunger in 2030 and support joint action to mitigate climate change; identifies a need to restructure value chains so that more of the processing and value-adding parts of production take place in source countries; reiterates the importance of respect for products with protected designation of origin; calls on the Commission to ensure investment instruments, such as Global Gateway and Global Europe, contribute to the development of a sustainable agricultural sector in Africa in line with the SDGs, and to support the implementation of the AfCFTA for intra-African agricultural trade; calls on the Commission to facilitate education and training to advance and promote sustainable agricultural practices, such as agroecology, in Africa and to advance existing initiatives in Africa; recalls the fact that agroecology’s ability to reconcile the economic, environmental and social dimensions of sustainability has been recognised in landmark reports from the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change and the Intergovernmental Science-Policy Platform on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services, as well as the World Bank and FAO-led International Assessment of Agricultural Science & Technology for Development; calls on the EU and Africa to play a leading role in the conclusion of an ambitious global agreement at the 15th Conference of the Parties to the Convention on Biological Diversity; notes, in this context, that sustainable agriculture and more sustainable nutrition in Europe can make a significant contribution to ensuring food security in African countries;

43.

Underlines the asymmetrical dependence of some African countries on agricultural imports for food security; expresses its grave concern at the consequences of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine for the supply of certain agricultural food products, mainly cereals, in view of the significant dependence of many states on these imports, as well as global supply chain disruptions and price increases leading to global food insecurity, most notably on the African continent; welcomes the Commission’s decision to assess the impact of the Russian-Ukrainian war on cereal imports and food security and calls on the Commission to take early action against possible humanitarian crises; stresses, furthermore, the disruption which the armed conflict is causing to African exports to Russia of certain products, such as citrus fruits, coffee and tea; calls on the Commission to work with African countries to secure access to agricultural products, to use the existing trade toolbox to address and facilitate access to agricultural products for our African partners, and to support them in boosting their agricultural production in order to enhance their food resilience;

44.

Recalls that with EU agri-food exports to Africa valued at EUR 17,6 billion and imports from Africa valued at EUR 16,5 billion in 2020, African countries are important destinations for EU exports and the EU remains the biggest export market for agricultural and food products from Africa; draws attention to the need for imports from Africa, and especially agri-food products, to meet EU health, safety and quality standards, including those relating to the use of hormones, antibiotics and genetically modified organisms; highlights that technical support and training should be offered to ensure that African producers have the opportunity and know-how to meet these standards; is convinced that the EU, as a major global player in the agri-food sector, should cooperate with African countries in further developing the benchmarks and international standards for sustainable food systems, based on respect for human and labour rights, fair competition, the precautionary principle, environmental protection and animal welfare, in accordance with WTO rules; points out that the EU is committed to supporting and promoting the global transition to sustainable agri-food systems with all its partners, in line with the objectives of the farm to fork strategy and the SDGs; points out that the EU and Africa share the objective of transforming the way we produce, distribute and consume our food; points out, therefore, that cooperation between the EU and its African partners must focus on the central issue of food supply, with tailored programmes for cooperation between EU and African farmers and SMEs, targeted investments in sustainable agricultural development, modern transport networks and appropriate storage infrastructure that provide African farmers with the means to make farming resistant to climate-related challenges;

45.

Advocates for stronger policy coherence at EU level in the context of agri-food trade, given the global implications of the common agricultural policy and agricultural trade on progress towards the achievement of the SDGs; calls for the EU to take into account the conclusions of the Task Force Rural Africa on the need for investment in African food chains, with a focus on value-added commodities; calls on the EU and its Member States to actively work with African partners to create synergies between the EU-Africa strategy and European Green Deal, in particular the external dimension of the farm to fork strategy;

46.

Underlines the importance of research and innovation in encouraging farmers to adopt sustainable agricultural practices and productive dry land agro-ecosystems and food systems; calls, in this regard, for stronger reliance on the contributions of African traditional knowledge to the just transition, especially regarding agricultural practices, fisheries and forest protection, thereby empowering the African people and local communities;

47.

Regrets the lack of recognition of the strategic importance of rangelands, which cover about 43 % of the African land surface and are therefore important carbon sinks; emphasises the importance of supporting small farms and pastoralism and other traditional/local food systems in order to strengthen their resilience and boost their contribution to food security, sustainable resource management and biodiversity conservation; notes that, for example, grazing rights and community pastures are traditional land use rights based on common law and not on securitised property rights; calls on the Commission to develop, together with local communities and local stakeholders, a strategy to optimise their potential through sustainable grazing management such as that practised by pastoralists; calls for the social tensions between settled agricultural populations and nomadic pastoral communities to be addressed, notably in regions with overlapping ethno-religious conflicts;

48.

Recommends to turn around the unwelcome trend of increasing numbers of people suffering from food insecurity in Africa by integrating humanitarian, development and peacebuilding policies in conflict-affected areas, by scaling up climate resilience across food systems, by strengthening the resilience of the most vulnerable to economic adversity, by intervening along food supply chains to lower the cost of nutritious foods and to increase the nutritional value of food products, by tackling poverty and structural inequalities, ensuring interventions are pro-poor and inclusive, and by strengthening food environments and changing consumer behaviour to promote, including by trade measures, dietary patterns with positive impacts on human health and the environment; underlines the need for sustainable and innovative policies that enable African states to ‘leapfrog’ older and more polluting technologies and agricultural practices with the goal of achieving an ecological and social transition to sustainable agri-food practices; highlights the central role played by the agricultural and food sectors in the African economy and in providing decent and sustainable job opportunities in rural areas in the many smallholdings or family farms through measures to enhance resilience, the sustainable modernisation of agricultural practices, improved product quality and product diversification; calls on the Commission to support local agricultural businesses and to increase the capability of small and family-owned farms to compete with large-scale corporate farms; is concerned about the increasing expansion of those highly industrialised farms that are based on monocultures, which contribute to deepening social inequalities and soil erosion and the ongoing loss of biodiversity; emphasises the importance of farmers for the strengthening of circular economies within the various African regions; welcomes the proposal of the Task Force for Rural Africa for the establishment of a EU-Africa twinning programme linking agricultural bodies of EU Member States and partner countries in Africa through which committed and comparable partners would be able to share best practices and knowledge;

49.

Underlines that the use of pesticides in intensive agriculture in Africa can have an impact on the health of workers who have very little access to training on plant protection and healthcare, in addition to causing environmental damage; calls for education and training in sustainable plant protection approaches and alternatives to pesticides and for the minimisation of exposure to hazardous substances; denounces the double standards applied by the EU regarding pesticides by allowing the export of hazardous substances that are banned in the EU to African countries and other non-EU countries; asks, therefore, for the current EU rules to be amended in order to eliminate this legal incoherence, in line with the Rotterdam Convention of 1998 and the European Green Deal;

50.

Stresses the need to help African countries to reduce the use of pesticides banned in the EU through the development of alternative systems for pest control; highlights the inconsistency of the EU in allowing exports to African and other non-EU countries of pesticides that are not permitted in the EU single market; calls for the swift ending of this inconsistency, as it completely contradicts the spirit of the European Green Deal;

51.

Points out that in comparison with other regions of the world, the distribution of added value in agricultural value chains is mostly unfavourable for African smallholders, as can be observed in the effects of market concentration on farmers and countries producing cocoa; welcomes the initiative by Ghana and Côte d’Ivoire to set up a living income differential for cocoa; welcomes the setting up of the EU Sustainable Cocoa Initiative and calls on the Commission to encourage private-sector-wide commitments to pay fair prices to cocoa farmers that enable them to produce sustainably, without child labour; recalls that EU-African trade relations and initiatives, like the one on cocoa, must rely on transparent and reliable monitoring and accountability; calls for the multi-stakeholder approach to be ensured via specific mechanisms to involve civil society in the development of strategies and sectoral policies; shares the views expressed by the Cocoa Coalition that the EU’s due diligence legislation in preparation, including the regulation on deforestation, should aim to deliver living incomes for cocoa farmers as an essential step in achieving a sustainable cocoa sector;

52.

Is concerned that the EU’s trade policy towards Africa is very fragmented; reiterates that the different EPAs should contribute to the development of intra-African integration and a fair and sustainable trade model and to reducing poverty; observes that the viewpoints regarding the evaluation of the success of the EPAs differ, with some in the EU and Africa arguing that the EPAs concluded or negotiated in the last decade do not sufficiently meet the requirements of a new partnership and were primarily aimed at enforcing EU interests, observing that EU exports to the EPA states have been detrimental to local production, especially in the agricultural sector, regretting that important EPA goals such as diversifying value chains and promoting regional integration in Africa have not been achieved, with the main exports remaining agricultural products and raw materials, and considering this, furthermore, to be one reason for the frequent criticism or even rejection of the EPAs in many African states, while others in the EU and the AU argue that EPAs contribute to and promote sustainable development in line with the SDGs and the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, reduce poverty, foster intra-African trade flows, improve regional integration, contribute to trade facilitation and the removal of unnecessary barriers to trade, increase market access for businesses to the EU and African markets, most notably for SMEs, promote public and private investments in Africa, promote good and sustainable agricultural practices, and foster trade relations between the EU and Africa, taking into account the outcomes of the EU-AU Summit, and while they also believe that in order to fully play this role and be conducive to the integration of EU and African value chains, the EPAs would have to be implemented and modernised to include provisions that support cross-border value chains, including additional areas such as the services trade, investment, intellectual property rights and competition, which would reassure businesses and investors about the business environment in those countries;

53.

Considers that EPAs should improve the ability of African countries to exploit trade opportunities in the areas of food security, healthcare and poverty reduction;

54.

Recalls that the EU request to ban export taxes on raw materials has been a long-lasting stumbling block in the negotiation process on EPAs; stresses that for those economies which almost exclusively base their revenues on the exploitation of natural resources, prohibiting such taxes may lock them in aid dependency, while hampering their economic diversification; stresses the right of African countries to regulate raw materials in their public interest and calls for the EU to refrain from adopting a trade policy that, as a general rule, prohibits African countries from levying export taxes on raw materials, insofar as it is WTO-compatible;

55.

Reiterates its request for an in-depth analysis of the impact of EPAs on local economies, regional integration, economic diversification and the SDGs to be carried out before new EPAs are negotiated; calls for EPAs to be modernised by adding strong, binding and enforceable trade and sustainable development (TSD) chapters aligned with the Paris Agreement; calls on the Commission, in this context, to work with our African partners to advance fair and sustainable trade, notably through TSD chapters in EPAs, and to work with our partners on the upcoming TSD review; stresses, furthermore, the importance of including the objective of combating forced labour and child labour in TSD chapters of Union trade agreements, given their prevalence in the agricultural sector; calls for systematic, transparent and evidenced-based monitoring by all stakeholders, including EU and African civil society and communities, local authorities and national parliaments, of the implementation of EU-African trade agreements and for compliance with the principles of policy coherence for development and of policy coherence for sustainable development; calls for an in-depth analysis on the impact of existing EPAs and trade agreements on African countries to determine the extent to which they are compatible with efforts to support the AfCFTA process and continental integration in Africa and the need for them to be consistent with the SDGs and Article 208 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union; calls for an adjustment of EPA provisions to be pursued, depending on the results; calls on the Commission, when reviewing EPAs, to, where appropriate, address, mitigate and avoid any potential effect that could impair the objectives of the development of the intra-African market, in close cooperation with our African partners; emphasises that EPAs need to support the further development of the AfCFTA; calls on the Commission to ensure EPAs are a basis for the strengthening of economic relations between the parties in a mutually beneficial way, taking into account their respective levels of development; calls on the Commission to pay special attention to SMEs, and to support African SMEs who export to the EU with technical assistance; notes that in order to make the EPAs more attractive, additional elements need to be covered by the agreements, such as capacity building, encouraging women to participate in the economy, including in agriculture, and investing in the opportunities for young people in African countries;

56.

Recalls that the implementation of sustainability chapters must be accompanied in parallel by capacity building through the EU’s development assistance and other investments to assist partner countries in honouring their commitments (17), and that civil society stakeholders should be involved in monitoring (18);

57.

Welcomes the reform of the Generalised Scheme of Preferences (GSP) Regulation (19) and its role in increasing trade opportunities, facilitating export diversification for developing countries, advancing sustainable development and ensuring respect for human rights, labour rights, environmental protection, sustainable development, good governance and gender equality; notes that several African countries will graduate from LDC status in the near future and highlights the need to support their smooth transition to GSP status; is of the opinion that these countries would benefit from GSP+ status and encourages them to consider applying, while calling on the Commission to proactively approach these potential candidates and offer them support in working towards meeting the criteria, and to ensure a smooth transition from LDC to GSP+ partner country status; calls on the Commission to ensure the GSP is complementary to other trade policy initiatives on the African continent; calls on the countries in the region benefiting from the GSP and Everything but Arms schemes to work to strengthen the effective implementation of their international commitments;

58.

Calls for increased investment in research and development related to green goods and technologies; calls on the Commission to take the necessary steps to ensure that the implementation of the future EU corporate sustainability due diligence and deforestation-free rules encourage long-term sourcing relationships and improved purchasing practices, ensuring a living wage for workers and a living income for smallholder farmers and ensuring respect for the environment and meaningful stakeholder engagement, including of rights holders, in all steps of the due diligence process; recalls that Africa is home to exceptional biodiversity; expresses its deep concern about overexploitation of natural resources and the impact of reduced biodiversity on resilience levels; is particularly concerned that the pace of deforestation is increasing in Africa, notably in the Congo basin, which in 2020 was second only to Brazil in terms of primary forest loss, and in Cameroon, and is also concerned about the smuggling of rare wildlife species; points out that African rainforest destruction leads to irreversible biodiversity and carbon sink losses, as well as of the homes and ways of life of indigenous communities; recalls that forests contribute significantly to reaching climate targets, protecting biodiversity and preventing desertification and extreme soil erosion; highlights the role of water as a key building block for social and economic resilience, especially in the context of food and nutrition security, and the fact that water is at risk of becoming a scarce resource; believes, therefore, that greater importance should be accorded to the supply of water; stresses that desertification and locust swarms have exacerbated the already difficult food security situation in Africa and that the COVID-19 pandemic and ensuing economic and logistics problems have shone a spotlight on the potential for local and regional markets to address vulnerabilities and shortcomings in the global food system; considers that a trade partnership must be based on models and technologies that are well-adapted to African countries’ agricultural models, economies and crops and on collaboration, notably through training and exchanges of knowledge, giving farmers ownership, independence and the right of initiative;

59.

Stresses the importance of cities and towns in promoting the spirit of fair trade; commends the Commission for launching the EU Cities for Fair and Ethical Trade Award; commends Vice-President and Commissioner for Trade Valdis Dombrovskis for his commitment to continue this important initiative; calls on the Commission to seek cooperation with the AU Commission to enhance direct cooperation between cities and towns in both continents, in order to promote fair and ethical trade relations and to increase the visibility of the many respective initiatives of city councils;

60.

Believes that now more than ever after the COVID-19 pandemic, on a global level, and especially with regard to Africa, new approaches should be taken for economic, commercial and trade relations based on fair and ethical trade and on the principles of solidarity and cooperation;

61.

Welcomes the declaration agreed by the meeting of leaders of local and regional governments of the member states of the AU and the EU on 15 February 2022 in Brussels, which emphasised inter alia that without the engagement of local and regional governments, 65 % of the 169 targets underpinning the SDGs will not be reached;

62.

Welcomes the agreement of the AfCFTA Council of Ministers on common rules of origin for the bloc for 87,7 % of goods or 3 800 tariff lines covered by the AfCFTA; calls on the European Commission to harmonise the rules of origin and to develop a proposal for unified rules of origin for trade with all African countries, based on the rules recently agreed within the AfCFTA, to replace the patchwork of rules of origin in the different trade agreements and arrangements of the EU with African regions and countries; is convinced that this would also be to the benefit of EU companies and customs authorities; calls on the Commission to explore further possibilities and measures to enhance links and synergies between the EU’s different trade arrangements with African countries and the AfCFTA; welcomes the AfCFTA’s goal of improving regional differentiation and the expansion and interconnection of infrastructure systems; calls on the EU to engage with the AfCFTA Secretariat to advance capacity building and technical support for the implementation of the AfCFTA;

63.

Welcomes the fact that in November 2021, the EIB opened its first hub in Africa, in Kenya’s capital Nairobi;

64.

Appreciates the initiative by the Council and the Commission to organise the first Africa-Europe Week, which was held in February 2022 in Brussels; welcomes the fruitful work of several thousand representatives from youth organisations, civil society organisations, local authorities, the cultural sector and the business sector; stresses that better EU engagement with young Africans and the African diaspora in the EU could structurally improve the EU-Africa relationship in the long term; regrets, in this context, that the European Parliament was not more involved and that the events took place during Parliament’s plenary week in Strasbourg, and underscores the importance of promoting, ahead of upcoming initiatives, greater cooperation between all stakeholders, including business organisations; calls on the Commission to organise the Africa-Europe Week on an annual basis, and to include young people, especially women and girls, in discussions organised during the Africa-Europe Week;

65.

Calls on the Commission to focus future editions of the EU-Africa Business Summit on the potential that local economic and sustainable production alternatives, such as organic and fair trade products, smallholder farmer cooperatives and social economy stakeholders, can play in building up a more sustainable and fair trading partnership between Africa and the EU;

66.

Stresses the necessity of increasing the involvement of stakeholders, in particular business associations of SMEs from across the African continent and increasingly important civil society organisations from both the EU and the AU, in the debates establishing the new dimension of trade, investment and economic cooperation, which is aimed at fair and ethical relationships;

67.

Notes that transport networks are critical enablers of trade and prosperous economies; stresses the need to better connect African rural and urban areas to ensure greater interconnectedness within African countries and the African continent; stresses that Team Europe proposals for the realisation of infrastructure projects must build on the needs identified by the AU in the Programme for Infrastructure Development for Africa; calls, in this regard, for local and regional stakeholders to be involved in the decision-making process on the nature and volume of infrastructure projects; recalls the fact that an estimated 53 % of roads in Africa are unpaved and are isolated from trade hubs, and that less than half of the population in rural areas has access to functional roads all year round, which illustrates the need to invest not only in flagship projects; also calls for investments in cold chain logistics and modern storage facilities and generally improved logistics between production and consumption locations that enable farmers to deliver their agricultural products over certain distances, also given the rapid urbanisation of Africa, thus contributing to ending food insecurity; notes that a functioning transport network and investments in infrastructure projects can contribute to the development of African economies; calls on the European Commission to facilitate investment in African infrastructural projects through its trade and investment instruments for Africa;

68.

Encourages a broad debate with the aim of reconsidering models and plans to develop infrastructure and to identify alternative mobility models and 21st century modern mobility solutions for everybody within the regions as well as across the continent, based on lessons learned in the EU and other industrialised countries, in order to avoid mistakes made there;

69.

Stresses that education and professional training that provide people with the skills required by the labour market are key factors for development; believes, in this context, that cooperation between universities, research institutions and vocational education and training programmes from both continents need to be strengthened; is of the opinion, in that regard, that private-sector-driven vocational education and training initiatives and entrepreneurship in Africa should be supported and better coordinated, as the pandemic has emphasised the importance of both digital skills and digital learning methods;

70.

Shares the long-term vision of creating a comprehensive EU-Africa continent-to-continent trade, cooperation and development agreement, building on the AfCFTA; underlines that a continent-to-continent trade and cooperation agreement must be preceded by the meaningful development of a robust and resilient intra-African market; stresses, in this regard, the role of the EU’s trade policy engagement with Africa in the development of the intra-African market; calls on the European Commission to regularly update Parliament on the long-term objective of a continent-to-continent trade and cooperation agreement, notably through the various policy instruments related to Africa;

71.

Calls for the responsible and swift implementation of the commitments on trade and investment agreed at the 2022 EU-AU Summit, and calls on the European Commission to structurally report to Parliament on the implementation of the commitments on trade and investment by the relevant committees;

72.

Welcomes the EU’s Africa-EU Green Energy Initiative and its continued support for the African Single Electricity Market; stresses that access to energy must be guaranteed at an affordable price to everyone as a common good and a basic right, and that access to energy and the future energy demand are key issues that the EU and Africa should address together; notes the need to leverage the new renewable and low carbon energy potential in Africa and invest in sectors with higher added value, such as green steel and green hydrogen, notably by improving technology cooperation and increasing clean energy exports; points out that technical assistance regarding energy market legislation is needed and should be provided through EU-African cooperation, as well as the development of common standards; points out that sustainable energy cooperation should be one the main features of the Global Gateway with regard to Africa; welcomes the commitment under the Global Gateway to mobilise EUR 2,4 billion in grants for sub-Saharan Africa and EUR 1,08 billion for North Africa to support renewable energy, energy efficiency, the just transition and the greening of local value chains; calls for a gender-smart investment approach in the energy sector that would empower women as energy leaders, workers and consumers;

73.

Insists on the importance of building partnerships to improve the sustainability of raw material value chains, building on the critical raw materials action plan and making use of all EU external policy instruments;

74.

Calls for the link between public health and biodiversity to be taken into account, in line with the UN One Health approach, and welcomes the announcement of the NaturAfrica initiative, which aims to protect wildlife and ecosystems in Africa and the review of the action plan against wildlife trafficking; notes that academic literature has located some global hotspots for emerging zoonotic diseases in Africa; recommends developing and incorporating pandemic and emerging disease health risk impact assessments in major development and land use projects facilitated by the renewed partnership between the EU and the AU and reforming financial aid for land use so that benefits and risks to biodiversity and health are recognised and explicitly targeted; invites the Commission to explore the possibility of issuing guidance for EU companies and investors active in Africa in relation with the future directive for sustainable corporate due diligence (20); calls on the EU and the AU to push for a new intergovernmental health and trade partnership aimed at reducing zoonotic disease risks in the international wildlife trade; stresses that the NaturAfrica initiative should be developed in consultation with all stakeholders, with particular attention paid to the rights of local communities, indigenous peoples and women; underlines that it should support African governments and local populations in tackling major drivers of biodiversity loss and environmental degradation in a holistic and systematic way, including by offering support for well-managed protected area networks; calls for the inclusion of ambitious biodiversity-related provisions inspired by the UN One Health approach when modernising EPAs; considers that the EU should contribute to the realisation of the Great Green Wall in the Sahel region, which will significantly contribute to putting a halt to further desertification and will thereby safeguard incomes from agriculture;

75.

Underlines that human rights and gender equality must be at the centre of the reinforced cooperation between the EU and the AU, with a special focus on the impact of emerging and innovative technologies on human rights and the inclusion of women in the economy; stresses the potential digital trade can have for advancing and improving trade facilitation in Africa, and calls on the Commission to advance digital capabilities to facilitate the implementation of EPAs and the implementation of the AfCFTA; calls on the Commission to consider the EU-AU digital agenda in its engagement with its global strategic partners;

76.

Notes that knowledge sharing and skills development within Africa can contribute to the development of a sustainable trade relationship; underlines the potential that digital infrastructure has to stimulate the African economy and drive innovation on the continent; calls for reinforced cooperation on EU-AU digital agendas based on the principles of democratic governance, supportive multilateral rules on e-commerce, effective regulatory mechanisms across the digital domain and global-to-local governance mechanisms for data and digital infrastructure that place people-centred development at their core; takes note of the creation of the AU-EU Digital Economy Task Force; stresses that EU-AU digital relations should promote Africa’s drive for digital transformation and respect the right of governments to maintain data ownership and regulate their digital economy according to their development needs and with a view to achieving a more balanced digital world; calls on the EU to support the digital upscaling of African countries with the help of UNCTAD platforms created to secure sustainable development gains from digital transformations; emphasises that digital transformation must be consistent with the principles of data protection;

77.

Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the African Union, the governments and parliaments of the member states of the African Union and the Secretary-General of the AfCFTA.

(1) OJ C 494, 8.12.2021, p. 80.

(2) Assembly/AU /Dec.692(XXXI).

(3) Kigali Decision (Assembly/AU/Dec.605(XXVII)).

(4) OJ C 162, 10.5.2019, p. 9.

(5) Texts adopted, P9_TA(2022)0073.

(6) OJ L 347, 30.12.2005, p. 1.

(7) OJ C 474, 24.11.2021, p. 11.

(8) Texts adopted, P9_TA(2021)0516.

(9) OJ L 130, 19.5.2017, p. 1.

(10) OJ C 465, 17.11.2021, p. 11.

(11) OJ C 184, 5.5.2022, p. 2.

(12) Texts adopted, P9_TA(2021)0472.

(13) FAO article of 11 February 2019 entitled ‘FAO calls for urgent action to curb corruption, illicit exploitation of forests’, accessed on 1 June 2022. Available at: https://www.fao.org/africa/news/detail-news/en/c/1180700/

(14) Article by the UN Development Programme in Ethiopia of 13 October 2016 entitled ‘Gender gap costs sub-Saharan Africa $US95 billion a year: UND’, accessed on 3 June 2022. Available at: https://www.undp.org/ethiopia/press-releases/gender-gap-costs-sub-saharan-africa-us95-billion-year-new-undp-report.html

(15) Commission communication of 18 February 2021 entitled ‘Trade Policy Review — An Open, Sustainable and Assertive Trade Policy’ (COM(2021)0066).

(16) Directive 2014/95/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 October 2014 amending Directive 2013/34/EU as regards disclosure of non-financial and diversity information by certain large undertakings and groups (OJ L 330, 15.11.2014, p. 1).

(17) German Development Institute discussion paper of January 2016 entitled ‘Can Rules of Origin in Sub-Saharan Africa be Harmonized? A Political Economy Exploration’.

(18) German Development Institute discussion paper of January 2016 entitled ‘Can Rules of Origin in Sub-Saharan Africa be Harmonized? A Political Economy Exploration’.

(19) Regulation (EU) No 978/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2012 applying a scheme of generalised tariff preferences and repealing Council Regulation (EC) No 732/2008 (OJ L 303, 31.10.2012, p. 1).

(20) Commission proposal of 23 February 2022 for a directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on corporate sustainability due diligence and amending Directive (EU) 2019/1937 (COM(2022)0071).

27.1.2023

Official Journal of the European Union

C 32/96

P9_TA(2022)0268

Future of EU international investment policy

European Parliament resolution of 23 June 2022 on the future of EU international investment policy (2021/2176(INI))

(2023/C 32/10)

The European Parliament,

—	having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), in particular Article 207(2) thereof,

—	having regard to Regulation (EU) No 1219/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2012 establishing transitional arrangements for bilateral investment agreements between Member States and third countries (1),

—

having regard to Regulation (EU) No 912/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 July 2014 establishing a framework for managing financial responsibility linked to investor-to-state dispute settlement tribunals established by international agreements to which the European Union is party (2),

—	having regard to Regulation (EU) 2020/852 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 June 2020 on the establishment of a framework to facilitate sustainable investment (3),

—

having regard to the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union, notably its opinion 2/15 of 16 May 2017 on the Free Trade Agreement between the EU and the Republic of Singapore, its judgment of 6 March 2018 in case C-284/16 (preliminary ruling on Slovak Republic v Achmea BV), its opinion 1/17 of 30 April 2019 on the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement between Canada and the EU and its Member States, its judgment of 2 September 2021 in case C-741/19 (preliminary ruling on Republic of Moldova v Komstroy LLC), and its judgment of 26 October 2021 in case C-109/20 (preliminary ruling on Republic of Poland v PL Holdings Sàrl),

—	having regard to its resolution of 6 April 2011 on the future European international investment policy (4),

—	having regard to its resolution of 13 December 2011 on trade and investment barriers (5),

—	having regard to its resolution of 7 July 2015 on the external impact of EU trade and investment policy on public-private initiatives in countries outside the EU (6),

—	having regard to its resolution of 5 July 2016 on a new forward-looking and innovative future strategy for trade and investment (7),

—	having regard to the Commission communication of 11 December 2019 on the European Green Deal (COM(2019)0640),

—	having regard to the Commission report of 6 April 2020 on the application of Regulation (EU) No 1219/2012 establishing transitional arrangements for bilateral investment agreements between Member States and third countries (COM(2020)0134),

—	having regard to the Commission communication of 18 February 2021 entitled ‘Trade Policy Review — An Open, Sustainable and Assertive Trade Policy’ (COM(2021)0066),

—	having regard to the Commission communication of 14 October 2015 entitled ‘Trade for all — Towards a more responsible trade and investment policy’ (COM(2015)0497),

—	having regard to the Commission communication of 26 November 2014 entitled ‘An Investment Plan for Europe’ (COM(2014)0903),

—	having regard to the Commission report of 12 November 2020 on the implementation of EU trade agreements: 1 January 2019 — 31 December 2019 (COM(2020)0705),

—	having regard to the Paris Agreement on climate change, adopted on 12 December 2015,

—

having regard to the Trade and Cooperation Agreement between the European Union and the European Atomic Energy Community, of the one part, and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, of the other part (8), which entered into force on 1 May 2021, and in particular Title II thereof on services and investment,

—	having regard to the 2014 UN Convention on Transparency in Treaty-based Investor-State Arbitration, which entered into force on 18 October 2017 (the Mauritius Convention),

—	having regard to the trade and investment agreements concluded by the EU, in particular the ‘second generation’ agreements with countries such as Canada, Singapore, Vietnam and Japan,

—	having regard to the 2030 UN Agenda for Sustainable Development adopted in 2015, in particular the 17 Sustainable Development Goals thereto,

—	having regard to the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, as endorsed by the UN Human Rights Council in 2011,

—	having regard to General Comment No 24 of 10 August 2017 of the UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights on state obligations under the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in the context of business activities,

—	having regard to the 2019, 2020 and 2021 world investment reports of the UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD),

—	having regard to the 2015 UNCTAD Investment Policy Framework for Sustainable Development,

—	having regard to the UNCTAD international investment agreement issues notes on investor-state dispute settlement cases: facts and figures for 2019 and 2020,

—	having regard to the 2018 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) working paper on international investment entitled ‘Societal benefits and costs of International Investment Agreements: a critical review of aspects and available empirical evidence’,

—	having regard to the 2014 OECD working paper on international investment entitled ‘Investment Treaties and Shareholder Claims for Reflective Loss: Insights from Advanced Systems of Corporate Law’,

—	having regard to the mandate given to Working Group III of the UN Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) in 2017 to work on a possible reform of investor-state dispute settlement,

—

having regard to the negotiating directives issued by the Council in 2018 authorising the Commission to negotiate, on behalf of the EU and in the framework of UNCITRAL, a convention establishing a multilateral investment court for the settlement of investment disputes, and to the subsequent EU proposal thereon,

—	having regard to the modernisation process of the Energy Charter Treaty, which was initiated in 2017, and to the EU’s text proposal thereon,

—	having regard to Italy’s decision to withdraw from the Energy Charter Treaty as of 1 January 2015,

—	having regard to the Agreement for the termination of Bilateral Investment Treaties between the Member States of the European Union (9),

—	having regard to the Declaration of the Governments of the Member States of 15 January 2019 on the legal consequences of the judgment of the Court of Justice in Achmea and on investment protection in the European Union,

—	having regard to the Agreement between the United States, Mexico and Canada which entered into force on 1 July 2020, and in particular chapter 14 thereof on investment,

—	having regard to the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, which entered into force on 1 January 2022, and in particular chapter 10 thereof on investment,

—	having regard to the report of the UN Working Group on the Issue of Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises presented to the UN General Assembly on 27 July 2021 entitled ‘Human rights-compatible international investment agreements’,

—	having regard to Rule 54 of its Rules of Procedure,

—	having regard to the opinion of the Committee on Development,

—	having regard to the report of the Committee on International Trade (A9-0166/2022),

whereas, since the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, foreign direct investment has remained an exclusive competence of the European Union, as enshrined in Article 3(1)(e), Article 206 and Article 207 TFEU; whereas the EU’s international investment policy reform path needs to further accelerate and be reinforced to address the current challenges;

whereas the EU is the world’s largest destination and source of inbound and outbound international investments; whereas they contribute to the sustainable economic growth of the EU and to job creation, although available empirical evidence has not shown a direct causal relationship between international investment agreements (IIAs) and the attraction of foreign direct investment;

whereas global foreign direct investment (FDI) flows, which had already been declining since 2015, experienced a dramatic drop in 2020 (-38 %) (10) due to the COVID-19 crisis; whereas increasing outward and inward FDI remains a key element of the path to recovery for the EU and for many other economies;

whereas according to the case-law of the Court of Justice, certain parts of the EU’s international investment policy, namely non-direct foreign investments (‘portfolio investments’) and the regime governing dispute settlement between investors and states, are a shared competence of the EU and its Member States;

whereas around 1 500 bilateral investment treaties ratified by the Member States before the Lisbon Treaty are still in place, and include the old model of investor-state dispute settlement, as does the Energy Charter Treaty; whereas none of the IIAs negotiated by the EU since the Lisbon Treaty has entered into force;

whereas the European Green Deal aims at responding to the challenges of climate change and environmental degradation; whereas all EU policies need to contribute to these goals, including investment policy; whereas substantial investments are needed worldwide in order to achieve the aims of the European Green Deal, meet the UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and recover from the COVID-19 pandemic; whereas working against climate change and environmental degradation, and creating more attractive investment conditions and supporting businesses are among the six priorities (11) of the EU between 2019 and 2024;

whereas FDI and EU investment policy should also play a key role in achieving the objectives of open strategic autonomy, diversifying supply chains and contributing to sustainable economic growth, job creation and integration in global value chains, as well as in seeking to promote conditions for EU investors abroad that reflect the level of openness that foreign investors enjoy in the EU, while taking into account the levels of development of third countries and the need to provide for differentiated treatment;

whereas developing countries face a gap of USD 2,5 trillion in annual financing to achieve the SDGs by 2030; whereas FDI is an instrument for financing the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and the corresponding SDGs; whereas such capital can support job creation and social and environmental improvements as set out in the SDGs; whereas the aim of attracting investment should go hand in hand with the acknowledgement, in the context of IIAs, that the parties to these agreements should seek to improve their levels of environmental or labour protection, and not weaken or reduce them;

I.	whereas the EU taxonomy aims at facilitating the shift of investments from unsustainable economic activities to those that are needed to achieve environmental sustainability, and more specifically climate neutrality in the next 30 years;

whereas investment policy includes measures such as removing undue barriers to investment, monitoring the impact of foreign investment on strategic autonomy, national security and the real economy, and devising other tools to encourage and facilitate direct investment in sectors and places where it is needed the most; whereas most IIAs focus on investment protection, with or without investor-state adjudication;

K.	whereas the number of investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) cases is rising each year, including against Member States; whereas about 15 % of cases known to be filed against Member States in 2020 were intra-EU disputes;

whereas most investment treaties do not specify how the notions of ‘full reparation’ and ‘fair market value’ of an investment are to be ascertained; whereas panels have in the last decade predominantly interpreted such notions by using ‘forward-looking’ valuation techniques based on discounted cash flow (DCF) methods, which in many cases have led panels to rule on amounts of compensation that are much higher than the aggregate amounts of expenditure actually incurred by investors in host countries;

whereas the EU is a global leader in investment policy reform; whereas significant reform of investment policy has been undertaken at European and international level since the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, at the insistence and with the support of Parliament; whereas the EU has launched and concluded IIAs with partner countries, reformed investment protection provisions, replaced ISDS with the investment court system (ICS), launched multilateral negotiations for an investment court, proposed legislation to regulate foreign subsidies, and adopted legislation for the screening of inward foreign direct investment; whereas these developments are significant steps in the right direction for a modernised and sustainable investment policy; whereas much more remains to be done to advance this reform agenda;

whereas the increasing recourse by investors to third parties to finance their litigation in exchange for a return or other financial interest in the outcome of a dispute (third-party funding) has exacerbated the imbalances underpinning compensation practices in litigation, by further reducing the risks for investors of pursuing a claim, and thereby adding incentives to increase the number of claims; whereas third-party funding may increase the bargaining power of claimants to the detriment of states with limited resources and weaker regulatory frameworks;

Underlines that investment can and should have a positive impact on sustainable economic growth, job creation and sustainable development, and contribute to the SDGs; stresses, therefore, its importance for the transformation of the EU economy; points out that this positive impact depends on governments’ capacity to regulate foreign investments; points out that inbound and outbound investments must meet the needs of the real economy; calls on the Commission to review the EU’s investment policy to ensure consistency with the European Green Deal and the SDGs, as well as with EU values, including respect for human rights and the social standards as defined by the European Pillar of Social Rights;

Believes that the EU’s investment policy needs to meet the expectations of investors and beneficiary states, as well as the EU’s broader economic interests and external policy objectives; recalls its request for an integrated and coherent policy framework, which promotes high-quality and sustainable investments; welcomes the efforts undertaken by the Commission since 2010 to reform the Union's investment policy in that direction; considers that EU international investment policy needs to be further reformed in order to better address a variety of challenges and continue its transformation into an integrated and coherent policy framework;

Considers that IIAs should facilitate green, gender-sensitive and inclusive sustainable investments, adequately protect investors, contribute to the resilience of the single market while safeguarding policy space in host states, and encourage the exchange of best practices, skills and know-how, in accordance with the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Guidelines for multinational enterprises on corporate social responsibility;

Is concerned that according to the OECD, developing countries faced a shortfall of USD 1,7 trillion in 2020 due to the COVID-19 crisis, in addition to the existing USD 2,5 trillion funding gap; stresses that the EU’s investment policy should help developing countries, notably African countries, to attract FDI and to reduce the funding gap to achieve the SDGs;

Considers that EU companies need adequate protection for their investments abroad; points out that protected investments, as codified in the EU’s IIAs, should not include speculative forms of investment, financial instruments or portfolio investments that can be held for speculative purposes; calls on the Commission to build on recent IIAs (12) to exclude public debt instruments from their scope; considers that financial instruments which can be withdrawn at any time do not require protection; asks the Commission to continue its endeavours to improve the definition of protected investments so as to make sure that IIAs protect only investments that make a substantial commitment of capital or other resources for a minimum number of years, for which there is an assumption of risk and expectation of profit; is of the opinion that protected investments should effectively contribute to the development of the host country; asks the Commission and the Member States to consider this criterion as defined in international law in the definition of protected investments for future agreements;

Market access

Welcomes the fact that recent investment agreements have a positive focus on market access and investment liberalisation and seek the removal of barriers to the establishment and operation of EU investors in foreign markets;

Calls on the Commission to seek conditions for EU investors abroad that reflect the level of openness that foreign investors enjoy in the EU, while taking into account the level of development of third countries and the need to provide for differentiated treatment; stresses the need for IIAs to safeguard the ability of states to regulate foreign investments in their jurisdiction; calls on the Commission to monitor barriers to the establishment and operation of EU investors in foreign markets, including discriminatory practices; welcomes the Commission’s focus on the enforcement of existing commitments and underlines that this should also apply to investment-related commitments;

Urges the Commission to strictly protect the policy spaces of the EU and the Member States, notably on energy, agriculture, fisheries, audiovisual, telecommunication and digital issues, as well as public services, when liberalising investments; stresses that liberalising investments should go hand in hand with safeguards to avoid exacerbating economic instability, especially in developing countries;

Underlines the importance of maintaining, strengthening and implementing the clauses in all investment agreements that prohibit the lowering of standards, as they are critical to avoid a race to the bottom in countries aiming to attract foreign investment; calls on the Commission to further analyse the effectiveness of such clauses, in particular in developing countries, to ensure that tax policy and development finance are aligned to support a ‘race to the top’;

Investment facilitation

10.

Points out that investment facilitation can contribute to unlocking investment opportunities in developing countries, notably for small and medium-sized enterprises, and to achieving the SDGs by helping to mobilise higher levels of investment to promote inclusive and sustainable growth and poverty reduction, as it supports a longer-term presence of foreign investors in the host economy and improves linkages between foreign investors and local companies; invites the Commission to support developing countries in improving the investment climate in their jurisdiction, both through development cooperation tools and through bilateral agreements; believes that investment facilitation is also a good instrument to improve the EU’s competitiveness and economic growth;

11.

Stresses that international agreements on investment facilitation should support and incentivise investments that advance sustainable development and avoid incentives for investments that cause harm to the environment, climate or society; notes that tax revenues are crucial for developing countries to provide basic public services; urges the Commission to work at multilateral level to promote sustainable investment facilitation which is not pursued through competitive tax breaks; highlights that introducing innovative investment facilitation measures can contribute to achieving the SDGs by helping to mobilise higher levels of investment to promote inclusive and sustainable growth and poverty reduction, as it supports a longer-term presence of foreign investors in the host economy, and to develop better linkages between foreign investors and local companies;

12.

Acknowledges the role taken by the EU in the World Trade Organization (WTO) negotiations regarding the Joint Initiative on Investment Facilitation for Development; underscores that more than two thirds of WTO members are participating in these negotiations; believes that caution is needed considering the very broad scope of the agreement under negotiation; emphasises the need to ensure that these negotiations abide by the rules of the WTO Marrakesh Agreement, which require consensus and overall transparency;

13.

Underlines the importance of an overall EU approach as regards investment facilitation at both bilateral and multilateral level, with an overarching focus on cooperation, including capacity building and technical assistance, notably as regards support for digitalisation in developing countries; welcomes the Commission’s work on new standalone investment facilitation agreements, focusing on supporting sustainable and inclusive investments; asks the Commission, in that context, to pursue negotiations with African partners that avoid creating administrative burdens for developing countries, while specifying the type of sustainable investments that will be facilitated; takes note of the fact that similar investment facilitation provisions are being negotiated in the future Investment Protocol of the African Continental Free Trade Area; invites the Commission to continue supporting those negotiations;

14.

Supports the Commission in its approach, at WTO level, to ensure, via a strong firewall, that investment facilitation disciplines cannot be imported in investor-state disputes; believes that disputes arising under the Joint Initiative on Investment Facilitation for Development should be resolved via mediation and cooperation;

15.

Underlines that investment facilitation provisions at both bilateral and WTO level should not only focus on creating obligations for public authorities in host countries, but should also clarify the obligations of home countries and their national investors regarding their investments abroad; emphasises, in that respect, the need to integrate enforceable provisions as regards corporate social responsibility, human rights and environmental due diligence, as well as anti-corruption safeguards in investment facilitation frameworks; calls on the Commission to include an enforceable chapter on sustainable development in all investment facilitation agreements with third countries, as well as monitoring mechanisms on the activities supported by FDI flows;

16.

Welcomes the Commission’s proposal for an instrument to tackle distortions caused by foreign subsidies that constitute an unfair form of investment, and calls for its swift adoption; calls on the Commission and the Member States to engage in negotiations at WTO level with a view to tackling distortions of competition, particularly in the area of industrial subsidies;

Enhancing the screening of foreign direct investment in the EU

17.

Welcomes the entry into force of the FDI Screening Regulation in 2019; points out that this screening mechanism aims to establish cooperation and potentially limit foreign investments in strategic sectors in order to protect the Union and its Member States, as well as to analyse and screen cases where the acquisition or control of a particular company, infrastructure or technology may create a security or public order risk in the EU;

18.

Underlines the importance of this mechanism as a step towards the better monitoring of the contribution of FDI to Europe’s strategic interests; calls on the Commission, in the context of its forthcoming review process, to provide more granular data on whether inward FDI flows support sustainable economic activities and greenfield investments, to assess different options to monitor the activities supported by outward flows, and to assess the possibility of further specifying whether other sectors should be considered as strategic sectors; in addition, asks the Commission to explore the possibility of strengthening the EU foreign direct investment screening mechanism to give it, with the agreement of the Member States, the power to block an investment that would create a risk to security and public order;

19.

Calls on those Member States that do not yet have one, to set up such a national foreign direct investment screening mechanism in order to ensure that European cooperation is effective;

Compatibility of IIAs with EU priorities

20.

Notes that an increasing number of legal proceedings before investment tribunals target environmental measures; deplores the fact that various countries, including the Member States, are being sued in relation to policies on climate, the phasing out of fossil fuels, or the just transition;

21.

Stresses that global efforts to combat climate change will require a rapid transition to renewable energy and fast government action to reduce reliance on fossil fuels; urges the Commission and the Member States to ensure consistency between IIAs and the European Green Deal, environmental policies, labour rights and human rights, by excluding from treaty protection investments in fossil fuels or any other activities that pose significant harm to the environment and human rights, and by including in the sustainable development chapters provisions that help compliance with the Paris Agreement, international treaties on labour and gender equality, and provisions aiming at improving the domestic framework regulating foreign investment;

22.

Notes with concern the asymmetry of certain IIAs in which foreign investors can pursue investment cases against states, while governments, workers and affected communities are unable to pursue in arbitration transnational corporations that fail to respect human rights, public health or labour and environmental laws; stresses that, similarly, the Multilateral Investment Court (MIC) is only intended for adjudicating in cases in which foreign investors sue states;

23.

Points out that even in the absence of legal proceedings, the explicit or implicit threat of recourse to investment lawsuits can enhance the position of investors in negotiations with states (the ‘chilling effect’); stresses in this regard that recent EU IIAs stipulate the principle that governments have the right to regulate for legitimate public policy objectives (13), including in a manner that may negatively affect the operation of an investment or an investor’s expectation of profits; underlines, however, that this right does not prevent states from having to comply with obligations established in IIAs, nor does it preclude investment claims or damages following the exercising of that right; is concerned that policy decision-making might therefore be delayed or decisions watered down;

24.

Underlines that, as a result, more public funds may be spent on compensating the fossil fuel sector than would be the case without the threat of investment litigation, making it more costly and thus more difficult for states to undertake energy transition measures, and representing an overall subsidy provided by taxpayers to the fossil fuel sector;

25.

Notes that in numerous investor–state arbitration cases, businesses have challenged actions that states claimed to have taken to address local concerns or unrest about a project’s impact; calls on the Commission and the Member States to include a right of standing for affected third parties in future IIAs; believes that tribunals should follow the case-law of the International Court of Justice and deem cases inadmissible when determinations of fact or law might prejudice affected local or indigenous communities which are not party to the investment proceedings; asks the Commission and the Member States to ensure transparency and support the involvement of vulnerable local communities, and in particular of indigenous people impacted by extractive or logging activities, in the negotiation and implementation of IIAs, since foreign investments can have far-reaching impacts on local communities;

Reformed approach

26.

Welcomes the new investment protection agreement model drawn up by the Commission in 2015 as a step in the right direction; notes, however, that no agreement which contains it has yet entered into force; recalls its position that the EU and its Member States should not sign or ratify investment protection treaties that include the ISDS mechanism; underscores the importance of making procedural reforms to investor-state dispute settlement; welcomes the fact that the ICS includes the creation of a fixed roster of arbitrators, an appeal mechanism, a code of conduct for arbitrators and improved transparency in arbitration proceedings; notes that the ICS still constitutes international arbitration and stresses that, unlike in national courts, arbitrators on the ICS roster would have discretion not to necessarily take into consideration relevant public interest laws when interpreting the substantive provisions enshrined in IIAs; regrets that arbitrators would still be paid on a case-by-case basis;

27.

Urges the Commission to fully support and accelerate negotiations to expand investor obligations and their enforcement; believes that investor obligations should not only be included in EU IIAs, but should also apply via separate binding and enforceable international instruments, and via robust domestic frameworks for human rights and environmental due diligence; notes that progress in these areas and the continued strengthening of EU IIA provisions should ensure that EU investors in non-EU countries, in particular in developing countries, transparently demonstrate their strategies to actively contribute to the achievement of the SDGs and the goals of the Paris Agreement, and are subject to accountability mechanisms, in particular by providing access to justice for victims in those countries;

28.

Welcomes provisions in IIAs regarding environmental, labour and corporate responsibility obligations for states and investors, as well as clauses stipulating the horizontal principle that standards should not be lowered to attract investment; regrets, however, the fact that the reform of investor obligations has not kept pace with the reform of ISDS;

29.

Calls on the Commission and the Member States to support the entry into force of the instrument on transnational corporations and other business enterprises with respect to human rights (14), currently being drawn up by the UN Human Rights Council, which is aimed at regulating the activities of transnational companies and firms;

30.

Welcomes the fact that, since 2016, EU IIAs containing investment protection clauses include more precise wording for some protection standards, as well as the right to regulate; underlines that EU IIAs should not allow broad protection standards to be used to challenge legitimate public policies; considers that protection standards should focus specifically on creating a level playing field between foreign and domestic investors, preventing and offering redress in cases where EU investors in non-EU countries are discriminated against, are denied access to justice, or fully lose the enjoyment of their investment to the benefit of the host state, including in times of war, and reciprocally for non-EU investors in the EU; asks the Member States and the Commission to avoid including ambiguous terminology in substantive clauses, and to continue reviewing protection standards on the basis of available evidence;

31.

Underlines the fact that EU IIAs negotiated after 2009 still include sunset clauses which prevent easy termination; takes note of recent negotiations in which parties agreed to a five-year sunset clause with the possibility to agree on an extension of five additional years in case no replacement is found; calls on Member States and the other contracting parties to neutralise sunset clauses in current agreements, and to significantly shorten sunset clauses in new investment agreements;

32.

Emphasises that under both customary international law and international human rights law, individuals are required to seek redress before domestic courts before bringing international proceedings against the state for wrongful acts; regrets the fact that international investment law, by contrast, usually does not require the exhaustion of domestic remedies; believes, that IIAs should require recourse through domestic justice systems to be exhausted before foreign investors can resort to an arbitration tribunal, as is the case in international human rights law; stresses that in the event of gross denial of justice in domestic courts, foreign investors should directly be able to seek international dispute settlement;

IIA ratification

33.

Points out that delays to Member States’ ratification of EU IIAs delay the replacement of bilateral investment treaties (BITs) with more transparent and modern provisions that protect equally all EU investors in third countries; calls on the Member States to ratify the concluded EU investment agreements; calls for the EU to work jointly with partner countries to continuously review and improve its IIAs, once they enter into force, along the lines developed in this report; expects the Member States to ensure the consistency of the IIAs with EU values and objectives;

Compensation

34.

Points out that DCF methodologies, generally used for calculating compensation in IIAs, are not a reliable valuation method for investment projects that are at an early stage or those with uncertain future income streams; underlines that the use of such methods by arbitration panels represents a significant departure from well-established compensation principles and practices in national and international legal systems outside IIAs, which provide for significantly more constrained margins of discretion for adjudication; underlines that the considerable damages awarded by investment tribunals have imposed a significant and increasing financial burden on respondent states; points out that the use of valuation methods generally used by adjudicators is highly controversial owing to their very wide margin of discretion and reliance on highly complex and inherently speculative assumptions; invites the Commission to assess in depth and provide for corrective and transparency oriented rules and safeguards in relation to the provisions governing compensation in EU IIAs, including the use of stronger clauses preventing the use of punitive damages; calls for compensation to be capped at the level of sunk costs, reflecting the amount of eligible expenditure actually incurred by the investors; underlines that balancing approaches should, as appropriate, determine compensation awards below this cap, taking into consideration contextual elements such as non-compliance by undertakings with their legal or contractual obligations or commitments;

35.

		ISSN 1977-091X
Official Journal of the European Union		C 32

English edition	Information and Notices	Volume 66 27 January 2023

	III Preparatory acts
	European Parliament
	Wednesday 22 June 2022
2023/C 32/11	Amendments adopted by the European Parliament on 22 June 2022 on the proposal for a directive of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Directive 2003/87/EC establishing a system for greenhouse gas emission allowance trading within the Union, Decision (EU) 2015/1814 concerning the establishment and operation of a market stability reserve for the Union greenhouse gas emission trading scheme and Regulation (EU) 2015/757 (COM(2021)0551 — C9-0318/2021 — 2021/0211(COD))	108
2023/C 32/12	Amendments adopted by the European Parliament on 22 June 2022 on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing a Social Climate Fund (COM(2021)0568 — C9-0324/2021 — 2021/0206(COD))	250
2023/C 32/13	Amendments adopted by the European Parliament on 22 June 2022 on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing a carbon border adjustment mechanism (COM(2021)0564 — C9-0328/2021 — 2021/0214(COD))	320
	Thursday 23 June 2022
2023/C 32/14	P9_TA(2022)0250 Exceptional temporary support under EAFRD in response to the impact of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine ***I European Parliament legislative resolution of 23 June 2022 on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulation (EU) No 1305/2013 as regards a specific measure to provide exceptional temporary support under the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development (EAFRD) in response to the impact of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine (COM(2022)0242 — C9-0185/2022 — 2022/0166(COD)) P9_TC1-COD(2022)0166 Position of the European Parliament adopted at first reading on 23 June 2022 with a view to the adoption of Regulation (EU) 2022/… of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulation (EU) No 1305/2013 as regards a specific measure to provide exceptional temporary support under the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development (EAFRD) in response to the impact of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine	399
2023/C 32/15	P9_TA(2022)0251 Gas storage ***I European Parliament legislative resolution of 23 June 2022 on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulation (EU) 2017/1938 of the European Parliament and of the Council concerning measures to safeguard the security of gas supply and Regulation (EC) No 715/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council on conditions for access to natural gas transmission networks (COM(2022)0135 — C9-0126/2022 — 2022/0090(COD)) P9_TC1-COD(2022)0090 Position of the European Parliament adopted at first reading on 23 June 2022 with a view to the adoption of Regulation (EU) 2022/… of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulations (EU) 2017/1938 and (EC) No 715/2009 with regard to gas storage	400
2023/C 32/16	P9_TA(2022)0252 EU Digital COVID Certificate — Union citizens ***I European Parliament legislative resolution of 23 June 2022 on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulation (EU) 2021/953 on a framework for the issuance, verification and acceptance of interoperable COVID-19 vaccination, test and recovery certificates (EU Digital COVID Certificate) to facilitate free movement during the COVID-19 pandemic (COM(2022)0050 — C9-0031/2022 — 2022/0031(COD)) P9_TC1-COD(2022)0031 Position of the European Parliament adopted at first reading on 23 June 2022 with a view to the adoption of Regulation (EU) 2022/… of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulation (EU) 2021/953 on a framework for the issuance, verification and acceptance of interoperable COVID-19 vaccination, test and recovery certificates (EU Digital COVID Certificate) to facilitate free movement during the COVID-19 pandemic	401
2023/C 32/17	P9_TA(2022)0253 EU Digital COVID Certificate — third-country nationals ***I European Parliament legislative resolution of 23 June 2022 on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulation (EU) 2021/954 on a framework for the issuance, verification and acceptance of interoperable COVID-19 vaccination, test and recovery certificates (EU Digital COVID Certificate) with regard to third-country nationals legally staying or residing in the territories of Member States during the COVID-19 pandemic (COM(2022)0055 — C9-0032/2022 — 2022/0030(COD)) P9_TC1-COD(2022)0030 Position of the European Parliament adopted at first reading on 23 June 2022 with a view to the adoption of Regulation (EU) 2022/… of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulation (EU) 2021/954 on a framework for the issuance, verification and acceptance of interoperable COVID-19 vaccination, test and recovery certificates (EU Digital COVID Certificate) with regard to third-country nationals legally staying or residing in the territories of Member States during the COVID-19 pandemic	402
2023/C 32/18	European Parliament resolution of 23 June 2022 on the Council position on Draft amending budget No 3/2022 of the European Union for the financial year 2022 — financing reception costs of people fleeing Ukraine (09095/2022 — C9-0182/2022 — 2022/0126(BUD))	403
2023/C 32/19	European Parliament resolution of 23 June 2022 on the proposal for a decision of the European Parliament and of the Council on the mobilisation of the European Globalisation Adjustment Fund for Displaced Workers following an application from France — EGF/2022/001 FR/Air France (COM(2022)0201 — C9-0170/2022 — 2022/0143(BUD))	405
2023/C 32/20	European Parliament resolution of 23 June 2022 on the proposal for a decision of the European Parliament and of the Council on the mobilisation of the European Globalisation Adjustment Fund for Displaced Workers following an application from Greece — EGF/2021/008 EL/Attica electrical equipment manufacturing (COM(2022)0248 — C9-0190/2022 — 2022/0170(BUD))	409
2023/C 32/21	European Parliament decision of 23 June 2022 on the nomination of Stephanus Abraham Blok as a Member of the Court of Auditors (C9-0150/2022 — 2022/0805(NLE))	414
2023/C 32/22	European Parliament legislative resolution of 23 June 2022 on the draft Council decision concerning the renewal of the Agreement for scientific and technological cooperation between the European Community and the Federative Republic of Brazil (14207/2021 — C9-0478/2021 — 2021/0336(NLE))	415
2023/C 32/23	European Parliament legislative resolution of 23 June 2022 on the draft Council decision concerning the accession of the European Union to the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Civil or Commercial Matters (13494/2021 — C9-0465/2021 — 2021/0208(NLE))	416

Contents		page

	EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT 2022-2023 SESSION Sittings of 22 to 23 June 2022 TEXTS ADOPTED	1

	I Resolutions, recommendations and opinions
	RESOLUTIONS
	European Parliament
	Thursday 23 June 2022
2023/C 32/01	European Parliament resolution of 23 June 2022 on the candidate status of Ukraine, the Republic of Moldova and Georgia (2022/2716(RSP))	2
2023/C 32/02	European Parliament resolution of 23 June 2022 on the draft Commission implementing decision authorising the placing on the market of products containing, consisting of or produced from genetically modified maize DP4114 × MON 810 × MIR604 × NK603 and genetically modified maize combining two or three of the single events DP4114, MON 810, MIR604 and NK603, pursuant to Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003 of the European Parliament and of the Council (D081155/01 — 2022/2694(RSP))	6
2023/C 32/03	European Parliament resolution of 23 June 2022 on Commission Implementing Decision (EU) 2022/797 of 19 May 2022 authorising the placing on the market of products containing, consisting of or produced from genetically modified maize NK603 × T25 × DAS-40278-9 and its sub-combination T25 × DAS-40278-9, pursuant to Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003 of the European Parliament and of the Council (D080148/03 — 2022/2713(RSP))	14
2023/C 32/04	European Parliament resolution of 23 June 2022 on illegal logging in the EU (2022/2523(RSP))	20
2023/C 32/05	European Parliament resolution of 23 June 2022 on the implementation and delivery of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) (2022/2002(INI))	28
2023/C 32/06	European Parliament resolution of 23 June 2022 on the implementation of the Recovery and Resilience Facility (2021/2251(INI))	42
2023/C 32/07	European Parliament resolution of 23 June 2022 on the implementation of inclusion measures within Erasmus+ 2014-2020 (2021/2009(INI))	58
2023/C 32/08	European Parliament resolution of 23 June 2022 on the 2021 Commission Report on Montenegro (2021/2247(INI))	63
2023/C 32/09	European Parliament resolution of 23 June 2022 on the future of EU-Africa trade relations (2021/2178(INI))	74
2023/C 32/10	European Parliament resolution of 23 June 2022 on the future of EU international investment policy (2021/2176(INI))	96