—

set aside the judgment of the General Court dated 6 December 2018 in Case T-665/17;

—

give final judgment in respect of Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 (1) or alternatively that the case be remitted to the General Court, and

—

order the EUIPO and any intervening parties in this appeal to bear their own costs and pay the Appellant’s costs of these proceedings and those of the proceedings before the General Court in Case T-665/17.

1.

infringed Article 8(1)(b) EUTMR; and

2.

failed to state reasons for its finding that the intervener's earlier mark relied on (‘earlier mark’) had enhanced distinctive character in relation to ‘financial affairs, monetary affairs, banking’, and/or

3.

distorted the facts both in relation to its assessment of the earlier mark and the opposed mark and in reaching the said finding of enhanced distinctive character.

1.

the General Court took account of the reputation of the earlier mark at the first stage of assessing the similarity of the marks, as well as when conducting the global assessment of likelihood of confusion, which was an incorrect approach and resulted in impermissible ‘double counting’;

2.

the General Court wrongly treated both the earlier mark and opposed mark as if they were essentially word marks, paying insufficient regard to their figurative nature, which adversely affected the assessment of both the visual and the aural similarities of the marks in issue and the relative weight to be given to each;

3.

the General Court made a number of errors in relation to identifying the services in class 36 for which it held that the earlier mark had a reputation and thus distinctive character, and

4.

both as a result of the foregoing errors and as a result of ignoring additional important factors, the General Court failed to conduct a proper global assessment of the likelihood of confusion between the earlier mark and the opposed mark.

1.

set aside in its entirety the judgment of the General Court of the European Union (Fourth Chamber) of 4 December 2018 in Case T-560/16;

2.

rule in accordance with the form of order sought by the applicant in those proceedings, that is,

annul the decision of EUIPO (then: OHIM) of 2 October 2014, according to which the applicant was transferred from the International Cooperation and Legal Affairs Department to the Operations Department;

in the alternative: refer the case back to the General Court of the EU after setting aside the abovementioned judgment;

3.

order EUIPO to pay the costs of all of the proceedings — that is, the proceedings before the General Court of the EU and the appeal proceedings before the Court of Justice of the EU.

1.

Should Article 1(2) of Directive 2008/118/EC (1) be interpreted as precluding and being incompatible with a tax such as the IVPEE (tax on the value of electricity production), which is nominally a direct tax but which, having regard to its true nature, is actually an indirect, purely revenue-raising, tax without a specific purpose, given that the classification of the tax under national law cannot override the interpretation provided by EU law, which is governed by the objectives of EU law and reflects the objective characteristics of the tax in question?

2.

In spite of the fact that it is classed as an environmental tax, is the fundamental aim of the IVPEE to raise revenue, in that activities involving the production of electricity and its incorporation into the electricity system are taxed in the same way, regardless of their intensity and environmental impact, in breach of Article 1, Article 3(1) and (2) and Article 3(3)(a) as read with Article 2(k) of Directive 2009/28/EC? (2)

3.

Should the principle of free competition and promotion of energy from renewable sources be interpreted as precluding the IVPEE, since it applies the same fiscal treatment to energy from non-renewable and from renewable sources, thus discriminating against the latter and breaching the support scheme established in Article 2(k) and related provisions of Directive 2009/28/EC?

4.

Finally, do the aforementioned principle of free competition and Articles 32, 33 and 34 of Directive 2009/72/EC (3) (CHAPTER VIII, ORGANISATION OF ACCESS TO THE SYSTEM) preclude the IVPEE, on the grounds that it permits positive discrimination in favour of non-national electricity producers, to the detriment of Spanish producers, thereby distorting the internal electricity market and access to the system?

1.

Must Article 56 TFEU, Directive 96/71/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 1996 concerning the posting of workers in the framework of the provision of services (1) and Directive 2014/67/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 May 2014 on the enforcement of Directive 96/71/EC (2) be interpreted as precluding a national provision which, for infringements of formal obligations in connection with the cross-border deployment of labour, such as a failure to make available documents relating to pay or a failure to report to the Central Coordination Office (ZKO notifications), provides for very high fines, in particular high minimum penalties, which are imposed cumulatively in respect of each worker concerned?

2.

If the answer to Question 1 is in the negative:

Must Article 56 TFEU, Directive 96/71/EC and Directive 2014/67/EU be interpreted as precluding the imposition of cumulative fines for infringements of formal obligations in connection with the cross-border deployment of labour which have no absolute upper limits?

1.

Must Articles 7, 8 and 52(1) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, whether or not read in conjunction with Article 47 of that Charter, be interpreted as precluding national legislation of a Member State which, in the context of the procedure for the exchange of information on request established in particular with a view to the implementation of Council Directive 2011/16/EU of 15 February 2011 on administrative cooperation in the field of taxation and repealing Directive 77/799/EEC, (1) excludes any remedy, in particular a judicial remedy, on the part of a third party holding information to challenge a decision by which the competent authority of that Member State requires that third party to communicate information to it for the purposes of implementing a request for exchange of information received from another Member State?

2.

If the answer to the first question is in the affirmative, must Article 1(1) and Article 5 of Directive 2011/16 be interpreted, if necessary taking account of the evolving nature of the interpretation of Article 26 of the OECD Model Tax Convention, as meaning that a request for exchange of information, and a consequent information order from the competent authority of the requested Member State, satisfy the condition that there is not a manifest lack of foreseeable relevance where the requesting Member State states the identity of the taxpayer concerned, the period covered by the investigation in the requesting Member State and the identity of the holder of the information in question, while seeking information concerning contracts and the associated invoices and payments which are unspecified but which are defined by criteria concerning, first, the fact that the contracts were concluded by the identified holder of the information, secondly, their applicability to the tax years covered by the investigation by the authorities in the requesting State and, thirdly, their relationship with the identified taxpayer concerned?

1.

Must Articles 7, 8 and 52(1) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, whether or not read in conjunction with Article 47 of that Charter, be interpreted as precluding national legislation of a Member State which, in the context of the procedure for the exchange of information on request established in particular with a view to the implementation of Council Directive 2011/16/EU of 15 February 2011 on administrative cooperation in the field of taxation and repealing Directive 77/99/EEC, (1) excludes any remedy, in particular a judicial remedy, on the part of the taxpayer concerned by the investigation in the requesting Member State and a third party to challenge a decision by which the competent authority of that Member State requires a holder of information to communicate information to it for the purposes of implementing a request for exchange of information received from another Member State?

2.

If the answer to the first question is in the affirmative, must Article 1(1) and Article 5 of Directive 2011/16 be interpreted, if necessary taking account of the evolving nature of the interpretation of Article 26 of the OECD Model Tax Convention, as meaning that a request for exchange of information, and a consequent information order from the competent authority of the requested Member State, satisfy the condition that there is not a manifest lack of foreseeable relevance where the requesting Member State states the identity of the taxpayer concerned, the period covered by the investigation in the requesting Member State and the identity of the holder of the information in question, while seeking information concerning bank accounts and financial assets which are unspecified but which are defined by criteria concerning, first, the fact that they are owned by an identified holder of information, secondly, their applicability to the tax years covered by the investigation by the authorities in the requesting State and, thirdly, their relationship with the identified taxpayer concerned?

—

Declare that the Republic of Cyprus, by failing to:

—

order the Republic of Cyprus to pay the costs.

1.

In the absence of a comprehensive and operational collecting system, the Republic of Cyprus failed to observe the time limit of 31.12.2012 of Directive 91/271/EEC concerning urban waste-water treatment (as extended by the Treaty of Accession of Cyprus to the European Union) for four agglomerations with populations above 10 000 inhabitants with respect to collection (Article 2) and, consequently, the secondary treatment of waste water (Article 4) and the infrastructure and monitoring of the latter (Articles 10 and 15).

2.

In the absence of a comprehensive and operational collecting system, the Republic of Cyprus failed to observe the time limit of 31.12.2012 of Directive 91/271/EEC concerning urban waste-water treatment (as extended by the Treaty of Accession of Cyprus to the European Union) for agglomerations with a population of 2 000-10 000 inhabitants with respect to collection (Article 2) and, consequently, the secondary treatment of waste water (Article 4) and the infrastructure and monitoring of the latter (Articles 10 and 15).

1)

Are the second subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU in conjunction with Article 47 of the Charter and the principle of effectiveness at least with regard to a national legal system which, for the purpose of safeguarding the independence and impartiality of the courts in its constitution, establishes a fundamental right to the allocation of cases to judges of cases according to a fixed allocation of cases determined in advance according to general rules to be interpreted as meaning that the legislature must ensure that this fundamental guarantee is effective and not merely theoretical?

2)

Are the second subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU in conjunction with Article 47 of the Charter and the principle of effectiveness at least with regard to a national legal system which, for the purpose of safeguarding the independence and impartiality of the courts in its constitution, establishes a fundamental right to the allocation of cases to judges according to a fixed allocation of cases determined in advance according to general rules to be interpreted as meaning that a judge who has doubts (i) concerning the legality of an intra-court allocation of cases or (ii) concerning the legality of an intra-court decision implementing an intra-court allocation of cases and directly affecting the activity of that judge (in particular an allocation of cases decision) must, with regard to those doubts, be able to lodge an appeal (in particular at no financial cost to that judge) at a different court with full powers to review the legality of the act considered to be unlawful?

If not: Are there any other provisions to be guaranteed by the legislature which ensure that a judge is able to attain legal compliance with the statutory provisions concerning him in respect of the observance of the statutory (in particular intra-court) provisions regarding the allocation of cases?

3)

Are the second subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU in conjunction with Article 47 of the Charter and the principle of effectiveness at least with regard to a national legal system which, for the purpose of safeguarding the independence and impartiality of the courts in its constitution, establishes a fundamental right to the allocation of cases to judges according to a fixed allocation of cases determined in advance according to general rules to be interpreted as meaning that a party to a court case which has doubts concerning (i) the legality of a provision of the intra-court allocation of cases that is prejudicial to the settlement of its case or (ii) the legality of the allocation of that case to a certain judge must, before the issuing of the court decision, with regard to those doubts, be able to lodge an appeal (which does not place an excessive financial burden on that party) at a different court with full powers to review the legality of the legal act considered to be unlawful?

If not: Are there any other provisions to be guaranteed by the legislature which ensure that a party, before the issuing of the court decision, is able to attain legal compliance with its fundamental right to observance of the ‘lawful judge’ principle?

4)

Are the second subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU in conjunction with Article 47 of the Charter and the principle of effectiveness at least with regard to a national legal system which, for the purpose of safeguarding the independence and impartiality of the courts in its constitution, establishes a fundamental right to the allocation of cases to judges according to a fixed allocation of cases determined in advance according to general rules to be interpreted as meaning that the intra-court allocation of cases and the intra-court file registration are organised in such a transparent and comprehensible manner that the judge or a party is able, without particular effort, to check that the specific allocation of files to a judge or a certain panel of judges corresponds to the provisions of the intra-court allocation of cases?

If not: Are there any other provisions to be guaranteed by the legislature which ensure that a judge or a party is in a position to be able to obtain knowledge of the legality of a certain allocation of court cases?

5)

Are the second subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU in conjunction with Article 47 of the Charter and the principle of effectiveness at least with regard to a national legal system which, for the purpose of safeguarding the independence and impartiality of the courts in its constitution, establishes a fundamental right to the allocation of cases to judges according to a fixed allocation of cases determined in advance according to general rules to be interpreted as meaning that the parties to a case and the judge in a court case must be able, without particular action on their part, to acquaint themselves with the content of the case allocation rules and that the parties to a case and the judge must in this way be able to check the legality of the allocation of the case to a judge or certain panel of judges?

If not: Are there any other provisions to be guaranteed by the legislature which ensure that a judge or a party is in a position to be able to obtain knowledge of the legality of a certain allocation of court cases?

6)

What obligations to act are incumbent upon a judge, in view of his obligation under EU law to observe the procedural provisions under EU law, who, by virtue of an (out-of-court or intra-court) legal act which cannot be challenged, is obliged to perform an act which is contrary to EU law and infringes party rights?

—

remit the application back to the General Court for its consideration taking account of the Court of Justice's findings;

—

order that by no later than 12 April 2019 (or such other date to which the Article 50 TFEU period may be extended)

—

order that the parties have liberty to apply to the General Court for further directions as appropriate;

—

order the Commission to pay the appellant's costs.

—

Declare that the Hellenic Republic, by failing to take all measures required for the implementation of the judgment delivered by the Court on 23 April 2015, in Case C-149/14, Rollison v Greece, (1) has failed to fulfil its obligations under Article 260(1) TFEU;

—

Order the Hellenic Republic to pay a proposed penalty payment of EUR 23 753.25 for each day of delay in the implementation of the judgment delivered in Case C-149/14, from the date when the judgment in this case is delivered until the date when the judgment that was delivered in C-149/14 has been implemented;

—

order the Hellenic Republic to pay a daily lump sum amounting to EUR 2 639.25 per day from the date of delivery of the judgment in Case C-149/14 until the date when the judgment in the present case is delivered or the date when the judgment in C-149/14 is implemented, if earlier, and provided that the above amount does not exceed it, to order payment of a minimum lump sum of EUR 1 310 000,

—

order the Hellenic Republic to pay the costs

1.

On the basis of Article 260(1) TFEU, the Hellenic Republic is obliged to take the necessary measures to comply with the judgment of the Court in Case C-149/14. However, the Hellenic Republic failed to take all the necessary measures to comply with the operative part of that judgment. In particular, the Hellenic Republic failed to undertake a programme of work in relation to vulnerable areas characterised by the presence of bodies of surface water or groundwater which are affected by pollution caused by nitrates from agricultural sources. Consequently, the Commission decided to bring an action before the Court.

2.

By this action, the Commission asks the Court to impose on the Hellenic Republic a lump sum amounting to EUR 2 639.25 per day and a penalty payment of EUR 23 753.25 per day. The amounts of the lump sum and the penalty payment have been calculated taking into account the seriousness and duration of the infringement and the deterrent effect, based on that Member State’s ability to pay.

—

declare that, by failing to ensure that in buildings with a total useful floor area of over 500m2, for which an energy performance certificate has been issued under Article 12(1) of Directive 2010/31/EU (1) of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 May 2010 on the energy performance of buildings, and which are frequently visited by the public, the energy performance certificates must be displayed, the Czech Republic has failed to fulfil its obligations under Article 13(2) of that directive;

—

order the Czech Republic to pay the costs.

1.

Article 13(2) of Directive 2010/31/EU provides for the obligation to display the energy performance certificate, issued in accordance with Article 12(1) of the Directive, in cases where a building with a useful floor area of over 500m2 is frequently visited by the public.

2.

However, Czech law (§ 7a zákon č. 406/2000 Sb., o hospodaření energií, ve znění pozdějších předpisů (Paragraph 7a of Law No 406/2000 on the management of energy, as amended)) provides for the obligation to display an energy performance certificate, or energy performance passport, for those buildings only where they are occupied by public authorities. Czech law thus does not provide for the obligation to display an energy performance passport in situations where those buildings are occupied by bodies other than public authorities, and are frequently visited by the public. The legislation required is still merely at the preparatory stage.

3.

The Czech Republic has therefore not ensured that, in buildings with a total useful floor area of over 500m2 for which an energy performance certificate has been issued under Article 12(1) of the directive, and which are frequently visited by the public, the energy performance certificate must be displayed, and thus it has failed to fulfil its obligations under Article 13(2) of the Directive.

1.

Does Article 56 et seq. of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union apply to national legislation (a binding measure of general application in the form of a municipal decree) prohibiting a certain service in part of one municipality, simply because some of the customers of a service provider affected by that legislation may come or do come from another Member State of the European Union?

If so, is a mere assertion of the possible presence of customers from another Member State sufficient to trigger the applicability of Article 56 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, or is the service provider obliged to prove the actual provision of services to customers who come from other Member States?

2.

Is it of any relevance to the answer to the first question that:

—

set aside the judgment of the General Court (Seventh Chamber, Extended Composition) of 14 February 2019 in Joined Cases T-131/16 and T-263/16 Belgium and Magnetrol International v. Commission EU:T:2019:91 insofar as it holds that Commission Decision (EU) 2016/1699 (1) of 11 January 2016 on the excess profit exemption State aid scheme SA.37667 (2015/C) (ex 2015/NN) implemented by Belgium erroneously classified the ‘excess profit’ system as a scheme within the meaning of Article 1(d) of Regulation 2015/1589 (2);

—

refer the case back to the General Court for reconsideration of the pleas not already assessed, and

—

reserve the costs of the proceedings at first instance and on appeal.

—

Declare the appeal admissible and well founded;

—

Accordingly, set aside the judgment of 28 February 2019 (T-414/16);

—

Annul Decision (CFSP) 2016/850 of 27 May 2016 (1) and its subsequent implementing acts, in so far as they concern the appellant;

—

Order the Council to pay the costs of the proceedings.

—

Declare the appeal admissible and well founded;

—

Accordingly, set aside the judgment of 28 February 2019 (T-415/16);

—

Annul Decision (CFSP) 2016/850 of 27 May 2016 (1) and its subsequent implementing acts, in so far as they concern the appellant;

—

Order the Council to pay the costs of the proceedings.

—

Declare the appeal admissible and well founded;

—

Accordingly, set aside the judgment of 28 February 2019 (T-440/16);

—

Annul Decision (CFSP) 2016/850 of 27 May 2016 (1) and its subsequent implementing acts, in so far as they concern the appellant;

—

Order the Council to pay the costs of the proceedings.

—

declare that the Federal Republic of Germany has failed to comply with its obligations under Articles 170 and 171 of Council Directive 2006/112/EC of 28 November 2006 on the common system of value added tax (1) and under Article 5 of Council Directive 2008/9/EC of 12 February 2008 laying down detailed rules for the refund of value added tax, provided for in Directive 2006/112/EC, to taxable persons not established in the Member State of refund but established in another Member State (2) by systematically refusing to request the information that is missing in an application for a VAT refund and, instead, immediately refusing the refund applications in such cases if such information can be provided only after the 30 September deadline.

—

order Federal Republic of Germany to pay the costs.

1.

First plea in law — Infringement of the principle of neutrality of VAT

The Federal Republic of Germany infringed the principle of neutrality of VAT established in Articles 170 and 171 of Directive 2006/112 and Article 5 of Directive 2008/9, according to which, upon the acquisition of goods and upon the receipt of services, a settlement of the VAT paid at the preceding stage is to occur to the benefit of the taxable person.

The principle of neutrality of turnover tax requires that an entitlement to a refund is to be granted where the substantive conditions for that entitlement are fulfilled. Where there are doubts whether the substantive conditions for a refund are fulfilled, refund applications under Article 5 in combination with the first sentence of the first paragraph of Article 21 of Directive 2008/9 are to be refused only where requests for information from the Member State of refund under Article 20 of that directive are unsuccessful.

2.

Second plea in law — Infringement of the principle of the practical effectiveness of entitlements to VAT refunds

The interpretation of Article 20(1) of Directive 2008/9 adopted by the Republic of Germany hinders the effective exercise of the entitlement to a VAT refund by taxable persons not established in the Member State of refund. In this regard, the administrative practice of the German tax authorities undermines the rights of those taxable persons under Articles 170 and 171 of Directive 2006/112 and Article 5 of Directive 2008/9.

In order to do justice to the neutrality principle to the greatest extent possible, the practical effectiveness of Directives 2006/112 and 2008/9 requires that entitlements to VAT refunds existing in substantive terms be enforced. The legislation intended full settlement of the VAT paid at the preceding stage upon the acquisition of goods and upon the receipt of services and also thus sought to create broadly equal competition conditions for all taxable persons, including in cases of cross-border turnover. To that end, all the reasonable administrative measures provided for in the directive enabling the enforcement of entitlements to VAT refunds were to be taken.

3.

Third plea in law — Infringement of the principle of the protection of legitimate expectations

The Federal Republic of Germany’s systematic refusal to request further information and supporting documentation under Article 20(1) of Directive 2008/9 infringes the principle of the protection of legitimate expectations. After receiving the confirmation that the refund application has been received, every taxable person should be confident that his application will be processed in accordance with the provisions of that directive. If that does not occur, his confidence that lawful procedures are being applied will be undermined.

1.

Annuls the European Parliament’s decision of 26 January 2016 rejecting his request for assistance, as confirmed by the decision of 12 July 2016 rejecting his claim;

2.

Dismisses the claim as to the remainder;

3.

Declares that the parties are to bear their own costs.

1.

Dismisses the action;

2.

Orders the Kingdom of Spain to pay the costs.

1.

Dismisses the action;

2.

Orders Scor SE to bear its own costs and to pay those incurred by the European Commission and Caisse centrale de réassurance (CCR), including those incurred in connection with the request for confidential treatment.

3.

Orders the French Republic to bear its own costs, including those incurred in connection with the request for confidential treatment.

1.

Dismisses the action;

2.

Orders the Federal Republic of Germany to bear its own costs and to pay those incurred by the European Commission.

1.

Annuls the decision of the Luxembourg Settlements Office of the Joint Sickness Insurance Scheme, as evidenced in payment slip No 244 of 25 January 2017, rendering Mr Francis Wattiau liable for payment of the sum of EUR 843.01, corresponding to 15 % of the medical bill of 30 May 2016;

2.

Orders the Parliament, in addition to bearing its own costs, to pay the costs incurred by Mr Wattiau.

1.

Annuls the decision of the First Board of Appeal of the European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO) of 15 December 2017 (Case R 3111/2014-1);

2.

Dismisses the action as to the remainder;

3.

Orders EUIPO to pay the costs.

1.

Joins Cases T-152/18 to T-155/18 for the purposes of the judgment;

2.

Annuls the decisions of the Fourth Board of Appeal of the European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO) of 20 December 2017 (Cases R 1319/2017-4, R 1321/2017-4, R 1322/2017-4 and R 1323/2017-4);

3.

Orders EUIPO and Solgar Holdings, Inc. to bear their own costs and each to pay half of the costs incurred by Sona Nutrition Ltd.

1.

Dismisses the action;

2.

Orders Mr Steeve Briois to bear his own costs and to pay those incurred by the European Parliament.

1.

Dismisses the action;

2.

Orders Mr Walter Mauritsch to pay the costs.

1.

Dismisses the action;

2.

Orders WP to pay the costs.

1.

Annuls the decision of the Fifth Board of Appeal of the European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO) of 28 March 2018 (Case R 1326/2017-5);

2.

Orders EUIPO to pay the costs.

1.

Dismisses the action;

2.

Orders Mr Victor Lupu to pay the costs.

1.

There is no longer any need to adjudicate on the action.

2.

Promeco NV shall bear its own costs and pay those incurred by the European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO).

3.

Aerts NV shall bear its own costs.

1.

There is no longer any need to adjudicate on the action.

2.

Engel GmbH and F. Engel K/S shall bear their own costs and Engel GmbH shall pay those incurred by the European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO).

1.

There is no longer any need to adjudicate on the action.

2.

Dermatest Gesellschaft für allergologische Forschung u. Vertrieb von Körperpflegemitteln mbH shall pay the costs.

1.

The action is dismissed as inadmissible.

2.

Romania shall bear its own costs and pay those incurred by the European Commission.

1.

The application for interim measures is dismissed.

2.

The costs are reserved.

—

annul the contested decision and maintain the trade mark EUTM-013545181 validly registered as it was registered on 05/05/2016 for all the goods and services;

—

order EUIPO to pay the judicial costs.

—

Inapplicability of Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council;

—

Absence of proof concerning the breach of the public interest.

—

declare that, as from 18 December 2018, the date of electronic service of the applicant’s second letter requesting the defendant to act, the defendant failed through inaction to fulfil its obligation to issue a decision, to be sent to the applicant as a complainant, closing the preliminary examination procedure in State aid case SA.48706 (RVV Rostocker Versorgungs- und Verkehrs-Holding GmbH and Nordwasser GmbH), that is, either a decision to initiate the formal investigation procedure or a decision not to initiate that procedure;

—

order the defendant to pay the costs of the proceedings; and

—

as a precaution and in the alternative, should the defendant remedy its failure to act after the action has been brought, order the defendant to pay the costs of the proceedings.

—

annul Decision SA.34045 (2013/C) (ex 2012/NN) of 28 May 2018 notified under document C(2018) 3166 (OJ 2019 L 14, p. 1) in respect of the years 2012 and 2013;

—

in the alternative, annul Decision SA.34045 (2013/C) (ex 2012/NN) of 28 May 2018 notified under document C(2018) 3166 as against the applicant in respect of the years 2012 and 2013;

—

in the further alternative, annul Decision SA.34045 (2013/C) (ex 2012/NN) of 28 May 2018 notified under document C(2018) 3166 in so far as it orders that baseload consumers with at least 7 000 annual hours of use repay more than 20 % of the published network charges, baseload consumers with at least 7 500 annual hours of use repay more than 15 % of the published network charges, and baseload consumers with at least 8 000 annual hours of use repay more than 10 % of the published network charges;

—

in the further alternative, annul Decision SA.34045 (2013/C) (ex 2012/NN) of 28 May 2018 notified under document C(2018) 3166 as against the applicant in so far as it orders that baseload consumers with at least 7 000 annual hours of use repay more than 20 % of the published network charges; and

—

order the defendant to pay the costs, including lawyers’ fees and travel expenses.

1.

Wrongful presumption of the existence of State aid for the purposes of Article 107(1) TFEU

In the first plea in law, it is claimed that the defendant erred in law in its examination of the contested exemption from network charges by presuming the use of State resources.

In addition, in the examination of the ‘selectivity’ criterion, the reference system was incorrectly and incompletely identified.

It is further claimed that, because of the incomplete identification of the reference system, the defendant failed to comply with its obligation to state reasons under the second paragraph of Article 296 TFEU.

2.

Infringement of the principle of equal treatment

In the second plea in law, it is alleged that the defendant’s decision provided for the obligation to make additional payments only for baseload consumers who were fully exempted from network charges in the years 2012 and 2013. Those baseload consumers were therefore unequally treated and unfairly disadvantaged vis-à-vis baseload consumers who, over the same period, enjoyed flat-rate network charge reductions and for whom there were no obligations to make additional payments.

In that respect, it is further claimed that the defendant, with regard to the unequal treatment, failed to comply with its obligation to state reasons under the second paragraph of Article 263 TFEU and Article 42(2)(c) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. Furthermore, the unequal treatment infringed the principle of non-discrimination under Article 32(1) of Directive 2009/72/EC. (1)

3.

Infringement of the principle of the protection of legitimate expectations

In the third plea in law, it is claimed that, in view of the particular circumstances, the applicant could expect to be allowed to retain the special network charges granted.

—

annul Decision SA.34045 (2013/C) (ex 2012/NN) of 28 May 2018 notified under document C(2018) 3166 (OJ 2019 L 14, p. 1) in respect of the years 2012 and 2013;

—

in the alternative, annul Decision SA.34045 (2013/C) (ex 2012/NN) of 28 May 2018 notified under document C(2018) 3166 as against the applicant in respect of the years 2012 and 2013;

—

in the further alternative, annul Decision SA.34045 (2013/C) (ex 2012/NN) of 28 May 2018 notified under document C(2018) 3166 in so far as it orders that baseload consumers with at least 7 000 annual hours of use repay more than 20 % of the published network charges, baseload consumers with at least 7 500 annual hours of use repay more than 15 % of the published network charges, and baseload consumers with at least 8 000 annual hours of use repay more than 10 % of the published network charges;

—

in the further alternative, annul Decision SA.34045 (2013/C) (ex 2012/NN) of 28 May 2018 notified under document C(2018) 3166 as against the applicant in so far as it orders that baseload consumers with at least 7 000 annual hours of use repay more than 20 % of the published network charges; and

—

order the defendant to pay the costs, including lawyers’ fees and travel expenses.

1.

Wrongful presumption of the existence of State aid for the purposes of Article 107(1) TFEU

In the first plea in law, it is claimed that the defendant erred in law in its examination of the contested exemption from network charges by presuming the use of State resources.

In addition, in the examination of the ‘selectivity’ criterion, the reference system was incorrectly and incompletely identified.

It is further claimed that, because of the incomplete identification of the reference system, the defendant failed to comply with its obligation to state reasons under the second paragraph of Article 296 TFEU.

2.

Infringement of the principle of equal treatment

In the second plea in law, it is alleged that the defendant’s decision provided for the obligation to make additional payments only for baseload consumers who were fully exempted from network charges in the years 2012 and 2013. Those baseload consumers were therefore unequally treated and unfairly disadvantaged vis-à-vis baseload consumers who, over the same period, enjoyed flat-rate network charge reductions and for whom there were no obligations to make additional payments.

In that respect, it is further claimed that the defendant, with regard to the unequal treatment, failed to comply with its obligation to state reasons under the second paragraph of Article 263 TFEU and Article 42(2)(c) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. Furthermore, the unequal treatment infringed the principle of non-discrimination under Article 32(1) of Directive 2009/72/EC. (1)

3.

Infringement of the principle of the protection of legitimate expectations

In the third plea in law, it is claimed that, in view of the particular circumstances, the applicant could expect to be allowed to retain the special network charges granted.

—

annul Decision SA.34045 (2013/C) (ex 2012/NN) of 28 May 2018 notified under document C(2018) 3166 (OJ 2019 L 14, p. 1) in respect of the years 2012 and 2013;

—

in the alternative, annul Decision SA.34045 (2013/C) (ex 2012/NN) of 28 May 2018 notified under document C(2018) 3166 as against the applicant in respect of the years 2012 and 2013;

—

in the further alternative, annul Decision SA.34045 (2013/C) (ex 2012/NN) of 28 May 2018 notified under document C(2018) 3166 in so far as it orders that baseload consumers with at least 7 000 annual hours of use repay more than 20 % of the published network charges, baseload consumers with at least 7 500 annual hours of use repay more than 15 % of the published network charges, and baseload consumers with at least 8 000 annual hours of use repay more than 10 % of the published network charges;

—

in the further alternative, annul Decision SA.34045 (2013/C) (ex 2012/NN) of 28 May 2018 notified under document C(2018) 3166 as against the applicant in so far as it orders that baseload consumers with at least 7 000 annual hours of use repay more than 20 % of the published network charges; and

—

order the defendant to pay the costs, including lawyers’ fees and travel expenses.

1.

Wrongful presumption of the existence of State aid for the purposes of Article 107(1) TFEU

In the first plea in law, it is claimed that the defendant erred in law in its examination of the contested exemption from network charges by presuming the use of State resources.

In addition, in the examination of the ‘selectivity’ criterion, the reference system was incorrectly and incompletely identified.

It is further claimed that, because of the incomplete identification of the reference system, the defendant failed to comply with its obligation to state reasons under the second paragraph of Article 296 TFEU.

2.

Infringement of the principle of equal treatment

In the second plea in law, it is alleged that the defendant’s decision provided for the obligation to make additional payments only for baseload consumers who were fully exempted from network charges in the years 2012 and 2013. Those baseload consumers were therefore unequally treated and unfairly disadvantaged vis-à-vis baseload consumers who, over the same period, enjoyed flat-rate network charge reductions and for whom there were no obligations to make additional payments.

In that respect, it is further claimed that the defendant, with regard to the unequal treatment, failed to comply with its obligation to state reasons under the second paragraph of Article 263 TFEU and Article 42(2)(c) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. Furthermore, the unequal treatment infringed the principle of non-discrimination under Article 32(1) of Directive 2009/72/EC. (1)

3.

Infringement of the principle of the protection of legitimate expectations

In the third plea in law, it is claimed that, in view of the particular circumstances, the applicant could expect to be allowed to retain the special network charges granted.

—

annul Decision SA.34045 (2013/C) (ex 2012/NN) of 28 May 2018 notified under document C(2018) 3166 (OJ 2019 L 14, p. 1) in respect of the years 2012 and 2013;

—

in the alternative, annul Decision SA.34045 (2013/C) (ex 2012/NN) of 28 May 2018 notified under document C(2018) 3166 as against the applicant in respect of the years 2012 and 2013;

—

in the further alternative, annul Decision SA.34045 (2013/C) (ex 2012/NN) of 28 May 2018 notified under document C(2018) 3166 in so far as it orders that baseload consumers with at least 7 000 annual hours of use repay more than 20 % of the published network charges, baseload consumers with at least 7 500 annual hours of use repay more than 15 % of the published network charges, and baseload consumers with at least 8 000 annual hours of use repay more than 10 % of the published network charges;

—

in the further alternative, annul Decision SA.34045 (2013/C) (ex 2012/NN) of 28 May 2018 notified under document C(2018) 3166 as against the applicant in so far as it orders that baseload consumers with at least 7 000 annual hours of use repay more than 20 % of the published network charges; and

—

order the defendant to pay the costs, including lawyers’ fees and travel expenses.

1.

Wrongful presumption of the existence of State aid for the purposes of Article 107(1) TFEU

In the first plea in law, it is claimed that the defendant erred in law in its examination of the contested exemption from network charges by presuming the use of State resources.

In addition, in the examination of the ‘selectivity’ criterion, the reference system was incorrectly and incompletely identified.

It is further claimed that, because of the incomplete identification of the reference system, the defendant failed to comply with its obligation to state reasons under the second paragraph of Article 296 TFEU.

2.

Infringement of the principle of equal treatment

In the second plea in law, it is alleged that the defendant’s decision provided for the obligation to make additional payments only for baseload consumers who were fully exempted from network charges in the years 2012 and 2013. Those baseload consumers were therefore unequally treated and unfairly disadvantaged vis-à-vis baseload consumers who, over the same period, enjoyed flat-rate network charge reductions and for whom there were no obligations to make additional payments.

In that respect, it is further claimed that the defendant, with regard to the unequal treatment, failed to comply with its obligation to state reasons under the second paragraph of Article 263 TFEU and Article 42(2)(c) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. Furthermore, the unequal treatment infringed the principle of non-discrimination under Article 32(1) of Directive 2009/72/EC. (1)

3.

Infringement of the principle of the protection of legitimate expectations

In the third plea in law, it is claimed that, in view of the particular circumstances, the applicant could expect to be allowed to retain the special network charges granted.

—

annul Decision SA.34045 (2013/C) (ex 2012/NN) of 28 May 2018 notified under document C(2018) 3166 (OJ 2019 L 14, p. 1) in respect of the years 2012 and 2013;

—

in the alternative, annul Decision SA.34045 (2013/C) (ex 2012/NN) of 28 May 2018 notified under document C(2018) 3166 as against the applicant in respect of the years 2012 and 2013;

—

in the further alternative, annul Decision SA.34045 (2013/C) (ex 2012/NN) of 28 May 2018 notified under document C(2018) 3166 in so far as it orders that baseload consumers with at least 7 000 annual hours of use repay more than 20 % of the published network charges, baseload consumers with at least 7 500 annual hours of use repay more than 15 % of the published network charges, and baseload consumers with at least 8 000 annual hours of use repay more than 10 % of the published network charges;

—

in the further alternative, annul Decision SA.34045 (2013/C) (ex 2012/NN) of 28 May 2018 notified under document C(2018) 3166 as against the applicant in so far as it orders that baseload consumers with at least 7 000 annual hours of use repay more than 20 % of the published network charges; and

—

order the defendant to pay the costs, including lawyers’ fees and travel expenses.

1.

Wrongful presumption of the existence of State aid for the purposes of Article 107(1) TFEU

In the first plea in law, it is claimed that the defendant erred in law in its examination of the contested exemption from network charges by presuming the use of State resources.

In addition, in the examination of the ‘selectivity’ criterion, the reference system was incorrectly and incompletely identified.

It is further claimed that, because of the incomplete identification of the reference system, the defendant failed to comply with its obligation to state reasons under the second paragraph of Article 296 TFEU.

2.

Infringement of the principle of equal treatment

In the second plea in law, it is alleged that the defendant’s decision provided for the obligation to make additional payments only for baseload consumers who were fully exempted from network charges in the years 2012 and 2013. Those baseload consumers were therefore unequally treated and unfairly disadvantaged vis-à-vis baseload consumers who, over the same period, enjoyed flat-rate network charge reductions and for whom there were no obligations to make additional payments.

In that respect, it is further claimed that the defendant, with regard to the unequal treatment, failed to comply with its obligation to state reasons under the second paragraph of Article 263 TFEU and Article 42(2)(c) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. Furthermore, the unequal treatment infringed the principle of non-discrimination under Article 32(1) of Directive 2009/72/EC. (1)

3.

Infringement of the principle of the protection of legitimate expectations

In the third plea in law, it is claimed that, in view of the particular circumstances, the applicant could expect to be allowed to retain the special network charges granted.

1.

First plea in law, alleging misinterpretation of Article 150 of Regulation (EU) No 1308/2013 as regards establishing the qualified majority of producers concerned by the proposed regulation of supply.

2.

Second plea in law, alleging misinterpretation of Article 150 of Regulation (EU) No 1308/2013 as regards the need to establish the substantive criteria for market imbalance for the purpose of adopting temporary supply regulation measures, and as regards the need for an adequate accompanying statement of reasons.

3.

Third plea in law, alleging misinterpretation of Article 150 of Regulation (EU) No 1308/2013 as regards the prohibition of discriminatory plans for regulation of supply.

—

annul Decision SA.34045 (2013/C) (ex 2012/NN) of 28 May 2018 notified under document C(2018) 3166 (OJ 2019 L 14, p. 1) in respect of the years 2012 and 2013;

—

in the alternative, annul Decision SA.34045 (2013/C) (ex 2012/NN) of 28 May 2018 notified under document C(2018) 3166 as against the applicant in respect of the years 2012 and 2013; and

—

order the defendant to pay the costs, including lawyers’ fees and travel expenses.

1.

Wrongful presumption of the existence of State aid for the purposes of Article 107(1) TFEU

In the first plea in law, it is claimed that the defendant erred in law in its examination of the contested exemption from network charges by presuming the use of State resources.

In addition, in the examination of the ‘selectivity’ criterion, the reference system was incorrectly and incompletely identified.

It is further claimed that, because of the incomplete identification of the reference system, the defendant failed to comply with its obligation to state reasons under the second paragraph of Article 296 TFEU.

2.

Infringement of the principle of the protection of legitimate expectations

In the second plea in law, it is claimed that, in view of the particular circumstances, the applicant could expect to be allowed to retain the special network charges granted.

—

annul Decision SA.34045 (2013/C) (ex 2012/NN) of 28 May 2018 notified under document C(2018) 3166 (OJ 2019 L 14, p. 1) in respect of the years 2012 and 2013;

—

in the alternative, annul Decision SA.34045 (2013/C) (ex 2012/NN) of 28 May 2018 notified under document C(2018) 3166 as against the applicant in respect of the years 2012 and 2013;

—

in the further alternative, annul Decision SA.34045 (2013/C) (ex 2012/NN) of 28 May 2018 notified under document C(2018) 3166 in so far as it orders that baseload consumers with at least 7 000 annual hours of use repay more than 20 % of the published network charges, baseload consumers with at least 7 500 annual hours of use repay more than 15 % of the published network charges, and baseload consumers with at least 8 000 annual hours of use repay more than 10 % of the published network charges;

—

in the further alternative, annul Decision SA.34045 (2013/C) (ex 2012/NN) of 28 May 2018 notified under document C(2018) 3166 as against the applicant in so far as it orders that baseload consumers with at least 7 000 annual hours of use repay more than 20 % of the published network charges; and

—

order the defendant to pay the costs, including lawyers’ fees and travel expenses.

1.

Wrongful presumption of the existence of State aid for the purposes of Article 107(1) TFEU

In the first plea in law, it is claimed that the defendant erred in law in its examination of the contested exemption from network charges by presuming the use of State resources.

In addition, in the examination of the ‘selectivity’ criterion, the reference system was incorrectly and incompletely identified.

It is further claimed that, because of the incomplete identification of the reference system, the defendant failed to comply with its obligation to state reasons under the second paragraph of Article 296 TFEU.

2.

Infringement of the principle of equal treatment

In the second plea in law, it is alleged that the defendant’s decision provided for the obligation to make additional payments only for baseload consumers who were fully exempted from network charges in the years 2012 and 2013. Those baseload consumers were therefore unequally treated and unfairly disadvantaged vis-à-vis baseload consumers who, over the same period, enjoyed flat-rate network charge reductions and for whom there were no obligations to make additional payments.

In that respect, it is further claimed that the defendant, with regard to the unequal treatment, failed to comply with its obligation to state reasons under the second paragraph of Article 263 TFEU and Article 42(2)(c) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. Furthermore, the unequal treatment infringed the principle of non-discrimination under Article 32(1) of Directive 2009/72/EC. (1)

3.

Infringement of the principle of the protection of legitimate expectations

In the third plea in law, it is claimed that, in view of the particular circumstances, the applicant could expect to be allowed to retain the special network charges granted.

—

annul the defendant’s decision, notified under document C(2018) 3166 (OJ 2019 L 14, p. 1), of 28 May 2018 on aid scheme SA.34045 (2013/C) (ex 2012/NN) implemented by Germany for baseload consumers under Paragraph 19 of the Stromnetzentgeltverordnung (Regulation on electricity network charges, ‘the StromNEV’); and

—

order the defendant to pay the costs of the proceedings.

—

annul the defendant’s decision, notified under document C(2018) 3166 (OJ 2019 L 14, p. 1), of 28 May 2018 on aid scheme SA.34045 (2013/C) (ex 2012/NN) implemented by Germany for baseload consumers under Paragraph 19 of the Stromnetzentgeltverordnung (Regulation on electricity network charges, ‘the StromNEV’); and

—

order the defendant to pay the costs of the proceedings.

—

annul Decision SA.34045 (2013/C) (ex 2012/NN) of 28 May 2018 notified under document C(2018) 3166 (OJ 2019 L 14, p. 1) in respect of the years 2012 and 2013;

—

in the alternative, annul Decision SA.34045 (2013/C) (ex 2012/NN) of 28 May 2018 notified under document C(2018) 3166 as against the applicant in respect of the years 2012 and 2013;

—

in the further alternative, annul Decision SA.34045 (2013/C) (ex 2012/NN) of 28 May 2018 notified under document C(2018) 3166 in so far as it orders that baseload consumers with at least 7 000 annual hours of use repay more than 20 % of the published network charges, baseload consumers with at least 7 500 annual hours of use repay more than 15 % of the published network charges, and baseload consumers with at least 8 000 annual hours of use repay more than 10 % of the published network charges;

—

in the further alternative, annul Decision SA.34045 (2013/C) (ex 2012/NN) of 28 May 2018 notified under document C(2018) 3166 as against the applicant in so far as it orders that baseload consumers with at least 7 000 annual hours of use repay more than 20 % of the published network charges; and

—

order the defendant to pay the costs, including lawyers’ fees and travel expenses.

1.

Wrongful presumption of the existence of State aid for the purposes of Article 107(1) TFEU

In the first plea in law, it is claimed that the defendant erred in law in its examination of the contested exemption from network charges by presuming the use of State resources.

In addition, in the examination of the ‘selectivity’ criterion, the reference system was incorrectly and incompletely identified.

It is further claimed that, because of the incomplete identification of the reference system, the defendant failed to comply with its obligation to state reasons under the second paragraph of Article 296 TFEU.

2.

Infringement of the principle of equal treatment

In the second plea in law, it is alleged that the defendant’s decision provided for the obligation to make additional payments only for baseload consumers who were fully exempted from network charges in the years 2012 and 2013. Those baseload consumers were therefore unequally treated and unfairly disadvantaged vis-à-vis baseload consumers who, over the same period, enjoyed flat-rate network charge reductions and for whom there were no obligations to make additional payments.

In that respect, it is further claimed that the defendant, with regard to the unequal treatment, failed to comply with its obligation to state reasons under the second paragraph of Article 263 TFEU and Article 42(2)(c) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. Furthermore, the unequal treatment infringed the principle of non-discrimination under Article 32(1) of Directive 2009/72/EC. (1)

3.

Infringement of the principle of the protection of legitimate expectations

In the third plea in law, it is claimed that, in view of the particular circumstances, the applicant could expect to be allowed to retain the special network charges granted.

—

annul the decision of the European Commission, notified under document C(2018) 3166 (OJ 2019 L 14, p. 1), of 28 May 2018 on aid scheme SA.34045 (2013/C) (ex 2012/NN) implemented by Germany for baseload consumers under Paragraph 19 of the Stromnetzentgeltverordnung (Regulation on electricity network charges); and

—

order the defendant to pay the costs of the proceedings.

—

The Court annuls the contested decision.

—

The respondent must pay the costs of the proceedings before the General Court and the proceedings before the Board of Appeal including the necessary expenses of Applicant in both proceedings.

—

Infringement of Article 7(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council;

—

Infringement of Articles 7(1)(c) and 7(2) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council.

—

annul Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/67 of 16 January 2019; (1) and

—

order the defendant to pay the costs.

1.

First plea in law, alleging that the limitation of the notion of European Union producers to those producers of the like or directly competing products that are manufactured using raw materials (paddy rice) produced in the European Union violates Article 22(1) and 23 of Regulation (EU) No 978/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2012. (2) In the alternative, the defendant’s approach would have violated Article 22(2) of Regulation No 978/2012.

2.

Second plea in law, alleging that by relying on incorrect or inaccurate data or data that would have not been related specifically to the like product, the defendant would have failed to assess properly the ‘serious difficulties’, in violation of Article 23 of Regulation No 978/2012. This would have made it impossible to assess properly if the conditions of Article 22(1) of Regulation (EU) No 978/2012 are met in relation to the like product as defined in Article 22(2) of Regulation No 978/2012.

3.

Third plea in law, alleging that the defendant carried out a comparison of the Cambodian import prices and the European Union prices in a way that would have violated Article 22(1) and 23 of Regulation No 978/2012.

4.

Fourth plea in law, alleging that the defendant’s causation analysis violates Article 22(1) of Regulation No 978/2012 as the serious difficulties faced by the European Union industry would have not been a sufficiently direct consequence of the Cambodian imports’ volume and prices. To the extent that the Regulation 2019/67 would rely on a cumulative analysis, it would also violate Article 22(1) of Regulation No 978/2012.

5.

Fifth plea in law, alleging that the defendant failed to disclose several essential facts or considerations or details underlying such essential facts or considerations in violation of Articles 17(1), (2), (3) and (4) of the Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) No 1083/2013 of 28 August 2013, (3) Article 38 of Regulation No 978/2012 and the applicants’ rights of defence.

6.

Sixth plea in law, alleging that the constituted file is largely deficient and would miss important sets of information. This would constitute a violation of Article 14 of Commission Delegated Regulation No 1083/2013, Article 38 of Regulation No 978/2012 and the applicants’ rights of defence.

—

annul the decision of the European Parliament P8_TA-PROV(2019)0137, of 12 March 2019, on the request for the waiver of the immunity of the applicant 2018/2267(IMM), and which actually waived the applicant’s immunity;

—

order the Parliament to pay the costs.

1.

First plea in law, alleging infringement of Article 9 of Protocol (No 7) on the privileges and immunities of the European Union (OJ 2010 C 83, p. 266), of Article 5(1) and (5) of the Rules of Procedure of the European Parliament (OJ 2005 L 44, p. 1) and of the Communications to Members Nos 11/2003 and 22/2016.

2.

Second plea in law, alleging an abuse of process, more specifically, infringement of Article 43 of the Communication to Members No 11/2016, inasmuch as the underlying purpose of the charges is to damage the applicant’s political activity, which constitutes a case of fumus persecutionis against him.

3.

Third plea in law, alleging infringement of the general principles of EU law ‘ne bis in idem’ and ‘electa una via’, an abuse of process and a misuse of powers.

—

annul the decision of the European Commission in Case M.8900 — Wieland/Aurubis Rolled Products/Schwermetall of 5 February 2019;

—

order the European Commission to pay the applicant’s costs of the present proceedings.

1.

First plea in law, alleging that the Commission made manifest errors by basing the contested decision on the flawed concept of a so-called ‘high-end’ sub-segment instead of basing the contested decision on the relevant market for rolled copper products as defined by the Commission itself.

2.

Second plea in law, alleging that the Commission provided neither a definition nor a clear-cut delineation of the so- called ‘high-end’ sub-segment, which it — untenably — based its assessment on. The Commission’s approach is manifestly erroneous and speculative.

3.

Third plea in law, alleging that the Commission made manifest errors of assessment by contradicting its own findings in the clearance decision in case M.8909 — KME/MKM.

4.

Fourth plea in law, alleging that the Commission applied an unprecedented and untenable theory of harm sui generis inappropriately linking horizontal and non-horizontal effect and mixing up clear and strict guidance provided by the merger guidelines.

5.

Fifth plea in law, alleging that the Commission made manifest errors in the competitive assessment of its alleged horizontal concern blatantly failing to investigate obvious facts in establishing the competitive landscape of the relevant market.

6.

Sixth plea in law, alleging that the Commission’s assessment regarding the switching possibilities of customers is manifestly erroneous.

7.

Seventh plea in law, alleging that the Commission alleges price increases due to the transaction without having provided any respective evidence.

8.

Eighth plea in law, alleging that the Commission committed manifest errors in its assessment of the change from joint to sole control over Schwermetall. In particular, the Commission failed to take the necessary investigative steps.

9.

Ninth plea in law, alleging that the Commission committed manifest errors in the assessment of the commitments offered by the applicant.

10.

Tenth plea in law, alleging that the Commission’s handling of the remedy procedure and of the market test was not compliant with due process.

11.

Eleventh plea in law, alleging that the Commission has violated essential procedural requirements and due process. It refused to market test the first two commitments and launched the market test far too late in the process.

—

annul the Council decision contained in a letter to the applicant of 12 February 2019 refusing full access to document ST 13593 2018 INIT (legal opinion of Council legal service of 25 October 2018), pursuant to Articles 4(2) and 4(3) of Regulation 1049/2001, (1);

—

in subsidiary order, order the Council to grant wider partial access to document ST 13593 2018 INIT, pursuant to Article 4(6) of Regulation 1049/2001; and

—

order the Council to pay the applicant’s costs, including the costs of any intervening parties.

1.

First plea in law, alleging an error in law and misapplication of the second indent of Article 4(2) of Regulation 1049/2001.

2.

Second plea in law, alleging an error in law and misapplication of Article 4(3), first paragraph, of Regulation 1049/2001.

3.

Third plea in law, a subsidiary plea, alleging that, should the exceptions relied upon be applicable to the requested document, the Council breached Article 4(6) of Regulation 1049/2001, in that it evidently failed to fulfil its obligation to grant the (proper and required) partial access it should have granted to the requested document under the said Article 4(6), by withholding access to the entire section on the legal analysis.

—

annul the European Parliament’s decision of 18 May 2018 terminating the applicant’s contract;

—

if needed, annul the European Parliament’s decision of 4 January 2019 rejecting the applicant’s complaint of 16 August 2018, notified on 9 January 2019;

—

order the defendant to compensate the applicant for the non-material damage suffered as a result of the fault of the defendant, evaluated at the sum of EUR 50 000;

—

order the defendant to bear the costs.

1.

First plea in law, alleging breach of the duty to state reasons and of the procedural rules applicable in the case of termination of the contract in question.

2.

Second plea in law, alleging violation of Articles 12a and 24 of the Staff Regulations and in this connection infringement of the right to have one’s affairs handled impartially and fairly, violation of the duty to act diligently and manifest error of assessment.

—

declare Article 1 of Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/85 of 21 January 2019 (1) and Article 1 of Council Implementing Decision (CFSP) 2019/87 of 21 January 2019 (2) inapplicable to the applicant;

—

annul, insofar as it concerns the applicant, Council Implementing Regulation 2019/85 and Council implementing Decision 2019/87;

—

declare that the applicant’s name be removed from the Annex (at number 266 thereto) of Council Implementing Regulation 2019/85 and from the Annex (at number 266 thereto) of Council Implementing Decision 2019/87; and

—

order the defendant to pay the costs.

1.

First plea in law, alleging that the defendant has provided insufficient or unsubstantiated reasons for the applicant’s designation.

2.

Second plea in law, alleging that the applicant’s designation is based on a manifest error of assessment of the facts, in so far as the defendant would have failed to adduce evidence of the facts indicated which would underpin or would purportedly underpin the reasoning of the measures taken or in so far as the defendant would have drawn unreasonable inferences from these facts.

3.

Third plea in law, alleging that the applicant’s designation violates the applicant’s right of defence.

4.

Fourth plea in law, alleging that the applicant’s designation violates the applicant’s property rights, freedom to trade and the principle of proportionality.

—

annul the decision of the Commission dated 12 February 2019 with reference Ares(2019)856949 on the exclusion of IMAGINA MEDIA AUDIOVISUAL SL from the procurement and grant award procedures governed by Regulation (EU, Euratom) no 2018/1046 of the European Parliament and of the Council, (1) to the extent that it excluded the Imagina/dpa Consortium or rejected its bids;

—

annul the decision of the Commission dated 9 April 2019 with reference Ares(2019)2494476 in so far as it should be considered the decision to exclude the Consortium from the tender with reference number PO/2018-05/A4 or rejected its bids;

—

annul the act(s) by which the Commission awards the contracts, or allows a party other than the Imagina/dpa Consortium to execute the audiovisual coverage of EU current affairs, related to Lots I, III and VI as described in the Tender;

—

order the Commission to compensate the Consortium for the damage that the Commission caused by preventing the Consortium to execute the contracts for Lots I, III and VI;

—

order the Commission to pay the applicants’ costs.

1.

First plea in law, alleging that the Commission committed a manifest error of assessment by failing to recognise that the exclusion of Imagina Media Audiovisual SL — being one of the members of the Consortium — has no effect on the execution of the contract regarding Lots I, III and VI of the Tender by the Consortium. Nor does the exclusion of Imagina Media Audiovisual SL have any effect on the decisions by which the Commission awarded these contracts to the Consortium.

2.

Second plea in law, alleging that the Commission committed a manifest error of assessment by failing to correctly apply the tender documents. Consequently, the Commission did not require the Consortium to replace Imagina Media Audiovisual SL with another entity to form part of the Consortium, as was required by the tender documents.

3.

Third plea in law, alleging that the Commission committed a manifest error of assessment by failing to apply correctly Article 136(9) of Regulation 2018/1046. Consequently, the authorising officer of the Commission did not require the Consortium to replace Imagina Media Audiovisual SL with another entity to form part of the Consortium, as was required by Regulation 2018/1046.

4.

Fourth plea in law, alleging that the Commission infringed the Consortium’s right to an effective remedy, and the principle of sound administration. The Commission unlawfully used its decision dated 12 February 2019 with reference Ares(2019) 856949 on the exclusion of Imagina Media Audiovisual SL or its letter dated 9 April 2019 with reference Ares(2019) 2494476 to exclude the Consortium from the tender with reference number PO/2018-05/A4.

5.

Fifth plea in law, alleging that the Commission infringed the Consortium’s right to an effective remedy, the Commission’s obligation to state reasons and the principle of sound administration. The Commission committed procedural errors and illegally awarded the contracts for Lots I, III and VI of the tender with reference number PO/2018-05/A4 to a tenderer other than the Consortium.

6.

Sixth plea in law, alleging that the Commission caused damages to the Consortium by the unlawful conduct on the part of the Commission as a consequence whereof the Consortium cannot execute the contracts for Lots I, III and VI of the tender with reference number PO/2018-05/A4.

—

annul the Commission decision Ares(2019)856949, whereby the Commission imposed a two-year exclusion on the applicant and registered the applicant in the early detection and exclusion database (1);

—

order the Commission to compensate the applicant for the damage caused by the contested decision;

—

order the Commission to pay the costs.

1.

First plea in law, alleging that the Commission errs in law by failing to conduct its own review or analysis, solely relying on the findings of the US Department of Justice without own proper review and incorrectly interpreting the findings of the US Department of Justice. As a result, the Commission makes an error of assessment of the facts and thus breaching the duty of care.

2.

Second plea in law, alleging that the Commission wrongfully excludes the applicant, therefore breaching Article 136(1)(c) of Regulation 2018/1046 and the rights of defence of the applicant by not clearly stating what exactly constitutes grave professional misconduct. Furthermore, the Commission allegedly errs in stating that the applicant is also excluded from on-going tenders since this does not follow from the operative part of the contested decision, by excluding the applicant for conduct related to media and marketing rights in sports in a tender for audio-visual coverage of EU current affairs since these are different markets that do not impact each other so that the reliability of the applicant in contracts for the European Union can be demonstrated, and in deciding that the applicant should be excluded since it did not have sufficient evidence to reach the contested decision and the non-prosecution agreement of the applicant with the US Department of Justice does not state that the applicant or its CEO’s are guilty.

3.

Third plea in law, alleging that the Commission errs in law by deciding that the exclusion would be proportional within the meaning of Article 136(3) Regulation 2018/1046 and thereby disregarding lack of impact on the financial interests and image of the Union and the time elapsed since the conduct.

4.

Forth plea in law, alleging that the Commission erred in deciding that the remedial measures taken by the Applicant are provisional and are insufficient having regard to Article 136(6)(a) in conjunction with 136(7) Regulation 2018/1046.

5.

Fifth plea in law, alleging that the Commission breaches the fundamental principle of equal treatment by treating the Applicant differently than other tenderers who concluded non-prosecution agreement with the US Department of Justice.

6.

Sixth plea in law, alleging that the Commission caused damages to the applicant by unlawfully deciding that the applicant should be excluded from the procurement grant procedures governed by Regulation 2018/1046.

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annul the contested decision;

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order the respondant to pay the costs of the proceedings before the General Court and of the proceedings before the EUIPO Board of Appeal including the necessary expenses of Applicant in both proceedings.

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Having refused protection for the mark in question, the Board of Appeal has infringed Articles 7(1)(b) and (c) (2) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council.

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Annul the decision of the AECE of the EEAS of 15 June 2018 finding that the applicant does not fulfil all the conditions of employment provided for in Article 82 of the CEOS and cannot be engaged as an Article 3b contract staff member in the EEAS;

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Annul the decision of the AECE of the EEAS of 14 January 2019 rejecting the complaint lodged by the applicant on 14 September 2018;

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Order the EEAS to pay the applicant compensation assessed at EUR 36 992.52 corresponding to one year’s remuneration under a CA FG II contract in accordance with the salary scale in force from 1 November 2017, subject to more precise calculation during the proceedings;

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Order the EEAS to calculate the loss in terms of pension entitlement resulting from the applicant not being recruited;

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Order the EEAS to pay the applicant compensation of EUR 15 000 by way of compensation for non-material damage resulting from the harm to her dignity and professional reputation;

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Order the EEAS to pay the applicant compensation of EUR 15 000 by way of compensation for non-material damage resulting from the harm to her health and well-being;

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Order the EEAS to pay the applicant compensation of EUR 15 000 by way of compensation for non-material damage resulting from the infringement by the EEAS of Regulation No 45/2001 on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data by the Community institutions and bodies and on the free movement of such data;

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Order the EEAS to pay the applicant compensation of EUR 10 000 by way of compensation for non-material damage resulting from breach of medical confidentiality and the confidential nature of personal data in the applicant’s medical file;

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Order the EEAS to pay the applicant compensation of EUR 15 000 by way of compensation for non-material damage resulting from slander and/or defamation in respect of the applicant;

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Order the EEAS to pay all the costs.

1.

First plea in law, alleging infringement of the second paragraph of Article 33 of the Staff Regulations of Officials of the European Union and Articles 82 and 83 of the Conditions of Employment of Other Servants of the European Union, the principles of proportionality and the right to be heard, the right to good administration and the duty of care, the principle of non-discrimination and the right to be treated fairly and impartially and the prohibition of psychological harassment.

2.

Second plea in law, alleging infringement of Regulation (EC) No 45/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 December 2000 on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data by the Community institutions and bodies and on the free movement of such data (OJ 2001 L 8, p. 1) and of Article 8 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union.

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annul the contested decision;

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order EUIPO to pay the costs, including the costs incurred in the proceedings before the Cancellation Division and the Second Board of Appeal of EUIPO.

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Infringement of Article 53(1)(c) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council;

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Infringement of Article 94(1) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council.

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annul the ECB’s decision of 14 February 2019 to conduct an on-site inspection on the premises of PNB Banka AS and its group companies;

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order the defendant to pay the costs.

1.

First plea in law, alleging that the ECB was not the competent supervisory authority with respect to PNB Banka AS at the time of the decision to conduct the on-site inspection.

2.

Second plea in law, alleging that the contested decision was not ‘necessary’ within the meaning of Article 12 of the SSM Regulation. (1)

3.

Third plea in law, alleging that the ECB failed to duly exercise its discretion pursuant to Article 12(1) of the SSM Regulation.

4.

Fourth plea in law, alleging that the ECB violated the principle of proportionality.

5.

Fifth plea in law, alleging that the ECB violated the applicants’ rights to be heard.

6.

Sixth plea in law, alleging that the ECB violated its obligation to examine and appraise carefully and impartially all the relevant aspects of the individual case.

7.

Seventh plea in law, alleging that the ECB violated the obligation to provide adequate reasoning for its decision.

8.

Eighth plea in law, alleging that the ECB violated the principles of legitimate expectations and legal certainty.

9.

Ninth plea in law, alleging that the ECB violated the principle of equal treatment and acted in a discriminatory manner with respect to the applicants.

10.

Tenth plea in law, alleging that the ECB violated Article 19 of and recital 75 to the preamble of the SSM Regulation and committed a détournement de pouvoir.

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Annul the contested decision of the appointing authority, the content of which is set out in the email of 20 September 2018 from the head of the Administration Department, and the implied decision of the appointing authority rejecting the applicant’s complaint. Consequently, EASO must take the measures necessary to implement the decision of the Court, in accordance with Article 266 TFEU, with retroactive effect;

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Order the defendant to pay all the applicant’s costs.

1.

First plea in law, alleging infringement of the principle of the protection of legitimate expectations.

2.

Second plea in law, alleging a failure to state reasons and, therefore, breach of an essential procedural requirement within the meaning of Article 263 TFEU.

3.

Third plea in law, alleging an inadequate statement of reasons for the contested decision, which contains a substantive error.

4.

Fourth plea in law, alleging an error of law in that the decision did not take account of the interests of the service and the duty of the Administration to have regard for the welfare of its staff.

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declare that the contested decision misapplied the judgment of the General Court (Fifth Chamber) of 23 November 2017 in case T-140/15;

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alter the contested decision, reverse CPVO Decision NN010 of 23 September 2013 and validate the challenge to the validity of CPVR No. EU 15118 raised by the applicant on 28 August 2012;

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declare that CPVR No. EU 15118 is ab initio null and void;

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order the defendant to pay the applicant’s costs pursuant to Article 87 of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court, including the costs of any intervening parties.

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Violation of the principles of legal certainty and legitimate expectations;

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Dereliction of duty and denial of justice.

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annul the Commission decision rejecting the applicant’s complaint (Case SA.53105 — Alleged aid to Eurobank Ergasias through sale of Piraeus Bank Bulgaria) at least insofar as it relates to the breaches of the restructuring commitments in Case SA.43364 and Case SA.43363;

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order the Commission to bear the costs.

1.

First plea in law, alleging that the Commission’s decision breached essential procedural requirements and violated the following:

2.

Second plea in law, alleging that the Commission incorrectly concluded that (i) the commitments given in Case SA.43364 in relation to the State aid received by Piraeus Bank, and (ii) the commitments given in Case SA.43363 in relation to the State aid received by Eurobank Ergasias, did not apply ratione temporis since the closing of the sale of Piraeus Bank Bulgaria will take place after 31 December 2018.

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annul the contested decision;

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the Defendant shall bear its own costs and pay those of the Applicant for Annulment.

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Infringement of Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council;

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Infringement of Article 59(1)(b) of (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council.

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annul the contested decision;

—

order the Defendant to bear its own costs and pay those of the Applicant for Annulment.

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Infringement of Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council;

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Infringement of Article 59(1)(b) of (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council.

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Find and declare that the applicant is not required to pay the sums claimed by the European Commission in Debit Note No 3241902288 received on 22 February 2019 and, most recently, in the note (Ref. Ares(2019)2858540) received on 29 April 2019, which are claimed in respect of recovery of aid and liquidated damages for Studio Galli Ingegneria’s alleged failure to fulfil obligations under Grant Agreement No 619120 concerning the ‘MARSOL’ project.

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Find and declare that the shortcomings alleged by the Commission are non-existent.

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Find and declare that the pre-information letter of 19 December 2018, the OLAF investigation report, the debit note of 22 February 2019, the subsequent reminder of 2 April 2019 and the final note (Ref. Ares(2019)2858540) of 29 April 2019 re-determining the amount claimed and rejecting SGI’s further requests are unlawful, invalid, and in any event unfounded.

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Find and declare that the debt claimed by the Commission is non-existent.

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Find and declare that the applicant is entitled to the aid that was paid by the Commission in accordance with Grant Agreement No 619120 concerning the ‘MARSOL’ project.

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In the alternative, find and declare that the amount to be recovered by the Commission may not exceed EUR 100 044.99.

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In the further alternative, order the Commission to pay SGI the costs it incurred in executing the ‘MARSOL’ project, in accordance with the provisions on unjust enrichment.

1.

First plea in law, alleging (i) failure to observe the principle of contractual good faith, (ii) infringement of the rights of defence during the phase following the close of the investigation, (iii) infringement of the right to an effective remedy within the meaning of Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (‘the Charter’), (iv) infringement of the right to good administration within the meaning of Article 41 of the Charter, (v) infringement of the right of access to documents within the meaning of Article 42 of the Charter, (vi) infringement of Article II.22 of the Grant Agreement and (vii) infringement of Article 1134 of the Belgian Civil Code.

2.

Second plea in law, alleging (i) non-existence of the alleged failure to fulfil obligations, (ii) non-existence of the debt claimed by the Commission, (iii) the unlawful and unfounded nature of OLAF’s investigation report and, consequently, of the Commission’s pre-information letter and debit notes, (iv) failure to observe the principles of the presumption of innocence, the burden of proof, and fairness as set out in Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 883/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 September 2013, and (v) an error of assessment as regards the evidence and infringement of Article 1315 of the Belgian Civil Code.

3.

Third plea in law, alleging failure to observe the principles of proportionality, fairness and contractual good faith, and infringement of Article II.22 of the Grant Agreement.

4.

Fourth plea in law, alleging, in the alternative, the right to compensation for the unjust enrichment of the European Commission.

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annul, pursuant to Article 263 TFEU, Council Decision (CFSP) 2019/354 of 4 March 2019 amending Decision 2014/119/CFSP concerning restrictive measures directed against certain persons, entities and bodies in view of the situation in Ukraine (OJ 2019 L 64, p. 7) and Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/352 of 4 March 2019 implementing Regulation (EU) No 208/2014 concerning restrictive measures directed against certain persons, entities and bodies in view of the situation in Ukraine (OJ 2019 L 64, p. 1), in so far as they relate to the applicant;

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order specific measures of organisation pursuant to Article 64 of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court, in particular:

—

order the Council to pay the costs of the proceedings pursuant to Article 87(2) of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court.

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annul the decision of the Board of Appeal of 22 February 2019 in Case R 1785/2018-2;

—

annul the decision of the Opposition Division of 10 July 2018 (opposition B 2 598 285;

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order that the opposing mark EUTM No 14 180 038 is to be registered for all the goods referred to in the application;

—

order the defendant to bear its own costs and to pay the applicant’s costs.

—

annul the contested decision;

—

order EUIPO to pay the costs.

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Infringement of Article 7(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council.

—

declare the action brought by Mr Oleksandr Viktorovych Klymenko admissible;

—

annul Council Decision (CFSP) 2019/354 of 4 March 2019 amending Decision 2014/119/CFSP concerning restrictive measures directed against certain persons, entities and bodies in view of the situation in Ukraine;

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annul Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/352 of 4 March 2019 implementing Regulation (EU) No 208/2014 concerning restrictive measures directed against certain persons, entities and bodies in view of the situation in Ukraine;

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order the Council of the European Union to pay the costs of the proceedings in accordance with Articles 87 and 91 of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court.

1.

First plea in law, alleging infringement of the obligation to state reasons, in that insufficient reasons are given for the contested measures.

2.

Second plea in law, alleging infringement of the rights of the defence and the right to effective judicial protection as enshrined in the fundamental principles of EU law and set out in Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, and of Articles 6 and 13 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.

3.

Third plea in law, alleging a lack of legal basis, since Article 29 of the Treaty on European Union cannot provide a legal basis for the restrictive measures adopted against the applicant.

4.

Fourth plea in law, alleging a manifest error of assessment, in that the applicant has provided evidence proving the lack of a sufficient factual basis for bringing criminal proceedings.