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pursuant to Article 88 of the Rules of Procedure, order the measures of organisation requested in the third plea insofar as the Court considers this necessary;

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annul Implementing Decision C(2025) 8118 final of the European Commission of 26 November 2025 determining the supervisory fee applicable to Facebook and Instagram pursuant to Article 43(3) of Regulation (EU) 2022/2065 (1) of the European Parliament and of the Council; and

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order the European Commission to bear the applicant’s costs and expenses in connection with these proceedings.

1.

First plea in law, alleging that the contested decision was wrong to calculate the maximum overall limit of the applicant’s fee by reference to the worldwide profits of Meta Platforms, Inc. on the basis of the second sentence of Article 5(2) of the Supervisory Fee Regulation (‘SFR’) (2), as that provision infringes Article 43(4) and (5) DSA in conjunction with Article 290(1) TFEU and must be declared inapplicable pursuant to Article 277 TFEU.

2.

Second plea in law, alleging that the contested decision was wrong to charge the applicant with a part of the so-called ‘residual amounts’ that were not charged to other providers as a result of the application of the cap on their supervisory fees, based on Article 5(4) SFR. That provision should be declared inapplicable to the applicant pursuant to Article 277 TFEU, because it infringes Article 43(5)(b) DSA in conjunction with Article 290(1) TFEU, and the principles of proportionality and equal treatment.

3.

Third plea in law, alleging that the contested decision is vitiated by an infringement of the applicant’s right to be heard enshrined in Article 41(2)(a) of the Charter. Neither the provisional determination of the amount of the annual supervisory fee nor the contested decision adequately explain the methodology and underlying figures used to determine the applicant’s average monthly active recipients (‘AMARs’) pursuant to Article 43(5)(b) DSA in a transparent or replicable manner.

4.

Fourth plea in law, alleging that that the contested decision is vitiated by a lack of reasoning. It fails to provide critical detail regarding how the applicant’s AMARs were calculated.

5.

Fifth plea in law, alleging that the contested decision followed the same approach for calculating AMARs that was held by the General Court, in Case T-55/24, to infringe Articles 43(3) to (5) and 87 DSA. The contested decision’s disregard of that judgment amounts to a violation of Article 266 TFEU. In the alternative, the Commission’s approach to calculating AMARs in the contested decision infringes Articles 43(3) to (5) and 87 DSA in conjunction with Articles 290 and 291 TFEU, and the principle of proportionality.