(1)

In the digital age, information and communication technology (ICT) supports complex systems used for everyday activities. It keeps our economies running in key sectors, including the financial sector, and enhances the functioning of the internal market. Increased digitalisation and interconnectedness also amplify ICT risk, making society as a whole, and the financial system in particular, more vulnerable to cyber threats or ICT disruptions. While the ubiquitous use of ICT systems and high digitalisation and connectivity are today core features of the activities of Union financial entities, their digital resilience has yet to be better addressed and integrated into their broader operational frameworks.

(2)

The use of ICT has in the past decades gained a pivotal role in the provision of financial services, to the point where it has now acquired a critical importance in the operation of typical daily functions of all financial entities. Digitalisation now covers, for instance, payments, which have increasingly moved from cash and paper-based methods to the use of digital solutions, as well as securities clearing and settlement, electronic and algorithmic trading, lending and funding operations, peer-to-peer finance, credit rating, claim management and back-office operations. The insurance sector has also been transformed by the use of ICT, from the emergence of insurance intermediaries offering their services online operating with InsurTech, to digital insurance underwriting. Finance has not only become largely digital throughout the whole sector, but digitalisation has also deepened interconnections and dependencies within the financial sector and with third-party infrastructure and service providers.

(3)

The European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB) reaffirmed in a 2020 report addressing systemic cyber risk how the existing high level of interconnectedness across financial entities, financial markets and financial market infrastructures, and particularly the interdependencies of their ICT systems, could constitute a systemic vulnerability because localised cyber incidents could quickly spread from any of the approximately 22 000 Union financial entities to the entire financial system, unhindered by geographical boundaries. Serious ICT breaches that occur in the financial sector do not merely affect financial entities taken in isolation. They also smooth the way for the propagation of localised vulnerabilities across the financial transmission channels and potentially trigger adverse consequences for the stability of the Union’s financial system, such as generating liquidity runs and an overall loss of confidence and trust in financial markets.

(4)

In recent years, ICT risk has attracted the attention of international, Union and national policy makers, regulators and standard-setting bodies in an attempt to enhance digital resilience, set standards and coordinate regulatory or supervisory work. At international level, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, the Committee on Payments and Market Infrastructures, the Financial Stability Board, the Financial Stability Institute, as well as the G7 and G20 aim to provide competent authorities and market operators across various jurisdictions with tools to bolster the resilience of their financial systems. That work has also been driven by the need to duly consider ICT risk in the context of a highly interconnected global financial system and to seek more consistency of relevant best practices.

(5)

Despite Union and national targeted policy and legislative initiatives, ICT risk continues to pose a challenge to the operational resilience, performance and stability of the Union financial system. The reforms that followed the 2008 financial crisis primarily strengthened the financial resilience of the Union financial sector and aimed to safeguard the competitiveness and stability of the Union from economic, prudential and market conduct perspectives. Although ICT security and digital resilience are part of operational risk, they have been less in the focus of the post-financial crisis regulatory agenda and have developed in only some areas of the Union’s financial services policy and regulatory landscape, or in only a few Member States.

(6)

In its Communication of 8 March 2018 entitled ‘FinTech Action plan: For a more competitive and innovative European financial sector’, the Commission highlighted the paramount importance of making the Union financial sector more resilient, including from an operational perspective to ensure its technological safety and good functioning, its quick recovery from ICT breaches and incidents, ultimately enabling the effective and smooth provision of financial services across the whole Union, including under situations of stress, while also preserving consumer and market trust and confidence.

(7)

In April 2019, the European Supervisory Authority (European Banking Authority), (EBA) established by Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council (4), the European Supervisory Authority (European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority), (‘EIOPA’) established by Regulation (EU) No 1094/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council (5) and the European Supervisory Authority (European Securities and Markets Authority), (‘ESMA’) established by Regulation (EU) No 1095/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council (6) (known collectively as ‘European Supervisory Authorities’ or ‘ESAs’) jointly issued technical advice calling for a coherent approach to ICT risk in finance and recommending to strengthen, in a proportionate way, the digital operational resilience of the financial services industry through a sector-specific initiative of the Union.

(8)

The Union financial sector is regulated by a Single Rulebook and governed by a European system of financial supervision. Nonetheless, provisions tackling digital operational resilience and ICT security are not yet fully or consistently harmonised, despite digital operational resilience being vital for ensuring financial stability and market integrity in the digital age, and no less important than, for example, common prudential or market conduct standards. The Single Rulebook and system of supervision should therefore be developed to also cover digital operational resilience, by strengthening the mandates of competent authorities to enable them to supervise the management of ICT risk in the financial sector in order to protect the integrity and efficiency of the internal market, and to facilitate its orderly functioning.

(9)

Legislative disparities and uneven national regulatory or supervisory approaches with regard to ICT risk trigger obstacles to the functioning of the internal market in financial services, impeding the smooth exercise of the freedom of establishment and the provision of services for financial entities operating on a cross-border basis. Competition between the same type of financial entities operating in different Member States could also be distorted. This is the case, in particular, for areas where Union harmonisation has been very limited, such as digital operational resilience testing, or absent, such as the monitoring of ICT third-party risk. Disparities stemming from developments envisaged at national level could generate further obstacles to the functioning of the internal market to the detriment of market participants and financial stability.

(10)

To date, due to the ICT risk related provisions being only partially addressed at Union level, there are gaps or overlaps in important areas, such as ICT-related incident reporting and digital operational resilience testing, and inconsistencies as a result of emerging divergent national rules or cost-ineffective application of overlapping rules. This is particularly detrimental for an ICT-intensive user such as the financial sector since technology risks have no borders and the financial sector deploys its services on a wide cross-border basis within and outside the Union. Individual financial entities operating on a cross-border basis or holding several authorisations (e.g. one financial entity can have a banking, an investment firm, and a payment institution licence, each issued by a different competent authority in one or several Member States) face operational challenges in addressing ICT risk and mitigating adverse impacts of ICT incidents on their own and in a coherent cost-effective way.

(11)

As the Single Rulebook has not been accompanied by a comprehensive ICT or operational risk framework, further harmonisation of key digital operational resilience requirements for all financial entities is required. The development of ICT capabilities and overall resilience by financial entities, based on those key requirements, with a view to withstanding operational outages, would help preserve the stability and integrity of the Union financial markets and thus contribute to ensuring a high level of protection of investors and consumers in the Union. Since this Regulation aims to contribute to the smooth functioning of the internal market, it should be based on the provisions of Article 114 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) as interpreted in accordance with the consistent case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union (Court of Justice).

(12)

This Regulation aims to consolidate and upgrade ICT risk requirements as part of the operational risk requirements that have, up to this point, been addressed separately in various Union legal acts. While those acts covered the main categories of financial risk (e.g. credit risk, market risk, counterparty credit risk and liquidity risk, market conduct risk), they did not comprehensively tackle, at the time of their adoption, all components of operational resilience. The operational risk rules, when further developed in those Union legal acts, often favoured a traditional quantitative approach to addressing risk (namely setting a capital requirement to cover ICT risk) rather than targeted qualitative rules for the protection, detection, containment, recovery and repair capabilities against ICT-related incidents, or for reporting and digital testing capabilities. Those acts were primarily meant to cover and update essential rules on prudential supervision, market integrity or conduct. By consolidating and upgrading the different rules on ICT risk, all provisions addressing digital risk in the financial sector should for the first time be brought together in a consistent manner in one single legislative act. Therefore, this Regulation fills in the gaps or remedies inconsistencies in some of the prior legal acts, including in relation to the terminology used therein, and explicitly refers to ICT risk via targeted rules on ICT risk-management capabilities, incident reporting, operational resilience testing and ICT third-party risk monitoring. This Regulation should thus also raise awareness of ICT risk and acknowledge that ICT incidents and a lack of operational resilience have the possibility to jeopardise the soundness of financial entities.

(13)

Financial entities should follow the same approach and the same principle-based rules when addressing ICT risk taking into account their size and overall risk profile, and the nature, scale and complexity of their services, activities and operations. Consistency contributes to enhancing confidence in the financial system and preserving its stability especially in times of high reliance on ICT systems, platforms and infrastructures, which entails increased digital risk. Observing basic cyber hygiene should also avoid imposing heavy costs on the economy by minimising the impact and costs of ICT disruptions.

(14)

A Regulation helps reduce regulatory complexity, fosters supervisory convergence and increases legal certainty, and also contributes to limiting compliance costs, especially for financial entities operating across borders, and to reducing competitive distortions. Therefore, the choice of a Regulation for the establishment of a common framework for the digital operational resilience of financial entities is the most appropriate way to guarantee a homogenous and coherent application of all components of ICT risk management by the Union financial sector.

(15)

Directive (EU) 2016/1148 of the European Parliament and of the Council (7) was the first horizontal cybersecurity framework enacted at Union level, applying also to three types of financial entities, namely credit institutions, trading venues and central counterparties. However, since Directive (EU) 2016/1148 set out a mechanism of identification at national level of operators of essential services, only certain credit institutions, trading venues and central counterparties that were identified by the Member States, have been brought into its scope in practice, and hence required to comply with the ICT security and incident notification requirements laid down in it. Directive (EU) 2022/2555 of the European Parliament and of the Council (8) sets a uniform criterion to determine the entities falling within its scope of application (size-cap rule) while also keeping the three types of financial entities in its scope.

(16)

However, as this Regulation increases the level of harmonisation of the various digital resilience components, by introducing requirements on ICT risk management and ICT-related incident reporting that are more stringent in comparison to those laid down in the current Union financial services law, this higher level constitutes an increased harmonisation also in comparison with the requirements laid down in Directive (EU) 2022/2555. Consequently, this Regulation constitutes lex specialis with regard to Directive (EU) 2022/2555. At the same time, it is crucial to maintain a strong relationship between the financial sector and the Union horizontal cybersecurity framework as currently laid out in Directive (EU) 2022/2555 to ensure consistency with the cyber security strategies adopted by Member States and to allow financial supervisors to be made aware of cyber incidents affecting other sectors covered by that Directive.

(17)

In accordance with Article 4(2) of the Treaty on European Union and without prejudice to the judicial review by the Court of Justice, this Regulation should not affect the responsibility of Member States with regard to essential State functions concerning public security, defence and the safeguarding of national security, for example concerning the supply of information which would be contrary to the safeguarding of national security.

(18)

To enable cross-sector learning and to effectively draw on experiences of other sectors in dealing with cyber threats, the financial entities referred to in Directive (EU) 2022/2555 should remain part of the ‘ecosystem’ of that Directive (for example, Cooperation Group and computer security incident response teams (CSIRTs)).The ESAs and national competent authorities should be able to participate in the strategic policy discussions and the technical workings of the Cooperation Group under that Directive, and to exchange information and further cooperate with the single points of contact designated or established in accordance with that Directive. The competent authorities under this Regulation should also consult and cooperate with the CSIRTs. The competent authorities should also be able to request technical advice from the competent authorities designated or established in accordance with Directive (EU) 2022/2555 and establish cooperation arrangements that aim to ensure effective and fast-response coordination mechanisms.

(19)

Given the strong interlinkages between the digital resilience and the physical resilience of financial entities, a coherent approach with regard to the resilience of critical entities is necessary in this Regulation and Directive (EU) 2022/2557 of the European Parliament and the Council (9). Given that the physical resilience of financial entities is addressed in a comprehensive manner by the ICT risk management and reporting obligations covered by this Regulation, the obligations laid down in Chapters III and IV of Directive (EU) 2022/2557 should not apply to financial entities falling within the scope of that Directive.

(20)

Cloud computing service providers are one category of digital infrastructure covered by Directive (EU) 2022/2555. The Union Oversight Framework (‘Oversight Framework’) established by this Regulation applies to all critical ICT third-party service providers, including cloud computing service providers providing ICT services to financial entities, and should be considered complementary to the supervision carried out pursuant to Directive (EU) 2022/2555. Moreover, the Oversight Framework established by this Regulation should cover cloud computing service providers in the absence of a Union horizontal framework establishing a digital oversight authority.

(21)

In order to maintain full control over ICT risk, financial entities need to have comprehensive capabilities to enable a strong and effective ICT risk management, as well as specific mechanisms and policies for handling all ICT-related incidents and for reporting major ICT-related incidents. Likewise, financial entities should have policies in place for the testing of ICT systems, controls and processes, as well as for managing ICT third-party risk. The digital operational resilience baseline for financial entities should be increased while also allowing for a proportionate application of requirements for certain financial entities, particularly microenterprises, as well as financial entities subject to a simplified ICT risk management framework. To facilitate an efficient supervision of institutions for occupational retirement provision that is proportionate and addresses the need to reduce administrative burdens on the competent authorities, the relevant national supervisory arrangements in respect of such financial entities should take into account their size and overall risk profile, and the nature, scale and complexity of their services, activities and operations even when the relevant thresholds established in Article 5 of Directive (EU) 2016/2341 of the European Parliament and of the Council (10) are exceeded. In particular, supervisory activities should focus primarily on the need to address serious risks associated with the ICT risk management of a particular entity.

Competent authorities should also maintain a vigilant but proportionate approach in relation to the supervision of institutions for occupational retirement provision which, in accordance with Article 31 of Directive (EU) 2016/2341, outsource a significant part of their core business, such as asset management, actuarial calculations, accounting and data management, to service providers.

(22)

ICT-related incident reporting thresholds and taxonomies vary significantly at national level. While common ground may be achieved through the relevant work undertaken by the European Union Agency for Cybersecurity (ENISA) established by Regulation (EU) 2019/881 of the European Parliament and of the Council (11) and the Cooperation Group under Directive (EU) 2022/2555, divergent approaches on setting the thresholds and use of taxonomies still exist, or can emerge, for the remainder of financial entities. Due to those divergences, there are multiple requirements that financial entities must comply with, especially when operating across several Member States and when part of a financial group. Moreover, such divergences have the potential to hinder the creation of further uniform or centralised Union mechanisms that speed up the reporting process and support a quick and smooth exchange of information between competent authorities, which is crucial for addressing ICT risk in the event of large-scale attacks with potentially systemic consequences.

(23)

To reduce the administrative burden and potentially duplicative reporting obligations for certain financial entities, the requirement for the incident reporting pursuant to Directive (EU) 2015/2366 of the European Parliament and of the Council (12) should cease to apply to payment service providers that fall within the scope of this Regulation. Consequently, credit institutions, e-money institutions, payment institutions and account information service providers, as referred to in Article 33(1) of that Directive, should, from the date of application of this Regulation, report pursuant to this Regulation, all operational or security payment-related incidents which have been previously reported pursuant to that Directive, irrespective of whether such incidents are ICT-related.

(24)

To enable competent authorities to fulfil supervisory roles by acquiring a complete overview of the nature, frequency, significance and impact of ICT-related incidents and to enhance the exchange of information between relevant public authorities, including law enforcement authorities and resolution authorities, this Regulation should lay down a robust ICT-related incident reporting regime whereby the relevant requirements address current gaps in financial services law, and remove existing overlaps and duplications to alleviate costs. It is essential to harmonise the ICT-related incident reporting regime by requiring all financial entities to report to their competent authorities through a single streamlined framework as set out in this Regulation. In addition, the ESAs should be empowered to further specify relevant elements for the ICT-related incident reporting framework, such as taxonomy, timeframes, data sets, templates and applicable thresholds. To ensure full consistency with Directive (EU) 2022/2555, financial entities should be allowed, on a voluntary basis, to notify significant cyber threats to the relevant competent authority, when they consider that the cyber threat is of relevance to the financial system, service users or clients.

(25)

Digital operational resilience testing requirements have been developed in certain financial subsectors setting out frameworks that are not always fully aligned. This leads to a potential duplication of costs for cross-border financial entities and makes the mutual recognition of the results of digital operational resilience testing complex which, in turn, can fragment the internal market.

(26)

In addition, where no ICT testing is required, vulnerabilities remain undetected and result in exposing a financial entity to ICT risk and ultimately create a higher risk to the stability and integrity of the financial sector. Without Union intervention, digital operational resilience testing would continue to be inconsistent and would lack a system of mutual recognition of ICT testing results across different jurisdictions. In addition, as it is unlikely that other financial subsectors would adopt testing schemes on a meaningful scale, they would miss out on the potential benefits of a testing framework, in terms of revealing ICT vulnerabilities and risks, and testing defence capabilities and business continuity, which contributes to increasing the trust of customers, suppliers and business partners. To remedy those overlaps, divergences and gaps, it is necessary to lay down rules for a coordinated testing regime and thereby facilitate the mutual recognition of advanced testing for financial entities meeting the criteria set out in this Regulation.

(27)

Financial entities’ reliance on the use of ICT services is partly driven by their need to adapt to an emerging competitive digital global economy, to boost their business efficiency and to meet consumer demand. The nature and extent of such reliance has been continuously evolving in recent years, driving cost reduction in financial intermediation, enabling business expansion and scalability in the deployment of financial activities while offering a wide range of ICT tools to manage complex internal processes.

(28)

The extensive use of ICT services is evidenced by complex contractual arrangements, whereby financial entities often encounter difficulties in negotiating contractual terms that are tailored to the prudential standards or other regulatory requirements to which they are subject, or otherwise in enforcing specific rights, such as access or audit rights, even when the latter are enshrined in their contractual arrangements. Moreover, many of those contractual arrangements do not provide for sufficient safeguards allowing for the fully-fledged monitoring of subcontracting processes, thus depriving the financial entity of its ability to assess the associated risks. In addition, as ICT third-party service providers often provide standardised services to different types of clients, such contractual arrangements do not always cater adequately for the individual or specific needs of financial industry actors.

(29)

Even though Union financial services law contains certain general rules on outsourcing, monitoring of the contractual dimension is not fully anchored into Union law. In the absence of clear and bespoke Union standards applying to the contractual arrangements concluded with ICT third-party service providers, the external source of ICT risk is not comprehensively addressed. Consequently, it is necessary to set out certain key principles to guide financial entities’ management of ICT third-party risk, which are of particular importance when financial entities resort to ICT third-party service providers to support their critical or important functions. Those principles should be accompanied by a set of core contractual rights in relation to several elements in the performance and termination of contractual arrangements with a view to providing certain minimum safeguards in order to strengthen financial entities’ ability to effectively monitor all ICT risk emerging at the level of third-party service providers. Those principles are complementary to the sectoral law applicable to outsourcing.

(30)

A certain lack of homogeneity and convergence regarding the monitoring of ICT third-party risk and ICT third-party dependencies is evident today. Despite efforts to address outsourcing, such as EBA Guidelines on outsourcing of 2019 and ESMA Guidelines on outsourcing to cloud service providers of 2021 the broader issue of counteracting systemic risk which may be triggered by the financial sector’s exposure to a limited number of critical ICT third-party service providers is not sufficiently addressed by Union law. The lack of rules at Union level is compounded by the absence of national rules on mandates and tools that allow financial supervisors to acquire a good understanding of ICT third-party dependencies and to monitor adequately risks arising from the concentration of ICT third-party dependencies.

(31)

Taking into account the potential systemic risk entailed by increased outsourcing practices and by the ICT third-party concentration, and mindful of the insufficiency of national mechanisms in providing financial supervisors with adequate tools to quantify, qualify and redress the consequences of ICT risk occurring at critical ICT third-party service providers, it is necessary to establish an appropriate Oversight Framework allowing for a continuous monitoring of the activities of ICT third-party service providers that are critical ICT third-party service providers to financial entities, while ensuring that the confidentiality and security of customers other than financial entities is preserved. While intra-group provision of ICT services entails specific risks and benefits, it should not be automatically considered less risky than the provision of ICT services by providers outside of a financial group and should therefore be subject to the same regulatory framework. However, when ICT services are provided from within the same financial group, financial entities might have a higher level of control over intra-group providers, which ought to be taken into account in the overall risk assessment.

(32)

With ICT risk becoming more and more complex and sophisticated, good measures for the detection and prevention of ICT risk depend to a great extent on the regular sharing between financial entities of threat and vulnerability intelligence. Information sharing contributes to creating increased awareness of cyber threats. In turn, this enhances the capacity of financial entities to prevent cyber threats from becoming real ICT-related incidents and enables financial entities to more effectively contain the impact of ICT-related incidents and to recover faster. In the absence of guidance at Union level, several factors seem to have inhibited such intelligence sharing, in particular uncertainty about its compatibility with data protection, anti-trust and liability rules.

(33)

In addition, doubts about the type of information that can be shared with other market participants, or with non-supervisory authorities (such as ENISA, for analytical input, or Europol, for law enforcement purposes) lead to useful information being withheld. Therefore, the extent and quality of information sharing currently remains limited and fragmented, with relevant exchanges mostly being local (by way of national initiatives) and with no consistent Union-wide information-sharing arrangements tailored to the needs of an integrated financial system. It is therefore important to strengthen those communication channels.

(34)

Financial entities should be encouraged to exchange among themselves cyber threat information and intelligence, and to collectively leverage their individual knowledge and practical experience at strategic, tactical and operational levels with a view to enhancing their capabilities to adequately assess, monitor, defend against, and respond to cyber threats, by participating in information sharing arrangements. It is therefore necessary to enable the emergence at Union level of mechanisms for voluntary information-sharing arrangements which, when conducted in trusted environments, would help the community of the financial industry to prevent and collectively respond to cyber threats by quickly limiting the spread of ICT risk and impeding potential contagion throughout the financial channels. Those mechanisms should comply with the applicable competition law rules of the Union set out in the Communication from the Commission of 14 January 2011 entitled ‘Guidelines on the applicability of Article 101 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union to horizontal cooperation agreements’, as well as with Union data protection rules, in particular Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council (13). They should operate based on the use of one or more of the legal bases that are laid down in Article 6 of that Regulation, such as in the context of the processing of personal data that is necessary for the purposes of the legitimate interest pursued by the controller or by a third party, as referred to in Article 6(1), point (f), of that Regulation, as well as in the context of the processing of personal data necessary for compliance with a legal obligation to which the controller is subject, necessary for the performance of a task carried out in the public interest or in the exercise of official authority vested in the controller, as referred to in Article 6(1), points (c) and (e), respectively, of that Regulation.

(35)

In order to maintain a high level of digital operational resilience for the whole financial sector, and at the same time to keep pace with technological developments, this Regulation should address risk stemming from all types of ICT services. To that end, the definition of ICT services in the context of this Regulation should be understood in a broad manner, encompassing digital and data services provided through ICT systems to one or more internal or external users on an ongoing basis. That definition should, for instance, include so called ‘over the top’ services, which fall within the category of electronic communications services. It should exclude only the limited category of traditional analogue telephone services qualifying as Public Switched Telephone Network (PSTN) services, landline services, Plain Old Telephone Service (POTS), or fixed-line telephone services.

(36)

Notwithstanding the broad coverage envisaged by this Regulation, the application of the digital operational resilience rules should take into account the significant differences between financial entities in terms of their size and overall risk profile. As a general principle, when distributing resources and capabilities for the implementation of the ICT risk management framework, financial entities should duly balance their ICT-related needs to their size and overall risk profile, and the nature, scale and complexity of their services, activities and operations, while competent authorities should continue to assess and review the approach of such distribution.

(37)

Account information service providers, referred to in Article 33(1) of Directive (EU) 2015/2366, are explicitly included in the scope of this Regulation, taking into account the specific nature of their activities and the risks arising therefrom. In addition, electronic money institutions and payment institutions exempted pursuant to Article 9(1) of Directive 2009/110/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council (14) and Article 32(1) of Directive (EU) 2015/2366 are included in the scope of this Regulation even if they have not been granted authorisation in accordance Directive 2009/110/EC to issue electronic money, or if they have not been granted authorisation in accordance with Directive (EU) 2015/2366 to provide and execute payment services. However, post office giro institutions, referred to in Article 2(5), point (3), of Directive 2013/36/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council (15), are excluded from the scope of this Regulation. The competent authority for payment institutions exempted pursuant to Directive (EU) 2015/2366, electronic money institutions exempted pursuant to Directive 2009/110/EC and account information service providers as referred to in Article 33(1) of Directive (EU) 2015/2366, should be the competent authority designated in accordance with Article 22 of Directive (EU) 2015/2366.

(38)

As larger financial entities might enjoy wider resources and can swiftly deploy funds to develop governance structures and set up various corporate strategies, only financial entities that are not microenterprises in the sense of this Regulation should be required to establish more complex governance arrangements. Such entities are better equipped in particular to set up dedicated management functions for supervising arrangements with ICT third-party service providers or for dealing with crisis management, to organise their ICT risk management according to the three lines of defence model, or to set up an internal risk management and control model, and to submit their ICT risk management framework to internal audits.

(39)

Some financial entities benefit from exemptions or are subject to a very light regulatory framework under the relevant sector-specific Union law. Such financial entities include managers of alternative investment funds referred to in Article 3(2) of Directive 2011/61/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council (16), insurance and reinsurance undertakings referred to in Article 4 of Directive 2009/138/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council (17), and institutions for occupational retirement provision which operate pension schemes which together do not have more than 15 members in total. In light of those exemptions it would not be proportionate to include such financial entities in the scope of this Regulation. In addition, this Regulation acknowledges the specificities of the insurance intermediation market structure, with the result that insurance intermediaries, reinsurance intermediaries and ancillary insurance intermediaries qualifying as microenterprises or as small or medium-sized enterprises should not be subject to this Regulation.

(40)

Since the entities referred to in Article 2(5), points (4) to (23), of Directive 2013/36/EU are excluded from the scope of that Directive, Member States should consequently be able to choose to exempt from the application of this Regulation such entities located within their respective territories.

(41)

Similarly, in order to align this Regulation to the scope of Directive 2014/65/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council (18), it is also appropriate to exclude from the scope of this Regulation natural and legal persons referred in Articles 2 and 3 of that Directive which are allowed to provide investment services without having to obtain an authorisation under Directive 2014/65/EU. However, Article 2 of Directive 2014/65/EU also excludes from the scope of that Directive entities which qualify as financial entities for the purposes of this Regulation such as, central securities depositories, collective investment undertakings or insurance and reinsurance undertakings. The exclusion from the scope of this Regulation of the persons and entities referred to in Articles 2 and 3 of that Directive should not encompass those central securities depositories, collective investment undertakings or insurance and reinsurance undertakings.

(42)

Under sector-specific Union law, some financial entities are subject to lighter requirements or exemptions for reasons associated with their size or the services they provide. That category of financial entities includes small and non-interconnected investment firms, small institutions for occupational retirement provision which may be excluded from the scope of Directive (EU) 2016/2341 under the conditions laid down in Article 5 of that Directive by the Member State concerned and operate pension schemes which together do not have more than 100 members in total, as well as institutions exempted pursuant to Directive 2013/36/EU. Therefore, in accordance with the principle of proportionality and to preserve the spirit of sector-specific Union law, it is also appropriate to subject those financial entities to a simplified ICT risk management framework under this Regulation. The proportionate character of the ICT risk management framework covering those financial entities should not be altered by the regulatory technical standards that are to be developed by the ESAs. Moreover, in accordance with the principle of proportionality, it is appropriate to also subject payment institutions referred to in Article 32(1) of Directive (EU) 2015/2366 and electronic money institutions referred to in Article 9 of Directive 2009/110/EC exempted in accordance with national law transposing those Union legal acts to a simplified ICT risk management framework under this Regulation, while payment institutions and electronic money institutions which have not been exempted in accordance with their respective national law transposing sectoral Union law should comply with the general framework laid down by this Regulation.

(43)

Similarly, financial entities which qualify as microenterprises or are subject to the simplified ICT risk management framework under this Regulation should not be required to establish a role to monitor their arrangements concluded with ICT third-party service providers on the use of ICT services; or to designate a member of senior management to be responsible for overseeing the related risk exposure and relevant documentation; to assign the responsibility for managing and overseeing ICT risk to a control function and ensure an appropriate level of independence of such control function in order to avoid conflicts of interest; to document and review at least once a year the ICT risk management framework; to subject to internal audit on a regular basis the ICT risk management framework; to perform in-depth assessments after major changes in their network and information system infrastructures and processes; to regularly conduct risk analyses on legacy ICT systems; to subject the implementation of the ICT Response and Recovery plans to independent internal audit reviews; to have a crisis management function, to expand the testing of business continuity and response and recovery plans to capture switchover scenarios between primary ICT infrastructure and redundant facilities; to report to competent authorities, upon their request, an estimation of aggregated annual costs and losses caused by major ICT-related incidents, to maintain redundant ICT capacities; to communicate to national competent authorities implemented changes following post ICT-related incident reviews; to monitor on a continuous basis relevant technological developments, to establish a comprehensive digital operational resilience testing programme as an integral part of the ICT risk management framework provided for in this Regulation, or to adopt and regularly review a strategy on ICT third-party risk. In addition, microenterprises should only be required to assess the need to maintain such redundant ICT capacities based on their risk profile. Microenterprises should benefit from a more flexible regime as regards digital operational resilience testing programmes. When considering the type and frequency of testing to be performed, they should properly balance the objective of maintaining a high digital operational resilience, the available resources and their overall risk profile. Microenterprises and financial entities subject to the simplified ICT risk management framework under this Regulation should be exempted from the requirement to perform advanced testing of ICT tools, systems and processes based on threat-led penetration testing (TLPT), as only financial entities meeting the criteria set out in this Regulation should be required to carry out such testing. In light of their limited capabilities, microenterprises should be able to agree with the ICT third-party service provider to delegate the financial entity’s rights of access, inspection and audit to an independent third-party, to be appointed by the ICT third-party service provider, provided that the financial entity is able to request, at any time, all relevant information and assurance on the ICT third-party service provider’s performance from the respective independent third-party.

(44)

As only those financial entities identified for the purposes of the advanced digital resilience testing should be required to conduct threat-led penetration tests, the administrative processes and financial costs entailed in the performance of such tests should be borne by a small percentage of financial entities.

(45)

To ensure full alignment and overall consistency between financial entities’ business strategies, on the one hand, and the conduct of ICT risk management, on the other hand, the financial entities’ management bodies should be required to maintain a pivotal and active role in steering and adapting the ICT risk management framework and the overall digital operational resilience strategy. The approach to be taken by management bodies should not only focus on the means of ensuring the resilience of the ICT systems, but should also cover people and processes through a set of policies which cultivate, at each corporate layer, and for all staff, a strong sense of awareness about cyber risks and a commitment to observe a strict cyber hygiene at all levels. The ultimate responsibility of the management body in managing a financial entity’s ICT risk should be an overarching principle of that comprehensive approach, further translated into the continuous engagement of the management body in the control of the monitoring of the ICT risk management.

(46)

Moreover, the principle of the management body’s full and ultimate responsibility for the management of the ICT risk of the financial entity goes hand in hand with the need to secure a level of ICT-related investments and an overall budget for the financial entity that would enable the financial entity to achieve a high level of digital operational resilience.

(47)

Inspired by relevant international, national and industry best practices, guidelines, recommendations and approaches to the management of cyber risk, this Regulation promotes a set of principles that facilitate the overall structure of ICT risk management. Consequently, as long as the main capabilities which financial entities put in place address the various functions in the ICT risk management (identification, protection and prevention, detection, response and recovery, learning and evolving and communication) set out in this Regulation, financial entities should remain free to use ICT risk management models that are differently framed or categorised.

(48)

To keep pace with an evolving cyber threat landscape, financial entities should maintain updated ICT systems that are reliable and capable, not only for guaranteeing the processing of data required for their services, but also for ensuring sufficient technological resilience to allow them to deal adequately with additional processing needs due to stressed market conditions or other adverse situations.

(49)

Efficient business continuity and recovery plans are necessary to allow financial entities to promptly and quickly resolve ICT-related incidents, in particular cyber-attacks, by limiting damage and giving priority to the resumption of activities and recovery actions in accordance with their back-up policies. However, such resumption should in no way jeopardise the integrity and security of the network and information systems or the availability, authenticity, integrity or confidentiality of data.

(50)

While this Regulation allows financial entities to determine their recovery time and recovery point objectives in a flexible manner and hence to set such objectives by fully taking into account the nature and the criticality of the relevant functions and any specific business needs, it should nevertheless require them to carry out an assessment of the potential overall impact on market efficiency when determining such objectives.

(51)

The propagators of cyber-attacks tend to pursue financial gains directly at the source, thus exposing financial entities to significant consequences. To prevent ICT systems from losing integrity or becoming unavailable, and hence to avoid data breaches and damage to physical ICT infrastructure, the reporting of major ICT-related incidents by financial entities should be significantly improved and streamlined. ICT-related incident reporting should be harmonised through the introduction of a requirement for all financial entities to report directly to their relevant competent authorities. Where a financial entity is subject to supervision by more than one national competent authority, Member States should designate a single competent authority as the addressee of such reporting. Credit institutions classified as significant in accordance with Article 6(4) of Council Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013 (19) should submit such reporting to the national competent authorities, which should subsequently transmit the report to the European Central Bank (ECB).

(52)

The direct reporting should enable financial supervisors to have immediate access to information about major ICT-related incidents. Financial supervisors should in turn pass on details of major ICT-related incidents to public non-financial authorities (such as competent authorities and single points of contact under Directive (EU) 2022/2555, national data protection authorities, and to law enforcement authorities for major ICT-related incidents of a criminal nature) in order to enhance such authorities awareness of such incidents and, in the case of CSIRTs, to facilitate prompt assistance that may be given to financial entities, as appropriate. Member States should, in addition, be able to determine that financial entities themselves should provide such information to public authorities outside the financial services area. Those information flows should allow financial entities to swiftly benefit from any relevant technical input, advice about remedies, and subsequent follow-up from such authorities. The information on major ICT-related incidents should be mutually channelled: financial supervisors should provide all necessary feedback or guidance to the financial entity, while the ESAs should share anonymised data on cyber threats and vulnerabilities relating to an incident, to aid wider collective defence.

(53)

While all financial entities should be required to carry out incident reporting, that requirement is not expected to affect all of them in the same manner. Indeed, relevant materiality thresholds, as well as reporting timelines, should be duly adjusted, in the context of delegated acts based on the regulatory technical standards to be developed by the ESAs, with a view to covering only major ICT-related incidents. In addition, the specificities of financial entities should be taken into account when setting timelines for reporting obligations.

(54)

This Regulation should require credit institutions, payment institutions, account information service providers and electronic money institutions to report all operational or security payment-related incidents – previously reported under Directive (EU) 2015/2366 – irrespective of the ICT nature of the incident.

(55)

The ESAs should be tasked with assessing the feasibility and conditions for a possible centralisation of ICT-related incident reports at Union level. Such centralisation could consist of a single EU Hub for major ICT-related incident reporting either directly receiving relevant reports and automatically notifying national competent authorities, or merely centralising relevant reports forwarded by the national competent authorities and thus fulfilling a coordination role. The ESAs should be tasked with preparing, in consultation with the ECB and ENISA, a joint report exploring the feasibility of setting up a single EU Hub.

(56)

In order to achieve a high level of digital operational resilience, and in line with both the relevant international standards (e.g. the G7 Fundamental Elements for Threat-Led Penetration Testing) and with the frameworks applied in the Union, such as the TIBER-EU, financial entities should regularly test their ICT systems and staff having ICT-related responsibilities with regard to the effectiveness of their preventive, detection, response and recovery capabilities, to uncover and address potential ICT vulnerabilities. To reflect differences that exist across, and within, the various financial subsectors as regards financial entities’ level of cybersecurity preparedness, testing should include a wide variety of tools and actions, ranging from the assessment of basic requirements (e.g. vulnerability assessments and scans, open source analyses, network security assessments, gap analyses, physical security reviews, questionnaires and scanning software solutions, source code reviews where feasible, scenario-based tests, compatibility testing, performance testing or end-to-end testing) to more advanced testing by means of TLPT. Such advanced testing should be required only of financial entities that are mature enough from an ICT perspective to reasonably carry it out. The digital operational resilience testing required by this Regulation should thus be more demanding for those financial entities meeting the criteria set out in this Regulation (for example, large, systemic and ICT-mature credit institutions, stock exchanges, central securities depositories and central counterparties) than for other financial entities. At the same time, the digital operational resilience testing by means of TLPT should be more relevant for financial entities operating in core financial services subsectors and playing a systemic role (for example, payments, banking, and clearing and settlement), and less relevant for other subsectors (for example, asset managers and credit rating agencies).

(57)

Financial entities involved in cross-border activities and exercising the freedoms of establishment, or of provision of services within the Union, should comply with a single set of advanced testing requirements (i.e. TLPT) in their home Member State, which should include the ICT infrastructures in all jurisdictions where the cross-border financial group operates within the Union, thus allowing such cross-border financial groups to incur related ICT testing costs in one jurisdiction only.

(58)

To draw on the expertise already acquired by certain competent authorities, in particular with regard to implementing the TIBER-EU framework, this Regulation should allow Member States to designate a single public authority as responsible in the financial sector, at national level, for all TLPT matters, or competent authorities, to delegate, in the absence of such designation, the exercise of TLPT related tasks to another national financial competent authority.

(59)

Since this Regulation does not require financial entities to cover all critical or important functions in one single threat-led penetration test, financial entities should be free to determine which and how many critical or important functions should be included in the scope of such a test.

(60)

Pooled testing within the meaning of this Regulation – involving the participation of several financial entities in a TLPT and for which an ICT third-party service provider can directly enter into contractual arrangements with an external tester – should be allowed only where the quality or security of services delivered by the ICT third-party service provider to customers that are entities falling outside the scope of this Regulation, or the confidentiality of the data related to such services, are reasonably expected to be adversely impacted. Pooled testing should also be subject to safeguards (direction by one designated financial entity, calibration of the number of participating financial entities) to ensure a rigorous testing exercise for the financial entities involved which meet the objectives of the TLPT pursuant to this Regulation.

(61)

In order to take advantage of internal resources available at corporate level, this Regulation should allow the use of internal testers for the purposes of carrying out TLPT, provided there is supervisory approval, no conflicts of interest, and periodical alternation of the use of internal and external testers (every three tests), while also requiring the provider of the threat intelligence in the TLPT to always be external to the financial entity. The responsibility for conducting TLPT should remain fully with the financial entity. Attestations provided by authorities should be solely for the purpose of mutual recognition and should not preclude any follow-up action needed to address the ICT risk to which the financial entity is exposed, nor should they be seen as a supervisory endorsement of a financial entity’s ICT risk management and mitigation capabilities.

(62)

To ensure a sound monitoring of ICT third-party risk in the financial sector, it is necessary to lay down a set of principle-based rules to guide financial entities’ when monitoring risk arising in the context of functions outsourced to ICT third-party service providers, particularly for ICT services supporting critical or important functions, as well as more generally in the context of all ICT third-party dependencies.

(63)

To address the complexity of the various sources of ICT risk, while taking into account the multitude and diversity of providers of technological solutions which enable a smooth provision of financial services, this Regulation should cover a wide range of ICT third-party service providers, including providers of cloud computing services, software, data analytics services and providers of data centre services. Similarly, since financial entities should effectively and coherently identify and manage all types of risk, including in the context of ICT services procured within a financial group, it should be clarified that undertakings which are part of a financial group and provide ICT services predominantly to their parent undertaking, or to subsidiaries or branches of their parent undertaking, as well as financial entities providing ICT services to other financial entities, should also be considered as ICT third-party service providers under this Regulation. Lastly, in light of the evolving payment services market becoming increasingly dependent on complex technical solutions, and in view of emerging types of payment services and payment-related solutions, participants in the payment services ecosystem, providing payment-processing activities, or operating payment infrastructures, should also be considered to be ICT third-party service providers under this Regulation, with the exception of central banks when operating payment or securities settlement systems, and public authorities when providing ICT related services in the context of fulfilling State functions.

(64)

A financial entity should at all times remain fully responsible for complying with its obligations set out in this Regulation. Financial entities should apply a proportionate approach to the monitoring of risks emerging at the level of the ICT third-party service providers, by duly considering the nature, scale, complexity and importance of their ICT-related dependencies, the criticality or importance of the services, processes or functions subject to the contractual arrangements and, ultimately, on the basis of a careful assessment of any potential impact on the continuity and quality of financial services at individual and at group level, as appropriate.

(65)

The conduct of such monitoring should follow a strategic approach to ICT third-party risk formalised through the adoption by the financial entity’s management body of a dedicated ICT third-party risk strategy, rooted in a continuous screening of all ICT third-party dependencies. To enhance supervisory awareness of ICT third-party dependencies, and with a view to further supporting the work in the context of the Oversight Framework established by this Regulation, all financial entities should be required to maintain a register of information with all contractual arrangements about the use of ICT services provided by ICT third-party service providers. Financial supervisors should be able to request the full register, or to ask for specific sections thereof, and thus to obtain essential information for acquiring a broader understanding of the ICT dependencies of financial entities.

(66)

A thorough pre-contracting analysis should underpin and precede the formal conclusion of contractual arrangements, in particular by focusing on elements such as the criticality or importance of the services supported by the envisaged ICT contract, the necessary supervisory approvals or other conditions, the possible concentration risk entailed, as well as applying due diligence in the process of selection and assessment of ICT third-party service providers and assessing potential conflicts of interest. For contractual arrangements concerning critical or important functions, financial entities should take into consideration the use by ICT third-party service providers of the most up-to-date and highest information security standards. Termination of contractual arrangements could be prompted at least by a series of circumstances showing shortfalls at the ICT third-party service provider level, in particular significant breaches of laws or contractual terms, circumstances revealing a potential alteration of the performance of the functions provided for in the contractual arrangements, evidence of weaknesses of the ICT third-party service provider in its overall ICT risk management, or circumstances indicating the inability of the relevant competent authority to effectively supervise the financial entity.

(67)

To address the systemic impact of ICT third-party concentration risk, this Regulation promotes a balanced solution by means of taking a flexible and gradual approach to such concentration risk since the imposition of any rigid caps or strict limitations might hinder the conduct of business and restrain the contractual freedom. Financial entities should thoroughly assess their envisaged contractual arrangements to identify the likelihood of such risk emerging, including by means of in-depth analyses of subcontracting arrangements, in particular when concluded with ICT third-party service providers established in a third country. At this stage, and with a view to striking a fair balance between the imperative of preserving contractual freedom and that of guaranteeing financial stability, it is not considered appropriate to set out rules on strict caps and limits to ICT third-party exposures. In the context of the Oversight Framework, a Lead Overseer, appointed pursuant to this Regulation, should, in respect to critical ICT third-party service providers, pay particular attention to fully grasp the magnitude of interdependences, discover specific instances where a high degree of concentration of critical ICT third-party service providers in the Union is likely to put a strain on the Union financial system’s stability and integrity and maintain a dialogue with critical ICT third-party service providers where that specific risk is identified.

(68)

To evaluate and monitor on a regular basis the ability of an ICT third party service provider to securely provide services to a financial entity without adverse effects on a financial entity’s digital operational resilience, several key contractual elements with ICT third-party service providers should be harmonised. Such harmonisation should cover minimum areas which are crucial for enabling a full monitoring by the financial entity of the risks that could emerge from the ICT third-party service provider, from the perspective of a financial entity’s need to secure its digital resilience because it is deeply dependent on the stability, functionality, availability and security of the ICT services received.

(69)

When renegotiating contractual arrangements to seek alignment with the requirements of this Regulation, financial entities and ICT third-party service providers should ensure the coverage of the key contractual provisions as provided for in this Regulation.

(70)

The definition of ‘critical or important function’ provided for in this Regulation encompasses the ‘critical functions’ as defined in Article 2(1), point (35), of Directive 2014/59/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council (20). Accordingly, functions deemed to be critical pursuant to Directive 2014/59/EU are included in the definition of critical functions within the meaning of this Regulation.

(71)

Irrespective of the criticality or importance of the function supported by the ICT services, contractual arrangements should, in particular, provide for a specification of the complete descriptions of functions and services, of the locations where such functions are provided and where data is to be processed, as well as an indication of service level descriptions. Other essential elements to enable a financial entity’s monitoring of ICT third party risk are: contractual provisions specifying how the accessibility, availability, integrity, security and protection of personal data are ensured by the ICT third-party service provider, provisions laying down the relevant guarantees for enabling the access, recovery and return of data in the case of insolvency, resolution or discontinuation of the business operations of the ICT third-party service provider, as well as provisions requiring the ICT third-party service provider to provide assistance in case of ICT incidents in connection with the services provided, at no additional cost or at a cost determined ex-ante; provisions on the obligation of the ICT third-party service provider to fully cooperate with the competent authorities and resolution authorities of the financial entity; and provisions on termination rights and related minimum notice periods for the termination of the contractual arrangements, in accordance with the expectations of competent authorities and resolution authorities.

(72)

In addition to such contractual provisions, and with a view to ensuring that financial entities remain in full control of all developments occurring at third-party level which may impair their ICT security, the contracts for the provision of ICT services supporting critical or important functions should also provide for the following: the specification of the full service level descriptions, with precise quantitative and qualitative performance targets, to enable without undue delay appropriate corrective actions when the agreed service levels are not met; the relevant notice periods and reporting obligations of the ICT third-party service provider in the event of developments with a potential material impact on the ICT third-party service provider’s ability to effectively provide their respective ICT services; a requirement upon the ICT third-party service provider to implement and test business contingency plans and have ICT security measures, tools and policies allowing for the secure provision of services, and to participate and fully cooperate in the TLPT carried out by the financial entity.

(73)

Contracts for the provision of ICT services supporting critical or important functions should also contain provisions enabling the rights of access, inspection and audit by the financial entity, or an appointed third party, and the right to take copies as crucial instruments in the financial entities’ ongoing monitoring of the ICT third-party service provider’s performance, coupled with the service provider’s full cooperation during inspections. Similarly, the competent authority of the financial entity should have the right, based on notices, to inspect and audit the ICT third-party service provider, subject to the protection of confidential information.

(74)

Such contractual arrangements should also provide for dedicated exit strategies to enable, in particular, mandatory transition periods during which ICT third-party service providers should continue providing the relevant services with a view to reducing the risk of disruptions at the level of the financial entity, or to allow the latter effectively to switch to the use of other ICT third-party service providers or, alternatively, to change to in-house solutions, consistent with the complexity of the provided ICT service. Moreover, financial entities within the scope of Directive 2014/59/EU should ensure that the relevant contracts for ICT services are robust and fully enforceable in the event of resolution of those financial entities. Therefore, in line with the expectations of the resolution authorities, those financial entities should ensure that the relevant contracts for ICT services are resolution resilient. As long as they continue meeting their payment obligations, those financial entities should ensure, among other requirements, that the relevant contracts for ICT services contain clauses for non-termination, non-suspension and non-modification on grounds of restructuring or resolution.

(75)

Moreover, the voluntary use of standard contractual clauses developed by public authorities or Union institutions, in particular the use of contractual clauses developed by the Commission for cloud computing services could provide further comfort to the financial entities and ICT third-party service providers, by enhancing their level of legal certainty regarding the use of cloud computing services in the financial sector, in full alignment with the requirements and expectations set out by the Union financial services law. The development of standard contractual clauses builds on measures already envisaged in the 2018 Fintech Action Plan that announced the Commission’s intention to encourage and facilitate the development of standard contractual clauses for the use of cloud computing services outsourcing by financial entities, drawing on cross-sectorial cloud computing services stakeholders’ efforts, which the Commission has facilitated with the help of the financial sector’s involvement.

(76)

With a view to promoting convergence and efficiency in relation to supervisory approaches when addressing ICT third-party risk in the financial sector, as well as to strengthening the digital operational resilience of financial entities which rely on critical ICT third-party service providers for the provision of ICT services that support the supply of financial services, and thereby to contributing to the preservation of the Union’s financial system stability and the integrity of the internal market for financial services, critical ICT third-party service providers should be subject to a Union Oversight Framework. While the set-up of the Oversight Framework is justified by the added value of taking action at Union level and by virtue of the inherent role and specificities of the use of ICT services in the provision of financial services, it should be recalled, at the same time, that this solution appears suitable only in the context of this Regulation specifically dealing with digital operational resilience in the financial sector. However, such Oversight Framework should not be regarded as a new model for Union supervision in other areas of financial services and activities.

(77)

The Oversight Framework should apply only to critical ICT third-party service providers. There should therefore be a designation mechanism to take into account the dimension and nature of the financial sector’s reliance on such ICT third-party service providers. That mechanism should involve a set of quantitative and qualitative criteria to set the criticality parameters as a basis for inclusion in the Oversight Framework. In order to ensure the accuracy of that assessment, and regardless of the corporate structure of the ICT third-party service provider, such criteria should, in the case of a ICT third-party service provider that is part of a wider group, take into consideration the entire ICT third-party service provider’s group structure. On the one hand, critical ICT third-party service providers, which are not automatically designated by virtue of the application of those criteria, should have the possibility to opt in to the Oversight Framework on a voluntary basis, on the other hand, ICT third-party service providers, that are already subject to oversight mechanism frameworks supporting the fulfilment of the tasks of the European System of Central Banks as referred to in Article 127(2) TFEU, should be exempted.

(78)

Similarly, financial entities providing ICT services to other financial entities, while belonging to the category of ICT third-party service providers under this Regulation, should also be exempted from the Oversight Framework since they are already subject to supervisory mechanisms established by the relevant Union financial services law. Where applicable, competent authorities should take into account, in the context of their supervisory activities, the ICT risk posed to financial entities by financial entities providing ICT services. Likewise, due to the existing risk monitoring mechanisms at group level, the same exemption should be introduced for ICT third-party service providers delivering services predominantly to the entities of their own group. ICT third-party service providers providing ICT services solely in one Member State to financial entities that are active only in that Member State should also be exempted from the designation mechanism because of their limited activities and lack of cross-border impact.

(79)

The digital transformation experienced in financial services has brought about an unprecedented level of use of, and reliance upon, ICT services. Since it has become inconceivable to provide financial services without the use of cloud computing services, software solutions and data-related services, the Union financial ecosystem has become intrinsically co-dependent on certain ICT services provided by ICT service suppliers. Some of those suppliers, innovators in developing and applying ICT-based technologies, play a significant role in the delivery of financial services, or have become integrated into the financial services value chain. They have thus become critical to the stability and integrity of the Union financial system. This widespread reliance on services supplied by critical ICT third-party service providers, combined with the interdependence of the information systems of various market operators, create a direct, and potentially severe, risk to the Union financial services system and to the continuity of delivery of financial services if critical ICT third-party service providers were to be affected by operational disruptions or major cyber incidents. Cyber incidents have a distinctive ability to multiply and propagate throughout the financial system at a considerably faster pace than other types of risk monitored in the financial sector and can extend across sectors and beyond geographical borders. They have the potential to evolve into a systemic crisis, where trust in the financial system has been eroded due to the disruption of functions supporting the real economy, or to substantial financial losses, reaching a level which the financial system is unable to withstand, or which requires the deployment of heavy shock absorption measures. To prevent these scenarios from taking place and thereby endangering the financial stability and integrity of the Union, it is essential to provide the convergence of supervisory practices relating to ICT third-party risk in finance, in particular through new rules enabling the Union oversight of critical ICT third-party service providers.

(80)

The Oversight Framework largely depends on the degree of collaboration between the Lead Overseer and the critical ICT third-party service provider delivering to financial entities services affecting the supply of financial services. Successful oversight is predicated, inter alia, upon the ability of the Lead Overseer to effectively conduct monitoring missions and inspections to assess the rules, controls and processes used by the critical ICT third-party service providers, as well as to assess the potential cumulative impact of their activities on financial stability and the integrity of the financial system. At the same time, it is crucial that critical ICT third-party service providers follow the Lead Overseer’s recommendations and address its concerns. Since a lack of cooperation by a critical ICT third-party service provider providing services that affect the supply of financial services, such as the refusal to grant access to its premises or to submit information, would ultimately deprive the Lead Overseer of its essential tools in appraising ICT third-party risk, and could adversely impact the financial stability and the integrity of the financial system, it is necessary to also provide for a commensurate sanctioning regime.

(81)

Against this background, the need of the Lead Overseer to impose penalty payments to compel critical ICT third-party service providers to comply with the transparency and access-related obligations set out in this Regulation should not be jeopardised by difficulties raised by the enforcement of those penalty payments in relation to critical ICT third-party service providers established in third countries. In order to ensure the enforceability of such penalties, and to allow a swift roll out of procedures upholding the critical ICT third-party service providers’ rights of defence in the context of the designation mechanism and the issuance of recommendations, those critical ICT third-party service providers, providing services to financial entities that affect the supply of financial services, should be required to maintain an adequate business presence in the Union. Due to the nature of the oversight, and the absence of comparable arrangements in other jurisdictions, there are no suitable alternative mechanisms ensuring this objective by way of effective cooperation with financial supervisors in third countries in relation to the monitoring of the impact of digital operational risks posed by systemic ICT third-party service providers, qualifying as critical ICT third-party service providers established in third countries. Therefore, in order to continue its provision of ICT services to financial entities in the Union, an ICT third-party service provider established in a third country which has been designated as critical in accordance with this Regulation should undertake, within 12 months of such designation, all necessary arrangements to ensure its incorporation within the Union, by means of establishing a subsidiary, as defined throughout the Union acquis, namely in Directive 2013/34/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council (21).

(82)

The requirement to set up a subsidiary in the Union should not prevent the critical ICT third-party service provider from supplying ICT services and related technical support from facilities and infrastructure located outside the Union. This Regulation does not impose a data localisation obligation as it does not require data storage or processing to be undertaken in the Union.

(83)

Critical ICT third-party service providers should be able to provide ICT services from anywhere in the world, not necessarily or not only from premises located in the Union. Oversight activities should be first conducted on premises located in the Union and by interacting with entities located in the Union, including the subsidiaries established by critical ICT third-party service providers pursuant to this Regulation. However, such actions within the Union might be insufficient to allow the Lead Overseer to fully and effectively perform its duties under this Regulation. The Lead Overseer should therefore also be able to exercise its relevant oversight powers in third countries. Exercising those powers in third countries should allow the Lead Overseer to examine the facilities from which the ICT services or the technical support services are actually provided or managed by the critical ICT third-party service provider, and should give the Lead Overseer a comprehensive and operational understanding of the ICT risk management of the critical ICT third-party service provider. The possibility for the Lead Overseer, as a Union agency, to exercise powers outside the territory of the Union should be duly framed by relevant conditions, in particular the consent of the critical ICT third-party service provider concerned. Similarly, the relevant authorities of the third country should be informed of, and not have objected to, the exercise on their own territory of the activities of the Lead Overseer. However, in order to ensure efficient implementation, and without prejudice to the respective competences of the Union institutions and the Member States, such powers also need to be fully anchored in the conclusion of administrative cooperation arrangements with the relevant authorities of the third country concerned. This Regulation should therefore enable the ESAs to conclude administrative cooperation arrangements with the relevant authorities of third countries, which should not otherwise create legal obligations in respect of the Union and its Member States.

(84)

To facilitate communication with the Lead Overseer and to ensure adequate representation, critical ICT third-party service providers which are part of a group should designate one legal person as their coordination point.

(85)

The Oversight Framework should be without prejudice to Member States’ competence to conduct their own oversight or monitoring missions in respect to ICT third-party service providers which are not designated as critical under this Regulation, but which are regarded as important at national level.

(86)

To leverage the multi-layered institutional architecture in the financial services area, the Joint Committee of the ESAs should continue to ensure overall cross-sectoral coordination in relation to all matters pertaining to ICT risk, in accordance with its tasks on cybersecurity. It should be supported by a new Subcommittee (the ‘Oversight Forum’) carrying out preparatory work both for the individual decisions addressed to critical ICT third-party service providers, and for the issuing of collective recommendations, in particular in relation to benchmarking the oversight programmes for critical ICT third-party service providers, and identifying best practices for addressing ICT concentration risk issues.

(87)

To ensure that critical ICT third-party service providers are appropriately and effectively overseen on a Union level, this Regulation provides that any of the three ESAs could be designated as a Lead Overseer. The individual assignment of a critical ICT third-party service provider to one of the three ESAs should result from an assessment of the preponderance of financial entities operating in the financial sectors for which that ESA has responsibilities. This approach should lead to a balanced allocation of tasks and responsibilities between the three ESAs, in the context of exercising the oversight functions, and should make the best use of the human resources and technical expertise available in each of the three ESAs.

(88)

Lead Overseers should be granted the necessary powers to conduct investigations, to carry out onsite and offsite inspections at the premises and locations of critical ICT third-party service providers and to obtain complete and updated information. Those powers should enable the Lead Overseer to acquire real insight into the type, dimension and impact of the ICT third-party risk posed to financial entities and ultimately to the Union’s financial system. Entrusting the ESAs with the lead oversight role is a prerequisite for understanding and addressing the systemic dimension of ICT risk in finance. The impact of critical ICT third-party service providers on the Union financial sector and the potential issues caused by the ICT concentration risk entailed call for taking a collective approach at Union level. The simultaneous carrying out of multiple audits and access rights, performed separately by numerous competent authorities, with little or no coordination among them, would prevent financial supervisors from obtaining a complete and comprehensive overview of ICT third-party risk in the Union, while also creating redundancy, burden and complexity for critical ICT third-party service providers if they were subject to numerous monitoring and inspection requests.

(89)

Due to the significant impact of being designated as critical, this Regulation should ensure that the rights of critical ICT third-party service providers are observed throughout the implementation of the Oversight Framework. Prior to being designated as critical, such providers should, for example, have the right to submit to the Lead Overseer a reasoned statement containing any relevant information for the purposes of the assessment related to their designation. Since the Lead Overseer should be empowered to submit recommendations on ICT risk matters and suitable remedies thereto, which include the power to oppose certain contractual arrangements ultimately affecting the stability of the financial entity or the financial system, critical ICT third-party service providers should also be given the opportunity to provide, prior to the finalisation of those recommendations, explanations regarding the expected impact of the solutions, envisaged in the recommendations, on customers that are entities falling outside the scope of this Regulation and to formulate solutions to mitigate risks. Critical ICT third-party service providers disagreeing with the recommendations should submit a reasoned explanation of their intention not to endorse the recommendation. Where such reasoned explanation is not submitted or where it is considered to be insufficient, the Lead Overseer should issue a public notice summarily describing the matter of non-compliance.

(90)

Competent authorities should duly include the task of verifying substantive compliance with recommendations issued by the Lead Overseer in their functions with regard to prudential supervision of financial entities. Competent authorities should be able to require financial entities to take additional measures to address the risks identified in the Lead Overseer’s recommendations, and should, in due course, issue notifications to that effect. Where the Lead Overseer addresses recommendations to critical ICT third-party service providers that are supervised under Directive (EU) 2022/2555, the competent authorities should be able, on a voluntary basis and before adopting additional measures, to consult the competent authorities under that Directive in order to foster a coordinated approach to dealing with the critical ICT third-party service providers in question.

(91)

The exercise of the oversight should be guided by three operational principles seeking to ensure: (a) close coordination among the ESAs in their Lead Overseer roles, through a joint oversight network (JON), (b) consistency with the framework established by Directive (EU) 2022/2555 (through a voluntary consultation of bodies under that Directive to avoid duplication of measures directed at critical ICT third-party service providers), and (c) applying diligence to minimise the potential risk of disruption to services provided by the critical ICT third-party service providers to customers that are entities falling outside the scope of this Regulation.

(92)

The Oversight Framework should not replace, or in any way or for any part substitute for, the requirement for financial entities to manage themselves the risks entailed by the use of ICT third-party service providers, including their obligation to maintain an ongoing monitoring of contractual arrangements concluded with critical ICT third-party service providers. Similarly, the Oversight Framework should not affect the full responsibility of financial entities for complying with, and discharging, all the legal obligations laid down in this Regulation and in the relevant financial services law.

(93)

To avoid duplications and overlaps, competent authorities should refrain from taking individually any measures aiming to monitor the critical ICT third-party service provider’s risks and should, in that respect, rely on the relevant Lead Overseer’s assessment. Any measures should in any case be coordinated and agreed in advance with the Lead Overseer in the context of the exercise of tasks in the Oversight Framework.

(94)

To promote convergence at international level as regards the use of best practices in the review and monitoring of ICT third-party service providers’ digital risk-management, the ESAs should be encouraged to conclude cooperation arrangements with relevant supervisory and regulatory third-country authorities.

(95)

To leverage the specific competences, technical skills and expertise of staff specialising in operational and ICT risk within the competent authorities, the three ESAs and, on a voluntary basis, the competent authorities under Directive (EU) 2022/2555, the Lead Overseer should draw on national supervisory capabilities and knowledge and set up dedicated examination teams for each critical ICT third-party service provider, pooling multidisciplinary teams in support of the preparation and execution of oversight activities, including general investigations and inspections of critical ICT third-party service providers, as well as for any necessary follow-up thereto.

(96)

Whereas costs resulting from oversight tasks would be fully funded from fees levied on critical ICT third-party service providers, the ESAs are. however, likely to incur, before the start of the Oversight Framework, costs for the implementation of dedicated ICT systems supporting the upcoming oversight, since dedicated ICT systems would need to be developed and deployed beforehand. This Regulation therefore provides for a hybrid funding model, whereby the Oversight Framework would, as such, be fully fee-funded, while the development of the ESAs’ ICT systems would be funded from Union and national competent authorities’ contributions.

(97)

Competent authorities should have all required supervisory, investigative and sanctioning powers to ensure the proper exercise of their duties under this Regulation. They should, in principle, publish notices of the administrative penalties they impose. Since financial entities and ICT third-party service providers can be established in different Member States and supervised by different competent authorities, the application of this Regulation should be facilitated by, on the one hand, close cooperation among relevant competent authorities, including the ECB with regard to specific tasks conferred on it by Council Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013, and, on the other hand, by consultation with the ESAs through the mutual exchange of information and the provision of assistance in the context of relevant supervisory activities.

(98)

In order to further quantify and qualify the criteria for the designation of ICT third-party service providers as critical and to harmonise oversight fees, the power to adopt acts in accordance with Article 290 TFEU should be delegated to the Commission to supplement this Regulation by further specifying the systemic impact that a failure or operational outage of an ICT third-party service provider could have on the financial entities it provides ICT services to, the number of global systemically important institutions (G-SIIs), or other systemically important institutions (O-SIIs), that rely on the ICT third-party service provider in question, the number of ICT third-party service providers active on a given market, the costs of migrating data and ICT workloads to other ICT third-party service providers, as well as the amount of the oversight fees and the way in which they are to be paid. It is of particular importance that the Commission carry out appropriate consultations during its preparatory work, including at expert level, and that those consultations be conducted in accordance with the principles laid down in the Interinstitutional Agreement of 13 April 2016 on Better Law-Making (22). In particular, to ensure equal participation in the preparation of delegated acts, the European Parliament and the Council should receive all documents at the same time as Member States’ experts, and their experts should systematically have access to meetings of Commission expert groups dealing with the preparation of delegated acts.

(99)

Regulatory technical standards should ensure the consistent harmonisation of the requirements laid down in this Regulation. In their roles as bodies endowed with highly specialised expertise, the ESAs should develop draft regulatory technical standards which do not involve policy choices, for submission to the Commission. Regulatory technical standards should be developed in the areas of ICT risk management, major ICT-related incident reporting, testing, as well as in relation to key requirements for a sound monitoring of ICT third-party risk. The Commission and the ESAs should ensure that those standards and requirements can be applied by all financial entities in a manner that is proportionate to their size and overall risk profile, and the nature, scale and complexity of their services, activities and operations. The Commission should be empowered to adopt those regulatory technical standards by means of delegated acts pursuant to Article 290 TFEU and in accordance with Articles 10 to 14 of Regulations (EU) No 1093/2010, (EU) No 1094/2010 and (EU) No 1095/2010.

(100)

To facilitate the comparability of reports on major ICT-related incidents and major operational or security payment-related incidents, as well as to ensure transparency regarding contractual arrangements for the use of ICT services provided by ICT third-party service providers, the ESAs should develop draft implementing technical standards establishing standardised templates, forms and procedures for financial entities to report a major ICT-related incident and a major operational or security payment-related incident, as well as standardised templates for the register of information. When developing those standards, the ESAs should take into account the size and the overall risk profile of the financial entity, and the nature, scale and complexity of its services, activities and operations. The Commission should be empowered to adopt those implementing technical standards by means of implementing acts pursuant to Article 291 TFEU and in accordance with Article 15 of Regulations (EU) No 1093/2010, (EU) No 1094/2010 and (EU) No 1095/2010.

(101)

Since further requirements have already been specified through delegated and implementing acts based on technical regulatory and implementing technical standards in Regulations (EC) No 1060/2009 (23), (EU) No 648/2012 (24), (EU) No 600/2014 (25) and (EU) No 909/2014 (26) of the European Parliament and of the Council, it is appropriate to mandate the ESAs, either individually or jointly through the Joint Committee, to submit regulatory and implementing technical standards to the Commission for adoption of delegated and implementing acts carrying over and updating existing ICT risk management rules.

(102)

Since this Regulation, together with Directive (EU) 2022/2556 of the European Parliament and of the Council (27), entails a consolidation of the ICT risk management provisions across multiple regulations and directives of the Union’s financial services acquis, including Regulations (EC) No 1060/2009, (EU) No 648/2012, (EU) No 600/2014 and (EU) No 909/2014, and Regulation (EU) 2016/1011 of the European Parliament and of the Council (28), in order to ensure full consistency, those Regulations should be amended to clarify that the applicable ICT risk-related provisions are laid down in this Regulation.

(103)

Consequently, the scope of the relevant articles related to operational risk, upon which empowerments laid down in Regulations (EC) No 1060/2009, (EU) No 648/2012, (EU) No 600/2014, (EU) No 909/2014, and (EU) 2016/1011 had mandated the adoption of delegated and implementing acts, should be narrowed down with a view to carry over into this Regulation all provisions covering the digital operational resilience aspects which today are part of those Regulations.

(104)

The potential systemic cyber risk associated with the use of ICT infrastructures that enable the operation of payment systems and the provision of payment processing activities should be duly addressed at Union level through harmonised digital resilience rules. To that effect, the Commission should swiftly assess the need for reviewing the scope of this Regulation while aligning such review with the outcome of the comprehensive review envisaged under Directive (EU) 2015/2366. Numerous large-scale attacks over the past decade demonstrate how payment systems have become exposed to cyber threats. Placed at the core of the payment services chain and showing strong interconnections with the overall financial system, payment systems and payment processing activities acquired a critical significance for the functioning of the Union financial markets. Cyber-attacks on such systems can cause severe operational business disruptions with direct repercussions on key economic functions, such as the facilitation of payments, and indirect effects on related economic processes. Until a harmonised regime and the supervision of operators of payment systems and processing entities are put in place at Union level, Member States may, with a view to applying similar market practices, draw inspiration from the digital operational resilience requirements laid down by this Regulation, when applying rules to operators of payment systems and processing entities supervised under their own jurisdictions.

(105)

Since the objective of this Regulation, namely to achieve a high level of digital operational resilience for regulated financial entities, cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States because it requires harmonisation of various different rules in Union and national law, but can rather, by reason of its scale and effects, be better achieved at Union level, the Union may adopt measures in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity as set out in Article 5 of the Treaty on European Union. In accordance with the principle of proportionality as set out in that Article, this Regulation does not go beyond what is necessary in order to achieve that objective.

(106)

The European Data Protection Supervisor was consulted in accordance with Article 42(1) of Regulation (EU) 2018/1725 of the European Parliament and of the Council (29) and delivered an opinion on 10 May 2021 (30),

(1)

Directive (EU) 2016/1148 of the European Parliament and the Council (4) aimed to build cybersecurity capabilities across the Union, mitigate threats to network and information systems used to provide essential services in key sectors and ensure the continuity of such services when facing incidents, thus contributing to the Union’s security and to the effective functioning of its economy and society.

(2)

Since the entry into force of Directive (EU) 2016/1148, significant progress has been made in increasing the Union’s level of cyber resilience. The review of that Directive has shown that it has served as a catalyst for the institutional and regulatory approach to cybersecurity in the Union, paving the way for a significant change in mind-set. That Directive has ensured the completion of national frameworks on the security of network and information systems by establishing national strategies on security of network and information systems and establishing national capabilities and by implementing regulatory measures covering essential infrastructures and entities identified by each Member State. Directive (EU) 2016/1148 has also contributed to cooperation at Union level through the establishment of the Cooperation Group and the network of national computer security incident response teams. Notwithstanding those achievements, the review of Directive (EU) 2016/1148 has revealed inherent shortcomings that prevent it from addressing effectively current and emerging cybersecurity challenges.

(3)

Network and information systems have developed into a central feature of everyday life with the speedy digital transformation and interconnectedness of society, including in cross-border exchanges. That development has led to an expansion of the cyber threat landscape, bringing about new challenges, which require adapted, coordinated and innovative responses in all Member States. The number, magnitude, sophistication, frequency and impact of incidents are increasing, and present a major threat to the functioning of network and information systems. As a result, incidents can impede the pursuit of economic activities in the internal market, generate financial loss, undermine user confidence and cause major damage to the Union’s economy and society. Cybersecurity preparedness and effectiveness are therefore now more essential than ever to the proper functioning of the internal market. Moreover, cybersecurity is a key enabler for many critical sectors to successfully embrace the digital transformation and to fully grasp the economic, social and sustainable benefits of digitalisation.

(4)

The legal basis of Directive (EU) 2016/1148 was Article 114 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), the objective of which is the establishment and functioning of the internal market by enhancing measures for the approximation of national rules. The cybersecurity requirements imposed on entities providing services or carrying out activities which are economically significant vary considerably among Member States in terms of type of requirement, their level of detail and the method of supervision. Those disparities entail additional costs and create difficulties for entities that offer goods or services across borders. Requirements imposed by one Member State that are different from, or even in conflict with, those imposed by another Member State, may substantially affect such cross-border activities. Furthermore, the possibility of the inadequate design or implementation of cybersecurity requirements in one Member State is likely to have repercussions at the level of cybersecurity of other Member States, in particular given the intensity of cross-border exchanges. The review of Directive (EU) 2016/1148 has shown a wide divergence in its implementation by Member States, including in relation to its scope, the delimitation of which was very largely left to the discretion of the Member States. Directive (EU) 2016/1148 also provided the Member States with very wide discretion as regards the implementation of the security and incident reporting obligations laid down therein. Those obligations were therefore implemented in significantly different ways at national level. There are similar divergences in the implementation of the provisions of Directive (EU) 2016/1148 on supervision and enforcement.

(5)

All those divergences entail a fragmentation of the internal market and can have a prejudicial effect on its functioning, affecting in particular the cross-border provision of services and the level of cyber resilience due to the application of a variety of measures. Ultimately, those divergences could lead to the higher vulnerability of some Member States to cyber threats, with potential spill-over effects across the Union. This Directive aims to remove such wide divergences among Member States, in particular by setting out minimum rules regarding the functioning of a coordinated regulatory framework, by laying down mechanisms for effective cooperation among the responsible authorities in each Member State, by updating the list of sectors and activities subject to cybersecurity obligations and by providing effective remedies and enforcement measures which are key to the effective enforcement of those obligations. Therefore, Directive (EU) 2016/1148 should be repealed and replaced by this Directive.

(6)

With the repeal of Directive (EU) 2016/1148, the scope of application by sectors should be extended to a larger part of the economy to provide a comprehensive coverage of sectors and services of vital importance to key societal and economic activities in the internal market. In particular, this Directive aims to overcome the shortcomings of the differentiation between operators of essential services and digital service providers, which has been proven to be obsolete, since it does not reflect the importance of the sectors or services for the societal and economic activities in the internal market.

(7)

Under Directive (EU) 2016/1148, Member States were responsible for identifying the entities which met the criteria to qualify as operators of essential services. In order to eliminate the wide divergences among Member States in that regard and ensure legal certainty as regards the cybersecurity risk-management measures and reporting obligations for all relevant entities, a uniform criterion should be established that determines the entities falling within the scope of this Directive. That criterion should consist of the application of a size-cap rule, whereby all entities which qualify as medium-sized enterprises under Article 2 of the Annex to Commission Recommendation 2003/361/EC (5), or exceed the ceilings for medium-sized enterprises provided for in paragraph 1 of that Article, and which operate within the sectors and provide the types of service or carry out the activities covered by this Directive fall within its scope. Member States should also provide for certain small enterprises and microenterprises, as defined in Article 2(2) and (3) of that Annex, which fulfil specific criteria that indicate a key role for society, the economy or for particular sectors or types of service to fall within the scope of this Directive.

(8)

The exclusion of public administration entities from the scope of this Directive should apply to entities whose activities are predominantly carried out in the areas of national security, public security, defence or law enforcement, including the prevention, investigation, detection and prosecution of criminal offences. However, public administration entities whose activities are only marginally related to those areas should not be excluded from the scope of this Directive. For the purposes of this Directive, entities with regulatory competences are not considered to be carrying out activities in the area of law enforcement and are therefore not excluded on that ground from the scope of this Directive. Public administration entities that are jointly established with a third country in accordance with an international agreement are excluded from the scope of this Directive. This Directive does not apply to Member States’ diplomatic and consular missions in third countries or to their network and information systems, insofar as such systems are located in the premises of the mission or are operated for users in a third country.

(9)

Member States should be able to take the necessary measures to ensure the protection of the essential interests of national security, to safeguard public policy and public security, and to allow for the prevention, investigation, detection and prosecution of criminal offences. To that end, Member States should be able to exempt specific entities which carry out activities in the areas of national security, public security, defence or law enforcement, including the prevention, investigation, detection and prosecution of criminal offences, from certain obligations laid down in this Directive with regard to those activities. Where an entity provides services exclusively to a public administration entity that is excluded from the scope of this Directive, Member States should be able to exempt that entity from certain obligations laid down in this Directive with regard to those services. Furthermore, no Member State should be required to supply information the disclosure of which would be contrary to the essential interests of its national security, public security or defence. Union or national rules for the protection of classified information, non-disclosure agreements, and informal non-disclosure agreements such as the traffic light protocol should be taken into account in that context. The traffic light protocol is to be understood as a means to provide information about any limitations with regard to the further spreading of information. It is used in almost all computer security incident response teams (CSIRTs) and in some information analysis and sharing centres.

(10)

Although this Directive applies to entities carrying out activities in the production of electricity from nuclear power plants, some of those activities may be linked to national security. Where that is the case, a Member State should be able to exercise its responsibility for safeguarding national security with respect to those activities, including activities within the nuclear value chain, in accordance with the Treaties.

(11)

Some entities carry out activities in the areas of national security, public security, defence or law enforcement, including the prevention, investigation, detection and prosecution of criminal offences, while also providing trust services. Trust service providers which fall within the scope of Regulation (EU) No 910/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council (6) should fall within the scope of this Directive in order to secure the same level of security requirements and supervision as that which was previously laid down in that Regulation in respect of trust service providers. In line with the exclusion of certain specific services from Regulation (EU) No 910/2014, this Directive should not apply to the provision of trust services that are used exclusively within closed systems resulting from national law or from agreements between a defined set of participants.

(12)

Postal service providers as defined in Directive 97/67/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council (7), including providers of courier services, should be subject to this Directive if they provide at least one of the steps in the postal delivery chain, in particular clearance, sorting, transport or distribution of postal items, including pick-up services, while taking account of the degree of their dependence on network and information systems. Transport services that are not undertaken in conjunction with one of those steps should be excluded from the scope of postal services.

(13)

Given the intensification and increased sophistication of cyber threats, Member States should strive to ensure that entities that are excluded from the scope of this Directive achieve a high level of cybersecurity and to support the implementation of equivalent cybersecurity risk-management measures that reflect the sensitive nature of those entities.

(14)

Union data protection law and Union privacy law applies to any processing of personal data under this Directive. In particular, this Directive is without prejudice to Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council (8) and Directive 2002/58/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council (9). This Directive should therefore not affect, inter alia, the tasks and powers of the authorities competent to monitor compliance with the applicable Union data protection law and Union privacy law.

(15)

Entities falling within the scope of this Directive for the purpose of compliance with cybersecurity risk-management measures and reporting obligations should be classified into two categories, essential entities and important entities, reflecting the extent to which they are critical as regards their sector or the type of service they provide, as well as their size. In that regard, due account should be taken of any relevant sectoral risk assessments or guidance by the competent authorities, where applicable. The supervisory and enforcement regimes for those two categories of entities should be differentiated to ensure a fair balance between risk-based requirements and obligations on the one hand, and the administrative burden stemming from the supervision of compliance on the other.

(16)

In order to avoid entities that have partner enterprises or that are linked enterprises being considered to be essential or important entities where this would be disproportionate, Member States are able to take into account the degree of independence an entity enjoys in relation to its partner or linked enterprises when applying Article 6(2) of the Annex to Recommendation 2003/361/EC. In particular, Member States are able to take into account the fact that an entity is independent from its partner or linked enterprises in terms of the network and information systems that that entity uses in the provision of its services and in terms of the services that the entity provides. On that basis, where appropriate, Member States are able to consider that such an entity does not qualify as a medium-sized enterprise under Article 2 of the Annex to Recommendation 2003/361/EC, or does not exceed the ceilings for a medium-sized enterprise provided for in paragraph 1 of that Article, if, after taking into account the degree of independence of that entity, that entity would not have been considered to qualify as a medium-sized enterprise or to exceed those ceilings in the event that only its own data had been taken into account. This leaves unaffected the obligations laid down in this Directive of partner and linked enterprises which fall within the scope of this Directive.

(17)

Member States should be able to decide that entities identified before the entry into force of this Directive as operators of essential services in accordance with Directive (EU) 2016/1148 are to be considered to be essential entities.

(18)

In order to ensure a clear overview of the entities falling within the scope of this Directive, Member States should establish a list of essential and important entities as well as entities providing domain name registration services. For that purpose, Member States should require entities to submit at least the following information to the competent authorities, namely, the name, address and up-to-date contact details, including the email addresses, IP ranges and telephone numbers of the entity, and, where applicable, the relevant sector and subsector referred to in the annexes, as well as, where applicable, a list of the Member States where they provide services falling within the scope of this Directive. To that end, the Commission, with the assistance of the European Union Agency for Cybersecurity (ENISA), should, without undue delay, provide guidelines and templates regarding the obligation to submit information. To facilitate the establishing and updating of the list of essential and important entities as well as entities providing domain name registration services, Member States should be able to establish national mechanisms for entities to register themselves. Where registers exist at national level, Member States can decide on the appropriate mechanisms that allow for the identification of entities falling within the scope of this Directive.

(19)

Member States should be responsible for submitting to the Commission at least the number of essential and important entities for each sector and subsector referred to in the annexes, as well as relevant information about the number of identified entities and the provision, from among those laid down in this Directive, on the basis of which they were identified, and the type of service that they provide. Member States are encouraged to exchange with the Commission information about essential and important entities and, in the case of a large-scale cybersecurity incident, relevant information such as the name of the entity concerned.

(20)

The Commission should, in cooperation with the Cooperation Group and after consulting the relevant stakeholders, provide guidelines on the implementation of the criteria applicable to microenterprises and small enterprises for the assessment of whether they fall within the scope of this Directive. The Commission should also ensure that appropriate guidance is given to microenterprises and small enterprises falling within the scope of this Directive. The Commission should, with the assistance of the Member States, make information available to microenterprises and small enterprises in that regard.

(21)

The Commission could provide guidance to assist Member States in implementing the provisions of this Directive on scope and evaluating the proportionality of the measures to be taken pursuant to this Directive, in particular as regards entities with complex business models or operating environments, whereby an entity may simultaneously fulfil the criteria assigned to both essential and important entities or may simultaneously carry out activities, some of which fall within and some of which are excluded from the scope of this Directive.

(22)

This Directive sets out the baseline for cybersecurity risk-management measures and reporting obligations across the sectors that fall within its scope. In order to avoid the fragmentation of cybersecurity provisions of Union legal acts, where further sector-specific Union legal acts pertaining to cybersecurity risk-management measures and reporting obligations are considered to be necessary to ensure a high level of cybersecurity across the Union, the Commission should assess whether such further provisions could be stipulated in an implementing act under this Directive. Should such an implementing act not be suitable for that purpose, sector-specific Union legal acts could contribute to ensuring a high level of cybersecurity across the Union, while taking full account of the specificities and complexities of the sectors concerned. To that end, this Directive does not preclude the adoption of further sector-specific Union legal acts addressing cybersecurity risk-management measures and reporting obligations that take due account of the need for a comprehensive and consistent cybersecurity framework. This Directive is without prejudice to the existing implementing powers that have been conferred on the Commission in a number of sectors, including transport and energy.

(23)

Where a sector-specific Union legal act contains provisions requiring essential or important entities to adopt cybersecurity risk-management measures or to notify significant incidents, and where those requirements are at least equivalent in effect to the obligations laid down in this Directive, those provisions, including on supervision and enforcement, should apply to such entities. If a sector-specific Union legal act does not cover all entities in a specific sector falling within the scope of this Directive, the relevant provisions of this Directive should continue to apply to the entities not covered by that act.

(24)

Where provisions of a sector-specific Union legal act require essential or important entities to comply with reporting obligations that are at least equivalent in effect to the reporting obligations laid down in this Directive, the consistency and effectiveness of the handling of incident notifications should be ensured. To that end, the provisions relating to incident notifications of the sector-specific Union legal act should provide the CSIRTs, the competent authorities or the single points of contact on cybersecurity (single points of contact) under this Directive with an immediate access to the incident notifications submitted in accordance with the sector-specific Union legal act. In particular, such immediate access can be ensured if incident notifications are being forwarded without undue delay to the CSIRT, the competent authority or the single point of contact under this Directive. Where appropriate, Member States should put in place an automatic and direct reporting mechanism that ensures systematic and immediate sharing of information with the CSIRTs, the competent authorities or the single points of contact concerning the handling of such incident notifications. For the purpose of simplifying reporting and of implementing the automatic and direct reporting mechanism, Member States could, in accordance with the sector-specific Union legal act, use a single entry point.

(25)

Sector-specific Union legal acts which provide for cybersecurity risk-management measures or reporting obligations that are at least equivalent in effect to those laid down in this Directive could provide that the competent authorities under such acts exercise their supervisory and enforcement powers in relation to such measures or obligations with the assistance of the competent authorities under this Directive. The competent authorities concerned could establish cooperation arrangements for that purpose. Such cooperation arrangements could specify, inter alia, the procedures concerning the coordination of supervisory activities, including the procedures of investigations and on-site inspections in accordance with national law, and a mechanism for the exchange of relevant information on supervision and enforcement between the competent authorities, including access to cyber-related information requested by the competent authorities under this Directive.

(26)

Where sector-specific Union legal acts require or provide incentives to entities to notify significant cyber threats, Member States should also encourage the sharing of significant cyber threats with the CSIRTs, the competent authorities or the single points of contact under this Directive, in order to ensure an enhanced level of those bodies’ awareness of the cyber threat landscape and to enable them to respond effectively and in a timely manner should the significant cyber threats materialise.

(27)

Future sector-specific Union legal acts should take due account of the definitions and the supervisory and enforcement framework laid down in this Directive.

(28)

Regulation (EU) 2022/2554 of the European Parliament and of the Council (10) should be considered to be a sector-specific Union legal act in relation to this Directive with regard to financial entities. The provisions of Regulation (EU) 2022/2554 relating to information and communication technology (ICT) risk management, management of ICT-related incidents and, in particular, major ICT-related incident reporting, as well as on digital operational resilience testing, information-sharing arrangements and ICT third-party risk should apply instead of those provided for in this Directive. Member States should therefore not apply the provisions of this Directive on cybersecurity risk-management and reporting obligations, and supervision and enforcement, to financial entities covered by Regulation (EU) 2022/2554. At the same time, it is important to maintain a strong relationship and the exchange of information with the financial sector under this Directive. To that end, Regulation (EU) 2022/2554 allows the European Supervisory Authorities (ESAs) and the competent authorities under that Regulation to participate in the activities of the Cooperation Group and to exchange information and cooperate with the single points of contact, as well as with the CSIRTs and the competent authorities under this Directive. The competent authorities under Regulation (EU) 2022/2554 should also transmit details of major ICT-related incidents and, where relevant, significant cyber threats to the CSIRTs, the competent authorities or the single points of contact under this Directive. This is achievable by providing immediate access to incident notifications and forwarding them either directly or through a single entry point. Moreover, Member States should continue to include the financial sector in their cybersecurity strategies and CSIRTs can cover the financial sector in their activities.

(29)

In order to avoid gaps between or duplications of cybersecurity obligations imposed on entities in the aviation sector, national authorities under Regulations (EC) No 300/2008 (11) and (EU) 2018/1139 (12) of the European Parliament and of the Council and the competent authorities under this Directive should cooperate in relation to the implementation of cybersecurity risk-management measures and the supervision of compliance with those measures at national level. The compliance of an entity with the security requirements laid down in Regulations (EC) No 300/2008 and (EU) 2018/1139 and in the relevant delegated and implementing acts adopted pursuant to those Regulations could be considered by the competent authorities under this Directive to constitute compliance with the corresponding requirements laid down in this Directive.

(30)

In view of the interlinkages between cybersecurity and the physical security of entities, a coherent approach should be ensured between Directive (EU) 2022/2557 of the European Parliament and of the Council (13) and this Directive. To achieve this, entities identified as critical entities under Directive (EU) 2022/2557 should be considered to be essential entities under this Directive. Moreover, each Member State should ensure that its national cybersecurity strategy provides for a policy framework for enhanced coordination within that Member State between its competent authorities under this Directive and those under Directive (EU) 2022/2557 in the context of information sharing about risks, cyber threats, and incidents as well as on non-cyber risks, threats and incidents, and the exercise of supervisory tasks. The competent authorities under this Directive and those under Directive (EU) 2022/2557 should cooperate and exchange information without undue delay, in particular in relation to the identification of critical entities, risks, cyber threats, and incidents as well as in relation to non-cyber risks, threats and incidents affecting critical entities, including the cybersecurity and physical measures taken by critical entities as well as the results of supervisory activities carried out with regard to such entities.

Furthermore, in order to streamline supervisory activities between the competent authorities under this Directive and those under Directive (EU) 2022/2557 and in order to minimise the administrative burden for the entities concerned, those competent authorities should endeavour to harmonise incident notification templates and supervisory processes. Where appropriate, the competent authorities under Directive (EU) 2022/2557, should be able to request the competent authorities under this Directive to exercise their supervisory and enforcement powers in relation to an entity that is identified as a critical entity under Directive (EU) 2022/2557. The competent authorities under this Directive and those under Directive (EU) 2022/2557 should, where possible in real time, cooperate and exchange information for that purpose.

(31)

Entities belonging to the digital infrastructure sector are in essence based on network and information systems and therefore the obligations imposed on those entities pursuant to this Directive should address in a comprehensive manner the physical security of such systems as part of their cybersecurity risk-management measures and reporting obligations. Since those matters are covered by this Directive, the obligations laid down in Chapters III, IV and VI of Directive (EU) 2022/2557 do not apply to such entities.

(32)

Upholding and preserving a reliable, resilient and secure domain name system (DNS) are key factors in maintaining the integrity of the internet and are essential for its continuous and stable operation, on which the digital economy and society depend. Therefore, this Directive should apply to top-level-domain (TLD) name registries, and DNS service providers that are to be understood as entities providing publicly available recursive domain name resolution services for internet end-users or authoritative domain name resolution services for third-party usage. This Directive should not apply to root name servers.

(33)

Cloud computing services should cover digital services that enable on-demand administration and broad remote access to a scalable and elastic pool of shareable computing resources, including where such resources are distributed across several locations. Computing resources include resources such as networks, servers or other infrastructure, operating systems, software, storage, applications and services. The service models of cloud computing include, inter alia, Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS), Platform as a Service (PaaS), Software as a Service (SaaS) and Network as a Service (NaaS). The deployment models of cloud computing should include private, community, public and hybrid cloud. The cloud computing service and deployment models have the same meaning as the terms of service and deployment models defined under ISO/IEC 17788:2014 standard. The capability of the cloud computing user to unilaterally self-provision computing capabilities, such as server time or network storage, without any human interaction by the cloud computing service provider could be described as on-demand administration.

The term ‘broad remote access’ is used to describe that the cloud capabilities are provided over the network and accessed through mechanisms promoting use of heterogeneous thin or thick client platforms, including mobile phones, tablets, laptops and workstations. The term ‘scalable’ refers to computing resources that are flexibly allocated by the cloud service provider, irrespective of the geographical location of the resources, in order to handle fluctuations in demand. The term ‘elastic pool’ is used to describe computing resources that are provided and released according to demand in order to rapidly increase and decrease resources available depending on workload. The term ‘shareable’ is used to describe computing resources that are provided to multiple users who share a common access to the service, but where the processing is carried out separately for each user, although the service is provided from the same electronic equipment. The term ‘distributed’ is used to describe computing resources that are located on different networked computers or devices and which communicate and coordinate among themselves by message passing.

(34)

Given the emergence of innovative technologies and new business models, new cloud computing service and deployment models are expected to appear in the internal market in response to evolving customer needs. In that context, cloud computing services may be delivered in a highly distributed form, even closer to where data are being generated or collected, thus moving from the traditional model to a highly distributed one (edge computing).

(35)

Services offered by data centre service providers may not always be provided in the form of a cloud computing service. Accordingly, data centres may not always constitute a part of cloud computing infrastructure. In order to manage all the risks posed to the security of network and information systems, this Directive should therefore cover providers of data centre services that are not cloud computing services. For the purposes of this Directive, the term ‘data centre service’ should cover provision of a service that encompasses structures, or groups of structures, dedicated to the centralised accommodation, interconnection and operation of information technology (IT) and network equipment providing data storage, processing and transport services together with all the facilities and infrastructures for power distribution and environmental control. The term ‘data centre service’ should not apply to in-house corporate data centres owned and operated by the entity concerned, for its own purposes.

(36)

Research activities play a key role in the development of new products and processes. Many of those activities are carried out by entities that share, disseminate or exploit the results of their research for commercial purposes. Those entities can therefore be important players in value chains, which makes the security of their network and information systems an integral part of the overall cybersecurity of the internal market. Research organisations should be understood to include entities which focus the essential part of their activities on the conduct of applied research or experimental development, within the meaning of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development’s Frascati Manual 2015: Guidelines for Collecting and Reporting Data on Research and Experimental Development, with a view to exploiting their results for commercial purposes, such as the manufacturing or development of a product or process, the provision of a service, or the marketing thereof.

(37)

The growing interdependencies are the result of an increasingly cross-border and interdependent network of service provision using key infrastructures across the Union in sectors such as energy, transport, digital infrastructure, drinking water and waste water, health, certain aspects of public administration, as well as space in so far as the provision of certain services depending on ground-based infrastructures that are owned, managed and operated either by Member States or by private parties is concerned, therefore not covering infrastructures owned, managed or operated by or on behalf of the Union as part of its space programme. Those interdependencies mean that any disruption, even one initially confined to one entity or one sector, can have cascading effects more broadly, potentially resulting in far-reaching and long-lasting negative impacts in the delivery of services across the internal market. The intensified cyberattacks during the COVID-19 pandemic have shown the vulnerability of increasingly interdependent societies in the face of low-probability risks.

(38)

In view of the differences in national governance structures and in order to safeguard already existing sectoral arrangements or Union supervisory and regulatory bodies, Member States should be able to designate or establish one or more competent authorities responsible for cybersecurity and for the supervisory tasks under this Directive.

(39)

In order to facilitate cross-border cooperation and communication among authorities and to enable this Directive to be implemented effectively, it is necessary for each Member State to designate a single point of contact responsible for coordinating issues related to the security of network and information systems and cross-border cooperation at Union level.

(40)

The single points of contact should ensure effective cross-border cooperation with relevant authorities of other Member States and, where appropriate, with the Commission and ENISA. The single points of contact should therefore be tasked with forwarding notifications of significant incidents with cross-border impact to the single points of contact of other affected Member States upon the request of the CSIRT or the competent authority. At national level, the single points of contact should enable smooth cross-sectoral cooperation with other competent authorities. The single points of contact could also be the addressees of relevant information about incidents concerning financial entities from the competent authorities under Regulation (EU) 2022/2554 which they should be able to forward, as appropriate, to the CSIRTs or the competent authorities under this Directive.

(41)

Member States should be adequately equipped, in terms of both technical and organisational capabilities, to prevent, detect, respond to and mitigate incidents and risks. Member States should therefore establish or designate one or more CSIRTs under this Directive and ensure that they have adequate resources and technical capabilities. The CSIRTs should comply with the requirements laid down in this Directive in order to guarantee effective and compatible capabilities to deal with incidents and risks and to ensure efficient cooperation at Union level. Member States should be able to designate existing computer emergency response teams (CERTs) as CSIRTs. In order to enhance the trust relationship between the entities and the CSIRTs, where a CSIRT is part of a competent authority, Member States should be able to consider functional separation between the operational tasks provided by the CSIRTs, in particular in relation to information sharing and assistance provided to the entities, and the supervisory activities of the competent authorities.

(42)

The CSIRTs are tasked with incident handling. This includes the processing of large volumes of sometimes sensitive data. Member States should ensure that the CSIRTs have an infrastructure for information sharing and processing, as well as well-equipped staff, which ensures the confidentiality and trustworthiness of their operations. The CSIRTs could also adopt codes of conduct in that respect.

(43)

As regards personal data, the CSIRTs should be able to provide, in accordance with Regulation (EU) 2016/679, upon the request of an essential or important entity, a proactive scanning of the network and information systems used for the provision of the entity’s services. Where applicable, Member States should aim to ensure an equal level of technical capabilities for all sectoral CSIRTs. Member States should be able to request the assistance of ENISA in developing their CSIRTs.

(44)

The CSIRTs should have the ability, upon an essential or important entity’s request, to monitor the entity’s internet-facing assets, both on and off premises, in order to identify, understand and manage the entity’s overall organisational risks as regards newly identified supply chain compromises or critical vulnerabilities. The entity should be encouraged to communicate to the CSIRT whether it runs a privileged management interface, as this could affect the speed of undertaking mitigating actions.

(45)

Given the importance of international cooperation on cybersecurity, the CSIRTs should be able to participate in international cooperation networks in addition to the CSIRTs network established by this Directive. Therefore, for the purpose of carrying out their tasks, the CSIRTs and the competent authorities should be able to exchange information, including personal data, with the national computer security incident response teams or competent authorities of third countries provided that the conditions under Union data protection law for transfers of personal data to third countries, inter alia those of Article 49 of Regulation (EU) 2016/679, are met.

(46)

Ensuring adequate resources to meet the objectives of this Directive and to enable the competent authorities and the CSIRTs to carry out the tasks laid down herein is essential. The Member States can introduce at the national level a financing mechanism to cover necessary expenditure in relation to the conduct of tasks of public entities responsible for cybersecurity in the Member State pursuant to this Directive. Such mechanism should comply with Union law and should be proportionate and non-discriminatory and should take into account different approaches to providing secure services.

(47)

The CSIRTs network should continue to contribute to strengthening confidence and trust and to promote swift and effective operational cooperation among Member States. In order to enhance operational cooperation at Union level, the CSIRTs network should consider inviting Union bodies and agencies involved in cybersecurity policy, such as Europol, to participate in its work.

(48)

For the purpose of achieving and maintaining a high level of cybersecurity, the national cybersecurity strategies required under this Directive should consist of coherent frameworks providing strategic objectives and priorities in the area of cybersecurity and the governance to achieve them. Those strategies can be composed of one or more legislative or non-legislative instruments.

(49)

Cyber hygiene policies provide the foundations for protecting network and information system infrastructures, hardware, software and online application security, and business or end-user data upon which entities rely. Cyber hygiene policies comprising a common baseline set of practices, including software and hardware updates, password changes, the management of new installs, the limitation of administrator-level access accounts, and the backing-up of data, enable a proactive framework of preparedness and overall safety and security in the event of incidents or cyber threats. ENISA should monitor and analyse Member States’ cyber hygiene policies.

(50)

Cybersecurity awareness and cyber hygiene are essential to enhance the level of cybersecurity within the Union, in particular in light of the growing number of connected devices that are increasingly used in cyberattacks. Efforts should be made to enhance the overall awareness of risks related to such devices, while assessments at Union level could help ensure a common understanding of such risks within the internal market.

(51)

Member States should encourage the use of any innovative technology, including artificial intelligence, the use of which could improve the detection and prevention of cyberattacks, enabling resources to be diverted towards cyberattacks more effectively. Member States should therefore encourage in their national cybersecurity strategy activities in research and development to facilitate the use of such technologies, in particular those relating to automated or semi-automated tools in cybersecurity, and, where relevant, the sharing of data needed for training users of such technology and for improving it. The use of any innovative technology, including artificial intelligence, should comply with Union data protection law, including the data protection principles of data accuracy, data minimisation, fairness and transparency, and data security, such as state-of-the-art encryption. The requirements of data protection by design and by default laid down in Regulation (EU) 2016/679 should be fully exploited.

(52)

Open-source cybersecurity tools and applications can contribute to a higher degree of openness and can have a positive impact on the efficiency of industrial innovation. Open standards facilitate interoperability between security tools, benefitting the security of industrial stakeholders. Open-source cybersecurity tools and applications can leverage the wider developer community, enabling diversification of suppliers. Open source can lead to a more transparent verification process of cybersecurity related tools and a community-driven process of discovering vulnerabilities. Member States should therefore be able to promote the use of open-source software and open standards by pursuing policies relating to the use of open data and open-source as part of security through transparency. Policies promoting the introduction and sustainable use of open-source cybersecurity tools are of particular importance for small and medium-sized enterprises facing significant costs for implementation, which could be minimised by reducing the need for specific applications or tools.

(53)

Utilities are increasingly connected to digital networks in cities, for the purpose of improving urban transport networks, upgrading water supply and waste disposal facilities and increasing the efficiency of lighting and the heating of buildings. Those digitalised utilities are vulnerable to cyberattacks and run the risk, in the event of a successful cyberattack, of harming citizens at a large scale due to their interconnectedness. Member States should develop a policy that addresses the development of such connected or smart cities, and their potential effects on society, as part of their national cybersecurity strategy.

(54)

In recent years, the Union has faced an exponential increase in ransomware attacks, in which malware encrypts data and systems and demands a ransom payment for release. The increasing frequency and severity of ransomware attacks can be driven by several factors, such as different attack patterns, criminal business models around ‘ransomware as a service’ and cryptocurrencies, ransom demands, and the rise of supply chain attacks. Member States should develop a policy addressing the rise of ransomware attacks as part of their national cybersecurity strategy.

(55)

Public-private partnerships (PPPs) in the field of cybersecurity can provide an appropriate framework for knowledge exchange, the sharing of best practices and the establishment of a common level of understanding among stakeholders. Member States should promote policies underpinning the establishment of cybersecurity-specific PPPs. Those policies should clarify, inter alia, the scope and stakeholders involved, the governance model, the available funding options and the interaction among participating stakeholders with regard to PPPs. PPPs can leverage the expertise of private-sector entities to assist the competent authorities in developing state-of-the-art services and processes including information exchange, early warnings, cyber threat and incident exercises, crisis management and resilience planning.

(56)

Member States should, in their national cybersecurity strategies, address the specific cybersecurity needs of small and medium-sized enterprises. Small and medium-sized enterprises represent, across the Union, a large percentage of the industrial and business market and often struggle to adapt to new business practices in a more connected world and to the digital environment, with employees working from home and business increasingly being conducted online. Some small and medium-sized enterprises face specific cybersecurity challenges such as low cyber-awareness, a lack of remote IT security, the high cost of cybersecurity solutions and an increased level of threat, such as ransomware, for which they should receive guidance and assistance. Small and medium-sized enterprises are increasingly becoming the target of supply chain attacks due to their less rigorous cybersecurity risk-management measures and attack management, and the fact that they have limited security resources. Such supply chain attacks not only have an impact on small and medium-sized enterprises and their operations in isolation but can also have a cascading effect on larger attacks on entities to which they provided supplies. Member States should, through their national cybersecurity strategies, help small and medium-sized enterprises to address the challenges faced in their supply chains. Member States should have a point of contact for small and medium-sized enterprises at national or regional level, which either provides guidance and assistance to small and medium-sized enterprises or directs them to the appropriate bodies for guidance and assistance with regard to cybersecurity related issues. Member States are also encouraged to offer services such as website configuration and logging enabling to microenterprises and small enterprises that lack those capabilities.

(57)

As part of their national cybersecurity strategies, Member States should adopt policies on the promotion of active cyber protection as part of a wider defensive strategy. Rather than responding reactively, active cyber protection is the prevention, detection, monitoring, analysis and mitigation of network security breaches in an active manner, combined with the use of capabilities deployed within and outside the victim network. This could include Member States offering free services or tools to certain entities, including self-service checks, detection tools and takedown services. The ability to rapidly and automatically share and understand threat information and analysis, cyber activity alerts, and response action is critical to enable a unity of effort in successfully preventing, detecting, addressing and blocking attacks against network and information systems. Active cyber protection is based on a defensive strategy that excludes offensive measures.

(58)

Since the exploitation of vulnerabilities in network and information systems may cause significant disruption and harm, swiftly identifying and remedying such vulnerabilities is an important factor in reducing risk. Entities that develop or administer network and information systems should therefore establish appropriate procedures to handle vulnerabilities when they are discovered. Since vulnerabilities are often discovered and disclosed by third parties, the manufacturer or provider of ICT products or ICT services should also put in place the necessary procedures to receive vulnerability information from third parties. In that regard, international standards ISO/IEC 30111 and ISO/IEC 29147 provide guidance on vulnerability handling and vulnerability disclosure. Strengthening the coordination between reporting natural and legal persons and manufacturers or providers of ICT products or ICT services is particularly important for the purpose of facilitating the voluntary framework of vulnerability disclosure. Coordinated vulnerability disclosure specifies a structured process through which vulnerabilities are reported to the manufacturer or provider of the potentially vulnerable ICT products or ICT services in a manner allowing it to diagnose and remedy the vulnerability before detailed vulnerability information is disclosed to third parties or to the public. Coordinated vulnerability disclosure should also include coordination between the reporting natural or legal person and the manufacturer or provider of the potentially vulnerable ICT products or ICT services as regards the timing of remediation and publication of vulnerabilities.

(59)

The Commission, ENISA and the Member States should continue to foster alignments with international standards and existing industry best practices in the area of cybersecurity risk management, for example in the areas of supply chain security assessments, information sharing and vulnerability disclosure.

(60)

Member States, in cooperation with ENISA, should take measures to facilitate coordinated vulnerability disclosure by establishing a relevant national policy. As part of their national policy, Member States should aim to address, to the extent possible, the challenges faced by vulnerability researchers, including their potential exposure to criminal liability, in accordance with national law. Given that natural and legal persons researching vulnerabilities could in some Member States be exposed to criminal and civil liability, Member States are encouraged to adopt guidelines as regards the non-prosecution of information security researchers and an exemption from civil liability for their activities.

(61)

Member States should designate one of its CSIRTs as a coordinator, acting as a trusted intermediary between the reporting natural or legal persons and the manufacturers or providers of ICT products or ICT services, which are likely to be affected by the vulnerability, where necessary. The tasks of the CSIRT designated as coordinator should include identifying and contacting the entities concerned, assisting the natural or legal persons reporting a vulnerability, negotiating disclosure timelines and managing vulnerabilities that affect multiple entities (multi-party coordinated vulnerability disclosure). Where the reported vulnerability could have significant impact on entities in more than one Member State, the CSIRTs designated as coordinators should cooperate within the CSIRTs network, where appropriate.

(62)

Access to correct and timely information about vulnerabilities affecting ICT products and ICT services contributes to an enhanced cybersecurity risk management. Sources of publicly available information about vulnerabilities are an important tool for the entities and for the users of their services, but also for the competent authorities and the CSIRTs. For that reason, ENISA should establish a European vulnerability database where entities, regardless of whether they fall within the scope of this Directive, and their suppliers of network and information systems, as well as the competent authorities and the CSIRTs, can disclose and register, on a voluntary basis, publicly known vulnerabilities for the purpose of allowing users to take appropriate mitigating measures. The aim of that database is to address the unique challenges posed by risks to Union entities. Furthermore, ENISA should establish an appropriate procedure regarding the publication process in order to give entities the time to take mitigating measures as regards their vulnerabilities and employ state-of-the-art cybersecurity risk-management measures as well as machine-readable datasets and corresponding interfaces. To encourage a culture of disclosure of vulnerabilities, disclosure should have no detrimental effects on the reporting natural or legal person.

(63)

Although similar vulnerability registries or databases exist, they are hosted and maintained by entities which are not established in the Union. A European vulnerability database maintained by ENISA would provide improved transparency regarding the publication process before the vulnerability is publicly disclosed, and resilience in the event of a disruption or an interruption of the provision of similar services. In order, to the extent possible, to avoid a duplication of efforts and to seek complementarity, ENISA should explore the possibility of entering into structured cooperation agreements with similar registries or databases that fall under third-country jurisdiction. In particular, ENISA should explore the possibility of close cooperation with the operators of the Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) system.

(64)

The Cooperation Group should support and facilitate strategic cooperation and the exchange of information, as well as strengthen trust and confidence among Member States. The Cooperation Group should establish a work programme every two years. The work programme should include the actions to be undertaken by the Cooperation Group to implement its objectives and tasks. The timeframe for the establishment of the first work programme under this Directive should be aligned with the timeframe of the last work programme established under Directive (EU) 2016/1148 in order to avoid potential disruptions in the work of the Cooperation Group.

(65)

When developing guidance documents, the Cooperation Group should consistently map national solutions and experiences, assess the impact of Cooperation Group deliverables on national approaches, discuss implementation challenges and formulate specific recommendations, in particular as regards facilitating an alignment of the transposition of this Directive among Member States, to be addressed through a better implementation of existing rules. The Cooperation Group could also map the national solutions in order to promote compatibility of cybersecurity solutions applied to each specific sector across the Union. This is particularly relevant to sectors that have an international or cross-border nature.

(66)

The Cooperation Group should remain a flexible forum and be able to react to changing and new policy priorities and challenges while taking into account the availability of resources. It could organise regular joint meetings with relevant private stakeholders from across the Union to discuss activities carried out by the Cooperation Group and gather data and input on emerging policy challenges. Additionally, the Cooperation Group should carry out a regular assessment of the state of play of cyber threats or incidents, such as ransomware. In order to enhance cooperation at Union level, the Cooperation Group should consider inviting relevant Union institutions, bodies, offices and agencies involved in cybersecurity policy, such as the European Parliament, Europol, the European Data Protection Board, the European Union Aviation Safety Agency, established by Regulation (EU) 2018/1139, and the European Union Agency for Space Programme, established by Regulation (EU) 2021/696 of the European Parliament and the Council (14), to participate in its work.

(67)

The competent authorities and the CSIRTs should be able to participate in exchange schemes for officials from other Member States, within a specific framework and, where applicable, subject to the required security clearance of officials participating in such exchange schemes, in order to improve cooperation and strengthen trust among Member States. The competent authorities should take the necessary measures to enable officials from other Member States to play an effective role in the activities of the host competent authority or the host CSIRT.

(68)

Member States should contribute to the establishment of the EU Cybersecurity Crisis Response Framework as set out in Commission Recommendation (EU) 2017/1584 (15) through the existing cooperation networks, in particular the European cyber crisis liaison organisation network (EU-CyCLONe), the CSIRTs network and the Cooperation Group. EU-CyCLONe and the CSIRTs network should cooperate on the basis of procedural arrangements that specify the details of that cooperation and avoid any duplication of tasks. EU-CyCLONe’s rules of procedure should further specify the arrangements through which that network should function, including the network’s roles, means of cooperation, interactions with other relevant actors and templates for information sharing, as well as means of communication. For crisis management at Union level, relevant parties should rely on the EU Integrated Political Crisis Response arrangements under Council Implementing Decision (EU) 2018/1993 (16) (IPCR arrangements). The Commission should use the ARGUS high-level cross-sectoral crisis coordination process for that purpose. If the crisis entails an important external or Common Security and Defence Policy dimension, the European External Action Service Crisis Response Mechanism should be activated.

(69)

In accordance with the Annex to Recommendation (EU) 2017/1584, a large-scale cybersecurity incident should mean an incident which causes a level of disruption that exceeds a Member State’s capacity to respond to it or which has a significant impact on at least two Member States. Depending on their cause and impact, large-scale cybersecurity incidents may escalate and turn into fully-fledged crises not allowing the proper functioning of the internal market or posing serious public security and safety risks for entities or citizens in several Member States or the Union as a whole. Given the wide-ranging scope and, in most cases, the cross-border nature of such incidents, Member States and the relevant Union institutions, bodies, offices and agencies should cooperate at technical, operational and political level to properly coordinate the response across the Union.

(70)

Large-scale cybersecurity incidents and crises at Union level require coordinated action to ensure a rapid and effective response because of the high degree of interdependence between sectors and Member States. The availability of cyber-resilient network and information systems and the availability, confidentiality and integrity of data are vital for the security of the Union and for the protection of its citizens, businesses and institutions against incidents and cyber threats, as well as for enhancing the trust of individuals and organisations in the Union’s ability to promote and protect a global, open, free, stable and secure cyberspace grounded in human rights, fundamental freedoms, democracy and the rule of law.

(71)

EU-CyCLONe should work as an intermediary between the technical and political level during large-scale cybersecurity incidents and crises and should enhance cooperation at operational level and support decision-making at political level. In cooperation with the Commission, having regard to the Commission’s competence in the area of crisis management, EU-CyCLONe should build on the CSIRTs network findings and use its own capabilities to create impact analysis of large-scale cybersecurity incidents and crises.

(72)

Cyberattacks are of a cross-border nature, and a significant incident can disrupt and damage critical information infrastructures on which the smooth functioning of the internal market depends. Recommendation (EU) 2017/1584 addresses the role of all relevant actors. Furthermore, the Commission is responsible, within the framework of the Union Civil Protection Mechanism, established by Decision No 1313/2013/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council (17), for general preparedness actions including managing the Emergency Response Coordination Centre and the Common Emergency Communication and Information System, maintaining and further developing situational awareness and analysis capability, and establishing and managing the capability to mobilise and dispatch expert teams in the event of a request for assistance from a Member State or third country. The Commission is also responsible for providing analytical reports for the IPCR arrangements under Implementing Decision (EU) 2018/1993, including in relation to cybersecurity situational awareness and preparedness, as well as for situational awareness and crisis response in the areas of agriculture, adverse weather conditions, conflict mapping and forecasts, early warning systems for natural disasters, health emergencies, infection disease surveillance, plant health, chemical incidents, food and feed safety, animal health, migration, customs, nuclear and radiological emergencies, and energy.

(73)

The Union can, where appropriate, conclude international agreements, in accordance with Article 218 TFEU, with third countries or international organisations, allowing and organising their participation in particular activities of the Cooperation Group, the CSIRTs network and EU-CyCLONe. Such agreements should ensure the Union’s interests and the adequate protection of data. This should not preclude the right of Member States to cooperate with third countries on management of vulnerabilities and cybersecurity risk management, facilitating reporting and general information sharing in accordance with Union law.

(74)

In order to facilitate the effective implementation of this Directive with regard, inter alia, to the management of vulnerabilities, cybersecurity risk-management measures, reporting obligations and cybersecurity information-sharing arrangements, Member States can cooperate with third countries and undertake activities that are considered to be appropriate for that purpose, including information exchange on cyber threats, incidents, vulnerabilities, tools and methods, tactics, techniques and procedures, cybersecurity crisis management preparedness and exercises, training, trust building and structured information-sharing arrangements.

(75)

Peer reviews should be introduced to help learn from shared experiences, strengthen mutual trust and achieve a high common level of cybersecurity. Peer reviews can lead to valuable insights and recommendations strengthening the overall cybersecurity capabilities, creating another functional path for the sharing of best practices across Member States and contributing to enhance the Member States’ levels of maturity in cybersecurity. Furthermore, peer reviews should take account of the results of similar mechanisms, such as the peer-review system of the CSIRTs network, and should add value and avoid duplication. The implementation of peer reviews should be without prejudice to Union or national law on the protection of confidential or classified information.

(76)

The Cooperation Group should establish a self-assessment methodology for Member States, aiming to cover factors such as the level of implementation of the cybersecurity risk-management measures and reporting obligations, the level of capabilities and the effectiveness of the exercise of the tasks of the competent authorities, the operational capabilities of the CSIRTs, the level of implementation of mutual assistance, the level of implementation of the cybersecurity information-sharing arrangements, or specific issues of cross-border or cross-sector nature. Member States should be encouraged to carry out self-assessments on a regular basis, and to present and discuss the results of their self-assessment within the Cooperation Group.

(77)

Responsibility for ensuring the security of network and information system lies, to a great extent, with essential and important entities. A culture of risk management, involving risk assessments and the implementation of cybersecurity risk-management measures appropriate to the risks faced, should be promoted and developed.

(78)

Cybersecurity risk-management measures should take into account the degree of dependence of the essential or important entity on network and information systems and include measures to identify any risks of incidents, to prevent, detect, respond to and recover from incidents and to mitigate their impact. The security of network and information systems should include the security of stored, transmitted and processed data. Cybersecurity risk-management measures should provide for systemic analysis, taking into account the human factor, in order to have a complete picture of the security of the network and information system.

(79)

As threats to the security of network and information systems can have different origins, cybersecurity risk-management measures should be based on an all-hazards approach, which aims to protect network and information systems and the physical environment of those systems from events such as theft, fire, flood, telecommunication or power failures, or unauthorised physical access and damage to, and interference with, an essential or important entity’s information and information processing facilities, which could compromise the availability, authenticity, integrity or confidentiality of stored, transmitted or processed data or of the services offered by, or accessible via, network and information systems. The cybersecurity risk-management measures should therefore also address the physical and environmental security of network and information systems by including measures to protect such systems from system failures, human error, malicious acts or natural phenomena, in line with European and international standards, such as those included in the ISO/IEC 27000 series. In that regard, essential and important entities should, as part of their cybersecurity risk-management measures, also address human resources security and have in place appropriate access control policies. Those measures should be consistent with Directive (EU) 2022/2557.

(80)

For the purpose of demonstrating compliance with cybersecurity risk-management measures and in the absence of appropriate European cybersecurity certification schemes adopted in accordance with Regulation (EU) 2019/881 of the European Parliament and of the Council (18), Member States should, in consultation with the Cooperation Group and the European Cybersecurity Certification Group, promote the use of relevant European and international standards by essential and important entities or may require entities to use certified ICT products, ICT services and ICT processes.

(81)

In order to avoid imposing a disproportionate financial and administrative burden on essential and important entities, the cybersecurity risk-management measures should be proportionate to the risks posed to the network and information system concerned, taking into account the state-of-the-art of such measures, and, where applicable, relevant European and international standards, as well as the cost for their implementation.

(82)

Cybersecurity risk-management measures should be proportionate to the degree of the essential or important entity’s exposure to risks and to the societal and economic impact that an incident would have. When establishing cybersecurity risk-management measures adapted to essential and important entities, due account should be taken of the divergent risk exposure of essential and important entities, such as the criticality of the entity, the risks, including societal risks, to which it is exposed, the entity’s size and the likelihood of occurrence of incidents and their severity, including their societal and economic impact.

(83)

Essential and important entities should ensure the security of the network and information systems which they use in their activities. Those systems are primarily private network and information systems managed by the essential and important entities’ internal IT staff or the security of which has been outsourced. The cybersecurity risk-management measures and reporting obligations laid down in this Directive should apply to the relevant essential and important entities regardless of whether those entities maintain their network and information systems internally or outsource the maintenance thereof.

(84)

Taking account of their cross-border nature, DNS service providers, TLD name registries, cloud computing service providers, data centre service providers, content delivery network providers, managed service providers, managed security service providers, providers of online marketplaces, of online search engines and of social networking services platforms, and trust service providers should be subject to a high degree of harmonisation at Union level. The implementation of cybersecurity risk-management measures with regard to those entities should therefore be facilitated by an implementing act.

(85)

Addressing risks stemming from an entity’s supply chain and its relationship with its suppliers, such as providers of data storage and processing services or managed security service providers and software editors, is particularly important given the prevalence of incidents where entities have been the victim of cyberattacks and where malicious perpetrators were able to compromise the security of an entity’s network and information systems by exploiting vulnerabilities affecting third-party products and services. Essential and important entities should therefore assess and take into account the overall quality and resilience of products and services, the cybersecurity risk-management measures embedded in them, and the cybersecurity practices of their suppliers and service providers, including their secure development procedures. Essential and important entities should in particular be encouraged to incorporate cybersecurity risk-management measures into contractual arrangements with their direct suppliers and service providers. Those entities could consider risks stemming from other levels of suppliers and service providers.

(86)

Among service providers, managed security service providers in areas such as incident response, penetration testing, security audits and consultancy play a particularly important role in assisting entities in their efforts to prevent, detect, respond to or recover from incidents. Managed security service providers have however also themselves been the target of cyberattacks and, because of their close integration in the operations of entities pose a particular risk. Essential and important entities should therefore exercise increased diligence in selecting a managed security service provider.

(87)

The competent authorities, in the context of their supervisory tasks, may also benefit from cybersecurity services such as security audits, penetration testing or incident responses.

(88)

Essential and important entities should also address risks stemming from their interactions and relationships with other stakeholders within a broader ecosystem, including with regard to countering industrial espionage and protecting trade secrets. In particular, those entities should take appropriate measures to ensure that their cooperation with academic and research institutions takes place in line with their cybersecurity policies and follows good practices as regards secure access and dissemination of information in general and the protection of intellectual property in particular. Similarly, given the importance and value of data for the activities of essential and important entities, when relying on data transformation and data analytics services from third parties, those entities should take all appropriate cybersecurity risk-management measures.

(89)

Essential and important entities should adopt a wide range of basic cyber hygiene practices, such as zero-trust principles, software updates, device configuration, network segmentation, identity and access management or user awareness, organise training for their staff and raise awareness concerning cyber threats, phishing or social engineering techniques. Furthermore, those entities should evaluate their own cybersecurity capabilities and, where appropriate, pursue the integration of cybersecurity enhancing technologies, such as artificial intelligence or machine-learning systems to enhance their capabilities and the security of network and information systems.

(90)

To further address key supply chain risks and assist essential and important entities operating in sectors covered by this Directive to appropriately manage supply chain and supplier related risks, the Cooperation Group, in cooperation with the Commission and ENISA, and where appropriate after consulting relevant stakeholders including from the industry, should carry out coordinated security risk assessments of critical supply chains, as carried out for 5G networks following Commission Recommendation (EU) 2019/534 (19), with the aim of identifying, per sector, the critical ICT services, ICT systems or ICT products, relevant threats and vulnerabilities. Such coordinated security risk assessments should identify measures, mitigation plans and best practices to counter critical dependencies, potential single points of failure, threats, vulnerabilities and other risks associated with the supply chain and should explore ways to further encourage their wider adoption by essential and important entities. Potential non-technical risk factors, such as undue influence by a third country on suppliers and service providers, in particular in the case of alternative models of governance, include concealed vulnerabilities or backdoors and potential systemic supply disruptions, in particular in the case of technological lock-in or provider dependency.

(91)

The coordinated security risk assessments of critical supply chains, in light of the features of the sector concerned, should take into account both technical and, where relevant, non-technical factors including those defined in Recommendation (EU) 2019/534, in the EU coordinated risk assessment of the cybersecurity of 5G networks and in the EU Toolbox on 5G cybersecurity agreed by the Cooperation Group. To identify the supply chains that should be subject to a coordinated security risk assessment, the following criteria should be taken into account: (i) the extent to which essential and important entities use and rely on specific critical ICT services, ICT systems or ICT products; (ii) the relevance of specific critical ICT services, ICT systems or ICT products for performing critical or sensitive functions, including the processing of personal data; (iii) the availability of alternative ICT services, ICT systems or ICT products; (iv) the resilience of the overall supply chain of ICT services, ICT systems or ICT products throughout their lifecycle against disruptive events; and (v) for emerging ICT services, ICT systems or ICT products, their potential future significance for the entities’ activities. Furthermore, particular emphasis should be placed on ICT services, ICT systems or ICT products that are subject to specific requirements stemming from third countries.

(92)

In order to streamline the obligations imposed on providers of public electronic communications networks or of publicly available electronic communications services, and trust service providers, related to the security of their network and information systems, as well as to enable those entities and the competent authorities under Directive (EU) 2018/1972 of the European Parliament and of the Council (20) and Regulation (EU) No 910/2014 respectively to benefit from the legal framework established by this Directive, including the designation of a CSIRT responsible for incident handling, the participation of the competent authorities concerned in the activities of the Cooperation Group and the CSIRTs network, those entities should fall within the scope of this Directive. The corresponding provisions laid down in Regulation (EU) No 910/2014 and Directive (EU) 2018/1972 related to the imposition of security and notification requirements on those types of entity should therefore be deleted. The rules on reporting obligations laid down in this Directive should be without prejudice to Regulation (EU) 2016/679 and Directive 2002/58/EC.

(93)

The cybersecurity obligations laid down in this Directive should be considered to be complementary to the requirements imposed on trust service providers under Regulation (EU) No 910/2014. Trust service providers should be required to take all appropriate and proportionate measures to manage the risks posed to their services, including in relation to customers and relying third parties, and to report incidents under this Directive. Such cybersecurity and reporting obligations should also concern the physical protection of the services provided. The requirements for qualified trust service providers laid down in Article 24 of Regulation (EU) No 910/2014 continue to apply.

(94)

Member States can assign the role of the competent authorities for trust services to the supervisory bodies under Regulation (EU) No 910/2014 in order to ensure the continuation of current practices and to build on the knowledge and experience gained in the application of that Regulation. In such a case, the competent authorities under this Directive should cooperate closely and in a timely manner with those supervisory bodies by exchanging relevant information in order to ensure effective supervision and compliance of trust service providers with the requirements laid down in this Directive and in Regulation (EU) No 910/2014. Where applicable, the CSIRT or the competent authority under this Directive should immediately inform the supervisory body under Regulation (EU) No 910/2014 about any notified significant cyber threat or incident affecting trust services as well as about any infringements by a trust service provider of this Directive. For the purpose of reporting, Member States can, where applicable, use the single entry point established to achieve a common and automatic incident reporting to both the supervisory body under Regulation (EU) No 910/2014 and the CSIRT or the competent authority under this Directive.

(95)

Where appropriate and in order to avoid unnecessary disruption, existing national guidelines adopted for the transposition of the rules related to security measures laid down in Articles 40 and 41 of Directive (EU) 2018/1972 should be taken into account in the transposition of this Directive, thereby building on the knowledge and skills already acquired under Directive (EU) 2018/1972 concerning security measures and incident notifications. ENISA can also develop guidance on security requirements and on reporting obligations for providers of public electronic communications networks or of publicly available electronic communications services to facilitate harmonisation and transition and to minimise disruption. Member States can assign the role of the competent authorities for electronic communications to the national regulatory authorities under Directive (EU) 2018/1972 in order to ensure the continuation of current practices and to build on the knowledge and experience gained as a result of the implementation of that Directive.

(96)

Given the growing importance of number-independent interpersonal communications services as defined in Directive (EU) 2018/1972, it is necessary to ensure that such services are also subject to appropriate security requirements in view of their specific nature and economic importance. As the attack surface continues to expand, number-independent interpersonal communications services, such as messaging services, are becoming widespread attack vectors. Malicious perpetrators use platforms to communicate and attract victims to open compromised web pages, therefore increasing the likelihood of incidents involving the exploitation of personal data, and, by extension, the security of network and information systems. Providers of number-independent interpersonal communications services should ensure a level of security of network and information systems appropriate to the risks posed. Given that providers of number-independent interpersonal communications services normally do not exercise actual control over the transmission of signals over networks, the degree of risks posed to such services can be considered in some respects to be lower than for traditional electronic communications services. The same applies to interpersonal communications services as defined in Directive (EU) 2018/1972 which make use of numbers and which do not exercise actual control over signal transmission.

(97)

The internal market is more reliant on the functioning of the internet than ever. The services of almost all essential and important entities are dependent on services provided over the internet. In order to ensure the smooth provision of services provided by essential and important entities, it is important that all providers of public electronic communications networks have appropriate cybersecurity risk-management measures in place and report significant incidents in relation thereto. Member States should ensure that the security of the public electronic communications networks is maintained and that their vital security interests are protected from sabotage and espionage. Since international connectivity enhances and accelerates the competitive digitalisation of the Union and its economy, incidents affecting undersea communications cables should be reported to the CSIRT or, where applicable, the competent authority. The national cybersecurity strategy should, where relevant, take into account the cybersecurity of undersea communications cables and include a mapping of potential cybersecurity risks and mitigation measures to secure the highest level of their protection.

(98)

In order to safeguard the security of public electronic communications networks and publicly available electronic communications services, the use of encryption technologies, in particular end-to-end encryption as well as data-centric security concepts, such as cartography, segmentation, tagging, access policy and access management, and automated access decisions, should be promoted. Where necessary, the use of encryption, in particular end-to-end encryption should be mandatory for providers of public electronic communications networks or of publicly available electronic communications services in accordance with the principles of security and privacy by default and by design for the purposes of this Directive. The use of end-to-end encryption should be reconciled with the Member States’ powers to ensure the protection of their essential security interests and public security, and to allow for the prevention, investigation, detection and prosecution of criminal offences in accordance with Union law. However, this should not weaken end-to-end encryption, which is a critical technology for the effective protection of data and privacy and the security of communications.

(99)

In order to safeguard the security, and to prevent abuse and manipulation, of public electronic communications networks and of publicly available electronic communications services, the use of secure routing standards should be promoted to ensure the integrity and robustness of routing functions across the ecosystem of internet access service providers.

(100)

In order to safeguard the functionality and integrity of the internet and to promote the security and resilience of the DNS, relevant stakeholders including Union private-sector entities, providers of publicly available electronic communications services, in particular internet access service providers, and providers of online search engines should be encouraged to adopt a DNS resolution diversification strategy. Furthermore, Member States should encourage the development and use of a public and secure European DNS resolver service.

(101)

This Directive lays down a multiple-stage approach to the reporting of significant incidents in order to strike the right balance between, on the one hand, swift reporting that helps mitigate the potential spread of significant incidents and allows essential and important entities to seek assistance, and, on the other, in-depth reporting that draws valuable lessons from individual incidents and improves over time the cyber resilience of individual entities and entire sectors. In that regard, this Directive should include the reporting of incidents that, based on an initial assessment carried out by the entity concerned, could cause severe operational disruption of the services or financial loss for that entity or affect other natural or legal persons by causing considerable material or non-material damage. Such initial assessment should take into account, inter alia, the affected network and information systems, in particular their importance in the provision of the entity’s services, the severity and technical characteristics of a cyber threat and any underlying vulnerabilities that are being exploited as well as the entity’s experience with similar incidents. Indicators such as the extent to which the functioning of the service is affected, the duration of an incident or the number of affected recipients of services could play an important role in identifying whether the operational disruption of the service is severe.

(102)

Where essential or important entities become aware of a significant incident, they should be required to submit an early warning without undue delay and in any event within 24 hours. That early warning should be followed by an incident notification. The entities concerned should submit an incident notification without undue delay and in any event within 72 hours of becoming aware of the significant incident, with the aim, in particular, of updating information submitted through the early warning and indicating an initial assessment of the significant incident, including its severity and impact, as well as indicators of compromise, where available. A final report should be submitted not later than one month after the incident notification. The early warning should only include the information necessary to make the CSIRT, or where applicable the competent authority, aware of the significant incident and allow the entity concerned to seek assistance, if required. Such early warning, where applicable, should indicate whether the significant incident is suspected of being caused by unlawful or malicious acts, and whether it is likely to have a cross-border impact. Member States should ensure that the obligation to submit that early warning, or the subsequent incident notification, does not divert the notifying entity’s resources from activities related to incident handling that should be prioritised, in order to prevent incident reporting obligations from either diverting resources from significant incident response handling or otherwise compromising the entity’s efforts in that respect. In the event of an ongoing incident at the time of the submission of the final report, Member States should ensure that entities concerned provide a progress report at that time, and a final report within one month of their handling of the significant incident.

(103)

Where applicable, essential and important entities should communicate, without undue delay, to their service recipients any measures or remedies that they can take to mitigate the resulting risks from a significant cyber threat. Those entities should, where appropriate and in particular where the significant cyber threat is likely to materialise, also inform their service recipients of the threat itself. The requirement to inform those recipients of significant cyber threats should be met on a best efforts basis but should not discharge those entities from the obligation to take, at their own expense, appropriate and immediate measures to prevent or remedy any such threats and restore the normal security level of the service. The provision of such information about significant cyber threats to the service recipients should be free of charge and drafted in easily comprehensible language.

(104)

Providers of public electronic communications networks or of publicly available electronic communications services should implement security by design and by default, and inform their service recipients of significant cyber threats and of measures they can take to protect the security of their devices and communications, for example by using specific types of software or encryption technologies.