(1)

Transnational criminal activities pose a significant threat to the internal security of the Union and call for a coordinated, targeted and adapted response. While national authorities operating on the ground are on the frontline in the fight against crime and terrorism, action at Union level is paramount to ensuring efficient and effective cooperation as regards the exchange of information. Furthermore, organised crime and terrorism, in particular, are emblematic of the link between internal and external security. Transnational criminal activities spread across borders and manifest themselves in organised crime and terrorist groups that engage in a wide range of increasingly dynamic and complex criminal activities. There is, therefore, a need for an improved legal framework to ensure that competent law enforcement authorities can prevent, detect and investigate criminal offences in a more efficient manner.

(2)

For the development of an area of freedom, security and justice, which is characterised by the absence of internal border controls, it is essential that competent law enforcement authorities in one Member State have, within the framework of the applicable Union and national law, the possibility to obtain equivalent access to the information available to their colleagues in another Member State. In that regard, competent law enforcement authorities should cooperate effectively and across the Union. Therefore, police cooperation on the exchange of relevant information for the purpose of preventing, detecting or investigating criminal offences is an essential component of the measures that underpin public security in an interdependent area without internal border controls. The exchange of information on crime and criminal activities, including terrorism, serves the overall objective of protecting the security of natural persons and safeguarding important interests of legal persons protected by law.

(3)

The majority of organised crime groups are present in more than three countries and are composed of members with multiple nationalities who engage in various criminal activities. The structure of organised crime groups is ever more sophisticated, with strong and efficient communication systems and cooperation between their members across borders.

(4)

To fight cross-border crime effectively, it is of paramount importance that competent law enforcement authorities swiftly exchange information and cooperate operationally with one another. Although cross-border cooperation between the competent law enforcement authorities has improved in recent years, certain practical and legal hurdles continue to exist. In that respect, Council Recommendation (EU) 2022/915 (2) will assist the Member States in further enhancing cross-border operational cooperation.

(5)

Some Member States have developed pilot projects to strengthen cross-border cooperation, focusing, for example, on joint patrols by police officers from neighbouring Member States in border regions. A number of Member States have also concluded bilateral or even multilateral agreements to strengthen cross-border cooperation, including the exchange of information. This Directive does not limit such possibilities, provided that the rules on the exchange of information set out in such agreements are compatible with this Directive where it applies. On the contrary, Member States are encouraged to exchange best practice and lessons learnt from such pilot projects and agreements and to make use of available Union funding in that regard, in particular from the Internal Security Fund, established by Regulation (EU) 2021/1149 of the European Parliament and of the Council (3).

(6)

The exchange of information between Member States for the purpose of preventing and detecting criminal offences is regulated by the Convention implementing the Schengen Agreement of 14 June 1985 (4), adopted on 19 June 1990, in particular Articles 39 and 46 thereof. Council Framework Decision 2006/960/JHA (5) partially replaced those provisions and introduced new rules for the exchange of information and intelligence between competent law enforcement authorities.

(7)

Evaluations, including those carried out under Council Regulation (EU) No 1053/2013 (6), have indicated that Framework Decision 2006/960/JHA is not sufficiently clear and does not ensure the adequate and rapid exchange of relevant information between Member States. Evaluations have also indicated that that Framework Decision is scarcely used in practice, in part due to the lack of clarity encountered in practice between the scope of the Convention implementing the Schengen Agreement and the scope of that Framework Decision.

(8)

Therefore, the existing legal framework should be updated with a view to eliminating discrepancies and to establishing clear and harmonised rules to facilitate and ensure the adequate and rapid exchange of information between the competent law enforcement authorities of different Member States and to allow the competent law enforcement authorities to adapt to the rapidly changing and expanding nature of organised crime, including in the context of the globalisation and digitalisation of society.

(9)

In particular, this Directive should cover the exchange of information for the purpose of preventing, detecting or investigating criminal offences, thereby fully superseding, in so far as such exchanges are concerned, Articles 39 and 46 of the Convention implementing the Schengen Agreement and providing the necessary legal certainty. In addition, the relevant rules should be simplified and clarified in order to facilitate their effective application in practice.

(10)

It is necessary to lay down harmonised rules governing the crosscutting aspects of the exchange of information between Member States under this Directive at different stages of an investigation, from the phase of gathering criminal intelligence to the phase of criminal investigation. Those rules should include the exchange of information through Police and Customs Cooperation Centres set up between two or more Member States on the basis of bilateral or multilateral arrangements for the purpose of preventing, detecting or investigating criminal offences. However, those rules should not include the bilateral exchange of information with third countries. The rules laid down in this Directive should not affect the application of rules of Union law on specific systems or frameworks for such exchanges, such as Regulations (EU) 2016/794 (7), (EU) 2018/1860 (8), (EU) 2018/1861 (9) and (EU) 2018/1862 (10) of the European Parliament and of the Council, Directives (EU) 2016/681 (11) and (EU) 2019/1153 (12) of the European Parliament and of the Council, and Council Decisions 2008/615/JHA (13) and 2008/616/JHA (14).

(11)

‘Criminal offence’ is an autonomous concept of Union law as interpreted by the Court of Justice of the European Union. For the purposes of this Directive, in the interest of effectively combating crime, ‘criminal offence’ should be understood as referring to any conduct punishable under the criminal law of the Member State that receives information, either pursuant to a request or pursuant to an own-initiative provision of information in accordance with this Directive, irrespective of the penalty that can be imposed in that Member State and irrespective of whether the conduct is also punishable under the criminal law of the Member State that provides information, without prejudice to the grounds for refusal of requests for information set out in this Directive.

(12)

This Directive is without prejudice to the Convention drawn up on the basis of Article K.3 of the Treaty on European Union, on mutual assistance and cooperation between customs administrations (15) (Naples II).

(13)

Since this Directive does not apply to the processing of information in the course of an activity which falls outside the scope of Union law, activities concerning national security do not fall within the scope of this Directive.

(14)

This Directive does not govern the provision and use of information as evidence in judicial proceedings. In particular, it should not be understood as establishing a right to use the information provided in accordance with this Directive as evidence and, consequently, it does not affect any requirement provided for in the applicable law to obtain the consent of the Member State providing the information for such use. This Directive does not affect Union legal acts on evidence, such as a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on European Production and Preservation Orders for electronic evidence in criminal proceedings and for the execution of custodial sentences following criminal proceedings, Directive 2014/41/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council (16) and a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council laying down harmonised rules on the designation of designated establishments and the appointment of legal representatives for the purpose of gathering electronic evidence in criminal proceedings. Consequently, even though they are not required to do so under this Directive, Member States providing information under this Directive should be allowed to consent, at the time of providing the information or thereafter, to the use of that information as evidence in judicial proceedings, including, where necessary under national law, through the use of instruments regarding judicial cooperation in force between the Member States.

(15)

All exchanges of information under this Directive should be subject to five general principles, namely the principles of availability, equivalent access, confidentiality, data ownership and data reliability. While those principles are without prejudice to the more specific provisions of this Directive, they should guide its interpretation and application where relevant. First, the principle of availability should be understood as indicating that relevant information available to the Single Point of Contact or the competent law enforcement authorities of one Member State should also be available, to the largest extent possible, to the Single Point of Contact or the competent law enforcement authorities of other Member States. However, that principle should not affect the application, where justified, of specific provisions of this Directive restricting the availability of information, such as those on the grounds for refusal of requests for information and on judicial authorisations, or of the obligation to obtain the consent of the Member State or third country that initially provided the information prior to sharing it. Second, pursuant to the principle of equivalent access, Member States should ensure that the access that the Single Point of Contact and the competent law enforcement authorities of other Member States have to relevant information is substantially the same as, and thus neither stricter nor less strict than, the access that their own Single Point of Contact and the competent law enforcement authorities have to that information, subject to the more specific provisions of this Directive. Third, the principle of confidentiality requires Member States to respect one another’s national rules on confidentiality when treating information marked as confidential that is provided to their Single Point of Contact or to their competent law enforcement authorities, by ensuring a similar level of confidentiality in accordance with the rules on confidentiality set out in national law. Fourth, pursuant to the principle of data ownership, information initially obtained from another Member State or from a third country should only be provided with the consent of and in accordance with the conditions imposed by that Member State or third country. Fifth, pursuant to the principle of data reliability, personal data that are found to be inaccurate, incomplete or no longer up to date should be erased or rectified or the processing of those data should be restricted, as appropriate, and any recipient of those data should be notified without delay.

(16)

In order to achieve the objective of facilitating and ensuring the adequate and rapid exchange of information between Member States, this Directive should provide the possibility for Member States to obtain information by addressing a request for information to the Single Point of Contact of other Member States, in accordance with certain clear, simplified and harmonised requirements. As regards the content of requests for information, this Directive should specify, in particular, in an exhaustive and sufficiently detailed manner and without prejudice to the need for a case-by-case assessment, the situations in which requests for information are to be considered urgent, the details they are to contain as a minimum and in which language they are to be submitted.

(17)

While the Single Points of Contact of each Member State should, in any event, be able to submit requests for information to the Single Point of Contact of another Member State, in the interest of flexibility, Member States should be allowed, in addition, to designate some of their competent law enforcement authorities, which might be involved in European cooperation, as designated law enforcement authorities for the purpose of submitting such requests to the Single Points of Contact of other Member States. Each Member State should submit to the Commission a list of its designated law enforcement authorities. Member States should inform the Commission where there are any changes to that list. The Commission should publish the lists online. In order for Single Points of Contact to be able to perform their coordinating functions under this Directive, it is, however, necessary that, where a Member State decides to allow some of its competent law enforcement authorities to submit requests for information to the Single Points of Contact of other Member States, that Member State makes its Single Point of Contact aware of all outgoing requests for information and of any communications relating thereto, by always putting its Single Point of Contact in copy. Member States should seek to limit the unjustified duplication of personal data to a strict minimum.

(18)

Time limits are necessary to ensure the rapid processing of requests for information submitted to a Single Point of Contact. Time limits should be clear and proportionate and take into account whether the request for information is to be considered as urgent and whether the request relates to directly accessible information or indirectly accessible information. In order to ensure compliance with the applicable time limits while allowing for a degree of flexibility, where objectively justified, it should only be possible, on an exceptional basis, to deviate from those time limits where, and in so far as, the competent judicial authority of the requested Member State needs additional time to decide on granting the necessary judicial authorisation. Such a need could arise, for example, because of the broad scope or the complexity of the matters raised by the request for information. In order to ensure, as far as possible, that time-critical opportunities to take action in specific cases are not missed, the requested Member State should provide any requested information as soon as it is held by the Single Point of Contact, even where that information is not the only information available that is relevant to the request. The rest of the requested information should be provided thereafter, as soon as it is held by the Single Point of Contact.

(19)

The Single Points of Contact should assess whether the information requested is necessary for and proportionate to achieving the purposes of this Directive and whether the explanation of the objective reasons justifying the request is sufficiently clear and detailed, so as to avoid the unjustified provision of information or the provision of disproportionate amounts of information.

(20)

In exceptional cases, it might be objectively justified for a Member State to refuse a request for information submitted to its Single Point of Contact. In order to ensure the effective functioning of the system created by this Directive in full compliance with the rule of law, those cases should be specified exhaustively and interpreted restrictively. However, the rules set out in this Directive place a strong emphasis on the principles of necessity and proportionality, thereby providing safeguards against any misuse of requests for information, including where it would entail manifest breaches of fundamental rights. The Member States, as an expression of their general due diligence, should therefore always verify the compliance of requests submitted to them under this Directive with the principles of necessity and proportionality and should refuse those requests they find to be non-compliant. Where the reasons for refusing the request relate only to parts of the information requested, the remaining information should be provided within the time limits set out in this Directive. In order to prevent unnecessary refusals of requests for information, the Single Point of Contact or the designated law enforcement authority of the requesting Member State, as applicable, should, on request, provide clarification or specifications that are needed to process the request for information. The applicable time limits should be suspended from the moment that the Single Point of Contact or, where applicable, the designated law enforcement authority of the requesting Member State receives the request for clarification or specifications. However, it should be possible to request clarification or specifications only where clarification or specifications are objectively necessary and proportionate such that without them the request for information would have to be refused for one of the reasons listed in this Directive. In the interest of effective cooperation, it should also remain possible to request necessary clarification or specifications in other situations, without this leading to the suspension of the time limits.

(21)

In order to allow for the necessary flexibility in view of operational needs that might vary in practice, this Directive should provide for two other means of exchanging information, in addition to requests for information submitted to the Single Points of Contact. The first one is the unsolicited provision of information by a Single Point of Contact or by a competent law enforcement authority to the Single Point of Contact or a competent law enforcement authority of another Member State without a prior request, namely the provision of information on its own initiative. The second one is the provision of information upon a request for information submitted either by a Single Point of Contact or by a competent law enforcement authority directly to a competent law enforcement authority of another Member State. In respect of both means of exchange of information, this Directive sets out only a limited number of minimum requirements, in particular on keeping the relevant Single Points of Contact informed and, as regards own-initiative provisions of information, the situations in which information is to be provided and the language to be used. Those requirements should also apply to situations in which a competent law enforcement authority provides information to the Single Point of Contact of its own Member State in order to provide that information to another Member State, such as where it is necessary to comply with the rules set out in this Directive on the language to be used when providing information.

(22)

The requirement of a prior judicial authorisation for the provision of information, where provided in national law, constitutes an important safeguard which should be respected. However, the Member States’ legal systems are different in that respect and this Directive should not be understood as affecting the rules and conditions concerning prior judicial authorisations laid down in national law, other than requiring that domestic exchanges and exchanges between Member States be treated in an equivalent manner, both on substance and procedurally. Furthermore, in order to keep any delays and complications relating to the application of such a requirement to a minimum, the Single Point of Contact or the competent law enforcement authorities, as applicable, of the Member State of the competent judicial authority should take all practical and legal steps, where relevant in cooperation with the Single Point of Contact or the designated law enforcement authority of the requesting Member State, to obtain the judicial authorisation as soon as possible. Although the legal basis of this Directive is limited to law enforcement cooperation under Article 87(2), point (a), of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), this Directive might be of relevance to judicial authorities.

(23)

It is particularly important that the protection of personal data, in accordance with Union law, be ensured in connection with all exchanges of information under this Directive. To that end, any personal data processing by a Single Point of Contact or a competent law enforcement authority under this Directive should be carried out in full compliance with Directive (EU) 2016/680 of the European Parliament and of the Council (17). Pursuant to Regulation (EU) 2016/794, the European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Cooperation (Europol) is to process data in accordance with the rules set out therein. That Directive and that Regulation are unaffected by this Directive. In particular, it should be specified that any personal data exchanged by Single Points of Contacts and competent law enforcement authorities remain limited to the categories of data per category of data subject listed in Section B of Annex II to Regulation (EU) 2016/794. Accordingly, a clear distinction should be made between the data concerning suspects and the data concerning witnesses, victims, or persons belonging to other groups, for which stricter limitations apply. Furthermore, as far as possible, any such personal data should be distinguished in accordance with their degree of accuracy and reliability. In order to ensure accuracy and reliability, facts should be distinguished from personal assessments. The Single Points of Contact or, where applicable, competent law enforcement authorities should process requests for information under this Directive as quickly as possible in order to ensure the accuracy and reliability of personal data, to avoid unnecessary duplication of data, and to reduce the risk of data becoming outdated or no longer being available to them. Where it appears that the personal data are incorrect, they should be rectified or erased or their processing should be restricted without delay.

(24)

In order to allow for the adequate and rapid provision of information by Single Points of Contact, either upon request or on their own initiative, it is important that the competent law enforcement authorities understand each other. All exchanges of information, including the provision of requested information, refusals of requests for information, including the reasons for such refusals, and, where applicable, requests for clarification or specifications and clarification or specifications provided which relate to a specific request should be transmitted in the language in which that request was submitted. Therefore, to prevent delays in the provision of requested information caused by language barriers and to limit translation costs, Member States should establish a list of one or more languages in which their Single Point of Contact can be addressed and in which it can communicate. Since English is a language that is broadly understood and used in practice with regard to law enforcement cooperation within the Union, it should be included on that list. Member States should provide that list and any updates thereto to the Commission. The Commission should publish online a compilation of those lists.

(25)

To ensure the safety and security of European citizens, it is essential that Europol hold the necessary information to fulfil its role as the Union’s criminal information hub supporting the competent law enforcement authorities. Therefore, when information is exchanged between Member States, irrespective of whether it is exchanged pursuant to a request for information submitted to a Single Point of Contact or competent law enforcement authority or whether it is provided by a Single Point of Contact or competent law enforcement authority on its own initiative, an assessment should be made, on a case-by-case basis, as to whether a copy of the request for information submitted under this Directive or of the information exchanged under this Directive should be sent to Europol in accordance with Article 7(6) of Regulation (EU) 2016/794 where it concerns a criminal offence falling within the scope of the objectives of Europol. Such assessments should be based on Europol’s objectives as set out in Regulation (EU) 2016/794 in so far as the scope of the criminal offence is concerned. Member States should not be obliged to send a copy of the request for information or of the information exchanged to Europol where it would be contrary to the essential interests of the security of the Member State concerned, where it would jeopardise the success of an ongoing investigation or the safety of an individual or where it would disclose information relating to organisations or specific intelligence activities in the field of national security. Moreover, in accordance with the principle of data ownership and without prejudice to the obligation set out in Regulation (EU) 2016/794 concerning the determination of the purpose of, and restrictions on, the processing of information by Europol, information initially obtained from another Member State or a third country should be provided to Europol only where that Member State or third country has given its consent. Member States should ensure that the staff of their Single Point of Contact and competent law enforcement authorities are adequately supported and trained to quickly and accurately identify which information exchanged under this Directive falls within the mandate of Europol and is necessary for it to fulfil its objectives.

(26)

The problem of the proliferation of communication channels used for the transmission of law enforcement information between Member States should be remedied because it hinders the adequate and rapid exchange of such information and increases the risks concerning the security of personal data. Therefore, the use of the Secure Information Exchange Network Application (SIENA), managed and developed by Europol in accordance with Regulation (EU) 2016/794, should be made mandatory for all transmissions and communications under this Directive, including the sending of requests for information to Single Points of Contact and directly to competent law enforcement authorities, the provision of information pursuant to such requests and the provision of information by Single Points of Contact and competent law enforcement authorities on their own initiative, communications on refusals of requests for information, clarification and specifications, and the sending of copies of requests for information or information to Single Points of Contact and Europol. To that end, all Single Points of Contact, and all competent law enforcement authorities that might be involved in exchanges of information, should be directly connected to SIENA. To allow frontline officers, such as police officers involved in dragnet operations, to use SIENA, it should also be operational on mobile devices, where appropriate. In that regard, a short transition period should be provided for in order to allow for the full roll-out of SIENA because it entails a change of the current arrangements in some Member States and requires those staff be trained. In order to take into account the operational reality and not to hamper good cooperation between competent law enforcement authorities, Member States should be able to allow their Single Point of Contact or their competent law enforcement authorities to use another secure communication channel in a limited number of justified situations. Where Member States permit their Single Point of Contact or their competent law enforcement authorities to use another communication channel due to the urgency of the request for information, they should, where practicable and consistent with operational needs, revert to using SIENA after the situation ceases to be urgent. The use of SIENA should not be mandatory for internal exchanges of information within a Member State.

(27)

In order to simplify, facilitate and better manage information flows, each Member State should establish or designate a Single Point of Contact. Single Points of Contact should be competent for coordinating and facilitating the exchange of information under this Directive. Each Member State should notify the Commission of the establishment or designation of its Single Point of Contact and any changes thereto. The Commission should publish those notifications and any updates thereto. The Single Points of Contact should, in particular, contribute to mitigating the obstacles to information flows resulting from the fragmentation of the way in which competent law enforcement authorities communicate with one another, in response to the growing need to jointly tackle cross-border crime, such as drug trafficking, cybercrime, trafficking in human beings, and terrorism. The Single Points of Contact should be assigned a number of specific, minimum tasks and have certain minimum capabilities so that they are able to effectively fulfil their coordinating functions in respect of the cross-border exchange of information for law enforcement purposes under this Directive.

(28)

The Single Points of Contact should have access to all information available within their Member State, including by having user-friendly access to all relevant Union and international databases and platforms, in accordance with the arrangements specified in the applicable Union and national law. In order to be able to meet the requirements of this Directive, in particular those on time limits, the Single Points of Contact should be provided with adequate resources in terms of budget and staff, including adequate translation capabilities, and they should function around the clock. In that regard, having a front desk that is able to screen, process and channel incoming requests for information could increase their efficiency and effectiveness. Single Points of Contact should also have at their disposition, at all times, judicial authorities competent to grant necessary judicial authorisations. In practice, that can be done, for example, by ensuring the physical presence of such judicial authorities within the premises of the Single Point of Contact or the functional availability of such judicial authorities either within the premises of the Single Point of Contact or directly available on call.

(29)

In order for them to be able to effectively perform their coordinating functions under this Directive, the Single Points of Contact should be composed of staff from those competent law enforcement authorities whose involvement is necessary for the adequate and rapid exchange of information under this Directive. While it is for each Member State to decide on the precise organisation and composition needed to meet that requirement, police, customs and other competent law enforcement authorities responsible for preventing, detecting or investigating criminal offences and possible contact points for regional and bilateral offices, such as liaison officers and attachés seconded or posted in other Member States and relevant Union law enforcement agencies, such as Europol, could be represented in the Single Points of Contact. However, in the interest of effective coordination, at a minimum, the Single Points of Contact should be composed of representatives of the Europol national unit, the SIRENE Bureau and the Interpol National Central Bureau, as established by the relevant Union legal act or international agreement and notwithstanding that this Directive does not apply to the exchange of information specifically regulated by those Union legal acts.

(30)

Given the specific demands of cross-border law enforcement cooperation, including the handling of sensitive information in that context, it is essential for the staff of the Single Points of Contact and the competent law enforcement authorities to have the necessary knowledge and skills to carry out their functions under this Directive in a lawful, efficient and effective manner. In particular, the staff of the Single Points of Contact should be offered, and encouraged to benefit from, adequate and regular training courses, provided both at Union and at national level, which correspond to their professional needs and specific backgrounds and which facilitate their contacts with the Single Points of Contact and competent law enforcement authorities of other Member States needed for the application of the rules set out in this Directive. In that respect, particular attention should be paid to the proper use of data processing tools and IT systems, to imparting knowledge about the relevant Union and national legal frameworks in the area of Justice and Home Affairs, with a particular focus on the protection of personal data, law enforcement cooperation and the handling of confidential information, and to the languages in which the Member State concerned has indicated that its Single Point of Contact is able to exchange information, with a view to helping overcome language barriers. For the purpose of providing the training, Member States should also, where appropriate, make use of the training courses and relevant tools offered by the European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Training (CEPOL), established by Regulation (EU) 2015/2219 of the European Parliament and of the Council (18), consider the possibility for the staff to spend a week at Europol, and make use of relevant offers made under programmes and projects funded by the Union budget, such as the CEPOL exchange programme.

(31)

In addition to technical skills and legal knowledge, mutual trust and common understanding are prerequisites for efficient and effective cross-border law enforcement cooperation under this Directive. Personal contacts acquired through joint operations and the sharing of expertise facilitate the building of trust and the development of a common Union culture of policing. Member States should also consider joint training courses and staff exchanges which focus on the transfer of knowledge about the working methods, investigative approaches and organisational structures of competent law enforcement authorities in other Member States.

(32)

To increase participation in training courses for the staff of the Single Points of Contact and the competent law enforcement authorities, Member States could also consider specific incentives for such staff.

(33)

It is necessary that the Single Points of Contact deploy and operate a single electronic case management system having certain minimum functions and capabilities in order to allow them to carry out each of their tasks under this Directive in an effective and efficient manner, in particular as regards the exchange of information. The case management system is a workflow system allowing Single Points of Contact to manage the exchange of information. It is desirable that the universal message format standard established by Regulation (EU) 2019/818 of the European Parliament and of the Council (19) be used in the development of the case management system.

(34)

The rules set out in Directive (EU) 2016/680 apply to the processing of personal data in the case management system. Processing includes storage. In the interests of clarity and the effective protection of personal data, the rules set out in that Directive should be further specified in this Directive. In particular, as regards the requirement set out in Directive (EU) 2016/680 that personal data be kept in a form which permits identification of data subjects for no longer than is necessary for the purposes for which they are processed, this Directive should specify that, where a Single Point of Contact receives information exchanged under this Directive containing personal data, the Single Point of Contact should keep the personal data in the case management system only in so far as it is necessary and proportionate for it to carry out its tasks under this Directive. Where that is no longer the case, the Single Point of Contact should irrevocably delete the personal data from the case management system. In order to ensure that the personal data is kept only for as long as necessary and proportionate, in accordance with rules concerning time limits for storage and review set out in Directive (EU) 2016/680, the Single Point of Contact should regularly review whether those requirements continue to be met. For that purpose, a first review should take place at the latest six months after an exchange of information under this Directive has concluded, that is, the moment at which the last item of information has been provided or the latest communication relating thereto has been exchanged. The requirements of this Directive regarding such review and deletion should, however, not affect the possibility for the national authorities competent for the prevention, detection and investigation of criminal offences to keep the personal data in their national criminal files under national law, in compliance with Union law, in particular Directive (EU) 2016/680.

(35)

In order to assist Single Points of Contact and competent law enforcement authorities in the exchange of information under this Directive and to foster a common European police culture between Member States, the Member States should encourage practical cooperation among their Single Points of Contact and competent law enforcement authorities. In particular, the Council should organise meetings of the Heads of the Single Points of Contact at least on an annual basis to share experience and best practice regarding the exchange of information for the purposes of this Directive. Other forms of cooperation should include the drafting of manuals on law enforcement information exchange, the compilation of national fact sheets on directly and indirectly accessible information, Single Points of Contact, designated law enforcement authorities and language regimes, or other documents on common procedures, the addressing of difficulties regarding workflows, awareness-raising about the specificities of relevant legal frameworks and the organisation, as appropriate, of meetings between relevant Single Points of Contact.

(36)

To enable the necessary monitoring and evaluation of the application of this Directive, Member States should be required to collect and annually provide to the Commission certain data concerning the implementation of this Directive. That requirement is necessary, in particular, to remedy the lack of comparable data quantifying relevant cross-border information exchanges between competent law enforcement authorities and also facilitates the reporting obligation of the Commission regarding the implementation of this Directive. Data required for that purpose should be automatically generated by the case management system and SIENA.

(37)

The cross-border nature of transnational crime and terrorism requires Member States to rely on one another to prevent, detect or investigate such criminal offences. Since the objective of this Directive, namely ensuring adequate and rapid information flows between competent law enforcement authorities and to Europol, cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States but can rather, by reason of the scale and effects of the action, be better achieved at Union level through the establishment of common rules and a common culture on the exchange of information and through modern tools and communication channels, the Union may adopt measures in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity as set out in Article 5 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU). In accordance with the principle of proportionality as set out in that Article, this Directive does not go beyond what is necessary in order to achieve that objective.

(38)

The European Data Protection Supervisor was consulted in accordance with Article 42(1) of Regulation (EU) 2018/1725 of the European Parliament and the Council (20) and delivered an opinion on 7 March 2022.

(39)

This Directive builds upon the values on which the Union is founded, as set out in Article 2 TEU, including the rule of law, freedom and democracy. It also respects fundamental rights and safeguards and observes the principles recognised by the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (the ‘Charter’), in particular the right to liberty and security, the respect for private and family life and the right to the protection of personal data as provided for by Articles 6, 7 and 8 of the Charter respectively, as well as by Article 16 TFEU. Any processing of personal data under this Directive should be limited to that which is strictly necessary and proportionate and subject to clear conditions, strict requirements and effective supervision by the national supervisory authorities established by Directive (EU) 2016/680 and the European Data Protection Supervisor, where appropriate in accordance with their respective mandates.

(40)

In accordance with Articles 1 and 2 of Protocol No 22 on the position of Denmark, annexed to the TEU and to the TFEU, Denmark is not taking part in the adoption of this Directive and is not bound by it or subject to its application. Given that this Directive builds upon the Schengen acquis, Denmark shall, in accordance with Article 4 of that Protocol, decide within a period of six months after the Council has decided on this Directive whether it will implement it in its national law.

(41)

Ireland is taking part in this Directive, in accordance with Article 5(1) of Protocol No 19 on the Schengen acquis integrated into the framework of the European Union, annexed to the TEU and to the TFEU, and Article 6(2) of Council Decision 2002/192/EC (21).

(42)

As regards Iceland and Norway, this Directive constitutes a development of the provisions of the Schengen acquis within the meaning of the Agreement concluded by the Council of the European Union and the Republic of Iceland and the Kingdom of Norway concerning the latters’ association with the implementation, application and development of the Schengen acquis (22) which fall within the area referred to in Article 1, point H, of Council Decision 1999/437/EC (23).

(43)

As regards Switzerland, this Directive constitutes a development of the provisions of the Schengen acquis within the meaning of the Agreement between the European Union, the European Community and the Swiss Confederation on the Swiss Confederation’s association with the implementation, application and development of the Schengen acquis (24) which fall within the area referred to in Article 1, point H, of Decision 1999/437/EC read in conjunction with Article 3 of Council Decision 2008/149/JHA (25).

(44)

As regards Liechtenstein, this Directive constitutes a development of the provisions of the Schengen acquis within the meaning of the Protocol between the European Union, the European Community, the Swiss Confederation and the Principality of Liechtenstein on the accession of the Principality of Liechtenstein to the Agreement between the European Union, the European Community and the Swiss Confederation on the Swiss Confederation’s association with the implementation, application and development of the Schengen acquis (26) which fall within the area referred to in Article 1, point H, of Decision 1999/437/EC read in conjunction with Article 3 of Council Decision 2011/349/EU (27),

(1)

Pursuant to Article 50(2)(a) of Regulation (EU) No 1151/2012, Sweden’s application to register the name ‘Grebbestadostron’ was published in the Official Journal of the European Union (2).

(2)

As no statement of opposition under Article 51 of Regulation (EU) No 1151/2012 has been received by the Commission, the name ‘Grebbestadostron’ should therefore be entered in the register,

(1)

Pursuant to Article 50(2)(a) of Regulation (EU) No 1151/2012, Spain’s application to register the name ‘Nueces de Nerpio’ was published in the Official Journal of the European Union (2).

(2)

As no statement of opposition under Article 51 of Regulation (EU) No 1151/2012 has been received by the Commission, the name ‘Nueces de Nerpio’ should therefore be entered in the register,

(1)

Regulation (EU) No 165/2014 has introduced smart tachographs, which include a connection to the global navigation satellite system (‘GNSS’).

(2)

The technical specifications for the construction, testing, installation operation and repair of smart tachographs and their components are set out in Implementing Regulation (EU) 2016/799 (2).

(3)

Regulation (EU) 2020/1054 of the European Parliament and of the Council (3) introduced new requirements for the smart tachograph, which required amending its technical specifications. Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2021/1228 (4) therefore amended Regulation (EU) 2016/799 to introduce a second version of the smart tachograph.

(4)

Implementing Regulation (EU) 2021/1228 introduced the mandatory use of the Galileo Open Service Navigation Message Authentication (‘OSNMA’) by smart tachographs, to allow the authentication of positions recorded by the tachograph through the use of Galileo Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS).

(5)

OSNMA is currently in a public testing phase, with a service declaration expected only after the introduction date of the second version of the smart tachograph in newly-registered vehicles. This makes the type-approval of vehicle units uncertain, as well as the behaviour of second version smart tachographs following a future change in signal-in-space in OSNMA.

(6)

To ensure harmonised testing and type approval conditions, as well as harmonised behaviours of vehicle units, it is necessary to ensure a common functioning of second version smart tachographs, both before and after the OSNMA service declaration.

(7)

The initial second version smart tachographs should be type approved on the basis of the OSNMA signal-in-space and cryptographic material available for the public testing phase of the service. In order to ensure that the driver is not disturbed after the change to the operational signal-in-space, these tachographs should ignore OSNMA until they can be updated to fully use the OSNMA service. This creates a transitional period for second version smart tachographs with regards to the use of OSNMA.

(8)

These transitional tachographs should ensure all the functionalities laid down in Chapter II of Regulation (EU) No 165/2014.

(9)

It is expected that no changes to the hardware will be needed once the service declaration of OSNMA takes place for the tachograph to function with the operational OSNMA service. It should therefore be possible for the software of a transitional tachograph to be updated to make full use of OSNMA once it is available.

(10)

In light of future developments regarding the availability and functioning of OSNMA, the feasibility of updating the tachograph in a workshop, or possible manipulation techniques detected against the tachograph in the field, the Commission may re-evaluate whether the technical specifications should be revised, including whether a requirement for the transitional smart tachograph to make full use of its OSNMA capability is necessary.

(11)

Sufficient time should be given to the industry to implement the transitional measures. The request for type approval of transitional tachographs should therefore be possible until at least 31 December 2023. It should also be possible to continue to install transitional tachographs for a limited period of time after the OSNMA Service Declaration.

(12)

Enforcement authorities should be able to recognise, once the transitional period has ended, whether the smart tachograph installed is fitted with a software version that allows it to make use of Galileo OSNMA.

(13)

The current date of application laid out in Article 2 of Implementing Regulation (EU) 2021/1228 prevents type-approval authorities from granting type-approval to equipment pursuant to Implementing Regulation (EU) 2016/799 in accordance with the amendments laid down in Implementing Regulation (EU) 2021/1228 before 21 August 2023. However, pursuant to articles 8(1) and 11 of Regulation (EU) No 165/2014, from that date vehicles registered for the first time in a Member State are to be equipped with the new version of the smart tachograph. Implementing Regulation (EU) 2021/1228 should therefore be amended to allow type-approval to be granted as soon as this Regulation enters into force.

(14)

The measures provided for in this Regulation are in accordance with the opinion of the Committee established by Article 42(1) of Regulation (EU) No 165/2014,

(1)

In accordance with Regulation (EC) No 470/2009, the Commission is to establish, by way of a Regulation, maximum residue limits (‘MRLs’) for pharmacologically active substances intended for use in the Union in veterinary medicinal products for food-producing animals or in biocidal products used in animal husbandry.

(2)

Table 1 of the Annex to Commission Regulation (EU) No 37/2010 (2) sets out the pharmacologically active substances and their classification regarding MRLs in foodstuffs of animal origin.

(3)

Praziquantel is already included in that table as an allowed substance for ovine and equidae species. The existing entry has a ‘no MRL required’ classification.

(4)

In accordance with Article 3 of Regulation (EC) No 470/2009, on 27 July 2021, VETHELLAS AEBE submitted a request to the European Medicines Agency (‘Agency’) for the extension of the existing entry for praziquantel to fin fish.

(5)

On 8 September 2022, the Agency, through the opinion of the Committee for Medicinal Products for Veterinary Use, concluded that the establishment of an MRL for praziquantel in fin fish, in relation to muscle and skin in natural proportions, was appropriate.

(6)

In accordance with Article 5 of Regulation (EC) No 470/2009, the Agency is to consider using MRLs established for a pharmacologically active substance in a particular foodstuff for another foodstuff derived from the same species, or MRLs established for a pharmacologically active substance in one or more species for other species.

(7)

The Agency concluded that the extrapolation of the ‘no MRL required’ classification for praziquantel in ovine species to other ruminants, except cattle, is appropriate.

(8)

In view of the opinion of the Agency, the Commission considers it appropriate to establish an MRL for praziquantel in fin fish, in relation to muscle and skin in natural proportions and to establish the recommended ‘no MRL required’ classification for praziquantel in all ruminants except bovine species.

(9)

Regulation (EU) No 37/2010 should therefore be amended accordingly.

(10)

The measures provided for in this Regulation are in accordance with the opinion of the Standing Committee on Veterinary Medicinal Products,

(1)

Pursuant to Article 300(3) of the Treaty, the Committee of the Regions is to consist of representatives of regional and local bodies who either hold a regional or local authority electoral mandate or are politically accountable to an elected assembly.

(2)

On 3 February 2020, the Council adopted Decision (EU) 2020/144 (2), appointing the members and alternate members of the Committee of the Regions for the period from 26 January 2020 to 25 January 2025.

(3)

An alternate member’s seat on the Committee of the Regions has become vacant following the end of the national mandate on the basis of which Ms Annette BERGBO was proposed for appointment.

(4)

The Finnish Government has proposed Mr Jesper JOSEFSSON, representative of a regional body who holds a regional authority electoral mandate, Lagtingsledamot, Ålands lagting (Member of Parliament, Parliament of Åland), as an alternate member of the Committee of the Regions for the remainder of the current term of office, which runs until 25 January 2025,

(1)

The European Agreement concerning the work of crews of vehicles engaged in international road transport (AETR) (1) entered into force on 5 January 1976. It was last amended on 20 September 2010.

(2)

Pursuant to Article 21 of the AETR, proposals of amendments to the Agreement may be submitted by any Contracting Party to the Secretary-General of the United Nations. Before submission to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, the proposals are first discussed in the Working Party on Road Transport (‘SC.1’) of the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE).

(3)

A Group of Experts has been established by the UNECE in the framework of the AETR. That group is a body empowered to develop and submit proposals for amending the AETR to the Working Party on Road Transport of the UNECE.

(4)

The Group of Experts on AETR, during its 32nd planned session of 12 June 2023, is to discuss a proposal by the Republic of Belarus and the Russian Federation to amend Article 4 of the AETR by introducing a ‘force majeure’ clause, as laid out in ECE/TRANS/SC.1/GE.21/2023/2/Rev.1.

(5)

It is appropriate to establish the position to be adopted on the Union’s behalf in the Group of Experts on the AETR, and possibly in the Working Party on Road Transport of the UNECE, as the amendment to the AETR which they will be called to consider and endorse would be binding under international law in accordance with Article 21(6) of the AETR and is capable of decisively influencing the content of Union legislation, namely Regulations (EC) No 561/2006 (2) and (EU) No 165/2014 (3) of the European Parliament and of the Council.

(6)

In its judgment of 31 March 1971 in Case 22/70 (4), the Court of Justice of the European Union recognised that the area of the work of crews of vehicles engaged in road transport is an exclusive external competence of the Union. This competence has been exercised since then in numerous legislative acts adopted by the Union co-legislators, including Regulations (EC) No 561/2006 and (EU) No 165/2014. Since the subject matter of the AETR falls within the scope of Regulation (EC) No 561/2006, the power to negotiate and conclude the AETR and its modifications lies exclusively with the Union pursuant to Article 3(2) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union.

(7)

The proposed amendment aims at solving a practical problem of the Republic of Belarus and of the Russian Federation that is likely the result of the war of aggression by the Russian Federation against Ukraine, in which the Republic of Belarus has a complicit role, and which led to the application by the Union of restrictive measures against the Russian Federation and the Republic of Belarus. Those restrictive measures have resulted, among other consequences, in certain companies established in the Union, including companies that usually supply digital tachograph cards and chips to the card issuing authorities of the Russian Federation and of the Republic of Belarus, suspending their operations in and with those two countries. As a result, those two Contracting Parties claim to be in a position where it is difficult or impossible to deliver tachograph cards to the drivers in those countries, who can therefore not comply with the AETR when engaged in international road transport operations falling within its scope. The proposed amendment would allow a Contracting Party to unilaterally notify that it could no longer fulfil one of the main requirements of the AETR, namely the use of a harmonised recording equipment for vehicles engaged in international transport (the digital tachograph), for reasons of ‘force majeure’ which would not be subject to any type of validation or assessment.

(8)

The envisaged amendment would allow, following a declaration of a ‘force majeure’ by a Contracting Party, not to require the use of digital tachographs and digital tachograph cards for vehicles registered in that Contracting Party when engaged in international road transport operations. It would thus render the enforcement of the drivers’ compliance with driving and rest times as laid out elsewhere in the AETR drastically more difficult, creating a loophole that would likely compromise the entire purpose of the AETR.

(9)

The position to be adopted on the Union’s behalf within the Group of Experts on the AETR and within the Working Party on Road Transport of the UNECE should be not to support the proposed amendment, in order to prevent a significant weakening of the enforcement of the rules on driving and rest times laid down in the AETR, and to ensure the full effect of the restrictive measures adopted by the Union.

(10)

It cannot be excluded that the Republic of Belarus or the Russian Federation formally submit to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, under Article 21(1) of the AETR, a proposal to amend the AETR irrespective of the discussions in UNECE’s bodies. In this case, Member States should object to that proposal under Article 21(2), point (a), of the AETR.

(11)

The Union’s position is to be expressed by the Member States of the Union that are members of the Group of Experts of the AETR and of the Working Party on Road Transport of the UNECE, acting jointly in the interest of the Union,

(1)

Highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) is an infectious viral disease in birds and may have a severe impact on the profitability of poultry farming causing disturbance to trade within the Union and exports to third countries. HPAI viruses can infect migratory birds, which can then spread these viruses over long distances during their autumn and spring migrations. Therefore, the presence of HPAI viruses in wild birds poses a continuous threat for the direct and indirect introduction of these viruses into establishments where poultry or captive birds are kept. In the event of an outbreak of HPAI, there is a risk that the disease agent may spread to other establishments where poultry or captive birds are kept.

(2)

Regulation (EU) 2016/429 establishes a new legislative framework for the prevention and control of diseases that are transmissible to animals or humans. HPAI falls within the definition of a listed disease in that Regulation, and it is subject to the disease prevention and control rules laid down therein. In addition, Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2020/687 (2) supplements Regulation (EU) 2016/429 as regards the rules for the prevention and control of certain listed diseases, including disease control measures for HPAI.

(3)

Commission Implementing Decision (EU) 2021/641 (3) was adopted within the framework of Regulation (EU) 2016/429 and it lays down emergency measures at Union level in relation to outbreaks of HPAI.

(4)

More particularly, Implementing Decision (EU) 2021/641 provides that the protection, surveillance and further restricted zones established by the Member States following outbreaks of HPAI, in accordance with Delegated Regulation (EU) 2020/687, are to comprise at least the areas listed as protection, surveillance and further restricted zones in the Annex to that Implementing Decision.

(5)

The Annex to Implementing Decision (EU) 2021/641 was recently amended by Commission Implementing Decision (EU) 2023/901 (4) following outbreaks of HPAI in poultry or captive birds in Czechia, Denmark, Germany, Italy, Hungary and Poland that needed to be reflected in that Annex.

(6)

Since the date of adoption of Implementing Decision (EU) 2023/901, Czechia, Germany, France, Hungary and Poland have notified the Commission of new outbreaks of HPAI in establishments where poultry or captive birds were kept, located in Moravian-Silesian Region in Czechia, in Saxony-Anhalt Land in Germany, in Nouvelle-Aquitaine and Occitania administrative regions in France, in Bács-Kiskun County in Hungary, and in Greater Poland Voivodeship in Poland.

(7)

The competent authorities of Czechia, Germany, France, Hungary and Poland have taken the necessary disease control measures required in accordance with Delegated Regulation (EU) 2020/687, including the establishment of protection and surveillance zones around those outbreaks.

(8)

In addition, the competent authority of France decided to establish further restricted zones in addition to the protection and surveillance zones established for certain outbreaks located in that Member State.

(9)

Moreover, the outbreaks confirmed in Czechia are located in close proximity to the border with Poland. Accordingly the competent authorities of these Member States have duly collaborated with regard to the establishment of the necessary surveillance zone in accordance with Delegated Regulation (EU) 2020/687, as the surveillance zone extends into the territory of Poland.

(10)

The Commission has examined the disease control measures taken by Czechia, Germany, France, Hungary and Poland in collaboration with those Member States, and it is satisfied that the boundaries of the protection and surveillances zones in Czechia, Germany, France, Hungary and Poland established by the competent authority of those Member States are at a sufficient distance from the establishments where the outbreaks of HPAI have been confirmed.

(11)

In the Annex to Implementing Decision (EU) 2021/641, there are currently no areas listed as protection zones for France.

(12)

In order to prevent any unnecessary disturbance to trade within the Union and to avoid unjustified barriers to trade being imposed by third countries, it is necessary to rapidly describe at Union level, in collaboration with Czechia, Germany, France, Hungary and Poland, the protection and surveillance zones duly established by those Member States in accordance with Delegated Regulation (EU) 2020/687, as well as the further restricted zones established by France.

(13)

Therefore, the areas listed as protection and surveillance zones for Czechia, Germany, Hungary and Poland, as well as the areas listed as surveillance and further restricted zones for France in the Annex to Implementing Decision (EU) 2021/641 should be amended.

(14)

In addition, protection zones should be listed for France in the Annex to Implementing Decision (EU) 2021/641

(15)

Accordingly, the Annex to Implementing Decision (EU) 2021/641 should be amended to update regionalisation at Union level to take account of the protection and surveillance zones duly established by Czechia, Germany, France, Hungary and Poland, and of the further restricted zones established by France in accordance with Delegated Regulation (EU) 2020/687, and the duration of the measures applicable therein.

(16)

Implementing Decision (EU) 2021/641 should therefore be amended accordingly.

(17)

Given the urgency of the epidemiological situation in the Union as regards the spread of HPAI, it is important that the amendments to be made to Implementing Decision (EU) 2021/641 by this Decision take effect as soon as possible.

(18)

The measures provided for in this Decision are in accordance with the opinion of the Standing Committee on Plants, Animals, Food and Feed,

(1)

African swine fever is an infectious viral disease affecting kept and wild porcine animals and can have a severe impact on the concerned animal population and the profitability of farming causing disturbance to movements of consignments of those animals and products thereof within the Union and exports to third countries.

(2)

In the event of outbreaks of African swine fever in kept and wild porcine animals, there is a serious risk of the spread of that disease to other establishments of kept porcine animals and to wild porcine animals.

(3)

Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2020/687 (2) supplements the rules for the control of the listed diseases referred to in Article 9(1)(a), (b) and (c) of Regulation (EU) 2016/429, and defined as category A, B and C diseases in Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2018/1882 (3). In particular, Articles 21 and 22 of Delegated Regulation (EU) 2020/687 provide for the establishment of a restricted zone in the event of an outbreak of a category A disease, including African swine fever, and for certain measures to be applied therein. In addition, Article 21(1) of that Delegated Regulation provides that the restricted zone is to comprise a protection zone, a surveillance zone, and if necessary further restricted zones around or adjacent to the protection and surveillance zones.

(4)

Also, Articles 63 to 66 of Delegated Regulation (EU) 2020/687 provide for certain measures to be taken in the event of an official confirmation of an outbreak of a category A disease in wild animals, including African swine fever in wild porcine animals. Notably, those provisions provide for the establishment of an infected zone and prohibitions on movements of wild animals of listed species and products of animal origin thereof.

(5)

Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2023/594 (4) lays down special disease control measures regarding African swine fever. In particular, Article 3, point (a), of that Implementing Regulation provides for the establishment of a restricted zone in the case of an outbreak of African swine fever in kept porcine animals, in accordance with Article 21(1) of Delegated Regulation (EU) 2020/687.

(6)

Also, in the event of an outbreak of that disease in wild porcine animals in an area of a Member State, Article 3, point (b), of Implementing Regulation (EU) 2023/594 provides for the establishment of an infected zone in accordance with Article 63 of Delegated Regulation (EU) 2020/687. In addition, Article 6 of that Implementing Regulation provides that that area is to be listed as a restricted zone II in Part II of Annex I thereto and that the infected zone, established in accordance with Article 63 of Delegated Regulation (EU) 2020/687, is to be adjusted without delay to comprise at least the restricted zone II. The special control measures for African swine fever laid down in Implementing Regulation (EU) 2023/594 include, inter alia, prohibitions on movements of consignments of porcine animals kept in restricted zones II and products thereof outside those restricted zones.

(7)

Italy has informed the Commission of the current African swine fever situation on its territory, following the confirmation of one outbreak of that disease in kept porcine animals in the Calabria region on 12 May 2023, and, in accordance with Delegated Regulation (EU) 2020/687 and Implementing Regulation (EU) 2023/594, it has established a restricted zone, which comprises protection and surveillance zones, where the general disease control measures laid down in Delegated Regulation (EU) 2020/687 are applied, in order to prevent the further spread of that disease.

(8)

Also, Italy has as informed the Commission of the confirmation of several outbreaks of African swine fever in wild porcine animals in the Calabria region on 11 May 2023. Accordingly, the competent authority of that Member State established an infected zone in accordance with Delegated Regulation (EU) 2020/687 and Implementing Regulation (EU) 2023/594.

(9)

In order to prevent any unnecessary disturbance to trade within the Union and to avoid unjustified barriers to trade by third countries, it is necessary to identify at Union level the restricted zone, which comprises protection and surveillance zones, and the infected zone for African swine fever in Italy in collaboration with that Member State.

(10)

In order to prevent the further spread of African swine fever, pending the listing of the area of Italy affected by the recent outbreaks in wild porcine animals as a restricted zone II in Part II of Annex I to Implementing Regulation (EU) 2023/594, the special control measures for African swine fever laid down therein, that apply to movements of consignments of porcine animals kept in restricted zones II and products thereof outside those zones, should also apply to movements of those consignments from the infected zone established by Italy following that recent outbreak, in addition to the measures laid down in Articles 63 to 66 of Delegated Regulation (EU) 2020/687.

(11)

Accordingly, that infected zone should be listed in the Annex to this Decision and it should be subject to the special control measures for African swine fever that apply to restricted zones II laid down in Implementing Regulation (EU) 2023/594. However, due to this new epidemiological situation of African swine fever and taking account of the increased immediate risk of the further spread of the disease, movements of consignments of kept porcine animals and products thereof to other Member States and to third countries should not be authorised from the infected zone in accordance with that Implementing Regulation. The duration of that zoning should be also laid down in this Decision.

(12)

Therefore, in order to mitigate the risks arising from the recent outbreak of African swine fever in wild porcine animals in Italy, the movements to other Member States and third countries of consignments of porcine animals kept in the infected zone and products thereof should not be authorised by Italy until the expiry date of this Decision.

(13)

Given the urgency of the epidemiological situation in the Union as regards the spread of African swine fever, it is important that the measures laid down in this Implementing Decision apply as soon as possible.

(14)

Accordingly, pending the opinion of the Standing Committee on Plants, Animals, Food and Feed, the infected zone in Italy should be established immediately and listed in the Annex to this Decision and the duration of that zoning fixed.

(15)

This Decision is to be reviewed at the next meeting of the Standing Committee on Plants, Animals, Food and Feed,