14.3.2013   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 76/1

1.1

The European Economic and Social Committee is aware that the issue of children and young people with high intellectual abilities has been fairly well researched, as a result of the studies conducted over the last decades and the extensive corpus of specialist scientific literature (1). However, given the importance of this topic, the EESC recommends that the European Commission and the Member States support further studies and research and adopt suitable measures to cater for diversity among all types of people. These should include programmes that would tap the potential of gifted children and young people in a wide variety of fields. The aims of this action would include facilitating employment and employability within the framework of the EU and, in a context of economic crisis, enhancing specialist knowledge and preventing brain drain to other parts of the world.

1.2

The Committee proposes nurturing the development and potential of children and young people with high abilities throughout the various stages and forms of their education, avoiding premature specialisation and encouraging schools to cater for diversity, and exploiting the possibilities of cooperative and non-formal learning.

1.3

The Committee recommends fostering education and lifelong learning, bearing in mind that each individual's intellectual potential is not static but evolves differently throughout the various stages of his or her life.

1.4

The Committee recommends that, in the future, greater consideration be given to each Member State's existing models for and experience in working with highly gifted children, particularly those which benefit all of society, facilitate cohesion, reduce school failure and encourage better education in accordance with the objectives of the Europe 2020 strategy.

1.5

The Committee highlights the need to detect, in the workplace, those workers (particularly young workers) who are able and willing to develop their intellectual capabilities and contribute to innovation, and to give them the opportunity to further their education in the field that best matches their ambitions and centres of interest.

1.6

The Committee proposes improving educational care for children and young people with high abilities, in terms of the following aspects:

1.7

Improving the care provided for highly able students should include their emotional education (which is particularly important during adolescence), the acquisition of social skills with a view to facilitating integration and inclusion in society, integration into the labour market, and fostering their teamwork skills.

1.8

Schemes and procedures for student exchanges and visits abroad should be tapped into so that gifted students can take part in them, particularly those from disadvantaged backgrounds.

1.9

Opportunities for exchanging information and good practices on detecting and caring for gifted students should be harnessed across the EU Member States.

1.10

Entrepreneurship should be fostered among children and young people with high abilities, with a view to encouraging responsibility and solidarity towards society overall.

2.1

The programme entitled Europe 2020: A European Strategy for smart, green and inclusive growth, adopted by the Commission in 2010, includes as one of its three basic priorities the quest for smart growth through the development of an economy based on knowledge and innovation. From this angle, the education of all citizens can be seen as a key resource through which to guarantee the future of the European Union, and this includes improved detection and educational care for highly able people.

2.2

The current education policies of the EU Member States focus strongly on catering for diversity among students, pledging to provide each student with the educational care they need to realise their full potential. As part of the efforts aimed at all students requiring specific educational support, it is necessary to increase the resources currently devoted to those with high intellectual abilities.

2.3

Looking at the current situation in the Member States, there is much variation when it comes to detecting and providing educational care for particularly gifted students. It is also clear that there is a need to improve educational practices and activities aimed at this type of students – something that is influenced by the scarcity of targeted teacher training in this area.

3.1.1

International studies and research concur that there are highly gifted people in all social groups (2). This principle can be applied to the population of the EU Member States. In social, political and educational terms, detection and care for people with high abilities is a relatively recent concept that will certainly gain weight over the coming years. The abovementioned studies all agree that improving detection and educational care for highly able students requires the involvement of all sectors of society: politicians, teaching staff, scientists and researchers, families and social partners.

3.1.2

Specialist scientific literature on the topic of high abilities recognises various terms in this regard: precociousness (results above those expected for a specific age), talentedness (particular skills in very specific areas such as maths, music, etc.) and, lastly, giftedness or high ability. This last concept – giftedness or high ability – is currently defined in terms of the following traits:

Although high ability in the school and academic context tends to go hand in hand with good school results, it is not uncommon to find cases of school failure among students with high abilities. Giftedness should not be seen as a static situation but, rather, as a potential which to be harnessed must be detected, recognised and catered for by society; otherwise, it may be lost.

3.1.3

The scientific literature also agrees that giftedness has many dimensions – i.e. it is broad and cross-disciplinary and cannot be limited to an IQ assessment; it should also take into account aspects such as originality and creativity of thought; and it is frequently conditioned and influenced by family and socio-cultural factors. Sometimes, as may occur with certain people on the autistic spectrum or with particular motor disorders, high abilities may coexist with disability.

3.1.4

Students and people with high abilities are present throughout all social groups and levels, regardless of gender or social standing. However, in practice, detection processes usually bring to light the following aspects which should be taken into account so that they can be offset:

3.1.5

As with the rest of the school population, when referring to highly able students and young people it is important to remember that they form an extremely varied group.

3.1.6

It is possible to come across students with high intellectual ability who struggle to succeed at school and fall among those students who do badly, owing for example to a lack of specific educational care or to problems fitting in. It is also far from uncommon to find students with high abilities who feel ostracised or rejected by their peer group, which also increases the likelihood of school failure. Proper detection and care for highly able students is a factor that can and should help to reduce school drop-out rates and increase the percentage of the population with a higher education, which is one of the basic goals of Europe 2020: A European Strategy for smart, green and inclusive growth.

3.2.1

Improving the care provided for highly able students involves various separate aspects: initial detection; psychological, educational and social assessment to confirm or refute the presence of high abilities; and educational care in its true sense, which can be provided through both formal and non-formal education.

3.2.2

It is commonly accepted that a considerable number of highly able people slip through the net during detection processes. The detection process can be carried out as from the end of pre-school or at the start of primary school. Just as for any other student with specific educational support needs, early detection of high abilities makes it easier to provide the right educational response and care, and to prevent potential school failure or drop-out further down the line. Although high abilities can also be detected at later stages of school or life, this places particular importance on the initial detection and psychoeducational assessment of students that may display high abilities.

3.2.3

Highly able students are usually first detected when their parents or teachers observe that they are standing out from classmates of the same age, or may be showing signs of not fitting in. This initial detection, which must then be confirmed or refuted by specialists, may be based on the following indicators:

3.2.4

In the early years (up to age 4-5), particular caution must be exercised when identifying highly able students, as the phenomenon of precociousness or the presence of family situations which greatly stimulate academic activity may result in a premature diagnosis which may not be sound or accurate. In such cases it would be useful to carry out reviews at times when high abilities are manifested or to check whether, conversely, the student is approaching levels considered normal.

3.2.5

In disadvantaged social settings, giftedness is often masked by socio-economic shortcomings and difficulties or even by the low expectations of educational centres themselves, and manifests itself less easily. It is important to take this fact into account, and to pay special attention to the development of children and young people from disadvantaged backgrounds in order to offer them the educational care they need, including the detection of those that may be highly able.

3.2.6

Some issues or expectations relating to highly able students and young people that should be avoided include:

3.2.7

Once the parents and teachers suspect that a child or young person may have high abilities, initial detection requires specific assessment instruments and should be carried out by specialists in psychoeducational assessment, who may be assisted by teachers from the educational establishment. This assessment should be as varied and thorough as possible, and should include different contexts (school, social, family) and a range of instruments for gathering information, so that it can be applied to any student, regardless of their family and social background. This extensive, varied assessment serves as the basis for the final psychoeducational report which confirms or refutes the presence of high abilities.

3.3.1

Once the presence of high abilities has been confirmed, the following factors and circumstances can facilitate an appropriate educational response for these children and young people:

3.3.2

Different teaching and education systems adopt different approaches for meeting the educational needs of students with high abilities. The measures adopted in this regard may fall within two different trends:

3.3.3

Currently, education systems in the EU tend to prefer the inclusive model. It aims to offer all students in the first stages of their schooling a common education in a school environment that caters for diversity, rather than establishing homogenous groups too soon. This approach is compatible with the fact that, during non-compulsory stages of education or when students are nearing the end of their secondary education and the start of their university studies, some Member States are trialling systems aimed at enhancing specific talents, or more homogenous group schemes aimed at highly able students and/or high academic achievers. As things stand at present, it seems that the likely trend in the future will be to maintain inclusive education during the first stages of school and open the way for homogenous groups in the more advanced or post-compulsory stages.

3.3.4

For students with high abilities, the specific educational measures that can be adopted within the educational establishment may be as follows (the ordinary measures are applicable to all students in general):

3.3.5

Outside schools, highly able students may participate in activities that are planned but less regulated than school activities, and allow for contact with highly able students from other establishments. Such extracurricular activities are fairly widespread and are very varied in scope. They may be supported by States, public authorities and the EU.

3.3.6

These two forms of educational care – formal and non-formal education – are not mutually exclusive. Better care for highly able students should include both aspects: specific care within their own establishment and within school hours similar to that required by all those children with particular support needs, together with additional, extracurricular care which may be provided inside or outside the educational establishment.

3.3.7

At present, the big issue is the substantial improvement of educational care received by highly able students within their own establishment. This means improving initial and ongoing training of teaching staff when it comes to detecting and providing educational care for highly able students within the general context of catering for student diversity.

3.3.8

Unleashing the potential of all young people in the EU, particularly highly gifted young people, is not a matter solely for the education sector. It is also important to implement a social and economic policy that makes it possible to offer these people jobs and opportunities from an early age so that they may realise their potential. In this case, Europe has a crucial mission: to prevent the brain drain whereby more able people leave for other parts of the world in which to use their talents.

4.1.1

In recent years, various studies have sketched an overview of the situation for high intellectual abilities throughout the EU (4). They show the following:

4.2.1

In every EU country, there are private associations of professionals and/or families that provide extracurricular educational activities to foster the abilities of particularly gifted students. In some countries, activities are also promoted by or in cooperation with the relevant education authorities.

4.2.2

The range of educational responses aimed at students with high abilities in the EU countries is as follows:

4.3.1

Despite the difficult economic climate (which also affects the education system) and the challenges facing teachers in their daily work, specialised teacher training in this area needs to be improved, in terms of both initial and ongoing training.

4.3.2

Most countries in the EU include specific training for the provision of care for students with high abilities in the official syllabus for future teachers, either as a specific subject or as part of the general training on catering for student diversity.

4.3.3

When it comes to publicly provided ongoing training for teachers, only half of countries offer this within their ongoing teacher training plans. This official ongoing training coexists with that offered by certain private bodies.

4.3.4

In short, it is clear that the situation in the EU displays considerable room for improvement in the following areas:

Martinez Torres, Mercé and Guirado, Angel (coords.), Altas capacidades intelectuales. Pautas de actuación, orientación, intervención y evaluación en el período escolar (High intellectual abilities: Guidelines for action, orientation, intervention and assessment in the school period), Barcelona, Editorial Graó, 2012.

Torrego, Juan Carlos (coord.), Alumnos con altas capacidades y aprendizaje cooperativo. Un modelo de respuesta educativa (Students with high abilities and cooperative learning. An educational response model), Madrid, Fundación SM, 2012.

Pfeiffer, Stephen: Current perspectives on the identification and assessment of gifted students, in Journal of Psychoeducational Assessment, 2011.

Wallace, B. and Erikson, G.: Diversity in Gifted Education. International perspectives on global issues, New York, Routledge, 2006. Sternberg, R.J. and Davidson, J.E.: Conceptions of giftedness, Cambridge University Press, 2005.

Sternberg, R J. (ed.): Definitions and conceptions of giftedness, Thousand Oaks, Corwin Press, 2004.

‘La atención a los alumnos con altas capacidades en la Unión Europea’ (Care for students with high abilities in the EU), in De todo un poco, No 11, annual publication of the Programa de Enriquecimiento Educativo para Alumnos con Altas Capacidades de la Comunidad de Madrid, pp. 21-29, Madrid, 2009

Gifted Learners. A survey of educational policy and provision. European Agency for Development in Special Needs Education, 2009.

Eurydice (2006), Specific Educational Measures to promote all Forms of Giftedness at School in Europe (Working Document). Brussels: Eurydice European Unit.

Monks, F.J., Pflüger, R, Gifted Education in 21 European Countries: Inventory and Perspective, University of Nijmegen, 2005.

14.3.2013   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 76/8

1.1

endorses and welcomes the principle that Europe 2020 – A strategy for smart, sustainable and inclusive growth  (1) and the Strategy for equality between women and men  (2) should be mutually reinforcing. To this end, it is essential to mainstream the gender dimension and insert specific measures into the objectives, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of policies developed under the umbrella of Europe 2020;

1.2

deems it essential to overcome the fact that the gender dimension is not specifically addressed in any of Europe 2020's seven flagship initiatives. The gender dimension should therefore be systematically incorporated into the National Reform Plans (NRP) and the European semester, especially at a time when Europe's economic situation requires more effective policy implementation and the more efficient use of resources, recognising the detrimental effect of gender inequality on economic growth;

1.3

supports the country-specific recommendations in which the Commission calls on the Member States to adjust their NRP budgets to ensure that policy measures take the principle of gender equality into account. It is important that the ministerial meetings held for the purpose of reviewing and monitoring implementation ensure that these recommendations are put into practice and followed through, and make visible the progress made on equality policy. This will require consistent use of Community Funds, especially the European Social Fund;

1.4

recommends that the next Multiannual Financial Framework (2014-2020) make available specific funding to advance women's rights and gender equality. In the EESC's view, funding should be adequate and visible as a guarantee of its implementation and transparency in order to foster support for equality policies, activities and projects in all areas falling within the EU's remit;

1.5

considers that, taking into account the different situations on the ground in the various countries, regions and sectors, steps should be taken to improve the social situation and increase women's participation in the labour market, including support for business start-ups. Support should also be given to their quantitative and qualitative potential in the different areas addressed by Europe 2020: innovation, research, education and training, the digital society, climate and the green economy, energy, mobility, competitiveness, employment, qualifications, social exclusion and poverty;

1.6

highlights the importance of the commitment and involvement of the social partners at the European, national, regional and sectoral levels, and at all stages of implementation of the various policies, to ensure that the changes needed in gender equality take place in all European Union countries. Social dialogue and collective bargaining agreements are key instruments for complementing national reform plans with the gender dimension. The framework for gender equality measures adopted by the European social partners is an important example in this regard, which should be reflected in Europe 2020;

1.7

stresses the importance of mainstreaming the gender dimension into the implementation of each of the seven flagship initiatives. This will require an understanding of the specific and different situations facing men and women with respect to: the labour market and lifelong learning; access to all levels of education and employment; poverty and the risks of exclusion; accessibility and use of the new technologies in the digital sector; and participation at all levels of training, research and production, especially in the new emerging sectors. The EESC recommends focusing on digital education for women, who are under-represented in IT production jobs. The EESC considers it essential that the Commission and the Member States make use of existing gender indicators and establish new indicators in areas where none currently exist;

1.8

is of the view that, given the dismal state of youth unemployment and early school-leaving in most Member States, which affect young men and women differently, the gender dimension really needs to be more closely integrated into the development of youth policies;

1.9

calls on the Member States to take account of the Commission's specific recommendations and take steps to improve the quantity and quality of women's employment in all countries. This will require improving access to and the quality of affordable public services to children and the elderly, eliminating the pay gap and implementing measures to reconcile family and personal life and work (making it easier to offer paternity leave and paid leave;

1.10

reiterates that Europe 2020 should foster and support, in cooperation with the social partners, specific and effective agreements and measures to ensure the health and safety in the workplace of pregnant women and those who have recently given birth. The EESC welcomed the Commission's proposal to adopt measures for an adequate period of maternity leave of no less than 18 weeks (3);

1.11

albeit to varying degrees across countries, regions and areas of work, the crisis has affected people's lives and heightened a number problems relating to health and social harmony; therefore believes that particular attention needs to be paid to implementing measures to help offset the negative effects (such as stress, violence and harassment at work and within the family (4)). This calls for common efforts to promote gender equality in society, eliminate structural inequalities and change gender roles and stereotypes;

1.12

considers that the progress of women in decision-making should be a priority, especially in those sectors and businesses deemed by Europe 2020 to be of strategic importance for the future. The EESC will soon adopt an opinion on the proposal of the Commission to adopt binding measures at EU level to boost women's participation in this area;

1.13

is concerned to note the cuts in social services and protection for the most disadvantaged and those most at risk of social exclusion and poverty. The measures to be implemented under Europe 2020 should therefore specifically target the growing proportion of women in poverty and seek to integrate women in the short term, through incentives to join the labour market and, in the long term, through access to basic education and new skills, the use of new technologies and new forms of work organisation, reconciling work and family life. The EESC believes that sixty years down the road of European integration, it is unacceptable to allow permanent wage gap between men and women to serve as an adjustment variable or to allow the erosion of women's job security. It believes that the Member States must include, as a matter of urgency, measures to secure stable employment for women, with decent salaries and pensions, in their NRPs;

1.14

considers it a priority, if Europe 2020 and the Strategy for equality are to achieve their goals, to send the parties concerned and society at large a clear message regarding the need to step up measures to continue moving towards equality. This requires, firstly, greater and closer coordination and cooperation within and among all the European institutions, the European Parliament, the Commission and the Council, the European Central Bank, the EESC and the Committee of the Regions. Secondly, these equality-related aspects must be incorporated at all levels into the membership (5) and daily work of the sections, groups and committees of such institutions.

2.1

Europe 2020, which was adopted in 2010, set the path for the European Union's growth in a difficult economic climate, which was already showing signs of the financial and political problems now afflicting the EU. Europe 2020 puts forward a set of measures that will enable the Member States, in an efficient and unified way, to meet the challenges posed by the crisis and, in turn, relaunch a growth model that is smarter, more sustainable and more inclusive.

2.2

A new process of economic governance, called the European Semester, was also established in order both to synchronise the assessment of Member States' budgetary and structural policies and also to ensure that the strategy's implementation can be monitored.

2.3

At the same time, the Strategy for equality establishes the Commission's work programme for gender equality. This policy proposal follows on from the Working Plan for equality between women and men (2006-2010) (6), and represents the best attempt yet to define a set of strategic objectives and indicators for gender-related issues.

2.4

Since 1996, the EU has adopted a two-fold approach to gender equality: firstly by implementing specific measures to overcome existing discrimination against women and secondly through gender mainstreaming in policy decisions (7).

2.5

The Committee endorses the principle that the proper application of Europe 2020 Strategy must be consistent with the Strategy for equality, to meet the challenges arising from the crisis effectively, since these two strategies are mutually reinforcing, and therefore agrees with the EP, which has expressed this view. The European Pact for Gender Equality (2011-2020), adopted by the Council in March 2011 (8), highlights the close link between the two strategies and calls for instruments to be combined in order to overcome the crisis.

3.1

Gender equality is not specifically addressed in the text, in any of the flagship initiatives and is not mentioned in the five quantifiable targets, except as regards the employment rate, with a call for the greater involvement of women in the work force. This stands in stark contradiction with the principles set out in the first part of Europe 2020 Strategy, which states that respect for equality is a key factor for overcoming the economic crisis, alongside economic, social and territorial solidarity, respect for the environment and cultural diversity.

3.2

Different European institutions, organisations representing civil society and the social partners have repeatedly emphasised the need for gender equality to be a priority under the new strategy for action and to be considered a key factor for competitiveness and growth. According to the EP, the text should include the full involvement of women in the labour market and in vocational training and a programme aimed at eliminating the wage gap between men and women.

3.3

The wording of the Europe 2020 Strategy did not meet with unanimous support and was criticised on a number of grounds: for its overly-general content, its unnecessarily complex structure and an excessively economic approach, which overlooks the social aspects. Much less emphasis is placed on gender equality than in previous employment strategies. The only visible and explicit aspect, the employment rate for women, clearly ignores the qualitative aspects of work and the different starting positions that exist on the labour market. Even the quantitative gender-specific targets contained in the Lisbon Strategy have disappeared.

3.4

The EESC considers that neither Europe 2020 nor the Strategy for equality will achieve their aims unless practical steps are taken to improve the situation in society and in women's work. Women's quantitative and qualitative potential should be supported as a prerequisite in the different areas of Europe 2020. Practical steps linked to the seven flagship initiatives are essential if progress is to be made on the priorities of Europe 2020: smart, sustainable and socially inclusive growth cannot become a reality without an equality policy.

3.5

The reform plans of the different Member States must recognise the economic added value of women's work, which would be gained, for instance, through the professionalisation of personal care work (9) and the specific shortcomings women encounter on the labour market (access at all levels and in all age groups, career progression, continuity, etc.), but also in society, with regard to all those social aspects that the Strategy for equality highlights as being crucial. To overcome the crisis and meet the new challenges, Europe 2020 must be implemented by establishing specific programmes, plans and measures that help improve equality. This cannot be done without an understanding of the different impact that the anti-crisis measures might have, given men and women's different starting positions.

3.6

The EESC is concerned to note the absence of practical measures and gender-specific indicators. This prevents any monitoring or evaluation of whether or not progress is being made on Europe 2020 and also means that the European Semester is left without the necessary instruments to combat inequality, given the different starting points, in line with the different gender realities among countries, sectors and spheres.

3.7

Europe 2020 should provide effective instruments for assessing the role of women in the EU's growth and the added value that this represents in social terms, as emphasised by the EESC opinion (10), which shares the views expressed in a study carried out under the Swedish presidency (11). This study highlights, among other things, that equality on the labour market could increase Member States' gross domestic product (GDP) by an average of 27 %.

4.1

Adopted in 2010, the Strategy for equality proclaims a close link to Europe 2020, in all aspects and flagship initiatives, especially with regard to designing and implementing the appropriate national measures, by means of technical assistance, structural funds or the main financial instruments, such as the 7th Framework Research Programme. Against the backdrop of the guidelines for employment and the evaluation of national policies, the Commission will monitor matters closely, in order to reduce inequalities and promote the social inclusion of women.

4.2

The strategy also refers to men's role in promoting gender equality and emphasises the importance of men's involvement in achieving the changes needed in the different roles that men and women play in society, in both the family and professional arenas.

4.3

The Strategy for equality details measures in five priority areas identified in the Women's Charter, as well as a chapter on horizontal issues: a) Equal economic independence; b) Equal pay for equal work and work of equal value; c) Equality in decision-making; d) Dignity, integrity and an end to gender-based violence; e) Gender equality in external actions; f) Horizontal issues (gender roles, legislation, and the governance and tools of gender equality).

4.4

The EESC agrees with the Commission's assertion that EU instruments such as the single market, financial aid and foreign policy instruments should be fully harnessed in order to address problems and achieve the Europe 2020 targets, but considers that follow-up must be provided to ensure consistency between implementation of the principles of the Strategy for equality and the main instruments of Europe 2020, especially the seven flagship initiatives and the guidelines, since these will be carried out at the EU level as well as in the Member States.

5.1.1

In its opinion on the Annual Growth Survey  (13), the EESC emphasised, among other things, that the aspect of quality in job creation needs to be boosted. In light of the crisis and its economic and social impact, the EU institutions and Member States should now make every effort to ensure further progress in this direction.

5.1.2

The Committee believes that to implement this initiative, account needs to be taken of the current situation of women in the world of work, as while they currently account for 44 % of Europe's working population, their situation remains different and vulnerable in a number of areas: a lower employment rate, the pay gap, the concentration or absence of women in particular sectors, limited involvement in business start-ups, part-time work (75 % of the total); temporary contracts, the lack of adequate childcare facilities; poor career advancement; the under-representation of women in the most senior positions, in both the business and political spheres, and imbalanced access to the various disciplines in education, vocational training and university studies.

5.1.3

The employment rate rose from 51 % in 1997 to 62 % in 2011, with the main increase being in jobs in sectors primarily employing women and which have been hard hit by adjustment measures. The economic crisis currently being experienced by the European Union, while affecting each country in a different way, is also worsening the situation of women and threatening the fragile progress achieved in equality between men and women. The EESC believes that the necessary support measures should be adopted to ensure that inequality in the workplace has not increased by the time the crisis is over.

5.1.4

The European Social Fund in particular must programme, monitor and evaluate all measures taken by the Member States, in order to ensure that the Strategy for equality is carried forward.

5.2.1

This initiative primarily covers two areas: employment and training. Its content is therefore closely linked to the previous initiative: to improve mobility in learning, modernise higher education, promote and validate both formal and informal learning and ensure effective and sustainable investment in education and vocational training.

5.2.2

The EESC considers the youth unemployment rate, currently standing at 20 %, to be one of the most worrying issues facing Europe today. The rate of unemployed young women, especially those with poor qualifications, is even higher.

5.2.3

The impact of maternity on the labour market is very different to that of paternity. Only 64,7 % of women with children under the age of 12 work, compared with 89,7 % of men. These figures and differences increase as the number of children rises. The lack of preschool places and the imbalanced distribution of family tasks make reconciling work and home life problematic and hamper women's career advancement.

5.2.4

The targets adopted by the Barcelona Council (2002) on the availability of preschool education places have been met by few States and the current situation, with cuts in these public services, is likely to make matters worse.

5.2.5

Another alarming figure is the rate of young women not in education, employment or training (‘NEETs’). According to EUROSTAT, 20 % of women are NEETs, compared with 13 % of men. Reducing the school dropout rate is one of the Europe 2020 targets covered by this initiative.

5.2.6

The EESC believes that to implement this flagship initiative, account should be taken of the current situation of vulnerable young women in different areas, in addition to those already mentioned above: poor basic training, less access to the type of vocational training required by the new knowledge society, insufficient validation of skills and lack of career guidance and specific financial problems when starting up a new business or an activity of their own. Measures specifically targeting young women are consequently needed.

5.3.1

This initiative aims to: draw up and implement programmes to promote social innovation for the most vulnerable, in particular by providing innovative education, training and job opportunities for the most disadvantaged communities, to combat discrimination (for example, against the disabled) and develop a new agenda for the integration of immigrants in order fully to harness their potential. It also proposes to assess the adequacy and sustainability of social protection and pensions systems and explore ways of ensuring better access to health care. The EESC has reservations regarding the concept of social innovation, an area where experience is, by nature, fragmentary and difficult to replicate. It is based both on the legislative principle of subsidiarity and on a sociological concept such as ‘equity’. A local response to a small group's need may be useful but it could never replace the equality and justice ensured by large collective social protection schemes (14).

5.3.2

Europe 2020 states that Member States will need to: define and implement measures tailored to the specific circumstances of particular risk groups and fully deploy their social security and pensions systems to ensure adequate income support and access to health care, in order to guarantee social cohesion. The increasing rates of unemployment and inactivity, economic insecurity, low wages, austerity measures, cuts in social benefits and family allowances particularly affect women. Firstly, as workers, since job cuts in the public sector and services directly affects them because these are sectors employing a high proportion of women. Women are also affected doubly, however, as both citizens and users, given that the cuts in the provision of services of general interest affect women, because they are the primary users of these services.

5.3.3

In Europe, over 70 % of low-wage workers are women. In most Member States, 17 % of women live in poverty, as do 15 % of men, which is also a worrying figure. Poverty and social marginalisation go hand in hand with labour market exclusion. Therefore, breaks in periods of work and precarious jobs, which are so common for women, especially women with low levels of qualification, have an immediate negative effect, which can continue into the medium and long term.

5.3.4

Single-parent families, widows, women with disabilities, victims of gender-based violence, elderly women and migrant women are particularly hard hit by budget cuts and the crisis and are at greater risk of social exclusion, given the lack of protection or specific aid measures.

5.4.1

The aim of the Digital Agenda is to promote access to information technologies, specifically the internet and its use by all European citizens, especially through programmes that boost digital literacy and accessibility.

5.4.2

To this end, the Member States should develop strategies for a high-speed internet and channel public funding, including through structural funds, towards areas not fully covered by private investment and should promote the roll-out and use of up-to-date online services (e.g. e-government, online health, smart homes, digital skills and security) (15).

5.4.3

The EESC is concerned at the lack of statistics broken down by gender, since this prevents a clear understanding of the situation of women in the professional sectors linked to the new technologies or the levels of use of such technology. The relevant studies would need to be carried out to assess women's situation in this area, also as service users, so that the information and training proposed in Europe 2020 can be more accurately targeted.

5.5.1

Among other measures, the ultimate aim of this initiative is to promote and strengthen links between education, business, research and innovation and will foster entrepreneurship. Member States will have to reform their national and regional R&D systems to encourage excellence and smart specialisation, prioritise knowledge expenditure, enhance cooperation between universities, research and business, ensure a sufficient number of graduates in mathematics and engineering and place fostering creativity, innovation and entrepreneurship at the heart of curricula.

5.5.2

Women can and must play an essential role in this process. In 2010, around 60 % of university graduates were women and yet this is not reflected in the posts held by women on the labour market. Furthermore, women are currently responsible for one in three business start-ups, make up 13,7 % of the managing boards of large listed companies and only 3 % chair such boards.

5.5.3

In most countries, horizontal gender segregation remains, according to the specialised area of training: as science, engineering, mathematics, technology. These disciplines are also a prime area of cooperation among future leaders of the business and research worlds, especially among masters and doctoral programmes, which are harder for women to access. The EESC therefore believes that measures to eliminate these barriers are essential.

5.5.4

Women are still under-represented in decision-making circles in science, business and the service sector. Only 18 % of the most senior university positions are occupied by women. Employment opportunities and the allocation of research funds must ensure women's progress in this field and serve to increase European society's potential for sustainable development.

5.6.1

This initiative proposes to adopt and implement a revised Action Plan for Energy Efficiency and promote a comprehensive programme for the effective use of resources, support for SMEs and households, making use of the Structural Funds and other sources to harness new financing through existing and successful systems of innovative investment models, which will stimulate changes in consumption and production patterns.

5.6.2

Energy and the environment are not neutral topics: energy use, access to clean water, recycling, heat sources for heating and powering homes and respect for the environment and its conservation, are some examples of areas in which women play a key role. Changes in consumption patterns are unthinkable without drawing up specific measures based on a real understanding of the situation and which target different groups, primarily women, in different ways.

5.6.3

This was also recognised by the Employment, Social Policy, Health and Consumer Affairs Council (EPSCO) is in its conclusions of June 2012, highlighting the essential role played by women in sustainable development. The EESC agrees with the view expressed in the Council's conclusions that women can have a key influence on decision-making concerning the environment, particularly with regard to climate change policy. This is a new opportunity for women, who can play a key role and improve their personal and financial situation by getting involved with the new and emerging green economy, which is a crucial sector for development and job creation.

5.6.4

At the corporate level, vertical discrimination in this sector remains high. Although 33 % of executive positions are now occupied by women, compared to 31 % in 2001; these are mostly in the trade and services sectors, with far fewer in manufacturing, construction and energy.

5.6.5

Very little research and information is available on gender-related matters and on the steps needed to increase the proportion of women in this process of sustainable development. The EESC believes that while investment is important, so is a focus on transcending stereotypes, providing solutions and promoting measures for positive action, since this is a growing sector and, if the starting point is discriminatory, there is a danger of heightening differences in social terms and of widening the social divide.

5.6.6

One of the priorities of the Strategy for equality is action within the EU's external relations, involving both cooperation programmes with neighbouring regions – as part of European neighbourhood policies – especially the Euromed region, and EU action in global forums. Immigrant women from non-EU countries, women migrating within the European Union and migrant women from neighbouring countries need to be given specific attention. The failure of Rio+20 in terms of sustainable development and women's rights is worrying. No progress at all has been made on critical issues such as the link between health and sexual and reproductive rights, women's rights to own property and inherit land, climate change and green jobs.

5.7.1

This flagship initiative has a key role to play in mainstreaming gender-related aspects in the Strategy for equality: pay transparency, equal pay initiatives and measures to encourage women to enter non-traditional professions are some of the key measures proposed in the strategy and which demonstrate appropriate synergies with this initiative.

5.7.2

In Europe, the pay gap between men and women stands on average at 17 %, ranging from 5 % to 31 % among the Member States. Underpinning this situation are a number of interlinked factors, such as: the lower value attached to work in sectors employing a high proportion of women, marked occupational segregation and career breaks taken for a variety of reasons, among others. The current crisis is simply worsening the situation.

5.7.3

The gap between the employment rate and pay has narrowed in some cases, but unfortunately this is not due to an increase in women's employment and wages, but to falling demand in sectors predominantly employing men (e.g. construction, manufacturing, finance), as a direct result of the crisis. The EESC notes that, under the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, one of the objectives of the European venture is ‘improved living and working conditions, so as to make possible their harmonisation while the improvement is being maintained’ (16) and that this applies to everyone.

5.7.4

The Committee considers that measures to kick-start growth in these struggling sectors are necessary, in conjunction with measures to combat occupational segregation, especially to improve women's participation in science, technology, engineering and mathematics, and also measures to improve the recognition of sectors employing a high proportion of women, such as domestic work, health services and care provision.

6.1

The European semester of policy coordination is the new instrument agreed on by the Member States to monitor implementation of Europe 2020. The European Pact for Gender Equality recommends applying a gender equality perspective and promoting gender equality policies when developing and implementing national reform programmes. It also urges the Commission and the Council to apply the gender perspective to the Annual Growth Survey, the Council conclusions and in the country-specific recommendations (CSR).

6.2

In April 2012, twelve Member States received country-specific recommendations incorporating a gender dimension in national action plans. The Commission suggested and the EESC supports specific reforms in the following areas: boosting the participation of women in the labour market; improving the availability and quality of childcare and schools open all day and care for the elderly, including caring for other dependents.

6.3

Most of the recommendations are intended to increase women's employment, but do not take into account the barriers to ensuring high-quality work in terms of pay and working conditions and bringing men's family responsibilities into line. Only one country, Austria, was given the recommendation to address the gender pay gap, despite the fact that this is still a reality in all Member States.

6.4

The EESC considers that some of the recommendations give cause for concern, as they could have an adverse effect on gender equality: those concerning pension reform; the proposals to revise pay and pensions review mechanisms; the rise in the retirement age without taking account of the years of healthy life and the proposal to introduce tax incentives for couples' second incomes.

14.3.2013   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 76/15

1.1

The seriousness of the maritime piracy plague has not come to the full awareness of European civil society. The EESC wishes to increase the sensitivity of civil society and European public opinion in order to mobilise Member States and the EU institutions for concrete action aiming at eradicating it. In 2011 the World Maritime Day was dedicated to the fight against piracy. Its multifaceted nature will require a holistic action and not an ad hoc piecemeal one. Piracy is not a remote issue taking place somewhere in the Indian Ocean affecting only vessels attacked and their seafarers. It is affecting European consumers and taxpayers in many respects and is not ‘a symptom that we can live with’.

The EESC advocates a concrete political will from the EU institutions and Member States to work out a permanent solution for piracy.

1.2

The EU has a unique toolbox with solutions ranging from trade and development aid to military presence, state-building and reconstruction.

1.3

The EESC welcomes the decisions of the UN Security Council and the EU to prolong the EU/NAVFOR–ATALANTA operation until December 2014, and to extend the area of operations to East and South in the Indian Ocean and in the Somali shoreline. It believes that EU NAVFOR should be given a more robust mandate with stronger engagement rules. The EESC urges to keep a strong commitment regarding the number of vessels deployed by EU Member States to this operation.

1.4

The recent linking of the Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia (ReCAAP) with the Djibouti Code of Conduct and the conclusion of bilateral agreements for the prosecution of pirates of the EU with Kenya, Seychelles, Mauritius and other countries is very important.

1.5

The EESC supports the establishment of a Regional Maritime Capacity Building mission by the European External Action Service (EEAS). The ‘EUCAP NESTOR’ will assist the Horn of Africa countries in creating a master plan to combat piracy, in drafting relevant legislation and supporting coast guard capacity.

1.6

The EESC requests EU Member States and states in accession process or having association agreements with the EU, to enforce legal actions against piracy and prosecution of pirates on the high seas according to Article 105 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982.

1.7

The EESC encourages shipping to apply the revised industry Best Management Practices (BMP 4) regarding self protection measures on board ships. The EESC calls on Member States considering allowing the use of qualified private armed guards for the protection of vulnerable ships to comply with the relevant guidance of the International Maritime Organization (IMO) and to draw up a strict legal framework that establishes, inter alia, the terms of the master of the ship's responsibility, particularly in the event of shots being fired. The use of private armed guards does not constitute a stand alone solution or should not become the norm and is complementary to the BMP. Member States are encouraged to organise convoys with military escorts and provide land-based military units (Vessel Protection Detachments - VPDs) under the auspices of the UN able to board a ship during the transiting from high risk areas.

1.8

The EESC is opposed to restricting the payment of ransoms which would have counter-productive effects and would put hostages to even greater risk. For the time being ransoms remain an instrument to ensure a safe return of seafarers, who are used as human shields. The EESC condemns the practice of pirates executing or torturing seafarers as a means of exerting pressure for the payment of ransoms.

1.9

The EESC believes that the key to solving the piracy problem lies in tracing and clamping down the involved financial flows. It welcomes targeting financiers and coordinating databases to increase the understanding of the pirate business model. A blacklist of financial institutions involved in piracy money laundering should be established in the EU. The work of Europol and Eurojust is commended in this respect.

1.10

The EESC urges the EU institutions to address escalation of armed robbery at sea (ARAS) and oil theft in West Africa and the Gulf of Guinea. As the modus operandi for ARAS is very different than that of Somali pirates, specific measures should be supported for this region. In the Indian Ocean, three million barrels of oil and 50 % of the world container trade are moving daily from piracy infested areas.

1.11

The EESC underlines the urgency to liberate the 218 seafarers currently held hostage and encourages anti-piracy vocational training of seafarers to protect themselves and healthcare clinics of seafarers held hostage. Three International Conventions (the Standards of Training, Certification and Watchkeeping for Seafarers Convention, 2010; the International Ship and Port Facility Security Code, 2004; and the Maritime Labour Convention, 2006) provide a legal basis for pre-embarkation training, onboard drills and exercises, repatriation, compensation, establishment of family liaisons, and post-release care of seafarers. The EESC prompts the EU to strengthen these Conventions and formulate a new comprehensive guidance for the welfare of seafarers who have or may become victims of piracy and of their families. The EU should have a leading role in amending these International Conventions in order to take account of measures for seafarers held hostage.

1.12

The elections of 20 August 2012 were a crucial event in the history of the failed state of Somalia. The EESC commits itself to cooperate in future EU action assisting the process of building up its civil society along the lines of similar action vis-à-vis other African countries.

1.13

The EESC asks for EU coordinated action to channel part of the development aid or other resources for training programmes of youngsters in the fisherman's profession, for promotion of sustainable agriculture and entrepreneurship. Decent living conditions for young Somalis could make piracy careers less appealing.

2.1.1

After five years of escalating pirate attacks on merchant ships in the Gulf of Aden, the Somali Basin, the Arabian Sea and the Indian Ocean, statistical figures may be misleading as to the piracy problem being contained. Such an assumption would be erroneously ignoring the imitation effect and the escalation of piracy in West Africa. The piracy problem is regretfully a worldwide issue occurring also in Indonesia, the Malacca/Singapore Straits, South China Seas and South America. Current figures (as of 24 September 2012) point to 50 incidents in Somalia, 34 in the Gulf of Guinea, and 51 in Indonesia.

2.1.2

Use of motherships has allowed pirates to operate more successfully. Ever-changing tactics and equipment facilitating identification of targets and tools to break into citadels onboard ships has rendered them more aggressive, sophisticated and violent occasionally resulting in deaths of seafarers.

2.1.3

Piracy starts as a maritime problem, evolving into a humanitarian, trade and global economic problem, affecting world consumers. Its cost could be exacerbated in case of disruption of the supply chain of goods and energy, should the world community not address effectively piracy activities or seafarers unions refuse to sail in the infested areas. Eighteen thousand vessels annually transit from these areas. Piracy in the Gulf of Aden/Horn of Africa represents a strategic threat to the EU since it affects the traffic in the main Europe-Asia corridor. Companies are increasingly using the Cape of Good Hope sea route in order to avoid the Suez Canal. Piracy has become a very lucrative criminal business and an appealing career for youngsters in the area. Its cost is disproportionate to the number of pirates involved (in Somalia around 1 500). Piracy is hampering the delivery of EU food aid when most needed to African drought victims. The naval presence in the Indian Ocean is likened to ‘patrolling the area of Europe with 20 police cars’.

2.1.4

Impunity of acts of piracy and undermining of international law and order (UNCLOS Convention 1982) are intolerable and the EU is required to show strong political will to eradicate it. The UN Contact Group on piracy off Somalia stimulated establishing a global strategy, including preventive and dissuasive measures, operational guidance for better cooperation of the naval forces, prosecuting pirates and tracking down their financial resources.

2.1.5

The EU controlling 40 % of world shipping cannot afford an uncontrollable escalation of piracy. As transport Commissioner Kallas stated: ‘Piracy at sea is a genuine threat to the EU transport policy’. Furthermore, the EU external trade, the energy supply and security, the seafarers' wellbeing and the humanitarian aid channelling are threatened.

2.2.1

During 2011 more than seven seamen were murdered and 39 injured by pirates. In 2012 (as of 24 September), six seamen were murdered and 448 held hostage after 225 attacks and 24 hijackings. On 30 June 2012 pirates captured 11 vessels with 218 seamen hostages in Somalia. Over 43 seafarers have been killed and 2 653 have been held hostages since 2007 in piracy incidents off the Somali coast.

2.2.2

International shipowners' and seafarers' associations (e.g. International Chamber of Shipping [ICS], European Community Shipowners' Associations [ECSA], European Transport Workers Federation [ETF], Asian Shipowners Forum [ASF], the SOS ‘Save Our Seafarers’ grouping of 31 international maritime industry organisations) joined to raise awareness of the human and economic cost of piracy via the media and by approaching politicians and industry at the highest level. The ASF (24 May 2012) revealed that in the last seven years 62 seamen died as a result of pirate actions and 4 000 have been held hostage on some 200 ships hijacked by Somalis. Whilst piracy attacks in the Indian Ocean have fallen for the first time in five years (2007-2012), the number of seafarers killed has tripled in the last two years (Sultan AHMED BIN SULAYEM/DP World Chairman 30.6.2012). Hence, there is no room for complacency.

2.2.3

Curbing piracy lies in preventing the crime in the first place, not in preventing the payments that secure freedom for victims of that crime. Seafarer deaths should not be accepted as ‘collateral damage’ in the war against piracy (Nautilus International).

2.3.1

Two reports on the economics of piracy are worth noting:

2.3.2

‘The Economic Cost of Maritime Piracy’, (December 2010) analyses the direct costs: ransoms, insurance premiums, re-routing around the Cape of Good Hope, deterrent security measures, armed guards, deployment of three naval missions, prosecutions, funding of anti-piracy organisations, humanitarian cost. It estimates the overall annual cost from USD 7 to 12 billion. In addition, the One Earth Foundation estimated the cost of ransoms for 2009-2010 as USD 830 million, and the annual cost of deterrent equipment/private armed annually between USD 360 million–2.5 billion.

2.3.3

‘The Economics of Piracy’ (May 2011), analyses the pirate ‘value chain’ between pirates, financiers, accountants, arms suppliers. It demonstrates how piracy can be a much more rewarding choice compared to the GDP/capita in Somalia (pirate incomes can be 67-157 times than the average Somali income). It focuses on the need to track the Hawala informal money transfer system and estimates the annual cost from USD 4.9 to USD 8.3 billion.

3.1.1

In their Joint Declaration on a partnership to counter maritime piracy and armed robbery in the Western Indian Ocean (London, 15 May 2012), the European Union and the International Maritime Organization (IMO) reiterated their determination to increase their capacity of countering maritime piracy and armed robbery and to improve maritime governance in the Western Indian Ocean. The ‘Djibouti Code of Conduct’ has become a key vehicle allowing 18 States in East Africa to formulate a regional answer to the problem. Moreover, the EU supported financially the International Maritime Bureau (IMB) for a period of three years regarding the activities of the IMB Piracy Reporting Centre, which is dedicated to the suppression of piracy and armed robbery against ships.

3.1.2

The International Piracy Contact Working Group explores methods of clamping down on beneficiaries as ransoms of EUR 300-500 million go to Somali network leaders who deposit it - possibly even in EU banks. The EESC urges that such ransoms should be traced and confiscated so that piracy is no longer an attractive business.

3.1.3

Following the adoption of the Strategic Framework for the Horn of Africa the appointment of a Special Representative coordinating EU action in the region is a step in the right direction.

3.1.4

The EESC welcomes the European Parliament Resolution on Maritime Piracy (10 May 2012) aiming at better coordination of the EU institutions to step up efforts in fighting pirates and in rebuilding Somalia as a sovereign state.

3.1.5

In a spate of past opinions since 2008 the EESC expressed concern regarding the proliferation of armed robbery and piracy in South East Asia and Africa (1). It urged the Commission to promote the establishment of appropriate jurisdictions to face the current impunity of pirates and categorically opposed the arming of seafarers. The EESC urged the Commission to examine the anti-piracy training of seafarers with the Member States.

3.1.6

In its conference on the ‘Attractiveness of Maritime Professions’ (7 March 2010) the EESC identified piracy as one of the disincentives in pursuing the seafarers' profession and negating the campaigns for their attraction.

3.2.1

The European Community Shipowners' Associations (ECSA) and the European Transport Workers' Federation (ETF) (31 July 2012) express concern in a Joint Declaration about continuing attacks despite successful international and European efforts. They placed eradication of piracy high on the agenda of the Sectoral Social Dialogue Committee for Maritime Transport (SSDC).

4.1

Piracy as a complex, multifaceted problem, can only be resolved with a holistic coordinated approach ashore and at sea. The EU is uniquely placed to provide such an approach: it is a well respected stakeholder in the region in diplomatic, trade, transport, military and humanitarian terms.

4.2

Seafarers continue to pay a heavy price. All efforts should lead to avert endangering their physical, mental and psychological integrity. The International Chamber of Shipping (ICS) compiled good practice guidelines for shipping companies to assist affected seafarers and their families.

4.3

Since the root causes of piracy require a long-term solution ashore, capacity building in Somalia is vital to terminate impunity and restore the rule of law. More commitment is required from EU flag states to ensure better coordination of naval forces and the prosecution of pirates.

4.4

Since piracy resurgence in 2007, what is now required is the political will to place it at the top of the EU political agenda and increase resources for more military aircrafts and vessels. The European External Action Service (EEAS) and the European Commission should collaborate with the European Council to identify the sectors of competence for action in combating piracy and capacity building in Somalia. The World Bank, Interpol and Europol can assist in the fight to chase ransoms.

4.5

EU Member States' anti-piracy legislation needs updating:

14.3.2013   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 76/20

1.1

The EESC welcomes the opportunity to give its opinion on the proposal from the European Parliament's Employment and Social Affairs Committee for a pilot project on a European social mark in 2013. However, the situation has changed since the opinion was requested, as the European Parliament's Budgets Committee text from 4 October 2012 was adopted without any reference to this pilot project.

1.2

In principle, the EESC supports the idea of boosting the social dimension in Europe and agrees that corporate social responsibility (CSR) should be recognised and encouraged. It is important, however, to stress that CSR must not under any circumstances be used as a substitute for social rights guaranteed in legal or international instruments, in which social dialogue has a central role.

1.3

It is therefore necessary, as a first step, to further clarify the added value, timing and focus of this proposal in relation to its policy goals. Those goals are important, but in the current circumstances they would be more effectively achieved above all by means of tougher and better-implemented social legislation.

1.4

The EESC would also point out that although the initiative is important, the proposal might be too complicated at a time when the EU is undergoing a crisis, with high unemployment and a rising number of bankruptcies. A social mark for CSR purposes only illustrates social activities that are voluntary, but these differ as a result of differences in legislation between Member States, because European legislation only provides for minimum standards. It would be undesirable to introduce additional commitments for businesses that risk at this point creating wider gulfs rather than increasing cohesion between different sized businesses and EU countries.

1.5

Account also needs to be taken of parallel initiatives such as social labelling in the field of social entrepreneurship (as referred to in the Social Business Initiative) to avoid confusion. In this connection, the EESC recommends waiting for the results of, and learning lessons from, the Commission's forthcoming exercise to map social labelling in the field of social enterprise. Other overlapping initiatives such as the new CSR awards, social considerations in procurement, etc, should also be taken into account in relation to this proposal.

1.6

The EESC also feels that the credibility, legitimacy and feasibility of a voluntary social mark need to be better demonstrated. Building trust in and awareness of a new labelling system at European level requires a comprehensive accreditation and monitoring system, which needs to be weighed up against the benefits of an additional labelling system. In this context, before considering the introduction of a new European social mark, the EESC recommends exhaustively mapping existing labelling systems in the different Member States, identifying best practice and learning from non-successful ones. The EESC therefore rather recommends improving and expanding existing labelling systems to cover social responsibility (where they do not already do so).

1.7

Awareness should also be raised of the systems that already exist and of the businesses that use them, and other businesses should be encouraged to use them, instead of creating an additional system for consumers and businesses to deal with. In addition, a European communication action on the European labels should be considered, at least in the medium term, to build awareness among consumers and citizens.

1.8

However, if a label were to be launched at some point, in order to avoid distortions, a European social labelling should not deviate too much from internationally recognised standardisations, but it should add a typically European touch: the respect for social rights.

2.1

The European Parliament's Committee for Employment and Social Affairs proposed a pilot project on a European social mark in 2013, but the European Parliament's Budget Committee text for 2013 pilot projects was adopted without any reference to this proposal in October (1). Given this new situation, this opinion will focus primarily on giving input on the proposed pilot project.

2.2

The idea behind the proposal is to help to create a more social Europe in which the existing minimum social and labour-law standards are enforced more effectively. The aim is to encourage job creation, support youth employment and combat poverty by introducing a progressive award scheme in the form of a ‘European social mark’.

2.3

The European Parliament's request to the EESC specifically relates to (a) what impact and benefits the mark would have in different policy areas, (b) what types of business would be interested in it on a voluntary basis, (c) what the options are for establishing a progressive mark, (d) what criteria should be met to obtain the mark, and (e) what would need to be done to raise awareness.

2.4

The Employment Committee's proposed social mark is intended to be voluntary and free of charge. It is aimed at all businesses in the EU, but focuses in particular on SMEs (2) and VSEs (3). The aim is to create a more socially responsible Europe by guaranteeing high social standards in all businesses in the EU. The proposal also aims to harmonise existing labelling systems and to use a rating scale to identify potential improvements. The idea is to use a list of social criteria to rate each business's internal social responsibility by awarding different levels of the social mark.

3.1

In the EESC's view, efforts to strengthen the social dimension and social values in Europe are important, but the added value, timing and focus of this project should be considered, and account should be taken of ongoing initiatives in related fields. The EESC would therefore like too see clearer arguments for what added value such an initiative provides and for whom, and what it contributes to Community legislation.

3.2

The EESC recently noted, in its opinion on corporate social responsibility (CSR) (4), that CSR was a sustainable development approach. In the same opinion, it also highlighted the need to clarify terminology such as ‘social responsibility’ (only in the workplace) and ‘societal responsibility’ (activities beyond the workplace).

3.3

Based on these definitions, the Employment Committee's proposed social mark appears to relate to ‘social responsibility’; as it is aimed at all businesses within the EU, account needs to be taken of the Commission's ongoing work on the 2011 EU strategy for corporate social responsibility (5), which already covers similar aspects.

3.4

It is important to stress, as the EESC has done in the past, that corporate social responsibility must not under any circumstances be used as a substitute for social rights guaranteed in legal or international instruments, which are primarily the responsibility of states and governments. Moreover, many businesses voluntarily take on more responsibility, and it is therefore important to underline that taking on greater social responsibility going beyond statutory requirements should be acknowledged and encouraged. The EESC believes that each business must find its own way of taking social responsibility in addition to the legal instruments. A mark for CSR purposes risks shifting the focus from social innovation to efforts to comply with certification requirements.

3.5

The idea of social labelling has been mentioned previously in connection with the Commission's work on social enterprise, with which the EESC has engaged actively in a number of opinions (6). The communication Towards a Single Market Act  (7) refers to social labelling in relation to social entrepreneurship and social enterprise. This was later followed up as a key action in the Commission's communication on the Social Business Initiative (8), which aims to improve social enterprises' opportunities to operate, compete and grow under the same conditions as other enterprises. One of the proposals in this initiative was to create a public database of labels and certifications to raise understanding among stakeholders of and comparability between different forms of labelling of social enterprise within the EU. The Commission also intends, in the near future, to launch a study on social enterprise, mapping where social labels for social enterprises are in place and what form they take, as well as other specific features, rules and models for this type of enterprise.

3.6

The EESC therefore feels that the forthcoming mapping exercise, as referred to in the Social Business Initiative, must be undertaken prior to, and separately from, efforts to develop a broader definition of social labelling of enterprises. In the EESC's view, this ongoing exercise must be completed before a broader labelling system is considered, as mapping the existing social enterprise labelling systems could provide valuable input concerning the possibilities and benefits of a broader system. Moreover, other related initiatives such as social considerations in procurement, the new CSR awards and sector platforms in the area of social enterprise labelling should be allowed to mature before new activities are launched.

3.7

The EESC would stress that it is important to make a clear distinction between the Employment Committee's proposal (relating to corporate social responsibility) and the Social Business Initiative: they have different objectives and must therefore be treated differently. The EESC therefore urges the Employment Committee to consider using a different term in its proposal, in order to avoid further confusion in terminology. This suggestion is given further weight by the existence of recognised players within the social enterprise field who are already certified to use such a term as a label for social enterprise, as with the ‘Social Enterprise Mark’ (9).

4.1

The aim of the proposed pilot project for a social mark is to encourage businesses to go beyond their statutory obligations in their efforts to be more socially responsible. This initiative is vitally important, but we wonder whether a European social mark might, in the current economic climate, be too complicated in comparison to its added value. The policy goals of the proposal are to boost job creation and youth employment and to combat poverty. All of these areas are of key importance for Europe, but the EESC believes that the link between them and a voluntary social label is too weak to be effective. Rather, it believes that these goals will still be more effectively achieved primarily by strengthening legislation on the subject and enforcing it better, and by renewing and reinforcing the open method of coordination in the social field.

4.2

The EESC also considers it important to point out that proposals in this field must start from the assumption that strong, competitive enterprises are the key to delivering economic growth and thus creating sustainable conditions for better social standards.

4.3

The proposal also features a stepped, progressive ‘grading system’ based on how well a business meets a variety of social criteria such as decent pay, social security, healthcare, gender equality, childcare, teleworking, etc. In view of the ongoing economic crisis and the major difficulties facing certain countries, the EESC is concerned that at this point such a progressive grading system risks creating wider gulfs rather than increasing cohesion between different sized businesses and EU countries. A progressive grading system will not be fit for purpose unless it is designed to be suitable not only for big multinational companies but also, and in particular, for SMEs and VSEs.

4.4

Furthermore, a label is only useful if it is known and recognised. Labelled SMEs and VSEs should therefore be the object of communication campaigns highlighting their commitment. What is regarded as social progress therefore needs to be discussed in detail with reference to subsidiarity in this area, and also with reference to different traditions and models of national welfare and social security systems. This dialogue must be held with the social partners and other stakeholders such as consumer associations, at both EU and national level.

4.5

As part of the EU's efforts to make it easier to start up and run businesses, a great many simplifications and measures to promote growth have been introduced in an effort to avoid weakening corporate social responsibility, employees' social rights or businesses' opportunities to grow and compete. Although much remains to be done in terms of rights, the EESC is doubtful whether a voluntary system will be effective in improving social responsibility. It would also note that, even if it is free of charge, a labelling system will require resources that could be put to better use in businesses that are already under pressure in this crisis.

4.6

As part of efforts to improve social responsibility, it is also necessary to evaluate the number of levels in which a business is responsible for social rights, e.g. with respect to cooperation with suppliers outside the EU. Unless there is clarity regarding this responsibility, it will not be possible to generate trust and confidence in the mark. Attention should also be paid to the possible impact on trade and importers.

4.7

Another important question to raise is the legitimacy of any standardised mark. Previous experience has shown that top-down, relatively prescriptive initiatives of this kind generally have little impact among consumer movements or other stakeholders, which is a prerequisite if the mark is to have any effect. In this connection, Fairtrade (10) is a good example of the consumer sector itself taking the initiative to introduce a mark and could be a guideline. Examples of labelling schemes that are considered not to have worked properly should also be analysed in more detail (11).

4.8

It is important to consider how to build trust in a new mark. From the perspective of consumers, the current situation is already confusing: there are a variety of labelling systems, many of which are difficult to understand, and it is impossible to keep up with them. Adding another new system and asking consumers to make informed choices could be expecting too much of them. Instead of introducing a new social mark, it would be worth considering expanding existing labelling systems to cover social responsibility (where they do not already do so). The same applies to the mark's ability to increase investor confidence. The Commission will use, for example, initiatives relating to social investment to develop guidelines for improving the reporting of social outcomes achieved by these efforts; the EESC highlighted this approach as essential in connection with investment in social enterprise (12), and it should also be taken into account in this initiative.

4.9

Attention should also be paid to the difficulties involved in establishing a complex system at European level, particularly in social, technical and practical terms. There are already various certification systems for different types of social labelling, the majority of which have improved the visibility and importance of social issues within businesses (13). In connection with the Employment Committee's proposal, particular attention should be paid to ISO 26000 (14), which covers the majority of the criteria included in the proposal and which many businesses have already signed up to. There are also a variety of other established international standards (15). The pilot project should therefore evaluate whether there is value in creating another new labelling system, or whether it would be better to increase awareness of and encourage businesses to use the existing systems and to strengthen them, for example through improvement indicators.

4.10

In order to avoid distortions, a European social labelling should not deviate too much from internationally recognised standardisations, but it should add a typically European touch: the respect for social rights.

4.11

Many of the proposed criteria for the social mark are covered by social dialogue, by areas of negotiation where the social partners decide, or by applicable national legislation, which means that it would be inappropriate to grade these criteria. The EESC points out that social dialogue has also promoted good practice and developed guidelines in the field, as corporate social responsibility contributes to and supplements social dialogue.

4.12

It is a complex and challenging matter to create a list of social criteria that suit all business types, national situations and circumstances. There are currently a variety of national systems and traditions regarding many of these social benefits alongside Community legislation, such as systems for childcare, parental leave, healthcare, the minimum wage, etc. The pilot project should therefore take account of the subsidiarity issues that arise, as well as the proposed criteria, in assessing the usefulness of the mark.

4.13

To build trust in the mark, it is necessary not only to work to raise awareness among businesses, investors and consumers, but also to establish an effective monitoring system. A mark only provides a snapshot of how well a business met the criteria at the point when it submitted its application. Without an independent body responsible for certification, monitoring and timelines for the mark, it will not be possible to generate the sought-after trust or social progress. In this respect, account must be taken of the risk of abuse and irregularities, and of the procedure for excluding businesses. The development of a suitable monitoring procedure will require resources and bureaucracy, and it is therefore important to weigh up the anticipated added social value against the increase in bureaucracy and complexity.

4.14

The EESC questions whether it is reasonable to create a labelling system covering all sectors and Member States in Europe. There are significant differences between businesses in terms of their ability to achieve the proposed targets, and there is no way to design the assessment body to be fair to them all. Therefore, we instead suggest developing a facet of a broader CSR concept in which the mark relates to various activities and processes, rather than to the business itself.

4.15

The EESC would therefore stress that, if a pilot project is undertaken in this area at some point, the target group for the mark should be involved in designing it. A study would be useful to clarify the key elements of the social mark, such as monitoring, validity period, withdrawal of the mark, assessment intervals, improvement indicators, etc. A pilot project should also aim to determine whether a European social mark is viable and useful in achieving the desired results.

14.3.2013   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 76/24

1.1

The Committee recalls (1) that the Single Market is a centrepiece of European integration, with the potential to deliver directly-felt benefits to European stakeholders and to generate sustainable growth for Europe's economies. In the current economic crisis a well-functioning, future-oriented Single Market is not merely desirable but essential for the political and economic future of the European Union.

1.2

Against the background of an ongoing economic crisis and, amongst other things, the impact the deregulation of financial markets has had on the national budgets of the Member States, on the real economy, on poverty and on employment in the EU (2), the optimistic tone the Commission strikes in its Communication regarding the implementation of the Single Market (SM) feels inappropriate. The EESC believes that the Commission has paid too little attention to the unintended negative side-effects of the Single Market. An overly explicit and demonstrative, but premature, claim of success can only frustrate the EU citizens. The consequence could be a further undermining of the Single Market rather than a new dynamic. The Commission should demonstrate a more realistic approach by communicating in a well-balanced tone.

1.3

The better functioning of the Single Market by means of the old and new guidelines is under huge threat from the massive increase to 28 million unemployed, particularly affecting youth in the EU. Hundreds of thousands of SMEs have gone bankrupt and 120 million citizens are at threat of poverty and social exclusion, i.e. approx. 25 % of the EU population. For these reasons, demand and consumption in the EU are massively affected. In addition to key actions the EU and the Member States must step up their efforts to overcome the financial, economic and budgetary crisis and to release the full potential of the Single Market.

1.4

The EESC calls on the Parliament, Commission and Council to act quickly without affecting quality, in order to ensure that these legislative proposals are adopted before the end of the Parliament and Commission mandates in spring 2014. The EESC would very much welcome the fast application of the measures proposed in the Communication on the Governance of the Single Market to improve the overall implementation of EU rules.

2.1

The Commission has defined the second phase of the Single Market Act (hereafter SMA) by means of 12 new key actions to improve the functioning of the Single Market. The EESC welcomes the fact that it has been consulted before the communication's publication and that the Commission has taken up some of its recommendations in the SMA II. However, it regrets that there was no formal public consultation this time and that the informal consultation was not evenly balanced between relevant stakeholders.

2.2

Despite the Single Market's positive contribution to economic growth and the creation of new jobs since its establishment, it has not delivered its full potential to all stakeholders, be they businesses, workers, consumers, citizens or others. The Commission mentions an extra 2.77 million jobs but says nothing about the precarious nature of some of these jobs (3). We know that since spring 2008, when the consequences of the economic crisis were felt throughout Europe, approximately 10 million jobs have been lost and it appears that we have not yet seen the end of this downturn (4).

2.3

Though the Commission indicates the guiding principles behind these choices (better regulation agenda, cost of non-Europe, etc.), the sense of urgency regarding some of the choices is not always clear in all European institutions. On the mobility of workers, for instance, the Commission announces an initiative in relation to the EURES portal while at the same time other fundamental activities in this field are still in the Council pending.

2.4

The EESC feels that the Commission has paid too little attention to the unintended negative side-effects of the Single Market. EU regulation of financial markets has been too weak to put an end to defective supervision and to prevent a type of entrepreneurship geared towards the short-term interests of a privileged group of shareholders. More attention needs to be paid to improving corporate governance. Increasing transparency and accountability should be the highest priority, in order to ensure that the Single Market contributes to developing a legal environment that respects the legitimate interests of all stakeholders.

2.5

Notable is the firmness with which the Commission claims that these 12 new levers will contribute to growth, more employment and more confidence in the Single Market. The EESC believes that the history of the Single Market's introduction demonstrates that some of the measures taken in the past have had ample effect in the short term. An overly explicit and demonstrative, but premature, claim of success can only frustrate the EU citizens, particularly in the absence of robust evidence from impact assessments. The consequence could be a further undermining of the Single Market rather than a new dynamic (5). The Commission should demonstrate a more realistic approach by communicating in a well-balanced tone.

2.6

Regrettably, the SMA I and II do not underscore the importance of ensuring confidence in relation to the enforcement of rights. The EESC is still impatient to see, at last, an efficient collective judicial redress instrument made available to European consumers. While liberalising markets and increasing competition are key objectives of the Single Market policy and play an important role in enabling consumers to choose freely, consumers also need a robust framework of protective rights in relation to the purchase of goods and services and the efficient enforcement of these rights. Several studies have concluded that the implementation of different EU instruments is slow and enforcement is still relatively weak, particularly in cross-border situations, and the Commission should therefore as a matter of urgency propose binding measures on new enforcement tools.

2.7

It is unfortunate that just 1 out of 12 initiatives is labelled a consumer measure, despite the fact that several levers have an important impact on European consumers' daily lives (6). We hope that this does not reflect the Commission's general view of consumer policy. It is important that the focus is wide and that consumers are not seen as an appendix to business policy but rather as independent players, with a view to creating a Single Market that benefits everybody, cf. the Monti and Grech reports. The EESC agrees with the Commission that there is still unused potential in the Single Market, after both the 50 proposals and the first 12 levers. However, from consumers' point of view, the Commission could and should have placed more emphasis on prioritizing consumer- friendly initiatives, as previously underlined in an EESC opinion (7).

2.8

The EESC is also struck by the lack of awareness of social partnership in this communication. Confidence and trust cannot be restored if involving social partners in EU policies is limited to the policy area of DG Employment. Consultation of social partners is also needed in relation to various activities within DG Market.

2.9

As the EESC has pointed out in previous opinions, any proposal for cross-border consumer transactions should be achieved incrementally, starting with cross-border commercial sales contracts between businesses (B2B) on a pilot basis. Pending the adoption of any proposal for B2C transactions, there should be no further initiative of optional nature regarding cross-border commercial sales contracts.

3.1

The Commission has already presented 11 of the 12 legislative proposals for the key actions and the EESC has adopted opinions on these proposals (8). The EESC calls on the Parliament, Commission and Council to act quickly, without affecting quality in order to ensure that these legislative proposals are adopted before the end of the Parliament and Commission mandates in spring 2014. The Member States should implement the adopted legislation correctly and enforce it to guarantee the level playing field and barriers created on unjustified and discriminatory grounds must be removed in order to enable the Single Market to function properly.

3.2

The withdrawal of the Monti II regulation does not solve the problems created by the European Court of Justice (ECJ) in its judgments relating to the posting of workers. A solution to the current situation must be found, since it is preventing workers from exercising their rights fully. The Commission should ensure that fundamental social rights cannot be restricted by economic freedoms. The Commission should consider a proposal for a social progress protocol to be attached to the European Treaties. Such a protocol should clarify the relationship between fundamental social rights and economic freedoms by confirming that the Single Market is not a goal in itself, but was established in order to achieve social progress for all EU citizens (effectively in implementation of Article 3.3 of the Consolidated version of the Treaty on European Union). It should also make it clear that economic freedoms and competition rules cannot take priority over fundamental social rights and social progress and can in no way be interpreted as granting undertakings the right to evade or circumvent national social and employment laws and practices or for the purposes of unfair competition on wages and working conditions.

3.3

The EESC has identified a number of measures that were missing from the SMA I and which it felt would also contribute to boosting citizens' confidence. The measures still missing include the revision of the copyright directive, copyright levies, net neutrality, the social progress protocol, micro- and family businesses, measures to support the creation of new companies and the expansion of existing ones, over-indebtedness and interbank transfers, with a view to consolidating the operation of the Single Euro Payments Area (SEPA).

4.9.1

Unsafe consumer products, including products bearing the CE mark, are still found on the EU market, posing avoidable risks to health and safety. The EESC is therefore pleased that the European Commission will propose a legislative ‘product safety package’ consisting of a Single Market surveillance instrument for all non-food products, a proposal for a new General Product Safety Directive (GPSD) and a multiannual market surveillance framework plan. The revision should provide for more clarity on how the various EU legislations dealing with product safety interact with each other. In particular, manufacturers' responsibilities need to be strengthened and clarified. It must be ensured that the level of enforcement is the same across the EU and that market surveillance activities are effective across the EU.

4.9.2

Child-appealing products should be explicitly addressed and the prohibition of food-imitating products should be maintained. The EU policy must constitute a major step forward for safety and health. Attention should be paid to unfair competition for EU businesses required to obey EU rules. The revision of the GPS Directive should effectively prevent dangerous products being placed on the market, which requires a European market surveillance system including effective controls at EU external borders.

4.10.1

The proposals presented here are placed under this heading in a rather artificial way. The EESC recognises the importance, at this time of crisis, of focussing on combating further social exclusion and poverty. In this regard, social enterprise has been highlighted as a key factor in the strategy for overcoming the crisis. The lack of a dedicated key action for the development and growth of the social economy and social enterprises is disappointing. The suggested key action 12 fails to address the increasing social exclusion and poverty in Europe. The EESC would therefore recommend a clear and dedicated key action on social enterprise based on the proactive recommendations of the EESC which the Committee believes will better address the need for further social cohesion (14).

4.10.2

The EESC welcomes the proposal to give all EU citizens access to a basic payment account, to ensure that payment account fees are transparent and comparable and to make it easier to switch payment accounts. The EESC hopes that the Commission will this time put forward binding legislation rather than the recommendation of July last year which was highly criticised for its voluntary nature. The EESC notes that the transparency and comparability of payment account fees for consumers has either shown significant shortcomings or failed entirely. The proposed EU legislation should ensure that every consumer has the right of access to a basic payment account and should remove any obstacle to switching payment accounts.

14.3.2013   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 76/31

1.1

For the European Economic and Social Committee (EESC), creating the European Research Area (ERA) is a priority objective for facilitating growth and economic, social and cultural development in the EU, as well as scientific excellence and cohesion between the Member States, regions and societies. The funding policy under the Horizon 2020 programme should be at the crucial level that enables this objective to be met.

1.2

The EESC has described its vision of the ERA in a number of previous opinions (1) and has opened an in-depth debate and dialogue on the question with the Commission, the European Parliament and the Council, and therefore welcomes the Communication.

1.3

The EESC agrees with the Commission when it points to growth as one of the ERA's priority objectives. In the present deep economic and social crisis, this indication is of crucial importance to European organised civil society.

1.4

The EESC believes that free movement of researchers, scientific knowledge and technology must become the internal market's ‘fifth freedom’.

1.5

The EESC considers that completing a unified research area is a constantly-changing process and that the 2014 deadline is over-ambitious, given that austerity measures are being imposed in many European countries, cutting national public investment in research and innovation.

1.6

The EESC welcomes the proposal to build the ERA through a reinforced partnership based on best practices rather than through regulation. It is, however, concerned that the Memoranda of Understanding with stakeholder organisations are of a voluntary nature rather than legally binding, and are informal.

1.7

The EESC calls for strong political will that can uphold effective and competitive national research systems. These can best be achieved through peer assessment, based on an evaluation of the quality of research terms, the structures involved and the results produced.

1.8

The EESC believes that publicly-funded research must give priority to sectors of particular importance to the well-being of European citizens, and that public funds must continue to finance projects as part of substantial, shared European cooperation.

1.9

The EESC urges the Commission and the Member States to take all the steps needed to remove the obstacles to completing the ERA concerning the lack of a European labour market for researchers, their working conditions, mobility and the social security system.

1.10

The EESC recalls the urgent need to change the situation regarding pensions and pension funds for researchers involved in transnational projects, and to set up a European supplementary pension fund to cover/offset the losses caused by moving from one country, and one social security system, to another.

1.11

The Committee warns that the new initiatives proposed by the Commission must not jeopardise or cancel out all the efforts to reduce the administrative burdens on researchers within the ERA.

1.12

The EESC alerts the European Commission and the Member States to the need to adopt all initiatives geared to effectively eradicating the gender discrimination and inequality that still persists in academic, scientific and research circles. It particularly welcomes the decision to ensure a female presence of at least 40 % on all committees involved in recruitment and drafting and/or reviewing project evaluation criteria, and on those that establish staff policies in academic, research and scientific centres.

1.13

The EESC welcomes the Commission's proposal to draw up a roadmap for einfrastructure development to support escience. It refers to its opinion (2) and supports the Communication (3) on accessing, preserving and disseminating the results of research and scientific knowledge.

1.14

The EESC backs the appeal from researchers and the European scientific community (4) addressed to the Heads of State and Government and to the Presidents of the EU institutions, pointing out that Europe cannot afford to lose its most talented researchers and teachers, especially young ones, and that European funding is essential to make its national counterpart more efficient and effective and in order to enhance pan-European and international competitiveness. It therefore calls for no reduction to be made in the corresponding item in the 2014-2020 European budget.

1.15

The EESC considers that the announced mapping of activities for priority areas, the Forum for disseminating and transferring the results of scientific and research projects, and the final assessment of the results produced by the Communication should be carried out with the full and active involvement of civil society involved in the ERA.

1.16

For all the above reasons, the EESC hopes that an internal group can be set up within the Committee to serve as a reference point for the European institutions during the various assessment, monitoring and decision-making stages involved in completing the ERA.

2.1

The EESC has expressed how it sees the ERA in numerous opinions, and this vision remains relevant; it welcomes the present Communication in favour of a stronger partnership, demonstrating the urgent need for the EU and the Member States to uphold and extend the commitments they have undertaken. Progress is, however, uneven across the Member States and remains sluggish in some cases. The Communication is innovative in that it extends the cooperation between the Commission and the Member States to ERA stakeholder organisations (5). The EESC considers that there is a need for wider and more efficient reinforced cooperation.

2.2

The EESC shares the Commission's view that the completion of the ERA must support economic growth, scientific excellence and cohesion amongst regions, countries and societies. At the same time, it must take account of the interaction that is needed between science and the market, between innovation and businesses, and between new ways of organising work and an increasingly interconnected research community.

2.3

The EESC however considers that in the current context of global crisis, more specific and decisive measures are needed to counter the negative impact of national fragmentation in framing and implementing research policies, and to optimise activities that help to boost their efficiency. Measures must also seek to increase healthy competition and cross-border synergies between national research systems, promote research careers and facilitate mobility and the free movement of knowledge (6).

2.4

The public consultations carried out in preparation for the Communication revealed that:

3.1

The EESC backs the Commission's argument for reinforcing national research systems through best practices, and agrees that resources should be allocated by means of open calls for proposals, evaluated by panels of experts (peer review  (7)), whether from the same countries, other Member States or third countries. It agrees that an assessment of the quality of research-performing teams and organisations and their outputs should be used as the basis for institutional public financing decisions. Researchers, teams and research proposals and programmes are still often not assessed according to comparable standards, although they involve projects and research that are funded and implemented in similar ways. For the EESC, this represents an unacceptable loss of value at a time when research budgets are being slashed in many Member States.

3.2

The EESC is aware that European research is among the best in the world. Research in universities and scientific institutes has enabled European businesses to pioneer technological development and take a lead in the field. The EESC is consequently concerned at the conclusion reached by the Commission in its impact assessment, where it argues that the gap between Europe and the US, Japan and other developed economies, is widening (8). This would suggest that Europe is losing ground in knowledge production, and that global innovation leaders are ahead of the EU27 for certain indicators. The EESC considers that, in view of the global crisis and the shifting balance of power that comes with it, the ERA should consolidate the leading position of European science. Its quality and level of excellence must serve as a competitive advantage when competing with other international players.

3.3

The EU decided in 2002 that the R&D investment of all Member States should reach 3 % of European GDP (9). The subsequent failures to achieve this target and its postponement to 2020 prompt the EESC to wonder if it will be achieved. The EESC agrees that one of the ERA's priorities must be growth, especially during the current serious economic and social crisis, and is gravely concerned about the extensive cuts in research caused by austerity policies.

3.4

One of the main purposes of the European Higher Education Area, which ties in closely with the achievement of the ERA, is to encourage mobility in order to effectively enrich the training of students, teachers and researchers. These cuts will make it difficult for many European researchers to benefit from and play a full part in the ERA. The EESC expresses its concern at the decisions that have been taken (10).

3.5

The EESC restates its firm belief that effective and competitive national research systems require strong political will, and EESC urges the EU and the Member States to make more determined and faster progress in fulfilling the commitments they have taken on.

3.6

In recent years publicly-funded research seems to have given up on sectors of strategic importance for the well-being of people in Europe, which should, in fact, represent innovative research fields for the ERA, and in particular as part of European cooperation.

3.7

The EESC also points out that in order to optimise and/or reshape financial support for national research systems, the false dichotomy between applied and basic science, which seems to appeal to a number of Member States that are striving to reduce their budgets, must be avoided. It would be a serious obstacle as regards access to resources or funding.

4.1

In the EU, pan-European research cooperation has been concentrated on a number of major initiatives (11). However, only 0,8 % of national GBAORDs (12) are used for joint Member State programmes, including those supported or co-funded by the Commission. This is in spite of the fact that the evidence shows that thanks to transnational cooperation, the level of R&D can be raised, it can be extended to new sectors, and public and private support can be obtained for joint projects. This confirms the need for robust knowledge networks across Europe.

4.2

Introducing new research funding schemes, such as the ERC's Synergy Grants, launched in 2012 in support of small cross-border (and usually interdisciplinary) groups of researchers, can help to demonstrate the added value and complementarity of joint work, provided that they take a creative approach to management and combine complementary knowledge, skills and resources in new ways.

4.3

Obstacles and barriers also remain in access for non-nationals to national research centres of European interest, and to pan-European research infrastructures for researchers working in non-participating Member States. In both cases, access is granted on the basis of national preference. The EESC believes that these difficulties are hampering full completion of the ERA.

4.4

The EESC believes that the planned mapping of activities, which would identify strengths, weaknesses and gaps in transnational scientific cooperation, should not only rely on information provided by the Member States, but should also ensure effective and genuine participation by those parts of civil society that are involved in and/or concerned by the ERA.

6.1

The number of female researchers has grown significantly in recent years in practically all sectors, but the number of active women researchers in senior academic positions as high-level heads of research in scientific institutes and universities is still too low (16). This is in spite of the fact that there is evidence that mixed research groups perform better, benefiting from wider expertise, knowledge sharing, diverse points of view and a higher level of social intelligence. Women's academic careers remain marked by strong vertical segregation and the glass ceiling remains firmly in place alongside labour segregation (17).

6.2

The gender pay gap continues in the academic field and research centres, as in other sectors of the economy. Factors contributing to this include supposedly ‘neutral’ job description systems that ignore gender inequalities, the burden of unshared family responsibilities and the persistence of direct and indirect discrimination (18). This means that female scientific potential is undervalued and is not fully tapped; women are underrepresented and research and innovation decisions are not gender-balanced.

6.3

Not all Member States have national policies to encourage gender mainstreaming in research, and this undermines the quality and relevance of such research. More equal participation by women would increase the diversity of the talent pool, the workforce and the decision-making process, and would enhance research quality. This would avoid the high economic costs and even mistakes associated with failing to take the gender perspective into account in research. If gender mainstreaming in research content is not improved, the ERA's aims in terms of levels of excellence will be negatively affected. Greater involvement of women would contribute to European socio-economic growth and would also boost research excellence, performance and impact.

6.4

The EESC calls on the Commission and the Member States to redouble their efforts to effectively eradicate remaining gender inequalities in academia, research and science. More specifically, they should hold true on the promise to ensure that all committees involved in recruitment, drafting and/or reviewing project evaluation criteria, or establishing staff policies in academic, research and scientific centres are at least 40 % women. The EESC views the establishment, implementation and evaluation of actions plans for gender equality in universities and research centres as a positive measure, provided that women are fully and actively involved in the entire process.

6.5

Similarly, the EESC strongly urges the Commission to ensure that organised civil society is involved in preparing the Recommendation that is to set out the guidelines for institutional changes promoting real equality between women and men in universities and research centres.

7.1

In April 2008, the Commission published a Recommendation (19) on the management of intellectual property in knowledge transfer activities, together with a Code of Practice for universities and other public research organisations (20). A Code is not, however, enough to ensure that the objectives of the Recommendation are achieved.

7.2

Access to scientific information is an essential prerequisite for successfully supporting research and innovation, and thus for Europe's competitiveness. This includes transfer of information between researchers, between research partnerships – particularly between research and business – and between researchers and the public, including open access to publications. The EESC welcomes the Commission Communication (21) on this question and refers to its specific opinion (22) on the subject.

7.3

The EESC also welcomes the intention to draw up a roadmap for e-infrastructure development to support e-science through access to research tools and resources.

7.4

The EESC urges the Commission to seek and harness the involvement of civil society organisations concerned with research and science through regular exchanges to take place as part of the Member State forum, which should serve as a reference point for disseminating and transferring the results of scientific programmes and projects.

14.3.2013   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 76/37

1.1

The Committee considers it essential to have an integrated European policy for the security industry, underpinned by a coordinated approach to tackling the challenges of the industry, a common strategy and a shared vision of its competitive development, in a unified European market.

1.2

In order to competitively reinvigorate the security industry (understood as the traditional security industry and the security-orientated defence industry, as well as new entrants, i.e. mainly companies extending their existing civilian technologies to security applications and security service providers) with its vast and promising pool of employment and users, the EESC considers it vital to develop:

1.3

While the EESC endorses the initiatives in the action plan, it would like to see these underpinned by stronger cooperation and coordination, centred, inter alia, around product types, on the basis of relevant, detailed statistics, looking at the sector's companies in terms, not least, of their production, workforce and size.

1.4

The EESC recommends coordination and convergence of information management systems, and guarantees of interoperability.

1.5

The EESC strongly advocates bolstering the scope for managing and anticipating new competition scenarios and the prospects for accessing institutional financial resources, including through participatory foresight exercises at EU level.

1.6

The societal and ethical dimension must be interlinked in a transparent way and guaranteed at all phases, from design to standardisation and technological application on the ground. New technologies and rules should incorporate, from the outset, protection of the fundamental rights of citizens, especially regarding privacy and personal data protection.

1.7

An EU-level effort is needed, as well as the coordination of national efforts, to ensure training and support for human resources, so as to ensure the delivery of quality professional services, respectful of the individual and in step with the application of advanced technologies within a fully interoperable system.

2.1

The security industry is a strategic sector with civil and military applications which are closely related and interlinked. It constitutes an ideal meeting point for scientific research, technological innovation and advanced applications.

2.2

This industry is inherently technology driven, with a constant influx of new technologies. Products and services in this sector are diverse, have high rates of obsolescence and require a high technical and scientific performance.

2.3

In the EU, the security industry has an estimated market value of up to EUR 36.5 billion and accounts for around 180 000 jobs. Globally, the market has grown over the last decade from EUR 10 billion to EUR 100 billion in 2011. The industry comprises the following sectors: aviation and maritime security and transport security in general; border security; critical infrastructure protection; counter-terrorism intelligence (including information and communications security and the cyber dimension); physical security; crisis management; and protective clothing.

2.4

In addition, there is the space-related security industry, with its many applications.

2.5

In Europe, the market for space-based security products is based on large multinational groups, which operate at European level, and individual Member States, in the civil and commercial spheres, with demand split 40 %-60 % between the commercial and the institutional.

2.6

Although market trends show constant growth, untouched by the economic slowdowns of the international crisis, the EU security industry is faced with a very fragmented internal market and an industrial base weakened by the considerable divergence between legal frameworks and technical and regulatory standards at national level, while research efforts and public procurement are still largely confined to individual Member States, despite EU action in this area, such as measures under FP7.

2.7

The EU is required to ensure the security of its citizens, businesses and society as a whole across a wide swath of activities, from civil protection against natural disasters to the protection of the food chain, from preventing and combating terrorism, to guarding against chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear and explosive risks.

2.8

The security industry is crucial for the future and is particularly representative of the challenges and opportunities facing Europe: thanks to their level of technological development, many EU companies are among the world leaders in various segments of the sector, but risk losing market share to their main trading partners.

2.8.1

Relevant, detailed and reliable statistics are needed with regard, looking at the sector's companies in terms, not least, of their production, workforce and size.

2.9

The management of companies within the security sector is highly complex, hinging on a number of variables:

2.10

In order to competitively reinvigorate the European security industry, the EESC considers it essential that the European internal market ensures:

2.11

At global level, the USA is by far the biggest competitor. It benefits from a harmonised legal framework, common standards and strong public demand at federal level (2), with a consolidated internal market that accounts for over 42 % of global turnover and companies at the forefront in technical security equipment. Japan and Israel have leading companies in specific kinds of advanced equipment, especially in the IT and communications sectors, while Russia and China are highly advanced in the traditional sectors of protection of physical security.

2.12

In this global context, the EESC stresses the need for a proactive EU industrial policy for the security sector that better reflects the balance between the capacities of the sector and a technical and regulatory framework and IPR, and above all, types of products, services and systems that can comply with common standards and harmonised regulations and procedures, such as:

while for ‘sensitive’ products, the regulatory and access conditions are subject to assessments and agreements on a case-by-case basis, to maintain quality and safety levels.

2.13

The EESC has repeatedly highlighted the need to develop policies on network and information security, which is crucial to the Digital Agenda for Europe.

2.14

The EESC has also previously expressed its views on the crucial issues of aviation security (3), maritime security (4) and land transport security (5), as well as on the management of operational cooperation at the external borders (6), underlining the role of the Frontex agency and the need for a global approach to border security and to combating illegal immigration.

2.15

With regard to space-based environment and security monitoring, the Committee has stressed the importance of the Sentinel satellites and the GMES programme and the satellite navigation system Galileo (7).

2.16

Several studies have emphasised the importance of security-technology demonstration projects in the field of chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear and explosive risk (CBRNE).

2.17

The 7th Framework Programme (FP7) is the first to include a specific research programme on security. With a budget of EUR 1.4 billion, it is focused solely on civil applications and developing the technologies and knowledge to protect EU citizens (8), while respecting their privacy and other fundamental rights.

2.18

The EESC believes that the use of civil/military hybrid technologies should be facilitated, by developing suitable standards in cooperation with the European Defence Agency, while more resources and impetus should be injected into supporting the ‘Security’ strand among the enabling technologies of the new research and innovation FP (9), encouraging demonstration projects and pilot prototyping.

2.19

The Commission included the security industry among the essential elements of the Europe 2020 flagship initiative An integrated industrial policy for the globalisation era, on which the Committee has already outlined its views (10).

2.20

The EESC believes it is essential to launch a single European strategy that takes an integrated approach to the security industry, because security is one of the main concerns of today's society, is a cornerstone of growth and employment and requires joint efforts and shared vision among all the Member States in order to strengthen competitiveness.

3.1

The communication outlines the strategic importance of the EU security industry and the main actions required to make the industry more competitive and innovative, through which the Commission intends to accompany this process.

3.2

The proposed action plan sets out the following guidelines:

3.3

The Commission intends to set up a monitoring group to track the progress of the proposed measures within a specific timeframe.

4.1

The Committee believes that, for the benefit of EU citizens, companies, workers and European society as a whole and with a view to developing a competitive and sustainable economy, it is essential to define a comprehensive, coordinated approach at EU level to tackling security challenges and developing the EU's security industry, by devising an overall EU strategy on security systems that places individuals and their dignity at the centre, so as to meet basic requirements in terms of freedom and security.

4.2

In the EESC's view, greater consideration needs to be given to the added value of the existing agencies, such as the EDA (defence), Frontex (external borders), Europol (public safety), ENISA (information security), the EASA (aviation safety), the EMSA (maritime safety) and the EFSA (food safety), and the alert systems such as RAPEX (European rapid alert system for product safety) and the ECHA in Helsinki (system on chemical products/REACH).

4.3

The EESC agrees with the Commission on the need to take full advantage of the leading position of many European companies in the sector, proactively securing a truly unified and practicable European internal market, unhindered by fragmentation, and promoting a sector that constitutes a pool of products and services that is vast and promising from an employment perspective.

4.4

However, the EESC thinks that the European action plan should go further and approach the launch of a fully-fledged common European strategy for the security industry with a shared vision, a European platform that brings together the various aspects of security and a system of governance capable of providing effective, unified coordination.

4.5

This integrated-approach strategy could take the form of a virtual platform, incorporating the ethical and governance issues, the inter-sectoral aspects and interoperability.

4.6

The EESC believes it necessary to bridge the gap of understanding between policymakers and the industry, including by strengthening initiatives such as the European Security Congress and through a permanent platform for dialogue, such as the Security Policy Forum.

4.7

Overcoming the fragmentation of the EU internal market requires:

4.8

The Committee believes that, in addition to integrating the social dimension right from the design phase of products, services and systems, mechanisms need to be implemented that involve the social partners and organised civil society in monitoring compliance with the societal and ethical dimension of developing security and its technological-production applications.

4.8.1

The issuance of technical and regulatory mandates, in conjunction with the EDA, should be done in accordance with the principles of the new standardisation policy, with an open and transparent annual work programme, full participation of the social partners and organised civil society representatives, and the establishment of specifications for public procurement that respect the principles of openness, consensus, transparency, relevance, neutrality and quality (11).

4.8.2

The EESC endorses the proposed approach to the mutual recognition of certification systems, insofar as it achieves common levels of competence for accredited certification bodies, more stringent selection criteria and harmonised selection procedures for conformity assessment (12).

4.9

The Committee would stress the importance of regulatory recognition for dual-use technologies to promote hybrid technologies for joint civil/military use, while advocating even more strongly that this be bolstered both financially and in terms of content under the enabling technologies priority provided for in Horizon 2020, alongside actions under the future Internal Security Fund.

4.9.1

As regards intellectual and industrial property, while the innovative approaches in Horizon 2020 are certainly important, IPR protection under the WTO and under the bilateral and multilateral European association agreements needs to be strengthened, with a particular focus on the clauses regarding liability limitation and access to international public procurement.

4.9.2

The EESC shares the Commission's view on the merits of making full use of the possibilities provided by the pre-commercial procurement instrument within Horizon 2020.

4.10

The EESC fully endorses bolstering the societal and ethical dimension in the rules governing the security-technology industry.

5.1

Overcoming market fragmentation on the basis of product type. The EESC recommends setting priorities for action not by sector but by type of product that can most readily meet the requirements of the single market, through harmonised regulations and procedures, on the grounds of their high market potential, and their impact on a broad section of the public and workers, with particular regard to promoting SME development, in terms of both financial resources and research, and with respect to organisation.

5.2

Research and innovation, IPR and procurement. The EESC calls for EU funding for security technologies under Horizon 2020 to be stepped up, in tandem with a strong presence within the ‘enabling technologies’ strand; it also advocates bolstering joint interoperability projects on security under the ISA programme (13); applying exemptions to the sector, under the State aid for Innovation system; verifying the effective application of Directives 2004/18/EC and 2009/81/EC and of the pre-commercial procurement instruments to the security industry; more public-private and civil-military cooperation and the facilitation of cross-border company merger and grouping strategies; harmonisation of the rules on third party limited liability protection (TPLL); and better internal IPR rules.

5.3

Access to international markets. The EESC believes it necessary to step up integrated, common foreign policy actions within the security industry, strengthening IPR protection under the WTO and the bilateral and multilateral European association agreements, guaranteeing equal access to international markets and procurement on the basis of reciprocity, increasing the weight of the EU in international standardisation and launching a quality label (euro security label).

5.4

Societal and ethical dimension. All security systems, products and services must respect the fundamental rights and freedoms of citizens, especially the right to privacy, and contribute to economic and social progress, secure trade and people's well-being and safety. Technological developments should enable the protection of personal data and privacy to be enhanced, from the outset, providing – with the support of public-private dialogue – the means for transparent and accountable law enforcement that should be centred on human protection.

5.5

Training, support and employment of qualified human resources: in line with the requirements of security and the application of advanced security technologies, so as to ensure the delivery of high-quality professional services, within a fully interoperable system that is respectful of individuals and their dignity.

14.3.2013   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 76/43

1.1

The success of research and innovation is the key to Europe's global competitiveness and thus provides the basis for jobs, social services and prosperity. The Horizon 2020 programme covers the urgently-needed development measures which the EU plans to take in this area. International cooperation with partners in non-EU countries is one aspect of this.

1.2

International cooperation has a broad favourable impact on progress in this area among the partners involved, and on understanding between nations.

1.3

However, its usefulness for Europe is very much dependent on the attractiveness of the European Research Area as well as the prestige and the performance of European universities, research institutions and businesses, including SMEs. One of the key objectives of the Europe 2020 strategy is to ensure that the necessary conditions for that strategy are put in place in Europe.

1.4

It is therefore all the more urgent, in the light of the current economic and financial crisis, to implement an anti-cyclical European support policy and to use all available financial and structural means to support the European Research Area, the foundations on which it is built and its international dimension, and to make it attractive and spare it from cuts. The Horizon 2020 budget must not be misused as a plaything for various conflicts of interest.

1.5

The main objective of framework agreements with partner countries is to create a level playing field with reciprocal rights and obligations. Apart from that, cooperation partners are not to be restricted by European rules any more than is strictly necessary for European interests. Creativity requires freedom.

1.6

Under the subsidiarity principle, project-related cooperation agreements should be carried out by those stakeholders who are themselves involved in the relevant cooperation project or are responsible for it as organisations.

1.7

Large-scale research infrastructures and demonstration projects may exceed the capacities and potential needs of a single Member State (and perhaps even the EU as a whole), and may therefore require the direct involvement of the Commission.

1.8

A condition for successful international cooperation projects is reliability, continuity and contingencies for their entire duration. This requires that special precautions be taken. In addition, adequate mobility of the experts involved must be guaranteed and promoted.

1.9

International cooperation is not an end in itself, but brings workers together and must be based on the added value expected to be achieved in each case. It should not develop into a political vehicle of Commission external policy.

1.10

The leitmotiv must be the EU's own interest as well as strengthening the European Research Area and Europe's capacity for innovation. Therefore European-funded cooperation with partners from developing countries should be funded preferably using the development aid budget.

1.11

For European cooperation partners, it is a significant economic disadvantage that there is still no EU community patent to safeguard intellectual property. The Committee calls on the Parliament, the Commission and the Council to support the planned moves towards a European patent with unitary effect and to finally break the impasse. In this connection, a grace period should also be introduced in Europe.

1.12

Information on the implementation of the strategic approach is not to be obtained by using new instruments, but rather by using, among things, the European Semester.

2.1

The communication sets out the reasons for international cooperation in research, development and innovation as well as its strategic goals and some of the practices pursued. International cooperation is understood to mean cooperation with partners outside the EU.

2.2

The highlighted objectives are as follows:

2.3

The new strategic approach to international cooperation in research and innovation should be characterised by:

3.1

The success of research and innovation is the key to Europe's global competitiveness and thus provides the basis for jobs, social benefits and prosperity. The Horizon 2020 programme covers the urgent development measures which the European Commission plans to take in this area. International cooperation is one aspect of the Horizon 2020 programme.

3.2

International cooperation in research and innovation has a broad favourable impact on progress in this area among the partners involved, and on understanding between nations. This applies not only within the European Research Area, but also right across the world and thus to the subject under consideration here. The Committee reiterates its earlier recommendations on this subject (1).

3.3

The Committee therefore welcomes the Commission's new communication and, for the most part, supports its goals and the arguments it puts forward.

3.4

The European negotiating positions at the outset of partnerships as well as the usefulness of international cooperation for the EU are very much dependent on the attractiveness of the European Research Area as well as the prestige and the performance of European universities and research institutions as well as the innovation capacity of businesses, including SMEs.

3.5

One of the key objectives of the Europe 2020 strategy is to ensure that the necessary conditions for that strategy are put in place in Europe. It is therefore all the more urgent, in the light of the current economic and financial crisis, to implement an anti-cyclical European support policy, in other words not to make cuts in this area and instead to use all available financial and structural means to support the European Research Area, the foundations on which it is built and its international dimension, and to make it attractive. For precisely that reason, however, the Horizon 2020 budget must be financed at the very least on the scale proposed by the Commission. The Committee therefore reiterates the request it has repeatedly made to the European Parliament and the Council that they should not allow any cuts in this area and not misuse this budget as a plaything for conflicts of interest.

3.6

Successful research and innovation does not thrive in all Member States equally. The Committee reiterates the request it has made several times that those Member States in the European Research Area which at present do not have enough research institutions and innovation developers of excellence should eliminate this disadvantage as quickly as possible with the help of the Structural and Cohesion Funds and should facilitate the development of a sufficient number of outstanding researchers and innovative entrepreneurship through successful support and economic policies. Only this can give practical expression to the useful concept of ‘Teaming of Excellence’ (2). The Committee therefore also urges all Member States (and, where relevant, the private sector too), for their part, to finally meet the targets of the Lisbon Strategy – now also incorporated in the Europe 2020 strategy – by investing 3 % of GDP in research and development.

3.7

One of the Commission's declared goals is that Horizon 2020 should be ‘fully open to third country participants, allowing European researchers to cooperate with the best brains across the world’. This possibility has of course existed for many decades (3) and is used actively. The Commission should therefore spell out the current situation more clearly. It should explain which new resources it intends to use to achieve any additional freedoms and what is to be newly permitted and supported.

3.8

As important support measures for successful international cooperation, the Commission proposes that framework agreements be established with potential partner countries. In the Committee's opinion, these agreements should be geared first and foremost to particularly innovative, successful and competitive industrial states. These framework agreements – by analogy to the free trade agreement – should above all ensure a level playing field with reciprocal rights and obligations. Apart from that, potential partners should not be restricted by European rules any more than is strictly necessary for European interests.

3.9

Framework agreements must avoid all irrelevant considerations and influences and allow enough flexibility and freedom so that agreements can be tailored as effectively as possible to individual cases and their starting situation. Creativity requires freedom of action.

3.10

It is particularly important to ensure adequate reliability, continuity and contingencies for the entire duration of the cooperation projects. This is a challenging task and requires that special precautions be taken.

3.11

According to the principle of subsidiarity, cooperation agreements should be carried out by those stakeholders who are themselves involved in the relevant cooperation project or are responsible for it as organisations.

3.12

For its part, the Commission should become directly involved only in those cases in which the potential of an individual Member State, business or research organisation is insufficient, e.g. major scientific and technical projects. However, where the Commission does become involved it should also assume responsibility. The Committee recalls (4) that large-scale research infrastructures and demonstration projects in particular may exceed the capacities and potential needs of a single Member State (and perhaps even the EU as a whole) and therefore require greater involvement from the Commission.

3.13

However, most forms of international cooperation develop through personal contacts between researchers, research groups, businesses (including SMEs) and research organisations, which are normally established and cultivated at international specialised conferences and fairs. These forms of self-organisation must be identified, recognised and used, and promoted more strongly. The Committee finds it regrettable that the recommendations it has repeatedly made in this connection have so far met with no discernable response from the Commission.

3.14

Adequate mobility of experts taking part in cooperation projects is a condition for their success. This aspect should be developed by the Commission, possibly along the lines of the rules and development models for intra-European mobility.

3.15

The Committee is concerned (point 5 of the Commission communication) that international cooperation could develop into a political end in itself for the Commission or a vehicle of Commission external policy. However, cooperation is not an end in itself and requires further effort, which is justified exclusively by the increase and multiplication of knowledge and skills as well as the fruits of innovation. For this reason, such cooperation projects should not involve more parties than can contribute added value.

3.16

This is not just a question of resource distribution priorities, but also the administrative effort required. Although the time and effort required within Europe to implement Horizon 2020 can hopefully be reduced through the simplification measures announced (5), it still takes up a significant proportion of scientists' and researchers' time. Supplementing this now with international cooperation measures, which may be subject to overly formal procedures, runs the risk of making the bureaucracy bloated once again.

3.17

Another concern is the use of the financial resources of Horizon 2020, which unfortunately are still too limited. If these funds go to third countries outside the EU, they will automatically be withdrawn from the European Research Area. In all cases, priorities must be weighed up carefully, not least given the considerable need of EU Member States to catch up. Therefore such cooperation projects, which are primarily about development aid, should preferably be funded using the development aid budget.

3.18

The Commission communication also touches on the issue of intellectual property, citing it as a reason for a ‘European’ approach. If basic research is involved, it is primarily a question of acknowledging the chronological priority of a new discovery or findings. However, even in the transition to application, the question of a possible invention's patentability naturally comes into play.

3.19

For decades there has been a festering European sore in this area: there is still no EU Community patent. For all businesses and especially SMEs in the EU this leads either to multiple costs in comparison to their non-European cooperation partners (in the USA, for example) or even to a patent being abandoned, i.e. the loss of patent protection. The Committee calls on the Parliament, the Commission and the Council (6) to fully support moves towards a European patent with unitary effect, which are due to take place in the near future, and to finally break the impasse. It welcomes the European Parliament's resolutions on the subject (7). In this connection, a grace period (8) should also be introduced in Europe.

3.19.1

Furthermore, the intellectual property rules associated with international Joint Technology Initiatives should be discussed again and reviewed.

4.1

According to the Commission proposal, the list of countries eligible for automatic funding is to be restricted, by complementing the current selection criterion, based solely on GNI per capita, with an additional criterion based on total GDP, excluding countries above a defined threshold.

4.1.1

In the Committee's view, this should be approached in a more nuanced way. The main criterion for EU-subsidised cooperation with selected citizens from outside the EU should exclusively be that European organisations, businesses and SMEs, scientists and researchers have a specific interest in acquiring the associated know-how or a need to do so. The main focus must be on supporting the European Research Area. Even if an outstanding expert from a country with a high level of GDP is required for a project, they should be supported if there is no other possibility of using their skills and their knowledge for European interests. The leitmotiv must be the EU's own interest.

4.2

The Commission believes that objective information is needed to implement the strategic approach. The Committee welcomes the oral statement by the Commission representative that no additional effort is planned for the compilation of statistics and collection of data – as proposed in the communication – and that the Commission is to draw on existing sources instead. The Committee recommends using, for example, data from the European semester (9), in order to avoid additional burdens for entrepreneurs and researchers.

14.3.2013   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 76/48

1.1

Access to scientific information is an essential requirement for successful research and boosting innovation, and therefore for Europe's competitiveness as well. This includes transfer of information between researchers, between research partnerships – particularly between research and business – and between researchers and the public.

1.2

Whilst bearing the following remarks in mind, the Committee supports the Commission's stated objectives and proposals and believes that they have the potential – with the help of the internet – to facilitate scientific work and to make it more efficient.

1.3

In order to successfully meet these objectives, researcher authorship and intellectual property must continue to be safeguarded, scientific and research freedom must not be compromised, and researchers should be spared red tape and additional work that puts a brake on their efficiency.

1.4

Open access (via the internet) to scientific publications expands or supplements the work of libraries in line with today's technical possibilities. It is very helpful, increasingly widespread, and should be taken further and fully developed. The goal should be global symmetry between Europe and countries outside Europe.

1.5

Preservation of scientific information (storage of research data) for potential later use is necessary and reflects sound scientific practice today. The Committee welcomes the Commission's intention to maintain support for the infrastructure needed to this end. To the extent that data storage is discussed in more detail in project agreements, technical decisions on scope, format, level of detail and description (with metadata) should be reached with the researchers concerned on a case-by-case basis.

1.6

This raises the issue of open (i.e. general, global, cost-free, unrestricted and unconditional) access via the internet to stored research data. There are many aspects to this issue, which concerns current scientific culture and has to be handled in a nuanced and careful way. Whilst it is possible to think of fields of research where open external access could be useful and safe, in many other fields there are compelling objections, which is why a broad-brush approach is not advisable.

1.7

Therefore, in selected cases possible solutions should build in an experimental and incremental way on self-organised data sharing (e.g. CERN, the internet) – already common and voluntary – and be empirically tested in a pilot with the agreement of the scientists involved in the research. However, the administrative work involved in this must not impose new requirements or additional procedures that would undermine simplification efforts that have only just begun.

1.8

Nevertheless, open access to an appropriate selection of data underlying figures in openly accessible publications could be useful – especially if there is global symmetry between Europe and countries outside Europe – so long as the added costs incurred are reasonable and justified.

1.9

All of these measures entail sometimes considerable added costs for researchers and their organisations, which need to be fully accounted for in budget planning and appropriations.

2.1

This communication sets out the action that the Commission intends to take to improve access to scientific information and to boost the benefits of public investment in research.

2.2

The action is aimed at:

2.3

As far as access to scientific publications is concerned, there are currently two publishing models:

2.4

A timetable has also been put forward for progressively achieving these objectives over the course of Horizon 2020.

i.

for data gathered as part of research, based on raw data, to first be adjusted and examined for incorrect measurements; checked for consistency in internal discussions; weighted; and if necessary compared or amalgamated with other measurement data, before being added to a validated, reliable data set and made public, and

ii.

for the researchers involved to be the first to report the data in a publication; to interpret the findings; and to draw conclusions.

a)

lifting the quality of scientific discourse, because understanding and evaluating published research results in detail requires access to the analysed data and the tools used to analyse them;

b)

boosting return on public funding used to gather data through re-use of those data.

—

confidentiality when developing innovations, particularly in cooperation with industry (SMEs); patent issues;

—

confidentiality of patient data in medical research;

—

protection of data authorship (of researchers and research organisations);

—

misunderstandings when consulting and interpreting data, together with the consequences;

—

possible legal restrictions on technology transfer linked to export controls;

—

ensuring global symmetry between the EU and third countries;

—

cost in terms of manpower and equipment needed to filter out relevant data from what is often a vast amount of raw data and make it more easily comprehensible for outsiders.

i.

highly complex experiments such as accelerators or test facilities used in fusion research, and

ii.

all cooperation with industrial research, including SMEs.

4.4.1

With open access to scientific publications, therefore, research budgets must not only provide for new research, they also need to cover the cost of making the results of this research generally accessible.

4.4.2

This applies equally to the cost of increased data storage and the expense in terms of personnel and infrastructure required for this (not least as a condition for point 4.4.3).

4.4.3

It applies all the more, of course, to the additional cost of establishing public access, where necessary, to all or selected research data.

14.3.2013   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 76/54

1.1

This proposal has been developed to remedy specific weaknesses identified in existing EU legislation with respect to the monitoring and control of trade between businesses in the EU in acetic anhydride, a commodity chemical with many legitimate and essential uses but also subject to diversion as a precursor for the illicit production of heroin from morphine, generally in Afghanistan. The EESC recognises the need for this amending regulation and strongly supports the proposal.

1.2

The EESC also supports the proposal to establish a European Database of approved operators and end-users and to improve the collection of reports from the Member States of seizures and stoppages of illicit shipments of all scheduled and unscheduled drug precursors.

1.3

The extension of the existing legislation on registration to ‘users’, as opposed to ‘operators’ requires some new or revised definitions; minor problems are noted and recommendations made. End-users should be fully briefed on the purpose and benefits of registration. Competent authorities should be granted the same rights of access to the business premises of end-users as are currently provided for in the case of operators.

1.4

The EESC recognises that the new proposals will be effective only if communicated properly and without unnecessary additional financial burdens for all those involved. The proposal to exclude micro-enterprises from registration fees is therefore strongly supported.

1.5

Finally the EESC notes that the involved parties in Europe have fully embraced the requirements of the relevant 1988 UN Convention, in particular Article 12, in respect of working together to achieve the desired goals. This has led to successes in working with others, in and outside the EU, to combat crime, to protect the health of citizens, to allow legitimate trade to continue, and to safeguard the reputations of the organisations and businesses concerned. The processes followed, the degree of mutual respect and trust developed, and the style and content of the communications to affected parties, all deserve to be recognised as models for regulatory behaviour and compliance at EU or any other level. It is hoped that planned proposals for controls on psychotropic substances and synthetic ‘designer drugs’ within the framework of strong, well focused and evidence-based public health policies at EU and national level, particularly in the field of prevention, will follow a similar pattern. The EESC looks forward to contributing to these proposals in due course.

2.1

Drug precursors are substances that are manufactured, traded and used world-wide in a wide variety of legitimate and essential processes, but which can also be diverted to the illicit manufacture of drugs such as cocaine, heroin, ecstasy or methamphetamines. Efforts to control the trade in these substances, required for their physical properties, e.g. as solvents to extract active ingredients from plant sources, or as chemical agents to modify the nature and effect of the resulting drugs, have long been regarded as essential.

2.2

The international framework for action is provided by the 1988 United Nations Convention against illicit traffic in narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances. Article 12 highlights that cooperation between regulating authorities and business is essential to achieve the desired results.

2.3

At European Union (EU) level, the reduction of drug precursor diversion is an important objective of both the EU Drugs Strategy (2005-2012) and Drugs Action Plan (2009-2012). The legal framework for internal trade is currently provided by Regulation (EC) No 273/2004, managed by DG ENTR (Directorate General Enterprise and Industry), and for external trade by Council Regulation (EC) No 111/2005, managed by DG TAXUD (Taxation and Customs Union). Commission Regulation (EC) No 1277/2005 amended by Regulations (EC) No 297/2009 and (EU) No 225/2011 provides the detailed implementing rules for competent authorities and economic operators.

2.4

Under these regulations, Member States collate and report the tonnages of certain scheduled (i.e. specifically monitored and controlled) and unscheduled (voluntarily monitored) substances that have been stopped (before delivery commenced) or seized (during or post-delivery). These quantities can then be related to the total quantities of such substances stopped or seized world-wide. Any unexpected increases in the quantities reported, or changes in the frequency and distribution of stoppages and seizures, can be due to improved monitoring but may also indicate the increased targeting of a particular market for illicit purposes, possibly due to perceived or actual weaknesses in local controls.

2.5

The consolidated data for 2008 showed a 7-fold increase over 2007 in the quantity reported for one particular precursor, acetic anhydride, used to convert morphine (derived from opium) into heroin. The 241 tonnes seized in the EU represented more than 75 % of total world seizures. This led to repeated criticism by the International Narcotics Control Board (INCB) of the UN. A Commission Report COM(2009) 709 on the evaluation and functioning of the relevant legislation concluded that, although generally the performance was satisfactory, there were indeed some weaknesses and made recommendations, in particular with respect to the monitoring and control of acetic anhydride sales within the EU.

2.6

Throughout this process the Commission and all other concerned parties have recognised that acetic anhydride plays an essential role as the alkylating agent in the synthesis of a wide range of coated materials, films, plastics, pharmaceuticals (for instance, aspirin) and other consumer products. The greater part of total global production (currently around 1 million tonnes per year) is said to be used in-house by the producers; a smaller proportion, less than a third of the total, is traded to third-party end-users. The amount required for illicit use, essentially in Afghanistan, is estimated to be between 380 and 570 tonnes per year. This in turn produces around 380 tonnes of Afghan heroin, of which 70 tonnes are supplied to drug users in Europe. At a reported average street value in Europe of EUR 40 per gram, this equates to annual illicit trade worth around EUR 3 billion. The market value of the acetic anhydride required is trivial in comparison to this – and in comparison to the value of legitimate sales or to the cost of lost personal or corporate reputations following such diversions for illicit use. The chemical industry's worldwide Responsible Care programme helps ensure that these points are understood by legitimate operators entering the market for the first time.

2.7

It is also recognised that, even if all the attempted diversions in Europe are successfully prevented, such diversions will take place elsewhere in the world. The financial rewards for drug producers, as above, are just too great. However controls are still fully justified and serve as models for others to follow. Provided they are seen as cost-effective, they are fully supported by the industry sectors affected so that their legitimate trade inside the EU can continue.

2.8

Given the above situation, the Commission considered a number of alternative approaches, as set out in the impact assessment, and consulted the representative bodies of the affected sectors – primarily CEFIC for the producers (‘operators’) and some large end-users and FECC for the distributors and smaller end-users – and representatives of the Member States who will be required to implement the proposals. There was general agreement that the current proposal was the preferred option.

3.1

The Commission's proposal extends the existing registration requirements for acetic anhydride producers, distributors and traders to their industrial end-users, i.e. companies buying acetic anhydride for their own uses or processes within the EU.

3.2

This is intended to further restrict actual or attempted diversions of acetic anhydride within the EU in an effort to reduce illicit usage outside the EU, and to create greater legal security for businesses acting legitimately within the EU.

3.3

The existing Category 2 of substances scheduled under Regulation (EC) No 273/2004 is therefore split into two parts, with Category 2a reserved for acetic anhydride and Category 2b for four other commodity chemicals not affected by this change. The definitions of Category 1, for lower volume specialty chemicals that are subject to even tighter controls as the most sensitive ‘key’ drug precursors, and of Category 3, for multi-purpose bulk chemicals, remain unchanged.

3.4

The proposal also aims to establish a European Database on Drug Precursors to ensure more efficient data collection on seizures and stopped shipments and to maintain a list of EU licensed or registered operators and users legally producing, trading or using drug precursors.

3.5

The proposal also clarifies some existing definitions, provides exemptions for registration fees for micro-enterprises amends existing provisions on Comitology in line with the new rules of the Lisbon Treaty, and eliminates the need for a formal adoption process in the preparation of guidelines. The proposal also clarifies the rights of Member States to adopt additional measures to obtain information and, if necessary, to enter operators' business premises on any suspicious order relating to non-scheduled substances.

3.6

The legal basis for the proposal is Article 114 (Treaty on the Functioning of the EU) and, at least in its current form, meets EU requirements on both subsidiarity and proportionality.

3.7

The regulation would come into force on the twentieth day following that of its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union and would be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States. The regulation provides for a transition period of up to 18 months for the competent authorities to develop the required processes and for some end-users to register for the first time. The registration processes for all users have been made more rigorous and registration may be now refused if the information supplied to the competent authorities is deemed to be unsatisfactory.

3.8

The proposal is accompanied by an explanatory memorandum and a Commission staff working document (impact assessment). An executive summary of the impact assessment is also available. The relevant web pages of DG ENTR and DG TAXUD summarise the development of Community legislation on the monitoring and control of drug precursors inside the EU and between the EU and third countries and provide links to all related documents, stakeholders and concerned organisations.

3.9

Commission reports on stoppages and seizures of drug precursors compiled from data supplied by the Member States for the years 2006-2010 provide the motivation for the current proposals and are shown on the websites. A presentation by DG ENTR to the Council Working Group on Customs Union dated 16 October 2012 gave further background. A copy of the ‘Guidelines for Operators’, published jointly by DG ENTR and DG TAXUD for distribution by the national competent authorities only to trusted companies involved in long term licit transactions of scheduled and non-scheduled substances, was supplied under separate cover.

3.10

Other reports, for instance the 2011 ‘Report on Precursors and chemicals frequently used in the illicit manufacture of narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances’ from the INCB and the 2012 ‘International Narcotics Control Strategy Report Chemical Controls’ from the US Department of State, provide external and more global overviews. It is now accepted, for instance, that Afghanistan has no legitimate demand for acetic anhydride and that all imports are therefore illicit. Coalition forces are reported to have seized around 20 tonnes of the much larger total imported in 2011. The primary illicit sources are said to be China, South Korea, Europe, the Central Asian States and India. Clearly this is still work in progress and close international cooperation and hard-earned mutual trust remain essential.

4.1

The EESC gave its opinion on COM(2002) 494 final on 26 February 2003 (1), fully endorsing the proposals from the Commission in respect of the proposed controls on drug precursors. This was duly noted in the final version, published as Regulation (EC) 273/2004, in February 2004 (2).

4.2

The EESC also strongly supports efforts to reduce drugs usage in and outside the EU, as made clear in its opinion of May 2012 in response to the Commission's Communication ‘Towards a stronger European response to drugs’ (3). This stressed the need to maintain a balanced approach to both supply and demand. Reductions in supply, which may only be temporary, must be backed by strong, well targeted and effective public health policies, particularly in the field of prevention, at EU and national level (Article 168(1) TFEU). Cooperation and best practice exchange between Member States will be essential. Policies should be based on data and evidence – and not the other way round.

4.3

The EESC therefore strongly supports the current proposal to tighten the monitoring and control of trade in acetic anhydride between businesses inside the EU and to implement further measures to assist the monitoring and control of drug precursors in general, in particular via the establishment of a European Database of licensed or registered operators and end-users and of the information provided by Member States on stoppages or seizures of substances diverted for illicit usage, in particular the manufacture of narcotic and psychotropic drugs, usually outside the EU. The diversion of small quantities of acetic anhydride for the manufacture of heroin is of particular concern.

4.4

The EESC also commends the Commission and all those involved in the implementation of the existing legislation and in the reviews and consultation process that have followed, for the close and continuing cooperation with Member States, regulatory authorities, law enforcement agencies, producers, carriers and end-users, as required under Article 12 of the 1988 UN Convention. This has led to a set of well-focused, well-informed, well-documented and cost-effective proposals, clearly supported, and therefore likely to be fully implemented, by all those directly affected.

4.5

This cooperation has already led to a drastic reduction in the quantities of drug precursors stopped or seized within the EU – hopefully indicating that the EU is no longer regarded as an easy target. The voluntary monitoring of non-scheduled substances is reported to have been particularly effective. Flexibility to deal with such innovative, persistent and highly profitable criminal behaviour is essential. In this area at least, everyone has the same objective. This is fully recognised by all concerned – and could perhaps serve as a model for cost-effective EU legislation in other areas, with wider impacts on businesses, employees and consumers.

4.6

The legislation also works because the producers, distributors and end-users affected are already subject to, and are experienced in implementing, a range of similar controls for radioactive materials, biological agents, dual use chemicals and exports requiring prior informed consent, and so on. New legislation on explosives precursors is about to be introduced. This does however require that the broad patterns of these requirements stay the same and that the list of substances requiring registration or licensing is kept to the minimum necessary. The current proposal is therefore likely to be effective, at least within its rather tightly defined objective to reduce even further any diversions to illicit usage of acetic anhydride during ongoing legal trade within the EU; other less focused or more burdensome alternatives would be more likely to fail.

4.7

The EESC also agrees with the Commission that this proposal does not affect working conditions within the industry or the rights of consumers in general, except to the extent that they as individuals support a reduction in the availability of heroin and related products in or outside Europe. Sadly this will be hard to measure, if indeed any such reduction occurs. This proposal however does not depend on such cost-benefit balancing and therefore should be implemented in this form and as quickly as possible.

4.8

Finally, the EESC looks forward to contributing to further EU initiatives in this area and therefore urges the Commission to bring forward as soon as possible planned new proposals in particular on psychotropic substances and purely synthetic ‘designer drugs’ which are now steadily replacing traditional drugs such as heroin as well as extending the market overall.

5.1

The EESC notes that the definitions of ‘operator’ and ‘user’ can be understood to overlap (as all affected ‘operators’ will at some time ‘possess scheduled substances’). As it is clearly necessary to distinguish between the two, this can be done by inserting the phrase ‘who is not an operator but’ after ‘legal person’ in the first line of the new point (h) of Article 2.

5.2

It is also important to establish that this refers specifically to users incorporated and operating inside the EU. Sales and/or deliveries to users outside the EU are covered under separate legislation. To ensure a smooth functioning of the internal market it should also be made clear between Member States as to where the operator and user registration is required, for instance where the operator or user are established, or where the product (acetic anhydride) is put on the market.

5.3

The requirement for end-users to register for the first time could lead to short term disruptions to legitimate trade. These can be minimised by proactive communications during the 18 months provided for this transition by the operators and distributors, preferably based on clear and appropriately worded guidance notes issued by the competent authorities in the Member States. The existing ‘Guidelines for Operators’ provide an excellent model for such communications. The purpose and benefits of registration should be made clear at the time of registration so that end-users, as well as operators, become aware of the possibility and risks of diversion, and can therefore better contribute to minimising these. Competent authorities should have the same rights of access to the business premises of both end-users and operators.

5.4

The EESC supports the Commission proposal that micro-enterprises should be exempted from any requirement to pay fees for registration as it is crucial that not only does this legitimate trade continue (for the sake of the micro businesses and those employed therein) but that the controls are understood and implemented as widely as possible. Given that the quantities required for illicit use are relatively small, the smaller users are probably most at risk to offers that they feel they cannot afford to miss. Good communication in support of compliance will therefore be essential, in print and electronic form, in all relevant local languages.

5.5

The EESC notes that the reporting and other information requirement for non-scheduled substances reflects its voluntary nature, i.e., Member States ‘may’ rather than ‘shall’ follow the proposed procedures. This is clearly not ideal for the protection of the internal market – but may be preferable to adding yet more substances to the lists of priority precursors already identified. This situation should therefore be watched carefully by all concerned.

5.6

Finally, in respect of the proposed European Database, the EESC welcomes the proposal and strongly encourages it to go ahead, subject only to the reservation that it should be sufficiently resourced for longer term update and use by all the concerned parties and designed to produce results, not merely accumulate out of date or partial data. The quality and quantity of data collected will be equally important. The continuing support of the law enforcement agencies in the Member States will be critical to this.

5.7

Access to the data must of course be restricted to those firmly and permanently committed to legitimate trade – presumably those recorded within the database. Input requirements for operators, distributors, traders and end-users, as well as for Member States, should, to preserve the internal market and to minimise costs, be harmonised wherever possible. This should not, however, conflict with the primary objective of this proposal, to identify and restrict the illicit diversion of drugs precursors and, hopefully, to apprehend those responsible.

14.3.2013   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 76/59

1.1

The Committee views cloud computing (CC) as an opportunity for European growth and competitiveness, and seeks to use this opinion to propose a different and complementary vision to that of the Commission communication. The Committee strongly encourages the Commission to consider this proposal carefully and to adjust its CC strategy accordingly.

1.2

The Committee shares the Commission's view that the use of CC in Europe needs to be developed in order to make its economy more flexible, more successful and more innovative. It therefore supports the three measures proposed by the Commission:

1.3

The use of cloud computing reinforces the need to protect the public, their data and their private lives. This is why the Committee encourages the Commission to continue along this path, especially by pursuing international cooperation and strengthening the regulatory framework on:

The Committee also points out that these protection measures would be most effective for information stored by CC providers on European territory.

1.4

Alongside and in addition to facilitating the use of CC, and taking inspiration from the success of CC in the US, the Committee recommends that the Commission seek to promote the development of European digital energy production, i.e. the emergence and strengthening of European suppliers of CC infrastructure (IaaS: Infrastructure as a Service).

There are many possible ways of achieving this:

The objective is to use the favourable conditions (strong data protection in Europe, users' concerns regarding distant suppliers, the need for strong security guarantees, etc.) to promote the emergence of European CC suppliers, be they local, national (sovereign cloud) or cross-border suppliers (consortia across several Member States).

1.5

Restructuring linked to the ‘cloudification’ of IT services, job losses, offshoring, virtualisation and greater distances between users and IT technicians are all negative aspects which have to be taken into account. However, this social impact is not mentioned in the Commission communication.

On the contrary, the Commission uses the forecasts of a market research company to support its view that CC should lead to the creation of 2,5 million jobs. The Committee wonders whether these figures are not unattainable and disconnected from the reality of the IT domain.

1.6

Alongside the European Cloud Partnership (ECP), the Commission should start developing a ‘Cloud First Policy’ (based on that of the US or New Zealand) as soon as possible, in order to promote CC use among European and Member State administrations. The aim would be to break down cultural barriers and individual fears, and of course to benefit from both the more flexible services and the significantly lower costs of CC.

The Committee of course stresses that the Commission must incorporate safeguards for the use of CC in public services and certain sensitive private sectors in this ‘Cloud First Policy’ in order to control, or even prevent, data being hosted by suppliers that are subject to risky national regulations – such as the Patriot Act, which applies to US suppliers even if they are established in Europe.

1.7

One of the main difficulties with CC – and one of the main concerns of users (both individuals and businesses) – is dealing with disputes with a supplier outside their borders.

Taking its inspiration from e-commerce, which is just as globalised and international as CC, the Committee, which has produced an opinion on the subject (1), suggests that the Commission include ODR (Online Dispute Resolution) as a possible solution for resolving, through mediation, the majority of disputes, including those covering several jurisdictions. Since it has to be independent and impartial, this mediation could be entrusted to an existing or new European agency. It would be responsible for mediating and negotiating between suppliers and users of CC. In addition, this mediation work would make it possible to identify the main causes of dispute, recurrent problems and needs for adjustments to practices or regulations.

1.8

Although various statements by Commission representatives (at conferences, in the press, etc.) have confirmed their desire to support communication with, awareness-raising of and training for potential users of CC, the communication does not set out any concrete, quantified measures.

The Committee therefore trusts that the Commission will supplement its communication with, among other things, initiatives prioritising those users with the lowest awareness of CC, i.e.:

1.9

The Committee suggests that the Commission should include the development of energy consumption standards for server farms specialising in CC in the communication.

1.10

With regard to the actions the Commission intends to take, the Committee suggests that an exact timetable be drawn up and that definite dates and progress reports be planned in detail for each of the proposed areas.

2.1

As a reminder, CC can be described as in the first sentence of the communication:

‘ “Cloud computing” in simplified terms can be understood as the storing, processing and use of data on remotely located computers [the precise location of which is not known] accessed over the internet.’

In addition, in 2012 the Committee produced an opinion exclusively on CC (2). The work of the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), the European Parliament and the European Data Protection Supervisor is also very interesting. The Commission has published two documents (the Commission's consultation of the Committee concerns the first document only):

2.2

The Commission puts forward three ‘strategic actions’ to promote CC use in Europe:

3.1

The Committee proposes a new vision for CC, illustrated by the concept of ‘digital energy’, which is becoming increasingly widely used to describe the computing capacity (storage, processing, data transfer) provided by CC.

Digital energy is provided with no need for consumers to be familiar with the production method, in other words the data centre, its location, technologies used, etc. New market segmentation is also emerging: alongside users and service providers, there are now digital energy producers who can make the huge investments necessary (in billions of dollars) to set up CC centres.

3.2

Like other forms of energy (fossil, electric, etc.), digital energy is an economic and strategic challenge.

Firstly, controlling this energy (be it in terms of production or distribution) is at the heart of the potential for growth and job creation as set out in the Digital Agenda. Secondly, an active role in the production of digital energy is necessary in order to ensure that Europe and its Member States have (at least partial) strategic independence and self-sufficiency.

3.3

The development of CC in Europe will therefore involve dealing with the entire value chain for digital energy (usage, services and production), as illustrated by the following table:

Recent decades have demonstrated the significance of the dependency of the Member States – or even of Europe as a whole – regarding various sources of energy: petrol, gas, electricity, etc. Should European citizens', businesses' and public services' data in future be hosted, managed and controlled by non-European CC operators, there would be legitimate concerns surrounding the impact of this dependency:

3.4

However, Europe is already highly dependent on non-European providers to provide hardware, software and computer networks. The stars of social networking come from the United States, while the most popular search engines are run by firms based either in the US or in China. IT development is increasingly being outsourced to India or other low-cost countries.

The production of digital energy at global level is currently almost entirely in the hands of an oligopoly of producers. The biggest European operator, according to some studies, is OVH (Acronym for On Vous Héberge (we host you) - www.ovh.com), but it does not have the same level of global visibility and influence. Several initiatives have been launched by telecommunications operators, such as T-Systems, Telefonica Digital, Cloud Sigma, Numergy/SFR and Cloudwatt/Orange. However, they are unable to compete with the market leaders: Amazon, Microsoft and Google.

3.5

Currently, although there are some differences between the Member States' regulations, they are close to the European texts, standards and directives; hence users' fears – in some cases justified – of their data being stored outside Europe, leading to difficulties and legal stalemates in the event of disputes.

In addition, the greatest cause for concern among users is the ‘Patriot Act’. This act came out of the war on terror (following the September 11 attacks), and allows the US government or a federal judge to access any data hosted and controlled by an American company, whether or not the owner of the data is American and including data hosted in a centre on European soil. Above all, the owner of the data cannot be informed that the host has disclosed the hosted data.

3.6

Economically, the sector should, according to the Commission, make it possible to create 2,5 million new jobs in Europe in the next eight years and contribute as much as EUR 160 billion a year to EU GDP (around 1 %).

The Committee questions whether the figures in these objectives are relevant – a detailed analysis of the impact of CC on the ground shows that:

The communication, though, does not mention or take account of the aforementioned social impact; nor does it refer to restructuring linked to the ‘cloudification’ of IT services, job losses, offshoring, virtualisation and greater distances between users and IT technicians.

3.7

Simply using CC is already generating energy savings on IT equipment. At the same time, the major suppliers of CC (storage space and associated services) have server farms, most of which use processors with a consumption of around 100 W/h per unit, which could be reduced to a tenth of that within the short or medium term. Some microprocessor manufacturers offer good value processors that release less heat (a real problem for air-conditioning in server rooms) and consume less energy.

4.1

The Commission focuses primarily on the public cloud, and does not discuss the private cloud market. However, this approach is considered to be reliable and sometimes necessary for critical information before going wholesale into the ‘public cloud’.

It is worth noting that the ‘public cloud’ means a publicly-available cloud, not a cloud for public services.

4.2

The introduction to the communication notes that cloud technology may bring additional risks, which is not necessarily the case in reality – the cloud does bring new risks, but also eliminates others.

4.3

Certain English terms such as ‘cloud-friendly’ and ‘cloud-active’ are difficult to translate into other languages; in some cases, the translated versions of the communication completely miss the point of the original version.

For example, in points 3.1 and 3.2, ‘cloud-friendly’ and ‘cloud-active’ are translated identically in some languages, although they correspond to different objectives.

5.1

The Commission's proposals to increase use of the cloud comprise:

All of these proposals are specific, realistic and necessary, and the Committee therefore supports them completely. It would, however, note that the first two proposals relate to difficulties that are not specific to Europe, and it would have expected the Commission to focus on specifically European problems in its communication.

5.2

The Committee is committed to the basic goals of the Digital Agenda, i.e.:

5.3

With regard to increasing the ‘use’ of CC, section 3.1 twice refers to ‘cloud-friendly’ as the goal to achieve. However, in a number of speeches in support of CC, the Commissioner responsible for the Digital Agenda has advocated aiming to make Europe ‘cloud-active’.

European Commission vice-president Neelie Kroes said in Davos (27.1.2011), ‘I want to make Europe not just “cloud-friendly” but “cloud-active”’ and officially announced the communication in an article on her blog entitled ‘Making Europe cloud active’ (27.9.2012). The level of development advocated in these statements is therefore more ambitious than just ‘cloud-friendly’.

The Committee is therefore surprised by the gap between the goals legitimately advocated by the Commission vice-president and the somewhat less ambitious actions actually proposed in the communication. It also points out that, in a previous opinion (5), it encouraged the Commission to be more ambitious than ‘cloud-active’ for Europe, suggesting that it should aim to be ‘cloud-productive’.

5.4

The communication does not propose creating a European operator – a ‘European super-cloud’ – to produce digital energy. In view of the mission of DG Connect, and of the difficulty of creating such a ‘giant’, the Committee understands and supports this position. The various operators in the sector with whom the Committee has been in contact (telecommunications operators, software producers, system integrators, etc.) are also unanimous in supporting this position.

However, the fact remains that a European middle ground can and must be found between an unrealistic European ‘giant’ and European ‘micro-clouds’ confined to niche markets by the commercial, financial and marketing power of global, non-European operators.

The Committee's proposal aims at developing and strengthening major European operators responsible for CC mega-centres, the future European digital industry. These operators could be local, national (sovereign cloud) or cross-border (consortia across several Member States).

5.5

The Committee also notes that, without being as large as the market leaders, European CC operators enjoy several competitive advantages:

These favourable conditions for the emergence of European operators will not last, however, and it is therefore important and urgent that the Commission take action to promote the emergence of European operators during this favourable period.

5.6

Section 2 of the communication notes that ‘go-it-alone efforts at national level are unlikely to deliver optimal cost efficiencies’. The Committee urges the Commission to reconsider its position regarding the sovereign cloud.

First of all, at no point in the communication or the impact analysis is this statement backed up by any facts, which is quite surprising given how starkly it is stated.

Secondly, in the absence of an alternative solution – which, again, the communication does not provide – criticism of sovereign or local clouds is harsh and could jeopardise credible possibilities for developing robust, durable CC provision that can compete against giants from other geographical areas (India, China or the US).

5.7

The proposed approach, using a European Cloud Partnership, is largely focused on the public services sector, with a view to ‘promoting common public sector leadership’ (see Section 3.5).

The Committee acknowledges and supports the Commission's position regarding the importance of public services in Europe's socioeconomic models: they do therefore have a role to play in the development of CC.

However, the Committee finds it difficult to see how, in a general climate of tight budgets, European public services can drive innovation in CC. It also points out that Europe's most outstanding successes have come either from the private sector (e.g. mobile telephony, chip cards) or from a private sector with the benefit of public support (e.g. Airbus, Ariane Espace, etc.).

The Committee recommends that the Commission set out more explicitly what ‘leadership’ role is envisaged for this partnership.

5.8

The approach proposed by the Commission follows a ‘top-down’ model, in other words promoting use in order to encourage the development of services, and possibly the production of digital energy.

The Committee would fully support this kind of gradual, demand-driven phasing-in in an environment with no dominant operators, or with a balance between European and non-European operators. Unfortunately, that environment no longer exists, and the main operators in CC are non-European and have an oligopoly. Increasing use of the cloud could therefore have counter-productive effects that further strengthen the position of these market leaders.

The Committee is not against this increase in use, but stresses that the Commission must establish safeguards so that its actions benefit European operators and allow them to emerge in the face of the dominant position of non-European operators.

5.9

In parallel with and in addition to the aforementioned top-down approach, the Committee would urge the Commission to propose specific actions that explicitly take a bottom-up approach, in other words encouraging the establishment of CC producers at regional, national or cross-border level to then promote the development of CC services and the use of CC.

Other sectors such as the automotive or mobile telephony sectors have shown the extent to which strong European industrial production could have knock-on effects on the higher levels (services and use). Incentive measures for these sectors could be re-used for the production of digital energy.

Another example worth taking into account is the US, where the development of CC took a bottom-up approach right from the start, with the successful results we are all aware of.

The Committee would therefore suggest that the Commission take inspiration from this successful example of large-scale cloud development in order to contribute to similar success in Europe.

5.10

The Commission, like other European institutions, makes massive use of information technologies, but the solutions developed to date have very rarely been based on CC. In the meantime, the US has established the ‘Cloud First Act’ requiring the administrations covered to prioritise a cloud-based approach.

On the basis of this success, the Committee suggests that the Commission should adopt a ‘Cloud First policy’ for itself and the other institutions, so as to enable the development of a European CC ecosystem and achieve significant reductions in operating budgets.

5.11

In the past, the Commission developed and implemented grassroots measures, in particular with regard to broadband and IT modernisation. These included:

In view of the success of these previous programmes, the Committee urges the Commission to plan and budget a similar programme specifically for CC.

The EESC calls for institutional and secured databases to be integrated in a regulated manner - gradually, but as soon as possible - into the cloud computing (CC) environment. This would enable citizens to manage critical data more easily (according to European and national law) and, at the same time, to grow trust in CC.

5.12

The Commission has proposed a series of actions to develop CC. The communication does not however present a definite and precise timetable for these actions.

The Committee urges the Commission to publish such a timetable as quickly as possible. Developments relating to CC technology are fast-moving. It is therefore urgent and important that all stakeholders be able to coordinate and align their own strategy with the actions of the Commission.

14.3.2013   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 76/66

1.1

The EESC considers that the EU's underlying objectives for the renewed EU-Pacific development Partnership are ambitious and far-reaching, but believes that the implementing arrangements, which mainly concern environmental protection and biodiversity conservation in the region, are not clear. It agrees that synergies are needed with other organisations to address the impact of climate change, which has a cross-cutting impact on all national and multilateral policies and has social as well as economic repercussions. Issues associated with the impact of climate change should, moreover, be incorporated in the area's comprehensive environmental policies in such a way as to aim for coherent behaviour and actions.

1.2

Nevertheless, the EESC believes that in order to achieve this objective, integrated sustainable development measures and activities have to be established in the countries concerned in order to maximise the impact of assistance. All actions have to be used synergistically, by actively involving all local stakeholders as well, on the basis of a medium- and long-term planning approach.

1.3

The EESC believes that it is important that the Communication acknowledges that the full enjoyment of rights and stable democracy are essential to a country's economic development. Regrettably, the situation in Fiji, where a dictatorship continues to deprive its citizens of their fundamental rights, receives no more than a cursory mention, whereas it deserves a more decisive and coherent European stance.

1.4

The definition of the renewed development partnership should be used as an opportunity to set out principles and preconditions which should serve as EU guidelines for all beneficiary countries of EU assistance, based on a full application of the Cotonou Agreement. Furthermore, the effective exercise of democracy through the full enjoyment of fundamental and labour rights and democratic participation must be guaranteed in all the countries.

1.5

Particular attention should be paid to the extremely serious and worrying situation of women in all the countries in this region, who are deprived of the most basic rights. Women's rights and protection should play a major role in all issues related to EU and Pacific relations. The high level of gender related violence and the low level of women involvement in decision making and high positions worries the EESC and its partners and should play a more significant role in the Commission document and future activities.

1.6

The EESC continues to view the growth of the social partners and of civil society in general as a fundamental consideration in this region and in all other regions concerned by agreements with the EU. For this reason, it is vital to promote and implement measures that allow this objective to be achieved in practice. Being aware of the difficulties associated with the region's geographical location, which also restrict structured bilateral relations, the EESC considers that it would be particularly useful to set up a network and a joint committee at the local and national level and, ideally, at the level of the entire region. These participatory instruments should facilitate the involvement of the social partners and civil society throughout the definition, implementation and monitoring of the agreements. This should become an absolute principle. An initiative to promote the establishment of a fully-fledged ESC in the region would be useful, also in order to promote stronger social dialogue, and improve capacity building for all local stakeholders through specific funding.

1.7

The EESC considers it a priority to coordinate the various EU actions through the Commission directorates-general involved in the programmes and the European External Action Service (EEAS) as well as the WTO's involvement in this region. Coordination is essential in view of the small size of the public administration in the countries concerned. This approach could represent an opportunity for decisive EEAS action in the hope of stronger EU foreign policy action based on enhanced coordination among its Member States.

1.8

The communication from the European Commission places a great deal of emphasis on climate matters. The EESC notes, however, that economic development is important to tackling the climate challenge. In order to ensure inclusive, sustainable and integrated growth that benefits development in the region, the EESC believes that it is vital to guarantee coherence between development and environmental protection interventions, as well as in other sectors, such as trade, fisheries, farming, food security, research and support for human rights and democracy. Aid delivery criteria must be based on clearly defined and pre-established indicators, including for monitoring programmes at a later stage and through the coordination of the various donors.

1.9

The EESC agrees that distinctions should be made between actions for ACP countries and overseas countries, depending on the various institutional or developmental situations of each country in order to optimise opportunities for regional integration. The situation of the overseas territories, which are more advanced than the other countries and already receive financing from the European Development Fund and bilateral assistance from individual countries, must also be assessed. These actions should be coordinated with programmes for other countries in the region. These territories could serve as an important reference for the dissemination of the rights, values and good practices of EU policies, based on inclusive growth.

1.10

With regard to trade agreements, it would be advisable, in light of current difficulties, to aim for a regional agreement, going beyond bilateral agreements, bearing in mind, however, that, with the exception of the fisheries sector, these are small economies, in relative terms of trade.

1.11

The EESC also considers it appropriate for the EU to follow closely, through the relevant specialised UN commission, the negotiations on the law of the sea connected with the CONTINENTAL SHELF, especially with regard to the area under consideration in this opinion.

2.1

The EU has concluded various partnership agreements with the Pacific region. This renewed partnership involves 15 independent island countries (1), four Overseas Countries and Territories (OCTs) (2), the Pacific Islands Forum (PIF), as well as Australia and New Zealand - key members of the Forum and like-minded partners. Following the 2006 strategy, the purpose is to consolidate its own role in the region, both because the EU is the second largest donor after Australia, and in order to contribute to the region's economic and social development, recognising the need to ensure full respect for rights and the consolidation of democratic institutions.

2.2

Building on the Cotonou Agreement (EU-ACP), the EU intends to use this Communication to focus its action in the Pacific as a region on a number of fundamental objectives, in line with its Agenda for Change (3):

The EU is recognised by local partners and interlocutors as a leader in the fight against climate change and its impact and intends to consolidate its presence in the region in a responsible manner.

2.3

However, most of the Island Countries and Territories constitute a small region in terms of the population concerned, but a vast one in terms of size and diversity, which presents not a few problems due to its geographical location, forming a fragile and delicate whole, united by the marine ecosystem (among other factors), which has a unique value that warrants attention and protection.

2.4

This is not an easy objective to achieve, not only for the reasons given in the Communication, but also because of the constraints imposed on EU external policy by the economic crisis, which could influence the future of the Cotonou Agreement beyond 2020. However, due to their position, these countries are of geostrategic importance to the EU since they are close to countries like China and Japan. To this end, it would be very useful to increase the involvement and make better use of the OCTs in the dissemination of the EU's policies, programme implementation and legal culture, with unquestionable mutual advantages.

3.1

Attention is given to the impact of climate change and the grave repercussions throughout the region regarding both the stability of the ecosystem, to the point of threatening its existence, and the risks of growing imbalances in the sustainable growth of the countries concerned, not only from a strictly economic or budgetary perspective, but also from a political and social perspective, with a multiplier effect on risks, which even limits the fulfilment of the UN Millennium Development Goals (MDGs).

3.2

Attention is given to the need for the various international donors to integrate their bilateral and multilateral assistance, which is too fragmented at present to be wholly effective. The financial instruments adopted and the impact of assistance itself should be enhanced.

3.3

The need to coordinate with international institutions; the Communication refers mainly to the UN with regard to the impact of climate change.

3.4

Attention is given to regional cooperation and the need to improve (or even develop) sectoral programmes and development plans supported by regional organisations in order to facilitate an integrated approach to assistance and its management in addition to the region's development strategies themselves.

3.5

Dialogue with local institutions is important in order to define assistance programmes and share responsibility for their implementation.

3.6

Attention is given to improving the efficiency of actions, with emphasis on the need to work with recipient countries to set up shared monitoring, management and implementation mechanisms. More specific information would be required on this point.

3.7

Analysis of the delivery methods of multilateral and bilateral donors, expressing a commitment to adapt aid delivery methods in a way that responds to the difficulties encountered by the small administrative departments of Pacific Island Countries and Territories; attention to the difficulties that recipient countries have when integrating assistance into their national development programmes, which presuppose targeted measures for improving the ‘capacity building’ of national institutions.

3.8

Concerns are expressed about human rights violations in Fiji, which the Commission intends to pursue, without however specifically mentioning any additional preconditions for the delivery of assistance.

4.1

The Communication is essentially unclear as to how the EU intends to identify and improve action beyond the short-term objectives, which are important, but incomplete if we intend to make an impact on the region's future sustainability. This is a unique and vast region with a very high number of small or extremely small countries in terms of population, which nevertheless cover an extensive geographical area. These countries have different approaches and different understandings of the need for measures aimed at long-term sustainable development, and a different perception of the rules to apply at the national level and in the territorial and international waters that mark the borders between these countries.

4.2

The EESC considers an integrated long-term approach to be necessary, involving the shared responsibility of all the parties operating in the area, be they international institutions, other countries, or local stakeholders. The Commission's proposal on partnership will have to take account of negotiations on the revision of the new EU budget, the new priorities set out in the post-2015 MDGs, and the process to be launched for new negotiations on the Cotonou Agreement.

4.3

The stated objectives should give greater attention to the integrated development of the Pacific region, to development policies, and to the intervention areas; for example, agriculture and food security are only mentioned in association with implications relating to climate change in the region. The vitality of rural areas depends on agriculture. Although farming is mainly at subsistence level – only sugar cane and palm oil are exported on a significant scale – there is a problem with managing natural resources and using farmland sustainably. The Committee notes that some of the countries concerned lost their preferential status, and therefore jobs, as a result of the 2006 reform of European sugar policy.

4.4

The Communication's focus is mainly on the risks of climate change, a vital question for the survival of some of the countries and the ecosystem (rising water levels, disappearing rainforests, saline aquifers, rising sea temperatures, etc.). This is why the Commission advocates allocating resources primarily to this sector, whereas integrated and coherent programmes for sustainable development and growth should be enhanced, with commitments defined by the recipient countries. To this end, it would be a good idea to involve the private sector, especially for SMEs.

4.5

The EESC points out that an integrated strategic approach to assistance is needed, and the Communication is a good start. The Commission's directorates-general, namely DG DEVCO, DG Maritime Affairs and Fisheries, DG Trade, DG SANCO, DG RTD, and the EEAS should focus on working together, since at present they need to be better coordinated (4) to improve the coherence of EU policies.