(1)

On 7 December 2020, the Council adopted Regulation (EU) 2020/1998.

(2)

Pursuant to Article 14(4) of Regulation (EU) 2020/1998, the Council has reviewed the list of natural or legal persons, entities or bodies subject to restrictive measures set out in Annex I to that Regulation. On the basis of that review, the entry concerning one deceased person should be removed from that Annex and the entries concerning seven persons should be updated.

(3)

Regulation (EU) 2020/1998 should therefore be amended accordingly,

(1)

On 5 March 2014, the Council adopted Regulation (EU) No 208/2014.

(2)

On the basis of a review by the Council, the entry for one person and the information regarding their rights of defence and their right to effective judicial protection should be deleted.

(3)

Annex I to Regulation (EU) No 208/2014 should therefore be amended accordingly,

(1)

In accordance with Article 5(1) of Directive (EU) 2019/2034, competent authorities may require certain investment firms to be subject to the same prudential treatment as credit institutions that fall within the scope of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council (2) and to comply with prudential supervision under Directive 2013/36/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council (3).

(2)

For the purposes of Article 5(1)(a) of Directive (EU) 2019/2034, it should be specified that if an investment firm carries out activities exceeding at least one out of four quantitative thresholds for over-the-counter derivatives, financial instruments underwriting and/or placing of financial instruments on a firm commitment basis, granted credits or loans to investors, and debt securities outstanding, those activities are carried out on such a scale that the failure or the distress of the investment firm could lead to systemic risk.

(3)

Given the systemic relevance of investment firms’ activities, as referred to in Article 5 of Directive (EU) 2019/2034, and the potential significant impact of a contagion effect across the financial sector, investment firms that are clearing members as defined in Article 4(1)(3) of Regulation (EU) 2019/2033 and that offer clearing services to other financial institutions, which are not clearing members themselves, should be considered for the purposes of Article 5(1)(b) of Directive (EU) 2019/2034.

(4)

This Regulation is based on the draft regulatory technical standards submitted to the Commission by the European Banking Authority after having consulted the European Securities and Markets Authority.

(5)

The European Banking Authority has conducted open public consultations on the draft regulatory technical standards on which this Regulation is based, analysed the potential related costs and benefits and requested the advice of the Banking Stakeholder Group established in accordance with Article 37 of Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council (4),

(1)

While investment firms falling within the scope of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council (2) and of Titles VII and VIII of Directive 2013/36/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council (3), in accordance with Article 1(2) and (5) of Regulation (EU) 2019/2033 of the European Parliament and of the Council (4), are subject to Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2021/923 (5), investment firms falling within the scope of Directive (EU) 2019/2034 of the European Parliament and of the Council are required to apply specific requirements to the variable remuneration of all members of staff whose professional activities have a material impact on the risk profile of the investment firm or of the assets that it manages. It is necessary to lay down appropriate criteria to identify those staff members. Those criteria should take into account the authority and responsibilities of such staff members, the investment firm’s risk profile or that of the assets it manages and performance indicators, the investment firm’s internal organisation, and the nature, scope and complexity of the firm concerned. Those criteria should also enable investment firms to set proper incentives in their remuneration policies to ensure that the staff members concerned act prudently when performing their tasks. Lastly, those criteria should reflect the level of risk of different activities within the investment firm.

(2)

Members of the management body have the ultimate responsibility for the investment firm, its strategy and activities, and therefore should always be considered to have a material impact on the investment firm’s risk profile. This applies both to the members of the management body in its management function who take decisions and to the members of the management body in its supervisory function who oversee the decision-making process and challenge decisions made.

(3)

Some staff members are responsible for providing internal support that is crucial to the operation of an investment firm’s business activities. Their activities and decisions can also have a material impact on an investment firm’s risk profile or that of the assets it manages because their activities and decisions may expose the investment firm to material operational and other risks.

(4)

The professional activities of staff members with managerial responsibility can have a material impact on the investment firm’s risk profile or that of the assets it manages because they can make strategic or other fundamental decisions that have an impact on the investment firm’s business activities or on the control functions applied. Such control functions include, typically, risk management, compliance and internal audit. The risks taken by the business units and the way those business units are managed are the most important factors for an investment firm’s risk profile or that of the assets it manages. Certain business activities create higher risks than others and therefore the nature of the business activities should be taken into account.

(5)

Appropriate qualitative criteria should ensure that staff members are identified as having a material impact where they are responsible for groups of staff whose activities could have a material impact on the investment firm’s risk profile or of the assets that it manages. This includes situations where the activities of individual staff members under their management do not individually have a material impact on the investment firm’s risk profile but the overall scale of their activities could have such an impact.

(6)

The total remuneration of staff members depends typically on the contribution that those staff members make to the successful achievement of the investment firm’s business objectives. That remuneration thus depends on the responsibilities, duties, abilities and skills of staff members and on the performance of staff members and the investment firm. Where a staff member is awarded a total remuneration which exceeds a certain threshold, it is reasonable to presume that such remuneration is linked to that staff member’s contribution to the investment firm’s business objectives and is therefore related to the impact of the staff member’s professional activities on the risk profile of the investment firm or of the assets that it manages. It is therefore appropriate to apply quantitative criteria related to the total remuneration of a staff member, both in absolute and relative terms, to other members of staff within the same investment firm to determine whether the professional activities of such staff member could have a material impact on the investment firm’s risk profile or that of the assets it manages.

(7)

Clear and appropriate thresholds should be established to identify staff members whose professional activities have a material impact on the investment firm’s risk profile or of the assets that it manages. Investment firms should be expected to apply the quantitative criteria in a timely manner. Quantitative criteria should follow developments in remuneration to be realistic. A first method to follow such developments is to base quantitative criteria on the total remuneration awarded in the preceding performance year, which includes the fixed remuneration paid for that performance year and the variable remuneration awarded in that performance year. A second method to follow such developments is to base quantitative criteria on the total remuneration awarded for the preceding performance year, which includes the fixed remuneration paid for that performance year and the variable remuneration awarded in the current performance year for the preceding financial year. The second method provides for a better alignment of the identification process with the actual remuneration awarded for a performance period but can only be applied where a timely calculation for the application of the quantitative criteria is possible. Where such timely calculation is no longer possible, the first method should be used. Under either method, the variable remuneration can include amounts that are awarded based on performance periods that are longer than one year, depending on the performance criteria used by the investment firm.

(8)

A quantitative threshold of EUR 500 000 should be set for the identification of staff members whose professional activities have a material impact on the risk profile of the investment firm or of the assets that it manages. Remuneration above that quantitative threshold or amounting to one of the highest remunerations within the investment firm thus establishes a strong presumption that the activities of staff members receiving such remuneration have a material impact on the investment’s risk profile or that of the assets it manages, in which case more supervisory scrutiny should be applied to establish whether the professional activities of such staff members have a material impact on the investment firm’s risk profile or that of the assets it manages.

(9)

However, such presumptions based on quantitative criteria should not apply where investment firms establish on the basis of additional objective criteria that such staff members do not in fact have a material impact on the investment firm’s risk profile or of the assets that it manages, taking into account all risks to which the investment firm is or may be exposed. To ensure an effective and consistent application of those objective criteria, competent authorities should approve the exclusion of the highest earning staff members identified or those staff members with a remuneration awarded of more than EUR 750 000. For staff members who are awarded more than EUR 1 000 000 (high earners), competent authorities should inform the European Banking Authority (EBA) before approving exclusions so that the EBA can ensure the consistent application of those criteria.

(10)

Being in the same remuneration bracket as senior management or risk takers may also be an indicator that the staff member’s professional activities have a material impact on the investment firm’s risk profile or that of the assets it manages. For that purpose, the remuneration paid to staff in control functions, support functions and members of the management body in its supervisory function should not be taken into account. In the application of this quantitative criterion, the fact that payment levels differ across jurisdictions should be also taken into account. Investment firms should be allowed to demonstrate that staff members who fall within the remuneration bracket, but do not meet any of the qualitative or other quantitative criteria, do not have a material impact on the investment firm’s risk profile or that of the assets it manages, taking into account all risks to which the investment firm is or may be exposed.

(11)

In order for competent authorities and auditors to be able to review the assessments carried out by investment firms to identify staff members whose professional activities have a material impact on the risk profile of the investment firm or of the assets that it manages, it is critical that investment firms keep records of the assessments made and their results, including of staff members who have been identified under criteria based on their total remuneration but whose professional activities are assessed as not having a material impact on the investment firm’s risk profile or of the assets that it manages.

(12)

This Regulation is based on the draft regulatory technical standards submitted to the Commission by the EBA after having consulted the European Securities and Markets Authority.

(13)

The EBA has conducted open public consultations on the draft regulatory technical standards on which this Regulation is based and analysed the potential related costs and benefits and requested the advice of the Banking Stakeholder Group established in accordance with Article 37 of Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council (6),

(1)

Variable remuneration awarded in instruments should promote sound and effective risk management and should not encourage risk-taking that exceeds the level of risk appetite of the investment firm. Therefore, classes of instruments which can be used for the purposes of variable remuneration should align the interests of staff with the longer-term interests of the investment firm, its shareholders, creditors, clients and other stakeholders by providing incentives for staff to act in the longer-term interest of the investment firm.

(2)

In order to ensure that there is a strong link to the credit quality of an investment firm as a going concern, instruments used for the purposes of variable remuneration should contain appropriate trigger events for write-down or conversion which reduce the value of the instruments in situations where the credit quality of the investment firm as a going concern has deteriorated. The trigger events used for remuneration purposes should not change the level of subordination of the instruments and therefore should not lead to a disqualification of Additional Tier 1 or Tier 2 instruments as own funds instruments.

(3)

While the conditions which apply to Additional Tier 1 and Tier 2 instruments are specified in Article 9 of Regulation (EU) 2019/2033 of the European Parliament and of the Council (2) in conjunction with Part Two, Title 1, Chapters 3 and 4 of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council (3), the Other Instruments referred to in Article 32(1), point (j)(iii), of Directive (EU) 2019/2034 (‘Other Instruments’) which can be fully converted to Common Equity Tier 1 instruments or written down, are not subject to specific conditions pursuant to those Regulations as they are not classified as own funds instruments for prudential purposes. Specific requirements should therefore be set for different classes of instruments to ensure that they are appropriate to be used for the purposes of variable remuneration, taking account of the different nature of the instruments. The use of instruments for the purposes of variable remuneration should not in itself prevent instruments from qualifying as own funds of an investment firm as long as the conditions laid down in Regulation (EU) 2019/2033 are met. Nor should such use in itself be understood as providing an incentive to redeem the instrument, as after deferral and retention periods staff members are, in general, able to receive liquid funds by other means than redemption.

(4)

Other Instruments are not limited to the financial instruments specified in Section C of Annex I to Directive 2014/65/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council (4). To reduce the administrative burden for the creation of such instruments, those instruments should also allow for the use of other contractual arrangements between staff members and investment firms. To ensure that those Other Instruments reflect the credit quality of an investment firm as a going concern, appropriate requirements should ensure that such instruments are written down or converted before an investment firm fails to meet its own funds requirements.

(5)

When instruments used for the purposes of variable remuneration are called, redeemed, repurchased or converted, in general such transactions should not increase the value of the remuneration awarded by paying out amounts that are higher than the value of the instrument or by converting into instruments which have a higher value than the instrument initially awarded. The replacement of instruments at the same value should ensure that remuneration is not paid through vehicles or methods that facilitate non-compliance with Directive (EU) 2019/2034 or Regulation (EU) 2019/2033.

(6)

When awarding variable remuneration and when instruments used for variable remuneration are redeemed, called, repurchased or converted, those transactions should be based on values that have been established in accordance with the applicable accounting standard at the point of time of the transaction, thus ensuring that the correct amount of variable remuneration is awarded and not unduly altered when the instrument is redeemed, called, repurchased or converted.

(7)

Article 54 of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 sets out the write-down and conversion mechanisms for Additional Tier 1 instruments. Additionally, Article 32(1), point (j)(iii), of Directive (EU) 2019/2034 requires that Other Instruments can be fully converted into Common Equity Tier 1 instruments or written down. As the economic outcome of a conversion or write-down of Other Instruments is the same as for Additional Tier 1 instruments, write-down or conversion mechanisms for Other Instruments should take into account the mechanisms that apply to Additional Tier 1 instruments, with adaptations to take account of the fact that Other Instruments do not qualify as own fund instruments from a prudential perspective. Tier 2 instruments are not subject to regulatory requirements regarding write-down and conversion under Regulation (EU) No 575/2013. To ensure that the value of all such instruments, when used for variable remuneration, is reduced when the credit quality of the investment firm deteriorates, the situations in which a write-down or conversion of the instrument is necessary should be specified. The write-down, write-up and conversion mechanisms for Tier 2 and Other Instruments should be specified to ensure consistent application.

(8)

Distributions arising from instruments can take various forms. They can be variable or fixed and can be paid periodically or at the final maturity of an instrument. To promote sound and effective risk management, no distributions should be paid to staff during deferral periods. Staff members should only receive the distributions in respect of periods which follow the vesting of the instrument, after which staff becomes its legal owner. Therefore, only instruments with distributions which are paid periodically to the owner of the instrument are appropriate for use as variable remuneration. Zero coupon bonds or instruments which retain earnings should not be part of remuneration which must consist of any of the instruments referred to inArticle 32(1), point (j), of Directive (EU) 2019/2034. This is because staff would benefit during the deferral period from increasing values, which can be understood as equivalent to receiving distributions.

(9)

Very high distributions can reduce the long-term incentive for prudent risk-taking as they effectively increase the variable part of the remuneration. In particular, distributions should not be paid out at intervals of longer than one year, as this would lead to distributions effectively accumulating during deferral periods and being paid out once the variable remuneration vests. Accumulation of distributions would circumvent the principle laid down in Article 32(3) of Directive (EU) 2019/2034 that remuneration payable under deferral arrangements vests no faster than on a pro rata basis. Article 32(2), point (b), of Directive (EU) 2019/2034 requires that variable remuneration is not to be paid through financial vehicles or methods that facilitate the non-compliance with that Directive or Regulation (EU) 2019/2033. Therefore, distributions made after the instrument has vested should not exceed market rates for such instruments issued by other investment firms or institutions of comparable credit quality. This should be ensured by requiring instruments used for variable remuneration, or the instruments to which they are linked, to be issued mainly to other investors, or by requiring such instruments to be subject to a cap on distributions.

(10)

Deferral and retention requirements which apply to awards of variable remuneration pursuant to Article 32(1), point (l), and Article 32(3) of Directive (EU) 2019/2034 have to be met at all relevant times, including when instruments used for variable remuneration are called, redeemed, repurchased or converted. In such situations, instruments should therefore be replaced with Additional Tier 1, Tier 2 and Other Instruments which reflect the credit quality of the investment firm as a going concern, have features equivalent to those of the instrument initially awarded, and are of the same value, taking into account any amounts which have been written down. Where instruments other than Additional Tier 1 instruments have a fixed maturity date, minimum requirements should be set for the remaining maturity of such instruments when they are awarded in order to ensure that they are consistent with requirements regarding the deferral and retention periods for variable remuneration.

(11)

Directive (EU) 2019/2034 does not limit the classes of instruments that can be used for variable remuneration to a specific class of financial instruments. It should therefore be possible to use synthetic instruments or contracts between staff members and investment firms which are linked to Additional Tier 1 instruments and Tier 2 instruments which can be fully converted or written down. This allows for the introduction of specific conditions in the terms of such instruments which apply only to instruments awarded to staff, without the need to impose such conditions on other investors.

(12)

In a group context, issuances may be managed centrally within a parent undertaking, including situations where the parent undertaking is subject to Directive 2013/36/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council (5) or Directive 2019/2034. Investment firms within a group may not always themselves issue instruments which are appropriate to be used for the purpose of variable remuneration. Regulation (EU) 2019/2033 in conjunction with Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 enables Additional Tier 1 and Tier 2 instruments issued through an entity within the scope of consolidation to form part of an investment firm’s own funds subject to certain conditions. Therefore, it should also be possible to use such instruments for the purpose of variable remuneration, provided that there is a clear link between the credit quality of the investment firm using those instruments for the purpose of variable remuneration and the credit quality of the issuer of the instrument. Such a link can usually be assumed to be the case between a parent undertaking and a subsidiary. Instruments other than Additional Tier 1 instruments and Tier 2 instruments that are not issued directly by an investment firm should also be capable of being used for variable remuneration, subject to equivalent conditions. Instruments that are linked to reference instruments issued by parent undertakings in third countries and that are otherwise equivalent to Additional Tier 1 instruments or Tier 2 instruments should be eligible to be used for the purposes of variable remuneration where the trigger event refers to the investment firm using such a synthetic instrument.

(13)

Article 32(1), point (k), of Directive (EU) 2019/2034, enables investment firms that do not issue any of the instruments referred to in Article 32(1), point (j), of that Directive, to use alternative arrangements, provided that the competent authority approves such use and provided that such arrangements fulfil the same objectives as the instruments referred to in Article 32(1), point (j), of that Directive. To fulfil the same objectives, such alternative arrangements should thus ensure that the variable remuneration awarded is subject to implicit risk adjustments. The value of such alternative arrangements should thus decrease whenever there is an adverse effect on the performance of the investment firm concerned or the assets it manages. Furthermore, where the investment firm is subject to the requirement to defer variable remuneration under Article 32(1), point (l), of Directive (EU) 2019/2034, the alternative arrangements should also be consistent with the requirement to defer variable remuneration, and with the application of malus or clawback arrangements and retention periods to variable remuneration paid in instruments.

(14)

This Regulation is based on the draft regulatory technical standards submitted to the Commission by the European Banking Authority after having consulted the European Securities and Markets Authority.

(15)

The European Banking Authority has conducted open public consultations on the draft regulatory technical standards on which this Regulation is based, analysed the potential related costs and benefits and requested the advice of the Banking Stakeholder Group established in accordance with Article 37 of Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council (6),

(1)

Rift Valley fever (RVF) is an emerging zoonotic vector-borne disease of wild and domestic ruminants caused by a virus and representing a potential cross-border threat. RVF is characterised by high rates of abortion and neonatal mortality in domestic ruminants. In humans, the disease mainly develops as an influenza-like illness, where a minority of patients may develop encephalitis or even severe hepatic disease with haemorrhagic manifestations. RVF is on the list of notifiable animal diseases (2) of the World Organisation for Animal Health (OIE).

(2)

In March 2019, the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC) published a rapid risk assessment to address the risk of importation of RVF virus and further spread of the virus within the Union and the European Economic Area (EEA) in relation to the increase in cases reported in Mayotte (3). The assessment highlighted that, although the risk from these outbreaks was very low for the Union and the EEA in terms of introduction of RVF virus through the legal trade of animals and animal products, the illegal transport of fresh meat, unpasteurised milk and untreated products from infected ruminants in personal luggage could pose a risk. The ECDC concluded that if the virus was introduced into the continental part of the Union and the EEA, further vector-borne transmission among animals could not be excluded.

(3)

In addition, the European Food Safety Authority (EFSA) adopted a scientific opinion on RVF on 23 January 2020 (4), indicating that the risk of spread of RVF into countries neighbouring the Union and the risk of possible introduction of infected vectors into the Union should not be ignored.

(4)

The risk of RVF entering the Union means that the Union should establish adequate surveillance and control measures against this disease, in accordance with Regulation (EU) 2016/429 of the European Parliament and of the Council (5), which establishes a legislative framework for the prevention and control of listed diseases. In accordance with the Annex to Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2018/1882 (6), RVF is considered as a category A, D and E disease, for which immediate eradication measures are to be taken as soon as it is detected.

(5)

The Union has in place adequate surveillance and disease control measures against RVF to ensure its immediate eradication if the disease enters into the Union. In order for these measures to continue being effective, they should also include appropriate preparedness and available resources to fight against the disease, taking also into account the zoonotic potential of the disease. In that respect, it is considered necessary to provide sufficient laboratory testing capacity, since the good quality of such testing capacity is essential to implement the surveillance and disease control measures and avoid, therefore, that the disease enters the Union.

(6)

So far, the Union has not established a European Union reference laboratory for RVF. The designation of a reference laboratory is essential to be able to apply surveillance and disease control measures on a scientific basis and in a homogeneous manner throughout the Union territory.

(7)

This Regulation should therefore establish a European Union reference laboratory for RVF to contribute to ensure the effectiveness of official controls and to coordinate assistance to official laboratories,

(1)

The European Commission (‘the Commission’) received a request for an exemption from the anti-dumping and countervailing measures applicable to imports of biodiesel consigned from Canada, whether declared as originating in Canada or not, as far as Verbio Diesel Canada Corporation (‘the applicant’) is concerned, pursuant to Article 13(4) of the basic anti-dumping Regulation and Article 23(6) of the basic anti-subsidy Regulation.

(2)

The request was submitted on 7 September 2021 by the applicant, who is an exporting producer of biodiesel in Canada (‘the country concerned’).

(3)

The product under review is fatty-acid mono-alkyl esters and/or paraffinic gasoil obtained from synthesis and/or hydro-treatment, of non-fossil origin, commonly known as ‘biodiesel’, in pure form or in a blend containing by weight more than 20 % of fatty-acid mono-alkyl esters and/or paraffinic gasoil obtained from synthesis and/or hydro- treatment, of non-fossil origin, consigned from Canada, whether declared as originating in Canada or not, currently falling under CN codes ex 1516 20 98 (TARIC code 1516209821), ex 1518 00 91 (TARIC code 1518009121), ex 1518 00 99 (TARIC code 1518009921), ex 2710 19 43 (TARIC code 2710194321), ex 2710 19 46 (TARIC code 2710194621), ex 2710 19 47 (TARIC code 2710194721), ex 2710 20 11 (TARIC code 2710201121), ex 2710 20 16 (TARIC code 2710201621), ex 3824 99 92 (TARIC code 3824999210), ex 3826 00 10 (TARIC codes 3826001020, 3826001050, 3826001089) and ex 3826 00 90 (TARIC code 3826009011).

(4)

By Regulations (EC) No 598/2009 (5) and (EC) No 599/2009 (6), the Council imposed definitive countervailing and anti-dumping duties on imports of biodiesel originating in the United States of America.

(5)

These measures were extended by Council Implementing Regulations (EU) No 443/2011 (7) and (EU) No 444/2011 (8), to imports of biodiesel consigned from Canada, whether declared as originating in Canada or not.

(6)

The measures currently in force are imposed by Implementing Regulation (EU) 2021/1266 following an expiry review pursuant to Article 11(2) of the basic anti-dumping Regulation and by Implementing Regulation (EU) 2021/1267 following an expiry review pursuant to Article 18(2) of the basic anti-subsidy Regulation.

(7)

The applicant alleged that it did not export the product under review to the Union during the investigation period used in the investigation that led to the extended measures as adopted by Implementing Regulations (EU) No 443/2011 and (EU) No 444/2011, namely the period from 1 April 2009 to 30 June 2010 (‘the original IP’). According to the evidence submitted by the applicant, the applicant was only legally created in 2019, whereas the plant was built and opened after the original IP in 2012.

(8)

In addition, the applicant provided evidence that it is a genuine producer and alleged that it has not circumvented the existing measures.

(9)

The applicant further claimed that after the original IP, in July 2021, it exported the product under review to the Union.

(10)

The Commission examined the evidence available and concluded that there was sufficient evidence to justify the initiation of an investigation pursuant to Article 13(4) of the basic anti-dumping Regulation and to Article 23(6) of the basic anti-subsidy Regulation for the purpose of determining the possibility of granting the applicant an exemption from the extended measures.

(11)

The Union industry known to be concerned was informed of the request for a review and was given an opportunity to comment. No comments were received.

(12)

In its investigation, the Commission will pay particular attention to the applicant’s relationship with the companies subject to the existing measures in order to ensure that it was not established in order to be used to circumvent the measures. The Commission will also consider whether particular monitoring conditions should be imposed in case the investigation will conclude that granting the exemption is warranted.

(13)

In line with Article 11(4) of the basic anti-dumping Regulation, in cases of new exporters in the exporting country in question which have not exported the product during the period of investigation on which the measures were based, the anti-dumping duty in force should be repealed with regard to imports of the product under review which are produced and sold for export to the Union by the applicant.

(14)

At the same time, such imports should be made subject to registration in accordance with Article 14(5) of the basic anti-dumping Regulation in order to ensure that, should the review result in a finding of circumvention in respect of the applicant, anti-dumping duties can be levied from the date of the registration of these imports. The amount of the applicant’s possible future liabilities would be equal to the duty applicable to ‘all other companies’ in Article 1(2) of Implementing Regulation (EU) 2021/1266 (172,2 EUR/tonne).

(15)

Since the basic anti-subsidy Regulation does not provide for the repeal of the countervailing duties in cases where exporters were not individually investigated during the original investigation, these measures will remain in force. Only if the review should result in the finding that the applicant is entitled to an exemption, will the anti-subsidy measures in force be repealed with regard to the applicant.

(16)

The investigation will cover the period from 1 April 2009 to 30 September 2021 (‘review investigation period’).

(17)

In order to obtain information it deems necessary for its investigation, the Commission will send a questionnaire to the applicant. The applicant must submit the completed questionnaire within 37 days of the date of entry into force of this Regulation, unless otherwise specified, pursuant to Article 6(2) of the basic anti-dumping Regulation and Article 11(2) of the basic anti-subsidy Regulation.

(18)

Subject to the provisions of this Regulation, all interested parties are invited to make their views known, submit information and provide supporting evidence. Unless otherwise specified, this information and supporting evidence must reach the Commission within 37 days of the date of entry into force of this Regulation.

(19)

All interested parties may request to be heard by the Commission investigation services. Any request to be heard must be made in writing and must specify the reasons for the request. For hearings on issues pertaining to the initiation of the investigation, the request must be submitted within 15 days of the date of entry into force of this Regulation. Thereafter, a request to be heard must be submitted within the specific deadlines set by the Commission in its communication with the parties.

(20)

Information submitted to the Commission for the purpose of trade defence investigations shall be free from copyrights. Interested parties, before submitting to the Commission information and/or data that is subject to third party copyrights, must request specific permission to the copyright holder explicitly allowing the Commission a) to use the information and data for the purpose of this trade defence proceeding and b) to provide the information and/or data to interested parties to this investigation in a form that allows them to exercise their rights of defence.

(21)

All written submissions, including the information requested in this Regulation, completed questionnaires and correspondence provided by interested parties for which confidential treatment is requested shall be labelled ‘Sensitive’. Parties submitting information in the course of this investigation are invited to reason their request for confidential treatment.

(22)

Parties providing ‘Sensitive’ information are required to furnish non-confidential summaries of it pursuant to Article 19(2) of the basic anti-dumping Regulation and Article 29(2) of the basic anti-subsidy Regulation, which will be labelled ‘For inspection by interested parties’. Those summaries should be sufficiently detailed to permit a reasonable understanding of the substance of the information submitted in confidence.

(23)

If a party providing ‘Sensitive’ information fails to show good cause for a confidential treatment request or does not furnish a non-confidential summary of it in the requested format and quality, the Commission may disregard such information unless it can be satisfactorily demonstrated from appropriate sources that the information is correct.

(24)

Interested parties are invited to make all submissions and requests by email including scanned powers of attorney and certification sheets, with the exception of voluminous replies which should be submitted on a portable digital storage medium (CD-ROM, DVD, USB flash drive) by hand or by registered mail. By using email, interested parties express their agreement with the rules applicable to electronic submissions contained in the document ‘CORRESPONDENCE WITH THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION IN TRADE DEFENCE CASES’ published on the website of the Directorate-General for Trade: http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2011/june/tradoc_148003.pdf

(25)

The interested parties must indicate their name, address, telephone and a valid email address and they should ensure that the provided email address is a functioning official business email, which is checked on a daily basis. Once contact details are provided, the Commission will communicate with interested parties by email only, unless they explicitly request to receive all documents from the Commission by another means of communication or unless the nature of the document to be sent requires the use of a registered mail. For further rules and information concerning correspondence with the Commission including principles that apply to submissions by email, interested parties should consult the communication instructions with interested parties referred to above.

Commission address for correspondence:

Email: TRADE-R752-BIODIESEL-EXEMPTION@ec.europa.eu

(26)

In order to guarantee the rights of defence, interested parties should have the possibility to comment on information submitted by other interested parties. When doing so, interested parties may only address issues raised in the other interested parties’ submissions and may not raise new issues. Comments on the information provided by other interested parties in reaction to the disclosure of the definitive findings should be submitted within 5 days from the deadline to comment on the definitive findings, unless otherwise specified. If there is an additional final disclosure, comments filed by other interested parties in reaction to this further disclosure should be made within 1 day from the deadline to comment on this further disclosure, unless otherwise specified. The outlined timeframe is without prejudice to the Commission’s right to request additional information from interested parties in duly justified cases.

(27)

Any extension to the time limits provided for in this Regulation should only be requested in exceptional circumstances and will only be granted if duly justified upon good cause being shown.

(28)

In any event, any extension to the deadline to reply to questionnaires will be limited normally to 3 days, and as a rule will not exceed 7 days.

(29)

Regarding time limits for the submission of other information specified in the Regulation, extensions will be limited to 3 days unless exceptional circumstances are demonstrated.

(30)

In cases where any interested party refuses access to or does not provide the necessary information within the time limits, or significantly impedes the investigation, findings, affirmative or negative, may be made on the basis of facts available, in accordance with Article 18 of the basic anti-dumping Regulation and Article 28 of the basic anti-subsidy Regulation.

(31)

Where it is found that any interested party has supplied false or misleading information, the information may be disregarded and use may be made of facts available.

(32)

If an interested party does not cooperate or cooperates only partially and findings are therefore based on facts available in accordance with Article 18 of the basic anti-dumping Regulation and Article 28 of the basic anti-subsidy Regulation, the result may be less favourable to that party than if it had cooperated.

(33)

Failure to give a computerised response will not be deemed to constitute non-cooperation, provided that the interested party shows that presenting the response as requested would result in an unreasonable extra burden or unreasonable additional cost. The interested party should immediately contact the Commission.

(34)

Interested parties may request the intervention of the Hearing Officer in trade proceedings. The Hearing Officer acts as an interface between the interested parties and the Commission investigation services. The Hearing Officer reviews requests for access to the file, disputes regarding the confidentiality of documents, requests for extension of time limits and requests by third parties to be heard. The Hearing Officer may organise a hearing with an individual interested party and mediate to ensure that the interested parties’ rights of defence are being fully exercised. The Hearing Officer will also provide opportunities for a hearing involving parties to take place, which would allow different views to be presented and rebuttal arguments offered.

(35)

A request for a hearing with the Hearing Officer should be made in writing and should specify the reasons for the request. For hearings on issues pertaining to the initial stage of the investigation, parties are invited to submit their request within 15 days of the date of entry into force of this Regulation. Thereafter, requests to be heard by the Hearing Officer shall be submitted at the earliest possible time following the occurrence of the event justifying such intervention. The Hearing Officer will examine the reasons for requests for interventions, the nature of the issues raised and the impact of those issues on the rights of defence, having due regard to the interests of good administration and the timely completion of the investigation.

(36)

For further information and contact details interested parties may consult the Hearing Officer’s web pages on DG Trade’s website: http://ec.europa.eu/trade/trade-policy-and-you/contacts/hearing-officer/

(37)

The investigation will be concluded, pursuant to Article 11(5) of the basic anti-dumping Regulation and to Article 22(1) of the basic anti-subsidy Regulation, within nine months of the date of the entry into force of this Regulation.

(38)

Any personal data collected in this investigation will be treated in accordance with Regulation (EU) 2018/1725 of the European Parliament and of the Council (9).

(39)

A data protection notice that informs all individuals of the processing of personal data in the framework of Commission’s trade defence activities is available on DG TRADE’s website: http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/accessing-markets/trade-defence/

(1)

Classical swine fever is an infectious viral disease affecting kept and wild porcine animals and can have a severe impact on the concerned animal population and the profitability of farming causing disturbance to movements of consignments of those animals and products thereof within the Union and exports to third countries.

(2)

Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2021/934 (2) was adopted within the framework of Regulation (EU) 2016/429, and it lays down special disease control measures regarding classical swine fever to be applied for a limited period of time by the Member States listed in Annex I thereto in the restricted zones listed in that Annex.

(3)

Taking into account the effectiveness of the surveillance and control measures undertaken in Bulgaria in accordance with Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2020/687 (3) and Implementing Regulation (EU) 2021/934, as presented by Bulgaria to the Standing Committee on Plants, Animals, Food and Feed, and in view of the favourable epidemiological situation of classical swine fever in that Member State, the whole territory of Bulgaria currently listed as a restricted zone in Annex I to Implementing Regulation (EU) 2021/934 should now be deleted from that Annex.

(4)

Implementing Regulation (EU) 2021/934 should therefore be amended accordingly.

(5)

In view of the improvements in the epidemiological situation of classical swine fever in Bulgaria and in order to ensure no undue restrictions concerning that disease, the amendments to be made to Implementing Regulation (EU) 2021/934 by this Regulation should take effect as soon as possible.

(6)

The measures provided for in this Regulation are in accordance with the opinion of the Standing Committee on Plants, Animals, Food and Feed,

(1)

The European Globalisation Adjustment Fund for Displaced Workers (EGF) aims to demonstrate solidarity and promote decent and sustainable employment in the Union by providing support for workers made redundant and self-employed persons whose activity has ceased in the course of major restructuring events and assisting them in returning to decent and sustainable employment as soon as possible.

(2)

The EGF is not to exceed a maximum annual amount of EUR 186 million (in 2018 prices), as laid down in Article 8 of Council Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2020/2093 (3).

(3)

On 25 June 2021, Spain submitted an application to mobilise the EGF, in respect of workers’ displacements in the economic sector classified under the Statistical classification of economic activities in the European Community (‘NACE’) (4) Revision 2 division 25 (Manufacture of fabricated metal products, except machinery and equipment) in the Nomenclature of Territorial Units for Statistics (‘NUTS’) (5) level 2 region of País Vasco (ES21) in Spain. It was supplemented by additional information provided in accordance with Article 8(5) of Regulation (EU) 2021/691. That application complies with the conditions for a financial contribution from the EGF as laid down in Article 13 of Regulation (EU) 2021/691.

(4)

The EGF should, therefore, be mobilised in order to provide a financial contribution of EUR 1 214 607 in respect of the application submitted by Spain.

(5)

In order to minimise the time taken to mobilise the EGF, this decision should apply from the date of its adoption,

(1)

On 7 December 2020, the Council adopted Decision (CFSP) 2020/1999 (1).

(2)

The measures set out in Articles 2 and 3 of Decision (CFSP) 2020/1999 apply as regards the natural and legal persons, entities and bodies listed in the Annex to Decision (CFSP) 2020/1999 until 8 December 2021.

(3)

On the basis of a review of the Annex to Decision (CFSP) 2020/1999, the measures set out in Articles 2 and 3 of that Decision as regards the natural and legal persons, entities and bodies listed in that Annex should be extended until 8 December 2022, except as regards one deceased person, whose entry should be removed from that Annex. The entries concerning seven persons included in that Annex should be updated.

(4)

Decision (CFSP) 2020/1999 should therefore be amended accordingly,

(1)

On 19 November 2018, the Council adopted Decision (CFSP) 2018/1788 (1).

(2)

Decision (CFSP) 2018/1788 provides for a 36-month implementation period for the activities referred to in Article 1 thereof from the date of the conclusion of the agreement referred to in Article 3(3) thereof.

(3)

The implementing partner, the United Nations Development Programme, acting on behalf of the South-Eastern and Eastern Europe Clearinghouse for the control of Small Arms and Light Weapons, requested an extension of the implementation period of Decision (CFSP) 2018/1788 until 17 October 2022, in view of the delay in the implementation of project activities under Decision (CFSP) 2018/1788 due to the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic.

(4)

The continuation of the activities referred to in Article 1 of Decision (CFSP) 2018/1788 until 17 October 2022 can be performed without any consequences as regards financial resources.

(5)

Article 5(2) of Decision (CFSP) 2018/1788 should therefore be amended accordingly,