3.2.2006   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 28/1

1.1

In compliance with the Hague Programme (2001), the Commission is presenting a consultative Green Paper on succession and wills outlining the subject's international aspects:

1.2

Transnational succession presents specific difficulties and obstacles for beneficiaries due to the diversity of substantive laws, procedural rules and rules on conflict of laws in force in each Member State.

1.3

The Green Paper therefore proposes that the European Union should consider the possibility of adopting substantive rules and rules governing jurisdiction, applicable law and mutual recognition not only for court judgments but also for administrative decisions and documents concerning wills and succession. Such rules would also apply when the international component of the succession involves a non-EU country.

2.1

At international level, there are three Hague Conventions on succession and wills, as well as another on trusts:

2.2

A UNIDROIT Convention providing a Uniform Law on the Form of an International Will was concluded in Washington on 26 October 1973 and came into force on 9 February 1978. The EU Member States parties to the Convention are Belgium, Cyprus, (Czechoslovakia), France, (The Holy See), Italy, the United Kingdom, Slovenia, and several non-EU countries including the United States and the Russian Federation. This convention provides for an international system of registration and a standard form for accomplishing this.

2.2.1

The Member States which are parties to the 1972 Basel Convention on the Establishment of a Scheme of Registration of Wills, concluded under the auspices of the Council of Europe but open for accession to non-member states, are Belgium, Cyprus, Estonia, France, Italy, Lithuania, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal and Spain.

2.3

The Hague Conventions concern jurisdiction and applicable law, the UNIDROIT Conventions concern substantive law on matters with an international dimension. Only the international provisions on the form of wills and on their registration on an international register currently have a sufficiently significant number of ratifying or contracting parties.

2.4

The matter under consideration concerns a fundamental human right, namely a specific form of property rights transfer following a person's death. EU legislation as regards competence, applicable law and mutual recognition for successions with an international component should take the form of a regulation.

2.5

In view of the subject's complexity, the Commission's aims and proposals are ambitious, but also pertinent and vital for the internal market. Many individuals are affected. In order to make the regulation more effective and avoid any clashes between rules or decisions taken by different states, it would be advisable to include as many issues as possible in the scope of the rules concerning conflicts of law, always making them functionally and essentially subordinate to the issue of succession (avoid adding, for example, issues which are basically matters for the legal arrangements concerning real rights).

2.6

The economic importance of having EU rules is undeniable, especially with regard to the transfer of SME assets in Europe, in order to ensure continuity following the death of an entrepreneur — an issue that is also important for employment and competitiveness in Europe.

2.7

Amendments should be considered to rules that, in some countries, prohibit agreements as to future successions or the appropriation of a portion of an inheritance for a specific use. This should be done in the countries concerned and encouraged by the EU with the aim of improving the harmonisation of substantive law and ensuring the continuity of businesses and farmholdings that would otherwise have to be liquidated when the time came to share them among several heirs.

2.8

In view of the profound differences between existing national laws despite certain recent developments, and in view of the small number of countries that have ratified the relevant international conventions, the Committee agrees with the Commission that it would currently be impossible to formulate uniform substantive law on international succession and wills that could be applied throughout the European Union. The working themes and priorities put forward are appropriate since progress in these areas would already solve many of the practical difficulties encountered by the relevant beneficiaries, notaries, administrations, courts and members of the legal profession.

2.8.1

Other paths can also be explored taking into account international law, which Member States could be asked to take into consideration for ratification or for accession to certain conventions (form of wills, applicable law, international will, national and international registration).

2.8.2

The law of succession and wills in Romano-Germanic legal systems has long been marked by attitudes towards inheritance that are extremely outdated in many respects. The deceased's (1) estate was considered to represent a form of continuity through one's heirs. The law of succession now tends increasingly towards contractualisation. Following a trend set in Germany and Switzerland, France is in the process of adopting succession law reforms granting the deceased and his heirs a greater role in settling succession, including greater guarantees for continuity of business.

2.8.3

On the other hand, extremely liberal systems that enable the testator to disinherit some of his bodily heirs without justification are being increasingly challenged, as demonstrated by the ever-growing body of litigation in this area.

2.8.4

Respecting certain historical and sociological specificities in different legal systems does not exclude the possibility that, in the long term, a greater level of standardisation, or at least a higher degree of convergence, will finally come into existence in Europe, thereby facilitating the execution and settlement of international wills. This process could be accelerated by creating a European will and a sufficiently open and liberal instrument on applicable law. The hypothesis of having Community provisions of substance could also be studied, in the context of an acceptance of ‘professio juris’  (2), as an alternative to one or more of the applicable national laws.

2.9

The Committee would point out that Council Regulation (EC) No 2201/2003 of 27 November 2003 concerning jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in matrimonial matters and the matters of parental responsibility, repealing Regulation (EC) No 1347/2000 constitutes a source of inspiration. Articles 21(3) and 46 of Regulation No 2201/2003, in particular, are relevant sources and, at the very least, set precedents in family law that contribute to determining the substance of the proposed legislative provisions (3).

2.10

The Committee therefore welcomes the Green Paper and considers that it raises fundamental and pressing questions. The EESC will endeavour to find answers to these questions, basing itself on the European citizens' best interests and taking into consideration their growing mobility and the major migrations that have already taken place in the past.

2.11

It would be appropriate to begin by dealing with the form of wills, international jurisdiction, and resolving conflict of law issues relating to applicable law, the registration of wills, as well as the mutual recognition of rulings by the courts and other competent authorities and endorsement, areas where precedents have already been set in European and international law.

2.12

The EESC feels that a unitary system (single law of succession and single set of rules governing inheritances) is preferable to having various scattered rules for settling a succession; however, for practical reasons, this principle should be subject to exceptions in certain cases, particularly for buildings or certain types of property (ships, aircraft, goodwill, etc.) located abroad.

2.13

Certain matters, such as agreements as to future successions or trusts, remain under national jurisdiction (4); but those concerning the recognition without exequatur of court decisions, which may or may not give rise to dispute in matters of succession, residual jurisdiction, recognition of decisions and documents issued by public or private extra-judicial authorities or registration in national land registers on the basis of the European certificate of inheritance, should be included under the proposed European legislation.

3.1

A regulation on successions similar to the above-mentioned Council Regulation No 2201/2003 would not be sufficient to solve the problems presented by international successions. In fact, most successions are not contentious and problems that arise in the absence of any contention must also be addressed. Furthermore, the courts are sometimes involved in settling non-contentious issues in certain countries, or for specific matters.

3.2

Needless to say, the Community instrument should regulate matters raised previously concerning the determination of the forum or fora having jurisdiction and the recognition of court decisions, but it should also consider the possibilities of regulating:

3.3

The Committee is in favour of the EU's Hague Programme insofar as it provides for the creation of a ‘European certificate of inheritance’ and a system for registering wills. Member States will have to determine which authority is authorised to issue such certificates and set up a centralised national registry if one does not already exist. A central register for the Community (or for Europe in the sense of the Council of Europe, provided that the Member States which have not already done so were asked to ratify the Convention of Basel) should be created and courts, notaries, and other officials authorised under the applicable national law should have access to the information deposited with the central register (at least, to find out on the basis of the deceased's name and his date of birth, in which Member State or third country, on what date, and with which authority the will has been deposited in order to request a copy from the aforementioned national authority).

3.3.1

The European registration system must, whatever happens, be compatible with the Basel Convention and the Washington Convention, since several Member States are already parties to them and since the draft EU legislation may also concern successions involving third countries.

3.4

Once status as heir has been established and the estate has been administered and distributed, administrative formalities should be as straightforward as possible. The Committee would be in favour of mutual recognition for all acts and documents issued by officials recognised under local law, and the direct registration in a land register (or with the appropriate authority for registering title to real estate) of title to property as well as any easements, mortgages, or other possible encumbrances that might burden the estate in question under the applicable national law.

3.5

The Committee would draw the Commission's attention to taxation issues that might face the heirs to an estate located in two or more countries. It is important to avoid any problems that might arise in regard to double taxation on part or all of the estate, which could have a confiscating effect in some successions or which could create inequalities amongst heirs depending on the nature of the goods they have each inherited. Stock will have to be taken of the rules applying to international successions in the Member States in order to establish which countries raise taxes on goods and assets situated outside their territory, compare rates and propose fair solutions to be submitted to the relevant countries. The Commission might possibly consider proposing a model convention against double taxation in respect of international successions, between the Member States.

3.6

Should a European will be based on the model of the Washington Convention's international will; and should European registration, as foreseen in the Basel Convention, be extended to international registration? This might encourage more countries to ratify the Washington and Basel Conventions and provide better guarantees for the beneficiaries of international wills involving not only Member States but also third countries. The Committee recommends that the Commission's work should follow this course because Member States are already familiar with these conventions, either because they have ratified them or because their public officials or courts have already dealt with wills and registrations subject to these legal systems.

3.7

Were this hypothesis to become reality, the European will would be recognised in its form by all national legal systems. European law must not allow simple matters of form to undermine the universal principle that recognises respect for the testator's intentions (favor testamenti) within the limits permitted by applicable law.

3.8

Specific Community rules are essential so that this legislation applies to all cases of successions under the jurisdiction of two or more Member States, or even of third countries, including those which are parties to international conventions, so as to guarantee the application of Community law in all circumstances (Community ‘special law’ would then have precedence over international law).

4.1

The Green Paper raises 39 main questions, which are broken down into sub-questions. The EESC will not attempt to address all these at this preliminary stage but would urge the Commission to consult individually each of the organisations representing members of the legal profession concerned by each of the topics considered by the Green Paper.

4.2

The EESC will restrict itself to presenting possible responses to a number of questions that it believes to be of particular significance. The overall approach adopted will focus on compliance with the conventions of the Hague, Basel, and Washington in order to ensure that the European rules are as standardised as possible, the future perspective being to achieve a legal consensus that is broadly acceptable to as many Member States and third countries as possible.

4.3

The connecting factors laid down in the Hague Convention of 1961 on conflict of laws relating to the form of testamentary dispositions should at least be retained since they offer sufficient diversity, making it possible, in most cases, to recognise the applicability of the law under which the will was made.

4.4

In the spirit of recent and ongoing reforms in continental Europe, the interests of legally incapacitated (minors or adults) or severely disabled heirs should be specifically safeguarded if a possible extension of the contractualisation of wills or the heirs' choice of applicable law modifies the reserved portion regime or creates inequalities amongst heirs. Greater flexibility for the testator or the beneficiaries should not undermine existing provisions in any of the applicable laws that afford these heirs the highest degree of protection (see questions 5 and 10 in the Green Paper).

4.5

Actions taken by of one of the heirs or his representative in administering the succession in a country where an executor need not be appointed should not constitute implicit acceptance of the succession without the benefit of inventory.

4.6

Consideration should be given to the option of the heirs accepting a succession up to the limit of the claims on the inheritance, and to that of a pact between heirs or a heritage contract providing for an unequal division for legitimate purposes (continued operation of a farm or business, advantage for an heir with a mental or physical disability), and to agreements providing for an equal division between children from different marriages or natural children if applicable law does not organise such equality, or to an heir passing on his rights to his own direct descendants, bearing in mind the increase in life expectancy.

4.7

The testator should also be allowed, subject to certain limits, to choose which law should be applicable to his estate, for example that of his nationality (or one of his nationalities), or that of his usual place of residence.

4.8

Finally, the EESC believes that the Commission's excellent comparative work should be pursued and developed. It should be regularly updated on the Community website and translated into an adequate number of languages to ensure its general usefulness for members of the legal profession, public officials, administrators, and courts dealing with international successions. It should also be structured to include a chapter-by-chapter synthesis clarifying the general principles for European citizens wishing to draft a will with international scope or for their heirs.

4.9

The EESC awaits with interest the results of the consultations already carried out by the Commission or those still to come; it hopes that a general line of approach and more concrete legislative proposals can then be submitted to it for an opinion, and proposes then to examine them in detail, since it considers the issue of wills and successions to be one of major interest for the citizens of Europe; their hopes for a simplification of formalities, greater legal and fiscal certainty and a speedier settlement of international successions, which they expect from a Community initiative, must not be disappointed, whether the circumstances be those of private individuals, businesses, farms or other economic activities where the entrepreneurs or owners wish to ensure continuity after their demise.

3.2.2006   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 28/5

1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

7.

8.

9.

1.1

Usable energy is the mainstay of our contemporary way of life and culture. It is only its ready availability that has made our present standard of living possible. If the Lisbon Strategy and the Gothenburg and Barcelona Council conclusions are to be implemented, a secure, cheap, environmentally-friendly and sustainable supply of usable energy is absolutely essential.

1.2

At present, the fossil fuels coal (2), oil and natural gas are the backbone of the European and global energy supply. Moreover, as they will continue to be important over the next few decades, they remain essential.

1.3

Their extraction and use, however, involves all kinds of harm to the environment, most notably the emission of greenhouse gases — especially CO2 and methane. We are talking about the depletion of finite resources.

1.4

The use of these vital raw materials has led to Europe being heavily dependent on high-grade imports of them, and this is set to increase in future, particularly as regards oil and, increasingly, natural gas.

1.5

The expected lifetime of world-wide resources and reserves (3) of coal, oil and gas is dependent on several factors (economic growth, exploration and technological advances). It still extends over many decades (perhaps even centuries in the case of coal), although in the case of oil, in particular, there could be a drop in reserves and shortage of supply before the middle of the present century. The way the oil markets are going at the moment, there could be virtually unpredictable price hikes, even in the very short term, which could have a considerable impact on national economies (4).

1.6

The EU's energy policy must do everything to reduce this dependency over the long term, particularly by taking energy-saving measures, using all fuels more efficiently and making greater use of alternative energy systems, such as renewable and nuclear energies. Continued development of alternative energy systems is particularly important on this front.

1.7

On the other hand, the EU's energy policy must be fully geared to securing the supply and supply routes of fossil fuels, a particular problem here being the political stability of some of the main suppliers. Cooperation with the Russian Federation, the CIS states, countries in the Middle East and regions neighbouring the EU (such as Algeria and Libya) is particularly important in this regard.

1.8

Making greater use of Europe's considerable coal deposits could also help to mitigate this dependency.

1.9

If the European internal market is working as it should and appropriate climate-protection measures are in place, there would be applications for fossil fuels in accordance with their respective characteristics and price and cost levels. This automatically ensures they will be used in a way that is particularly energy-efficient and economical.

1.10

This has produced a situation in which coal predominates in the steel industry and in power plants, while oil and gas are used primarily in producing heat and in non-energy spheres. Oil-based products prevail in the transport sector.

1.11

Natural gas and oil are both more scarce and more versatile and so should be used in the energy mix predominantly for applications — such as fuel for transport and as raw material for the chemicals industry — where the use of coal would involve extra costs, energy consumption and CO2 emissions.

1.12

Progress in technology must be used to achieve a sustained reduction in CO2 emissions per product unit (e.g., kg CO2/kWh, t CO2/t steel and g CO2/passenger-kilometre). This requires an improvement in energy efficiency in all areas of energy conversion and application.

1.13

Energy and economic policy needs, therefore, to provide a reliable framework for investment which will lead to improved technology in industry, trade and private consumption.

1.14

In the coming decades, Europe will have to increase its power plant capacity by around 400 GW (5). If CO2 emissions and fuel consumption are to be stabilised or reduced, these new plants must have the best available technology.

1.15

In the transport field, every effort has to be made to cut the specific use of fuel (consumption per passenger-kilometre) and to prevent total consumption continuing to rise. This requires technological progress in many areas of vehicle and fuel development, measures to avoid traffic congestion (building of roads and tunnels/routing systems) and a reduction in traffic (6). Increased use of electric-powered vehicles, such as electric trains, reduces reliance on oil by allowing diversification in the use of primary energies (coal, gas, renewable energies, nuclear power).

1.16

Improved efficiency in the energy sphere requires increased research and development, especially into power stations which use fossil fuels, which involves both industry and public support measures.

1.17

The Committee welcomes, therefore, the ‘Energy’ thematic area in the proposal for the 7th research and development framework programme. This should be adequately funded and cover all possible energy technologies. It should particularly include those measures which increase the efficiency of fossil fuel use, as the overall benefits to be had here are particularly great.

1.18

In the case of electricity from fossil fuels, there is also a chance of significantly reducing CO2 emissions when converting energy, provided CO2 sequestration and storage procedures (Clean Coal Technology) are used. Developing and testing procedures of this kind is therefore particularly important in the 7th research and development framework programme.

2.1

Usable energy (7) is the mainstay of our contemporary way of life and culture. Its ready availability opened the door to our present-day standard of living. The need for a guaranteed, economical, environmentally friendly and sustainable supply of usable energy is at the heart of the Council conclusions from Lisbon, Gothenburg and Barcelona.

2.2

The Committee has noted on several occasions that supplying and using energy puts a strain on the environment, involves risks and depends on unforeseeable and external political factors. None of the options and technologies which could contribute to future energy supply is technologically perfect, entirely free of adverse effects on the environment, suitable for all needs, and offers predictable pricing and availability over the long term. Added to this are the questions of diminishing reserves and resources with all that this entails. This difficult situation will be significantly exacerbated by the increase in the world's population, the increasing thirst for energy of the developing countries and, above all, the rapidly increasing energy needs of the big new industrial nations, such as China, India and Brazil.

2.3

A secure, long-term, environmentally sound and competitive energy supply must therefore remain a major goal of a forward-looking European energy policy. For the reasons given, this cannot rely on a few energy sources alone. Instead, the only way of countering energy shortages and other risks is through an energy mix that is diverse in type and origin and in which all available fuels and technologies are used and (further) developed so that eventually they can compete among themselves under accepted environmental conditions and in changing circumstances.

3.1

At the present time, around four-fifths of the world's energy supply — and that of the EU of 25 — is based on the use of the fossil fuels oil, natural gas and coal.

3.2

Forecasts of future development generally differ according to point of view and interests, given that they depend on assumptions about future demographic and economic developments, further advances in exploration and development techniques and the wider political circumstances in this or that country. This applies particularly to nuclear energy and to backing given to renewable energies.

3.2.1

According to the reference prognoses (8) issued in 2004 by the International Energy Agency in Paris and the US Department of Energy's Information Administration (EIA), even 25 years from now, these fossil fuels will still account for over 80 % of the world's energy consumption.

3.2.2

The contribution of renewable energies will grow, but not at a rate above that of energy consumption, according to IEA and EIA estimates; their share will thus remain constant. If present trends continue, nuclear energy is also expected to take a slightly larger share in supply in absolute terms, but again, assuming the broad policy conditions do not radically change at EU level, the increase will be below the overall trend in consumption. As a result, the IEA and EIA are now even anticipating a decline in nuclear energy's share in covering the world's energy consumption.

3.2.3

The European Commission's baseline scenario (9) for the EU-25, published in September 2004 and at variance with the worldwide trend as seen by the IEA and EIA, envisages an increase in the share of renewable energies in the EU-25's total energy consumption from today's 6 % to 9 % in 2030. However, as this estimate also sees a reduction in the share of nuclear energy in the EU-25, the Commission's baseline scenario equally concludes that, in the EU-25 too, fossil fuels will still account for over 80 % of the total energy consumption in 2030.

3.3

Fossil fuels are non-renewable raw materials. The potential of fossil fuels needs to be examined in order to estimate how long oil, natural gas and coal can retain their key role.

3.4

This requires definition of terms and units of measurement. The terms used are reserves, resources and potentials. A variety of measurements (10) are usually used for energy sources, such as tons or barrels for oil, metric tons or tons of coal equivalent for coal and cubic metres or cubic feet for natural gas. They are compared in terms of their energy content, measured in joules or watt seconds.

3.5

The Estimated Ultimate Recovery (EUR) is the total recoverable amount of energy raw materials present in the earth's crust before exploitation by man. Not all experts necessarily agree on this estimate. The better we know the earth's crust, however, and the more sophisticated the investigative techniques, the more the prognoses converge.

3.6

Only the recoverable part of resources is included in the Estimated Ultimate Recovery. This depends, however, on the available technologies and their cost-effectiveness and could therefore increase as these continue to be developed. The remaining potential is obtained by subtracting from the EUR the amounts already recovered.

3.7

The remaining potential comprises reserves plus resources. By reserves are meant those amounts of energy raw materials which have been confirmed and can be economically recovered with currently available technology. By resources are meant both those amounts of an energy raw material which either have been confirmed but cannot yet be economically and/or technologically recovered and those which, although they have not been proven, are anticipated on the basis of geological indications.

3.8

It is reserves which are at the forefront of public debate, because it is from these that the coverage of energy sources is derived. By dividing reserves by current annual consumption, we get the ‘static lifetime’. This gives us a static lifetime for resources worldwide of around forty years for oil, around sixty years for gas and around two hundred years for coal.

3.9

However, the reserves and their static lifetime are by no means fixed amounts. In reality, a decline in the static lifetime of reserves triggers more intense exploration, which results in resources being converted, not least thanks to technological progress, into reserves. (Thus, for example, in the 1970s the static lifetime of oil was put at thirty years.)

3.10

The statistically proven resources of oil are around twice the size of the reserves, of natural gas and coal as much as tenfold the reserves.

3.11

A further indicator of future availability of fossil fuels is the already recovered share of the EUR. If this exceeds 50 %, and thus the Depletion Mid Point is reached, it will be difficult to increase recovery or even to maintain it at the same level.

3.12

Oil: More than a third of ‘conventional’ oil's EUR of 380 billion tons oil equivalent has been recovered so far. At present recovery volumes, half of the conventional potential would be used up in around ten years. Any increase in recovery after that would mean turning increasingly to non-conventional deposits (heavy oil, oil sand, oil shale). This would put back the Depletion Mid Point. Otherwise, there could be a drop in reserves and a drastic fall in supply (11) even before the middle of the present century.

3.13

Natural gas and coal: the position is similar in the case of natural gas, where non-conventional deposits such as gas hydrates can also increase the remaining EUR. In the case of coal, the estimated EUR of 3 400 billion tons of oil units, only around 3 % has yet been recovered.

3.14

However, exploration for gas (methane) hydrates and the technology for recovering them are still at the research stage, so no reliable claims can be made about how much they can contribute to the energy supply. On the one hand, there are estimates that the potential supplies exceed all the known supplies of fossil fuels, while on the other, nothing is certain concerning their recovery (basically technology and costs). Moreover, their release — whether due to climate change or the actions of man — is seen to involve an element of uncertainty, or even risk, as this could produce an accumulation of the powerful greenhouse gas methane in the atmosphere, which would be extremely damaging to the climate.

3.15

The costs of recovering fossil fuels differ greatly. Depending on the deposit, those for oil currently stand at between 2 and 20 USD a barrel. Although ever smaller deposits have to be developed in increasingly difficult geological and geographical conditions, these cost increases can be offset, or even more than offset, by gains in productivity, mostly based on technological innovation. In the case of natural gas, too, there are corresponding differences in recovery costs. In the case of coal, costs very much depend on the depth of the deposit, seam thickness and also whether it can be recovered by opencast or only deep mining. The cost range is considerable, from a few USD/t (e.g., in Powder River Basin in the USA) to 200 USD/t in the case of mining in certain European coalfields.

3.16

The regional distribution of fossil reserves, particularly those of oil, is also very uneven. 65 % of oil reserves are in the Middle East. The distribution of natural gas is only slightly better, with two key regions, the Middle East (34 %) and the successor states of the USSR (39 %). Coal reserves, on the other hand, are more evenly distributed. The largest coal reserves are in North America and there are also large coal supplies in China, India, Australia, South Africa and Europe.

3.17

The concentration of strategically important fossil fuel sources — especially oil, though also natural gas — in geopolitically high-risk regions of the Middle East is particularly problematic for the security of the energy supply.

4.1

Primary energy consumption in the EU of 25 in 2004 was around 2.5 billion tons of coal equivalent or around 75 exajoules (75 x 1018 joules). This corresponds to 16 % of the world's energy consumption of 15.3 billion tons of coal equivalent. At 5.5 tons of coal equivalent, the per capita consumption of energy in the EU of 25 is more than double the world average, albeit only half that in North America. In terms of the economic performance it produces, energy consumption in Europe is only around half the average in all non-European regions, as energy is used here substantially more efficiently than in many other parts of the world.

4.2

The most important energy sources in the EU of 25 in 2004 — measured in total primary energy consumption — were mineral oil at 39 %, natural gas at 24 % and coal at 17 %. Other important staples of the EU energy supply are nuclear energy at 14 % and renewable and other energy sources at 6 %. The shares of the various fossil energy sources differ widely among the 25 Member States. They range in the case of natural gas from 1 % in Sweden to almost 50 % in the Netherlands, in the case of mineral oil from less than 30 % in Hungary to two-thirds in Portugal, and in the case of coal from 5 % in France to 60 % in Poland. The main reason for these differences is the different size of fossil energy reserves in the individual Member States.

4.3

The total energy reserves of the EU of 25 are comparatively tiny at around 38 billion tons of coal equivalent. This is 3 % of worldwide reserves, if non-conventional hydrocarbons are included. Coal supplies (lignite and hard coal), at 31 billion tons of coal equivalent, account for the bulk of this and are roughly equally divided between lignite and hard coal. Natural gas reserves stand at 4 billion tons of coal equivalent and oil reserves at 2 billion tons of coal equivalent. For the foreseeable future, the EU will remain the world's largest net energy importer. According to European Commission estimates, this dependency will increase to more than two-thirds by 2030.

4.4

The distribution of fossil energy reserves among the EU of 25 is very uneven. Oil supplies are concentrated particularly in the British and then the Danish North Sea. They are substantially depleted, so recovery will fall. Gas reserves are mostly concentrated in the Netherlands and Great Britain, while those of coal are distributed above all among Germany, Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Greece and Great Britain. Norwegian oil and gas reserves also play an important role because, although not a member of the EU, Norway is a member of the European Economic Area.

4.5

Given the low reserves of fossil fuels generally, the EU of 25 already has to import half of its energy needs. According to the European Commission's Green Paper, this will increase to 70 % by 2030. Dependence on imports is particularly high in the case of crude oil, with more than three-quarters of needs covered by imports from non-EU countries. Imports of natural gas stand at 55 %, and of coal at one-third.

4.6

This has led to Europe being heavily dependent on imports of the vital raw material ‘energy’ (especially oil and, increasingly, gas) and it is set to be even more dependent in the future. The EU is, in fact, the world's largest net energy importer.

4.7

This means that the EU's energy policy must be fully geared to securing the supply and supply routes of fossil fuels, a particular problem here being the political stability of some of the main suppliers. Cooperation with the Russian Federation, the CIS states, countries in the Middle East and regions neighbouring the EU (such as Algeria and Libya) is particularly important in this regard.

4.8

But, equally, the EU's energy policy must also do everything to reduce this dependency over the long term, particularly by using all fuels more efficiently and making greater use of alternative energy systems, such as renewable energy (including development and brining to market) and nuclear energies. Continued development of alternative energy systems is particularly important on this front.

4.9

Against this background, making greater use of Europe's considerable coal deposits could also help to mitigate this dependency, particularly as far stricter environmental standards already apply to coal mining here than in other parts of the world.

5.1

The trajectory of energy consumption in the EU of 25 is set to follow the baseline scenario set out in the Commission's ‘European Energy and Transport Scenarios on Key Drivers’ (13) which assumes the continuation of current trends and policies. Its prognosis follows.

5.2

Primary energy consumption will rise by 2040 to 2.9 billion tons of coal equivalent — a mere 0.6 % p.a. However, GDP is expected to rise by 2.4 % p.a. up to 2030. The reduction in energy intensity (ratio of energy consumption to GDP) of more than 1.7 % p.a. (!) that this requires should be achieved through structural changes, improved energy efficiency and the introduction of advanced technologies.

5.3

The share of fossil fuels in covering primary energy consumption will even increase by 2 percentage points, to 82 %, by 2030.

5.4

Coal: After an initial downturn, coal consumption is expected to rise again around 2015 as the result of its improved competitiveness in electricity production. Rising gas prices and the anticipated availability of advanced coal-to-electricity conversion technologies are the main reasons for this development. On this assessment, coal consumption in 2030 will match that for 2000. Coal's share in primary energy consumption in the EU-25 will then be around 15 %, as it was in 2005. As a downturn of 40 % in coal extraction in the EU is expected in the period 2005 to 2030, together with an increase in coal imports of around 125 %, the share of imports in covering the EU-25's coal consumption will rise from 1/3 in 2005 to almost 2/3 in 2030.

5.5

Oil: As growth rates are then expected to be sluggish — at 0.2 % p.a. -, oil's share in primary energy consumption is expected to fall in 2030 to 34 % — 5 percentage points lower than today.

5.6

Gas: At 2.7 % p.a., growth in gas consumption will initially be buoyant up to 2015. This trend will then slacken, for reasons which include reduced competitiveness in electricity production compared with coal. However, gas is expected to experience the strongest increase in consumption of all fossil fuels for the entire period to 2030. The share of natural gas in the EU-25's primary energy consumption will increase from 26 % in 2005 to 32 % in 2030. Liquefied natural gas (LNG) enables diversification of gas sources, as it can be transported by sea. At the present time, LNG accounts for around 25 % of world trade in oil. Indonesia is the largest LNG exporter, followed by Algeria, Malaysia and Qatar.

5.7

Recovery of fossil fuels in the EU of 25 will fall by around 2 % p.a. up to 2030. This will increase reliance on imports of all fossil fuels by that year to more than two-thirds. As already mentioned, in 2030 import levels for coal will be at almost two-thirds, for gas more than 80 % and for oil almost 90 %. Particularly critical is the growing dependence on gas imports from a restricted number of suppliers.

5.8

Electricity consumption will grow to 2030 by an average of 1.4 % p.a. This will increase the demand on power station capacity from today's c. 700 GW (maximum electrical capacity) to c. 1 100 GW in 2030. Old power stations will also need to be replaced with new plants. The Commission's estimate in its baseline scenario is that the expected increase in capacity will come from an increase of around 300 GW in fossil energies and around 130 GW in wind, hydro and solar energies, while nuclear plant capacity is expected to decrease by 30 GW between 2005 and 2030, failing any lasting change in overall policy.

5.9

There will thus be great challenges and much work to be done in supplying the EU's energy over the next 25 years, though these could also bring economic opportunities. They include ensuring supply (including reducing import dependency), meeting growing environmental demands, guaranteeing the competitive price of energy and making the needed investments.

6.1

Coal, oil and natural gas are natural hydrocarbons produced over millions of years through a transformation from biological substances — deposited biomass; in effect, then, it is deposited solar energy. Different geological conditions in their formation (e.g., pressure, temperature and age) have resulted in different products. An important distinguishing feature is the fuel's hydrogen content. Natural gas has the highest ratio of hydrogen to carbon at 4: 1, while that of oil is 1.8: 1, and of coal 0.7: 1. This in large part determines the various applications to which these fossil fuels are put.

6.2

As yet there is no alternative to the use of coal, oil and natural gas as fuels, as the raw material for making many products (from medicines to common synthetics) and as a carbonaceous reducing agent for iron and steel production. However, their specific physical and chemical properties (state, hydrogen content, carbon content, ash content, etc.) make them particularly good for many applications and less so for others. Economic, technological and environmental criteria determine the choice of the hydrocarbon to be used.

6.3

Around 7 % of fossil fuels consumed in the EU are used for ‘non-energy’ consumption, i.e., mainly the production of chemical products. At the beginning of the last century reusable materials — initially ones derived from coal — were the basis for the newly emerging branch of manufacturing. Since then, hydrocarbon reusable materials have been almost completely edged out by natural gas and oil products. Oil and natural gas will continue to dominate in this segment of the market in future for as long as supplies remain. The lifetime of oil and gas reserves would be significantly longer if these fuels could be used less for producing energy and heat.

6.4

The established process for the production of basic oxygen steel is the carbon-based blast furnace/converter route. The blast furnace process requires the use of coke as a reducing agent for the production of pig iron, where it also serves as an insulator and for the gas supply system. At 475 kg per ton, the average consumption of reducing agent in modern European plants is close to the minimum that is technologically possible.

6.5

The transport sector is still experiencing high growth rates. This sector accounts for around 25 % of energy consumption and road transport is almost entirely dependent on oil products. Liquid fuels have a high energy content per unit of volume or mass. This is the prerequisite for economical and efficient application in the transport sector, which is why liquid fuels and their infrastructure have established themselves in road transport. Increased use of electric-powered vehicles, such as trains, reduces reliance on oil by allowing a range of primary energies to be used (coal, gas, renewable energies, nuclear power).

6.6

Competing with oil-based liquid fuels are natural gas and liquefied natural gas (LNG) used directly as a fuel. It remains to be seen whether these product lines will be able to secure greater market share (14).

6.7

Households and small consumers require around 30 % of energy. The choice of energy source is based on economic criteria and is increasingly dictated by convenience and the environment. In this sector heating oil, natural gas, electricity — and in populated areas district heating from combined heat and power plants — are in competition with one another.

6.8

40 % of the EU's energy consumption is converted in power stations to electricity and heat. Technologically speaking, coal, oil and natural gas — as well as nuclear energy — are all equally suited for conversion into electricity. In technologically highly efficient power stations, natural gas can provide an efficiency (in converting primary energy into electrical energy) of almost 60 %. For hard coal the figure in modern plants is between 45 % and 50 %, and for lignite 43 %.

6.9

Around 40 % of the world's electricity needs and around 30 % in the EU are derived from coal. Around 63 % of the world's coal production is used to provide electricity: coal is more economical than oil or natural gas in providing electricity and is reliably available all over the world from widely diversified areas of production.

6.10

The aim is to concentrate the use of coal on steel and electricity production and so get a fossil fuel energy mix which combines economic benefits, environmental protection, security of supply and protection of resources. Worldwide supplies of coal are substantially greater than those of oil and natural gas.

6.11

The broad policy conditions should therefore provide incentives to use natural gas and oil, which are both relatively scarce and relatively versatile, predominantly for applications — such as fuel for transport and as raw material for the chemicals industry — where the use of coal (as well as of nuclear power and, to some extent, renewable energy sources) would involve extra costs, technology and energy consumption — and hence more CO2 production! The depletion of these reserves could thus be postponed to the benefit of future generations.

6.12

This would also mean incentives for the use of coal (and renewable and nuclear energies) in power stations for generating electricity, so that oil and natural gas would not be needed (see also point 8.12). Europe has available, in central and eastern Europe, considerable supplies of hard coal and lignite. These reserves can be used to prevent the EU's dependence on energy imports increasing further.

7.1

Environmental analyses and comparisons of fossil fuels must cover the entire production and application chain: extraction and recovery of raw materials, transport, energy conversion and end use. All of these steps involve more or less major effects on the environment, as well as energy losses. In the case of imported fuels, those environmental effects which arise beyond the EU's borders also need to be taken into account.

7.2

Different environmental effects need to be taken into account in the recovery/production of coal, oil and natural gas. In the case of coal mining, depletion of the landscape needs to be limited, as do dust emissions. In the case of drilling and recovery of oil the leakage of oil and natural gas, as well as by-products, needs to be prevented; the same is true for recovering natural gas and for the related pipeline or tanker transportation of oil and natural gas. Special precautions are needed in the case of offshore production. The methane produced in oil recovery should not be burned off, but put to industrial use. Something similar applies in the case of coal mining to the fire damp produced, which can contain large amounts of methane.

7.3

The European Large Combustion Plant Directive sets strict environmental standards for the building and running of power stations with a performance of ≥ 50 MWth. Concentrations of pollutants in discharge gas from gas, oil and coal-fired power stations must be limited to the state of technology as determined in this Directive. Older plants are to be modernised. This should ensure that the emissions of dust (and fine dust, see 7.6), sulphur dioxide, nitrogen oxides and, above all, harmful heavy metals and toxic or carcinogenic organic substances are reduced to a tolerable level for nature and people. Noise levels must also be pre-emptively reduced to a level at which harm is avoided as much as possible.

7.4

Coal contains non-combustible substances which are separated (in electric or fabric filters) as ash following the combustion process in a power station. The ash content of hard coal is normally up to 10 % (and occasionally as much as 15 %). Depending on the composition, ash is used as an extender in the cement industry and road building or used for mine and land filling.

7.5

Oil also has a proportion — albeit small — of ash. When oil is processed in the refineries, the ash (which includes parts of vanadium and nickel) remains in a solid state known as petroleum coke. It is then used for its residue energy in power stations and combustion plants which have the necessary purification equipment for separating all the pollutants.

7.6

For a number of years now there has been intensified discussion of fine dust emissions (15). These are respirable suspended dust particles which are smaller than 10 μm and could be a trigger for respiratory diseases. Such particles are also emitted by oil and coal combustion, as the filters are not able to completely separate finer ash particles. The most important source of fine dust emissions, however, are vehicles running on diesel which are not fitted with particle filters. In coal and oil power stations dust emission is restricted by the European Large Combustion Plant Directive's ceiling of 20 mg/m. In large power stations fine dust emissions are further reduced by wet flue gas desulphurisation. To reduce fine dust emissions further and to maintain emission ceilings throughout Europe, stricter conditions for diesel vehicles have been enacted by the EU which make particle filters obligatory in cars from 2008.

7.7

The desulphurisation of flue gases from large power stations and industrial combustion plants was made compulsory in some EU Member States as early as the 1980s. This put an end to the acidification of land and lakes that was already visible. The latest version of the European Large Combustion Plant Regulation prescribes an SO2 flue gas ceiling of 200 mg/m3 for plants >300 MW. The current state of technology allows separation of sulphur parts to a level of more than 90 %. New markets have been found for the products of sulphur separation, notably plaster, and the consumption of natural resources thereby reduced.

7.8

At high temperatures in the process of burning fossil fuels, nitrogen oxides are produced from the nitrogen in the fuel itself or in the combustion air. At increased concentrations these nitrogen oxides can cause respiratory diseases and are also a precursor of environmentally damaging ozone. The European Large Combustion Plant Regulation demands that nitrogen oxide emissions from power stations >300 MW not exceed 200 mg/m3.

7.9

Science goes on the basis of a causal relationship between the emission of man-made CO2 and other so-called greenhouse gases and an increase in temperature of the earth's surface (the greenhouse effect). The extent of the effect is still uncertain. Every year 20 billion tons of CO2 emissions are produced in the process of coal, oil and natural gas combustion; this is the prime source of man-made CO2 emission. Alongside increasing efficiency and energy-saving measures, CO2 separation technologies (see below) have the most potential for producing a considerable alleviation in the long term and therefore need to be developed.

7.10

Increasing efficiency in energy conversion and use is vital for comprehensive success in climate protection. The measures needed for this should be seized upon. Fuel substitution strategies are, by contrast, less effective, as they only have a one-sided effect on the consumption of certain forms of fuel (e.g., gas) and would thereby put in doubt economic efficiency and the EU's supply security. Moreover, gas is too important a raw material for the chemicals industry and the transport sector to be used for producing electricity.

7.11

Per energy unit, the combustion of natural gas produces only 50 % to 60 % of environmentally harmful CO2 compared with the burning of coal, because not only the carbon in the gas is used (burned), but also the hydrogen. However, methane itself — a main component of natural gas — is a greenhouse gas far more harmful to the climate (c. factor 30) than CO2. For this reason, everything must be done in the production and use of fossil fuels to prevent methane emissions. Methane released in the recovery of oil and coal must be captured and put to some use. It is also vital to avoid leakages of methane in transporting natural gas, as even the slightest losses in transit by pipeline are enough to offset the advantage natural gas has in this respect over coal.

7.12

Past experience shows that the best way to achieve rapid success in protecting the climate and the environment while using coal, oil and gas is to replace ageing plants and power stations with ones that have more modern technology and greater efficiency. For this reason, broad policy conditions which promote investment in new technology are particularly suited to achieving ambitious environmental protection objectives.

7.13

In the last twenty years, European environmental legislation has brought about harmonisation of environmental standards in the countries of the European Community. The European Large Combustion Plant Directive and the European Air Quality Directive have made important contributions to this, as have policies and measures to increase energy efficiency and reduce greenhouse gas emissions.

8.1

In the EU of 25, coal, oil and gas power stations account for more than 60 % of the total installed capacity of power stations and thus form the backbone of electricity supply in Europe. The need to replace decommissioned power stations and to satisfy increasing demands made on power station capacity (see point 5.8) means that a considerable number of new power stations will have to be built within the next twenty-five years. Even with more intense use of renewable energy and an expansion of nuclear energy, coal and gas power stations will have to meet a substantial part of this shortfall. The greater the efficiency and pollutant capture rate of these power stations, the easier it will be to meet environmental and climate protection requirements.

8.2

For this reason, improved R&D efforts are also required in the field of power station development. In the 1990s these efforts were neglected and public funding for research fell drastically in almost all the Member States.

8.3

The Committee welcomes the fact that its repeated recommendation to create a special ‘Energy’ thematic area in the 7th R&D framework programme has been taken up. However, the relevant research programmes of the Member States should be modified accordingly. This could usher in an important change in the trend. This also concerns the further development of power station technology for using fossil fuels, which would also benefit the competitiveness of the European plant construction industry in a globally expanding power station market.

8.4

Modern coal-fired power stations achieve an efficiency of more than 45 % using hard coal and more than 43 % using lignite. The steps needed to achieve an efficiency level of 50 % in coal power stations by 2020 are known. The long-term goal is to raise pressure and temperature in the steam cycle of the power stations to 700° C/350 bar, which will require the necessary materials to be developed. Pre-treatment plants for drying lignite coal should be tested for a new generation of lignite power stations. Such ambitious development aims require the kind of international cooperation that exists in the EU projects AD 700 and Comtes 700 for the development of a 700° C power station. The demonstration of a new power station concept requires investments of up to EUR 1 bn. As individual companies are hardly in a position to bear the costs and risks alone, cooperation between European companies should be sought.

8.5

In recent decades the development of high-performance gas turbines in gas-fired power stations has produced considerable improvements in efficiency. The efficiency of newer natural gas power stations has reached almost 60 %. However, there is uncertainty about the long-term competitiveness of natural gas power stations, and hence the construction of new gas-power plants, due to a drastic price hike on the gas market.

8.6

If the production of electricity from coal is to benefit from progress in gas turbine technology, coal first needs to be converted into gas. In the 1980s and 1990s the EU made an enormous contribution, through research funds, to the development of gasification technology and supported the building of two demonstration power stations with integrated coal gasification. These lines of development should be pursued not only in view of the increase in efficiency for coal-fired power stations, but should also be the technological basis for further development of a so-called zero-CO2 coal-fired power station.

8.7

Efficiency improvement and reduction of CO2 need not be limited to industry and electricity production. At the present time, the potential for savings related to household and commercial end-use is particularly large, because so far the cost incentive (savings in consumption/costs for new building or conversion) has often not been given.

8.8

The energy needs of the transport sector continue to rise, due in part to increasing mobility following EU enlargement. The increase in emissions of pollutants and greenhouse gases harmful to health must first be limited and then reduced to a minimum through the development of more efficient and less polluting motors and vehicles. Exhaust gas purification technologies must be continually developed. It seems that this goal can only be achieved through a successful development and blanket introduction of a bundle of progressive technologies. These include improvements to internal combustion engines, diesel technology, hybrid propulsion, fuel and the efficiency of vehicle fuels, the development of fuel cells and, possibly, hydrogen technology.

8.9

Fuel cells are ideally suited to boosting the efficiency of combined production of electricity and heat by perhaps around 20 % for both vehicles and stationary use in the household, commerce and industry. This also requires a gaseous fuel — natural gas, synthetic gas or pure hydrogen — which can be extracted, for example, from methanol via a reformer upstream of the fuel cell. However, although known about for 150 years, the fuel cell has not yet achieved an economic/technological breakthrough as a (competitive) vehicle fuel or decentralised combined power and heating plant. Nevertheless, research and development should be advanced, including with public support, to locate and — if possible — tap its potential.

8.10

No energy option has captured as much attention in recent years as the ‘hydrogen’ option and there is often even talk of the future hydrogen society. At the same time, there is often a misunderstanding among the public that hydrogen is, like oil or coal, a primary energy fuel. This is not the case: hydrogen must be recovered either from fossil hydrocarbons or water, in the latter case using electrical energy; just as CO2 is combusted carbon, so water (H2O) is combusted hydrogen.

8.11

Furthermore, the transport of hydrogen has a cost disadvantage compared with that of electricity or liquid hydrocarbons. This means that hydrogen should only be used where it would not be reasonable or possible to use electricity. An impartial analysis of this concept is needed to focus research on realistic goals.

8.12

Given the crucial importance to the transport sector of easily transportable hydrocarbons (fuels), reserves and resources should be safeguarded as far as possible, which means that oil should not be used where coal, nuclear or renewable energy sources would seem promising.

9.1

The target the EU has set itself — and which goes far beyond ‘Kyoto’ — of a worldwide reduction in greenhouse gas emissions by the middle of the century can only be achieved if, within a few decades, power stations and other large industrial plants can be, to a large extent, conceived, built and operated as zero-CO2 or reduced CO2 forms of production. Even if nuclear energy and renewable energy sources are radically expanded, they will not be in a position to take on this role alone and replace fossil fuels in a few decades.

9.2

Several procedures have been proposed for running coal-fired power station on a zero-CO2 basis. With modifications, these can also be used for oil and gas combustion. In principle, three methods are employed: (i) CO2 separation from the combustion gas of conventional power stations, (ii) development of oxygen combustion and (iii) the gasification combined power station with CO2 separation from the combustion gas; this last concept is the one furthest developed.

9.3

CO2 separation from the combustion gas of coal gasification produces pure hydrogen, which can be used in hydrogen turbines to produce electricity. Harmless steam remains as the discharge gas. If this technology proves successful, a synergy with hydrogen technology in other fields is on the horizon.

9.4

For more than twenty years the concept of power stations with IGCC (Integrated Gasification Combined Cycle) has been intensively researched and developed. The gas purification procedures are in principle known, but need to be adapted to coal technology. But the costs of producing electricity on the basis of this concept of the power station could be almost double those of conventional power stations without CO2 separation, and the consumption of resources will increase by around a third. However, in most places this technology will be more economical than other zero-CO2 power producing technologies, such as wind or solar energy or electricity from biomass.

9.5

In the 1980s, various IGCC concepts — at that time, of course, without CO2 separation — were developed in Europe, in part supported by the EU. 300 MW demonstration plans for hard coal were built and operated in Spain and the Netherlands. A lignite demonstration plant was developed, built and operated — again with EU support — to produce synthetic gas for subsequent methanol synthesis. Europe is thus excellently equipped technologically for developing zero-CO2 coal-fired power stations and for testing in demonstration plants.

9.6

Not only power stations, but other industrial process which produce large quantities of CO2 emissions — such as H2 production, various chemical processes and mineral oil processing, as well as the production of cement and steel -, should be examined with a view to their potential for CO2 separation. In many of these processes CO2 separation could be carried out more economically and technologically more simply than in the case of power stations.

9.7

There is a great need for research into safe, environmentally acceptable and economical CO2 storage. The possibilities are being explored of depositing CO2 in depleted oil and gas deposits, geological aquifer layers and coal deposits, as well as in the ocean. While storage in depleted oil and gas deposits, where available, would be the cheapest alternative, depositing in geological aquifer layers is favoured for large quantities, not least because such geological conditions are readily available worldwide. The key question here is to provide reliable proof that CO2 can be stored safely in such places for a long time and without adverse effects on the environment. A series of research experiments to achieve this is being supported by the EU. The results available so far are encouraging, though concerns remain that a rise in sea temperature might trigger a release of CO2 deposited in the ocean (see also point 3.14).

9.8

A comprehensive introduction of CO2 separation technology and storage will only be available after 2020 and even then on the assumption that the necessary R&D studies are on schedule and prove successful. Studies estimate costs of between EUR 30 and EUR 60 for every ton of CO2 disposed of (CO2 separation, transport and storage), which is more advantageous than most methods of renewable electricity production.

3.2.2006   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 28/16

1.1

With the adoption of Regulation (EC) No 724/2004 of 31 March amending Regulation (EC) No 1406/2002 establishing a European Maritime Safety Agency (EMSA), the Agency was assigned new tasks in the field of oil pollution response.

1.2

The present proposal establishes procedures for Community funding of the Agency's new tasks, on the basis of a multiannual commitment to be spread over a period of seven years, from 2007 to 2013. The Commission proposes a sum of EUR 154 million to cover the necessary funding for the seven-year period.

1.3

Following the assignment of the new tasks, in October 2004 the Agency's Administrative Board adopted an Action Plan for oil pollution preparedness and response. This identifies the activities that the Agency intends to embark on within the context of the Regulation, both in terms of response to an oil spill, using specialised anti-pollution vessels, and in terms of preparedness for mounting effective response operations.

1.4

The EMSA identified four priority areas for action: the Baltic Sea, the Western approaches to the English Channel, the Atlantic coast and the Mediterranean (particularly the area along the tanker trade route from the Black Sea), where the Agency intends to station chartered pollution response vessels ready to act when called upon by one or more Member States. It should be pointed out that the EMSA's role in this field will be to supplement (not to replace) national pollution response mechanisms. The Action Plan further includes additional response capacity for incidents involving hazardous and noxious substances (HNS).

1.5

The Regulation amended in 2004 requires the EMSA to provide the Commission and the Member States with technical and scientific assistance in the field of pollution response, which can be divided into three categories: information, cooperation and coordination, and operational assistance.

1.6

It is operational assistance which will require the greatest financial investment, since the Action Plan provides for the creation of a network of standby oil-recovery vessels and a Satellite Imagery Service Centre. The contracts to be concluded by EMSA to assure oil recovery assistance cover all actions and their financial consequences until the initiation of intervention following an oilspill. The costs of intervention by an oil-recovery vessel will be borne by the soliciting Member State.

1.7

As these new responsibilities are long-term, the Commission is proposing a multiannual budget which can both provide the necessary long-term investments and ensure adequate financial security, reducing expenditure in the negotiation of long-term contracts.

2.1

In its opinion on the proposal assigning new tasks to the EMSA in the field of pollution response (1), the EESC welcomed the Commission's proposal and stressed the EMSA's key role in improving maritime safety in the Member States. However, it regretted the fact that several Member States were still not properly equipped to respond to major accidents like those of the Erika and Prestige.

2.2

Despite the progress made, the current situation still leaves something to be desired in some cases. Together with the Action Plan, the Agency presented an overview of Member States' oil pollution response capacities, which stated that response capacity needed to be supplemented in certain regions with additional recovery vessels and equipment.

2.3

All coastal States cannot be expected to be permanently equipped with all the resources needed to deal with major sea accidents, particularly large-scale oil spills, on their own. However, the current lack of resources has resulted in environmental damage which will have long-term consequences.

2.4

The EESC therefore supports the proposal to give the EMSA the necessary resources to supplement Member States' pollution prevention and response mechanisms upon request. However, the EESC stresses that these resources can only serve as supplements. Under no circumstances should the above financial means be taken to replace pollution prevention measures which should be established by Member States.

2.5

In particular, the EESC stresses the need for a multiannual financing programme to fund these mechanisms. This is the only way to ensure consistent programming of the EMSA's activities in this area, and to optimise use of resources by concluding contracts with a minimum term of three years for the provision of rapid response (2) vessels.

2.6

The EESC reiterates the comment made in its Opinion referred to in point 2.1, regarding the need to ensure that the owner(s) of ships chartered to carry out these tasks respect(s) the relevant Community and international legislation, in particular that governing safety conditions on ships and the living and working conditions of crew members.

2.7

As the Action Plan adopted by the Agency identifies priorities on the basis of the limited funds to be made available, the EESC is concerned that, given the current difficulties in reaching agreement on the Community budget, the funds ultimately provided might be lower than those set out in the proposed budget. This would mean selecting certain measures over others or making progress in some areas at the expense of others. The EESC cannot support this approach, since the decision by Member States to grant the Agency additional competences implies the need to ensure the necessary funding to enable it to achieve its goals in the field of maritime pollution prevention. It is essential that maritime pollution prevention and response are accorded the necessary importance at Community level too, and that they are not viewed purely from an economic perspective.

2.8

The EESC is concerned about the delays of some Member States in implementing certain measures already adopted in the field of maritime pollution prevention and response, particularly in designating places of refuge and protected areas, providing reception facilities or in strengthening their resources for effective port state control. These delays cast doubt over these countries' genuine commitment to preventing and responding to maritime pollution, despite the good intentions regularly expressed, particularly after each new major maritime accident.

2.9

Investment is also needed in aerial surveillance means and equipment for detecting and combating pollution and preventing the violation of antipollution regulations.

2.10

Satellite imagery can also be used to complement surveillance and monitoring activities. The EESC supports the Commission's plan to set up a Satellite Imagery Service Centre, to help Member States in detecting, monitoring and managing illegal discharges and accidental oil spills.

2.11

Given the high costs (3) entailed in a satellite imagery service, the EESC believes that use of resources needs to be optimised and, in particular, that the use of images needs to be coordinated between Member States; this could lead to considerable cost-savings. At the same time, there are grounds for investment to improve image-gathering in all European maritime areas, as current coverage is not genuinely comprehensive, particularly in the Mediterranean area.

2.12

The EESC also considers the planned information, cooperation and coordination measures to be very important. These will ensure more rational use of existing resources and the Agency has a fundamental role to play here.

3.1

The EESC supports the proposal to give the EMSA the necessary resources to supplement Member States' pollution prevention and response mechanisms upon request.

3.2

The Committee regrets however that a number of Member States have not yet allocated the appropriate resources or established mechanisms of their own and asks the Commission to urge them to accelerate that process.

3.3

The EESC is concerned that, given the current difficulties in reaching an agreement on the Community budget, the funds ultimately provided might be lower than those set out in the proposed budget. The decision by Member States to give the Agency additional competences implies the need to ensure the necessary funding to enable it to achieve its goals in the field of maritime pollution prevention. It is essential that maritime pollution prevention and response are accorded the necessary importance at Community level too, and that they are not viewed purely from an economic perspective.

3.4

The Agency's role in promoting cooperation and coordination of Member States' resources and activities is fundamental for the establishment of a rational and cost effective strategy.

3.2.2006   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 28/18

1.1

This communication from the European Commission follows on from the considerable amount of work already conducted at European level, including: the Commission Report on risk management in January 2001, the Council discussions under the Swedish Presidency in Spring 2001, the Spanish Memorandum and the International Conference on Agricultural insurance and income guarantees in Madrid at the beginning of 2002, the Greek Memorandum and the Seminar on natural disasters in Thessaloniki in 2003, and the Conference organised by the Dutch Presidency in December 2004 on Material and immaterial costs of eradication of animal diseases.

1.2

More specifically, the communication has been drawn up to fulfil a commitment made by the Commission, in the form of a declaration issued in Luxembourg, in the context of the June 2003 CAP reform:

‘The Commission will examine specific measures to address risks, crises and national disasters in Agriculture. A report accompanied by appropriate proposals will be presented to the Council before the end of 2004. The Commission will analyse in particular the financing of these measures through the one percentage point of modulation directly re-distributed to Member States as well as the inclusion, in each common market organisation, of an article empowering the Commission to act, in the case of a Community-wide crisis, along the lines established for such cases in the common market organisation for beef’.

1.3

The communication also responds to the Conclusions of the December 2003 Council which called for the discussion to be continued; for an updated inventory of the risk management tools available to be provided; for the different risk management options to be considered; for possible new measures (common market organisation, financial support, competition rules) to be taken into account; and lastly for the guidelines on state aid in the agriculture sector to be assessed and adaptations suggested.

1.4

In the past, the CAP offered protection by means of its market and price support policies. Since the last reform, however, farmers are exposed more directly to a whole series of risks. The Commission therefore wishes to try out new instruments, in the context of the CAP, so as to help farmers improve their ability to manage risks and crises.

1.5

In its working documents, the Commission has drawn up an inventory of the current risks in agriculture: human or personal risk; asset risk (buildings etc.); financial risk; liability risk (genetically modified organisms); production risk (weather conditions); and price risk. It has also drawn up an inventory of the risk management tools currently available: indebtedness and investment (tax exempt savings); adaptation of production techniques; diversification; marketing techniques (contracts, integration); futures; mutual funds; and insurance.

1.6

In order to meet expectations more effectively and limit the damage caused by crises in the agriculture sector, this extremely broad analysis needs to be taken further.

2.1

In the first three pages of the communication, the Commission contextualises the problems relating to risk and crisis management. The working documents accompanying the communication address a large number of ideas. In the proposals which follow, the Commission goes on to respond to the explicit requests made in the Council Conclusions, i.e. extension of a safety net and financing of risk and crisis management measures through modulation using three options: insurance against natural disasters, supporting mutual funds and providing basic coverage against income crises.

2.2

Using modulation funds would mean using instruments based on rural development measures. Consequently, these new measures would have to improve the competitiveness of agricultural holdings (priority axis 1), respect the principle of annuality, comply with the rules on state aid and be compatible with the green box criteria established by the WTO.

2.3

The first option is insurance against natural disasters. In the Commission's view, this can help to reduce the ad hoc compensation payments paid out by Member States. A financial contribution of 50 % could be made towards producers' insurance premiums. Compensation would be paid out where losses exceeded 30 % of the average agricultural production in the preceding three-year period, or a three-year average based on the preceding five-year period (excluding the years of highest and lowest production). Compensation could not exceed 100 % of the income loss. The payment could not specify the type or quantity of future production. Another alternative to subsidising insurance premiums would be reinsurance by private insurance companies.

2.4

The second option is mutual funds, which are a way of risk sharing among groups of producers. Under this option, temporary and degressive support could be granted to cover administrative costs. It would be calculated according to the number of farmers participating. The funds must be formally recognised by the Member State. Compatibility with the WTO's green box would have to be assessed on a case-by-case basis.

2.5

The third option is to provide basic income coverage. This is based on the Canadian model and the requirements of the green box. The purpose is to increase the total liquid funds available in the event of crises (support for incomes). The system would be open to all agricultural producers. Compensation would be paid if the loss exceeded 30 % in the reference period (as for option 1). An income indicator is to be determined. Compensation must be less than 70 % of the income loss and must not relate to the type or volume of future production.

3.1

The Committee welcomes the Commission proposal, which launches the debate on a subject that is vital for the future of agriculture. The Commission has produced the communication in response to specific demands within a binding framework. The Committee considers this to be only a preliminary analysis, which will need to be expanded on in order to respond to the risks and crises listed in the introduction.

3.2

In chapters 1 (introduction) and 2 (background) of its communication, the Commission gives a brief outline of the new situation following the 2003 CAP reform (introduction of the single payment scheme) and lists the various measures that have been taken and the tasks that the Council has assigned with regard to risk and crisis management in agriculture. Neither the Commission's communication nor the working document from DG Agriculture explicitly mention the changes which have occurred regarding the risks to which European agriculture is exposed.

3.3

The Committee notes that the reform of June 2003 is making agricultural prices much more volatile. This, combined with the volatility of farm input prices, is increasing the likelihood of economic crises affecting agricultural holdings. Moreover, many scientists believe that climatic instability is also increasing. When economic crises occur, farmers are always the weakest links in the various production and distribution chains. They therefore need effective tools to help them to respond to crises and risks. The Committee therefore wishes to comment on a number of the points raised by the Commission.

3.4

The Commission has taken the positive step of proposing three schemes. These would be optional as far as the Member States are concerned, and complementary. They are interesting in themselves and none should be rejected automatically. However, each option needs to be analysed in more depth.

3.5

The Commission has considered using one percentage point of modulation to fund these schemes. However, it should first have assessed the cost of the proposed measures. While emphasising that the Commission's proposal is neutral in budgetary terms, the Committee wonders whether the envisaged funding will be commensurate with needs.

3.6

Funding under the first pillar helps to stabilise incomes and markets, and this role has been guaranteed until 2013. Such funding is vital for the survival of many farms, and modulation of direct aid should not be increased.

3.7

The sums produced by modulation vary widely between the Member States, and are non-existent for the new Member States. The Committee therefore proposes that as an alternative to the one percentage point of modulation, each Member State could assign part of its EAFRD allocation to risk and crisis management, up to a maximum of 0.1 % of its National Agricultural Product.

3.8

Because of the use of modulation funds, the Commission has worked within a rural development framework. The Committee believes that a broader approach should be taken and that other means of action should also be considered, including common market organisations (CMOs), competition policy, trade etc.

3.9

Whilst it is essential to analyse a certain number of risks and crises, their management is not always the responsibility of the Common Agricultural Policy. The risks connected with natural disasters, which cannot be forecast and therefore cannot be insured against, and epidemics such as foot and mouth disease, cannot fall within the remit of the CAP. Other existing instruments such as the veterinary fund or the solidarity fund should be available for these specific situations. In addition, an EU system for responding to natural disasters is currently being considered (1), and this system should cover risks in agriculture.

3.10

The Committee stresses that all these measures can only be effective if they are used to complement existing market management mechanisms within the CMOs, which include highly efficient tools tailored specifically to the various sectors. Similarly, in relation to trade, it is absolutely vital that the EU safeguard the Community preference within the Doha round.

3.11.1.1

The Committee draws attention to its opinion on a common system of agricultural insurance (2): a number of the requests made in this opinion remain valid. Agricultural insurance is a useful tool for covering certain specific risks, but it cannot replace the public authorities when it comes to managing exceptional risks.

3.11.1.2

Currently, under the guidelines for state aid in the agriculture sector, aid is authorised up to a ceiling of 80 % of the insurance premiums against losses due to natural disasters, such as earthquakes and other extraordinary events. Losses resulting from adverse weather conditions or animal and plant diseases are classed as natural disasters only if the losses reach a given threshold, currently set at 20 % of normal production in disadvantaged regions and 30 % elsewhere.

3.11.1.3

State aid of up to 50 % of insurance premiums is also permitted, when agricultural insurance covers losses beneath these thresholds, resulting both from natural disasters and from adverse weather conditions or animal and plant diseases.

3.11.1.4

The Commission's proposals on this aspect therefore represent a step backwards compared with the measures currently authorised under state aid. In order to provide a real incentive for the maximum number of farmers to make use of these instruments, it is necessary to introduce a system that is more attractive to the beneficiaries.

3.11.1.5

In some areas of risk prevention (such as multi-risk insurance), tried and tested mechanisms already exist in some Member States. The Committee supports the Commission's idea of establishing a new supplementary agricultural insurance instrument, bearing in mind that the introduction of new measures at EU level must not threaten existing systems which have already proved effective at national level.

3.11.1.6

Although the agricultural insurance system is a cross-cutting element in rural development, it must also allow for sectoral implementation, in order to meet the specific needs of the different regions of the European Union.

3.11.1.7

A considerable amount of unpublished work has been conducted on the issue of re-insurance. Mutual associations and private insurance companies could join forces to set up a re-insurance fund. The establishment of EU-level re-insurance could bring real Community added value.

3.11.2.1

The support proposed by the Commission does not provide a strong enough incentive. As a minimum, a capital investment should be provided at the launch of these funds to support their operation during the initial period. For it to be workable, this option would need the backing of producers' organisations.

3.11.2.2

The Council's failure to reach an agreement on the establishment of a fund for the pig meat sector shows what a difficult exercise this is. When a sector faces a serious crisis, farmers' contributions are not sufficient. In many cases, however, mutual funds enable economically viable farms to weather a crisis.

3.11.2.3

One strong incentive for agricultural producers and the other players in the production and distribution chains to come together would be direct management of mutual funds' market operations, including marketing, processing, storage and sales to non-EU countries. This would not only develop a sense of accountability in all the various players, who would play a greater role in market operations, but also bring the situation into line with the 2003 reform. Moreover, when instruments are implemented at a level close to the economic operators rather than by the authorities, they often work more effectively.

3.11.2.4

The new instrument should benefit and not pose a threat to existing mutual funds.

3.11.3.1

This option needs to be tested, and further work is needed on the subject. The income support provided in the EU for many sectors takes the form of direct aid, and under no circumstances should the system now being proposed replace direct payments to farmers. However, this does not mean that the Commission cannot explore other avenues for the longer term.

Analysis of the implementation of a system of this type in Canada (3) shows that such schemes could provide a useful tool for the EU in the medium to long term. They have been important for some of our trade partners, e.g. the United States and Canada. However, the Canadian mechanism is one of the main planks in their agricultural income support policy, and requires a large public budget which is not currently available to the EU.

3.11.4.1

The Committee endorses the Commission's view that it is necessary to promote the development of market-based risk management tools (such as insurance, the futures market and contract farming).

3.11.4.2

The Committee highlights its opinion on rural development (4) and calls for training and information initiatives to be financed by the European Social Fund rather than coming under rural development, which has other objectives.

3.11.5.1

Under the subsidiarity principle, rural development policy is implemented by the Member States. As a consequence, only the agri-environmental measures are binding. The Committee acknowledges that this approach is useful from the point of view of ensuring that policy is tailored to the actual needs of the EU's different regions. However, the probability of risks and crises occurring has increased throughout the EU. A degree of harmonisation is therefore essential, so that all farmers across the Union are treated fairly and have access to risk and crisis management schemes.

3.12.1.1

At EU level, promotion measures may be financed using various tools: rural development, internal market or non-EU country market. As mentioned above, early promotion measures are an extremely effective way of preventing a crisis from worsening. In the various regulations, the Commission should simplify the implementation of these measures so as to enable action to be taken swiftly.

3.12.2.1

During sectoral crises, measures to support storage have already proved effective in a certain number of CMOs. By spreading product sales over a longer period, such measures can help prevent crises resulting from over-production. The EU should authorise producers' organisations to introduce this tool under the mutual funds. It would also be an attractive means of encouraging farmers to set up producers' organisations.

3.12.3.1

In the event of major Community crises in the beef CMO, the Commission may act on the legal basis of Article 38 (5) of the regulation on the common market organisation for beef which states ‘When a substantial rise or fall in prices is recorded on the Community market and this situation is likely to continue, thereby disturbing or threatening to disturb the market, the necessary measures may be taken’.

3.12.3.2

The Committee regrets that the Commission has not seen fit to extend such a clause to other CMOs. The Council of Ministers has endorsed the line taken by the Commission.

3.12.3.3

The Committee points out that the situation has changed since the 2003 reform and that some CMOs have no safety net. If the pig meat or poultry sector were to face a consumer-confidence crisis leading to a sharp drop in consumption, many farms would go out of business.

3.12.3.4

Given that it would only mean providing the Commission with the legal basis to take action, if it considered such action to be warranted, the Committee calls for the general introduction of a ‘safety net’ clause for all CMOs, in order to ensure a level playing field for all sectors. It therefore asks the Commission and the Council to review their position.

3.12.4.1

In sectors where products can be consumed either fresh or processed, measures to support processing can help to prevent crises in the fresh products sector by temporarily permitting a production surplus in the processed products sector, where the market is less volatile and therefore less sensitive to fluctuations in the volume of production. These measures could be taken either by Member States or producers' organisations.

3.12.5.1

Measures aimed at reducing production are amongst the most effective available. If market expectations suggest that supply may outstrip demand, voluntary or compulsory measures to reduce production before harvest can avert a crisis. These measures could be taken either by Member States or by producers' organisations.

4.1.1

The Commission defines a crisis as ‘an unforeseen situation that endangers the viability of agricultural holdings, either at a localised level or across a whole sector of production’ (6). The Committee thinks that a clear distinction should be made between economic and other crises, and that economic crises should be defined using objective, transparent criteria.

4.1.2

In the case of economic crises, the Commission needs to define precisely what constitutes a ‘regional crisis’, ‘national crisis’ and ‘Community crisis’. The definitions should be based on a sound knowledge of the various markets, so as to determine the average price over the previous three or five years (in the latter case, excluding the best year and the worst year). A market crisis would be declared if there was an x % drop in the price of a particular product over a period of y days. The variables x and y should be defined according to sector and Member State, and possibly also according to production region. The dates on which the crisis is deemed to begin and end could then be decided by the public authorities.

4.1.3

For other types of crisis, each Member State has sufficient definitions to handle existing situations in their own particular context.

4.2.1

During crises, the lower prices paid to producers are not always passed on to consumers (7) and this prevents the market from functioning at optimum levels. The Council should review the 1962 regulation on the application of certain rules of competition to agricultural production and trade (8) and broaden the tasks of DG Competition, so as to oblige it to ensure that the market functions properly in the event of crisis by derogating from the usual principles.

4.2.2

Specific tools can be introduced for this purpose, particularly in the fruit and vegetable sectors. This government intervention in market operations must be accepted by the Commission in the context of the exemption regulations that exist in sectors such as insurance. This derogation from the competition rules would be temporary and would be overseen by the public authorities for the duration of the crisis.

4.2.3

One option here would be inter-business price agreements, such as those that could be reached by enterprises covering the whole production and distribution chain or by distributors, via central purchasing bodies.

4.2.4

In the case of unprocessed products, the difference between the price paid to the producer and the consumer price could be limited.

4.3.1

As part of the August 2004 framework agreement on the liberalisation of trade in agricultural products at the WTO, it was agreed to completely abolish all forms of export subsidies, provided all other existing instruments were eliminated in parallel. The date and speed at which they are to be abolished has yet to be decided.

4.3.2

However, the opening-up of the EU market will make producers more vulnerable to crises. During the current negotiations, Community preference must thus be preserved. The EU's social, pricing and ecological standards must not be undermined by social and ecological dumping of cheap imports. Food-sovereignty criteria must be taken into account. For these reasons, a system of qualified external protection or market access should be set up and further developed.

4.3.3

In times of crisis, the EU should limit imports and should use all the room for manoeuvre available to facilitate exports when the time comes to implement the future WTO agreements.

4.3.4

The Commission could envisage maintaining a share of the rights notified at Geneva so as to create a new tool for managing trade flows.

4.3.5

This right maintained at the WTO would not be used for sectoral subsidies, but, for example as a joint mechanism with third countries (like the one already set up with Egypt), used in the event of crises within the Community in order to facilitate the supply of external markets without exporting the crisis elsewhere.

4.3.6

Cooperation with the relevant authorities in third countries would make it possible to establish a price for the beneficiary country that would not disrupt its own market. European aid could focus on transport costs, administrative costs or (in the case of food aid) the cost of the merchandise.

4.4.1

In the current budget framework, which is based on the EU's own resources and annual expenditure, it is impossible to avoid this principle. However, the principle has serious consequences and should ultimately be reviewed in order to improve the functioning of the EU.

4.4.2

In the shorter term, it is possible to avoid this constraint. One solution could be to classify sums invested in stabilisation funds as expenditure. These funds would only be used if necessary in years when crises occurred.

4.5.1

One effective tool for managing trade risk is to enable producers to organise so that they can exert a genuine influence in trade negotiations. The Commission must continue to press forward in this direction and should, by means of incentives, encourage farmers to set up producers' organisations.

4.5.2

With regard to crisis management, the Committee would like to see organisations of producers and of the other actors involved in the various production and distribution chains come together at an appropriate level for the tasks which could be assigned to them.

5.1

In terms of responding to the problems of risk and crisis management, the Commission's proposals are a step in the right direction, but only a first step.

5.2

The proposals are only an adjunct to the management of agricultural markets conducted at European level via the CMOs and trade regulation. These provisions, which have demonstrated their effectiveness, must under no circumstances be brought into question.

5.3

The EU already possesses instruments that can usefully be deployed in the event of certain types of risk or crisis, and these should be coordinated. The veterinary fund and the EU solidarity fund should thus be retained and fine-tuned to enable them to respond to risks and crises in the agriculture sector, in tandem with the proposals outlined in the present opinion.

5.4

The 2003 CAP reform and the increasingly unstable climate conditions will have considerable implications for the management of farm holdings, which will be increasingly vulnerable to risks and crises. Consequently, it is vital that the ongoing liberalisation of trade in the Doha Round should safeguard the Community preference.

5.5

The three options proposed by the Commission need to be explored in more depth and implemented in the short or medium term. Nevertheless, these proposals are not an adequate response to the situation that will probably arise over the coming years. Work must therefore be pursued on this issue both at sectoral level during the forthcoming reforms of the CMOs and through a cross-sectoral regulation.

5.6

As far as finances are concerned, committing one percentage point of modulation is certainly a positive move, but it is vital to ensure fair treatment of all EU farmers, for example by committing 0.1 % of the National Agricultural Product. In future, other sources of financing will have to be found.

5.7

The Committee calls for ex-ante and ex-post evaluations in order (a) to assess new levels of risk in agriculture and budgetary needs, inter alia following the CAP reform, the increasing vagaries of the weather, and the WTO negotiations, and (b) to analyse the appropriateness of the solutions proposed to address these situations.

5.8

Organising producers and production and distribution chains represents one potential way forward for European agriculture. The Commission should step up its work to promote this kind of organisation.

5.9

The Commission has taken the positive step of proposing three schemes. The aim should not be to decide definitively between them, but to make sure that they are all available for the future and to explore them in more depth.

5.10

Risk and crisis management is a key topic for the Committee. On the basis of the work carried out in this field, the Commission should, in the near future, table a legislative proposal for putting the various provisions into practice. The Committee wishes to be consulted on this.

3.2.2006   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 28/25

1.1

Intensive farming of chickens kept for meat production raises problems of animal welfare and health. The Scientific Committee on Animal Health and Animal Welfare thinks that most welfare problems are attributable to breeding selection for reasons of growth and food conversion, with no accompanying improvements in animal welfare or health. Genetic selection has thus led to changes in metabolic and behavioural traits, resulting in leg problems, ascites, sudden-death syndrome and other health concerns. At the same time, the Scientific Committee notes that the negative effects of high stocking rates are reduced in buildings where good indoor climatic conditions can be sustained (1).

1.2

The EU has only general requirements for the protection of animals kept for farming purposes (2). However, some Member States have made national provision for the protection of chickens kept for meat production, and various voluntary quality assurance schemes are in place that also encompass welfare aspects. The Commission feels that common minimum standards are a potential means of tackling these welfare problems and of securing a more level playing field and a more effective common market. This also reflects civil society's growing awareness of the need for proper animal protection standards, and ties in with the Commission's action plan on animal welfare.

1.3

The Commission is proposing that that the maximum density of chickens per square metre of useable area (‘stocking density’) be fixed at 30 kg/m2 (live weight). Member States may, however, permit a stocking density not exceeding 38 kg/m2 live weight in establishments or single units of an establishment in which the owner or keeper complies with a number of requirements relating, among other things, to inspections, monitoring and follow-up carried out by the competent authority of the Member State concerned. The proposal also contains a range of detailed minimum requirements for all establishments, covering inspection and monitoring, drinkers, feeding, litter, noise, light, cleaning, disinfection, record-keeping, surgical interventions, training and guidance. Establishments with a higher stocking density are subject to additional requirements for record-keeping and documentation, NH3 and CO2 concentrations, temperature and humidity, the installation and inspection of ventilation, cooling and heating systems, the evaluation of indicators in post-mortem inspections and procedures in case of non-compliance. A regulatory procedure is proposed to secure the uniform application and ongoing adaptation of the provisions set out in the annexes, with assistance being provided by the Standing Committee on the Food Chain and Animal Health.

1.4

This ‘integrated approach’ for establishments and single units of an establishment with a higher stocking density is based on an increased flow of information between the producer, the competent authority and the slaughterhouse, underpinned by post-mortem inspections. The Commission feels that the data on production parameters collected for commercial purposes and in order to monitor compliance with feed and food law and hygiene requirements (3) can also be used to improve animal welfare. This integrated approach is, moreover, the foundation of the new legislation on food hygiene and on veterinary controls (4).

1.5

Not later than two years from the date of adoption of this directive, and drawing on the experience gained in applying voluntary labelling schemes, the Commission will submit a report on the possible introduction of a specific, harmonised, mandatory labelling regime at Community level for chicken meat, meat products and preparations, based on compliance with animal welfare standards; in addition, the report will consider the compliance of such a regime with WTO rules. Drawing on further scientific advice, the Commission will also submit a report — accompanied, if need be, by appropriate legislative proposals — on the influence of genetic parameters on identified deficiencies resulting in poor welfare of chickens.

2.1

As the Commission points out, the EU public is increasingly alive to animal welfare concerns in intensive production systems. This is, among other things, clearly reflected in a 2005 Eurobarometer study (5). In the same way as other relevant factors, therefore, animal welfare should also be included as an element in the ‘European model of society’ so as to offset any adverse impact of free trade and stronger competition, both within the EU and in the wider world.

2.2

Responsibility for welfare problems cannot be placed on one single link of the EU production and marketing chain for chickens kept for meat production. This includes genetic selection in internationally focused breeding centres, the production of parent animals, hatcheries, the production stage itself, slaughterhouses, marketing and consumers. Moreover, within the individual categories, views vary both on welfare problems and on economic and competition-related issues. As representative of civil society — and given the diversity of its membership — the EESC clearly has a responsibility to help establish sound and acceptable minimum standards of animal welfare in the EU.

2.3

The Committee commends the Commission's thorough preparatory work and endorses the proposed approach. The general provisions that apply to all flocks are obvious requirements based on enhanced self-monitoring on the farm, and they do not, for the most part, present any difficulties. The EESC also broadly endorses the more far-reaching requirements of the integrated scheme for flocks with higher stocking density, which take the proposed foot pad lesion scoring system, mortality and other possible indications of poor welfare conditions as a basis for intervention and an overhaul of conditions in the establishment in question.

2.4

The key issue is stocking density, where underlying standards must be based on the best possible scientific advice and on striking a balance between the various indicators of physiological conditions, behaviour and health. In the light of the Scientific Committee's report, the EESC considers it proper and acceptable to introduce a maximum limit of 30 kg/m2 for flocks in general and 38 kg/m2 for flocks where any adverse impact is countered by specific requirements relating to indoor climatic conditions.

2.5

At the same time, it must be recognised that stocking density is a critical factor in production costs and competitiveness. According to a March 2005 Dutch study, the proposed maximum stocking density will affect almost every establishment in the country. A typical Dutch holding of chickens kept for meat production earns, on average, just 1.89 cent per chicken after the deduction of variable and fixed costs (6). This shows the extremely narrow earnings margin in this kind of farming. To maintain the same level of earnings at stocking densities of 30 and 38 kg/m2, therefore, the price of a chicken kept for meat production has to rise by 8.0 and 2.5 cent respectively — for consumers a seemingly minimal increase. However, at European level, the industry feels that a maximum stocking density of less than 42 kg/m2 will inevitably result in a gradual displacement of EU sales on both European and third-country markets because of competition from key export countries outside the EU.

2.6

Hence, the requirement for lower stocking densities in the EU must go hand in hand with an adjustment in international trade rules so that the same or equivalent requirements also apply to imports from outside the EU. The EESC recognises the difficulty of discussing this issue in the current WTO negotiating round. But if the EU decides to adopt proper and legitimate animal welfare standards in this and in other areas, then it must, subsequently, also have the wherewithal, as one of the world's biggest trading partners, to press successfully at international level for the introduction of a clause of some kind to ensure that those standards are maintained (7).

2.7

Naturally, non-EU countries with comparative advantages and acceptable welfare standards can, potentially, gain a bigger share of the EU market and must therefore be presumed to support the introduction of international standards. But it will be paradoxical — and unacceptable — if, as a result of higher standards within the Union, EU production and sales on the European market and third-country markets gradually shift to non-EU countries with lower standards, or if the EU feels it is unable to improve animal welfare standards on the grounds that conditions in other key trading partners are also poor and there is a risk of production relocating there.

2.8

For that reason, the EU — whether with or without prior international agreement — must require that imports from all non-EU countries comply with equivalent rules. If, therefore, international acceptance is lacking, a degree of provocation may be necessary in order to draw the requisite attention to the need for law change, and to promote understanding of why that has to be done. The Commission should in any case make a detailed economic study of the competitive environment two years after the directive comes into force in the Member States to assess how the situation is shaping up.

2.9

The World Organisation for Animal Health (known by its French acronym OIE) recently adopted recommendations on certain other aspects of animal welfare, thereby demonstrating growing international awareness of the need for minimum international standards. The OIE recommendations stemmed from a conference held in 2004 as a forum for constructive dialogue between institutions, scientists, stakeholders and NGOs from around the world, including an array of developing countries. The conference underscored the need for a scientific basis for international animal welfare standards. The Committee feels that the WTO must take this task on board so that minimum standards adopted under OIE auspices can be applied within the context of the WTO.

2.10

In the light of negative experiences such as defective implementation or the introduction nationally of stiffer, competition-distorting requirements, the industry at EU level feels that the rules should be laid down in a regulation. The EESC recognises the advantages of a regulation, but notes that the Member States prefer directives, which allow the implementing provisions to be adapted to suit specific national conditions. A directive also seems better suited to the proposed integrated approach. Similarly, common rules on the technical details of farming methods will lack the necessary flexibility with regard to the systems used, and counteract technical developments designed to secure more effective and welfare-friendly farming practices. It must, however, be impressed upon the Commission that non-implementation or defective implementation cannot be tolerated.

2.11

Yet it is paradoxical that the Commission should cite distortions of competition arising from the different existing national arrangements as one of the reasons behind the proposal — and behind the need for common rules — while, at the same time, the proposal itself opens the door to more stringent national rules in the individual Member States. Common rules in the EU are a key point of departure for Union efforts to secure common rules internationally. As for Member States' failure to implement directives properly or at all, the Commission must, in future, take its Treaty responsibilities seriously and ensure that the rules are applied correctly within the timeframes that the Member States themselves have been involved in setting.

2.12

The EESC is fully supportive of more far-reaching voluntary schemes in the shape of codes of practice and would like to see them replaced by a joint, European-level scheme along the lines of the one for organic products. This gives consumers choice and lets the market itself show the extent of the interest in raising animal welfare standards beyond the current minimum requirements. The EESC would also like to see a mandatory labelling scheme for EU products, if such practice is compatible with WTO rules. That said, current EU law should be complied with in any case, obviating the need to mention that point specifically on the labelling. For pre-packed chickens, consideration should also be given to the possibility of indicating the production method on the packaging, as is currently done for eggs.

2.13

The Commission should, as announced, submit a report based on new scientific evidence, and taking into account additional research and practical experience, in order to further improve the welfare of chickens kept for meat production. The report should also consider the influence of genetic parameters on identified deficiencies. However, the proposal ought to take account of the impact of genetic selection even at this stage, and there is also a need for rules on conditions for parent animals. Work on this front should therefore begin without delay, and should be revised at a later stage if necessary in the light of the slaughtering data. Otherwise, the Commission will only be able to start work once the slaughtering data become available five years after adoption of the directive.

2.14

The EESC recognises that research is a long-term process and that current rules should be adapted to new knowledge and technological developments. At the same time, research in this and in other fields must also be stepped up so as to improve knowledge in areas where it falls short of the mark. This applies, among other things, to the connection between stocking densities and climatic and environmental conditions (8). Biosecurity also merits much greater attention, given the close link between animal health, welfare and the environment, in connection, for instance, with avian influenza (9).

3.1

Irrespective of production systems, stocking densities, technical arrangements etc., stockmanship, management and good agricultural practice are of vital importance for animal welfare and health. These factors, and their importance in daily contact with — and care of — animals, cannot, by their very nature, be secured through legislation and monitoring. The provisions of the proposal relating to instructions, guidance, courses, training and inspection at least twice a day should be self-evident in this regard. The EESC is concerned, however, that there are no skills requirements and that training may be replaced by experience irrespective of the kind of experience involved.

3.2

Steps must be taken to ensure that any assessment of animal welfare is conducted independently by inspectors with enough training and experience in the field. Similarly, written records should be kept in a uniform way in the Member States.

3.3

In the interests of transparency, it should also be made clear that poultry kept at low stocking densities is only inspected as part of the ‘hygiene package’. Approved training schemes and documented training periods should also be required for all establishments above a certain size.

3.4

The requirements for maximum NH3 and CO2 concentrations must be laid down in such a way that the limits are not exceeded under normal conditions. Under atypical climate conditions it will be impossible to exceed these limits in the bulk of ideal production systems.

3.5

The proposal states that ‘all buildings shall have light with an intensity of at least 20 lux during the light periods, measured at bird eye level’ and that ‘the light must follow a 24-hour rhythm and include periods of darkness lasting at least 8 hours in total, with at least one uninterrupted period of darkness of at least 4 hours’. This corresponds exactly to the Council of Europe's recommendation (10). Drawing on scientific reports and practical experience, however, the industry considers a minimum of 15 lux for the first 14 days, followed by a minimum of 5 lux and a four-hour uninterrupted period of darkness to be adequate. The industry says that trials involving a higher light density and longer periods of darkness have led to more foot pad lesions and to animals being rejected because of skin lesions. In the EESC's view, a balance needs to be struck between many different considerations, and policy should be based on the most relevant scientific findings and practical experience. In cases of uncertainty or a lack of documentation, further studies should be carried out so that the provisions in place can be adjusted to reflect the best knowledge available on this subject at any given time.

3.6

In establishments with higher stocking densities, the proposal provides for intervention when the mortality rate exceeds 1 % plus 0.06 % multiplied by the slaughter age of the flock in days, i.e. around 3.5 %. The industry feels that a maximum limit of 0.12 % mortality per day is justified, and that, as there is no connection between welfare and mortality in the first seven days, the limits could, if necessary, reasonably be set at 1.5 %. The EESC considers that the limit here and in other areas should be set at a level that reflects practical possibilities in a smooth-running establishment. In cases where there is notification of severe deficiencies, consideration should also be given to supplementing records of mortality and foot pad burns with records of, for instance, leg problems and peritonitis in the flock.

3.7

Detailed written descriptions, including photographs of foot pad lesions in the different groups, should be laid down by the Commission in order to standardise the classifications.

4.1

Subject to the above comments, the EESC endorses the Commission's approach to the issue and the proposal's detailed provisions. The various limits for light intensity, maximum NH3 and CO2 concentrations, mortality, foot pad lesions etc. should be set at a level that reflects the practical possibilities in a smooth-running establishment.

4.2

Any reduction in stocking density from current levels must be accompanied by a welfare clause in international trade rules that makes it possible for the EU to lay down equivalent requirements for imports from non-EU countries, so that poor conditions in key export countries outside the EU do not preclude proper and warranted standards within the Union. If international acceptance is lacking, the EU will have to take unilateral action to draw the requisite attention to the need for law change, and to promote understanding of why that has to be done. Otherwise, production must to a large extent be expected to shift to countries with lower standards. At the same time, the Commission should conduct a detailed economic study of the situation two years after the directive comes into force in the Member States.

4.3

Research has to be a long-term process and rules should be adapted on an ongoing basis to reflect new knowledge and technological developments. Research must also be stepped up so as to improve knowledge in areas where it falls short of the mark.

3.2.2006   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 28/29

1.1

The programme is designed to encourage cooperation between citizens and their organisations from different countries so that they can meet, act together and develop their own ideas in a European environment that goes beyond a national vision and respects their diversity. Mutual understanding, solidarity and a sense of belonging to Europe are the building blocks for the involvement of citizens.

1.2

The programme both ensures the continuity of the current civic participation programme and opens the way to new activities, while providing a degree of flexibility in order to be adaptable to future developments.

1.3

The overall aim of the programme, reprising the terms used in the proposal, is to help to:

1.4

Taking into account the current situation and the identified needs, the Commission proposes the following specific objectives, to be implemented on a transnational basis:

1.5

Three types of action are proposed: Action 1 — Active citizens for Europe (Town twinning, Citizens' projects and support measures); Action 2 — Active civil society in Europe (Structural support for European public policy research organisations, Structural support for civil society organisations at European level, Support for projects initiated by civil society organisations); Action 3 — Together for Europe (High-visibility events, Studies, Information and dissemination tools).

2.1

The Commission proposes to make developing European citizenship a ‘main priority’ for EU action (1). The EESC sees this not just as appropriate but also urgent or even crucial to continued European integration. The low turnout in the last European Parliament elections, highlighted in the preamble to the programme, is not the only sign of this urgency. The vicissitudes of the ratification of the European Constitutional Treaty show that the consequences of a failure to involve European citizens actively in European integration are public mistrust of the union's institutions, perhaps even leading to an attitude of rejection.

2.2

This situation is common, albeit to varying degrees, in all the Member States and affects or will affect the candidate countries. Given this, it is positive that the programme puts all of them on the same footing.

2.3

For while this weak connection with what is already a European reality is not expressed exactly identically in every Member State — not least because of the different ratification methods chosen by each country — and while it cannot, consequently, be seen to the same extent everywhere, it does nevertheless seem to exist to differing degrees in all the Member States.

2.4

Even where a sometimes intense, unprecedented European debate exists, particularly in the countries that chose or were able to ratify the European Constitutional Treaty by referendum, the debate turns more around national identity and citizenship (and safeguarding them in an often defensive, even ‘nationalistic’ way) than on the actual achievements and progress proposed in the Constitutional Treaty. This is particularly the case as regards social policies (rightly perceived as a key indicator of citizenship), and democratic policies (‘scuppered’ by a prejudice that is almost universal yet largely unmerited of an anti-democratic, technocratic Europe that almost wilfully keeps citizens out of the decision-making process).

2.5

Although it covers the period 2007-2013, and is thus outside the period when all Member States will have proceeded in their different ways with the ratification (or not) of the Constitutional Treaty, the proposed programme, its discussion and its approval in the current context cannot fail to have an immediate impact on the key issue of European citizenship that is so dramatically in the ‘here and now’. However, the 2007-2013 programme shadows the Council's 2004 decision too closely (2). It has few resources, and while the methods envisaged are tried and tested, they are insufficiently innovative to deal with the challenges of which we are even more acutely aware today. The fact is that there is a problem here and now; children born today will be 8 years old in 2013 and their mental outlook as future citizens is already partly formed.

2.6

The EESC is convinced that the current context and the debate on a new ‘Citizens for Europe’ programme for the period 2007-2013 are, paradoxically, highly favourable to at last turning the spotlight on the question of European citizenship; to moving on from a somewhat hackneyed notion of unity in diversity which, in reality — and if we are not careful — might only promote diversity or even a compartmentalised society. It therefore endorses the proposal to extend the 2004-2006 programme without waiting for the external evaluation report scheduled for the end of 2006 at the latest (and which must still go ahead). The EESC wants to be a major player, a focal point for the importance invested in this programme. While it fully understands that a programme such as this must ensure continuity with the current civic participation programme, it fully endorses the strong criticism Parliament and some civil society organisations have made of that programme's lack of ambition. Its proposals therefore aim to ensure that the 2007-2013 programme will not be just a reworking of the current programme

2.7

It is clear that the programme's extreme financial modesty means that it cannot cover all European citizenship issues, as its vast array of objectives and actions might lead to believe. It is, however, a key link in the chain: that of ‘active European citizenship’, defined as the ability of citizens to organise independently and exert power and responsibility in public policy, in order to defend the common good and ensure its development (3). The EESC therefore insists that the allocated budget (EUR 235 million over 7 years!) must be ringfenced, whatever the final conclusions of the debate on the financial perspective of the European Union might be.

2.8

While it is true that the context requires a qualitative leap forward, it also makes it possible. From this point of view, the EESC would like to see the Union press ahead with a study into the extent to which citizens currently feel a connection with the European Union — or at least pool available studies to enable a sufficiently accurate diagnosis to be made.

2.9

The Committee believes that the fact that ‘European citizens seem to have developed a certain distance towards the European institutions and to have difficulties in identifying themselves within the process of European integration’ (4) is, in addition to genuine ignorance and incomprehension of the way the Community operates and of the logic behind it, and the undeniable nationalist and protectionist attitudes linked to various objective and subjective risks and fears generated by globalisation, a result of the lack of recognition of existing European citizenship, in particular in its more active, organised forms.

2.10

From this point of view, one could argue that the considerable synchronisation, the different forms of mobility (admittedly well below the potential opened by European integration), the physical and material removal of borders, the common currency and the single market have not been sufficiently highlighted: ‘a common European identity is not perceived because it has not been stated’ (5); However, it is increasingly evident that when Europe is viewed from the outside, e.g. when travelling or residing outside its borders, a real ‘European way of life’ is everywhere apparent and attractive.

2.11

Consequently, the current fixation with an entrenched national identity must not be allowed to mask the consistency and quality of the European lifestyle, of its democratic forms of participation. A more ambitious programme of ‘active European citizenship’ could reduce, alleviate and transform these entrenched positions.

2.12

In any event, and whatever the difficulties or temporary deadlock that might ensue from the current debates surrounding the ratification of the Constitutional Treaty and the necessarily agitated period for European integration, the EESC believes that the context lends itself well to the issue of active European citizenship. It considers that the 2007-2013 programme must be seen — and if possible enhanced — against a background in which citizens are once more concerned — whatever their stance — with Europe, with their ability to intervene both directly and through their chosen organisations in the European decision-making process.

2.13

The EESC therefore calls for an open symposium so that the whole notion of European citizenship can be approached in this new context, and to get to grips with the issue in its entirety rather than just firing off responses in a multitude of separate programmes that are insufficiently comprehensible or operational. The EESC could organise this symposium. The Committee is delighted that the Commission takes a positive view of such an initiative (6).

3.1

While the EESC, a European institution representing organised civil society and explicitly referred to in the Treaties, appreciates the fact that it has been asked to deliver an opinion on the programme (referral not being mandatory in this case), it feels that the proposal submitted to the Council and to the European Parliament would have benefited from being referred to the Committee an even earlier stage. Admittedly, the programme was the subject of a major on-line consultation between December 2004 and February 2005 (receiving 1,000 answers) and of a consultative forum (bringing together 350 participants) on 3 and 4 February 2005. But providing more scope for consultation of the European Economic and Social Committee from the outset — instead of merely requesting for an opinion ‘ex-post’ — would offer a way of tackling the numerous reasons why European citizens feel disconnected from their ability to really count in EU decision-making, both as individuals and through their chosen organisations.

3.2

The EESC regrets to see that the programme, which refers to the Commission's identification of three types of response to the problem of why citizens feel removed from the European institutions, does not seem able to address the issue holistically. Although the EESC is keen to see specific responses to specific topics, it would suggest that the three types of response should be also brought under an umbrella programme, making it possible to deal with all aspects of the issue and to work on common objectives, on areas of commonality and complementarity.

3.3

Public information about the European institutions, communication campaigns on European issues, an awareness of the rights conferred by European citizenship and a feeling of belonging — i.e. European identity — are part of a whole. However, while the Commission programme speaks of complementarity with other Community programmes and instruments, it remains vague on this fundamental question and has nothing to say about the kind of arrangements that would ensure that action is consistent with the objectives. An approach that fails to bring together these three aspects will find it hard to reverse the current significant decline in the way citizens connect with the EU and European identity.

3.4

The EESC would like to be sure that this specific programme will be accompanied by a robust information and communication campaign to inform citizens about the institutions and their rights. This must include information about the existence and the specific role of the EESC itself, which is under-publicised in the communication policy of the other European institutions. The EESC also need to radically rethink its communication policy which does not live up to the role that it claims to play in bringing about an active European citizenship, as its most eminent representative.

3.5

Although the programme appears to appreciate the disconnection citizens feel with regard to the European institutions and their difficulty in being part of the European integration process, it does not seem to face up to all the consequences. This can be seen in the words and expressions that it uses, whereas merely referring to this crisis of identification and participation could play an important role in overcoming it. Consequently it hardly seems credible to present a programme of such modest financial means as the way to put ‘citizens at the centre’ of the European integration process. Who can believe it? Similarly, and even more so given the stakes (amply highlighted in the preamble to the programme), it is hard to find any major innovations which can really help to change the current situation, other than some significant advances (multi-annual projects, pooling experience, opening up to new partners, removal of some constraints for beneficiaries and support for major events, notably in the context of intercultural dialogue).

3.6

The overall impression is one of too much continuity with the 2004-2006 programme. The structural support once again granted to a certain number of organisations that the programme mentions as appearing to pursue an objective of general European interest should be replaced with an open funding access procedure, based on clear transparent criteria. What constitutes a ‘general European objective’ also needs to be clarified if it is to be workable.

3.7

The EESC is fully aware that the programme is more specifically open to associations and NGOs, which — unlike other civil society organisations, e.g. the social partners — do not have access to other programmes and other arrangements that enable them to make a meaningful contribution towards extending active European citizenship.

However, if it is to be able to identify clearly the express wish of the social partners and other civil society organisations, mutuals and cooperatives to play a specific, visible role in this process, the programme must be open to them both in theory and in practice. In return, the social partners need to be prepared to work more closely with the associations and NGOs on other budget headings.

3.8

As on several previous occasions, the EESC would reiterate the urgent need to define an open European citizenship, containing specific rights and open to all regularly settled or long-term residents of the European Union (7). The inclusion of the Charter of Fundamental Rights in the European Constitutional Treaty and the fact that the European Union is a signatory to the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms requires the recognition of a ‘civic’ citizenship that is relatively independent of a European citizenship that can currently only be acquired through national citizenship of one of the Member States. This first step towards participative citizenship for all persons residing stably in the European Union should be ‘made legal’ if we really want to achieve a European identity and a specific European citizenship, and if we genuinely want this citizenship to do more than just superimpose some abstract European citizenship onto the national citizenship of the Member States.

3.9

The EESC takes the view that it will remain difficult to make any real progress in this crucial area without any progressive build-up of solid material support for European citizenship. Such support cannot come from national citizenship alone and the rights conferred by this European citizenship which unites us must be accompanied by a number of duties. Consequently, the failure to use a legislative instrument to promote citizen participation, whilst understandable given the lack of specific material support for European citizenship, is questionable if we are aiming, albeit gradually, to attach specific rights and duties to this citizenship. The EESC considers that we must make progress in these areas, regardless of the material or symbolic support chosen. In addition to the European non-military service for young people already proposed by the Commission, other options could be a personal contribution — however small — to the European budget (admittedly a thorny question), and/or election of the representatives of the people on the same day in all countries, i.e. an election that would involve all EU Member States.

4.2.1

The EESC considers that this part of the programme could be developed much further. Meeting and acting together at trans-national level is the cornerstone of European citizenship. The EESC therefore believes that, while this programme does not address the problem of a statute for European associations, mutual societies and foundations, a definitive solution should be found as a support measure in order to develop solidarity and mutual action, particularly as part of a voluntary framework.

4.2.2

The EESC takes the view that strengthening European networks is, in accordance with the programme, a crucial element. However, the EESC would again insist that all European networks should have the same access to this structural support, rather than some organisations having priority, although the Commission does take steps to ensure that there is no ‘carte blanche’ and that the projects must be quantifiable. Moreover, funding for projects — even small ones — is crucial as it enables national and local organisations, which are in direct contact with citizens, to take on a European dimension and help to bridge the gap between citizens and the European institutions. The EESC also welcomes the fact that, in providing funding for small projects, the programme enables trans-national initiatives to grow out of national networks, even if the initiatives do not cover all Member States.

4.2.3

The EESC is extremely concerned that a Commission proposal such as that from DG Justice, Freedom and Security (8) could lead, in the name of security and the fight against terrorism, to NGOs and associations being generally viewed with suspicion. This is because they could, by their very nature, be an entry point for such phenomena, and the associations could be forced, through over-bureaucratic procedures, to assume the burden of proof in the matter. If this were to happen, it would run against the spirit and the letter of the programme.

4.2.4

The EESC believes that it — together with the Committee of the Regions and with the agreement of the European Parliament — should be specifically tasked with coordinating consultations with the social organisations and local authorities; with distilling their opinions and communicating them to the other Community institutions; and with ensuring the latter are well-informed upstream. The European Parliament should formally consult the EESC and the CoR on this subject on a regular basis.

4.2.5

A formal partnership (9) rather than a case-by-case one, based on equality notwithstanding diversity of role, between the EP and organised civil society as expressed through its European institutions, becomes crucial, despite the fact that this is still far from happening or even being considered. The active European citizenship programme should work to eliminate all traces of any hierarchical vision of the European authorities, since European culture is also one of sharing power and authority.

4.3.1

The EESC believes that focusing on intra-European intercultural dialogue should be the main objective of this programme. The current debate on the Constitutional Treaty has shown that ignorance of intra-European cultural differences has been underestimated, as have deep-rooted stereotypes, the sometimes contrary nature of the most fundamental elements — particularly legal and constitutional — which determine the way each Member State views the world. Equally underestimated are convergence in lifestyle, values, worldview, the conviction that homo europeus is different in terms of his citizenship from all other citizens of the planet. ‘Homo europeus’ is the result of the concrete implementation of the Union's moral and spiritual heritage, which is founded on the universal, unassailable values of human dignity, freedom, equality and solidarity. It is underpinned by the principles of democracy and the rule of law. It puts the citizen at the heart of its work by creating EU citizenship and an area of freedom, security and justice. High-profile events, information and dissemination tools, studies recognising not just real differences (instead of clichéd ones) but also — perhaps primarily — a ‘European way of life’ must therefore be promoted energetically. European culture does not rest on inherited values alone; it also ensues from the construction of the European Union itself: its single market, its common currency, a Europe reunited with itself (enlargement to the countries of Eastern Europe). However, if these high-profile events are to encourage a sense of belonging and shore up a European identity, it is essential that citizens and their organisations should be very closely involved in planning and implementation, or better still, come forward with ideas themselves, as they are best placed to identify the key features and symbols of an identity that is part of their everyday lives.

4.3.2

The EESC believes that, within the confines of its remit, its contribution towards promoting the social dimension of culture and organising a permanent, able partnership with the European Parliament in this area is crucial to identifying and continuously honing a common cultural identity for European citizens. This cultural identity cannot be achieved by merely safeguarding a cultural heritage that is often less ‘common’ than we might want to admit. A common European citizenship is a highly contemporary issue. It will be forged through the decision to link the countries of Europe — of all Europe — ever more closely through the difficult but essential sharing of sovereignty. For, as Claude Lévi-Strauss puts it, ‘I knew a time when national identity was the only conceivable principle in relations between States. We now know the disasters that resulted’. A culture of shared sovereignty — not abandonment of sovereignty — this is the culture and identity of the European citizen of today, and of tomorrow even more so.

5.1

European citizenship is at the heart of the recent crisis following the rejection by some countries of the European Constitutional Treaty. Reconnecting citizens with the institutions of the Union must therefore, more than ever, be at the heart of Commission concerns and policy, in particular through the promotion of active European citizenship. A comprehensive debate of this issue thus needs to be organised with all stakeholders before the new programme for the period 2007-2013 is approved.

This debate could be organised within the framework of the symposium referred to in point 2.11 above, and the EESC could be tasked with preparing it.

5.2

The symposium should openly discuss active European citizenship, defining the rights and responsibilities of European citizens as opposed to those conferred by citizenship of individual Member States.

The option to define and trial economic, social, political, environmental and other rights that are specific to active European citizenship, particularly as regards solidarity and security (civil protection is one that springs to mind), should be discussed and put to the vote in a single European poll by universal suffrage.

5.3

The EESC believes that, despite the real problems involved, it is now crucial to deliver a European Association Statute, if we are to endow active European citizenship with an appropriate framework that goes beyond a simple — and contentious — ‘safe’ code of conduct.

5.4

In any event, and whatever the outcome of the EU budget negotiations, the EESC calls for the budget for the programme to be ringfenced, as it constitutes a minor outlay for a major plank in developing European citizenship, which the Commission rightly sees as a fundamental priority for EU action. Moreover, the EESC recommends not keeping to the announced per capita budget of EUR 0.55 for 6 years, but rather cultivating all possible synergies between the various Directorates-General in order to pool objectives and resources on this issue which concerns all the European institutions because of its central importance for the future. In this connection, European Union policy on active citizenship should be drawn up by a permanent inter-institutional unit, bringing together all stakeholder Directorates-General and representatives from all the other EU institutions.

5.5

The EESC suggests that primary education — rather than only lifelong learning programmes — is the time and place to teach European citizenship as a stand-alone subject rather than applying a merely cosmetic approach (colours, stickers, caps, festivals, etc.) Citizenship is not just a matter for active age brackets.

Following this line, the Commission could ask the Member States to include in their school syllabuses an EU knowledge component and questions that are specific to European citizenship. A primary level ‘Erasmus’ programme adapted to this age bracket should be envisaged, going well beyond traditional language exchange programmes.

We need to leave behind the static, unappealing European ‘sites’ that are currently available and harness all the new ICT potential, especially the playful, interactive, participatory features (perhaps even setting up a psychological evaluation unit for each new citizen support). The suggestion and proposals are consistent with the Comenius programme, whose objectives are:

5.6

With regard to specific actions, all levels must be promoted together, without eliminating the micro-projects — where citizens are the protagonists and which help to promote European identity at local or national level — in favour of support granted to European networks. The only criterion for distributing funds to various types of action must be their impact on active European citizenship and involvement of citizens in the European project and in shaping and implementing EU policies.

5.7

The EESC fully endorses the Commission's proposals which, from a technical standpoint, aim to simplify procedures radically in an area (direct, active citizen participation) that is much less able to cope with bureaucratic hurdles.

5.8

The EESC is convinced that the ‘invention’ of specific features of European citizenship, which are more than the mere sum of national citizenships (whether these features be of a symbolic, economic, socio-political, cultural or legal nature), is now an absolute priority for the European Union, and that the promotion of active citizenship can make a significant contribution here. The Committee is prepared to play its part in this ‘invention’ by coordinating the consultation of civil society organisations and by encouraging the other Community institutions to listen to their views and take them on board.

3.2.2006   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 28/35

1.1

The European Economic and Social Committee acknowledges the European Youth Pact and its elaboration as outlined in this Communication from the Commission on European policies concerning youth. This Communication provides a framework that can serve as a basis for future policy development in areas affecting young people in the European Union.

1.2

The destiny of Europe increasingly depends on its ability to foster societies that are welcoming towards children and young people. Adoption of the European Pact for Youth by the Spring 2005 European Council, as part of the revised Lisbon Strategy focussing on growth and jobs, is a recognition that integrating young people in society and working life, and making better use of their potential, are essential for ensuring a return to sustained and sustainable growth in Europe.

1.3

In acknowledgement of the multitude of challenges for young people in today's society the EESC has regularly contributed to youth policy development at Community level for over a decade (1). It has initiated important debates on key areas, such as youth employment, social integration, education, mobility, participation and the role of NGOs. Whilst the EESC is also cognisant of the challenges currently facing the European Union and the need to regain confidence.

1.4

The EESC recommends that Young People are placed at the centre of this framework and are encouraged and given space to actively participate in the development of policies. Contributing to change is a major motivation for young people to get involved. The Member States and institutions must provide the necessary resources, supports and mechanisms to facilitate young people at all levels to engage in decisions and actions that impact on their lives. Only real influence will lead to real responsibility.

1.5

More than ever, Europe needs young people's ongoing commitment that will help to build an integrated, competitive, safe and inclusive Europe. If the European Union is to mean anything to young people, it must be relevant in their lives and show a clear interest in and respond visibly and creatively to their needs. Equally, success of this initiative depends on the involvement of all parties concerned, in particular, youth organisations as well as regional and local authorities and the social partners. The EESC has taken on board the ‘idea which emerges’ from the High Level Group's report on the future of social policy in an enlarged European Union: ‘from a new intergenerational pact’ to a pact focused on the elderly and based on fears … to a new pact focused on the young and based on confidence … to turn all these fears into a ‘win-win’ process based on a positive perception of the future and a new intergenerational balance'.

1.6

Consequently, the EESC hopes that this Communication will lay the basis, both at the European and national level, for a greater partnership between decision-makers and young people. Real and continued involvement of young people and youth organisations in the development and implementation of policies will ensure that young peoples' real needs are addressed and that young people feel an ownership of the Lisbon process.

2.1

At the Spring European Council of 22-23 March, the EU Heads of State and Government adopted a ‘European Youth Pact’ (2). In proposing this Pact the Heads of State and Government of France, Germany, Spain and Sweden identified four principal issues: the vulnerability of young people; the need to develop solidarity across the generations, in an ageing society; the need to equip young people through their education and training; the need for better coherence across all policy areas that concern young people.

2.2

The Communication addresses a range of issues and policy areas that are of high concern to young people in Europe, and were identified as such in the Commission's White Paper A new impetus for European youth and the subsequent Council resolution of 27 June 2002, which set the framework for youth policy in Europe.

2.3

In response to the Spring Council conclusions, the European Commission adopted integrated guidelines on 12 April (3). This package of guidelines, comprising on the one hand a recommendation for Broad Economic Policy Guidelines, and on the other hand a proposal that has been endorsed for a Council decision on Employment Guidelines, should serve as a basis for the national reform programmes for the next three years, to be drawn up by the member states.

2.4

In the introduction to the guidelines, the importance of involving the relevant stakeholders in the Lisbon Strategy is underlined, and it is stated that member states as well as the EU should take every opportunity to involve regional and local governments, social partners and civil society in the implementation of the integrated guidelines.

2.5

While the Broad Economic Policy Guidelines concentrate on the contribution of economic policies to achieving the Lisbon goals, the Employment Guidelines relate especially to the European Employment Strategy and aim to coordinate the employment policies of the member states. It is in the Employment guidelines that, with specific reference to the European Youth Pact, some action lines of the Pact are incorporated in the integrated guidelines. Two guidelines in particular reflect the content of the European Youth Pact: guideline No 18 includes building employment pathways for young people and reducing youth unemployment, better reconciliation of work and private life and childcare facilities; guideline No 23 includes reducing the number of early school leavers, increasing access to initial vocational, secondary and higher education, including apprenticeships and entrepreneurship training. Also, guideline No 24 includes broadening the supply of education and training tools, developing frameworks to support the transparency of qualifications, their effective recognition and the validation of non-formal and informal learning. At the end of the employment guidelines, it is repeated that member states should establish a broad partnership for change by involving parliamentary bodies and stakeholders, including those at regional and local levels.

2.6

This initiative highlights youth in core areas of the Lisbon partnership for growth and jobs, in particular via the European Employment and Social Inclusion Strategies and also the Education and Training 2010 Work programme, and calls for consistency across the initiatives within them.

2.7

Adoption of the Pact coincides with the completion of the first cycle of implementing the White Paper on a new impetus for European youth of 2001, taken forward in the Council Resolution of June 2002. This established a framework of European cooperation in the youth field for enhancing young peoples' active citizenship, through an open method of coordination (OMC) by including a youth dimension in other policies.

2.8

The European Youth Pact as it has been finally adopted at the Spring Meeting of the European Council stresses the need for young Europeans to benefit from a set of policies and measures forming a fully integrated part of the Lisbon Strategy and aims to improve the education, training, mobility, vocational integration and social inclusion of young people, and to facilitate the reconciliation of working life and family life. The European Youth Pact also includes the ambition to ensure the overall consistency of initiatives in these areas and to provide a starting point for strong, ongoing mobilisation on behalf of young people. It also notes that it the success of the European Youth Pact depends on the involvement of all parties concerned, first and foremost national, regional and local youth organisations as well as the European, regional and local authorities and the social partners. Lines of action are proposed for Member States to draw upon in three fields: 1) employment, integration and social advancement; 2) education training and mobility; and 3) the reconciliation of working life and family life.

3.1

In drafting this opinion the EESC organised a consultation of representatives of organisations involving young people on 6 September 2005. The results of this consultation are included in this opinion.

3.2

The involvement of young people must be the starting point for all strands. Any Policy aimed at young people must be characterised by the fundamental principle of youth participation: a principle that is reiterated at European and International level (4). While the EESC welcomes the measures to consult with young people at a European level, in particular through the organisation of the ‘États Généraux’ in 2005, it is with regret that the EESC notes that the Communication does not sufficiently outline with tangible recommendations how young people and youth organisations will be involved and will participate at a member state level. The EESC calls on the Commission and Members States to utilise more creative methods to reach and engage with young people.

3.3

The EESC stresses the importance of the active participation and autonomy of young people, not only in the labour market, but in society at large. The active participation of young people in society and their autonomy should be both an objective and a method that contributes to the personal development of young people, to their sense of initiative and their social integration and to the social cohesion in general.

3.4

The EESC notes with regret that mechanisms to truly involve young people and their organisations are not clearly outlined in this Communication. At the hearing on 6 September 2005, referred to in point 3.1, students' organisations, among others, stressed the extent to which seeing young people run general interest organisations by proxy — in this instance, the students' compulsory social security system — allowed young people as a whole — not just organised youth — to take responsibility for and to represent themselves as a group. The EESC calls on the Commission and Member States to develop and implement their policies in partnership with young people and youth organisations and continue to involve them in all steps. Young people and youth organisations and social partners must be consulted on the development of measures for this initiative with the national Lisbon reform programmes and on following up implementation.

3.5

The EESC looks forward to receiving the synthesis report (5) of the Commission documenting the work to date of Member States in the area of youth participation as part of the OMC (6) process. It is hoped that this synthesis report will provide examples of good practice which could be replicated in other Member States.

3.6

The EESC seeks clarification on the role of civil society organisations, in particular youth organisations, in the cycle of the open method of co-ordination. It should be recalled that paragraph 38 of the Lisbon European Council conclusions describes a role for NGOs in the Open Method of Coordination (7). Given its expertise and experience, the EESC can play an active role in this field, and help devise and to enable a mechanism within its own sphere for the involvement of young people and youth organisations.

4.1

The EESC welcomes the special attention that the Pact is giving to the issue of youth employment. However the Youth Pact should be developed and implemented from a perspective that views it as an important goal in itself, and not merely as an element of the Lisbon Strategy. Moreover, while the success of the Lisbon Strategy is important for young people, young people are also important for the success of the Lisbon strategy. Investing in young people is essential to achieve higher growth and employment rates, continued innovation and stronger entrepreneurship. Their involvement in the strategy and their sense of ownership of and commitment to its objectives are necessary to make Lisbon work.

4.2

Likewise the issue of employment is central to the concerns of Europe's citizens and every effort must be made to combat unemployment, the unacceptable level of which poses a real threat to the cohesion of our societies (8). The youth unemployment rate in Europe is still more than twice the average unemployment rate. Many young people face the very real possibility of being unemployed or struggling to live on a low income. For young people from disadvantaged backgrounds, ethnic minorities, immigrants, the disabled and women, the risks of being socially excluded are even higher. On the broader front, it is young people as a whole who are affected by issues such as vulnerability, poverty and dependency; this constitutes a historically unprecedented tragedy as well as a new opportunity for forging solidarity among young people as a whole and for society in order to find a way out of this unprecedented situation in Europe.

4.3

Young people are more at risk of unemployment and, if at work, of low income (9). The Lisbon Strategy aims to create not only more jobs but better jobs. To ensure that every young person has a real chance of entering the labour market, greater emphasis must be given to appropriate training, education, apprenticeships and opportunities for young people to achieve personal and professional fulfilment and gain the necessary skills for living. It is also important that school education should enable young people to manage their working lives and make successful use of life-long learning mechanisms.

4.4

The EESC underlines the recognition of demographic change in Europe and the links to the Commissions Green Paper on confronting demographic change (10). For example the number of 0-14 year olds will decline by 11 % from 2000 to 2015 and continue to do so by 6 % until 2030. Parallel to this change the EESC underlines the social, cultural and political change in Europe. Demographic change is not purely about statistics and numbers, it is imperative that a wider perspective is taken when considering the appropriate policies and actions. As the High Level Group on the future of social policy in an enlarged European Union points out, this demographic situation, which will see a significant reduction in the comparative influence of young people as a group up until at least 2025 can, if we grasp it, present an opportunity as it implies ‘less demand for societal resources’ and the possibility of bringing about substantial improvements in these fields at a steady cost.

4.5

Therefore, the EESC believes that a European Pact for and with young people would have the potential to significantly improve the living conditions and prospects of young people in Europe while at the same time it could reinforce the effective implementation of the Lisbon Strategy.

5.1

The EESC welcomes the conclusions of the European Council that young people would benefit from a set of policies and measures fully integrated in the revised Lisbon Strategy.

5.2

In the Communication the following aspects of the Integrated Guidelines were identified as relevant to maximise the impact of the Youth Pact:

5.3

The EESC is disappointed to note that while Actions have been identified for each of the above measures the Communication fails to identify explicit and measurable targets for either the Member States or for the Commission. At a time when citizens are questioning the value of the European Union it is vital that Europe is seen to take effective action. In order to achieve this it is essential that the targets are unequivocal and result-driven.

5.4

National governments must be encouraged to quantify objectives and set clear targets in their national reform programmes. These objectives and targets must not only address the challenges young people face in the areas identified but also address issues which have a significant, albeit indirect, influence on the achievement of these objectives. Housing and accommodation as well as the need for family policy aimed at young parents are prominent among these issues. It is also important that effective coordination mechanisms are put in place, both at European and national level, to achieve a coherent approach in all areas.

5.5

The EESC requests that the following targets be considered for inclusion in Member States Lisbon Strategy national reform programmes:

5.6

The EESC encourages the Commission to continue its work on the recognition of youth work and looks forward to the introduction of initiatives including ‘Youthpass’. However the EESC considers that the ‘Youthpass’ alone is not sufficient action in order to strengthen the recognition of youth work. It therefore recommends that the Commission should engage with employer organisations, workers organisations, representatives of the formal education system and appropriate NGOs to develop versatile methodology to raise the awareness on the contribution of youth work to the development of young people and the skills, values and attitudes that young people gain through active involvement in youth organisations and youth work activities. The EESC could facilitate this process.

5.7

The European countries which score top positions in the competitiveness ranking drawn up by the World Economic Forum all have high level of investment in social policy and social protection and show high employment rates and low poverty after social transfers (12). Sustainable social security systems, bases on the principle of solidarity, designed to afford protection against the major risks encountered in the life of the individual are the foundations for success.

5.8

The EESC urges that the situation of young people in rural areas and poor urban areas be given greater consideration. Young people are often disadvantaged because of the area in which they live. In many rural areas and poor urban areas, young people do not have access to high quality education, training, mobility, health services, leisure facilities, employment opportunities or have chances to participate in civil society. Specific measures should be introduced to ensure that young people in certain geographical areas could benefit fully from opportunities and make choices in their own lives. The remoteness of many rural areas means that young people do not have good access to information, especially regarding opportunities.

5.9

The EESC welcomes the proposal to launch a study on the social integration of highly disadvantaged young people in 2005. However, Member States need to step up to the challenge of eradicating child poverty and put immediate targets in place. Meeting this challenge will require a comprehensive, sustained and fully-resourced programme of action that addresses the multi-dimensional nature of child poverty. Child poverty has a severe impact on children across a range of issues such as health, education and even a child's future ‘life chances’ of ever breaking out of the poverty trap. Member States need to immediately implement policies addressing the entire spectrum of these issues.

5.10

The Commission is committed to mainstream disability, which it expressly confirms in the European Action Plan on Equal Opportunities for people with disabilities from 2003 (13). Therefore the Commission has a duty to combat discrimination in all actions of the Commission. Mainstreaming disability is necessary in order to ensure the full and equal participation and inclusion of disabled persons in society. In order to include disabled young persons entirely in youth policy, the EESC stresses that the following points need be included in the Communication: Equal participation to the activities of the Youth Programme; Equal Access to information on youth policy and youth projects and Awareness raising measures.

5.11

Young people are not an homogeneous group. The EESC recommends, therefore, that policies made at the national level should be sufficiently varied and respect the needs of both the labour market and the individual. The Committee also recommends that the European Commission conduct an analysis of the circumstances and needs of young people in Europe.

6.1

The EESC commends the Commission for including the active citizenship of young people in this initiative despite the fact that it was excluded from the European Youth Pact. The EESC concurs with the Commission's proposal to maintain and consolidate the four current objectives of: participation; information; voluntary activities and knowledge of youth issues. However, the EESC underlines the importance of ensuring that the focus of the Open Method of Coordination should now be to produce tangible results. Therefore where deficiencies in the OMC system and process are identified they must be noted and addressed.

6.2

The EESC recognises that Member States will be reporting on the common objectives for participation and information by the end of 2005, and that reports on voluntary activities and better knowledge of the youth field will follow in 2006. However, the EESC calls for increased partnership and highlights the value of including all stakeholders, most particularly young people and youth organisations in drawing up the national progress reports. In the interests of transparency it is also important that these reports are developed publicly and/or at least available publicly when submitted. Also NGOs should be encouraged and supported financially to engage in their own evaluation of the OMC process.

6.3

Civil society organisations and the social partners are an integral part of any pluralistic democracy. In this context youth organisations, play a valuable role in promoting active citizenship and participation. They do this by working directly with, and for young people in building their personal skills and confidence, so that they can reach their potential and achieve the optimum standard and quality of life. These organisations operate at a grassroots level, tackling local issues with the support of individuals and groups in their own area. They are also working to promote and build the capacity of young people to self advocate. Youth NGOs should be adequately financially supported and given the necessary recognition and means to be able to participate as real actors in decision-making and society at all levels.

6.4

In its discussions on the representativeness of European civil society organisations in civil dialogue the EESC has already emphasised on several occasions (14) that only clearly established representativeness can give civil society players the right to participate effectively in the process of shaping and preparing Community decisions, as is the case for the social partners under the European social dialogue.

6.5

The EESC notes with disappointment that the main contribution that volunteers make to society highlighted by the Commission was with regard to their role in natural disasters. While this role is worthy, the EESC considers that the Commission and the Member States should recognise and highlight the ongoing and continuing role that volunteers play in a wide variety of NGOs at local, regional, national and European level. In particular, the Committee calls on the Member States to facilitate voluntary activities by means of suitable tax policies, recognising that voluntary activities are not only a source of psychological and ethical satisfaction for young people, but also make it possible for innumerable social welfare services to be provided, or to make them less costly.

6.6

The EESC regrets that the actions proposed are minimal and have no targets or clear objectives. This is a missed opportunity to progress this key component.

6.7

European programmes have an important role in contributing to the objectives of the Open Method of Coordination and the European Youth Pact, as well as strengthening young people's involvement in other policies that concern them. The EESC supports the Commission's view that projects that encourage young people to become active, involved citizens and that are aimed at helping them develop their capacities should be developed at local, regional, national and European level within the framework of the different European programmes. However, while many programmes could indeed be used with this aim, there is a need to promote the use of these programmes by and for young people and youth organisations and to make these programmes more youth-friendly. The use of different programmes, especially the European Social Fund and the Structural Funds, is a major opportunity to advance youth policy from rhetoric to action. Different projects realised to promote the living conditions or the employment of young people are often too small to be supported with these funds. Therefore the Commission and the Member States should engage with youth organisations to facilitate the use of EU programme funding in favour of young people in Europe.

6.8

The EESC believes that the programme with the greatest potential to enhance the personal and social development of young people and to promote active citizenship is the European Youth Programme. We welcome the initiative for a new Youth in Action Programme for the years 2007—2013 and will continue to be actively involved in the preparation process. Considering the enlargement of the programme and the increasing will of young people to benefit from it, we strongly demand from the Council to support the proposal to moderately increase the funding for this programme to €1,200 million. Further we believe that young people, European youth organisations and the European Youth Forum have to be regularly consulted on the implementation of the programme. The EESC calls on national economic and social councils to become involved in innovative experiments in order to make it easier for young people to participate in national consultation procedures, and to exchange best practices regarding the role of young people within their organisations.

7.1

The EESC supports the Commission's proposal to primarily concentrate on the policy areas covered by the European Youth Pact. Nonetheless the EESC underlines the importance of an integrated and cross-sectoral youth policy, when developing polices in the youth field.

7.2

A horizontal approach to the development of policy will ensure a more coordinated and effective strategy. Member States regularly consult with Employer and Trade Union organisations when developing policies such as employment guidelines. Equally Member States must consult with young people and their organisations on policies that affect them.

7.3

The EESC notes in its own initiative opinion ‘Obesity in Europe — role and responsibilities of civil society partners (15)’ that more than 14 million children are overweight in Europe, including 3 million obese. But even more worrying: this number rises by 400,000 each year. The EESC calls for a collective involvement of all stakeholders including young people.

7.4

The Committee shares the Commission's primary concern for actions focusing on the health of children and young people, and particularly healthy lifestyles. It is convinced that actions of this kind have a real impact on citizens, and are urgently needed. It therefore calls for the initiative in support of such actions, scheduled for 2006, to be brought forward to 2005, also in the light of the consultations and initiatives already under way.

7.5

The EESC encourages the Seventh Research Framework Programme to undertake research on the impact of young peoples' participation in representative democracy and in voluntary activities. This report could potentially provide an insight into the impact of participation.

3.2.2006   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 28/42

1.1

The logic and analyses that led the EESC to adopt, with a very large majority its opinion in favour of the Constitutional Treaty (28 October 2004) have not changed, and nor therefore have the arguments and recommendations developed. Indeed, in the Committee's opinion the vagaries of the ratification process of the Constitutional Treaty confirm the validity of the positions it has taken.

1.2

For example, the referendum results in France and the Netherlands not only demonstrate the failure of the Member States and the European institutions to communicate to the public what Europe is actually about and how it reaches agreements but, they also reveal the gulf separating the public from the European project. It must be said that this gulf is not unique to those countries and is not simply the result of poor communication or the current economic situation, but it does call into question the nature of the agreement itself and thus the way in which it was reached.

1.3

It is worthwhile recalling the ‘clear messages’ which, in the Committee's October 2004 opinion, it believed should be got across to civil society:

1.4

Despite a series of shortcomings in the Constitutional Treaty which the Committee also highlighted, it argued strongly for European civil society to be rallied behind the achievements of the Constitutional Treaty in order to overcome these shortcomings.

1.5

Those identified by the Committee included the following:

1.6

In the Committee's opinion, all of these observations remain pertinent and valid. In its October 2004 opinion, the Committee argued strongly not only in favour of the ratification of the Constitutional Treaty, but also that EU citizens needed to be made aware of the democratic progress achieved by the draft Constitution and of its advantages.

1.7

The debates which took place around the ratification process demonstrated yet again that one of the major challenges facing the European Union is the question of how to preserve and guarantee growth, jobs and prosperity for the current and future generations. As the latest Eurobarometer survey (Eurobarometer 63, September 2005) shows, this question is at the heart of European citizens' concerns.

1.8

A vital element in the response to that challenge is to be found in the objectives set out in the Lisbon Strategy, as identified by the Heads of State or Government in 2000, a Strategy which offers a concrete vision of the future of European society.

1.9

It is necessary to recognise however that, despite five years of intense debates and activities at European level, the results so far have been disappointing and the implementation of the Strategy has been found wanting.

1.10

‘Alongside undeniable progress, there are shortcomings and obvious delays’ reported the European Council in March 2005. There may be many reasons for these shortcomings and the delay, but most would agree on the following two observations:

1.11

Thus the March 2005 European Council notably underlined the need for civil society to appropriate and participate actively in achieving the aims of the Lisbon Strategy.

1.12

It is particularly clear in this context that the future of the European model of society, including its social model, which is a fundamental part of the collective identity of European citizens and with which they strongly identify, will depend on the realisation of the Lisbon Strategy's objectives. Thus, the challenge is not so much about the future of the Constitutional Treaty, important though it is, but about creating the conditions which will enable European citizens to reappropriate the European project on the basis of a global shared vision about the sort of society they desire.

1.13

That is why, in its October 2004 Opinion, the Committee also established a link between the Constitutional Treaty and the Lisbon Strategy, arguing that:

‘The Lisbon Strategy should be introduced into the debate since it maps out a vision of the future for all citizens of the EU marked by: competitiveness, full employment, shared knowledge; investment in human resources; and growth, whilst preserving the living environment and the quality of life through sustainable development …’

2.1

To master the challenges facing the European Union, the European integration process must be ‘re-legitimised’, based on a new conception of democratic action which bestows a determining role on civil society and its representative institutions.

2.2

To that end, the participation of civil society in the public decision-making process is an essential instrument in reinforcing the democratic legitimacy of the European institutions and European action. It is an even more essential element in encouraging the emergence of a shared view about the purpose and the direction of ‘Europe’ and thus a new consensus, on the basis of which it should be possible to pursue the European integration process and to define and implement a project for the Europe of tomorrow which will respond more fully to the expectations of its citizens.

2.3

The European Union's institutions and the Member State governments must encourage a genuine subsidiarity culture that embraces not only the different levels of authority but also the different component elements of society, in such a way as to demonstrate to the European citizen that the EU will act only where there is clear added value and in respect of the principle of better lawmaking.

2.4

According to the latest Eurobarometer findings, 53 per cent of those questioned believed their voice didn't count in the European Union. Only 38 per cent believed the opposite.

2.5

Such findings demonstrate the need to build and to use tools which will enable European citizens to be genuinely involved in the exercise of defining a project for the enlarged Europe, a project which should be equipped with true content and which will encourage them to support and identify with the European integration process.

2.6

In this context it should be emphasised that the democratic legitimacy of the European Union reposes not only on a clear definition of the powers and responsibilities of its institutions. It also implies that:

2.7

In the Committee's opinion, the currently suspended, or delayed, ratification process on the Constitutional Treaty contains an essential irony: the absence of the Constitution, and in particular the absence of the provisions in Title VI on the democratic life of the European Union, further underlines the need for the Constitution. A fundamental challenge facing the Union is therefore how to get that basic message across.

2.8

In the Committee's opinion, the logic behind the Constitution's provisions for participatory democracy and civil dialogue remains entirely valid. The European institutions must therefore invest fully in the logic of the Constitution Treaty and establish an authentic participatory democracy.

2.9

The need to enhance participation is all the more urgent given that, notwithstanding everything that has occurred in the recent past, the European Union's citizens expect much of it. The same Eurobarometer survey, cited previously, indicated that some 60 per cent of European Union citizens favour increased integration within the Union (various other opinion polls produce similar findings). The results also indicate that, in the face of urgent challenges such as the fights against unemployment, poverty and social exclusion, Europe's citizens would like to see the Union's role reinforced.

2.10

Already, in October 2004, the Committee argued that, in order to overcome the Treaty's shortcomings and also in order to ensure its ratification through the rallying of civil society, a number of measures could be taken to build on the proposed institutional framework and improve it through operational measures. In particular, the Committee argued that:

2.11

In this way the Committee has sought to convince EU governments and institutions of the vital need to rally civil society and civil society organisations behind the spirit, as much as the letter, of the Constitution.

2.12

The Committee notes that the ‘broad debate’ envisaged by the Heads of State or Government in their June declaration is not currently occurring. The Committee feels that such a broad debate should be relaunched as soon as possible. However, the Committee also feels that such a debate would be counter-productive unless public opinion is somehow reassured about the nature of the European integration process and, in particular, about the democratic aspects of that process.

2.13

The reflection period decided upon by the Heads of State or Government of the Member States in June should naturally be used to consider ways of overcoming the political and institutional situation which has resulted from the referendum results in France and the Netherlands.

2.14

But in the Committee's opinion the reflection period should above all be exploited to help establish the foundations of a popular shared vision about the future of Europe and of a new social contract between Europe and its citizens, of a new consensus which would also establish the framework within which the policies necessary to guarantee growth, employment and prosperity can be placed. In this context, Member State governments should ‘take home the EU’.

2.15

It is vital to demonstrate that ‘participatory democracy’ and ‘civil dialogue’ are not empty slogans but, rather, essential principles on which the success of the European Union's policies and therefore of its future depend.

2.16

It is therefore indispensable to involve civil society as broadly as possible, at national, regional and local level, in all future debates and discussions, to encourage the Union's citizens to express their concrete expectations and, in order to do this, to put in place a genuine strategy of listening and of dialogue about the Union's policies and about the vision they have of their shared future.

2.17

In this context the Committee will closely examine the European Commission's ‘Plan D’, all the more so because it is convinced that, to date, no real debate has taken place and that the method, timetable and resources planned for stimulating the debate — not only in all the accession countries but also at intra-Community level — will be crucial. The EESC welcomes the views repeatedly expressed by European Commission Vice-President Margot Wallström that communication is a two-way process and that ‘Europe’ must listen more. In the Committee's understanding, ‘listening’ does not necessarily mean ‘following’, but it does mean ‘involving’ and it should mean ‘understanding’.

3.1

More generally, the Committee has welcomed the emerging understanding that the European Union should equip itself with a genuine communication strategy and that it should overhaul and enhance its communication tools. The Committee welcomed the European Parliament's 26 April 2005 report on the implementation of the European Union's information and communication strategy, and welcomed the European Commission's 20 July 2005 adoption of an action plan to improve communicating Europe by the European Commission.

3.2

The Committee has itself adopted and regularly revised a strategic communication plan. In addition, in December 2004 the Committee's Bureau approved an overall strategic approach to the challenge of ‘Communicating Europe’. In both contexts the Committee has sought to enhance the bridging function of its members and of the organisations they represent. The Committee was a committed participant in the 2004 so-called ‘Wicklow initiative’, notably tabling a strategic document, ‘Bridging the Gap’, at the Amsterdam informal ministerial meeting on how organised civil society in general and the Committee in particular should be more fully involved in the communication process.

3.3

The Committee welcomed the November 2004 European Council's request to the European Commission to elaborate a coherent communication strategy for the Union. The Committee, in close cooperation with the European Commission, is organising a stakeholders' forum on the communications challenge designed to enable civil society organisations to feed their views into the reflection process currently under way and which the European Commission may also consider when drafting its expected consultative White Paper on the communications challenge.

3.4

The Committee, which organised a similar stakeholders' forum to address the policy issue of sustainable development in April 2005, is ready and willing to organise similar such consultative and listening exercises on major policy issues, thus enhancing organised civil society's voice and helping ‘Brussels’ better to listen.

3.5

In this context, the Committee emphasises the central role it hopes the European Parliament will continue to play as the first, and most vital, element in the democratic bridging exercise. The Committee is ready to act as a partner o the European Parliament, as it did during the Convention process, organising hearings and forums of its own initiative or on those issues where the Parliament wishes particularly to consult with organised civil society.

3.6

Such considerations lead the Committee to emphasise two fundamental considerations. First, whilst the Committee welcomes the increasing emphasis on communications strategies and communications tools, it should be recalled that any communications approach can only be as good as the content of the message it contains. Thus, communication is a complementary mechanism and not an end in itself. Second, whilst the Committee is fully committed to the twin processes of establishing a European-level communication strategy and enhancing communication tools, Union-level activity must be seen as complementary to the communications processes taking place within the Member States. Thus, such a European-level strategy is vitally necessary but it is far from sufficient.

3.7

In this context, the role of representative and consultative institutions at Member State level — national parliaments and national economic and social councils notably among them — as well as at regional and local level should be stressed.

4.1

The reasons and the logic which led the Committee to vote in favour of the Constitutional Treaty by such a large majority — particularly its provisions on the democratic life of the Union — remain the same. The Committee continues to believe firmly that the best way to guarantee the Union's democratic life is to anchor such provisions in a fixed constitutional settlement. However, the current period of uncertainty should not prevent all of the European Union's actors from taking measures as of now to start making participatory democracy a reality. All of the Union's institutions should therefore reflect actively on how they can:

In addition, the European Commission should consider anticipating the provisions of Article I-47 (4) of the Constitutional Treaty by consulting civil society on the content of the European law defining the procedures for implementing the right of citizens' initiative (the EESC could be asked to deliver an exploratory opinion on this subject).

4.2

For its part, the European Economic and Social Committee reasserts its determination to play an important, if complementary, role in enhancing civil dialogue not only through traditional consultative mechanisms but also through its bridging function between Europe and organised civil society. The Committee draws attention in this context to the need for fresh thinking about ways of interacting with organised civil society. The Committee is ready, willing and able to act as a full partner in all activities designed to enhance civil dialogue.

4.3

European economic conditions are a key factor in determining public attitudes towards the European integration process. The European Economic and Social Committee reaffirms its support for the Lisbon Strategy but insists that the Union and its member states must be seen to be delivering on their commitments. The Committee is convinced that the Lisbon Strategy is the best possible guarantee of the Union's future economic prosperity and social, environmental and cultural well-being, yet it has singularly failed to capture the public imagination in the way that, for example, the ‘1992’ campaign to create the Single Market managed to do. The Member States must accept and honour their responsibilities in this context. The Strategy must be rendered less abstract and its aims (if not its title) introduced into domestic political parlance. Civil society and civil society organisations must be involved

4.4

For its part, the European Economic and Social Committee will continue to work under the mandate granted it by the 22-23 March European Council, ‘to set up with Member States' economic and social committees and other partner organisations an interactive network of civil society initiatives aimed at promoting the implementation of the strategy’. (Doc. 7619/1/05/ rev. 1 Council, paragraph 9).

4.5

The Committee has consistently argued the need for enhanced communication between the European Union and the citizens on whose behalf it purports to work. The Committee recognises that a lot of work has recently taken place at the level of the EU's institutions, both individually and collectively; to cite but two recent examples, the complete restructuring of the European Parliament's website and the European Commission's Europe Direct service. The Committee favours close inter-institutional cooperation in the field of communication. It notes the Commission's ‘Plan D’ and also its intention of launching a White Paper in the near future. It is fully committed to playing a supporting role wherever it can in bridging the gap, as evidenced by its 7-8 November stakeholders' forum on that theme.

4.6

However, the Committee believes that communication can only be as good as the message it contains. Referring back to its views on the Lisbon Strategy, it believes that the European institutions but, above all, the member states, need to reflect further on how they communicate Europe. Much has already been said about halting the ‘blame game’, but it is clear that ‘Europe’ is too often perceived as negative or defensive, and that insufficient effort is made to ‘sell’ the positive aspects of the integration process.

4.7

In the context of enhancing coordination, the Committee calls for the so-called ‘Wicklow initiative’ (informal meetings of European affairs ministers) to be re-activated, but to be given a specific and permanent mandate to examine ways in which Europe can be better communicated and to provide member states with an informal context in which to take stock of public opinion and to exchange best practices. At the inter-institutional level, the Committee calls for the Inter-Institutional Group to be similarly mandated to meet at more regular and more frequent intervals to discuss communication issues. Such mechanisms are particularly important given the rapid rate of technological development (for example, mobile phones, broad band) and the rapid development of new communication techniques to exploit these.

4.8

The Committee underlines its belief that communication must be a permanent concern and not the subject of an occasional campaign on a specific issue.

4.9

The European Union's institutions must guard against a false, if clearly well-intentioned, belief that the current ‘disconnect’ can be solved from the central level of ‘Brussels’. In reality, what the European institutions do in the field of communications can only be complementary. The main responsibility lies elsewhere. The outcome of the elections to the European Parliament and the results of the French and Dutch referendums on the Constitutional Treaty show clearly that many European citizens view Europe sceptically. This regards above all the effects of European legislation on their living and working conditions. It is down to the Member States to explain to their citizens the meaning of the EU and the necessity of specific European legislation and to communicate the resulting effects to each respective national sphere.

4.10

Public opinion, including civil society, will be convinced of the legitimacy and the common future of the European Union only if there is perceived credibility, trust, a transparent legislative process and a well-functioning rule of law. In the first instance, these have to be safeguarded by the governments of the member states. Governments have to act as real co-owners of the Union and abstain from the ‘we-they’ model and the constant double talk that this model involves.

4.11

As the role of the Irish National Forum on Europe demonstrated, civil society organisations can sometimes make decisive contributions. It is essential to enhance communication at a relevant level (local, professional, etc.) and to explain the success stories of the European policy or legislative process in relevant and accessible terms at that level. Civil society organisations are well placed to do this. The EESC is thus determined to help and encourage civil society organisations within the Member States, particularly through the bridging function of its members. Moreover, if a wide debate about the European project and about European policies is indeed to be launched, then it must begin at the lower levels of civil society within the member states. A Europe-wide forum will only make sense if it allows for the expression of these views reported back up and also down. Indeed, what is needed is not so much a top-down or a bottom-up approach, but a bottom-down approach.

4.12

This opinion has deliberately eschewed much discussion about the future of the Constitutional Treaty and the options open to the European Union. Clearly, a permanent return to the status quo ante of the Nice Treaty cannot be an option. But perhaps the broad debate envisaged by the Heads of State or Government could help illumine the best way forward. However, the Committee notes with some alarm that such broad debate is largely absent in most of the Member States. In the absence of such debate, it is difficult to see how genuine progress can be made.

3.2.2006   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 28/47

1.1

By 2020/2030 the European Union, which today comprises 25 Member States, will certainly have expanded through the accession of new Member States, starting with Romania, Turkey Bulgaria, Croatia, etc. Without making any assumptions about other possible accessions, it is likely that in terms of cooperation and exchange, at least, the EU's immediate sphere of influence will extend to outlying countries such as the Ukraine, Georgia, and Russia.

1.2

Within this vast territory the size of a continent, which forms a rectangle 6 000 km east to west by 4 000 km north to south, new demands will be made of passenger transport so as to guarantee free movement upholding the principle of liberty, develop a European democracy based on cultural exchange and encourage economic development.

1.3

The development of the means of transport to meet the likely demand for mobility over the coming two to three decades must be carried out with a view to achieving the objectives set out at the Lisbon Summit in 2000:

‘Europe must become the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world, capable of sustainable economic growth with more and better jobs and greater social cohesion’.

1.4

All proposals aimed at developing collective and individual means of passenger transport will therefore have to take the following into account:

1.5

Any assessments and measures relating to the development of passenger transport must, in order to be inclusive and guarantee equal opportunities, take account of the rights of passengers with reduced mobility (PRMs), such as people with disabilities, older people, and very young children. In order to guarantee that PRMs can enjoy independent mobility free of hindrance, regulatory measures need to be introduced to ensure that future means of transport and the related infrastructure, are accessible to them. In the case of air transport, for instance, the Commission has proposed a regulation which sets out the rights of PRMs (1).

1.6

The Committee notes that over the past few decades the European Union has taken an active interest in goods transport, producing a large number of measures aimed at increasing the capacity of freight transport so as to encourage European trade and — hence — economic development. There has thus been a plethora of transport infrastructure projects, a majority of which have been aimed at developing road infrastructure, with a much smaller proportion targeted at rail infrastructure, and very few at inland waterways.

1.7

At the end of 2005 the Commission will present a communication regarding the mid-term results of the proposals it made in the White Paper on European Transport Policy for 2010: Time to Decide. This will allow assessments to be drawn up on whether users have successfully been put at the heart of transport policy, and whether consideration given to sustainable development has resulted in a real transfer of increases in freight transport away from roads to alternative means of transport (rail, inland waterways and sea …). The Committee will, at the appropriate moment, present an opinion in the usual form on the basis of this review. That opinion should not be pre-empted here.

1.8

Pending this, the Committee notes that even though projections by the International Union of Railways (UIC) give the passenger/km ratio for Western Europe for 2010/2020 (2), no overall evaluation of passenger transport has yet been carried out. For several decades now the general view seems to be that satisfying demands and needs in freight transport will produce adequate solutions in passenger transport. This approach explains the development of road infrastructures. These have been used indiscriminately for freight, as well as individual and collective passenger transport (cars, coaches). Roads have always had this double function. Today increases in road traffic make the co-existence of freight transport alongside passenger transport difficult, or even dangerous, on a number of routes. This prioritisation of freight transport has led to road infrastructure projects being favoured over other means of transport because roads can be used by both freight and persons.

1.9

The Committee believes that this state of affairs:

1.10

In view of the above, the Committee, which is not in a position to carry out studies, calls on the Commission to undertake a general appraisal as soon as possible to:

2.1.1

The Committee calls on the Commission to take action to make Europe's citizens and policymakers more aware of the geographical dimensions that Europe has attained today and will have attained in the near future. By 2020/2030 the EU, which today counts 25 Member States, will no doubt include new members. Its immediate sphere of influence will have expanded as a result of its proximity to other states (or its cooperation with neighbouring states), and will stretch across the entire European continent. Here, issues relating to passenger and freight transport will manifest themselves on a much larger scale.

2.1.2

Currently, too few Europeans are aware of the size of the EU and the scope of its influence. This covers a territory that reaches from the Atlantic Ocean to the heart of Russia, from east to west, and from the Baltic to the Mediterranean — and hence also Africa — from north to south.

2.1.3

The new distances involved in this space, and the time required to travel across them cannot be considered as an extension or a simple continuation of the situation that existed up to that point, given the limitations on technology and speed of travel in the medium term.

2.1.4

Furthermore, globalisation and the increases in the standard of living sought by countries with high population levels will lead to increased demand for passenger transport, with several hundred million people living outside the EU wishing or needing to travel within Europe each year on successive trips of a relatively short nature. The Committee therefore believes that, when considering the future size of Europe attention must be paid to both the distances involved (within the European area, the EU's immediate sphere of influence and international connections), and the time required to cover them (duration of travel, speed of means of transport, optimisation of the time required for travel, taking into account the wishes of users and the constraints they face).

2.2.1

The main reasons that make passenger transport a requirement are:

2.2.2

The Committee recommends that the following reasons for travel are looked into, although this is not an exhaustive list:

2.2.3

The Committee recommends that the general appraisal it is calling for should focus on travel that generates repetitive or continuous movements of a substantial nature.

—

Travel by individuals or very small groups (several persons, couples, families…)

Please note: the number of passengers authorised to travel in a vehicle driven by a private individual under the highway codes could be used as a definition of a ‘small group’.

—

Travel in a large group for different reasons (professional, tourism, retired persons, holiday makers, etc. …).

2.2.6

The Committee therefore suggests categorising distances as follows:

2.2.7

Finally, the chapter dealing with distances also needs to consider international and trans continental travel, in order to factor in the movements of people entering and leaving the European area.

2.2.8

The Committee would obviously like the general appraisal that it is advocating to take account of the different forms of passenger transport and the infrastructures that will be required. The aim, therefore, must be to identify, assess and optimise tried and tested means of transport, and also to explore — without preconceived notions — new possibilities which will allow technologies that appear over the coming decades to be integrated into the transport system quickly. This assumes that the Commission will make proposals to encourage, organise and coordinate research programmes for the development of new forms of transport, and that it anticipates future needs, whilst at the same time taking into account the time required to implement new solutions.

2.2.9

The existing means of passenger transport can, for the purpose of this appraisal, be categorised as follows:

2.3.1

The Committee's research into the available data, which forecasts passenger transport over the coming decades, has revealed serious shortcomings in that area. The number of assessments relating to transport as it was in the past is quite large. However, such assessments are not conducive to reliable predictions on the future. For instance, they do not take recent developments into account, such as enlargement of the EU to 25 Member States, the possibility of further accessions in the medium term, or developments in countries that lie within the EU's immediate sphere of influence.

2.3.2

The EESC is not aware of any available studies on the potential impact and consequences on the EU resulting from increases in the standard of living in developing countries. According to several concurring predictions from different sources, these increases will allow several hundred million people to travel outside their country's borders by 2020 in the case of China and, in the case of India, most probably by 2030. The often quoted figure of 100 million Chinese being able to travel outside their country as tourists by 2020 seems unrealistic today. However, this represents only 8 % of the Chinese population. This is smaller than the percentage of Japanese tourists who travel abroad each year (around 12 million people). A recent study suggests that 4 % of the Chinese population have now reached a standard of living equal to that of the European average. 4 % is not a large figure, but, given the size of China, it represents more than 50 million people!

2.3.3

Even supposing that only 50 million Chinese choose to come to Europe as tourists, visiting several EU countries by plane on relatively short stays (ten days on average), the Committee recommends that the EU look into the necessary development of capacities, after having checked theoretical predictions. It calls on Member States to introduce appropriate means of enabling the EU to reap the economic benefit of such increases in tourism. Failure to provide Chinese and Indian visitors with the mobility they expect when the time comes will mean that they will travel instead to countries which are in a position to welcome them.

2.3.4

The Committee noted with interest the document published by the Commission in September 2004 and entitled: European energy and transport: Scenario on key drivers. This document, which should serve as a reference, shows the results of an enquiry into the outlook for various areas by 2010/2020/2030. The main objective of the document is to study energy needs and the possibility of using less polluting and/or renewable energies. Chapter VI deals with transport and gives us some insight into the future. It would be useful to review these figures in order to identify and extract the data relating to passenger transport together with freight transport, which still holds a dominant position in these statistics.

2.3.5

The appendix to this report (3) provides some indication of expected developments.

The data covers 30 countries (the 25 Member States, to which the Commission has added Romania, Bulgaria, Switzerland, Norway and Turkey). Generally speaking, passenger transport in these countries will grow over a forty-year period. (Gpkm = Giga-passenger per kilometre)

2.3.6

The Committee notes that, interestingly, the predictions for the coming decades foresee lower growth than for the 1990/2000 period. This would seem to indicate that the mobility of persons is no longer a measure of economic vitality.

2.3.7

The indication is that passenger transport in private cars will increase by 45 % in the 2000/2030 period, but rail transport by only 30 %. Meanwhile, air transport will increase 300 % over the same period. The Committee is not in a position to assess the consistency of these predictions, but suggests that they are examined in depth so that an overview of the situation in the medium and long term can be gained.

2.3.8

The Committee calls on the Commission to initiate a comprehensive and targeted study to assess, as fully as possible, the quantitative and qualitative needs in passenger transport that have to be met by 2020 and 2030.

2.3.9

This study should examine not just the 30 countries already selected by the Commission in the above document, but also other countries which lie in the EU's immediate sphere of influence (Croatia, Albania, Ukraine, Russia, North Africa …), and which in the 25 years to come will, whatever the form, enjoy closer relations with the EU.

2.3.10

The impact of international travel, especially the effect of tourism originating in developing countries (China, India), needs to be assessed in order to gauge the movement of people both into and out of the European area, as well as movements within it.

3.1

believes that the mobility of persons in an enlarged Europe must be guaranteed in order to strengthen democracy and contribute to cohesion in the EU;

3.2

notes that, there are very few studies into the mobility of persons by 2030 that allow the assessment of transport needs and the infrastructures that will be required to meet them;

3.3

points out that any expansion of infrastructures on a continental scale would require very long implementation periods (around two decades) before they would come into use;

3.4

believes the Commission should, given that the information available indicates a strong increase in demand for passenger transport, initiate studies on the subject followed by a general and targeted appraisal, in parallel with studies and discussions on the development of goods transport;

3.5

suggests that these discussions could be the subject of a new Transport Policy White Paper in 2010 attaching greater importance to this than 2001. This should allow the requirements that will confront passenger transport by 2020/30 to be met. The following criteria could be covered:

3.6

recommends that the Commission, together with the Member States concerned, introduce the necessary means to ensure the best possible mobility for people, in line with the principle of sustainable development, by taking into account:

3.7

stresses in conclusion that a united Europe must ensure that Member States offer a balanced transport service, both for freight and passengers. It wishes to be notified when the appraisal is launched and to be involved therein, and also to be consulted on the conclusions.

3.2.2006   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 28/52

—

Proposal for a Council Regulation on the common organisation of the markets in the sugar sector

—

Proposal for a Council Regulation amending Regulation (EC) No 1782/2003 establishing common rules for direct support schemes under the common agricultural policy and establishing certain support schemes for farmers

—

Proposal for a Council Regulation establishing a temporary scheme for the restructuring of the sugar industry in the European Community and amending Regulation (EC) No 258/1999 on the financing of the common agricultural policy

1.1

Twenty-one EU countries produce sugar beet. The French overseas departments and Spain are minor sugar cane producers (280 000 tonnes). In general, annual European sugar production fluctuates between 17 and 20 million tonnes, whereas European demand for sugar is estimated at 16 million tonnes a year.

1.2

Beet cultivation on crop rotation extends over 2.2 million hectares of land and involves 320 000 farmers (i.e. slightly less than 7 hectares per beet farmer). Beet is processed at 236 sugar factories employing some 75 000 permanent and seasonal workers directly. The European sugar beet/sugar sector accounts directly or indirectly for a total of 500 000 jobs.

1.3

The European Union also produces 500 000 tonnes of isoglucose and 250 000 tonnes of inuline syrup and has a refining industry for raw sugar cane (most of which — 1.6 million tonnes — is imported from the ACP countries (1)).

1.4

In the sugar, isoglucose and inuline syrup sector, the last roll-forward of the quota system took place in 2001.

1.5

On 14 July 2004, the Commission submitted a communication on sugar sector reform (2), on which the EESC adopted an opinion on 15 December 2004 (3).

1.6

On 22 June 2005, the Commission submitted three legislative proposals (4), which are the subject of this opinion.

At the same time, the Commission submitted a proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing accompanying measures for Sugar Protocol countries affected by the reform of the EU sugar regime (5).

1.7

The Commission's legislative proposal diverges from the communication of 14 July 2004 in:

2.1

The EESC considers that reform of the CMO in sugar has become necessary. It refers in this regard to its opinion of 15 December 2004 (6), in particular to points 2.1, 2.4, 2.6, 2.7, 2.8, 2.9 and 2.10.

2.2

The EESC notes, however, that the proposal for reform goes considerably further than what was announced in the communication of 14 July 2004. The cuts in prices and production are much more drastic and exports will be rapidly abolished. The proposal therefore sends the wrong message to our competitors in WTO negotiations. Furthermore, it does not safeguard the aim of a European sugar industry that is capable of guaranteeing market supply, in particular in regions where restructuring is difficult.

2.3

The EESC is concerned about the impact of the proposed cuts in prices and production on farmers' incomes and on employment. In this connection, it emphasises the key role that the sugar industry plays in many regions. The EESC considers that the proposal is out of step with the European agricultural model, with the Council's oft-repeated desire to support traditional farm production in the least-favoured regions or Member States, and with multifunctionality, sustainability and the Lisbon Strategy. Indeed, the proposals for reform would result in the loss of 150 000 direct or indirect jobs.

2.4

The EESC does not believe that the Commission's reform scenario — securing market balance by cutting prices — can meet its objective, which is to maintain a strong European beet farming and sugar industry and to treat developing countries supplying preferential sugar with respect. The EESC considers that everything possible should be done to prevent new areas of the global market being opened up — in particular to Brazil — through swaps (triangular trade), which bring no benefit to the development of LDCs. In that connection, the Committee would stress that Brazilian sugar production — which is largely sustained by that country's bio-ethanol policy and monetary policy — is subject to social, environmental and land-ownership conditions which are unacceptable but which nonetheless account for the extremely low production costs and the rise in production during recent years, which has led to increased stocks and thus low prices in the world market. It considers that access to the EU market should be conditioned by compliance with social norms as referred to in the Declaration of the International Labour Organisation Conference held in 1998.

2.5

The EESC (7)‘considers that the proposed cuts in prices and quotas are a major step towards full sugar market liberalisation. Such a move cannot therefore provide beet growers, sugar sector workers and European consumers with the prospect of a sustainable future’.

2.6

The EESC (8)‘fails to understand why the Commission did not adopt the idea of negotiating preferential import quotas with the LDCs, as those countries themselves are requesting. That would make it possible to satisfy the interests of the poorest developing countries in a more targeted way and to secure a balanced market supply at sustainable prices in Europe. The EESC would highlight the fundamental contradiction in the stance taken by the Commission which, on the one hand, cites the Everything but Arms initiative to justify the radical reform of the sugar CMO, but, on the other, refuses to act on the LDCs' explicit request for a preferential quota system’.

2.7

The EESC (9) does not believe that the significant fall in sugar prices would benefit consumers. 70 % of sugar is consumed in processed products; this makes it very difficult to reduce the costs passed on to consumers. Furthermore, in countries where sugar markets have been opened up, the prices paid by consumers have not decreased.

2.8

The EESC fails to understand why the Commission is proposing to abolish unprocessed sugar exports so rapidly. Despite losing the dispute at the WTO panel, the European Union still has the right to export 1 273 000 tonnes of subsidised unprocessed sugar, whether this be quota sugar with refund or out-of-quota sugar without refund. Sugar beet yields also vary somewhat and the market will be subject to the variability of import levels. It would therefore be useful if exports could provide some flexibility in managing the fluctuations in the availability of quota or out-of-quota sugar. This flexibility is needed to ensure that production is sustainable and that rational use is made of workers and equipment.

2.9

The EESC supports the Commission proposal for a voluntary restructuring scheme, which would make implementation of the restructuring programme considerably easier. It would like to see this plan extended, however, to take account of the interests of sugar beet growers and sugar sector workers.

2.10

Overall, the EESC (10) feels that the Commission has failed to gauge the impact of its proposal, which would result in a massive transfer of resources from the rural sector (farming and primary processing) in both Europe and the developing countries to large international food and marketing companies. It would also be the unmaking of much of the European and ACP sugar industry, with the Brazilian sugar industry being virtually the sole beneficiary (11).

3.1

The EESC welcomes the fact that the Commission is proposing a regulation for the period from 1 July 2006 to 30 September 2015, as it had requested.

3.2

The EESC considers that the proposed price cuts are excessive and will furthermore have no effect on sugar imports through triangular trade operations (the global market, LDCs, the EU) and which will vary in value according to fluctuations in world prices and exchange rates. The EESC therefore calls for price cuts to be restricted to the minimum required — in line with WTO negotiations — and for these to be spread over time, just like the tariff reductions, particularly in order to give the new Member States the time they need to adapt.

The EESC also calls on the Council to pay particular attention to the problems facing farmers in regions with major problems or in regions that offer few profitable alternatives to sugar beet growing.

3.3

The EESC is surprised to note the proposal's provision for a charge on production to be met by growers and refiners, since quota levels will clearly be lower than consumption. It is also surprised that the Commission's approach is based on promoting competition between European production and imported sugar. The charge thus discriminates against Community sugar growers and refiners. The EESC therefore calls for it to be abolished or, failing that, extended to all imported sugar.

3.4

The Committee believes there can be no effective CMO in sugar unless there is also some power to restrict imports. It therefore recommends including provisions prohibiting sugar SWAPs with Least Developed Countries and, should the Commission decide to withdraw a certain tonnage of quota sugar from the market (withdrawal procedure) or to apply a private storage aid measure (a market price below the reference price), automatically applying a quantitative safeguard clause with respect to imports from LDCs.

3.5

The EESC considers the proposal to be unreasonably restrictive as regards exports. It takes the view that all export possibilities authorised under the WTO should be authorised by the regulation, in particular the export of an additional volume of out-of-quota sugar when the quantitative and budgetary limits authorised under the WTO for subsidised exports are not reached by exports of quota sugar with refund.

The regulation should furthermore allow for the export of quota sugar without refund.

3.6

The EESC condemns the weakness of the market organisation tools that have been put forward to replace intervention. Indeed, it is possible to foresee, given the irregular and unpredictable nature of imports, resulting in permanent pressure on the market, that private storage and mandatory withdrawal will not ensure that the market price respects the reference price. The EESC thus calls for the intervention arrangements to be maintained.

3.7

The EESC takes note of the Commission's proposal to provide 60 % compensation for the loss of beet farming income as a result of the price cuts. It considers that compensation must be equitable and that the percentage must be similar to that of compensation for other crops. It wishes to state that the real drop in beet prices, taking account of the production charge and the risk of a further 10 % cut, could reach 50 %. This being the case, compensation would only amount to 51 %. The EESC thus recommends a lower price cut and a higher rate of compensation, whilst respecting the proposed budget constraints. The EESC stresses that granting compensation for price cuts does not remove the long-term need for effective management tools in order to avoid market collapse and to guarantee farmers' incomes.

3.8

The EESC notes that the proposal for compensation envisages decoupled aid, distributed per hectare of beet or chicory for which an A+B sugar or inuline syrup delivery contract has been concluded. It considers that the Member States, by means of appropriate provisions, must have complete freedom to grant beet and chicory growers the maximum aid permitted within the national ceilings set out in the proposal. The EESC recommends that the Commission assess the long-term effects of decoupling.

3.9

The Committee finds it illogical that the proposal should advocate a free-of-charge 300 000 tonne increase in isoglucose quotas whilst at the same time establishing a tough restructuring programme with the aim of substantially reducing sugar quotas and that the million tonnes of additional quota sugar that can be allocated has to be paid for.

3.10

The EESC notes that, at the beginning of the regulation, the Commission accepts its suggestion to implement a voluntary programme of compensated restructuring, replacing its mandatory quota-reduction mechanism and the transferability of quotas at European level.

The EESC calls for codecision for growers/refiners on the restructuring process, and for appropriate compensation for restructuring to be granted to growers affected by this process.

The Committee notes in this connection that the additional payment of EUR 4.68 per tonne of A+B beet agreed for 2006/2007 for growers affected by restructuring simply represents the early allocation of aid to these growers to compensate for the price cuts that will occur in 2007/2008. It does not, therefore, represent compensation for restructuring.

3.11

The EESC considers that the Council should attach the greatest importance to the impact of the Commission proposal on employment in the various regions affected by restructuring in the sugar industry. It calls on Member States and the Commission to improve access to the European Structural Funds and to the European Social Fund, especially in the regions most affected by restructuring and in the new Member States, to help to mitigate the reform's adverse effects on employment by means of social schemes that go considerably further than the mandatory legal framework. Job creation, diversification and reconversion must be promoted.

3.12

In this regard, the EESC considers it necessary that, as a matter of urgency, the Commission and the Member States support — with regulatory and financial measures — a proactive policy on the use of biofuels, in which sugar beet should play a major role. The EESC considers that there is an urgent need to further develop the processing of above-quota sugar production in the non-food sector.

3.13

The EESC wishes to draw the Commission's and the Council's attention to the highly destabilising effect of sugar imports from the Balkans on the neighbouring countries. The Committee recommends that the necessary safeguard measures be drawn up and implemented (in particular, adherence to the intervention price or the reference price) and urges that Croatia's quota be set in the very near future.

4.1

The EESC recognises the need to reform the sugar CMO but believes that the reform proposals go too far as regards cutting production and prices.

Their implementation would have considerable repercussions for the European sugar sector, and would in particular result in the loss of at least 150 000 jobs in regions that are often already struggling and lacking in profitable alternatives to the cultivation of sugar.

4.2

The EESC calls on the Council to demonstrate greater ambition than the Commission on the issue of European beet and sugar production, by restricting import volumes and by authorising the use of all export options permitted by the WTO. A production target two to three million tonnes higher than that being proposed by the Commission is indeed possible, in particular by restricting imports. This would help to save 50 000 to 75 000 jobs and around 50 000 beet farms in regions throughout the Community.

4.3

The Committee fears that the aims of the Everything But Arms initiative and of the CMO sugar reforms for development policy will not be met and this is why it supports the LDCs' request to negotiate import quotas for sugar with the Union. Swap practices should, under no circumstances, be admitted and automatic safeguard clauses and a code of conduct which meets social and environmental sustainability and food sovereignty criteria should be established for access to the EU market.

4.4

The EESC recommends that a flow of quota or out-of-quota sugar exports in line with the tonnages authorised by the WTO be maintained, in order to continue supplying our nearest traditional customer base.

4.5

It reiterates that any changes to prices should be spread over time and should comply strictly with international commitments and that, if necessary, sugar must be treated as a sensitive product in the context of the Doha Development Agenda (DDA) negotiations.

4.6

The EESC thus recommends that the current intervention mechanism be maintained, and that effective market management tools be implemented on a long-term basis.

4.7

It requests that partial compensation to growers for income lost as a result of beet price cuts be increased, insofar as possible, and allocated in full. It stresses the need to ensure that this aid is sustainable and for the sugar budget to be maintained at current levels.

4.8

The Committee welcomes the Commission proposal on a restructuring programme, but calls for growers to have a right to codecision and for aid to be granted to growers affected by factory closures to help them to restructure their farms.

4.9

The EESC reiterates its view that the European Structural Funds and the European Social Fund should be mobilised in order to give workers affected by the restructuring of the European sugar industry the best opportunities to develop new career paths, as well as the necessary compensation.

4.10

The EESC considers that the sugar sector must, as a matter of urgency, be included in the energy debate (a biofuels policy) as a means of helping to offset the reform's more harmful consequences.

4.11

The Committee insists that the destabilising effects of sugar imports from the Balkans be corrected without delay.

4.12

The EESC calls on the Council to monitor the situation in regions which are facing difficulties or which offer few profitable alternatives within farming.

3.2.2006   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 28/57

1.1

The EC Treaty does not provide for a common forestry policy, nor does the proposal for a new constitutional Treaty.

1.2

The European Commission published a communication on a forestry strategy for the EU on 18 November 1998. On 15 December 1998 the EU Council of Ministers adopted a resolution on the Union's forestry strategy based on the Commission communication.

1.3

The Council identified sustainable management and use of forests — as defined by the ministerial conference on forestry held in Helsinki in 1993 — and the multifunctional role of forests as key elements of the common forestry strategy, serving as a general basis for action.

1.4

Other key principles of the forestry strategy are subsidiarity, according to which responsibility for forestry policy lies with the Member States, and the possibility for the Community to contribute to the achievement of sustainable management and use of forests and the multifunctional role of forests, wherever Community-level action can bring added value.

1.5

The European Economic and Social Committee issued an own-initiative additional opinion on EU forestry policy on 9 December 1999.

1.6

In its resolution, the Council called upon the Commission to report to it within five years on the implementation of the EU forestry strategy.

1.7

The Commission issued its communication on implementation of the EU forestry strategy on 10 March 2005. A Staff Working Document is attached to the communication which contains a detailed description of the actions and activities implemented in the context of the EU Forestry Strategy during the period 1999–2004.

1.8

The Committee endorses the general thrust of the Commission communication, especially with regard to enhancing implementation and improving coordination. The Committee believes it is important to implement the Commission's proposed action plan for sustainable forest management without delay.

2.1.1

Challenges facing the EU forestry sector and forestry policy have been affected since 1998 by many changes in the policy context; the Commission communication highlights EU enlargement, adoption of EU strategic policy objectives and developments in the international forestry and environment policy framework.

2.1.2

With enlargement, EU forest area increased by about 20 %, forest resources by about 30 % and the number of forest owners from 12 million to 16 million. It is necessary to increase institutional capacity for promoting sustainable forestry in the new Member States; developing private ownership structures and institutional structures present a particular challenge.

2.1.3

At the sustainable development summit in Johannesburg in 2002 the importance of sustainable forestry was highlighted as a sustainable development resource and a way of helping to achieve the Millennium Development Goals more generally. The summit approved an action plan which is binding on governments and which included a number of decisions relating to forests.

2.1.4

The EU forestry sector has had to face an increasingly globalised market for forest products and a highly concentrated forestry industry requiring more efficient timber production than before.

2.1.5

Forests have a significant role and provide many benefits for society. At the same time, sustainable use of forests and the environmental services provided by them have become more and more important. In particular the international environment agreements signed by the EU and its Member States have created new challenges for forestry.

2.1.6

The Lisbon European Council (March 2000) approved a new strategic goal for the EU, namely to become the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy, capable of sustainable economic growth with more and better jobs and greater social cohesion. The Gothenburg European Council (June 2001) approved the EU sustainable development strategy, complementing the Lisbon strategy, which requires dealing with economic, social and environmental policies in a mutually reinforcing way.

2.1.7

Many EU policies, laws and measures have a direct or indirect impact on forestry. Their compatibility and complementarity with EU forestry strategy and its implementation have not been evaluated.

2.2.1

In its resolution, the Council noted in relation to the forestry strategy that the Community should be actively involved in implementing the resolutions of the ministerial conference on forestry and participate pro-actively in international discussion and negotiations on forestry-related issues, in particular the United Nations Intergovernmental Forum on Forests.

2.2.2

In its 1999 opinion, the European Economic and Social Committee noted that the EU should provide strong support for the establishment of a global, legally binding instrument for the management, conservation and sustainable development of every kind of forest, which complies with the forestry principles agreed at Rio. This objective is still relevant from the point of view of the internationalisation of trade in forest products, the globalisation of the forestry industry, the continuing loss of forests and the need to protect the rights of local populations that depend on forests.

2.2.3

To prevent illegal logging and selling of timber, the Commission has adopted the Forest Law Enforcement, Governance and Trade (FLEGT) Action Plan and a legislative proposal on setting up the FLEGT authorisation system. The Committee considers the prevention of illegal logging and illegal selling of timber to be of utmost importance. Illegal logging causes serious environmental, economic and social damage, and timber from illegal logging distorts trade in timber products. However, as far as preventing illegal logging is concerned, the emphasis should primarily be on measures that can be taken in collaboration with timber-producing countries to tighten up administrative processes and improve law enforcement. This is the best way of taking into account national social factors and influences on the living conditions and welfare of communities dependent on forests, for example. Particular attention should be paid to protecting original natural forests and their diversity. Clarification of land-use rights is an essential part of efforts to reduce illegal logging. The proposed authorisation scheme does not obviate the need to tighten up these measures.

2.2.4

The impact of international economic, social and environment policy and UN environmental agreements on EU forests and the framework for forestry activities has increased. Under the UN Convention on Biodiversity, an extended work programme on forest biodiversity was adopted in 2002. Under the UN Convention on Climate Change there was agreement on the role of forests as carbon sinks in preventing climate change. The Kyoto Protocol in particular has presented the forestry sector with both new challenges and opportunities. Sustainable forestry can significantly affect the fulfilment of obligations imposed by international environmental agreements. This requires that the EU adopt a coordinated and convergent approach in international environment, economic and social policy and its own policies, one that strikes a balance between the various dimensions of sustainable forestry and respects the diverse uses of forests.

2.2.5

At pan-European level, the Ministerial Conference on the Protection of Forests in Europe (MCPFE) is the most important forum for discussing forestry policy, and has been able to create an effective framework for promoting forest management and use which are sustainable in economic, ecological, social and cultural terms.

2.3.1

The 4th Ministerial Conference on the Protection of Forests in Europe (held in Vienna on 28-30 April 2003) emphasised the importance of national forestry programmes in developing cooperation between the forestry sector and other sectors. It was agreed at the ministerial conference that a national forestry programme constitutes a participatory, holistic, intersectoral and iterative process of policy planning, implementation, monitoring and evaluation at the national and/or subnational level in order to proceed towards the further improvement of sustainable forest management as defined in Helsinki, and to contribute to sustainable development.

2.3.2

In accordance with the subsidiarity principle, national forest programmes are a key means of implementing objectives of the EU forestry strategy. National forest programmes are holistic and multi-sectoral framework programmes that consider the impact of the forest sector on other sectors and the impact of other sectors on the forest sector. National forest programmes can take into account and balance multiple uses of forests and society's expectations of them taking into consideration special national features. National forest programmes create coherence and consistency between national policies and with international commitments. These programmes should be evaluated to monitor whether they fulfil the set objectives.

2.3.3

International environment and forestry policy commitments entered into by the EU and the Member States can best be implemented in the forestry sector by incorporating these commitments into national forest programmes.

2.3.4

The EU should promote the drawing up of national forest programmes, as recommended by the MCPFE, in order to promote sustainable forestry and achieve a holistic approach to developing forestry and forestry policy in the Member States and the Community.

2.4.1

The principal instrument for implementing forestry strategy at Community level has been rural development policy. During the period 2000-2006, EUR 4.8 billion was allocated to forestry measures under rural development policy, half of which was spent on afforestation of agricultural land and half on other forestry measures.

2.4.2

The Court of Auditors' Special Report No 9/2004 on Forestry Measures within Rural Development Policy found that neither the Commission nor the Member States assumed responsibility for assessing whether a project contributed to the achievement of the EU forestry strategy.

2.4.3

The General Regulation on support for rural development (No 1257/1999, Article 29) stipulates that support for forestry provided by the Member States under rural development policy must be based on national or subnational forestry programmes or equivalent instruments. In some Member States national programmes are only just being set up, and they are operational in only a few countries.

2.4.4

The assessment of forestry measures carried out under rural development policy has been hampered by the Commission's lack of data on Member States' forestry measures. No effective system exists for monitoring forestry measures in the Member States supported by EU funding.

2.4.5

Although a significant portion of funding is used for afforestation measures, no clear operational objectives have been set regarding how afforestation measures should be deployed under the forestry strategy, in particular taking environmental objectives into account.

2.4.6

Many Commission DGs and units are involved in the procedure for approving rural development plans and operational programmes, as well as the approval of forestry measures. The complexity of decision-making has limited the extent to which rural development policy is used in implementing the EU forestry strategy.

2.4.7

It must also be clarified whether it would be more efficient to concentrate EU resources not on subsidising afforestation but on timber market promotion, on reward mechanisms for environmental services, on research, training and information, and on rural development measures to secure long-term improvements in conditions and employment in the forestry sector and in environmental services provided by forests.

2.4.8

It must also be remembered that forestry and timber is a market-based industry and part of the open sector of the economy. The EU internal market will only function efficiently if competition on the timber market is not distorted by support policy.

2.5.1

The practice of forestry should be economically, ecologically, socially and culturally sustainable. Protection of forests, monitoring their condition, repairing damage and safeguarding the environmental services they provide are important aspects of sustainable forestry. Sustainable forest use should be safeguarded by ensuring adequate regeneration.

2.5.2

Key objectives for EU forests are to maintain their health and vitality by protecting them from air pollutants, forest fires and other harmful agents, whether organic (diseases, insects) or inorganic (erosion).

2.5.3

Some 0.4 million hectares of forest in the EU are hit by fire every year. Forest fires are a serious problem especially in the southern Member States. As well as preventing forest fires, the Community has collected data on fires and monitored their size and causes. The Community has established a framework for systematic collection of data on the extent of and reasons for forest fires. This system has been used to assess and monitor measures taken by the Member States and the Commission to prevent forest fires. EU forest and environmental protection cannot succeed unless an effective approach is developed for monitoring and preventing forest fires.

2.5.4

The main laws concerned with maintaining the health and vitality of forests are the plant protection directive, the directive on marketing of forest reproductive material, and the framework regulation on monitoring of forests and environmental interactions (Forest Focus).

2.5.5

The Forest Focus regulation establishes a framework for a Community scheme to continue monitoring forest health and programmes for prevention of forest fires and to develop and diversify monitoring systems. The aim is to produce reliable and comparable data on the condition of forests and on the harmful factors affecting the Community's forest ecosystems.

2.5.6

Data are already being collected in the framework of international agreements, the Food and Agricultural Organisation (FAO), the Timber Committee of the Economic Commission for Europe, EUROSTAT and the MCPFE on forest biodiversity, forest resources, carbon sequestration, the carbon cycle and forest products and protective effects. When developing Community monitoring schemes it is important to draw on national, pan-European and global monitoring schemes that already exist or are in preparation, and to ensure protection of landowners' privacy with respect to data handling and publishing.

2.5.7

The Community's plant protection directive contains provisions on protecting plants or products of plant origin from harmful substances, and on pest control. The plant protection directive also sets standards for international trade in wood products and planting material. Climate change increases the risk of plant pests spreading and breeding. To protect forest health and prevent the spread of major forest pests in EU territory it is necessary to ensure sufficiently tight plant protection rules and effective surveillance. Nevertheless, such measures should not lead to trade distorting measures, resulting from the use of such a directive as a non-tariff barrier to trade.

2.5.8

Forests and forest biodiversity are an important part of Europe's natural environment. Protecting forest biodiversity is a key aspect of Community environmental policy. The forestry strategy states that the conservation of forest biodiversity can be achieved in the Union largely through appropriate forest management measures. Biodiversity can also be protected through sustainable forestry by establishing forest conservation areas. In accordance with the subsidiarity principle, Member States are responsible for incorporating biodiversity issues as appropriate into national forest programmes or corresponding instruments.

2.5.9

The most important laws dealing with protection of forest biodiversity are the ‘Habitats Directive’ (92/43/EEC) and the ‘Birds Directive’ (79/409/EEC). Conservation of protected species and habitats has been achieved at Community level by setting up a network of special conservation areas, the Natura 2000 network. In management and control of Natura 2000 areas, account must be taken of social, economic and information preconditions, financial consequences as well as specific local and regional features.

2.5.10

Incorporating protection of forest biodiversity into the practice of sustainable forest use across the entire forest area and the Natura 2000 network is a fundamental prerequisite for the achievement of biodiversity conservation goals, as well as fulfilling binding international obligations.

2.5.11