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having regard to the 2015-2030 United Nations Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs),

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having regard to the Paris Agreement reached at the 21st Conference of Parties of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (COP21),

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having regard to Commission Technical Report entitled ‘The impact of EU consumption on deforestation’ (2013-063) (1),

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having regard to the Commission Communication of 17 October 2008 entitled ‘Addressing the challenges of deforestation and forest degradation to tackle climate change and biodiversity loss’ (COM(2008)0645),

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having regard to the Amsterdam Declaration of 7 December 2015 entitled ‘Towards Eliminating Deforestation from Agricultural Commodity Chains with European Countries’, in support of a fully sustainable palm oil supply chain by 2020 and in support of an end to illegal deforestation by 2020,

—

having regard to the promise of government support for the scheme to make the palm oil industry 100 % sustainable by 2020, made by the five Member States and signatories to the Amsterdam Declaration: Denmark, Germany, France, the United Kingdom and the Netherlands,

—

having regard to the European Strategy for a low-carbon mobility of July 2016 and the Commission proposal of 30 November 2016 for a directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the promotion of the use of energy from renewable sources (recast) (COM(2016)0767),

—

having regard to the study commissioned and funded by the Commission of 4 October 2016 entitled ‘The land use change impact of biofuels consumed in the EU: Quantification of area and greenhouse gas impacts’,

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having regard to the report entitled ‘Globiom: the basis for biofuel policy post-2020’,

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having regard to Special Report No 18/2016 of the European Court of Auditors on the EU system for the certification of sustainable biofuels,

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having regard to the United Nations Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD),

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having regard to the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES),

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having regard to the Nagoya Protocol on Access to Genetic Resources and the Fair and Equitable Sharing of Benefits Arising from their Utilisation to the Convention on Biological Diversity, which was adopted on 29 October 2010 in Nagoya, Japan and entered into force on 12 October 2014,

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having regard to the EU biodiversity strategy to 2020, and the related mid-term review (2),

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having regard to its resolution of 2 February 2016 on the mid-term review of the EU’s Biodiversity Strategy (3),

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having regard to the International Union for the Conservation of Nature (IUCN) World Conservation Congress held in Hawaii in 2016 and its Motion 066 on mitigating the impacts of palm oil expansion and operations on biodiversity,

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having regard to the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP),

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having regard to Rule 52 of its Rules of Procedure,

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having regard to the report of the Committee on the Environment, Public Health and Food Safety and the opinions of the Committee on Development, the Committee on International Trade and the Committee on Agriculture and Rural Development (A8-0066/2017),

A.

whereas the European Union has ratified the Paris Agreement and should play a crucial role in achieving the objectives laid down in the areas concerning the fight against climate change and delivering environmental protection and sustainable development;

B.

whereas the EU was instrumental in setting the Sustainable Development Goals that are closely linked to the issue of palm oil (SDGs 2, 3, 6, 14, 16, 17 and, in particular, 12, 13 and 15);

C.

whereas under the 2030 Agenda On Sustainable Development, the EU is committed to promoting the implementation of sustainable management of all types of forests, to halting deforestation, to restoring degraded forests and to substantially increasing afforestation and reforestation worldwide by 2020; whereas under the 2030 Agenda the EU is also committed to ensuring sustainable consumption and production patterns, to encouraging companies to adopt sustainable practices and integrate sustainability information into their reporting cycle and to promoting sustainable public procurement practices, in accordance with national policies and global priorities by 2020;

D.

whereas there are many drivers of global deforestation, including the production of agricultural commodities such as soy, beef, maize and palm oil;

E.

whereas nearly half (49 %) of all recent tropical deforestation is the result of illegal clearing for commercial agriculture and this destruction is driven by overseas demand for agricultural commodities, including palm oil, beef, soy, and wood products; whereas it is estimated that the illegal conversion of tropical forests for the purposes of commercial agriculture produces 1,47 gigatonnes of carbon each year — the equivalent of 25 % of the EU’s annual fossil fuel-based emissions (4);

F.

whereas the wildfires of 2015 in Indonesia and Borneo were the worst observed for almost two decades and occurred as a result of global climate change, land use changes and deforestation; whereas the extremely dry conditions in the regions in question are likely to become more common events in the future, unless concerted action is taken to prevent fires;

G.

whereas the wildfires in Indonesia and Borneo exposed 69 million people to unhealthy air pollution and are responsible for thousands of premature deaths;

H.

whereas fires in Indonesia are typically the result of the clearing of land for palm oil plantations and other agricultural uses; whereas 52 % of fires in Indonesia in 2015 occurred in carbon-rich peatlands, turning the country into one of the largest contributors to global warming on Earth (5);

I.

whereas the absence of accurate palm oil concession maps and public land registries in many producing countries makes it difficult to determine responsibility for forest fires;

J.

whereas under the New York Declaration on Forests, the EU has agreed to ‘help meet the private-sector goal of eliminating deforestation from the production of agricultural commodities such as palm oil, soy, paper and beef products by no later than 2020, recognizing that many companies have even more ambitious targets’;

K.

whereas in 2008 the EU committed to reduce deforestation by at least 50 % by 2020 and to halt global forest cover loss by 2030;

L.

whereas precious tropical ecosystems, which cover a mere 7 % of the Earth’s surface, are under increasing pressure from deforestation; whereas the establishment of palm oil plantations is resulting in massive forest fires, the drying up of rivers, soil erosion, peatland drainage, the pollution of waterways and overall loss of biodiversity, which in turn leads to the loss of many ecosystem services and is having a major impact on the climate, the conservation of natural resources and the preservation of the global environment for present and future generations;

M.

whereas the consumption of palm oil and its derived processed goods plays a major role in the impact of EU consumption on global deforestation;

N.

whereas demand for vegetable oils in general is set to increase (6), while demand for palm oil will, according to estimates, double by 2050 (7); whereas, since the 1970s, 90 % of the growth in palm oil production has been concentrated in Indonesia and Malaysia; whereas, moreover, oil palm cultivation is also taking off in other Asian countries, as well as in Africa and Latin America, where new plantations are constantly being established and existing ones expanded, a state of affairs that will lead to further damage to the environment; notes, however, that replacing palm oil with other vegetable oils would create a need for more land for cultivation;

O.

whereas the heavy use of palm oil is primarily due to its low cost, which is made possible by the increase in the number of oil palm plantations in deforested areas; whereas, in addition, the use of palm oil in the food industry is in keeping with a model of mass, unsustainable production and consumption, which runs counter to the use and promotion of organic, high-quality, zero-food-mile ingredients and products;

P.

whereas palm oil is increasingly being used as a biofuel and in processed food, with some 50 % of packaged goods now containing palm oil;

Q.

whereas some companies trading in palm oil are failing to prove beyond doubt that the palm oil in their supply chain is not linked to deforestation, peatland drainage or environmental pollution, and to demonstrate that it has been produced with full respect for fundamental human rights and adequate social standards;

R.

whereas under the 7th Environment Action Programme (EAP) the Commission is required to assess the environmental impact, in a global context, of Union consumption of food and non-food commodities and, if appropriate, to develop policy proposals to address the findings of such assessments, and to consider the development of a Union action plan on deforestation and forest degradation;

S.

whereas the Commission is planning studies on deforestation and palm oil;

T.

whereas the total GHG emissions from palm oil-related land use change is unknown; whereas it is necessary to improve scientific assessments in this regard;

U.

whereas there are no reliable data available in producer countries on the areas of land given over to the cultivation of oil palms, whether authorised or not; whereas this obstacle, from the outset, undermines the measures taken to certify the sustainability of palm oil;

V.

whereas the energy sector was responsible for 60 % of EU palm oil imports in 2014, with 46 % of imported palm oil used as fuel for transport (a six-fold increase on 2010) and 15 % for power and heat generation;

W.

whereas it is estimated that by 2020 the amount of land that will be converted globally to produce palm oil for biodiesel will be 1 Mha (million hectares), of which 0,57 Mha will be converted from Southeast Asian primary forests (8);

X.

whereas the total land use change caused by the EU 2020 biofuel mandate is 8,8 Mha, of which 2,1 Mha of land is converted in Southeast Asia under pressure from oil palm plantation expansion, half of which occurs at the expense of tropical forest and peatland;

Y.

whereas the deforestation of rainforests is destroying the natural habitats of more than half of the world’s animal species and more than two thirds of its plant species and endangering their survival; whereas rainforests are home to some of the world’s rarest and often endemic species, which are included on the red list of the International Union for the Conservation of Nature (IUCN) in the category of critically endangered species considered to have been undergoing an observed, estimated, inferred or suspected population size reduction of more than 80 % over the last 10 years or three generations; whereas EU consumers should be better informed of the efforts made to protect those animal and plant species;

Z.

whereas multiple investigations reveal widespread abuses of basic human rights during the establishment and operation of palm oil plantations in many countries, including forced evictions, armed violence, child labour, debt bondage or discrimination against indigenous communities;

AA.

whereas there are very worrying reports (9) that a substantial part of global palm oil production is in breach of fundamental human rights and adequate social standards, that child labour is frequently being exploited, and that there are many land conflicts between local and indigenous communities and palm oil concession holders;

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having regard to Articles 2 and 3 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) and Article 157 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU),

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having regard to Protocol No 1 on the role of National Parliaments in the European Union,

—

having regard to Protocol No 2 on the application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality,

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having regard to Articles 21 and 23 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union,

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having regard to the Beijing Platform for Action,

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having regard to the UN Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, adopted in 1979,

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having regard to Council Directive 79/7/EEC of 19 December 1978 on the progressive implementation of the principle of equal treatment for men and women in matters of social security (1),

—

having regard to Directive 2006/54/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 July 2006 on the implementation of the principle of equal opportunities and equal treatment of men and women in matters of employment and occupation (2),

—

having regard to Directive 2010/41/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 July 2010 on the application of the principle of equal treatment between men and women engaged in an activity in a self-employed capacity and repealing Council Directive 86/613/EEC (3),

—

having regard to Regulation (EU) No 1303/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 December 2013 laying down common provisions on the European Regional Development Fund, the European Social Fund, the Cohesion Fund, the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development and the European Maritime and Fisheries Fund and laying down general provisions on the European Regional Development Fund, the European Social Fund, the Cohesion Fund and the European Maritime and Fisheries Fund and repealing Council Regulation (EC) No 1083/2006 (4),

—

having regard to Regulation (EU) No 1305/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 December 2013 on support for rural development by the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development (EAFRD) and repealing Council Regulation (EC) No 1698/2005 (5),

—

having regard to Article 7 of Regulation (EU) No 1305/2013 on the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development,

—

having regard to its resolution of 12 March 2008 on the situation of women in rural areas of the EU (6),

—

having regard to its resolution of 5 April 2011 on the role of women in agriculture and rural areas (7),

—

having regard to its resolution of 8 July 2015 on the Green Employment Initiative: Tapping into the job creation potential of the green economy (8),

—

having regard to its resolution of 8 September 2015 on family businesses in Europe (9),

—

having regard to the recommendations issued on 17 October 2016 by the UN Committee on World Food Security on livestock production and world food security, in particular those relating to gender equality and women’s empowerment,

—

having regard to its resolution of 27 October 2016 on how the CAP can improve job creation in rural areas (10),

—

having regard to Rule 52 of its Rules of Procedure,

—

having regard to the joint deliberations of the Committee on Agriculture and Rural Development and the Committee on Women’s Rights and Gender Equality under Rule 55 of the Rules of Procedure,

—

having regard to the report of the Committee on Agriculture and Rural Development and the Committee on Women’s Rights and Gender Equality (A8-0058/2017),

A.

whereas social and economic circumstances and living conditions have changed substantially in recent decades and differ quite considerably between the Member States as well as within them;

B.

whereas women make significant contributions to the rural economy, and whereas the diversification measures and the concept of multifunctionality, as an essential basis for sustainable development strategies, though not yet fully exploited in all areas, have opened up new opportunities for women, with the help of innovation and the creation of new concepts which make it possible to inject fresh dynamism into farming;

C.

whereas women are very often the promoters of the development of additional activities on or outside the farm beyond the scope of agricultural production, making it possible to impart real added value to activities in rural areas;

D.

whereas women living in rural areas are not a homogeneous group, given that their situation, occupations, contributions to society and ultimately their needs and interests vary significantly among and within Member States;

E.

whereas women are actively involved in agricultural activities, entrepreneurship and tourism, and play an important role in preserving cultural traditions in rural areas, which can contribute to the building and/or strengthening of regional identity;

F.

whereas equality between women and men is a core principle of the European Union and its Member States, and its promotion one of its principal objectives; whereas gender equality is a basic value of the EU recognised in the Treaties and in the Charter of Fundamental Rights, and the EU has assumed the specific task of integrating it in all its activities; whereas gender mainstreaming is an important tool in the integration of this principle into EU policies, measures and actions with a view to promoting equality between women and men, and combating discrimination in order to increase active involvement of women in the labour market, and economic and social activities; whereas this tool is also applicable to the EU Structural and Investment Funds, including the EAFRD;

G.

whereas family farming is the most common operational farming model in the EU-28 with 76,5 % of the work being carried out by the holder or members of his or her family (11) and should thus be supported and protected; whereas family farming promotes intergenerational solidarity and social and environmental responsibility, thus contributing to the sustainable development of rural areas;

H.

whereas, in a context of growing urbanisation, it is essential to maintain an active, dynamic and prosperous population in rural areas, with particular attention to areas with natural constraints, as the conservation of the environment and the landscape depend on it;

I.

whereas the ageing of the population together with the decline in farming activity and economic decline in the EU’s rural areas represent some of the main causes of depopulation and women’s abandonment of rural areas, which has an adverse impact not only on the labour market but also on the social infrastructure; whereas this situation can only be halted if the European institutions and governments take all possible steps to ensure greater recognition of their work and rights and provide rural areas with the necessary services that make work-life balance possible;

J.

whereas rural tourism, which includes the supply of goods and services in the countryside through family and cooperative enterprises, is a low-risk sector, generates employment, makes it possible to combine personal and family life with work and encourages the rural population, especially women, to remain in the countryside;

K.

whereas the economic crisis has affected the European Union and has had a severe impact on many rural areas and regions; whereas the consequences of the crisis are still visible and young people from rural areas are facing serious levels of unemployment, poverty and depopulation that affect women in particular; whereas women directly experience the impact of the crisis in the management of their farms and homes;

L.

whereas such a situation poses a serious challenge for the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), which should ensure the development of rural areas while enhancing their potential;

M.

whereas it is necessary to maintain a sustainable and vibrant farming sector as the fundamental economic, environmental and social basis of rural areas, which contributes to rural development, sustainable food production, biodiversity and the creation of jobs;

N.

whereas the status of smallholder and family farms as primary food producers must be improved and their farming and livestock activities maintained by promoting innovation and adequate financial resources and measures at EU level; whereas 2,4 million farms in the EU disappeared between 2005 and 2010, most of which were small or family farms, increasing unemployment in rural areas;

O.

whereas the promotion of diversification measures and the development of short supply chains, as well as promotion of producer organisations (POs), can contribute to the sector’s resilience, which faces the challenges of unfair trading practices and increasingly volatile markets;

P.

whereas it is important to support and promote the participation of women in the agri-food value chain, since their role is mainly concentrated in production and processing;

Q.

whereas access to lifelong learning, the opportunity to validate skills acquired in non-formal settings, and the opportunity to re-train and to acquire skills that can be used in a dynamically developing labour market are crucial prerequisites for increasing women’s employment in rural areas;

R.

whereas cooperatives, mutuals, social enterprises and other alternative business models have enormous potential to stimulate sustainable and inclusive economic growth and economically empower women in rural areas and in the agricultural sector;

S.

whereas the inclusion of women and girls in education and lifelong learning, particularly in areas of science, technology, engineering, and maths (STEM), as well as in entrepreneurship is necessary for achieving gender equality in the agricultural and food production sectors, as well as in tourism and other industries in rural areas;

T.

whereas women represent slightly less than 50 % of the total working-age population in the rural areas of the EU, but only about 45 % of the total economically active population; whereas many are never registered as unemployed or included in unemployment statistics and no clear figures exist on women’s involvement in farming as owners or employees;

U.

whereas in the predominantly rural areas of the EU, only 61 % of women aged 20 to 64 were employed in 2009 (12); whereas, in many Member States, women in rural areas have limited access to employment and their chances of working in farming are relatively poor, yet they still play an important role in rural development and in the social fabric of rural areas, through providing income for households or improving living conditions;

V.

whereas in 2014 women were responsible for about 35 % of total working time in agriculture, carrying out 53,8 % of part-time work and 30,8 % of full-time work, thereby making a significant contribution to agricultural production; whereas work carried out by spouses and other female family members on farms is often indispensable and constitutes nothing short of ‘invisible work’ due to a lack of professional status allowing for its recognition and for the women concerned to register with the social security services, which would prevent the possible loss of entitlements such as sick leave and maternity leave, and ensure their financial independence;

W.

whereas in some Member States, such as France, different legal statuses exist for wives who work regularly on the farm (coworker, employee or farm manager), which makes it possible for proper social protection to be extended to them to insure them against adverse eventualities in their personal life and their work;

X.

whereas on average only 30 % of farm holdings in the EU are managed by women; whereas there is a significant number of female workers in agriculture, and most women are classified as the holder’s spouse, corresponding to 80,1 % of all spouses in 2007 (13);

Y.

whereas the farm owner is the person mentioned on bank documents and for the purposes of subsidies and accumulated rights, and the person who represents the farm within associations and groups; whereas not being the owner of the farm means not having any rights related to this ownership status (rights to single payments, suckler cow premiums, vine planting rights, income, etc.) and this places women farmers in a vulnerable and disadvantaged situation;

Z.

whereas, to be able to benefit from positive aid schemes in favour of working women in agriculture, they should be recognised as owners or co-owners; whereas women’s farm ownership or co-ownership should be promoted by the European Union, which would have positive effects on their situation in the labour market, social entitlements and economic independence, thus ensuring their greater visibility (and recognition of their contribution to the economy and incomes) in rural areas and increased access to land;

AA.

whereas women in rural areas need to be made more visible in European, national and regional statistics in order to reflect their situation and the role they play;

AB.

whereas increased access for young people and women to land would improve generational renewal in farming and foster economic growth and social well-being;

AC.

whereas the provision of quality and affordable public and private services, including care for children, elderly and other dependants, including persons with disabilities, is important for all inhabitants of rural areas; whereas such services are particularly important for facilitating a work-life balance, especially for women, given that they have been involved to a greater extent in looking after young, dependent and elderly members of the family;

AD.

whereas women have a multifunctional role in rural areas and, therefore, such services would enable them to work and further develop their careers while ensuring a fair distribution of family and care responsibilities;

AE.

whereas the basis for improving the quality of life in rural areas is the availability of infrastructure such as transport links, access to high-speed broadband Internet, including mobile data services and energy provision, as well as quality social, health and educational services;

AF.

whereas rural broadband coverage continues to lag behind national coverage across the EU-28; whereas, in 2015, 98,4 % of rural households were covered by at least one broadband technology, but only 27,8 % had access to next-generation services; whereas digital infrastructure, which is not fully developed in all rural areas of the EU, can be of great help in accessing information and educational opportunities, information-sharing and the exchange of good practices between women in rural areas, and can represent a key element in the support needed to maintain the female population of those areas;

AG.

whereas education is a fundamental tool for fostering the value of equality, which should be promoted across the board, not only in schools, but also in vocational training, and especially in training focusing on the primary sector;

AH.

whereas improving general conditions in rural areas will result in achieving an improved status for women in those areas;

AI.

whereas the significant contribution that women make to local and rural development is not sufficiently reflected in their participation in the corresponding decision-making processes, given that women in rural areas are often under-represented in decision-making bodies such as agricultural cooperatives, trade unions and municipal governments; whereas increasing women’s representation in such bodies is highly important;

AJ.

whereas women in rural areas also suffer from gender pay and pension gaps, which are widening in some Member States; whereas establishing up-to-date statistics on the employment situation of women in rural areas, as well as their working and living conditions, therefore deserves greater attention;

AK.

whereas thematic sub-programmes on ‘Women in rural areas’ have not been created so far and women’s participation in the use of the instruments available under rural development programmes until 2014 was regrettably low; whereas out of 6,1 million participants in training measures, only 28 % were women; whereas only 19 % of the beneficiaries of physical investment in farm holdings for modernisation and 33 % of the beneficiaries of diversification measures were women; whereas with regard to jobs created as a result of axis 3 measures (diversification of the economy in rural areas), only 38 % of the beneficiaries were women;

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—

having regard to Article 50 of the Treaty on European Union,

—

having regard to Articles 3(5), 4(3) and 8 of the Treaty on European Union,

—

having regard to Articles 217 and 218 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

—

having regard to the notification given by the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom to the European Council on 29 March 2017 in accordance with Article 50(2) of the Treaty on European Union,

—

having regard to its resolution of 28 June 2016 on the decision to leave the EU resulting from the UK referendum (1),

—

having regard to its resolutions of 16 February 2017 on possible evolutions of and adjustments to the current institutional set-up of the European Union (2), on improving the functioning of the European Union building on the potential of the Lisbon Treaty (3), and on budgetary capacity for the euro area (4),

—

having regard to Rule 123(2) and (4) of its Rules of Procedure,

A.

whereas the notification by the United Kingdom Government to the European Council begins the process by which the United Kingdom will cease to be a Member State of the European Union and the Treaties will no longer apply to it;

B.

whereas this will be an unprecedented and regrettable event as a Member State has never withdrawn from the European Union before; whereas that withdrawal must be arranged in an orderly fashion so as not to negatively affect the European Union, its citizens and the process of European integration;

C.

whereas the European Parliament represents all citizens of the European Union and will act throughout the whole process leading to the withdrawal of the United Kingdom to protect their interests;

D.

whereas although it is the sovereign right of a Member State to withdraw from the European Union, it is the duty of all remaining Member States to act in unity in the defence of the European Union’s interests and its integrity; whereas, therefore, the negotiations will be conducted between the United Kingdom, on the one hand, and the Commission on behalf of the European Union and its remaining 27 Member States (EU-27), on the other;

E.

whereas negotiations on the United Kingdom’s withdrawal from the European Union will begin following adoption by the European Council of guidelines for those negotiations; whereas this resolution represents the European Parliament’s position for those guidelines and will also form the basis of Parliament’s assessment of the negotiation process and of any agreement reached between the European Union and the United Kingdom;

F.

whereas until it leaves the European Union the United Kingdom must enjoy all the rights and fulfil all the obligations deriving from the Treaties, including the principle of sincere cooperation laid down in Article 4(3) of the Treaty on European Union;

G.

whereas the United Kingdom has stated in its notification of 29 March 2017 its intention to fall outside the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice of the European Union;

H.

whereas the United Kingdom Government has indicated in the same notification that its future relationship with the European Union will not include membership of the internal market or membership of the customs union;

I.

whereas, nevertheless, continued membership of the United Kingdom of the internal market, the European Economic Area and/or the customs union would have been the optimal solution for both the United Kingdom and the EU-27; whereas this is not possible as long as the United Kingdom Government maintains its objections to the four freedoms and to the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice of the European Union, refuses to make a general contribution to the Union budget, and wants to conduct its own trade policy;

J.

whereas, following the result of the referendum on leaving the European Union, the decision ‘concerning a new settlement for the United Kingdom within the European Union’ annexed to the European Council conclusions of 18 and 19 February 2016 is in any case null and void in all its provisions;

K.

whereas the negotiations must be conducted with the aims of providing legal stability and minimising disruption, and providing a clear vision of the future for citizens and legal entities;

L.

whereas a revocation of notification needs to be subject to conditions set by all EU-27, so that it cannot be used as a procedural device or abused in an attempt to improve on the current terms of the United Kingdom’s membership;

M.

whereas without a withdrawal agreement the United Kingdom would automatically exit the European Union on 30 March 2019, and would do so in a disorderly manner;

N.

whereas a large number of United Kingdom citizens, including a majority in Northern Ireland and Scotland, voted to remain in the European Union;

O.

whereas the European Parliament is especially concerned at the consequences of the United Kingdom’s withdrawal from the European Union for Northern Ireland and its future relations with Ireland; whereas in that respect it is crucial to safeguard peace and therefore to preserve the Good Friday Agreement in all its parts, recalling that it was brokered with the active participation of the Union, as the European Parliament emphasised in its resolution of 13 November 2014 on the Northern Ireland peace process (5);

P.

whereas the withdrawal of the United Kingdom should compel the EU-27 and the Union institutions to better address the current challenges and to reflect on their future and on their efforts to make the European project more effective, more democratic, and closer to the citizens; recalls the Bratislava roadmap, the resolutions of the European Parliament on the matter, the European Commission’s White Paper of 1 March 2017 on the Future of Europe, the Rome Declaration of 25 March 2017, and the proposals of the High-Level Group on Own Resources of 17 January 2017, which may serve as a basis for this reflection;

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having regard to the Commission proposal for a Council Regulation amending Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 1311/2013 laying down the multiannual financial framework for the years 2014-2020 (COM(2016)0604),

—

having regard to the draft Council regulation amending Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 1311/2013 laying down the multiannual financial framework for the years 2014-2020 (14942/2016) and Council’s corrigendum (14942/2016 COR2),

—

having regard to the request for consent submitted by the Council in accordance with Article 312 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and Article 106a of the Treaty establishing the European Atomic Energy Community (C8-0103/2017),

—

having regard to the Council agreement in principle of 7 March 2017 on the revision of the multiannual financial framework 2014-2020 (1),

—

having regard to its resolution of 6 July 2016 on the preparation of the post-electoral revision of the MFF 2014-2020: Parliament’s input ahead of the Commission’s proposal (2),

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having regard to its resolution of 26 October 2016 on the mid-term revision of the MFF 2014-2020 (3),

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having regard to its legislative resolution of 5 April 2017 on the draft regulation (4),

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having regard to Rule 99(2) of its Rules of Procedure,

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having regard to the report of the Committee on Budgets (A8-0117/2017),

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3.

4.

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having regard to the draft Commission implementing decision authorising the placing on the market of products containing, consisting of, or produced from genetically modified maize Bt11 × 59122 × MIR604 × 1507 × GA21, and genetically modified maizes combining two, three or four of the events Bt11, 59122, MIR604, 1507 and GA21, pursuant to Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003 of the European parliament and of the Council on genetically modified food and feed (D049280),

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having regard to Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 September 2003 on genetically modified food and feed (1), and in particular 7(3), 9(2) and 21(2) thereof,

—

having regard to the vote of the Standing Committee on the Food Chain and Animal Health referred to in Article 35 of Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003, on 27 January 2017, where no opinion was delivered, and to the vote of the Appeal Committee on 27 March 2017, where again no opinion was delivered,

—

having regard to Articles 11 and 13 of Regulation (EU) No 182/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 February 2011 laying down the rules and general principles concerning mechanisms for control by Member States of the Commission’s exercise of implementing powers (2),

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having regard to the opinion adopted by the European Food Safety Authority (EFSA) on 15 July 2016 (3), which includes a minority opinion, and EFSA’s previous opinions on maize containing the single events, Bt11 (expressing Cry1Ab and PAT proteins), 59122 (expressing Cry34Ab1, Cry35Ab1 and PAT proteins), MIR604 (expressing mCry3A and PMI proteins), 1507 (producing Cry1F and PAT proteins) and GA21 (expressing mEPSPS protein),

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having regard to the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulation (EU) No 182/2011 laying down the rules and general principles concerning mechanisms for control by Member States of the Commission’s exercise of implementing powers (COM(2017)0085, COD(2017)0035),

—

having regard to its previous resolutions objecting to the authorisation of genetically modified organisms (4),

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having regard to the motion for a resolution of the Committee on the Environment, Public Health and Food Safety,

—

having regard to Rule 106(2) and (3) of its Rules of Procedure,

A.

whereas on 1 July 2011 Syngenta submitted an application for the placing on the market of foods, food ingredients, and feed containing, consisting of, or produced from Bt11 × 59122 × MIR604 × 1507 × GA21 maize to the national competent authority of Germany in accordance with Articles 5 and 17 of Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003; whereas that application also covered the placing on the market of genetically modified maize Bt11 × 59122 × MIR604 × 1507 × GA21 in products consisting of it or containing it for uses other than food and feed as any other maize, with the exception of cultivation;

B.

whereas on 21 February 2014 Syngenta extended the scope of the application to all sub-combinations of the single genetic modification events constituting Bt11 × 59122 × MIR604 × 1507 × GA21 maize, except the sub-combination 1507 × 59122, which was already authorised by Commission Decision 2010/432/EU (5);

C.

whereas on 31 March 2016 Syngenta updated the scope of the application by excluding the following four sub-combinations, which were in the scope of another application: Bt11 × GA21 maize, MIR604 × GA21 maize, Bt11 × MIR604 maize, and Bt11 × MIR604 × GA21 (6);

D.

whereas no specific data regarding any of the 20 sub-combinations have been submitted by the applicant (7);

E.

whereas the intended uses of the five-event stack are to control lepidopteran and coleopteran maize pests and provide tolerance to herbicides containing glufosinate ammonium or glyphosate (8); whereas the intended uses of the different sub-combinations are similar, depending on the combinations;

F.

whereas on 26 August 2016, the European Food Safety Authority (EFSA) gave a favourable opinion in accordance with Articles 6 and 18 of Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003 with regard to the GM-maize Bt11 × 59122 × MIR604 × 1507 × GA21 and all of the sub-combinations covered by the scope of the application; whereas the EFSA opinion included a minority opinion;

G.

whereas EFSA acknowledges that no specific data have been submitted for all 20 sub-combinations, that many of them have not even been created yet, and that no scientific information regarding them could be retrieved in a literature search, but nevertheless concludes that all 20 sub-combinations are ‘expected to be as safe as the five-event stack maize’;

H.

whereas EFSA does not consider any post-market monitoring for the GM-events concerned to be necessary; whereas EFSA merely states that the requirement for monitoring should be considered on the basis of the new protein expression data provided, if these sub-combinations were to be created via targeted breeding approaches and imported into the Union;

I.

whereas hundreds of critical comments have been submitted by Member States during the three-month consultation period (9); whereas those comments refer to, inter alia: missing information and data, poorly performed studies, missing studies, missing evidence to exclude certain routes of exposure, an insufficient data basis, e.g. as regards digestibility, missing consideration of the combined effects of the different Bt toxin proteins when judging the potential for allergenicity and toxicity, shortcomings as regards the experimental design of the field trials and the statistical analysis, missing reports on the results of the monitoring, failure to demonstrate that the product does not have any adverse effects on the environment, failure to further assess detected statistically significant differences, e.g. in nutritional composition, and failure to conduct immunological tests with regard to a potentially higher allergenic potential;

J.

whereas a minority opinion was expressed by Jean-Michel Wal, Member of the EFSA GMO Panel (10), stating that: ‘no specific data regarding any of those 20 sub-combinations have been provided by the Applicant, who also did not give a satisfactory rationale explaining the reasons why those data are missing and/or why he would consider that they are not necessary for the risk assessment. This is a most important reason for expression of this minority opinion, considering that there cannot be two kinds of risk assessment, a comprehensive one based on a complete set of data and another one for which no specific data at all are available and which is based on assumptions and indirect considerations deduced by the Panel by the so called “weight of evidence approach” and extrapolation of data obtained for the single events, the five-event stack and other stacks that were submitted and assessed in other applications. In addition to this matter of principle, in the present case, this may result in uncontrolled risk for the health of human consumers in certain segments of the population.’;

K.

whereas, more specifically, the minority opinion questions why the kind of extrapolation made to assess potential adverse effects is not precisely defined: ‘The criteria, procedure and the level of confidence that should be required for this extrapolation are not given and there is no critical appraisal of its limitations. No evaluation of the resulting uncertainty has been performed, e.g. using a probabilistic analysis, as recommended by the Draft Guidance on Uncertainty in EFSA Scientific Assessment (Revised for Internal Testing) of the EFSA Scientific Committee. These weaknesses may invalidate the general conclusion.’;

L.

whereas the EFSA minority opinion also points to several shortcomings and contradictory arguments with regard to the application, e.g. the fact that the applicant on the one hand alludes to the fact that all sub-combinations had been produced, and its protein expression level had been analysed (11), but on the other hand does not provide any data on any of the sub-combinations;

M.

whereas the genetically modified maize varieties SYN-BTØ11-1, DAS-59122-7 and DAS-Ø15Ø7-1 involved express a PAT-protein which confers tolerance to the glufosinate-ammonium herbicide; whereas glufosinate is classified as toxic to reproduction and thus falls under the exclusion criteria set out in Regulation (EC) No 1107/2009; whereas the approval of glufosinate expires on 31 July 2018 (12);

N.

whereas the genetically modified MON-ØØØ21-9 maize, as described in the application, expresses the mEPSPS protein which confers tolerance to glyphosate herbicides; whereas the International Agency for Research on Cancer — the specialised cancer agency of the World Health Organisation — classified glyphosate as probably carcinogenic to humans on 20 March 2015 (13);

O.

whereas the vote of the Standing Committee on the Food Chain and Animal Health referred to in Article 35 of Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003 on 27 January 2017 delivered no opinion; whereas only 10 Member States, representing only 38,43o% of the Union population voted in favour, while 13 Member States voted against, with four Member States abstaining,; whereas the vote of the Appeal Committee on 27 March 2017 again delivered no opinion;

P.

whereas, in both the explanatory memorandum of its legislative proposal presented on 22 April 2015 amending Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003 as regards the possibility for the Member States to restrict or prohibit the use of genetically modified food and feed on their territory and in the explanatory memorandum of the legislative proposal presented on 14 February 2017 amending Regulation (EU) No 182/2011, the Commission deplored the fact that, since the entry into force of Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003, authorisation decisions have been adopted by the Commission without the support of the Member States’ committee opinion and that the return of the dossier to the Commission for final decision, which is very much the exception for the procedure as a whole, has become the norm for decision-making on genetically modified food and feed authorisations; whereas this practice has, on several occasions, been deplored by Commission President Juncker as not being democratic (14);

Q.

whereas the legislative proposal of 22 April 2015 amending Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003 was rejected by Parliament on 28 October 2015 on the grounds that, while cultivation necessarily takes place on a Member State’s territory, GMO trade crosses borders, which means that a national ‘sales and use’ ban proposed by the Commission could be impossible to enforce without reintroducing border checks on imports; whereas the Parliament not only rejected the legislative proposal, but also called on the Commission to withdraw its proposal and submit a new one;

R.

whereas it is already the case that Recital 14 of Regulation (EU) No 182/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 February 2011 laying down the rules and general principles concerning mechanisms for control by Member States of the Commission’s exercise of implementing powers clearly rules that: ‘When considering the adoption of other draft implementing acts concerning particularly sensitive sectors, notably taxation, consumer health, food safety and protection of the environment, the Commission, in order to find a balanced solution, will, as far as possible, act in such a way as to avoid going against any predominant position which might emerge within the appeal committee against the appropriateness of an implementing act.’ (15);

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5.

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resolution of 16 January 2014 on the proposal for a Council decision concerning the placing on the market for cultivation, in accordance with Directive 2001/18/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council, of a maize product (Zea mays L., line 1507) genetically modified for resistance to certain lepidopteran pests (OJ C 482, 23.12.2016, p. 110),

—

resolution of 16 December 2015 on the Commission Implementing Decision (EU) 2015/2279 of 4 December 2015 authorising the placing on the market of products containing, consisting of, or produced from genetically modified maize NK603 × T25 (P8_TA(2015)0456),

—

resolution of 3 February 2016 on the draft Commission implementing decision authorising the placing on the market of products containing, consisting of, or produced from genetically modified soybean MON 87705 × MON 89788 (P8_TA(2016)0040),

—

resolution of 3 February 2016 on the draft Commission implementing decision authorising the placing on the market of products containing, consisting of, or produced from genetically modified soybean MON 87708 × MON 89788 (P8_TA(2016)0039),

—

resolution of 3 February 2016 on the draft Commission implementing decision authorising the placing on the market of products containing, consisting of, or produced from genetically modified soybean FG72 (MST-FGØ72-2) (P8_TA(2016)0038),

—

resolution of 8 June 2016 on the draft Commission implementing decision authorising the placing on the market of products containing, consisting of, or produced from genetically modified maize Bt11 × MIR162 × MIR604 × GA21, and genetically modified maizes combining two or three of those events (P8_TA(2016)0271),

—

resolution of 8 June 2016 on the draft Commission implementing decision as regards the placing on the market of a genetically modified carnation (Dianthus caryophyllus L., line SHD-27531-4) (P8_TA(2016)0272),

—

resolution of 6 October 2016 on the draft Commission implementing decision renewing the authorisation for the placing on the market for cultivation of genetically modified maize MON 810 seeds (P8_TA(2016)0388),

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resolution of 6 October 2016 on the draft Commission implementing decision authorising the placing on the market of genetically modified maize MON 810 products (P8_TA(2016)0389),

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resolution of 6 October 2016 on the draft Commission implementing decision concerning the placing on the market for cultivation of genetically modified maize Bt11 seeds (P8_TA(2016)0386),

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resolution of 6 October 2016 on the draft Commission implementing decision concerning the placing on the market for cultivation of genetically modified maize 1507 seeds (P8_TA(2016)0387),

—

resolution of 6 October 2016 on the draft Commission implementing decision authorising the placing on the market of products containing, consisting of, or produced from genetically modified cotton 281-24-236 × 3006-210-23 × MON 88913 (P8_TA(2016)0390).

—

having regard to Articles 3, 8 and 21 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) and to Articles 80, 208 and 216 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU),

—

having regard to the Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign and Security Policy published in June 2016,

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having regard to the Commission communications entitled: ‘A European Agenda on Migration’ of 13 May 2015 (COM(2015)0240); ‘Forced Displacement and Development’ of 26 April 2016 (COM(2016)0234); ‘Establishing a new Partnership Framework with third countries under the European Agenda on Migration’ of 7 June 2016 (COM(2016)0385); and ‘Strengthening European investments for jobs and growth: Towards a second phase of the European Fund for Strategic Investments and a new European External Investment Plan’ of 14 September 2016 (COM(2016)0581); and to the Joint Communications from the European Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy entitled: ‘Addressing the Refugee Crisis in Europe: The Role of EU External Action’ of 9 September 2015 (JOIN(2015)0040); ‘Migration on the Central Mediterranean Route: Managing flows, saving lives’ of 25 January 2017 (JOIN(2017)0004); and ‘Review of the European Neighbourhood Policy’ of 18 November 2015 (JOIN(2015)0050),

—

having regard to the General Affairs Council conclusions on the Global Approach to Migration and Mobility (GAMM) of 3 May 2012,

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having regard to the European Council conclusions on migration of 25-26 June, 15 October and 17-18 December 2015 and of 17-18 March and 28 June 2016,

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having regard to the Foreign Affairs Council conclusions on migration in EU development cooperation of 12 December 2014, on migration of 12 October 2015, on the EU approach to forced displacement and development of 12 May 2016 and on external aspects of migration of 23 May 2016,

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having regard to the Foreign Affairs Council conclusions on the future partnership priorities and compacts with Jordan and Lebanon of 17 October 2016,

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having regard to the Declaration of the High-Level Conference on the Eastern Mediterranean/Western Balkans route of 8 October 2015,

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having regard to the Political Declaration and Action Plan of the Valletta Summit of 11-12 November 2015,

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having regard to the conclusions of the Bratislava Summit of 16 September 2016,

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having regard to the European Court of Auditors Special Report (9/2016) on ‘EU external migration spending in Southern Mediterranean and Eastern Neighbourhood countries until 2014’,

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having regard to the UN Convention and Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees, and to the core international human rights conventions, the European Convention on Human Rights and the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights,

—

having regard to the Geneva Conventions and their Additional Protocols regulating the conduct of armed conflict and seeking to limit its effects,

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having regard to the outcome document of the United Nations Summit on Sustainable Development of 25 September 2015 entitled ‘Transforming our world: the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development’,

—

having regard to the New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants of the United Nations General Assembly High-Level Meeting to Address Large Movements of Refugees and Migrants of 19 September 2016 and the annexes thereto on a ‘Comprehensive refugee response framework’ and ‘Towards a global compact for safe, orderly and regular migration’,

—

having regard to its previous resolutions, in particular those of 9 July 2015 on the review of the European Neighbourhood Policy (1), of 8 March 2016 on the situation of women refugees and asylum seekers in the EU (2), of 12 April 2016 on the situation in the Mediterranean and the need for a holistic EU approach to migration (3), of 13 September 2016 on the EU Trust Fund for Africa: implications for development and humanitarian aid (4), and of 25 October 2016 on human rights and migration in third countries (5),

—

having regard to Rule 52 of its Rules of Procedure,

—

having regard to the joint deliberations of the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Committee on Development under Rule 55 of the Rules of Procedure,

—

having regard to the report of the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Committee on Development and the opinions of the Committee on Budgets and the Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (A8-0045/2017),

A.

whereas migration is a human right enshrined in Article 13 of the UN Declaration of Human Rights; whereas people should have the right to live their lives in their home country and in the region in which they have been born and grown up and where they have their cultural and social roots;

B.

whereas human mobility is at an unprecedentedly high level, with 244 million international migrants, owing to various reasons, migrating both voluntarily and involuntarily; whereas such international migration occurs primarily within the same region and between developing countries; whereas, according to the International Organisation for Migration (IOM), migrant women make up the majority of international migrants in Europe (52,4 %) and North America (51,2 %); whereas South-South migration flows have continued to grow compared to South-North movements: in 2015, 90,2 million international migrants born in developing countries resided in other countries in the Global South, while 85,3 million born in the South resided in countries in the Global North;

C.

whereas an ever-increasing number of unaccompanied minors are crossing the Mediterranean, and, despite the increasing number of rescue operations, the number of deaths in the Mediterranean is still on the rise (5 079 for 2016 as against 3 777 for 2015, according to the IOM);

D.

whereas according to the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), in 2015 a record-high number of 65,3 million people — including 40,8 million internally displaced persons (IDPs) and 21,3 million refugees — remain forcibly displaced because of conflicts, violence, human rights violations, violations of international humanitarian law and destabilisation; whereas this has occurred in addition to those displaced on account of natural disasters, inequalities, poverty, poor socio-economic prospects, climate change, the lack of serious and effective long-term development policies and the lack of political will to firmly tackle the structural problems underpinning those migration flows; whereas, according to the UNHCR, there are at least 10 million stateless persons;

E.

whereas the current data available reveal that the number of refugees has increased by more than 50 % in the last five years; whereas this staggering increase is explained by a number of elements, including the fact that the voluntary repatriation of refugees has been at its lowest level since the 1980s, that the number of refugees offered local integration possibilities remains limited, and that resettlement numbers are steady at around 100 000 annually;

F.

whereas 6,7 million refugees are living in protracted displacement situations — estimated to last about 26 years on average — with a total lack of prospects; whereas durable solutions to displacement remain unacceptably low, which makes it necessary to view forced displacement as a political and development challenge, not an exclusively humanitarian one;

G.

whereas this global challenge requires a holistic and multilateral approach based on international cooperation and synergies, as well as coordinated and concrete solutions which should not be only reactionary but anticipate possible future crises; whereas 86o% of the world’s refugees live in impoverished regions, with least developed countries hosting 26 % of the total and thus suffering from stretched capacities and further destabilisation of their own social and economic cohesion and development; whereas those countries only very rarely have instruments to protect migrants’ rights, and do not even have instruments in the field of asylum; whereas the million people who arrived in the EU in 2015 represented 0,2 % of the EU population, compared with much higher percentages (up to 20 %) in neighbouring countries or in Europe during the 1990s;

H.

whereas refugees, internally displaced persons and migrants are legally distinct categories but in reality often large-scale mixed movements of people occur because of a variety of political, economic, social, developmental, humanitarian and human rights implications that cut across borders; whereas the human dignity of all the people involved in these movements must be at the centre of all European policies concerning such matters; whereas, moreover, refugees and asylum-seekers must always be treated in accordance with their status and under no circumstances should they be denied the benefit of the rights stemming from the relevant international conventions and the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union; whereas the legal distinction between refugees and migrants should not be taken to indicate that migration for economic reasons or for seeking a better life is less legitimate than for fleeing persecution; whereas in most cases both political and economic rights, among other core human rights, are threatened in situations of conflict, instability or unrest and continue to be challenged as a result of forcible displacement;

I.

whereas the ongoing food and nutrition crisis in the Sahel causes the erosion of people’s resilience, aggravated by the rapid succession of crises, the absence of basic services and the conflicts in the region; whereas this situation will cause further migration;

J.

whereas at each stage of their journey, migrants are exposed to all kinds of physical and psychological dangers, including violence, exploitation, trafficking and sexual and gender-based abuse; whereas this is particularly the case for vulnerable people, such as women (e.g. women heads of household or pregnant women), children — whether unaccompanied, separated or accompanied by their families — LGBTI people, people with disabilities, people in need of urgent medical treatment and the elderly; whereas these vulnerable groups should be urgently granted humanitarian protection and access to protection and referral mechanisms, to residence status and to basic services including healthcare as part of their resettlement or while their applications for asylum are being considered in accordance with applicable law;

K.

whereas the increase in human mobility, if managed in a safe, orderly, regular, responsible and pre-emptive manner, can mitigate migrants’ and refugees’ exposure to harm, can provide significant benefits to host countries and migrants alike, as recognised by the 2030 Agenda, and can also act as a great factor of growth for host countries, including the EU; whereas these benefits are often largely underestimated; whereas the EU must produce workable solutions, including making use of foreign workers, in anticipation of increasing European population ageing, in order to guarantee a balance between persons in remunerative work and non-active populations and to meet specific labour-market needs;

L.

whereas the EU response has mobilised different internal and external instruments, but appears to have been excessively focussed on the short term and on reducing or stopping movements; whereas this short-term approach addresses neither the causes of forced displacement and migration nor the humanitarian needs of migrants; whereas further improvements are needed in the EU response on crisis management and conflict prevention tools, as violent conflicts constitute the main root cause of forced displacement;

M.

whereas the European Court of Auditors has expressed serious doubts about the effectiveness of the EU’s external migration spending, including on projects regarding the human rights of migrants; whereas the Court also found that security and border protection were the predominant element in European migration spending;

N.

whereas humanitarian aid based on needs and respect of the principles of humanity, neutrality, impartiality and independence, as well on compliance with international humanitarian law and the human rights provided by the Geneva Conventions and the additional protocols thereto, must be at the core of all EU external action; whereas aid independence — i.e. aid that is free from any political, economic or security considerations or any type of discrimination — must prevail;

O.

whereas the successful implementation of a human rights-based migration policy requires challenging negative perceptions of migration and the development of positive narratives to depict migration movements as an opportunity for host countries, in order to counter extremism and populism;

P.

whereas the EU has a responsibility to support its implementing partners in carrying out rapid, effective and high quality assistance and protection, and should be accountable to the populations affected; whereas, in that regard, the EU’s partners require timely and predictable funding, and decisions on the allocation of funding for changing or new priorities should allow them sufficient time for planning and mitigation measures;

Q.

whereas decentralised cooperation can help in gaining a better grasp of the needs and cultures of IDPs, migrants and refugees and raise awareness among the local population about the challenges faced by migrants in their countries of origin; whereas local and regional European governments can play a key role in helping address these root causes, through capacity-building;

R.

whereas Article 21 of the Treaty on European Union explicitly states that the ‘Union's action on the international scene shall be guided by the principles which have inspired its own creation, development and enlargement, and which it seeks to advance in the wider world: democracy, the rule of law, the universality and indivisibility of human rights and fundamental freedoms, respect for human dignity, the principles of equality and solidarity, and respect for the principles of the United Nations Charter and international law’; whereas, according to Article 208 of the Lisbon Treaty, development assistance aims at reducing and eventually eradicating poverty in third countries;

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—

having regard to its previous resolutions on Russia, in particular its resolutions of 23 October 2012 (1), of 13 June 2013 on the rule of law in Russia (2), of 13 March 2014 on Russia: sentencing of demonstrators involved in the Bolotnaya Square events (3), its recommendation of 2 April 2014, its resolutions of 23 October 2014 on the closing-down of the NGO ‘Memorial’ (winner of the 2009 Sakharov Prize) in Russia (4), of 15 January 2015 on Russia, in particular the case of Alexei Navalny (5), of 12 March 2015 on the murder of the Russian opposition leader Boris Nemtsov and the state of democracy in Russia (6), and of 24 November 2016 on the case of Ildar Dadin, prisoner of conscience in Russia (7),

—

having regard to the Russian Constitution, in particular Article 29 which protects the freedom of speech and Article 31 which includes the right to peaceful assembly, and to the international human rights obligations to which Russia has committed itself as Member of the Council of Europe, the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the UN,

—

having regard to the ‘Partnership for Modernisation’ initiated in 2010 in Rostov-on-Don and to the commitment made by the Russian leadership to the rule of law as a fundamental basis for the modernisation of Russia,

—

having regard to Article 5 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and Article 7 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, both of which provide that no one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment and to which the Russian Federation is a party,

—

having regard to the United Nations Declaration on Human Rights Defenders, adopted by the UN General Assembly on 9 December 1998,

—

having regard to its resolution of 16 March 2017 on the Ukrainian prisoners in Russia and the situation in Crimea (8),

—

having regard to the seventh periodic report of the Russian Federation considered by the United Nations Human Rights Committee at its 3136th and 3137th meetings, held on 16 and 17 March 2015,

—

having regard to Rules 135(5) and 123(4) of its Rules of Procedure,

A.

whereas on 26 March 2017, between 33 000 and 93 000 people took part in anti-corruption rallies, marches and demonstrations in over 80 cities across Russia; whereas over 2 000 protesters were detained by police in cities across Russia, including about 1 000 in Moscow; whereas opposition politician Alexei Navalny was detained and fined USD 350 for organising banned protests and sentenced to 15 days in jail; whereas the protests are reckoned to be the largest since the anti-Kremlin demonstrations in 2011 and 2012;

B.

whereas the verdict of the Leninsky Court in Kirov (8 February 2017) against Russian opposition politician Alexei Navalny on charges of embezzlement attempts served to silence yet another independent political voice in the Russian Federation; whereas the European Court of Human Rights has ruled that Navalny was denied the right to a fair trial in his prosecution in 2013 on the same charges;

C.

whereas the Russian Government has opened a criminal investigation against unidentified people who called via the internet for a demonstration in Moscow on 2 April 2017 demanding the resignation of Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev, an end to Russian military operations in Ukraine and Syria, the release of Navalny and payment of compensation to activists detained during a Moscow protest on 26 March 2017; whereas on 2 April 2017 at least 31 people were arrested during opposition protests in Moscow and thereafter detained for ‘breaches of public order’;

D.

whereas the Russian Federation, as a full member of the Council of Europe, a signatory to the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the UN Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment has committed itself to the principles of democracy, the rule of law and respect for fundamental freedoms and human rights; whereas the European Union has repeatedly offered additional assistance and expertise to help Russia to modernise and abide by its constitutional and legal order, in line with Council of Europe standards;

E.

whereas there are concerns about developments in the Russian Federation with regard to respect for, and the protection of, human rights and respect for commonly agreed democratic principles and the rule of law; whereas the Russian Federation has ratified 11 out of the 18 international human rights treaties;

F.

whereas the criminal law of the Russian Federation has been amended and the new Article 212.1 has been introduced, according to which a person can be charged with violation of the law on public assemblies, notwithstanding the fact that this amendment restricts the freedom of speech and assembly;

G.

whereas, according to the Memorial Human Rights Centre, the number of political prisoners in the country has significantly increased in recent years, totalling 102 persons in 2016;

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having regard to its previous resolutions and recommendations on Belarus, including on the European Neighbourhood Policy,

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having regard to the statements by the Chair of its Delegation for relations with Belarus of 27 March 2017, the European External Action Service (EEAS) spokesperson of 17 March 2017, the UN Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Belarus of 14 and 28 March 2017, the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly (PA) of 24 March 2017, the Director of the OSCE/ODIHR of 17 and 26 March 2017, the OSCE PA Human Rights Committee of 27 March 2017, and the Observatory for the Protection of Human Rights Defenders (FIDH-OMCT) of 29 March 2017 on recent arrests of peaceful protesters and unlawful detentions in Belarus,

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having regard to the Council conclusions on Belarus, in particular those of 15 February 2016 lifting the restrictive measures against 170 individuals and three Belarusian companies,

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having regard to Council Decision (CFSP) 2017/350 of 27 February 2017 (1) prolonging the restrictive measures against Belarus until 28 February 2018, which include an arms embargo and an asset freeze and a travel ban against four people listed in connection with the unresolved disappearances of two opposition politicians, one businessman and one journalist in 1999 and 2000,

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having regard to the parliamentary elections held on 11 September 2016 and to the presidential election held on 11 October 2015; having regard to the numerous declarations by the Belarusian authorities that some of the OSCE/ODIHR recommendations following the 2015 presidential election would be implemented ahead of the 2016 parliamentary elections and having regard to the OSCE/ODIHR final report of 28 January 2016 on the presidential election in Belarus of 11 October 2015,

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having regard to the report by FIDH and the Human Rights Centre ‘Viasna’ on Forced Labour and Pervasive Violations of Workers’ Rights in Belarus,

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having regard to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the UN Declaration on Human Rights Defenders, the UN International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the European Convention on Human Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,

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having regard to Rules 135(5) and 123(4) of its Rules of Procedure,

A.

whereas the Government of Belarus introduced Presidential Decree No 3 ‘On the Prevention of Social Dependency’, the so-called ‘social parasite tax’, which was signed by President Alexander Lukashenko in 2015 and began to be implemented as of February 2017 — this decree sanctions unemployment by imposing a special duty to finance government expenditures, ranging from a fee of approximately EUR 240, which is about two thirds of the average monthly wage in Belarus, to forced labour for citizens who have been working for fewer than 183 days a year; whereas the decree was received with widespread criticism from citizens, activists and journalists;

B.

whereas since 17 February and over the course of March 2017, despite the pressure from the state media and security forces, including the presence of armed officers to disperse demonstrations, mass peaceful protests of thousands of citizens have been taking place in dozens of cities across Belarus as a reaction against the adoption of Presidential Decree No 3, and against the construction of a business centre near Kurapaty, a memorial site for the victims of Stalin;

C.

whereas the authorities have responded violently to these demonstrations, in particular on 25 and 26 March 2017; whereas peaceful demonstrators tried to march along Minsk’s main avenue on the Freedom Day of 25 March, but were blocked by a cordon of riot police; whereas the security forces have attacked the protesters, beating women, minors and the elderly; whereas hundreds of protesters have been arrested, including domestic and foreign journalists reporting on the events; whereas at least 700 people have been detained in Minsk, some of whom were unintentional spectators;

D.

whereas a large group of human rights defenders have been detained while observing peaceful demonstrations; whereas according to the Human Rights Centre ‘Viasna’, as of the end of the day on 27 March 2017, a total of 177 people had been handed court rulings on administrative charges over their participation in the 25 March protests, of which 74 resulted in administrative detention and 93 in fines; whereas more than 100 opposition members were arrested as a preventive measure before the protests;

E.

whereas 27 people, including Zmitser Dashkevich, a former political prisoner and a leader of the ‘Young Front’ movement, have been arrested under allegations of plotting a riot by groups trained in Ukraine, Poland and Lithuania; whereas they face an offence punishable by imprisonment for up to three years; whereas the Committee for State Security (KGB) is refusing to disclose the number of people arrested in connection with the so-called ‘mass riot case’;

F.

whereas Mikalay Statkevich, a prominent opposition figure and former presidential candidate, who was expected to lead the demonstration in Minsk, was arrested and kept in a KGB detention centre for three days, with no information as to his whereabouts; whereas Sergei Kulinich and Sergei Kuntsevich were also arrested; whereas Uladzimir Nyaklyayev, a well-known Belarusian poet and presidential candidate in 2010, was also illegally detained prior to the rally of 25 March 2017 and, as a consequence, had to be hospitalised due to weakened health conditions; whereas Pavel Seviarynets, Vitali Rymashevski, Anatol Liabedzka and Yuri Hubarevich, along with a number of civic activists, were arrested over the course of March 2017; whereas on 23 March Ales Lahvinets, deputy chairman of the Movement for Freedom, was arrested in Minsk; whereas around 60 human rights observers were preventatively detained;

G.

whereas on 25 March 2017 the police raided the office of the Human Rights Centre ‘Viasna’ in the Belarusian capital, preventatively arresting at least 57 persons involved in the monitoring of ongoing peaceful protests; whereas prior to this, other human rights defenders, such as Oleg Volchek, a head of the Human Rights Centre ‘Legal Assistance to the Population’, and Anatoli Poplavni, a member of the Gomel branch of the Human Rights Centre ‘Viasna’, were detained and sentenced to short terms of imprisonment; whereas Leonid Sudalenka, a member of ‘Viasna’, was also detained and convicted for having submitted over 200 citizens’ complaints against the provisions of the above-mentioned Presidential Decree No 3;

H.

whereas according to the Belarusian Association of Journalists (BAJ) 120 incidents of violations of journalists’ rights have been registered; whereas the internet was shut down across the country and journalists have been sanctioned for covering the events or sentenced to prison on charges of hooliganism or for disobeying police orders; whereas some of them are still awaiting trial; whereas over 20 cases of harassment of Belsat TV reporters have been recorded since 12 March 2017, and whereas on 31 March 2017 the offices of Belsat TV were raided and searched by the police, and some equipment seized and removed;

I.

whereas these events are the most serious that have occurred since the harsh crackdown on demonstrations in 2010 and can be seen as a regretful setback; whereas this new wave of repression is taking place exactly one year after the EU’s decision to enter into a so-called re-engagement policy for relations with Belarus;

J.

whereas Belarus is an OSCE participating state and has agreed to respect the rights of peaceful assembly and association; whereas the above-mentioned mass arrests, excessive use of force against protesters and the reported raids of civil society organisations are clear violations of these commitments;

K.

whereas Belarus is the only country in Europe still to carry out capital punishment; whereas the first death penalty sentence in 2017 was handed down on 17 March 2017;

L.

whereas the EU lifted most of the restrictive measures in regard to Belarusian officials and legal entities in February 2016 as a gesture of goodwill to encourage Belarus to improve its human rights, democracy and rule of law record; whereas the Council in its conclusions on Belarus of 15 February 2016 stressed the need to enhance EU-Belarus cooperation in a number of economic, trade and assistance-related fields, which would open up the possibility for Belarus to apply for EIB and EBRD financing;

M.

whereas the difficult economic situation in Belarus faces further prospects of deterioration, with major sectors still remaining under state ownership and under an administrative command and control system; whereas Belarus’s dependence on Russia’s economic aid is continuously increasing;

N.

whereas one of the objectives of Belarus’s participation in the Eastern Partnership and its parliamentary branch, Euronest, is to intensify cooperation between the country and the EU; whereas the Belarusian Parliament has no official status in the Euronest Parliamentary Assembly;

O.

whereas Belarus is part of the Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO) and takes part in the ‘Zapad 2017’ joint military manoeuvres with Russia, which cover scenarios involving attacks on its western neighbours that include simulating the use of nuclear weapons and which have a potential negative impact on the security and national sovereignty of the Republic of Belarus and the region;

P.

whereas the EU is committed to a stable, democratic and prosperous future for Belarus, for the benefit of its people; whereas a significant improvement in freedom of speech and freedom of the media, respect for the political rights of ordinary citizens and opposition activists alike and respect for the rule of law and fundamental rights are all prerequisites for better relations between the EU and Belarus;

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