4.10.2012   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 299/1

—

The EESC calls on the European institutions and national governments to make a renewed political commitment to engage with all relevant partners (the European Parliament, the Committee of the Regions, the European Economic and Social Committee, national parliaments, regional and local authorities, the social partners, organised civil society, national Economic and Social Councils or similar bodies, cities and all other forms of local authorities) under the Europe 2020 Strategy.

—

The EESC undertakes to build on work with the national Economic and Social Councils (ESCs) and similar bodies and national representatives of organised civil society by becoming the European contact point and to provide a dedicated platform for them to further their own work on the Europe 2020 Strategy.

—

In the long term, the EESC believes that the European Union should develop a long-term vision of the ultimate goal of stakeholder engagement and work to gradually develop this.

—

In the short term, the EESC believes that a number of small changes would have a significant impact on progress. In particular, as a matter of urgency, Member States and the European Commission should reconsider the timing and type of processes in order to allow for genuine engagement and co-responsibility by all stakeholders.

2.1

On 18 April 2012, the incoming Cypriot Presidency asked the European Economic and Social Committee to prepare an opinion on the subject of strengthening the participatory processes and the involvement of the local authorities, NGOs and the social partners in the implementation of Europe 2020 in light of its intention to make the issue a priority for the Presidency and for the Informal EPSCO in July 2012.

With the European Semester now in its third year, it is an appropriate time to look at participatory processes under Europe 2020 and to see how they could be developed.

2.2

The EESC's Europe 2020 Steering Committee is dedicated to overseeing the work and bringing together national ESCs and similar bodies in Member States to share experiences on how to improve participatory processes under Europe 2020.

2.3

The role played by the EESC in the implementation of the Europe 2020 Strategy (1) is now fully recognised and the Committee wishes to share its recommendations on how to improve participatory processes under the 2020 Strategy and the European Semester.

3.1

The European Union and its population are facing a severe economic and financial crisis that has had a severe impact on the whole of the European Union and its citizens. Many Member States have experienced extremely strained situations, and increased levels of unemployment remain a concern. The EESC therefore considers, as expressed in a great many of its opinions over the last three years, that the Europe 2020 Strategy is more important than ever as it offers a comprehensive agenda for reform aimed at securing sustainable growth and building a more resilient European Union.

3.2

The Europe 2020 Strategy for smart, sustainable and inclusive growth is the growth strategy setting out targets in key policy areas at EU and national level. It is very wide in scope with the overall ambition of supporting smart, sustainable and inclusive growth and covering developments in innovation and R&D, climate change, energy, unemployment, industrial policy and social and territorial cohesion, addressing poverty levels, cohesion policy and much more.

3.3

The governance of Europe 2020 aims to bring together European, national and shared competences in a multilayer system, thus helping to enhance the legitimacy of deepening European integration. Compared to the Lisbon Strategy, Europe 2020 has interlinked flagship initiatives that provide focus and support in important thematic areas, priorities, headline targets, and a reinforced and rigorous oversight system – with the option of critical assessments of developments (or the lack of them) at national level.

3.4

Compared to the Lisbon Strategy, the reporting mechanism is different, not only because it is more highly concentrated, but because it is now aligned with the processes under the new and improved economic governance systems so that, for example, the Stability and Convergence Programme and National Reform Programmes are submitted to the European Commission at the same time allowing for a more complete view of where individual Member States are and where they intend to go.

3.5

A change in the process was first highlighted in the Europe 2020 Strategy document itself which made it clear that "we need greater ownership" and that to this end "the contribution of stakeholders at national and regional level and of the social partners needs also to be enhanced". A specific commitment was made that both the EESC and the Committee of the Regions should be more closely associated. This need for participatory processes has been repeated on several occasions, most importantly in the European Council conclusions of March 2010 and in the Guidance for drafting, implementing and monitoring National Reform Programmes under the Europe 2020 Strategy issued by the European Commission which reinforces that "it will be important to closely associate national parliaments, social partners, regions and other stakeholders in the preparation of the NRP, so as to increase ownership of the strategy".

4.1

Three years into the Europe 2020 Strategy it is clear that many Member States are committed to involving the social partners and organised civil society in the European Semester and have involved these partners in their national processes. However, the application of this commitment is patchy, with varying levels of commitment seen and even where this commitment exists, varying levels of real involvement of partners in the process. While many Member States do inform and consult with their partners, the process often lacks focus and, from the point of view of those taking part, can feel disjointed or lacking in overall strategy. In particular, concerns have been raised by the EESC and others about the very tight deadlines, often leaving virtually no time for a proper discussion with the social partners, civil society organisations or regional and national parliaments. Nor are these concerns solely felt at the national level; many organisations at European level have questioned whether the European Semester process and governance, as well as monitoring under the Europe 2020 Strategy could be improved. The European Parliament has made policy recommendations in order to better define its own role and the contribution that it could make (2) and the Committee of the Regions is preparing to issue its own guidelines shortly.

4.2

Within the EESC, the establishment of the Europe 2020 Steering Committee has provided an essential focus to our work; providing the EESC with one group that has oversight of all that the European 2020 Strategy covers and the proposals linked to it, rather than only seeing it piecemeal. Representatives of the Commission and other stakeholders regularly attend meetings of the Steering Committee. To strengthen the link to national bodies, the Steering Committee regularly invites the national Economic and Social Councils and similar institutions to key meetings of the European Semester and organises Europe 2020-related events locally in cooperation with national civil society actors. These efforts should be stepped up and expanded.

4.3

The role that the EESC has played in bringing together the national Economic and Social Councils and similar bodies, although not solely focused on the European Semester and the Europe 2020 Strategy, has also proved useful in developing our and their analysis and understanding of the situations across the European Union and strengthening the proposals that both the EESC and they make.

5.1

It is clear that in order to optimise the impact of the European Semester, improving and increasing participatory processes under Europe 2020 would benefit the strategy itself and ultimately the well-being of citizens.

5.2

The European Union and its Member States often make reference to the usefulness of participatory processes and the involvement of organised civil society. The social partners and the broader public in fact have a number of different processes and systems in place; it is useful to be clear about why this is actually so important and what can potentially be gained from a properly functioning system ensuring greater participation. Proactively engaging with the social partners and organised civil society can generate:

6.1

In looking at the processes used to date at both European and national level, the EESC believes that there is much to be done and that these processes can be built up to develop a system that will truly deliver a solid partnership among the European institutions, national governments, social partners, civil society organisations, national and regional parliaments and other stakeholders. Much of this will require focused and concerted effort and will not be achieved quickly. However, the EESC feels such systems should be developed by gradually building up a strategic and comprehensive multi-layered partnership process, while at the same time quickly implementing simple actions that could provide improvements in the short term.

6.2

Most importantly, the EESC calls upon all European institutions and national governments to renew their political commitment to more regularly and systematically involve the social partners, civil society organisations, national parliaments, regional and local authorities and all other stakeholders, ensuring that this is done as comprehensively as possible in the strong, viable and sustainable participatory processes under Europe 2020. The Lisbon Treaty stresses the need to consult civil society at European level in the decision-making process. If the Member States are to acquire for themselves more ownership of and engagement in both the 2020 Strategy and the European process, they should exercise the same discipline, consulting ESCs and similar bodies as often as possible.

7.1

With regard to its own role, the EESC considers that it is vital that it continues its focus and strategic engagement with all parts of the Europe 2020 Strategy, in order to maintain the capacity to see the possible synergies generated by the strategy and its constituent parts.

7.2

The EESC believes that the work undertaken by its own Europe 2020 Steering Committee should be continued and developed. The Steering Committee needs to retain its focus on the Strategy and its implications for the general public, and should build on its internal communication with those members not involved in the work of the Steering Committee in order to ensure that all benefit from the Steering Committee's overviews and insight.

7.3

The EESC considers that the work that it has been gradually achieving in coordinating the connections between and work of national Economic and Social Councils, where they exist, has had a very positive impact, but could be improved. Many of these organisations also have a role to play at national level in the Europe 2020 Strategy, as do many of their members. As regards improving involvement in the Europe 2020 Strategy, the EESC believes that this is an area where rapid, simple action could yield significant benefits. The EESC believes that it is ideally placed to become the European contact point for the national Economic and Social Councils and similar bodies, especially in assisting them with their own work under Europe 2020. The EESC is willing to make such a commitment and to begin this process of further strengthening contacts and cooperation by involving the national Economic and Social Councils and similar bodies in an event focusing on the Europe 2020 Strategy at the earliest opportunity.

8.1

The EESC strongly supports the Cypriot Presidency's intention to focus on strengthening the participatory processes under the Europe 2020 process and to devote part of the Informal EPSCO in July 2012 to this work. The EESC fully supports this as a strong start for Member States and the European Commission to fully consider how they can each improve upon what they do.

8.2

The EESC calls upon all Member States to provide clarification at national level as to which government agencies are responsible for which measures under Europe 2020, and the relationship between the agencies responsible for coordinating or monitoring the National Reform Programmes and those agencies responsible for the actual implementation. Even a simple clarification of this in each Member State would enable actors to interact with the correct bodies to better effect.

8.3

The EESC believes that full transparency as to the forms of participation used in each Member State as well as descriptions of the processes and instruments that governments intend to use will provide clarity for everyone as to what is happening, why and how.

8.4

The EESC believes that the European Commission and Member States should urgently review the timing of the different actions under the European Semester. The most persistent challenge pointed out by nearly all stakeholders in the existing structures is the lack of adequate time allowed for any sort of considered response or proper debate. As a matter of urgency, the Member States should consider the deadlines that they currently use and how those could be made more reasonable.

8.5

The EESC strongly encourages regional and local authorities to deepen their involvement in the Europe 2020 processes within their national framework and directly at EU level. The establishment by the Committee of the Regions of the Europe 2020 Monitoring Platform is an excellent development towards this objective. The EESC believes that this greater involvement should be supported by national governments. The insights of local and regional authorities on local developments and potential applications is a key part of what should be put in place for Europe 2020 to play its full potential role.

9.1

The EESC believes that there are very useful models already in place for the creation of strong structures for permanent dialogue. The EESC believes that the Code of Good Practice for Civil Participation in the decision-making process launched by the Council of Europe (3) provides an excellent framework and set of principles for this work which can be applied to the Europe 2020 Strategy. Using such a set of principles will allow the European Union and the Member States to gradually move discussions along the spectrum of involvement from fairly low levels of involvement primarily focused on information giving, through to open consultation, a developing dialogue among the participants until ultimately a true partnership can be developed – the four major steps along the spectrum of participatory processes as described in the Code. The EESC believes that the processes under Europe 2020 should begin to gradually move along this spectrum of involvement. The Code also provides a number of very useful tools that could be applied to Europe 2020 processes.

9.2

Organised civil society in Member States should be involved throughout the European Semester. One key process in the area of design is the drafting of the National Reform Programmes. The Member-State drafting process should build on a broad and more collaborative dialogue with the social partners and organised civil society. These actors do not only provide expertise in goal setting and the design of programmes and strategies for areas such as employment, education and social inclusion, they are also fundamental actors in the implementation of these strategies.

9.3

Another key step in the European Semester is the publication and review of the Country-Specific Recommendations. The European social partners and organised civil society must be informed and consulted on the country-specific recommendations for each Member State. In this context, timing is crucial so as to permit the involvement of organised civil society at an early stage in the formulation of future prospects for the following cycles.

9.4

The EESC has in previous opinions suggested benchmarking as a way to measure the progress made in the implementation of the EU 2020 Strategy. Here the national ESC or similar organisation analyses and establishes its own priority criteria using statistics which are freely accessible on the Eurostat website. Some ESCs are already practising this and other national ESCs should be encouraged to engage in the same process. With this benchmarking, the stakeholders continuously monitor the implementation of the reforms. This constitutes valuable input into the revision of National Reform Programmes.

9.5

Steps should be taken to energise the debate on the implementation of the EU 2020 Strategy in Member States, and governments should develop more effective feedback processes about the impact of greater civil and social dialogue on the Strategy. Here the role of civil society in the follow-up can be of specific value. Regular conferences in the Member States involving all relevant stakeholders would be useful but also open hearings in the Parliament presenting the National Reform Programmes.

9.6

There is a contradiction between the growing awareness among the European institutions about the need to consult organised civil society, and the difficulties currently faced by the majority of national ESCs and similar bodies. These organisations are often mostly financed by public budgets. In many Member States, their budgets have been slashed. This is leading the national Economic and Social Councils or equivalent bodies to focus solely on national priorities and to scale back their participation at European level. European institutions should consider how they could give support and assistance to these organisations, at least in their contribution to the European Semester.

9.7

As having a main contact point for the follow-up with national ESCs and similar bodies can be of specific value, the European Commission could consider giving the EESC the responsibility and support for organising a conference with all national ESCs or similar bodies and institutions at least once a year, carefully timed to fit in with the European Semester, in order to discuss the European Semester, the 2020 Strategy and their contribution and best practices in this area.

10.1

The EESC believes that the stakeholders themselves could also renew their engagement in the processes under Europe 2020. While believing that the primary responsibility rests with the Member States and that they need to review the processes for engaging partners, stakeholders themselves could learn more from each other and have more confidence in engaging directly with the European institutions as well as national governments. Equally, despite the need for governments to urgently re-think the timing of processes, stakeholders should improve their own anticipation of the stages of the European Semester.

11.1

In its request to the EESC, the Cypriot Presidency specifically emphasised the need for suggestions on closer involvement of civil society in implementation and follow-up in areas of social policy like poverty and exclusion. The EESC considers that involvement of stakeholders in a structured and regular dialogue at European and national level is critical to providing opportunities to find effective solutions in these policy areas.

11.2

It is helpful to pursue a stakeholder approach and to cultivate structured dialogue with civil society actors in shaping, implementing and monitoring policy as part of the work of the platform to combat poverty and exclusion. In areas like poverty and exclusion, it is often civil society actors that first register trends and social developments and bring them to wider attention. Their determined efforts to highlight the perspective of users and work to promote prevention, as well as the development and delivery of innovative services for these target groups, offer valuable lessons and experience for strategic efforts to address poverty and exclusion. Here the EESC underlines the important strategic role played by the social economy and NGOs, whose aim is to reduce poverty, promote job creation and develop services that meet society's needs in a creative way.

11.3

Within this policy field, it is important to mention the National Social Reports (NSRs), which complement the national reform programmes (NRPs) and are drawn up by the Social Protection Committee. Based on the open method of coordination, these reports assess the social dimension of Europe 2020. Taking the annual growth strategy as their point of reference, they identify the most urgently needed reforms and propose concrete measures. It is important to create a way of more effectively involving stakeholders in the NSR process, which does not yet happen to a sufficient extent, and to better link this to the NRPs. It is essential to strengthen the open method of coordination for social protection, taking integrated national strategies as the point of departure to create a stronger link with the European platform against poverty.

11.4

The annual EU-level events against poverty and exclusion should be followed up by a relevant hearing at national level in cooperation with public bodies, people living in poverty, NGOs, organisations in the social economy, the social partners and other civil society actors. The goal should be to identify and analyse progress and shortcomings in this policy area together, and to propose reforms. This event should be timed to coincide with preparation of the NRPs.

11.5

The ongoing dialogue and consultation on specific issues should also be planned in advance to allow sufficient time for interested parties to express their interest. As part of the stakeholder approach, there should also be a review of the social impact of the Annual Growth Survey and the progress that has been made.

11.6

The NRPs and setting of national targets are key aspects of efforts to implement the Europe 2020 Strategy and the political strategies on poverty reduction. It is important to define the poverty-related objective so as to include groups at risk of poverty and cumulative disadvantage, so that strategies and reforms are effectively targeted at these groups. Involvement of, and partnership with, civil society actors are of critical importance here, as these actors are often able early on to identify new at-risk groups or increasing risks for excluded groups.

4.10.2012   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 299/6

1.1

The primary role of the banking sector, which accounts on average for 5 % of EU GDP, should be to finance the real economy – with a particular focus on innovative companies and the growth of SMEs, the driving force of the EU economy – and to safeguard depositors' savings.

1.2

The Committee welcomes the efforts being made by the European Commission and the Member States to bolster the banking sector and to prevent further financial crises by lowering risk levels and mitigating their effects.

1.3

The Committee maintains that lessons need to be learned from recent economic and financial crises and a fresh approach adopted to ensure more effective supervision by national, European and international authorities and increased accountability of financial institutions.

1.4

The Committee supports the measures aimed at strengthening banks' capital structure and their ability to finance the economy while cautioning banking executives against the temptation to seek very short-term profit and to engage in speculative activities that destabilise the markets.

The responsibilities of banking executives and of oversight bodies at national and EU levels and within the banks themselves need to be clearly and better defined, so as to promote ethical behaviour on the basis of transparent rules.

1.5

The Committee draws attention to the difficulties that arise from the accumulation of regulatory measures, and to the challenges that have to be faced by the 8 000 European banks in order to finance the economy in a difficult economic environment in Europe, which has been hit by a debt crisis whose scale and consequences have not yet been brought under control.

1.6

Europe's banks are facing increased competition from third-country banks, which are not subject in their country of origin to the same legislative and regulatory constraints as banks in Europe.

1.7

The measures aimed at strengthening banks' capital structure include requirements for increased, better quality capital, enhanced risk coverage, the introduction of a leverage ratio and a new approach to liquidity. These measures are likely to impact on bank balance sheets, and may bring about a substantial decline in profitability.

1.8

Consequently, banks are tending to downsize, in order to become more robust, to shift their focus to the most profitable activities, and to reduce their range of financial services in order to have greater control over their risk exposure.

Some are advocating the need to return to their core business: receiving customers' deposits, protecting savers and financing the real economy.

1.9

The EESC believes that a gradual return to the separation of commercial banking activities from those of corporate and investment banking is desirable. The current global crisis shows that a globalised financial system based on unfettered liberalisation entails a risk of derailment linked to the misuse of this freedom by the markets:

1.10

The new capital requirements, particularly the obligation to build up a capital ratio of 9 % of the highest quality capital – by 30 June 2012 in the case of the 60 systemic banks, and between 2015 and the end of 2018 for the rest – could have adverse consequences for local or cooperative banks, which are more SME- and micro-enterprise friendly. Capital requirements should not discriminate against any particular group of banks.

1.11

If banks face difficulties in raising capital, it will be harder for SMEs to obtain the finance they need. A credit crunch and a rise in bank charges must be averted. The Committee thus urges the Commission, the European Banking Authority (EBA) and the national supervisory authorities to ensure that the capital buffers of small banks are adapted to their economic model.

1.12

Prudential requirements are already leading to tighter, more costly credit for small businesses, including start-ups, innovative companies and the more risky ventures. Europe will not be able to achieve the goals of the Europe 2020 strategy, the Digital Agenda, Cloud-active Europe, the Energy roadmap 2050 or the Small Business Act if the share of funding for SMEs falls following implementation of the new prudential measures.

The Committee calls on the Commission to very closely monitor trends in bank lending and bank charges to businesses and individuals.

1.13

The measures aimed at increasing the effectiveness of market supervision by national, European and international authorities will have far-reaching consequences for the organisation of banks and internal oversight. This will place greater responsibility on management, with the requirement to assess the return on equity more carefully and improve risk management. The banks will have to draw up their sales forecasts and product and banking portfolio development strategies with due regard for their return and an assessment of ability to absorb capital. This will lead to restructuring with a view to increasing the importance of IT, audit, and risk management departments and their staffing levels, at the expense of other, more traditional areas.

1.14

Banks in the EU employ over 3 million people, the vast majority in retail banking. Since early 2011, more than 150 000 jobs have been cut and many branches have closed. Various forecasts estimate that a further 100 000 jobs will be lost in 2012. The Committee calls on the Commission to help improve sectoral social dialogue and to develop consultation with the social partners on the initiatives affecting the development of the profession.

1.15

When the new rules are implemented, the Committee would like to see account being taken of the different situations of the Member States, and particularly the new EU Member States, whose credit markets have not achieved their full potential and whose banks are mostly owned by the major European and global banking groups. To improve their balance sheets and meet the new requirements, these groups may be tempted to transfer funds from their subsidiaries and curtail their investments, greatly reducing the financing of the economies of these countries. The Committee points out here the commitment made under the Vienna initiative to avoid an outflow of funds. It is necessary to protect certain particular models such as the cooperative banks in Germany and Poland. This sector comprises over 300 banks in Poland alone and to achieve the radical reform that the new rules entail will require a transition period.

1.16

To support the harmonisation process, the remit of the European Banking Authority needs to be bolstered. The Committee points out that the free movement of capital is ensured at EU level, while the security of deposits and bank solvency fall under the remit of the national authorities. The credit market differs from one Member State to the next. In countries where credit is underdeveloped, catching up too quickly in terms of debt levels can create a speculative bubble. If the prudential rules are implemented uniformly across the EU, national authorities will be unable to intervene in time. However, it is worth considering the suggestion of several European leaders to create an EU banking union to establish EU-level supervision for systemic banks and a guarantee for deposits in case of bankruptcy.

1.17

At global level, European banks are in danger of becoming less competitive in relation to their competitors. For banks raising additional own funds, most of the available capital is in sovereign wealth funds and Asian and Middle Eastern banks. There is a real danger that the ownership of the EU banking system will move out of the control of EU Member States. For this reason, the Committee calls on the European authorities to step up their efforts to ensure that the same prudential rules will apply worldwide, with the aim of achieving a genuinely global set of rules.

1.18

The new IT technologies: e-banking, home banking, secure virtual transactions (electronic signatures) and cloud computing are revolutionising traditional banking services. The banks will have the difficult task of financing the real economy while having to cope not only with higher funding costs following the introduction of new technologies, but also lower profitability. The Committee feels that all banking stakeholders should be supported through this far-reaching change.

2.1

The financial crisis and its impact on the economy have led governments and financial authorities to look at the root causes of the collapse of a financial system thought to be established, well regulated and properly supervised.

2.2

The initial financial and monetary measures were taken in some haste (substantial cut in base rates, liquidity, state aid); longer-term measures have been aimed at bolstering the structure of the markets and preventing future systemic crises: hence their regulatory, supervisory or fiscal nature. While the supranational organisations – the IMF, the G20, the BIS, the Commission – have adopted an open attitude to cooperation, there have been differences of opinion.

2.3

Since the 2008 crisis, more than 50 legislative measures have been adopted by the EU. 99 % of the reforms will have been passed by the end of 2011, to come into effect in 2013, with the exception of the core tier one capital ratio, which becomes effective for the 60 banks deemed systemic on 30 June 2012. For the other banks, this measure is to come into effect between 2015 and 2018.

2.4

The third Basel Accord, published in November 2010, requires banks to hold more higher-quality capital in order to withstand future crises, and in particular to hold:

Basel III introduces a minimum 3 % leverage ratio and two mandatory liquidity ratios: the short-term liquidity ratio, which requires banks to hold sufficient high-quality liquid assets to cover their liquidity requirements over 30 days; and the long-term liquidity ratio amounting to a minimum amount of stable funding above their liquidity requirements over one year.

2.4.1

The European Commission put forward its proposals on transposing Basel III into CRD IV in July 2011. This is aimed at strengthening the European banking sector while encouraging the banks to continue to finance the growth of the economy. However, the Commission has not taken any practical initiatives to encourage lending.

2.5

The proposals' objectives are to encourage banks to hold more capital in order to resist shocks and to set up a new framework enabling supervisors to monitor banks and take action when they spot risks.

2.6

CRD IV covers areas of the current Capital Requirements Directive, but it needs to be transposed in a way suitable to each country.

2.7

Despite the delays and flaws in the rules adopted, real progress has been made towards a new set of rules. However, the following questions remain:

3.1

Europe's banks are currently having to cope with sudden regulatory and economic changes that are giving rise to concerns as regards their ability to fulfil their role of financing the economy at a time of economic downturn triggered by the debt crisis, which is particularly affecting the euro area.

3.2

Upon implementation of the Basel Committee measures (Basel III), banks are required to build up their capital, to comply with very high, long-term NSFR liquidity ratios and to create prudential capital.

3.3

Stress testing of the banks, carried out in two phases, has failed to assuage doubts over the impact of a default by one or more members of the euro area.

3.4

A lack of confidence has taken hold in the international financial community sparking liquidity problems on the interbank market. This has led banks to shift their focus to the safest investments.

3.5

Against this backdrop, the ECB has intervened twice and offered a total of EUR 1 000 billion in three-year loans to the banking sector at a rate of 1 %. This facility has been vital to restoring confidence on the interbank market and keeping credit flowing in the economy. However, a substantial tranche of these funds has been redeposited with the ECB, and another portion used to buy public debt. The Committee thinks that the ECB should devise a means of tracking the use of these funds.

3.6

The need to recapitalise the banks, estimated by the European Banking Authority to require in excess of EUR 100 billion, is becoming increasingly urgent.

3.7

Lending to businesses, particularly SMEs and authorities, and to individuals, is becoming subject to increasing stringency. The associated risks are being carefully scrutinised by the banks, which is pushing up the costs of this financing. At the same time, the alternative of financing businesses through the financial markets is even more difficult. This situation, coupled with austerity policies, has fuelled predictions of little or no growth, apart from a very few exceptions, in the year 2012 across the entire European Union.

4.1

In this regard, it is important to think back to the subprime crisis. Warning signs that a subprime crisis was about to erupt should have been heeded by the supervisory authorities. No one doubted the return on an investment that delivered a profit to the bankers and their clients. Although the FDIC warned against these products, no action was taken by the Federal Reserve during the period 2002-2006.

4.2

The collapse of Lehman Brothers bank could have been avoided if the oversight bodies had noticed its severe liquidity problems in time. The danger posed by mortgages offered at 100 % of the value of the property and sold on in bundles by financial intermediaries was beyond the control of anyone. To prevent future crises, measures should be introduced bestowing personal liability on the directors of financial institutions for lack of proper supervision.

4.3

While it is true that the crisis erupted as a result of overly complex "toxic" products, it is also true that oversight bodies could have prohibited their creation, or circulation, on the basis of the existing rules.

The new rules will not be able to provide a cast-iron guarantee against a fresh crisis occurring if supervisory authorities are not given sufficient resources to fulfil their role and if internal oversight remains ineffective.

4.4

Given financial deregulation, governments should deliver on their international cooperation commitments so as to prevent uneven regulation across different areas.

4.5

The following principles should underpin the new set of rules:

4.6

The work of supervisory authorities should be subject to a periodic assessment by an independent body of experts who are no longer working in the financial sector. This assessment should, inter alia, focus on the impact of their decisions on the management of banks.

5.1

Banks are currently under great pressure as they must redefine their business model following the new rules. The combination of the rules and the difficult economic and financial climate has had the following effects:

5.2

All of this means:

5.3

The new rules do not distinguish between the major banks and small institutions. They may be unsuited to certain countries, such as the new Member States of Central and Eastern Europe, which have high growth rates.

5.4

The credit market differs from one Member State to the next. In countries where credit is underdeveloped, catching up too quickly in terms of debt levels can create a speculative bubble. If the prudential rules are applied at EU level, national authorities will be unable to intervene quickly enough. To support the harmonisation process, the remit of the European Banking Authority needs to be bolstered.

5.5

Certain particular models such as the cooperative banks, which operate independently and healthily, need to be catered for. To achieve the reform that the new rules entail will require a transition period. Cooperative banks are crucial to local development. They act in the interests of their members, who are also their depositors and borrowers: SMEs, farmers, municipalities and many other local players.

5.6

The major banks will seek investment that is low-risk and more profitable; in addition, there are fears of higher taxation and losses on the sovereign debt of certain liabilities.

5.7

The consolidation process will probably accelerate. Savings banks and cooperative banks can rely on sources of funding that are "autonomous", but the banks that go to the markets to refinance will be forced to merge, with negative consequences for SMEs and consumers. Some banks have been acquired and sold on after their local or regional network has been dismantled. There has been a high incidence of domestic bank concentration in the cooperative and mutual sectors as well as in savings banks.

5.8

A lower level of bank profitability, due, inter alia, to higher funding costs, and the extremely restrictive principles governing liquidity management may lead to higher bank charges and interest rates for term deposits as well as for clients' private accounts.

5.9

In the context of the new rules, banks are speeding up their restructuring and use of new technologies (online banking, virtual counters, use of smartphones).

5.10

The changes in distribution channels will ultimately lead to a shrinkage of branch networks and a reduction in employment. The implementation of the CRD IV Directive will lead to additional IT and risk-management jobs being created in the banks at the expense of the other bank activities. High-quality social dialogue needs to be developed at all levels on the issues of jobs and training in order to properly manage the ongoing change.

6.1

The European Parliament has given its approval in principle to a tax on financial transactions, which the Commission is considering introducing; however, there is no consensus among Member States, and the US authorities are not keen on the idea. The low rate envisaged should not constitute an unbearable burden for banks or a competitive handicap at global level. As highlighted in two opinions previously adopted by the EESC (1), the purpose of this tax is both to provide new tax revenues, in particular to fund development assistance, and to change the behaviour of the banks to shift the focus towards medium- to long-term funding of the economy, as opposed to very short-term speculative trading.

6.2

The issue of separating retail banking from corporate and investment banking is currently under consideration in a study instigated by Commissioner Barnier, thus calling into question the universal bank model. The debate is centred on a total separation, a ring-fencing of investment banking activities or prohibiting banks from engaging in proprietary investment. Some experts are against this idea, stressing that universal banks ensure the depth and liquidity of markets and are better at financing the economy.

6.3

The development landscape of the financial world and the banking sector has altered over the last thirty years: the opening-up of the markets led to the globalisation of finance; this in turn contributed to the development and proliferation of tax and regulatory havens. Increased competition at global level fostered the emergence of new financial institutions, and new products and services.

6.4

The major banking groups have displayed the weaknesses and limitations of a level of growth that precludes good governance. They will tend to downsize so as to become more robust with less marked, more predictable profit fluctuations, and no extravagant bonuses. They will concentrate their activities on their core business, i.e. receiving deposits and providing credit, while limiting their provision of other services, curbing their international expansion and focusing their activities on higher-growth markets, which will restrict their profitability.

6.5

The new rules will see the awarding of bonuses and executive remuneration practices subject to greater accountability and more stringent controls.

6.6

Banking supervision extended to all types of financial business would allow oversight of non-banks (such as shadow banking).

6.7

Binding rules on access to the banking profession need to be introduced to enable staff to be selected with the requisite skills to reassure clients and investors.

6.8

When state aid and international aid in response to the financial crises dries up, the sector as a whole is likely to evolve in line with economic conditions and the development of new technologies, but especially following the strategies specific to each well-managed company. The banks will have the difficult task of retaining their credibility as lenders to the real economy while having to cope with higher financing costs and lower profitability.

4.10.2012   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 299/12

—

accelerating knowledge development, technology transfer and uptake;

—

maintaining EU industrial leadership on low-carbon energy technologies;

—

fostering science for transforming energy technologies to achieve the 2020 Energy and Climate Change goals;

—

contributing to the worldwide transition to a low-carbon economy by 2050.

—

The ETPs gather together all stakeholders: research centres and universities, industry (big players and SMEs), plant producers, non-profit as well as commercial organisations, associations, public authorities and unions.

—

In the platform there is a clear identification of "roles" and hierarchy within the sector. The stakeholders share a common vision, roadmap and implementation plan.

—

ETPs enjoy strong input and support from industry, one of the key pillars of the EC economy. ETPs are industry-driven, thus ensuring the industrial relevance of their initiatives. Input provided by ETPs not only touches on technology and research needs but also on technology transfer.

—

ETPs have a lean management structure and are flexible, mobilising "forces" and pooling resources.

—

ETP-related industry sectors have a fundamental position in the value chain: many innovations are dependent on basic processes (manufacturing, processing industries, forestry and robotics, for instance) and materials (chemicals and steels). As such, therefore, process and material innovations have a catalytic effect on EU innovation.

—

ETPs are already tackling societal challenges. They cover an area which has a major impact on society in terms of growth and value-added jobs. ETPs respond to key policy issues (bio-economy, raw materials and resource efficiency, for example).

—

Some ETPs have National TPs and Regional TPs in place, in all EU countries.

—

Education is addressed as strategic element of the platforms.

—

Originating from existing ETPs, a number of implementation vehicles (e.g. PPP, Cluster etc.) are already in place.

—

ETPs should think strategically, and avoid becoming a narrow lobby-group and losing focus. - ETPs may suffer from duplication or excessive fragmentation of activity.

—

In some cases the big "players" dominate ETP action.

—

It is not easy to recognise and attribute final applications and innovations to ETPs:

—

More effort is needed to generate a multi-sectoral perspective harmonising stakeholders’ interests and their interaction.

—

ETPs should improve their communication and the dissemination of results.

—

ETPs are key to boosting the EU "industrial policy". The related NTPs and RTPs mirror ETP structure at MS level, improving platform coordination and effectiveness. Co-ordination and harmonisation of European, national and regional R&I programmes should be improved in cooperation with ETPs.

—

The solution-provider role of ETPs with regard to societal challenges will gain a higher profile in the light of the enhanced strategy of addressing innovation in addition to research.

—

Specific priorities have been defined to boost innovation in the public and private domains: Resource and Energy Efficiency in Process Industry (SPIRE), Biobased Industries PPP, European Innovation Partnerships on Water, Raw Materials, Smart Cities (jointly with the SET plan and EMIRI).

—

ETPs request the EC for an increased use of Coordination Support Actions to drive value chain cooperation and to improve simplification efforts. Improving international cooperation, attracting the best global knowledge for EU commercialisation and exploitation could make a major contribution to the work of ETPs.

—

ETPs should link demand-side innovation tools to complement research actions in order to accelerate market up-take.

—

ETPs could raise awareness of the importance of various industrial manufacturing processes for sustaining welfare and wellbeing in Europe.

—

People-focused education, learning & training should be maintained within the ETP landscape.

—

ETPs claim a lack of financial resources to run the platforms.

—

ETPs may suffer the decline of EU industry. The EU Industries are losing their worldwide leading position; they suffer from a generally low level of risk-taking in the EU and from a lack of entrepreneurship recognition in comparison to other parts of the world.

—

More effective implementation of the EU regulatory framework simplification process (including participation in EU projects), increased effort in reducing fragmentation and competition between institutional initiatives, better coordinated policies and for increased visibility in the future at institutional level, could increase the effectiveness of ETPs.

—

Manufacturing processes and the manufacturing-related R&I activities are losing their societal appeal for the general public and especially for young people. This is also a consequence of the delocalisation of manufacturing activities outside Europe.

—

strengthen the EU’s position in science;

—

strengthen industrial leadership in innovation. This includes major investment in key technologies, greater access to capital and support for SMEs;

—

help address major concerns shared by all Europeans on issues such as climate change, developing sustainable transport and mobility.

4.10.2012   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 299/17

1.1

The world is subject to rapid geopolitical change. The dominant position of the Western world is being challenged both economically and politically. While defence budgets across the European Union are being cut, defence spending in China, India, Brazil, Russia and others is going up. Therefore the EESC calls on the Council and the Commission to make an overall evaluation of determining aspects of the EU's position and role in the world, to result in a convincing update of European foreign, security and defence policies.

1.2

Defence policy is shaped by countries' strategic interests, perceived threats and political objectives, which in Europe are mainly defined in national terms. Obsolete approaches visibly lead to increasing fragmentation, gaps, overcapacity and a lack of interoperability in European defence capabilities. The arguments for improvement are overwhelming; it is a matter of political will. This was already argued convincingly back in 1986! (1) The situation is now much more pressing in political, economic and defence terms. The EESC calls on the Council to work seriously on an EU defence umbrella.

1.3

Security and defence policy should boost the EU and Member States' self-confidence. It should inspire confidence in society and the general public, properly equipped soldiers, business and the sector's workforce. EU citizens have a right to be adequately protected. Adequate future-proof European armaments are increasingly needed. To that end current isolated practices of Member States are completely insufficient as well as wasting taxpayer’s money.

1.4

In line with policies and current practices in the US and other (emerging) world actors as well as given the exclusive responsibility of governments to protect citizens and to ensure security, the EESC underlines the need of defining European strategic interests in the framework of the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) (2). In the end the triangle of foreign affairs and security, defence, and industrial capability is indivisible, supporting Europe’s position in the world, her economic and political interests as well as values (human rights, democracy). The European External Action Service (EEAS) should be directly involved.

1.5

The EESC emphasises that, should Europe wish to maintain a sound security and defence industry in creating a critical mass for effectiveness and cost efficiency, a radical change in mindset and policies is needed. These must produce a stable and predictable future for armed forces befitting Europe's economic and technological weight. Given big differences between Member States a primary responsibility in this regard falls to the main producing Member States.

1.6

In the EESC’s view, there are strong arguments to strengthen European planning and committed coordination:

1.7

In addition to actions of the European Defence Agency (EDA) and the Defence Package of 2007 (3) the EESC calls for a well-designed European industrial policy for the defence sector with its specific characteristics of government requirements and public funding. In the framework of Europe 2020, this industrial policy must be based on shared national and EU competences – with EDA and Commission as full partners - as well as consultations with the defence industry and other stakeholders, among them social partners and the need of a well-organised social dialogue.

1.8

EU policies and funding should link EU level and national investments leading to reducing fragmentation and duplication of public expenditure, enhancing quality and interoperability.

1.9

State-of-the-art R&D is crucial for the development of "new generation" armaments which are badly needed. Such R&D can never be an exclusive matter for industry alone. The main responsibility falls to governments. Consequently, it is very vulnerable to current budget cutbacks. The Council and stakeholders should identify urgently and launch as soon as possible research programmes that would help European industry to address undesirable dependencies from elsewhere. "Dual use" technology is a necessity. The EU’s R&D programme should be supportive. It should ensure effective cross-border R&D cooperation.

1.10

Further strengthening of the technological and industrial basis of European defence must be planned as much as possible. To that end satisfactory measures at EU-level are necessary (4).

1.11

Closer coordination between the Commission, EDA, and other relevant EU stakeholders is needed. The renewed commitment of President Barroso (5), Vice-President Tajani and Commissioner Barnier as well as the establishment of the Task Force on Defence is very timely. The EESC also welcomes last December’s forward-looking EP Resolution on European Defence and the broad spectrum of issues at stake (6).

1.12

In the same spirit and in view of strengthening the initiative of the EC Task Force on Defence, the EESC urges the Commission to publicly raise these issues. The Commission should also consider to provide elements of answers as appropriate to the findings that result from the differences in industrial and technological capabilities between Member States as well as differences in the levels of investment in research and defence in general.

2.1

Article 42 of the Treaty on European Union states that the common security and defence policy shall be an integral part of the common foreign and security policy. Article 42(3) adds that Member States shall make military capabilities available to the Union for the implementation of that policy. Since 2005 the European Defence Agency (EDA) has worked to strengthen the industrial and technological base of the defence sector and provide better equipment for soldiers. Progress, however, is very limited.

2.2

Completing the internal market as well as effective financial coordination are high priorities now. The Europe 2020 strategy is giving strong support to both objectives. This leap forward should also inspire new steps in European defence.

2.3

Yet there is no similar development in the defence sector. The military pact between France and the United Kingdom in 1998 looked set to mark a new mindset and a new start. The same spirit of closer defence cooperation was reflected in the foundation of the European Defence and Space Company, EADS, in 2003. This, however, was not followed by further consolidation. It is significant that the LoI-countries (the group of countries with major production capacity, i.e. France, Germany, the United Kingdom, Italy, Spain and Sweden) have, contrary to previous intentions, not yet come up with any viable proposal for rationalisation or consolidation.

2.4

Stagnation has led to national approaches and emphasis on national production. There is a certain renationalisation. Europe-based industrial companies are all focusing on export markets. There is no common strategic concept, neither among governments nor among industrial partners.

2.5

Meanwhile new challenges will increasingly affect potential markets. A huge challenge is the development of armaments in emerging economies. China, Russia, India and Brazil (the BRICs), followed by some smaller countries, are on their way. The Chinese defence budget is expected to rise from EUR 120 billion now to EUR 250 billion by 2015. Russia has announced a huge increase in its defence budget up to 2015. The US spends more than double the total European budget: EUR 450 bn. versus EUR 204 bn. in 2007 and the European budget is shrinking ever more. The overall European R&D budget is at the most 20 % of the American one. 50 % of the European defence budget goes on manpower against 25 % in the US. Europe has more people under arms, but they are far less equipped. World conditions will never be what they were before. Time is not on our side.

2.6

Over the last decades, many studies have advocated adapting the defence industry to the global market. All underline lasting shortcomings, as defence markets prove very imperfect, with most states continuing to support their "own" industry. Attempts to improve markets, such as the EU Defence Package of 2007, intend to overcome some market deficiencies and diverging national practices.

2.7

The issues at stake are complex, partly due to the very long time lags from the design phase to bringing products into operation. Therefore the EESC considers that a broad approach from a technological, economic and social perspective would be a more suitable way to discuss this area than just looking at it from the defence perspective.

2.8

A key point is the divergence of strategic concepts between countries with a considerable armaments industry, in particular as regards the definition of "essential national security interest", and the relation between national security and export markets. Some smaller countries have a reasonably well-developed industry, while others have practically no production sites at all. Clearly, the approaches of all countries differ according to their needs and potential. The outcome is fragmentation and a patchwork vision of defence industry. Operations like in Libya make increasing gaps in available weapon systems painfully clear. The consequences should be clearly acknowledged and evaluated.

2.9

These developments concern both investments and employment. The defence industry is a high technology sector that directly employs 600 000 qualified people and, indirectly, another two million. There are worrying pressures for further cuts. Often production sites have a strong regional concentration which could become centres of excellence but which, adversely, run the risk of being hit by financial cuts. These sites will suffer greatly if reorganisation and cuts take place in an unplanned and unstructured way.

2.10

Current employment is, of course, a primary worry for individual governments as well. In its turn, it may well hamper the development of a common vision which is needed to address properly the social consequences of a declining defence industry, including the loss of know-how and its effects on human capital. By contrast, a common vision will favour a balanced job creation and avoid the risk of losing researchers and highly-specialised senior technicians and scientists to third countries, contrary to the goals that the EU is seeking to achieve with the EU 2020 strategy.

2.11

EU approaches and the intergovernmental framework can and should work in the same perspective. As long as national sovereignty prevails, the output of any common framework will bear limited fruit, with few improvements to overcapacity, overlap and fragmentation. The contradictions between the philosophy of national sovereignty on the one hand and financial, technological, economic and social needs on the other are manifest.

2.12

It is thus worrying that the objective of "pooling and sharing", i.e. the organisation of European interdependence, has not been put in terms of a common strategy. In spite of a broadly-felt awareness of the changed international context the pressure from outside is apparently not yet strong enough for the promotion of common approaches and solutions. Remarkably enough, by contrast, European countries are still willing to remain dependent on the US in the area of defence procurement instead of purchasing in Europe.

2.13

If Europe wishes to maintain a sound security and defence industry, capable of developing and producing cutting edge systems, and thereby ensuring its own security, a radical change in mindset and policies is needed. Waiting any longer would hasten a downsizing of capabilities below levels from which the EU could climb back to the top in essential areas. This would be still more difficult as cuts in R&D spending would directly affect a generation of researchers and qualified employees. If Europe does not succeed, industries may disappear, jobs will be lost and know-how will evaporate, leaving Europe at the mercy of others. A sense of urgency and action is needed among those who care for Europe and European security.

3.1

The Treaty on European Union rightly underlines the inextricable link between foreign, security and defence policy. An effective foreign policy has to be built on convincing defence capabilities. Adequate defence capabilities, in their turn, must be designed and developed in the light of perceived threats and agreed objectives in a very complicated and fragile international context.

3.2

The core factor is the EU's position and role in tomorrow's world, taking into account the rapidly changing geopolitical realities in which an increasing number of world players emerge. From that perspective, the EESC considers that it is high time for a concerted drive in Europe. Past and recent experience proves that continuing traditional approaches risks sidelining Europe and the Member States.

3.3

The EESC calls for a stable and predictable future for European armed forces befitting Europe's current economic and technological weight. The huge time lags from the design of systems to bringing them on line reinforces the need to make decisions as of this year.

3.4

From a social and political point of view, the EESC highlights four important aspects regarding the need for effective European defence capabilities:

3.5

There is an ongoing debate over the future of the CSDP, although it is rarely put in such terms. Many topics such as the use of Battle groups, the controversy over the development of a single operational HQ, funding of EU CSDP missions, finding contributions to those missions and calls for a review of Europe Security Strategy, amount to a discussion on the CSDP in all but name. It would be a step forward to approach it in that way. Moreover, in all deliberations concerning these important issues the industrial implications of decisions (or non-decisions) should also be considered. It will also prove the strong connection between industrial capabilities and the implementation of a CSDP. The prime responsibility is with governments.

3.6

The Trans-Atlantic relationship and NATO are of critical importance. For a long time, Americans have severely criticised the way Europeans look after their defence obligations within the Alliance. There is a continuous call on both sides of the Atlantic for a "European pillar" in NATO. Until now the opposite has been happening.

3.7

The lack of a proper "European pillar" has deep political roots. There still is insufficient political will in Europe to define European "strategic" interests or common key military capabilities. By contrast, the US and other countries use the concept of strategic activities, encompassing all research and industries which contribute to the global security of their citizens, be it civil or military.

3.8

Against this backdrop the EESC considers that building a "European pillar", the exaggerated dependence of European military capabilities on the US, should be replaced by a more balanced relationship. Parallel to a badly needed discussion on common European strategic interests which is an exclusive responsibility of governments, orderly planning through cooperation between the European institutions, the Member States and defence industries as well as a progressive review of Member States' habits of buying automatically "off the shelf" in the US, should start as soon as possible.

3.9

Improving conditions for industrial cooperation with US industries on a more equal footing will be beneficial from both an industrial and financial perspective.

4.1

There is a close relationship between foreign and defence/security policies and defence industries. Despite privatisation governments have a large stake in defence industry as customer, as regulator and as providers of export licenses.

4.2

Defence industries have considerable room for manoeuvre in export markets. This is partly due to privatisation, partly to encouragement by governments: the economic crisis is turning some defence ministers into explicitly stated export promoters. Anyway, the crisis is forcing the defence sector to consider exports as a central feature of their business models. On average, 2011 was a very profitable year for European industries. Companies are also fairly successful in developing "dual use" production.

4.3

World players like China, India and Brazil, have their own foreign political ambitions, culminating in rising defence budgets. At the moment this creates perceived opportunities for European exports. How long will this last? Industry is still doing reasonably well, but its performances are largely based on investments of some 20 to 25 years ago. Further dropping or stagnating investments at this very moment would already have irreversible consequences in the near future.

4.4

Moreover, it is realistic to expect that emerging powers will start to build up their industry independently of Western industries, and, subsequently, that they, as Europe’s future competitors in third-country markets, will increasingly block imports from Western countries or link these to conditions.

4.5

At the moment, there are no new major programmes in Europe about to start and this will undoubtedly affect future export success. Moreover, it has been some time since any major emerging country has required a significant level of technology transfer and production in their countries.

4.6

One-time export contracts will in all likelihood be used to copy technology from Western industries. For these an alternative to blocking imports could be to set up production (and development) facilities in the countries concerned. At the moment it is largely a matter of speculation to what extent such development will affect facilities and labour opportunities in Europe. In the longer term, it is likely that the position of European industry will be undermined by emerging giants. Enhanced technology and production in these countries will also affect European (potential) export markets in other third countries. Competition in products as well as prices will become fiercer.

4.7

Due to long time lags in development and production as well as technological investments and continuous innovation, Europe needs targeted coordination to ensure an up-to-date self-reliant defence industry. As long as market size is predominantly determined by national borders, it is almost automatically below critical mass, even in large Member States. Export to third countries may alleviate this to some extent, but the future is uncertain, while market conditions are often far from stable.

4.8

Persisting declining budgets, which under present circumstances imply considerable limitations, should be a wake-up call. They affect budgets for investment and procurement, certainly when operational and maintenance costs remain at the same level or increase as a result of ongoing military operations (Afghanistan, Libya, anti-piracy operations, to name a few).

4.9

This results in postponing or even cancelling investments that are essential for industry to ensure the upkeep and renewal of production and development capabilities. Moreover, in difficult times industry itself will be less prepared to invest in such upkeep or new activities. Only by working together in a coherent fashion can the needed investments be ensured.

4.10

The EESC advocates a well-designed European industrial policy for the defence sector, from the designing of systems to the operational phase. This is a matter of specific industrial policy. It is by its very nature a public market: R&D must be financed beyond seed money due to unprofitable margins at the start and to specific governmental requirements. It is necessary to identify European key industrial capabilities as well as investment policies to promote robust European production. As no single country has sufficient resources available to fund "new generation" armaments, it is necessary to mix national and European goals as well as national and European resources, financially as well as industrially. Governance should be based on shared EU and national competences according to the agreed Europe 2020 strategy. This is also an effective label to optimise coordination between the European institutions and within the Commission which still functions far below its potential. In this respect the Task Force which will start shortly as a platform – Commission, EDA, EEAS - to discuss priorities, capabilities and gaps, can provide valuable support.

4.11

R&D is a central theme. The defence industry is a high technology, knowledge-intensive industrial activity, which would also be needed for full-fledged prototype development. R&D is almost never an exclusive matter for industry alone. Development and system lifecycles are simply too long, and the financial impact too big for industry to carry all financial risks. History proves that all successful programmes are carried out jointly by governments and industry.

4.12

A very high percentage of defence R&D in the world comes from governments either directly or indirectly through purchases. Not surprisingly, defence industries are on average avoiding too much financial risk given the nature of the products. Defence R&D is particularly vulnerable to government cutbacks.

4.13

Consequently, besides industrial consolidation, sufficient funding and pooling agreed among the Member States, the Commission and industry is needed for research, technology and development. Defence investments require a high degree of funding for R&D and technological projects. In addition, access to critical technologies must be ensured. If critical technologies for development and production were no longer accessible due to restrictions on exports imposed by others, serious problems to achieving European security goals would arise.

4.14

R&D performed outside defence organisations plays an increasingly important role due to progress in independent science and technology in many areas. Often it is only in the last phases of development that the ultimate application determines whether the R&D can be identified as "defence" or "civil" R&D. "Dual-use" R&D is of growing importance for defence applications, see for instance IT. It is thus of primary importance for the European Defence Technological and Industrial Base (EDTIB) to stimulate "dual-use" R&D, in particular as it enables funding from outside the defence communities.

4.15

Public R&D funding at EU level should be agreed among the Member States. It can be carried out via the upcoming Framework Programme 8 (FP8) or via a separate fund, preferably via packages of advanced research areas, for example nanotechnology and artificial intelligence. Special procedures must be planned given the relationship between the defence industry and the public sector.

4.16

The EDA and the Commission should have a prominent role as foreseen in the European Framework Cooperation, also to avoid day-to-day political interference. EDA should be given the opportunity to play its full role as provided in the Lisbon Treaty (7).

4.17

An appropriate workforce with up-to-date skills is crucial for an industrial and R&D programme for defence (8). This is another firm argument for a stable framework for R&D and industry instead of disorderly restructuring. It has to be kept in mind that defence workforces are the cement on which the future of defence capabilities is built. Consultation of and communication with industry, R&D institutes, higher education, military organisations and interested trade unions must help ensure that both ongoing restructuring and forward-looking production of armaments in Europe will be organised properly.

4.18

Budget constraints make it necessary to tackle overlaps and ineffectiveness. Controlled consolidation is not necessarily equivalent to building big companies. It means building sufficient critical mass and quality by international standards which ensure a competitive position in home markets and third countries. Coordinating the planning of projects at European level by governments, relevant EU players and industry is increasingly necessary.

4.19

Differences in size and output of industries are a fact. Member States differ greatly in industrial importance. Part of an agreement among participating countries should be to ensure that industries in non-LoI countries (=main producers) will be connected to relevant projects. This approach is not only politically desirable, it also promotes a fruitful relationship between big and smaller companies as well as research institutes. As suppliers, SMEs should successfully add to smart specialisation chains.

4.20

Specific attention is required for a perceived vulnerability in countries of Central Europe due to their exposed geographical position. In view of both the need to make citizens in these countries feel well protected as well as the desirability to make full use of specific technical knowledge in the field of defence, the EESC underlines the need of appropriate integration of available knowledge and competences in countries in Central Europe in ongoing and future defence projects.

4.21

An integrated European market for defence products would create a more stable home market. Besides combining existing national markets, a European market would encourage harmonisation or even standardisation of requirements and procurement rules between the various Member States. More harmonisation or standardisation would improve financial and economic conditions enhancing the competitiveness of European companies in a global market.

4.22

A European defence market would have critical mass. Against that backdrop, the EESC points to damaging consequences when the Member States continue to buy "off the shelf" abroad, particularly in the US. First, it undermines the advantages of a European market for industry; consequently prices for such defence products would rise for their European customers, if industry were prevented from selling in third-country markets where (state) competition will definitely become increasingly fierce. Second, European countries that buy "off the shelf" in the US pay for American technological costs which are included in the price of those products.

4.23

Given the financial and international political prospects, a fundamental European debate and operational conclusions are indispensable. If not all Member States are willing to participate in a common framework, the principle of "Enhanced cooperation" should prevail. More integration and a positive attitude to buying European will turn out to be the only way in which market sizes comparable to those in the US can be approximated. Without an effective home market there are grounds for serious doubts as to whether European industry has any hope of competing at global level.

5.1

The industrial landscape between the various armed forces - land, sea, air - differs significantly from country to country. In a number of areas no country can any longer be considered to be able to develop on its own new generations of armaments.

5.2

In the land sector only a limited number of large system integrating companies is able to develop and produce Main Battle Tanks (MBT) and lighter military vehicles. Main European producers are in France, Germany and the UK. There is a large spectrum of subsystem manufacturers and third tier suppliers with an under-representation from Central Europe.

5.3

Many countries develop their "own" naval industry, and build naval vessels with a great variety of size and complexity from country to country. The LoI nations and the Netherlands are leading, also in the area of concept design and complex naval research facilities which are quite different from developing civil ship building. Here again there is a broad spectrum of subsystem manufacturers and third tier suppliers.

5.4

Military aircraft are only developed and produced in a few countries. The industry is concentrated in a small number of largely multinational companies, operating at European level and beyond. The industry is primarily concentrated in EADS, BEA-Systems, Dassault and Saab-Aircraft. Advanced aerodynamic research is limited to a few countries.

5.5

The Electronics sector, including Command, Communication and Control, is of increasing importance for defence with major industrial players such as Thales, "BAE Systems" and "Finmeccanica". For the largest European electronics industry groups Philips and Siemens, defence is less important. For these, the production volume for cost-effective mass production of specific electronic components such as integrated circuits for defence is too small anyway. Engaging these large industrial groups, however, underlines the importance of dual use in this field.

5.6

As regards ammunition and explosives, the number of industries has gradually declined over the last decades partly due to environmental constraints. Public safety forces such industries either to move older production sites or simply to close them down.

5.7

Access to critical technologies is essential, and should be supported in the framework of a CSDP. The same goes for certain materials such as carbon fibres or materials for electronic components.

5.8

The Defence Package of 2007, adopted in 2009, can be very supportive. The Member States should have transposed the directives in the summer of 2011. It is still too early to be positive or sceptical about their knock-on effects for creating one internal market. The process is not yet finalised and the implementation of the goal of inter-Community transfer of defence products as well as of notions such as essential national security interests remains to be seen.

5.9

Article TFEU 346 provides a derogation from EU procurement laws for the protection of essential national security interests. This broad formulation may prevent proper market developments, particularly in desirable supply chains. The EESC advocates a more specific interpretation of Article 346 that opens sufficient opportunities for European solutions and optimal European supply chains, fostering security of supply, available specialties in Member States, and value for money.

5.10

National security of information causes similar problems as those mentioned in point 5.9 and has to be reviewed as well. It is also an important and sensitive issue in the involvement of European industries in defence projects in the US.

5.11

"Sharing and pooling", including common training programmes, should be a forward-looking programme. A basic condition is that lip service is replaced by concrete planning and a targeted approach with clearly identified steps. However, as long as there is no agreement on defence doctrines it will be very difficult to carry out "sharing and pooling" in a feasible way.

4.10.2012   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 299/24

—

including men in debate and communication;

—

removing gender stereotyping, particularly in education and career paths;

—

promoting academic studies which can lead to new business start-ups for women;

—

ensuring fair access to funding and resources on equal terms; and

—

improving social protection for self-employed.

—

The European Network of Mentors for Women Entrepreneurs, inaugurated during a Polish Presidency event on 15 November 2011. The Network is one of the actions proposed in the 2011 SBA Review, enforces and complements the actions to promote, support and encourage female entrepreneurship.

—

European network for policy makers to promote women's entrepreneurship (WES).

—

Women's entrepreneurship portal (6).

—

to eliminate unlawful discrimination and harassment on the grounds of sex;

—

to promote equality of opportunity between women and men.

5.1.3.1

Create an office of Women's Business Ownership within the European Commission and Member States’ competent ministries. It should preferably not be situated in the gender ministries to provide a clear distinction between economic enterprise activities and gender equality responsibilities. It must have a serious mandate with targets and resources. DG Enterprise currently has 1 out of 900 staff solely dedicated to female entrepreneurship in Europe!

5.1.3.2

Appoint a Women’s Enterprise Director/Envoy, or High Level Representative within the European Commission and Member States’ enterprise ministries, but with a cross-departmental role for raising awareness about the economic benefits of encouraging more women to start and grow businesses. These offices should be time bound (4-10 years depending on economy and funding structure) and should have a very clear remit with specific objectives and accountability. The Women’s Enterprise Director/Envoy or High Level Representative could also have responsibility for promoting the industry and academic tracks which lead to increased female entrepreneurship such as research, science, high-tech, direct selling and online/IT development.

5.1.3.3

Collect essential data that allows for the measurement and quantification of the allocation of resources for female entrepreneurs - a key reason why women face discrimination in business, especially in the start-up phases. Support the production of annual policy and research updates on women’s enterprise across European regions. Increase the collection of and access to gender-disaggregated data across government departments and agencies. It is essential that DG Enterprise and Economic Development Ministries across Member States conduct a Gender Impact Assessment by collecting relevant data which includes the number of female entrepreneurs, the number of women-owned businesses, the number of employees in these businesses, the allocation of resources to these businesses and entrepreneurs. It is important to recognise that countries such as Australia, Canada and the US have successfully increased levels of female entrepreneurship through the collection and analysis of such data.

5.1.3.4

Enforce current legislation in areas of gender equality. Recent figures show female unemployment at its highest level in 23 years across Europe. There is also a record level of young people, including many female graduates, who are not economically active. The gender pay gap exists and there is a lack of female representation in the decision-making process across Europe. It is essential that the EU and Member States fulfil their obligation of gender duty in disaggregating information by gender, particularly in data collection and in the allocation of resources.

5.2.1.1

That as all activities relating to the promotion of female entrepreneurship and women owned businesses are of societal and economic benefit to all, men must be encouraged to be part of this debate and recognise the added value of promoting women's activity as entrepreneurs. The relevant communications, networks and training should include both genders and social protection should also ensure that equal treatment is given to all in society.

5.2.1.2

To ensure the accessibility of entrepreneurship to all by making sure that education at all levels removes gender stereotyping of entrepreneurs and by managing the language and terms used to describe entrepreneurs. At the same time, to ensure that support currently offered to entrepreneurs by universities and further education is attractive and useful to young women, closing the gap between the numbers of young men and young women starting businesses.

5.2.1.3

To promote traditional and non-traditional career paths for women of all ages in a gender neutral manner. Europe has many highly qualified women with degrees, many currently unemployed as a result of the crisis, who may not have considered owning their own business as an option.

5.2.1.4

To create dedicated women’s business centres offering essential business information, networks, knowledge sharing, training and mentoring. These are absent in some EU countries and often under-resourced within business associations and chambers of commerce across the EU. However, these centres where dedicated resources are applied can be highly effective in promoting female entrepreneurship. Many examples of best practice can be found in Germany.

5.2.1.5

To ensure support and access to information, funds and resources in research, science and technology for women who may wish to start their own company or develop their research or innovations.

5.2.1.6

That financial institutions review the disclosure of information on lending in relation to gender. There is research that shows that lending to women is low and often at much higher interest rates than for men (15).

5.2.1.7

To review of social security provision for all entrepreneurs but particularly the practical aspects of provision for female entrepreneurs during pregnancy and as mothers and carers. The Commission Action Plan: The European Agenda for Entrepreneurship (16) draws attention to the need for better social security schemes, but does not go far enough in delivering relevant proposals.

5.2.1.8

To develop and implement an EU-wide public broadcasting compact, to encourage public broadcasters from Member States to commit to setting targets on gender balanced media coverage in relation to entrepreneurship – Taking women off the "female pages" and putting them on the business pages! Research indicates that media coverage can significantly and positively influence perceptions and attitudes towards female entrepreneurs. Increased media coverage of successful female entrepreneurs as role models would have a measurable impact on societal attitudes towards female entrepreneurship.

4.10.2012   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 299/29

1.1

The potential of women working and/or with a business in agricultural and rural areas should be analysed, recorded and promoted in all EU policies, and not penalised by some of them: this will lay the groundwork for women to become drivers of development and innovation, helping the entire sector to emerge from the crisis.

1.2

All EU legislation and programmes should ensure equal treatment, equal opportunities and measures to promote conditions for women through effective gender mainstreaming, simplifying procedures for accessing funds and periodically monitoring results.

1.3

Women should be involved in plans for the sector's development at local and regional level; they therefore need to be equipped with the skills to participate and to put across their needs, experiences and plans (capacity building).

1.4

Universities and research centres should collaborate with the women concerned in order to analyse potential and needs, provide training and technology to support the development of businesses run by women, and enhance women's work and life in the agricultural sector.

1.5

ICT (1) are essential for developing and improving women's agricultural activities, provided that they are effective, accessible and cheap (broadband) and have a good level of regional coverage. This can also create work for ICT technicians.

1.6

The establishment of women's networks (underpinned by good ICT) develops contacts, promotes participation and fosters personal relationships and the exchange of good practice between women in the EU and women in candidate and third countries, thus also furthering international cooperation and trade.

1.7

Training should target the needs and potential of the women concerned; the women themselves can be responsible for disseminating information using innovative methods (discussion and self-teaching groups, newspaper columns, training sessions in educational establishments, etc.).

1.8

To enable women to get organised and participate, thereby developing their potential, efficient, accessible and flexible services are needed which will free up their time from care duties. This applies to healthcare, transport, credit, distribution, marketing and care of the elderly and children, as well as social security to provide safeguards for women who do not have any. Here again, jobs will be created in the services concerned.

1.9

All Member States should promote legal recognition of assisting spouses so that they are covered for social security and healthcare. A legislative framework for joint rights of access should be established at EU level, possibly by means of a statute for women in agricultural and rural areas.

1.10

Women can help to make farming and their environment more sustainable if they are equipped with the necessary knowledge and technology (green technology, efficient management and use of resources, generation of clean energy). In order to kick-start this type of innovative and sustainable business, a fast-track scheme should be set up, granting streamlined access to resources (especially under the second pillar of the CAP).

1.11

Women can reinvigorate the crafts sector and traditional, high-quality, organic products, partly through closer collaboration between women producers and consumers, which needs to be studied and developed (as in the case of short supply chains).

1.12

The reform of the CAP and rural development policies must pull together to promote women's work and businesses, particularly by means of theme-based programmes for women (second pillar).

1.13

Member States, regional and local authorities and the social partners have a shared responsibility to promote the potential of women living in agricultural and rural areas by ensuring that laws are respected and implementing an appropriate legal framework that guarantees the principle of gender equality and representation, including within their own institutions. Positive examples in some Member States should serve as an incentive to ensuring that women – as also called for by the European Parliament – are appropriately represented in all political, economic and social bodies in the agricultural sector and rural areas.

2.1

Women's potential in agriculture and rural areas is underrated; the 2010 CAP report (2) refers to women only through Eurostat statistics, while the 2010 report on rural development refers in passing to the gap in labour market participation (76 % men, 62 % women (3). Even the interesting Council Decision of 20 February 2006 on Community strategic guidelines for rural development  (4) refers to women only in relation to the need to facilitate their access to employment.

2.2

On the other hand, the European Parliament, with its 2011 resolution on The role of women in agriculture and rural areas  (5) gives an accurate list of the main issues facing women and proposes a number of strategic avenues to support them in their social and economic lives. The Committee endorses the EP's analysis and agrees with its conclusions, and would also draw attention to a series of opinions of its own (6).

2.3

The Committee welcomes the Commission's proposal for a regulation setting out common provisions for the Structural Funds and the accompanying Commission staff working documents (7), as well as the Communication on the European partnership on innovation in agriculture (8). These documents include interesting points which give reason to hope that the institutions will pay closer attention to gender issues. The Committee hopes that they will be followed by appropriate Council decisions.

2.4

The EESC pays tribute to the activities of rural women's organisations and similar networks in a number of Member States, which may be independent or integrated into farmers' associations. There are also some rural youth organisations that work very actively to promote gender equality. As a result, many women gain qualifications and are motivated to engage in other entrepreneurial, social, professional and political activities. They also have a large stake in the progress that has been achieved so far, such as in social security for farmer families. In some farmers' associations, which have traditionally been dominated by men, today women play a very influential role (9). Cases like this should serve as an example in all Member States.

2.5

In parallel with the abovementioned texts, the present opinion aims to identify criteria and measures which can help women to unlock their potential as workers and entrepreneurs and drive innovation for sustainable development and good quality jobs. A clearer identification of the potential and needs of women in the workforce and in agricultural and rural entrepreneurship could raise and upgrade production, help to develop a strategic perspective, nurture diversification and make the CAP more consistent with rural development and territorial cohesion policies.

3.1

The successive CAP reforms have blurred the concepts of farming economies, rural economies and land management/development. This has created a larger field of study (10) in which to analyse the problems faced by women; it has also increased the need for accurate, disaggregated and qualitative data, building on the work already done by Eurostat. The EP's 2011 resolution states that there are 26,7 million people working regularly in agriculture, 42 % of whom (11,2 million) are women, including all agricultural and rural activities in which people are employed in any capacity (although this form of employment is often neither their sole nor their main job). Eurostat, meanwhile, measures agricultural employment on the basis of Annual Work Units (AWU), which brings the total number of men and women working in any capacity in the sector down to 11,1 million in 2010 (for agricultural, forestry, hunting and fishing activities); the total number of women employed would thus be around 4,7 million (11).

3.2

This reference to statistical methods shows that the problem is important not because of the numbers involved, but because of the strategic nature of the agricultural and rural sector as it interacts with urban and peri-urban environments and their sustainable environmental and social development. The opinion will therefore consider the situation of women in agriculture and rural areas in the light of two aspects: the high level of production standards in European farming, and women's potential which can be tapped using limited, but effectively targeted resources. It will also be borne in mind that we are still in the grip of an acute crisis which is hurting – but also creating opportunities for – women living and working in agricultural and rural areas.

4.1

Recent data on the agricultural and rural situation show that, after a drop in production and employment triggered by the slow-down in consumption and exports, the sector is growing again, with a consequent increase in revenue. The internal market in particular has displayed a certain preference for quality and sustainability: for example, local produce ("zero food miles" or short supply chain (12) and/or organic produce is increasingly popular among consumers.

4.2

As regards employment, between 2007 and 2008 around 900 000 jobs were lost in the agricultural sector, while between 2008 and 2009, the net loss was 200 000 AWU (13). The downward trend in employment could thus settle at a level which reflects a natural drop in the number of workers owing to farm rationalisation, with fewer unskilled workers and more highly skilled workers.

4.3

Despite these reasons for optimism, the crisis is certainly not over nor have conditions for women improved. The female workforce, which already labours under serious disadvantages in both full-time (26 % of women against 52 % of men) and part-time employment (9,7 % of men against 11,8 % of women) (14), is still employed informally in the bulk of agricultural production. Furthermore, in addition to these data, seasonal work (which accounts for a huge proportion of workers, with fewer permanent employees) and informal and illegal work are still a widespread and invisible or problematic and unquantified issue, which should be tackled by encouraging a switch from undeclared work to legal forms of employment and, as far as possible, by stabilising women's work.

4.3.1

The position of immigrant women (from inside and outside the EU) is very worrying; they are often denied the most basic rights, beginning with being paid late or with unjustified and unjustifiable reductions. This situation has deteriorated since the beginning of the crisis and cannot be justified by the difficulties encountered by small farms and processing businesses in accessing credit. There have thus been many cases of female workers who have had to return to their home country without being paid, or who have found themselves at the mercy of exploiters, criminals and labour traffickers who unfortunately cannot yet be prosecuted in some EU countries.

4.3.2

As farms are scattered across a wide area and many of them are small, it can be difficult to check on employment conditions. However, careful management by local administrations, together with the social partners and civil society organisations, can be a springboard for combating anomalies and crime, guaranteeing rights and secure conditions for all.

5.1

The quality side of agricultural production is an important aspect of women's work, whether they are producers, assisting spouses, consumers or passers-on of authentic traditions, practices and creativity. In order to build on this situation, choices need to be made at local level.

5.2

The development and application of advanced production techniques, research, vocational guidance and training must involve research centres and universities interacting with agricultural and rural areas; this means including the needs of women and an analysis of their potential in their studies.

5.3

It is often thought that any problem involving improving quality and boosting competitiveness can be solved by means of some form of training. This may simply lead to more training programmes, rather than good-quality, targeted programmes, which often fail to respond suitably either to the specific needs of the economy and the stakeholders concerned or to jointly agreed sustainable development strategies. If it is to grow, the agricultural and rural sector needs properly equipped female workers and entrepreneurs, but training alone will not immediately upgrade work, business and life if the requisite structures and services are not in place and if sustainable, high-quality jobs are not created.

6.1

Any form of training, provision of services or rationalisation must be rooted in an analysis of the conditions and resources of the women who live and work in agricultural and rural areas. This will entail careful analysis of the region and the potential and expectations of the people living there, which will require the active participation of the women concerned. Participation is a process in which national, local and regional authorities and socio-occupational organisations all take their share of responsibility. The overall potential of a region can be increased by unlocking the potential of the women living there. Targeted and effective programmes to develop innovation, entrepreneurship and employment among women can create jobs (especially for young people), curbing and sometimes even reversing the rural exodus.

6.1.1

Universities and the region itself need to collaborate in analysing this potential: research centres should be involved in planning and assessing development plans. This means that effective links, using advanced and accessible ICT, need to be guaranteed between universities and the women involved, in order to conduct and test detailed research at grassroots level (15).

6.1.2

Regional development plans should include specific training schemes for female workers, assisting spouses and female entrepreneurs, building on their ability to adapt, innovate, and pass on knowledge and good practices. Women who have undergone training should be encouraged to pass the knowledge gained on to other women through formal mechanisms (cooperatives, bodies involved in local-authority decisions, rural development action groups, etc.) and informal mechanisms (discussion and self-tuition groups, training sessions in educational establishments, radio and TV programmes, newspaper columns, social enterprises, etc). Incentives here will involve freeing up women's time by providing assistance and good local services (paid leave, childcare facilities, efficient and free transport (16), supplying stand-ins for any care duties, farm crèches, etc.), as well as financial incentives.

6.2

Efficient, high-speed (broadband) and cheap internet coverage is a prerequisite, given that in some Member States less than 60 % of households have an internet connection. More widespread use of ICT can also help with home study and communication between geographically distant areas and encourages communication with women in agricultural and rural sectors in other countries, fostering interest in studying languages and experience-swapping.

6.2.1

ICT also provide the means to establish networks of women entrepreneurs, assisting spouses and women workers who, spurred by the presence of migrants from outside the EU, also communicate and collaborate with women from candidate and third countries. This can result in a fruitful exchange of experience, improved development cooperation and greater trade integration, as well as helping solve the global food challenge.

6.3

Women's health in agricultural and rural areas is a priority. Effective healthcare services (including medical advice and diagnosis given remotely) and high-quality medical equipment must monitor health and safety and occupational diseases in the workplace; this can also create jobs for specialised staff. These services (particularly reproductive healthcare and gynaecological check-ups) should be provided free of charge; at any rate, the fees should always be in line with the woman's income and family situation. A key aspect is the presence of many older women: life expectancy in some of the more rural countries is much longer for women than for men, and so women predominate in the over-60s category (17). Medical, assistance and support services are essential for this category of women, partly so that younger women do not have to take on additional family burdens.

6.4

Assisting spouses in the agriculture sector continue to be treated very differently from one country to the next. They are not formally recognised as workers (despite the fact that they work very hard in this sector) and in some Member States still have no access to any form of healthcare or pension provision (except for universal coverage where provided by social security). Mechanisms need to be set up to ensure coverage for these women, for example through specific pension funds promoted by the social partners or the local and regional authorities. Rules for joint rights of access should be established, possibly by means of a European statute for women in agricultural and rural areas.

6.5

Women are key players in the rational use of energy and waste disposal as they manage the family economy. Sorting waste for recycling and proper facilities for composting and processing (biomass) can go hand in hand with energy saving targets and virtuous cycles of agricultural and organic production which is self-sufficient in terms of energy. Access to new green production technologies and the efficient use of resources should be facilitated, with specific incentives offered to farms and businesses run by women.

6.6

In many countries, groups of women have launched worthwhile initiatives in agri-tourism, particularly involving cooperatives, and have managed them very successfully. In view of the growing interest in this type of tourism, a network of businesses in this sector should be formed and best practice shared.

6.7

In order to contribute to sustainable development and the activities undertaken by women (often on small plots), the distribution sector needs to perform well and be efficient and flexible: local distribution cooperatives with low overheads could foster the sale of more affordable, high-quality local products. One-off events promoting these products have also proven useful.

6.8

It is important to promote local crafts which are being lost. Targeted information and marketing campaigns can help maintain or create businesses and jobs, stemming the rural exodus and the drop in quality brought about by large-scale imports. Effective interaction between suitable services, technologies and transport is therefore imperative in order to link up rural and agricultural areas with urban markets (18).

6.9

Access to credit for setting up agricultural and crafts businesses and cooperatives needs to be improved, giving more responsibilities to traditional-style banks (especially agricultural credit unions and local savings banks) and promoting microcredit programmes aimed primarily at women.

7.1

Pending the adoption of the proposed regulation setting out common provisions for the Structural Funds (19), it should be pointed out that the EAFRD Regulation stresses the need to use the fund's resources to promote equality between men and women and includes provisions for informing and involving bodies which pursue this goal (20). The new common regulation could be reinforced with the introduction of a fast-track scheme for women engaged in setting up innovative and sustainable agricultural, rural or crafts businesses. This would give civil society organisations involved in the partnership referred to in Article 6 of the regulation greater weight and increase their power of initiative.

7.2

With regard to the proposed common regulation on the Funds, which has already been considered in an EESC opinion (21), the Committee reiterates that it is very concerned about the potential impact of macroeconomic conditionalities (Article 21) on projects involving initiatives geared towards women. The Committee calls for the inclusion of specific provisions to avoid harming, directly or indirectly, the most vulnerable members of society, including women.

7.3

In addition to the abovementioned proposals, the Committee calls on the Commission to react more quickly to the changing conditions and requirements experienced by women, and above all to ensure that programmes promoting the role of women in agricultural and rural areas are not overly rigid in terms of content and approach.

7.4

Stronger and improved participation by women in agricultural and rural development should be mainstreamed in European programmes for research and development, training (European Social Fund, etc.) and labour mobility, and of course in the implementation of economic, social and territorial cohesion policy.

7.5

The provisions, programmes and projects implementing the second pillar should be monitored periodically as part of the CAP monitoring procedures to ensure that they are effective in pursuing equal opportunities and in the appropriate use of resources.

7.6

Rural development policies should include theme-based sub-programmes for women, and experience with the Leader initiative should be built on and circulated.

7.7

In order to develop programmes which make tapping women's potential a priority, the region (in the physical, administrative and sociological meaning of the term) must be the number one player in an interactive process. The social partners and civil society organisations must take a share of direct responsibility for making and enacting choices. In order to do this they also need to demonstrate that they are capable of representing women's needs practically and effectively and of integrating women into organisations at every level, with due focus on capacity building for women.

7.7.1

The Committee calls on all the organisations represented within it to focus keenly on women who work and live in agricultural and rural areas, passing on their needs and aspirations and systematically including them in the various horizontal and vertical partnership bodies.

4.10.2012   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 299/34

1.1

Aware of the shared interest in closer relations between the European Union and the Republic of Moldova, the EESC has, in the present opinion, and following its mission in March 2012, opted to propose the following recommendations with the aim of:

1.2

In its recommendations to the Commission and to the European Parliament, the Committee firstly recommends that a balanced free trade agreement be reached, ensuring that civil society organisations are involved at every stage in the process. In order to bring about a DCFTA, the work of the Commission should be coordinated with that of the EEAS. The Committee advocates:

1.3

In its recommendations to the Moldovan public authorities, the Committee urges the government and parliament to:

1.4

In its recommendations to Moldovan civil society organisations, the Committee wishes to build up its relations with Moldovan civil society within the framework of the Eastern Partnership. It submits the following proposals to Moldovan civil society and would be willing to present them at a conference in Moldova in order to flesh out the Partnership's Contact between People platform. In addition to setting up a MESEC, the EESC recommends that the social partners and civil society partners:

2.1

Moldovan civil society is already engaging with the policy of approximation with the EU through a number of mechanisms. A 30-member consultative body, the CNP, was set up in January 2011 and works with the government, while there is also a body for consultation with parliament. The national convention for European integration, founded in November 2010, brings together a number of organisations with the aim of issuing proposals and disseminating information on the European integration process, so that a direct and open debate can be held with stakeholders. Moreover, several thematic platforms bringing together civil society organisations have emerged nationally.

2.2

Moldovan organisations are involved in various Eastern Partnership civil society forum groups: democracy, human rights, good governance and stability; general recommendations; environment, energy and climate change; contact between people. The EESC wishes to encourage the development of the fifth working group on social dialogue, also covering broader economic and social matters (3).

2.3

The social partners have an essential part to play in bringing the EU and Moldova closer. The independence of trade unions, recognised in the constitution, is enshrined in the law of July 2000 guaranteeing the freedom to establish trade unions, the right to engage in collective bargaining and the protection of trade union assets. The trade union scene has changed significantly in recent years: the two existing trade unions, the CSRM and Solidaritate, have merged to form a single body, the National Confederation of Trade Unions of Moldova (CNSM). Having joined the International Trade Union Confederation, the CNSM is beginning to take part in international activities and meetings. It could also request observer status at the European Trade Union Confederation.

2.3.1

The most representative employers' body is the 32-member National Confederation of Employers of the Republic of Moldova, founded in 1996, which defines itself as non-political and independent. The national employment agency manages the Mobility Partnership between the EU and Moldova, to ensure the smooth integration of Moldova's labour market. The employers' organisations play their part in integration by implementing the project's decisions at local and regional level.

2.3.2

It would therefore be helpful to strengthen the social partners' information units on the DCFTA, working in cooperation with their European or Member State professional counterparts.

2.4

Certain categories of the population, especially in the countryside, remain in a vulnerable situation. Women are particularly hard hit by the worsening social situation: high unemployment, loss of skills, lower wages, seasonal work and scanty social benefits. Women have similar rights to men, but are more vulnerable on the labour market. Moreover, women account for only 14 % of entrepreneurs in Moldova. The rural population is still overrepresented among people living below the poverty line (4) and the proportion of rural poor rose in 2009. Children in Moldova are exposed to a range of ills: homelessness, child labour, trafficking and prostitution and their situation remains a cause for concern. The "social orphans" phenomenon, with children given away to orphanages by their families as a result of poverty, remains widespread.

2.5

The way the media operate has been improving for several years. The audiovisual coordinating council adopted a new method for supervising the media coverage of politics in late October 2010, with the aid of the European Union and the Council of Europe. Two new television channels also came on air in 2010 (Jurnal TV and Publika TV) together with four new radio stations (Radio Sport, Aquarelle FM, Publika FM and Prime FM). Training in European affairs for journalists should be a priority. Progress with regard to freedom of expression will enable the public and business circles to be better informed of the challenges of approximation, especially for farmers.

2.6

Despite undeniable progress, civil society still experiences serious organisational difficulties. Territorial inequalities persist: the non-governmental sector is active in the main urban centres – Chisinau, Balti, Cahul and Ungheni – but is largely inactive across large swathes of the country. The trade unions, in contrast, have a better spread across the country. As a result of the continuing secession, cooperation remains limited between the two sides of the Dniester. In addition, NGOs are largely dependent on external donors, potentially undermining their independence and sustainability. Lastly, expertise networks – even if of high quality – are based on a pool of experts that is too small, as the list of major NGOs in the countries has scarcely grown in recent years.

3.1

The preparations for a DCFTA between the EU and Moldova touch upon goods, services and investment, but its deep and comprehensive character entails transposing and effectively applying the Community acquis in the area of trade. This necessitates appropriate support and major reforms. The Moldovan economy lacks competitiveness owing to a number of factors: a poor transport infrastructure (particularly roads), the small scale of the internal market, an uninnovative climate, the chronic instability of policies, difficulty in accessing finance, and corruption. Exports are no longer geared exclusively to the post-Soviet markets. The shift in external trade towards Europe is a reality: nearly half of the country's exports go in this direction. This stems from the growing share of exports from the textiles sector (from 10 % in 1999 to 22,7 % in 2008) (5), owing to the low cost of skilled labour.

3.2

A sustainability impact assessment that started at the same time as the negotiations and is currently under way should provide information by September 2012 on the positive and negative effects of opening up trade (6). Under the consultant's terms of reference (7), the EESC will have to be consulted on the issues involved in these negotiations, and on the contributions to public consultation. It will also pay particular attention to the position paper to be drawn up by the Commission following the impact assessment, and will scrutinise the flanking measures carefully.

3.3

The agreement-related risks for the EU are clearly defined: they essentially concern health and plant health rules and investment guarantees. The improvement in the business climate needed in order to attract European investment hinges on stepping up anti-corruption measures. The 2011 corruption perceptions index put Moldova 112th in its world ranking with a score of 2.9 out of 10 (8). The bodies tackling this problem are the Centre for Combating Economic Crime and Corruption and the public prosecutor's special anti-corruption unit. Appropriate legislation is in place, but anti-corruption policy is not being properly implemented. The finger can be pointed at a lack of political will, a rather fatalistic attitude among the general public and civil society's insufficient involvement in these issues. Fighting corruption is among the main priorities of international donors (Council of Europe, EU, SIDA, World Bank, UNDP, USAID, etc.). Several NGO groupings have also addressed this issue (Centre for the Analysis and Prevention of Corruption, Transparency International Moldova, Anti-Corruption Alliance, and the Centre for Investigative Journalism). The change of political parties in government has not yet yielded tangible results in this field.

3.4

The DCFTA will have widespread repercussions in the social sphere. In this connection, the EESC emphasises the importance of social dialogue for the country's development. It recommends the adoption of the protocol providing a system of collective complaints under the Council of Europe's Social Charter, an upgrading of the works inspectorate and the introduction of labour courts. The Moldovan authorities are cooperating with the ILO on the issue of undeclared work with a view to attaining European standards, and are taking part in the 2012 European Year of Active Ageing and Solidarity between Generations. Furthermore, the reception of migrants returning to Moldova should be improved, and the rights of Moldovans in other countries enhanced. Labour force training and retraining are among areas that should be given priority.

3.5

The agricultural and agri-food sector is key in Moldova when it comes to negotiating the agreement. Moldovan farming needs to make progress in terms of certification of origin, verification of compliance with health and plant health rules, and compliance with the rules of competition if it wishes to export to the European markets and ensure that its food is safe. Standards have now been adopted, but real implementation is a lengthy and costly process, especially for animal products (in 2008, the only animal product that could be exported by Moldova was honey). Alignment with European standards generates high costs for small producers: the authorities must conduct a policy of institutional reform and support for the agri-food and wine sector. Projects financed by the European Commission's "Aid for Trade" mechanism would be valuable in raising standards.

3.6

Industry, long in decline, seems to be in a position to exploit its competitive price edge in proximity to the European markets, as evidenced by the rapid progress of the textiles sector. This light industry can set up anywhere in the country, especially in the disadvantaged regions of the south. The car industry has recently made inroads into the north of the country, thanks to German investors. Moldova's participation in the Danube region strategy and the modernisation of major industrial plants (especially those situated along the right bank of the Dniester) would be assets for development.

3.7

In order to qualify as a deep and comprehensive agreement, a free trade agreement of this kind with the EU must be built on Moldova's ability to conform with the Community acquis. This requirement will imply sufficient financial support. Experience with additions to the internal market has clearly pointed to the decisive role of the structural funds in ensuring social and territorial cohesion. The Committee therefore recommends that flanking measures of equivalent value be brought together in order to reduce the risk of widening social inequalities or regional disparities. To this end, the agreement monitoring committee will focus in particular on the implementation of ENPARD, the programme for agriculture and rural development.

3.8

Moldova's ecological situation gives grounds for real concern regarding the future (soil, water, energy), that must be taken into account in the negotiations on the agreement. The Soviet legacy is particularly problematic here, especially regarding the management of toxic residues. The prevailing droughts over recent years show that the Moldovan economy is vulnerable to environmental and climate deterioration. Worse, more than half of the country's water tables are polluted, and these resources meet two thirds of the population's drinking water needs. Environmental policy is affected by the poverty of the resources allocated to it, despite international commitments, such as those of the EIB. There is also a pressing need to alert all economic actors, who remain largely unaware of transport and construction issues. Moldova, which has joined the European Energy Community, is also highly dependent on imported fossil fuels, and energy efficiency remains low. The EESC advocates supporting environmental organisations that are working to promote energy savings or the rational use of resources and waste management.

3.9

The impact assessment should look in particular at the situation in Transnistria in order to assess, in the light of the DCFTA, the possible effects on border security and the economic and social impacts. The agreement could contribute to smoothing out internal disputes and ensuring territorial integrity.

4.1

In order to foster civil society progress towards greater dialogue and consultation, the EESC recommends that a MESEC be set up, following the example of other countries of the region. A study of the various experiences in Europe would allow Moldova to map out its own path.

4.2

The MESEC project comes in response to the need to give civil society a clear structure and will boost its influence and relevance. The current proliferation of ad-hoc structures offers a flexible, experimental framework, but their duration is uncertain and their functioning fragile. The fact that the social partners and associations or NGOs occupy adjacent positions means that the latter are less visible in public debate.

4.3

A MESEC would make a valuable contribution to seeking consensus on the choices facing society, by allowing different interests to be reflected in the development model. A way of working together, based on consultation, must be built up around the three pillars of sustainable development. This would also represent a significant step towards a viable strategy for reintegrating Transnistria.

4.4

A MESEC would guarantee the independent nature of analyses by keeping them apart from partisan quarrels and separate from the origins of resources, while enabling different points of view to be expressed. Questions on how to combat discrimination on the grounds of gender, origin or religion should also be addressed by such a council.

4.5

A Moldovan ESEC would meet the need for evaluation of public policies as the Community acquis is brought on board. The institution could host the committee monitoring the trade agreement in conjunction with the European Economic and Social Committee.

4.10.2012   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 299/39

4.10.2012   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 299/45

3.2.1

An inversion of the "production pyramid", taking a cross-border cooperative approach, with a critical mass that ensures the necessary scale and scope. Based on individual or family producers, it is necessary to foster the activities of associations and cooperatives on the ground (which stimulate the rural economy), creating larger structures (regional networks and competitive clusters) which bring farmers closer to the portions of distribution channels with the greatest added value. This cooperative structure will make it possible to maximise yields and meet the diversity of demand, shortening distribution channels between production and consumption hubs (8). Furthermore, cooperative integration (9) ensures greater traceability throughout the process, in terms of both quality and price formation, which in turn means optimised resources and greater efficiency.

3.2.2

Cooperative social return. Profits earned within the cooperative network in turn benefit the participating cooperatives, enhancing their capacity to increase their market power, providing greater employability, wider access to basic resources and more favourable conditions for producers and consumers, fostering synergies in the new commercial relations environment.

3.2.3

Concentration of demand  (10). Cooperatives, together with the promotion of consumer networks which focus consumer demand, are intended to help those consumers to access products under better pricing and quality conditions. Direct contact with producers can be achieved by means of local markets and by optimising online trading. This approach is in line with the objectives laid out by the European Union's main organisations of farmers and agri-cooperatives: "The objective is to promote/support farmers' initiatives selling directly their products to the end-consumer (e.g. direct sales at the farm-gate, through agricultural cooperatives, at local markets, through collective platforms or businesses under the control of the producer)." (11).

3.2.4

Circular market model  (12) based on shorter distribution channels. In order to counter the excessive weight of operators who add no value to the agri-food marketing chain, distribution channels must be fostered that bring production units and consumption (i.e. primary producers and end-consumers) as close as possible together (13). This helps to create "market loops" which make it possible to adjust, in terms of means and costs, the available productive resources to the needs of the population, preventing surpluses or deficits, which may furthermore cause artificial price fluctuations. All of this will enable the food supply chain to operate in a fairer, more transparent and more balanced manner, helping to eradicate those abusive and unfair practices that jeopardise legitimate competition.

3.2.5

New technologies  (14). Technological innovation provides the cornerstone for the growth of a more cooperative market, in terms of both the innovative development of agri-food production techniques and the logistical structure required to optimise the efficiency of communication processes when implementing smart production, distribution and consumption networks (organisations with a high capacity for self-organisation and the ability to develop flexibly, and with the capacity to learn how to act in order to achieve their objectives). Their virality, interoperability and interconnectivity within a digitalised environment will make it possible to cut out unnecessary middlemen. New technologies must therefore be the tools in a process to increase collective efficiency, given their capacity to produce change and introduce innovation into food chains.

3.3.1

The adoption of measures in the context of EU policies. Reform of the legal framework and an appropriate policy of incentives are needed in order to promote measures to support the establishment of cooperatives by means of development agencies, financial credit etc., as well as cooperative integration and internationalisation measures, social innovation and cohesion measures, and measures to strengthen partnerships between public institutions and SMEs, cooperatives, consumer associations or other groups.

3.3.2

Cooperative public procurement  (15). The progress made over recent years in the context of green public procurement and, more recently, in the adoption of ethical criteria in administrations' public procurement procedures have had a significant impact on the social and economic progress of sustainability and cooperation actions. The capacity of public procurement to serve as an example and the high volume of purchasing it entails undoubtedly make it a crucial instrument for promoting the intended objectives. Stimulating market flows between public administrations and cooperative networks can be a decisive factor in a new model of sustainable production and consumption.

3.3.3

Quality labels  (16). Quality labels are indirect tools for promoting marketed products, certifying their origin, characteristics and attributes, and in this case the added value of the social aspect of cooperative production ("cooperative label"). This brand image enhances the reputation of products and enables agricultural associations to move from being production-focused to market-focused.

3.3.4

Transparency and information for consumers  (17). Transparency, particularly with regard to quality and traceability, is a balancing factor in the value chain, in tandem with campaigns to make the public more aware of the purchasing decisions they make within a cooperative market. It leads to greater symmetry of information and coordinated action between production and consumption (necessary for the efficiency of a sustainability-based model), and links supply and demand, both temporally and geographically in the integration of the respective marketing processes. Consumer groups should also be prioritised, and channels leading to the concentration of final agri-food demand should be identified.

3.3.5

Education and training in social entrepreneurship and the cooperative movement  (18). Although this is clearly a proactive instrument whose effect is only seen later, it is nevertheless vital in order to consolidate the changes taking place in the market. Learning and absorbing cooperative principles at school does not just foster a favourable attitude towards the cooperative system and towards cooperation as a source of confidence at an early stage in people's lives; it can also extend to the pupils' parents, encouraging them to adopt consumption patterns which are in harmony with the actions proposed. In this regard, fostering entrepreneurship amongst young people is particularly crucial, incentivising and stimulating the creation and consolidation of cooperatives, be it at the production, marketing or consumption stage. Knowledge, exchange and dissemination of good cooperative practices will undoubtedly contribute to all of this.

3.3.6

Differential tax treatment  (19). Fairer taxation must gear consumption towards the efficient use of resources (20), taking more account of the content of each product in socio-environmental terms and the added social value of the cooperative approach. On the basis of a specific fiscal framework, tax incentives and compensatory aid are amongst the most direct and potentially effective instruments. As experience in various Member States has shown, the adoption of differential tax treatment promotes financial independence and autonomy but, like some of the initiatives proposed above, requires a prior impact assessment.

3.3.7

Use of technology. Technological progress and universal access to that technology are the best way to promote achievement of the objectives. In this regard, the following initiatives should be stressed: research and innovation in agri-food production, the creation of new marketing areas and distribution channels and, finally, high-quality certification, by awarding points for nutritional value, supply guarantees and other public benefits, and subtracting points for negative social, environmental and other external factors, so that criteria such as food safety and health, ecological and social footprints are taken into account and appreciated by consumers when it comes to prices and the corresponding production and distribution costs. This certification system would have to be implemented in conjunction with other elements such as smart telephony, specific IT applications and social networks.

3.4.1

Economic: stable and secure access to markets for farmers' products, sustainable financing, socially responsible investments, stimulation of the market, safeguarding of competition, protection of consumer rights and interests, etc.

3.4.2

Social: land planning, rural development and inclusion, cultural heritage and local and regional identity, food sovereignty and security, non-over-production and the accessibility of food, social traceability of products, the non-relocation of companies, the guarantee of decent wages and improving working conditions, social responsibility and responsible consumption, community health and healthy lifestyles, direct participation by citizens in the decisions made by the institutions representing them, etc.

3.4.3

Environmental: energy saving, conservation of ecosystems, ecological footprints, agroecology and permaculture, rational and responsible use of raw materials and natural resources, the life cycle of agri-food products, the creation of green jobs as a way of expanding the market, etc.

4.10.2012   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 299/49

—

advocates the need for a standardised EU legal framework for the entire aviation sector, which prevents uncontrolled subsidy practices and ensures a level-playing field for all market participants also at the local level,

—

agrees, that a general principle, that private investment cannot be considered as State aid. At the same time, a public operator can act as a private investor if the investment is commercially justifiable,

—

recommends, that state aid for investments in airport infrastructure and start-up aid for airlines should only be possible in strictly defined cases, and be limited according to the period of time and intensity,

—

endorses need for full disclosure of the aid available to airports and carriers and the conditions under which aid could have been paid,

—

calls upon further stimulation of the social dialog and avoidance of social dumping in the sector,

—

underlines importance of proper implementation of Guidelines; enforcement is of utmost value,

—

calls for a long-term policy as far as development or regional airports are concerned. Aviation guidelines can be enforced successfully only as far as clear policy priorities of regional airport development are agreed.

—

Need for simplification and increase of transparency of guidelines,

—

Support for more enforcement of State aid rules to airlines and airports,

—

New category of rules to avoid distortion of competition between airports located in the same catchment area,

—

More clarity and predictability for rules on investment aid (clear definitions of financial parameters).

—

There should be no distortion to competition,

—

Through further enabling of regional air transport, development and accessibility of regions are to be improved,

—

Duplication of unprofitable airports is to be avoided,

—

Creation and maintenance of overcapacity is to be avoided.

4.10.2012   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 299/54

1.1

The European Economic and Social Committee would first point out that companies constitute, by definition, the key players in strategies for adapting the units operating on markets, and are therefore at the heart of any restructuring process.

1.2

The Committee stresses the importance of the role the CCMI has played and continues to play in the area of industrial restructuring, as a prime forum for constructive dialogue and the development of ideas and recommendations for the Commission, the Council and the European Parliament.

1.3

The Committee reaffirms that restructuring generally entails complex processes. Anticipating change means preparing companies and employees for new challenges ahead, while minimising the social impact of the changes, maximising the chances of success, creating a climate of mutual trust and being sure to involve the social partners and organised civil society.

1.4

The EU's workers and companies are currently faced with:

1.5

The Committee thus welcomes this green paper, which has come at an opportune moment. However, it hopes that following this discussion process practical and effective action will be taken, involving an integrated approach at all levels of production, consumption and services. This will require interaction and information exchange across all levels of the production and distribution chain, coupled with the exchange of best practice in the field and a timeframe of specific deadlines for implementing the guidelines, standards and reference frameworks built on the wealth of EU rules and common, shared values.

1.6

The Committee considers it of fundamental importance, when it comes to anticipation and restructuring, to enhance the role of the social partners, organised civil society and consumers at EU, national, regional, local and company levels, with the involvement of local leaders and knowledge and skills networks.

1.7

In the Committee's view, social dialogue, negotiation and participation are not only fundamental values of the European social model, but are also tools that promote and give real support to social cohesion, quality employment, job creation and the drive to boost innovation and competitiveness across Europe's economies.

1.8

The Committee thinks that the EU's structural and cohesion policies as well as its innovation and research policies should be geared to proactive support in shaping the mechanisms for anticipating and accompanying restructuring into win-win systems for both workers and companies.

1.9

The Committee considers it essential that economic and social partners play a greater role in the Structural Fund monitoring bodies so as to ensure the success of European structural policy.

1.10

The Committee recommends that structural policy measures be closely interlinked and coordinated with those in support of research and innovation, and use investment and industrial policies to support the transition to a low-carbon European economy.

1.11

The Committee believes that EU education, training and lifelong learning programmes should be seen as key tools enabling public authorities and companies to proactively anticipate change, alongside the ongoing efforts of economic players – especially SMEs – and workers.

1.12

The Committee advocates closer coordination at EU level between Commission policies and services, agencies and the numerous observatories, so that companies that are restructuring receive clear, consistent support in their decision-making. In particular, suitable support and mentoring systems should be available to SMEs and micro businesses, which face obvious difficulties in planning ahead for restructuring.

1.13

The Committee reaffirms the need for State aid supporting employment in businesses affected by globalisation to be based on conditions that guarantee free and fair competition.

1.14

Finally, the Committee recommends bolstering EU policy supporting the development of participatory foresight exercises, both territorial and sectoral, with the aim of realising a shared, mutually acceptable vision, partly by making more of local factors, so as to generate more and better jobs within healthy and competitive businesses.

1.15

Taking account of demographic trends in Europe, the Committee attaches particular importance to an active policy on ageing and the "silver economy" and the need to adapt products and services to these new opportunities.

2.1

It will be some time yet before Europe's economy sees a recovery, before it emerges from the deepest recession in decades to hit Europe. The crisis is putting public finances and governments under severe pressure and is prompting company crises, rationalisation, restructuring and closures in the real economy with dramatic repercussions on unemployment rates.

2.2

This restructuring entails complex, multi-faceted processes, and changes to business strategies with regard to company organisation, form, size and activities.

2.2.1

Multiple economic and operational objectives should be identified relating to the situation on the global markets and in the sectors in which businesses operate, primarily at sectoral level.

2.3

In practice, this process should involve anticipating employment possibilities in emerging sectors with a particular focus on SMEs, which have been hardest hit by the current crisis, while also taking due account of consumer interests and behaviour.

2.4

Anticipating change means not only preparing companies and employees for the challenge of future developments, but also carrying out the necessary restructuring to tackle those challenges, while minimising the social impact of the changes, ensuring stability and reducing the cost. Environmental protection and sustainable development should also be factored in: the European technology platforms and the studies they conduct, can outline tangible prospects for both workers and companies.

2.5

Over the past two decades, we have witnessed an acceleration of the phenomena of market repositioning, relocation, reorganisation and/or closure of production units, as well as mergers, acquisitions, and/or outsourcing of activities. However, over the last four years, Europe has been faced with an increasingly pressing need to strengthen the anticipatory nature of these processes, given the pace of change and the urgent need for restructuring that has arisen from the deepening economic, financial and market crises. Phenomena such as booming Internet sales figures and cross-border sales are also having an influence on the markets in the different countries.

2.6

The economic and financial crisis has not only intensified restructuring processes at the various levels, but has also led to austerity measures and cuts in public expenditure, and consequently heavy job losses in the public sector, while also undermining the various safety nets for workers, local communities and companies in many countries.

2.7

The Commission's objective in terms of restructuring is to help strengthen and disseminate the culture of anticipation and innovation in terms of the way restructuring is carried out: the EU shares responsibility with the Member States "for achieving the objectives defined in Article 3 of the Treaty on European Union" (Article 145 TFEU).

2.8

Back in 2005, in its communication on restructuring and employment, the Commission recognised the problems connected with the social costs of restructuring, not only for workers themselves, who experience growing uncertainty regarding their working conditions, but also for the various sectors of the economy.

2.9

Though restructuring is primarily governed by rules at national and regional levels, the EU has significant responsibility in terms of managing, supervising and accelerating these processes. It is required to supervise the proper functioning of the EU regulatory framework as regards both information and consultation, and the protection of workers (1) and to play an active role here, a role that derives essentially from the Europe 2020 strategy and the obligations laid down in the Treaty.

2.10

If the EU wants to be successful in addressing the challenges posed by the financial and economic crisis, globalisation, climate change, demographic trends and growing inequalities arising from the social costs of austerity programmes, it needs to develop and step up proactive strategies for anticipating and managing restructuring, underpinned by a common set of values and practices consistent with the major socio-economic Treaty objectives.

2.11

Under the Europe 2020 integrated guidelines (adopted by the Council on 22/4/2010), the EU and the Member States should thus implement reforms aimed at "smart growth", driven by knowledge and innovation, with due regard to consumer needs and behaviour, and with a view to:

2.12

With regard to support for corporate and sectoral restructuring, it is vital that companies have early-warning systems(see European Restructuring Monitor ERM) in place as a pre-condition for effective planning of restructuring processes, agreed upon by all stakeholders. This is partly to ensure proper retraining for workers, but also to ensure that sectoral and inter-sectoral networks are developed, that can manage change in an integrated way, with the help of professional guidelines that ensure high levels of employability.

2.13

On 18 April 2012, in Strasbourg, the Commission presented its new employment package – on which the Committee is to issue an opinion – which calls on Member States to bolster their domestic employment policies, and paves the way for reinforced coordination and monitoring of employment policies.

3.1

The Commission has launched a public consultation on company restructuring and anticipating change, its aim being to "identify successful practices and policies in the field".

3.2

The green paper sets out a series of questions on the lessons that can be learned from the crisis, on possible economic and industrial adaptation, on the capacity of companies and workers to adapt, on the role of local and regional administrations, on the role of vocational training in human resource management and on dialogue between socio-economic players.

4.1

In the Committee's view, the green paper should be seen as following on from the 2005 communication on restructuring and employment, which set out to define the EU's role in anticipating and managing restructuring processes, in order to boost employment.

4.2

The Committee feels that the 2005 communication brought about positive developments at EU level in terms of promoting a European approach to anticipating and restructuring, including a number of high-level thematic conferences and expert-led seminars (restructuring fora), ESF initiatives, various comparative studies, toolboxes and guidelines, an obvious example being the Staff Working Document "Restructuring in Europe 2011".

4.3

The Committee notes with concern that the green paper does not set out proposals for action with specific, tight deadlines, in response to the seriousness of the ongoing crisis, but rather takes the approach of a series of open questions, without specifying by when or how the measures would be implemented. Conversely, more robust measures have emerged from other instruments such as the employment package launched in May 2012, on which the Committee is to issue an opinion.

4.4

While companies constitute, by definition, the key players in strategies for adapting and positioning the units operating on markets and thus in the restructuring processes arising from these operational strategies, the following factors must also be taken into account:

4.5

At EU level, the Committee reiterates that in order to carry a development strategy through (2), the social partners of organised civil society as a whole should work towards developing Territorial Social Responsibility (TSR) with a view to implementing a coordinated set of strategies, including:

4.6

The Committee thinks that the EU's structural and cohesion policies as well as its innovation and research policies should be geared to proactive support in shaping mechanisms for anticipating and accompanying restructuring into win-win systems for both workers and companies. The Structural Funds, and in particular the European Social Fund, the European Regional Development Fund and the European Globalisation Adjustment Fund, could play a significant role in enhancing the employability of workers and minimising the social impact of redundancies.

4.7

The Committee considers it essential that the economic and social partners and organised civil society players play a greater role in the Structural Fund partnership and monitoring bodies, and emphasises that the success of European structural policy hinges on the specific skills of the relevant players based in a given area.

4.8

In particular, the Committee attaches importance to the integration of restructuring policies and industrial policies geared towards the transition to a low-carbon European economy, with due regard for climate and environmental requirements, and with a view to developing and adequately funding new green jobs and skills, as the Committee has emphasised in previous opinions (4).

4.8.1

With regard, inter alia, to the designation of 2012 as the European Year for Active Ageing, the Committee stresses the importance of developing skills in the services delivered by NGOs, the social economy and companies, in order to foster healthy, active and dignified ageing, and develop products and services that meet the needs of these consumers (5).

4.9

The Committee also believes that EU education, training and lifelong learning programmes should be seen as key tools for proactively anticipating change, alongside the ongoing efforts of companies and workers: As mentioned by Businesseurope "72 % of companies in the EU check the need for training of their staff in a systematic way. 32 % of workers in the EU participated in training financed by their employers in 2010".

4.10

As a social response to the crisis, the national stimulus packages, and the proposals so far adopted have been inadequate. Insufficient consideration has been given to the vital need for job creation and the necessary measures to boost demand (such as better coordinated fiscal stimulus packages and wage policies).

4.10.1

State aid and Structural funding to support employment in businesses affected by globalisation and the credit crisis should be based on assurances that such aid does not have the effect of hampering free competition. Efforts should be made, above all, to sustain employment levels and collective agreements should be respected. For instance, Developments in the Netherlands, where "Self-employed without staff" models work extremely well, must be considered. Through this system, the unemployed get a chance to make their expertise available and create their own jobs.

4.11

The Committee stresses the need for closer coordination at EU level between policies and Commission services, so that clear consistent support is given to the choices of companies that are restructuring:

4.12

The Committee considers it of fundamental importance to enhance the role of the social partners and organised civil society at all levels: social dialogue, negotiation and participation are not only fundamental values of the European social model – which have always been endorsed by Committee – but are also tools that support and promote successful social cohesion, quality employment, the creation of jobs and the drive to boost innovation and competitiveness across Europe's economies.

4.13

In this context, the Committee stresses the role the CCMI plays as a prime forum for constructive dialogue and the development of ideas and recommendations, thanks to the experience it has succeeded in building up since the ECSC Treaty.

4.14

As has been shown by many studies and best practice analyses, at both EU and national levels, relationships of trust among the social partners and effective social dialogue are fundamental prerequisites for anticipating and managing change in the best possible way.

4.15

In particular, the Committee believes that dialogue, consultation and negotiation should be the cornerstones of reform and flexicurity pathways. On the one hand, framework conditions need to be established to enable companies – with due regard for different national circumstances – to adapt with speed and flexibility to innovation, markets and user/consumer requirement; on the other hand, the adaptability and professional development of workers must be supported and facilitated.

4.16

Moreover, as the Committee has previously pointed out, "flexicurity can only work if employees are properly trained. There is a strong link between new skills and the creation of new jobs.""The EESC considers that measures enhancing the security side (in the broadest sense) of flexicurity must currently be the top priority." The aim should be stable employment.

4.17

The Committee also deems it important for public authorities, education and training bodies and companies to combine forces to enhance the range of jobs and training available, by developing new, versatile professional profiles and skills and supporting lifelong learning.

4.18

In this context, the Committee emphasises the fundamental importance of mechanisms to secure access to education and lifelong training, designed to meet needs in terms of new job profiles and qualifications, especially for young people, in line with the vision outlined in the Agenda for New Skills and Jobs, which is the subject of another EESC opinion (6).

4.19

The Committee would underline the importance of closer cooperation between stakeholders at local level, given that, especially at that level "a positive attitude to change and the existence of high-quality social dialogue in a climate of confidence are important factors for preventing or limiting the harmful social consequences".

4.20

The Committee believes that SMEs merit particular attention; appropriate measures should be made available to them by public and private bodies such as employers' organisations and trade associations, chambers of commerce, industry and crafts and other bodies, especially at local and regional levels, with preferential access to credit and to training, as well as suitable measures for cutting red tape.

4.21

Further consultations and policymaking on anticipation and restructuring should be based on the findings from over seven years of analysis, studies and reports carried out at EU level.

4.22

While in the past, the focus was clearly on analysis and the exchange of information, best practice (7) and innovative experience, in future, the EU should concentrate mainly on practical measures, i.e. on development and growth, and foster the implementation of common guidelines, standards and reference frameworks built on the wealth of EU rules and common values.

4.23

Last but not least, the Committee stresses the importance of the human dimension: the people – and families – who are the victims of sectoral and corporate restructuring, are often put through human dramas that are not always given due consideration. Psychological and social support measures should be provided for, beyond the necessary recovery in investment and return to growth and sustainable job creation.

4.10.2012   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 299/60

—

with some forms of Stability Bonds, the obligation to maintain budgetary discipline would be reduced or lost altogether as euro-area Member States would pool credit risk for some or all of their public debt, implying a risk of moral hazard, since the credit risk stemming from individual lack of fiscal discipline would be shared by all participants; as the issuance of Stability Bonds may weaken market discipline, substantial changes in the framework for economic governance in the euro area would be required which would have implications for budgetary sovereignty;

—

Stability Bonds would need to have high credit quality to be accepted by investors;

—

achieving a high credit quality will also be important to ensure the acceptance of Stability Bonds by all euro-area Member States;

—

the credit rating for Stability Bonds would primarily depend on the credit quality of the participating Member

States and the underlying guarantee structure.

3.2.1.1

Approach No 1: Full substitution of Stability Bond issuance for national issuance, with joint and several guarantees

Under this approach, euro-area government financing would be fully covered by the issuance of Stability Bonds with national issuance discontinued. The credit rating of the largest euro area Member States would very likely be crucial in determining the rating of Stability Bonds, suggesting that a stability bond issued today could have a high credit rating. This approach would be most effective in delivering the benefits of Stability Bond issuance, but at the same time this approach would involve the greatest risk of moral hazard. It would require a very strong framework to ensure budgetary discipline, economic competiveness and reduction of macroeconomic imbalances at national level.

3.2.1.2

Approach No 2: Partial substitution of national issuance with Stability Bond issuance with joint and several guarantees

Under this approach, Stability Bond issuance would be underpinned by joint and several guarantees, but would replace only a limited portion of national issuance.

The portion of issuance not in Stability Bonds would remain under respective national guarantees. Accordingly, the euro area sovereign bond market would consist of two distinct parts: Stability Bonds and State bonds. A key issue in this approach would be the specific criteria for determining the relative proportions of Stability Bonds and national issuance.

3.2.1.3

Approach No 3: Partial substitution of national issuance with Stability Bond issuance with several but not joint guarantees

Under this approach, Stability Bonds would again substitute only partially for national issuance and would be underpinned by pro-rata guarantees of euro-area Member States. This approach differs from Approach No 2 insofar as Member States would retain liability for their respective share of Stability Bond issuance as well as for their national issuance.

4.10.2012   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 299/72

1.1

The EESC reiterates its unswerving support for European space policy and, in particular, for the major European projects Galileo and GMES, which it considers to be of strategic importance for European economic and scientific development. In its opinions (1) the EESC has consistently stressed the need to dedicate more attention and resources to space sector activities, an area where the EU must maintain its prominent position.

1.2

The EESC is totally against the Commission's proposal to relegate the financing necessary for development and completion of the GMES programme to an external ad hoc fund.

1.3

The EESC points out that it is indispensable for a programme that is entering the operational phase to be assured of its continuity; otherwise, it will fail. The entire proposal for innovative funding, management and governance mechanisms that are different from the tried and tested ones that are customary in the EU appears untimely, unjustified and very risky. Indeed, the creation of new funding models and bodies means going into an exhausting and uncertain phase of negotiations and study, which will certainly take years, which seems incompatible with the entry into operation of a programme such as GMES. It also seems pointless given that the Commission and the other European agencies already have all the competences and powers necessary to pursue the programme.

1.4

The EESC calls for the financing of the programme to be brought within the 2014-2020 Multiannual Financial Framework, and for its governance to be structured in such a way as to take into account capabilities currently existing in Europe, avoiding both the fragmentation of management bodies and the creation of new bodies that are ill-suited to taking over the management of a programme that has been developed over a whole decade. This request has already been made in a previous opinion (2).

1.5

The communication relating to the details of implementing the proposal for an intergovernmental agreement on the operation of GMES (3), which was published while this opinion was being discussed, does not change these conclusions. On the contrary, it strengthens them by enabling the EESC to point out once again the high risk associated with the belated introduction of a new, untested financing and management model outside of the multiannual financial framework and the EU's established management channels.

1.6

The EESC is extremely concerned about the real risk that the GMES programme might encounter serious difficulties, wasting the EUR 3,2 billion investment already made. In the light of discussions between Member States, this does not seem so much a risk as a certainty.

1.7

The EESC points out that it seems highly risky and unnecessary to attempt to redefine the complex system of GMES funding and governance, as set out in the communication in question, less than a year from its planned entry into operation (the A satellites for the Sentinel-1, Sentinel-2 and Sentinel-3 constellations are due to be launched in 2013), not least given the strategic importance of the programme for the EU.

1.8

No feasibility study is provided to allow an assessment of the scheme's viability in terms of effectiveness and efficiency. In addition, there is no clear justification of the need for a new set-up.

1.9

The EESC notes the different treatment afforded to the two flagship programmes of the European space programme, Galileo and GMES, the former being included in the Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF) and the latter not.

1.10

When it comes to governance, one can only be surprised at the minor role allocated in this complex system to the European Space Agency (ESA), which has to date designed, managed and operated the majority of European satellite systems, in addition to having supplied almost all the financing thus far, in partnership with the European Commission. Its replacement by new bodies or others with little experience of managing satellite systems and the data they collect appears groundless.

1.11

The EESC would argue that with less than a year to go before the entry into force of the GMES programme funding model, introducing such a radical overhaul of programme responsibilities as that proposed by the communication is a highly risky operation.

1.12

The EESC draws attention to the uncertain, vague nature of the Commission's governance proposal. There are obvious problems with the model proposed and the technical coordination is entrusted to bodies that have neither experience of space sector activities nor a culture of working together with other agencies. Furthermore, over 80 % of the activities planned under the GMES programme are space-related. The EESC calls on the Commission to review the model proposed and maintain unitary governance, continuing to give the ESA technical responsibility for the programme, under Commission supervision and control as originally planned.

2.1

The communication in question, of 30 November 2011, sets out the situation identified by the European Commission, whereby the operational phase of the GMES earth monitoring and security strategic programme, as defined thus far and brought to the final implementation phase, should be funded outside the 2014-2020 Multiannual Financial Framework (4). It also makes a proposal regarding its governance. This communication is therefore of fundamental importance to the GMES programme.

2.2

The subsequent communication relating to the details of implementing the proposal for an intergovernmental agreement on the operation of GMES (5), which was published while this opinion was being discussed, does not change the comments on the communication under discussion nor its conclusions, as it is an addendum that sets out the financial aspects of the proposed fund and introduces a new body. This new body, the GMES Council, duplicates the competences that have hitherto applied to the management of European space programmes and thus creates clear conflicts of competences and duplication of decision-making bodies in Europe.

2.3

GMES – the Global Monitoring for Environment and Security programme – is one of the European Union's two flagship space sector programmes; the other is Galileo. It plays a fundamental role in earth observation, providing the means to understand and monitor climate change, civil protection and security, sustainable development and crisis management.

2.4

The fact that funding for the GMES earth monitoring and security strategic programme has not been included within the proposal for the 2014-2020 Multiannual Financial Framework is cause for great concern owing to the very real danger that a programme of strategic importance to Europe will be lost, along with a decade's work and EUR 3 billion in investment.

2.5

In its analysis of December 2011 (6), the EESC already expressed grave concern regarding the future of this programme, should continuity in its funding be lost.

2.6

In February 2012, in a resolution on the future of GMES (7), the European Parliament stated that it did not believe "that financing GMES outside the Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF) – with the funding and governance structure that the Commission proposed in its communication – is a viable option".

2.7

The space component of GMES is based on three constellations of satellites, Sentinel-1, -2 and -3, and on instruments hosted on other satellites (Sentinel 4 and 5). The first of the three constellations is due to be launched in 2013. The definition of a financial framework providing funding for these imminent operations is therefore a matter of the utmost urgency.

2.8

Given the lack of a proposal, the ESA's director-general, speaking at a press conference on 9 January 2012, reaffirmed that in the absence of a decision on the funding of GMES operations the agency would not go ahead with the planned launches (8).

2.9

In this communication, the European Commission proposes pinpointing the necessary funding for the building and implementation of the entire infrastructure by establishing a new GMES-specific fund, which would require an intergovernmental agreement between the EU's Member States within the Council.

2.10

All 27 Member States of the EU should contribute to the fund on the basis of their gross national income (GNI). The communication includes a model agreement, which is fleshed out in the subsequent communication (9).

2.11

The governance proposal contained in the communication, no less important than the financial proposal, identifies numerous players who should take responsibility for the various aspects and sectors covered by the GMES programme.

2.12

The introduction of a new, complex funding scheme and a new management body for a space programme (the GMES Council) seems unnecessary and comes rather late, at one year from the launch of the first satellites.

3.1

The GMES earth monitoring and security programme and the GALILEO programme for satellite navigation are major strategic EU programmes, intended to enable the EU to maintain its independence and prime position in the space sector.

3.2

Maintaining strong leadership and independence in the space sector is of strategic importance for the future of Europe, owing to the widespread, essential economic, technological, geopolitical and, in the widest sense of the word, cultural effects of activities developed in the space sector.

3.3

GMES is a strategic EU programme that was set up under Regulation (EU) No 911/2010 of the European Parliament and the Council.

3.4

The communication states that "in order to respond to ever growing challenges at global level Europe needs a well-coordinated and reliable Earth observation system of its own. GMES is that system".

3.5

The communication proposes a new funding model, outside of the consolidated management system within the EU budget, which requires a specific contribution and approval from all 27 Member States. The mechanism for this is such that, in the current financial situation (looking at, purely by way of example, the situation in Greece and possible difficulties faced by France and Italy), it is highly likely, if not certain, to be blocked, which would lead to the end of the GMES programme.

4.1

The communication excludes GMES from the 2014-2020 QFP.

4.2

Funding is to be secured instead by means of an internal agreement between representatives of the Member State governments within the Council.

4.3

The agreement provides that each EU Member State must first complete the procedures necessary for its entry into force, notifying the secretary-general of the Council of the European Union of this.

4.4

Ratification by all EU Member States is a prerequisite for the agreement's entry into force.

4.5

The agreement can enter into force only once it has been approved by the last Member State. Given the current financial situation in Europe in general, and in some Member States in particular, this clause seems in and of itself to be enough to bring about the failure of the GMES programme.

4.6

The timetable and procedures for the organisation of this Council meeting are not yet known, which is risky given that the launch dates for the Sentinel -1, -2, and -3 satellites (2013) are fast approaching.

4.7

As for the planning, management and implementation of the GMES fund, the communication provides for the Council to adopt a regulation on the basis of a Commission proposal. There is no draft version of this regulation available as yet.

4.8

The communication states that the financial regulation on the GMES fund, setting out the rules regarding its establishment and implementation and the presentation and auditing of accounts, is to be adopted by the Council following a proposal from the Commission. There is no draft version of this regulation available as yet.

4.9

So far, the development of the programme has cost EUR 3,2 billion, shouldered almost entirely by the ESA (EUR 1 890 million) and the EU (EUR 1 300 million).

4.10

The implementation of the programme as a whole and its maintenance, development and modernisation bring estimates as to the budget needed for the 2014-2020 period to EUR 5,8 billion, in other words, approximately 0,6 % of the EU budget for the same period, which the 2014-2020 MFF sets at EUR 1 025 billion. It is also worth noting that the EU budget amounts to approximately 1,1 % of gross national income.