(1)

Information society services and especially intermediary services have become an important part of the Union’s economy and the daily life of Union citizens. Twenty years after the adoption of the existing legal framework applicable to such services laid down in Directive 2000/31/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council (4), new and innovative business models and services, such as online social networks and online platforms allowing consumers to conclude distance contracts with traders, have allowed business users and consumers to impart and access information and engage in transactions in novel ways. A majority of Union citizens now uses those services on a daily basis. However, the digital transformation and increased use of those services has also resulted in new risks and challenges for individual recipients of the relevant service, companies and society as a whole.

(2)

Member States are increasingly introducing, or are considering introducing, national laws on the matters covered by this Regulation, imposing, in particular, diligence requirements for providers of intermediary services as regards the way they should tackle illegal content, online disinformation or other societal risks. Those diverging national laws negatively affect the internal market, which, pursuant to Article 26 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), comprises an area without internal frontiers in which the free movement of goods and services and freedom of establishment are ensured, taking into account the inherently cross-border nature of the internet, which is generally used to provide those services. The conditions for the provision of intermediary services across the internal market should be harmonised, so as to provide businesses with access to new markets and opportunities to exploit the benefits of the internal market, while allowing consumers and other recipients of the services to have increased choice. Business users, consumers and other users are considered to be ‘recipients of the service’ for the purpose of this Regulation.

(3)

Responsible and diligent behaviour by providers of intermediary services is essential for a safe, predictable and trustworthy online environment and for allowing Union citizens and other persons to exercise their fundamental rights guaranteed in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (the ‘Charter’), in particular the freedom of expression and of information, the freedom to conduct a business, the right to non-discrimination and the attainment of a high level of consumer protection.

(4)

Therefore, in order to safeguard and improve the functioning of the internal market, a targeted set of uniform, effective and proportionate mandatory rules should be established at Union level. This Regulation provides the conditions for innovative digital services to emerge and to scale up in the internal market. The approximation of national regulatory measures at Union level concerning the requirements for providers of intermediary services is necessary to avoid and put an end to fragmentation of the internal market and to ensure legal certainty, thus reducing uncertainty for developers and fostering interoperability. By using requirements that are technology neutral, innovation should not be hampered but instead be stimulated.

(5)

This Regulation should apply to providers of certain information society services as defined in Directive (EU) 2015/1535 of the European Parliament and of the Council (5), that is, any service normally provided for remuneration, at a distance, by electronic means and at the individual request of a recipient. Specifically, this Regulation should apply to providers of intermediary services, and in particular intermediary services consisting of services known as ‘mere conduit’, ‘caching’ and ‘hosting’ services, given that the exponential growth of the use made of those services, mainly for legitimate and socially beneficial purposes of all kinds, has also increased their role in the intermediation and spread of unlawful or otherwise harmful information and activities.

(6)

In practice, certain providers of intermediary services intermediate in relation to services that may or may not be provided by electronic means, such as remote information technology services, transport, accommodation or delivery services. This Regulation should apply only to intermediary services and not affect requirements set out in Union or national law relating to products or services intermediated through intermediary services, including in situations where the intermediary service constitutes an integral part of another service which is not an intermediary service as recognised in the case-law of the Court of Justice of the European Union.

(7)

In order to ensure the effectiveness of the rules laid down in this Regulation and a level playing field within the internal market, those rules should apply to providers of intermediary services irrespective of their place of establishment or their location, in so far as they offer services in the Union, as evidenced by a substantial connection to the Union.

(8)

Such a substantial connection to the Union should be considered to exist where the service provider has an establishment in the Union or, in the absence of such an establishment, where the number of recipients of the service in one or more Member States is significant in relation to the population thereof, or on the basis of the targeting of activities towards one or more Member States. The targeting of activities towards one or more Member States can be determined on the basis of all relevant circumstances, including factors such as the use of a language or a currency generally used in that Member State, or the possibility of ordering products or services, or the use of a relevant top-level domain. The targeting of activities towards a Member State could also be derived from the availability of an application in the relevant national application store, from the provision of local advertising or advertising in a language used in that Member State, or from the handling of customer relations such as by providing customer service in a language generally used in that Member State. A substantial connection should also be assumed where a service provider directs its activities to one or more Member States within the meaning of Article 17(1), point (c), of Regulation (EU) No 1215/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council (6). In contrast, mere technical accessibility of a website from the Union cannot, on that ground alone, be considered as establishing a substantial connection to the Union.

(9)

This Regulation fully harmonises the rules applicable to intermediary services in the internal market with the objective of ensuring a safe, predictable and trusted online environment, addressing the dissemination of illegal content online and the societal risks that the dissemination of disinformation or other content may generate, and within which fundamental rights enshrined in the Charter are effectively protected and innovation is facilitated. Accordingly, Member States should not adopt or maintain additional national requirements relating to the matters falling within the scope of this Regulation, unless explicitly provided for in this Regulation, since this would affect the direct and uniform application of the fully harmonised rules applicable to providers of intermediary services in accordance with the objectives of this Regulation. This should not preclude the possibility of applying other national legislation applicable to providers of intermediary services, in compliance with Union law, including Directive 2000/31/EC, in particular its Article 3, where the provisions of national law pursue other legitimate public interest objectives than those pursued by this Regulation.

(10)

This Regulation should be without prejudice to other acts of Union law regulating the provision of information society services in general, regulating other aspects of the provision of intermediary services in the internal market or specifying and complementing the harmonised rules set out in this Regulation, such as Directive 2010/13/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council (7) including the provisions thereof regarding video-sharing platforms, Regulations (EU) 2019/1148 (8), (EU) 2019/1150 (9), (EU) 2021/784 (10) and (EU) 2021/1232 (11) of the European Parliament and of the Council and Directive 2002/58/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council (12), and provisions of Union law set out in a Regulation on European Production and Preservation Orders for electronic evidence in criminal matters and in a Directive laying down harmonised rules on the appointment of legal representatives for the purpose of gathering evidence in criminal proceedings.

Similarly, for reasons of clarity, this Regulation should be without prejudice to Union law on consumer protection, in particular Regulations (EU) 2017/2394 (13) and (EU) 2019/1020 (14) of the European Parliament and of the Council, Directives 2001/95/EC (15), 2005/29/EC (16), 2011/83/EU (17) and 2013/11/EU (18) of the European Parliament and of the Council, and Council Directive 93/13/EEC (19), and on the protection of personal data, in particular Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council (20).

This Regulation should also be without prejudice to Union rules on private international law, in particular rules regarding jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters, as Regulation (EU) No 1215/2012, and rules on the law applicable to contractual and non-contractual obligations. The protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data is governed solely by the rules of Union law on that subject, in particular Regulation (EU) 2016/679 and Directive 2002/58/EC. This Regulation should also be without prejudice to Union law on working conditions and Union law in the field of judicial cooperation in civil and criminal matters. However, to the extent that those Union legal acts pursue the same objectives as those laid down in this Regulation, the rules of this Regulation should apply in respect of issues that are not addressed or not fully addressed by those other legal acts as well as issues on which those other legal acts leave Member States the possibility of adopting certain measures at national level.

(11)

It should be clarified that this Regulation is without prejudice to Union law on copyright and related rights, including Directives 2001/29/EC (21), 2004/48/EC (22) and (EU) 2019/790 (23) of the European Parliament and of the Council, which establish specific rules and procedures that should remain unaffected.

(12)

In order to achieve the objective of ensuring a safe, predictable and trustworthy online environment, for the purpose of this Regulation the concept of ‘illegal content’ should broadly reflect the existing rules in the offline environment. In particular, the concept of ‘illegal content’ should be defined broadly to cover information relating to illegal content, products, services and activities. In particular, that concept should be understood to refer to information, irrespective of its form, that under the applicable law is either itself illegal, such as illegal hate speech or terrorist content and unlawful discriminatory content, or that the applicable rules render illegal in view of the fact that it relates to illegal activities. Illustrative examples include the sharing of images depicting child sexual abuse, the unlawful non-consensual sharing of private images, online stalking, the sale of non-compliant or counterfeit products, the sale of products or the provision of services in infringement of consumer protection law, the non-authorised use of copyright protected material, the illegal offer of accommodation services or the illegal sale of live animals. In contrast, an eyewitness video of a potential crime should not be considered to constitute illegal content, merely because it depicts an illegal act, where recording or disseminating such a video to the public is not illegal under national or Union law. In this regard, it is immaterial whether the illegality of the information or activity results from Union law or from national law that is in compliance with Union law and what the precise nature or subject matter is of the law in question.

(13)

Considering the particular characteristics of the services concerned and the corresponding need to make the providers thereof subject to certain specific obligations, it is necessary to distinguish, within the broader category of providers of hosting services as defined in this Regulation, the subcategory of online platforms. Online platforms, such as social networks or online platforms allowing consumers to conclude distance contracts with traders, should be defined as providers of hosting services that not only store information provided by the recipients of the service at their request, but that also disseminate that information to the public at the request of the recipients of the service. However, in order to avoid imposing overly broad obligations, providers of hosting services should not be considered as online platforms where the dissemination to the public is merely a minor and purely ancillary feature that is intrinsically linked to another service, or a minor functionality of the principal service, and that feature or functionality cannot, for objective technical reasons, be used without that other or principal service, and the integration of that feature or functionality is not a means to circumvent the applicability of the rules of this Regulation applicable to online platforms. For example, the comments section in an online newspaper could constitute such a feature, where it is clear that it is ancillary to the main service represented by the publication of news under the editorial responsibility of the publisher. In contrast, the storage of comments in a social network should be considered an online platform service where it is clear that it is not a minor feature of the service offered, even if it is ancillary to publishing the posts of recipients of the service. For the purposes of this Regulation, cloud computing or web-hosting services should not be considered to be an online platform where dissemination of specific information to the public constitutes a minor and ancillary feature or a minor functionality of such services.

Moreover, cloud computing services and web-hosting services, when serving as infrastructure, such as the underlying infrastructural storage and computing services of an internet-based application, website or online platform, should not in themselves be considered as disseminating to the public information stored or processed at the request of a recipient of the application, website or online platform which they host.

(14)

The concept of ‘dissemination to the public’, as used in this Regulation, should entail the making available of information to a potentially unlimited number of persons, meaning making the information easily accessible to recipients of the service in general without further action by the recipient of the service providing the information being required, irrespective of whether those persons actually access the information in question. Accordingly, where access to information requires registration or admittance to a group of recipients of the service, that information should be considered to be disseminated to the public only where recipients of the service seeking to access the information are automatically registered or admitted without a human decision or selection of whom to grant access. Interpersonal communication services, as defined in Directive (EU) 2018/1972 of the European Parliament and of the Council (24), such as emails or private messaging services, fall outside the scope of the definition of online platforms as they are used for interpersonal communication between a finite number of persons determined by the sender of the communication. However, the obligations set out in this Regulation for providers of online platforms may apply to services that allow the making available of information to a potentially unlimited number of recipients, not determined by the sender of the communication, such as through public groups or open channels. Information should be considered disseminated to the public within the meaning of this Regulation only where that dissemination occurs upon the direct request by the recipient of the service that provided the information.

(15)

Where some of the services provided by a provider are covered by this Regulation whilst others are not, or where the services provided by a provider are covered by different sections of this Regulation, the relevant provisions of this Regulation should apply only in respect of those services that fall within their scope.

(16)

The legal certainty provided by the horizontal framework of conditional exemptions from liability for providers of intermediary services, laid down in Directive 2000/31/EC, has allowed many novel services to emerge and scale up across the internal market. That framework should therefore be preserved. However, in view of the divergences when transposing and applying the relevant rules at national level, and for reasons of clarity and coherence, that framework should be incorporated in this Regulation. It is also necessary to clarify certain elements of that framework, having regard to the case-law of the Court of Justice of the European Union.

(17)

The rules on liability of providers of intermediary services set out in this Regulation should only establish when the provider of intermediary services concerned cannot be held liable in relation to illegal content provided by the recipients of the service. Those rules should not be understood to provide a positive basis for establishing when a provider can be held liable, which is for the applicable rules of Union or national law to determine. Furthermore, the exemptions from liability established in this Regulation should apply in respect of any type of liability as regards any type of illegal content, irrespective of the precise subject matter or nature of those laws.

(18)

The exemptions from liability established in this Regulation should not apply where, instead of confining itself to providing the services neutrally by a merely technical and automatic processing of the information provided by the recipient of the service, the provider of intermediary services plays an active role of such a kind as to give it knowledge of, or control over, that information. Those exemptions should accordingly not be available in respect of liability relating to information provided not by the recipient of the service but by the provider of the intermediary service itself, including where the information has been developed under the editorial responsibility of that provider.

(19)

In view of the different nature of the activities of ‘mere conduit’, ‘caching’ and ‘hosting’ and the different position and abilities of the providers of the services in question, it is necessary to distinguish the rules applicable to those activities, in so far as under this Regulation they are subject to different requirements and conditions and their scope differs, as interpreted by the Court of Justice of the European Union.

(20)

Where a provider of intermediary services deliberately collaborates with a recipient of the services in order to undertake illegal activities, the services should not be deemed to have been provided neutrally and the provider should therefore not be able to benefit from the exemptions from liability provided for in this Regulation. This should be the case, for instance, where the provider offers its service with the main purpose of facilitating illegal activities, for example by making explicit that its purpose is to facilitate illegal activities or that its services are suited for that purpose. The fact alone that a service offers encrypted transmissions or any other system that makes the identification of the user impossible should not in itself qualify as facilitating illegal activities.

(21)

A provider should be able to benefit from the exemptions from liability for ‘mere conduit’ and for ‘caching’ services when it is in no way involved with the information transmitted or accessed. This requires, among other things, that the provider does not modify the information that it transmits or to which it provides access. However, this requirement should not be understood to cover manipulations of a technical nature which take place in the course of the transmission or access, as long as those manipulations do not alter the integrity of the information transmitted or to which access is provided.

(22)

In order to benefit from the exemption from liability for hosting services, the provider should, upon obtaining actual knowledge or awareness of illegal activities or illegal content, act expeditiously to remove or to disable access to that content. The removal or disabling of access should be undertaken in the observance of the fundamental rights of the recipients of the service, including the right to freedom of expression and of information. The provider can obtain such actual knowledge or awareness of the illegal nature of the content, inter alia through its own-initiative investigations or through notices submitted to it by individuals or entities in accordance with this Regulation in so far as such notices are sufficiently precise and adequately substantiated to allow a diligent economic operator to reasonably identify, assess and, where appropriate, act against the allegedly illegal content. However, such actual knowledge or awareness cannot be considered to be obtained solely on the ground that that provider is aware, in a general sense, of the fact that its service is also used to store illegal content. Furthermore, the fact that the provider automatically indexes information uploaded to its service, that it has a search function or that it recommends information on the basis of the profiles or preferences of the recipients of the service is not a sufficient ground for considering that provider to have ‘specific’ knowledge of illegal activities carried out on that platform or of illegal content stored on it.

(23)

The exemption of liability should not apply where the recipient of the service is acting under the authority or the control of the provider of a hosting service. For example, where the provider of an online platform that allows consumers to conclude distance contracts with traders determines the price of the goods or services offered by the trader, it could be considered that the trader acts under the authority or control of that online platform.

(24)

In order to ensure the effective protection of consumers when engaging in intermediated commercial transactions online, certain providers of hosting services, namely online platforms that allow consumers to conclude distance contracts with traders, should not be able to benefit from the exemption from liability for hosting service providers established in this Regulation, in so far as those online platforms present the relevant information relating to the transactions at issue in such a way as to lead consumers to believe that that information was provided by those online platforms themselves or by traders acting under their authority or control, and that those online platforms thus have knowledge of or control over the information, even if that may in reality not be the case. Examples of such behaviour could be where an online platform fails to display clearly the identity of the trader, as required by this Regulation, where an online platform withholds the identity or contact details of the trader until after the conclusion of the contract concluded between the trader and the consumer, or where an online platform markets the product or service in its own name rather than in the name of the trader who will supply that product or service. In that regard, it should be determined objectively, on the basis of all relevant circumstances, whether the presentation could lead an average consumer to believe that the information in question was provided by the online platform itself or by traders acting under its authority or control.

(25)

The exemptions from liability established in this Regulation should not affect the possibility of injunctions of different kinds against providers of intermediary services, even where they meet the conditions set out as part of those exemptions. Such injunctions could, in particular, consist of orders by courts or administrative authorities, issued in compliance with Union law, requiring the termination or prevention of any infringement, including the removal of illegal content specified in such orders, or the disabling of access to it.

(26)

In order to create legal certainty, and not to discourage activities that aim to detect, identify and act against illegal content that providers of all categories of intermediary services undertake on a voluntary basis, it should be clarified that the mere fact that providers undertake such activities does not render unavailable the exemptions from liability set out in this Regulation, provided those activities are carried out in good faith and in a diligent manner. The condition of acting in good faith and in a diligent manner should include acting in an objective, non-discriminatory and proportionate manner, with due regard to the rights and legitimate interests of all parties involved, and providing the necessary safeguards against unjustified removal of legal content, in accordance with the objective and requirements of this Regulation. To that aim, the providers concerned should, for example, take reasonable measures to ensure that, where automated tools are used to conduct such activities, the relevant technology is sufficiently reliable to limit to the maximum extent possible the rate of errors. In addition, it is appropriate to clarify that the mere fact that the providers take measures, in good faith, to comply with the requirements of Union law, including those set out in this Regulation as regards the implementation of their terms and conditions, should not render unavailable the exemptions from liability set out in this Regulation. Therefore, any such activities and measures that a provider may have taken should not be taken into account when determining whether the provider can rely on an exemption from liability, in particular as regards whether the provider provides its service neutrally and can therefore fall within the scope of the relevant provision, without this rule however implying that the provider can necessarily rely thereon. Voluntary actions should not be used to circumvent the obligations of providers of intermediary services under this Regulation.

(27)

Whilst the rules on liability of providers of intermediary services set out in this Regulation concentrate on the exemption from liability of providers of intermediary services, it is important to recall that, despite the generally important role played by such providers, the problem of illegal content and activities online should not be dealt with by solely focusing on their liability and responsibilities. Where possible, third parties affected by illegal content transmitted or stored online should attempt to resolve conflicts relating to such content without involving the providers of intermediary services in question. Recipients of the service should be held liable, where the applicable rules of Union and national law determining such liability so provide, for the illegal content that they provide and may disseminate to the public through intermediary services. Where appropriate, other actors, such as group moderators in closed online environments, in particular in the case of large groups, should also help to avoid the spread of illegal content online, in accordance with the applicable law. Furthermore, where it is necessary to involve information society services providers, including providers of intermediary services, any requests or orders for such involvement should, as a general rule, be directed to the specific provider that has the technical and operational ability to act against specific items of illegal content, so as to prevent and minimise any possible negative effects on the availability and accessibility of information that is not illegal content.

(28)

Since 2000, new technologies have emerged that improve the availability, efficiency, speed, reliability, capacity and security of systems for the transmission, ‘findability’ and storage of data online, leading to an increasingly complex online ecosystem. In this regard, it should be recalled that providers of services establishing and facilitating the underlying logical architecture and proper functioning of the internet, including technical auxiliary functions, can also benefit from the exemptions from liability set out in this Regulation, to the extent that their services qualify as ‘mere conduit’, ‘caching’ or ‘hosting’ services. Such services include, as the case may be, wireless local area networks, domain name system (DNS) services, top-level domain name registries, registrars, certificate authorities that issue digital certificates, virtual private networks, online search engines, cloud infrastructure services, or content delivery networks, that enable, locate or improve the functions of other providers of intermediary services. Likewise, services used for communications purposes, and the technical means of their delivery, have also evolved considerably, giving rise to online services such as Voice over IP, messaging services and web-based email services, where the communication is delivered via an internet access service. Those services, too, can benefit from the exemptions from liability, to the extent that they qualify as ‘mere conduit’, ‘caching’ or ‘hosting’ services.

(29)

Intermediary services span a wide range of economic activities which take place online and that develop continually to provide for transmission of information that is swift, safe and secure, and to ensure convenience of all participants of the online ecosystem. For example, ‘mere conduit’ intermediary services include generic categories of services, such as internet exchange points, wireless access points, virtual private networks, DNS services and resolvers, top-level domain name registries, registrars, certificate authorities that issue digital certificates, voice over IP and other interpersonal communication services, while generic examples of ‘caching’ intermediary services include the sole provision of content delivery networks, reverse proxies or content adaptation proxies. Such services are crucial to ensure the smooth and efficient transmission of information delivered on the internet. Examples of ‘hosting services’ include categories of services such as cloud computing, web hosting, paid referencing services or services enabling sharing information and content online, including file storage and sharing. Intermediary services may be provided in isolation, as a part of another type of intermediary service, or simultaneously with other intermediary services. Whether a specific service constitutes a ‘mere conduit’, ‘caching’ or ‘hosting’ service depends solely on its technical functionalities, which might evolve in time, and should be assessed on a case-by-case basis.

(30)

Providers of intermediary services should not be, neither de jure, nor de facto, subject to a monitoring obligation with respect to obligations of a general nature. This does not concern monitoring obligations in a specific case and, in particular, does not affect orders by national authorities in accordance with national legislation, in compliance with Union law, as interpreted by the Court of Justice of the European Union, and in accordance with the conditions established in this Regulation. Nothing in this Regulation should be construed as an imposition of a general monitoring obligation or a general active fact-finding obligation, or as a general obligation for providers to take proactive measures in relation to illegal content.

(31)

Depending on the legal system of each Member State and the field of law at issue, national judicial or administrative authorities, including law enforcement authorities, may order providers of intermediary services to act against one or more specific items of illegal content or to provide certain specific information. The national laws on the basis of which such orders are issued differ considerably and the orders are increasingly addressed in cross-border situations. In order to ensure that those orders can be complied with in an effective and efficient manner, in particular in a cross-border context, so that the public authorities concerned can carry out their tasks and the providers are not subject to any disproportionate burdens, without unduly affecting the rights and legitimate interests of any third parties, it is necessary to set certain conditions that those orders should meet and certain complementary requirements relating to the processing of those orders. Consequently, this Regulation should harmonise only certain specific minimum conditions that such orders should fulfil in order to give rise to the obligation of providers of intermediary services to inform the relevant authorities about the effect given to those orders. Therefore, this Regulation does not provide the legal basis for the issuing of such orders, nor does it regulate their territorial scope or cross-border enforcement.

(32)

The applicable Union or national law on the basis of which those orders are issued might require additional conditions and should be the basis for the enforcement of the respective orders. In the event of non-compliance with such orders, the issuing Member State should be able to enforce them in accordance with its national law. The applicable national law should be in compliance with Union law, including the Charter and the TFEU provisions on the freedom of establishment and the freedom to provide services within the Union, in particular with regard to online gambling and betting services. Similarly, the application of such national laws for the enforcement of the respective orders is without prejudice to applicable Union legal acts or international agreements concluded by the Union or by Member States relating to the cross-border recognition, execution and enforcement of those orders, in particular in civil and criminal matters. On the other hand, the enforcement of the obligation to inform the relevant authorities about the effect given to those orders, as opposed to the enforcement of the orders themselves, should be subject to the rules set out in this Regulation.

(33)

The provider of intermediary services should inform the issuing authority about any follow-up given to such orders without undue delay, in compliance with the time limits set out in relevant Union or national law.

(34)

Relevant national authorities should be able to issue such orders against content considered illegal or orders to provide information on the basis of Union law or national law in compliance with Union law, in particular the Charter, and to address them to providers of intermediary services, including those established in another Member State. However, this Regulation should be without prejudice to Union law in the field of judicial cooperation in civil or criminal matters, including Regulation (EU) No 1215/2012 and a Regulation on European production and preservation orders for electronic evidence in criminal matters, and to national criminal or civil procedural law. Therefore, where those laws in the context of criminal or civil proceedings provide for conditions that are additional to or incompatible with the conditions provided for in this Regulation in relation to orders to act against illegal content or to provide information, the conditions provided for in this Regulation might not apply or might be adapted. In particular, the obligation on the Digital Services Coordinator from the Member State of the issuing authority to transmit a copy of the orders to all other Digital Services Coordinators might not apply in the context of criminal proceedings or might be adapted, where the applicable national criminal procedural law so provides.

Furthermore, the obligation for the orders to contain a statement of reasons explaining why the information is illegal content should be adapted, where necessary, under the applicable national criminal procedural law for the prevention, investigation, detection and prosecution of criminal offences. Finally, the obligation on the providers of intermediary services to inform the recipient of the service might be delayed in accordance with applicable Union or national law, in particular in the context of criminal, civil or administrative proceedings. In addition, the orders should be issued in compliance with Regulation (EU) 2016/679 and the prohibition of general obligations to monitor information or to actively seek facts or circumstances indicating illegal activity laid down in this Regulation. The conditions and requirements laid down in this Regulation which apply to orders to act against illegal content are without prejudice to other Union acts providing for similar systems for acting against specific types of illegal content, such as Regulation (EU) 2021/784, Regulation (EU) 2019/1020, or Regulation (EU) 2017/2394 that confers specific powers to order the provision of information to Member State consumer law enforcement authorities, whilst the conditions and requirements that apply to orders to provide information are without prejudice to other Union acts providing for similar relevant rules for specific sectors. Those conditions and requirements should be without prejudice to retention and preservation rules under applicable national law, in compliance with Union law and confidentiality requests by law enforcement authorities related to the non-disclosure of information. Those conditions and requirements should not affect the possibility for Member States to require a provider of intermediary services to prevent an infringement, in compliance with Union law including this Regulation, and in particular with the prohibition of general monitoring obligations.

(35)

The conditions and requirements laid down in this Regulation should be fulfilled at the latest when the order is transmitted to the provider concerned. Therefore, the order may be issued in one of the official languages of the issuing authority of the Member State concerned. However, where that language is different from the language declared by the provider of intermediary services, or from another official language of the Member States agreed between the authority issuing the order and the provider of intermediary services, the transmission of the order should be accompanied by a translation of at least the elements of the order which are set out in this Regulation. Where a provider of intermediary services has agreed with the authorities of a Member State to use a certain language, it should be encouraged to accept orders in the same language issued by authorities in other Member States. The orders should include elements that enable the addressee to identify the issuing authority, including the contact details of a contact point within that authority where appropriate, and to verify the authenticity of the order.

(36)

The territorial scope of such orders to act against illegal content should be clearly set out on the basis of the applicable Union or national law enabling the issuance of the order and should not exceed what is strictly necessary to achieve its objectives. In that regard, the national judicial or administrative authority, which might be a law enforcement authority, issuing the order should balance the objective that the order seeks to achieve, in accordance with the legal basis enabling its issuance, with the rights and legitimate interests of all third parties that may be affected by the order, in particular their fundamental rights under the Charter. In particular in a cross-border context, the effect of the order should in principle be limited to the territory of the issuing Member State, unless the illegality of the content derives directly from Union law or the issuing authority considers that the rights at stake require a wider territorial scope, in accordance with Union and international law, while taking into account the interests of international comity.

(37)

The orders to provide information regulated by this Regulation concern the production of specific information about individual recipients of the intermediary service concerned who are identified in those orders for the purposes of determining compliance by the recipients of the service with applicable Union or national rules. Such orders should request information with the aim of enabling the identification of the recipients of the service concerned. Therefore, orders regarding information on a group of recipients of the service who are not specifically identified, including orders to provide aggregate information required for statistical purposes or evidence-based policy-making, are not covered by the requirements of this Regulation on the provision of information.

(38)

Orders to act against illegal content and to provide information are subject to the rules safeguarding the competence of the Member State in which the service provider addressed is established and the rules laying down possible derogations from that competence in certain cases, set out in Article 3 of Directive 2000/31/EC, only if the conditions of that Article are met. Given that the orders in question relate to specific items of illegal content and information, respectively, where they are addressed to providers of intermediary services established in another Member State they do not in principle restrict those providers’ freedom to provide their services across borders. Therefore, the rules set out in Article 3 of Directive 2000/31/EC, including those regarding the need to justify measures derogating from the competence of the Member State in which the service provider is established on certain specified grounds and regarding the notification of such measures, do not apply in respect of those orders.

(39)

The requirements to provide information on redress mechanisms available to the provider of the intermediary service and to the recipient of the service who provided the content include a requirement to provide information about administrative complaint-handling mechanisms and judicial redress including appeals against orders issued by judicial authorities. Moreover, Digital Services Coordinators could develop national tools and guidance as regards complaint and redress mechanisms applicable in their respective territory, in order to facilitate access to such mechanisms by recipients of the service. Finally, when applying this Regulation Member States should respect the fundamental right to an effective judicial remedy and to a fair trial as provided for in Article 47 of the Charter. This Regulation should therefore not prevent the relevant national judicial or administrative authorities from issuing, on the basis of the applicable Union or national law, an order to restore content, where such content was in compliance with the terms and conditions of the provider of the intermediary service but has been erroneously considered as illegal by that provider and has been removed.

(40)

In order to achieve the objectives of this Regulation, and in particular to improve the functioning of the internal market and ensure a safe and transparent online environment, it is necessary to establish a clear, effective, predictable and balanced set of harmonised due diligence obligations for providers of intermediary services. Those obligations should aim in particular to guarantee different public policy objectives such as the safety and trust of the recipients of the service, including consumers, minors and users at particular risk of being subject to hate speech, sexual harassment or other discriminatory actions, the protection of relevant fundamental rights enshrined in the Charter, the meaningful accountability of those providers and the empowerment of recipients and other affected parties, whilst facilitating the necessary oversight by competent authorities.

(41)

In that regard, it is important that the due diligence obligations are adapted to the type, size and nature of the intermediary service concerned. This Regulation therefore sets out basic obligations applicable to all providers of intermediary services, as well as additional obligations for providers of hosting services and, more specifically, providers of online platforms and of very large online platforms and of very large online search engines. To the extent that providers of intermediary services fall within a number of different categories in view of the nature of their services and their size, they should comply with all the corresponding obligations of this Regulation in relation to those services. Those harmonised due diligence obligations, which should be reasonable and non-arbitrary, are needed to address the identified public policy concerns, such as safeguarding the legitimate interests of the recipients of the service, addressing illegal practices and protecting the fundamental rights enshrined in the Charter. The due diligence obligations are independent from the question of liability of providers of intermediary services which need therefore to be assessed separately.

(42)

In order to facilitate smooth and efficient two-way communications, including, where relevant, by acknowledging the receipt of such communications, relating to matters covered by this Regulation, providers of intermediary services should be required to designate a single electronic point of contact and to publish and update relevant information relating to that point of contact, including the languages to be used in such communications. The electronic point of contact can also be used by trusted flaggers and by professional entities which are under a specific relationship with the provider of intermediary services. In contrast to the legal representative, the electronic point of contact should serve operational purposes and should not be required to have a physical location. Providers of intermediary services can designate the same single point of contact for the requirements of this Regulation as well as for the purposes of other acts of Union law. When specifying the languages of communication, providers of intermediary services are encouraged to ensure that the languages chosen do not in themselves constitute an obstacle to communication. Where necessary, it should be possible for providers of intermediary services and Member States' authorities to reach a separate agreement on the language of communication, or to seek alternative means to overcome the language barrier, including by using all available technological means or internal and external human resources.

(43)

Providers of intermediary services should also be required to designate a single point of contact for recipients of services, enabling rapid, direct and efficient communication in particular by easily accessible means such as telephone numbers, email addresses, electronic contact forms, chatbots or instant messaging. It should be explicitly indicated when a recipient of the service communicates with chatbots. Providers of intermediary services should allow recipients of services to choose means of direct and efficient communication which do not solely rely on automated tools. Providers of intermediary services should make all reasonable efforts to guarantee that sufficient human and financial resources are allocated to ensure that this communication is performed in a timely and efficient manner.

(44)

Providers of intermediary services that are established in a third country and that offer services in the Union should designate a sufficiently mandated legal representative in the Union and provide information relating to their legal representatives to the relevant authorities and make it publicly available. In order to comply with that obligation, such providers of intermediary services should ensure that the designated legal representative has the necessary powers and resources to cooperate with the relevant authorities. This could be the case, for example, where a provider of intermediary services appoints a subsidiary undertaking of the same group as the provider, or its parent undertaking, if that subsidiary or parent undertaking is established in the Union. However, it might not be the case, for instance, when the legal representative is subject to reconstruction proceedings, bankruptcy, or personal or corporate insolvency. That obligation should allow for the effective oversight and, where necessary, enforcement of this Regulation in relation to those providers. It should be possible for a legal representative to be mandated, in accordance with national law, by more than one provider of intermediary services. It should be possible for the legal representative to also function as a point of contact, provided the relevant requirements of this Regulation are complied with.

(45)

Whilst the freedom of contract of providers of intermediary services should in principle be respected, it is appropriate to set certain rules on the content, application and enforcement of the terms and conditions of those providers in the interests of transparency, the protection of recipients of the service and the avoidance of unfair or arbitrary outcomes. Providers of the intermediary services should clearly indicate and maintain up-to-date in their terms and conditions the information as to the grounds on the basis of which they may restrict the provision of their services. In particular, they should include information on any policies, procedures, measures and tools used for the purpose of content moderation, including algorithmic decision-making and human review, as well as the rules of procedure of their internal complaint-handling system. They should also provide easily accessible information on the right to terminate the use of the service. Providers of intermediary services may use graphical elements in their terms of service, such as icons or images, to illustrate the main elements of the information requirements set out in this Regulation. Providers should inform recipients of their service through appropriate means of significant changes made to terms and conditions, for instance when they modify the rules on information that is permitted on their service, or other such changes which could directly impact the ability of the recipients to make use of the service.

(46)

Providers of intermediary services that are primarily directed at minors, for example through the design or marketing of the service, or which are used predominantly by minors, should make particular efforts to render the explanation of their terms and conditions easily understandable to minors.

(47)

When designing, applying and enforcing those restrictions, providers of intermediary services should act in a non-arbitrary and non-discriminatory manner and take into account the rights and legitimate interests of the recipients of the service, including fundamental rights as enshrined in the Charter. For example, providers of very large online platforms should in particular pay due regard to freedom of expression and of information, including media freedom and pluralism. All providers of intermediary services should also pay due regard to relevant international standards for the protection of human rights, such as the United Nations Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights.

(48)

Given their special role and reach, it is appropriate to impose on very large online platforms and very large online search engines additional requirements regarding information and transparency of their terms and conditions. Consequently, providers of very large online platforms and very large online search engines should provide their terms and conditions in the official languages of all Member States in which they offer their services and should also provide recipients of the services with a concise and easily readable summary of the main elements of the terms and conditions. Such summaries should identify the main elements of the information requirements, including the possibility of easily opting out from optional clauses.

(49)

To ensure an adequate level of transparency and accountability, providers of intermediary services should make publicly available an annual report in a machine-readable format, in accordance with the harmonised requirements contained in this Regulation, on the content moderation in which they engage, including the measures taken as a result of the application and enforcement of their terms and conditions. However, in order to avoid disproportionate burdens, those transparency reporting obligations should not apply to providers that are micro or small enterprises as defined in Commission Recommendation 2003/361/EC (25) and which are not very large online platforms within the meaning of this Regulation.

(50)

Providers of hosting services play a particularly important role in tackling illegal content online, as they store information provided by and at the request of the recipients of the service and typically give other recipients access thereto, sometimes on a large scale. It is important that all providers of hosting services, regardless of their size, put in place easily accessible and user-friendly notice and action mechanisms that facilitate the notification of specific items of information that the notifying party considers to be illegal content to the provider of hosting services concerned (‘notice’), pursuant to which that provider can decide whether or not it agrees with that assessment and wishes to remove or disable access to that content (‘action’). Such mechanisms should be clearly identifiable, located close to the information in question and at least as easy to find and use as notification mechanisms for content that violates the terms and conditions of the hosting service provider. Provided the requirements on notices are met, it should be possible for individuals or entities to notify multiple specific items of allegedly illegal content through a single notice in order to ensure the effective operation of notice and action mechanisms. The notification mechanism should allow, but not require, the identification of the individual or the entity submitting a notice. For some types of items of information notified, the identity of the individual or the entity submitting a notice might be necessary to determine whether the information in question constitutes illegal content, as alleged. The obligation to put in place notice and action mechanisms should apply, for instance, to file storage and sharing services, web hosting services, advertising servers and paste bins, in so far as they qualify as hosting services covered by this Regulation.

(51)

Having regard to the need to take due account of the fundamental rights guaranteed under the Charter of all parties concerned, any action taken by a provider of hosting services pursuant to receiving a notice should be strictly targeted, in the sense that it should serve to remove or disable access to the specific items of information considered to constitute illegal content, without unduly affecting the freedom of expression and of information of recipients of the service. Notices should therefore, as a general rule, be directed to the providers of hosting services that can reasonably be expected to have the technical and operational ability to act against such specific items. The providers of hosting services who receive a notice for which they cannot, for technical or operational reasons, remove the specific item of information should inform the person or entity who submitted the notice.

(52)

The rules on such notice and action mechanisms should be harmonised at Union level, so as to provide for the timely, diligent and non-arbitrary processing of notices on the basis of rules that are uniform, transparent and clear and that provide for robust safeguards to protect the right and legitimate interests of all affected parties, in particular their fundamental rights guaranteed by the Charter, irrespective of the Member State in which those parties are established or reside and of the field of law at issue. Those fundamental rights include but are not limited to: for the recipients of the service, the right to freedom of expression and of information, the right to respect for private and family life, the right to protection of personal data, the right to non-discrimination and the right to an effective remedy; for the service providers, the freedom to conduct a business, including the freedom of contract; for parties affected by illegal content, the right to human dignity, the rights of the child, the right to protection of property, including intellectual property, and the right to non-discrimination. Providers of hosting services should act upon notices in a timely manner, in particular by taking into account the type of illegal content being notified and the urgency of taking action. For instance, such providers can be expected to act without delay when allegedly illegal content involving a threat to life or safety of persons is being notified. The provider of hosting services should inform the individual or entity notifying the specific content without undue delay after taking a decision whether or not to act upon the notice.

(53)

The notice and action mechanisms should allow for the submission of notices which are sufficiently precise and adequately substantiated to enable the provider of hosting services concerned to take an informed and diligent decision, compatible with the freedom of expression and of information, in respect of the content to which the notice relates, in particular whether or not that content is to be considered illegal content and is to be removed or access thereto is to be disabled. Those mechanisms should be such as to facilitate the provision of notices that contain an explanation of the reasons why the individual or the entity submitting a notice considers that content to be illegal content, and a clear indication of the location of that content. Where a notice contains sufficient information to enable a diligent provider of hosting services to identify, without a detailed legal examination, that it is clear that the content is illegal, the notice should be considered to give rise to actual knowledge or awareness of illegality. Except for the submission of notices relating to offences referred to in Articles 3 to 7 of Directive 2011/93/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council (26), those mechanisms should ask the individual or the entity submitting a notice to disclose its identity in order to avoid misuse.

(54)

Where a provider of hosting services decides, on the ground that the information provided by the recipients is illegal content or is incompatible with its terms and conditions, to remove or disable access to information provided by a recipient of the service or to otherwise restrict its visibility or monetisation, for instance following receipt of a notice or acting on its own initiative, including exclusively by automated means, that provider should inform in a clear and easily comprehensible way the recipient of its decision, the reasons for its decision and the available possibilities for redress to contest the decision, in view of the negative consequences that such decisions may have for the recipient, including as regards the exercise of its fundamental right to freedom of expression. That obligation should apply irrespective of the reasons for the decision, in particular whether the action has been taken because the information notified is considered to be illegal content or incompatible with the applicable terms and conditions. Where the decision was taken following receipt of a notice, the provider of hosting services should only reveal the identity of the person or entity who submitted the notice to the recipient of the service where this information is necessary to identify the illegality of the content, such as in cases of infringements of intellectual property rights.

(55)

Restriction of visibility may consist in demotion in ranking or in recommender systems, as well as in limiting accessibility by one or more recipients of the service or blocking the user from an online community without the user being aware (‘shadow banning’). The monetisation via advertising revenue of information provided by the recipient of the service can be restricted by suspending or terminating the monetary payment or revenue associated to that information. The obligation to provide a statement of reasons should however not apply with respect to deceptive high-volume commercial content disseminated through intentional manipulation of the service, in particular inauthentic use of the service such as the use of bots or fake accounts or other deceptive uses of the service. Irrespective of other possibilities to challenge the decision of the provider of hosting services, the recipient of the service should always have a right to effective remedy before a court in accordance with the national law.

(56)

A provider of hosting services may in some instances become aware, such as through a notice by a notifying party or through its own voluntary measures, of information relating to certain activity of a recipient of the service, such as the provision of certain types of illegal content, that reasonably justify, having regard to all relevant circumstances of which the provider of hosting services is aware, the suspicion that that recipient may have committed, may be committing or is likely to commit a criminal offence involving a threat to the life or safety of person or persons, such as offences specified in Directive 2011/36/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council (27), Directive 2011/93/EU or Directive (EU) 2017/541 of the European Parliament and of the Council (28). For example, specific items of content could give rise to a suspicion of a threat to the public, such as incitement to terrorism within the meaning of Article 21 of Directive (EU) 2017/541. In such instances, the provider of hosting services should inform without delay the competent law enforcement authorities of such suspicion. The provider of hosting services should provide all relevant information available to it, including, where relevant, the content in question and, if available, the time when the content was published, including the designated time zone, an explanation of its suspicion and the information necessary to locate and identify the relevant recipient of the service. This Regulation does not provide the legal basis for profiling of recipients of the services with a view to the possible identification of criminal offences by providers of hosting services. Providers of hosting services should also respect other applicable rules of Union or national law for the protection of the rights and freedoms of individuals when informing law enforcement authorities.

(57)

To avoid disproportionate burdens, the additional obligations imposed under this Regulation on providers of online platforms, including platforms allowing consumers to conclude distance contracts with traders, should not apply to providers that qualify as micro or small enterprises as defined in Recommendation 2003/361/EC. For the same reason, those additional obligations should also not apply to providers of online platforms that previously qualified as micro or small enterprises during a period of 12 months after they lose that status. Such providers should not be excluded from the obligation to provide information on the average monthly active recipients of the service at the request of the Digital Services Coordinator of establishment or the Commission. However, considering that very large online platforms or very large online search engines have a larger reach and a greater impact in influencing how recipients of the service obtain information and communicate online, such providers should not benefit from that exclusion, irrespective of whether they qualify or recently qualified as micro or small enterprises. The consolidation rules laid down in Recommendation 2003/361/EC help ensure that any circumvention of those additional obligations is prevented. Nothing in this Regulation precludes providers of online platforms that are covered by that exclusion from setting up, on a voluntary basis, a system that complies with one or more of those obligations.

(58)

Recipients of the service should be able to easily and effectively contest certain decisions of providers of online platforms concerning the illegality of content or its incompatibility with the terms and conditions that negatively affect them. Therefore, providers of online platforms should be required to provide for internal complaint-handling systems, which meet certain conditions that aim to ensure that the systems are easily accessible and lead to swift, non-discriminatory, non-arbitrary and fair outcomes, and are subject to human review where automated means are used. Such systems should enable all recipients of the service to lodge a complaint and should not set formal requirements, such as referral to specific, relevant legal provisions or elaborate legal explanations. Recipients of the service who submitted a notice through the notice and action mechanism provided for in this Regulation or through the notification mechanism for content that violate the terms and conditions of the provider of online platforms should be entitled to use the complaint mechanism to contest the decision of the provider of online platforms on their notices, including when they consider that the action taken by that provider was not adequate. The possibility to lodge a complaint for the reversal of the contested decisions should be available for at least six months, to be calculated from the moment at which the provider of online platforms informed the recipient of the service of the decision.

(59)

In addition, provision should be made for the possibility of engaging, in good faith, in the out-of-court dispute settlement of such disputes, including those that could not be resolved in a satisfactory manner through the internal complaint-handling systems, by certified bodies that have the requisite independence, means and expertise to carry out their activities in a fair, swift and cost-effective manner. The independence of the out-of-court dispute settlement bodies should be ensured also at the level of the natural persons in charge of resolving disputes, including through rules on conflict of interest. The fees charged by the out-of-court dispute settlement bodies should be reasonable, accessible, attractive, inexpensive for consumers and proportionate, and assessed on a case-by-case basis. Where an out-of-court dispute settlement body is certified by the competent Digital Services Coordinator, that certification should be valid in all Member States. Providers of online platforms should be able to refuse to engage in out-of-court dispute settlement procedures under this Regulation when the same dispute, in particular as regards the information concerned and the grounds for taking the contested decision, the effects of the decision and the grounds raised for contesting the decision, has already been resolved by or is already subject to an ongoing procedure before the competent court or before another competent out-of-court dispute settlement body. Recipients of the service should be able to choose between the internal complaint mechanism, an out-of-court dispute settlement and the possibility to initiate, at any stage, judicial proceedings. Since the outcome of the out-of-court dispute settlement procedure is not binding, the parties should not be prevented from initiating judicial proceedings in relation to the same dispute. The possibilities to contest decisions of providers of online platforms thus created should leave unaffected in all respects the possibility to seek judicial redress in accordance with the laws of the Member State concerned, and therefore should not affect the exercise of the right to an effective judicial remedy under Article 47 of the Charter. The provisions in this Regulation on out-of-court dispute settlement should not require Member States to establish such out-of-court settlement bodies.

(60)

For contractual consumer-to-business disputes regarding the purchase of goods or services, Directive 2013/11/EU ensures that Union consumers and businesses in the Union have access to quality-certified alternative dispute resolution entities. In this regard, it should be clarified that the rules of this Regulation on out-of-court dispute settlement are without prejudice to that Directive, including the right of consumers under that Directive to withdraw from the procedure at any stage if they are dissatisfied with the performance or the operation of the procedure.

(61)

Action against illegal content can be taken more quickly and reliably where providers of online platforms take the necessary measures to ensure that notices submitted by trusted flaggers, acting within their designated area of expertise, through the notice and action mechanisms required by this Regulation are treated with priority, without prejudice to the requirement to process and decide upon all notices submitted under those mechanisms in a timely, diligent and non-arbitrary manner. Such trusted flagger status should be awarded by the Digital Services Coordinator of the Member State in which the applicant is established and should be recognised by all providers of online platforms within the scope of this Regulation. Such trusted flagger status should only be awarded to entities, and not individuals, that have demonstrated, among other things, that they have particular expertise and competence in tackling illegal content and that they work in a diligent, accurate and objective manner. Such entities can be public in nature, such as, for terrorist content, internet referral units of national law enforcement authorities or of the European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Cooperation (‘Europol’) or they can be non-governmental organisations and private or semi-public bodies such as the organisations part of the INHOPE network of hotlines for reporting child sexual abuse material and organisations committed to notifying illegal racist and xenophobic expressions online. To avoid diminishing the added value of such mechanism, the overall number of trusted flaggers awarded in accordance with this Regulation should be limited. In particular, industry associations representing their members' interests are encouraged to apply for the status of trusted flaggers, without prejudice to the right of private entities or individuals to enter into bilateral agreements with the providers of online platforms.

(62)

Trusted flaggers should publish easily comprehensible and detailed reports on notices submitted in accordance with this Regulation. Those reports should indicate information such as the number of notices categorised by the provider of hosting services, the type of content, and the action taken by the provider. Given that trusted flaggers have demonstrated expertise and competence, the processing of notices submitted by trusted flaggers can be expected to be less burdensome and therefore faster compared to notices submitted by other recipients of the service. However, the average time taken to process may still vary depending on factors including the type of illegal content, the quality of notices, and the actual technical procedures put in place for the submission of such notices.

For example, while the Code of conduct on countering illegal hate speech online of 2016 sets a benchmark for the participating companies with respect to the time needed to process valid notifications for removal of illegal hate speech, other types of illegal content may take considerably different timelines for processing, depending on the specific facts and circumstances and types of illegal content at stake. In order to avoid abuses of the trusted flagger status, it should be possible to suspend such status when a Digital Services Coordinator of establishment opened an investigation based on legitimate reasons. The rules of this Regulation on trusted flaggers should not be understood to prevent providers of online platforms from giving similar treatment to notices submitted by entities or individuals that have not been awarded trusted flagger status under this Regulation, from otherwise cooperating with other entities, in accordance with the applicable law, including this Regulation and Regulation (EU) 2016/794 of the European Parliament and of the Council (29). The rules of this Regulation should not prevent the providers of online platforms from making use of such trusted flagger or similar mechanisms to take quick and reliable action against content that is incompatible with their terms and conditions, in particular against content that is harmful for vulnerable recipients of the service, such as minors.

(63)

The misuse of online platforms by frequently providing manifestly illegal content or by frequently submitting manifestly unfounded notices or complaints under the mechanisms and systems, respectively, established under this Regulation undermines trust and harms the rights and legitimate interests of the parties concerned. Therefore, there is a need to put in place appropriate, proportionate and effective safeguards against such misuse, that need to respect the rights and legitimate interests of all parties involved, including the applicable fundamental rights and freedoms as enshrined in the Charter, in particular the freedom of expression. Information should be considered to be manifestly illegal content and notices or complaints should be considered manifestly unfounded where it is evident to a layperson, without any substantive analysis, that the content is illegal or, respectively, that the notices or complaints are unfounded.

(64)

Under certain conditions, providers of online platforms should temporarily suspend their relevant activities in respect of the person engaged in abusive behaviour. This is without prejudice to the freedom by providers of online platforms to determine their terms and conditions and establish stricter measures in the case of manifestly illegal content related to serious crimes, such as child sexual abuse material. For reasons of transparency, this possibility should be set out, clearly and in sufficient detail, in the terms and conditions of the online platforms. Redress should always be open to the decisions taken in this regard by providers of online platforms and they should be subject to oversight by the competent Digital Services Coordinator. Providers of online platforms should send a prior warning before deciding on the suspension, which should include the reasons for the possible suspension and the means of redress against the decision of the providers of the online platform. When deciding on the suspension, providers of online platforms should send the statement of reasons in accordance with the rules set out in this Regulation. The rules of this Regulation on misuse should not prevent providers of online platforms from taking other measures to address the provision of illegal content by recipients of their service or other misuse of their services, including through the violation of their terms and conditions, in accordance with the applicable Union and national law. Those rules are without prejudice to any possibility to hold the persons engaged in misuse liable, including for damages, provided for in Union or national law.

(65)

In view of the particular responsibilities and obligations of providers of online platforms, they should be made subject to transparency reporting obligations, which apply in addition to the transparency reporting obligations applicable to all providers of intermediary services under this Regulation. For the purposes of determining whether online platforms and online search engines may be very large online platforms or very large online search engines, respectively, that are subject to certain additional obligations under this Regulation, the transparency reporting obligations for online platforms and online search engines should include certain obligations relating to the publication and communication of information on the average monthly active recipients of the service in the Union.

(66)

In order to ensure transparency and to enable scrutiny over the content moderation decisions of the providers of online platforms and monitoring the spread of illegal content online, the Commission should maintain and publish a database which contains the decisions and statements of reasons of the providers of online platforms when they remove or otherwise restrict availability of and access to information. In order to keep the database continuously updated, the providers of online platforms should submit, in a standard format, the decisions and statement of reasons without undue delay after taking a decision, to allow for real-time updates where technically possible and proportionate to the means of the online platform in question. The structured database should allow access to, and queries for, the relevant information, in particular as regards the type of alleged illegal content at stake.

(67)

Dark patterns on online interfaces of online platforms are practices that materially distort or impair, either on purpose or in effect, the ability of recipients of the service to make autonomous and informed choices or decisions. Those practices can be used to persuade the recipients of the service to engage in unwanted behaviours or into undesired decisions which have negative consequences for them. Providers of online platforms should therefore be prohibited from deceiving or nudging recipients of the service and from distorting or impairing the autonomy, decision-making, or choice of the recipients of the service via the structure, design or functionalities of an online interface or a part thereof. This should include, but not be limited to, exploitative design choices to direct the recipient to actions that benefit the provider of online platforms, but which may not be in the recipients’ interests, presenting choices in a non-neutral manner, such as giving more prominence to certain choices through visual, auditory, or other components, when asking the recipient of the service for a decision.

It should also include repeatedly requesting a recipient of the service to make a choice where such a choice has already been made, making the procedure of cancelling a service significantly more cumbersome than signing up to it, or making certain choices more difficult or time-consuming than others, making it unreasonably difficult to discontinue purchases or to sign out from a given online platform allowing consumers to conclude distance contracts with traders, and deceiving the recipients of the service by nudging them into decisions on transactions, or by default settings that are very difficult to change, and so unreasonably bias the decision making of the recipient of the service, in a way that distorts and impairs their autonomy, decision-making and choice. However, rules preventing dark patterns should not be understood as preventing providers to interact directly with recipients of the service and to offer new or additional services to them. Legitimate practices, for example in advertising, that are in compliance with Union law should not in themselves be regarded as constituting dark patterns. Those rules on dark patterns should be interpreted as covering prohibited practices falling within the scope of this Regulation to the extent that those practices are not already covered under Directive 2005/29/EC or Regulation (EU) 2016/679.

(68)

Online advertising plays an important role in the online environment, including in relation to the provision of online platforms, where the provision of the service is sometimes in whole or in part remunerated directly or indirectly, through advertising revenues. Online advertising can contribute to significant risks, ranging from advertisements that are themselves illegal content, to contributing to financial incentives for the publication or amplification of illegal or otherwise harmful content and activities online, or the discriminatory presentation of advertisements with an impact on the equal treatment and opportunities of citizens. In addition to the requirements resulting from Article 6 of Directive 2000/31/EC, providers of online platforms should therefore be required to ensure that the recipients of the service have certain individualised information necessary for them to understand when and on whose behalf the advertisement is presented. They should ensure that the information is salient, including through standardised visual or audio marks, clearly identifiable and unambiguous for the average recipient of the service, and should be adapted to the nature of the individual service’s online interface. In addition, recipients of the service should have information directly accessible from the online interface where the advertisement is presented, on the main parameters used for determining that a specific advertisement is presented to them, providing meaningful explanations of the logic used to that end, including when this is based on profiling.

Such explanations should include information on the method used for presenting the advertisement, for example whether it is contextual or other type of advertising, and, where applicable, the main profiling criteria used; it should also inform the recipient about any means available for them to change such criteria. The requirements of this Regulation on the provision of information relating to advertising is without prejudice to the application of the relevant provisions of Regulation (EU) 2016/679, in particular those regarding the right to object, automated individual decision-making, including profiling, and specifically the need to obtain consent of the data subject prior to the processing of personal data for targeted advertising. Similarly, it is without prejudice to the provisions laid down in Directive 2002/58/EC in particular those regarding the storage of information in terminal equipment and the access to information stored therein. Finally, this Regulation complements the application of the Directive 2010/13/EU which imposes measures to enable users to declare audiovisual commercial communications in user-generated videos. It also complements the obligations for traders regarding the disclosure of commercial communications deriving from Directive 2005/29/EC.

(69)

When recipients of the service are presented with advertisements based on targeting techniques optimised to match their interests and potentially appeal to their vulnerabilities, this can have particularly serious negative effects. In certain cases, manipulative techniques can negatively impact entire groups and amplify societal harms, for example by contributing to disinformation campaigns or by discriminating against certain groups. Online platforms are particularly sensitive environments for such practices and they present a higher societal risk. Consequently, providers of online platforms should not present advertisements based on profiling as defined in Article 4, point (4), of Regulation (EU) 2016/679, using special categories of personal data referred to in Article 9(1) of that Regulation, including by using profiling categories based on those special categories. This prohibition is without prejudice to the obligations applicable to providers of online platforms or any other service provider or advertiser involved in the dissemination of the advertisements under Union law on protection of personal data.

(70)

A core part of the online platform’s business is the manner in which information is prioritised and presented on its online interface to facilitate and optimise access to information for the recipients of the service. This is done, for example, by algorithmically suggesting, ranking and prioritising information, distinguishing through text or other visual representations, or otherwise curating information provided by recipients. Such recommender systems can have a significant impact on the ability of recipients to retrieve and interact with information online, including to facilitate the search of relevant information for recipients of the service and contribute to an improved user experience. They also play an important role in the amplification of certain messages, the viral dissemination of information and the stimulation of online behaviour. Consequently, online platforms should consistently ensure that recipients of their service are appropriately informed about how recommender systems impact the way information is displayed, and can influence how information is presented to them. They should clearly present the parameters for such recommender systems in an easily comprehensible manner to ensure that the recipients of the service understand how information is prioritised for them. Those parameters should include at least the most important criteria in determining the information suggested to the recipient of the service and the reasons for their respective importance, including where information is prioritised based on profiling and their online behaviour.

(71)

The protection of minors is an important policy objective of the Union. An online platform can be considered to be accessible to minors when its terms and conditions permit minors to use the service, when its service is directed at or predominantly used by minors, or where the provider is otherwise aware that some of the recipients of its service are minors, for example because it already processes personal data of the recipients of its service revealing their age for other purposes. Providers of online platforms used by minors should take appropriate and proportionate measures to protect minors, for example by designing their online interfaces or parts thereof with the highest level of privacy, safety and security for minors by default where appropriate or adopting standards for protection of minors, or participating in codes of conduct for protecting minors. They should consider best practices and available guidance, such as that provided by the communication of the Commission on A Digital Decade for children and youth: the new European strategy for a better internet for kids (BIK+). Providers of online platforms should not present advertisements based on profiling using personal data of the recipient of the service when they are aware with reasonable certainty that the recipient of the service is a minor. In accordance with Regulation (EU) 2016/679, notably the principle of data minimisation as provided for in Article 5(1), point (c), thereof, this prohibition should not lead the provider of the online platform to maintain, acquire or process more personal data than it already has in order to assess if the recipient of the service is a minor. Thus, this obligation should not incentivize providers of online platforms to collect the age of the recipient of the service prior to their use. It should be without prejudice to Union law on protection of personal data.

(72)

In order to contribute to a safe, trustworthy and transparent online environment for consumers, as well as for other interested parties such as competing traders and holders of intellectual property rights, and to deter traders from selling products or services in violation of the applicable rules, online platforms allowing consumers to conclude distance contracts with traders should ensure that such traders are traceable. The trader should therefore be required to provide certain essential information to the providers of online platforms allowing consumers to conclude distance contracts with traders, including for purposes of promoting messages on or offering products. That requirement should also be applicable to traders that promote messages on products or services on behalf of brands, based on underlying agreements. Those providers of online platforms should store all information in a secure manner for the duration of their contractual relationship with the trader and 6 months thereafter, to allow any claims to be filed against the trader or orders related to the trader to be complied with.

This obligation is necessary and proportionate, so that the information can be accessed, in accordance with the applicable law, including on the protection of personal data, by public authorities and private parties with a legitimate interest, including through the orders to provide information referred to in this Regulation. This obligation leaves unaffected potential obligations to preserve certain content for longer periods of time, on the basis of other Union law or national laws, in compliance with Union law. Without prejudice to the definition provided for in this Regulation, any trader, irrespective of whether it is a natural or legal person, identified on the basis of Article 6a(1), point (b), of Directive 2011/83/EU and Article 7(4), point (f), of Directive 2005/29/EC should be traceable when offering a product or service through an online platform. Directive 2000/31/EC obliges all information society services providers to render easily, directly and permanently accessible to the recipients of the service and competent authorities certain information allowing the identification of all providers. The traceability requirements for providers of online platforms allowing consumers to conclude distance contracts with traders set out in this Regulation do not affect the application of Council Directive (EU) 2021/514 (30), which pursues other legitimate public interest objectives.

(73)

To ensure an efficient and adequate application of that obligation, without imposing any disproportionate burdens, providers of online platforms allowing consumers to conclude distance contracts with traders should make best efforts to assess the reliability of the information provided by the traders concerned, in particular by using freely available official online databases and online interfaces, such as national trade registers and the VAT Information Exchange System, or request the traders concerned to provide trustworthy supporting documents, such as copies of identity documents, certified payment accounts’ statements, company certificates and trade register certificates. They may also use other sources, available for use at a distance, which offer a similar degree of reliability for the purpose of complying with this obligation. However, the providers of online platforms concerned should not be required to engage in excessive or costly online fact-finding exercises or to carry out disproportionate verifications on the spot. Nor should such providers, which have made the best efforts required by this Regulation, be understood as guaranteeing the reliability of the information towards consumer or other interested parties.

(74)

Providers of online platforms allowing consumers to conclude distance contracts with traders should design and organise their online interface in a way that enables traders to comply with their obligations under relevant Union law, in particular the requirements set out in Articles 6 and 8 of Directive 2011/83/EU, Article 7 of Directive 2005/29/EC, Articles 5 and 6 of Directive 2000/31/EC and Article 3 of Directive 98/6/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council (31). For that purpose, the providers of online platforms concerned should make best efforts to assess whether the traders using their services have uploaded complete information on their online interfaces, in line with relevant applicable Union law. The providers of online platforms should ensure that products or services are not offered as long as such information is not complete. This should not amount to an obligation for the providers of online platforms concerned to generally monitor the products or services offered by traders through their services nor a general fact-finding obligation, in particular to assess the accuracy of the information provided by traders. The online interfaces should be user-friendly and easily accessible for traders and consumers. Additionally and after allowing the offering of the product or service by the trader, the providers of online platforms concerned should make reasonable efforts to randomly check whether the products or services offered have been identified as being illegal in any official, freely accessible and machine-readable online databases or online interfaces available in a Member State or in the Union. The Commission should also encourage traceability of products through technology solutions such as digitally signed Quick Response codes (or ‘QR codes’) or non-fungible tokens. The Commission should promote the development of standards and, in the absence of them, of market led solutions which can be acceptable to the parties concerned.

(75)

Given the importance of very large online platforms, due to their reach, in particular as expressed in the number of recipients of the service, in facilitating public debate, economic transactions and the dissemination to the public of information, opinions and ideas and in influencing how recipients obtain and communicate information online, it is necessary to impose specific obligations on the providers of those platforms, in addition to the obligations applicable to all online platforms. Due to their critical role in locating and making information retrievable online, it is also necessary to impose those obligations, to the extent they are applicable, on the providers of very large online search engines. Those additional obligations on providers of very large online platforms and of very large online search engines are necessary to address those public policy concerns, there being no alternative and less restrictive measures that would effectively achieve the same result.

(76)

Very large online platforms and very large online search engines may cause societal risks, different in scope and impact from those caused by smaller platforms. Providers of such very large online platforms and of very large online search engines should therefore bear the highest standard of due diligence obligations, proportionate to their societal impact. Once the number of active recipients of an online platform or of active recipients of an online search engine, calculated as an average over a period of six months, reaches a significant share of the Union population, the systemic risks the online platform or online search engine poses may have a disproportionate impact in the Union. Such significant reach should be considered to exist where such number exceeds an operational threshold set at 45 million, that is, a number equivalent to 10 % of the Union population. This operational threshold should be kept up to date and therefore the Commission should be empowered to supplement the provisions of this Regulation by adopting delegated acts, where necessary.

(77)

In order to determine the reach of a given online platform or online search engine, it is necessary to establish the average number of active recipients of each service individually. Accordingly, the number of average monthly active recipients of an online platform should reflect all the recipients actually engaging with the service at least once in a given period of time, by being exposed to information disseminated on the online interface of the online platform, such as viewing it or listening to it, or by providing information, such as traders on an online platforms allowing consumers to conclude distance contracts with traders.

For the purposes of this Regulation, engagement is not limited to interacting with information by clicking on, commenting, linking, sharing, purchasing or carrying out transactions on an online platform. Consequently, the concept of active recipient of the service does not necessarily coincide with that of a registered user of a service. As regards online search engines, the concept of active recipients of the service should cover those who view information on their online interface, but not, for example, the owners of the websites indexed by an online search engine, as they do not actively engage with the service. The number of active recipients of a service should include all unique recipients of the service that engage with the specific service. To this effect, a recipient of the service that uses different online interfaces, such as websites or applications, including where the services are accessed through different uniform resource locators (URLs) or domain names, should, where possible, be counted only once. However, the concept of active recipient of the service should not include incidental use of the service by recipients of other providers of intermediary services that indirectly make available information hosted by the provider of online platforms through linking or indexing by a provider of online search engine. Further, this Regulation does not require providers of online platforms or of online search engines to perform specific tracking of individuals online. Where such providers are able to discount automated users such as bots or scrapers without further processing of personal data and tracking, they may do so. The determination of the number of active recipients of the service can be impacted by market and technical developments and therefore the Commission should be empowered to supplement the provisions of this Regulation by adopting delegated acts laying down the methodology to determine the active recipients of an online platform or of an online search engine, where necessary, reflecting the nature of the service and the way recipients of the service interact with it.

(78)

In view of the network effects characterising the platform economy, the user base of an online platform or an online search engine may quickly expand and reach the dimension of a very large online platform or a very large online search engine, with the related impact on the internal market. This may be the case in the event of exponential growth experienced in short periods of time, or by a large global presence and turnover allowing the online platform or the online search engine to fully exploit network effects and economies of scale and of scope. A high annual turnover or market capitalisation can in particular be an indication of fast scalability in terms of user reach. In those cases, the Digital Services Coordinator of establishment or the Commission should be able to request more frequent reporting from the provider of the online platform or of the online search engine on the number of active recipients of the service to be able to timely identify the moment at which that platform or that search engine should be designated as a very large online platform or very large online search engine, respectively, for the purposes of this Regulation.

(79)

Very large online platforms and very large online search engines can be used in a way that strongly influences safety online, the shaping of public opinion and discourse, as well as online trade. The way they design their services is generally optimised to benefit their often advertising-driven business models and can cause societal concerns. Effective regulation and enforcement is necessary in order to effectively identify and mitigate the risks and the societal and economic harm that may arise. Under this Regulation, providers of very large online platforms and of very large online search engines should therefore assess the systemic risks stemming from the design, functioning and use of their services, as well as from potential misuses by the recipients of the service, and should take appropriate mitigating measures in observance of fundamental rights. In determining the significance of potential negative effects and impacts, providers should consider the severity of the potential impact and the probability of all such systemic risks. For example, they could assess whether the potential negative impact can affect a large number of persons, its potential irreversibility, or how difficult it is to remedy and restore the situation prevailing prior to the potential impact.

(80)

Four categories of systemic risks should be assessed in-depth by the providers of very large online platforms and of very large online search engines. A first category concerns the risks associated with the dissemination of illegal content, such as the dissemination of child sexual abuse material or illegal hate speech or other types of misuse of their services for criminal offences, and the conduct of illegal activities, such as the sale of products or services prohibited by Union or national law, including dangerous or counterfeit products, or illegally-traded animals. For example, such dissemination or activities may constitute a significant systemic risk where access to illegal content may spread rapidly and widely through accounts with a particularly wide reach or other means of amplification. Providers of very large online platforms and of very large online search engines should assess the risk of dissemination of illegal content irrespective of whether or not the information is also incompatible with their terms and conditions. This assessment is without prejudice to the personal responsibility of the recipient of the service of very large online platforms or of the owners of websites indexed by very large online search engines for possible illegality of their activity under the applicable law.

(81)

A second category concerns the actual or foreseeable impact of the service on the exercise of fundamental rights, as protected by the Charter, including but not limited to human dignity, freedom of expression and of information, including media freedom and pluralism, the right to private life, data protection, the right to non-discrimination, the rights of the child and consumer protection. Such risks may arise, for example, in relation to the design of the algorithmic systems used by the very large online platform or by the very large online search engine or the misuse of their service through the submission of abusive notices or other methods for silencing speech or hampering competition. When assessing risks to the rights of the child, providers of very large online platforms and of very large online search engines should consider for example how easy it is for minors to understand the design and functioning of the service, as well as how minors can be exposed through their service to content that may impair minors’ health, physical, mental and moral development. Such risks may arise, for example, in relation to the design of online interfaces which intentionally or unintentionally exploit the weaknesses and inexperience of minors or which may cause addictive behaviour.

(82)

A third category of risks concerns the actual or foreseeable negative effects on democratic processes, civic discourse and electoral processes, as well as public security.

(83)

A fourth category of risks stems from similar concerns relating to the design, functioning or use, including through manipulation, of very large online platforms and of very large online search engines with an actual or foreseeable negative effect on the protection of public health, minors and serious negative consequences to a person's physical and mental well-being, or on gender-based violence. Such risks may also stem from coordinated disinformation campaigns related to public health, or from online interface design that may stimulate behavioural addictions of recipients of the service.

(84)

When assessing such systemic risks, providers of very large online platforms and of very large online search engines should focus on the systems or other elements that may contribute to the risks, including all the algorithmic systems that may be relevant, in particular their recommender systems and advertising systems, paying attention to the related data collection and use practices. They should also assess whether their terms and conditions and the enforcement thereof are appropriate, as well as their content moderation processes, technical tools and allocated resources. When assessing the systemic risks identified in this Regulation, those providers should also focus on the information which is not illegal, but contributes to the systemic risks identified in this Regulation. Such providers should therefore pay particular attention on how their services are used to disseminate or amplify misleading or deceptive content, including disinformation. Where the algorithmic amplification of information contributes to the systemic risks, those providers should duly reflect this in their risk assessments. Where risks are localised or there are linguistic differences, those providers should also account for this in their risk assessments. Providers of very large online platforms and of very large online search engines should, in particular, assess how the design and functioning of their service, as well as the intentional and, oftentimes, coordinated manipulation and use of their services, or the systemic infringement of their terms of service, contribute to such risks. Such risks may arise, for example, through the inauthentic use of the service, such as the creation of fake accounts, the use of bots or deceptive use of a service, and other automated or partially automated behaviours, which may lead to the rapid and widespread dissemination to the public of information that is illegal content or incompatible with an online platform’s or online search engine's terms and conditions and that contributes to disinformation campaigns.

(85)

In order to make it possible that subsequent risk assessments build on each other and show the evolution of the risks identified, as well as to facilitate investigations and enforcement actions, providers of very large online platforms and of very large online search engines should preserve all supporting documents relating to the risk assessments that they carried out, such as information regarding the preparation thereof, underlying data and data on the testing of their algorithmic systems.

(86)

Providers of very large online platforms and of very large online search engines should deploy the necessary means to diligently mitigate the systemic risks identified in the risk assessments, in observance of fundamental rights. Any measures adopted should respect the due diligence requirements of this Regulation and be reasonable and effective in mitigating the specific systemic risks identified. They should be proportionate in light of the economic capacity of the provider of the very large online platform or of the very large online search engine and the need to avoid unnecessary restrictions on the use of their service, taking due account of potential negative effects on those fundamental rights. Those providers should give particular consideration to the impact on freedom of expression.

(87)

Providers of very large online platforms and of very large online search engines should consider under such mitigating measures, for example, adapting any necessary design, feature or functioning of their service, such as the online interface design. They should adapt and apply their terms and conditions, as necessary, and in accordance with the rules of this Regulation on terms and conditions. Other appropriate measures could include adapting their content moderation systems and internal processes or adapting their decision-making processes and resources, including the content moderation personnel, their training and local expertise. This concerns in particular the speed and quality of processing of notices. In this regard, for example, the Code of conduct on countering illegal hate speech online of 2016 sets a benchmark to process valid notifications for removal of illegal hate speech in less than 24 hours. Providers of very large online platforms, in particular those primarily used for the dissemination to the public of pornographic content, should diligently meet all their obligations under this Regulation in respect of illegal content constituting cyber violence, including illegal pornographic content, especially with regard to ensuring that victims can effectively exercise their rights in relation to content representing non-consensual sharing of intimate or manipulated material through the rapid processing of notices and removal of such content without undue delay. Other types of illegal content may require longer or shorter timelines for processing of notices, which will depend on the facts, circumstances and types of illegal content at hand. Those providers may also initiate or increase cooperation with trusted flaggers and organise training sessions and exchanges with trusted flagger organisations.

(88)

Providers of very large online platforms and of very large online search engines should also be diligent in the measures they take to test and, where necessary, adapt their algorithmic systems, not least their recommender systems. They may need to mitigate the negative effects of personalised recommendations and correct the criteria used in their recommendations. The advertising systems used by providers of very large online platforms and of very large online search engines can also be a catalyser for the systemic risks. Those providers should consider corrective measures, such as discontinuing advertising revenue for specific information, or other actions, such as improving the visibility of authoritative information sources, or more structurally adapting their advertising systems. Providers of very large online platforms and of very large online search engines may need to reinforce their internal processes or supervision of any of their activities, in particular as regards the detection of systemic risks, and conduct more frequent or targeted risk assessments related to new functionalities. In particular, where risks are shared across different online platforms or online search engines, they should cooperate with other service providers, including by initiating or joining existing codes of conduct or other self-regulatory measures. They should also consider awareness-raising actions, in particular where risks relate to disinformation campaigns.

(89)

Providers of very large online platforms and of very large online search engines should take into account the best interests of minors in taking measures such as adapting the design of their service and their online interface, especially when their services are aimed at minors or predominantly used by them. They should ensure that their services are organised in a way that allows minors to access easily mechanisms provided for in this Regulation, where applicable, including notice and action and complaint mechanisms. They should also take measures to protect minors from content that may impair their physical, mental or moral development and provide tools that enable conditional access to such information. In selecting the appropriate mitigation measures, providers can consider, where appropriate, industry best practices, including as established through self-regulatory cooperation, such as codes of conduct, and should take into account the guidelines from the Commission.

(90)

Providers of very large online platforms and of very large online search engines should ensure that their approach to risk assessment and mitigation is based on the best available information and scientific insights and that they test their assumptions with the groups most impacted by the risks and the measures they take. To this end, they should, where appropriate, conduct their risk assessments and design their risk mitigation measures with the involvement of representatives of the recipients of the service, representatives of groups potentially impacted by their services, independent experts and civil society organisations. They should seek to embed such consultations into their methodologies for assessing the risks and designing mitigation measures, including, as appropriate, surveys, focus groups, round tables, and other consultation and design methods. In the assessment on whether a measure is reasonable, proportionate and effective, special consideration should be given to the right to freedom of expression.

(91)

In times of crisis, there might be a need for certain specific measures to be taken urgently by providers of very large online platforms, in addition to measures they would be taking in view of their other obligations under this Regulation. In that regard, a crisis should be considered to occur when extraordinary circumstances occur that can lead to a serious threat to public security or public health in the Union or significant parts thereof. Such crises could result from armed conflicts or acts of terrorism, including emerging conflicts or acts of terrorism, natural disasters such as earthquakes and hurricanes, as well as from pandemics and other serious cross-border threats to public health. The Commission should be able to require, upon recommendation by the European Board for Digital Services (‘the Board’), providers of very large online platforms and providers of very large search engines to initiate a crisis response as a matter of urgency. Measures that those providers may identify and consider applying may include, for example, adapting content moderation processes and increasing the resources dedicated to content moderation, adapting terms and conditions, relevant algorithmic systems and advertising systems, further intensifying cooperation with trusted flaggers, taking awareness-raising measures and promoting trusted information and adapting the design of their online interfaces. The necessary requirements should be provided for to ensure that such measures are taken within a very short time frame and that the crisis response mechanism is only used where, and to the extent that, this is strictly necessary and any measures taken under this mechanism are effective and proportionate, taking due account of the rights and legitimate interests of all parties concerned. The use of the mechanism should be without prejudice to the other provisions of this Regulation, such as those on risk assessments and mitigation measures and the enforcement thereof and those on crisis protocols.

(92)

Given the need to ensure verification by independent experts, providers of very large online platforms and of very large online search engines should be accountable, through independent auditing, for their compliance with the obligations laid down by this Regulation and, where relevant, any complementary commitments undertaken pursuant to codes of conduct and crises protocols. In order to ensure that audits are carried out in an effective, efficient and timely manner, providers of very large online platforms and of very large online search engines should provide the necessary cooperation and assistance to the organisations carrying out the audits, including by giving the auditor access to all relevant data and premises necessary to perform the audit properly, including, where appropriate, to data related to algorithmic systems, and by answering oral or written questions. Auditors should also be able to make use of other sources of objective information, including studies by vetted researchers. Providers of very large online platforms and of very large online search engines should not undermine the performance of the audit. Audits should be performed according to best industry practices and high professional ethics and objectivity, with due regard, as appropriate, to auditing standards and codes of practice. Auditors should guarantee the confidentiality, security and integrity of the information, such as trade secrets, that they obtain when performing their tasks. This guarantee should not be a means to circumvent the applicability of audit obligations in this Regulation. Auditors should have the necessary expertise in the area of risk management and technical competence to audit algorithms. They should be independent, in order to be able to perform their tasks in an adequate and trustworthy manner. They should comply with core independence requirements for prohibited non-auditing services, firm rotation and non-contingent fees. If their independence and technical competence is not beyond doubt, they should resign or abstain from the audit engagement.

(93)

The audit report should be substantiated, in order to give a meaningful account of the activities undertaken and the conclusions reached. It should help inform, and where appropriate suggest improvements to the measures taken by the providers of the very large online platform and of the very large online search engine to comply with their obligations under this Regulation. The audit report should be transmitted to the Digital Services Coordinator of establishment, the Commission and the Board following the receipt of the audit report. Providers should also transmit upon completion without undue delay each of the reports on the risk assessment and the mitigation measures, as well as the audit implementation report of the provider of the very large online platform or of the very large online search engine showing how they have addressed the audit’s recommendations. The audit report should include an audit opinion based on the conclusions drawn from the audit evidence obtained. A ‘positive opinion’ should be given where all evidence shows that the provider of the very large online platform or of the very large online search engine complies with the obligations laid down by this Regulation or, where applicable, any commitments it has undertaken pursuant to a code of conduct or crisis protocol, in particular by identifying, evaluating and mitigating the systemic risks posed by its system and services. A ‘positive opinion’ should be accompanied by comments where the auditor wishes to include remarks that do not have a substantial effect on the outcome of the audit. A ‘negative opinion’ should be given where the auditor considers that the provider of the very large online platform or of the very large online search engine does not comply with this Regulation or the commitments undertaken. Where the audit opinion could not reach a conclusion for specific elements that fall within the scope of the audit, an explanation of reasons for the failure to reach such a conclusion should be included in the audit opinion. Where applicable, the report should include a description of specific elements that could not be audited, and an explanation of why these could not be audited.

(94)

The obligations on assessment and mitigation of risks should trigger, on a case-by-case basis, the need for providers of very large online platforms and of very large online search engines to assess and, where necessary, adjust the design of their recommender systems, for example by taking measures to prevent or minimise biases that lead to the discrimination of persons in vulnerable situations, in particular where such adjustment is in accordance with data protection law and when the information is personalised on the basis of special categories of personal data referred to in Article 9 of the Regulation (EU) 2016/679. In addition, and complementing the transparency obligations applicable to online platforms as regards their recommender systems, providers of very large online platforms and of very large online search engines should consistently ensure that recipients of their service enjoy alternative options which are not based on profiling, within the meaning of Regulation (EU) 2016/679, for the main parameters of their recommender systems. Such choices should be directly accessible from the online interface where the recommendations are presented.

(95)

Advertising systems used by very large online platforms and very large online search engines pose particular risks and require further public and regulatory supervision on account of their scale and ability to target and reach recipients of the service based on their behaviour within and outside that platform’s or search engine's online interface. Very large online platforms or very large online search engines should ensure public access to repositories of advertisements presented on their online interfaces to facilitate supervision and research into emerging risks brought about by the distribution of advertising online, for example in relation to illegal advertisements or manipulative techniques and disinformation with a real and foreseeable negative impact on public health, public security, civil discourse, political participation and equality. Repositories should include the content of advertisements, including the name of the product, service or brand and the subject matter of the advertisement, and related data on the advertiser, and, if different, the natural or legal person who paid for the advertisement, and the delivery of the advertisement, in particular where targeted advertising is concerned. This information should include both information about targeting criteria and delivery criteria, in particular when advertisements are delivered to persons in vulnerable situations, such as minors.

(96)

In order to appropriately monitor and assess the compliance of very large online platforms and of very large online search engines with the obligations laid down by this Regulation, the Digital Services Coordinator of establishment or the Commission may require access to or reporting of specific data, including data related to algorithms. Such a requirement may include, for example, the data necessary to assess the risks and possible harms brought about by the very large online platform’s or the very large online search engine’s systems, data on the accuracy, functioning and testing of algorithmic systems for content moderation, recommender systems or advertising systems, including, where appropriate, training data and algorithms, or data on processes and outputs of content moderation or of internal complaint-handling systems within the meaning of this Regulation. Such data access requests should not include requests to produce specific information about individual recipients of the service for the purpose of determining compliance of such recipients with other applicable Union or national law. Investigations by researchers on the evolution and severity of online systemic risks are particularly important for bridging information asymmetries and establishing a resilient system of risk mitigation, informing providers of online platforms, providers of online search engines, Digital Services Coordinators, other competent authorities, the Commission and the public.

(97)

This Regulation therefore provides a framework for compelling access to data from very large online platforms and very large online search engines to vetted researchers affiliated to a research organisation within the meaning of Article 2 of Directive (EU) 2019/790, which may include, for the purpose of this Regulation, civil society organisations that are conducting scientific research with the primary goal of supporting their public interest mission. All requests for access to data under that framework should be proportionate and appropriately protect the rights and legitimate interests, including the protection of personal data, trade secrets and other confidential information, of the very large online platform or of the very large online search engine and any other parties concerned, including the recipients of the service. However, to ensure that the objective of this Regulation is achieved, consideration of the commercial interests of providers should not lead to a refusal to provide access to data necessary for the specific research objective pursuant to a request under this Regulation. In this regard, whilst without prejudice to Directive (EU) 2016/943 of the European Parliament and of the Council (32), providers should ensure appropriate access for researchers, including, where necessary, by taking technical protections such as through data vaults. Data access requests could cover, for example, the number of views or, where relevant, other types of access to content by recipients of the service prior to its removal by the providers of very large online platforms or of very large online search engines.

(98)

In addition, where data is publicly accessible, such providers should not prevent researchers meeting an appropriate subset of criteria from using this data for research purposes that contribute to the detection, identification and understanding of systemic risks. They should provide access to such researchers including, where technically possible, in real-time, to the publicly accessible data, for example on aggregated interactions with content from public pages, public groups, or public figures, including impression and engagement data such as the number of reactions, shares, comments from recipients of the service. Providers of very large online platforms or of very large online search engines should be encouraged to cooperate with researchers and provide broader access to data for monitoring societal concerns through voluntary efforts, including through commitments and procedures agreed under codes of conduct or crisis protocols. Those providers and researchers should pay particular attention to the protection of personal data, and ensure that any processing of personal data complies with Regulation (EU) 2016/679. Providers should anonymise or pseudonymise personal data except in those cases that would render impossible the research purpose pursued.

(99)

Given the complexity of the functioning of the systems deployed and the systemic risks they present to society, providers of very large online platforms and of very large online search engines should establish a compliance function, which should be independent from the operational functions of those providers. The head of the compliance function should report directly to the management of those providers, including for concerns of non-compliance with this Regulation. The compliance officers that are part of the compliance function should have the necessary qualifications, knowledge, experience and ability to operationalise measures and monitor the compliance with this Regulation within the organisation of the providers of very large online platform or of very large online search engine. Providers of very large online platforms and of very large online search engines should ensure that the compliance function is involved, properly and in a timely manner, in all issues which relate to this Regulation including in the risk assessment and mitigation strategy and specific measures, as well as assessing compliance, where applicable, with commitments made by those providers under the codes of conduct and crisis protocols they subscribe to.

(100)

In view of the additional risks relating to their activities and their additional obligations under this Regulation, additional transparency requirements should apply specifically to very large online platforms and very large online search engines, notably to report comprehensively on the risk assessments performed and subsequent measures adopted as provided by this Regulation.

(101)

The Commission should be in possession of all the necessary resources, in terms of staffing, expertise, and financial means, for the performance of its tasks under this Regulation. In order to ensure the availability of the resources necessary for the adequate supervision at Union level under this Regulation, and considering that Member States should be entitled to charge providers established in their territory a supervisory fee to in respect of the supervisory and enforcement tasks exercised by their authorities, the Commission should charge a supervisory fee, the level of which should be established on an annual basis, on very large online platforms and very large online search engines. The overall amount of the annual supervisory fee charged should be established on the basis of the overall amount of the costs incurred by the Commission to exercise its supervisory tasks under this Regulation, as reasonably estimated beforehand. Such amount should include costs relating to the exercise of the specific powers and tasks of supervision, investigation, enforcement and monitoring in respect of providers of very large online platforms and of very large online search engines, including costs related to the designation of very large online platforms and of very large online search engines or to the set up, maintenance and operation of the databases envisaged under this Regulation.

It should also include costs relating to the set-up, maintenance and operation of the basic information and institutional infrastructure for the cooperation among Digital Services Coordinators, the Board and the Commission, taking into account the fact that in view of their size and reach very large online platforms and very large online search engines have a significant impact on the resources needed to support such infrastructure. The estimation of the overall costs should take into account the supervisory costs incurred in the previous year including, where applicable, those costs exceeding the individual annual supervisory fee charged in the previous year. The external assigned revenues resulting from the annual supervisory fee could be used to finance additional human resources, such as contractual agents and seconded national experts, and other expenditure related to the fulfilment of the tasks entrusted to the Commission by this Regulation. The annual supervisory fee to be charged on providers of very large online platforms and of very large online search engines should be proportionate to the size of the service as reflected by the number of its active recipients of the service in the Union. Moreover, the individual annual supervisory fee should not exceed an overall ceiling for each provider of very large online platforms or of very large online search engines taking into account the economic capacity of the provider of the designated service or services.

(102)

To facilitate the effective and consistent application of the obligations in this Regulation that may require implementation through technological means, it is important to promote voluntary standards covering certain technical procedures, where the industry can help develop standardised means to support providers of intermediary services in complying with this Regulation, such as allowing the submission of notices, including through application programming interfaces, or standards related to terms and conditions or standards relating to audits, or standards related to the interoperability of advertisement repositories. In addition, such standards could include standards related to online advertising, recommender systems, accessibility and the protection of minors online. Providers of intermediary services are free to adopt the standards, but their adoption does not presume compliance with this Regulation. At the same time, by providing best practices, such standards could in particular be useful for relatively small providers of intermediary services. The standards could distinguish between different types of illegal content or different types of intermediary services, as appropriate.

(103)

The Commission and the Board should encourage the drawing-up of voluntary codes of conduct, as well as the implementation of the provisions of those codes in order to contribute to the application of this Regulation. The Commission and the Board should aim that the codes of conduct clearly define the nature of the public interest objectives being addressed, that they contain mechanisms for independent evaluation of the achievement of those objectives and that the role of relevant authorities is clearly defined. Particular attention should be given to avoiding negative effects on security, the protection of privacy and personal data, as well as to the prohibition on imposing general monitoring obligations. While the implementation of codes of conduct should be measurable and subject to public oversight, this should not impair the voluntary nature of such codes and the freedom of interested parties to decide whether to participate. In certain circumstances, it is important that very large online platforms cooperate in the drawing-up and adhere to specific codes of conduct. Nothing in this Regulation prevents other service providers from adhering to the same standards of due diligence, adopting best practices and benefitting from the guidelines provided by the Commission and the Board, by participating in the same codes of conduct.

(104)

It is appropriate that this Regulation identify certain areas of consideration for such codes of conduct. In particular, risk mitigation measures concerning specific types of illegal content should be explored via self- and co-regulatory agreements. Another area for consideration is the possible negative impacts of systemic risks on society and democracy, such as disinformation or manipulative and abusive activities or any adverse effects on minors. This includes coordinated operations aimed at amplifying information, including disinformation, such as the use of bots or fake accounts for the creation of intentionally inaccurate or misleading information, sometimes with a purpose of obtaining economic gain, which are particularly harmful for vulnerable recipients of the service, such as minors. In relation to such areas, adherence to and compliance with a given code of conduct by a very large online platform or a very large online search engine may be considered as an appropriate risk mitigating measure. The refusal without proper explanations by a provider of an online platform or of an online search engine of the Commission’s invitation to participate in the application of such a code of conduct could be taken into account, where relevant, when determining whether the online platform or the online search engine has infringed the obligations laid down by this Regulation. The mere fact of participating in and implementing a given code of conduct should not in itself presume compliance with this Regulation.

(105)

The codes of conduct should facilitate the accessibility of very large online platforms and very large online search engines, in compliance with Union and national law, in order to facilitate their foreseeable use by persons with disabilities. In particular, the codes of conduct could ensure that the information is presented in a perceivable, operable, understandable and robust way and that forms and measures provided pursuant to this Regulation are made available in a manner that is easy to find and accessible to persons with disabilities.

(106)

The rules on codes of conduct under this Regulation could serve as a basis for already established self-regulatory efforts at Union level, including the Product Safety Pledge, the Memorandum of understanding on the sale of counterfeit goods on the internet, the Code of conduct on countering illegal hate speech online, as well as the Code of Practice on Disinformation. In particular for the latter, following the Commission’s guidance, the Code of Practice on Disinformation has been strengthened as announced in the European Democracy Action Plan.

(107)

The provision of online advertising generally involves several actors, including intermediary services that connect publishers of advertisements with advertisers. Codes of conduct should support and complement the transparency obligations relating to advertising for providers of online platforms, of very large online platforms and of very large online search engines set out in this Regulation in order to provide for flexible and effective mechanisms to facilitate and enhance the compliance with those obligations, notably as concerns the modalities of the transmission of the relevant information. This should include facilitating the transmission of the information on the advertiser who pays for the advertisement when they differ from the natural or legal person on whose behalf the advertisement is presented on the online interface of an online platform. The codes of conduct should also include measures to ensure that meaningful information about the monetisation of data is appropriately shared throughout the value chain. The involvement of a wide range of stakeholders should ensure that those codes of conduct are widely supported, technically sound, effective and offer the highest levels of user-friendliness to ensure that the transparency obligations achieve their objectives. In order to ensure the effectiveness of codes of conduct, the Commission should include evaluation mechanisms in drawing up the codes of conduct. Where appropriate, the Commission may invite the Fundamental Rights Agency or the European Data Protection Supervisor to express their opinions on the respective code of conduct.

(108)

In addition to the crisis response mechanism for very large online platforms and very large online search engines, the Commission may initiate the drawing up of voluntary crisis protocols to coordinate a rapid, collective and cross-border response in the online environment. Such can be the case, for example, where online platforms are misused for the rapid spread of illegal content or disinformation or where the need arises for rapid dissemination of reliable information. In light of the important role of very large online platforms in disseminating information in our societies and across borders, providers of such platforms should be encouraged in drawing up and applying specific crisis protocols. Such crisis protocols should be activated only for a limited period of time and the measures adopted should also be limited to what is strictly necessary to address the extraordinary circumstance. Those measures should be consistent with this Regulation, and should not amount to a general obligation for the participating providers of very large online platforms and of very large online search engines to monitor the information which they transmit or store, nor actively to seek facts or circumstances indicating illegal content.

(109)

In order to ensure adequate oversight and enforcement of the obligations laid down in this Regulation, Member States should designate at least one authority with the task to supervise the application and enforce this Regulation, without prejudice to the possibility to designate an existing authority and to its legal form in accordance with national law. Member States should, however, be able to entrust more than one competent authority, with specific supervisory or enforcement tasks and competences concerning the application of this Regulation, for example for specific sectors where existing authorities may also be empowered, such as electronic communications’ regulators, media regulators or consumer protection authorities, reflecting their domestic constitutional, organisational and administrative structure. In the exercise of their tasks, all competent authorities should contribute to the achievement of the objectives of this Regulation, namely to the proper functioning of the internal market for intermediary services where the harmonised rules for a safe, predictable and trusted online environment that facilitates innovation, and in particular the due diligence obligations applicable to different categories of providers of intermediary services, are effectively supervised and enforced, with a view to ensure that fundamental rights, as enshrined in the Charter, including the principle of consumer protection, are effectively protected. This Regulation does not require Member States to confer on competent authorities the task to adjudicate on the lawfulness of specific items of content.

(110)

Given the cross-border nature of the services at stake and the horizontal range of obligations introduced by this Regulation, one authority appointed with the task of supervising the application and, where necessary, enforcing this Regulation should be identified as a Digital Services Coordinator in each Member State. Where more than one competent authority is appointed to supervise the application of, and enforce, this Regulation, only one authority in that Member State should be designated as a Digital Services Coordinator. The Digital Services Coordinator should act as the single contact point with regard to all matters related to the application of this Regulation for the Commission, the Board, the Digital Services Coordinators of other Member States, as well as for other competent authorities of the Member State in question. In particular, where several competent authorities are entrusted with tasks under this Regulation in a given Member State, the Digital Services Coordinator should coordinate and cooperate with those authorities in accordance with the national law setting their respective tasks and without prejudice to the independent assessment of the other competent authorities. While not entailing any hierarchical supraordination over other competent authorities in the exercise of their tasks, the Digital Services Coordinator should ensure effective involvement of all relevant competent authorities and should timely report their assessment in the context of cooperation on supervision and enforcement at Union level. Moreover, in addition to the specific mechanisms provided for in this Regulation as regards cooperation at Union level, Member State should also ensure cooperation among the Digital Services Coordinator and other competent authorities designated at national level, where applicable, through appropriate tools, such as by pooling of resources, joint task forces, joint investigations and mutual assistance mechanisms.

(111)

The Digital Services Coordinator, as well as other competent authorities designated under this Regulation, play a crucial role in ensuring the effectiveness of the rights and obligations laid down in this Regulation and the achievement of its objectives. Accordingly, it is necessary to ensure that those authorities have the necessary means, including financial and human resources, to supervise all the providers of intermediary services falling within their competence, in the interest of all Union citizens. Given the variety of providers of intermediary services and their use of advanced technology in providing their services, it is also essential that the Digital Services Coordinator and the relevant competent authorities are equipped with the necessary number of staff and experts with specialised skills and advanced technical means, and that they autonomously manage financial resources to carry out their tasks. Furthermore, the level of resources should take into account the size, complexity and potential societal impact of the providers of intermediary services falling within their competence, as well as the reach of their services across the Union. This Regulation is without prejudice to the possibility for Member States to establish funding mechanisms based on a supervisory fee charged to providers of intermediary services under national law in compliance with Union law, to the extent that it is levied on providers of intermediary services having their main establishment in the Member State in question, that it is strictly limited to what is necessary and proportionate to cover the costs for the fulfilment of the tasks conferred upon the competent authorities pursuant to this Regulation, with the exclusion of the tasks conferred upon the Commission, and that adequate transparency is ensured regarding the levying and the use of such a supervisory fee.

(112)

The competent authorities designated under this Regulation should also act in complete independence from private and public bodies, without the obligation or possibility to seek or receive instructions, including from the government, and without prejudice to the specific duties to cooperate with other competent authorities, the Digital Services Coordinators, the Board and the Commission. On the other hand, the independence of those authorities should not mean that they cannot be subject, in accordance with national constitutions and without endangering the achievement of the objectives of this Regulation, to proportionate accountability mechanisms regarding the general activities of the Digital Services Coordinators, such as their financial expenditure or reporting to the national parliaments. The requirement of independence should also not prevent the exercise of judicial review, or the possibility to consult or regularly exchange views with other national authorities, including law enforcement authorities, crisis management authorities or consumer protection authorities, where appropriate, in order to inform each other about ongoing investigations, without affecting the exercise of their respective powers.

(113)

Member States can designate an existing national authority with the function of the Digital Services Coordinator, or with specific tasks to supervise the application and enforce this Regulation, provided that any such appointed authority complies with the requirements laid down in this Regulation, such as in relation to its independence. Moreover, Member States are in principle not precluded from merging functions within an existing authority, in accordance with Union law. The measures to that effect may include, inter alia, the preclusion to dismiss the president or a board member of a collegiate body of an existing authority before the expiry of their terms of office, on the sole ground that an institutional reform has taken place involving the merger of different functions within one authority, in the absence of any rules guaranteeing that such dismissals do not jeopardise the independence and impartiality of such members.

(114)

Member States should provide the Digital Services Coordinator, and any other competent authority designated under this Regulation, with sufficient powers and means to ensure effective investigation and enforcement, in accordance with the tasks conferred on them. This includes the power of competent authorities to adopt interim measures in accordance with national law in case of risk of serious harm. Such interim measures, which may include orders to terminate or remedy a given alleged infringement, should not go beyond what is necessary to ensure that serious harm is prevented pending the final decision. The Digital Services Coordinators should in particular be able to search for and obtain information which is located in its territory, including in the context of joint investigations, with due regard to the fact that oversight and enforcement measures concerning a provider under the jurisdiction of another Member State or the Commission should be adopted by the Digital Services Coordinator of that other Member State, where relevant in accordance with the procedures relating to cross-border cooperation, or, where applicable, by the Commission.

(115)

Member States should set out in their national law, in accordance with Union law and in particular this Regulation and the Charter, the detailed conditions and limits for the exercise of the investigatory and enforcement powers of their Digital Services Coordinators, and other competent authorities where relevant, under this Regulation.

(116)

In the course of the exercise of those powers, the competent authorities should comply with the applicable national rules regarding procedures and matters such as the need for a prior judicial authorisation to enter certain premises and legal professional privilege. Those provisions should in particular ensure respect for the fundamental rights to an effective remedy and to a fair trial, including the rights of defence, and, the right to respect for private life. In this regard, the guarantees provided for in relation to the proceedings of the Commission pursuant to this Regulation could serve as an appropriate point of reference. A prior, fair and impartial procedure should be guaranteed before taking any final decision, including the right to be heard of the persons concerned, and the right to have access to the file, while respecting confidentiality and professional and business secrecy, as well as the obligation to give meaningful reasons for the decisions. This should not preclude the taking of measures, however, in duly substantiated cases of urgency and subject to appropriate conditions and procedural arrangements. The exercise of powers should also be proportionate to, inter alia the nature and the overall actual or potential harm caused by the infringement or suspected infringement. The competent authorities should take all relevant facts and circumstances of the case into account, including information gathered by competent authorities in other Member States.

(117)

Member States should ensure that violations of the obligations laid down in this Regulation can be sanctioned in a manner that is effective, proportionate and dissuasive, taking into account the nature, gravity, recurrence and duration of the violation, in view of the public interest pursued, the scope and kind of activities carried out, as well as the economic capacity of the infringer. In particular, penalties should take into account whether the provider of intermediary services concerned systematically or recurrently fails to comply with its obligations stemming from this Regulation, as well as, where relevant, the number of recipients of the service affected, the intentional or negligent character of the infringement and whether the provider is active in several Member States. Where this Regulation provides for a maximum amount of fines or of a periodic penalty payment, this maximum amount should apply per infringement of this Regulation and without prejudice to the modulation of the fines or periodic penalty payments for specific infringements. Member States should ensure that the imposition of fines or periodic penalty payments in respect of infringements should in each individual case be effective, proportionate and dissuasive by setting up national rules and procedures in accordance with this Regulation, taking into account all the criteria concerning the general conditions for imposing the fines or periodic penalty payments.

(118)

In order to ensure effective enforcement of the obligations laid down in this Regulation, individuals or representative organisations should be able to lodge any complaint related to compliance with those obligations with the Digital Services Coordinator in the territory where they received the service, without prejudice to this Regulation’s rules on allocation of competences and to the applicable rules on handling of complaints in accordance with national principles of good administration. Complaints could provide a faithful overview of concerns related to a particular intermediary service provider’s compliance and could also inform the Digital Services Coordinator of any more cross-cutting issues. The Digital Services Coordinator should involve other national competent authorities as well as the Digital Services Coordinator of another Member State, and in particular the one of the Member State where the provider of intermediary services concerned is established, if the issue requires cross-border cooperation.

(119)

Member States should ensure that Digital Services Coordinators can take measures that are effective in addressing and proportionate to certain particularly serious and persistent infringements of this Regulation. Especially where those measures can affect the rights and interests of third parties, as may be the case in particular where the access to online interfaces is restricted, it is appropriate to require that the measures are subject to additional safeguards. In particular, third parties potentially affected should be afforded the opportunity to be heard and such orders should only be issued when powers to take such measures as provided by other acts of Union law or by national law, for instance to protect collective interests of consumers, to ensure the prompt removal of web pages containing or disseminating child pornography, or to disable access to services that are being used by a third party to infringe an intellectual property right, are not reasonably available.

(120)

Such an order to restrict access should not go beyond what is necessary to achieve its objective. For that purpose, it should be temporary and be addressed in principle to a provider of intermediary services, such as the relevant hosting service provider, internet service provider or domain registry or registrar, which is in a reasonable position to achieve that objective without unduly restricting access to lawful information.

(121)

Without prejudice to the provisions on the exemption from liability provided for in this Regulation as regards the information transmitted or stored at the request of a recipient of the service, a provider of intermediary services should be liable for the damages suffered by recipients of the service that are caused by an infringement of the obligations set out in this Regulation by that provider. Such compensation should be in accordance with the rules and procedures set out in the applicable national law and without prejudice to other possibilities for redress available under consumer protection rules.

(122)

The Digital Services Coordinator should regularly publish, for example on its website, a report on the activities carried out under this Regulation. In particular, the report should be published in a machine-readable format and include an overview of complaints received and of their follow-up, such as the overall number of complaints received and the number of complaints that led to the opening of a formal investigation or to the transmission to other Digital Services Coordinators, without referring to any personal data. Given that the Digital Services Coordinator is also made aware of orders to take action against illegal content or to provide information regulated by this Regulation through the information sharing system, the Digital Services Coordinator should include in its annual report the number and categories of such orders addressed to providers of intermediary services issued by judicial and administrative authorities in its Member State.

(123)

In the interest of clarity, simplicity and effectiveness, the powers to supervise and enforce the obligations under this Regulation should be conferred to the competent authorities in the Member State where the main establishment of the provider of intermediary services is located, that is, where the provider has its head office or registered office within which the principal financial functions and operational control are exercised. In respect of providers that are not established in the Union, but that offer services in the Union and therefore fall within the scope of this Regulation, the Member State where those providers appointed their legal representative should have competence, considering the function of legal representatives under this Regulation. In the interest of the effective application of this Regulation, all Member States or the Commission, where applicable, should, however, have competence in respect of providers that failed to designate a legal representative. That competence may be exercised by any of the competent authorities or the Commission, provided that the provider is not subject to enforcement proceedings for the same facts by another competent authority or the Commission. In order to ensure that the principle of ne bis in idem is respected, and in particular to avoid that the same infringement of the obligations laid down in this Regulation is sanctioned more than once, each Member State that intends to exercise its competence in respect of such providers should, without undue delay, inform all other authorities, including the Commission, through the information sharing system established for the purpose of this Regulation.

(124)

In view of their potential impact and the challenges involved in effectively supervising them, special rules are needed regarding the supervision and enforcement in respect of providers of very large online platforms and of very large online search engines. The Commission should be responsible, with the support of national competent authorities where relevant, for oversight and public enforcement of systemic issues, such as issues with a wide impact on collective interests of recipients of the service. Therefore, the Commission should have exclusive powers of supervision and enforcement of the additional obligations to manage systemic risks imposed on providers of very large online platforms and of very large online search engines by this Regulation. The exclusive powers of the Commission should be without prejudice to certain administrative tasks assigned by this Regulation to the competent authorities of the Member State of establishment, such as the vetting of researchers.

(125)

The powers of supervision and enforcement of due diligence obligations, other than the additional obligations to manage systemic risks imposed on providers of very large online platforms and of very large online search engines by this Regulation, should be shared by the Commission and by the national competent authorities. On the one hand, the Commission could in many instances be better placed to address systemic infringements committed by those providers, such as those affecting multiple Member States or serious repeated infringements or concerning a failure to establish effective mechanisms required by this Regulation. On the other hand, the competent authorities in the Member State where the main establishment of a provider of very large online platform or of very large online search engine is located could be better placed to address individual infringements committed by those providers, that do not raise any systemic or cross-border issues. In the interest of efficiency, to avoid duplication and to ensure compliance with the principle of ne bis in idem, it should be for the Commission to assess whether it deems it appropriate to exercise those shared competences in a given case and, once it has initiated proceedings, Member States should no longer have the ability to do so. Member States should cooperate closely both with each other and with the Commission, and the Commission should cooperate closely with the Member States, in order to ensure that the system of supervision and enforcement set up by this Regulation functions smoothly and effectively.

(126)

The rules of this Regulation on the allocation of competence should be without prejudice to the provisions of Union law and national rules on private international law concerning jurisdiction and applicable law in civil and commercial matters, such as proceedings brought by consumers in the courts of the Member State where they are domiciled in accordance with relevant provisions of Union law. Regarding the obligations imposed by this Regulation on providers of intermediary services to inform the issuing authority of the effect given to the orders to act against illegal content and orders to provide information, the rules on allocation of competence should only apply to the supervision of enforcement of those obligations, but not to other matters related to the order, such as the competence to issue the order.

(127)

Given the cross-border and cross-sectoral relevance of intermediary services, a high level of cooperation is necessary to ensure the consistent application of this Regulation and the availability of relevant information for the exercise of enforcement tasks through the information sharing system. Cooperation may take different forms depending on the issues at stake, without prejudice to specific joint investigation exercises. It is in any case necessary that the Digital Services Coordinator of establishment of a provider of intermediary services informs other Digital Services Coordinators about issues, investigations and actions which are going to be taken vis à vis such a provider. Moreover, when a competent authority in a Member State holds relevant information for an investigation carried out by the competent authorities in the Member State of establishment, or is able to gather such information located in its territory to which the competent authorities in the Member State of establishment do not have access, the Digital Services Coordinator of destination should assist the Digital Services Coordinator of establishment in a timely manner, including through the exercise of its powers of investigation in accordance with the applicable national procedures and the Charter. The addressee of such investigatory measures should comply with them and be liable in case of failure to comply, and the competent authorities in the Member State of establishment should be able to rely on the information gathered through mutual assistance, in order to ensure compliance with this Regulation.

(128)

The Digital Services Coordinator of destination, in particular on the basis of complaints received or of the input of other national competent authorities where appropriate, or the Board in case of issues involving at least three Member States, should be able to ask the Digital Services Coordinator of establishment to take investigatory or enforcement actions with regard to a provider under its competence. Such requests for action should be based on well-substantiated evidence showing the existence of an alleged infringement with negative impact on collective interests of the recipients of the service in its Member State or having a negative societal impact. The Digital Services Coordinator of establishment should be able to rely on mutual assistance or invite the requesting Digital Services Coordinator to a joint investigation in case further information is needed to take a decision, without prejudice to the possibility to request the Commission to assess the matter if it has reason to suspect that a systemic infringement by a very large online platform or a very large online search engine may be at stake.

(129)

The Board should be able to refer the matter to the Commission in case of any disagreement as to the assessments or the measures taken or proposed or of a failure to adopt any measures in accordance with this Regulation following a cross-border cooperation request or a joint investigation. Where the Commission, on the basis of the information made available by the concerned authorities, considers that the proposed measures, including the proposed level of fines, cannot ensure the effective enforcement of the obligations laid down in this Regulation, it should accordingly be able to express its serious doubts and request the competent Digital Services Coordinator to re-assess the matter and take the necessary measures to ensure compliance with this Regulation within a defined period. This possibility is without prejudice to the Commission’s general duty to oversee the application of, and where necessary enforce, Union law under the control of the Court of Justice of the European Union in accordance with the Treaties.

(130)

In order to facilitate cross-border supervision and investigations of obligations laid down in this Regulation involving several Member States, the Digital Services Coordinators of establishment should be able, through the information sharing system, to invite other Digital Services Coordinators to a joint investigation concerning an alleged infringement of this Regulation. Other Digital Services Coordinators, and other competent authorities, where appropriate, should be able to join the investigation proposed by the Digital Services Coordinator of establishment, unless the latter considers that an excessive number of participating authorities may affect the effectiveness of the investigation taking into account the features of the alleged infringement and the lack of direct effects on the recipients of the service in those Member States. Joint investigation activities may include a variety of actions to be coordinated by the Digital Services Coordinator of establishment in accordance with the availabilities of the participating authorities, such as coordinated data gathering exercises, pooling of resources, task forces, coordinated requests for information or common inspections of premises. All competent authorities participating in a joint investigation should cooperate with the Digital Services Coordinator of establishment, including by exercising their powers of investigation within their territory, in accordance with the applicable national procedures. The joint investigation should be concluded within a given timeframe with a final report taking into account the contribution of all participating competent authorities. Also the Board, where this is requested by at least three Digital Services Coordinators of destination, may recommend to a Digital Services Coordinator of establishment to launch such joint investigation and give indications on its organisation. In order to avoid deadlocks, the Board should be able to refer the matter to the Commission in specific cases, including where the Digital Services Coordinator of establishment refuses to launch the investigation and the Board does not agree with the justification given.

(131)

In order to ensure a consistent application of this Regulation, it is necessary to set up an independent advisory group at Union level, a European Board for Digital Services, which should support the Commission and help coordinate the actions of Digital Services Coordinators. The Board should consist of the Digital Services Coordinators, where these have been appointed, without prejudice to the possibility for Digital Services Coordinators to invite in its meetings or appoint ad hoc delegates from other competent authorities entrusted with specific tasks under this Regulation, where that is required pursuant to their national allocation of tasks and competences. In case of multiple participants from one Member State, the voting right should remain limited to one representative per Member State.

(132)

The Board should contribute to achieving a common Union perspective on the consistent application of this Regulation and to the cooperation among competent authorities, including by advising the Commission and the Digital Services Coordinators about appropriate investigation and enforcement measures, in particular vis à vis the providers of very large online platforms or of very large online search engines and having regard, in particular, to the freedom of the providers of intermediary services to provide services across the Union. The Board should also contribute to the drafting of relevant templates and codes of conduct and to the analysis of emerging general trends in the development of digital services in the Union, including by issuing opinions or recommendations on matters related to standards.

(133)

For that purpose, the Board should be able to adopt opinions, requests and recommendations addressed to Digital Services Coordinators or other competent national authorities. While not legally binding, the decision to deviate therefrom should be properly explained and could be taken into account by the Commission in assessing the compliance of the Member State concerned with this Regulation.

(134)

The Board should bring together the representatives of the Digital Services Coordinators and possible other competent authorities under the chairmanship of the Commission, with a view to ensuring an assessment of matters submitted to it in a fully European dimension. In view of possible cross-cutting elements that may be of relevance for other regulatory frameworks at Union level, the Board should be allowed to cooperate with other Union bodies, offices, agencies and advisory groups with responsibilities in fields such as equality, including gender equality, and non-discrimination, data protection, electronic communications, audiovisual services, detection and investigation of frauds against the Union budget as regards custom duties, consumer protection, or competition law, as necessary for the performance of its tasks.

(135)

The Commission, through the Chair, should participate in the Board without voting rights. Through the Chair, the Commission should ensure that the agenda of the meetings is set in accordance with the requests of the members of the Board as laid down in the rules of procedure and in compliance with the duties of the Board laid down in this Regulation.

(136)

In view of the need to ensure support for the Board’s activities, the Board should be able to rely on the expertise and human resources of the Commission and of the competent national authorities. The specific operational arrangements for the internal functioning of the Board should be further specified in the rules of procedure of the Board.

(137)

Given the importance of very large online platforms or very large online search engines, in view of their reach and impact, their failure to comply with the specific obligations applicable to them may affect a substantial number of recipients of the services across different Member States and may cause large societal harms, while such failures may also be particularly complex to identify and address. For this reason the Commission, in cooperation with the Digital Services Coordinators and the Board, should develop the Union expertise and capabilities as regards the supervision of very large online platforms or very large online search engines. The Commission should therefore be able to coordinate and rely on the expertise and resources of such authorities, for example by analysing, on a permanent or temporary basis, specific trends or issues emerging with regard to one or more very large online platforms or very large online search engines. Member States should cooperate with the Commission in developing such capabilities, including through secondment of personnel where appropriate, and contributing to the creation of a common Union supervisory capacity. In order to develop the Union expertise and capabilities, the Commission may also draw on the expertise and capabilities of the Observatory on the Online Platform Economy as set up in Commission Decision of 26 April 2018 on setting up the group of experts for the Observatory on the Online Platform Economy, relevant expert bodies, as well as centres of excellence. The Commission may invite experts with specific expertise, including in particular vetted researchers, representatives of Union agencies and bodies, industry representatives, associations representing users or civil society, international organisations, experts from the private sector, as well as other stakeholders.

(138)

The Commission should be able to investigate infringements on its own initiative in accordance with the powers provided for in this Regulation, including by asking access to data, by requesting information or by performing inspections, as well as by relying on the support of the Digital Services Coordinators. Where supervision by the competent national authorities of individual alleged infringements by providers of very large online platforms or very large online search engines points to systemic issues, such as issues with a wide impact on collective interests of recipients of the service, the Digital Services Coordinators should be able to, on the basis of a duly reasoned request, refer such issues to the Commission. Such a request should contain, at least, all the necessary facts and circumstances supporting the alleged infringement and its systemic nature. Depending on the outcome of its own assessment, the Commission should be able to take the necessary investigative and enforcement measures pursuant to this Regulation, including, where relevant, launching an investigation or adopting interim measures.

(139)

In order to effectively perform its tasks, the Commission should maintain a margin of discretion as to the decision to initiate proceedings against providers of very large online platforms or of very large online search engine. Once the Commission initiated the proceedings, the Digital Services Coordinators of establishment concerned should be precluded from exercising their investigative and enforcement powers in respect of the concerned conduct of the provider of the very large online platform or of very large online search engine, so as to avoid duplication, inconsistencies and risks from the viewpoint of the principle of ne bis in idem. The Commission, however, should be able to ask for the individual or joint contribution of the Digital Services Coordinators to the investigation. In accordance with the duty of sincere cooperation, the Digital Services Coordinator should make its best efforts in fulfilling justified and proportionate requests by the Commission in the context of an investigation. Moreover, the Digital Services Coordinator of establishment, as well as the Board and any other Digital Services Coordinators where relevant, should provide the Commission with all necessary information and assistance to allow it to perform its tasks effectively, including information gathered in the context of data gathering or data access exercises, to the extent that this is not precluded by the legal basis according to which the information has been gathered. Conversely, the Commission should keep the Digital Services Coordinator of establishment and the Board informed on the exercise of its powers and in particular when it intends to initiate the proceeding and exercise its investigatory powers. Moreover, when the Commission communicates its preliminary findings, including any matter to which it objects, to providers of very large online platforms or of very large online search engines concerned, it should also communicate them to the Board. The Board should provide its views on the objections and assessment made by the Commission, which should take this opinion into account in the reasoning underpinning Commission's final decision.

(140)

In view of both the particular challenges that may arise in seeking to ensure compliance by providers of very large online platforms or of very large online search engines and the importance of doing so effectively, considering their size and impact and the harms that they may cause, the Commission should have strong investigative and enforcement powers to allow it to investigate, enforce and monitor compliance with the rules laid down in this Regulation, in full respect of the fundamental right to be heard and to have access to the file in the context of enforcement proceedings, the principle of proportionality and the rights and interests of the affected parties.

(141)

The Commission should be able to request information necessary for the purpose of ensuring the effective implementation of and compliance with the obligations laid down in this Regulation, throughout the Union. In particular, the Commission should have access to any relevant documents, data and information necessary to open and conduct investigations and to monitor the compliance with the relevant obligations laid down in this Regulation, irrespective of who possesses the documents, data or information in question, and regardless of their form or format, their storage medium, or the precise place where they are stored. The Commission should be able to directly require by means of a duly substantiated request for information that the provider of the very large online platform or of the very large online search engine concerned as well as any other natural or legal persons acting for purposes related to their trade, business, craft or profession that may be reasonably aware of information relating to the suspected infringement or the infringement, as applicable, provide any relevant evidence, data and information. In addition, the Commission should be able to request any relevant information from any public authority, body or agency within the Member State for the purpose of this Regulation. The Commission should be able to require access to, and explanations by means of exercise of investigatory powers, such as requests for information or interviews, relating to documents, data, information, data-bases and algorithms of relevant persons, and to interview, with their consent, any natural or legal persons who may be in possession of useful information and to record the statements made by any technical means. The Commission should also be empowered to undertake such inspections as are necessary to enforce the relevant provisions of this Regulation. Those investigatory powers aim to complement the Commission’s possibility to ask Digital Services Coordinators and other Member States’ authorities for assistance, for instance by providing information or in the exercise of those powers.

(142)

Interim measures can be an important tool to ensure that, while an investigation is ongoing, the infringement being investigated does not lead to the risk of serious damage for the recipients of the service. This tool is important to avoid developments that could be very difficult to reverse by a decision taken by the Commission at the end of the proceedings. The Commission should therefore have the power to impose interim measures by decision in the context of proceedings opened in view of the possible adoption of a decision of non-compliance. This power should apply in cases where the Commission has made a prima facie finding of infringement of obligations under this Regulation by the provider of very large online platform or of very large online search engine. A decision imposing interim measures should only apply for a specified period, either one ending with the conclusion of the proceedings by the Commission, or for a fixed period which can be renewed insofar as it is necessary and appropriate.

(143)

The Commission should be able to take the necessary actions to monitor the effective implementation of and compliance with the obligations laid down in this Regulation. Such actions should include the ability to appoint independent external experts and auditors to assist the Commission in this process, including where applicable from competent authorities of the Member States, such as data or consumer protection authorities. When appointing auditors, the Commission should ensure sufficient rotation.

(144)

Compliance with the relevant obligations imposed under this Regulation should be enforceable by means of fines and periodic penalty payments. To that end, appropriate levels of fines and periodic penalty payments should also be laid down for non-compliance with the obligations and breach of the procedural rules, subject to appropriate limitation periods in accordance with the principles of proportionality and ne bis in idem. The Commission and the relevant national authorities should coordinate their enforcement efforts in order to ensure that those principles are respected. In particular, the Commission should take into account any fines and penalties imposed on the same legal person for the same facts through a final decision in proceedings relating to an infringement of other Union or national rules, so as to ensure that the overall fines and penalties imposed are proportionate and correspond to the seriousness of the infringements committed. All decisions taken by the Commission under this Regulation are subject to review by the Court of Justice of the European Union in accordance with the TFEU. The Court of Justice of the European Union should have unlimited jurisdiction in respect of fines and penalty payments in accordance with Article 261 TFEU.

(145)

Given the potential significant societal effects of an infringement of the additional obligations to manage systemic risks that solely apply to very large online platforms and very large online search engines and in order to address those public policy concerns, it is necessary to provide for a system of enhanced supervision of any action undertaken to effectively terminate and remedy infringements of this Regulation. Therefore, once an infringement of one of the provisions of this Regulation that solely apply to very large online platforms or very large online search engines has been ascertained and, where necessary, sanctioned, the Commission should request the provider of such platform or of such search engine to draw a detailed action plan to remedy any effect of the infringement for the future and communicate such action plan within a timeline set by the Commission, to the Digital Services Coordinators, the Commission and the Board. The Commission, taking into account the opinion of the Board, should establish whether the measures included in the action plan are sufficient to address the infringement, taking also into account whether adherence to relevant code of conduct is included among the measures proposed. The Commission should also monitor any subsequent measure taken by the provider of a very large online platform or of a very large online search engine concerned as set out in its action plan, taking into account also an independent audit of the provider. If following the implementation of the action plan the Commission still considers that the infringement has not been fully remedied, or if the action plan has not been provided or is not considered suitable, it should be able to use any investigative or enforcement powers pursuant to this Regulation, including the power to impose periodic penalty payments and initiating the procedure to disable access to the infringing service.

(146)

The provider of the very large online platform or of the very large online search engine concerned and other persons subject to the exercise of the Commission’s powers whose interests may be affected by a decision should be given the opportunity of submitting their observations beforehand, and the decisions taken should be widely publicised. While ensuring the rights of defence of the parties concerned, in particular, the right of access to the file, it is essential that confidential information be protected. Furthermore, while respecting the confidentiality of the information, the Commission should ensure that any information relied on for the purpose of its decision is disclosed to an extent that allows the addressee of the decision to understand the facts and considerations that led up to the decision.

(147)

In order to safeguard the harmonised application and enforcement of this Regulation, it is important to ensure that national authorities, including national courts, have all necessary information to ensure that their decisions do not run counter to a decision adopted by the Commission under this Regulation. This is without prejudice to Article 267 TFEU.

(148)

The effective enforcement and monitoring of this Regulation requires a seamless and real-time exchange of information among the Digital Services Coordinators, the Board and the Commission, based on the information flows and procedures set out in this Regulation. This may also warrant access to this system by other competent authorities, where appropriate. At the same time, given that the information exchanged may be confidential or involving personal data, it should remain protected from unauthorised access, in accordance with the purposes for which the information has been gathered. For this reason, all communications between those authorities should take place on the basis of a reliable and secure information sharing system, whose details should be laid down in an implementing act. The information sharing system may be based on existing internal market tools, to the extent that they can meet the objectives of this Regulation in a cost-effective manner.

(149)

Without prejudice to the rights of recipients of services to turn to a representative in accordance with the Directive (EU) 2020/1828 of the European Parliament and of the Council (33) or to any other type of representation under national law, recipients of the services should also have the right to mandate a legal person or a public body to exercise their rights provided for in this Regulation. Such rights may include the rights related to the submission of notices, the challenging of the decisions taken by providers of intermediary services, and the lodging of complaints against the providers for infringing this Regulation. Certain bodies, organisations and associations have particular expertise and competence in detecting and flagging erroneous or unjustified content moderation decisions, and their complaints on behalf of recipients of the service may have a positive impact on freedom of expression and of information in general, therefore, providers of online platforms should treat those complaints without undue delay.

(150)

In the interest of effectiveness and efficiency, the Commission should carry out a general evaluation of this Regulation. In particular, that general evaluation should address, inter alia, the scope of the services covered by this Regulation, the interplay with other legal acts, the impact of this Regulation on the functioning of the internal market, in particular regarding digital services, the implementation of codes of conduct, the obligation to designate a legal representative established in the Union, the effect of the obligations on small and micro enterprises, the effectiveness of the supervision and enforcement mechanism and the impact on the right to freedom of expression and of information. In addition, to avoid disproportionate burdens and ensure the continued effectiveness of this Regulation, the Commission should perform an evaluation of the impact of the obligations set out in this Regulation on small and medium-sized enterprises within three years from the start of its application and an evaluation on the scope of the services covered by this Regulation, particularly for very large online platforms and for very large online search engines, and the interplay with other legal acts within three years from its entry into force.

(151)

In order to ensure uniform conditions for the implementation of this Regulation, implementing powers should be conferred on the Commission to lay down templates concerning the form, content and other details of reports on content moderation, to establish the amount of the annual supervisory fee charged on providers of very large online platforms and of very large online search engines, to lay down the practical arrangements for the proceedings, the hearings and the negotiated disclosure of information carried out in the context of supervision, investigation, enforcement and monitoring in respect of providers of very large online platforms and of very large online search engines, as well as to lay down the practical and operational arrangements for the functioning of the information sharing system and its interoperability with other relevant systems. Those powers should be exercised in accordance with Regulation (EU) No 182/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council (34).

(152)

In order to fulfil the objectives of this Regulation, the power to adopt acts in accordance with Article 290 TFEU should be delegated to the Commission to supplement this Regulation, in respect of criteria for the identification of very large online platforms and of very large online search engines, the procedural steps, methodologies and reporting templates for the audits, the technical specifications for access requests and the detailed methodology and procedures for setting the supervisory fee. It is of particular importance that the Commission carry out appropriate consultations during its preparatory work, including at expert level, and that those consultations be conducted in accordance with the principles laid down in the Interinstitutional Agreement of 13 April 2016 on Better Law-Making (35). In particular, to ensure equal participation in the preparation of delegated acts, the European Parliament and the Council receive all documents at the same time as Member States' experts, and their experts systematically have access to meetings of Commission expert groups dealing with the preparation of delegated acts.

(153)

This Regulation respects the fundamental rights recognised by the Charter and the fundamental rights constituting general principles of Union law. Accordingly, this Regulation should be interpreted and applied in accordance with those fundamental rights, including the freedom of expression and of information, as well as the freedom and pluralism of the media. When exercising the powers set out in this Regulation, all public authorities involved should achieve, in situations where the relevant fundamental rights conflict, a fair balance between the rights concerned, in accordance with the principle of proportionality.

(154)

Given the scope and impact of societal risks that may be caused by very large online platforms and very large online search engines, the need to address those risks as a matter of priority and the capacity to take the necessary measures, it is justified to limit the period after which this Regulation starts to apply to the providers of those services.

(155)

Since the objectives of this Regulation, namely to contribute to the proper functioning of the internal market and to ensure a safe, predictable and trusted online environment in which the fundamental rights enshrined in the Charter are duly protected, cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States because they cannot achieve the necessary harmonisation and cooperation by acting alone, but can rather, by reason of territorial and personal scope, be better achieved at the Union level, the Union may adopt measures, in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity as set out in Article 5 of the Treaty on European Union. In accordance with the principle of proportionality as set out in that Article, this Regulation does not go beyond what is necessary in order to achieve those objectives.

(156)

The European Data Protection Supervisor was consulted in accordance with Article 42(1) of Regulation (EU) 2018/1725 of the European Parliament and of the Council (36) and delivered an opinion on 10 February 2021 (37),

(1)

In accordance with Council Decision (EU) 2021/1117 (2), the Implementing Protocol to the Fisheries Partnership Agreement between the Gabonese Republic and the European Community (2021-2026) (3) (the ‘Protocol’) was signed on 29 June 2021, subject to its conclusion at a later date.

(2)

The Protocol has been applied on a provisional basis from the date of its signature.

(3)

The objective of the Fisheries Partnership Agreement between the Gabonese Republic and the European Community (4) (the ‘Agreement’) and of the Protocol is to enable the Union and the Gabonese Republic (‘Gabon’) to work more closely together to further promote the development of a sustainable fisheries policy and the responsible exploitation of fisheries resources in the Gabonese fishing zone and in the Atlantic Ocean, while contributing to decent working conditions in the fisheries sector.

(4)

The Protocol should be approved.

(5)

Article 9 of the Agreement establishes a Joint Committee responsible for monitoring the implementation of the Agreement. Furthermore, pursuant to Article 19(5) of the Protocol, the Joint Committee may adopt certain amendments to the Protocol. In order to facilitate the adoption of such amendments, the Commission should be empowered, subject to respecting specific substantive and procedural conditions, to approve them on behalf of the Union under a simplified procedure.

(6)

The Union’s position on amendments that are proposed to the Protocol should be established by the Council. The Commission should approve the proposed amendments on behalf of the Union, unless a number of Member States constituting a blocking minority, in accordance with Article 16(4) of the Treaty on European Union, object to them.

(7)

The Protocol should enter into force as soon as possible, in view of the economic importance of Union fishing activities in the Gabonese fishing zone and the need to reduce as much as possible the period of interruption of such activities,

(1)

African swine fever is an infectious viral disease affecting kept and wild porcine animals and can have a severe impact on the concerned animal population and the profitability of farming causing disturbance to movements of consignments of those animals and products thereof within the Union and exports to third countries.

(2)

Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2021/605 (2) was adopted within the framework of Regulation (EU) 2016/429, and it lays down special disease control measures regarding African swine fever to be applied for a limited period of time by the Member States listed in Annex I thereto (the Member States concerned), in restricted zones I, II and III listed in that Annex.

(3)

The areas listed as restricted zones I, II and III in Annex I to Implementing Regulation (EU) 2021/605 are based on the epidemiological situation of African swine fever in the Union. Annex I to Implementing Regulation (EU) 2021/605 was last amended by Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2022/1911 (3) following changes in the epidemiological situation as regards that disease in Germany and Italy. Since the date of adoption of that Implementing Regulation, the epidemiological situation as regards that disease in certain Member States concerned has evolved.

(4)

Any amendments to restricted zones I, II and III in Annex I to Implementing Regulation (EU) 2021/605 should be based on the epidemiological situation as regards African swine fever in the areas affected by that disease and the overall epidemiological situation of African swine fever in the Member State concerned, the level of risk for the further spread of that disease, as well as scientifically based principles and criteria for geographically defining zoning due to African swine fever and the Union’s guidelines agreed with the Member States at the Standing Committee on Plants, Animals, Food and Feed and publicly available on the Commission’s website (4). Such amendments should also take account of international standards, such as the Terrestrial Animal Health Code (5) of the World Organisation for Animal Health (WOAH) and justifications for zoning provided by the competent authorities of the Member States concerned.

(5)

Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2020/689 (6) supplements the rules for the control of the listed diseases referred to in Article 9(1), points (a), (b) and (c), of Regulation (EU) 2016/429, and defined as category A, B and C diseases in Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2018/1882 (7). In particular, Article 9 of Delegated Regulation (EU) 2020/689 provides for certain measures to classify an animal or a group of animals as a suspected or confirmed case of a listed disease, including African swine fever.

(6)

Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2020/687 (8) supplements the rules for the control of the listed diseases referred to in Article 9(1), points (a), (b) and (c), of Regulation (EU) 2016/429, and defined as category A, B and C diseases in Implementing Regulation (EU) 2018/1882. In particular, Articles 63 to 66 of Delegated Regulation (EU) 2020/687 provide for certain measures to be taken in the event of an official confirmation of an outbreak of a category A disease in wild animals, including African swine fever in wild porcine animals. Notably, those measures provide for the establishment of an infected zone and prohibitions on movements of wild animals of listed species and products of animal origin thereof.

(7)

In May 2022, Italy has informed the Commission of the current African swine fever situation on its territory, following a suspected case of that disease in a wild porcine animal in the Rieti Province, in the Lazio Region. Using the precautionary principle, the competent authority of that Member State treated the suspected case of African swine fever as if it were a confirmed case of African swine fever, and established an infected zone as provided for in the case of the official confirmation of that disease in Delegated Regulation (EU) 2020/687 and Implementing Regulation (EU) 2021/605.

(8)

In October 2022, Italy informed the Commission that the continuous and detailed disease control measures and the passive surveillance of kept and wild porcine animals demonstrate the absence of the circulation of the African swine fever virus in the Rieti province, and that the Italian competent authority is in a position to conclude that the suspected case of African swine fever in the Rieti province should not be considered as a confirmed case of African swine fever in accordance with Article 9(2), point (b), of Delegated Regulation (EU) 2020/689 because, despite the fact that a nucleic acid specific to the disease was identified in the results of tests on the animal, the animal did not show any clinical signs consistent with the disease and any epidemiological links with another suspected or confirmed cases was ruled out.

(9)

In addition, since the date of adoption of Implementing Regulation (EU) 2022/1911 there have been new outbreaks of African swine fever in wild porcine animals in Germany. Furthermore, the epidemiological situation in certain zones listed as restricted zones I and III in Poland has improved as regards kept and wild porcine animals.

(10)

In October 2022, several outbreaks of African swine fever in wild porcine animals were observed in the state of Brandenburg in Germany, in an area currently listed as a restricted zone II in Annex I to Implementing Regulation (EU) 2021/605, located in close proximity to an area in the state of Brandenburg currently listed as a restricted zone I in that Annex. Those new outbreaks of African swine fever in wild porcine animals constitute an increased level of risk, which should be reflected in Annex I to Implementing Regulation (EU) 2021/605. Accordingly, the current boundaries of the restricted zones I and II should be amended to take account of those recent outbreaks.

(11)

Following those recent outbreaks of African swine fever in wild porcine animals in the state of Brandenburg in Germany and taking into account the current epidemiological situation as regards African swine fever in the Union, zoning in this Member State has been reassessed and updated in accordance with Articles 5, 6 and 7 of Implementing Regulation (EU) 2021/605. In addition, the risk management measures in place have also been reassessed and updated. These changes should be reflected in Annex I to Implementing Regulation (EU) 2021/605.

(12)

Furthermore, taking into account the effectiveness of the disease control measures for African swine fever for kept porcine animals in certain restricted zones III listed in Annex I to Implementing Regulation (EU) 2021/605 being applied in Poland in accordance with Delegated Regulation (EU) 2020/687, and in particular those laid down in Articles 22, 25 and 40 thereof, and in line with the risk mitigation measures for African swine fever set out in the WOAH Code, certain areas in the Lubelskie, Podkarpackie, Wielkopolskie and Lubuskie regions in Poland, currently listed as restricted zones III in Annex I to Implementing Regulation (EU) 2021/605 should now be listed as restricted zones II in that Annex, due to the absence of outbreaks of African swine fever in kept porcine animals in those restricted zones III for the past 12 months, while the disease is still present in wild porcine animals. Those restricted zones III should now be listed as restricted zones II taking account of the current African swine fever epidemiological situation.

(13)

Also, taking into account the effectiveness of the disease control measures for African swine fever for kept porcine animals in the restricted zones I listed in Annex I to Implementing Regulation (EU) 2021/605 being applied in Poland in accordance with Delegated Regulation (EU) 2020/687, and in particular those laid down in Articles 64, 65 and 67 thereof, and in line with the risk mitigation measures for African swine fever set out in the WOAH Code, certain zones in the Podkarpackie, Łódzkie and Śląskie regions in Poland, currently listed as restricted zones I in Annex I to Implementing Regulation (EU) 2021/605 should now be deleted from the restricted zones I in that Annex, due to the absence of African swine fever outbreaks in kept and wild porcine animals in those restricted zones I for the past 12 months. The restricted zones I should now be deleted from that Annex to take account of the current African swine fever epidemiological situation.

(14)

Also, on the basis of the information and justifications received from Italy, in particular taking account of the completion of the epidemiological investigation and the effectiveness of the disease control measures for African swine fever, and taking account of the current favourable African swine fever situation in wild porcine animals in the Lazio region and the disease control measures duly implemented by Italy, in order to prevent any unnecessary disturbance to trade, it is appropriate that the restricted zones I and II in the province of Rieti should now be deleted from Annex I to Implementing Regulation (EU) 2021/605 to take account of the current African swine fever epidemiological situation in that Member State.

(15)

In order to take account of the recent developments in the epidemiological situation of African swine fever in the Union, and in order to combat the risks associated with the spread of that disease in a proactive manner new restricted zones of a sufficient size should be demarcated for Germany and Poland, and listed as restricted zones I and II in Annex I to Implementing Regulation (EU) 2021/605. Also, certain parts of restricted zone I should be deleted from that Annex for Poland. As the situation as regards African swine fever is very dynamic in the Union, when demarcating those new restricted zones, account has been taken of the epidemiological situation in the surrounding areas.

(16)

Given the urgency of the epidemiological situation in the Union as regards the spread of African swine fever, it is important that the amendments to be made to Annex I to Implementing Regulation (EU) 2021/605 by this Implementing Regulation take effect as soon as possible.

(17)

The measures provided for in this Regulation are in accordance with the opinion of the Standing Committee on Plants, Animals, Food and Feed,