ISSN 1977-091X

Official Journal

of the European Union

C 383

European flag  

English edition

Information and Notices

Volume 58
17 November 2015


Notice No

Contents

page

 

I   Resolutions, recommendations and opinions

 

OPINIONS

 

European Economic and Social Committee

 

509th EESC plenary session, 1 and 2 July 2015

2015/C 383/01

Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on Women and Transport (exploratory opinion requested by the Commission)

1

2015/C 383/02

Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on Environmental, social and health claims in the single market (own-initiative opinion)

8

2015/C 383/03

Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on Sport and European Values (own-initiative opinion)

14

2015/C 383/04

Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on Energy storage: a factor in integration and energy security (own-initiative opinion)

19

2015/C 383/05

Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on Smart cities as drivers for development of a new European industrial policy (own-initiative opinion)

24

2015/C 383/06

Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on the TTIP and its impact on SMEs (own-initiative opinion)

34

2015/C 383/07

Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on The post-2015 objectives in the Euro-Mediterranean region (own-initiative opinion)

44

2015/C 383/08

Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on Financing development — the position of civil society (own-initiative opinion)

49

2015/C 383/09

Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on the Evaluation of European Commission stakeholder consultations (own-initiative opinion)

57


 

III   Preparatory acts

 

EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE

 

509th EESC plenary session, 1 and 2 July 2015

2015/C 383/10

Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on the Green Paper on Building a Capital Markets Union(COM(2015) 63 final)

64

2015/C 383/11

Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on The Paris Protocol — A blueprint for tackling global climate change beyond 2020(COM(2015) 81 final)

74

2015/C 383/12

Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on the Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee, the Committee of the Regions and the European Investment Bank on A Framework Strategy for a Resilient Energy Union with a Forward-Looking Climate Change Policy(COM(2015) 80 final) and the Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on Achieving the 10 % electricity interconnection target — Making Europe’s electricity grid fit for 2020(COM(2015) 82 final)

84

2015/C 383/13

Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee — Towards a new European neighbourhood policy(JOIN(2015) 6 final)

91

2015/C 383/14

Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on the Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council repealing Council Directive 76/621/EEC relating to the fixing of the maximum level of erucic acid in oils and fats and Council Regulation (EC) No 320/2006 establishing a temporary scheme for the restructuring of the sugar industry(COM(2015) 174 final — 2015/0090 COD)

99

2015/C 383/15

Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on the Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on a multiannual recovery plan for Bluefin tuna in the eastern Atlantic and the Mediterranean repealing Regulation (EC) No 302/2009(COM(2015) 180 final — 2015/0096 COD)

100


EN

 


I Resolutions, recommendations and opinions

OPINIONS

European Economic and Social Committee

509th EESC plenary session, 1 and 2 July 2015

17.11.2015   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 383/1


Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on ‘Women and Transport’

(exploratory opinion requested by the Commission)

(2015/C 383/01)

Rapporteur:

Ms Madi SHARMA

Co-rapporteur:

Mr Raymond HENCKS

On 8 March 2015, the European Commission decided to consult the European Economic and Social Committee, under Article 304 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, on

Women and Transport.

The Section for Transport, Energy, Infrastructure and the Information Society, which was responsible for preparing the Committee’s work on the subject, adopted its opinion on 16 June 2015.

At its 509th plenary session, held on 1 and 2 July 2015 (meeting of 1 July), the European Economic and Social Committee adopted the following opinion by 119 votes to 1 with 3 abstentions.

1.   Conclusions and recommendations

1.1

All dimensions of the transport sector — air, sea, road, rail, inland navigation, space and logistics — are traditionally male-dominated and as a result:

transport policy is male-oriented: devised by men and centred around their lifestyle,

employment in the sector is primarily male and is geared to male workers,

the values embedded in the industry show little support for females in the sector and lack gender-sensitivity,

gender consideration is absent from EU transport policy.

A snap shot of current statistics in the sector, included in Appendix 1, demonstrates the discrimination in the sector. Many of the barriers highlighted are generic to other sectors, but the transport sector is specifically poor in addressing the issues.

1.2

Hence this exploratory opinion, drawn up at the request of the EU Commissioner for Transport, focuses on the opportunities for the transport sector to better include women and generate more economic, social and sustainable growth. This report does not cover women as users of transport; however the EESC believes that an exploratory opinion on the subject could also be drawn up. Despite the failings, the situation can change by implementing gender neutral policies to support competitiveness, innovation, growth and jobs in the context of EU 2020. The new Investment Plan for Europe promoting growth and jobs must mainstream gender equality, by eliminating existing gender impediments and developing a culture of engagement and inclusiveness for both men and women to be equally active in all aspects of transport. Greater recognition of gender is needed for it to become a prominent part of EU transport policy.

1.3

The key recommendations are to:

collect data and establish key indicators to identify and deconstruct barriers,

ensure women are visible and active in policy- and decision-making and planning,

proactively engage both sexes in creating a better working environment, including equal pay for equal work, within all the diversities of the sector,

take actions towards attracting women to employment opportunities with measures to improve employment quality,

better engage universities and career services to promote the wide scope of the sector, including technology, R&D and engineering,

proactively promote the role of women in business,

empower women and the sector to be more inclusive.

2.   Overview

2.1

Gender engagement in transport is complex and is not covered in depth here. Interest in transport is initiated by education, family, experience, necessity or need for innovation. Participation in the sector is the result of career opportunities offered in education institutions, qualifications, skills or networks. Remaining in the sector can be dependent on human resources development, training, upskilling and diversification, working conditions, salary, working time and work-life balance.

2.2

For women, this includes issues of safety, gender-based violence and sexual harassment from fellow workers or users. Additionally, women can face an interruption of their career through maternity and caring provision. Therefore, re-entering the sector requires flexible working arrangements, retraining and measures to avert loss of seniority/status.

2.3

Nevertheless where working conditions are good, both men and women in the sector find fulfilment, job satisfaction, high standards of training, skills development and opportunities for promotion and inclusion in decision-making. For company owners, this translates into opportunities for innovation, growth and job creation.

2.4

When analysing trends in employment, distinction should be made between mobile and non-mobile personnel in transport. Female transport employees find it more difficult to work away from home and thus in almost all transport professions except aviation, mobile jobs are male-dominated. Traditionally mobile jobs are better remunerated, thus the gender pay gap in transport becomes persistent and harder to address.

2.5

The impact of the economic crisis has also affected female employees. Pre-crisis tendencies showed that the industry opened up to women, efforts were doubled to actively recruit and promote women in transport. Much of this trend at the time was in the development of service land-based professions and investment in technologies which no longer required strength in manual labour. However, these trends were tempered by the crisis, as cost-cutting equally affected the measures needed to accompany workplace gender policies.

3.   Policy aims for better gender balance

3.1

The EESC is pleased to see Commissioner BULC, a woman, with the portfolio for transport. All too often, the gender composition in decision-making bodies is based on pigeon holes rather than on competence. For the EU transport sector to succeed with strong sustainable growth, it must have gender neutrality in its policy- and decision-making process. Women must be equally involved in both, not through positive discrimination but on merit, competence and transparency of appointments.

3.2

A higher participation of women at senior level, including as non-executive directors, has been proven to bring bottom-line benefits to companies (1). Women’s engagement within the decision-making process will assist companies, institutions and associations to innovate and bring new market insights. A gender diverse workforce promotes collaboration, understanding and tolerance and has been proven to drive competitiveness, productivity and corporate social responsibility, ensuring retention of both genders.

3.3

The EESC would thus recommend simple non-bureaucratic procedures of regular auditing and reporting of progress made by transport actors (policymakers, companies, trade unions, transport associations, stakeholders) on gender equality. This should include the education of users in overcoming stereotypes and perceptions. Women and men should be given the same opportunities to influence the creation, design and management of the transport system, where their values are given equal weight. The Commission could consider this both in their own policy dialogue and as a requirement for TEN-T project funding or R&D funding.

4.   Data collection and indicators

4.1

The EU Commission and Member States could better support the industry through data collection and statistical analyses that are gender sensitive and gender disaggregated, highlighting key areas for investment or support.

4.2

The following indicators should be considered:

guidance and advice from secondary and tertiary education,

qualifications and training — including secondary education through to higher education,

recruitment salaries,

career opportunities and barriers,

work-life balance,

health and safety in the workplace,

working culture, including a breakdown by gender roles,

women in policy- and decision-making, including at company board level,

allocation of resources for female entrepreneurs.

4.3

Data analysis can be used to examine the employment cycle, where there are obstacles to women’s entry and progression in the sector. Thereafter, industry-specific instruments can be created to address the weaknesses that discriminate against women.

4.4

The European Commission could further consider analysing the following:

the distribution and allocation of public money, including EU project funding, as gender bias in the decision-making processes impacts on the use of public budgets and of public infrastructures. This should lead to the introduction of gender budgeting in European transport policy,

the division of macroeconomic measures to counter the impact of gender bias in the development of tax policies, road pricing policies, aviation tax policy, public services policy, liberalisation policies and consumer rights policy. This would ensure gender mainstreaming in public services and in liberalisation/privatisation policies within the sector,

collating the data to serve as a foundation, based on evidence, for future European transport policy and its processes. For example, the UK Public Transport Gender Audit highlights compliance by transport institutions in the area of gender mainstreaming.

5.   Employment: female participation

5.1

Europe has seen an increase in female participation in the labour market in all sectors in recent decades. The growth continues, and yet the transport sector remains largely unfriendly to working women. Despite a number of initiatives under the European Social Fund and the EQUAL programme, the transport sector remains a segregated industry where men are predominantly concentrated as drivers/pilots, technicians or in occupations involving physical work and a heavy workload, whereas women are predominantly in service-related and administrative jobs.

5.2

In general, restructuring in the transport sector has hit the mainly male dominated transport occupations: rail, ports and inland waterways; while more women are employed in the service activities developed within the emerging supply chains, logistics companies, etc. Today, the implementation of new technologies makes it possible for women and men equally to take up jobs in sectors that have traditionally involved heavy physical work. However, work life balance remains a problem and continues to hamper women’s employment in mobile jobs.

5.3

The general perception that certain jobs, workplaces and working time arrangements are exclusively suitable for men is wide-spread. This has considerable impact on recruitment and retention of the female workforce in occupations where women are under-represented.

5.4

With regard to equal pay, segregation in transport maintains the gender pay gap. Men are concentrated in technical jobs, regarded as more qualified, while women are predominant in administration and customer service. Men work longer hours and account for more full-time jobs in transport, whereas women tend to opt for more flexible work arrangements which have restricted opportunities. In transport, career prospects are better for men than for women. Access to male dominated jobs is still problematic, despite the fact that both men and women have equal access to vocational training. This leads to situations where women are trained in technical professions but cannot get a job to match their level of qualification. All these contribute to deepen the pay gap between women and men in transport.

5.5

A gender sensitive approach for health and safety in transport provides a number of challenges as the majority of jobs with a visible risk for occupational accidents and illnesses are male dominated. This diminishes chances for a gender differentiated approach in health and safety policies/measures. However, varying occupations, tasks, working conditions or hours worked entail different exposure to hazards.

5.6

The European Union transport sector has a high incidence of all forms of violence, where many types of incidents go unreported. Third-party violence is equally problematic in transport as women are predominantly concentrated in those transport professions involving direct contact with the customer and thus tend to be more exposed to aggressive behaviour and attacks from customers. Front desk personnel have to confront growing levels of public frustration caused by congestions, delays or lack of information during delays. In this context more should be done to encourage transport companies to adopt zero-tolerance workplace violence policies.

5.7

The EESC proposes that the revision of the 2011 White Paper Roadmap to a Single European Transport Area include a new initiative — to be added to the list in Annex I — in favour of gender equality in transport professions, namely actions attracting women to employment opportunities in the transport sector with measures to improve employment quality across all modes of transport, working conditions, training and Lifelong Learning (LLL), operational and occupational health and safety and good career opportunities, all of which contribute to a better work-life balance. Women could be better integrated into the transport sector through positive action, which requires at least new sanitary infrastructure, changing rooms and accommodation and a more reasonable assessment of continuous working time, as well as stress, repetitive movements and fatigue related to each transport mode.

5.8

A number of European sectoral social partner initiatives to make transport a better workplace for women show the industry’s awareness of the potential obstacles to be addressed. A study carried out by the rail social partners CER and the ETF on representation and better integration of women in railway professions led to recommendations whose implementation at company level is currently jointly monitored by the two organisations. The same approach is used in urban public transport by UITP and the ETF. In maritime, in 2014, ETF and ECSA developed a comprehensive training toolkit including guidelines, a video and a workbook aiming at tackling harassment on board vessels. In ports and docks, the ETF, ESPO, IDC and FEPORT recently agreed on joint recommendations with 14 action points aimed at promoting and keeping women in employment in ports.

5.9

Many organisations, including the ILO, and social partners, have already created guidelines, training packages, toolkits and codes of practice that can be used or strengthened to increase female participation in the sector. The Commission could include a strong gender dimension within the pillars of a Social, Employment and Training Observatory for Transport, as recommended in the 2011 EESC opinion on How EU policies have impacted on the job opportunities, the training needs and the working conditions of transport workers.

6.   Women in business

6.1

Entrepreneurs have become more important as providers of employment opportunities and key players, including in the transport sector (2). Today this includes engagement in the green economy, intelligent transport systems ITS, CCTV, real time planning and security.

6.2

Simple, specific policies for women-owned enterprises could bring a return on investment that would increase growth and employment opportunities in the EU. The Commission should consider creating a women’s business ownership office within the European Commission and Member States’ relevant ministries. It should be part of the ministries for economic development in order to provide a clear distinction between economic enterprise activities and gender equality responsibilities.

6.3

Furthermore the appointment of a women’s enterprise director or high-level representative within the European Commission and Member States’ with a cross-departmental role of raising awareness about the economic benefits of encouraging more women to start and grow businesses should be considered. This ‘enterprise director’ could also have responsibility for promoting the industry and the academic paths which lead to increased female entrepreneurship, such as research, science, high-tech engineering, transport engineering and IT development.

7.   Women and transport; making it happen

7.1

To overcome under-representation of women and to use the talent pool of women in the transport labour market more efficiently and extensively, the EESC recommends the following tools that could be used to build the capacity of women at all levels. This can be done through the development of EU projects within DG Transport, or in collaboration with other established EU projects (partnerships):

develop a coordinated approach between institutions, industry associations, trade unions and stakeholders working in the sector, to establish a campaign welcoming women to the transport industry and highlighting the added value to the EU economy and social fabric of better inclusion of women in the sector. This was recently achieved by the UK Transport for London, where 100 women in the transport sector were showcased. Celebrating their success demonstrated the important role of women in transport and engaged, motivated and inspired current and future generations of female transport workers,

equality in transport: This is not industry specific, but studies show that the inequalities in the transport sector are a key reason why women do not consider engaging more in the sector. These issues should be addressed as a priority:

equal pay for equal work,

transparent recruitment process,

flexible work practices — including job sharing and part-time work opportunities,

attracting talent — considering mature as well as young female workers, both with and without high level qualifications,

decision-making — include more women on company boards, within management structures, within trade unions beyond membership level, and within policy making.

7.2

Mentoring: increasing the support mechanisms, providing knowledge and experience, creating networks and giving guidance. This can be provided internally within companies and between employee levels, externally between companies and comparable transport sectors, and through established mentoring programmes without a focus solely on transport. Mentoring networks should contain both male and female participants. Furthermore, these networks can be developed into clusters and be cross-sectoral in order to allow the transfer of knowledge, best practices, skills and opportunities throughout the transport industry.

7.3

Development programs: creating the training that will allow for skills development and professional qualification attainment to increase competences without gender bias, thus ensuring equality of competence levels for recruitment or promotions.

7.4

Education: review the education system and the promotion of the roles in the transport sector to redefine the assumption that the sector is only suitable for males. Identify female role models to promote the opportunities.

7.5

Promote innovation and small business in transport: identify women working in small to medium-sized enterprises to identify new trends, innovation and R&D possibilities. Showcase successes. Best practice: the Women 1st Top 100 Club is a network of the most influential women in hospitality, passenger transport, travel and tourism, who act as ambassadors and role models for the female leaders of tomorrow (http://women1st.co.uk/top-100).

7.6

Supply chain engagement: encourage suppliers to include data on gender in their supply chain. Identify opportunities to consider procurement contracts for female-owned companies. (Best practice: the US-based initiative WEConnect offers tenders and procurement contracts especially for women across all sectors. It is now operational in Europe (http://weconnectinternational.org).

7.7

Corporate social responsibility (CSR): encourage companies to report gender statistics as part of their corporate social responsibility and engage in the promotion of women in the transport sector. Contribute to building an industry’s brand as an ‘industry of choice’ for all.

7.8

Internationalisation: Europe is valued for its knowledge transfer and partnership development. Transport is a global sector with many challenges where Europe can share its experience and innovation capacity, as well as open itself to new markets. A crucial role for women in the sector would be to promote European industry and expertise overseas.

Brussels, 1 July 2015.

The President of the European Economic and Social Committee

Henri MALOSSE


(1)  OJ C 133, 9.5.2013, p. 68.

(2)  OJ C 299, 4.10.2012, p. 24.


17.11.2015   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 383/8


Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on ‘Environmental, social and health claims in the single market’

(own-initiative opinion)

(2015/C 383/02)

Rapporteur:

Mr Bernardo HERNÁNDEZ BATALLER

On 22 January 2015, the European Economic and Social Committee, acting under Rule 29(2) of its Rules of Procedure, decided to draw up an opinion on:

‘Environmental, social and health claims in the single market’

(own-initiative opinion).

The Section for the Single Market, Production and Consumption, which was responsible for preparing the Committee’s work on the subject, adopted its opinion on 9 June 2015.

At its 509th plenary session, held on 1 and 2 July 2015 (meeting of 2 July 2015), the European Economic and Social Committee adopted the following opinion by 135 votes to 17 with 14 abstentions.

1.   Conclusions and recommendations

1.1.

Marketing communication is an important tool enabling companies to publicise their products and services in a transparent manner, ensuring that the internal market operates smoothly and offers a high degree of consumer protection. Some messages, however, are not reliable or contain inaccuracies, making environmental, social or ethical and health-related claims that are damaging to businesses that comply with all the rules and to consumers.

1.2.

The environmental and social performance of products and services is currently measured and communicated using a range of channels and formats, under different initiatives, in differing formats and based on a variety of methodologies for assessment. The European Economic and Social Committee (EESC) believes it is important that the Commission put forward European methodologies for measuring and communicating the overall environmental impact of products and services. An inventory of official labels should also be compiled, specifying their meaning and the bodies accredited for awarding, validating and differentiating them. In any case, consumers have the right to have clear and precise information on a product’s origin.

1.3.

The EESC hopes that, with a view to extending Directive 2005/29/EC, the Commission will revise the guidelines facilitating consumers’ and businesses’ access to reliable and transparent information and will clarify the use of environmental, ethical and health-related claims in marketing communications.

1.4.

In the field of administrative cooperation, each Member State’s consumer authorities should carry out a ‘sweep’ of environmental, social, ethical and health-related claims, to be able to assess the situation today on the basis of real data.

1.5.

The EU should equip itself with a coherent, comprehensive and consistent legal framework for regulating online marketing communications, which shows due regard for the right to personal privacy and for the protection of other public policy objectives.

1.6.

The European Commission and the Member States, within the scope of their respective powers, should develop initiatives for surveillance, monitoring and sanctions in relation to existing self-regulation and co-regulation schemes in this area that cover environmental, social and health-related claims. It should be ensured, in particular, that national and European self-regulatory bodies in the field of advertising meet the standards set out in the Community provisions and recommendations, especially with the aim of securing a high degree of consumer protection. Consumer organisations should also be informed when codes of conduct are drawn up, so that they can be involved in the drafting process.

2.   Introduction

2.1.

There are a good many businesses in Europe that provide the consumer with comprehensive, accurate and transparent information on the essential characteristics of goods and services placed on the market. Nevertheless, the improper use of environmental, social and health-related claims is harming businesses that play by the rules, as well as consumers that purchase goods and services.

2.2.

The right to information enables the workings of the internal market to be more transparent and redresses the obvious imbalances in the supplier/consumer relationship.

2.3.

The consumer has the right to obtain comprehensive, accurate and transparent information on the essential characteristics of goods and services placed on the market.

2.4.

Information is therefore a crucial factor in consumers’ and users’ purchasing decisions, both when acquiring a product on the basis of preferences and choices and when rejecting those that do not meet their needs and wishes to the same extent. In turn, technological developments make it increasingly easy for companies to cater to the demands of different consumer segments individually, making use of loyalty schemes, by customising their products. A clear example of this is ‘one-to-one’ marketing.

2.5.

In a social market economy model such as the one set out in the Treaty, the EU cannot be said to have a comprehensive legal framework governing marketing communications because it is unnecessarily complex, patchy, inconsistent and sometimes incoherent, being primarily based on:

Directive 2005/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council (1) on unfair commercial practices, which only covers the relationship between consumers and businesses. This Directive is without prejudice to EU and Member State rules on health and, with regard to financial services, Member States may impose requirements that are more demanding or restrictive than those contained in the Directive,

Directive 2006/114/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council (2) concerning misleading and comparative advertising, which covers the relationship between businesses,

Directive 2010/13/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council (3) on the coordination of certain provisions laid down by law, regulation or administrative action in Member States concerning the provision of audiovisual media services (Audiovisual Media Services Directive), which amended the directive generally known as the Television without Frontiers Directive,

in the food sector, the relevant legislation is Regulation (EC) No 1924/2006 (4), on nutrition and health claims made on foods and also in relation to other sectors in the field of health, such as cosmetics and personal care products, on which the Commission is already working,

the communication on corporate social responsibility (5) and the more recent communication on ‘A Digital Single Market Strategy for Europe’ (6).

2.6.

The Commission has published a number of communications, has opened a public debate and is working on, among other things, what is known as the environmental footprint of products, in order to guarantee reliable and accurate information on products’ environmental impact throughout their life cycle.

2.7.

Although technological advances have given consumers greater access to information, the EU’s regulation of online marketing communication is currently spread across a number of texts (the directives on electronic commerce, consumer protection, protection of privacy in commercial communication, unfair commercial practices, etc.). The EESC believes that in the future, a proposal should be made to build on the strategy that has been adopted. In the short term, however, there should be consolidation to draw the provisions in force together in a single recast text and to avoid contradictions in the messages sent out using this channel of communication.

2.8.

Furthermore, a framework for cooperation between the Commission and the Member States already exists, in Regulation (EC) No 2006/2004 on consumer protection cooperation, which should explore these areas further, in order to assess any infringements that may be committed.

2.9.

Where existing remedies are concerned, these vary widely from one Member State to another because, while some provide the courts directly with effective means of ensuring compliance with the rules, others have developed various self-regulation and co-regulation initiatives for advertising, through codes of conduct and through out-of-court dispute settlement bodies that complement legislation and existing administrative and judicial enforcement mechanisms.

2.10.

There are also other variables that complicate the matter further, including:

the option of voluntary labelling,

the footprint of corporate social responsibility policies,

more selective consumer demand for products with specific characteristics addressing a particular concern,

the frequent inadequacy of effective monitoring mechanisms, and

the difficulties faced by consumers in differentiating and verifying information.

2.11.

Finally, a number of promotional techniques, such as branded content, emotional marketing and storytelling, product placement or so-called neuro-marketing applications, while helping suppliers to achieve their business targets more effectively, hamper rational the public’s decisions in relation to their purchasing decisions, uses and consumption, based on a real assessment of actual profits of goods and services and the appropriateness of their pricing. Among other things, because they often eliminate the traditional distinction between advertising and non-advertising content, cheating recipients of the message of their right to know the nature and commercial purpose that might exist behind a message that appears merely to be providing information, and are therefore likely to mislead more vulnerable consumers, such as young people, the elderly and people with disabilities.

2.12.

In short, the EESC supports the existence of higher-quality products and services that are ethically produced, or which are distinguished by their better environmental and/or social performance, and the existence of environmental, social and health-related claims focusing this opinion on claims and marketing communications that are false, inaccurate or lead to confusion.

3.   General comments

3.1.

The impact of marketing communications based on questionable, inaccurate or hard-to-verify claims that lead to errors and confusion is diverse and of varying severity, but is always of significant detriment to consumers, to businesses that observe the rules and by extension, to the workings of an ethical and transparent market in goods and services.

3.2.

The implications include the following:

distortion of supply, as a result of the claims’ effect on prices,

creation of non-transparent markets with a major imbalance between supply and demand,

constraint on consumers’ purchasing power by undermining their ability to make informed choices, due to a lack of accurate information enabling them to compare their needs and wishes with the nature of what is on offer,

deterrence and frustration for committed consumers who factor responsibility into their decisions (environmental, social, health-related claims) where the information received is misleading, false or unverifiable,

the promotion of ‘free-rider’ behaviour, which hampers the establishment and expansion of responsible consumption, by suppliers who benefit from the growing interest of consumers in such factors but who are not willing to pay for them, which also damages businesses that do act properly,

loss of consumer confidence in the market and in the oversight exercised by the public authorities.

3.3.

The information must meet consumers’ real needs and expectations and should therefore be assessed to see whether it reflects, to a sufficient degree, the purpose, content, presentation, context, and identification of the advertising message, the basic requirements for which are the following: reliability, topicality, impartiality, accuracy, relevance, succinctness, comprehensibility, clarity, readability and ease of access. The EESC maintains that a product’s label should state the product’s origin, because this increases the level of protection and prevents consumers from being misled or confused, thus serving to make their choices easier.

4.   Environmental claims

4.1.

Environmental claims focus mainly on the impact on the environment of the products’ composition or use, often related to climate change and pollutant emissions. But this may also extend to other areas, such as the rational use of natural resources, deforestation, species diversity, or energy efficiency and, ultimately, to the environmental footprint of company activity and the consumption of products on our environment.

4.2.

Using such claims as a mere formality or for the sake of appearances but in a way that has no bearing on the reality of the product or its manufacture creates a phenomenon known as ‘greenwashing’, which can be defined as the selective promotion of environmentally-positive information through advertising, giving consumers a distorted impression of the facts, in which these ‘green’ aspects are over-emphasised. The Commission also defines this practice in its guidance on implementing Directive 2005/29/EC (7).

4.3.

From the environmental point of view, information on a brand’s impact (either positive or negative) creates a certain image in consumers’ minds. In turn, this image influences aspects such as purchasing decisions or political opinions. By punishing ‘bad’ behaviour and rewarding ‘good’ behaviour, in the form of purchasing decisions, the system achieves a certain dynamic equilibrium.

4.4.

The most commonly-used greenwashing techniques are the following:

making a polluting process appear to be greener than it really is. Suggesting that a product is ‘green’ based on a limited set of attributes while ignoring other important environmental issues. The final product might be very green but the process that has created it may be highly polluting. Greenwashing can also include poor practices in the supply chain linked to unhealthy working conditions with harmful products,

lack of evidence. An environmental claim that cannot be corroborated by readily available supporting information or by reliable third-party certification,

vagueness: a claim which is so poorly defined that its real meaning is likely to be misinterpreted by consumers,

‘false’ labels or awards that the product has not in fact received.

4.5.

The criteria used should ensure that the consumer receives accurate information and should prohibit the misuse of environmental claims in marketing communications.

4.6.

One measure to make the workings of the market more transparent might be to introduce harmonised European methodologies, such as the so-called ‘environmental footprint’, making it possible to establish the environmental traceability of products and organisations. These methods should be based on commonly-used international standards, such as ISO 14201, on environmental labels and declarations — self-declared environmental claims, or the International Chamber of Commerce Code.

5.   Ethical and social claims

5.1.

In the same way that claims abound in the environmental sphere, there is also a kind of ‘greenwashing’ that applies to the ‘ethical and social qualities’ of companies and products. The aim here is to transform the acquisition of a product into an opportunity for charitable or inclusive action which is social in nature insofar as it would implicitly benefit groups or communities that have specific needs or vulnerabilities.

5.2.

It is currently common to see brands associated with socially minded projects, using a type of campaign based on promoting sales. These are known as ‘charity promotions’ or sales promotion campaigns linked to social action, which have achieved a degree of success as a result of the economic crisis. When such actions use inaccurate claims just to make sales, they can confuse the consumer and cause him or her to make purchasing mistakes, and are therefore particularly harmful.

5.3.

Such measures focus on campaigns entailing solidarity, humanitarian aid or social support for certain communities or population groups, or even support for short-term causes arising from emergency situations, or from a structural issue involving discrimination, segregation, inequality, etc.

5.4.

Other cases of social washing or social greenwashing, occur when a company is portrayed as being socially responsible without there being sufficient evidence of this, or where a promotional and social quality is given an exaggerated role in the company’s core business.

5.5.

Social or ethical claims are sometimes combined with others of an environmental nature, but also extend, in line with current trends, to other aspects such as employment, promoting local life, public participation and any other area that triggers consumers’ desire to make associated purchases.

5.6.

Account should also be taken in this regard of the hidden behaviour of pseudo ‘ethical, social and environmental affairs consultants’, who confuse consumers and cause them to make purchasing mistakes, because they operate on the market as traders or brokers, abusing the good faith and credulity of consumers, and who seek to profit from marketing goods or services on the basis of fallacious arguments.

5.7.

Financial operations that use ethical, social or environmental arguments in seeking to market financial products and instruments, while failing to meet the solvency requirements and supervisory checks that are mandatory for financial institutions, are particularly detrimental to the workings of the internal market. The European Banking Authority has recently adopted an opinion putting forward a number of measures to reduce risks and to establish requirements for advertising and recommendations to protect participants from potential conflicts of interest.

5.8.

‘Social washing’, or the use of inaccurate information in order to present a socially committed image, should be prevented.

6.   Health claims and claims of other types

6.1.

The recent wave of consumer concern about healthy lifestyles and the expansion of technology into the production of food, cosmetics and other health-related products have also triggered the use of health-related claims in areas ranging from food and nutrition, benefits for beauty and weight-loss, to enhanced physical and cognitive functions.

6.2.

Alongside environmental claims, the upsurge of consumer concerns about healthy eating also provides an opportunity to make claims relating to organic farming, or to the presence or absence of food ingredients such as vitamins, omega-3 fatty acids, sugars, salt or alcohol and even transgenic substances.

6.3.

The progressive ageing of the population and increased life expectancy represent fertile ground for even greater use to be made of unlawful claims.

6.4.

Similarly, so-called ‘healthy marketing’, which makes use of such claims to provide added value to boost marketing campaigns, has been done for food supplements or herbal products but also for mass-consumption goods, also contains misuse of alleged health benefits, garbed in pseudo-scientific arguments.

7.   Specific comments

7.1.

It should be noted that the options of voluntary labelling and the design of logos and pictograms creates rather vague associations in the cognitive and emotional processes that lead consumers to make a purchasing decision. Statements or pictures must not be used to clearly and firmly claim anything unless it can be proved beyond doubt. Specific steps should be taken to check claims.

7.2.

However, verifying claims must be carried out in accordance with the type of media used, since each one has its own specific features. To summarise, claims can be made, in schematic form, using the following (among others):

texts,

messages and slogans,

logos

symbols and signs,

pictograms,

images and photos,

graphs and data,

ranges of colours,

faces and names of familiar and highly-reputed individuals and organisations.

7.3.

It is permissible to ask that information containing unprovable claims and serving commercial purposes not be used or that it be corrected.

7.4.

The EESC therefore calls on the European Commission and the Member States to take the appropriate steps, in keeping with the provisions of Regulation (EC) No 2006/2004, in the form of administrative cooperation and in particular promoting joint activities, to eradicate the fraudulent use of inaccurate ethical, environmental or health claims, working closely with European Consumer Centres, which play a crucial role in such situations.

Brussels, 2 July 2015.

The President of the European Economic and Social Committee

Henri MALOSSE


(1)  OJ L 149, 11.6.2005, p. 22.

(2)  OJ L 376, 27.12.2006, p. 21.

(3)  OJ L 95, 15.4.2010, p. 1.

(4)  OJ L 404, 30.12.2006, p. 9.

(5)  COM(2002) 347 final.

(6)  COM(2015) 192 final.

(7)  SEC(2009) 1666 final. See point 2.5.1.


17.11.2015   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 383/14


Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on ‘Sport and European Values’

(own-initiative opinion)

(2015/C 383/03)

Rapporteur:

Bernardo HERNÁNDEZ BATALLER

On 10 July 2014, the European Economic and Social Committee, acting under Rule 29(2) of its Rules of Procedure, decided to draw up an own-initiative opinion on:

Sport and European Values.

The Section for Employment, Social Affairs and Citizenship, which was responsible for preparing the Committee’s work on the subject, adopted its opinion on 17 June 2015.

At its 509th plenary session, held on 1 and 2 July (meeting of 2 July), the European Economic and Social Committee adopted the following opinion by 99 votes to 59 with 32 abstentions.

1.   Conclusions and recommendations

1.1

Sport helps meet the EU’s strategic objectives, brings to the fore key educational and cultural values and is a conduit of integration, since it is open to all members of the public, regardless of their gender, ethnic origin, religion, age, nationality, social situation or sexual orientation. Sport is a tool to tackle intolerance, xenophobia and racism.

1.2

Sporting activities allow all people to channel their hopes in a constructive way, enriching them with the values that sport entails such as hard work, solidarity and cohesion. Such activities also bring physical and mental well-being while helping to alleviate social problems by providing positive values. In this regard, the debate should also focus on establishing a body of minimum universal standards which promote the integrity of the practice of sport by children and young people in all sporting disciplines.

1.3

Volunteering has a key role to play in the development of grass-roots sport and in clubs, affording it considerable value from a social, economic and democratic point of view. Volunteering and active citizenship through sport, including winter sports, should therefore be promoted.

1.4

The principle of good governance and sound management should ensure integrity in sporting competitions. In sport, autonomy is a condition for sporting organisations which must act in accordance with the principles of transparency, accountability and democracy. In light of this, all stakeholders must be appropriately represented in the decision-making process. In order to consolidate this general prevention framework, and as demonstrated by a recent comprehensive study (1), trust must be built up between national authorities and sporting institutions with a view to facilitating the necessary exchange of information between national judicial authorities and international sports institutions.

1.5

As regards innovation, the EESC urges the Commission and Member States to disseminate information and to exchange among themselves, in a European context, information on positive experiences and best practices relating to ways to create and support strategic partnerships between the main stakeholders from different sectors, aimed at strengthening the role of sport as a driver of innovation and economic growth. In this respect, it is very important to know how to reap the benefits that organising major sporting events can and should bring to the regions and cities in which they are held. The Committee believes that the Commission must pay attention to the new initiatives and methodologies emerging at international level which are aimed at helping regions and cities put into practice sports projects that promote sustainable economic and social development.

1.6

With an eye to the development of the sports sector, steps should be taken to foster the use of EU funding instruments at different levels.

1.7

At European level, efforts should be made to promote social cohesion, measures to include disadvantaged groups in sporting activities and social integration, including that of prisoners, so that they may find in sport a tool for reintegration into society, since it brings emotional well-being and provides a source of stability through the values of hard work, solidarity and ultimately ‘fair play’. These can help eradicate social exclusion and discrimination.

1.8

The EU has an important role to play in tackling inequality with a view to removing the barriers that prevent people with disabilities from taking part in sport, promoting their participation in competitions and eradicating any form of social prejudice in this regard. A positive step would therefore be for the Commission to propose to the Council of Ministers that it draw up a ‘European Code of Good Practices on Sport and Social Inclusion’ with a view to fostering and promoting more extensively the practice of sport among people with disabilities.

1.9

Special attention should be devoted by the EU and Member States to promoting sport and physical exercise amongst older people. In an increasingly ageing Europe, it is of paramount importance that targeted initiatives and funding are deployed to this effect.

2.   Introduction

2.1

Within the framework of the integration process, the Lisbon Treaty provides for certain values which are common to the EU and its Member States. These higher values are human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities.

The Lisbon Treaty gives the EU authority to promote the European aspects of sport (Article 165 TFEU). The various dimensions of sport (social, economic and cultural) must be examined from the point of view of how they tie in with the values enshrined in Article 2 TEU, entailing a clear commitment to act on the part of the institutions and the Member States, which must promote policies, standards and measures to develop the European aspects of sport, while at the same time applying the subsidiarity principle.

2.2

The aim of this own-initiative opinion is to promote the potential of European values and the values of sport, including winter sports, to all citizens and social organisations, and to promote the EU sport policy, given that until now judicial decisions on the subject have been only sporadic, usually related to the exercise of economic freedoms.

2.3

Even in ancient times, classical Greek philosophy distinguished between the activities of the body and the mind and the Olympic spirit was the fruition of these ideas, with ethics and the promotion of peace playing a key role.

Sport has an important part to play in meeting the European and worldwide goals of the Europe 2020 strategy, given the significant contribution this sector can make to smart, sustainable and inclusive growth.

3.   The social function of sport

3.1

In order to safeguard the social function of sport, Member States must have in place suitable infrastructure to facilitate the practice of sport, with the respective regions of each country having an appropriate, sufficient and balanced basic network of sporting facilities and equipment.

3.2

Volunteering continues to be the cornerstone of sport in Europe, since it is volunteers who enable sporting ideals to develop and spread, together with charitable sports associations. In this regard, a strong emphasis should be placed on the role of schools in championing Olympic values, as they foster peace and harmony in sport, preserving a system of coexistence and integration in a democratic and pluralist society as well as the human values which are identified with sport and play a role in eradicating violence, racism, intolerance and xenophobia in this area.

3.2.1

The application of the principles of good governance is essential for sports organisations. These must be guided by the principles of transparency, responsibility and democracy and must duly represent all stakeholders in the decision-making process, including the fans who generally promote the principles of fair play. Consideration should be given to the possibility of imposing stricter transparency requirements when activities are funded with public money.

3.2.2

The EESC believes that consideration should be given to taking coordinated action against undesirable phenomena such as match fixing, doping and violence not only on the basis of the EU’s competences set out in Articles 6 and 165 TFEU, but also those relating to the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice and any others which might be necessary in order to adopt supranational measures that could even act as a genuine deterrent.

3.2.3

These measures should aim to ensure a high level of safety and could, for example, include measures geared towards ensuring cooperation and coordination between police (Europol) and judicial (Eurojust) authorities and other competent authorities, which must include sporting federations.

3.3

Promoting physical activity and the practice of sport is a key factor in protecting public health in a modern society. It should be pointed out that sport promotes a healthy lifestyle and improves quality of life, so that people take full advantage of the opportunities it affords, thereby reducing spending on healthcare.

3.4

The institutional measures taken by the EU in the area of sport have received a significant boost thanks to the public debate surrounding the ‘European dimension of sport’, the inclusion of sport in the Erasmus+ programme and the strategic actions on gender equality in sport, among other things. The priorities of this programme are discussed every year and, for this reason, the EESC calls for the next evaluation to take account of the observations of this opinion.

3.4.1

This institutional action will have to be strengthened by taking the steps needed to make use of the added value and positive aspects of indigenous, traditional and more locally-based sports as proof of the EU’s cultural and historical diversity. This diversity should be fostered and promoted.

3.4.2

On the basis of the abovementioned Erasmus+ programme, the Commission should provide a clear assessment of the impact of including sports in that programme, especially as regards meeting the objectives on new skills and jobs and young people.

3.5

In order to ensure that sport contributes to the consolidation and development of European values, it is essential to adopt and execute measures of a coordinating, complementary or supporting nature which are designed to protect these European values, especially those geared to protecting human dignity, as well as some aspects of the education of people whose proper integration is essential if democracy and the rule of law are to function smoothly. This approach could be enhanced through the ‘fair play’ message channelled by sport, which conveys to society a large number of European values.

The European dimension of sport is no less important in helping to meet some of the benchmarks for equality between men and women. An important step would be to create and use educational materials to train sports leaders and parents in order to contribute to the elimination of gender stereotypes and the promotion of gender equality in sport, and to encourage an ever greater balance in the representation of both sexes on management boards and sports committees. In this connection, the development of a best practices charter for the development of young people and protection in sport is viewed as a major step (2).

3.6

Playing sport, individually and collectively, can be a legitimate source of job creation, wealth and well-being. Making proper use of sport has a very important role to play nowadays if we are to tackle youth unemployment and social exclusion. Special mention should be made of the situation of athletes who begin a second career after having retired from high-level competitive sport and who need to prepare in a specific way for this stage in their lives (dual career). Equivalence and recognition of diplomas and qualifications in sport are needed for the proper development of these young people. The latter point is important in order to put an end to the shadow economy which may exist in this sector and to move towards legalisation in future.

3.6.1

It would be a good idea to decide how European funding mechanisms can be used to encourage people to play sport as a way of promoting social integration and youth employment, gender equality, innovation, creation of networks of organisations which champion social reintegration and meeting other goals of public interest.

As a way of tackling social exclusion and a means of reintegration, sport is an appropriate means of moving closer to values which boost personal and social development, with an impact on people’s health and education. At European level, efforts should be made to promote social cohesion and social integration, including that of prisoners, who may find in sport a tool for reintegration into society, since it brings emotional well-being and provides a source of cohesion and stability through the values of hard work, solidarity and ultimately ‘fair play’.

3.6.2

A network of organisations should be created to advocate social cohesion and social reintegration through sport, especially those which are played most widely, in such a way that there is an exchange of best practices based on the European values enshrined in the Treaties, with a European congress of innovative practices for social reintegration through sport, championships organised at European Union level and the publication and dissemination of these networks’ results.

3.7

One of the EU’s institutional tasks associated with tackling inequality is to remove the barriers preventing people with disabilities from taking part in sport, promoting their participation in competitions and eradicating any form of social prejudice in this regard.

A positive step would be for the Commission to propose to the Council of Ministers that it draw up a ‘European Code of Good Practices on Sport and Social Inclusion’.

3.7.1

The integration of people with disabilities should be promoted through sporting events with a view to improving quality of life and developing the social habits of people with disabilities and their families. For this reason, sport is not just a healthy habit, it also improves and enhances the mobility of these people and allows them to develop their decision-making abilities, friendships and team-working skills.

3.7.2

In order to promote Paralympic or high-level sport for people with disabilities and thus raise the level of public awareness, the public authorities must roll out a communication strategy with an eye to the Paralympic Games and other high-level international events, making use of key media and professionals and resulting in high-quality television coverage of the Paralympic Games, a significant amount of airtime and the use of primetime television slots.

3.7.3

The provisions adapting each national legislative framework to the international Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities pursue the same goals and provide for ‘accessibility and design for all’ as tools which must be used to change and create environments which allow full public participation.

3.7.4

Since the lack of training of the various stakeholders is one of the barriers systematically identified when seeking to develop programmes to promote the inclusion of older people and people with disabilities in sporting activities, it is recommended that the necessary material be provided to meet the training needs of primary and secondary school physical education teachers and sports coaches to develop sporting activities in an inclusive environment.

3.8

The apparently irreversible process of the ageing of European society, accompanied by a constant increase of life expectancy, makes it indispensable to develop targeted initiatives and programmes to promote sport and physical exercise amongst older people. This is an area which, in most countries, has been overlooked and requires special attention, both at EU and Member State level.

4.   The economic nature of sport

4.1

Sport has an economic dimension based on professional sport and sport as a business, which affect the internal market. Another specific dimension of sport is voluntary work and its social, educational and cultural functions, which make a significant contribution to positive values such as sportsmanship, respect and social inclusion.

Therefore, a distinction must be made between sporting and commercial interests, and the EESC believes that sport should be protected from excessive economic influence so that the principles and values of sport prevail.

4.1.1

The unique and essential characteristics of sport should be given specific consideration when applying EU legislation in cases where the EU may play a more effective role than the Member States and with due consideration for the subsidiarity principle.

4.2

With regard to the economic dimension of sport, account must be taken of the special ties between these activities and fundamental rights.

4.2.1

Therefore, in order ensure appropriate protection against infringements of intellectual property rights and, in particular, against digital piracy, which put the business of sport at risk, consideration should be given to adopting measures based on the principle of proportionality. In any case, the fundamental rights of citizens to receive information must prevail. The aim here is to ensure, at the very least, that the public has the right to obtain and receive news, that major sporting events are broadcast and that journalists have the right to inform.

4.2.2

It would be a good idea to adopt directives in other areas such as competition policy — specifically State aid — in order to clarify what kinds of aid are considered to be a legitimate means of meeting sport’s social, cultural and educational objectives.

4.2.3

Online sports betting in unregulated markets, especially illegal betting, currently represents one of the main threats to sport; its negative effects are comparable to those of doping and spectator violence and may lead to manipulation of the uncertain nature of sporting competitions. With regard to other aspects, such as betting and gambling, there is a need to adopt public-interest measures to prevent gambling addiction and protect minors, especially against online gambling.

4.2.4

Sport has an in-built and inherent incentive to push those who practise sport towards constant improvement in performance and excellence, meaning that the sports sector is characterised by constant innovation that has made sports technology a major sector within the ‘applied sciences’, including textile technology, human motion mechanics, new materials, sensors, actuators and human-oriented design in particular. The building and running of sports facilities and participation and attendance at sports events are becoming an important part of the experience economy, of which the development of sport tourism is also an example.

4.2.5

Other themes related economically to sport, such as the free movement of people and services, sponsorship deals, regulating the activities of players’ agents, sports insurance and health, educational programmes for sportsmen and women and professional qualifications relating to sport, should be examined and, where appropriate, measures relating to these areas should be proposed or adopted by the Commission.

4.2.6

With regard to professional training for younger trainers, the rules in the different EU Member States must be improved, given that the work of a trainer is comparable to that of a teacher and that, in some cases (e.g. preparation for sporting competitions), the trainer spends more time with the young sportsperson than a teacher does with their pupils. Training for trainers must take place in a formal framework and be certified by a teaching diploma issued by the State.

4.2.7

The EESC calls for European sporting federations to play a role in defending the values and principles set out in this opinion, in the hope that their work in all areas is underpinned by these values and principles, at the very least the activities associated with the award of public prizes and recognition.

Brussels, 2 July 2015.

The President of the European Economic and Social Committee

Henri MALOSSE


(1)  Protecting the Integrity of Sport Competition: The Last Bet for Modern Sport, pp. 120-124, University of Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne and International Centre for Sport Security (ICSS), May 2014.

(2)  This was one of the main conclusions of the Inter Regional Sports Policy Summit (Lisbon, 16—17 March 2015), which brought together most of the key international stakeholders to establish sports policies.


17.11.2015   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 383/19


Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on ‘Energy storage: a factor in integration and energy security’

(own-initiative opinion)

(2015/C 383/04)

Rapporteur:

Pierre-Jean COULON

On 22 January 2015, the European Economic and Social Committee, acting under Rule 29(2) of its Rules of Procedure, decided to draw up an own-initiative opinion on

Energy storage: a factor in integration and energy security.

The Section for Transport, Energy, Infrastructure and the Information Society, which was responsible for preparing the Committee’s work on the subject, adopted its opinion on 16 June 2015.

At its 509th plenary session, held on 1 and 2 July 2015 (meeting of 1 July), the European Economic and Social Committee adopted the following opinion unanimously (131 votes).

1.   Conclusions and recommendations

1.1

The EESC calls for EU climate and energy objectives to lead to a greater share of renewables in the energy mix. The Committee has consistently supported renewable energies: a sustainable system composed mostly of renewables is the only long-term solution for the future of our energy. It notes the importance of supplementing the energy system in a number of ways.

1.2

Due to their intermittent nature, renewable energies and their development pose a real challenge in terms of storage. Storage is a strategic issue for the European Union, in order to permanently guarantee the security of the EU’s supply and the viability of the energy market, both technically and in terms of cost. This explains why the issue is high on the European agenda, and why it is a priority area, particularly for the Energy Union launched in 2015.

1.3

In a previous opinion, the EESC highlighted the issue of storage, describing it as ‘a challenge, an opportunity and an absolute necessity.’ It underlines the importance of a successful energy transition in the European Union and it calls for all resources to be harnessed in order to achieve tangible, large-scale results in this area.

1.4

The EESC acknowledges that different storage solutions exist and that technologies are at different stages of technological and industrial development.

1.5

The EESC points out that — alongside its advantages — energy storage can have significant financial, as well as environmental and health costs. For this reason, it calls for impact assessments to be carried out systematically, not merely to assess the competitiveness of technologies, but also to evaluate their impact on health and the environment. The EESC also considers it important to assess the effect that these technologies have on the creation of activities and jobs.

1.6

The EESC advocates stepping up investment and research and development work in the area of storage. In addition, it calls for better European synergy in this area, in order to reduce energy transition costs, guarantee the security of supply and render the European economy competitive. The EESC supports the need for greater harmonisation of Member States’ energy storage regulations.

1.7

The EESC also calls for a Europe-wide public dialogue on energy (the European Energy Dialogue) to allow the whole of civil society to take ownership of the energy transition and to influence future decisions on energy storage technologies.

1.8

The EESC highlights the importance of gas in the energy mix and its significance in terms of energy security for the citizens. It calls for storage to be encouraged in this sector, so that all of the Member States, together, will have reserves available.

2.   Making a successful energy transition and guaranteeing energy security

2.1

Energy supply and management are major political and socioeconomic priorities, as well as key factors in ensuring a successful energy transition and tackling climate challenges. Although energy demand is falling within the EU (energy consumption has been decreasing since 2006 and we now consume roughly the same amount of energy as during the early 1990s), the growing trend towards intermittent renewable energies has increased energy storage needs. Storage will play an essential role in a number of sectors (compensating for fluctuations, electric cars, defence, etc.) and it will be a strategic concern for Europe and its industry. It should be noted that the issue of storing renewable energy is also one of the main arguments presented by opponents to this type of energy.

2.2

While the majority of primary energy sources (gas, oil or coal) can be stored easily, questions still remain regarding the size, cost and location of strategic storage facilities. The other major primary energy source, renewable energies, varies when it comes to storage. Hydropower can very often be accumulated by storing water in lakes and reservoirs. While biomass can also be stored relatively easily, solar and wind energy — normally used to generate electricity — can at present only be stored using complex, expensive intermediary processes.

3.   A priority for Europe

3.1

The European Commission has analysed the scenarios for decarbonising the energy system and in 2011 it published an Energy Roadmap 2050, which sets out various scenarios for 2050. To achieve the decarbonisation objectives set, the electricity sector would rely on a large share of renewables — between 59 and 85 % — most of which would come from variable renewable power generation. In a subsequent communication in 2014 — A policy framework for climate and energy in the period from 2020 to 2030 — the path to decarbonisation is confirmed, indicating an RES share of almost 45 % of power generation in 2030. This is in line with the targets agreed by EU leaders on 23 October 2014 as part of the 2030 policy framework. The significant share of variable RES in the electricity system would require tens or hundreds of GW of storage capacity in the electricity grid, even when other flexibility measures are employed.

3.2

Moreover, the European Commission has made storing electricity one of its priorities and has reiterated the essential role of storage. Accordingly, in its 2013 working document on energy storage (http://ec.europa.eu/energy/sites/ener/files/energy_storage.pdf), the Commission calls for better coordination between this and other key EU policies such as climate policy. Energy storage should be incorporated into, and supported by, all relevant existing and future EU energy and climate measures and legislation, including strategies on energy infrastructure. In addition, in its Communication on the Energy Union of 25 February 2015, it points out that ‘The European Union is committed to becoming the world leader in renewable energy, the global hub for developing the next generation of technically advanced and competitive renewable energies. The EU has also set an EU target of at least 27 % for the share of renewable energy consumed in the EU in 2030.’ The Commission plans to drive forward a new research and development (R) strategy, stating that: ‘if Europe (…) is to be the world number one in renewable energies, it must lead on the next generation of renewable technologies, as well as storage solutions.’

3.3

Similarly, the conclusions from the most recent Madrid Forum indicate that ‘the Forum has confirmed the strategic role that gas storage plays in ensuring a secure supply to the EU.’ The EESC also highlights the importance of encouraging the development of gas storage.

4.   Technological developments in the field of storage

4.1

Electricity storage solutions can be divided into four main categories, as depending on energy needs and constraints, energy can be stored in different forms (e.g. electricity, gas, hydrogen, heat, cold) near to production sites, on grids or near to where it will be used:

potential mechanical energy (hydroelectric dams, pumped-storage power plants (PSP)/marine PSPs/compressed air energy storage (CAES),

mechanical kinetic energy (flywheel storage),

electrochemical energy (cells, batteries, capacitors, hydrogen vectors),

thermal energy (latent or sensible heat).

4.2

The most common form of electricity storage worldwide is pumped hydroelectric storage, such as uninterruptible power supplies (UPS). Electricity network operators, manufacturers and managers of tertiary buildings have shown a renewed interest in these systems. PSPs enable: the integration of intermittent renewable energies, particularly wind and solar energy; advanced capacity and the ability to stagger the demand for power; economic arbitration (recharging when demand and prices are low, reselling when demand and prices are high, with ‘social’ adjustment measures) and the staggering of investment in the electricity networks. However, it is unlikely that possible storage capacities will be sufficient to compensate for long periods without wind or sun in the event of large-scale expansion of these types of renewable energies.

4.3

The storage market has also seen the emergence of five new sectors which could become more widespread over the course of the next decade:

energy storage during industrial processes: either in thermal or chemical form. This provides the capacity to eliminate or to stagger demand in order to optimise electricity, heat and even gas consumption,

energy storage by linking the electricity and gas networks: via the injection of hydrogen produced from electrolysis, or by producing synthetic methane through the process of methanation (e.g. the German Energy Agency, Dena’s ‘Power to Gas’ system — www.powertogas.info),

electricity storage for neighbourhoods and residential buildings under smart ‘islanding’ or ‘positive energy’ initiatives (e.g. project Nicegrid in France),

mobile electricity storage in electric vehicles using V2G systems (vehicle to grid): Toyota, Nissan, Renault, etc.,

fully adjustable, variable-speed, flexible pumped-storage power plants for the balancing power market (PSP).

4.4

It should be noted that the role of hydrogen looks promising (although its cost, and security and transport issues, diminish its potential considerably). Hydrogen is an energy vector which does not emit greenhouse gases if produced using a decarbonised source. It also has many (mainly industrial) uses, such as local electricity production (supplying isolated sites, emergency generators), energy storage (support for the network, using renewable energies) or cogeneration. It is also used in land transport (individual vehicles, public transport, heavy goods vehicles, etc.), air transport (main or auxiliary aircraft propulsion), marine or water transport (submarines, main or auxiliary propulsion), refineries and the petrochemical industry (for green hydrogen), and has other uses, in particular portable appliances (external chargers or integrated batteries). This is all currently under development.

Techniques for producing hydrogen from electrolysis and fuel cells are now very flexible and widely available, although they remain inefficient — which increases the demand for wind turbines or solar panels even further and therefore overcapacity in this area. Hydrogen is an essential energy vector in systems which make use of the flexibility between different energy networks (e.g. the Hybrid Power Plant in Berlin). Where necessary, hydrogen (‘methanised’ hydrogen) can be produced from renewable electricity to be injected into gas networks, or stored for distribution as fuel or chemical agent. It can even be re-injected as electricity. Methanised hydrogen — which has by far the greatest energy storage potential, can be transported safely and can be stored (for long periods) in current gas infrastructure (geological storage, etc.) — can also be used to form long-chain hydrocarbons (which have multiple applications: from aviation fuel to other products such as plastics, which are currently only made using fossil fuels). Moreover, the carbon ideally present in a circular economy (CO2 etc.), will be reused and will not accumulate in the atmosphere. This therefore constitutes a move from greenhouse gas production to energy production. Interest in these solutions will be further increased by the potential to make use of the heat generated by the exothermic processes of hydrogen production and producing electricity from hydrogen. Hydrogen is thus one of the rare energy vectors to enable economic, societal and environmental arbitration between the electricity market and other energies.

4.5

Another compelling example is the storage of electricity produced by solar panels during the day in a battery. The problem with solar panels installed on the roofs of houses is that they produce electricity when the house is empty. In the evening, when the occupants return, the sun has often long set and the panels no longer produce energy.

4.6

A solution seems to have been discovered and developed by a German company. The company linked components with a computer programme and an application for smartphones. Using their mobile phones, users can check the level of charge reached by the battery storing the electricity produced by the solar panels during the day. The financial calculations are enlightening: normally, household solar panels produce between 25 % and 35 % of a family’s energy requirements. With this solution, they regularly exceed 70 %. Based on current prices, a return will be made on the investment in around 8 years, and the batteries are guaranteed for 20 years.

4.7

This is also an incentive for the household production and consumption or ‘prosumer’ model that the EESC has supported in many of its opinions.

4.8

Although various solutions may therefore already exist, it seems that the potential for additional equipment is still limited. Moreover, significant barriers persist to the development of new, more flexible technologies, such as lithium-ion batteries or ‘power-to-gas’. The main drawback of these solutions is their cost and their economic competitiveness — which remain far removed from market conditions — along with the considerable size of the batteries. In its forecast, the French Environment and Energy Management Agency (Ademe) (Energy Storage Systems/Strategic Roadmap, 2011) does not envisage a boom in the stationary storage systems industry until 2030. Consultancy firm McKinsey (Battery Technology Charges Ahead, McKinsey, 2012) believes that although the price of energy storage is predicted to fall in the coming years, the scale and speed of this decline is still debatable. In its view, the cost of a lithium-ion battery could fall from USD 600/kWh to USD 200/kWh in 2020 and to USD 160/kWh in 2025.

5.   Strategic issues

5.1

The EESC points out that the need to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, along with generally dwindling fossil fuels (although new deposits have been found in recent years), has led to a growth in renewable energies, something which the EESC has supported in several opinions (TEN/564 and TEN/508). In the light of the upsurge in renewable energies, the EESC has also underlined the importance of supplementing the energy system in a number of ways, namely: extensions to transport networks, storage facilities and reserve capacity. The development of renewable energies in large quantities is a strategic issue because, while it will reduce imports (which is both an economic and ethical benefit), it requires large-scale storage facilities (which enable energy to be stored not only from day to day, but also from season to season).

5.2

The EESC therefore acknowledges that storage is the key issue facing an energy transition which includes a large proportion of intermittent renewable energies. It reiterates the need to create and increase storage capacity. It stresses that energy storage is an essential condition for reaching the EU’s overarching energy objectives, which the EESC supports, namely:

enhancing energy security for European citizens and businesses,

widespread use of renewables (evening out fluctuations without resorting to the use of fossil fuels),

optimising costs by bringing energy prices down.

5.3

The EESC recognises that storing energy can have significant financial costs, as well as environmental and health costs. For example, certain underground gas storage projects counteract efforts to preserve water resources. The EESC therefore calls for improvements to be made to all technologies. The EESC believes that mass storage can be an important means of utilising the complementary nature of renewable energies. Given the short-, medium- and long-term variations in solar energy, wind power could be used as a substitute. The Committee highlights that this will lead to the creation of a network of interconnections between different electricity sources — a network that will build on smart grids. These smart grids use computer technologies which optimise energy production, distribution and consumption. The EESC supports the development of this technology as it makes it possible to manage energy demand, while stressing the importance of basing it on impact assessments carried out on the subject, respecting the freedom of each consumer. It would be even more useful to carry out a general assessment of all instruments — for example, the M/441 Mandate or the German BSI Protection Profile, which allows the secure transfer and distribution of data — to ensure the integration of Smart Homes, etc. Such an assessment could help to find specific applications which meet the future needs of Smart Cities, such as planning in accordance with weather forecasts.

5.4

The EESC highlights the importance of a European regulatory framework for energy storage, in order to be able to quantify the benefits of ‘greening’ electricity and gas networks.

5.5

Furthermore, the EESC points out that the storage market for electricity networks is growing rapidly, and has significant potential to generate economic activity and jobs, which should compensate for job losses in other energy sectors. Future investments by network operators and energy companies are motivated by the need to integrate a growing share of intermittent energy sources. In Europe, market development is underpinned by the construction of pumped-storage power plants, the renovation of existing PSP plants and the conversion of hydroelectric dams into this type of plant. Barriers to the efficiency of PSPs should therefore be reduced immediately. In order to secure the economic and environmental benefits of this technology, the necessary measures must be adopted to allow these kinds of plants to be built and operated.

6.   Enhancing research and development

6.1

The EESC notes that so far, the EU has focused spending on deploying technology rather than on R&D (Energy, a networked Europe report by Michel Derdevet, 23 February 2015). Public spending on R&D in Europe (in all sectors) is set at similar levels in real terms to the 1980s (in contrast, American and Japanese expenditure has risen), while renewable energies are booming. The SET plan (The strategic technology plan for energy), set up in 2007, failed to raise suitable funding. The various pressures on the European energy system, due to the need to integrate renewable energies and to secure Europe’s energy supply and economic competitiveness, mean that renewed European cooperation in the field of energy R&D is needed. Storage is one of the key elements of the main smart grid projects launched in 2012 and 2013, as well as a major R&D concern as regards addressing the challenges faced by tomorrow’s energy networks.

6.2

Energy storage technologies are at different stages of technological and industrial development. The EESC calls for more research and development, and for improved synergies at European level, especially since most R&D projects in Europe and worldwide are concerned with similar challenges and opportunities. The EESC has, in several opinions, expressed its regret that research activities are not geared to the issues at hand and called for them to be stepped up at European level. The Member States should also be encouraged to contribute proportionally to this effort. The EU must boost coordination and investment quickly, given the crucial role of R&D in overcoming the final technical obstacles and (through industrial storage solutions) reducing investment costs, which remain far too high. This will also enable renewable energies to be better integrated and energy transition costs to be reduced. Moreover, it will limit the impact that certain forms of energy have on health, allow the development of training and jobs in the sector, guarantee the security of the energy system and ensure the development of innovative sectors which are competitive on the international stage. Finally it will enable the European economy to be competitive.

Brussels, 1 July 2015.

The President of the European Economic and Social Committee

Henri MALOSSE


17.11.2015   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 383/24


Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on ‘Smart cities as drivers for development of a new European industrial policy’

(own-initiative opinion)

(2015/C 383/05)

Rapporteur:

Ms RONDINELLI

On 22 January 2015, the European Economic and Social Committee, acting under Rule 29(2) of its Rules of Procedure, decided to draw up an own-initiative opinion on

Smart cities as drivers for development of a new European industrial policy.

The Section for Transport, Energy, Infrastructure and the Information Society, which was responsible for preparing the Committee’s work on the subject, adopted its opinion on 16 June 2015.

At its 509th plenary session, held on 1 and 2 July 2015 (meeting of 1 July), the European Economic and Social Committee adopted the following opinion by 149 votes with two abstentions.

1.   Conclusions and recommendations

1.1

In the context of growing urbanisation, the EU and its Member States see cities as ‘laboratories for a more dynamic, digital Europe’ in which to test out measures that can generate growth with employment and social development.

1.2

The sustainability of cities will be the result of a smart mix of more mature and innovative technologies, integrated (European, national and local-level) platforms, modern infrastructure, energy efficiency, more efficient services redesigned to reflect the needs of the public and users, and the integration of smart electricity networks, the internet, and sensor technology.

1.3

Such advanced cities, acting as innovation laboratories and rolled out on a large scale, would contribute to the industrial and socioeconomic ‘renaissance’ of the EU, setting in motion a genuine industrial, financial and social revolution.

1.4

The EESC therefore considers that smart cities can become drivers for development of a new European industrial policy that can influence the development of specific productive sectors, extending the benefits of the digital economy onto a large scale. In his speech to the EESC’s plenary session on 22 April 2015, European Commission Vice-President Maroš ŠEFČOVIČ stated, inter alia, that smart cities were a development priority for the EU and pointed out that city mayors were enthusiastic about investing in the communities of the future.

1.5

To achieve this, it is essential to converge towards a development model that is more advanced and effective than those applied to date, which have been characterised by extremely fragmented action. For this reason, the EESC is proposing that the other European institutions and the national governments couple the concept of ‘smartness’ with a sustainable, integrated development model that can be applied to a city, island, subnational entity or industrial district and that features the coexistence and simultaneous integration of six enabling pillars:

technologies and tools for energy efficiency and integration of renewable sources,

dissemination of technology platforms and connectivity to set up the new digital service systems,

new digital services to improve the quality of life and work of the public and businesses;

upgrading of infrastructure and urban redesign,

education and training of individuals, businesses and the public sector in digital skills,

an economically and financially viable model for investment.

1.6

The coexistence of these six pillars should be considered a standard and indispensable component of a strategic smart city project. Equally important is that this model be applied in a policy context that ensures the highest standards of network security, IT systems, applications and devices, which form the basis of digital service ecosystems.

1.7

In order to translate this proposal into practical measures, while civil society involvement is indispensable, the EESC also considers it essential that the EU and its Member States coordinate their policy measures and furnish them with the appropriate level of public financial resources while opening them up structurally to public-private partnership.

1.8

More specifically, in order to introduce fully sustainable innovations designed to improve people’s quality of life and wellbeing, the EESC considers that investment in smart cities should be supported by making more of synergies between existing European, national and regional public funds and by harnessing the opportunities provided by the European Fund for Strategic Investments (EFSI).

1.9

To make this a reality, the EESC advocates that:

the European Commission set up a single European centre of expertise for smart cities, involving the directorates-general concerned, the Member States, the EESC and the Committee of the Regions,

every Member State therefore set up one-stop shops to provide smart cities with access to technical and financial expertise, and that would link up directly with the single European centre of expertise on smart city policy and resources. These one-stop shops should be open to local public and private stakeholders so as to nurture advocacy by consultative groups made up of civil society organisations and the social partners at national level and within individual cities,

the new EFSI European Investment Advisory Hub set up a special section for smart cities,

the European Innovation Partnership for Smart Cities and Communities be extended to involve civil society and the EESC.

1.10

The EESC believes that it would be worthwhile promoting a European project platform on the basis of these new instruments, with the features required by the EFSI that would be conducive to the emergence and integration of Member State smart city projects, and that would support the financing of projects by building in available public and potential private resources and the forms of guarantee available under the EFSI.

1.11

The EESC deems it essential to promote a smart cities common market, by means not least of a harmonised regulatory framework that includes:

an EU-level review of public-private partnership tools in order to make them more attractive for businesses and extend their operational remit to the services sector, which is central to the digital economy,

tools for innovative procurement and pre-commercial procurement,

uniform mechanisms to enable urban authorities to benefit transparently from the economic resources deriving from the cost savings and new services generated by the smart city platforms and to incentivise their reinvestment in further innovative projects.

1.12

For the EESC, the involvement and participation of civil society organisations and consultation between the social partners are essential, not only when it comes to drawing up the strategic plans and projects connected with the implementation of the sustainable and integrated smart city development model, but also to ensure that such plans translate into economic and social benefits for the public and into better living and working conditions.

2.   Background

2.1

The growth of urbanisation globally (under Millennium Development Goal No 11, the UN is implementing the United smart cities project aimed at helping all of the world’s cities become sustainable, inclusive, safe and resilient to disasters), and at European level (1) is linked increasingly to the spread of smart cities (European Union — regional policy; Cities of tomorrow, October 2011), because this is where most individuals and businesses will choose to focus their economic, personal and social interests (72 % of the EU’s population (359 million) now live in cities and by 2020 this proportion will be 80 % (Commission data)). However, in Europe, where there are widespread smaller urban centres and where industry has traditionally favoured business chains and networks, the shift towards this new model will also have to be catered for and facilitated over very wide areas and business districts.

2.2

Increased awareness of these issues on the part of national and local policymakers is demonstrated by the increasing numbers of bilateral partnerships between European Smart cities and municipalities from other continents still to evolve towards sustainability. Such agreements are designed to replicate successful positive experiences or share and capitalise on good practice. The Chinese government, for instance, chose 12 cities to sign cooperation agreements on sustainable urban development (http://ec.europa.eu/energy/sites/ener/files/documents/12_cities.pdf) with what are considered to be some of the EU’s smartest cities. There has also been a proliferation of projects and initiatives on smart city development promoted on the initiative of governments and/or the public (such as the Malaga Charter, 7 February 2011 (http://www.catmed.eu/pag/en/11/la-charte-de-malaga)), or by associations, organisations or European networks, such as Eurocities (http://www.eurocities.eu) and the Covenant of Mayors (http://www.covenantofmayors.eu).

2.3

The Europe 2020 strategy promotes smart cities across Europe through investment in ICT infrastructure to boost human capital, and in solutions that exploit the opportunities arising from new technologies and digitisation so as to: improve sustainability and quality of life and work for individuals and businesses; increase the efficiency and accessibility of services; and reduce poverty, unemployment, social exclusion, pollution and environmental damage.

2.4

With the Venice Declaration for a more Digital Union (http://ec.europa.eu/digital-agenda/en/news/digital-venice-2014), national governments reiterated their aim to promote the transition of their economies onto a digital footing, in the belief that digital technologies may become the cornerstone of a new industrial policy model, in which information and communication technologies are an essential input for any type of production of goods and services, along with easy access to financial instruments and energy sources.

2.5

In this context, cities are seen by Member States as ‘laboratories for a more dynamic, digital Europe’ as they are potential drivers for these changes. Smart cities are test beds for the EU for measures that can generate growth with employment, because it is there that digital technologies can be combined with innovative infrastructure and new services.

2.6

Making cities ‘smart’ will impact on technology innovation, intelligent transport and energy efficiency, and on the day-to-day life of individuals, workers and businesses thanks to many changes, related, for instance to teleworking, e-democracy and greater transparency, and will allow more active participation in the decision-making process.

2.7

At the conference held by the EESC on 10 November 2014 on Smart Cities — towards a European economic revival through civic innovation (http://www.eesc.europa.eu/?i=portal.en.events-and-activities-smart-cities-civic-innovation), policymakers, city leaders and civil society representatives discussed how smart cities can be used as tools to guide the development of a new industrial policy in Europe and support growth and employment; through which means civil society players can contribute to shaping strategies; and which policy tools to implement to encourage the emergence of investment in smart cities throughout the EU.

2.8

The EESC believes that in order for smart cities to become drivers for development of a new European industrial policy (2), three measures need to be targeted:

2.8.1

defining a more advanced and effective smart city development model that can overcome the current fragmentation and promote a single vision for projects, going well beyond integrating ICTs, mobility and energy efficiency. There is a particular need to target initiatives that may take various forms at local level and that are underpinned by the pursuit of a simultaneous impact on GDP, growth, employment and productivity (quantitative economic indicators), and on people’s quality of life and physical and mental well-being (qualitative economic indicators);

2.8.2

encouraging investment in smart cities by pursuing a public-private partnership approach that gives priority to making the most of the many European funds available and generating synergies between them and the workings of the EFSI (Proposal for a regulation amending Regulations (EU) No 1291/2013 and (EU) No 1316/2013, COM(2015) 10 final), with the aim of adopting a development model at European level that is distinguished by the capacity to generate social, environmental, production and employment returns simultaneously (the European Commission predicts growth of 2,8 million jobs by 2018 (StartUp Europe, EESC conference, 10 November 2014)), and securing the prospect of private co-investors recovering their capital;

2.8.3

stepping up the inclusion and role of civil society and the social partners in the process of strategically designing smart cities, and in their implementation and subsequent monitoring, which is essential when it comes to improving the quality of life and work of individuals and businesses.

3.   A sustainable and integrated model for the development of smart cities in the digital economy

3.1

The European Parliament study (3) shows how current strategies or initiatives aim to make cities smarter in at least one of the following areas: governance of public participation, public relations, quality of life, mobility, the economy and the environment. The implication is that it is possible to envisage a smart city project where only one of these features is present. The study goes on to identify three key smart city component types: technological, human and institutional.

3.2

In the Committee’s view, it is essential to develop a new sustainable, productive and inclusive smart city model, no longer seen as an ‘information technology’, ‘environmental improvement’ or ‘energy efficiency’ project, but as part of a new European industrial policy in which growth, which generates employment and social development, constitutes the dividend of the digital transformation of our economies.

3.3

Creating this model entails not only a more integrated approach to smart city projects, but also:

less fragmented strategies at Member State and Commission levels,

greater standardisation and integration of operational programmes, constituent elements and European and national financial instruments for developing smart cities,

the development of financial solutions that can create leverage in respect of private resources, including by using public resources for risk mitigation,

harnessing strategic public procurement aimed at generating types of product and service that improve the effectiveness observed by the public, public administrations and businesses; and increasing the distinctive competitiveness of an area and/or network and/or business sector.

3.4

Accordingly, the EESC, conscious that it is possible to apply a smart strategy to a city, island, subnational entity or industrial district, is proposing that the European institutions and national governments identify a smart city development model, as part of programmes that feature the coexistence and simultaneous integration of six enabling pillars. (In Italy, this model, which grew out of the proposal drawn up by the Amerigo association (for Italian alumni of US international cultural exchange programs) and by Enam (the European network of American alumni associations), is serving as a basis for the definition of a smart city strategy by the Ministry of Economic Development, in the context of the Juncker plan.)

the presence of technologies and tools for energy efficiency and integration of renewable resources, such as smart electrical infrastructure (smart grids) supporting and facilitating energy savings plans; integrating ad hoc solutions and devices; facilitating the use of a mix of supply sources, in both public and private sectors; integrating with connectivity infrastructure and encouraging the dissemination of freely accessible IP signals,

dissemination of technology and connectivity platforms that enable the creation of new digital service systems by means of ICT and telecommunications infrastructure that can: provide for widespread connectivity, partly via integration with smart grids; pursue the spread of the internet of Everything connected to sensors, devices and services; harness public and private open data and the urban digital agenda; while securing the highest possible standards of security for applications and of privacy for public, business and government information,

development of new digital service ecosystems, to improve the quality of life of individuals and of business production processes, by means of smart integrated services and applications supported by connectivity platforms and smart grids. These digital service ecosystems operating across several sectors (e.g. mobility, e-health, digital tourism, industry 4.0) could spawn or bolster a European industry to serve smart cities, particularly when the major technology players promote the rolling out of solutions developed and produced by smaller companies, such as start-ups,

projects to improve infrastructure and promote urban redesign, such as the rethinking of the vocation of certain areas of cities, renovating and converting public buildings and infrastructure as part of a productive, environmental and social mindset, with a view to increasing not only the financial value of the properties but also their value as perceived by their users, not least by disseminating efficient connected technologies and promoting indirect public procurement mechanisms,

plans to provide training and enable individuals, businesses and the public sector to upgrade their digital skills so that the innovations introduced can be fully used by the widest possible range of end users,

economic and financial viability plans for investments based on clear identification: of the returns deriving from services, from the upgrading of infrastructure and from steps taken to improve efficiency; of the method of dividing the benefits between network operators, investors, developers of smart solutions and devices and users; and of public and private financing instruments that can facilitate the implementation of these new models.

3.5

The coexistence of these elements can maximise the impact of projects in terms of economic and employment growth, quality of life, simplified relations between and with administrations, energy saving for the public and private sectors, while generating competitiveness and knowledge spillover effects on the business sector.

3.6

These smart cities will be synonymous with high-quality public services, a better quality of life and work for individuals and businesses, new job opportunities brought about by a more innovative business ecosystem, and greater environmental sustainability. These results can be achieved with a lower level of non-repayable public funding thanks to the involvement of private funding, strategic planning of systems of services that can generate ‘new revenue flows’ and the creation of networks of large industrial groups and small and medium-sized businesses.

3.7

Against this backdrop of enormous opportunities, the EESC considers it essential to address the issue of the security of networks, IT systems, applications and devices, which form the basis of digital service ecosystems. For cities to shift to a smart model, the information on which services are based, which is by definition very sensitive, must be collected and processed with confidentiality, integrity and real-time availability.

3.8

It is also imperative that Member States open a debate at European level regarding security standards, to cover widespread services and devices within the internet of Everything, to prevent them being interrupted, corrupted or even diverted, causing serious damage to people, public health, and the protection of privacy and business, and ultimately to the public image of all initiatives aimed at achieving smart cities.

4.   Smart cities, a tool for a European industrial policy platform

4.1

Integrating the six enabling pillars would make smart cities an ideal tool for fostering a new type of investment that in addition to having a positive social impact in terms of externalities, brings in a profitability mechanism to make investment fully economically and financially sustainable.

4.2

A European smart cities investment plan would multiply the impact of initiatives if the following three factors were in place: a policy promoting the scalability of the solutions, which in turn depends on the degree of standardisation of the components; promotion of a smart cities common market, to counter the fragmentation and diversification of measures from country to country, and pinpoint common tools to respond to any serious issues that may arise; and a unified financial approach.

4.3

The scalability of solutions, i.e. expanding or replicating existing solutions, is currently linked mainly to trial micro-infrastructure and intelligent traffic systems, and depends on the involvement of major technology providers and cooperation between cities. Other trial initiatives, although very important in terms of the quality of the solutions proposed or the capacity for grass-roots involvement of individuals or businesses, are so specific in nature that their potential for replication is limited.

4.4

The EESC believes that scalability of solutions at European level is pivotal when it comes to attracting sufficient private investment to bring into partnership with public investment, thus making this smart cities policy conducive to increasing employment, GDP, productivity and quality of life.

4.5

More specifically, the EESC believes that:

while acknowledging that cities should have broad discretion to identify the subcomponents of the six enabling pillars geared to local roles and needs, smart city projects should make sure that the solutions chosen are replicable and scalable,

this replicability and scalability should also be pursued by encouraging the emergence of technical standards for interoperability, exchange and open enabling solutions, so as to combine maximum flexibility at local level with the opportunity to foster the development of solutions that are useful in general and community terms but that can also be adapted to specific needs,

the level of economic and financial viability of smart investments can be increased, making it easier for large companies, SMEs and start-ups, particularly when part of a network with large companies, to propose cutting-edge solutions for European development programmes,

the efficiency and effectiveness of the public and private capital used can also be increased, encouraging the allocation of public capital to finance project subcomponents or components that are at greatest risk of failing or failing completely on the market, and the allocation of private capital to those with positive or high return,

the effectiveness of this process in terms of social and economic impact can be increased through platforms for cooperation between cities aimed at replicability and the promotion of best practice.

4.6

Combining these measures could lead to the creation of a smart cities common market, which would make the EU the first global platform for testing the development model described above, which could have a significant impact on:

the amount of investment to which large, medium-sized and small businesses could have access in the context of the public-private partnership approach,

promotion and integration, within the strategic projects, of the start-up system, innovative companies and research, which could generate significant spillover effects in terms of technologies, organisational and social models and employment impact,

ensuing capacity to mobilise private funding, attracted by a more coherent policy framework at European level and the appropriate use of public resources for leverage and risk containment.

5.   Investment and economic and financial sustainability

5.1

There is no specific fund at European or Member State level dedicated to smart cities, but rather a host of ways to access funding under specific programmes. (In addition to the programmes of individual Member States, which are based on the combination of national resources and the Structural Funds (ERDF, ESF, EAFRD), there are European funds that can cover particular aspects of a smart city, such as Horizon 2020, the Connecting Europe Facility (CEF) and the COSME, Urban and LIFE programmes.) Given that under the current regulatory framework the grouping of resources within a single fund cannot be envisaged, the EESC considers it essential that the institutions involved step up their coordination, that they do more to harness the potential synergies between their policies, and that institutions, cities and public and private stakeholders use unambiguous and uniform means of communication.

5.2

As regards the need to establish a meaningful development model of integrated measures, the EESC considers that this objective risks not being fully pursued due to the fragmented nature of the expertise and resources of both the European Commission (with smart cities policy spanning six directorates-general), and the Member States, where the division of powers and responsibilities between central, regional and local administrations is not always clear.

5.3

The EESC therefore recommends that the Commission set up a single European centre of expertise on smart city policy and resources, involving the directorates-general concerned, the Member States, the Committee of the Regions and the EESC, whose tasks would be to:

centralise steering policies, not least to reduce fragmentation and bureaucracy,

secure political and administrative coordination between the EU, the Member States and the municipalities so as to implement the model and the relevant policies,

provide administrations that are aiming to plan smart measures with harmonised information, by improving the transparency of available financial resources and making a clear link between these and the budget lines,

facilitating the launch of European partnerships between public and private undertakings,

promote the involvement of the social partners and civil society,

improve the exchange of information on best practice,

encourage the dissemination of the integrated and sustainable smart city development model at national level.

5.4

The single European centre of expertise for smart cities should work in tandem with the EFSI. On this note, the EESC would once again (4) stress that the EFSI should provide backing for strategic infrastructural projects that offer economic and social value added, so that they can contribute to those of the EU’s political objectives (5) that are designed to complete the single market in the transport, telecommunications, digital infrastructure, energy, urban and rural development, social development, environment and natural resource sectors.

5.5

Projects such as these, which are essential for making cities smart, can strengthen Europe’s scientific and technological foundations and facilitate the benefits for society, by making better use of the economic and industrial potential of strategies relating to innovation, research and technological development.

5.6

Leaning on integration between the single European centre of expertise for smart cities and the EFSI, and on the opportunity that the latter provides to establish platforms for projects and financing at European, national or sectoral level, the EESC recommends forming a European project platform for smart cities, in order to promote a uniform approach to their financing, through the integration of available public and potential private resources and the activation of the appropriate public forms of risk mitigation. This platform should promote the identification, pooling and financing of projects that involve several Member States that conform to the smart city model that the EESC proposes the Commission adopt.

5.7

To encourage the emergence of these types of projects, the EESC would recommend that one-stop shops be set up in all Member States, giving smart cities access to finance and technical support, with the aim of:

maintaining a maximum level of coordination with the single European Centre of expertise for smart cities, thus ensuring that policy guidelines are disseminated at national level,

translating local demands into requirements and projects that fall within the remit of the enabling pillars,

improving the use of non-repayable public funding and/or loans on favourable terms to finance the initiatives covered by the various enabling pillars,

providing support for the framing of more appropriate public-private partnership and procurement tools, with the aim of promoting fast, efficient and effective interaction with the business sector,

choosing a financial framework that is better suited to blending public sector resources with those that might be made available by private investors, possibly with additional guarantees to be provided by the EFSI.

5.8

A new European Investment Advisory Hub (EIAH) is to be set up alongside the EFSI to accompany Member States in adopting the most appropriate measures to facilitate the establishment of a project pipeline and implement all the tools necessary to provide for the financing of projects. The EESC would like to see it set up a special ‘smart cities’ section, equipped with the skills and competences best suited to ensuring that all project-related aspects are taken into account.

6.   Civic participation measures, the role of civil society and review of the regulatory framework to improve policymaking

6.1

The EESC points out that the preconditions for adopting and implementing the integrated smart city development model are the affirmation at institutional level of a long-term vision, the full involvement of the interest groups concerned by the changes under way (the public, civil society organisations and both sides of industry), and efficient and innovative governance of the processes involved in developing smart cities.

6.2

The European, national and local institutions involved in the strategic planning of measures to promote smart cities will be called upon to adopt a long-term strategic vision for these programmes. The integrated development model could serve as a means of blending the needs of all the interest groups involved, guaranteeing maximum inclusiveness while also ensuring that initiatives are economically and financially sustainable.

6.3

Cities will act as smart strategic planners and supervisors and should base the task of carrying out the planned measures on a fruitful, structured and ongoing dialogue between the various business, financial, industrial, social and voluntary-sector players, with set timescales and the possibility of adapting to changes and developments.

6.4

Cities will only progress towards a smart mindset if the process is based on an ongoing dialogue with civil society, which can result in the full involvement of groups that represent collective, private or general interests in the needs assessment phase, in the translation of those needs into specific requirements, and in the monitoring of the effectiveness of measures taken to meet them. This kind of civic participation should be fostered at European, national and local levels.

6.5

To this end, the EESC proposes that:

the European Innovation Partnership for Smart Cities and Communities (submitted by the High Level Group of the European Innovation Partnership for Smart Cities and Communities, 14 October 2013 (http://ec.europa.eu/eip/smartcities/)) be extended to involve civil society players, including the EESC, and all stakeholders active in the areas covered by the six enabling pillars of the proposed smart city model, in addition to operators active in seeking solutions in the areas of mobility, ICTs and the environment, which are already represented,

every Member State nurture advocacy involving civil society representatives at the needs assessment, requirement shaping and strategy design stages, by setting up consultative groups within both the one-stop shops providing access to financial and technical support for smart cities and within the individual cities concerned,

action be taken to simplify and integrate the regulatory framework, through common European legislation, preferably in the form of a directive, with a view to:

reviewing public-private partnership tools in order to make them more attractive for businesses and extending their operational remit to the services sector, which is central to the digital economy,

improving tools for innovative procurement and pre-commercial procurement,

introducing uniform mechanisms in respect of urban authorities to enable them to benefit transparently from a share of the cash flows deriving from new services based on the smart city platforms, such as those arising from the commercial use of public and private open data and open services; and to lead them to reinvest a share of the savings generated and the revenue arising from the upgrading of infrastructure and the provision of services in the strengthening and expansion of smart city projects.

Brussels, 1 July 2015.

The President of the European Economic and Social Committee

Henri MALOSSE


(1)  Commission communication on the EU urban agenda, COM(2014) 490 final; Opinion ECO/369; EESC opinion on the EU urban agenda (OJ C 291, 4.9.2015, p. 54).

(2)  EESC opinions on the following themes: For a European industrial renaissance (OJ C 311, 12.9.2014, p. 47), A stronger European industry for growth and economic recovery, (OJ C 327, 12.11.2013, p. 82), and Reshoring of EU industries in the framework of reindustrialisation (OJ C 311, 12.9.2014, p. 15).

(3)  Directorate-General for Internal Policies. Mapping Smart Cities in the EU, 2014, (http://www.smartcities.at/assets/Publikationen/Weitere-Publikationen-zum-Thema/mappingsmartcities.pdf).

(4)  EESC opinion on An Investment Plan for Europe (OJ C 268, 14.8.2015, p. 27).

(5)  Commission communications on the Telecommunications single market COM(2013) 634 final; European energy union COM(2014) 520 final, COM(2015) 80 final and COM(2015) 82 final; Single market in transport COM(2014) 22 final.


17.11.2015   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 383/34


Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on the TTIP and its impact on SMEs

(own-initiative opinion)

(2015/C 383/06)

Rapporteur:

Emmanuelle BUTAUD-STUBBS

Co-rapporteur:

Panagiotis GKOFAS

On 11 December 2014, the European Economic and Social Committee, acting under Rule 29(2) of its Rules of Procedure, decided to draw up an own-initiative opinion on the:

TTIP and its impact on SMEs.

The Section for External Relations, which was responsible for preparing the Committee’s work on the subject, adopted its opinion on 11 June 2015.

At its 509th plenary session, held on 1 and 2 July 2015 (meeting of 2 July), the European Economic and Social Committee adopted the following opinion by 187 votes to 2, with 2 abstentions.

1.   Conclusions and recommendations

1.1.

Given the importance of SMEs for the European economy, the EESC considers it essential, particularly in light of the implications for employment and professional codes of conduct, to have an impact assessment detailing by sector and by Member State the likely consequences that the entry into force of the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) would have, under current negotiating terms, on European SMEs.

1.2.

The two studies conducted by DG Trade on SMEs, one on challenges and opportunities for exporting SMEs in general (1) and one more recent study published in April 2015 specifically on SMEs and the TTIP (2), are useful but do not cover all aspects. They are relevant in the way they present certain difficulties relating to the internationalisation of SMEs and the trade and regulatory barriers they face, but they do not provide an exact, evidence-based and detailed assessment, by sector and Member State, of the impact that the TTIP could have on exporting and non-exporting companies integrated into the various value chains.

1.3.

The EESC therefore calls on the European Commission to carry out a new impact assessment on SMEs or very small enterprises (VSEs), micro-enterprises and liberal professions, regardless of whether or not they intend to export, in order to gauge the potential impact of an integrated transatlantic market in their sectors of activity (agriculture and agri-food, tourism, crafts, the hotel industry, catering, manufacturing and services, etc.). It is crucial to be able to anticipate how these businesses will be affected by the opening of a more integrated transatlantic market. Will the TTIP bring about a change in their business models, production methods, regulatory framework, service delivery or strategies in terms of investment and jobs once this new area of competition is in place?

1.4.

The EESC would like to use the opportunity provided by the negotiations with the US to better monitor SME support policies on each side of the Atlantic through an evidence-based approach (e.g. benchmarking public procurement and SMEs, access to finance and to capital market conditions, disaster management, access to market information/requirements and Small Business Standards). This comparison will doubtless identify appropriate new measures for supporting SMEs and thereby strengthen the practical implementation of the European Small Business Act (SBA). The Committee is currently drawing up an opinion on the subject (INT/755) which follows up on previous opinions on the same subject. It considers that the time has now come for the European institutions to heed the call by European and national SME organisations for a legally binding SBA and more closely coordinated industrial and trade policies. The network of ‘SME envoys’ also needs to be turned into a more effective real authority responsible for coordinating, monitoring and enforcing SME policy in the internal market, advocating the emerging needs of and appropriate solutions for SMEs.

1.4.1.

The SME category in the EU is itself highly varied, with a high percentage of very small enterprises with fewer than nine employees. Moreover, the distribution of SMEs by size also varies widely among the Member States. The same is true for regulated and non-regulated liberal professions. Given the strong presence of micro-enterprises in trade, manufacturing and craft industries, the EESC recommends that the European Commission in coordination with the authorities of the Member States most concerned (including public/private research institutes and universities), organise local awareness-raising and information campaigns and training seminars in order to ensure better understanding of the various chapters of the TTIP and the sectors covered, the opportunities involved and the ‘points to watch’.

1.4.2.

In the EU the liberal professions — regulated and non-regulated — represent a system of sensitive services in the interest of clients and society in general that have been granted a specific role.

1.5.

The EESC is pleased that there is a chapter on SMEs in the negotiations but would like to improve the content, and has therefore drawn up proposals set out in the section on specific comments. The current content proposed by the European Commission needs to be fleshed out in several areas, including ways in which SMEs may be represented in the future SME committee and the remit of this committee.

The EESC asks the Commission, the European Parliament and other competent authorities to introduce an ‘SME chapter’ as a permanent chapter in current and future trade negotiations in which the interests of EU SMEs will be taken into account in order to deploy the potential benefits in different regions and markets.

This, along with the ‘think small first’ principle applied in trade policies, will guarantee that SMEs could and should be beneficiaries and first actors of globalisation processes.

1.6.

The EESC asks the European Commission’s SMEs envoy to ensure that small and micro-enterprises and the liberal professions are represented in the negotiation process, with at least one specific seat on the TTIP Advisory Board, in order to overcome information gaps, to guarantee necessary multi-sector expertise and to be compliant with basic transparency on information/data of common interest. It would also recommend that SMEs’ economic, professional and sectoral organisations be assisted when providing SMEs and micro-enterprises with support and guidance in cooperation with interested science and research bodies, and that financing measures be established where necessary. The EESC calls for the mutual recognition of qualifications and certifications for all stages of government activity and a level playing field at all levels of public procurement (including federal states, regions and municipalities).

2.   General comments

2.1.    The importance of SMEs on both sides of the Atlantic

On both sides of the Atlantic, SMEs represent the bulk of the economy, added value and job creation, even though the term ‘SME’ is defined differently. This means that the major economic impact of the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) being signed in terms of added value and creation of links will come from SMEs and their capacity to seize the opportunities to break into new markets and adjust to the new situation. Various studies show that SMEs engaged in internationalisation are more innovative, grow more rapidly and create more and better paid jobs.

2.1.1.   The EU and its SMEs — or VSEs, as is very often the case

In the EU, a small and medium-sized enterprise is a company employing fewer than 250 people with a turnover of less than EUR 50 million. According to the figures of the European Commission, there are more than 20 million SMEs in the EU which represent 98 % of all companies, 67 % of total employment and 58 % of gross added value. EU SMEs created 85 % of all new European jobs between 2002 and 2010.

According to the European Commission’s most recent report, European SMEs contribute 28 % of total direct exports to the US, an indication of the growth potential. Out of the 7 90  000 European companies exporting to non-EU countries, 6 19  000 are SMEs, and 3 53  000 of these are VSEs with fewer than 9 employees, proof that their size does not prevent them from exporting (3).

The number of European SMEs currently exporting to the US is relatively low, however: 1 50  000, according to the abovementioned report, including 65  000 with fewer than 9 employees. This proportion — less than 1 % of the over 20 million European SMEs — seems very low. Many SMEs and VSEs of certain countries (e.g. Italy) rank highly in terms of number of businesses trading with US markets. However, Eurostat data take account only of direct exports and not indirect exports; in other words, they disregard the fact that many SMEs/VSEs work as subcontractors or on a ‘B-to-B’ (business to business) basis, producing intermediate goods or services which are then assembled for export to the US. This modest figure can also be explained by the number of European SMEs and VSEs tied to the local economy (‘face-to-face’ economy) which are not interested in exporting or investing abroad. On the other hand, there is certainly significant growth potential for companies that may, or already do, export to other third countries.

2.1.2.   SMEs in the US: more structured enterprises

In the US, SMEs are firms with fewer than 500 employees, though the number can rise to as many as 1  000 or 1  500 in some sectors (4). These companies — which may consequently be several times larger than their EU counterparts — are also the backbone of the US economy. The 28 million US SMEs make up 99 % of all firms, employ over 50 % of private sector employees and generate 65 % of net new private sector jobs.

2.2.    The importance of the TTIP for SMEs

2.2.1.

Due to their size, SMEs are often disproportionately affected by high customs duties and burdensome regulatory requirements in transatlantic trade because, with a small amount of trade in terms of volume and value, they need more resources and competences than bigger firms to overcome trade barriers. For these reasons, they will benefit from the tariff and non-tariff liberalisation measures provided for in the transatlantic agreement. In its opinion on Transatlantic trade relations and the EESC’s views on an enhanced cooperation and eventual EU-USA FTA, the EESC has already listed the opportunities and the points that need to be watched in all the areas covered by the negotiations (5).

2.2.2.

One of the chief advantages that the TTIP is expected to deliver for SMEs is the outcome of regulatory cooperation, which could lead to the harmonisation and approximation of certain rules and the mutual recognition of inspection or certification. However, the EESC would here like to point out that both parties have pledged not to use the TTIP to lower existing technical standards. Therefore, an analysis of the value added delivered by the EU Small Business Standard experience, supported by the Commission in partnership with the most representative SME organisations, could be very promising. Regulatory cooperation must be transparent and comply with the regulatory autonomy of the Member States and of the EU while maintaining their ability to adopt measures which they deem appropriate in areas such as protection of health, consumers, workers or the environment.

2.3.    The international development of SMEs

According to the WTO, the international development of SMEs can be divided into four steps:

direct exports to a foreign country,

exports with the support of foreign independent professionals,

creation of subsidiaries in the foreign countries,

establishment in the third country in order to produce and sell in the export country.

Each step requires additional information, administrative compliance capacities and human and financial resources because SMEs need to be aware of export market regulations before starting to export goods and/or services. Thereafter, they must be able to design a more permanent strategy to establish themselves and ultimately become fully integrated in the export country, with local companies employing local human resources in compliance with local regulations. Of course, the digital economy could help some SMEs to become international more quickly. The rapid expansion of e-commerce provides small companies with larger business opportunities, particularly in the sector of consumer goods (B-to-C), and for liberal professions also in the B-to-B sector.

The Commission’s analysis also shows that there is a connection between the size of the enterprise and the volume exported. SMEs account for 81 % of exporting firms, but only 34 % of the volume exported (6); however, worldwide, they account for more than 50 % in some specialised niche markets.

2.4.    Level of internationalisation of SMEs in the US and the EU

The level of internationalisation of European SMEs is reported to be higher than that of US SMEs. This is mainly due to EU SMEs’ involvement in intra-European trade, the development of which is far from complete. This is the first step towards their internationalisation and enhanced knowledge of foreign markets and enables them to look for business opportunities outside the EU. Size does not seem to be an impediment: in some Member States, 90 % of exporting firms are SMEs, and some sectors, such as fashion, agri-food products, machines or furniture, are particularly geared towards exports.

Although statistics on this subject are somewhat scarce and sometimes difficult to analyse owing to the different methods used and data which are not always comparable, studies carried out for the European Commission (7) show that in the EU, 42 % of SMEs are active internationally in one way or another.

Internationalisation is often linked to factors such as:

export intensity of the industry in which SMEs are engaged,

size of the domestic market.

The internationalisation of European SMEs is higher in sectors such as wholesale trade, mining, manufacturing, research and sale of motor vehicles, and relatively low in sectors such as legal services, construction, planning and development and human health services which by definition need direct access to the client or patient (8).

According to the US study on this issue (9), SMEs accounted for approximately 30 % of known US merchandise exports, with the main export markets for SMEs being Canada and Mexico — in other words NAFTA partner countries. Electrical products, machinery and chemicals are amongst the top merchandise export categories for SMEs. Data for US SMEs service exports are quite limited but professional services is the sector where US exports are estimated to make up a substantial share.

2.5.    The current role of SMEs in the transatlantic trade and investment market

Bilateral transatlantic trade is characterised by a high proportion of trade between multinational companies. This means that most of this particular bilateral trade is composed of intra-group flows of services and goods, trade in intellectual property licences and rights, and capital flows between parent companies and their subsidiaries.

The Commission study on SMEs and the TTIP states that SMEs accounted for 28 % of EU exports by volume in 2012. This is below the 32 % average for SME exports by volume for all markets outside the EU. It also has to be seen in terms of the percentage of SMEs among companies exporting to the US, which is 88 % — significantly higher than the average of SMEs exporting outside the EU, standing at 78 %. These figures confirm the hypothesis that a large part of the volume of exports is generated by intra-group trade, hence the potential of a transatlantic agreement as a stimulus for European SME exports and investments. It should however be noted that this figure does not take into account indirect exports by European SMEs which, as subcontractors and manufacturers of semi-processed products, contribute to the making of complex finished products exported to the US. At Member State level, there are major discrepancies in the number of exporting SMEs and the volumes exported.

There are no exact figures for the number of US SMEs exporting to the EU or the volume of such exports. However, SMEs in the United States account for 33 % of US exports (10), a figure very close to the one seen in the European Union.

2.6.    The main barriers faced by SMEs

Because of their size, SMEs generally find it more difficult to enter foreign markets, to support the additional costs linked to trade in small quantities of goods, and to adjust to local regulations. According to Sergio Arzeni, Director of the Centre for Entrepreneurship, SMEs and local development of the OECD, ‘the cost of compliance for SMEs could be 10 to 30 times higher proportionally than the ones for the large companies’ (11).

To sum up, when expanding internationally, SMEs face difficulties brought about by their small size and limited resources, difficulties that they have to overcome before they can even start to tackle specific barriers to trade and investment. These specific barriers are as follows:

barriers to access to export finance,

lack of up-to-date information and data on requirements related to products/services,

insufficient knowledge of the market for their products or services (market studies),

difficulty in identifying and getting in touch with potential clients,

staff who do not have adequate training in dealing with international development or establishing contacts with investors or importers,

lack of incentives and support from the public authorities and too much red tape surrounding public support policies,

cultural and language barriers,

inconsistent regulations and systems for harmonising and recognising qualifications and licences.

In view of these shortcomings, SMEs primarily need mentoring services and tailored advice (personalised follow-up or coaching, tutoring or mentoring, etc.) generally provided by their professional and sectoral bodies.

As regards the trade and investment barriers faced by European companies in the US, it is relatively difficult to prioritise them because companies often describe the barriers encountered without necessarily ranking them in specific categories. There is also a difference between obstacles perceived by non-exporting firms and obstacles actually faced by exporting firms. However, looking at the various studies and surveys carried out (12), the main obstacles may be described as follows:

the widely varying levels of liability and the possibility of taking out insurance at market costs,

export costs (excluding customs duties) arising from the cost of transport, the duration and complexity of customs formalities and the need to have or to pay a customs agent and, particularly in the US, to take out insurance to cover the cost of any liability claims,

difficulties in accessing export credit,

taxes and customs duties, which are still a major barrier for some sectors, such as tobacco, textiles and clothing,

the complexity of rules of origin and the cost of certificates of origin,

compliance with the different technical or sanitary and phytosanitary rules and certification and inspections relating to these rules,

technical and sanitary regulations required only in certain American states or rules which differ between states,

different qualification requirements and restrictions on activity in individual states and local regulatory areas;

the protection of intellectual property rights, particularly non-compliance with denominations of origin and different sets of rules on trademarks and patents;

the cost of legal protection and market surveillance for European companies holding geographical indications;

public procurement restrictions arising from the ‘Buy American Act’ and the frequent changes aimed at extending its scope,

the complex procedures for obtaining visas, residence, work permits and for starting economic activity in the United States,

restrictions or licences required at federal level or at the level of federal states in the case of some service providers.

These obstacles are not exclusive to SMEs, but they have more of an impact and are more dissuasive. In terms of the TTIP, most of them will be the subject of specific chapters to be applied across the board to all businesses. As a result, the SME chapter in the TTIP will be somewhat limited: promoting the participation of all SMEs in the transatlantic market by making the relevant information available and strengthening cooperation between the public authorities responsible for SMEs.

2.7.    Support for SMEs

2.7.1.

In view of the obstacles that they encounter and their limited resources, SMEs — particularly small and micro-enterprises — primarily need mentoring services and tailored advice, including in the area of employee training (personalised follow-up or coaching, tutoring or mentoring, etc.) generally provided by their professional and sectoral bodies. Steps must be taken to ensure that these bodies have the logistical resources needed to be able to inform and advise businesses and provide them with tailored support, partly through the European Structural and Investment Funds (ESIF).

2.7.2.

In addition to the mentoring services and advice tailored to each SME on the basis of its specific characteristics and needs, businesses must be able to access the resources needed to cover their tangible and intangible investments. To this end, alongside the European Structural and Investment Funds (ESIF), the EESC recommends that the COSME programme’s financial instruments, particularly venture capital and guarantee systems, be readily accessible to SMEs including those willing to invest in the US markets.

2.7.3.

The EU should review the insurance available for exports of goods and services and develop options that are market-compatible.

2.8.    The current SME chapter in the TTIP

The EESC is pleased that the TTIP includes a chapter devoted exclusively to SMEs, but intends to reinforce the content (see proposals in the ‘Specific comments’ section). The European Union proposal for a legal text on ‘Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises’ in the TTIP was tabled for discussion with the US in the negotiating round of 19—23 May 2014. For the EU, this will be the first chapter of its kind in a free trade agreement. The text was made public on 7 January 2015 (13). This text takes the shape of a Chapter X on small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) and touches on various issues in order to increase SMEs’ participation in trade and exchange best practices.

2.8.1.   Cooperation on SMEs

The Parties should exchange information, develop and make available tools and resources related to intellectual property rights, share good regulatory practices, support measures for businesses, and encourage venture capital and investment in small companies in order to increase SMEs’ competitiveness in international trade.

2.8.2.   Market data and information sharing

The current proposal of Article X(2) covers information-sharing between Parties. A website containing the most relevant information (such as the text of the TTIP Agreement, customs regulations, registry of technical regulations in force, sanitary and phytosanitary measures, rules on public procurement, and business registration procedures) should be established. The Data Harmonisation Programme concerning the most relevant areas of interest of SMEs should be the subject of a joint analysis carried out by an ad hoc EU/US expert Task Force.

An online database with all tariff nomenclature codes and rates of duty, rules of origin, country of origin marking requirements, etc. should be provided by the Parties in all EU languages.

2.8.3.   Help desk

A single information point is mentioned in the text proposed by the European Commission (Article X(2)c). It is also required by the Transatlantic Economic Council. An extended sub-network of such information points, supported by reliable representative organisations of SMEs with established contacts in the EU and US business environments could guarantee a qualified impact and more committed involvement by different authorities and a wide range of stakeholders.

2.8.4.   Establishment of an SME committee

Draft Article X.4 aims to establish a transatlantic committee.

3.   Specific comments

3.1.    Gauging the impact of differences in how SMEs are defined

The Europeans and Americans interpret the concept of ‘SME’ differently, with a maximum possible difference in the number of employees ranging from 250 to 1  000. In addition to this, the US definition is defined by sectors (14) — it refers mainly to companies employing fewer than 500 but in some sectors include companies up to 750 and even 1  000 employees. For most sectors, it does not refer to turnover or balance sheet total.

The EESC asks the European Commission to draw up a detailed table of the definition of SME in the US, sector by sector, and most importantly to begin work to verify that these differences in definition are not detrimental to smaller European SMEs.

3.1.1.

The professions — regulated and non-regulated — are a special kind of SME that exists in various shapes and to varying degrees in all the EU Member States. These SMEs offer goods and services based on specific expertise; they are highly trusted by their customers and must meet particular standards of independence. Not only are they important economic partners, they also play a role in the European social model.

3.2.    Assessing and monitoring the impact of a broader transatlantic market on exporting and non-exporting enterprises

Given the importance of SMEs for the European economy, the EESC considers it essential, particularly in light of the implications for employment, to study a plan for an impact assessment detailing by sector and by Member State the likely consequences that the entry into force of the TTIP would have, under current negotiating terms, on European SMEs. Ex ante and ex post impact studies need to be conducted on SMEs/VSEs, micro-enterprises and liberal professions, whether or not they intend to export, in order to gauge the potential impact of the creation of a transatlantic market.

The European Parliament has already looked at the impact of the TTIP on manufacturing industries and the energy market, and has concluded that the impact will be positive, but will vary according to the sector of activity (15). The impact on other sectors, however, with closer links to the local economy (agriculture, tourism, crafts, the hotel industry, ICT, catering, industry, self-employed, services, liberal professions, etc.) has not yet been specifically studied.

The next negotiation rounds of the TTIP need to achieve an ambitious outcome for the agricultural sector, with special emphasis on market access, geographical indications and sanitary and phytosanitary measures. It is imperative to preserve the high standards of food safety and animal and human health in force in the EU.

It is crucial to be able to anticipate how these businesses will be affected by the opening of a more integrated transatlantic market. Will the TTIP bring about a change in their business models, production methods, service delivery or strategies in terms of investment and jobs once this new area of competition is in place? It is also necessary to provide for adjustment measures and policies enabling all European SMEs to make the most of the TTIP.

3.3.    A new de minimis threshold to help SMEs/VSEs to ‘test’ the market on a very small scale

De minimis limits set thresholds below which no duty or tax is charged and clearance procedures, including data requirements, are minimal.

There is a demand from the Atlantic Council and generally a push from the US side to raise the existing de minimis limits to USD 800 for packages shipped by small businesses entering the United States or the European Union (current levels are respectively USD 200 and EUR 150). In the EU, even if the goods are exempt from customs duties, VAT is levied on consignments with a value of more than EUR 10 to EUR 22 (depending on the Member State).

Raising the de minimis threshold for travellers arriving by air, and on inbound packages, could help SMEs, particularly new start-ups, particularly in the area of consumer goods, to start their exports at a low scale or to engage in online business without paying any duties. The EESC asks the European Commission to assess the feasibility of this demand (impact on customs revenues, intellectual property rights, etc.). The EESC welcomes the EU initiative to set up a database — 10 things to know when doing business online  (16) for European operators who export their goods to other EU Member States. The Committee believes that this database could also be adapted to transatlantic trade.

3.4.    Necessary access to all relevant information on a multilingual portal

The EESC supports the Commission’s request as regards the creation of a portal for SMEs and would like to make the following requests:

all information should be provided in the 24 official EU languages,

the software tool should be as simple as possible and user friendly,

the operation of the database should be tested by a panel of EU SMEs in order to be sure that the tool answers their needs,

the database should also include a human interface with a team able to answer questions on the US and EU sides.

The Commission report on SMEs and the TTIP shows clearly that a substantial number of firms, whilst being aware of the measures that apply to their exports, have no way of knowing whether these are federal measures, federal state measures or private standards. It is therefore important that the authorities are able to identify systematically which procedures and regulations are found to be particularly difficult for SMEs and to provide specific forms explaining the problem and the procedure for complying with requirements.

3.5.    A representative SME committee with specific prerogatives

The EESC is pleased that the dialogue already in place is to be put on a formal footing by the European and American authorities responsible for SMEs. Nevertheless, it considers that SME organisations should be appropriately represented in the transatlantic dialogue concerning them, and that the membership of the future SME committee should not be limited to national administrations but opened up to organisations representing SMEs/VSEs and micro-enterprises on both sides of the Atlantic. Certain regulatory framework conditions for SMEs will also have substantial effects on the employees and customers of SMEs. Representatives from these interest groups should therefore be present on the future SME committee as members, in order to bring their interests to bear accordingly from the outset.

The EESC suggests that the future SME committee be given the following remit: monitoring the way in which the TTIP is implemented in respect of SMEs/VSEs and micro-enterprises, and its effects on their employees and customers, conducting impact studies, issuing proposals on how to solve the difficulties encountered by SMEs/VSEs and micro-enterprises and their employees and customers, and channelling information to these businesses, etc.

3.6.    An information campaign at national and regional levels

Correct information for SMEs is key to enabling them to benefit from the new trade opportunities offered by the TTIP (removal of customs duties, trade facilitation and regulatory cooperation resulting in approximation or mutual recognition of conformity assessments, qualifications and professional regulations).

This information cannot only be provided by websites. In order to increase SMEs’ knowledge and understanding of available tools and public support initiatives, an awareness-raising campaign involving international trade specialists and experts on export to and investment in the US should be rolled out for SMEs. Existing tools that can help internationalisation of SMEs such as the Market Access Database and Enterprise Europe Network are still largely unknown to SMEs. Efforts to achieve internationalisation and going abroad for companies begin in their home countries; therefore attention should be paid to resources and help for SMEs could be provided at Member State and, possibly, at EU level.

The EESC also recommends establishing a network of associations of European and American SMEs, with the task of promoting the TTIP with an authentic ‘bottom-up’ approach.

3.7.    Deepening the European policy for SMEs

3.7.1.

It is important that the TTIP is not seen as a tool for dismantling preferential treatment for SMEs given in public procurement contracts at local and regional level. Such preferences should be maintained by the TTIP, provided they apply without distinction to European and American SMEs.

3.7.2.

In addition, it is crucial that the ‘Think Small First’ principle is applied in the negotiation process and in regulatory cooperation, so that the priorities and real-life situations of small and micro-enterprises are taken into account from the very beginning of the legislative process and their specific interests safeguarded. The EESC therefore asks that small and micro-enterprises be specifically represented on the TTIP Advisory Board.

3.7.3.

As regards regulatory cooperation, it must be possible to offer tailored support to help SMEs, particularly small and micro-enterprises, achieve regulatory compliance.

3.7.4.

It should be stressed that a large number of the companies likely to invest in or export to the transatlantic market are companies that innovate and need rigorous, clear rules on the protection of intellectual property, both in the US and in the EU.

3.7.5.

As regards the agri-food sector, special attention needs to be paid to companies that base their production and related processes on ethical, cultural and environmental considerations. It is crucial to continue to foster trade in such products as they contribute to sustainable development. It is also necessary to ensure proper protection of geographical indications, as these provide consumers with a guarantee both of a product’s origin and of its method of production. The EU has for years been pursuing a quality policy for its products: this is one of the main factors in giving EU producers a competitive edge, makes a significant contribution to preserving its cultural and gastronomic tradition, and upholds rural development together with policies to support the market and producers’ incomes.

3.7.6.

In a separate opinion, the EESC will be taking stock of the Small Business Act (SBA) in the US and the EU in order to have a clear understanding of the benefits that the US SBA offers American SMEs in terms of access to public procurement or financing, for example. It will thus be possible, at the appropriate juncture, to propose improvements to and more efficient working methods for the European SBA, with a view to making it more favourable for European SMEs and more binding.

Brussels, 2 July 2015.

The President of the European Economic and Social Committee

Henri MALOSSE


(1)  DG Trade Chief Economist Note SMEs are more important than you think! Challenges and opportunities for EU exporting SMEs (http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2014/september/tradoc_152792.pdf).

(2)  Small and Medium Sized Enterprises and the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2015/april/tradoc_153348.pdf).

(3)  See footnote 1.

(4)  https://www.sba.gov/sites/default/files/files/Size_Standards_Table.pdf

(5)  OJ C 424, 26.11.2014, p. 9.

(6)  See footnote 1.

(7)  Internationalisation of SMEs — Final report 2010. Annual report on European SMEs 2013/2014 (http://ec.europa.eu/growth/smes/business-friendly-environment/performance-review/files/supporting-documents/2014/annual-report-smes-2014_en.pdf), p. 62.

(8)  See footnote 7.

(9)  U.S. International Trade Commission (USITC), Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises: Overview of Participation in U.S. Exports 2010 (http://www.usitc.gov/publications/332/pub4125.pdf).

(10)  Atlantic Council, The Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership — Big Opportunities for Small Business (http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/images/publications/TTIP_SME_Report.pdf) p. 3.

(11)  WTO, wt/COMTD/AFT/W/53, p. 23.

(12)  Atlantic Council, The Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership — Big Opportunities for Small Business (http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/images/publications/TTIP_SME_Report.pdf p. 3); Small and Medium Sized Enterprises and the TTIP (http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2015/april/tradoc_153348.pdf); Small companies in a big market (http://www.svensktnaringsliv.se/english/publications/small-companies-in-a-big-market-how-a-free-trade-agreement-betwee_611404.html).

(13)  http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2015/january/tradoc_153028.pdf

(14)  https://www.sba.gov/sites/default/files/files/Size_Standards_Table.pdf

(15)  ITRE Committee, TTIP impact on European Energy markets and manufacturing industries, 2015 (http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2015/536316/IPOL_STU(2015)536316_EN.pdf).

(16)  https://ec.europa.eu/growth/tools-databases/dem/watify/selling-online?language=en


17.11.2015   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 383/44


Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on ‘The post-2015 objectives in the Euro-Mediterranean region’

(own-initiative opinion)

(2015/C 383/07)

Rapporteur:

Ms An LE NOUAIL MARLIÈRE

On 22 January 2015, the European Economic and Social Committee, acting under Rule 29(2) of its Rules of Procedure, decided to draw up an own-initiative opinion on

The post-2015 objectives in the Euro-Mediterranean region.

The Section for External Relations, which was responsible for preparing the Committee’s work on the subject, adopted its opinion on 11 June 2015.

At its 509th plenary session, held on 1 and 2 July 2015 (meeting of 1 July 2015), the European Economic and Social Committee adopted the following opinion by 57 votes to 22 with 7 abstentions.

1.   Conclusions and recommendations

1.1

The EESC recommends that the UfM member States and the EU validate the SDGs agreed, by ratifying the relevant international conventions.

1.2

The EESC recommends that the UfM member States and the EU effectively protect the public investment needed to achieve the SDGs.

1.3

The EESC recommends that the UfM member States and the EU organise implementation by involving civil society and the regions at local level, as close as possible to the people.

1.4

The Committee takes note of the conclusions of the Foreign Affairs and International Relations Council held on 26 May 2015 and of the European Commission’s 2015 annual report on the commitments given by the EU and the Member States on public development aid and the results that have been achieved.

1.5

It regrets, however, that the EU has given itself until 2030 to reach the target of 0,7 % of GDP (1).

1.6

The Committee supports the EU’s intention to strengthen the non-financial aspects (such as ratifying international legal instruments and combating financial crime).

1.7

It urges the Commission to adopt a coherent stance that takes account of both bilateral, plurilateral and multilateral trade interests and the sustainable development goals, in order to maintain the credibility of the goals and of European aid.

1.8

The Committee recommends extending both the dialogue between the social partners and the European institutions on vocational training and lifelong learning, in which it was duly invited to participate and which it helped set up (2), and the action programmes in this area.

1.9

The Committee calls for these recommendations to be included in the EU’s programme and in its neighbourhood policy: coherence between policies on trade, external affairs, development, financing and the protection of democracy and human rights, in line with the commitments given to civil society by the Commission Vice-President Federica MOGHERINI on 28 May 2015 (3).

2.   Introduction

2.1

A major item on the European and world agenda for the coming years will be the debate on the post-2015 sustainable development goals (SDGs). The Euro-Mediterranean region displays some specific common characteristics requiring consideration of how to build sustainable development goals into European neighbourhood policy and into policies covering the southern Mediterranean countries. The problems of food security, poverty and social exclusion, limited access to water, the particular situation of the region’s countries in democratic and economic transition and the need to restore peace and security, call for an EESC opinion that can offer guidelines for the effective application and monitoring of the post-2015 agenda in the Mediterranean.

2.2

By helping to identify the real challenges and by putting forward proposals for the Euromed region, together with civil society, the EESC can offer useful advice to the governments of this sorely-battered region and to the European institutions.

2.3

In this opinion, the European Economic and Social Committee also wishes to build on the work it has done on the sustainable development goals in general and on those concerning this geographical region, the shores of the Mediterranean Sea, in particular.

2.4

The UN Secretary General submitted a report summarising the contributions made by the open working group tasked with looking at universal post-2015 sustainable development goals, based on the adoption of the governments’ declaration entitled ‘The future we want’ after the Rio+ 20 Conference, and which established the decision to make the Millennium goals, which are specific to the developing countries, common but differentiated goals applicable to everyone in the world, in countries that are industrialised or emerging, developing or least-developed. Extensive consultations have taken place at different regional and sub-regional levels, and the main organised civil society groups represented at the United Nations have had the opportunity to take part in these and assert their interest. Seventeen goals and 169 targets have been adopted concerning the ‘means of implementation and the global partnership for sustainable development’.

2.5

Two major events that are inextricably linked to the post-2015 sustainable development goals will take place in 2015: an international conference in Addis Ababa on financing for development, in July 2015, and the 21st Conference of the Parties to the Framework Convention on Climate Change in Paris, in late 2015.

2.6

This post-2015 sustainable development agenda seeks to establish a framework for the United Nations’ future work on the ground, with a new focus on equality, social inclusion and decent work, while safeguarding sustainable sources of income for people who work, the environment, and the pace of renewal of biological and natural resources. However, this agenda takes as its starting point that the economic model governing our societies is not sustainable. This means that world leaders will have to demonstrate considerable boldness. The current economic, social and environmental and ultimately political situation is completely untenable in many parts of the world, and this holds particularly true for the Euro-Mediterranean region. To achieve the SDGs, many people maintain that, at the very least, the economic and financial principles that are currently driving economies need to be adjusted, in order to change the status quo.

2.7

In southern Europe, countries are experiencing social and economic situations that are no longer accepted by the population and which make it impossible to address environmental and climate imperatives that would give Europeans the chance to construct a different type of environmental, economic and social area. Young people, despite the investment in their education by the national or European system, do not have a framework of opportunities enabling them to flourish and contribute to the EU’s economic, social and environmental competitiveness.

2.8

Few jobs have been created since 2008; in fact, many jobs have been lost and the job-creation rate has not kept pace with demographic trends or with the arrival on the market of graduates, resulting in the rejection of austerity policies with no end in sight. Public policies and services in the fields of education, health, transport and housing have suffered as a result of austerity guidelines, whereas achieving the sustainable development goals requires these services to be strengthened. The number of people who are homeless or who live in sub-standard housing is continuing to rise in the EU-28 and most of the jobs created are excessively flexible, insecure and offer no real future. The number of unpaid or poorly-paid trainees is rocketing, we are witnessing a radicalisation of European society, intolerance, hostility to others and a failure to understand, the generation gap is widening, and individualism and survival are creating a gulf between the professional political classes and frustrated citizens.

2.9

On the southern shores of the Mediterranean, we have seen the rejection of dictatorships that had appropriated economic gains, freedom of expression and equality. Many countries have changed their method of transition, shifting from the hoped-for example of national consensus for democracy to authoritarian takeover by an all-powerful military class. At the same time, radicalised groups have taken the opportunity to engage in armed occupation or to remould themselves into criminal regimes. Part of Africa now lives under this permanent threat, and the Near and Middle East are experiencing both huge population displacements and new political and military set-ups. In short, civilian populations have no time to catch their breath.

2.10

In these circumstances, it is unlikely that any sustainable development goal can be credible as a way of restoring peace, improving material well-being and building up the region’s economy. It is not possible to sustainably attract investment to, or for such investment to remain and flourish in, regions that are democratically, socially and environmentally unstable. Furthermore, the fact that economic development has for many decades benefited only a minority of families and individuals or dictators has undermined those institutions that are able to operate fairly, transparently and democratically.

3.   Environment

3.1

Facts show that the Euro-Mediterranean Region is vulnerable to environmental disasters, both land-based and at sea. According to a report (2013), the Mediterranean coastal environment provides the livelihood for at least 150 million people. The same report quotes the UNEP as identifying 13 gas plants, 55 refineries, 180 power stations, 750 yacht harbours, 286 commercial ports, 112 airports, and 238 desalination plants, along the Mediterranean coasts, with most of which being potential sources of environmental emergencies. The report states also that establishing adequate measures to mitigate the impact in case of natural or man-made disasters is a top priority for the whole region (4).

4.   Employment

4.1

In his speech of 28 May, Commissioner Johannes HAHN stressed the need to create 5 million new jobs every year to employ a growing work force and to ensure social inclusion. He also pointed out that, in order to achieve this target, the region would have to ensure economic growth of more than 6 %.

4.2

The promotion of decent jobs (objective 8) must be the key, as poor-quality work (precarious, low-paid jobs, without sustainable and universal social protection) is one of the roots of poverty. Renewed focus should therefore be placed on the quality of growth, healthy and secure employment and working conditions and social protection for workers and their families as an essential means of combating poverty and exclusion.

5.   Private sources of funding

5.1

In order for the private sector’s contribution to commercial partnerships for industrial development to be productive and effective, it must go hand in hand with a decent work agenda that is more uncompromising on ensuring decent working conditions than has been the case so far. The jobs created must, more than ever before, be high in quality and well paid, respect human health and the environment, and be covered by effective social protection (5). This is particularly important for the MENA region, where youth unemployment is among the highest in the world and in continuous rise, and therefore there is a significant proportion of young people in active age in NEETS ‘Not in employment, education, training’. Guaranteeing minimum income security to people in the informal sector is essential for social and political stability and conflict prevention, as it reduces radicalism and extremism, thereby contributing to political stability and security (6). Initial education and ongoing training, equality, the participation of young people and women in the labour market, people’s desire to be respected, the right of expression, decent pay, safety, protection of the environment and public health, early childhood education and intergenerational solidarity are aspirations common to both sides of the Mediterranean. Governments must be able to guarantee these aspirations without the threat of supranational arbitration that unilaterally protects private interests, for all the importance that we might want to accord to international trade in financing universal objectives (7).

6.   Means of implementation and monitoring progress towards goals

6.1

The multilateral negotiations at the WTO focus on trade as an instrument for implementing virtuous sustainable development. A number of current negotiation processes however, demonstrate a lack of consistency between certain free trade goals and the achievement of the sustainable development goals. These include agreements on services that plan to liberalise or privatise many public services that are accessible to most people and necessary to achieve goals; agreements on environmental goods, technology transfers, industrial property rights; agreements on the new information technologies, on the extractive and mining industries and on bodies for settling disputes between multinational companies and States. There are many areas in which laudable aims have their credibility undermined by the negotiations between corporate and State powers.

6.2

Trade Policy should allow developing countries policy space — including the ability to focus on impacts on unemployment, vulnerable people, gender equality and sustainable development — rather than promoting liberalisation as an end in itself. For this, we recommend a comprehensive review of all trade agreements and investment treaties to identify all areas where they may limit developing countries’ ability to prevent and manage crises, regulate capital flows, protect the right to livelihoods and decent jobs, enforce fair taxation, deliver essential public services and ensure sustainable development.

6.3

Governments should undertake mandatory human rights impact assessments of multilateral, plurilateral and bilateral trade and investment agreements, focusing especially on the rights to development, and the specific rights to food, health and a livelihood, taking into account the impact on marginalised groups. This would include implementing the draft resolution, passed in the Human Rights Council in Geneva in June 2014, to establish a working group to prepare an instrument imposing international human rights’ legal obligations on transnational corporations.

6.4

For a set period, in which the world could be deemed to be recovering from the financial crises of 2008 (financial) and 2011 (democracy), investments in employment and the environment and relating to the post-2015 development goals should be removed from public deficit calculations, should be seen as universal, lasting and sustainable investments in the common interest, should receive zero-rate financing and should be inaccessible to hedge funds.

6.5

Combating tax evasion and tax avoidance and illicit financial flows for laundering money derived from illegal activities, including undeclared work, the trafficking of migrants or the export of non-recovered waste, should make it possible to free up the additional resources needed to achieve the SDGs (8).

6.6

Lastly, it should be borne in mind that the existing international legal instruments are also means of implementation and that, if certain conventions — such as the fundamental ILO labour conventions, the UN Convention of 18 December 1979 on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, the International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families, Convention C189 on the protection of domestic workers, and Convention C184 on Safety and Health in Agriculture, the International Covenant of Economic Social and Cultural Rights, and its Optional Protocol, to name but a few — were ratified and transposed into the positive law of the UfM member States, they would constitute preferred non-financial means of implementation that would in themselves guarantee the legal (de jure) protection of individuals that is essential if a number of sustainable development goals are to be achieved in practice (de facto):

Sustainable Development Goals (9)

 

Goal 1. End poverty in all its forms everywhere

 

Goal 2. End hunger, achieve food security and improved nutrition and promote sustainable agriculture

 

Goal 3. Ensure healthy lives and promote well-being for all at all ages

 

Goal 4. Ensure inclusive and equitable quality education and promote lifelong learning opportunities for all

 

Goal 5. Achieve gender equality and empower all women and girls

 

Goal 6. Ensure availability and sustainable management of water and sanitation for all

 

Goal 7. Ensure access to affordable, reliable, sustainable and modern energy for all

 

Goal 8. Promote sustained, inclusive and sustainable economic growth, full and productive employment and decent work for all

 

Goal 9. Build resilient infrastructure, promote inclusive and sustainable industrialisation and foster innovation

 

Goal 10. Reduce inequality within and among countries

 

Goal 11. Make cities and human settlements inclusive, safe, resilient and sustainable

 

Goal 12. Ensure sustainable consumption and production patterns

 

Goal 13. Take urgent action to combat climate change and its impacts (10)

 

Goal 14. Conserve and sustainably use the oceans, seas and marine resources for sustainable development

 

Goal 15. Protect, restore and promote sustainable use of terrestrial ecosystems, sustainably manage forests, combat desertification, and halt and reverse land degradation and halt biodiversity loss

 

Goal 16. Promote peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development, provide access to justice for all and build effective, accountable and inclusive institutions at all levels

 

Goal 17. Strengthen the means of implementation and revitalise the global partnership for sustainable development

6.7

On 28 May 2015, the Committee of the Regions and the European Economic and Social Committee, together with the European Commission, co-organised a Euromed Civil Society Forum, which heard statements from Commissioner Johannes HAHN and Commission Vice-President Federica MOGHERINI, as well as the President of the European Parliament.

6.8

At this forum for discussing the EU’s new Neighbourhood Policy guidelines, Commissioner HAHN highlighted the different funds that have been directly allocated to the humanitarian crisis in Syria and neighbouring countries — EUR 52 million under the Neighbourhood Civil Society Facility — and spoke of the work that had been carried out, to which EUR 40 million allocated under the EU Regional Trust Fund must be added.

6.9

Lastly, reference should be made to the European Agenda on Migration, which was published by the Commission 2 weeks after the Heads of State Summit and which puts forward a tangible plan for sharing the burden of measures aimed at resettling and hosting refugees, in keeping with Article 78(3) TFEU (11).

Brussels, 1 July 2015.

The President of the European Economic and Social Committee

Henri MALOSSE


(1)  Commissioner Neven Mimica, 508th EESC plenary session, 28 May 2015.

(2)  http://www.etf.europa.eu/web.nsf/pages/home

(3)  http://eeas.europa.eu/statements-eeas/2015/150528_01_en.htm

(4)  http://www.preventionweb.net — Euro-Mediterranean Partnership Program (PPRD South) February 2013.

(5)  See EESC opinion on social protection in European Union development cooperation (OJ C 161, 6.6.2013, p. 82).

(6)  Post-2015 Objectives in the Euro-Mediterranean region, EESC hearing, 22 May 2015, Solidar vision on post 2015.

(7)  EESC opinion, REX/441 (see page 49 of this Official Journal).

(8)  At least USD 1  000 billion, according to the World Bank, the IMF, transparency.org, etc.

(9)  As per Zero draft of the outcome document for the UN Summit to adopt the Post-2015 Development Agenda as per January 2015.

(10)  Acknowledging that the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change is the primary international, intergovernmental forum for negotiating the global response to climate change.

(11)  http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-is-new/news/news/2015/20150527_02_en.htm


17.11.2015   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 383/49


Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on Financing development — the position of civil society

(own-initiative opinion)

(2015/C 383/08)

Rapporteur:

Ivan VOLEŠ

On 18 February 2015, the European Economic and Social Committee, acting under Rule 29(2) of its Rules of Procedure, decided to draw up an own-initiative opinion on:

Financing development — the position of civil society.

The Section for External Relations, which was responsible for preparing the Committee’s work on the subject, adopted its opinion on 11 June 2015.

At its 509th plenary session, held on 1 and 2 July 2015 (meeting of 2 July 2015), the European Economic and Social Committee adopted the following opinion by 142 votes to 0 with 3 abstentions.

1.   Conclusions and recommendations

1.1.

The EESC requests that the new development agenda have a global dimension and aim to improve people’s quality of life. It must be based on respect for human rights, prevention and peaceful resolution of conflicts, good governance, reducing social inequalities, strengthening the role of women and the involvement of all those who feel responsible for the development of this world and maintaining it for future generations.

1.2.

The EESC supports adoption of the proposed sustainable development goals and requests that all available financial resources be drawn on and used transparently and effectively to achieve a balanced integration of the economic, social and environmental dimensions of sustainable development. A battle must be waged to prevent the squandering of resources on hostilities and their illegal transfer and flight into the grey economy.

1.3.

The EESC asks that support for social dialogue be included among the development priorities, since it is an important instrument for taking account even-handedly of the interests of the social partners that enables social stability to be maintained, which is essential for achieving sustainable development goals (SDGs).

1.4.

Official Development Assistance (ODA) must be directed to the least developed countries and countries in vulnerable situations. The EU should reaffirm its commitment to providing total ODA of 0,7 % of GNP and 0,15-0,20 % to the least developed countries. This commitment must be linked to the requirement for the proper and effective use of all funding sources for development assistance in line with the principles agreed in Monterrey, Doha and Busan.

1.5.

ODA should be assessed not just in terms of financial volume, but also in terms of its quality and its contribution to achieving sustainable development goals. New indicators to assess its effectiveness need to be developed.

1.6.

To make budget support to developing countries more efficient, the EESC recommends building on experience in implementing the EU’s cohesion policy and its instruments, such as Structural and Cohesion Funds, so that development resources would be used directly for achieving SDGs.

1.7.

Making better use of domestic resources, both public and private, which will increase in importance, will require major fiscal reforms, establishment of tax governance, integration of the informal sector into the legal economy and a resolute fight to tackle and prevent corruption. Concluding an international agreement on the fight against tax evasion, tax havens and illegal financial flows and improving cooperation with the OECD and the UN Tax Committee would help in this aim.

1.8.

The EESC supports the involvement of the private sector in implementing projects that are — at least in part — commercially unviable through public-private partnerships (PPPs) and funding these through ‘blending’. The prerequisite for successful implementation is an ex ante assessment of the sustainability of compliance with the principles of transparency, including reporting, mutual accountability and enforceability of commitments.

1.9.

The EESC recognises the potential benefit of foreign direct investment for development, as long as it is directed towards SDGs. Earnings on foreign direct investment should primarily be reinvested in the developing countries where they have been generated. Beneficiary countries should have a clear investment strategy. New investor countries — such as China, Brazil and India — should take the principles of sustainable development into account when investing in developing countries.

1.10.

The EESC supports innovative and complementary sources of financing for development, such as crowdfunding, the work of international charities and remittances to countries from their diasporas. The Committee welcomes proposals for new sources of financing submitted by the Leading Group on Innovative Financing for Development. These could become a significant source on the condition that they are applied globally and are not too much of a burden for the sector.

1.11.

Civil society, including social partners and non-governmental organisations, must be involved far more actively and in a far more structured way in shaping development programmes, monitoring their implementation and evaluating their outcomes and impact. Both developing and developed countries therefore need to systematically put together and improve the system for monitoring development aid processes and involve the relevant civil society organisations in it. Here the EESC is willing to make available its considerable experience of cooperation with partners in, for example, the ACP countries, Latin America, Asia, Eastern Partnership, and EuroMed.

1.12.

If civil society is to be able to carry out this task, it must be backed up by programmes for building the capacity of civil society institutions in partner countries.

2.   Core EESC positions on the post-2015 development agenda

2.1.

2015 is a key year in terms of establishing a new global approach to development. The main mission of the Millennium Development Goals, reducing poverty, has only partially been achieved. The new sustainable development goals (SDG) (1) should bring about the fundamental changes that the EESC has long been calling for. The Committee welcomes the fact that many of its recommendations have been incorporated into the SDGs.

2.2.

In recent opinions the EESC has requested that the new development goals become elements of global sustainable development (2). It has promoted the vital role of civil society in development policy (3) and pointed out the need to include social security in EU development policy (4). The Committee has also submitted a number of proposals on involving the private sector in post-2015 development (5), on including sustainable development goals and the role of civil society in EU investment agreements (6), on the contribution of trade to growth and development (7), and on the post-2015 objectives in the Euro-Mediterranean region (8). The joint extraordinary meeting of the REX section and the EESC’s Sustainable Development Observatory on 20 October 2014 adopted recommendations on the agenda for sustainable development beyond 2015 which apply to the forthcoming meetings on SDGs and financing for them.

2.3.

Social dialogue as a tool for addressing relations between employers and employees must become a key part of the post-2015 development agenda so that the social stability essential for successful ongoing development of the society in question can be maintained through collective agreements that cater fairly to their interests.

2.4.

The EESC insists on the need of consistency between free trade goals and sustainable development goals in on-going negotiations in the framework of WTO or currently undertaken by the EU on services, environmental goods and in the implementation of existing WTO agreements.

2.5.

All trade and investment agreements should comply with the sustainable development criteria including their impact on employment, vulnerable people and gender equality. They should not prevent the developing countries from managing crises, regulating capital flows, enforcing fair taxation and delivering essential public services. The EU should undertake full sustainability impact assessments, of EPAs in particular, focusing especially on the rights to development, and the specific rights to food, health and a fair wage, also taking into account the impact on vulnerable groups.

2.6.

The global consensus on sustainable development must respect fundamental human rights and focus on conflict prevention and peace building, eliminating social inequalities, good governance, support for local democratic self-government, strengthening the role of women, and private sector involvement in development. To achieve this end, the international legal instruments, conventions, agreements and regulations should be adopted, promoted and ratified by the UN members (9). We consider the European Commission communication A Global Partnership for Poverty Eradication and Sustainable Development after 2015  (10) to be a good basis for the forthcoming negotiations and call on the EU to play a leading role.

3.   General comments

3.1.

The EESC stresses the need for a holistic approach to sustainable development. Each country takes prime responsibility for its own development, while the global community is responsible for creating an international environment enabling sustainable development in all countries and respect for global public goods, preservation of natural resources, stable financial markets, management of migration and targeted support for technological advances aimed at sustainable development.

3.2.

Bringing all available financial resources into play is a precondition for achieving SDGs. According to Unctad estimates, the annual investment needed in developing countries to meet key sustainable development objectives for the period 2015 to 2030 is USD 3,9 trillion, with USD 2,5 trillion not covered (11).

3.3.

The EESC agrees with the view that the world does in fact have enough financial resources that could be used. In addition to official resources (12), there also are hidden sources, such as the financing of hostilities and conflicts around the world. Availability of resources is also diminished by tax avoidance, the shadow economy, and illicit financial transfers, which should be systematically combated.

3.4.

The task of finding and marshalling resources cannot be separated from the obligation to use them properly. We must continue to adhere to the principles of effectiveness and efficiency adopted in Monterrey, Doha and Busan and resolutely combat wasteful and inefficient use of all forms of financial and non-financial resources designated for development.

3.5.

Development assistance should be judged not only in terms of amount, but also its quality and its contribution to achieving sustainable development goals and improving quality of life. New indicators that include value criteria therefore need to be created and statistics offices in developing countries reinforced, for example through transfer of know-how and shared information.

3.6.

Broader participation of organisations from the whole spectrum of civil society in formulating national targets and development plans would help bring the interests of the private sector in line with public objectives. It is in their common interest to promote the principles of transparency, accessibility of public tenders, effectiveness and efficiency of invested funds and the responsibility of public officials for implementing the development strategy adopted.

3.7.

To fulfil its role in development the private sector needs a favourable business environment that encompasses respect for the generally recognised democratic principles of the rule of law, facilitates company start-ups and growth, cuts down on bureaucracy, increases transparency, reduces corruption and encourages investment. The private sector must adhere to the internationally accepted principles of corporate social responsibility, respect fundamental economic and social rights and sustainable development requirements and create new jobs in accordance with the ILO Decent Work Agenda.

3.8.

The EESC calls for better coordination and coherence of all EU policies related to sustainable development (13) in order to avoid any duplication, overlap, fragmentation and possibly even inconsistencies in approach and to deepen systematic bilateral coordination of Member State development assistance aimed at achieving SDGs.

4.

Specific comments

4.1.    Official Development Assistance (ODA)

4.1.1.

Although ODA cannot meet all development assistance needs, it will continue to be essential for people in the least-developed countries, countries in a state of armed conflict, at risk from natural disasters or epidemics and people living on isolated islands and in countries without access to the sea.

4.1.2.

ODA funds should be used as a priority to eliminate poverty in poor countries and those in vulnerable situations. The EESC points out that poverty has also increased in middle-income countries as a result of unequal distribution of wealth. ODA should be leveraged to marshal all sources of aid, including private investment, to eradicate poverty.

4.1.3.

The EESC calls on the Commission and the Council to agree on a common European position on ODA in negotiations at the Addis Ababa conference. The EU should reaffirm its commitment to providing total ODA of 0,7 % of GNP and 0,15-0,20 % of GNP as ODA to the least developed countries. The EESC points out that the climate protection measures to be discussed at the Paris conference in December 2015 will require additional resources.

4.1.4.

Data on the amount of ODA do not in themselves show the quality and results of the aid provided or its actual impact on the development of the recipient country. The EESC supports the proposal of the OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) to monitor aid and support for sustainable development provided not just by ODA, but also outside the ODA framework (14). Non-financial aid (such as education, sharing of experience, technology and know-how, and scientific and technological cooperation) often has greater developmental benefits for the country than financial aid.

4.1.5.

Budget support for developing countries should always have a specific allocated budget and donor and beneficiary should have a specified mutual accountability for seeing that this form of aid is used effectively for SDGs and in compliance with internationally recognised rules for financial management and control including robust conditional provisions and measures to tackle and prevent corruption. The EU funding itself should be credibly protected from corruption. The Committee recommends building on experience in implementing European cohesion policy in developing countries to better target development resources to SDGs and to more rigorously monitor how they are used and assess the results achieved.

4.2.    Domestic resources

4.2.1.

The EESC believes that the importance of both public and private domestic resources for development will increase substantially in the near future.

4.2.2.

To increase the volume and effectiveness of the use of domestic resources, illicit financial flows, laundering of the money derived from illegal activities, including undeclared work, the trafficking of migrants or the export of non-recovered waste should be consistently combated, tax collection improved, corruption and criminality tackled and the extensive informal sector incorporated into the legal economy. Developing countries need to be assisted in implementing fundamental fiscal reforms and improving tax administration. The EESC calls on the EU to work more actively towards achieving international agreements on the fight against tax evasion, tax havens and illicit financial flows and towards improving cooperation with the OECD Centre for Tax Policy and Administration and the UN Tax Committee.

4.2.3.

Today the level of domestic private investment, direct or portfolio, is several times higher than foreign investment. It should be channelled into investment goals, for example through incentives or well-prepared and secured PPP projects, so that it could become a significant tool for achieving SDGs.

4.2.4.

There is a wealth of untapped domestic resource potential in developing countries with rich mineral resources where, despite relatively high state revenue, the majority of the population lives in poverty and building of the national economy, infrastructure and social services is neglected. The methods of certain foreign investors in the extractive industry in developing countries are rightly criticised by civil society, which calls for compliance with basic standards for environmental protection, social protection of workers, transparency of tax payments and transfers of profits abroad, and reporting in accordance with the OECD regulations for multinational companies (15). The EESC welcomes measures to remedy the situation, such as the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (16).

4.3.    Blending and PPPs

4.3.1.

The EESC believes that where governments are not fully able to deliver the necessary investment from public sources — for infrastructure, in particular, but also for public services — and these investments are not commercially feasible, public-private partnerships must be used and PPP projects should be financed through blending in line with OECD recommendations (17).

4.3.2.

PPP projects must be drawn up in line with the development strategy of the country in question on the basis of feasibility studies, take into account ex-ante sustainability factors, and comply with the principles of transparency, mutual accountability, and enforceability of commitments. Social partners and other civil society representatives should be involved in assessing the benefits of these projects for sustainable development and monitoring compliance with ILO conventions.

4.3.3.

Blending should also be used for social entrepreneurship and sustainable projects for the integration of vulnerable groups into the economic environment.

4.4.    Foreign investment

4.4.1.

In 2013, the influx of foreign direct investment (FDI) into developing countries was as much as USD 778 billion, but its contribution to sustainable development is often unclear. Only 2 % of total FDI to developing countries goes to those that are least developed. In sub-Saharan Africa it goes mainly to the extractive industry without contributing more directly to the rest of the economy. New investor countries — such as China, Brazil and India — should take the principles of sustainable development into account when investing in developing countries.

4.4.2.

According to the study by the NGO EURODAD on the state of finances of developing countries, the amount of money leaving these countries in 2014 was twice that of financial resources entering them from abroad, including from ODA, FDI, charities, profit transfers, remittances and other sources (18). Efforts must be made to ensure that these funds are reinvested as much as possible in a way that benefits sustainable development in the beneficiary countries.

4.4.3.

National development strategies should also include support for investment. Favourable conditions such as peace, stability and good governance must be created in order for FDI to be obtained and channelled towards SDGs. Developing countries should also incorporate SDGs into investment agreements concluded and offer adequate guarantees for these investments. The EESC recommends that investment support agencies and financial institutions in sending countries and those in receiving countries enter into direct technical cooperation linked with national sustainable development strategies.

4.4.4.

There should be support for investments that bring some profit in the short term but also provide the opportunity of long-term profitability through their social impact, such as capacity building or the environment, which would lead to sustainable development.

4.5.    Innovative and complementary forms of funding

4.5.1.

Crowdfunding and investment are a potential tool for financing smaller development projects (19). The EESC notes that these instruments should be defined and an appropriate regulatory framework must be drawn up quickly, as recommended in its opinion (20).

4.5.2.

The EESC welcomes the growing number of international charitable funds, foundations and programmes to promote sustainable development, such as the Global Fund to Fight HIV, Tuberculosis and Malaria, the Global Partnership for Education, and the GAVI Alliance, which supports immunisation of children in the least developed countries. These funds and foundations, in which public institutions cooperate with private donors and NGOs, should improve the coordination of their work and direct it towards SDGs.

4.5.3.

Funds designated for ODA but not currently allocated to investment projects could be put into development investment funds and secured bonds so as to generate short-term revenue and help to create further resources (21). In the longer term this should help increase the volume of resources needed for development aid (22).

4.5.4.

The EESC welcomes some of the proposals of the Leading Group on Innovative Financing for Development (23) and backs efforts to create new sources of financing for SDGs. However, these new sources must be used in a consistent way globally, without jeopardising the competitiveness of the sector concerned, and their use to further SDGs must be transparent. The ECSC would welcome a voluntary worldwide initiative from the banking sector to help finance the gap between needs and the resources available to achieve SDGs.

4.5.5.

Funds coming from diasporas — that is, people transferring savings to their countries of origin — are a little-used source that could also be employed to meet SDGs. The costs of these transfers should be reduced. Members of diasporas should be offered training and incentive programmes that support their interest in investing in development projects that would increase the value of their savings while contributing to SDGs.

4.6.    Financing micro, small and medium-sized enterprises

4.6.1.

Micro-enterprises and SMEs, which are the main source of potential for growth and job creation, are faced with insufficient access to funding. This problem is particularly acute in the least developed countries and tools must therefore be sought to facilitate SME access to financial resources. This must be done while respecting the differences in types of entrepreneurship in developing countries, where micro-enterprises, small-scale retailers and small family farms predominate.

4.6.2.

There are many different microcredit systems for SMEs. The Committee thinks those using mobile phone applications are the most effective. It also welcomes using microcredit for funding green energy projects and initiatives to provide zero-interest microcredits. Loans for SMEs (USD 10-200 thousand), which are currently lacking, could be replaced by capital leasing and other instruments. This requires help for developing the financial market and local banks, including local agents.

4.6.3.

Support from developed countries for SMEs should include transfer of experience, managerial skills and technical know-how, training in financial management and financial literacy, and support for their inclusion in value and supply chains. The EU should promote the application of the principles of its directive on combating late payment to improve funding of SMEs.

4.6.4.

Micro, small and medium-sized enterprises operating in the agricultural sector must be protected from land-grabbing investment practices that lead to their collapse. The creation of instruments insuring against the effects of climate change would also help them. Development plans must not neglect support for social economy enterprises, which could play a key role in achieving SDGs.

4.6.5.

Ensuring that financial tools such as basic bank accounts or financial applications for mobile phones are accessible to the broadest possible strata of the population in developing countries is key to economic and social development.

4.7.    Involvement of civil society in development aid

4.7.1.

Civil society in developed countries, including social partners and non-governmental organisations, is a direct protagonist in development and plays an important role in helping to steer development cooperation and monitoring its effectiveness (24).

4.7.2.

Systematic support needs to be given to creating and improving a system to monitor processes and results of development aid in individual countries that directly involves relevant civil society organisations. This is a way of helping to identify and eliminate hurdles to achieving SDGs. The EESC has had good experience over many years with the work of joint committees, platforms and consultative bodies, such as the ACP-EU follow-up committee, EU-Latin American and EU-Caribbean meetings with organised civil society and so on.

4.7.3.

Social partners are also direct providers of development aid. Trade unions in developed countries carry out socially oriented development projects and support the institutional development of partner trade union organisations. Employers’ organisations, chambers of commerce, SME associations and industrial federations carry out joint projects with partner business organisations in developing countries and pass on experience to them.

4.7.4.

Non-governmental organisations play a unique role in development aid, both in developed and developing countries. They are particularly active in helping to cope with the aftermath of humanitarian and natural disasters and work in the social sphere on such matters as health, gender issues and education. They also bring in funds from the general public, organise collections, awareness-raising events and so on. One interesting example is the financing of a form of distance education which helps build people-to-people contacts between ordinary citizens.

4.7.5.

The EESC calls on the European Commission to support the work of EU civil society organisations aimed at meeting SDGs with adequate funding of programmes to build civil society institutions in partner countries. The EESC is currently drawing up an information report to complement this opinion that will recommend models for effectively involving civil society in the implementation and monitoring of the post-2015 development agenda.

Brussels, 2 July 2015.

The President of the European Economic and Social Committee

Henri MALOSSE


(1)  The September UN Summit in New York.

(2)  EESC opinion on A decent life for all: Ending poverty and giving the world a sustainable future (OJ C 271, 19.9.2013, p. 144).

(3)  EESC opinion on Civil society involvement in the EU’s development policies and in development cooperation (OJ C 181, 21.6.2012, p. 28).

(4)  EESC opinion on the Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions — Social protection in European Union development cooperation (OJ C 161, 6.6.2013, p. 82).

(5)  EESC opinion on The involvement of the private sector in the post-2015 development framework (OJ C 67, 6.3.2014, p. 1).

(6)  Opinion on the Role for sustainable development and civil society involvement in stand-alone EU investment agreements with third countries (OJ C 268, 14.8.2015, p. 19).

(7)  Opinion on Trade, growth and development- Tailoring trade and investment policy for those countries most in need (OJ C 351, 15.11.2012, p. 77).

(8)  Opinion REX/438 on the post-2015 objectives in the Euro-Mediterranean region, point 6.4 (see page 47 of the Official Journal).

(9)  The UN Convention of 18 December 1979 on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, the International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families, Convention C189 on the protection of domestic workers, and Convention C184 on Safety and Health in Agriculture, the International Covenant of Economic Social and Cultural Rights, and its Optional Protocol and others.

(10)  Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions A Global Partnership for Poverty Eradication and Sustainable Development after 2015, COM(2015) 44 final, 5 February 2015.

(11)  The Global Development Financing Landscape — Who can contribute what?, James Zhan, Director of the Investment and Enterprise Division, World Investment Report, Unctad, delivered at a public hearing of the European Parliament on 24 February 2015.

(12)  Assets held in banks are estimated at USD 121 trillion, with USD 34 trillion in pension funds, USD 28 trillion in insurance companies, USD 25 trillion in multinational companies, and USD 6,5 trillion in sovereign investment funds.

(13)  For example, trade, agriculture, job creation, social protection, climate change, energy, protection of the environment and biodiversity, transport, health, product and consumer policy, regional and urban development, migration, and combatting corruption and money laundering.

(14)  TOSSD — Total official support for Sustainable Development.

(15)  http://www.oecd.org/corporate/mne/48004323.pdf

(16)  https://eiti.org/

(17)  http://www.oecd.org/governance/budgeting/PPP-Recommendation.pdf

(18)  http://www.eurodad.org/Entries/view/1546315/2014/12/15/The-State-of-Finance-for-Developing-Countries-2014

(19)  infoDev, Crowdfunding’s Potential for the Developing World, 2013, infoDev, World Bank — Department of Finance and Private Sector Development.

(20)  EESC opinion on Unleashing the potential of Crowdfunding in the European Union, Brussels (OJ C 451, 16.12.2014, p. 69).

(21)  The budgetary allocation of funds for ODA on a yearly basis entirely rules out these options.

(22)  The Belgian Investment Organisation (BIO), established by the government to support the business sector in Africa, transferred part of its funds that were designed for loans for entrepreneurs to other investment funds and gradually recuperated them as needed.

(23)  http://www.leadinggroup.org/rubrique69.html

(24)  Development Policy Forum (www.friendsofeurope.org/policy-area/global-europe/), Policy Forum on Development www.uclg.org.


17.11.2015   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 383/57


Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on the ‘Evaluation of European Commission stakeholder consultations’

(own-initiative opinion)

(2015/C 383/09)

Rapporteur:

Ronny LANNOO

On 20 January 2015, the European Economic and Social Committee, acting under Rule 29(2) of its Rules of Procedure, decided to draw up an own-initiative opinion on the

Evaluation of European Commission stakeholder consultations.

The subcommittee on the Evaluation of European Commission stakeholder consultations, which was responsible for preparing the Committee’s work on the subject, adopted its opinion on 9 June 2015.

At its 509th plenary session, held on 1 and 2 July 2015 (meeting of 2 July 2015), the European Economic and Social Committee adopted the following opinion by 179 votes to 1, with 4 abstentions.

Preliminary remarks

The aim of this own-initiative opinion is to assess the existing methods of stakeholder consultation carried out by the European Commission in accordance with Article 11(3) TEU. On the basis of this assessment, the opinion sets out proposals that are intended to be constructive and realistic, with a view to structurally enhancing and monitoring the consultation process in the interest of all parties.

1.   Conclusions and recommendations

1.1

In this opinion, the EESC sets out recommendations on stakeholder consultation, as provided for in the Treaties, with a view to enhancing the quality of these consultations and bridging the gap between the EU and its people. This exercise has also been undertaken by the European Commission by means of a broad consultation of stakeholders on the consultation procedures, and translated into the Better Regulation package put forward by Commission Vice-President, Frans TIMMERMANS. At the request of the Commission, the EESC will later issue an opinion on the entire Better Regulation package.

1.2

The EESC is concerned about the way in which stakeholder consultations are carried out and therefore also about the quality of the results of such consultations. It is therefore calling for consultations to be consistent and representative and to ensure added value for the organisations and interest groups concerned.

1.3

On the basis of a sample of consultations assessed in the first half of 2014, the Committee concluded that there is an uneven qualitative approach across the various DGs concerned, and found an insufficient volume of responses and thus a lack of representativeness, as well as shortcomings in the use of appropriate language and terminology for the target groups concerned and in the reporting of results and follow-up. Overall, it can therefore be concluded that the existing guidelines here are not being sufficiently implemented.

1.4

Conscious of the difficulty entailed in appropriately consulting the diverse range of citizens and organisations in the EU Member States, the EESC has put forward below a number of structural, practical and realistic proposals and asks the European Commission to cooperate constructively in developing and implementing new measures.

1.5

The Committee calls on the Commission to make the guidelines and quality standards for stakeholder consultation binding on all of its directorates-general. To ensure that these guidelines are applied, the Committee proposes that a coordination unit be set up at the level of the general secretariat to provide support to the DGs in stakeholder consultation.

1.6

A more strategic approach to the consultation process, from preparation to assessment, with systematic involvement of the relevant existing structures (organisations representing the target groups and advisory and consultative bodies) should ensure a greater, high-quality response. Setting out a clear timetable for consultations and explaining their purpose would enable stakeholders to increase their capacity to participate in consultations.

1.7

The Committee points out that accurate stakeholder mapping is essential to a quality consultation process. To this end, the EESC recommends that the Commission make use of existing structures, such as the Committee and representative organisations, and draw on the transparency register. New structures are, therefore, not required.

1.8

In the Committee’s view, a fresh effort needs to be made to streamline the methods and tools used for stakeholder consultation. Initially, there are two possible methods of consultation: written/online or oral/discussion. The methods and tools selected should depend on the stated aim, target group, etc., in the framework of the strategic approach to the consultation process. Furthermore, it would be advisable to make effective use of the new technologies, particularly with a view to better reaching certain target groups, such as young people.

1.9

Under this approach, a distinction should be drawn between consultations of civil society organisations and of the general public. The difference between the two is not only a matter of methodology, but also of objective, since for the former group the aim is to ensure representativeness, while for the latter, it is about promoting inclusion and participation.

1.10

Where the written questionnaire method is chosen, the Committee feels that such questionnaires should be made available in all official EU languages. In addition, the EESC advocates that the questionnaire be submitted in advance to the organisations representing the target groups concerned in order to prevent overly specialised jargon making the questionnaire difficult for the target groups to understand.

1.11

When the results are being processed, the Committee would stress the importance of giving a quantitative and qualitative weighting to the various responses, depending on whether they come from individuals or civil society representative organisations, or depending on the representativeness and involvement of that organisation. The response submitted by a representative organisation would then receive a greater weighting.

1.12

In order to increase participation in consultations, the EESC emphasises the importance of a summary report of the responses received being drawn up for each consultation, and of explanations being given as to why certain responses were, or were not, taken into account in the further stages of drafting the proposal.

1.13

In view of its role set out in the Treaties, the Committee would like to act as facilitator to ensure the success of stakeholder consultations. It can participate and cooperate in all of the key phases of the process (identifying the stakeholders, drafting the questionnaires, summarising and following up the results). In order to bring structure, stability and representativeness to the process, the Committee could, as in the past, hold hearings and conferences and establish platforms and forums for dialogue.

1.14

When it comes to stakeholder consultation, the European Commission should make more use of the potential offered by closer cooperation with the Committee, as recommended in the protocol on cooperation between the Committee and the Commission signed on 22 February 2012 (1). In the interests of optimising resources, and taking the approach of interinstitutional cooperation, this would enable maximum benefit to be derived from both the specific skills and knowledge of the stakeholders and the expertise, experience and competence of the Committee in consultation practices.

1.15

With regard to interactive meetings, the EESC could act as organiser, in conjunction with the Commission, as it already does regularly in the framework of structured dialogue platforms (for example on immigration, on consumption, etc.).

1.16

Finally, the EESC calls for a sustained campaign to raise awareness of the consultation process and the individual consultations. The Committee would like to take an active part in this through the organisations represented within it.

1.17

Furthermore, the EESC, as a promoter of structured civil dialogue and an essential instrument of participatory democracy, encourages the Commission to step up its use of structured dialogue platforms. This would not only enable stakeholders to play a continuous part in all stages of the policy process, but would also have a positive impact in terms of cost and time.

2.   The state of play in stakeholder consultation

2.1    Provisions

2.1.1

In accordance with Article 11(3) of the Treaty on European Union, ‘the European Commission shall carry out broad consultations with parties concerned in order to ensure that the Union’s actions are coherent and transparent’.

Such consultations are aimed at ensuring the active involvement of stakeholders from organised civil society and the general public, so that the general European interest can be sought when framing policies, to ensure their democratic relevance and the broadest possible public support.

2.1.2

‘Consultation’ is a process whereby the Commission gathers the opinions and views of the public and stakeholders. This complementary process takes place without prejudice to the structured civil dialogue (Article 11(2) TFEU) and consultations carried out within specific frameworks, such as consultation of the social partners as part of social dialogue (employers’ organisations and trade unions) (Article 154 TFEU) or of advisory bodies, such as the European Economic and Social Committee (Article 304 TFEU) (2), which it may on no account replace.

2.1.3

In addition to their involvement in consultations under Article 154 TFEU, the social partners, employers’ organisations and trade unions participate fully in the consultation mentioned in points 2.1.1 and 2.1.2, in the fields of consumer law, environmental law, trade policy, etc.

The European Economic and Social Committee has been assigned an advisory role by the Treaties vis-à-vis the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission. Furthermore, a cooperation protocol (3) specifies the practical arrangements for cooperation between the Committee and the Commission.

2.2    Guidelines for stakeholder consultations

2.2.1

In 2002, the European Commission established minimum standards (4) for stakeholder consultations, which apply on a mandatory basis to stakeholder consultations on any proposal, legislative or non-legislative. Under REFIT, the Commission has also announced that consultations are to be carried out for evaluations, fitness checks and the drafting of implementing measures and delegated acts (5).

2.2.2

In its 2002 guidelines for DGs on carrying out stakeholder consultations, the European Commission provides for, inter alia, publication of the explanatory memorandum on the topic in question, its content and the purpose of the consultation. Afterwards, the number of responses, the nature of the respondents and a summary of the findings should be published.

2.2.3

As regards multilingualism, there are currently no formal rules in force.

2.2.4

The 2002 guidelines with minimum standards for stakeholder consultation lay down 10 steps in the consultation process, divided into three phases: define strategy (6), run consultation (7), analyse results (8).

2.2.5

The European Commission has had 12 different methods for its policy-preparation consultations depending on the objectives and the target group. The 12 methods are as follows: open online public consultation; studies; Eurobarometer; conferences, public hearings, meetings with stakeholders; meetings, workshops, seminars with those directly involved; focus groups; personal interviews; European Commission expert groups; SME panels; consultation of local or regional authorities; questionnaires; and online discussion forums.

2.3    Implementation of the guidelines in practice

2.3.1

Despite these guidelines and the large number of methods and tools available, many stakeholders are critical of the effectiveness of the current consultation system. Specific obstacles include difficulties in being informed of consultations (information being easy to find on the EU websites and publicising the consultations), the language and terminology, information on the results and, finally, the follow-up.

2.3.2

In addition, the quality and the approach of consultations vary significantly depending on the DG concerned and they lack coordination and a uniform methodological approach.

2.3.3

Based on a sample, the EESC has carried out a check of the application of the guidelines in the first 25 consultations held in 2014. On the basis of this sample, the following comments can be made:

participation in the online consultations varies hugely (9),

where there are few respondents, representativeness is de facto poor, both geographically and in terms of the category of respondents. With a higher number of answers, geographical representativeness is better but is often unbalanced with regard to the quality of the responses. However, a clear trend emerges towards a predominance of respondents from large Member States. Also, the replies from organisations based in Brussels are classified as input from Belgium, while in many cases they are European federations or organisations that have no link to Belgium as a Member State,

as regards transparency and feedback of the results, in only six of the sample of 25 consultations was a summary of the results published, which is less than a quarter. In less than half of the consultations were the responses also published. In none of the consultations was further information provided on the follow-up to the issue.

In conclusion, there is generally a lack of representativeness and quality, and scant information is provided on the outcome and follow-up.

3.   The current Commission: new working methods and prospects

3.1

In the political guidelines of the new European Commission, a more democratic European Union is one of the 10 priorities. The objective of creating a mandatory register of all organisations and individuals that lobby the European Commission and the European Parliament is at the heart of that priority.

3.2

On 19 May 2015, the Commission published a package of measures aimed at better regulation, the Better Regulation package (10), on which the Committee will issue an opinion, at the request of the Commission. The measures envisaged are structured around four strands: more transparency and consultation, keeping existing laws under review, better impact assessment and quality control, and a new interinstitutional agreement.

3.3

As part of this, revised guidelines for stakeholder consultations have also been proposed. In preparation for these, a consultation (11) on the ‘Stakeholder consultation guidelines’ was organised. The findings (12) from this consultation have been taken into account in this opinion.

4.   Making consultations more effective: recommendations

The Committee sees consultations as one of the means of bridging the gap with the European citizen, provided that the procedures are structured, continuous, and ensure good stakeholder representativeness. Only then will consultations help to effectively involve the public and civil society in the European project.

The Committee has already made specific proposals here, inter alia, in its opinions on consultation under the Better Regulation programme, Article 11 TEU and REFIT (13).

4.1    Key elements of the consultation process

4.1.1

The Committee asks the European Commission to impose the existing internal guidelines as binding on DGs and to penalise non-compliance (for example, where there is no transparency regarding the responses or no assessment report), just as the quality of impact assessment is subject to sanctions by the Impact Assessment Board.

4.1.2

The Committee thus calls for a coordinating unit within the Commission’s general secretariat, under the direct management of the relevant Commission vice-president. This unit would also provide support to all DGs as regards the overall approach and strategy of consultations, the drawing up and implementation of quality requirements and procedures, quality guidance, information and follow-up.

4.1.3

The coordination unit would be assisted by an expert group, supplemented by representatives of the target groups at which the consultation is aimed. The EESC calls on the Commission to harness the Committee’s expertise here, particularly when it comes to selecting the target groups, validating the questionnaires, and summarising and following up the results.

4.1.4

A more systematic approach to consultations, with clear timetables and advance notice, should make it easier for stakeholders to prepare for their participation. In this regard, a reliable and regularly-updated provisional timetable of consultations is essential. More generally, the Committee proposes that the Commission put these consultations on a more structured institutional and representative foundation by taking advantage of the resources of the consultative bodies or their equivalents at national, regional and local levels.

4.1.5

The EESC asks the Commission to publish an annual evaluation of its approach to consultations and the results thereof.

The Committee advises the Commission to draw up an inventory of best practices in the Member States, as a source of inspiration. The OECD studies on this topic may be very useful here (14). The Committee also recommends encouraging any other form of civic engagement and participation. The Council of Europe’s Code of good practice on civil participation in the decision-making process could serve as a good model here (15).

4.2    Stakeholder mapping

4.2.1

Properly determining the target group of a consultation is essential to obtaining the necessary information. Professional tools of proven reliability are needed here. Effective cooperation with the existing structures, the Committee and legitimate and representative civil society organisations is also vital in this regard. Within the limits of its remit and by cooperating effectively with the organisations concerned and the Commission, the EESC could help identify representative organisations within certain target groups.

4.2.2

The work carried out by the EESC (16) on establishing criteria for the representativeness of civil society organisations could be used as a basis for the aforementioned process of identifying representative organisations. The EESC would thus like to further bolster the impact of and cooperation with such organisations in the consultation process.

4.2.3

A good geographical and target-group distribution should systematically be a particular focus. It must also be ensured that particular attention is given to under-represented and less-resourced groups in ‘stakeholder mapping’.

4.2.4

The EESC stresses the importance of introducing a substantiated weighting system in the analysis of consultation responses, giving priority to organisations that are representative and directly concerned.

4.2.5

With a view to increasing the participation of stakeholders in consultations, the content of feedback after consultations is very important. Stakeholders should see results from their input and thus feel that they have had a real influence on the policy proposals, or receive an explanation as to why certain elements were not taken into account.

4.3    Methods and tools

4.3.1

The EESC could act as a ‘network of networks’ in order to disseminate the written (online) consultation to the various stakeholders (just as the Committee of the Regions does as regards local authorities). With regard to interactive meetings, the EESC could act as organiser, given its contacts and expertise in this area.

4.3.2

Questionnaires used in (online) consultations should be submitted for comments to civil society organisations representing the target group(s) concerned and in the language of the target audience. Furthermore, questionnaires should be tested in advance by a sample group of stakeholders. To this end, preliminary stakeholder mapping and the transparency register could be used as tools to target these organisations (see point 4.2). The EESC should act as facilitator here.

4.4    Establishing the timing of the consultation and its duration

4.4.1

Under the guidelines, a time limit of at least 12 weeks should be set for responses to online consultations, and for interactive meetings 20 working days’ notice should be given. The Committee advises against launching consultations during the summer. Furthermore, the provisional timetable (advocated in point 4.1.4) should be adhered to as far as possible.

To give stakeholders an opportunity to prepare for their participation in consultations, the EESC deems it appropriate to provide them with sufficient information on the entire preparation process and the schedule of the (various) consultations. All effective means of encouraging stakeholders to participate should be deployed.

4.5    Publicising the consultation: accessibility and visibility

4.5.1

The EESC calls on the Commission, including its delegations in the Member States, to put in place an effective and sustained information campaign to publicise the consultations and encourage stakeholders to participate. The Committee could definitely also play a role here, and ask its members to disseminate information within their own networks.

4.5.2

Each consultation should be announced in a clear, appropriate and timely manner in the media of the Commission and the Member States and to the relevant civil society organisations. The representatives of the Commission in the Member States should also be involved in this overall approach.

4.6    Analysing the results

4.6.1

The Committee deems it very important that the Commission take account of the points of view expressed during consultations and justify the extent to which it has done so.

4.6.2

In the substantiated weighting system used in processing the results (see point 4.2.3), organised civil society stakeholders should proportionately be the most represented.

4.7    Reporting on the results and providing feedback

4.7.1

The Committee is in favour of the publication of a summary report, accompanied by an overview of all the responses received. This will foster transparency.

4.7.2

In addition, the EESC advocates providing information — not least to the respondents — on the follow-up to the issue, such as amendments to the proposal and the next steps in the decision-making process.

5.   The role of the European Economic and Social Committee

5.1    In the consultation process

5.1.1

In the interests of optimising resources, and taking the approach of interinstitutional cooperation, the Committee could thus make available to the decision-making process both its knowledge of stakeholders active in the various EU policy areas, and also its expertise, experience and competence in consultation practices.

5.1.2

In accordance with its work priorities and with the cooperation of the Commission, the Committee wishes to monitor and assess certain consultations, draw up an opinion on this matter, and if appropriate, organise a public hearing.

5.1.3

In close cooperation with the organisations concerned, the Committee would like to provide input and expertise to the Commission during the key stages of the consultation process, in particular the selection of the target group, the questionnaire, the summary and the follow-up.

5.1.4

Moreover, the EESC could act as a ‘network of networks’ and a facilitator in order to disseminate the written (online) consultation to the various stakeholders (just as the Committee of the Regions does as regards local authorities).

5.1.5

With regard to interactive meetings, the EESC could act as organiser, in conjunction with the Commission, as it already does regularly in the framework of structured dialogue platforms (for example on immigration, on consumption, etc.).

5.1.6

As part of an effective and sustained information campaign, the Committee could contribute by calling on its members to disseminate information within their own networks.

5.2    Under the cooperation protocol between the European Commission and the EESC

5.2.1

At different stages in the preparation, implementation and follow-up of a consultation, the EESC could act as an information channel between the European Commission and organised civil society.

5.2.2

For certain activities, such as interactive meetings, joint initiatives of the Commission and the Committee could be organised.

Brussels, 2 July 2015.

The President of the European Economic and Social Committee

Henri MALOSSE


(1)  http://www.eesc.europa.eu/?i=portal.en.eu-cooperation.22469

(2)  Article 304 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union.

The Committee shall be consulted by the European Parliament, by the Council or by the Commission where the Treaties so provide. The Committee may be consulted by these institutions in all cases in which they consider it appropriate. It may issue an opinion on its own initiative in cases in which it considers such action appropriate.

The European Parliament, the Council or the Commission shall, if it considers it necessary, set the Committee, for the submission of its opinion, a time limit which may not be less than 1 month from the date on which the chairman receives notification to this effect. Upon expiry of the time limit, the absence of an opinion shall not prevent further action.

The opinion of the Committee, together with a record of the proceedings, shall be forwarded to the European Parliament, to the Council and to the Commission.

(3)  http://www.eesc.europa.eu/?i=portal.en.eu-cooperation.22469

(4)  COM(2002) 704 as supplemented and amended by COM(2012) 746 and SWD(2012) 422.

(5)  COM(2014) 368.

(6)  1. define the objectives of the consultation; 2. stakeholder mapping; 3. select methods and tools; 4. define the timing of the consultation and its duration.

(7)  1. prepare consultation webpage; 2. advertise consultation; 3. acknowledge receipt of contributions.

(8)  1. analyse the responses; 2. report on the results and provide feedback; 3. evaluate the consultation exercise.

(9)  In only 13 consultations out of 25 is the number of participants stated. The number of respondents ranges from 14 to 1  114. Half of them had fewer than 100 responses.

(10)  http://ec.europa.eu/smart-regulation/index_en.htm

(11)  Consultation on the Commission’s stakeholder consultation guidelines from 30.6.2014 to 30.9.2014: http://ec.europa.eu/smart-regulation/guidelines/consultation_2014/stakeholder-consultation/index_en.htm

(12)  http://ec.europa.eu/smart-regulation/impact/docs/contributions/summary_responses_stakeholder_consultation_guidelines_public_consultation_en.pdf

(13)  EESC opinion on Better Regulation (OJ C 48, 15.2.2011, p. 107).

EESC Opinion Principles, procedures and action for the implementation of Articles 11(1) and 11(2) of the Lisbon Treaty (OJ C 11, 15.1.2013, p. 8).

EESC Opinion The Regulatory Fitness and Performance programme (REFIT): state of play and outlook (OJ C 230, 14.7.2015, p. 66).

(14)  http://www.oecd.org/gov/regulatory-policy/governance-regulators.htm

(15)  http://www.coe.int/t/ngo/code_good_prac_en.asp

(16)  EESC Opinion (OJ C 88, 11.4.2006, p. 41).


III Preparatory acts

EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE

509th EESC plenary session, 1 and 2 July 2015

17.11.2015   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 383/64


Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on the ‘Green Paper on Building a Capital Markets Union’

(COM(2015) 63 final)

(2015/C 383/10)

Rapporteur:

Mr Juan MENDOZA CASTRO

Co-rapporteur:

Ms ANGELOVA

On 9 March 2015 the European Commission decided to consult the European Economic and Social Committee, under Article 304 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, on the

Green Paper on Building a Capital Markets Union

(COM(2015) 63 final).

The Section for Economic and Monetary Union and Economic and Social Cohesion, which was responsible for preparing the Committee’s work on the subject, adopted its opinion on 18 June 2015.

At its 509th plenary session, held on 1 and 2 July 2015 (meeting of 1 July 2015), the European Economic and Social Committee adopted the following opinion by 100 votes to 2 with 3 abstentions.

1.   Conclusions and recommendations

1.1

The Committee supports the Green Paper on a Capital Markets Union, awaits the Commission’s proposals on what changes might be needed as to achieve the goals stated in the document and expresses its belief that the proposed measures will be based on a balanced consideration of the viewpoints expressed by all the stakeholders.

1.2

The aim of the Commission’s initiative should be to create the conditions for an efficient, modern financial services sector with appropriate regulations, which grants access to capital providers by companies seeking investment, especially SMEs and high growth companies.

1.3

The EESC sees the capital markets as pools of liquidity, where companies can raise funds and trade in financial instruments, and strongly supports the ultimate goal of the CMU — to overcome the current fragmentation of the markets thus enabling the listing of all types of companies.

1.4

Since a Capital Markets Union (CMU) is to a significant extent a reality for large companies, the EESC stresses the need for measures that will also allow SMEs to benefit from it.

1.5

The CMU should improve the financing of the economy in the long term by tapping the potential for promoting the best practices of corporate governance and corporate social responsibility, focusing not only on economic but also environmental and social objectives.

1.6

SMEs’ specific needs should be explicitly taken into account in any future decisions related to CMU. The EESC strongly recommends decisive and swift action to be taken in the following directions:

developing a secondary market,

devising a unified simplified standard for qualitative and quantitative requirements for listing SMEs on regulated markets for financial instruments,

introducing credit ratings according to a standardised transparent methodology,

accepting simplified standardised criteria (model) for registration on regulated markets, including a detailed mid-term business plan for investments and business development in addition to financial information,

creating more ‘tailor-made’ investment products as these should more closely match companies’ needs,

updating and amalgamating the definitions of micro, small and medium-sized enterprises in the different items of EU legislation so as to better reflect the variety of SMEs and differences between the Member States,

providing a definition of an emerging growth and high growth company and devoting special attention to the needs of such companies on the capital market,

creating a unified European stock-exchange segmentation model, which differentiates SMEs based on their type as issuers, or creating specialised segments on the respective national regulated markets,

encouraging the strengthening of the administrative capacity of national consumer protection bodies and financial regulation agencies,

providing investors with conditions which are at least comparable, if not better, than those on international markets.

1.7

The EESC concurs with the acknowledgement in the Green Paper that a very low proportion of household savings finds its way into more productive investments than government bonds or bank deposits, especially at this time of financial repression for savers.

1.8

The EESC highlights the importance of traditional banking for the stability of the financial system. The EESC acknowledges the importance of completing the European Banking Union.

1.9

Sustainable high quality securitisation calls for promoting basic structures with short intermediation chains.

1.10

The EESC considers that the Green Paper provides a comprehensive review of the current state of play in the capital markets in Europe, as well as the measures needed to achieve a CMU.

2.   The content of the Green Paper

2.1

Compared with other jurisdictions, capital market based financing in Europe is relatively underdeveloped. European equity, debt and other markets play a smaller role in financing growth and European businesses remain heavily reliant on banks, making our economies vulnerable to a tightening of bank lending.

2.2

There is also insufficient investor confidence, and European savings may not always be being put to the most productive use.

2.3

Building a CMU is a key initiative in the work programme of the Commission.

2.4

A CMU would ensure greater diversification in the funding of the economy and reduce the cost of raising capital, particularly for SMEs.

2.5

More integrated capital markets, especially for equity, would enhance the shock-absorption capacity of the European economy and allow for more investment without increasing levels of indebtedness.

2.6

A CMU should enhance the flow of capital — through efficient market infrastructure and intermediaries — from investors to European investment projects, improving allocation of risk and capital across the EU and, ultimately, making Europe more resilient to future shocks.

2.7

The key principles underpinning a CMU are: it should maximise the benefits of capital markets for the economy, jobs and growth; it should create a single market for capital for all 28 Member States; it should be built on firm foundations of financial stability; it should ensure an effective level of consumer and investor protection; and it should help to attract investment from all over the world and increase EU competitiveness.

3.   General comments

3.1

The Committee fully supports the Commission’s initiative. If all the Member States of Europe are to thrive in a vibrant, knowledge based economy, a Capital Markets Union is a necessary structural reform. The blockage to the EU-wide development of a range of innovative financial products has to be freed up, as this is holding back competitive financing for investment, particularly for small and medium sized companies, start-ups and for long-term infrastructure products.

3.2

The aim of the Commission’s initiative should be to create the conditions for an efficient, modern financial services sector with appropriate but not excessive regulations, allowing a much wider range of sources of investment finance and thereby addressing the worryingly low level of investment.

3.3

The EESC sees capital markets as pools of liquidity, where companies can raise funds and trade with financial instruments. Taking this as a starting point, the EESC believes that the CMU has already been achieved for large companies and, in reply to the Commission’s questions in the Green Paper, will focus mostly on measures that will allow SMEs and high growth companies to also benefit from such a union.

3.4

The CMU should improve the financing of the economy in the long term by tapping the potential for promoting the best practices of corporate governance and corporate social responsibility, focusing not only on economic but also environmental and social objectives.

3.5

The Green Paper views SMEs as a targeted issuer. As such, SMEs’ specific needs should be explicitly taken into account in any future decisions, as far as bonds or other fixed income financial instruments are concerned, as follows:

proper choice of financing maturities,

structure of financing and pay-back,

cost of financing, including that related to entering the respective market,

content and structure of warranties and collateral for preparing the respective investment product.

In order to adequately address all these needs, it is vital to devise simplified and standardised products and procedures for the participation of SMEs on capital markets.

3.6

The EESC calls on the European Commission, European supervisory authorities and the Member States to act with caution when producing and transposing future legislation aimed at achieving a functioning CMU to ensure that the European capital market provides investors and issuers with conditions which are at least comparable, if not better, than those on international markets.

3.7

An effective capital markets union is not possible without involving and attracting EU citizens as individual investors. The EESC concurs with the acknowledgement in the Green Paper that a very low proportion of household savings finds its way into more productive investments than government bonds or bank deposits, especially at this time of financial repression for savers.

3.8

The importance of traditional banking to the stability of the financial system should be underlined.

3.9

A sustainable high quality securitisation market — such as the Green Paper refers to — calls for promoting basic structures with short intermediation chains to link borrowers and savers directly.

4.   Answers to the questions posed in the Green Paper

4.1    Priorities for early action

1)   Beyond the five priority areas identified for short-term action, what other areas should be prioritised?

A large part of the proposed measures are focused on primary markets. Bearing in mind the specific characteristics of SMEs, it is also necessary to explore possibilities for developing the secondary market.

In particular, it is vital to devise a unified simplified standard for qualitative and quantitative requirements for listing SMEs on regulated markets for financial instruments. A mechanism to make traded SMEs more attractive for investors should also be developed, bearing in mind SMEs’ limited financial and administrative resources.

While retaining the main principles for taking investors’ interests into account, it is recommended to start with some specific issues in the Prospectus Directive in order to relieve the administrative and bureaucratic requirements wherever possible, and to explore the possibilities of liberalising some disclosure requirements for SMEs.

Shortening the deadlines for consideration of the prospectus for issuers who already have securities admitted to trading on a regulated market and have made a public offering of securities, and are respectively public companies or registered as issuers. Deadlines may accordingly be reduced to 7 days. A special procedure should be provided for listing SMEs in a simplified way, especially if they are to be traded on the unofficial market of the stock exchanges. The directive should allow greater national discretion for national regulators to regulate listing of SMEs.

Pursuant to Article 14, paragraph 2 of Directive 2003/71/EC, the notification for public offering and the initial and final term of the subscription shall be published in one daily newspaper. Requirements for publication of announcements/notifications and the prospectus itself on paper and in daily newspapers should be increasingly limited. The disclosure of information on the internet, especially through the websites of the respective regulated market or of the company, should become the main means of communication between the issuer and investors. On the other hand, there may be a certain uniformity of requirements for information disclosure via websites — through unification or a special page for investors; the latter could thereby acquire information more quickly and easily on the essential aspects of the publicly offered securities.

2)   What further steps around the availability and standardisation of SME credit information could support a deeper market in SME and start-up finance and a wider investor base?

Useful measures in this context would be:

introduction of credit ratings according to a standardised transparent methodology,

acceptance of simplified standardised criteria (model) for registration on regulated markets, including, besides financial information, a detailed mid-term business plan for investments and business development.

3)   What support can be given to European Long Term Investment Funds (ELTIFs) to encourage their take up?

The most pressing measure is to review the regulatory requirements for pension funds and insurance companies in the different Member States with a view to liberalising their portfolios where necessary with respect to the possibility of investing in ELTIFs. Pension funds and insurance companies will be interested in this form of asset and also have the funds to capitalise ELTIFs. To enhance this process, it will be useful to develop a unified profitability evaluation model covering the whole investment chain.

4)   Is any action by the EU needed to support the development of private placement markets other than supporting market-led efforts to agree common standards?

No Action by the EU might be needed if these market-led efforts do not succeed.

4.2

Measures to develop and integrate capital markets

5)   What further measures could help to increase access to funding and channelling of funds to those who need them?

In general, access to finance would improve if more ‘tailor-made’ investment products were created as these should better match companies’ needs (for example as regards maturity, collateral and structure of payments).

Also, regulatory bodies should allow the possibility of debt-instrument issuance, which as a kind of contract with bondholders should be as similar as possible to project financing and corporate lending from banks.

6)   Should measures be taken to promote greater liquidity in corporate bond markets, such as standardisation? If so, which measures are needed and can these be achieved by the market, or is regulatory action required?

Yes, standardisation will improve liquidity in corporate bond markets. In this case, taking regulatory measures discussed and agreed with all stakeholders makes sense.

7)   Is any action by the EU needed to facilitate the development of standardised, transparent and accountable ESG (Environment, Social and Governance) investment, including green bonds, other than supporting the development of guidelines by the market?

Yes, standardisation criteria should include specific principles regarding environmental, social and governance investment. The EESC supports the promotion of ‘Green Bonds’ as well as ‘green’ mortgages, loans for energy efficiency projects and renewable energy, among others. All of these should be included in the investor’s options. The EESC finds it necessary to disseminate information and launch campaigns to promote ESG investments widely and publicise best practices in this regard, including in close cooperation with and through networks of business and investors associations.

8)   Is there value in developing a common EU-level accounting standard for small and medium-sized companies listed on multilateral trading facilities (MTFs)? Should such a standard become a feature of SME Growth Markets? If so, under which conditions?

The current European definition of SMEs includes firms of vastly different sizes and does not allow for differentiation on the basis of industry. The EESC supports a standard European definition of micro, small and medium-sized enterprises and calls for the various definitions given in different items of EU legislation to be updated, so as to better reflect the variety of SMEs and differences between the Member States, and amalgamated (1). It suggests providing a definition of an emerging growth and high growth company and devoting special attention to the needs of such companies on the capital market. Without this, MTFs will only include a limited number of countries, and growth markets will not be able to attract many cross-border investors. The content of such a standard should be in conformity with SMEs’ limited financial and administrative capacity.

9)   Are there barriers to the development of appropriately regulated crowdfunding or peer to peer platforms including on a cross-border basis? If so, how should they be addressed?

Differences between national legislations are a major reason for the weak development of prospective forms of investment such as crowdfunding. It is therefore advisable for the Commission to promote legislative harmonisation.

4.3    Developing and diversifying the supply of funding

10)   What policy measures could incentivise institutional investors to raise and invest larger amounts and in a broader range of assets, in particular long-term projects, SMEs and innovative and high growth start-ups?

Before anything else, changes in the regulations for institutional investors’ portfolios are needed, because in many Member States such investments are not allowed for them at all.

11)   What steps could be taken to reduce the costs to fund managers of setting up and marketing funds across the EU? What barriers are there to funds benefiting from economies of scale?

The costs are not excessively high even now, and depend above all on marketing channels. Those funds which are marketed through branches of banks or other financial institutions do not usually have significant costs and do not face barriers for benefitting from economies of scale. Funds which are marketed separately would have higher costs.

Fund-raising prospectuses should be simplified and unified, as well as all the registration documents for entering the respective regulated market.

A unified European stock-exchange segmentation model is needed, which differentiates SMEs based on their type as issuers. The same result can be achieved by creating specialised segments on the respective national regulated markets.

12)   Should work on the tailored treatment of infrastructure investments target certain clearly identifiable subclasses of assets? If so, which of these should the Commission prioritise in future reviews of the prudential rules such as CRDIV/CRR and Solvency II?

To finance infrastructure projects, the EESC suggests:

establishing a more comprehensive public review process for infrastructure to ensure planning is more strategically coordinated,

increasing the focus of government and Europe-wide funding to financially unviable but socially important projects (potentially through (partial) guarantees in order to make them viable),

producing an easy-to-understand guide to infrastructure finance through banks and capital markets,

amending the accounting and regulatory treatment of infrastructure projects to make them more attractive for investors,

defining certain clearly identifiable subclasses of infrastructure projects and tailoring the treatment of infrastructure investments to them. This involves different risk evaluation for each subclass and will improve predictability, in such a way as to make investments more attractive for institutional investors,

increasing the use of structures which enable retail investors to participate better in illiquid financing,

as the current Solvency II capital charges fail to distinguish between long-term corporate debt and infrastructure debt, the case should be considered for modifying this,

improving the transparency and democratic accountability of public-private partnerships by requiring public access to the full contracts and regular public reporting on their value for money.

13)   Would the introduction of a standardised product, or removing the existing obstacles to cross-border access, strengthen the single market in pension provision?

Yes. Taking into consideration the fact that pension provision and philosophy is very different across the Member States and the goal stated by the EC in the Green Paper to achieve a pan-European retirement scheme.

14)   Would changes to the EuVECA and EuSEF Regulations make it easier for larger EU fund managers to run these types of funds? What other changes if any should be made to increase the number of these types of fund?

It is possible that such changes would make large fund managers more interested in running such funds. However, this could also lead to excessive concentration and conflicts of interests. Therefore, before taking such a measure it is advisable to carefully research whether this is the main obstacle preventing large fund managers from running such funds.

15)   How can the EU further develop private equity and venture capital as an alternative source of finance for the economy? In particular, what measures could boost the scale of venture capital funds and enhance the exit opportunities for venture capital investors?

The scale of private equity and venture capital funds could be increased by an appropriate relaxation of restrictions on the portfolios of institutional investors such as pension funds, insurance companies and Undertakings for Collective Investment in Transferable Securities (UCITS).

16)   Are there impediments to increasing both bank and non-bank direct lending safely to companies that need finance?

In the aftermath of the financial crisis, bank lending has suffered increased constraints as a result of tighter capital-adequacy requirements and the need to decrease risk exposure. Non-bank direct lending is not allowed by the legislation in many Member States; in many cases, insurance companies, pension funds and other financial institutions cannot lend directly to non-financial companies.

17)   How can cross border retail participation in UCITS be increased?

Cross-border investments require a well-developed investment culture, relevant knowledge and foreign-language proficiency. So an increase in cross-border retail participation could only be achieved by promoting the use of personal financial planners (consultants), who could help retail investors to make informed decisions in an international context.

18)   How can the European Supervisory Authorities (ESAs) further contribute to ensuring consumer and investor protection?

In most Member States, national consumer protection bodies usually have relatively limited capacity in the financial services area. In some cases it is not even clear whether they have legal rights in this area and what these rights are. Therefore it might be useful for the European supervisory authorities to encourage strengthening the administrative capacity of national consumer protection bodies and financial regulation agencies in that regard.

19)   What policy measures could increase retail investment? What else could be done to empower and protect EU citizens accessing capital markets?

Encourage Member States to establish favourable conditions for stock brokers and investment companies to establish funds for new ventures which permit tax incentives (such as a write-off of the investment against income tax for household savings). Together with improving institutional consumer protection (as suggested in the reply to the previous question), an increase in retail investment could also be stimulated by introducing different forms of financial education targeted at non-professional investors and savers, and very well regulated financial planning consultancy services for individuals.

20)   Are there national best practices in the development of simple and transparent investment products for consumers which can be shared?

Best practices are not yet well established, they are still taking shape. Among the few examples is the process of accreditation of investment products by professional associations in the UK (2). In general the development of such products is not an easy task, because investment products may be complex by their very nature and also because issuers try to meet a variety of needs and try to differentiate their products from other similar products. Another problem might be the consideration that if the government tries to force the development of such products, this might be considered as intervention in the market and restricting competition. This is why, instead of making efforts in this respect, it would be more productive if the development of financial education and financial advisory services for individuals were encouraged.

21)   Are there additional actions in the field of financial services regulation that could be taken to ensure that the EU is internationally competitive and an attractive place in which to invest?

Competitiveness should be viewed in a comparative perspective. Therefore the EU capital markets should provide investors with conditions which are at least comparable, if not better, than those on international markets. This would require measures to improve investor protection and adapt tax structures (with more careful scrutiny of the benefits and costs of the proposed tax on financial transactions).

22)

What measures can be taken to facilitate the access of EU firms to investors and capital markets in third countries?

The best way is to stimulate cooperation with banks that have a well-developed network of branches in third countries.

4.4    Improving market effectiveness — intermediaries, infrastructure and broader legal framework

23)   Are there mechanisms to improve the functioning and efficiency of markets not covered in this paper, particularly in the areas of equity and bond market functioning and liquidity?

Such mechanisms could include:

a long-term minimal liquidity of the market for financial instruments issued by SMEs should be assured. This could be achieved by stimulating liquidity providers or market-makers that quote financial instruments issued by SMEs,

increasing investors’ trust in SMEs by introducing corporate-governance best practices, and involving key financial investors in their management,

increasing SMEs’ attractiveness — e.g. through possibilities for corporate guarantees (or guarantees from specialised institutions) for issues by SMEs, meeting certain criteria,

introducing stimuli for SMEs listed on regulated markets,

introducing stimuli for investors in issues by listed SMEs.

24)   In your view, are there areas where the single rulebook remains insufficiently developed?

The single rulebook approach, developed for the banking sector through CRD IV, DGS and BRRD, creates a level playing field and furthers the single market. Extending this approach to the non-banking financial sector could therefore be very useful. An approach similar to that of the BRRD should also be introduced for central counterparties.

25)   Do you think that the powers of the ESAs to ensure consistent supervision are sufficient? What additional measures relating to EU-level supervision would materially contribute to developing a capital markets union?

On the question of supervisory convergence, the EESC:

agrees on the need for corrective action to improve the operation of the European System of Financial Supervision (ESFS),

calls for the promotion of measures to facilitate coordination between the ESFS, the new Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) arrangement and the Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM),

calls for the regulatory functions of the ESFS institutions to be rationalised with a view to simplifying the regulatory framework and making procedures more transparent and effective,

asks for a medium-term strategy designed to bring about organisational and functional consolidation on the part of the supervisors (by considering the possibility of a single seat and the adoption of a ‘twin peaks’ model),

calls on the European Commission to assess the feasibility of more structural measures regarding the organisation of the ESFS and the authorities’ funding mechanisms.

26)   Taking into account past experience, are there targeted changes to securities ownership rules that could contribute to more integrated capital markets within the EU?

The inter-relations between the depositary institutions should be improved, as should the security of cross-border clearing and settlement.

27)   What measures could be taken to improve the cross-border flow of collateral? Should work be undertaken to improve the legal enforceability of collateral and close-out netting arrangements cross-border?

Measures are to be welcomed to create a unified European registry of cross-border collateral, or to interconnect the respective departments of the national registers. Without such measures being implemented, cross-border investment will remain limited.

28)   What are the main obstacles to integrated capital markets arising from company law, including corporate governance? Are there targeted measures which could contribute to overcoming them?

The differences between commercial law, business practices and corporate governance models across the Member States are the most serious impediments for a Capital Markets Union. To overcome this will take a long time and will not be easy, but is a must. It will require careful study of Member States’ jurisdictions.

29)   What specific aspects of insolvency laws would need to be harmonised in order to support the emergence of a pan-European capital market?

Insolvency laws are vital for the capital markets and as in the case of commercial law and corporate governance should be harmonised after thorough research, because otherwise there is a risk that investment will move to countries where investors’ rights are better protected. In particular, the fresh start option should be carefully considered.

30)   What barriers are there around taxation that should be looked at as a matter of priority to contribute to more integrated capital markets within the EU and a more robust funding structure at company level and through which instruments?

The structure of taxation systems varies greatly across the Member States and is very sensitive to any changes. At the current stage, taxation harmonisation will be very difficult to achieve and should be viewed as an end-stage of the process.

31)   How can the EU best support the development by the market of new technologies and business models, to the benefit of integrated and efficient capital markets?

The EU should concentrate on building a single digital network infrastructure, which should provide for swift, efficient and safe communications between markets, companies and investors (3), as well as an opportunity for remote and cross-border participation in shareholders’ general meetings and for voting. Efforts should also focus on finding ways to decrease the relatively high clearing and settlement costs when trading across borders.

32)   Are there other issues, not identified in this Green Paper, which in your view require action to achieve a Capital Markets Union? If so, what are they and what form could such action take?

The Green Paper provides a comprehensive review of the current state of play in the capital markets in Europe, as well as the measures needed to achieve a CMU. At this stage it is better not to open more issues, but rather to better plan the timing for implementing the measures which have already been decided, and to select some important tactical reforms to start with: these should be tangible and have a direct and measurable impact. This will create a momentum which will facilitate the implementation of more difficult reforms in the future.

Notwithstanding, the EESC notes that the Green Paper does not address:

the credit rating of financial instruments,

measures related to the problem of the procyclicality of financial products.

Brussels, 1 July 2015.

The President of the European Economic and Social Committee

Henri MALOSSE


(1)  In general terms, the common definition of SMEs is set out in EU Recommendation 2003/361/EC, which is rather out of date and reflects neither EU enlargement, nor the economic realities following the crisis. For the purposes of the Green Paper, the definition of SMEs is given in Directive 2014/65/EU of 15 May 2014 on markets in financial instruments. There is another definition of SMEs in Directive 2013/34/EU of 26 June 2013 on the annual financial statements, consolidated financial statements and related reports of certain types of undertakings.

(2)  The Association of British Insurers, British Bankers Association and the Building Societies Association in negotiations with the British Standards Institute decided to develop simple financial products which comply with an agreed set of principles, which are presented in the Sergeant Report (March, 2013).

(3)  As an example of best practice, see the independent electronic marketplace for corporate lending FINPOINT https://www.finpoint.co.uk/


17.11.2015   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 383/74


Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on ‘The Paris Protocol — A blueprint for tackling global climate change beyond 2020’

(COM(2015) 81 final)

(2015/C 383/11)

Rapporteur:

Lutz RIBBE

On 25 March 2015, the European Commission decided to consult the European Economic and Social Committee, under Article 43(2) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, on

The Paris Protocol — A blueprint for tackling global climate change beyond 2020

(COM(2015) 81 final).

The Section for Agriculture, Rural Development and the Environment, which was responsible for preparing the Committee’s work on the subject, adopted its opinion on 4 June 2015. The rapporteur was Lutz Ribbe.

At its 509th plenary session, held on 1 and 2 July 2015 (meeting of 2 July), the Committee adopted the following opinion by 193 votes to 12 with 9 abstentions.

1.   Conclusions and recommendations

1.1

The EESC expects the COP 21 negotiating parties to finally decide on a binding agreement which is both fair and ambitious. Apart from some minor exceptions, the Committee fully supports the Commission’s negotiating position on this matter. However, it takes issue with the fact that the EU has yet to fully grasp the key role to be played by civil society in this process.

1.2

All parties to the framework convention on climate change must, without exception, assume responsibility for meeting the actual goal, namely to stabilise ‘greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic (1) interference with the climate system’. Only then can even greater damage to human beings, the environment and future generations be prevented.

1.3

The principle of common but differentiated responsibility is correct. Most countries should rapidly embark on a process of transformation away from fossil fuels towards a high level of resource and energy efficiency and renewables. Those countries which today contribute little to climate change should be supported so that they can move directly towards a ‘low carbon economy’. Major opportunities are opening up on this front, especially for innovative European businesses, which must be given political support in this regard. Care should be taken that such transformation does not impoverish people below the poverty line. Rather it should and must be used effectively to create fresh economic impetus, particularly at regional level, and to develop new decentralised, carbon-free energy production facilities, that involve the local people.

1.4

Negotiations at COP 21 will thus relate not to a conventional environmental issue, but rather to laying the foundations for a new global low carbon economy.

1.5

Such processes require pioneers. This is a role Europe has played successfully for many years. However, it can no longer be said that Europe is going it alone when it comes to tackling climate change. Many other economic blocs now invest heavily in the transformation process and in green technologies, without taking a more active role in the COP negotiations. Regardless of the outcome of the negotiations in Paris, in reality the battle for future markets in green technologies that are important for protecting the climate started a long time ago, and it is a battle that Europe needs to fight, whether or not COP 21 produces results.

1.6

Negotiations at the COP will not cover important economic conditions which may lead to ‘carbon leakage’ or ‘low carbon leakage’. It is therefore necessary, even outside the ambit of the UNFCCC negotiations, to constantly bear in mind climate issues and their economic, social and political consequences. The EU needs to promote at all levels, for example, the creation of market-based mechanisms that help to ensure that product-based emissions are taken into account in global trade issues.

1.7

The EESC cautions that it is not by the (hopefully) ambitious outcomes of COP 21 that our climate will be saved, but rather by their systematic implementation. And it is not politicians who will implement them, but citizens. Although they must create the right conditions, with not only environmental but also economic and social consequences in mind, it is civil society that will put them into practice. The decisions therefore need broad public approval and support from businesses, trade unions and all other elements of civil society.

1.8

Unfortunately, the multiple roles played by civil society (see point (6) will be discussed only on the outer fringes of the COP, and the EU has taken no evident steps to change this. The communication provides no tangible indications whatsoever as to the role civil society should play. The new climate policy cannot and must not be imposed ‘from above’, but needs to be based on broad support of a majority of citizens, through an active civic dialogue including all stakeholders and to be implemented ‘from below’. The EESC recommends that the Commission, the Council and the European Parliament (EP) finally engage in intensive and structured dialogue, so that society’s fundamental willingness to develop new structures is not jeopardised. The actual EU policy in this area to date has been very disappointing. In this context the EESC recommends that the Commission both create the structural conditions and provide the necessary resources to allow civil society to engage with all stakeholders on the basis of equal recognition and inclusion.

1.9

The EESC stresses that there are environmental, economic and social opportunities linked with already existing CO2 mitigation techniques which can lead to job creation and business development worldwide.

2.   Background

2.1

23 years ago, in May 1992, the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) was adopted in New York. Article 2 of the convention set out its objective, namely to stabilise ‘greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic (2) interference with the climate system’ and to mitigate possible consequences.

2.2

In the same year, the convention was signed by 154 states at the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) in Rio. It entered into force in March 1994 and has now been ratified by 196 parties.

2.3

These states meet once a year at the Conference of Parties (COP), also known as the UN climate summits. To date, no measures have been adopted that would even come close to achieving the objectives of the convention: so far there are only binding targets — laid down in the Kyoto Protocol adopted at COP 3 in Kyoto — for maximum emissions for industrialised countries, but, as is well known, the Kyoto Protocol has not been ratified by all industrialised countries.

2.4

However, there is now consensus that, after 21 years of negotiations, during which global emissions have increased by almost 50 % (from 30,8 billion tonnes of CO2 equivalent in 1992 to 43,4 billion tonnes in 2011) (3) and the negative impact of anthropogenic climate change has become increasingly clear, it is high time to take action.

2.5

Almost all scientific studies show that it is still possible to cap the temperature increase accordingly. To do so, we need to act very quickly to start implementing appropriately ambitious measures: the studies also show that, while the target can also in theory be achieved later on, this would involve a disproportionate increase in costs and entail massive damage, affecting millions of people and the economy to an equal extent.

2.6

The framework convention on climate change does not spell out exactly what ‘dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system’ means. At the COP 16 (in 2010), the parties reached a political agreement to limit the global temperature increase to less than 2 oC (or even 1,5 oC) compared with pre-industrial levels. However, they did not provide any scientific basis to show this political agreement would actually achieve that objective.

2.7

The EESC would once again draw the attention of all stakeholders — both politicians and civil society — specifically to the fact that even today, with the global temperature increase much lower than 2 oC, there are clear signs of this interference and the serious consequences it entails. The 2 oC limit therefore cannot be seen as a target to be reached, but rather as a ceiling to be undercut as much as possible.

3.   The COP 21 in Paris

3.1

The 21st COP will be held in Paris in December 2015, at which, it has been promised, the necessary ambitious, fair and binding decisions for all 196 parties to the convention will — finally — be adopted in the form of a ‘global deal’ that would enter into force in 2020.

3.2

The decisions being sought include:

(a)

tackling climate change: the parties have undertaken to inform the UNFCCC secretariat of their national emission reduction targets (Intended Nationally Determined Contributions (= INDC)) by the end of March 2015. These targets should be ambitious and go beyond the efforts made to date. The sum of these INDCs should be enough to keep the global temperature increase below 2 oC. A summary report assessing whether this will be achieved is to be published by 1 November 2015;

(b)

measures to adapt to climate change;

(c)

financial arrangements for tackling and adapting to climate change and for compensation (‘loss and damage’); this includes the question of (a) how the promised USD 100 billion per year will be paid in the run-up to 2020, and (b) what the criteria and requirements will be for its distribution;

(d)

issues surrounding technology transfer (taking account of ‘intellectual property’);

(e)

rules on monitoring the agreement, including with regard to measuring, reporting, monitoring/transparency, etc. (4); and, of particular importance,

(f)

the legal framework for the agreement, i.e. the binding nature of the decisions.

3.3

Agreement also needs to be reached on what practical measures to protect the climate should be taken to make use of the period between December 2015, when the decisions are taken, and 2020, when the binding measures enter into force (‘pre-2020 action’).

3.4

Governments will also consider for the first time the way in which climate policies should be implemented. The EESC supports current references to the need to respect human rights and secure a just transition which maintains and creates decent work and good quality jobs in the transition to a low carbon economy.

3.5

The EU has summed up its position and expectations for COP 21 in the communication on The Paris Protocol — a blueprint for tackling global climate change beyond 2020  (5). It proposes, among other things, making the agreements binding by adopting the Paris Agreement as a protocol to the climate framework convention. It should ‘enter into force as soon as countries with a collective total of 80 % of current global emissions have ratified it’.

3.6

The parties to the convention are agreed in subscribing to the principle of common but differentiated responsibility, i.e. the principle that all parties must bear responsibility, whether or not they contribute heavily to climate change. The precise scope of their responsibility should depend on a number of very different factors such as historical and current emissions levels, economic strength, social situation, the extent to which they are impacted, etc.

4.   What European civil society expects from the COP 21 negotiations

4.1

The EESC urges all negotiating parties to finally adopt a legally binding agreement in Paris. It strongly supports the EU’s negotiating position set out in Commission communication COM(2015) 81 final.

4.2

At COP 21, a consensus needs to be reached on a prevention policy in which we take, today, ambitious and far-reaching decisions for tomorrow. These decisions will form the basis for the economic and social activities of future generations, and will also help to ease the suffering of people already experiencing the impact of climate change.

4.3

Negotiations at COP 21 will thus relate not to a conventional environmental issue, but rather to laying the foundations for a new global low carbon economy.

4.4

The EESC welcomes the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities. Every contracting state must acknowledge its responsibility and can no longer shirk it, ‘hide’ behind other countries or — as has sometimes happened in the past — take the attitude that they are only willing to take on responsibility if they are paid for it.

Tackling climate change

4.5

The Committee points out that a globally satisfactory level of emissions can be achieved only if everyone in the world produces an average of no more than 2 tonnes of CO2 equivalent per year.

4.5.1

In Europe (where the average is approximately 9 t CO2 equivalent per person per year), this could only be achieved by implementing the 2050 target (80-95 % reduction in CO2 emissions in Europe). China (currently at approx. 6 t CO2 equivalent per person per year) would have to reduce its current per capita emissions by two thirds, and for example the United States (currently at 16,5 t CO2 equivalent per person per year) and the current ‘world leader’ Qatar (40 t CO2 equivalent per person per year) would have to make even bigger reductions.

4.5.2

On the other hand, countries such as Mali (0,04 t CO2 equivalent per person per year) and Rwanda (0,06 t CO2 equivalent per person per year) cannot be expected to make reductions. The EESC does not therefore entirely agree with the Commission statement that there need to be ‘substantial and sustained reductions in greenhouse gas emissions by all countries’. These countries should instead be moving directly towards a ‘low carbon economy’. The climate policy responsibilities in terms of tackling and adapting to climate change are thus common but differentiated. These countries need urgent support, which at the same time opens up many opportunities for cooperation for innovative companies. European companies, which (still) hold 40 % of all patents for green technologies, could benefit from this in particular.

4.5.3

It is important to note that the emissions data referred to above do not reflect the major differences that exist within countries’ social strata and also the fact that the CO2 emissions from manufacturing are not attributed to the countries in which they are produced but rather to those countries in which the products are used. If the opposite were true, then for example China would have a much better greenhouse gas record and Germany’s would be worse (6).

4.6

The EESC views the establishment of national emission reduction targets (INDC) as a central part of the COP 21 process. The considerable delays in the submission of INDCs to the UNFCCC secretariat (7) are a very bad sign.

4.7

The EESC realises that it is still by no means clear whether proponents of a stringent COP 21 agreement will be able to build this kind of ‘solidarity for future generations’ between 196 parties with very different current circumstances and in some cases very different political orientations and cultural backgrounds (8).

4.8

The negotiations on the EU’s 2030 climate and energy package, which were effectively a ‘COP’ at EU level, showed that even at EU level it is almost impossible to implement what is being sought at COP, namely the establishment of clear national responsibilities. The EESC therefore finds it regrettable that there are no longer any binding national targets under the 2030 EU energy and climate package, which may make it more difficult to achieve Europe’s common goal and to ‘assign’ responsibilities (9). Announcing INDCs for EU Member States would be a right signal for the COP negotiation.

Adaptation to climate change, financial regulation and technology transfer

4.9

‘Differentiated responsibility’ also means that there is a need for solidarity, in that we need to help less developed and financially weak countries, in particular, to build a climate-friendly ‘green’ economy and enable them to deal with the damage caused by climate change, which often affects them the most. Care should be taken that such transformation does not impoverish people below the poverty line. Rather it should and must be used effectively to create fresh economic impetus, particularly at regional level, and to develop new decentralised, carbon-free energy production facilities that involve the local people.

4.10

Financial matters and technology transfer therefore have an important role to play. The less developed countries have already been bitterly disappointed, because the once promised ‘development aid’ (0,7 % GDP) has for some time now not been provided in the amounts that were promised. This must not continue.

Legally binding arrangements and monitoring of the agreement

4.11

The EESC agrees with the EU statement that a legally binding agreement provides the crucial basis for a global level playing field and the implementation of key decisions.

4.12

The advantages of a legally binding agreement would be, inter alia:

that it would send a clear political signal from all governments to business and investors, and also to the general public, that the goal of a low carbon economy is shared by the entire global community,

that it would provide a long-term and predictable framework, which encourages investments in carbon reduction and adaptation technologies, in a cost effective way,

that transparency and accountability would be clearly specified, and

that investment would be available for the required measures, in other words it would create a direct link to the real economy.

4.13

Civil society expects that the new climate agreement will take into account its demands for the need for a just transition, taking into account human and employee rights, considering social consequences, including loss and damage and issues of adaptation to climate change, particularly in the poorest countries.

4.14

It is imperative that implementation of the decisions must be transparent and verifiable, and countries which do not comply with decisions should no longer be able to reap the benefits offered by the agreement.

4.15

The EESC acknowledges that the proposal by the Commission for dynamism through regular reviews could allow for the strengthening of mitigation commitments considering different national circumstances and evolving responsibilities.

Expectations of the EU’s role in global climate protection

4.16

In recent years, the EU has gained a good reputation around the world for its approach to climate change issues. The EESC believes it is important, not only in the negotiations but also by means of an active policy outside these negotiations, to continue to build trust in the fact that the purpose of establishing an ambitious climate protection policy is not, for example, to gain economic advantages over other nations or economic interest groups.

4.17

The EU should continue to lead by example in a credible way at global level: in politics and business, negotiation and change processes like this cannot work without ‘pioneers’ and ‘drivers’. It is important to stress that the EU can play this leading role in a credible way only if it is shown that climate policy and positive economic development go hand in hand.

4.18

On a positive note, it can be seen that many measures that were first introduced in the EU, and were by no means uncontroversial at the time, have now been adopted by other countries. Examples include subsidies for renewable energy sources, as well as the emissions trading system, which even China is making some use of now.

4.19

The EESC welcomes the fact that the EU High Representative, Frederica MOGHERINI, is focusing heavily on climate protection in her external policy, in the form of a climate diplomacy action plan (10). Likewise, President JUNCKER’s statement that he wants to make the EU the world number one in renewable energies — not just in the interests of protecting the climate, but also because it creates jobs and promotes energy security — is an important signal in the right direction.

4.20

The EU thus has something to show for itself at global level. It has, for example, demonstrated that economic growth can be decoupled from an increase in emissions. No economic area in the world has lower greenhouse gas emissions per unit of GDP than the EU. Many European businesses are frontrunners as far as energy and resource efficiency are concerned. This has a lot to do with the technological achievements, and thus the innovativeness, of European businesses; these have developed in response to the EU’s comparatively stringent environmental legislation.

4.21

Nonetheless, Europe still has a lot to do: the target of reducing CO2 emissions by 80-95 % by 2050 will not be reached with technological innovation alone. This is apparent, for example, in the transport sector, where innovation in exhaust technology has been, at least in part, quite simply offset by the increase in the number of vehicles and roads. Structural changes will thus be required — i.e. there needs to be much greater consistency than in the past between climate policy and other policies.

5.   The course of negotiations at COPs in recent years — and the real world outside the negotiations

5.1

The EESC has been following the climate negotiations for many years. It recognises how very important it is to reach a positive conclusion in Paris, but would also point out that the climate cannot be saved by decisions alone, but only by the implementation of practical measures.

5.2

The international community in Paris would no doubt find it easier to reach consensus if, for example, the common decisions from the Rio+20 conference had been, or were in the process of being, implemented — specifically, ‘phas[ing] out harmful and inefficient fossil fuel subsidies that encourage wasteful consumption and undermine sustainable development’ (11). Even then, it was already recognised that market-based instruments (such as carbon taxes, emissions trading systems, etc.) should be used, which the EESC considers to be appropriate (12). A new International Monetary Fund working paper (13) estimates the total of global direct and indirect subsidies for fossil fuels at an annual figure of USD 5,3 trillion (!), equating to more than USD 15 billion per day. Even with the envisaged Green Climate Fund amounting to USD 100 billion per year, the negative impact of these subsidies is not offset.

5.3

There are, however, huge gaps between political commitments and implementation which have shaken the confidence that civil society has in global political agreements. Paris must not reinforce these disappointments, but bring about a fundamental change.

5.4

However, it is also important for Europe to pay attention to developments occurring outside the ‘world of COP negotiations’, in the ‘world of real economic development’. For example:

At COP 20 in Lima, California and China signed an agreement providing for close cooperation between these powerful economic blocs on renewable energy, electromobility and energy efficiency measures. There are no such strategic cooperation agreements with Europe,

China and the USA have headed the list of countries with the highest investment in renewable energy for several years now. In 2013, investment in renewable energy amounted to USD 54,2 billion in China, USD 33,9 billion in the USA, and USD 28,6 billion in Japan. The United Kingdom was fourth, with USD 12,1 billion, and Germany was fifth with USD 9,9 billion. Particularly in Germany and Italy, investment in this area has fallen considerably (14).

Global competitiveness, carbon leakage and/or low carbon leakage

5.5

In terms of ‘today’, not all the decisions that need to be taken to achieve the objectives of the framework convention on climate change will result solely in win-win situations. It is therefore quite right to highlight the difficulties there will be in reconciling, where at all possible, the COP’s decisions with short-term national or sectoral (economic) interests.

5.6

This will not always be possible, as there will obviously be sectors that will have no role, or a much smaller one, to play in the new low carbon economy, and will therefore lose out from the necessary structural changes. It does nobody any good to hide this fact; these sectors, and the people and regions concerned, have a right to know how politicians intend to handle these changes to ensure that they are socially responsible and cause as little disruption as possible. These difficulties must, however, also not be an excuse for not taking action today: it will be cheaper to act today to promote the transition to a low carbon economy than to repair the damage in the future (15).

5.7

The issue of opening up future markets, e.g. in renewable energy (RE) or efficiency technologies, is vitally important for Europe’s future competitiveness. Of course, the voices in Europe warning of ‘carbon leakage’ and urging Europe not to forge ahead too quickly on its own need to be taken seriously.

5.8

But Europe is not on its own any more — it has global competition. We therefore now also need to address ‘low carbon leakage’, in other words the risk that Europe could lose its past technological, and thus economic, lead in renewable energy and so on.

5.9

This may happen very quickly. In the field of renewable energy, Europe has been left behind when it comes to battery storage technology. China and California have taken the lead in electromobility, and the cheapest solar panels in the world are made in China; this cannot be attributed to wage dumping to any significant extent. Significantly higher public and private investments are urgently required in the R & D sector.

5.10

The present lack of a global level playing field constitutes a remarkable challenge for European businesses competing globally. Sectors such as steel, paper and chemical industries, where there is specific global interdependence, are still economically important today. In the EU, the climate impacts from manufacturing industries decreased by 31 % between 1990 and 2012 thanks to technology development (16).

5.11

It is not likely that the role of these industries can be completely substituted with new ‘green’ industry branches by 2050. It would not serve the European economy or the world climate if these industries were forced to move production outside the EU without reductions in global emissions.

5.12

The extent of this carbon leakage is often debated. It can be direct, moving factories and production overseas as a direct response to new political measures. But it can also be more indirect, shown through increasing investments overseas while keeping EU production for the time being. This is far more common in global companies today, driven by many production factors. As the products from these types of ‘old industries’ are globally increasing, balanced incentives need to be created that also foster low carbon technologies in such EU industries without lowering their relative competitiveness.

5.13

EU industry and trade must help contribute to lowering impact from their businesses in keeping with the target of minus 80-95 % by 2050. The roadmap towards this target might however be different between the industries and businesses. EU industry and trade can contribute to the global target by creating, producing and exporting products and services that help other countries to lower their emissions. As long as this is done with lower climate impact in Europe than other places, this could mean that higher total emissions could be accepted in the short run, without however calling into question the 2050 European reduction target. It should therefore be examined whether such EU roadmaps are useful for each industry branch.

5.14

The problems of ‘carbon leakage’ or ‘low carbon leakage’ mentioned above are not part of the COP negotiations. Therefore the EU needs to ensure at all levels that, for example, market-based mechanisms are put in place that take account of, among other things, product-based emissions relating to global trade. Further steps have to be taken to deal with ‘carbon leakage’, such as border carbon adjustment, a system aimed at reducing CO2 emissions while ensuring a level playing field. Under this system, the price of imported goods will be increased at the border on the basis of a calculation of the mass emissions for those goods. Models in a recent study show that border carbon adjustment can substantially reduce carbon leakage in relevant sectors (17).

5.15

However, border carbon adjustments in the form currently being discussed are not welcomed by some of Europe’s major trading partners. This issue has to be negotiated in the WTO. The treaty allows the consideration of such ‘non-trade’ issues. The difficulty of doing this in the absence of a global agreement on carbon pricing should not be underestimated. The concerns may be addressed through better BCA design. The bottom line is that border carbon tax adjustment is not an anti-dumping tool but a contribution to a worldwide sustainable climate policy, if well designed (18).

5.16

In concrete terms, this means, for example, that provision should be made for relevant mechanisms in the TTIP or CETA negotiations.

What would the (partial) failure of the negotiations mean?

5.17

In the comments that follow, the EESC would like to point out that even the failure or partial failure of the COP 21 negotiations would by no means mark the end of climate protection efforts — though it would be regrettable and a major setback. We would not have the clarity and predictability that a binding agreement would provide, and which would be highly desirable for the economy and society in general and would give new impetus. However, in reality, the battle for future markets in green technologies started a long time ago, and it is a battle that Europe needs to fight, whether or not COP 21 produces results.

5.18

As is well known, climate protection is not the only argument justifying moves towards a low carbon economy. The nascent scarcity of fossil fuels, the issue of energy security, and the fact that in many areas RE technologies already produce cheaper energy than conventional fuels are all clear signposts down a path that we cannot turn back from.

6.   The role of civil society

6.1

Just as the EESC, on the one hand, supports the positions set out in the Commission communication on the Paris Protocol, it finds it incomprehensible, on the other, that the communication lacks any strategy for how the Commission intends to communicate its positions to civil society, or to organise with it the subsequent implementation of the decisions taken. For the EESC, the Commission clearly has an obligation, as far as its climate policy strategy is concerned, to enter into a structured dialogue with civil society and in particular with the representative institutional committees.

6.2

Civil society has at least three key roles. First, it must help to monitor the political negotiation process and exert societal pressure to ensure that not only are the abovementioned binding decisions taken, but that those decisions are also in line with environmental, economic and social expectations.

6.2.1

Negotiations — such as the COP — are thus necessary only because there are different views within the international community regarding urgency, scope, financing, accountability, etc. Were there to be consensus, there would be no need for negotiations. Even within civil society, there were (and still are) different positions. However, the latest COPs have shown that it is certainly no longer ‘only’ environmentalists, development groups, women’s organisations and representatives of indigenous peoples — to name just a few of the stakeholders — who are calling for rigorous climate protection efforts, but also a broad-based global civil society movement.

6.2.2

We also particularly need to acknowledge the strong commitment of the (global) trade union movement and of many economic interest groups and businesses over many years — for example, the work of the ITUC and the World Business Council for Sustainable Development. It is recognised that a resource-efficient and climate-friendly economy opens up new opportunities for economic development.

6.2.3

COP 20 in Lima was an impressive demonstration of this on both sides, by both employers and employees, but also civil society as a whole, which shows the politicians responsible that very broad sections of society want more than has so far come out of the negotiations politically.

6.2.4

Even in regions and municipalities, climate protection work has taken on a whole new dimension. They too recognise not only that there is a need to prevent further damage to certain regions and to the people living and working there, but also that opportunities are emerging to create new value chains, which should be taken advantage of.

6.3

The second role of civil society is to be actively involved in implementing climate protection decisions. In the EESC’s view, the policy in this respect needs to be reinvented in strategic terms, it should make such participation possible and it should move towards much closer involvement.

6.3.1

For example, it was crystal clear from the EESC’s investigation into the extent to which civil society is involved in implementing the European Renewables Directive that a broad swathe of civil society, including many SMEs, want to be directly involved in, for example, the form of civic energy projects, so that they themselves can benefit from the new economic opportunities in their regions.

6.3.2

The success of the ‘energy transition’ in Denmark and Germany, for example, is very much based on the fact that individuals, farmers, municipalities, cooperatives and small businesses are involved in energy production and benefit from it economically. However, opportunities to get involved here have been systematically made worse by the Commission, rather than better.

6.4

Thirdly, apart from monitoring the process and helping implement decisions, civil society can also help by spreading good practices and knowledge of positive developments in businesses. It is especially important to focus on those economic areas where there seems to be a common misconception that ‘nothing is done, emissions just keep growing’, such as transport or industrial processes. Political decisions can be more relevant if the incentives are based on knowledge of current or anticipated developments in technology and business models. This civil society task can be carried out by means of conferences and information sharing that show the broad approach of commitment from the private sector, not least in the EU Member States.

6.5

The strategic role of civil society will barely feature in the COP discussions, which makes it all the more important for politicians to coordinate with civil society outside the COP process and to develop appropriate strategies.

6.6

The EU is lagging significantly behind here. For example, the Committee finds it regrettable that neither the EU’s 2030 climate and energy package nor the proposal on a European Energy Union contain any concrete ideas for getting civil society involved.

6.7

The EESC recommends that the Commission, the Council and the European Parliament finally engage in intensive and structured dialogue, so that society’s fundamental willingness to develop new mechanisms is not jeopardised. The new climate policy cannot and must not be imposed ‘from above’, but needs to be based on broad support from all stakeholders and to be implemented ‘from below’.

Brussels, 2 July 2015.

The President of the European Economic and Social Committee

Henri MALOSSE


(1)  i.e. man-made.

(2)  i.e. man-made.

(3)  http://de.statista.com/statistik/daten/studie/311924/umfrage/treibhausgasemissionen-weltweit/

(4)  The parties are already required to publish regular reports including information on current greenhouse gas emissions and trends.

(5)  COM(2015) 81 final, 25.2.2015.

(6)  University of Maryland, see: www.tagesschau.de/ausland/klimaindex104.html

(7)  The INDCs should be submitted by the end of March 2015. As at 17 May 2015, only Switzerland, the EU, Norway, Mexico, the USA, Gabon, Russia, Liechtenstein, Andorra and Canada had submitted their INDCs.

(8)  See: http://www.futurejustice.org/

(9)  See EESC opinion on a Policy framework for climate and energy in the period from 2020 to 2030 (NAT/636), points 1.2 and 1.3.

(10)  Discussed at the Foreign Affairs Council meeting on 19 January 2015, 5411/15.

(11)  See point 225 of the outcome document.

(12)  See EESC opinion ‘Market-based instruments towards a resource efficient and low carbon economy in the EU’ (NAT/620) (OJ C 226, 16.7.2014, p. 1), points 1.3, 1.7 and 1.8.

(13)  IMF Working Paper ‘How Large are Global Energy Subsidies?’ (WP/15/105).

(14)  Germany: USD 30,6 billion in 2011, USD 22,8 billion in 2012, to USD 9,9 billion in 2013. Italy: USD 28 billion in 2011 (fourth in the world at the time), USD 14,7 billion in 2012, to EUR 3,6 billion in 2013 (now 10th in the world).

(15)  Reference to the World Resource Institute’s study Better Growth, Better Climate: the New Climate Economy Report.

(16)  EEA: Annual European Union greenhouse gas inventory 1990-2012 and inventory report 2014.

(17)  See EESC opinion ‘Market-based instruments towards a resource efficient and low carbon economy in the EU’ (NAT/620) (OJ C 226, 16.7.2014, p. 1), point 3.5.

(18)  See footnote 17.


17.11.2015   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 383/84


Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on the ‘Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee, the Committee of the Regions and the European Investment Bank on A Framework Strategy for a Resilient Energy Union with a Forward-Looking Climate Change Policy’

(COM(2015) 80 final)

and the

‘Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on Achieving the 10 % electricity interconnection target — Making Europe’s electricity grid fit for 2020’

(COM(2015) 82 final)

(2015/C 383/12)

Rapporteur:

Ms Ulla SIRKEINEN

Co-rapporteur:

Mr Pierre COULON

On 9 March and 25 March 2015 the European Commission decided to consult the European Economic and Social Committee, under Article 304 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, on the

Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee, the Committee of the Regions and the European Investment Bank on A Framework Strategy for a Resilient Energy Union with a Forward-Looking Climate Change Policy

(COM(2015) 80 final), and the

Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on Achieving the 10 % electricity interconnection target — Making Europe’s electricity grid fit for 2020

(COM(2015) 82 final).

The Section for Transport, Energy, Infrastructure and the Information Society, which was responsible for preparing the Committee’s work on the subject, adopted its opinion on 16 June 2015.

At its 509th plenary session, held on 1 and 2 July 2015 (meeting of 1 July), the European Economic and Social Committee adopted the following opinion unanimously by 100 votes.

1.   Conclusions and recommendations

The EESC concludes that

1.1

EU energy policy has been partly successful in particular in increasing the use of renewable energy and increasing consumer choice. Still most energy policy issues are treated mainly as national interests.

1.2

Challenges have increased: risks for security of gas supply; increased energy costs which harm consumers and weaken industrial competitiveness; effects of high shares of intermittent renewable energy on the electricity system stability.

1.3

Massive investments are needed to secure energy supply in Europe. Investors need a political framework as predictable and reliable as possible.

1.4

In order to deliver what Europeans expect energy has to be tackled in a more coherent way. Cooperation between Member States and a fully functioning internal energy market are inevitable.

1.5

The proposal for a European Energy Union is endorsed and its implementation is urgent. This could lead to making free movement of energy the fifth EU freedom!

The EESC recommends that

1.6

The success of the initiative would require a clearer message — a leading vision — on what European citizens and enterprises will gain from the Energy Union.

1.7

Alongside security of supply and sustainability, a high priority should be action on energy costs to citizens and enterprises. Where increases in final electricity prices are due to political action, correction can be rightfully expected.

1.8

Energy should become a central part of the EU’s external policies in face of increasing competition for energy sources and the need to diversify sources of supply.

1.9

When preparing proposals for reviews of different strands of energy legislation, as proposed in the roadmap and supported by the EESC, the Commission should avoid inconsistencies and increasing costs, but rather try to simplify processes.

1.10

Methods to activate consumers should be developed in cooperation with consumers themselves, including innovative use of ICT. Energy poverty should be addressed primarily by social policy measures.

1.11

In tapping the big potential of energy efficiency gains in buildings and transport, in particular, innovative funding ideas are in demand.

1.12

A structural reform of the EU emissions trading scheme (EU ETS) is needed, while measures in the non-ETS sectors are just as important.

1.13

Until a global level playing field is a reality the problem of carbon leakage must be taken very seriously. Best industrial performers need to be fully compensated for direct and indirect cost increases.

1.14

Development of renewable energy, including bioenergy, needs support but this should not increase user costs.

1.15

Solving future energy challenges requires strengthened R&I financing. Dealing with energy as a production input as efficiently and sustainably as possible offers a broad potential for growth and jobs in the EU.

1.16

A new energy policy governance must ensure coherence between different aspects of energy as well as fulfilment of EU-level targets. The supporting European Energy Dialogue (EED), proposed by the EESC, should be activated without delay.

1.17

Measures to increase the interconnection of electricity grids must be urgently implemented, including faster approval processes. Whether an equal target for all is really viable could be explored.

2.   Introduction

2.1

Energy policy in the EU has three main objectives: security of supply, sustainability and competitiveness. EU legislation covers energy markets as well as environmental and climate aspects of energy. EU finance supports energy R&D and infrastructure development. Efficiency of energy use is by nature to a large extent a local or national responsibility, with internal market aspects to be observed. The Treaties give Member States the right to decide on the use of their energy resources and their energy mix.

2.2

Energy policies in Europe have been partly successful. Targets (20-20-20 by 2020) set for decreasing greenhouse gas emissions and increasing the use of renewable energy sources seem to be met ahead of time and energy efficiency seems to develop almost to the target, albeit partly due to the economic downturn. Markets have been opened and consumer choice increased. Still, in practice energy policy is treated mainly as a national issue. EU legislation has been slowly or incompletely implemented, a real functioning internal market has not been achieved. At EU and national levels, policies on different aspects of energy have been fragmented and often unbalanced.

2.3

To amend this, in 2010 the Notre Europe-Jacques Delors Institute proposed the formation of a European Energy Community. This initiative was actively supported by the EESC.

2.4

Recently new energy challenges have risen to the forefront. Concerns over security of energy supply are acute in some Member States. Consumers, especially the vulnerable, suffer from increased energy costs in the face of the economic downturn. Industry struggles for competitiveness against lower energy prices in competing regions and if industrial decline in many Member States together with carbon leakage continues, not only jobs and growth, but also the energy transition itself is in danger. In spite of great successes in the field of renewable energy, Europe is in danger of losing its frontrunner position. In some countries an ever higher share of renewables leads to management problems in the electricity system and traditional energy production is becoming increasingly unprofitable. Investments of the magnitude of EUR 2  000 billion are needed according to the Commission (1) between 2020 and 2030 to secure energy supply, including generation and grid investments, independently of the question as to whether conventional or alternative fuel sources are used.

3.   The Communications from the Commission

3.1

The new Commission under Jean-Claude JUNCKER has made energy policy one of its ten priority areas. In October 2014 the European Council set policy targets for energy and climate policy up to 2030: a decrease of at least 40 % of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions from the 1990 level, at least a 27 % share of renewable energy and at least 27 % better energy efficiency.

3.2

On 25 February 2015 the Commission presented its Communication on a Framework Strategy for a Resilient Energy Union with a Forward-Looking Climate Change Policy  (2). The strategy has five mutually reinforcing and interrelated dimensions designed to bring greater energy security, sustainability and competitiveness:

energy security, solidarity and trust,

a fully integrated European energy market,

energy efficiency contributing to moderation of demand,

decarbonising the economy, and

research, innovation and competitiveness.

3.3

The strategy presents the Commission’s overall vision of an Energy Union. Based on brief descriptions of challenges in the five dimensions, it proposes fifteen action points. An appended roadmap lists the Commission’s planned actions, covering mainly this year and 2016. Most of these are revisions of existing legislation.

3.4

In the same package the Commission published a Communication on Achieving the 10 % electricity interconnection target — Making Europe’s electricity grid fit for 2020  (3) and a Communication on The Paris Protocol — A blueprint for tackling global climate change beyond 2020  (4).

4.   General remarks

4.1

The Committee sees the European Commission’s initiative for a European Energy Union as akin to the earlier idea of a European Energy Community, and consequently endorses this initiative.

4.2

In order to be able to deliver on the massive needs, investors need as soon as possible a predictable and reliable legislative framework from 2020 onwards. The action points and the roadmap presented by the Commission do not include big changes, but reviewing and updating of present legislation. What matters most is implementation. It is now of utmost importance that the swiftness of the timetable is not deviated from. Naturally it is of equal importance that neither the Parliament nor the Council drag their feet on these issues.

4.3

The success of this initiative would however, in the view of the EESC, require a clearer message — a leading vision — on what European citizens and enterprises will gain from the Energy Union. This vision should be kept at the top of the minds of all decision makers involved.

4.4

Many stakeholders are concerned about inconsistent legislation and interference in too many aspects of the energy economy. In order to deliver what Europeans expect, in particular in relation to new challenges, energy has to be tackled in a more coherent way. This applies to the different policy goals and areas as well as national vs. wider common EU interests.

4.5

The EESC is convinced that cooperation between Member States and a fully functioning internal energy market are inevitable to achieve energy policy goals. More renewable energy sources are needed to reduce external dependence and emissions. It is already obvious that an electricity system with bigger shares of intermittent renewables may function better in a bigger than national market. Back-up, peak and (gas) storage costs are also lower on a bigger market.

4.6

Alongside security of supply and sustainability, a high priority should be action on energy costs to citizens and enterprises. When citizens feel more and more alienated from the EU and are distressed by the economic slowdown, energy costs are undoubtedly an important concern. The same is true for enterprises, in particular SMEs, and their workers competing on international markets.

4.7

Where the increases in end energy prices, in particular for electricity, are mainly due to political decisions on taxes and charges, correction of this can be rightfully expected. The Commission should go ahead with its plans on reviewing prices and guiding support measures. At the same time the Commission should explain what the price effects of the planned changes in the emissions trading system and the promised abolition of subsidies for environmentally harmful energy sources (5) will be.

5.   Specific remarks

Energy security, solidarity and trust

5.1

The EESC agrees with the Commission that key drivers of security of supply are the completion of the internal energy market and more efficient energy consumption. In addition the international geopolitical scene merits much more attention. Global competition for energy resources will intensify, and this as well as diversification of supply of energy to the EU should be central parts of the EU external and trade policy actions.

5.2

Diversification of energy sources is largely a matter of national energy mix and supply choices. The EU can and should support infrastructure development. Gas supply is now under special attention. The development of gas demand in the EU should be thoroughly explored, and projections for infrastructure investments should be adapted to this. More attention should be directed to other energy sources, like indigenous ones.

5.3

It should be obvious for Member States that they have an interest in closer cooperation and exchange of information in a market — gas or other — where they are faced with a dominant supplier or a cartel. Cooperation should however not hinder the market from working. Solidarity is to be expected between Member States but this can only be based on trust and respect of common commitments and rules. The problems of energy islands require special attention, including the specificities of islands as compared with the mainland.

A fully integrated internal energy market

5.4

Updating electricity and gas networks is of key importance for the realisation of the Energy Union. The issue of electricity interconnection will be discussed in chapter 6 based on the Communication on this subject.

5.5

Energy, especially electricity markets, suffers from incomplete implementation of the relevant directives and still weak cooperation between transmission system operators and national regulators. The EESC supports the Commission’s proposals on these issues, but warns against increasing administrative burdens and costs.

5.6

The links between wholesale and retail markets are weak, or at least obscure — more transparency is needed for pricing. Insufficient price signals for investments and lack of demand side flexibility seem to be key issues. Challenges are the increased share of renewables and the question of overcapacity versus the need for balance and peak capacity. A review of relevant regulation is needed, but in drafting the Commission should avoid increased user costs while supporting solutions conducive to trans-border markets.

5.7

Electricity and gas markets have increasingly already developed into de facto regional markets of neighbouring countries. This is a welcome development, on the way to EU-wide markets, and should be supported by rule-makers. In particular, good practices and experiences should be shared between regions and, indeed, the EU. Here, too, more administrative burdens must be avoided.

5.8

It is in everybody’s interest to activate the consumers in the energy markets, but this cannot be done by force. Carefully chosen methods, in particular innovative use of ICT, need to be developed in cooperation with the consumers themselves in order to tap the potential lying in demand response and thereby cost reduction.

5.9

Vulnerable consumers are even more vulnerable in today’s economic situation in many Member States. The EESC agrees with the Commission’s thinking of primarily supporting these consumers by sufficient social policy measures. The observatory of energy poverty, proposed by the Committee earlier, would help to identify real needs.

Energy efficiency as a contribution to the moderation of energy demand

5.10

On energy efficiency, the EESC agrees with the Commission that most of the work has to be done nationally and locally. Successful EU measures in this area have been labelling and eco-design rules, which need to be reviewed regularly.

5.11

The EESC welcomes the Commission’s intention to present proposals to ensure that efficiency measures and demand side response could compete on equal terms in the energy market, provided this is designed to meet users’ real interests.

5.12

The EESC agrees that in the building and transport sectors the energy efficiency — or actually saving — potential is big and should be tapped by carefully designed measures. For instance energy certification and building material labelling systems would need reviews. Innovative funding ideas are in demand.

Decarbonisation of the economy

5.13

The EESC is preparing a separate Opinion on the ‘road to Paris’. The EESC mainly supports the EU efforts on this absolutely crucial road to achieving sufficient global legally binding commitments.

5.14

The EESC also supports, as in earlier opinions, the structural reform proposals of the EU emissions trading scheme (EU ETS). Just as important are the decisions on future, mainly national, measures in the non-ETS sectors.

5.15

Until a global level playing field is a reality, the problem of carbon leakage must be taken very seriously by the EU. Energy intensive industries under threat of carbon leakage must be secured compensation for both direct and indirect cost increases of the EU ETS in relation to their GHG efficiency, fully compensating best performers. For the indirect compensations an EU-wide frame is needed to avoid distortion of competition within the EU.

5.16

The EESC warmly supports the objective to ensure the EU as global number one on renewable energy. Support measures are needed, but they should be in line with competition and market rules, be market based and avoid increasing end user prices of energy. Support to mature and competitive technologies should be phased out. In these respects the EESC supports the Commission’s efforts.

5.17

In addition to renewables the development of all kinds of decarbonisation technologies and solutions — clean tech — should be an EU goal.

5.18

The EESC supports the Commission’s view that the EU needs investments in the plant-based bio-economy as an important source of non-intermittent renewable energy. In preparing plans for this area, impact on the environment, land use and food production have to be taken into account. Also hydropower has potential to offer.

An Energy Union for Research, Innovation and Competitiveness

5.19

The EESC supports the proposed new strategy for R&I but repeats its view from earlier opinions that more resources are needed to solve future energy challenges. The Committee emphasises the need, in particular, to stimulate private funding by using EU measures and to be more involved in global R&D cooperation.

5.20

EU competitiveness is, however, not only about being best at energy- and climate-related technologies. It is just as much, or even more, about dealing with energy as a production input as efficiently and sustainably as possible, better than the competitors. This is a broader and more secure way to ensure growth and more jobs in Europe.

5.21

Transition is eminent in all sectors of the economy. The EESC underlines its strong view that transition has to be just and fair. Training and life-long learning are key measures for success. Social dialogue at EU and national levels has a central role on this road.

Energy Union Governance

5.22

The EESC fully supports the Commission’s efforts to ensure coherence between different aspects of energy policy and coordination between Member States. The new governance must also aim at ensuring fulfilment of EU level targets for 2030. However more planning or reporting obligations should not be put upon Member States, instead present requirements must be streamlined.

5.23

The EESC is pleased to see that its initiative for an energy dialogue with stakeholders has been taken on board by the Commission. A detailed action plan on this is now expected.

6.   Remarks on the communication on achieving the 10 % interconnection target

6.1

Increased shares of renewable, intermittent electricity requires more network capacity, as does the goal of reducing costs for peak and back-up capacity. The need for more interconnection capacity is in many cases obvious, even pressing. It is astonishing that in so many cases the 10 % target is so far from being reached. The proposed measures in the Communication are welcomed. The EESC has earlier commented on this issue, including in a recent own-initiative opinion on European cooperation in energy networks.

6.2

The approach by Projects of Common Interest seems to be appropriate. It also seems effective to give priority to financing of projects that will most significantly increase the interconnection capacity from present levels below 10 %. But it also seems reasonable to take into account the economic situation in the countries in question.

6.3

Full implementation of the TEN-E regulation is urgent. Efforts to shorten approval procedures are most necessary. Furthermore, this is an area where all possibilities to smoothen and speed up processes by involving local stakeholders early should be explored. The EESC has for this purpose, inter alia, proposed to set up the European Energy Dialogue. This should be taken into account when developing the proposal of an Energy Infrastructure Forum.

6.4

Still, it could be explored as to whether an equal target for all Member States, irrespective of size, energy mix, neighbourhood etc., is really viable. A levelled electricity price could be used as an indicator of sufficient interconnector capacity.

Brussels, 1 July 2015.

The President of the European Economic and Social Committee

Henri MALOSSE


(1)  COM(2014) 903 final.

(2)  COM(2015) 80 final.

(3)  COM(2015) 82 final.

(4)  COM(2015) 81 final.

(5)  These are estimated by the International Monetary Fund at EUR 330 bn per annum.


17.11.2015   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 383/91


Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee — ‘Towards a new European neighbourhood policy’

(JOIN(2015) 6 final)

(2015/C 383/13)

Rapporteur:

Gintaras MORKIS

Co-Rapporteur:

Cristian PIRVULESCU

On 10 June 2015, the European Commission decided to consult the European Economic and Social Committee, under Article 304 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, on

Towards a new European neighbourhood policy

(JOIN(2015) 6 final).

The Section for External Relations, which was responsible for preparing the Committee’s work on the subject, adopted its opinion on 11 June 2015.

At its 509th plenary session, held on 1—2 July 2015 (meeting of 1 July 2015), the European Economic and Social Committee adopted the following opinion by 108 votes to 1 with 2 abstentions.

1.   Conclusions and recommendations

1.1

The European Commission and the European External Action Service (EEAS) have initiated a public discussion on the new European neighbourhood policy (ENP). The European Economic and Social Committee (EESC) welcomes this re-examination of the ENP and considers it to be a timely, crucially important review.

1.2

The EESC notes that the current ENP does not reflect reality in the EU’s neighbourhood and it has faced a lot of challenges, which were not properly addressed. Fundamental changes to the ENP mechanism and instruments are needed.

1.3

The ENP countries have differing foreign policy priorities and ambitions for their relationship with the EU. The EESC therefore stresses the need to apply the principles of differentiation and flexibility. The EESC notes that the southern and eastern geographical scope of the ENP should be maintained, but that policies concerning relationships should be developed and improved. Some current ENP countries should be seen as genuine partners of the EU, others as neighbours. At the same time, the EESC emphasises that the acceptance of democratic values and respect for human rights should be applicable to all states, as applying double standards would demoralise other ENP countries.

1.4

In its Joint Consultation Paper Towards a new Neighbourhood Policy, the European Commission raised many questions. However, in this opinion the EESC will focus on the most important of them: civil society’s positions, both in the EU and in partner states.

1.5

The EESC welcomes the recent consultations with southern partners held in Barcelona, the informal ministerial meeting on the future of ENP (Barcelona, 13 April 2015) — where participants reaffirmed their intention to work together to create an area of prosperity and good neighbourliness in the Mediterranean — and the Joint Declaration of the Eastern Partnership (EaP) Summit (Riga, 21—22 May 2015) — where participants renewed their commitment to further strengthening democracy, the rule of law, human rights and fundamental freedoms, as well as to upholding the principles and norms of international law. It is important that the EU remains committed to supporting the territorial integrity, as well as the independence and sovereignty of all its partners.

1.6

The EESC suggests that the new ENP should focus on activities that strive to increase human security and the stability of the EU’s neighbourhood, as well as activities which create better economic and social conditions — and prosperity — in the ENP partner states. The main objective of the renewed ENP should be to ensure the security of the people and to secure their prospect of leading a dignified and prosperous life in their country, free of violence, oppression and poverty. The ENP should actively engage in confidence-building measures and post-conflict action.

1.7

The EESC emphasises that better employment, a sustainable and openly functioning economy, attracting foreign investment, effective and accessible public services and social protection provide a basis for stability, security and even democratisation. Alongside the two major initiatives which contain the main drivers for further integrating ENP countries with the EU, namely trade liberalisation (which mainly consists of association agreements — AA and deep and comprehensive free trade areas — DCFTAs) and mobility and visa facilitation (or visa liberalisation for some countries), the EESC sees education and professional training (especially for young people) as the third initiative of major importance within the new ENP.

1.8

The EESC suggests that the ENP must not dissociate from the common foreign and security policy (CFSP) and the common security and defence policy (CSDP). At the same time, while assessing the interests and reactions of stakeholders beyond the ENP area, the EU should stand firm, ensuring that no one can impose their will on independent states, or dictate the agenda or objectives of the EU and the ENP countries.

1.9

The EU should work more closely with other international organisations, such as NATO and the UN, to defend the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of all ENP countries. Better diplomacy and communication outside the ENP area (especially with civil society) is needed as a confrontation-prevention instrument and in order to generate mutually beneficial relations that lead to economic progress and improved living standards.

1.10

The EESC calls for the management of mobility and migration by promoting the solidarity of Member States, as a part of EU’s global approach. Partnerships with ENP and other countries are important tools for addressing the significant challenges that this policy faces. The EU should act swiftly and in a coordinated manner to solve the humanitarian situation in the Mediterranean.

1.11

The EESC stresses that visa facilitation and liberalisation remains a key initiative from the ENP partners’ point of view. The EESC welcomes negotiations on a readmission agreement with Morocco and the start of negotiations on a visa facilitation agreement. It is looking forward to negotiations on visa facilitation and readmission agreements with Tunisia and Jordan. Visa liberalisation (with Moldova) and visa facilitation agreements, (with Ukraine, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia) should be fully implemented and should become successful examples for all ENP countries.

1.12

The EESC suggests that civil society’s role be further enhanced in three main ways: by empowering civil society, rendering it better able to support stabilisation and democratisation processes; by including civil society organisations more in ENP-related commitments and activities and finally, by making better use of European civil society’s expertise and resources to support the development of civil society in the ENP countries.

1.13

The EESC calls for compliance with fundamental human and social rights — in particular, freedom of association and the right to collective bargaining — to be fully recognised. Social dialogue should also be encouraged in both the eastern and southern dimensions of the ENP. The EESC calls for the independence of the social partners and civil society organisations (CSOs) to be respected.

1.14

The EESC emphasises that it is important to encourage cultural (as well as economic and political) institutions for dialogue and consensus building. In the EESC’s view, stabilisation and democratisation in the ENP countries depend on the viability of cultural and religious models, which should be tolerant and inclusive.

1.15

The EESC suggests that the EU send a clear signal to ENP citizens, indicating that the policy is for their people, their security and their welfare. Co-ownership at civil society level should become a priority throughout the whole EU. A review of the ENP must encourage better communication on EU interests and values, both within the EU and in the partner countries.

2.   The challenges for ENP

2.1

The EU needs cooperative neighbours to feel secure and prosperous itself. The ENP ambitiously aimed to encourage neighbouring countries to implement political and economic reforms, in exchange for receiving access to EU markets, greater mobility and financial support. Heightened security challenges and geopolitical shocks in the EU’s neighbourhood further emphasised the importance of a stable, democratic and prosperous neighbourhood area.

2.2

Dramatic changes in the EU neighbourhood also pose a threat to EU countries. The implementation of the Eastern Partnership (EaP) provoked Russia’s aggressive policy not only towards the EU’s neighbours, but also towards EU Member States — particularly the Nordic and central and eastern European countries. Violent conflicts in Syria, Iraq, and Libya have led to a humanitarian crisis and terrorism risks that may also spill over into the EU.

2.3

The EU must recognise its role and influence on ENP countries and their neighbours — which contributed to political and social disturbances and galvanised the interest of certain stakeholders beyond the borders of the ENP countries. The Arab Spring and its consequences and the Ukrainian crisis should be seen as proof that the EU has a significant impact on social and political processes. The EU has contributed to people’s awareness and has increased their aspirations with regard to their governments; the EU, at least in part, has woken the civil powers which initiate political activities.

2.4

At the same time, the ENP has had some disappointments, both in the EU and the ENP countries. Therefore, fundamental changes are needed to revise the ENP and its instruments, which should be based on the principles of differentiation and flexibility. The southern and eastern geographical scope of the ENP should be maintained, but policies on relationships should be developed and improved. The ENP should encourage all neighbouring countries to become real partners for dialogue and cooperation.

3.   Principal pillars of the new ENP

3.1    Economy and prosperity

3.1.1

The EESC notes that improving relations between the EU and ENP countries will depend on four conditions: stability, transparency, free market rules and a long-term strategy. The revised ENP should concentrate on creating conditions for sustainable economic and social developments in the ENP countries. Better employment and an openly functioning economy create high added value for society as a whole, thereby providing a basis for stability, security and even democratisation. The EU should focus more on better-financed instruments that provide support for the economic adjustments that will be necessary to enhance competitiveness, initiatives for sustainable business investment and the adjustments to economic production which aim to generate higher quality employment. Special attention should be paid to the economic empowerment of young people, women and marginalised groups. Economic growth and employment initiatives must receive adequate funding and be accompanied by tailor-made programmes. The implementation of such programmes could draw on good practices from the initiative for social cohesion programme relating to the stability pact for south-eastern Europe (1).

3.1.2

Education and professional training would be the best long-term investment in economic growth and sustainable security. The EU should consider opportunities to extend the Erasmus+ programmes to allow ENP countries to increase their participation. These programmes provide the best mechanism for sharing EU academic and professional skills with the most advanced ENP partners. The EESC welcomes the first Erasmus+ international call launched in October 2014 and encourages the EU to extend opportunities for the ENP countries to take part, in addition to increasing financing for other educational and professional training instruments.

3.1.3

The EU should strive to complete a free trade area between the EU and all ENP countries. This can be considered a critical instrument for enhancing lasting economic and social prosperity. The EU should seek to integrate the ENP partners into the EU single market more actively; in particular by establishing DCFTAs as soon as the necessary conditions are met. ENP countries which prioritise further integration may focus on the AA/DCFTA signing process, while others could engage in alternative cooperation platforms (such as the European Energy Union, etc.). However, AAs/DCFTAs should not be viewed as an end in themselves, or as the only path available. Their value should be assessed in terms of their positive impact on sustainable economic development, innovation, stable employment and enhanced fiscal capacity in ENP countries.

3.1.4

The EESC welcomes the launch of the EU DCFTA facility for SMEs, which is dedicated to supporting SMEs from Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine, helping them to seize new trade opportunities arising from DCFTAs and reach higher quality standards in line with EU best practices. The 3rd EaP Business Forum (Riga, 21 May 2015) stressed that in order to benefit substantially from the AAs/DCFTAs, additional instruments to help businesses transform and adapt to higher standards should be provided. It also suggested that entrepreneurial activities and trade should be better promoted in the region.

3.1.5

The new ENP should make supporting reform of the public administration, justice, the security sector, legal regulation and effective implementation of legislation one of its most visible activities. Positive trends, such as increasing investment in ENP countries and enhancing cooperation between EU and ENP businesses, can only be generated by making visible progress in the fight against corruption and organised crime in the EU’s neighbourhood. All EU neighbouring countries are faced with widespread corruption. Despite efforts to curb it, it persists and penetrates all layers of public and private life. The EU should, therefore, as part of its financing programmes, improve the conditionality for credible anti-corruption measures and develop a robust mechanism to monitor implementation. Equal attention should be paid to enhancing the effectiveness, viability and accessibility of social, education and health services in ENP countries, as these are of vital importance to the quality of life and safety of people living in these countries.

3.2   Stability and security

3.2.1

Stability and human security should become the most critical ENP objective. The EESC believes that a safe and prosperous neighbourhood can be established only if human security in the region significantly increases. Quality of governance and respect for human rights, the absence of crime and physical danger, inclusive economic development and social and environmental protection are all factors that determine the stability of the region in the medium to long term. Instability in the EU neighbourhood and the lack of credibility that the ENP model and its instruments suffer from should not lead to a decline in ambition or a refusal of the EU’s commitments. Programmes and instruments for stability and conflict prevention should be among the new ENP’s highest priorities.

3.2.2

The EU should work more closely with other international organisations, such as NATO and the UN, to defend the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of all ENP countries. Better diplomacy and communication outside the ENP area (especially with civil society) is needed as a confrontation-prevention instrument and in order to generate mutually beneficial relations that lead to economic progress and improved living standards.

3.2.3

The ENP has a fundamental role to play in preventing radicalisation and fighting terrorism and organised crime. In addition to taking necessary and proportional measures to combat terrorism, the EU must use existing ENP instruments to address the structural determinants of its spread. Investment in education and economic opportunities is needed, together with measures to improve governance (2).

3.2.4

The new ENP should refer to harmonising ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ powers. The ENP must not be dissociated from the common foreign and security policy (CFSP) and the common security and defence policy (CSDP). The current review of the ENP should be closely linked to the revised EU security strategy.

3.2.5

The issue of ‘neighbours of neighbours’ is of the utmost importance. No one can impose their will on independent states, or dictate the agenda or objectives of the EU and the ENP countries. The EESC stresses that it would be more beneficial for Russia to get involved in efforts to create stable, democratic and economically advanced countries, rather than to confront the ENP countries that are pursuing further integration with the EU.

3.3

Mobility and migration

3.3.1

Visa facilitation remains a key initiative from the ENP partners’ point of view. The EESC welcomes negotiations on a readmission agreement with Morocco (launched in January 2015) and the start of negotiations on a visa facilitation agreement. It is looking forward to negotiations on visa facilitation and readmission agreements with Tunisia and Jordan. Visa liberalisation (with Moldova) and visa facilitation agreements, (with Ukraine, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia) should be fully implemented and should become a successful example for all ENP countries. The EESC sees visa liberalisation agreements with Ukraine and Georgia as a powerful tool, which encourages those states to integrate with EU more quickly. However their implementation should be accompanied by increased international support, to secure territorial integrity and control of the countries’ borders.

3.3.2

EU neighbourhood policy should be part of the global approach to migration and mobility. It is important that the EU stimulates immigration for the purposes of employment or education, via legal, flexible and transparent procedures (3).

3.3.3

In response to the recent events which led to a surge in migratory flows from northern Africa — flows which tragically resulted in a significant numbers of deaths — the EU should move urgently to protect the lives of those who intend to reach EU territory. The EU should commit to a more serious and far-reaching involvement with countries involved in these migratory flows — countries of origin and transit.

3.3.4

The EU should conclude agreements with third countries, especially neighbouring countries, immigrants’ countries of origin and transit countries, taking into consideration the specific circumstances in each country. Priorities set out in these mobility partnerships incorporate factors relating to economic migration and mobility. Greater priority should be given to organising legal migration and visa policy, the recognition of qualifications, educational mobility, social security rights, and migration and mobility’s contribution to development (4). A reform of Frontex is a priority, transforming it into a European body of border guards that supports Member States, and developing a more effective and standardised system of accountability for its activities (5).

3.4

Differentiation

3.4.1

The ENP should be re-formulated in order to apply the principle of differentiation more flexibly, both in terms of geography and — within the regions — in accordance with the aspirations of the ENP countries, civil liberties and human rights, institutional capacity and security needs. While supporting the differentiation principle, all the partner countries should commit to adhering to fundamental rights and the rule of law. The acceptance of democratic values and respect for human rights should be applicable to all states equally, as applying double standards would demoralise other ENP countries.

3.4.2

The EU remains interested in and committed to the principle of conditionality. The EESC emphasised the principles of differentiation and conditionality in its relations with partner countries (6). At the same time, the Committee expressed its desire to ensure that a ‘less for less’ approach would not undermine a country’s potential to implement reforms at its own preferred pace and in accordance with its absorption capacity. When national governments in ENP countries refrain from closer involvement with ENP instruments, EU ‘soft power’ should be directed towards civil society.

3.4.3

The ENP is distinct from the enlargement policy; however, European states are free to apply for EU membership if they satisfy the criteria and conditions of admission under Article 49 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. If the ENP inspires a European country to comply with the Copenhagen criteria, we should welcome such a result — gained through the ‘more for more’ approach.

4.   Focus on civil society and communication

4.1    Civil society

4.1.1

The role of civil society in developing the ENP should be re-evaluated and further enhanced. The Committee has named civil society’s activities; the state of human rights; economic, social and cultural rights and the protection of religious freedom as the essential criteria for assessing a country’s governance (7). Co-ownership at civil society level should become a priority throughout the whole EU. Cooperation instruments such as the Eastern Partnership Civil Society Forum (EaP Civil Society Forum) should be strengthened and extended.

4.1.2

There are three main directions that the reform should take, namely: empowering civil society, thereby rendering it better able to support stabilisation and democratisation processes; including civil society organisations more in ENP-related commitments and actions and finally, making better use of expertise and resources that European civil society can offer to support the development of civil society in the ENP countries.

4.1.3

As demonstrated during the transition to democracy in central and eastern Europe, civil society is a key player in the process of creating stability and democratisation. Using its instruments, the ENP should allocate significant resources to improving civil society’s organisational capacity and including it in governmental processes (8). A key aspect of this is to support social dialogue and institutionalised public consultation, as they are instruments which facilitate consensus building and democratic progress (9).

4.1.4

The EU should include clauses on the protection of democratic freedoms and individual rights in bilateral agreements, but crucially, with regard to their implementation, the EESC calls for the criteria for assessing a country’s governance to include benchmarks on the treatment of civil society (legislative framework, capacity building, dialogue etc.), human rights and economic, social and cultural rights (10).

4.1.5

The EESC calls for civil society to be more closely involved in drafting, implementing and monitoring agreements between the EU and the ENP countries (11). ENP progress reporting should not only reflect official government data and positions but should factor in wider contributions from governmental and non-governmental actors. The EESC believes that civil society from both the EU and partner countries should be involved in drawing up a sustainability impact assessment prior to the negotiations, and that civil society mechanisms should be included in the future DCFTAs (12).

4.1.6

The ENP instruments should be easily accessible to civil society organisations in the Member States and ENP states. They should encourage dialogue, commitment and an exchange of ideas. The EESC underlines that the social partners, civil society organisations and the economic and social councils of the Member States have a vital role to play in terms of sharing experiences and knowledge, disseminating information, benchmarking, transferring expertise, and managing administrative resources (13).

4.2    Social dialogue

4.2.1

The EESC has constantly stressed the importance of social dialogue for promoting economic development and democratisation. It has also highlighted the general success of the ENP (14). Social dialogue should be encouraged equally in both the eastern and southern dimensions of the ENP. The EESC calls for respect for the independence of social partners and civil society organisations (CSOs). This is one of the fundamental human and social rights defined by international and European organisations (15).

4.2.2

The EESC calls for adherence to these fundamental rights — in particular, freedom of association and the right to collective bargaining — to be fully recognised. It calls on the countries concerned to make the necessary effort to move towards integrating European and international norms, defined by the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, the European Social Charter (Council of Europe) and the International Labour Organisation (ILO) and establishing the ‘social rule of law’. Compliance with these norms must be included in the formal criteria used to draw up and evaluate association agreements (16).

4.2.3

Despite the fact that employers’ and workers’ organisations exist in all ENP countries, social dialogue — which has to play an important role if sustainable growth and social peace within society is to be achieved — has so far been rather weak in these countries. A systematic programme should be developed, with the aim of promoting exchanges of best practice drawn from experience in the area of social and employment policy, in the EU and the partner countries.

4.3    Cultural dialogue

4.3.1

The ENP should encourage greater understanding — both between ENP countries and between the EU and ENP countries — of each other’s cultures, religious dialogue and cultural diversity. In the long term creating stability and democratisation in the ENP countries also depends on the viability of cultural and religious models and how tolerant and inclusive they are.

4.3.2

It is important to encourage cultural — as well as political and economic — dialogue and consensus building. This should translate into effective, substantial financial and networking support for inter-cultural dialogue, independent cultural production and public debates. It should enhance the voice and visibility of independent thinkers, artists and activists from ENP countries and promote their productive interactions with domestic and European audiences.

4.4    Visibility and communication

4.4.1

A review of the ENP must serve as a stimulus to improve communication on EU interests and values, both within the EU and in the partner countries. This becomes particularly important when a wave of propaganda from terrorist groups and Russia is rising (17). The EU is obliged to send a clear signal to the ENP citizens that this policy is concerned with people, their security and welfare. This will require the creation of new instruments which can reach local authorities, the media, and NGOs.

4.4.2

General awareness is essential in order to evaluate and appreciate ENP influence for people’s needs. Freedom of expression, beliefs, media, and information security in the EU’s neighbourhood is of a critical importance. Supporting people’s access to internet, free and independent media, investigative journalism, and media cooperation initiatives (media twinning) between the EU and ENP countries should become one of the most important objectives in order to strengthen society’s resilience to aggressive propaganda.

Brussels, 1 July 2015.

The President of the European Economic and Social Committee

Henri MALOSSE


(1)  EESC opinion on social dialogue in the eastern partnership countries OJ C 161, 6.6.2013, p. 40.

(2)  OJ C 218, 23.7.2011, p. 91.

(3)  OJ C 458, 19.12.2014, p. 7.

(4)  OJ C 451, 16.12.2014, p. 1.

(5)  See footnote 3.

(6)  OJ C 43, 15.2.2012, p. 89.

(7)  See footnote 6.

(8)  See also OJ C 351, 15.11.2012, p. 27.

(9)  See also OJ C 248, 25.8.2011, p. 37.

(10)  OJ C 376, 22.12.2011, p. 32.

(11)  See also OJ C 299, 4.10.2012, p. 34 and OJ C 12, 15.1.2015, p. 48.

(12)  See footnote 9.

(13)  See footnote 10.

(14)  See: EESC opinion on Involvement of civil society in the Eastern Partnership, OJ C 277, 17.11.2009, p. 30; OJ C 248, 25.8.2011, p. 37.

(15)  See footnote 1.

(16)  See footnote 1.

(17)  See: EESC information report on REX/432 How media is used to influence social and political processes in the EU and Eastern neighbouring countries, (not yet published in the Official Journal).


17.11.2015   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 383/99


Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on the ‘Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council repealing Council Directive 76/621/EEC relating to the fixing of the maximum level of erucic acid in oils and fats and Council Regulation (EC) No 320/2006 establishing a temporary scheme for the restructuring of the sugar industry’

(COM(2015) 174 final — 2015/0090 COD)

(2015/C 383/14)

On 27 April 2015 the European Parliament and on 11 May 2015 the Council decided to consult the European Economic and Social Committee, under Article 43(2) of the TFEU, on the

Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council repealing Council Directive 76/621/EEC relating to the fixing of the maximum level of erucic acid in oils and fats and Council Regulation (EC) No 320/2006 establishing a temporary scheme for the restructuring of the sugar industry

(COM(2015) 174 final — 2015/0090 COD).

Since the Committee endorses the content of the proposal and feels that it requires no comment on its part, it decided, at its 509th plenary session of 1 and 2 July 2015 (meeting of 1 July), to issue an opinion endorsing the proposed text.

Brussels, 1 July 2015.

The President of the European Economic and Social Committee

Henri MALOSSE


17.11.2015   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 383/100


Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on the ‘Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on a multiannual recovery plan for Bluefin tuna in the eastern Atlantic and the Mediterranean repealing Regulation (EC) No 302/2009’

(COM(2015) 180 final — 2015/0096 COD)

(2015/C 383/15)

On 30 April 2015 the European Parliament and on 7 May 2015 the Council decided to consult the European Economic and Social Committee, under Article 43(2) of the TFEU, on the

Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on a multiannual recovery plan for Bluefin tuna in the eastern Atlantic and the Mediterranean repealing Regulation (EC) No 302/2009

(COM(2015) 180 final — 2015/0096 COD).

Since the Committee endorses the content of the proposal and feels that it requires no comment on its part, it decided, at its 509th plenary session of 1 and 2 July 2015 (meeting of 1 July), to issue an opinion endorsing the proposed text.

Brussels, 1 July 2015.

The President of the European Economic and Social Committee

Henri MALOSSE