5.6.2019

Official Journal of the European Union

L 146/3

COMMISSION IMPLEMENTING REGULATION (EU) 2019/912

of 28 May 2019

amending Implementing Regulation (EU) No 650/2014 laying down implementing technical standards with regard to the format, structure, contents list and annual publication date of the information to be disclosed by competent authorities in accordance with Directive 2013/36/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council

(Text with EEA relevance)

THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION,

Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

Having regard to Directive 2013/36/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on access to the activity of credit institutions and the prudential supervision of credit institutions and investment firms, amending Directive 2002/87/EC and repealing Directives 2006/48/EC and 2006/49/EC (1), and in particular Article 143(3) thereof,

Whereas:

(1)

Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) No 650/2014 (2) specifies the format, structure, contents list and annual publication date of the information to be published by competent authorities in accordance with Article 143 of Directive 2013/36/EU. The information required to be published by competent authorities in accordance with that Implementing Regulation should now be updated to ensure consistency with changes that have been made to the framework for prudential supervision of institutions.

(2)

It is important that the information published by competent authorities is of high quality and easily comparable. Article 5 of Implementing Regulation (EU) No 650/2014 should therefore be amended to clarify that competent authorities should only compile aggregate statistical data from institutions that fall under their supervision, and to clarify for which period data should be reported.

(3)

Annex I to Implementing Regulation (EU) No 650/2014 sets out the templates for publishing information on the laws, regulations, administrative rules and general guidance adopted in each Member State. That Annex should be amended to provide more useful and relevant information on how competent authorities carry out supervision in their jurisdictions.

(4)

Annex II to Implementing Regulation (EU) No 650/2014 sets out the templates for publishing information on the options and discretions available in Union Law. That Annex should be amended to cover additional options and discretions stemming from Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2015/61 (3). It should also be amended to allow for the distinction between the transitional or permanent nature of those options and discretions, and to allow for the distinction between the application of those options and discretions to, on the one hand, credit institutions and, on the other hand, investment firms.

(5)

The implementation of the EBA Guidelines on the supervisory review and evaluation process (SREP) (4) should be more transparent. Annex III to Implementing Regulation (EU) No 650/2014 should therefore be amended to include a description of the supervisory approach to the internal liquidity adequacy assessment process (ILAAP).

(6)

Overlaps should be avoided and the comparability of the aggregate statistical data published by competent authorities should be improved. Annex IV to Implementing Regulation (EU) No 650/2014 should therefore be amended to take into account the level of prudential consolidation applied by institutions in accordance with Chapter 2 of Title II of Part One of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council (5).

(7)	To improve the quality of the published information and to allow for a more meaningful comparison of that information, the templates in the Annexes to Implementing Regulation (EU) No 650/2014 should contain detailed guidance and instructions.

(8)	This Regulation is based on the draft implementing technical standards submitted by the European Banking Authority to the Commission.

(9)

EBA has conducted open public consultations on the draft implementing technical standards on which this Regulation is based, analysed the potential related costs and benefits, and requested the opinion of the Banking Stakeholder Group established in accordance with Article 37 of Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council (6).

(10)	Implementing Regulation (EU) No 650/2014 should therefore be amended accordingly,

HAS ADOPTED THIS REGULATION:

Article 1

Implementing Regulation (EU) No 650/2014 is amended as follows:

(1)

in Article 5, the second and third paragraphs are replaced by the following:

‘Competent authorities shall update the information referred to in point (d) of Article 143(1) of that Directive by 31 July of each year. That information shall cover the preceding calendar year.

Competent authorities shall, for the institutions subject to their prudential supervision, update the information referred to in points (a) to (c) of Article 143(1) of that Directive on a regular basis, and in any event by 31 July of each year, unless there is no change in the information last published.’;

(2)	Annex I is replaced by the text in Annex I to this Regulation;

(3)	Annex II is replaced by the text in Annex II to this Regulation;

(4)	Annex III is replaced by the text in Annex III to this Regulation;

(5)	Annex IV is replaced by the text in Annex IV to this Regulation.

Article 2

This Regulation shall enter into force on the twentieth day following that of its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union.

This Regulation shall be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States.

Done at Brussels, 28 May 2019.

For the Commission

The President

Jean-Claude JUNCKER

(1) OJ L 176, 27.6.2013, p. 338.

(2) Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) No 650/2014 of 4 June 2014 laying down implementing technical standards with regard to the format, structure, contents list and annual publication date of the information to be disclosed by competent authorities in accordance with Directive 2013/36/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council (OJ L 185, 25.6.2014, p. 1).

(3) Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2015/61 of 10 October 2014 to supplement Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 of the European Parliament and the Council with regard to liquidity coverage requirement for Credit Institutions (OJ L 11, 17.1.2015, p. 1).

(4) Guidelines on common procedures and methodologies for the supervisory review and evaluation process (SREP) of 19 December 2014, EBA/GL/2014/13.

(5) Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on prudential requirements for credit institutions and investment firms and amending Regulation (EU) No 648/2012 (OJ L 176, 27.6.2013, p. 1).

(6) Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 November 2010 establishing a European Supervisory Authority (European Banking Authority), amending Decision No 716/2009/EC and repealing Commission Decision 2009/78/EC (OJ L 331, 15.12.2010, p. 12).

ANNEX I

RULES AND GUIDANCE

List of templates

Part 1	Transposition of Directive 2013/36/EU
Part 2	Model approval
Part 3	Specialised lending exposures
Part 4	Credit risk mitigation
Part 5	Specific disclosure requirements applied to institutions
Part 6	Waivers for the application of prudential requirements
Part 7	Qualifying holdings in a credit institution
Part 8	Regulatory and financial reporting

General remarks on filling in templates in Annex I

When publishing information on the general criteria and methodologies, competent authorities shall not disclose any supervisory measures directed at specific institutions, whether taken with respect to a single institution or to a group of institutions.

PART 1

Transposition of Directive 2013/36/EU

Transposition of provisions of Directive 2013/36/EU

Provisions of Directive 2013/36/EU

Links to national text (1)

Reference(s) to national provisions (2)

Available in EN (Y/N)

010

Date of the last update of information in this template

(dd/mm/yyyy)

020

I.	Subject matter, scope and definitions

Articles 1 to 3

030

II.	Competent authorities

Articles 4 to 7

040

III.	Requirements for access to the activity of credit institutions

Articles 8 to 27

050

1.	General requirements for access to the activity of credit institutions

Articles 8 to 21

060

2.	Qualifying holding in a credit institution

Articles 22 to 27

070

IV.	Initial capital of investment firms

Articles 28 to 32

080

V.	Provisions concerning the freedom of establishment and the freedom to provide services

Articles 33 to 46

090

1.	General principles

Articles 33 to 34

100

2.	The right of establishment of credit institutions

Articles 35 to 38

110

3.	Exercise of the freedom to provide services

Article 39

120

4.	Powers of the competent authorities of the host Member State

Articles 40 to 46

130

VI.	Relations with third countries

Articles 47 to 48

140

VII.	Prudential supervision

Articles 49 to 142

150

1.	Principles of prudential supervision

Articles 49 to 72

160

1.1	Competence and duties of home and host Member States

Articles 49 to 52

170

1.2	Exchange of information and professional secrecy

Articles 53 to 62

180

1.3	Duty of persons responsible for the legal control of annual and consolidated accounts

Article 63

190

1.4	Supervisory powers, powers to impose penalties and right of appeal

Articles 64 to 72

200

2.	Review processes

Articles 73 to 110

210

2.1	Internal capital adequacy assessment process

Article 73

220

2.2	Arrangements, processes and mechanisms of institutions

Articles 74 to 96

230

2.3	Supervisory review and evaluation process

Articles 97 to 101

240

2.4	Supervisory measures and powers

Articles 102 to 107

250

2.5	Level of application

Articles 108 to 110

260

3.	Supervision on a consolidated basis

Articles 111 to 127

270

3.1	Principles for conducting supervision on a consolidated basis

Articles 111 to 118

280

3.2	Financial holding companies, mixed financial holding companies and mixed-activity holding companies

Articles 119 to 127

290

4.	Capital buffers

Articles 128 to 142

300

4.1

Buffers

Articles 128 to 134

310

4.2	Setting and calculating countercyclical capital buffers

Articles 135 to 140

320

4.3	Capital conservation measures

Articles 141 to 142

330

VIII.

Disclosure by competent authorities

Articles 143 to 144

340

IX.	Amendments of Directive 2002/87/EC

Article 150

350

X.	Transitional and final provisions

Articles 151 to 165

360

1.	Transitional provisions on the supervision of institutions exercising the freedom of establishment and the freedom to provide services

Articles 151 to 159

370

2.	Transitional provisions for capital buffers

Article 160

380

3.	Final provisions

Articles 161 to 165

PART 2

Model approval

010	Date of the last update of information in this template	(dd/mm/yyyy)
		Description of the approach
	Supervisory approach for the approval of the use of Internal Ratings Based (IRB) Approach to calculate minimum capital requirements for credit risk
020	Minimum documentation to be provided by the institutions applying for the use of IRB approach	[free text]
030	Description of the assessment process conducted by the competent authority (use of self assessment, reliance on external auditors and on-site-inspections) and main criteria of the assessment	[free text]
040	Form of the decisions taken by the competent authority and communication of the decisions to applicants	[free text]
	Supervisory approach for the approval of the use of Internal Model Approach (IMA) to calculate minimum capital requirements for market risk
050	Minimum documentation to be provided by the institutions applying for the use of IMA approach	[free text]
060	Description of the assessment process conducted by the competent authority (use of self assessment, reliance on external auditors and on-site-inspections) and main criteria of the assessment	[free text]
070	Form of the decisions taken by the competent authority and communication of the decisions to applicants	[free text]
	Supervisory approach for the approval of the use of Internal Model Method (IMM) to calculate minimum capital requirements for counterparty credit risk
080	Minimum documentation to be provided by the institutions applying for the use of IMM approach	[free text]
090	Description of the assessment process conducted by the competent authority (use of self assessment, reliance on external auditors and on-site-inspections) and main criteria of the assessment	[free text]
100	Form of the decisions taken by the competent authority and communication of the decisions to applicants	[free text]
	Supervisory approach for the approval of the use of Advanced Measurement Approach (AMA) to calculate minimum capital requirements for operational risk
110	Minimum documentation to be provided by the institutions applying for the use of AMA approach	[free text]
120	Description of the assessment process conducted by the competent authority (use of self assessment, reliance on external auditors and on-site-inspections) and main criteria of the assessment	[free text]
130	Form of the decisions taken by the competent authority and communication of the decisions to applicants	[free text]

PART 3

Specialised lending exposures

	Regulation (EU) No 575/2013	Provisions	Information to be provided by the competent authority
010	Date of the last update of the information in this template		(dd/mm/yyyy)
020	Article 153(5)	Has the competent authority published guidance to specify how institutions should take into account the factors referred to in paragraph 5 of Article 153 when assigning risk weights to specialised lending exposures?	[Yes/No]
030		If so, please provide the reference to the national guidance	[reference to national text]
040		Is the national guidance available in English?	[Yes/No]

PART 4

Credit risk mitigation

	Regulation (EU) No 575/2013	Provisions	Description	Information to be provided by the competent authority
010	Date of the last update of the information in this template				(dd/mm/yyyy)
020	Article 201(2)	Publication of the list of financial institutions that are eligible providers of unfunded credit protection or guiding criteria for identifying these financial institutions	Competent authorities shall publish and maintain the list of financial institutions that are eligible providers of unfunded credit protection under point (f) of Article 201(1) of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 or the guiding criteria for identifying such eligible providers	List of the financial institutions or guiding criteria for their identification	[free text - a hyperlink to such list or guiding criteria on the competent authority's website can be provided]
030	Article 201(2)	Description of the applicable prudential requirements	Competent authorities shall publish a description of the applicable prudential requirements together with the list of the eligible financial institutions or the guiding criteria for identifying these financial institutions	Description of the prudential requirements applied by the competent authority	[free text]
040	Article 227(2)(e)	Condition for applying a 0 % volatility adjustment	Under the Financial collateral Comprehensive Method institutions may apply a 0 % volatility adjustment provided that the transaction is settled in a settlement system proven for that type of transaction	Detailed description on how the competent authority considers the settlement system as a proven system	[free text]
050	Article 227(2)(f)	Condition for applying a 0 % volatility adjustment	Under the Financial collateral Comprehensive Method institutions may apply a 0 % volatility adjustment provided that the documentation covering the agreement or transaction is standard market documentation for repurchase transactions or securities lending or borrowing transactions in the securities concerned	Specification of the documentation to be considered as standard market documentation	[free text]
060	Article 229(1)	Valuation principles for immovable property collateral under the IRB approach	The immovable property may be valued by an independent valuer at or at less than the mortgage lending value in the Member States that have laid down rigorous criteria for the assessment of this mortgage lending value in statutory or regulatory provisions	Criteria set out in the national legislation for the assessment of the mortgage lending value	[free text]

PART 5

Specific disclosure requirements applied to institutions

	Directive 2013/36/EU	Regulation (EU) No 575/2013	Provision	Information to be provided by the competent authority
010	Date of the last update of information in this template				(dd/mm/yyyy)
020	Article 106(1)(a)		Competent authorities may require institutions to publish information referred to in Part Eight of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 more than once per year, and to set deadlines for publication	Frequency and deadlines for publication applicable to institutions	[free text]
030	Article 106(1)(b)		Competent authorities may require institutions to use specific media and locations for publications other than the financial statements	Types of specific media to be used by institutions	[free text]
040		Article 13(1) and (2)	Significant subsidiaries and those which are of material significance for their local market shall disclose information specified in Part Eight of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 on an individual or sub-consolidated basis.	Criteria applied by the competent authority to assess the significance of a subsidiary	[free text]

PART 6

Waivers for the application of prudential requirements

	Regulation (EU) No 575/2013	Provisions	Description	Information to be provided by the competent authority
010	Date of the last update of the information in this template				(dd/mm/yyyy)
020	Article 7(1) and (2) (Individual waivers for subsidiaries)	Exemption from the application on an individual basis of prudential requirements set out in Parts Two to Five and Eight of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013	The waiver may be granted to any subsidiary provided that there is no current or foreseen material practical or legal impediment to the prompt transfer of own funds or repayment of liabilities by its parent undertaking pursuant to point (a) of Article 7(1).	Criteria applied by the competent authority to assess that there is no obstacle to the prompt transfer of own funds or repayment of liabilities	[free text]
030	Article 7(3) (Individual waivers for parent institutions)	Exemption from the application on an individual basis of prudential requirements set out in Parts Two to Five and Eight of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013	The waiver may be granted to a parent institution provided that there is no current or foreseen material practical or legal impediment to the prompt transfer of own funds or repayment of liabilities to the parent institution pursuant to point (a) of Article 7(3).	Criteria applied by the competent authority to assess that there is no obstacle to the prompt transfer of own funds or repayment of liabilities	[free text]
040	Article 8 (Liquidity waivers for subsidiaries)	Exemption from the application on an individual basis of liquidity requirements set out in Part Six of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013	The waiver may be granted to institutions within a sub-group provided that these institutions have entered into contracts that, to the satisfaction of the competent authorities, provide for the free movement of funds between them to enable them to meet their individual and joint obligations as they become due pursuant to point (c) of Article 8(1).	Criteria applied by the competent authority to assess whether the contracts provide for free movement of funds between the institutions in a liquidity sub-group	[free text]
050	Article 9(1) (Individual consolidation method)	Permission granted to parent institutions to incorporate subsidiaries in the calculation of their prudential requirements set out in Parts Two to Five and Eight of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013	The permission is granted only where the parent institution demonstrates fully to the competent authorities that there is no current or foreseen material practical or legal impediment to the prompt transfer of own funds, or repayment of liabilities when due by the subsidiary incorporated in the calculation of requirements to its parent institution pursuant to Article 9(2).	Criteria applied by the competent authority to assess that there is no obstacle to the prompt transfer of own funds or repayment of liabilities	[free text]
060	Article 10 (Credit institutions permanently affiliated to a central body)	Exemption from the application on an individual basis of prudential requirements set out in Parts Two to Eight of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013	Member States may maintain and make use of existing national legislation regarding the application of the waiver as long as it does not conflict with the Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 or Directive 2013/36/EU	Applicable national law / regulation regarding the application of the waiver	[reference to national text]

PART 7

Qualifying holdings in a credit institution

	Directive 2013/36/EU	Assessment criteria and information that is necessary for assessing the suitability of the proposed acquirer seeking to acquire a credit institution and the financial soundness of the proposed acquisition	Information to be provided by the competent authority
010	Date of the last update of information in this template			(dd/mm/yyyy)
020	Article 23(1)(a)	Reputation of the proposed acquirer	Description on how the competent authority assesses the integrity of the proposed acquirer	[free text]
030			Description on how the competent authority assesses the professional competence of the proposed acquirer	[free text]
040			Practical details on the cooperation process between competent authorities pursuant to Article 24 of Directive 2013/36/EU	[free text]
050	Article 23(1)(b)	Reputation, knowledge, skills and experience of any member of the management body or senior management who will direct the business of the credit institution	Description on how the competent authority assesses the reputation, knowledge, skills and experience of members of management body and senior managers	[free text]
060	Article 23(1)(c)	Financial soundness of the proposed acquirer	Description on how the competent authority assesses the financial soundness of the proposed acquirer	[free text]
070	Article 23(1)(c)	Financial soundness of the proposed acquirer	Practical details on the cooperation process between competent authorities pursuant to Article 24 of Directive 2013/36/EU	[free text]
080	Article 23(1)(d)	Compliance of the credit institution with the prudential requirements	Description on how the competent authority assesses whether or not the credit institution will be able to comply with the prudential requirements	[free text]
090	Article 23(1)(e)	Suspicion of money laundering or terrorist financing	Description on how the competent authority assesses whether or not there are reasonable grounds to suspect money laundering or terrorist financing	[free text]
100	Article 23(1)(e)	Suspicion of money laundering or terrorist financing	Practical details on the cooperation process between competent authorities pursuant to Article 24 of Directive 2013/36/EU	[free text]
110	Article 23(4)	List specifying the information to be provided to the competent authorities at the time of notification	List of information that must be provided by the proposed acquirer at the time of notification in order for the competent authority to carry out the assessment of the proposed acquirer and the proposed acquisition	[free text]

PART 8

Regulatory and financial reporting

010	Date of the last update of information in this template	(dd/mm/yyyy)
020	Implementation of the reporting on financial information in accordance with the Commission Implementing Regulation 680/2014
030	Is the application of the requirement set out in Article 99(2) of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 extended to institutions which do not apply international accounting standards as applicable under Regulation (EC) No 1606/2002?	[Yes/No]
040	If so, what accounting frameworks apply to these institutions?	[free text]
050	If so, which is the level of application of the reporting? (solo/consolidated/sub-consolidated basis)	[free text]
060	Is the application of requirements set out in Article 99(2) of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 extended to financial entities other than credit institutions or investment firms?	[Yes/No]
070	If so, what types of financial entities (e.g. financial firms) are subject to these reporting requirements?	[free text]
080	If so, what is the size of these financial entities in terms of total balance sheet (on a solo basis)?	[free text]
090	Are XBRL standards used for submitting the reporting to the competent authority?	[Yes/No]
100	Implementation of the reporting on own funds and own funds requirements in accordance with the Commission Implementing Regulation 680/2014
110	Is the application of requirements set out in Article 99(1) of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 extended to financial entities other than credit institutions or investment firms?	[Yes/No]
120	If so, what accounting frameworks apply to these financial entities?	[free text]
130	If so, what types of financial entities (e.g. financial firms) are subject to these reporting requirements?	[free text]
140	If so, what is the size of these financial entities in terms of total balance sheet (on a solo basis)?	[free text]
150	Are XBRL standards used for submitting the reporting to the competent authority?	[Yes/No]

(1) Hyperlink(s) to the website containing the national text transposing the Union provision in question.

(2) Detailed references to the national provisions, such as relevant Title, Chapter, paragraph etc.

ANNEX II

OPTIONS AND DISCRETIONS

List of templates

Part 1	Options and discretions set out in Directive 2013/36/EU, Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 and LCR Delegated Regulation (EU) 2015/61
Part 2	Transitional options and discretions set out in Directive 2013/36/EU and Regulation (EU) No 575/2013
Part 3	Variable elements of remuneration (Article 94 of Directive 2013/36/EU)

Competent authorities shall not disclose supervisory actions or decisions directed at specific institutions. When publishing information on the general criteria and methodologies, competent authorities shall not disclose any supervisory measures directed at specific institutions, whether taken with respect to a single institution or to a group of institutions.

PART 1

Options and discretions set out in Directive 2013/36/EU, Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 and LCR Delegated Regulation (EU) 2015/61

Directive 2013/36/EU

Regulation (EU) No 575/2013

LCR delegated regulation (EU) 2015/61

Adressee

Scope

Denomination

Description of the option or discretion

Exercised (Y/N/NA) (1)

National text (2)

Reference(s) (3)

Available in EN (Y/N)

Details / Comments

010

Date of the last update of information in this template

(dd/mm/yyyy)

020

Article 9(2)

Member States

Credit Institutions

Exception to the prohibition against persons or undertakings other than credit institutions from taking deposits or other repayable funds from the public

The prohibition against persons or undertakings other than credit institutions from carrying out the business of taking deposits or other repayable funds from the public shall not apply to a Member State, a Member State's regional or local authorities, a public international bodies of which one or more Member States are members, or to cases expressly covered by national or union law, provided that those activities are subject to regulations and controls intended to protect depositors and investors.

[Y/N/NA]

Mandatory if Y

030

Article 12(3)

Member States

Credit Institutions

Initial capital

Member States may decide that credit institutions which do not fulfil the requirements to hold separate own funds and which were in existence on 15 December 1979 may continue to carry out their business.

[Y/N/NA]

Mandatory if Y

040

Article 12(3)

Member States

Credit Institutions

Initial capital

Credit Institutions for which Member States have decided that they can continue to carry out their business according to Article 12(3) of Directive 2013/36/EU may be exempted by MS from complying with the requirements contained in the first subparagraph of Article 13(1) of Directive 2013/36/EU.

[Y/N/NA]

Mandatory if Y

050

Article 12(4)

Member States

Credit Institutions

Initial capital

Member States may grant authorisation to particular categories of credit institutions the initial capital of which is less that EUR 5 million, provided that the initial capital is not less than EUR 1 million and the Member State concerned notifies the Commission and EBA of its reasons for exercising that option.

[Y/N/NA]

Mandatory if Y

060

Article 21(1)

Competent Authorities

Credit Institutions

Exemptions for credit institutions permanently affiliated to a central body

Competent authorities may exempt with regard to credit institutions permanently affiliated to a central body from the requirements set out in Articles 10, 12 and 13(1) of Directive 2013/36/EU.

[Y/N/NA]

Mandatory if Y

070

Article 29(3)

Member States

Investment Firms

Initial capital of particular types of investment firms

Member States may reduce the minimum amount of initial capital from EUR 125 000 to EUR 50 000 where a firm is not authorised to hold client money or securities, to deal for its own account, or to underwrite issues on a firm commitment basis.

[Y/N/NA]

Mandatory if Y

080

Article 32(1)

Member States

Investment Firms

Investment firms' initial capital grandfathering clause

Member States may continue authorising investment firm and firms covered by Article 30 of Directive 2013/36/EU which were in existence on or before 31 December 1995, the own funds of which are less than the initial capital levels specified for them in Article 28(2), Article 29(1) or (3) or Article 30 of that Directive.

[Y/N/NA]

Mandatory if Y

090

Article 40

Competent Authorities

Credit Institutions

Reporting requirements to host competent authorities

The competent authorities of host Member States may, for information, statistical or supervisory purposes, require that all credit institutions having branches within their territories shall report to them periodically on their activities in those host Member States, in particular to assess whether a branch is significant in accordance with Article 51(1) of Directive 2013/36/EU.

[Y/N/NA]

Mandatory if Y

100

Article 129(2)

Member States

Investment Firms

Exemption from the requirement to maintain a capital conservation buffer for small and medium-sized investment firms

By way of derogation from paragraph 1 of Article 129, a Member State may exempt small and medium-sized investment firms from the requirements set out in that paragraph if such an exemption does not threaten the stability of the financial system of that Member State.

[Y/N/NA]

Mandatory if Y

110

Article 130(2)

Member States

Investment Firms

Exemption from the requirement to maintain a countercyclical capital buffer for small and medium-sized investment firms

By way of derogation from paragraph 1 of Article 130, a Member State may exempt small and medium-sized investment firms from the requirements set out in that paragraph if such an exemption does not threaten the stability of the financial system of that Member State.

[Y/N/NA]

Mandatory if Y

120

Article 133(18)

Member States

Credit Institutions and Investment firms

Requirement to maintain a systemic risk buffer

Member States may apply a systemic risk buffer to all exposures.

[Y/N/NA]

Mandatory if Y

130

Article 134(1)

Member States

Credit Institutions and Investment firms

Recognition of a systemic risk buffer rate

Other Member States may recognise the systemic risk buffer rate set according to Article 133 and may apply that buffer rate to domestically authorised institutions for the exposures located in the Member State setting that buffer rate.

[Y/N/NA]

Mandatory if Y

140

Article 152 first paragraph

Member Stattes

Credit Institutions

Reporting requirements to host competent authorities

The competent authorities of host Member States may, for statistical purposes, require that all credit institutions having branches within their territories shall report to them periodically on their activities in those host Member States.

[Y/N/NA]

Mandatory if Y

150

Article 152 second paragraph

Member States

Credit Institutions

Reporting requirements to host competent authorities

Host Member States may require that branches of credit institutions from other Member States provide the same information as they require from national credit institutions for that purpose.

[Y/N/NA]

Mandatory if Y

160

Article 160(6)

Member States

Credit Institutions and Investment firms

Transitional provisions for capital buffers

Member States may impose a shorter transitional period for capital buffers than that specified in paragraphs 1 to 4 of Article 160. Such a shorter transitional period may be recognised by other Member States.

[Y/N/NA]

Mandatory if Y

170

Article 4(2)

Member States or Competent Authorities

Credit Institutions and Investment firms

Treatment of indirect holdings in real estate

Member States or their competent authorities may allow shares constituting an equivalent indirect holding of immovable property to be treated as a direct holding of immovable property provided that such indirect holding is specifically regulated in the national law of the Member State and, when pledged as collateral, provides equivalent protection to creditors.

[Y/N/NA]

Mandatory if Y

180

Article 6(4)

Competent Authorities

Investment Firms

Application of requirements on an individual basis

Pending the report from the Commission in accordance with Article 508(3), competent authorities may exempt investment firms from compliance with the obligations laid down in Part Six (liquidity) taking into account the nature, scale and complexity of the investment firms' activities.

[Y/N/NA]

Mandatory if Y

190

Article 24(2)

Reporting and the compulsory use of IFRS

Competent authorities may require that institutions effect the valuation of assets and off-balance sheet items and the determination of own funds in accordance with International Accounting Standards as applicable under Regulation (EC) No 1606/2002).

[Y/N/NA]

Mandatory if Y

200

Article 89(3)

Competent Authorities

Credit Institutions and Investment firms

Risk weighting and prohibition of qualifying holdings outside the financial sector

Competent authorities apply the following requirements to qualifying holdings of institutions referred to in paragraphs 1 and 2:

for the purpose of calculating the capital requirement in accordance with Part Three of this Regulation, institutions shall apply a risk weight of 1 250 % to the greater of the following:

(i)	the amount of qualifying holdings referred to in paragraph 1 in excess of 15 % of eligible capital;

(ii)	the total amount of qualifying holdings referred to in paragraph 2 that exceed 60 % of the eligible capital of the institution;

[Y/N/NA]

Mandatory if Y

201

Article 89(3)

Competent Authorities

Credit Institutions and Investment firms

Risk weighting and prohibition of qualifying holdings outside the financial sector

Competent authorities apply the following requirements to qualifying holdings of institutions referred to in paragraphs 1 and 2:

the competent authorities shall prohibit institutions from having qualifying holdings referred to in paragraphs 1 and 2 the amount of which exceeds the percentages of eligible capital laid down in those paragraphs.

[Y/N/NA]

Mandatory if Y

210

Article 95(2)

Competent Authorities

Investment Firms

Requirements for investment firms with limited authorisation to provide investment services

Competent authorities may set the own fund requirements for investment firms with limited authorisation to provide investment services as the own fund requirements that would be binding on those firms according to the national transposition measures in force on 31 December 2013 for Directive 2006/49/EC and Directive 2006/48/EC.

[Y/N/NA]

Mandatory if Y

220

Article 99(3)

Competent Authorities

Credit Institutions

Reporting on own funds requirements and financial information

Competent authorities may require those credit institutions applying international accounting standards as applicable under Regulation (EC) No 1606/2002 for the reporting of own funds on a consolidated basis pursuant to Article 24(2) of this Regulation to also report financial information as laid down in paragraph 2 of this Article.

[Y/N/NA]

Mandatory if Y

230

Article 124(2)

Competent Authorities

Credit Institutions and Investment firms

Risk weights and criteria applied to exposures secured by mortgages on immovable property

Competent authorities may set a higher risk weight or stricter criteria than those set out in Article 125(2) and Article 126(2), where appropriate, on the basis of financial stability considerations.

[Y/N/NA]

Mandatory if Y

240

Article 129(1)

Exposures in the form of covered bonds

The competent authorities may, after consulting EBA, partly waive the application of point (c) of the first subparagraph and allow credit quality step 2 for up to 10 % of the total exposure of the nominal amount of outstanding covered bonds of the issuing institution, provided that significant potential concentration problems in the Member States concerned can be documented due to the application of the credit quality step 1 requirement referred to in that point.

[Y/N/NA]

Mandatory if Y

250

Article 164(5)

Competent Authorities

Credit Institutions and Investment firms

Minimum values of exposure weighted average Loss Given Default (LGD) for exposures secured by property

Based on the data collected under Article 101 and taking into account forward-looking immovable property market developments and any other relevant indicators, the competent authorities shall periodically, and at least annually, assess whether the minimum LGD values in paragraph 4 of this Article are appropriate for exposures secured by residential property or commercial immovable property located in their territory. Competent authorities may, where appropriate on the basis of financial stability considerations, set higher minimum values of exposure weighted average LGD for exposures secured by immovable property in their territory.

[Y/N/NA]

Mandatory if Y

260

Article 178(1)(b)

Competent Authorities

Credit Institutions and Investment firms

Default of an obligor

Competent authorities may replace the 90 days with 180 days for exposures secured by residential property or SME commercial immovable property in the retail exposure class, as well as exposures to public sector entities.

[Y/N/NA]

Mandatory if Y

270

Article 284(4)

Competent Authorities

Credit Institutions and Investment firms

Exposure value

Competent authorities may require an α higher than 1.4 or permit institutions to use their own estimates in accordance with Article 284 (9)

[Y/N/NA]

Mandatory if Y

280

Article 284(9)

Competent Authorities

Credit Institutions and Investment firms

Exposure value

Competent authorities may permit institutions to use their own estimates of alpha

[Y/N/NA]

Mandatory if Y

290

Article 327(2)

Competent Authorities

Credit Institutions and Investment firms

Netting between a convertible and an offsetting position in the underlying instrument

Competent authorities may adopt an approach under which the likelihood of a particular convertible's being converted is taken into account or require an own funds requirement to cover any loss which conversion might entail.

[Y/N/NA]

Mandatory if Y

300

Article 395(1)

Competent Authorities

Large exposure limits for exposures to institutions

Competent authorities may set a lower large exposure limit than EUR 150 000 000 for exposures to institutions.

[Y/N/NA]

Mandatory if Y

310

Article 400(2)(a) 493(3)(a)

Competent Authorities

Exemptions or partial exemptions to large exposures limits

Competent authorities may fully or partially exempt covered bonds falling within the terms of Article 129(1), (3) and (6).

[Y/N/NA]

Mandatory if Y

320

Article 400(2)(b) 493(3)(b)

Competent Authorities

Exemptions or partial exemptions to large exposures limits

Competent authorities may fully or partially exempt asset items constituting claims on regional governments or local authorities of Member States.

[Y/N/NA]

Mandatory if Y

330

Article 400(2)(c) 493(3)(c)

Competent Authorities

Exemptions or partial exemptions to large exposures limits

Competent authorities may fully or partially exempt exposures incurred by an institution to its parent undertaking or subsidiaries.

[Y/N/NA]

Mandatory if Y

340

Article 400(2)(d) 493(3)(d)

Competent Authorities

Exemptions or partial exemptions to large exposures limits

Competent authorities may fully or partially exempt exposures to regional or central credit institutions with which the credit institution is associated in a network and which are responsible for cash-clearing operations within the network.

[Y/N/NA]

Mandatory if Y

350

Article 400(2)(e) 493(3)(e)

Competent Authorities

Exemptions or partial exemptions to large exposures limits

Competent authorities may fully or partially exempt exposures to credit institutions incurred by credit institutions, one of which operates on a non-competitive basis and provides or guarantees loans under legislative programmes or its statutes, to promote specified sectors of the economy under some form of government oversight and restrictions on the use of the loans, provided that the respective exposures arise from such loans that are passed on to the beneficiaries via credit institutions or from the guarantees of these loans.

[Y/N/NA]

Mandatory if Y

360

Article 400(2)(f) 493(3)(f)

Competent Authorities

Exemptions or partial exemptions to large exposures limits

Competent authorities may fully or partially exempt exposures to institutions, provided that those exposures do not constitute such institutions' own funds, do not last longer than the following business day and are not denominated in a major trading currency.

[Y/N/NA]

Mandatory if Y

370

Article 400(2)(g) 493(3)(g)

Competent Authorities

Exemptions or partial exemptions to large exposures limits

Competent authorities may fully or partially exempt exposures to central banks in the form of required minimum reserves held at those central banks which are denominated in their national currencies.

[Y/N/NA]

Mandatory if Y

380

Article 400(2)(h) 493(3)(h)

Competent Authorities

Exemptions or partial exemptions to large exposures limits

Competent authorities may fully or partially exempt exposures to central governments in the form of statutory liquidity requirements held in government securities which are denominated and funded in their national currencies provided that, at the discretion of the competent authority, the credit assessment of those central governments assigned by a nominated External Credit Assessment Institution is investment grade.

[Y/N/NA]

Mandatory if Y

390

Article 400(2)(i) 493(3)(i)

Competent Authorities

Exemptions or partial exemptions to large exposures limits

Competent authorities may fully or partially exempt 50 % of medium/low risk off-balance sheet documentary credits and of medium/low risk off-balance sheet undrawn credit facilities referred to in Annex I and subject to the competent authorities' agreement, 80 % of guarantees other than loan guarantees which have a legal or regulatory basis and are given for their members by mutual guarantee schemes possessing the status of credit institutions.

[Y/N/NA]

Mandatory if Y

400

Article 400(2)(j) 493(3)(j)

Competent Authorities

Exemptions or partial exemptions to large exposures limits

Competent authorities may fully or partially exempt legally required guarantees used when a mortgage loan financed by issuing mortgage bonds is paid to the mortgage borrower before the final registration of the mortgage in the land register, provided that the guarantee is not used as reducing the risk in calculating the risk-weighted exposure amounts.

[Y/N/NA]

Mandatory if Y

410

Article 400(2)(k) 493(3)(k)

Competent Authorities

Exemptions or partial exemptions to large exposures limits

Competent authorities may fully or partially exempt assets items constituting claims on and other exposures to recognised exchanges.

[Y/N/NA]

Mandatory if Y

420

Article 412(5)

Member States

Credit Institutions

Liquidity coverage requirement

Member States may maintain or introduce national provisions in the area of liquidity requirements before binding minimum standards for liquidity coverage requirements are specified and fully introduced in the Union in accordance with Article 460.

[Y/N/NA]

Mandatory if Y

430

Article 412(5)

Member States or Competent Authorities

Credit Institutions

Liquidity coverage requirement

Member states or competent authorities may require domestically authorised institutions, or a subset of those institutions to maintain a higher liquidity coverage requirement up to 100 % until the binding minimum standard is fully introduced at a rate of 100 % in accordance with Article 460.

[Y/N/NA]

Mandatory if Y

440

Article 413(3)

Member States

Credit Institutions

Stable funding requirement

Member States may maintain or introduce national provisions in the area of stable funding requirements before binding minimum standards for net stable funding requirements are specified and introduced in the Union in accordance with Article 510.

[Y/N/NA]

Mandatory if Y

450

Article 415(3)

Competent Authorities

Credit Institutions

Liquidity reporting requirements

Competent authorities may continue to collect information through monitoring tools for the purpose of monitoring compliance with existing national liquidity standards, until the full introduction of binding liquidity requirements.

[Y/N/NA]

Mandatory if Y

460

Article 420(2)

Competent Authorities

Credit Institutions

Liquidity outflow rate

The competent authorities may apply an outflow rate up to 5 % for trade finance off-balance sheet related products, as referred to in Article 429 and Annex 1.

[Y/N/NA]

Mandatory if Y

470

Article 467(2)

Competent Authorities

Credit Institutions and Investment firms

Transitional treatment of unrealised losses measured at fair value

By way of derogation from paragraph 1 of Article 467, the competent authorities may, in cases where such treatment was applied before 1 January 2014, allow institutions not to include in any element of own funds unrealised gains or losses on exposures to central governments classified in the ‘Available for Sale’ category of EU-endorsed IAS 39.

[Y/N/NA]

Mandatory if Y

480

Article 467(3) second subparagraph

Competent Authorities

Credit Institutions and Investment firms

Transitional treatment of unrealised losses measured at fair value

Competent authorities shall determine and publish the applicable percentage in the ranges specified in points (a) to (d) of paragraph 2 of Article 467.

[Y/N/NA]

Mandatory if Y

490

Article 468(2)

Competent Authorities

Credit Institutions and Investment firms

Transitional treatment of unrealised gains measured at fair value

Competent authorities may permit institutions to include in the calculation of their Common Equity Tier 1 capital 100 % of their unrealised gains at fair value where under Article 467 institutions are required to include their unrealised losses measured at fair value in the calculation of Common Equity Tier 1 capital.

[Y/N/NA]

Mandatory if Y

500

Article 468(3)

Competent Authorities

Credit Institutions and Investment firms

Transitional treatment of unrealised gains measured at fair value

Competent authorities shall determine and publish the applicable percentage of unrealised gains in the ranges specified in points (a) to (c) of paragraph 2 of Article 468 that is removed from Common Equity Tier 1 capital.

[Y/N/NA]

Mandatory if Y

510

Article 471(1)

Competent Authorities

Credit Institutions and Investment firms

Exemption from deduction of equity holding in insurance companies from CET1 items

By way of derogation from Article 49(1), during the period from 1 January 2014 to 31 December 2022, competent authorities may permit institutions to not deduct equity holdings in insurance undertakings, reinsurance undertakings and insurance holding companies where the conditions set out in paragraph 1 of Article 471 are met.

[Y/N/NA]

Mandatory if Y

520

Article 473(1)

Competent Authorities

Credit Institutions and Investment firms

Introduction of amendments to IAS 19

By way of derogation from Article 481 during the period from 1 January 2014 until 31 December 2018, competent authorities may permit institutions that prepare their accounts in conformity with the international accounting standards adopted in accordance with the procedure laid down in Article 6(2) of Regulation (EC) No 1606/2002 to add to their Common Equity Tier 1 capital the applicable amount in accordance with paragraph 2 or 3 of Article 473, as applicable, multiplied by the factor applied in accordance with paragraph 4 of Article 473.

[Y/N/NA]

Mandatory if Y

530

Article 478(3)

Competent Authorities

Credit Institutions and Investment firms

Transitional deductions from Common Equity Tier 1, Additional Tier 1 and Tier 2 items

Competent authorities shall determine and publish an applicable percentage in the ranges specified in paragraphs 1 and 2 of Article 478 for each of the following deductions:

(a)	the individual deductions required pursuant to points (a) to (h) of Article 36(1), excluding deferred tax assets that rely on future profitability and arise from temporary differences;

(b)	the aggregate amount of deferred tax assets that rely on future profitability and arise from temporary differences and the items referred to in point (i) of Article 36(1) that is required to be deducted pursuant to Article 48;

(c)	each deduction required pursuant to points (b) to (d) of Article 56;

(d)	each deduction required pursuant to points (b) to (d) of Article 66.

[Y/N/NA]

Mandatory if Y

540

Article 479(4)

Competent Authorities

Credit Institutions and Investment firms

Transitional recognition in consolidated Common Equity Tier 1 capital of instruments and items that do not qualify as minority interests

Competent authorities shall determine and publish the applicable percentage in the ranges specified in paragraph 3 of Article 479.

[Y/N/NA]

Mandatory if Y

550

Article 480(3)

Competent Authorities

Credit Institutions and Investment firms

Transitional recognition of minority interests and qualifying Additional Tier 1 and Tier 2 capital

Competent authorities shall determine and publish the value of the applicable factor in the ranges specified in paragraph 2 of Article 480.

[Y/N/NA]

Mandatory if Y

560

Article 481(5)

Competent Authorities

Credit Institutions and Investment firms

Additional transitional filters and deductions

For each filter or deduction referred to in paragraphs 1 and 2 of Article 481, competent authorities shall determine and publish the applicable percentages in the ranges specified in paragraphs 3 and 4 of that Article

[Y/N/NA]

Mandatory if Y

570

Article 486(6)

Competent Authorities

Credit Institutions and Investment firms

Limits for grandfathering of items within Common Equity Tier 1, Additional Tier 1 and Tier 2 items

Competent authorities shall determine and publish the applicable percentages in the ranges specified in paragraph 5 of Article 486.

[Y/N/NA]

Mandatory if Y

580

Article 495(1)

Competent Authorities

Credit Institutions and Investment firms

Transitional treatment of equity exposures under the IRB approach

By way of derogation from Chapter 3 of Part Three, until 31 December 2017, the competent authorities may exempt from the IRB treatment certain categories of equity exposures held by institutions and EU subsidiaries of institutions in that Member State as at 31 December 2007.

[Y/N/NA]

Mandatory if Y

590

Article 496(1)

Competent Authorities

Credit Institutions and Investment firms

Transitional provision on the calculation of own fund requirements for exposures in the form of covered bonds

Until 31 December 2017, competent authorities may waive in full or in part the 10 % limit for senior units issued by French Fonds Communs de Créances or by securitisation entities which are equivalent to French Fonds Communs de Créances laid down in points (d) and (f) of Article 129(1), provided that conditions specified in points (a) and (b) of Article 496(1) are fulfilled.

[Y/N/NA]

Mandatory if Y

600

Article 10(1)(b)(iii)

Competent Authorities

Credit Institutions

LCR - Liquid assets

The liquidity reserve held by the credit institution in a central bank is recognisable as Level 1 asset provided that it can be withdrawn in times of stress. The purposes under which central bank reserves may be withdrawn for the purposes of this Article must be specified in an agreement between the CA and the ECB or the central bank.

[Y/N/NA]

Mandatory if Y

610

Article 10(2)

Competent Authorities

Credit Institutions

LCR - Liquid assets

The market value of extremely high quality covered bonds referred to in paragraph 1(f) shall be subject to a haircut of at least 7 %. Except as specified in relation to shares and units in CIUs in points (a) and (b) of Article 15(2), no haircut shall be required on the value of the remaining level 1 assets.

Those cases where the higher haircuts were set to an entire asset class (all assets subject to a specific and differentiated haircut in the LCR Delegated Regulation) (e.g. to all level 1 covered bonds, etc.).

[Y/N/NA]

Mandatory if Y

620

Article 12(1)(c)(i)

Competent Authorities

Credit Institutions

LCR - Level 2B assets

Shares may constitute level 2B assets provided that they form part of a major stock index in a MS or in a third country, as identified as such by the CA of a MS or the relevant public authority in a third country.

[Y/N/NA]

Mandatory if Y

630

Article 12(3)

Competent Authorities

Credit Institutions

LCR - Level 2B assets

For credit institutions which in accordance with their statutes of incorporation are unable for reasons of religious observance to hold interest bearing assets, the competent authority may allow to derogate from points (ii) and (iii) of paragraph 1(b) of this Article, provided there is evidence of insufficient availability of non-interest bearing assets meeting these requirements and the non-interest bearing assets in question are adequately liquid in private markets.

[Y/N/NA]

Mandatory if Y

640

Article 24(6)

Competent Authorities

Credit Institutions

LCR - Outflows from stable deposits in a third country qualifying for the 3 % rate

Credit institutions may be authorised by their competent authority to multiply by 3 % the amount of the retail deposits covered by a deposit guarantee scheme in a third country equivalent to the scheme referred to in paragraph 1 if the third country allows this treatment.

[Y/N/NA]

Mandatory if Y

PART 2

Transitional options and discretions set out in Directive 2013/36/EU and Regulation (EU) No 575/2013

Directive 2013/36/EU

Regulation (EU) No 575/2013

Adressee

Scope

Denomination

Description of the option or discretion

Year(s) of application and the value in % (if applicable)

Exercised (Y/N/NA)

National text

References

Available in EN (Y/N)

Details / Comments

010

Date of the last update of information in this template

(dd/mm/yyyy)

011

Article 160(6)

Member States

Credit Institutions and Investment firms

Transitional provisions for capital buffers

[Year]

[Y/N/NA]

Mandatory if Y

012

Article 493(3)(a)

Member States

Credit Institutions and Investment firms

Exemptions or partial exemptions to large exposures limits

Competent authorities may fully or partially exempt covered bonds falling within the terms of Article 129(1), (3) and (6).

[Year]

[Y/N/NA]

Mandatory if Y

013

Article 493(3)(b)

Member States

Credit Institutions and Investment firms

Exemptions or partial exemptions to large exposures limits

Competent authorities may fully or partially exempt asset items constituting claims on regional governments or local authorities of Member States.

[Year]

[Y/N/NA]

Mandatory if Y

014

Article 493(3)(c)

Member States

Credit Institutions and Investment firms

Exemptions or partial exemptions to large exposures limits

Competent authorities may fully or partially exempt exposures incurred by an institution to its parent undertaking or subsidiaries.

[Year]

[Y/N/NA]

Mandatory if Y

015

Article 493(3)(d)

Member States

Credit Institutions and Investment firms

Exemptions or partial exemptions to large exposures limits

[Year]

[Y/N/NA]

Mandatory if Y

016

Article 493(3)(e)

Member States

Credit Institutions and Investment firms

Exemptions or partial exemptions to large exposures limits

[Year]

[Y/N/NA]

Mandatory if Y

017

Article 493(3)(f)

Member States

Credit Institutions and Investment firms

Exemptions or partial exemptions to large exposures limits

[Year]

[Y/N/NA]

Mandatory if Y

018

Article 493(3)(g)

Member States

Credit Institutions and Investment firms

Exemptions or partial exemptions to large exposures limits

Competent authorities may fully or partially exempt exposures to central banks in the form of required minimum reserves held at those central banks which are denominated in their national currencies.

[Year]

[Y/N/NA]

Mandatory if Y

019

Article 493(3)(h)

Member States

Credit Institutions and Investment firms

Exemptions or partial exemptions to large exposures limits

[Year]

[Y/N/NA]

Mandatory if Y

020

Article 493(3)(i)

Member States

Credit Institutions and Investment firms

Exemptions or partial exemptions to large exposures limits

[Year]

[Y/N/NA]

Mandatory if Y

021

Article 493(3)(j)

Member States

Credit Institutions and Investment firms

Exemptions or partial exemptions to large exposures limits

[Year]

[Y/N/NA]

Mandatory if Y

022

Article 493(3)(k)

Member States

Credit Institutions and Investment firms

Exemptions or partial exemptions to large exposures limits

Competent authorities may fully or partially exempt assets items constituting claims on and other exposures to recognised exchanges.

[Year]

[Y/N/NA]

Mandatory if Y

023

Article 412(5)

Member States

Credit Institutions

Liquidity coverage requirement

[Year]

[Y/N/NA]

Mandatory if Y

024

Article 412(5)

Member States or Competent Authorities

Credit Institutions

Liquidity coverage requirement

[Year]

[Y/N/NA]

Mandatory if Y

025

Article 413(3)

Member States

Credit Institutions

Stable funding requirement

[Year]

[Y/N/NA]

Mandatory if Y

026

Article 415(3)

Competent Authorities

Credit Institutions

Liquidity reporting requirements

[Year]

[Y/N/NA]

Mandatory if Y

027

Article 467(2)

Competent Authorities

Credit Institutions and Investment firms

Transitional treatment of unrealised losses measured at fair value

[Year]

[Y/N/NA]

Mandatory if Y

028

Article 467(3)

Competent Authorities

Credit Institutions and Investment firms

Transitional treatment of unrealised losses measured at fair value

Applicable percentage of unrealised losses pursuant to Article 467(1) that are included in the calculation of Common Equity Tier 1 items (percentage in the ranges specified in paragraph 2 of that Article)

2014 (20 % to 100 %)

[Y/N/NA]

Mandatory if Y

029

2015 (40 % to 100 %)

[Y/N/NA]

Mandatory if Y

030

2016 (60 % to 100 %)

[Y/N/NA]

Mandatory if Y

031

2017 (80 % to 100 %)

[Y/N/NA]

Mandatory if Y

032

Article 468(2) 2nd subparagrap

Competent Authorities

Credit Institutions and Investment firms

Transitional treatment of unrealised gains measured at fair value

[Year]

[Y/N/NA]

Mandatory if Y

033

Article 468(3)

Competent Authorities

Credit Institutions and Investment firms

Transitional treatment of unrealised gains measured at fair value

2015 (60 % to 100 %)

[Y/N/NA]

Mandatory if Y

034

2016 (40 % to 100 %)

[Y/N/NA]

Mandatory if Y

035

2017 (20 % to 100 %)

[Y/N/NA]

Mandatory if Y

036

Article 471(1)

Competent Authorities

Credit Institutions and Investment firms

Exemption from deduction of equity holding in insurance companies from CET1 items

[Year]

[Y/N/NA]

Mandatory if Y

037

Article 473(1)

Competent Authorities

Credit Institutions and Investment firms

Introduction of amendments to IAS 19

[Year]

[Y/N/NA]

Mandatory if Y

038

Article 478(2)

Credit Institutions and Investment firms

Deduction from Common Equity Tier 1 items for deferred tax assets that existed prior to 1 January 2014

Applicable percentage if the alternative applies (percentage in the ranges specified in paragraph 2 of Article 478)

2014 (0 % to 100 %)

[Y/N/NA]

Mandatory if Y

039

2015 (10 % to 100 %)

[Y/N/NA]

Mandatory if Y

040

2016 (20 % to 100 %)

[Y/N/NA]

Mandatory if Y

041

2017 (30 % to 100 %)

[Y/N/NA]

Mandatory if Y

042

2018 (40 % to 100 %)

[Y/N/NA]

Mandatory if Y

043

2019 (50 % to 100 %)

[Y/N/NA]

Mandatory if Y

044

2020 (60 % to 100 %)

[Y/N/NA]

Mandatory if Y

045

2021 (70 % to 100 %)

[Y/N/NA]

Mandatory if Y

046

2022 (80 % to 100 %)

[Y/N/NA]

Mandatory if Y

047

2023 (90 % to 100 %)

[Y/N/NA]

Mandatory if Y

048

Article 478(3)(a)

Credit Institutions and Investment firms

Transitional deductions from Common Equity Tier 1, Additional Tier 1 and Tier 2 items

Competent authorities shall determine and publish an applicable percentage in the ranges specified in paragraphs 1 and 2 of Article 478 for (a) the individual deductions required pursuant to points (a) to (h) of Article 36(1), excluding deferred tax assets that rely on future profitability and arise from temporary differences;

2014 (20 % to 100 %)

[Y/N/NA]

Mandatory if Y

049

2015 (40 % to 100 %)

[Y/N/NA]

Mandatory if Y

050

2016 (60 % to 100 %)

[Y/N/NA]

Mandatory if Y

051

2017 (80 % to 100 %)

[Y/N/NA]

Mandatory if Y

052

Article 478(3)(b)

Credit Institutions and Investment firms

Transitional deductions from Common Equity Tier 1, Additional Tier 1 and Tier 2 items

Competent authorities shall determine and publish an applicable percentage in the ranges specified in paragraphs 1 and 2 of Article 478 for (b) the aggregate amount of deferred tax assets that rely on future profitability and arise from temporary differences and the items referred to in point (i) of Article 36(1) that is required to be deducted pursuant to Article 48;

2014 (20 % to 100 %)

[Y/N/NA]

Mandatory if Y

053

2015 (40 % to 100 %)

[Y/N/NA]

Mandatory if Y

054

2016 (60 % to 100 %)

[Y/N/NA]

Mandatory if Y

055

2017 (80 % to 100 %)

[Y/N/NA]

Mandatory if Y

056

Article 478(3)(c)

Credit Institutions and Investment firms

Transitional deductions from Common Equity Tier 1, Additional Tier 1 and Tier 2 items

Competent authorities shall determine and publish an applicable percentage in the ranges specified in paragraphs 1 and 2 of Article 478 for (c) each deduction required pursuant to points (b) to (d) of Article 56;

2014 (20 % to 100 %)

[Y/N/NA]

Mandatory if Y

057

2015 (40 % to 100 %)

[Y/N/NA]

Mandatory if Y

058

2016 (60 % to 100 %)

[Y/N/NA]

Mandatory if Y

059

2017 (80 % to 100 %)

[Y/N/NA]

Mandatory if Y

060

Article 478(3)(d)

Credit Institutions and Investment firms

Transitional deductions from Common Equity Tier 1, Additional Tier 1 and Tier 2 items

Competent authorities shall determine and publish an applicable percentage in the ranges specified in paragraphs 1 and 2 of Article 478 for (d) each deduction required pursuant to points (b) to (d) of Article 66.

2014 (20 % to 100 %)

[Y/N/NA]

Mandatory if Y

061

2015 (40 % to 100 %)

[Y/N/NA]

Mandatory if Y

062

2016 (60 % to 100 %)

[Y/N/NA]

Mandatory if Y

063

2017 (80 % to 100 %)

[Y/N/NA]

Mandatory if Y

064

Article 479(4)

Credit Institutions and Investment firms

Transitional recognition in consolidated Common Equity Tier 1 capital of instruments and items that do not qualify as minority interests

Competent authorities shall determine and publish the applicable percentage in the ranges specified in paragraph 3 of Article 479.

2014 (0 % to 80 %)

[Y/N/NA]

Mandatory if Y

065

2015 (0 % to 60 %)

[Y/N/NA]

Mandatory if Y

066

2016 (0 % to 40 %)

[Y/N/NA]

Mandatory if Y

067

2017 (0 % to 20 %)

[Y/N/NA]

Mandatory if Y

068

Article 480(3)

Credit Institutions and Investment firms

Transitional recognition of minority interests and qualifying Additional Tier 1 and Tier 2 capital

Competent authorities shall determine and publish the value of the applicable factor in the ranges specified in paragraph 2 of Article 480.

2014 (0,2 to 1,0)

[Y/N/NA]

Mandatory if Y

069

2015 (0,4 to 1,0)

[Y/N/NA]

Mandatory if Y

070

2016 (0,6 to 1,0)

[Y/N/NA]

Mandatory if Y

071

2017 (0,8 to 1,0)

[Y/N/NA]

Mandatory if Y

072

Article 481(1)

Credit Institutions and Investment firms

Applicable percentage if a single percentage applies (percentage in the ranges specified in paragraph 3 of Article 481)

2014 (0 % to 80 %)

[Y/N/NA]

Mandatory if Y

073

2015 (0 % to 60 %)

[Y/N/NA]

Mandatory if Y

074

2016 (0 % to 40 %)

[Y/N/NA]

Mandatory if Y

075

2017 (0 % to 20 %)

[Y/N/NA]

Mandatory if Y

076

Article 481(5)

Additional transitional filters and deductions

2014 (0 % to 80 %)

[Y/N/NA]

Mandatory if Y

077

2015 (0 % to 60 %)

[Y/N/NA]

Mandatory if Y

078

2016 (0 % to 40 %)

[Y/N/NA]

Mandatory if Y

079

2017 (0 % to 20 %)

[Y/N/NA]

Mandatory if Y

080

Article 486(6)

Credit Institutions and Investment firms

Limits for grandfathering of items within Common Equity Tier 1, Additional Tier 1 and Tier 2 items

Applicable percentage for determining the limits for grandfathering of items within Common Equity Tier 1 items pursuant to paragraph 2 of Article 486 (percentage in the ranges specified in paragraph 5 of that Article)

2014 (60 % to 80 %)

[Y/N/NA]

Mandatory if Y

081

2015 (40 % to 70 %)

[Y/N/NA]

Mandatory if Y

082

2016 (20 % to 60 %)

[Y/N/NA]

Mandatory if Y

083

2017 (0 % to 50 %)

[Y/N/NA]

Mandatory if Y

084

2018 (0 % to 40 %)

[Y/N/NA]

Mandatory if Y

085

2019 (0 % to 30 %)

[Y/N/NA]

Mandatory if Y

086

2020 (0 % to 20 %)

[Y/N/NA]

Mandatory if Y

087

2021 (0 % to 10 %)

[Y/N/NA]

Mandatory if Y

088

Applicable percentage for determining the limits for grandfathering of items within Additional Tier 1 items pursuant to paragraph 3 of Article 486 (percentage in the ranges specified in paragraph 5 of that Article)

2014 (60 % to 80 %)

[Y/N/NA]

Mandatory if Y

089

2015 (40 % to 70 %)

[Y/N/NA]

Mandatory if Y

090

2016 (20 % to 60 %)

[Y/N/NA]

Mandatory if Y

091

2017 (0 % to 50 %)

[Y/N/NA]

Mandatory if Y

092

2018 (0 % to 40 %)

[Y/N/NA]

Mandatory if Y

093

2019 (0 % to 30 %)

[Y/N/NA]

Mandatory if Y

094

2020 (0 % to 20 %)

[Y/N/NA]

Mandatory if Y

095

2021 (0 % to 10 %)

[Y/N/NA]

Mandatory if Y

096

Applicable percentage for determining the limits for grandfathering of items within Tier 2 items pursuant to paragraph 4 of Article 486 (percentage in the ranges specified in paragraph 5 of that Article)

2014 (60 % to 80 %)

[Y/N/NA]

Mandatory if Y

097

2015 (40 % to 70 %)

[Y/N/NA]

Mandatory if Y

098

2016 (20 % to 60 %)

[Y/N/NA]

Mandatory if Y

099

2017 (0 % to 50 %)

[Y/N/NA]

Mandatory if Y

100

2018 (0 % to 40 %)

[Y/N/NA]

Mandatory if Y

101

2019 (0 % to 30 %)

[Y/N/NA]

Mandatory if Y

102

2020 (0 % to 20 %)

[Y/N/NA]

Mandatory if Y

103

2021 (0 % to 10 %)

[Y/N/NA]

Mandatory if Y

104

Article 495(1)

Credit Institutions and Investment firms

Transitional treatment of equity exposures under the IRB approach

[Year]

[Y/N/NA]

Mandatory if Y

105

Article 496(1)

Credit Institutions and Investment firms

Transitional provision on the calculation of own fund requirements for exposures in the form of covered bonds

[Year]

[Y/N/NA]

Mandatory if Y

PART 3

Variable elements of remuneration (Article 94 of Directive 2013/36 EU)

	Directive 2013/36/EU	Adressee	Scope	Provisions	Information to disclose	Exercised (Y/N/NA)	References	Available in EN (Y/N)	Details / Comments
010	Date of the last update of information in this template				(dd/mm/yyyy)
020	Article 94(1)(g)(i)	Member States or Competent Authorities	Credit Institutions and Investment firms	Maximum ratio between the variable and fixed components of remuneration (% set in national law calculated as variable component divided by fixed component of remuneration)	[Value in %]	[Y/N]	Mandatory if Y	Mandatory if Y
030	Article 94(1)(g)(ii)	Member States or Competent Authorities	Credit Institutions and Investment firms	Maximum level of the ratio between the variable and fixed components of remuneration which may be approved by shareholders or owners or members of the institution (% set in national law calculated as variable component divided by fixed component of remuneration)	[Value in %]	[Y/N]	Mandatory if Y	Mandatory if Y
040	Article 94(1)(g)(iii)	Member States or Competent Authorities	Credit Institutions and Investment firms	Maximum part of the total variable remuneration to which the discount rate may be applied (% of the total variable remuneration)	[Value in %]	[Y/N]	Mandatory if Y	Mandatory if Y
050	Article 94(1)(l)	Member States or Competent Authorities	Credit Institutions and Investment firms	Description of any restriction on the types and designs or prohibitions of instruments that can be used for the purposes of awarding variable remuneration	[Free text/value]	[Y/N]	Mandatory if Y	Mandatory if Y

(1) ‘Y’ (Yes) indicates that the competetent authority or Member State empowered to exercise the relevant option or discretion has exercised it.

‘N’ (No) Indicates that the competetent authority or Member State empowered to exercise the relevant option or discretion has not exercised it.

‘NA’ (Not applicable) indicates that the exercise of the option is not possible or the discretion does not exist.

(2) The text of the provision in the national legislation.

(3) Reference in the national legislation and hyperlink(s) to the website containing the national text transposing the Union provision in question.

ANNEX III

Supervisory review and evaluation process (SREP) (1)

010

Date of the last update of information in this template

(dd/mm/yyyy)

020

Scope of application of SREP

(Articles 108 to 110 of CRD)

Description of the approach of the competent authority to the scope of application of SREP including:

—	what types of institutions are covered by/excluded from SREP, especially if the scope is different from those specified in Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 and Directive 2013/36/EU;

—	a high-level overview of how the competent authority takes into account the principle of proportionality when considering the scope of SREP and frequency of assessment of various SREP elements (2).

[free text or reference or hyperlink to such guidance]

030

Assessment of SREP elements

(Articles 74 to 96 of CRD)

Description of the approach of the competent authority to the assessment of individual SREP elements (as referred to in EBA Guidelines on common procedures and methodologies for SREP- EBA/GL/2014/13) including:

—

a high-level overview of the assessment process and methodologies applied to the assessment of SREP elements, including: (1) business model analysis, (2) assessment of internal governance and institution-wide controls, (3) assessment of risks to capital, and (4) assessment of risks to liquidity and funding;

—	a high-level overview of how the competent authority takes into account the principle of proportionality when assessing individual SREP elements, including how the categorisation of institutions have been applied (3).

[free text or reference or hyperlink to such guidance]

040

Review and evaluation of ICAAP and ILAAP

(Articles 73, 86, 97, 98 and 103 of CRD)

Description of the approach of the competent authority to the review and evaluation of the internal capital adequacy assessment process (ICAAP) and internal liquidity adequacy assessment process (ILAAP) as part of the SREP, and, in particular, for assessing the reliability of the ICAAP and ILAAP capital and liquidity calculations for the purposes of determining additional own funds and quantitative liquidity requirements including (4):

—	an overview of the methodology applied by the competent authority to review the ICAAP and ILAAP of institutions;

—	Information/reference to the competent authority requirements for submission of ICAAP and ILAAP related information, in particular covering what information need to be submitted;

—	information on whether an independent review of the ICAAP and ILAAP is required from the institution.

[free text or reference or hyperlink to such guidance]

050

Overall SREP assessment and supervisory measures

(Articles 102 and 104 of CRD)

Description of the approach of the competent authority to the overall SREP assessment (summary) and application of supervisory measures on the basis of the overall SREP assessment (5).

Description of how SREP outcomes are linked to the application of early intervention measures according to Article 27 of Directive 2014/59/EU and determination of conditions whether the institution can be considered failing or likely to fail according to Article 32 of that Directive (6).

[free text or reference or hyperlink to such guidance]

(1) Competent authorities shall disclose the criteria and methodologies used in rows 020 to 040 and in row 050 for the overall assessment. The type of information that shall be disclosed in form of an explanatory note is described in the second column.

(2) The scope of SREP to be considered both at a level of an institution and in respect of its own resources.

A competent authority shall explain the approach used to classify institutions into different categories for SREP purposes, describing the use of quantitative and qualitative criteria, and how financial stability or other overall supervisory objectives are affected by such categorisation.

A competent authority shall also explain how categorisation is put in practice for the purposes of ensuring at least a minimum engagement in SREP assessments, including the description of the frequencies for the assessment of all SREP elements for different categories of institutions.

(3) Including working tools e.g. on-site inspections and off-site examinations, qualitative and quantitative criteria, statistical data used in the assessments. Hyperlinks to any guidance on the website are recommended.

(4) Competent authorities shall also explain how the assessment of ICAAP and ILAAP is covered by the minimum engagement models applied for proportionality purposes based on SREP categories as well as how proportionality is applied for the purposes of specifying supervisory expectations to ICAAP and ILAAP, and in particular, any guidelines or minimum requirements for the ICAAP and ILAAP the competent authorities have issued.

(5) The approach competent authorities apply to arrive to the overall SREP assessment and its communication to the institutions. The overall assessment by competent authorities is based on a review of all the elements referred to in row 020 to 040, along with any other relevant information about the institution that the competent authority may obtain.

(6) Competent authorities may also disclose the policies that guide their decisions for taking supervisory measures (within the meaning of Articles 102 and 104 of the CRD) and early intervention measures (within the meaning of Article 27 of the Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive (BRRD)) whenever their assessment of an institution identifies weaknesses or inadequacies that call for supervisory intervention. Such disclosures might include the publication of internal guidelines or other documents describing general supervisory practices. However, no disclosure is required regarding decisions on individual institutions, to respect the confidentiality principle.

Furthermore, competent authorities may provide information regarding the implications if an institution violates relevant legal provisions or does not comply with the supervisory or early intervention measures imposed based on the SREP outcomes, e.g. it shall list enforcement procedures that are in place (where applicable).

ANNEX IV

AGGREGATE STATISTICAL DATA

List of templates

Part 1	Consolidated data per Competent Authority
Part 2	Data on credit risk
Part 3	Data on market risk
Part 4	Data on operational risk
Part 5	Data on supervisory measures and administrative penalties
Part 6	Data on waivers

General remarks on filling in templates in Annex IV

—

Numerical cells shall include only numbers. There shall be no references to national currencies. The currency used is euros and non-euro area Member States shall convert their national currencies into euros using the ECB exchange rates (at the common reference date, i.e. the last day of the year under review), with one decimal place when disclosing amounts in millions.

—	Unit of disclosure shall be in millions of euro for the reported monetary amounts (hereafter – MEUR).

—	Percentages shall be disclosed with two decimals.

—	If data is not being disclosed, the reason for non-disclosure shall be provided using the EBA nomenclature, i.e. N/A (for not available) or C (for confidential).

—	The data shall be disclosed on an aggregated basis without identifying individual either credit institutions or investment firms.

—	The references to COREP templates pursuant to the Commission implementing regulation (EU) No 680/2014 are provided in Parts 1 to 4, where available.

—	Competent authorities shall collect data relating to XXXX year onwards on consolidated basis. This will ensure the consistency of the information collected.

—

The templates of this Annex shall be read in conjunction with the reporting scope of consolidation hereby defined. To ensure efficient data collection, the information for credit institutions and investment firms shall be reported separately, but the same level of consolidation shall be applied in both cases.

—

In order to ensure the coherence and comparability of reported data, the ECB shall publish only aggregate statistical data for supervised entities for which it conducts and exercises direct supervision at the reference date of the disclosure, while national competent authorities shall publish aggregate statistical data only for credit institutions not directly supervised by the ECB.

—	Data shall be compiled only for investment firms subject to CRD. Investment firms which are not subject to CRD regime are excluded from the data collection exercise.

PART 1

Consolidated data per Competent Authority (year XXXX)

			Reference to COREP template	Data
	Number and size of credit institutions
010	Number of credit institutions			[Value]
020	Total assets of the jurisdiction (in MEUR) (1)			[Value]
030	Total assets of the jurisdiction (1) as % of GDP (2)			[Value]
	Number and size of foreign credit institutions (3)
040	From third countries	Number of branches (4)		[Value]
050		Total assets of branches (in MEUR)		[Value]
060		Number of subsidiarie (5)		[Value]
070		Total assets of subsidiaries (in MEUR)		[Value]
	Total capital and capital requirements of credit institutions
080	Total Common Equity Tier 1 capital as % of total capital (6)		CA1 (row 020 / row 010)	[Value]
090	Total Additional Tier 1 capital as % of total capital (7)		CA1 (row 530 / row 010)	[Value]
100	Total Tier 2 capital as % of total capital (8)		CA1 (row 750 / row 010)	[Value]
110	Total capital requirements (in MEUR) (9)		CA2 (row 010) * 8 %	[Value]
120	Total capital ratio (%) (10)		CA3 (row 050)	[Value]
	Number and size of investment firms
130	Number of investment firms			[Value]
140	Total assets (in MEUR) (1)			[Value]
150	Total assets as % of GDP			[Value]
	Total capital and capital requirements of investment firms
160	Total Common Equity Tier 1 capital as % of total capital (6)		CA1 (row 020 / row 010)	[Value]
170	Total Additional Tier 1 capital as % of total capital (7)		CA1 (row 530 / row 010)	[Value]
180	Total Tier 2 capital as % of total capital (8)		CA1 (row 750 / row 010)	[Value]
190	Total capital requirements (in MEUR) (9)		CA2 (row 010) *8 %	[Value]
200	Total capital ratio (%) (10)		CA3 (row 050)	[Value]

PART 2

Data on credit risk (year XXXX)

	Credit risk data			Reference to COREP template	data
	Credit institutions: Own funds requirements for credit risk
010	Credit institutions: own funds requirements for credit risk	% of total own funds requirements (11)		CA2 (row 040) / (row 010)	[Value]
020	Credit institutions: breakdown by approach	% based on the total number of credit institutions (12)	Standardised Approach (SA)		[Value]
030			IRB approach when neither own estimates of Loss Given Default nor conversion factors are used		[Value]
040			IRB approach when own estimates of Loss Given Default and/or conversion factors are used		[Value]
050		% based on total own funds requirements for credit risk	SA	CA2 (row 050) / (row 040)	[Value]
060			IRB approach when neither own estimates of Loss Given Default nor conversion factors are used	CR IRB, Foundation IRB (row 010, col 260) / CA2 (row 040)	[Value]
070			IRB approach when own estimates of Loss Given Default and/or conversion factors are used	CR IRB, Advanced IRB (row 010, col 260) / CA2 (row 040)	[Value]
080	Credit institutions: breakdown by IRB exposure class	% based on total IRB risk weighted exposure amount	IRB approach when neither own estimates of Loss Given Default nor conversion factors are used	CA2 (row 250 / row 240)	[Value]
090			Central governments and central banks	CA2 (row 260 / row 240)	[Value]
100			Institutions	CA2 (row 270 / row 240)	[Value]
110			Corporates - SME	CA2 (row 280 / row 240)	[Value]
120			Corporates - Specialised Lending	CA2 (row 290 / row 240)	[Value]
130			Corporates - Other	CA2 (row 300 / row 240)	[Value]


140			IRB approach when own estimates of Loss Given Default and/or conversion factors are used	CA2 (row 310 / row 240)	[Value]
150			Central governments and central banks	CA2 (row 320 / row 240)	[Value]
160			Institutions	CA2 (row 330 / row 240)	[Value]
170			Corporates - SME	CA2 (row 340 / row 240)	[Value]
180			Corporates - Specialised Lending	CA2 (row 350 / row 240)	[Value]
190			Corporates - Other	CA2 (row 360 / row 240)	[Value]
200			Retail - Secured by real estate SME	CA2 (row 370 / row 240)	[Value]
210			Retail - Secured by real estate non-SME	CA2 (row 380 / row 240)	[Value]
220			Retail - Qualifying revolving	CA2 (row 390 / row 240)	[Value]
230			Retail - Other SME	CA2 (row 400 / row 240)	[Value]
240			Retail - Other non-SME	CA2 (row 410 / row 240)	[Value]
250			Equity IRB	CA2 (row 420 / row 240)	[Value]
260	Securitisation positions IRB	CA2 (row 430 / row 240)	[Value]
270	Other non credit-obligation assets	CA2 (row 450 / row 240)	[Value]
	Credit risk data			Reference to COREP template	data
280	Credit institutions: Own funds requirements for credit risk
290	Credit institutions: breakdown by SA exposure class*	% based on total SA risk weighted exposure amount	Central governments or central banks	CA2 (row 070 / row 050)	[Value]
300			Regional governments or local authorities	CA2 (row 080 / row 050)	[Value]
310			Public sector entities	CA2 (row 090 / row 050)	[Value]
320			Multilateral Development Banks	CA2 (row 100 / row 050)	[Value]
330			International Organisations	CA2 (row 110 / row 050)	[Value]
340			Institutions	CA2 (row 120 / row 050)	[Value]
350			Corporates	CA2 (row 130 / row 050)	[Value]
360			Retail	CA2 (row 140 / row 050)	[Value]
370			Secured by mortgages on immovable property	CA2 (row 150 / row 050)	[Value]
380			Exposures in default	CA2 (row 160 / row 050)	[Value]
390			Items associated with particular high risk	CA2 (row 170 / row 050)	[Value]
400			Covered bonds	CA2 (row 180 / row 050)	[Value]
410			Claims on institutions and corporates with a short-term credit assessment	CA2 (row 190 / row 050)	[Value]
420			Collective investment undertakings	CA2 (row 200 / row 050)	[Value]
430			Equity	CA2 (row 210 / row 050)	[Value]
440			Other items	CA2 (row 211 / row 050)	[Value]
450			Securitisation positions SA	CA2 (row 220 / row 050)	[Value]
460	Credit institutions: breakdown by credit risk mitigation (CRM) approach	% based on the total number of credit institutions (13)	Financial collateral simple method		[Value]
470		% based on the total number of credit institutions (13)	Financial collateral comprehensive method		[Value]
	Investment firms: Own funds requirements for credit risk
480	Investment firms: own funds requirements for credit risk	% of total own funds requirements (14)		CA2 (row 040) / (row 010)	[Value]
490	Investment firms: breakdown by approach	% based on the total number of investment firms (12)	SA		[Value]
500		% based on the total number of investment firms (12)	IRB		[Value]
510		% based on total own funds requirements for credit risk (15)	SA	(CA2 (row 050) / (row 040)	[Value]
520			IRB	(CA2 (row 240) / row 040)	[Value]

	Additional information on securitisation (in MEUR)			Reference to COREP template	data
	Credit institutions: originator
530	Total amount of securitisation exposures originated on balance sheet and off-balance sheet			CR SEC SA (row 030, col 010) + CR SEC IRB (row 030, col 010)	[Value]
540	Total amount of securitisation positions retained (securitisation positions - original exposure pre conversion factors) on balance sheet and off-balance sheet			CR SEC SA (row 030, col 050) + CR SEC IRB (row 030, col 050)	[Value]

	Exposures and losses from lending collateralised by immovable property (MEUR) (16)			Reference to COREP template	data
550	Use of residential property as collateral	Sum of exposures secured by residential property (17)		CR IP Losses (row 010, col 050)	[Value]


560		Sum of losses stemming from lending up to the reference percentages (18)		CR IP Losses (row 010, col 010)	[Value]
570		Of which: immovable property valued with mortgage lending value (19)		CR IP Losses (row 010, col 020)	[Value]
580	Sum of overall losses (20)		CR IP Losses (row 010, col 030)	[Value]
590	Of which: immovable property valued with mortgage lending value (19)		CR IP Losses (row 010, col 040)	[Value]
600	Use of commercial immovable property as collateral	Sum of exposures secured by immovable commercial property (17)		CR IP Losses (row 020, col 050)	[Value]


610		Sum of losses stemming from lending up to the reference percentages (18)		CR IP Losses (row 020, col 010)	[Value]
620		Of which: immovable property valued with mortgage lending value (19)		CR IP Losses (row 020, col 020)	[Value]
630	Sum of overall losses (20)		CR IP Losses (row 020, col 030)	[Value]
640	Of which: immovable property valued with mortgage lending value (19)		CR IP Losses (row 020, col 040)	[Value]

PART 3

Data on market risk (21) (year XXXX)

	Market risk data			Reference to COREP template	data
	Credit institutions: Own funds requirements for market risk
010	Credit institutions: own funds requirements for market risk	% of total own funds requirements (22)		CA2 (row 520) / (row 010)	[Value]
020	Credit institutions: breakdown by approach	% based on the total number of credit institutions (23)	Standardised approach		[Value]
030		% based on the total number of credit institutions (23)	Internal models		[Value]
040		% based on total own funds requirements for market risk	Standardised approach	CA2 (row 530) / (row 520)	[Value]
050		% based on total own funds requirements for market risk	Internal models	CA2 (row 580) / (row 520)	[Value]
	Investment firms: Own funds requirements for market risk
060	Investment firms: own funds requirements for market risk	% of total own funds requirements (22)		CA2 (row 520) / (row 010)	[Value]
070	Investment firms: breakdown by approach	% based on the total number of investment firms (23)	Standardised approach		[Value]
080		% based on the total number of investment firms (23)	Internal models		[Value]
090		% based on total own funds requirements for market risk	Standardised approach	CA2 (row 530) / (row 520)	[Value]
100		% based on total own funds requirements for market risk	Internal models	CA2 (row 580) / (row 520)	[Value]

PART 4

Data on operational risk (year XXXX)

	Operational risk data			Reference to COREP template	data
	Credit institutions: Own funds requirements for operational risk
010	Credit institutions: own funds requirements for operational risk	% of total own funds requirements (24)		CA2 (row 590) / (row 010)	[Value]
020	Credit institutions: breakdown by approach	% based on the total number of credit institutions (25)	Basic Indicator Approach (BIA)		[Value]
030			Standardised Approach (TSA) / Alternative Standardised Approach (ASA)		[Value]
040			Advanced Measurement Approach (AMA)		[Value]
050		% based on total own funds requirements for operational risk	BIA	CA2 (row 600) / (row 590)	[Value]
060			TSA/ASA	CA2 (row 610) / (row 590)	[Value]
070			AMA	CA2 (row 620) / (row 590)	[Value]
	Credit institutions: Losses due to operational risk
080	Credit institutions: total gross loss	Total gross loss as % of total gross income (26)		OPR Details (row 920, col 080) / OPR ((sum (row 010 to row 130), col 030)	[Value]
	Investment firms: Own funds requirements for operational risk
090	Investment firms: own funds requirements for operational risk	% of total own funds requirements (24)		CA2 (row 590) / (row 010)	[Value]
100	Investment firms: breakdown by approach	% based on the total number of investment firms (25)	BIA		[Value]
110			TSA/ASA		[Value]
120			AMA		[Value]
130		% based on total own funds requirements for operational risk	BIA	CA2 (row 600) / (row 590)	[Value]
140			TSA/ASA	CA2 (row 610) / (row 590)	[Value]
150			AMA	CA2 (row 620) / (row 590)	[Value]
	Investment firms: Losses due to operational risk
160	Investment firms: total gross loss	Total gross loss as % of total gross income (26)		OPR Details (row 920, col 080) / OPR (sum (row 010 to row 130), col 030)	[Value]

PART 5

Data on supervisory measures and administrative penalties (27) (year XXXX)

	Supervisory measures		data
	Credit institutions
010	Supervisory measures taken in accordance with Article 102(1)(a)	Total number of supervisory measures taken in accordance with Article 104(1) of Directive 2013/36/EU:	[Value]
011		to hold own funds in excess of the minimum capital requirements [Article 104(1)(a)]	[Value]
012		to reinforce governance arrangements and internal capital management [Article 104(1)(b)]	[Value]
013		to present a plan to restore compliance with supervisory requirements [Article 104(1)(c)]	[Value]
014		to apply a specific provisioning policy or treatment of assets [Article 104(1)(d)]	[Value]
015		to restrict/limit business or activities [Article 104(1)(e)]	[Value]
016		to reduce the risk inherent in the activities, products and systems [Article 104(1)(f)]	[Value]
017		to limit variable remuneration [Article 104(1)(g)]	[Value]
018		to strengthen own funds by using net profits [Article 104(1)(h)]	[Value]
019		to restrict/prohibit distributions or interest payments [Article 104(1)(i)]	[Value]
020		to impose additional or more frequent reporting requirements [Article 104(1)(j)]	[Value]
021		to impose specific liquidity requirements [Article 104(1)(k)]	[Value]
022		to impose additional disclosure requirements [Article 104(1)(l)]	[Value]
023		Number and nature of other supervisory measures taken (not listed in Article 104(1) of Directive 2013/36/EU)	[Value]
024	Supervisory measures taken in accordance with Article 102(1)(b) and other provisions of Directive 2013/36/EU or Regulation (EU) No 575/2013	Total number of supervisory measures taken in accordance with Article 104(1) of Directive 2013/36/EU:	[Value]
025		to hold own funds in excess of the minimum capital requirements [Article 104(1)(a)]	[Value]
026		to reinforce governance arrangements and internal capital management [Article 104(1)(b)]	[Value]
027		to present a plan to restore compliance with supervisory requirements [Article 104(1)(c)]	[Value]
028		to apply a specific provisioning policy or treatment of assets [Article 104(1)(d)]	[Value]
029		to restrict/limit business or activities [Article 104(1)(e)]	[Value]
030		to reduce the risk inherent in the activities, products and systems [Article 104(1)(f)]	[Value]
031		to limit variable remuneration [Article 104(1)(g)]	[Value]
032		to strengthen own funds by using net profits [Article 104(1)(h)]	[Value]
033		to restrict/prohibit distributions or interest payments [Article 104(1)(i)]	[Value]
034		to impose additional or more frequent reporting requirements [Article 104(1)(j)]	[Value]
035		to impose specific liquidity requirements [Article 104(1)(k)]	[Value]
036		to impose additional disclosure requirements [Article 104(1)(l)]	[Value]
037		Number and nature of other supervisory measures taken (not listed in Article 104(1) of Directive 2013/36/EU)	[Value]

	Supervisory measures		data
	Investment firms
037	Supervisory measures taken in accordance with Article 102(1)(a)	Total number of supervisory measures taken in accordance with Article 104(1) of Directive 2013/36/EU:	[Value]
038		to hold own funds in excess of the minimum capital requirements [Article 104(1)(a)]	[Value]
039		to reinforce governance arrangements and internal capital management [Article 104(1)(b)]	[Value]
040		to present a plan to restore compliance with supervisory requirements [Article 104(1)(c)]	[Value]
041		to apply a specific provisioning policy or treatment of assets [Article 104(1)(d)]	[Value]
042		to restrict/limit business or activities [Article 104(1)(e)]	[Value]
043		to reduce the risk inherent in the activities, products and systems [Article 104(1)(f)]	[Value]
044		to limit variable remuneration [Article 104(1)(g)]	[Value]
045		to strengthen own funds by using net profits [Article 104(1)(h)]	[Value]
046		to restrict/prohibit distributions or interest payments [Article 104(1)(i)]	[Value]
047		to impose additional or more frequent reporting requirements [Article 104(1)(j)]	[Value]
048		to impose specific liquidity requirements [Article 104(1)(k)]	[Value]
049		to impose additional disclosure requirements [Article 104(1)(l)]	[Value]
050		Number and nature of other supervisory measures taken (not listed in Article 104(1) of Directive 2013/36/EU)	[Value]
051	Supervisory measures taken in accordance with Article 102(1)(b) and other provisions of Directive 2013/36/EU or Regulation (EU) No 575/2013	Total number of supervisory measures taken in accordance with Article 104(1) of Directive 2013/36/EU:	[Value]
052		to hold own funds in excess of the minimum capital requirements [Article 104(1)(a)]	[Value]
053		to reinforce governance arrangements and internal capital management [Article 104(1)(b)]	[Value]
054		to present a plan to restore compliance with supervisory requirements [Article 104(1)(c)]	[Value]
055		to apply a specific provisioning policy or treatment of assets [Article 104(1)(d)]	[Value]
056		to restrict/limit business or activities [Article 104(1)(e)]	[Value]
057		to reduce the risk inherent in the activities, products and systems [Article 104(1)(f)]	[Value]
058		to limit variable remuneration [Article 104(1)(g)]	[Value]
059		to strengthen own funds by using net profits [Article 104(1)(h)]	[Value]
060		to restrict/prohibit distributions or interest payments [Article 104(1)(i)]	[Value]
061		to impose additional or more frequent reporting requirements [Article 104(1)(j)]	[Value]
062		to impose specific liquidity requirements [Article 104(1)(k)]	[Value]
063		to impose additional disclosure requirements [Article 104(1)(l)]	[Value]
064		Number and nature of other supervisory measures taken (not listed in Article 104(1) of Directive 2013/36/EU)	[Value]

	Administrative penalties (28)		data
	Credit institutions
065	Administrative penalties (for breaches of authorisation/ acquisitions of qualifying holding requirements)	Total number of administrative penalties from Article 66(2) of Directive 2013/36/EU applied:	[Value]
066		public statements identifying the natural/legal person responsible and the nature of the breach [Article 66(2)(a)]	[Value]
067		orders requiring the natural/legal person responsible to cease the conduct and to desist from a repetition of that conduct [Article 66(2)(b)]	[Value]
068		administrative pecuniary penalties imposed on legal/natural person [points (c) to (e) of Article 66(2)]	[Value]
069		suspensions of the voting rights of shareholders [Article 66(2)(f)]	[Value]
070		Number and nature of other administrative penalties applied (not specified in Article 66(2) of Directive 2013/36/EU)	[free text]
071	Administrative penalties (for other breaches of requirements imposed by Directive 2013/36/EU or Regulation (EU) No 575/2013)	Total number of administrative penalties from Article 67(2) of Directive 2013/36/EU applied:	[Value]
072		public statements identifying the natural/legal person responsible and the nature of the breach [Article 67(2)(a)]	[Value]
073		orders requiring the natural/legal person responsible to cease the conduct and to desist from a repetition of that conduct [Article 67(2)(b)]	[Value]
074		withdrawals of authorisation of credit institution [Article 67(2)(c)]	[Value]
075		temporary bans against natural person from exercising functions in credit institutions [Article 67(2)(d)]	[Value]
076		administrative pecuniary penalties imposed on legal/natural person [points (e) to (g) of Article 67(2)]	[Value]
077		Number and nature of other administrative penalties applied (not specified in Article 67(2) of Directive 2013/36/EU)	[free text]
	Investment firms
078	Administrative penalties (for breaches of authorisation/ acquisitions of qualifying holding requirements)	Total number of administrative penalties from Article 66(2) of Directive 2013/36/EU applied:	[Value]
079		public statements identifying the natural/legal person responsible and the nature of the breach [Article 66(2)(a)]	[Value]
080		orders requiring the natural/legal person responsible to cease the conduct and to desist from a repetition of that conduct [Article 66(2)(b)]	[Value]
081		administrative pecuniary penalties imposed on a legal person [points (c) to (e) of Article 66(2)]	[Value]
082		suspensions of the voting rights of shareholders [Article 66(2)(f)]	[Value]
083		Number and nature of other administrative penalties applied (not specified in Article 66(2) of Directive 2013/36/EU)	[Value]
084	Administrative penalties (for other breaches of requirements imposed by Directive 2013/36/EU or Regulation (EU) No 575/2013)	Total number of administrative penalties from Article 66(2) of Directive 2013/36/EU applied:	[Value]
085		public statements identifying the natural/legal person responsible and the nature of the breach [Article 67(2)(a)]	[Value]
086		orders requiring the natural/legal person responsible to cease the conduct and to desist from a repetition of that conduct [Article 67(2)(b)]	[Value]
087		withdrawals of authorisation of investment firms [Article 67(2)(c)]	[Value]
088		temporary bans against natural person from exercising functions in investment firms [Article 67(2)(d)]	[Value]
089		administrative pecuniary penalties imposed on legal/natural person [points (e) to (g) of Article 67(2)]	[Value]
090		Number and nature of other administrative penalties applied (not specified in Article 67(2) of Directive 2013/36/EU)	[free text]
Competent authorities shall not disclose supervisory actions or decisions directed at specific institutions. When publishing information on the general criteria and methodologies, competent authorities shall not disclose any supervisory measures directed at specific institutions, whether taken with respect to a single institution or to a group of institutions.

PART 6

Data on waivers (29) (year XXXX)

	Exemption from the application on an individual basis of prudential requirements set out in Parts Two to Five, Seven and Eight of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013
	Legal reference in Regulation (EU) No 575/2013	Article 7(1) and (2) (waivers for subsidiaries) (30)	Article 7(3) (waivers for parent institutions)
010	Total number of waivers granted	[Value]	[Value]
011	Number of waivers granted to parent institutions which have or hold participations in subsidiaries established in third countries	N/A	[Value]
012	Total amount of consolidated own funds held in the subsidiaries established in third countries (in MEUR)	N/A	[Value]
013	Percentage of the total consolidated own funds held in subsidiaries established in third countries (%)	N/A	[Value]
014	Percentage of the consolidated own funds requirements allocated to subsidiaries established in third countries (%)	N/A	[Value]
	Permission granted to parent institutions to incorporate subsidiaries in the calculation of their prudential requirements set out in Parts Two to Five and Eight of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013
	Legal reference in Regulation (EU) No 575/2013	Article 9(1) (Individual consolidation method)
015	Total number of permissions granted	[Value]
016	Number of permissions granted to parent institutions to incorporarte subsidiaries established in third countries in the calculation of their requirement	[Value]
017	Total amount of consolidated own funds held in the subsidiaries established in third countries (in MEUR)	[Value]
018	Percentage of the total consolidated own funds held in subsidiaries established in third countries (%)	[Value]
019	Percentage of the consolidated own funds requirements allocated to subsidiaries established in third countries (%)	[Value]
	Exemption from the application on an individual basis of liquidity requirements set out in Part Six of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013
	Legal reference in Regulation (EU) No 575/2013	Article 8 (Liquidity waivers for subsidiaries)
020	Total number of waivers granted	[Value]
021	Number of waivers granted pursuant to Article 8(2) where all institutions within a single liquidity sub-group are authorised in the same Member State	[Value]
022	Number of waivers granted pursuant to Article 8(1) where all institutions within a single liquidity sub-group are authorised in several Member States	[Value]
023	Number of waivers granted pursuant to Article 8(3) to institutions which are members of the same Institutional Protection Scheme	[Value]
	Exemption from the application on an individual basis of prudential requirements set out in Parts Two to Eight of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013
	Legal reference in Regulation (EU) No 575/2013	Article 10 (Credit institutions permanently affiliated to a central body)
024	Total number of waivers granted	[Value]
025	Number of waivers granted to credit institutions permanently affiliated to a central body	[Value]
026	Number of waivers granted to central bodies	[Value]

(1) The total assets figure shall be the total assets value of the country for the national competent authorities, only for rows 020 and 030, and for the ECB the total assets value of Significant Institutions for the whole SSM.

(2) GDP at market price; suggested source – Eurostat/ECB.

(3) EEA countries shall not be included.

(4) Number of branches as defined in point (1) of Article 4(1) of CRR. Any number of places of business set up in the same country by a credit institution with headquarters in a third country should be counted as a single branch.

(5) Number of subsidiaries as defined in point (16) of Article 4(1) of CRR. Any subsidiary of a subsidiary undertaking shall be regarded as a subsidiary of the parent undertaking, which is at the head of those undertakings.

(6) Ratio of Common Equity Tier 1 capital as defined in Article 50 of CRR to the own funds as defined in point (118) of Article 4(1) and Article 72 of CRR, expressed in percentage (%).

(7) Ratio of Additional Tier 1 Capital as defined in Article 61 of CRR to the own funds as defined in point (118) of Article 4(1) and Article 72 of CRR, expressed in percentage (%).

(8) Ratio of Tier 2 Capital as defined in Article 71 of CRR to the own funds as defined in point (118) of Article 4(1) and Article 72 of CRR, expressed in percentage (%).

(9) The 8 % of total risk exposure amount as defined in Articles 92(3), 95, 96 and 98 of CRR.

(10) The ratio of the own funds to the total risk exposure amount as defined in point (c) of Article 92(2) of CRR, expressed in percentage (%).

(11) Ratio of the own fund requirements for credit risk as defined in points (a) and (f) of Article 92(3) of CRR to the total own funds as defined in Articles 92(3), 95, 96 and 98 of CRR.

(12) If an institution uses more than one approach, it shall be counted in each of these approaches. Hence, the sum of the percentages reported for the three approaches may be higher than 100 %.

(13) In the exceptional cases, where an institution uses more than one approach, it shall be counted in each of these approaches. Hence, the sum of the percentages reported may be higher than 100 %.

(14) Ratio of the own fund requirements for credit risk as defined in points (a) and (f) of Article 92(3) of CRR to the total own funds as defined in Articles 92(3), 95, 96 and 98 of CRR.

(15) The percentage of the own fund requirements of investment firms that apply the SA and IRB approach respectively in relation to the total own fund requirements for credit risk as defined in points (a) and (f) of Article 92(3) of CRR.

(16) The amount of the estimated losses shall be reported at the reporting reference date.

(17) As defined in points (c) and (f) of Article 101(1) of CRR, respectively; the market value and mortgage lending value according to points (74) and (76) of Article 4 (1); only for the part of exposure treated as fully and completely secured according to Article 124 (1) of CRR;

(18) As defined in points (a) and (d) of Article 101(1) of CRR, respectively; the market value and mortgage lending value according to points (74) and (76) of Article 4 (1).

(19) When the value of the collateral has been calculated as mortgage lending value.

(20) As defined in points (b) and (e) of Article 101(1) of CRR, respectively; the market value and mortgage lending value according to points (74) and (76) of Article 4 (1).

(21) The template shall include information on all institutions and not only on those with market risk positions.

(22) Ratio of the total risk exposure amount for position, foreign exchange and commodities risks as defined in point (i) of point (b), points (i) and (iii) of point (c) of Articles 92(3) of CRR and point (b) of Article 92(4) of CRR to the total risk exposure amount as defined in Articles 92(3), 95, 96 and 98 of CRR (in %).

(23) If an institution uses more than one approach, it shall be counted in each of these approaches. Hence, the sum of the percentages reported may be higher than 100 %, but also lower than 100 % as entities with small trading portfolio are not obliged to determine market risk.

(24) Ratio of the total risk exposure amount for operational risk as defined in Article 92(3) of CRR to the total risk exposure amount as defined in Articles 92(3), 95, 96 and 98 of CRR (in %).

(25) If an institution uses more than one approach, it shall be counted in each of these approaches. Hence, the sum of the percentages reported may be higher than 100 %, but also lower than 100 % as some investment firms are not obliged to count operational risk capital charges.

(26) Only with respect to entities, which use AMA or TSA/ASA approach; ratio of the total loss amount for all business lines to the sum of the relevant indicator for banking activities subject to TSA/ASA and AMA for the last year (in %).

(27) Information shall be reported based on the date of decision.

Due to differences in national regulations as well as in supervisory practices and approaches across the competent authorities the figures provided in this table might not allow for a meaningful comparison between jurisdictions. Any conclusions without carefully considering these differences can be misleading.

(28) The administrative penalties imposed by competent authorities. Competent authorities shall report all administrative penalties against which there is no appeal available in their jurisdiction by the reference date of the disclosure. Competent authorities of Member States where it is permitted to publish administrative penalties subject to an appeal, shall also report those administrative penalties unless the appeal annulling the administrative penalty is issued.

(29) Competent authorities shall report Information on waiver practices based on the total number of waivers by the competent authority, which are still effective or in force. The information to be reported is limited to those entities granted a waiver. Where the information is not available, i.e. not part of the regular reporting, it shall be reported as ‘N/A’.

(30) The number of institutions which have been granted the waiver shall be used as a basis for counting the waivers.

5.6.2019

Official Journal of the European Union

L 146/63

COMMISSION IMPLEMENTING REGULATION (EU) 2019/915

of 4 June 2019

imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of certain aluminium foil in rolls originating in the People's Republic of China following an expiry review under Article 11(2) of Regulation (EU) 2016/1036 of the European Parliament and of the Council

THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION,

Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

Having regard to Regulation (EU) 2016/1036 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2016 on protection against dumped imports from countries not members of the European Union (1) (‘the basic Regulation’), and in particular Article 11(2) thereof,

Whereas:

1. PROCEDURE

1.1. Measures in force

(1)

In March 2013, following an anti-dumping investigation (‘the original investigation’), the Council imposed by Implementing Regulation (EU) No 217/2013 (2) (‘the definitive Regulation’), a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of certain aluminium foils in rolls currently falling under CN codes ex 7607 11 11 and ex 7607 19 10 and originating in the People's Republic of China (‘the PRC’).

(2)	The definitive Regulation imposed an anti-dumping duty at rates ranging between 14,2 % and 15,6 % on imports from the sampled cooperating exporting producers, 14,6 % on the non-sampled cooperating companies and a duty rate of 35,6 % on all other exporting producers in the PRC.

1.2. Initiation of an expiry review

(3)	On 14 June 2017, the Commission published a notice of impending expiry of the anti-dumping measures in force on the imports of certain aluminium foil in rolls originating in the PRC in the Official Journal of the European Union (3).

(4)

On 14 December 2017, eight Union producers (ALEURO Converting Sp. Z o.o., CeDo Sp. z o.o., Cuki Cofresco SpA, Fora Folienfabrik GmbH, ITS BV, Rul-Let A/S, SPHERE SA and Wrapex Ltd) (‘the applicants’), representing more than 40 % of the total production of certain aluminium foil in rolls in the European Union (‘the Union’), lodged a request for review under Article 11(2) of the basic Regulation.

(5)	The applicants based their request on the grounds that the expiry of the measures would be likely to result in continuation or recurrence of dumping and injury to the Union industry.

(6)	Having determined that sufficient evidence existed for the initiation of an expiry review, on 13 March 2018 the Commission published a notice of initiation in the Official Journal of the European Union (4) (‘the Notice of Initiation’).

1.3. Review investigation period and period considered

(7)	The investigation of the likelihood of continuation or recurrence of dumping and injury covered the period from 1 January 2017 to 31 December 2017 (‘the review investigation period’ or ‘RIP’).

(8)	The examination of trends relevant for the assessment of the likelihood of a continuation or recurrence of injury covered the period from 1 January 2014 to the end of the review investigation period (‘the period considered’).

1.4. Interested parties

(9)

The Commission invited in the Notice of Initiation all interested parties to contact it in order to participate in the investigation. The Commission specifically informed the applicants, known Union producers and their associations; known importers of certain aluminium foil in rolls in the Union, the authorities in the PRC and known exporting producers in the PRC of the initiation of the expiry review and invited them to cooperate.

(10)	All interested parties had the opportunity to comment on the initiation of the investigation and to request a hearing with the Commission and/or the Hearing Officer in trade proceedings. No interested party requested a hearing.

1.5. Sampling

(11)	In the Notice of Initiation, the Commission stated that it might sample the interested parties in accordance with Article 17 of the basic Regulation.

1.5.1. Sampling of Union producers

(12)	The Commission stated in the Notice of Initiation that it had provisionally selected a sample of Union producers.

(13)	In accordance with Article 17(1) of the basic Regulation, the Commission selected the sample on the basis of the largest representative volume of production of the like product, which could reasonably be investigated within the time available.

(14)

The provisionally selected sample consisted of three Union producers accounting for around 66 % of the total production volume of the cooperating Union producers. The Commission invited interested parties to comment on the provisional sample and received comments only from Sphere SA, which sought confirmation that only its production company Sphere France SAS would be included in the sample. The sample was thus found to be representative of the Union Industry.

1.5.2. Sampling of unrelated importers

(15)	The Commission invited in the Notice of Initiation importers and their representative associations to make themselves known and to provide specific information necessary to decide whether sampling was necessary and, if so, to select a sample.

(16)	No unrelated importer provided the requested information and agreed to be included in the sample. One company replied that it is neither an importer nor user of the product under review.

1.5.3. Sampling of exporting producers in the PRC

(17)

To decide whether sampling was necessary and, if so, to select a sample, the Commission asked all known producers in the PRC to provide the information specified in the Notice of Initiation. In addition, the Commission requested the cooperation of the Mission of the PRC to the European Union to identify and/or contact other producers, if any, that could be interested in participating in the investigation.

(18)	Four groups of Chinese producers submitted sampling replies. In view of the low number of replies, the Commission decided that sampling was not necessary and requested all Chinese producers that submitted sampling replies to complete the questionnaire.

1.5.4. Users

(19)	The Commission invited in the Notice of Initiation the users and their representative associations, and representative consumer organisations to make themselves known and cooperate. No users in the Union or their associations came forward.

1.5.5. Questionnaires and verification visits

(20)	The Commission sent questionnaires to the three sampled Union producers. As mentioned in recital 18 questionnaires were also sent to four groups of producers in the PRC.

(21)

The three sampled Union producers submitted a questionnaire reply. However, none of the Chinese producers that had submitted sampling replies subsequently submitted a completed questionnaire response. The Commission informed the exporting producers of the consequences of the lack of cooperation; yet, no exporting producer cooperated in the investigation.

(22)

The Commission sought and verified all the information deemed necessary for the determination of a likelihood of continuation or recurrence of dumping and injury and Union interest. Verification visits pursuant to Article 16 of the basic Regulation were carried out at the premises of the following Union producers:

—	CeDo Sp. z o.o., Katy Wrocławskie, Poland;

—	ITS BV, Apeldoorn, The Netherlands;

—	SPHERE SA, Paris, France.

1.6. Procedure for the determination of the normal value under Article 2(6a) of the basic Regulation

(23)

In view of the sufficient evidence available at the initiation of the investigation tending to show the existence of significant distortions within the meaning of point (b) of Article 2(6a) of the basic Regulation, the Commission considered it appropriate to initiate the investigation on the basis of Article 2(6a) of the basic Regulation.

(24)

Consequently, in order to collect the necessary data for the eventual application of Article 2(6a) of the basic Regulation, in the Notice of Initiation the Commission invited all exporting producers in the PRC to provide the information requested in Annex III to the Notice of Initiation regarding the inputs used for producing the product under review. Four groups of Chinese producers provided information in this regard.

(25)

In order to obtain information it deems necessary for its investigation with regard to the alleged significant distortions within the meaning of point (b) of Article 2(6a) of the basic Regulation, the Commission also sent a questionnaire to the Government of the People's Republic of China (‘GOC’). No reply was received from the GOC.

(26)

In the Notice of Initiation, the Commission also invited all interested parties to make their views known, submit information and provide supporting evidence regarding the appropriateness of the application of Article 2(6a) of the basic Regulation within 37 days of the date of publication of this Notice in the Official Journal of the European Union. No submissions or additional evidence were received in that respect from the GOC or the exporting producers.

(27)

In the Notice of Initiation, the Commission also specified that, in view of the evidence available, it may need to select an appropriate representative country pursuant to Article 2(6a)(a) of the basic Regulation for the purpose of determining the normal value based on undistorted prices or benchmarks.

(28)

On 19 April 2018, the Commission published a first note for the file (‘the Note of 19 April 2018’) seeking the views of the interested parties on the relevant sources that the Commission may use for the determination of the normal value. In the Note of 19 April 2018, the Commission provided a list of all factors of production such as materials, energy and labour used in the production of the product under review by the exporting producers. In addition, taking into account the criteria guiding the choice of undistorted prices or benchmarks, the Commission identified, at that stage, Turkey as a potential representative country. The Commission further indicated that it had identified a producer, Sedat Tahir A.S., whose financial statements were publically available and which was producing the product under review in the potential representative country.

(29)	The Commission gave the opportunity to all interested parties to comment, within 10 days, but no comments were received.

(30)

In a ‘Second note on the sources for the determination of the normal value’ of 3 October 2018 (‘the Note of 3 October 2018’), the Commission confirmed its intention to use Turkey as the representative country, confirmed the specific customs codes and sources of data for the factors of production and confirmed the selling, general and administrative costs (‘SG&A’) and profit figures relating to the Turkish company Sedat Tahir A.S., which, if appropriate, it intended to use for the construction of normal value.

(31)	The Commission gave the opportunity to all interested parties to comment, within 10 days, but no comments were received.

2. PRODUCT UNDER REVIEW AND LIKE PRODUCT

2.1. Product under review

(32)

The product under review is the same as in the original investigation, namely aluminium foil of a thickness of 0,007 mm or more but less than 0,021 mm, not backed, not further worked than rolled, whether or not embossed, in low weight rolls of a weight not exceeding 10 kg, currently falling under CN codes ex 7607 11 11 and ex 7607 19 10 (TARIC codes 7607111110 and 7607191010) (‘the product under review’).

(33)	The product under review is generally used as a consumer product for packaging and other household/catering applications (‘aluminium household foil’).

2.2. Like product

(34)

It was considered that the product under review produced in the PRC and exported to the Union, the product produced in the representative country Turkey and the product produced and sold in the Union by the Union industry have the same basic physical and technical characteristics, and the same basic uses. No interested parties commented on the determination of the like product.

(35)	The Commission decided that those products are therefore like products within the meaning of Article 1(4) of the basic Regulation.

2.3. Claims regarding product scope

(36)	The Commission did not receive any claims regarding the product scope.

3. LIKELIHOOD OF CONTINUATION OR RECURRENCE OF DUMPING

3.1. Preliminary remarks

(37)	In accordance with Article 11(2) of the basic Regulation, the Commission examined whether the expiry of the measures in force would be likely to lead to a continuation or recurrence of dumping from the PRC.

(38)

As mentioned in recital 21, none of the Chinese exporting producers cooperated in the investigation. Thus, the exporting producers failed to submit questionnaire replies, including any data on export prices and costs, domestic prices and costs, capacity, production, investments, etc. Likewise, the GOC and the exporting producers failed to address the evidence on the case file, including the ‘Commission Staff Working Document on Significant Distortions in the Economy of the People's Republic of China for the Purposes of Trade Defense Investigations’ (5) (‘the Report’), and the additional evidence provided by the applicants, showing that such prices and costs were affected by substantial government interventions. Therefore, the Commission resorted to the use of facts available in accordance with Article 18 of the basic Regulation.

(39)

The Commission notified the Chinese authorities and the exporting producers mentioned in recital 18 of the application of Article 18 of the basic Regulation and gave them the opportunity to comment. The Commission did not receive any comments. Accordingly, pursuant to Article 18(1) of the basic Regulation, the findings in relation to the likelihood of continuation or recurrence of dumping set out below were based on facts available, in particular, the information contained in the request for the expiry review, in the submissions by interested parties, and the statistics available in the Article 14(6) database/Eurostat.

3.2. Continuation of dumping of imports during the review investigation period

(40)

For the review investigation period, the statistical data from Eurostat shows that the product under review continued to be imported into the Union from the PRC. It amounted to 1 519 tonnes and constituted 1,8 % of the total Union consumption during the review investigation period. In this respect, the Commission noted that such a level is not unusually low in the context of expiry reviews as effective measures seeking to counter the injurious effects of dumped imports logically are expected to reduce imports from the previous injuriously-dumped level. In fact, the volume of imports from the PRC during the RIP amounts to 22,9 % of all imports. Moreover, as noted in recital 165, calculating dumping on the basis of export prices to third countries during the RIP also show similar levels of dumping. This confirms that the conclusions reached on the basis of the import volumes into the EU during the RIP are also representative. Consequently, the Commission concluded that the actual imports in the review investigation period were representative and, therefore, examined whether dumping continued during the review investigation period.

3.3. Normal value

(41)	According to Article 2(1) of the basic Regulation, ‘the normal value shall normally be based on the prices paid or payable, in the ordinary course of trade, by independent customers in the exporting country’.

(42)

However, according to Article 2(6a)(a) of the basic Regulation, ‘in case it is determined […] that it is not appropriate to use domestic prices and costs in the exporting country due to the existence in that country of significant distortions within the meaning of point (b), the normal value shall be constructed exclusively on the basis of costs of production and sale reflecting undistorted prices or benchmarks’, and ‘shall include an undistorted and reasonable amount of administrative, selling and general costs and for profits’. As further explained below, the Commission concluded in the present investigation that, based on the evidence available, and in view of the lack of cooperation of the GOC and the exporting producers, the application of Article 2(6a) of the basic Regulation was appropriate.

3.3.1. Existence of significant distortions

3.3.1.1. Introduction

(43)

Article 2(6a)(b) of the basic Regulation defines ‘significant distortions as those distortions which occur when reported prices or costs, including the costs of raw materials and energy, are not the result of free market forces as they are affected by substantial government intervention. In assessing the existence of significant distortions regard shall be had, inter alia, to the potential impact of one or more of the following elements:

—	the market in question being served to a significant extent by enterprises which operate under the ownership, control or policy supervision or guidance of the authorities of the exporting country;

—	state presence in firms allowing the state to interfere with respect to prices or costs;

—	public policies or measures discriminating in favour of domestic suppliers or otherwise influencing free market forces;

—	the lack, discriminatory application or inadequate enforcement of bankruptcy, corporate or property laws;

—	wage costs being distorted;

—	access to finance granted by institutions which implement public policy objectives or otherwise not acting independently of the state ’.

(44)

Article 2(6a)(c) of the basic Regulation provides that ‘[w]here the Commission has well-founded indications of the possible existence of significant distortions as referred to in point (b) in a certain country or a certain sector in that country, and where appropriate for the effective application of this Regulation, the Commission shall produce, make public and regularly update a report describing the market circumstances referred to in point (b) in that country or sector’.

(45)

Interested parties were invited to rebut, comment or supplement the evidence contained in the investigation file at the time of initiation. That file contained, in particular, allegations and evidence from the applicants on the existence of significant distortions in the Chinese aluminium market. The file also contained a copy of the Report, produced by the Commission, showing the existence of substantial government intervention at many levels of the economy, including specific distortions in many key factors of production (such as land, energy, capital, raw materials and labour) as well as in specific sectors (such as aluminium). The Report was placed in the investigation file at the initiation stage.

(46)

On the basis of the evidence available on the file, including the evidence contained in the Report, the Commission thus decided to examine whether it is appropriate or not to use domestic prices and costs in the PRC, due to the existence of significant distortions within the meaning of point (b) of Article 2(6a) of the basic Regulation. That analysis covered the examination of the substantial government interventions in its economy in general, but also the specific market situation in the relevant sector (i.e. aluminium), including the product under review.

(47)

As specified in recitals 25-26, neither the GOC nor the exporting producers commented or provided evidence supporting or rebutting the existing evidence on the investigation file, including the Report, and the additional evidence provided by the applicants, on the existence of significant distortions and/or on the appropriateness of the application of Article 2(6a) of the basic Regulation in the case at hand.

3.3.1.2. Allegations by the applicants and evidence provided to support those allegations

(48)	The request contained some relevant evidence supporting the allegations on significant distortions and complementing the Report.

(49)

Firstly, the applicants indicated in Section III A.1.a of the request that the Commission had already noted in the investigation that led to the adoption of the Initial Regulation (6) that ‘the price of the upstream basic raw material, aluminium, was distorted’ and that ‘these distortions were also found in the price of the intermediate raw material, aluminium jumbo foil in rolls’.

(50)

In this regard, in the investigation that led to the adoption of the Initial Regulation, the Commission first noted that primary aluminium accounts for ca. 60-70 % of the costs of production of the product under review and it is thus the main cost-driver in its production. Second, the Commission noted that the prices of aluminium on the Chinese market (so-called ‘SHFE price’) (7) diverged greatly from the LME price (8), which is the worldwide reference price. Third, the Commission considered that the situation could be explained by a ‘series of state-driven factors and significant interference by the State in the domestic market with a number of tools’ (9). On the basis of the above, in the Initial Regulation, the Commission concluded in this regard that these factors have essentially led to a situation where Chinese primary aluminium prices and the prices of downstream aluminium products are the result of state intervention independent from price fluctuations on international markets.

(51)

Secondly, the applicants indicated in Section III A.1.b of the request for review that, in addition to referring to the evidence contained in the Report, the distortions highlighted by the Commission in the Initial Regulation still exist. In this regard, they indicate that market-distortions in the Chinese non-ferrous metals industry were highlighted in a report prepared for WV Metalle, the German non-ferrous metals industry association, dated 24 April 2017 (‘WV Metalle Report’) (Annex 5 of the request). The WV Metalle Report confirmed in particular that the non-ferrous metal sector constitutes a core element of government planning in the context of the Strategic Emerging Industry Initiative, the Made in China 2025 Plan, as well as other high-level programmes. It indicates that the GOC directly intervenes in the pricing of capital, labour, land, raw materials and basic inputs to the production process.

(52)

According to the applicants, the WV Metalle Report further indicates that the contemporary debt-equity swaps initiative is not market-driven, that the non-ferrous metal sector has consistently benefited and continues to benefit from generous financial and non-monetary support, that China's non-ferrous metal sector has received substantial subsidies including energy subsidies, particularly directed towards state-owned enterprises and that the GOC strictly controls volumes and prices of products of the non-ferrous metals industry, including through export duties, quotas, licenses, export restrictions, promotional subsidies, taxes and tax rebates.

(53)

Thirdly, in Annex 6 of the request, the applicants indicated that the preliminary affirmative findings of the US Department of Commerce, in its countervailing duty investigation of certain aluminium from China, indicated that 37 % of domestic aluminium consumption in China is by State-owned enterprises and that the GOC imposes a 30 % export tariff on primary aluminium, resulting in distortions of the Chinese downstream domestic market for aluminium. On 5 March 2018, the US Department of Commerce confirmed the provisional findings in the Final Determination.

(54)

In addition, the applicants considered that the US Department of Commerce established that Chinese aluminium foil producers benefited from a number of countervailable subsidies, and therefore, the applicants considered that the Chinese aluminium market is served to a significant extent by enterprises which operate under the ownership, control or policy supervision or guidance of the authorities of the exporting country, that public policies influence and distort free market forces on the Chinese aluminium market and that Chinese producers have access to finance granted by institutions which implement public policy objectives or otherwise do not act independently of the State. This would allegedly result in distortions of the SHFE prices.

3.3.1.3. Significant distortions affecting the domestic prices and costs in the People's Republic of China

(55)

The very foundation of the Chinese economic system, i.e. the concept of the so called ‘socialist market economy’, is at odds with the notion of free play of market forces. That concept is enshrined in the Chinese Constitution and determines the economic governance of the PRC. The core principle of that system is the ‘socialist public ownership of the means of production, namely, ownership by the whole people and collective ownership by the working people’. The State-owned economy is considered the ‘leading force of the national economy’ and the State has the mandate ‘to ensure its consolidation and growth’ (10). Consequently, the overall setup of the Chinese economy not only allows for substantial government interventions into the economy, but such interventions are expressly mandated. The notion of supremacy of public ownership over private ownership permeates the entire legal system and is emphasized as a general principle in all central pieces of legislation. The Chinese property law is a prime example of this causal relationship: It refers to the primary stage of socialism and entrusts the State with upholding the basic economic system under which the public ownership shall play a dominant role. Other forms of ownership are tolerated, with the law permitting them to develop side by side with State ownership (11).

(56)

In addition, according to relevant Chinese legislation, the socialist market economy shall be developed under the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party (‘CCP’). The structures of the Chinese State and of the CCP are intertwined at every level (legal, institutional, personal), forming a superstructure in which the roles of CCP and the State are indistinguishable. Following an amendment of the Chinese Constitution in March 2018, the leading role of the CCP was given an even greater prominence by a finding reaffirmed in the text of Article 1 of the Constitution. Following the existing first sentence of the provision: ‘[t]he socialist system is the basic system of the People's Republic of China’ a new second sentence was inserted which reads: ‘The defining feature of socialism with Chinese characteristics is the leadership of the Communist Party of China.’ (12) This illustrates the unquestioned and ever growing control of the CCP over the economic system of the PRC. This control is inherent to the Chinese system and goes well beyond the situation customary in other countries where the governments exercise broad macroeconomic control within the boundaries of which free market forces are at play.

(57)

The Chinese State undertakes an interventionist economic policy in pursuance of goals which coincide with the political agenda set by the CCP, rather than reflecting the prevailing economic conditions in a free market (13). The interventionist economic tools deployed by the Chinese authorities are manifold, including the system of industrial planning, the financial system, as well as various facets of the regulatory environment.

(58)

First, on the level of overall administrative control, the direction of the Chinese economy is governed by a complex system of industrial planning which affects all economic activities within the country. The totality of these plans cover a comprehensive and complex matrix of sectors and crosscutting policies and is present on all levels of government. Plans at provincial level tend to be fairly detailed while national plans tend to set somewhat broader targets. Plans also specify the tool box in order to support the relevant industries/sectors as well as the timeframes in which the objectives need to be achieved. Some plans still contain explicit output targets while this was a regular feature in previous planning cycles. Under those plans, individual industrial sectors and/or projects are being singled out as (positive or negative) priorities in line with the government priorities and specific development goals are attributed to them (industrial upgrade, international expansion etc.). The economic operators, private and State-owned alike, must effectively adjust their business activities according to the realities imposed by the planning system. This is not only because of the formally binding nature of the plans. Crucially, the relevant Chinese authorities at all level of government adhere to the system of plans and they use their vested powers accordingly, thereby forcing the economic operators to comply with the priorities set out in the plans (see also point 3.3.1.5 below) (14).

(59)

Second, on the level of allocation of financial resources, the financial system of the PRC is dominated by the State-owned commercial banks. Those banks, when setting up and implementing their lending policy need to align themselves with the government's industrial policy objectives rather than primarily assessing the economic merits of a given project (see also point 3.3.1.8 below) (15). The same applies to the other components of the Chinese financial system, such as the stock markets, bond markets, private equity markets, etc. Even though of lesser significance than the banking sector, these parts of the financial sector are institutionally and operationally set up in a manner not geared towards maximizing the efficient functioning of the financial markets but towards ensuring control and allowing intervention by the State and the CCP (16).

(60)

Third, on the level of regulatory environment, the interventions by the State into the economy take a number of forms. For instance, public procurement rules are regularly used to pursue policy goals other than economic efficiency, thereby undermining market based principles in the area. The applicable legislation specifically provides that public procurement shall be conducted in order to facilitate the achievement of goals designed by State policies. However, the nature of these goals remains undefined, thereby leaving broad margin of appreciation to the decision-making bodies (17). Similarly, in the area of investment, the Chinese government maintains significant control and influence over destination and magnitude of both State and private investment. Investment screening as well as various incentives, restrictions, and prohibitions related to investment are used by authorities as an important tool for supporting industrial policy goals, such as maintaining State control over key sectors or bolstering domestic industry (18).

(61)

In sum, the Chinese economic model is based on certain basic axioms which provide for and encourage manifold government interventions. Such substantial government interventions are at odds with free play of market forces, resulting in distorting the effective allocation of resources in line with market principles (19).

3.3.1.4. Significant distortions according to Article 2(6a)(b), first indent of the basic Regulation: the market in question being served to a significant extent by enterprises which operate under the ownership, control or policy supervision and guidance of the authorities of the exporting country

(62)

Against the above background of the dominance of State ownership in the Chinese economic model, State owned enterprises (‘SOEs’) represent an essential part of the Chinese economy. The government and the CCP maintain structures that ensure their continued influence over SOEs. The state-party not only actively formulates and oversees the implementation of general economic policies by individual SOEs, but also claims its rights to participate in operational decision-making of SOEs. This is typically done through the rotation of cadres between government authorities and SOEs, through presence of party members on SOEs executive bodies and of party cells in companies (see also point 3.3.1.4 below), as well as through shaping the corporate structure of the SOE sector (20). In exchange, SOEs enjoy a particular status within the Chinese economy, which entails a number of economic benefits, in particular shielding from competition and preferential access to relevant inputs, including finance (21).

(63)

In this connection, an OECD study published in January 2019 (‘OECD Study’) (22) refers to SOEs in the aluminium sector which specifically emphasize in their regulatory filings how State ownership influences relevant industrial policies and how State ownership translates into government support. More specifically, one SOE mentions in its 2016 bond prospectus that it is one of the 52 backbone State-owned enterprises, that it plays a key role in the formulation and implementation of policies in the power sector and that it receives comprehensive and sustainable support from the GOC. Another SOE refers in its 2017 bond prospectus to the fact that the respective provincial government can exert significant influence on the group (23).

(64)

This is all the more important given that the PRC is the largest aluminium producer in the world, with several large SOEs amongst the top individual producers worldwide. According to estimates, SOEs account for more than 50 % of the total primary aluminium output in the PRC (24). A recent study of the non-ferrous metal industry in the PRC also points in the direction of SOEs accounting for a dominant share of the domestic market (25). While an increase in capacity in recent years is attributed partly to privately-owned companies, such capacity increase would usually also entail various forms of (local) government involvement, such as tolerating illegal capacity expansion (26). Moreover, the aluminium production capacity amongst the main SOEs has also increased, though to a lesser extent (27).

(65)

With a high level of government intervention in the aluminium industry and a high share of SOEs in the sector, even privately owned aluminium producers are prevented from operating under market conditions. Indeed, both public or privately owned enterprises in the aluminium sector are also subject to policy supervision and guidance as set out in section 3.3.1.5 below.

(66)

State control and intervention in the production of the product concerned (aluminium household foils) takes place within the general framework described. Indeed, according to the information available to the Commission, many of the major producers of the product under review are State-owned. The evidence available thus suggests that aluminium foil producers in the PRC are subject to the same ownership, control or policy supervision and guidance by the Chinese government and thus do not operate in accordance with market principles.

3.3.1.5. Significant distortions according to Article 2(6a)(b), second indent of the basic Regulation: State presence in firms allowing the state to interfere with respect to prices or costs

(67)

Apart from exercising control over the economy by means of ownership of SOEs, the Chinese State is in a position to interfere with prices and costs through State presence in firms. While the right to appoint and to remove key management personnel in SOEs by the relevant State authorities, as foreseen in the Chinese legislation, can be considered to reflect the corresponding ownership rights (28), CCP cells in enterprises, State-owned and private alike, represent another channel through which the State can interfere with business decisions. According to the PRC's company law, a CCP organisation is to be established in every company (with at least three CCP members as specified in the CCP Constitution (29)) and the company shall provide the necessary conditions for the activities of the party organisation. In the past, this requirement appears to not have always been followed or strictly enforced. However, since at least 2016 the CCP has reinforced its claims to control business decisions in SOEs as a matter of political principle. The CCP is also reported to exercise pressure on private companies to put ‘patriotism’ first and to follow party discipline (30). In 2017, it was reported that party cells existed in 70 % of some 1,86 million privately owned companies, with growing pressure for the CCP organisations to have a final say over the business decision within their respective companies (31). These rules apply in general in the Chinese economy, including to the producers of the product under review and the suppliers of their inputs.

(68)	The following example illustrates well the above trend of an increasing level of intervention by the GOC in the aluminium sector:

(69)

In 2017, a Chinese state-owned aluminium producer, China Aluminium International Engineering Corporation Limited (‘Chalieco’), amended its Articles of Association giving more prominence to the role of party cells within the company. It included a whole chapter on the Party Committee, and Article 113 thereof states: ‘In deciding major corporate issues, the Board shall consult the Party Committee of the Company in advance.’ (32) Furthermore, in their 2017 Annual Report (33) the Aluminum Corporation of China (‘Chalco’) states that a number of directors, supervisors, and senior management – including the Chairman and Executive Director, and the Chairman of the Supervisory Committee – are members of the CCP.

(70)

The State's presence and intervention in the financial markets (see also section 3.3.1.8 below) as well as in the provision of raw materials and inputs further have a distorting effect on the market. Thus, the State presence in firms, including SOEs, in the aluminium and other sectors (such as the financial and input sectors) allow the government to interfere with respect to prices and costs.

3.3.1.6. Significant distortions according to Article 2(6a)(b) of the basic Regulation, third indent: public policies or measures discriminating in favour of domestic suppliers or otherwise influencing free market forces

(71)

The direction of the Chinese economy is to a significant degree determined by an elaborate system of planning which sets out priorities and prescribes the goals the central and local governments must focus on. Relevant plans exist on all levels of government and cover virtually all economic sectors, the objectives set by the planning instruments are of binding nature and the authorities at each administrative level monitor the implementation of the plans by the corresponding lower level of government. Overall, the system of planning in the PRC results in resources being driven to sectors designated as strategic or otherwise politically important by the government, rather than being allocated in line with market forces (34).

(72)

For instance, the government plays a key role in the development of the Chinese aluminium sector (including the product under review). There are numerous plans, directives and other documents pertaining to aluminium, issued at the national, regional and municipal level, clearly showing the high degree of intervention of the Chinese government. Through these and other instruments, the government directs and controls virtually every aspect of the development and functioning of the aluminium sector.

(73)	These policies and targets for the aluminium sector have an important direct or indirect impact on the production costs of the product under review.

(74)

Although the 13th Five-Year Plan on Economic and Social Development (35) does not contain specific provisions on aluminium, for the non-ferrous metal industry in general it envisages a strategy of promoting cooperation on international production capacity and equipment manufacturing. To achieve these goals, the plan confirms that it will enhance supporting systems related to taxation, finance, insurance, investment and financing platforms, as well as risk assessment platforms (36).

(75)	The corresponding sectoral plan, the Non-Ferrous Metal Industry Development Plan (2016-2020) (‘Plan’) sets out specific policies and targets that the government aims to achieve for a number of non-ferrous metals industries (37), including aluminium.

(76)

The Plan aims at upgrading the range of product types produced by the Chinese aluminium industry, inter alia, through supporting innovation. It calls for swift development of the mixed ownership system and a boost to SOE's vitality. It further provides for the possibility of stock-piling non-ferrous metals, improving the security of resources, including aluminium and sets specific quantitative targets for reducing power consumption, increasing the ratio of recycled aluminium in production and increasing capacity utilisation (38).

(77)

The Plan further provides for structural adjustments with stricter control on new smelting facilities and elimination of outdated capacity. It provides for geographical distribution of processing plants, focuses on projects to increase bauxite and alumina resource exploitation and covers electricity supply and pricing policy (39).

(78)

With this wide range of measures and policies, the Plan represents a continuation of the 2009 Non-Ferrous Metals Industry Adjustment and Revitalization Plan which was adopted to alleviate the negative effects on the non-ferrous metal industry of the financial crisis. The key objectives, set out in the plan include, inter alia, production volume control, restructuration, raw material sourcing, export tax policy, security of resources, stockpiling, technological innovation, financial policy and planning and implementation (40).

(79)

Another policy document targeting the aluminium sector is the Standard Conditions applicable to the Aluminium Industry issued by the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology (‘MIIT’) on 18 July 2013, in order to speed up structural adjustment and curb disorderly expansion of the aluminium smelting capacities. The Standard Conditions introduce minimum production quantities for new plants, quality standards and security of supply for imported and domestically sourced bauxite and alumina. The Standard Conditions indicate that MIIT is the authority in charge of the standardisation and management of the aluminium industry, as well as publication of the list of companies authorised to operate in the aluminium industry (41).

(80)

Moreover, Entry Conditions Applicable to the Aluminium Industry, issued by the National Development and Reform Commission (‘NDRC’) in October 2007 and formally in force until 2016, had as its main objective to promote the development of the aluminium industry and to reduce greenhouse gas emissions (42).

(81)	Finally, the Guidelines for Accelerating the Restructuring of the Aluminium Industry (‘Restructuring Guidelines’) (43), issued by the NDRC in April 2006, regard aluminium as a fundamental product in the development of the national economy.

(82)

The Restructuring Guidelines state that, in implementing the Industrial Development Policy approved by the State Council, specific objectives shall be achieved in certain areas. These areas are:

—	Enhance the concentration in the industry;

—	Access to financial capital (see also section 3.3.1.8 below);

—	Organisation of the industry;

—	Strict control of exports of electrolytic aluminium; and

—	Elimination of outdated capacity.

(83)

With respect to organisation of the industry and elimination of outdated capacity, the objectives stated in the Restructuring Guidelines have been pursued also by more recent policies, such as by the Plan which encourages non-ferrous metal enterprises to develop upstream and downstream alliances and restructuring within the sector and across sectors, to increase the level of concentration of the sector and to strengthen business integration and process re-engineering (see also recitals 74-76).

(84)

Thus, the numerous plans, directives and other documents pertaining to aluminium, issued at the national, regional and municipal level, clearly show the high degree of intervention of the Chinese government in the aluminium sector (44). Through these and other instruments, the government directs and controls virtually every aspect of the development and functioning of the sector.

(85)	Beyond the plans, the government's intervention in the sector has taken the form, inter alia, of export-related measures, including export duties, export quotas, export performance requirements and minimum export price requirements on different raw materials for aluminium.

(86)

The GOC further discourages exports of primary aluminium and its inputs, aiming at promoting higher added-value aluminium products. This objective is pursued by granting full or partial VAT rebates on downstream aluminium products in combination with incomplete VAT rebates and export taxes on primary aluminium (45).

(87)

Moreover, the price of key inputs such as energy and electricity are found to be influenced by different types of government intervention (46). Other types of government intervention leading to market distortions include the stockpiling policy through the State Reserve Bureau and the role of the SHFE (47). In addition, several trade defence investigations have established that the Chinese government has consistently granted different types of State support measures to aluminium producers (48). The extensive intervention of the GOC in the aluminium sector has led to overcapacity (49), which is arguably the clearest illustration of the implications of the GOC's policies and the resulting distortions.

(88)

The OECD Study also identified additional government support influencing market forces in the aluminium sector. Such support would typically take the form of inputs, in particular electricity (50) and primary alumina, sold at below-market prices (51). The OECD Study further describes how the GOC objectives for the aluminium sector are translated into industrial policies and specific actions on the provincial and local level, including for example capital injections, priority possession rights to mineral resources, governmental grants and subsidies or tax incentives (52).

(89)	In sum, the GOC has measures in place to induce operators to comply with the public policy objectives of supporting encouraged industries, including the production of the product under review and the raw materials used for producing it. Such measures impede market forces from operating normally.

3.3.1.7. Significant distortions according to Article 2(6a)(b), fourth indent of the basic Regulation: the lack, discriminatory application or inadequate enforcement of bankruptcy, corporate or property laws

(90)

The Chinese bankruptcy system appears inadequate to deliver on its own main objectives such as to fairly settle claims and debts and to safeguard the lawful rights and interests of creditors and debtors. This appears to be rooted in the fact that while the Chinese bankruptcy law formally rests on similar principles as corresponding laws in other countries, the Chinese system is characterised by systematic under-enforcement. The number of bankruptcies remains notoriously low in relation to the size of the country's economy, not least because the insolvency proceedings suffer from a number of shortcomings, which effectively function as a disincentive for bankruptcy filings. Moreover, the role of the State in the insolvency proceedings remains strong and active, often having direct influence on the outcome of the proceedings (53).

(91)

In addition, the shortcomings of the system of property rights are particularly obvious in relation to ownership of land and land-use rights in the PRC (54). All land is owned by the State (collectively owned rural land and State-owned urban land). Its allocation remains solely dependent on the State. There are legal provisions that aim at allocating land use rights in a transparent manner and at market prices, for instance by introducing bidding procedures. However, these provisions are regularly not respected, with certain buyers obtaining their land for free or below market rates (55). Moreover, authorities often pursue specific political goals including the implementation of the economic plans when allocating land (56).

(92)

Therefore, the Chinese bankruptcy and property laws do not appear to properly work, resulting in distortions when maintaining insolvent firms afloat and in relation to the land provision and acquisition in the PRC. Those considerations, on the basis of the evidence available, appear to be fully applicable also in the aluminium sector and more specifically with respect to the product under review.

(93)

This finding is supported by the provisional affirmative determination of the US Department of Commerce, in the Countervailing Duty Investigation of certain Aluminium Foil from The People's Republic of China, which found, using adverse facts available, that the Government of the PRC's provision of land for Less Than Adequate Remuneration constitutes a financial contribution within the meaning of Section 771 (5)(D) of the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended (57).

3.3.1.8. Significant distortions according to Article 2(6a)(b), fifth indent of the basic Regulation: wage costs being distorted

(94)

A system of market-based wages cannot fully develop in the PRC as workers and employers are impeded in their rights to organisation. The PRC has not ratified a number of essential conventions of the International Labour Organisation (‘ILO’), in particular those on freedom of association and on collective bargaining (58). Under national law, only one trade union organisation is active. However, this organisation lacks independence from the State authorities and its engagement in collective bargaining and protection of workers' rights remains rudimentary (59). Moreover, the mobility of the Chinese workforce is restricted by the household registration system, which limits access to the full range of social security and other benefits to local residents of a given administrative area. This typically results in workers who are not in possession of the local residence registration finding themselves in a vulnerable employment position and receiving lower income than the holders of the residence registration (60). Those findings lead to the distortion of wages costs in the PRC.

(95)

The Commission did not receive any evidence that the aluminium sector, including the product under review, would not be subject to the Chinese labour law system as described above. The aluminium sector is thus affected by the distortions of wage costs both directly (when making the product under review) as well as indirectly (when having access to capital or inputs from companies subject to the same labour system in the PRC).

3.3.1.9. Significant distortions according to Article 2(6a)(b), sixth indent of the basic Regulation: access to finance granted by institutions which implement public policy objectives or otherwise not acting independently of the State

(96)	Access to capital for corporate actors in the PRC is subject to various distortions.

(97)

Firstly, the Chinese financial system is characterised by the strong market position of State-owned banks (61), which, when granting access to finance, take into consideration criteria other than economic viability of a project. Similarly to non-financial SOEs, the banks remain connected to the State not only through ownership but also via personal relations (the top executives of the large State-owned financial institutions are ultimately appointed by the CCP) (62) and, again just like non-financial SOEs, the banks regularly implement public policies designed by the government. In doing so, the banks comply with an explicit legal obligation to conduct their business in accordance with the needs of the national economic and social development and under the guidance of the industrial policies of the State (63). This is compounded by additional existing rules, which direct finances into sectors designated by the government as encouraged or otherwise important (64).

(98)

While it is acknowledged that various legal provisions refer to the need to respect normal banking behaviour and prudential rules such as the need to examine the creditworthiness of the borrower, the overwhelming evidence, including findings made in trade defence investigations, suggests that these provisions play only a secondary role in the application of the various legal instruments.

(99)

Furthermore, bond and credit ratings are often distorted for a variety of reasons including the fact that the risk assessment is influenced by the firm's strategic importance to the Chinese government and the strength of any implicit guarantee by the government. Estimates strongly suggest that Chinese credit ratings systematically correspond to lower international ratings.

(100)

This is compounded by additional existing rules, which direct finances into sectors designated by the government as encouraged or otherwise important (65). In the aluminium sector, the Restructuring Guidelines have mandated provision of loans to companies which meet the relevant state industry policies (66). Such interventions into capital allocation result in a bias for lending to SOEs, large well-connected private firms and firms in key industrial sectors, which implies that the availability and cost of capital is not equal for all players on the market. There is indeed evidence, including for the aluminium sector, that SOEs receive privileged treatment from banks in forms of loan interest rates, amounts, and terms, which results in a competitive advantage for SOEs (67).

(101)

Secondly, borrowing costs have been kept artificially low to stimulate investment growth. This has led to the excessive use of capital investment with ever lower returns on investment. This is illustrated by the recent growth in corporate leverage in the state sector despite a sharp fall in profitability, which suggests that the mechanisms at work in the banking system do not follow normal commercial responses.

(102)

In this respect, the OECD Study refers to anecdotal evidence that certain aluminium producers in the PRC have obtained financing on preferential terms, with cost of financing being seemingly decoupled from the corresponding level of corporate leverage. According to the study, one state-owned aluminium producer explicitly stated in its 2016 bond prospectus that it attracts considerable financial support from Chinese policy banks bearing interest rate below benchmark. Similarly, the 2017 bond prospectus of another state-owned producer refers to the strong ties which the company maintains with Chinese banks, including policy banks that have provided that company with low-cost financing sources. The OECD Study concludes in this connection that while there can be many reasons why interest rates are low for these firms, the contrast between poor financial indicators and low interest rates may suggest some potential under-pricing of the risk associated with those borrowers (68).

(103)

Thirdly, although nominal interest rate liberalization was achieved in October 2015, price signals are still not the result of free market forces, but are influenced by government induced distortions. Indeed, the share of lending at or below the benchmark rate still represents 45 % of all lending and recourse to targeted credit appears to have been stepped up, since this share has increased markedly since 2015 in spite of worsening economic conditions. Artificially low interest rates result in under-pricing, and consequently, the excessive utilization of capital.

(104)

Overall credit growth in the PRC indicates a worsening efficiency of capital allocation without any signs of credit tightening that would be expected in an undistorted market environment. As a result, non-performing loans have increased rapidly in recent years. Faced with a situation of increasing debt-at-risk, the Chinese government has opted to avoid defaults. Consequently, bad debt issues have been handled by rolling over debt, thus creating so called ‘zombie’ companies, or by transferring the ownership of the debt (e.g. via mergers or debt-to-equity swaps), without necessarily removing the overall debt problem or addressing its root causes.

(105)

In essence, despite the recent steps that have been taken to liberalize the market, the corporate credit system in the PRC is affected by significant systemic issues and distortions resulting from the continuing pervasive role of the state in the capital markets.

(106)

No evidence was submitted to the effect that the aluminium sector, including the product under review, would be exempted from the above-described government intervention in the financial system. Therefore, the substantial government intervention in the financial system leads to the market conditions being severely affected at all levels.

3.3.1.10. Systemic nature of the distortions described

(107)

The Commission noted that the distortions described in the Report are not limited to the aluminium sector in general or the product under review in particular. On the contrary, the evidence available shows that the facts and features of the Chinese system as described above in sections 3.3.1.1-3.3.1.5 as well as in Part I of the Report apply throughout the country and across the sectors of the economy. The same holds true for the description of the factors of production as set out above in sections 3.3.1.6-3.3.1.8 above and in Part II of the Report.

(108)

In order to manufacture the product under review, a range of inputs is needed. There is no evidence in the investigation file that those inputs are not sourced in the PRC. When the Chinese aluminium foil producers purchase/contract those inputs, the prices they pay (and which are recorded as their costs) are clearly exposed to the same systemic distortions mentioned above. For instance, suppliers of inputs employ labour that is subject to the distortions; Suppliers in the PRC can borrow money that is subject to the distortions on the financial sector/capital allocation; they are subject to a system of land-use rights that distorts the cost of using land; and, above all, they are subject to the planning system which applies across all levels of government and sectors, thus also permeating their production process in a directly and indirectly.

(109)

As a consequence, not only can the domestic sales prices of the product under review not be used, but all the input costs (including raw materials, energy, land, financing, labour, etc.) are equally tainted by significant distortions within the meaning of Article 2(6a) of the basic Regulation because their price formation is affected by substantial government intervention, as described in Parts I and II of the Report. Indeed, the government interventions described in relation to the allocation of capital, land, labour, energy and raw materials are present throughout the PRC. This means, for instance, that an input that in itself was produced in the PRC by combining a range of factors of production is likely exposed to significant distortions within the meaning of Article 2(6a) of the basic Regulation. The Commission received no evidence – nor did it establish counter-evidence – that would dispute this finding. The same applies for the input to the input and so forth. No evidence or argument has been put forward by the GOC or the exporting producers in the present investigation to the contrary.

3.3.1.11. Conclusion

(110)

The analysis laid out in sections 3.3.1.2-3.3.1.9, which includes an examination of all the available evidence relating to the PRC's intervention in its economy in general as well as in the aluminium sector (including the product under review) showed that prices or costs, including the costs of raw materials, energy and labour, are not the result of free market forces because they are affected by substantial government intervention within the meaning of Article 2(6a)(b) of the basic Regulation. On that basis, and in the absence of any cooperation from the GOC and the exporting producers, the Commission concluded that it is not appropriate to use domestic prices and costs to establish the normal value in this case.

(111)

Consequently, the Commission proceeded to construct the normal value exclusively on the basis of costs of production and sale reflecting undistorted prices or benchmarks, that is, in this case, on the basis of corresponding costs of production and sale in an appropriate representative country, in accordance with Article 2(6a)(a) of the basic Regulation, as discussed in the following section. The Commission recalled that no exporting producer cooperated with the investigation after submitting the sampling forms and that no claim was presented that some domestic costs would be undistorted under the third indent of Article 2(6a)(a) of the basic Regulation.

3.3.2. Representative country

3.3.2.1. General remarks

(112)

According to Article 2(6a)(a), first indent of the basic Regulation, the normal value was constructed on the basis of costs of production and sale in an appropriate representative country.

(113)

The choice of the representative country was based on the following criteria:

—	A level of economic development similar to the PRC. For this purpose, the Commission used countries with a gross national income similar to the PRC on the basis of the database of the World Bank;

—	Production of the product under review in that country (69);

—	Availability of relevant public data in that country;

—	Where there is more than one possible representative country, preference shall be given, where appropriate, to the country with an adequate level of social and environmental protection.

(114)

As explained in recitals 28 to 29, in the Note of 19 April 2018, the Commission informed interested parties that it had identified only Turkey as a possible representative country and invited interested parties to comment and suggest other countries. No comments were received on this aspect.

(115)

As indicated in recitals 30 to 31, in the Note of 3 October 2018, the Commission confirmed its intention to use Turkey as the potential representative country and requested comments. No comments were subsequently received on this aspect either.

3.3.2.2. A level of economic development similar to the PRC

(116)

Turkey is regarded by the World Bank as a country with a similar level of economic development to the PRC, i.e. it is classified as an ‘upper-middle income’ country on a gross national income (‘GNI’) basis (70), similarly to the PRC.

3.3.2.3. Production of the product under review in the representative country

(117)

In the Note of 19 April 2018, the Commission indicated that it had identified a producer of the product under review in Turkey, Sedat Tahir A.Ș. Interested parties were invited to comment and to propose other producers in other representative countries which fulfilled the criteria of Article 2(6a)(a) first indent of the basic Regulation. No comments or proposals were received, either on the appropriateness of the representative country, or to suggest countries other than Turkey as representative countries.

3.3.2.4. Availability of the relevant public data in the representative country

(118)

In the Note of 19 April 2018, the Commission indicated that both the main input raw material (i.e. aluminium foil in so-called jumbo rolls of a weight exceeding 10 kg) and the product under review (i.e. aluminium foil in small rolls of a weight not exceeding 10 kg) are classified in the same HS codes, namely 7607 11 and 7607 19. In order to ensure a correct identification of the input material, only countries which further differentiate between the main input material and the product under review can be considered appropriate representative countries in order to properly calculate the normal value. At that stage, it was considered that it is only in Turkey that the main input material is classified in different codes from the product under review and a complete set of public data is available.

(119)

Interested parties were invited to comment on the appropriateness of Turkey, inter alia, in line with the above criteria. No comments were received.

(a) Data on factors of production

(120)

With regard to Turkey, import data with regard to the main raw materials used in the production of the product under review was readily available in Global Trade Atlas, while data on other important factors of production, such as labour and electricity costs were also readily available from the Turkish Statistical Institute website.

(b) Financial data (manufacturing overheads, SG&A and profits)

(121)

The investigation showed that financial data is publicly available for the Turkish producer, Sedat Tahir A.Ș., for the year 2017.

3.3.2.5. Conclusion

(122)

Under Article 2(6a)(a) first indent of the basic Regulation, the objective is find, in a possible representative country, all or as many of the corresponding undistorted factors of production used by the cooperating Chinese producers and of undistorted amounts for manufacturing overheads, SG&A and profits as possible.

(123)

In view of the above analysis, Turkey met all the criteria laid down in Article 2(6a)(a), first indent of the basic Regulation in order to be considered as an appropriate representative country. In particular, Turkey has production of the product under review and a complete set of data available for all factors of production, manufacturing overheads, SG&A and profit.

(124)

Having established that Turkey is an appropriate representative country in this case, there was no need to analyse further the level of social and environmental protection in Turkey.

3.3.3. Manufacturing overhead costs, SG&A and profits

(125)

According to Article 2(6a)(a), fourth paragraph of the basic Regulation, ‘the constructed normal value shall include an undistorted and reasonable amount for administrative, selling and general costs and for profits’.

(126)

As mentioned in recitals 28 to 31, the Commission indicated that it had identified a producer, Sedat Tahir A.S., whose financial statements were publically available and which was producing the product under review in the prospective representative country. It further indicated that it intended to use the Profit and Loss account figures of Sedat Tahir A.Ș. for 2017 as a basis for the establishment of the SG&A and profit percentages to construct the normal value. No comments were received on this aspect within the stipulated 10-days deadline.

(127)

Manufacturing overheads are not separately identified in the available Profit and Loss account figures of Sedat Tahir A.Ș. and the Commission therefore considered them to be included in the cost of goods sold or cost of manufacturing.

(128)

The Commission then used the Profit and Loss account figures of Sedat Tahir A.Ș. for 2017 as a basis for the establishment of the SG&A and profit percentages of cost of manufacturing to be applied to the constructed cost of manufacturing in order to build up the constructed normal value.

3.3.4. Sources used to establish undistorted costs

(129)

According to Article 2(6a)(a) of the basic Regulation, ‘the normal value shall be constructed exclusively on the basis of costs of production and sale reflecting undistorted prices and benchmarks’ and ‘shall include an undistorted and reasonable amount for administrative, selling and general costs and for profits’.

(130)

In the Note of 19 April 2018, the Commission stated that it intended to use Global Trade Atlas (‘GTA’) database to establish the undistorted costs for the first five input raw materials identified in table 1 below. The Commission further stated that it intended to use the Turkish Statistical Institute as the source of labour costs and electricity costs. It further stated that it planned to use the Orbis database as the source of publically available financial statements to establish a reasonable amount for administrative, selling and general costs and for profits.

3.3.4.1. Factors of production

(131)

As already stated in recital 28, in the Note of 19 April 2018, the Commission established an initial list of factors of production and Turkish sources intended to be used for all factors of production such as materials, energy and labour used in the production of the product under review.

(132)

Given the lack of cooperation from exporting producers, the Commission used the consumption quantities of the various factors of production, used in producing the product under review, obtained from a large sampled Union producer and applied those to the Turkish unit costs obtained from the various sources indicated in recitals 130 to 144 for the different factors of production used to produce the product under review, in order to establish the Cost of Production. Indeed, based on the information available from the original investigation, the production process of the Chinese exporting producers and the materials used appear to be identical to the one provided by the Union producer in question.

(133)

Considering all the information submitted by interested parties and the results of the verification visit at the premises of one of the applicants, the following factors of production, HS codes, and 12-digit Turkish tariff codes, where applicable, have been identified.

Table 1

Factor of Production	Tariff code	Unit import value
Aluminium foil, not backed, rolled but not further worked (jumbo rolls)	7607 11 19 00 11 7607 11 19 00 12	3,83 EUR/kg
Colour box/carton box for single roll	4819 20	3,20 EUR/kg
Paper core	4822 90	1,25 EUR/kg
Outer case used to pack 24 rolls	4819 20	3,20 EUR/kg
Labour (direct and indirect labour), Wages in the manufacturing sector	[N/A]	8,15 EUR/Man hour
Electricity	[N/A]	0,06 EUR/kWh

3.3.4.2. Materials

(134)

With regard to aluminium foil, the applicants indicated that the standard raw material used is aluminium foil, not backed, rolled but not further worked, falling into HS code 7607 11. This was supported by two out of the four Chinese producers that provided replies to Annex III to the Notice of Initiation. One of the applicants provided further information that the 12-digit Turkish tariff codes for jumbo rolls are 7607 11 19 00 11 and 7607 11 19 00 12. On the basis of those figures, the Commission then calculated the weighted average import value in euros per kg for aluminium jumbo rolls, to be used as the relevant raw material cost in the cost of production.

(135)

With regard to colour box/carton box for single roll, the applicants indicated that the applicable HS code was 4819 10 while one Chinese producer indicated the applicable HS code to be 4819 20. HS code 4819 10 includes ‘… boxes of corrugated paper or paperboard’, whereas HS code 4819 20 includes ‘… boxes of non-corrugated paper or paperboard’. As the applicable boxes are non-corrugated, the Commission decided to examine HS code 4819 20. The Turkish nomenclature was examined at a more detailed level within that HS code but no more precise appropriate description was determined. Therefore, the Commission decided to use the referred HS code at 6 digit level for the purpose of establishing the cost of that element of the cost of production to be used for constructing the normal value.

(136)

With regard to the paper core, the applicants indicated the same HS code 4819 10 as for the colour box/carton box. On review of its description, the Commission concluded that the product should be classified as ‘other spools of paperboard’ under HS code 4822 90. The Turkish nomenclature was examined at a more detailed level within that HS code but no more precise appropriate description was determined and therefore the Commission decided to use HS code 4822 90 at 6 digit level for the purpose of establishing the cost of that element of the cost of production to be used for constructing the normal value.

(137)

One of the applicants provided information that it is necessary to include an outer case (which is used to pack 24 rolls of aluminium foil) as a factor of production. On review of its description, the Commission concluded that the product should be classified as well under HS code 4819 20. The Turkish nomenclature was examined at a more detailed level within that HS code but no more precise appropriate description was determined and therefore the Commission decided to use HS code 4819 20 at 6 digit level for the purpose of establishing the cost of that element of the cost of production to be used for constructing the normal value.

(138)

For aluminium foil, the Commission extracted the import value in EUR and the quantity in kilograms from the rest of the world, excluding the PRC, to Turkey, in the year 2017, for the Turkish tariff codes 7607 11 19 00 11 and 7607 11 19 00 12. On the basis of those figures, the Commission then calculated the weighted average import value in euros per kg for aluminium jumbo rolls, to be used as the relevant raw material cost in the cost of production.

(139)

With regard to the colour box/carton box and with regard to the outer case, the Commission extracted the import value in EUR and the quantity in kilograms from the rest of the world, excluding the PRC, to Turkey in the year 2017 for HS code 4819 20. On the basis of those figures, the Commission then calculated the weighted average import value in EUR per kg for colour box/carton box and for the outer case to be used as the relevant raw material costs in the cost of production.

(140)

For the paper core, the Commission extracted the import value in EUR and the quantity in kilograms from the rest of the world, excluding the PRC, to Turkey in the year 2017 for HS code 4822 90. On the basis of those figures, the Commission then calculated the weighted average import value in euros per kg for the paper core, to be used as the relevant raw material cost in the cost of production.

(141)

With regard to aluminium foil scrap, according to one of the applicants, waste can be considered to be zero and therefore, no value should be included in the constructed cost of production for scrap. In the absence of any other comments, the Commission decided to adopt that approach.

(142)

In order to establish the undistorted price of raw materials as delivered at the gate of the exporting producer's factory, the Commission considered whether it is appropriate to add the import duty of the representative country, Turkey, and costs for domestic transport of materials to the import price. The Commission established that Turkey did not apply an import duty to the imports of the main raw material, aluminium foil in jumbo rolls, from the countries other than the PRC from which most imports were sourced. As far as domestic transport of materials is concerned, since no Chinese producer cooperated, such information is not readily available. However, as indicated in recital 153 the normal value not adjusted for such import duties and transport costs already shows that export sales are dumped at very high levels. Therefore, an examination of the domestic transport costs of materials and import duties, with the consequence that the normal value would need to be adjusted upwards for such costs, could only have led to an increase of the normal value and hence of the dumping margin. In light of the above, the Commission did not consider it necessary in the case at hand to adjust the raw materials costs for import duty and domestic transport costs.

3.3.4.3. Labour

(143)

With regard to labour costs, in its Note of 3 October 2018, the Commission indicated that it intended to use the data published by the Turkish Statistical Institute. In particular, the Commission indicated that it intended to use the hourly labour costs in the manufacturing sector for 2016, for the economic activity C.24 (manufacture of basic metals (71)) according to NACE Rev.2 (72), which are the most recent statistics available (73). It further indicated that the values would be properly adjusted for inflation using the domestic producer price index (74) published by the Turkish statistical institute. In the absence of any comments, the Commission adopted that approach.

3.3.4.4. Electricity

(144)

With regard to electricity costs, in its Note of 3 October 2018, in the absence of information on consumption levels in the PRC, the Commission indicated that it intended to apply the average electricity unit price for industrial users, provided in a press release issued by the Turkish statistical institute (75). In the absence of any comments, the Commission adopted that approach.

3.3.5. Calculations

(145)

In order to establish the constructed normal value, the Commission followed the following two steps.

(146)

First, the Commission established the undistorted manufacturing costs. In the absence of cooperation by the exporting producers, the Commission then multiplied the usage factors as observed at the level of one of the applicants' production process for materials, labour, energy by the undistorted costs per unit observed in the representative country Turkey.

(147)

Second, to the manufacturing costs identified above the Commission applied the Sedat Tahir A.Ș.'s manufacturing overhead costs, SG&A and profit. They were identified on the basis of Sedat Tahir A.Ș.'s annual report of 2017.

(148)

On that basis, the Commission constructed the normal value per product type on an ex-work basis in accordance with Article 2(6a)(a) of the basic Regulation. Due to the fact no exporting producers cooperated, the normal value was established on a countrywide basis and not for each exporter and producer separately.

3.4. Export price

(149)

As mentioned in recital 21, the Commission did not receive any questionnaire reply from producers in the PRC. The Commission therefore established one weighted average export price for all types of aluminium household foil on the basis of Eurostat import statistics (‘Comext’).

3.5. Comparison

(150)

The Commission compared the normal value and the export price on an ex-works basis.

(151)

Where justified by the need to ensure a fair comparison, the Commission adjusted the normal value and the export price for differences affecting prices and price comparability, in accordance with Article 2(10) of the basic Regulation. An upwards adjustment of 2 % was made to the normal value for non-refundable VAT costs, and a downwards adjustment of 1 %-3 % was made to the export price for international freight, insurance and domestic transport costs.

3.6. Dumping margin

(152)

The Commission compared the weighted average normal value of the like product with the weighted average price of all exports to the Union, in accordance with Articles 2(11) and (12) of the basic Regulation.

(153)

On this basis, the Commission found a dumping margin, expressed as a percentage of the CIF Union frontier price duty unpaid, at a level above 150 %. The Commission therefore concluded that dumping continued during the review investigation period.

3.7. Likelihood of a continuation of dumping should the measures be repealed

(154)

Further to the finding of dumping during the review investigation period, the Commission analysed whether there was a likelihood of continuation of dumping should the measures be repealed.

(155)

As a consequence of non-cooperation of producers from the PRC, this examination was based on the information available to the Commission, that is, information supplied in the request for review and information from other independent available sources, such as official import statistics and information obtained from interested parties during the investigation.

(156)

In order to examine the likely development of imports should measures be repealed, the Commission analysed spare capacity in the PRC and the attractiveness of the Union market.

3.7.1. Spare capacity in the PRC

(157)

In the request for review, the applicants recalled that aluminium jumbo rolls simply need to be cut to become the product under review, so the excess Chinese capacity for aluminium jumbo rolls is relevant in determining the excess capacity for the product under review.

(158)

As mentioned in the request for review, in the Commission Implementing Regulation of 17 December 2015 extending anti-dumping measures on aluminium foil jumbo rolls following an expiry review (76), it was estimated that the Chinese production capacity for all types of aluminium foil was 450 000 tonnes larger than the total domestic Chinese consumption. It was also estimated that this production capacity would increase from 2,5 million tonnes in 2014 to 2,8 million tonnes in 2018, whereas the increase in domestic consumption would unlikely be sufficient to absorb the increasing capacity (77). The Union consumption of the product under review is around 85 600 tonnes.

(159)

In the final determination in the anti-dumping and countervailing investigations on aluminium foil jumbo rolls, based on responses from exporters and producers in the PRC, the US International Trade Commission projected spare capacity of aluminium foil in the PRC for 2017 and 2018 as 161 233 tonnes and 157 305 tonnes respectively (78), thereby significantly exceeding EU demand.

(160)

In addition, the responses received from the four groups of producers in the PRC which submitted sampling replies, confirmed that they have a spare capacity of around 25 % on average.

(161)

On that basis, the Commission found that there are substantial excess capacities available in the PRC and as a consequence, there is a strong likelihood that import volumes will significantly increase and exercise increased price pressure, should the anti-dumping measures be repealed.

(162)

The information provided by the applicants in this regard was not contested by interested parties. The Commission found no evidence which contradicted this information.

3.7.2. Attractiveness of the Union market

(163)

In order to establish the possible development of imports in case measures are repealed, the Commission considered the attractiveness of the Union market with regard to prices.

(164)

In this regard an analysis of Chinese export price statistics is not useful, since both the raw material and the finished product are reported under the same HS codes in the PRC.

(165)

However, an analysis of the sampling replies provided by the Chinese producers shows that – on average – they charge higher prices to the EU market than to other third country markets and to the domestic market, despite the measures in force. Indeed, prices to the EU market were on average 5 %-10 % higher than prices to other third countries, and on average 20 %-25 % higher than prices on the domestic market.

(166)

As indicated in the request for review, both Turkey and India have applied anti-dumping measures against aluminium foil from the PRC since 2014 and 2017 respectively. Should the EU measures on aluminium household foil be allowed to lapse, the existence of measures against imports to those other markets and the attractiveness of the EU market in terms of price, would make redirection of sales to the EU market highly likely.

(167)

The significant export volumes and market shares from the PRC during the original investigation period (12 994 tonnes, 13,4 %) and the continuing export of the product under review from the PRC to the Union market during the period considered ( 1 519 tonnes, 1,8 %), allow the Commission to conclude that the Union market is attractive for producers of the product under review in the PRC.

(168)

Consequently, should the measures be allowed to lapse, the imports from the PRC to the Union are likely to increase significantly and at dumped prices.

3.7.3. Conclusion on the likelihood of continuation of dumping

(169)

Based on the above, in particular given the dumping margin established in the review investigation period, the significant spare capacity available in the PRC, the attractiveness of the Union market, the Commission expects that a repeal of the measures would likely result in a continuation of dumping, and that dumped exports will enter the Union market in significant quantities. It is therefore considered that there is a likelihood of continuation of dumping should the current anti-dumping measures be allowed to lapse.

3.7.4. Likelihood of recurrence of dumping

(170)

The investigation showed that Chinese imports continued to enter the Union market at dumped prices during the review investigation period. Despite the relatively low import volumes compared to Union consumption, the dumping margins found are confirmed by the analysis of export prices to other third countries, which appear to be even lower as described in recital 165. In view of the elements examined in sections 3.7.1 and 3.7.2, the Commission also concluded that it is highly likely that Chinese producers would export significant quantities of aluminium household foil to the Union at dumped prices, should the measures lapse. Thus, there is evidence of likelihood of continuation of dumping and, in any event, of likelihood of recurrence of dumping should the measures lapse.

4. LIKELIHOOD OF A CONTINUATION OR RECURRENCE OF INJURY

4.1. Definition of the Union industry and Union production

(171)

During the review investigation period, the like product was produced by 20 known producers in the Union. They constitute the ‘Union industry’ within the meaning of Article 4(1) of the basic Regulation.

4.2. Preliminary remarks

(172)

The Commission assessed injury on the basis of trends concerning production, production capacity, capacity utilisation, sales, market share, employment, productivity and growth, which it collected at the level of the total Union industry and trends concerning prices, profitability, cash flow, ability to raise capital and investments, stocks, return on investment and wages, which it collected at the level of the sampled Union producers.

4.3. Union consumption

(173)

The Commission established the Union consumption by adding together the sales volume in the Union by the Union industry and the total imports into the Union as reported by Eurostat.

(174)

The Union consumption of the product under review developed as follows:

Table 2

Union Consumption (tonnes)

	2014	2015	2016	RIP
Total consumption	104 521	93 058	88 707	85 666
Index (2014 = 100)	100	89	85	82
Source: Eurostat, data submitted by the Union industry and verified questionnaire replies from the sampled Union producers

(175)

The Union consumption decreased gradually by 18 % in the period considered. A year-by-year analysis shows this gradual decrease throughout the period, faster between 2014 and 2015 and then levelling off between 2016 and the review investigation period.

4.4. Imports from the PRC

4.4.1. Volume and market share of the imports from the PRC

(176)

The Commission established the volume of imports from the PRC into the Union on the basis of Eurostat data at TARIC level and the market shares of the imports by comparing these import volumes with the Union consumption as shown in Table 2.

(177)

Market share and imports from the PRC developed as follows:

Table 3

Import volume and market share

	2014	2015	2016	RIP
Volume of imports from the PRC (tonnes)	3 510	2 549	2 650	1 519
Index (2014 = 100)	100	73	75	43
Market share of PRC imports (%)	3,4	2,7	3,0	1,8
Index (2014 = 100)	100	82	89	53
Source: Eurostat

(178)

Imports from the PRC were at a peak in 2014, with a significant fall in 2015, a slight recovery in 2016 and another significant drop in the review investigation period, resulting in an overall decrease by 57 % during the period considered. The market share of the imports fell from 3,4 % to 1,8 % during the review investigation period.

(179)

It is relevant for the analysis of injury to note that imports from the PRC continued to enter the Union, with duties paid, throughout the period considered.

4.4.2. Prices of imports from the PRC

(180)

The Commission used the prices of imports from the PRC reported by Eurostat.

(181)

The average prices of imports from the PRC into the Union developed as follows:

Table 4

PRC import prices

	2014	2015	2016	RIP
Average PRC import price (EUR per tonne)	2 340	2 934	2 827	2 413
Index (2014 = 100)	100	125	121	103
Source: Eurostat

(182)

Average prices of imports from the PRC increased by 25 % between 2014 and 2015, decreased slightly in 2016 and then dropped almost to the level of 2014 in the review investigation period.

(183)

During the period considered the average per tonne import prices from the PRC remained significantly lower than both the average per tonne sales price and the average per tonne cost of production of the Union industry as reported in Table 10.

4.4.3. Price undercutting

(184)

The Commission determined the price undercutting during the review investigation period by comparing the weighted average sales prices of the sampled Union producers charged to unrelated customers in the Union market, adjusted to an ex-works level, with the import price data from Eurostat for the product under review from the PRC at a CIF level, adjusted to a landed price, including an amount of conventional customs duty.

(185)

The result of the comparison was expressed as a percentage of the sampled Union producers' average price during the review investigation period.

(186)

The comparison showed for imports from the PRC an average undercutting of 29,3 % in the Union market during the review investigation period.

4.5. Imports from third countries other than the PRC

(187)

The volume of imports into the Union as well as the market share and the price trends for imports of the product under review from other third countries are shown in Table 5. The volume and price trends are based on Eurostat data.

Table 5

Imports from third countries other than the PRC

	2014	2015	2016	RIP
Volume of imports (tonnes)	4 011	2 525	4 029	5 119
Index (2014 = 100)	100	63	100	128
Market share (%)	3,8	2,7	4,5	6,0
Index (2014 = 100)	100	71	118	156
Average import price (EUR per tonne)	2 621	2 685	2 653	2 888
Index (2014 = 100)	100	102	101	110
Source: Eurostat

(188)

Import volumes from other third countries fluctuated over the period considered. They dropped by 37 % from 2014 to 2015 but then doubled in the review investigation period showing an overall increase of 28 % during the period considered.

(189)

Since the total Union consumption decreased over the period considered, this increase translated in an increase of the market share of the imports from other third countries over the same period from 3,8 % in 2014 to 6,0 % during the review investigation period.

(190)

Average prices of imports from third countries other than the PRC increased by 10 % during the period considered but remain well below the price levels of the Union industry as reported in Table 10.

(191)

During the period considered, imports of the product under review from other third countries were mainly from Turkey, Norway and Thailand.

(192)

The applicants claimed in their request for review that imports from Norway increased considerably in the period considered without there being any production of the product under review according to their market knowledge. The applicants claimed also that transhipment practices of the product under review are taking place in Thailand and Indonesia and suspects these products to originate in the PRC.

(193)

The Commission analysed Eurostat data in respect of the imports in question. The volume of imports into the Union from Norway, Thailand and Indonesia developed as follows:

Table 6

Imports from Norway, Thailand and Indonesia

	2014	2015	2016	RIP
Volume of imports from Norway (tonnes)	233	86	790	1 186
Index (2014 = 100)	100	37	339	509
Volume of imports from Thailand (tonnes)	0	0	70	654
Index (2016 = 100)	0	0	100	934
Volume of imports from Indonesia (tonnes)	0	0	0	196
Source: Eurostat

(194)

The Commission is not aware of any production of the product under review in Norway. The Commission also found that in the review investigation period, imports from Norway, Thailand and Indonesia entirely compensated the decrease of imports from the PRC. The applicants brought forward a claim of possible circumvention of existing anti-dumping measures on imports from the PRC through transhipment practices in Norway, Thailand and Indonesia. However, the Commission was unable to verify the evidence received in support of this claim.

4.6. Economic situation of the Union industry

4.6.1. General remarks

(195)

In accordance with Article 3(5) of the basic Regulation, the Commission examined all relevant economic factors and indices having a bearing on the state of the Union industry during the period considered.

(196)

As referred to in recital 12 the Commission used sampling for the determination of possible injury suffered by the Union industry.

(197)

For the injury determination, the Commission distinguished between macroeconomic and microeconomic injury indicators.

(198)

The Commission evaluated the macroeconomic indicators on the basis of data submitted by the Union industry and the verified questionnaire replies from the sampled Union producers. The data related to all Union producers.

(199)

The Commission evaluated the microeconomic indicators on the basis of verified data in the questionnaire replies from the sampled Union producers.

(200)

The Commission found both sets of data to be representative of the economic situation of the Union industry.

(201)

The macroeconomic indicators are: production, production capacity, capacity utilisation, sales volume, market share, growth, employment and productivity.

(202)

The microeconomic indicators are: average unit prices, average unit cost, labour costs, inventories, profitability, cash flow, investments, return on investments and ability to raise capital.

4.6.2. Macroeconomic indicators

4.6.2.1. Production, production capacity and capacity utilisation

(203)

The total Union industry's production, production capacity and capacity utilisation developed over the period considered as follows:

Table 7

Production, production capacity and capacity utilisation of Union producers

	2014	2015	2016	RIP
Production volume (tonnes)	104 344	96 478	89 070	86 254
Index (2014 = 100)	100	92	85	83
Production capacity (tonnes)	160 145	163 178	144 653	147 950
Index (2014 = 100)	100	102	90	92
Capacity utilisation (%)	65	59	62	58
Index (2014 = 100)	100	91	95	89
Source: Data submitted by the Union industry and verified questionnaire replies from the sampled Union producers

(204)

The production volume of the Union industry decreased by 17 % over the period considered and followed the decrease of the Union consumption. The decrease became less pronounced between 2016 and the end of the review investigation period.

(205)

The production capacity of the Union industry decreased by 8 % over the period considered, showing that the Union industry was not fully able to reduce capacity to deal with the reduction in production during the period considered.

(206)

Capacity utilisation fluctuated over the period considered, but is at its lowest in the review investigation period when compared to 2014. Overall, the capacity utilisation rate decreased by 11 % over the period considered.

4.6.2.2. Sales volume and market share

(207)

The Union industry's sales volume in the Union and market share developed over the period considered as follows:

Table 8

Sales volume and market share of Union producers

	2014	2015	2016	RIP
Sales volume in the Union (tonnes)	97 000	87 984	82 028	79 028
Index (2014 = 100)	100	91	85	81
Market share (%)	92,8	94,5	92,5	92,3
Source: Data submitted by the Union industry and verified questionnaire replies from the sampled Union producers

(208)

The sales volume of the Union industry in the Union market decreased by 19 % over the period considered. The decrease followed the decline in Union consumption.

(209)

The Union industry was able to gain market share between 2014 and 2015 but lost it again in 2016. During the review investigation period the Union industry's market share is even slightly lower than at the beginning of the period considered.

4.6.2.3. Growth

(210)

During the period considered the production of the Union industry decreased by 17 % while Union consumption decreased by 18 % and the sales volume of the Union industry on the Union market decreased by 19 %. The drop in sales volume of the Union Industry over the period considered should be seen in the context of the declining consumption over the same period. The market share of the Union slightly declined.

4.6.2.4. Employment and productivity

(211)

Employment and productivity of the Union industry developed over the period considered as follows:

Table 9

Employment and productivity of Union producers

	2014	2015	2016	RIP
Number of employees (Full Time Equivalent or FTE)	1 048	1 033	1 015	977
Index (2014 = 100)	100	99	97	93
Productivity (tonnes per employee)	100	93	88	88
Index (2014 = 100)	100	94	88	89
Source: Data submitted by the Union industry and verified questionnaire replies from the sampled Union producers

(212)

Due to reduced production, employment of the Union industry also declined by 7 % during the period considered. This reduction in employment is however lower than the reduction in production of 17 % over the period considered. This affected the productivity of the Union producers, which declined by 11 % over the period considered.

4.6.3. Microeconomic indicators

4.6.3.1. Prices and factors affecting prices

(213)

The average sales prices and cost of production of the sampled Union producers to unrelated customers in the Union developed over the period considered as follows:

Table 10

Average sales prices in the Union and unit costs

	2014	2015	2016	RIP
Average sales price per tonne (EUR)	3 723	3 844	3 596	3 703
Index (2014 = 100)	100	103	97	99
Average cost of production per tonne (EUR)	3 539	3 719	3 549	3 802
Index (2014 = 100)	100	105	100	107
Source: verified questionnaire replies from the sampled Union producers

(214)

The Union industry's average sales price per tonne to unrelated customers in the Union slightly decreased by 1 % during the period considered whilst its cost of production per tonne increased by 7 % over the same period.

4.6.3.2. Labour costs

(215)

The average labour costs of the sampled Union producers developed over the period considered as follows:

Table 11

Average labour costs per employee

	2014	2015	2016	RIP
Average labour costs per employee (EUR per FTE)	26 187	26 509	26 383	25 348
Index (2014 = 100)	100	101	101	97
Source: verified questionnaire replies from the sampled Union producers

(216)

The average labour costs per worker of the Union industry decreased slightly over the period considered.

4.6.3.3. Stocks

(217)

Stock levels of the sampled Union producers developed over the period considered as follows:

Table 12

Stocks

	2014	2015	2016	RIP
Closing stock (tonnes)	1 378	1 321	1 598	1 285
Index (2014 = 100)	100	96	116	93
Source: verified questionnaire replies from the sampled Union producers

(218)

The level of closing stocks fluctuated during the period considered. Overall, it decreased by 7 % over this period.

4.6.3.4. Profitability, cash flow, investments, return on investments and ability to raise capital

(219)

The Commission established the profitability of the Union industry by expressing the pre-tax profit of the sales of the like product to unrelated customers in the Union as a percentage of the turnover of those sales.

(220)

Profitability, cash flow, investments and return on investments of the sampled Union producers developed over the period considered as follows:

Table 13

Profitability, cash flow, investments and return on investments

	2014	2015	2016	RIP
Profitability of sales to unrelated customers (% of sales turnover)	5,1	5,5	1,4	– 2,8
Index (2014 = 100)	100	109	27	– 55
Cash flow ('000 EUR)	3 306	6 758	2 085	612
Index (2014 = 100)	100	204	63	19
Investments ('000 EUR)	1 818	2 068	2 074	1 887
Index (2014 = 100)	100	114	114	104
Return on investments (%)	256	254	78	– 115
Index (2014 = 100)	100	99	30	– 45
Source: verified questionnaire replies from the sampled Union producers

(221)

Overall, the profitability of the Union industry dropped sharply by 155 % over the period considered. Although it improved by 9 % between 2014 and 2015, it collapsed to a lossmaking level during the review investigation period.

(222)

The net cash flow, the Union industry's ability to self-finance its activities, decreased by 81 % over the period considered. It doubled between 2014 and 2015 but then declined sharply in 2016 and the review investigation period.

(223)

During the period considered the annual investments in the like product made by the Union industry increased by 4 % over the period considered.

(224)

The Union industry's return on investment, the profit as a percentage of the net book value of assets, dropped by 145 % over the period considered and became negative in the review investigation period.

4.6.4. Conclusion on the situation of the Union industry

(225)

The investigation showed that most of the injury indicators developed negatively and the economic and financial situation of the Union industry deteriorated during the period considered.

(226)

With measures in place, the Union industry was able to maintain its price levels and market share in a declining market.

(227)

The Union industry's production and sales volume followed the same negative trend as the Union consumption. However, the negative trends of its profitability, cash flow and return on investments are not correlated with the negative development of the consumption. These indicators developed positively in the beginning of the period considered, after the imposition of measures, but started to deteriorate quickly as a result of the significant decrease in consumption and increase in cost of production. The Union industry became loss-making in the review investigation period.

(228)

At the same time, imports from third countries have increased both in absolute volumes and market share during the period considered and, as explained in recital 194, have entirely compensated the decrease of imports from the PRC. Although average prices of the imports from third countries were at lower levels than the Union industry prices, the Commission could not conclude whether these imports were a cause of injury to the Union industry as their product mix was unknown. However, the average unit price from third countries is still much higher than the prices at which the imports from the PRC entered the Union market during the review investigation period. Consequently, the worsening economic and financial situation of the Union industry coincides with the continued presence at representative volumes of dumped imports from the PRC on the Union market, which continue to undercut the Union industry's prices and therefore have continued to put an unfair competitive pressure on the Union industry.

(229)

The Commission concluded that, upon an overall assessment of the injury factors, the Union industry has not improved its economic and financial situation and has not recovered from the material injury that the Commission found in the original investigation.

4.7. Likelihood of continuation of injury

(230)

In accordance with Article 11(2) of the basic Regulation, the Commission examined whether material injury from imports from the PRC would continue should the measures against the PRC be allowed to lapse. The investigation has shown that the imports from the PRC were made at dumped price levels during the review investigation period (recital 153) and that there was a likelihood of continuation of dumping should measures be allowed to lapse (recital 169).

(231)

To establish the likelihood of continuation of injury if the measures against the PRC were repealed the Commission analysed (i) the spare capacity available in the PRC, (ii) the attractiveness of the Union market and (iii) the impact of Chinese imports on the situation of the Union industry should measures be allowed to lapse.

(i) Spare capacity in the PRC

(232)

As explained in recitals 157 to 162, there are substantial excess capacities in the PRC, which largely exceed the total Union consumption during the review investigation period. In addition, the Commission has found no elements that could indicate any significant increase of domestic demand of the product under review in the PRC or in any other third country market in the near future. The Commission therefore concluded that domestic demand in the PRC or in other third country markets could not absorb the available spare capacity in the PRC.

(ii) Attractiveness of the Union market

(233)

As explained in recitals 165 to 167, the Union market is an attractive market for exporting producers from the PRC. The market share of imports from the PRC was 13,4 % during the original investigation period (2010 – 2011), showing the possible level of imports from the PRC should the measures lapse.

(234)

Imports from the PRC excluding the anti-dumping duty would have undercut the Union industry's sales prices by 29,3 % in the review investigation period. This is an indication of the likely price level of imports from the PRC should measures be repealed. On this basis, it is likely that the price pressure on the Union market would increase should the measures be repealed, thus leading the Union industry to suffer further injury.

(235)

On this basis, in the absence of measures, exporting producers from the PRC will likely increase their presence in the Union market, in terms of both volume and market share, and at dumped prices that would significantly undercut the Union industry's sales prices.

(iii) Impact on the Union industry

(236)

The continuous presence of dumped imports from the PRC in the Union market and their low pricing policy have prevented the Union industry to benefit fully from the existing anti-dumping measures and recover from past injurious dumping practices. Due to the presence of these dumped imports the Union industry has not been able to reflect its increased costs into its sales prices, which caused a considerable deterioration of its profitability to loss-making levels in the review investigation period.

(237)

If the measures are repealed, the Union industry would not be able to maintain its sales volume and market share against low priced imports from the PRC. It is highly likely that the market share of the PRC would increase rapidly if the measures are allowed to lapse. Losing sales volume would lead to an even lower utilisation rate and an increase in the average cost of production. Together with increased price pressure this would lead to a further deterioration of the already precarious financial situation of the Union industry and ultimately the closures of production sites, and eventually the disappearance of the industry.

(238)

Therefore, the Commission concluded that there is a strong likelihood that the expiry of the existing measures would lead to a continuation of injury from imports from the PRC and that the already precarious situation of the Union industry will be likely to further deteriorate.

4.8. Conclusion

(239)

The repeal of the measures would in all likelihood result in a significant increase of dumped imports from the PRC at prices undercutting the Union industry prices. The Commission therefore concluded that there is a strong likelihood of continuation of injury should measures be repealed.

4.9. Likelihood of recurrence of injury

(240)

In addition, the Commission found that the repeal of the measures would in all likelihood result in recurrence of further injury should measures be repealed. Indeed, even if the continuous injury suffered by the Union industry could not be attributed to the subject imports, the Commission found that there is strong likelihood of recurrence of injury on the basis of the lower export prices to third countries (see recital 165, the significant levels of spare capacity in the PRC as well as the attractiveness of the EU market (see section 4.7).

5. UNION INTEREST

(241)

In accordance with Article 21 of the basic Regulation, the Commission examined whether maintaining the existing anti-dumping measures would be against the interest of the Union as a whole.

(242)

The Commission based the determination of the Union interest on an appreciation of all the various interests involved, including those of the Union industry, importers and users. All interested parties were given the opportunity to make their views known pursuant to Article 21(2) of the basic Regulation.

(243)

On this basis, the Commission examined whether, despite the conclusions on the likelihood of a continuation of dumping and injury, compelling reasons existed which would lead to the conclusion that it was not in the Union interest to maintain the existing measures.

5.1. Interest of the Union industry

(244)

The investigation has shown that should the measures be repealed, the fragile situation of the Union industry is very likely to significantly deteriorate further.

(245)

Therefore, the Commission concluded that the continuation of the measures against the PRC would benefit the Union industry.

5.2. Interest of importers and users

(246)

As indicated in recitals 16 and 19 no importer nor user came forward and cooperated in this investigation. As found in previous investigations with such non-cooperation, the Commission concluded that the continuation of measures would not negatively affect the Union importers and users.

5.3. Conclusion on Union interest

(247)

In view of the above, the Commission concluded that there are no compelling reasons to conclude that it is not in the Union interest to extend the existing anti-dumping measures on imports of the product under review originating in the PRC.

6. ANTI-DUMPING MEASURES

(248)

All interested parties were informed of the essential facts and considerations on the basis of which it was intended to maintain the anti-dumping measures in force. They were also granted a period within which they could submit comments to this disclosure and to request a hearing with the Commission and/or the Hearing Officer in trade proceedings. No comments or submissions, or requests for hearings, were received.

(249)

It follows from the above considerations that the anti-dumping measures applicable to imports of certain aluminium foils in rolls originating in the PRC imposed by the definitive Regulation should be maintained.

(250)

The individual company anti-dumping duty rates specified in this Regulation are solely applicable to imports of the product under review produced by these companies and thus by the specific legal entities mentioned. Imports of the product under review manufactured by any other company not specifically mentioned in the operative part of this Regulation with its name and address, including entities related to those specifically mentioned, cannot benefit from those rates and shall be subject to the duty rate applicable to ‘all other companies’.

(251)

Any claim requesting the application of these individual anti-dumping duty rates (e.g. following a change in the name of the entity or following the setting up of new production or sales entities) should be addressed to the Commission (79) immediately with all relevant information. In particular any modification in the company's activities linked to production, domestic and export sales associated with, for instance, that name change or that change in the production and sales entities. If appropriate, the Regulation will then be amended accordingly by updating the list of companies benefitting from individual duty rates.

(252)

In view of Article 109 of Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2018/1046 of the European Parliament and of the Council (80), when an amount is to be reimbursed following a judgment of the Court of Justice of the European Union, the interest to be paid should be the rate applied by the European Central Bank to its principal refinancing operations, as published in the C series of the Official Journal of the European Union on the first calendar day of each month.

(253)

The measures provided for in this Regulation are in accordance with the opinion of the Committee established by Article 15(1) of the basic Regulation,

HAS ADOPTED THIS REGULATION:

Article 1

1. A definitive anti-dumping duty is hereby imposed on imports of aluminium foil of a thickness of 0,007 mm or more but less than 0,021 mm, not backed, not further worked than rolled, whether or not embossed, in low weight rolls of a weight not exceeding 10 kg, currently falling under CN codes ex 7607 11 11 and ex 7607 19 10 (TARIC codes 7607111110 and 7607191010) and originating in the People's Republic of China.

2. The rate of the definitive anti-dumping duty applicable to the net, free-at-Union frontier price, before duty, of the product described in paragraph 1 and manufactured by the companies listed below, shall be as follows:

Company	Duty	TARIC additional code
CeDo (Shanghai) Ltd, Shanghai	14,2 %	B299
Ningbo Favored Commodity Co. Ltd, Yuyao City	14,6 %	B301
Ningbo Times Aluminium Foil Technology Co. Ltd, Ningbo	15,6 %	B300
Able Packaging Co. Ltd, Shanghai	14,6 %	B302
Guangzhou Chuanlong Aluminium Foil Product Co. Ltd, Guangzhou	14,6 %	B303
Ningbo Ashburn Aluminium Foil Products Co. Ltd, Yuyao City	14,6 %	B304
Shanghai Blue Diamond Aluminium Foil Manufacturing Co. Ltd, Shanghai	14,6 %	B305
Weifang Quanxin Aluminium Foil Co. Ltd, Linqu	14,6 %	B306
Zhengzhou Zhuoshi Tech Co. Ltd, Zhengzhou City	14,6 %	B307
Zhuozhou Haoyuan Foil Industry Co. Ltd, Zhouzhou City	14,6 %	B308
Zibo Hengzhou Aluminium Plastic Packing Material Co. Ltd, Zibo	14,6 %	B309
Yuyao Caelurn Aluminium Foil Products Co. Ltd, Yuyao	14,6 %	B310
All other companies	35,6 %	B999

3. The application of the individual duty rates specified for the companies mentioned in paragraph 2 shall be conditional upon presentation to the customs authorities of the Member States of a valid commercial invoice, which shall conform to the requirements set out in the Annex to this Regulation. If no such invoice is presented, the duty applicable to all other companies shall apply.

4. Unless otherwise specified, the provisions in force concerning customs duties shall apply.

Article 2

Where any new exporting producer in the People's Republic of China provides sufficient evidence to the Commission that:

(a)	it did not export to the Union the product described in Article 1.1 in the period between 1 October 2010 to 30 September 2011;

(b)	it is not related to any exporter or producer in the People's Republic of China which is subject to the anti-dumping measures imposed by this Regulation;

(c)	it has actually exported to the Union the product described in Article 1.1 or it has entered into an irrevocable contractual obligation to export a significant quantity to the Union after the end of the original investigation period;

the Commission may amend Article 1.2 by adding the new exporting producer to the cooperating companies not included in the sample of the original investigation and thus subject to the weighted average duty of 14,6 %.

Article 3

This Regulation shall enter into force on the day following that of its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union.

This Regulation shall be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States.

Done at Brussels, 4 June 2019.

For the Commission

The President

Jean-Claude JUNCKER

(1) OJ L 176, 30.6.2016, p. 21.

(2) Council Implementing Regulation (EU) No 217/2013 of 11 March 2013 imposing a definitive antidumping duty and collecting definitively the provisional duty imposed on imports of certain aluminium foils in rolls originating in the People's Republic of China (OJ L 69, 13.3.2013, p. 11).

(3) OJ C 188, 14.6.2017, p. 21.

(4) Notice of initiation of an expiry review of the anti-dumping measures applicable to imports of certain aluminium foil in rolls originating in the People's Republic of China (OJ C 95, 13.3.2018, p. 8).

(5) SWD(2017) 483 final/2.

(6) Definitive Regulation, recital 13 confirming recitals 27 to 53 of Commission Regulation (EU) No 833/2012 of 17 September 2012 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of certain aluminium foils in rolls originating in the People's Republic of China (‘the Initial Regulation’), OJ L 251, 18.9.2012, p. 29. See in particular recital 31.

(7) Shanghai Futures Exchanges (http://www.shfe.com.cn/en/).

(8) Initial Regulation, recital 33.

(9) Ibid., recital 34.

(10) The Report – Chapter 2, p. 6-7.

(11) The Report – Chapter 2, p. 10.

(12) http://en.pkulaw.cn/display.aspx?cgid=311950&lib=law, accessed on 25 January 2019.

(13) The Report – Chapter 2, p. 20-21.

(14) The Report – Chapter 3, p. 41, 73-74.

(15) The Report – Chapter 6, p. 120-121.

(16) The Report – Chapter 6, p. 122-135.

(17) The Report – Chapter 7, p. 167-168.

(18) The Report – Chapter 8, p. 169-170, 200-201.

(19) The Report – Chapter 2, p. 15-16, The Report – Chapter 4, p. 50, p. 84, The Report – Chapter 5, p. 108-9.

(20) The Report – Chapter 3, p. 22-24 and Chapter 5, p. 97-108.

(21) The Report – Chapter 5, p. 104-9.

(22) OECD (2019), ‘Measuring distortions in international markets: the aluminium value chain’, OECD Trade Policy Papers, No 218, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/c82911ab-en.

(23) OECD Study, p. 29.

(24) Australian Anti-Dumping Commission, Aluminium Extrusions from China, REP 248, p. 79 (13 July 2015).

(25) Taube, M. (2017). Analysis of Market Distortions in the Chinese Non-Ferrous Metals Industry, Think!Desk, 24 April 2017, p. 51.

(26) See for example a report concerning Shandong provincial government's failure to curb aluminium capacity expansion: https://mp.weixin.qq.com/s?__biz=MzI2OTUyMzA0Nw==&mid=2247494318&idx=1&sn=9690ca50845c19f38eafff659516817a&chksm=eaddaba6ddaa22b071a5e2588aa787ed6f6a1a964ccae55c4d85c6f7ccbfcb5cedd3cdceac9d&scene=0&pass_ticket=JFplYZoDqNTFmOPYUGJbMwF0XlC1N3hAJ3EYPpsKx6rkt4fSeZ4TwIvB5BffX4du#rd (accessed on 22 February 2019).

(27) The Report – Chapter 15, p. 387-388.

(28) The Report – Chapter 5, p. 100-1.

(29) The Report – Chapter 2, p. 26.

(30) The Report – Chapter 2, p. 31-2.

(31) See https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-congress-companies-idUSKCN1B40JU, accessed on 25 January 2019.

(32) The Report – Chapter 15, p. 388.

(33) http://www.chalco.com.cn/chalcoen/rootfiles/2018/04/19/1524095189602052-1524095189604257.pdf, accessed on 8 March 2019

(34) The Report – Chapter 4, p. 41-2, 83.

(35) The 13th Five-Year Plan for Economic and Social Development of the People's Republic of China (2016-2020), http://en.ndrc.gov.cn/newsrelease/201612/P020161207645765233498.pdf.

(36) The Report – Chapter 15, p. 377.

(37) The Report – Chapter 12, p. 275-282 and Chapter 15, p. 378-382.

(38) The Report – Chapter 12, p. 275-282.

(39) The Report – Chapter 15, p. 378-382, 390.

(40) The Report – Chapter 15, p. 384-385.

(41) The Report – Chapter 15, p. 382-383.

(42) The Report – Chapter 15, p. 385-386.

(43) The Report – Chapter 15, p. 386.

(44) The Report – Chapter 15, pp. 377-387.

(45) The Report – Chapter 15, p. 378 and 389; OECD Study, p. 25-26.

(46) The Report – Chapter 15, pp. 390-391.

(47) The Report – Chapter 15, pp. 392-393.

(48) The Report – Chapter 15, pp. 393-394.

(49) The Report – Chapter 15, pp. 395-396.

(50) Provision of discounted electricity is reported also by other sources. See for example: Economic Information Daily: Worrying over growth downturns, western region releasing preferential policies to support high energy consumption industries http://jjckb.xinhuanet.com/2012-07/24/content_389459.htm (accessed on 22 February 2019), reporting on how western Chinese provinces like Shaanxi, Ningxia, Qinghai and Gansu have continued to provide cheap electricity to attract more investments.

(51) Ibid, p. 16, p. 30. However, the Chinese authorities interfere with respect to other inputs, too. A typical example is coal where the government retains the power to subdue coal price rises. See: https://policycn.com/policy_ticker/coal-price-unlikely-to-jump-during-heating-season/?iframe=1&secret=c8uthafuthefra4e (accessed on 22 February 2019).

(52) Ibid. p. 16-18.

(53) The Report – Chapter 6, p. 138-149.

(54) The Report – Chapter 9, p. 216.

(55) The Report – Chapter 9, p. 213-215.

(56) The Report – Chapter 9, p. 209-211.

(57) Decision Memorandum for the Preliminary Affirmative Determination: Countervailing Duty Investigation of certain Aluminium Foil from The People's Republic of China, published by the International Trade Administration, Department of Commerce, on 7 August 2017, IX.E. p. 30, available at https://enforcement.trade.gov/frn/summary/prc/2017-17113-1.pdf (last accessed on 11 March 2019).

(58) The Report – Chapter 13, p. 332-337.

(59) The Report – Chapter 13, p. 336.

(60) The Report – Chapter 13, p. 337-341.

(61) The Report – Chapter 6, p. 114-117.

(62) The Report – Chapter 6, p. 119.

(63) The Report – Chapter 6, p. 120.

(64) The Report – Chapter 6, p. 121-122, 126-128, 133-135.

(65) The Report – Chapter 6, p. 121-122, 126-128, 133-135.

(66) The Report – Chapter 15, p. 386.

(67) See for example: China Economic Daily: Chinese Academy of Fiscal Sciences reports indicates SOEs are getting loans at rates 1,5 percent lower than private companies http://www.ce.cn/xwzx/gnsz/gdxw/201708/01/t20170801_24724804.shtml (accessed on 22 February 2019).

(68) OECD Study, p. 21.

(69) If there is no production of the product under review in any country with a similar level of development, production of a product in the same general category and/or sector of the product under review may be considered.

(70) https://data.worldbank.org/income-level/upper-middle-income, accessed on 25 January 2019.

(71) The category ‘basic metals’ includes aluminium under code C24.4.2.

(72) The NACE codes can be found at http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/index/nace_all.html.

(73) The labour costs are available at http://www.turkstat.gov.tr/PreIstatistikTablo.do?istab_id=2088.

(74) The press release publishing the annual change for the domestic producer price index for the manufacturing sector is available at http://www.turkstat.gov.tr/PreTabloArama.do?metod=search&araType=hb_x.

(75) The press release publishing electricity prices in Turkey can be found at http://www.turkstat.gov.tr/PreHaberBultenleri.do?id=27665.

(76) Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2015/2384 of 17 December 2015 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of certain aluminium foils originating in the People's Republic of China and terminating the proceeding for imports of certain aluminium foils originating in Brazil following an expiry review pursuant to Article 11(2) of Council Regulation (EC) No 1225/2009, OJ L 332, 18.12.2015, p. 63 recital 31.

(77) Idem., recitals 83-84.

(78) US International Trade Commission, Aluminium Foil from China, Investigation Nos 701-TA-570 and 731-TA-1346 (Final), April 2018, Table VII-4.

(79) European Commission, Directorate-General for Trade, Directorate H, 1049 Brussels, Belgium.

(80) Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2018/1046 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 July 2018 on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union, amending Regulations (EU) No 1296/2013, (EU) No 1301/2013, (EU) No 1303/2013, (EU) No 1304/2013, (EU) No 1309/2013, (EU) No 1316/2013, (EU) No 223/2014, (EU) No 283/2014, and Decision No 541/2014/EU and repealing Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 966/2012 (OJ L 193, 30.7.2018, p. 1).

ANNEX

A declaration signed by an official of the entity issuing the commercial invoice, in the following format, must appear on the valid commercial invoice referred to in Article 1.3:

(1)	the name and function of the official of the entity issuing the commercial invoice;

(2)

the following declaration:

‘I, the undersigned, certify that the (volume) of certain aluminium foils in rolls, sold for export to the European Union covered by this invoice, was manufactured by (company name and registered seat) (TARIC additional code) in the People's Republic of China. I declare that the information provided in this invoice is complete and correct.

Date and signature’.

		ISSN 1977-0677
Official Journal of the European Union		L 146

English edition	Legislation	Volume 62 5 June 2019

Contents		II Non-legislative acts	page
		REGULATIONS
	*	Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/911 of 24 May 2019 approving an amendment to the specification for a Protected Designation of Origin or a Protected Geographical Indication (Costers del Segre (PDO))	1
	*	Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/912 of 28 May 2019 amending Implementing Regulation (EU) No 650/2014 laying down implementing technical standards with regard to the format, structure, contents list and annual publication date of the information to be disclosed by competent authorities in accordance with Directive 2013/36/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council ( 1 )	3
	*	Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/913 of 29 May 2019 concerning the renewal of the authorisation of lanthanum carbonate octahydrate as a feed additive for cats and repealing Regulation (EC) No 163/2008 (holder of authorisation Bayer HealthCare AG) ( 1 )	57
	*	Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/914 of 29 May 2019 concerning the authorisation of a preparation of Bacillus licheniformis DSM 28710 as a feed additive for turkeys for fattening, turkeys reared for breeding and minor poultry species for fattening and reared for laying (holder of authorisation HuvePharma NV) ( 1 )	60
	*	Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/915 of 4 June 2019 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of certain aluminium foil in rolls originating in the People's Republic of China following an expiry review under Article 11(2) of Regulation (EU) 2016/1036 of the European Parliament and of the Council	63
	*	Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/916 of 4 June 2019 fixing the adjustment rate for direct payments pursuant to Regulation (EU) No 1306/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council in respect of the calendar year 2019	98
	*	Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/917 of 4 June 2019 establishing technical specifications, measures and other requirements required for the system of interconnection of insolvency registers in accordance with Article 25 of Regulation (EU) 2015/848 of the European Parliament and of the Council	100
		DECISIONS
	*	Decision (EU, Euratom) 2019/918 of the Representatives of the Governments of the Member States of 29 May 2019 appointing Judges to the General Court	104
	*	Commission Implementing Decision (EU) 2019/919 of 4 June 2019 on the harmonised standards for recreational craft and personal watercraft drafted in support of Directive 2013/53/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council	106
		ACTS ADOPTED BY BODIES CREATED BY INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS
	*	Decision No 1/2019 of the ACP-EU Council of Ministers of 23 May 2019 on the delegation of powers to the ACP-EU Committee of Ambassadors on the decision to adopt transitional measures pursuant to Article 95(4) of the ACP-EU Partnership Agreement [2019/920]	114

No	Reference of the standard
1.	EN ISO 6185-1:2018
	Inflatable boats - Part 1: Boats with a maximum motor power rating of 4,5 kW (ISO 6185-1:2001)
2.	EN ISO 6185-2:2018
	Inflatable boats - Part 2: Boats with a maximum motor power rating of 4,5 kW to 15 kW inclusive (ISO 6185-2:2001)
3.	EN ISO 6185-3:2018
	Inflatable boats - Part 3: Boats with a hull length less than 8 m with a motor rating of 15 kW and greater (ISO 6185-3:2014)
4.	EN ISO 6185-4:2018
	Inflatable boats - Part 4: Boats with a hull length of between 8 m and 24 m with a motor power rating of 15 kW and greater (ISO 6185-4:2011, Corrected version 2014-08-01)
5.	EN ISO 7840:2018
	Small craft - Fire-resistant fuel hoses (ISO 7840:2013)
6.	EN ISO 8469:2018
	Small craft - Non-fire-resistant fuel hoses (ISO 8469:2013)
7.	EN ISO 8666:2018
	Small craft - Principal data (ISO 8666:2016)
8.	EN ISO 8849:2018
	Small craft - Electrically operated direct-current bilge pumps (ISO 8849:2003)
9.	EN ISO 9093-1:2018
	Small craft - Seacocks and through-hull fittings - Part 1: Metallic (ISO 9093-1:1994)
10.	EN ISO 9093-2:2018
	Small craft - Seacocks and through-hull fittings - Part 2: Non-metallic (ISO 9093-2:2002)
11.	EN ISO 11192:2018
	Small craft - Graphical symbols (ISO 11192:2005)
12.	EN ISO 11547:2018
	Small craft - Start-in-gear protection (ISO 11547:1994)
13.	EN ISO 11812:2018
	Small craft - Watertight cockpits and quick-draining cockpits (ISO 11812:2001)
14.	EN ISO 12215-1:2018
	Small craft - Hull construction and scantlings - Part 1: Materials: Thermosetting resins, glass-fibre reinforcement, reference laminate (ISO 12215-1:2000)
15.	EN ISO 12215-2:2018
	Small craft - Hull construction and scantlings - Part 2: Materials: Core materials for sandwich construction, embedded materials (ISO 12215-2:2002)
16.	EN ISO 12215-3:2018
	Small craft - Hull construction and scantlings - Part 3: Materials: Steel, aluminium alloys, wood, other materials (ISO 12215-3:2002)
17.	EN ISO 12215-4:2018
	Small craft - Hull construction and scantlings - Part 4: Workshop and manufacturing (ISO 12215-4:2002)
18.	EN ISO 12215-5:2018
	Small craft - Hull construction and scantlings - Part 5: Design pressures for monohulls, design stresses, scantlings determination (ISO 12215-5:2008, including Amd 1:2014)
19.	EN ISO 12215-6:2018
	Small craft - Hull construction and scantlings - Part 6: Structural arrangements and details (ISO 12215-6:2008)
20.	EN ISO 12215-8:2018
	Small craft - Hull construction and scantlings - Part 8: Rudders (ISO 12215-8:2009, including Cor 1:2010)
21.	EN ISO 12215-9:2018
	Small craft - Hull construction and scantlings - Part 9: Sailing craft appendages (ISO 12215-9:2012)
22.	EN ISO 12216:2018
	Small craft - Windows, portlights, hatches, deadlights and doors - Strength and watertightness requirements (ISO 12216:2002)
23.	EN ISO 13297:2018
	Small craft - Electrical systems - Alternating current installations (ISO 13297:2014)
24.	EN ISO 13590:2018
	Small craft - Personal watercraft - Construction and system installation requirements (ISO 13590:2003)
25.	EN ISO 14509-1:2018
	Small craft - Airborne sound emitted by powered recreational craft - Part 1: Pass-by measurement procedures (ISO 14509-1:2008)
26.	EN ISO 14509-3:2018
	Small craft - Airborne sound emitted by powered recreational craft - Part 3: Sound assessment using calculation and measurement procedures (ISO 14509-3:2009)
27.	EN ISO 15083:2018
	Small craft - Bilge-pumping systems (ISO 15083:2003)
28.	EN ISO 15084:2018
	Small craft - Anchoring, mooring and towing - Strong points (ISO 15084:2003)
29.	EN ISO 16180:2018
	Small craft - Navigation lights - Installation, placement and visibility (ISO 16180:2013)
30.	EN ISO 21487:2018
	Small craft - Permanently installed petrol and diesel fuel tanks (ISO 21487:2012, including Amd 1:2014 and Amd 2:2015)
31.	EN ISO 25197:2018
	Small craft - Electrical/electronic control systems for steering, shift and throttle (ISO 25197:2012, including Amd 1:2014)

No	Reference of the standard
1.	EN ISO 6185-1:2001
	Inflatable boats - Part 1: Boats with a maximum motor power rating of 4,5 kW (ISO 6185-1:2001)
2.	EN ISO 6185-2:2001
	Inflatable boats - Part 2: Boats with a maximum motor power rating of 4,5 kW to 15 kW inclusive (ISO 6185-2:2001)
3.	EN ISO 6185-3:2014
	Inflatable boats - Part 3: Boats with a hull length less than 8 m with a motor rating of 15 kW and greater (ISO 6185-3:2014)
4.	EN ISO 6185-4:2011
	Inflatable boats - Part 4: Boats with a hull length of between 8 m and 24 m with a motor power rating of 15 kW and greater (ISO 6185-4:2011, Corrected version 2014-08-01)
5.	EN ISO 7840:2013
	Small craft - Fire-resistant fuel hoses (ISO 7840:2013)
6.	EN ISO 8469:2013
	Small craft - Non-fire-resistant fuel hoses (ISO 8469:2013)
7.	EN ISO 8849:2003
	Small craft - Electrically operated direct-current bilge-pumps (ISO 8849:2003)
8.	EN ISO 9093-1:1997
	Small craft - Seacocks and through-hull fittings - Part 1: Metallic (ISO 9093-1:1994)
9.	EN ISO 9093-2:2002
	Small craft - Seacocks and through-hull fittings - Part 2: Non-metallic (ISO 9093-2:2002)
10.	EN ISO 11192:2005
	Small craft - Graphical symbols (ISO 11192:2005)
11.	EN ISO 11547:1995
	Small craft - Start-in-gear protection (ISO 11547:1994)
	EN ISO 11547:1995/A1:2000
12.	EN ISO 11812:2001
	Small craft - Watertight cockpits and quick-draining cockpits (ISO 11812:2001)
13.	EN ISO 12215-1:2000
	Small craft - Hull construction and scantlings - Part 1: Materials: Thermosetting resins, glass-fibre reinforcement, reference laminate (ISO 12215-1:2000)
14.	EN ISO 12215-2:2002
	Small craft - Hull construction and scantlings - Part 2: Materials: Core materials for sandwich construction, embedded materials (ISO 12215-2:2002)
15.	EN ISO 12215-3:2002
	Small craft - Hull construction and scantlings - Part 3: Materials: Steel, aluminium alloys, wood, other materials (ISO 12215-3:2002)
16.	EN ISO 12215-4:2002
	Small craft - Hull construction and scantlings - Part 4: Workshop and manufacturing (ISO 12215-4:2002)
17.	EN ISO 12215-5:2008
	Small craft - Hull construction and scantlings - Part 5: Design pressures for monohulls, design stresses, scantlings determination (ISO 12215-5:2008)
	EN ISO 12215-5:2008/A1:2014
18.	EN ISO 12215-6:2008
	Small craft - Hull construction and scantlings - Part 6: Structural arrangements and details (ISO 12215-6:2008)
19.	EN ISO 12215-8:2009
	Small craft - Hull construction and scantlings - Part 8: Rudders (ISO 12215-8:2009)
	EN ISO 12215-8:2009/AC:2010
20.	EN ISO 12215-9:2012
	Small craft - Hull construction and scantlings - Part 9: Sailing craft appendages (ISO 12215-9:2012)
21.	EN ISO 12216:2002
	Small craft - Windows, portlights, hatches, deadlights and doors - Strength and watertightness requirements (ISO 12216:2002)
22.	EN ISO 13297:2014
	Small craft - Electrical systems - Alternating current installations (ISO 13297:2014)
23.	EN ISO 13590:2003
	Small craft - Personal watercraft - Construction and system installation requirements (ISO 13590:2003)
	EN ISO 13590:2003/AC:2004
24.	EN ISO 14509-1:2008
	Small craft - Airborne sound emitted by powered recreational craft - Part 1: Pass-by measurement procedures (ISO 14509-1:2008)
25.	EN ISO 14509-3:2009
	Small craft - Airborne sound emitted by powered recreational craft - Part 3: Sound assessment using calculation and measurement procedures (ISO 14509-3:2009)
26.	EN ISO 15083:2003
	Small craft - Bilge-pumping systems (ISO 15083:2003)
27.	EN ISO 15084:2003
	Small craft - Anchoring, mooring and towing - Strong points (ISO 15084:2003)
28.	EN ISO 16180:2013
	Small craft - Navigation lights - Installation, placement and visibility (ISO 16180:2013)
29.	EN ISO 21487:2012
	Small craft - Permanently installed petrol and diesel fuel tanks (ISO 21487:2012)
	EN ISO 21487:2012/A1:2014
	EN ISO 21487:2012/A2:2015
30.	EN ISO 25197:2012
	Small craft - Electrical/electronic control systems for steering, shift and throttle (ISO 25197:2012)
	EN ISO 25197:2012/A1:2014

		Corrigenda
	*	Corrigendum to Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2019/897 of 12 March 2019 amending Regulation (EU) No 748/2012 as regards the inclusion of risk-based compliance verification in Annex I and the implementation of requirements for environmental protection ( OJ L 144, 3.6.2019 )	116

(a)	five working days in advance for maintenance operations that may cause an unavailability period of up to 4 hours;
(b)	10 working days in advance for maintenance operations that may cause an unavailability period of up to 12 hours;
(c)	30 working days in advance for infrastructure computer room maintenance, which may cause up to six days unavailability period per year.