(1)

Must Article 1(1) of Directive 96/71/EC, (1) in conjunction with Articles 3 and 5 thereof and Articles 285 and 299 of the [Hungarian] Labour Code, be interpreted as meaning that an infringement of that directive and of the French minimum wage legislation can be relied upon by Hungarian workers as against their Hungarian employers in proceedings instituted before the Hungarian courts?

(2)

Must per diems intended to cover the costs incurred during the posting of a worker abroad be regarded as forming part of the worker’s wage?

(3)

Is the practice whereby, in the event of a given economy based on the distance travelled and the fuel consumed, the employer uses a formula to pay the driver of a transport vehicle an allowance which does not form part of the wage provided for in his employment contract and on which no taxes or social security contributions are payable, contrary to Article 10 of Regulation No 561/2006/EC? (2) Notwithstanding that the fuel economy [allowance] encourages drivers of transport vehicles to drive in such a way as might endanger road safety (for example, by freewheeling for as long as possible when going downhill)?

(4)

Is Directive 96/71/EC applicable to the international transport of goods, account being taken in particular of the fact that the European Commission has initiated infringement proceedings against France and Germany for applying minimum wage legislation to the road transport sector?

(5)

If it has not been transposed into national law, can a directive in itself create obligations incumbent on an individual and, therefore, constitute by itself the basis for an action against an individual in a dispute brought before a national court?

1.A

Must Article 6(1) TEU and Article 5(2) of Directive 2010/64/EU (1) be interpreted as meaning that, in order to guarantee the right to a fair trial for defendants who do not speak the language of the proceedings, a Member State must create a register of properly qualified independent translators and interpreters or — failing that — ensure by some other means that it is possible to control the quality of language interpretation in court proceedings?

1.B

If the previous question is answered in the affirmative and if, in the specific case, since the language interpretation is not of adequate quality, it is not possible to establish whether the defendant has been informed of the subject matter of the charge or indictment against him, must Article 6(1) TEU and Articles 4(5) and 6(1) of Directive 2012/13/EU (2) be interpreted as meaning that, in those circumstances, the proceedings cannot continue in his absence?

2.A

Must the principle of judicial independence referred to in the second subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU, Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights and the case-law of the Court of Justice of the European Union be interpreted as meaning that that principle is breached where the president of the National Office of the Judiciary, who is responsible for the central administration of the courts and who is appointed by the parliament, the only body to which he or she is accountable and which may remove him or her from office, fills the post of president of a court — a president who, inter alia, has powers in relation to organisation of the allocation of cases, commencement of disciplinary procedures against judges, and assessment of judges — by means of a direct temporary nomination, circumventing the applications procedure and constantly disregarding the opinion of the competent self-governance bodies of judges?

2.B

If the previous question is answered in the affirmative and if the court hearing the specific case has reasonable grounds to fear that that case is being unduly prejudiced as a result of the president’s judicial and administrative activities, must the principle of judicial independence be interpreted as meaning that a fair trial is not guaranteed in that case?

3.A

Must the principle of judicial independence referred to in the second subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU, Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights and the case-law of the Court of Justice of the European Union be interpreted as precluding a situation in which, since 1 September 2018 — unlike the practice followed in previous decades — Hungarian judges receive by law lower remuneration than prosecutors of the equivalent category who have the same grade and the same length of service, and in which, in view of the country’s economic situation, judges’ salaries are generally not commensurate with the importance of the functions they perform, particularly in the light of the practice of discretionary bonuses applied by holders of high level posts?

3.B

If the previous question is answered in the affirmative, must the principle of judicial independence be interpreted as meaning that, in such circumstances, the right to a fair trial cannot be guaranteed?

4.A

Must Article 267 TFEU be interpreted as precluding a national practice whereby the court of last instance, in proceedings to harmonise the case-law of the Member State, declares as unlawful a decision by which a lower court makes a request for a preliminary ruling without interfering with the legal effects of the decision in question?

4.B

If question 4.A is answered in the affirmative, must Article 267 TFEU be interpreted as meaning that the referring court must disregard contrary decisions of the courts of last instance and positions of principle adopted in the interest of harmonising the law?

4.C

If question 4.A is answered in the negative, in that case, can the suspended criminal proceedings be reopened given that the preliminary ruling proceedings are pending?

5.

Must the principle of judicial independence, established in the second subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU, Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights and the case-law of the Court of Justice, read in the light of Article 267 TFEU, be interpreted as meaning that that principle precludes disciplinary proceedings being brought against a judge for having made a request for a preliminary ruling?

1.

Is it compatible with Articles 168(a) and 178(a) of Council Directive 2006/112/EC (1) of 28 November 2006 on the common system of value added tax in conjunction with Articles 220(a) and 226 of that directive, and with the principle of effectiveness, for a national legal interpretation and a national practice to operate (i) to the effect that the mere fact of being in possession of an invoice the content of which meets the requirements of Article 226 of that directive is not sufficient to fulfil the material conditions governing the right to deduct tax, the taxable person also being compelled, as a prerequisite of legitimately exercising the right to deduct tax on the basis of the invoice in question, to be in possession of additional documentary evidence that must not only comply with the provisions of Directive 2006/112 but also be consistent with the principles of the national legislation on accounting and the specific provisions concerning supporting documents, as well as (ii) to the effect that each member of the chain must recall and declare in the same way each detail of the economic transaction attested by those supporting documents?

2.

Is it compatible with the provisions of Directive 2006/112 on [the deduction of VAT] and with the principles of fiscal neutrality and of effectiveness for a national legal interpretation and a national practice to operate (i) to the effect that, in the case of a chain transaction, the mere fact that the transaction forms part of a chain has the consequence, irrespective of any other circumstance, of imposing on each of the members of that chain an obligation to scrutinise the components of the economic transaction carried out by them and a duty to draw inferences from that scrutiny for the taxable person situated at the other end of the chain, as well as (ii) to the effect that the taxable person is refused the right to [deduct VAT] on the ground that the constitution of the chain, although not prohibited by national law, was not [reasonably] justified from an economic point of view? In that context, when it comes to examining the objective circumstances capable of justifying a refusal to grant the right [to deduct VAT] in the case of a chain transaction, is it possible, when determining and assessing the relevance and probative force of the evidential material on which the refusal of the right to deduct VAT is based, to apply only the provisions of Directive 2006/112 and national law relating to the deduction of tax, as material provisions specifying the facts relevant to the determination of the factual framework, or is there also a duty to apply, as special provisions, the accounting legislation of the Member State in question?

3.

Is it compatible with the provisions of Directive 2006/112 on [the deduction of VAT] and with the principles of fiscal neutrality and of effectiveness for a national legal interpretation and a national practice to operate (i) to the effect that a taxable person who uses goods for the purposes of his taxed transactions in the Member State in which he carries out those transactions and who is in possession of an invoice consistent with Directive 2006/112 is denied the right [to deduct VAT] on the ground that he is not aware of all the components [of the transaction] carried out by the members of the chain or on the basis of circumstances associated with the members of the chain upstream of the issuer of the invoice and over which the taxable person was unable to bring to bear any influence for reasons beyond his control, as well as (ii) to the effect that the right to [deduct VAT] is made subject to the condition that, so far as concerns the measures reasonably incumbent upon him, the taxable person must comply with a general obligation of scrutiny that must be discharged not only before the contract is concluded but also during and even after its performance? In that context, is the taxable person obliged to refrain from exercising the right [to deduct VAT] in the case where, in connection with any component of the economic transaction indicated on the invoice and at any point subsequent to the conclusion of the contract or during or after its performance, he notices an irregularity or becomes aware of a circumstance the consequence of which would be the refusal of the right [to deduct VAT] pursuant to the practice of the tax authority?

4.

Having regard to the provisions of Directive 2006/112 relating to [the deduction of VAT] and the principle of effectiveness, does the tax authority have an obligation to specify how tax evasion has been committed? Is it appropriate for the tax authority to proceed in such a way that omissions and irregularities on the part of members of the chain that exhibit no reasonable causal link with the right to [deduct tax] are regarded as proof of tax evasion on the ground that, since those omissions and irregularities rendered the content of the invoice implausible, the taxable person knew or should have known about the tax evasion? If tax evasion has been committed, does this justify the fact that the scrutiny required of the taxable person must exhibit the breadth, depth and scope indicated above or does that duty exceed the requirements of the principle of effectiveness?

5.

Is a penalty involving refusal of the right [to deduct VAT] and consisting in the obligation to pay a tax penalty equal to 200 % of the tax difference proportionate in the case where the tax authority has incurred no loss of revenue directly linked to the taxable person’s right [to deduct VAT]? May account be taken of the presence of any of the circumstances referred to in the third sentence of Article 170(1) of the az adózás rendjéről szóló 2003. évi XCII. törvény (Law XCII of 2003 on General Taxation Procedure; ‘the Law on General Taxation Procedure’) in the case where the taxable person has made available to the tax authority all the documents that were in his possession and has included in his tax return the invoices issued?

6.

In the event that it is apparent from the answers given to the questions referred for a preliminary ruling that the interpretation of the rule of national law which has been followed since the case that gave rise to the order of 10 November 2016, Signum Alfa Sped (C-446/15, [not published,] EU:C:2016:869) and the practice adopted on the basis of that interpretation are not consistent with the provisions of Directive 2006/112 relating to [the deduction of VAT], and having regard to the fact that the first-instance court cannot make a request for a preliminary ruling to the Court of Justice in all cases, may the view be taken, on the basis of Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, that the right of taxable persons to bring a judicial action for damages guarantees them the right to an effective remedy and an impartial tribunal provided for in that article? Is it possible, in that context, to adopt an interpretation to the effect that the form of the decision given in Signum Alfa Sped means that the question had already been regulated by Community law and had been clarified by the case-law of the Court of Justice and that, consequently, the answer to it was obvious, or does it mean that, since new proceedings were instituted, the question had not been fully clarified and, consequently, there was still a need to seek a preliminary ruling from the Court of Justice?

1.

Is it compatible with the relevant provisions [on the deduction of VAT] of Directive 2006/112 (1) and with the principle of tax neutrality for national interpretation and practice to operate with the effect that the tax authority denies the right [to deduct VAT] on an economic transaction between the parties, on the basis that it finds the form of the legal relationship between them (a works contract) to be fraudulent because it gives rise to a right to deduct tax and, therefore, classifies it, under Article 1(7) [of the General Law on Tax Procedure] as an activity (agency) that does not give rise to a right to deduct, taking the view that the parties’ conduct was intended to evade tax since the activity carried on by the addressee of the invoice did not necessarily have to take [that form of business activity], and since it could also have performed that activity as an agent? In that context, are taxable persons obliged, as a requirement for [deducting VAT], to choose the form of economic activity that places the greater tax burden on them, or is there an abusive practice where, in exercise of their freedom to contract and for purposes unrelated to tax law, they choose a contractual form for the economic activity carried on between them that also has the unintended consequence of entitling them to deduct the tax?

2.

Is it compatible with the relevant provisions [on the deduction of VAT] of Directive 2006/112 and with the principle of tax neutrality for national interpretation and practice to operate with the effect that, where a taxable person wishing to exercise the right [to deduct VAT] fulfils the substantive and formal requirements [for that deduction] and has taken the measures it can be expected to take before concluding the contract, the tax authority denies the right to deduct VAT on the basis that it finds that it was unnecessary from an economic perspective to set up a chain and that doing so is therefore an abusive practice because the subcontractor, notwithstanding that it is in a position to supply the services, engages other subcontractors to perform them for reasons unconnected with the taxable event, and because the taxable person wishing to exercise the right [to deduct VAT] knew that its subcontractor, at the time it accepted the commission, owing to a lack of personnel and material resources, would perform the services using subcontractors of its own? Is the answer affected by the fact that the taxable person or its subcontractor included in the chain a subcontractor with which it has a direct relationship or to which it has a personal or organisational link (personal acquaintance, family relationship or even ownership)?

3.

If the preceding question is answered in the affirmative, is the requirement that the facts must be determined on the basis of objective facts satisfied where, in proceedings in which the tax authority considers the economic relationship between the taxable person wishing to exercise the right to [deduct VAT] and its subcontractor is irrational and unjustified, it bases that finding solely on the evidence of some of the subcontractor’s employees, without ascertaining on the basis of objective facts the characteristics of the economic activity under the contract, the specific circumstances of that activity or the relevant economic context, and without hearing the directors with decision-making powers of the taxable person or of the subcontractors forming part of the chain and, if that requirement is satisfied, is it relevant whether the taxable person or members of the chain are capable of performing the services and is it necessary to involve an expert in that respect?

4.

Is it compatible with Directive 2006/112 and with the principle of effectiveness for national interpretation and practice to operate with the effect that, where the substantive and formal requirements [to deduct VAT] are satisfied and the measures that can [reasonably] be expected have been taken, the tax authority, acting on the basis of circumstances that, according to judgments of the Court of Justice do not justify [the refusal to allow the deduction of VAT] and are not objective, finds tax evasion to have been proven and denies the right [to deduct VAT] solely because those circumstances occur in the chain detected as a whole, in a sufficient number of its members who were investigated?

1.

Is it compatible with Article 147 of Council Directive 2006/112/EC (1) of 28 November 2006 on the common system of value added tax (‘the VAT Directive’) for a Member State to operate a practice whereby the concept of ‘personal luggage’, defined as forming part of the concept of the supply of goods to foreign travellers, which is exempt from value added tax, is treated in the same way as both the concept of personal effects used in the Convention concerning Customs Facilities for Touring, done at New York on 4 June 1954, and the Additional Protocol thereto, and the concept of ‘luggage’ defined in Article 1(5) of Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2015/2446 supplementing Regulation (EU) No 952/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council as regards detailed rules concerning certain provisions of the Union Customs Code?

2.

In the event of a negative answer to the previous question, how is the concept of ‘personal luggage’ in Article 147 of the VAT Directive to be defined, given that that directive does not define it? Is the national practice whereby the tax authorities of a Member State take into account only the ‘normal meaning of terms’ compatible with the provisions of Community law?

3.

Must Articles 146 and 147 of the VAT Directive be interpreted as meaning that, where a taxable person does not qualify for the exemption for the supply of goods to foreign travellers under Article 147 of that directive, it must be examined, where appropriate, whether the exemption for the supply of goods for export under Article 146 of that directive is applicable, even if the customs procedures laid down in the Union Customs Code and in delegated legislation have not been carried out?

4.

If the answer given to the previous question is that, where the exemption for foreign travellers is not applicable, the transaction qualifies for a VAT exemption on the ground that the goods are for export, can the legal transaction be classified as a supply of goods for export that is exempt from VAT contrary to the intention expressed by the customer at the time of placing the order.

5.

In the event of an affirmative answer to the third and fourth questions, in a situation such as that in the case at issue, in which the issuer of the invoice knew at the time of supplying the goods that they had been purchased for the purposes of resale but the foreign buyer nonetheless wished to remove them from the territory under the scheme applicable to foreign travellers, with the result that the issuer of the invoice acted in bad faith in issuing the tax refund application form available for that purpose under that scheme, and in refunding the output VAT pursuant to the exemption for foreign travellers, is it compatible with Articles 146 and 147 of the VAT Directive and the EU law principles of fiscal neutrality and proportionality for a Member State to operate a practice whereby the tax authority refuses to refund tax incorrectly declared and paid on supplies of goods to foreign travellers without classifying such transactions as supplies for goods for export and without making a correction to that effect, notwithstanding that it is indisputable that the goods left Hungary as traveller’s luggage?

1.

Should Article 90(1) of Council Directive 2006/112/EC (1) of 28 November 2006 on the common system of value added tax be interpreted as precluding a provision of national law, such as that at issue in the main proceedings, under which a pharmaceutical company which, pursuant to an agreement it is not obliged to enter into, makes payments to the state health insurance agency based on the revenue obtained from pharmaceutical products and which, therefore, does not retain the full amount of the consideration for those products, is not entitled subsequently to reduce the taxable amount, solely because the payment method is not set out in advance in its commercial policy and the payments are not principally for promotional purposes?

2.

If the answer to the first question is in the affirmative, should Article 273 of Council Directive 2006/112/EC of 28 November 2006 on the common system of value added tax be interpreted as precluding a provision of national law, such as that at issue in the main proceedings, under which, in order to be able subsequently to reduce the taxable amount, an invoice made out to the person entitled to the refund providing proof of the transaction giving entitlement to that refund is required, even though the transaction that enables the subsequent reduction in the taxable amount is duly documented and can subsequently be verified, is based in part on truthful, publicly available information, and enables the tax to be collected correctly?

1.

Can Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights and Article 31 of Directive 2013/32/EU (1) of the European Parliament and of the Council (known as the ‘Procedures Directive’) be interpreted, in the light of Articles 6 and 13 of the European Convention on Human Rights, as meaning that it is possible for effective judicial protection to be guaranteed in a Member State even if its courts cannot amend decisions given in asylum procedures but may only annul them and order that a new procedure be conducted?

2.

Can Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights and Article 31 of Directive 2013/32/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council (known as the ‘Procedures Directive’) be interpreted, again in the light of Articles 6 and 13 of the European Convention on Human Rights, as meaning that legislation of a Member State which lays down a single mandatory time limit of 60 days in total for judicial proceedings in asylum matters, irrespective of any individual circumstances and without regard to the particular features of the case or any potential difficulties in relation to evidence, is compatible with those provisions?

1.

When an offer of shares to the public for subscription is directed at both retail and qualified investors, and a prospectus is issued for the retail investors, is an action for damages arising from the prospectus available to both kinds of investor or only to retail investors?

2.

In the event that the answer to the first question is that it is also available to qualified investors, is it possible to assess the extent to which they were aware of the economic situation of the issuer of the offer of shares to the public otherwise than through the prospectus, on the basis of their legal and commercial relations with that issuer (for example, being shareholders of the issuer or members of its management bodies, etc.)?

1.

Is the Agreement on air transport of 21 June 1999 (1) between the Swiss Confederation and the European Community, as amended by Decision No 2/2010 of the Community/Switzerland Air Transport Committee of 26 November 2010, (2) to be interpreted as meaning that Regulation (EC) No 261/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 February 2004 establishing common rules on compensation and assistance to passengers in the event of denied boarding and of cancellation or long delay of flights, and repealing Regulation (EEC) No 295/91, (3) is applicable, in accordance with its Article 3(1)[(b)], also to passengers who depart on a flight from a third country and land at an airport in Switzerland in order subsequently to embark on a flight to a Member State?

2.

If the first question is answered in the affirmative: Does this applicability for courts of a Member State also cover the case-law of the Court of Justice, according to which passengers whose flights are delayed may be treated, for the purposes of the application of the right to compensation, as passengers whose flights have been cancelled (CJEU, judgment of 19 November 2009 — Cases C-402/07 and C-432/07)? (4)

3.

Can a right to compensation under Article 7 of Regulation (EC) No 261/2004 also exist when a passenger does not catch a directly connecting flight due to a relatively minor delay in arrival, with the result that there is a delay in arrival at the final destination of three hours or more, but the two flights were operated by different air carriers and the booking confirmation was issued by a tour operator who combined the flights for its customers?

1.

Can the supply of audiovisual media services to viewers by the public television broadcaster be regarded as a service supplied for consideration within the meaning of Article 2(1)(c) of Directive 2006/112/ЕC (1) if it is financed by the State in the form of subsidies, with the viewers paying no fees for the broadcasting, or does it not constitute a service supplied for consideration within the meaning of that provision and not fall within the scope of that Directive?

2.

If the answer is that the audiovisual media services provided to viewers by the public television broadcaster fall within the scope of Article 2(1)(c) of Directive 2006/112/ЕC, can it then be considered that exempt supplies for the purposes of Article 132(1)(q) of the Directive are involved, and is a national regulation which exempts this activity solely on the basis of the payment from the State budget received by the public television broadcaster, regardless of whether that activity is also of a commercial nature, permissible?

3.

Is a practice which makes a full right of input tax deduction for purchases dependent not solely on the use of the purchases (for taxable or non-taxable activity), but also on the way in which those purchases are financed, namely on the one hand from self-generated income (advertising services inter alia), and on the other hand from State subsidisation, and which grants the right to full input tax deduction only for purchases financed from self-generated income and not for those financed through State subsidies, with the delimitation thereof being required, permissible pursuant to Article 168 of Directive 2006/112/EC?

4.

If it is considered that the activity of the public television broadcaster consists of taxable and exempt supplies, having regard to its mixed financing, what is the scope of the right to input tax deduction in respect of those purchases and which criteria must be applied for the determination thereof?

1.

Are the principles of equal treatment and transparency laid down in Article 18(1) of [Directive 2014/24] (1) and Article 49 of [Directive 2014/24], in conjunction with points 7 and 10(a) of Part C of Annex V to Directive 2014/24, to be interpreted as meaning that the contract notice in a case such as the present must contain information on the estimated quantity and/or the estimated value of the supplies under the framework contract to which the tender relates?

If the answer to this question is in the affirmative, the Court is also asked whether the above provisions are to be interpreted as meaning that the information must be stated in respect of the framework contract (a) as a whole and/or (b) in respect of the original contracting authority which stated its intention to conclude an agreement on the basis of the invitation to tender (in the present case: Region Nordjylland) and/or (c) in respect of the original contracting authority which merely stated that it is participating in one option (in the present case: Region Syddanmark).

2.

Are the principles of equal treatment and transparency laid down in Article 18(1) of [Directive 2014/24] and Articles 33 and 49 of [Directive 2014/24], in conjunction with points 7 and 10(a) of Part C of Annex V to Directive 2014/24, to be interpreted as meaning that either the contract notice or the tender specifications must set a maximum quantity and/or a maximum value of the supplies under the framework contract to which the tender relates, such that the framework contract in question will no longer have any effect when that limit is reached?

If the answer to this question is in the affirmative, the Court is also asked whether the above provisions are to be interpreted as meaning that the above maximum limit must be indicated in respect of the framework contract (a) as a whole and/or (b) in respect of the original contracting authority which stated its intention to conclude an agreement on the basis of the invitation to tender (in the present case: Region Nordjylland) and/or (c) in respect of the original contracting authority which merely stated that it is participating in one option (in the present case: Region Syddanmark).

If the answer to Question 1 and/or Question 2 is in the affirmative, the Court is further asked — in so far as it is relevant to the content of those answers — to answer the following question:

3.

Is Article 2d(1)(a) of [Directive 92/13], read in conjunction with Articles 33 and 49 of [Directive 2014/24], in conjunction with points 7 and 10(a) of Part C of Annex V to Directive 2014/24, to be interpreted as meaning that the condition that ‘the contracting entity has awarded a contract without prior publication of a notice in the Official Journal of the European Union’ covers a case such as the present where the contracting authority has published a contract notice in the Official Journal of the European Union concerning the envisaged framework contract, but

1.

Does a strike by airline pilots who are employed by an air carrier and who are needed to carry out a flight constitute an ‘extraordinary circumstance’ within the meaning of Article 5(3) of Regulation No 261/2004, (1) when the strike is not implemented in connection with a measure decided upon or announced by the air carrier but of which notice is given and which is lawfully initiated by workers’ organisations as industrial action intended to induce the air carrier to increase wages, provide benefits or amend employment conditions in order to meet the organisations’ demands?

2.

What significance, if any, is to be attached to the fairness of the workers’ organisations’ demands and, in particular, to the fact that the wage increase demanded is significantly higher than the wage increases which generally apply to the national labour markets in question?

3.

What significance, if any, is to be attached to the fact that the air carrier, in order to avoid a strike, accepts a proposal for settlement from a national body responsible for mediating labour disputes but the workers’ organisations do not?

1.

dismisses the application;

2.

orders WD to pay the costs.

1.

Annuls the decision of the European Commission of 7 June 2018 refusing, partially or totally, to grant Compañía de Tranvías de la Coruña, SA, access to documents relating to the Commission’s opinion sent to the French Republic concerning the fact that the metro lines contract is valid until 2039, in so far as it refused in part to grant access to the data other than personal data contained in the letter of 25 October 2010 sent by the Commission to the French authorities and in the letters of 27 July 2012 and 5 June 2013 sent by the Vice-President of the Commission, Mr Kallas, to the RATP;

2.

Dismisses the action as to the remainder;

3.

Orders the Commission to bear its own costs and to pay one fifth of the costs incurred by Compañía de Tranvías de la Coruña;

4.

Orders Compañía de Tranvías de la Coruña to bear four fifths of its own costs.

1.

Dismisses the action;

2.

Orders Stada Arzneimittel AG to pay the costs.

1.

Dismisses the action;

2.

Orders Hungary to pay the costs.

1.

Dismisses the action;

2.

Orders Hickies, Inc. to pay the costs.

1.

Annuls the decision of the Fourth Board of Appeal of the European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO) of 15 October 2018 (Case R 539/2018-4);

2.

Orders EUIPO to bear its own costs and to pay those incurred by Dalasa Handelsgesellschaft mbH in the proceedings before the General Court;

3.

Orders Charité — Universitätsmedizin Berlin, Gliedkörperschaft Öffentlichen Rechts to bear the costs that it has incurred during the proceedings before the General Court;

4.

Dismisses the action as to the remainder.

1.

Annuls the decision of the Fourth Board of Appeal of the European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO) of 15 October 2018 (Case R 540/2018-4);

2.

Orders EUIPO to bear its own costs and to pay those incurred by Dalasa Handelsgesellschaft mbH in the proceedings before the General Court;

3.

Orders Charité — Universitätsmedizin Berlin, Gliedkörperschaft Öffentlichen Rechts to bear the costs that it has incurred during the proceedings before the General Court;

4.

Dismisses the action as to the remainder.

1.

Dismisses the action;

2.

Dismisses the cross-claim as inadmissible;

3.

With regard to the main action, orders Globalia Corporación Empresarial, SA, to pay the costs, including those incurred by Touring Club Italiano for the purposes of the proceedings before the Board of Appeal;

4.

With regard to the cross-claim, orders Touring Club Italiano to bear its own costs and to pay the costs incurred by Globalia Corporación Empresarial and by EUIPO.

1.

Annuls the decision of the Second Board of Appeal of the European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO) of 13 December 2018 (Case R 874/2018-2) in so far as it ruled out the existence of a likelihood of confusion in relation to the services other than ‘translation and interpretation’ services in Class 41 of the Nice Agreement Concerning the International Classification of Goods and Services for the Purposes of the Registration of Marks of 15 June 1957, as revised and amended;

2.

Dismisses the action as to the remainder;

3.

Orders each party to bear its own costs.

1.

Dismisses the action;

2.

Orders Ms Dominique Bilde to bear her own costs and to pay those incurred by the European Parliament.

1.

Annuls the decision of the Fourth Board of Appeal of the European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO) of 11 February 2019 (Case R 1153/2018-4);

2.

Orders EUIPO to pay the costs.

1.

Dismisses the action;

2.

Orders Pierre Balmain to pay the costs.

1.

Dismisses the action;

2.

Orders Pierre Balmain to pay the costs.

1.

The action is dismissed as inadmissible;

2.

There is no longer any need to adjudicate on the application for leave to intervene of the Kingdom of Spain;

3.

The Republic of Latvia shall bear its own costs and pay those incurred by the European Commission, with the exception of those relating to the application for leave to intervene;

4.

The Kingdom of Spain, the Republic of Latvia and the Commission shall each bear their own costs relating to the application for leave to intervene.

1.

The action is dismissed.

2.

Mr Harry Shindler and the other applicants whose names are listed in the annex are ordered to pay the costs.

1.

The application for interim measures is dismissed.

2.

The costs are reserved.

1.

The application for interim measures is dismissed.

2.

The costs are reserved.

—

annul the Commission decision of 14 March 2019 rejecting the applicant’s request to be admitted to the internal competition COM/1/AD10/18 (AD10);

—

order the Commission to pay the costs.

1.

First plea in law, alleging violation of Article 27 of the Staff Regulations by the decision refusing to admit the applicant to the internal competition due to the lack of minimum grade.

2.

Second plea in law, alleging violation of the principle of equal treatment and Article 27 of Staff Regulations by requirement of a minimum grade which does not affect in the same way temporary agents and officials.

3.

Third plea in law, alleging violation of Article 27 of the Staff Regulations by the requirement to apply to one field only which prevents the recruitment based on highest standard of ability, efficiency and integrity on the broadest possible basis.

—

annul the Commission decision of 14 March 2019 rejecting the applicant’s request to be admitted to the internal competitions COM/2/AD12/18;

—

order the Commission to pay the costs.

1.

First plea in law, alleging violation of Article 27 of the Staff Regulations by the decision refusing to admit the applicant to the internal competition due to the lack of minimum grade. The applicant alleges that the minimum grade is not the real indicator of the competencies. As a result, the requirement of a minimum grade prevents the recruitment of experienced and qualified candidates.

2.

Second plea in law, alleging violation of the principle of equal treatment and Article 27 of Staff Regulations by requirement of a minimum grade which does not affect in the same way temporary agents and officials.

3.

Third plea in law, alleging violation of Article 27 of the Staff Regulations by the requirement to apply to one field only which prevents the recruitment based on highest standard of ability, efficiency and integrity on the broadest possible basis.

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annul the decision of the European Parliament of 5 December 2019 to award it second place in the call for tenders TRA/EU19/2019: Translation services lot 5 (translation into English);

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order the European Parliament to pay the applicant’s damages suffered as a result of the loss of the contract;

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alternatively, order the European Parliament to pay the applicant’s damages suffered as a result of the loss of opportunity;

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order the European Parliament to pay the applicant’s legal fees and other costs and expenses incurred in connection with this application, even if the current application is rejected.

1.

First plea in law, alleging insufficient motivation — Infringement of the obligation to state reasons, infringement of Article 296 of the TFEU, of Annex I, Chapter 1, Common provisions, Section 1, point 31 of the Financial Regulation (EU) 2018/1046 (1) and of Article 89 of Delegated Regulation (EU) 2019/715 (2) — Infringement of an essential procedural requirement and of the right to an effective remedy.

2.

Second plea in law, alleging manifest errors of assessment.

3.

Third plea in law, alleging unclear evaluation criteria — Use of the same criterion twice — Award of points for the same characteristic of the tenders under two different evaluation criteria.

4.

Fourth plea in law, alleging infringement of Article 21.2 of Annex I of the Financial Regulation (EU) 2018/1046 — Inadequate weighting of the award criteria.

5.

Fifth plea in law, alleging infringement of the tender specifications and Article 175 of the Financial Regulation (EU) 2018/1046, related to the standstill period.

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declare her application admissible;

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annul the contested decision and, so far as necessary, the decision rejecting the complaint;

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order the defendant to pay an amount of EUR 449 397,05, in compensation for the material damage suffered, together with interest at the legal rate until payment in full has been made;

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order the defendant to pay an amount of EUR 20 000 in compensation for the non-material damage suffered, together with interest at the legal rate until payment in full has been made; and,

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order the defendant to pay the costs.

1.

First plea in law, alleging breach of Article 84 of the Conditions of Employment of Other Servants of the European Union (CEOS):

2.

Second plea in law, alleging failure to state adequate reasons and manifest error of assessment:

3.

Third plea in law, alleging misuse of powers.

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annul Commission Implementing Decision (EU) 2019/1835, (1) in so far as it excludes from European Union Financing certain expenditure incurred by the United Kingdom’s accredited paying agencies under the European Agricultural Guarantee Fund (EAGF) and under the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development (EAFRD) for the stated reason of weakness in the definition of Active Farmer — connected companies; and

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order the Commission to pay the United Kingdom’s costs.

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First of all, the Commission erred in its interpretation of the language of Article 9(2)(A). It does not preclude payment to a claimant merely because the claimant is part of a larger group of companies, some other member of which group undertakes activities on the negative list.

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Secondly, the applicant argues the language of that provision is not capable of having the meaning ascribed to it by the Commission. As a matter of syntax, it is clear that what is prohibited is that the group should itself operate the activity in question. This condition is not met where the claimant for the direct payment is a company which (in and of itself) meets the definition of farmer in Article 4(1)(a), but which does not (in and of itself) operate a relevant activity.

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Thirdly, the United Kingdom’s interpretation is reinforced by the fact the wording in Article 9(2)(A) mirrors that in Article 4(1)(a) defining the notion of ‘farmer’. A ‘farmer’ may comprise either (a) a single (natural or legal) person who exercises an agricultural activity, or (b) a group of such persons. In the latter case, the single ‘farmer’ within the meaning of Article 4(1)(a) will be comprised in a collective of natural or legal persons. The phrase should not be read as introducing a ‘connected entities’ element in Article 4(1)(a), therefore such meaning should not be given to Article 9(2)(a).

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Fourthly, the phrase ‘groups of natural or legal persons’ appears elsewhere in the Regulation, however the Commission does not seem to consistently interpret it in the line of its interpretation of Article 9(2)(a). The United Kingdom argues that the critical phrase must plainly be interpreted uniformly throughout Regulation 1307/13.

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Fifthly, the United Kingdom also argues that there is a further linguistic problem with the Commission’s interpretation. The reference to ‘natural’ person in the critical phrase is redundant. Indeed, it would be sufficient to refer only to ‘groups of legal persons’. A natural person can never be owned by another natural or legal person, nor can they be associated with some other such person in the way that one company can be connected with another company.

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Sixthly, wider purposive or teleological considerations support the United Kingdom’s position and undermine hat of the Commission. Indeed, Recital 10 reads that direct payments should not be made to ‘natural or legal persons unless such persons can demonstrate that their agricultural activity is not marginal’. This approach is entirely consonant with the UK’s interpretation of Article 9(2)(A), and contrary to that of the Commission.

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Lastly, Article 9(2)(C) permits an exception to the prohibition in Article 9(2)(A) where the claimant (whether a single person or a group) falls within points (a) to (c). Provides the claimants are able to prove their agricultural activity is ‘not insignificant’ they fall under (b). It is therefore clear that there is no legislative intention to exclude payments to persons who undertake activities on the negative list per se.

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declare his action admissible and well founded;

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annul the decision of 21 March 2019, under the reference Ares(2019)1889562 to reinstate the applicant in grade AD 8, step 5;

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annul the decision of 21 October 2019, under the reference Ares(2019)6485832, notified on the same date, by which the appointing authority rejected the applicant’s complaint, which he had lodged on 21 June 2019 under the reference R/348/19, against the contested decision;

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acknowledge the harm resulting from the loss of opportunity of being promoted and from being deprived of the right to continue his duties; on that basis, order the Commission to pay compensation provisionally assessed at EUR 300 000 (three hundred thousand), subject to an increase or reduction in that amount in the course of the proceedings;

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order the defendant to pay all costs of the proceedings, in accordance with the Rules of Procedure of the General Court of the European Union.

1.

First plea in law, alleging a breach of the obligation to execute the judgments of the General Court pursuant to Article 266 TFUE, as well as infringements of the principle of legitimate expectations and the principle of good faith. The applicant states that, by the Commission’s own admission, the Commission did not carry out a reconstruction of his career, as it was required to do, to comply with the judgment of 13 December 2018, CX v Commission (T-743/16 RENV, not published, EU:T:2018:937). The applicant adds that the Commission undertook no review of his circumstances, nor considered the comparative merits of other officials eligible for promotion. The applicant concludes by submitting that the abovementioned judgment of the General Court which annulled the decision to remove him from post constituted an assurance which was able to give rise, on his part, to justified expectations that his career would be reconstructed by the appointing authority in a fair and sincere manner, and in accordance with the applicable provisions and principles.

2.

Second plea in law, alleging a breach of the obligation to state reasons and a failure to state any reasons. The applicant submits that the contested note does not contain any statement of reasons as regards the decision to classify him in grade A 8, step 5. According to the applicant, this is an ‘act adversely affecting a person’ as opposed to a ‘purely confirmatory act’, since that note implements and thus, in fact, notifies a decision of the Commission adversely affecting a person, even though it may have been tacit and may not have been notified previously to the applicant.

3.

Third plea in law, alleging a substantive error, a manifest error of assessment, a breach of the general provisions for implementing Article 45 of the Staff Regulations of Officials of the European Union (the ‘Staff Regulations’) and procedural defects. The applicant submits that there is no provision anywhere in the Staff Regulations that a disciplinary decision downgrading an official automatically takes precedence over a subsequent promotion decision where the addressee of both decisions is the same official and that promotion is, by its very nature, a legal measure to which no prior or subsequent condition may be attached and which may not be limited in time. The Commission should therefore have considered, when reconstructing the applicant’s career, that he had been classified in grade AD 10 since 1 January 2010. In addition, the applicant submits that, following the General Court’s annulment of the decision to remove him from post, and for the purposes of reinstating him and reconstructing his career, the Commission was also under an obligation to reopen the promotion procedure at the stage at which it had been suspended pursuant to the general provisions for implementing Article 45 of the Staff Regulations. Lastly, according to the applicant, for the purposes of reconstructing his career in a fair and rigorous manner and in good faith, the Commission was bound, pursuant to the principle of good administration, to analyse in detail all the relevant information making it possible to reach a reasoned decision with regard to the grade in which he should have been reinstated. Not only did the Commission fail to do that, but it did not even hear the applicant before taking its decision.

4.

Fourth plea in law, alleging a breach of the principles of equal opportunities and of equal treatment between officials and of the principle of entitlement to reasonable career prospects. The applicant submits that the principle of entitlement to reasonable career prospects which is a particular expression of the principle of equal treatment applied to officials has been infringed in so far as the administration overlooked, during the period from 1 January 2010 to 1 May 2019, both that principle of entitlement to reasonable career prospects and Article 5(5) of the Staff Regulations read in conjunction with the provisions of Annex I(B) to the Staff Regulations and the provisions under the Staff Regulations relating to the promotion of officials, which establish that the applicant could have been promoted to grade AD 11 by 1 January 2014 and then to grade AD 12 by 1 January 2018. Those same considerations also lead to the conclusion that there has been an infringement of the principles of equal opportunities and of equal treatment between officials because the applicant was not treated in the same way as other officials.

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annul Commission Decision C(2019) 5187 final of 18 July 2019 declaring a concentration in Case M.8864 — Vodafone/Certain Liberty Global Assets to be compatible with the internal market and the EEA Agreement;

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order the Commission to pay the costs of the proceedings.

1.

First plea in law, alleging that, in taking the view that there is no significant impediment to effective competition on the ‘market for the retail supply of TV signal transmission to multi-dwelling-unit customers’, the Commission committed manifest errors of assessment, failed to comply with its obligation to state reasons and infringed its duty of care with regard to:

2.

Second plea in law, alleging that, in taking the view that there is no significant impediment to effective competition on the ‘market for the retail supply of TV signal transmission to single-dwelling-unit customers’, the Commission committed manifest errors of assessment, failed to comply with its obligation to state reasons and infringed its duty of care with regard to the assumption that the parties to the concentration are neither potential nor direct competitors.

3.

Third plea in law, alleging that the Commission committed manifest errors of assessment and infringed Article 2 and Article 8 of Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 (1) when defining the market and assessing the competitive impact of the supply of multiple play offers, in particular offers of fixed telecommunications services combined with mobile telecommunications services (‘FMC offers’).

4.

Fourth plea in law, alleging that the Commission committed manifest errors of assessment, infringed Article 2 and Article 8 of Regulation No 139/2004, failed to comply with its obligation to state reasons and infringed its duty of care when assessing and in considering as acceptable the Wholesale Cable Broadband Access commitment.

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annul the Commission decision C (2019) 5187 final of 18 July 2019 in case M.8864 — Vodafone/Certain Liberty Global Assets;

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order the defendant to pay the costs.

1.

First plea in law, alleging that the Commission infringed Articles 2, paragraphs 2 and 3 of the EC Merger Regulation (1) by clearing a transaction resulting in a dominant position of the merged entity and a significant impediment of effective competition (‘SIEC’) in the German market for the retail supply of TV signal transmission to multi-dwelling units (‘MDU’) customers. The Commission’s conclusion that the Parties were neither actual (direct/indirect) nor potential competitors pre-Transaction and that the Transaction would not lead to a significant deterioration of the competitive conditions is vitiated by manifest errors of assessment. In particular, the Commission failed to take account of the negative repercussions of the merged entity’s superior market power in the markets for wholesale supply and acquisition of TV channels and for wholesale TV signal transmission (the ‘wholesale TV markets’) in the MDU market.

2.

Second plea in law, alleging that the Commission’s finding of a lack of a SIEC in the single dwelling units (‘SDU’) market is equally vitiated by manifest errors of assessment, in particular since it is also based on the alleged lack of a significant competitive relationship among the Parties pre-Transaction. The Transaction results in a dominant position entailing a SIEC in the SDU market comprising only cable and IPTV.

3.

Third plea in law, alleging that the Commission’s conclusion as to the ability and incentives of the merged entity to harm Tele Columbus and other retail TV signal suppliers dependent on intermediary TV signal delivery by the merged entity is vitiated by errors of law and manifest errors of assessment.

4.

Fourth plea in law, alleging that the Commission’s assessment of the negative effects of the Transaction on the wholesale TV markets is incomplete and manifestly erroneous. In particular, the Commission erroneously held that the merged entity would not have the incentive to foreclose access of the merged entity’s competitors to content and that such foreclosure would not have significant negative effects on the downstream markets for retail TV signal supply to MDUs and SDUs. The Commission also failed to assess the merged entity’s ability and incentive to harm downstream competitors by otherwise worsening their access conditions to TV content including digital functionalities (i.e. instant restart, pause etc.) than through total foreclosure (‘partial foreclosure’), to the detriment of consumers.

5.

Fifth plea in law, alleging that the Commission committed a manifest error of assessment by considering that the Transaction, as modified by the commitments offered by Vodafone, does not lead to a SIEC on the wholesale TV markets. Since the commitments do not meet the standards of the Commission’s Remedies Notice and were insufficient to remedy the SIEC of the Transaction on these and other markets, the Commission’s clearance decision accepting these remedies violates Art. 2 (3) of the Merger Regulation.

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partially annul the contested decision;

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order EUIPO and other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal to pay the costs of the applicant in the present proceedings, including those incurred before EUIPO.

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Infringement of Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council.

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partially annul the contested decision;

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order EUIPO and other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal to pay the costs of the applicant in the present proceedings, including those incurred before EUIPO.

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Infringement of Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council.

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partially annul the contested decision;

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order EUIPO and other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal to pay the costs of the applicant in the present proceedings, including those incurred before EUIPO.

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Infringement of Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council.

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annul Commission Decision C(2019) 5187 of 18 July 2019 (M.8864 — VODAFONE/CERTAIN LIBERTY GLOBAL ASSETS),

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order the Commission to pay the costs of the proceedings

1.

First plea in law, alleging a manifest error of assessment and procedural irregularity in the examination of whether horizontal non-coordinated effects on the German ‘market for the supply of cable TV signal transmission to households in multi-dwelling-units (MDU customers)’ (‘MDU market’) significantly impede effective competition.

2.

Second plea in law, alleging a manifest error of assessment in the examination of whether horizontal non-coordinated effects on the German ‘market for the supply of cable TV signal transmission to households in single-dwelling-units (SDU customers)’ significantly impede effective competition.

3.

Third plea in law, alleging a manifest error of assessment and procedural irregularity in the examination of whether vertical non-coordinated effects on the signal transmission market and the related MDU market in Germany significantly impede effective competition.

4.

Fourth plea in law, alleging a manifest error of assessment in the examination of whether horizontal non-coordinated effects on the so-called feed-in market in Germany significantly impede effective competition.

5.

Fifth plea in law, alleging a manifest error of assessment and procedural irregularity in the examination of commitments since the Commission accepted a set of commitments that was inherently unsuitable from the outset to compensate for the significant impediments to competition resulting from the merger.