—

having regard to Article 5(3) of Council Decision (EU, Euratom) 2020/2053 of 14 December 2020 on the system of own resources of the European Union (1) (Own Resources Decision),

—

having regard to Council Regulation (EU) 2020/2094 of 14 December 2020 establishing a European Union Recovery Instrument to support the recovery in the aftermath of the COVID-19 crisis (2),

—

having regard to the Interinstitutional Agreement of 16 December 2020 between the European Parliament, the Council of the European Union and the European Commission on budgetary discipline, on cooperation in budgetary matters and on sound financial management, as well as on new own resources, including a roadmap towards the introduction of new own resources (3),

—

having regard to Council Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2020/2093 of 17 December 2020 laying down the multiannual financial framework for the years 2021 to 2027 (4), including the joint and unilateral declarations agreed as part of the multiannual financial framework (MFF),

—

having regard to the Commission communication of 14 April 2021 on a new funding strategy to finance NextGenerationEU (COM(2021)0250),

—

having regard to the Commission proposal for a Council decision amending the Own Resources Decision (COM(2021)0570),

—

having regard to the Commission communication of 11 December 2019 on the European Green Deal (COM(2019)0640) and Parliament’s resolution of 15 January 2020 thereon (5),

—

having regard to Rule 54 of its Rules of Procedure, as well as Article 1(1)(e) of, and Annex 3 to, the decision of the Conference of Presidents of 12 December 2002 on the procedure for granting authorisation to draw up own-initiative reports,

—

having regard to the report of the Committee on Budgets (A9-0250/2022),

A.

whereas the Own Resources Decision empowers the Commission to borrow funds of up to EUR 750 billion in 2018 prices between 2021 and 2026 on the capital markets on behalf of the Union for the sole purpose of addressing the consequences of the COVID-19 crisis through NextGenerationEU (NGEU), the EU’s recovery instrument; whereas EUR 360 billion in 2018 prices may be used to provide loans to Member States and EUR 390 billion may be used directly for EU expenditure;

B.

whereas the repayment of the funds borrowed and the related interest is to be borne by the Union budget and scheduled so as to ensure the steady and predictable reduction of liabilities until 31 December 2058 at the latest; whereas the own resources ceilings have been increased by 0,6 % in order to cover all Union liabilities resulting from NGEU borrowing;

C.

whereas Parliament, the Council and the Commission adopted a legally binding roadmap towards the introduction of new own resources with a view to generating sufficient funds to cover expected expenditure related to the repayment of NGEU, thereby not reducing funding for Union programmes and policies;

D.

whereas under the Own Resources Decision, the Commission must comprehensively inform Parliament and the Council on a regular basis about all aspects of its debt management strategy, including an issuance calendar with expected issuance dates and volumes for the forthcoming year, and a plan setting out the expected principal and interest payments;

E.

whereas the total amount programmed for NGEU and the payment of the periodic coupon and redemption at maturity (EURI repayment costs) has been set at EUR 14,7 billion for the 2021-2027 period;

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21.

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25.

—

having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), in particular Title XIX thereof,

—

having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/695 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 28 April 2021 establishing Horizon Europe — the Framework Programme for Research and Innovation, laying down its rules for participation and dissemination (1),

—

having regard to Council Decision (EU) 2021/764 establishing the Specific Programme implementing Horizon Europe — the Framework Programme for Research and Innovation (2),

—

having regard to Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2018/1046 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 July 2018 on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union (3),

—

having regard to the European Innovation Council (EIC) work programmes for 2021 and 2022,

—

having regard to the EIC impact report 2021,

—

having regards to the Commission communication of 11 January 2018 entitled ‘Horizon 2020 interim evaluation: maximising the impact of EU research and innovation’ (COM(2018)0002),

—

having regard to the impact assessment of 7 June 2018 accompanying the Commission’s proposal for Horizon Europe (SWD(2018)0307),

—

having regard to the statement from the EIC Board of 16 August 2022 for the discussion in Parliament’s Committee on Industry, Research and Energy on EIC implementation (4),

—

having regard to the statement by the EIC Board of 9 February 2022 on the EIC work programme for 2022 and future of the EIC Fund (5),

—

having regard to the Commission press release of 5 August 2022 entitled ‘EIC Accelerator implementation update’ (6),

—

having regard to Rule 54 of its Rules of Procedure, as well as Article 1(1)(e) of, and Annex 3 to, the decision of the Conference of Presidents of 12 December 2002 on the procedure for granting authorisation to draw up own-initiative reports,

—

having regard to the report of the Committee on Industry, Research and Energy (A9-0268/2022),

A.

whereas the EIC is the EU’s flagship innovation programme to identify, develop and scale up breakthrough, and in particular deep-tech, innovations; whereas the EIC will facilitate and enhance networking and cooperation and create synergies between different innovation communities in the EU and with the EIT in particular, ensuring broad geographical coverage; whereas it was set up to foster Europe’s technological strategic autonomy as well as to improve the functioning of the European venture capital market;

B.

whereas Regulation (EU) 2021/695 identifies the EIC as ‘a centrally managed one-stop shop’ which ‘shall focus mainly on breakthrough and disruptive innovation, targeting especially market-creating innovation, while also supporting all types of innovation, including incremental’;

C.

whereas Regulation (EU) 2021/695 stipulates that the EIC must operate in accordance with clear Union added value, autonomy, ability to take risk, efficiency, effectiveness, transparency and accountability;

D.

whereas Council Decision (EU) 2021/764 stipulates that the EIC has two objectives: firstly, to identify, develop and deploy high-risk innovations of all kinds, including incremental; and secondly, to support the rapid scale-up of innovative companies at Union and international levels along the pathway from ideas to market;

E.

whereas the EIC is implemented through three main pillars: the EIC Pathfinder; the EIC Transition; and the EIC Accelerator;

F.

whereas the Pathfinder provides grants to high-risk cutting-edge projects that explore new and deep-tech areas with the aim of developing potentially radical innovative technologies of the future and new market opportunities;

G.

whereas the Accelerator mainly supports small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) with the ambition of developing breakthrough, deep-tech innovations which are key to Europe’s future growth and open strategic autonomy;

H.

whereas the Accelerator is implemented mainly by using EIC blended finance awarded through a single, clear and transparent process and with a single decision, providing the supported innovator with a single global commitment to financial resources covering the various stages of innovation until market deployment, including pre-mass commercialisation;

I.

whereas the Horizon Europe legislation allows for the Union to bear the initial risk of the selected innovation alone;

J.

whereas Council Decision (EU) 2021/764 requires the Commission to establish a special purpose vehicle for the implementation of EIC blended finance and to manage all operational elements of Accelerator projects;

K.

whereas the EIC Pilot and EIC Enhanced Pilot successfully demonstrated the feasibility of the EIC as a fully-fledged programme as outlined in the general conclusions of the 2022 evaluation study published by the Commission (7), despite some initial issues including unclear communication with beneficiaries about the investment conditions for companies;

L.

whereas the effectiveness of the EIC Pilot was under pressure due to low success rates;

M.

whereas between 2018 and 2020, the EIC Pilot funded 330 Pathfinder projects under calls with high numbers of submissions;

N.

whereas the geographical spread of participation and, in particular, coordination of the Pathfinder Pilot was concentrated in the EU-15 and Associated Countries; whereas a country’s position in the European innovation scoreboard seemed to be reflected in the number of applications as well as in the success of its innovators in the Pathfinder Pilot: the innovation leaders had the highest success rates and emerging innovators had the lowest success rates;

O.

whereas the EIC Fund under its original structure, as put in place in 2020 under the EIC Pilot and which was accepted by the Commission at the time, was functioning appropriately; whereas 140 equity investment decisions were taken, despite the recurrent delays and issues in signing the blended finance instrument; whereas these decisions had a leverage ratio of 2,7, showing that the EIC Fund in its original structure was capable of establishing significant co-investment;

P.

whereas the evaluation study concludes that ‘the EIC Fund is underpinned by well-justified public policy goals and market needs’ and that ‘a contentious point on the Fund structure pivots around the interpretation of two eligibility rules: non-bankability and co-investment’;

Q.

whereas the due diligence procedure as established under the EIC Pilot has been particularly successful because it has delivered high quality due diligence assessments as confirmed by the fact that several of these assessments were used to attract external investors, indicating that investors base their investment decisions on due diligence of sufficient quality;

R.

whereas the structured professional investment advice delivered by the Investment Committee and the European Investment Bank (EIB) team embedded in the EIC and SMEs Executive Agency (EISMEA) was able to deliver the high quality due diligence thanks to the unique cooperation between EISMEA and the EIB in combination with investment expertise brought in by external experts, including serial investors and venture capitalists, on the Investment Committee;

S.

whereas the annotated model grant agreement for Horizon Europe was published extremely late, which created significant uncertainty among applicants, including potential applicants under the EIC;

T.

whereas the introduction of programme managers has the potential to increase the effectiveness of the EIC; whereas a further nine programme managers have been appointed;

U.

whereas the work of the programme managers still lacks visibility and is seen as lacking transparency by stakeholders;

V.

whereas the EIC is a new type of programme which carries more financial risk than traditional Union spending and which requires a dedicated auditing strategy;

W.

whereas under the 2021 and 2022 work programmes, EUR 1,55 billion and EUR 1,71 billion respectively was made available for the EIC; whereas in both of those years, roughly EUR 430 million stemmed from the NextGenerationEU budget, all of which was made available for grant components of the EIC; whereas about 52 % of the available budget was allocated to open, bottom-up calls under the open calls; whereas 65 % of the available funding was allocated to the grant components of the EIC, while 35 % was allocated to the investment components; whereas nearly 70 % of the available funding was allocated to the Accelerator calls, with 20 % going to the Pathfinder calls;

X.

whereas the Pathfinder Open call had a success rate of 6,45 % and 7 % in 2021 and 2022 respectively; whereas under the Pathfinder Challenges call of 2021, 403 proposals were submitted and 39 proposals were awarded, which is a success rate of 9,7 %;

Y.

whereas for the Accelerator call there were two cut-off dates in 2021 and 2022 respectively;

Z.

whereas, until September 2022, the only funding transferred to Accelerator beneficiaries was grant pre-payments for which the time-to-grant was 12 months, no funds were transferred as part of (quasi-) equity support and only one investment decision was taken, leading to a time-to-investment of well over a year; whereas the Commission only started signing term sheets in the summer of 2022 for beneficiaries selected in 2021 and most of them will be signed after the summer (8);

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—

having regard to its previous resolutions on Russia and Ukraine, including its resolutions of 6 October 2022 on Russia’s escalation of its war of aggression against Ukraine (1), of 19 May 2022 on the fight against impunity for war crimes in Ukraine (2), and of 25 November 2021 on the human rights violations by private military and security companies, particularly the Wagner Group (3),

—

having regard to the Charter of the United Nations, the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide of 9 December 1948 and the Fourth Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War of 12 August 1949,

—

having regard to the international legal framework for preventing and fighting terrorism, including UN Security Council Resolution 2341 on protection of critical infrastructure against terrorist acts, adopted on 13 February 2017,

—

having regard to the European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism of 27 January 1977, and the international conventions that followed,

—

having regard to the EU legal framework against terrorism, including Council Common Position 2001/931/CFSP of 27 December 2001 on the application of specific measures to combat terrorism (4) and Council Regulation (EC) No 2580/2001 of 27 December 2001 on specific restrictive measures directed against certain persons and entities with a view to combating terrorism (5),

—

having regard to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC),

—

having regard to Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly Resolution 2463 of 13 October 2022 on the further escalation of the Russian Federation’s aggression against Ukraine,

—

having regard to the statement of 10 October 2022 by European Council President Charles Michel on Russia’s violent attacks against Kyiv and other cities across Ukraine,

—

having regard to the declaration of the High Representative on behalf of the European Union of 22 September 2022 on Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine,

—

having regard to the UN General Assembly resolution of 14 November 2022 recommending the creation of a register to document damages caused by the Russian Federation’s aggression against Ukraine,

—

having regard to Rule 132(2) and (4) of its Rules of Procedure,

A.

whereas since 2014, and in particular after 24 February 2022, when Russia relaunched the illegal, unprovoked and unjustified war of aggression against Ukraine, its forces have conducted indiscriminate attacks against residential areas and civilian infrastructure, have killed thousands of Ukrainian civilians and carried out acts of terror throughout the country targeting various elements of civilian infrastructure such as residential areas, schools, hospitals, railway stations, theatres, and water and electricity networks; whereas these brutal and inhumane acts are causing death, suffering, destruction and displacement;

B.

whereas the Russian armed forces and their proxies have committed summary executions, abductions, sexual violence, torture and other atrocities in newly and previously occupied territories of Ukraine, including the massacres of civilians in cities and towns such as Bucha, Irpin, Izium and Lyman, the deliberate attack on a theatre in Mariupol, which killed hundreds of people, and the attack against the Kramatorsk railway station, which killed 60 civilians;

C.

whereas many thousands of civilians have been murdered in Ukraine, including hundreds of children, and many more have been tortured, harassed, sexually assaulted, kidnapped or forcibly displaced or disappeared by the Russian armed forces and their proxies; whereas human rights groups and international observer missions have thoroughly documented the numerous atrocities committed by the Russian armed forces and their proxies against Ukrainian civilians, such as summary executions, torture, rape and mass detention of civilians in so-called filtration centres, as well as forced adoptions of Ukrainian children and forced deportations; whereas the number of documented war crimes in Ukraine is nearing 40 000 and is expected to increase after war crimes are documented in the recently liberated parts of Kherson oblast; whereas according to monitoring data gathered by Ukraine’s Institute of Mass Information, the Russian Federation has committed 457 crimes against journalists and media in Ukraine and the Russian occupiers have killed more than 40 Ukrainian and foreign journalists since the start of the war of aggression; whereas the same methods have been used by the Russian Federation and its proxies in the occupied territories since 2014, with the most infamous example being that of the ‘Izolyatsia prison’ in Donetsk;

D.

whereas the Russian Federation continues to persistently violate the principles of the UN Charter through its acts of aggression against the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of Ukraine, and to blatantly and grossly violate international humanitarian law, inter alia by deliberately targeting civilian objects that should not be the object of attack according to Article 52(1) of the 1977 Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions of 1949; whereas these crimes reflect a grotesque indifference to the rules and laws of war that constrain the exercise of military power, as seen for instance in the inhumane treatment of prisoners of war, the widespread use of torture against and the summary executions of Ukrainian prisoners of war, as well the denial of access to international humanitarian organisations such as the International Committee of the Red Cross;

E.

whereas the Russian Federation has already launched more than 4 000 missiles against Ukraine and shelled the country more than 24 000 times, including from the territory of Belarus; whereas Russia’s missile, drone and artillery strikes have damaged or destroyed 60 982 civilian infrastructure facilities across Ukraine to date, including 42 818 residential buildings and houses, 1 960 educational institutions and 396 medical institutions, 392 cultural and 87 religious buildings, and 5 315 water and electricity facilities; whereas deliberate missile and drone attacks launched by the Russian Federation, including with Iranian-supplied drones, have damaged or destroyed around 40 % of the critical energy infrastructure of Ukraine;

F.

whereas during the siege of Mariupol, the authorities of the Russian Federation created a large-scale humanitarian crisis, which led to the deaths of tens of thousands of civilians and destroyed 95 % of the city;

G.

whereas since October 2022, Russia has been deliberately targeting Ukrainian critical infrastructure all over the country in order to terrorise the population and cut its access to gas, electricity, water, the internet and other basic goods and services, which is particularly devastating with winter on its way; whereas the purpose of these attacks is to terrorise the population of Ukraine, to suppress their resistance and resolve to continue defending their country, and to force them to accept the occupying power and agree to the illegal attempt to annex several parts of Ukraine; whereas Polish territory has been hit during these attacks, killing two Polish citizens;

H.

whereas Russia is responsible for the global food security crisis as a result of its war of aggression against Ukraine and its blockade of Ukrainian seaports; whereas Russia has been weaponising food and hunger since the beginning of the war; whereas Russia’s deliberate actions, including destroying stocks, disrupting production and imposing quotas on its own exports of foodstuffs and fertilisers, have exacerbated the global food security crisis;

I.

whereas Russia has illegally annexed the Ukrainian Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol, as well as the Donetsk, Kherson, Luhansk and Zaporizhzhia oblasts of Ukraine; whereas Russia’s occupation of the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant (NPP) is a serious threat to the plant’s safety and security; whereas Russia has kidnapped the workers of the NPP and forced them to work, has stored military equipment on the site and has opened fire on targets in its immediate vicinity; whereas Russia has also jeopardised the safety and security of the Chernobyl NPP;

J.

whereas Russia poses a risk to the safety and security of the whole European continent and the rules-based international order through its efforts to undermine the security and safety of Ukraine’s nuclear facilities and its threats of using nuclear weapons; whereas Russian officials have threatened European countries on several occasions, including with ‘military-technical measures’, due to their support for Ukraine and/or their aspirations to join NATO; whereas Russia’s attempt to leverage energy exports as a tool of geopolitical coercion amounts to using energy supplies as a weapon; whereas the damage to the Nord Stream 1 and 2 pipelines on 26 September 2022 resulted in major gas leaks in the Baltic Sea, which also constitutes an environmental attack on the EU;

K.

whereas the Russian armed forces and Russian state-controlled groups and proxies such as the Wagner Group have repeatedly targeted civilians in several other locations, including during the Second Chechen War, the 2008 Russia-Georgia war and the Syrian Civil War, as well as in Libya, the Central African Republic and Mali; whereas the Wagner Group receives significant political, economic and logistical support from the Russian state, in particular the Russian Ministry of Defence;

L.

whereas for many years Russia has supported and financed terrorist regimes and organisations, notably the Assad regime in Syria, to which Russia has supplied arms and in whose defence it has carried out deliberate attacks on the Syrian civilian population, cities and civilian infrastructure; whereas Russia has carried out attacks in other sovereign countries and on its own territory, including killing or attempting to assassinate many of the opponents of Putin’s dictatorship, among them journalists, politicians, activists and foreign leaders — most notably Anna Politkovskaya, Viktor Yushchenko, Boris Nemtsov, Stanislav Markelov, Anastasia Baburova, Sergei Protazanov, Natalya Estemirova, Sergey Magnitsky, Sergei Yushenkov, Yuri Shchekochikhin, Boris Berezovsky, Dzhokhar Dudayev and Zelimkhan Khangoshvili — as well as poisoning with nerve agents the Skripal family in the United Kingdom, poisoning Alexander Litvinenko, Vladimir Kara-Murza, Alexei Navalny and others, and bombing ammunition depots in the Czech Republic in 2014; whereas the current Russian regime’s systematic repression of its own people has taken on a totalitarian nature and whereas it has a long history of using violence against its political opponents;

M.

whereas the Russian Federation actively supports and enables Alexandr Lukashenka in his oppression of the people of Belarus through an enormous wave of mass repressive measures, including torture; whereas, according to investigations, senior Belarusian officials conspired to use a false bomb threat to unlawfully divert a Ryanair passenger flight in order to arrest a Belarusian dissident, in a joint special operation of the Belarusian and Russian secret services; whereas hijacking a civilian plane constitutes an act of state terrorism; whereas Lukashenka should be treated as an accomplice in the war of aggression against Ukraine for his role in enabling attacks from the territory of Belarus and openly supporting the Russian aggressors;

N.

whereas on 15 November 2022, a Dutch court convicted two Russians and a pro-Moscow Ukrainian separatist in absentia of the murders of 298 people for the shooting down of Malaysia Airlines flight 17; whereas the Russian state continues to deny its responsibility for shooting down Malaysia Airlines flight 17, and refuses to collaborate with international justice bodies; whereas, likewise, the Russian Federation continues to refuse to return the wreckage and black boxes of the TU-154 Polish Government aircraft which crashed near Smolensk in the Russian Federation in April 2010;

O.

whereas Russia is also waging an active information war, spreading disinformation about Ukraine, Europe and liberal democratic values, and conducting special operations to destabilise society in Ukraine and discredit Ukraine’s relations with its international partners;

P.

whereas the EU maintains a list of persons, groups and entities involved in terrorist acts which are subject to sanctions but the current legal framework, unlike those of countries such as the United States and Canada, does not provide for the designation of a state as a sponsor of terrorism;

Q.

whereas the actions undertaken by Russian and proxy forces fit the definition of terrorism accepted by the EU, the UN Security Council and the UN General Assembly, contained in UN Security Council Resolution 1566 of 2004, UN General Assembly Resolution 49/60 of 9 December 1994 and Council Common Positions 2001/931/CFSP and 2009/468/CFSP (6);

R.

whereas over recent months, the parliaments or chambers of the parliaments in Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Poland and Czechia, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe and the Conference of Parliamentary Committees for Union Affairs of Parliaments of the European Union (COSAC) have adopted resolutions declaring Russia as a terrorist state or a state sponsor of terrorism, or designating the current Russian regime as a terrorist one; whereas the US Senate Resolution of 27 July 2022 and the US House of Representatives Resolution of 12 May 2022 called upon the US Department of State to designate the Russian Federation as a state sponsor of terrorism;

S.

whereas the President of the European Council Charles Michel stated in his remarks at Parliament’s extraordinary debate of 1 March 2022 on Russian aggression against Ukraine that Russia’s aggression constitutes ‘geopolitical terrorism, pure and simple’; whereas President Michel stated on 23 September 2022, in his speech to the 77th UN General Assembly on the Russian Federation, that ‘when a permanent member of the Security Council starts an unprovoked, unjustified war which has been condemned by the General Assembly, its suspension from the Security Council should be automatic’;

T.

whereas in his statement of 14 March 2022, Zbigniew Rau, the Chairperson-in-Office of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), qualified the attacks by the Government of the Russian Federation against innocent civilians and civilian infrastructure in Ukraine as ‘state terrorism’;

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18.

—

having regard to the Treaty on European Union, in particular Articles 8 and 21 thereof,

—

having regard to Council Common Position 2008/944/CFSP of 8 December 2008 defining common rules governing control of exports of military technology and equipment (1),

—

having regard to its resolution of 17 February 2022 entitled ‘Implementation of the Common Security and Defence Policy — annual report 2021’ (2),

—

having regard to the report of the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 16 June 2021 entitled ‘CFSP Report — Our priorities in 2021’,

—

having regard to the Joint Declaration between the European Union and the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) of 17 November 2021 on European Union support to UNRWA (2021-2024),

—

having regard to the joint communication by the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and the Commission of 18 May 2022 on a strategic partnership with the Gulf (JOIN(2022)0013), and to the Council conclusions of 20 June 2022 thereon,

—

having regard to UN General Assembly Resolution 66/290 of 10 September 2012 entitled ‘Follow-up to paragraph 143 on human security of the 2005 World Summit Outcome’,

—

having regard to UN Security Council Resolution 1325 (2000) of 31 October 2000 on women and peace and security,

—

having regard to the UN General Assembly Resolution 70/1 of 25 September 2015 entitled ‘Transforming our world: the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development’,

—

having regard to the UN Sustainable Development Goals,

—

having regard to its resolution of 23 October 2020 on gender equality in EU’s foreign and security policy (3),

—

having regard to Rule 54 of its Rules of Procedure,

—

having regard to the report of the Committee on Foreign Affairs (A9-0256/2022),

A.

whereas the countries in the broader Middle East region referred to in this report, which encompasses the area between the Mediterranean Sea and the Persian Gulf, are very diverse; whereas this region is strategic for the EU given its geographical position and common ties and requires a long-term approach and coordinated policy, considering the objectives of the Union to promote the values of peace, security and the protection of human rights in strict compliance with international law; whereas the stability and security of Europe and the broader Middle East region are interdependent, and whereas the security situation in the region is currently characterised by ongoing conflicts with strong regional and extra-regional dimensions, and is both fragile and very concerning;

B.

whereas the Middle East region has been plagued by outbreaks of instability, resulting from both structural geopolitical tensions and persistent internal factors, such as socioeconomic development challenges, weak governance and religious radicalism; whereas numerous countries in the broader Middle East have faced war, instability and social and financial crises; whereas terrorist organisations have exploited the instability and security situation and have caused many civilian deaths; whereas in this troubled context, and in view of historical and neighbourly relations, the EU has a key role to play in helping the region to achieve stability; whereas the EU, as a global player, must be able to assert itself as a constructive partner, drawing on its mediation capabilities to help Middle Eastern countries achieve stability and prosperity;

C.

whereas the influence and role of different EU Member States in the region is very unequal, owing to their specific historic, cultural and socioeconomic ties; whereas all EU Member States share the common objectives of security and stability, as well as promoting human rights and democracy; whereas these differences can sometimes give rise to contradictory or conflicting views in the region’s countries and rival strategies that are deeply detrimental to the EU achieving a more coherent and effective approach; whereas EU policy has been increasingly focused on the issues of migration and asylum, as well as counterterrorism; whereas it is also necessary to focus on the underlying causes of instability in order to provide long-term strategies and solutions for shared challenges;

D.

whereas there are many heated state, ethnic and religious rivalries in the Persian Gulf that will likely not only perpetuate current crises, such as the one in Yemen, but also spread instability across the entire region;

E.

whereas the unresolved conflicts in Libya and Syria are a reason for major concern, and hamper the stability of the whole region; whereas third actors, such as Iran, Russia, and Türkiye in Syria, are present in these countries and military and paramilitary groups are involved in these conflicts, such as Russia’s Wagner Group; whereas Yemen is in the midst of a protracted political and humanitarian crisis, which has been exacerbated by the war, and there has been a constant flow of arms into the country; whereas 80 % of the population, 24,1 million people, are in need of humanitarian aid and protection; whereas the war in Yemen is now the largest humanitarian crisis in the world; whereas there are ongoing social and political conflicts in Iraq and Lebanon in which different regional powers are attempting to influence the local population in order to expand their control; whereas these conflicts have the potential to further develop; whereas the ongoing Israeli occupation of the Palestinian territories continues to be a source of instability; whereas conflicts in the region has affected the lives of millions of refugees forced to leave their countries, including around 14 million Palestinians (4), 7 million Syrians (5), 2 million Iraqis (6) and 1,7 million Yemenis (7);

F.

whereas the UNRWA continues to contribute to regional stability and peace; whereas its funding is not adequate for it to fulfil its mandate, which is key for the human development of and humanitarian support for some of the world’s most vulnerable refugees, and therefore the EU’s continued support for the UNRWA is a key element in the EU strategy of contributing to the promotion of security, stability and development in the region;

G.

whereas the US, despite giving lower priority to the region, continues to play a relevant role, including through a direct military and security presence, which has been shrinking, but still plays a decisive role in many countries; whereas Russia has emerged as a military actor in the region following its 2015 intervention to support Syria’s regime;

H.

whereas on 15 September 2020, the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain agreed to normalise their diplomatic relations with Israel by signing the so-called Abraham Accords;

I.

whereas the summit of 27 and 28 March 2022 between Israel, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Egypt and Morocco aiming to create a new regional approach on security and increase their cooperation, which was also attended by the US Secretary of State, paved the way for a new regional approach to security; whereas since 2011, Iran has significantly expanded its influence in the region; whereas at the annual summit of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) in Al-Ula in 2021, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Egypt and Bahrain ended their boycott of Qatar after nearly four years; whereas in 2021, talks between Saudi Arabia and Iran and high-level dialogues between Iran and the United Arab Emirates contributed to de-escalation in the region;

J.

whereas both Ukraine and Russia are leading exporters of grain and fertilisers for agricultural products for numerous countries in the region that are highly dependent and vulnerable; whereas Russia's war in Ukraine and its blockade of Ukraine’s grain is causing shortages of wheat and cereal, and could push up to 49 million people into famine-like conditions; whereas disruptions related to the war are exacerbating already-rising food prices and deepening poverty;

K.

whereas EU Member States continue to export arms to countries in the region; whereas the EU has established a common position that sets out common rules governing control of exports of military technology and equipment (8);

L.

whereas countries in the region are key trading partners for the EU and there are important economic ties between the two sides; whereas the ongoing global energy crisis, which has been exacerbated by Russia’s war in Ukraine, has led to increased contacts with the GCC and other countries in the region on the import of energy resources into the EU; whereas there is potential for stronger cooperation in other areas, such as the green transition, climate change mitigation and adaption, tourism, better governance, education, culture and human rights; whereas the joint communication on a strategic partnership with the Gulf outlined multiple areas of common interest between the EU, the GCC and other Gulf countries; whereas the Arab Gulf countries have increased their international humanitarian and development aid;

M.

whereas the broader Middle East is among the most affected by climate change worldwide, with temperatures rising twice as fast as the global average; whereas the region’s countries face a multitude of environmental challenges, such as desertification, biodiversity loss, pollution in marine and coastal areas, air pollution and water scarcity and quality issues, which will be exacerbated by climate change; whereas the frequency and intensity of sand storms is steadily increasing in the region; whereas climate-induced water shortages, desertification and food insecurity threaten human security and may aggravate existing or trigger new conflicts in the region; whereas increased contact with partners in the region is needed against the backdrop of the ongoing global energy crisis and the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine; whereas there is potential for stronger cooperation in other areas such as the green transition, better governance and human rights; whereas the European Green Deal can create channels for constructive cooperation between the EU and countries in the region; whereas the EU will have to import renewable energy to meet its climate targets; whereas in the context of global efforts to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and divest from fossil fuels, the countries of the broader Middle East need to diversify their economies, which strongly rely on the extraction and trade of hydrocarbons; whereas in October 2021, the United Arab Emirates pledged to achieve net-zero emissions by 2050, Saudi Arabia pledged to achieve net-zero emissions domestically by 2060 and Qatar pledged to achieve a 25 % reduction in greenhouse gas emissions by 2030;

N.

whereas problems associated with non-inclusive governance and breaches of the rule of law, human rights and fundamental freedoms, as well as terrorism, corruption and foreign interference in the region, are worrying and are significant sources of instability and insecurity; whereas the imprisonment or torture of peaceful political opposition figures, human rights defenders and social activists in several countries across the region has increased in response to legitimate democratic aspirations and is paving the way for further conflict; whereas according to reports, 520 executions were recorded in seven countries in 2021 — Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Syria, United Arab Emirates and Yemen — constituting a 19 % increase in comparison to 2020; whereas deeply rooted corruption adversely impacts employment, growth and development and compromise states’ abilities to fulfil their obligation to promote, respect and protect the human rights of individuals within their jurisdictions; whereas the world’s highest levels of youth unemployment and the imprisonment or torture of political opposition figures and social activists across the region fuel tension and conflict;

O.

whereas the definitions of stability and security are positively related to democratic development and to respect for the rule of law; whereas recent research (9) on political economy confirms that ‘there is an economically and statistically significant positive effect of democracy on future GDP per capita’, and implies that ‘long-run GDP increases by about 20-25 % in the 25 years following a democratization’ process; whereas the clampdown on media pluralism and freedom of the press has further destabilised the region, by increasing the promotion of violence and demonising all opposition voices;

P.

whereas according to UNICEF, children and young people (aged 0-24 years) in the Middle East and North Africa currently account for nearly half of the region’s population; whereas according to the 2021 Arab Youth Survey, the rising cost of living and other ‘kitchen table’ issues are seen as top obstacles facing the region, as over one third of young Arabs struggle to make ends meet; whereas hundreds of European children have been held for more than four years in the Al-Hol and Al-Roj detention camps;

Q.

whereas the EU Human Rights guidelines, including EU guidelines on violence against women and girls and the promotion of women’s rights and gender equality, should be strengthened and centred at the core of the EU’s strategy for the region; whereas women’s human rights are being systematically violated and women’s rights activists continue to be harassed, intimidated, detained and imprisoned in the region or barred from travelling; whereas honour killings remain prevalent in many countries in the broader Middle East, and many women continue to live in marital captivity; whereas fully including women in the prevention and resolution of conflicts has proven to be beneficial in promoting security and stability globally; whereas across the GCC, in recent years there has been a significant focus on increasing women’s representation in the workforce, as well as in municipalities and parliaments;

R.

whereas LGBTI people continue to be victims of repression and violence throughout the region and the death penalty still exists in many countries in the region;

S.

whereas religious and ethnic minorities, including Christians, continue to be persecuted in many Middle Eastern countries, and whereas the full enjoyment of their rights and freedoms should be guaranteed;

T.

whereas the recent events in Iran have caused the pre-existing human rights crisis to deteriorate further; whereas following the death of Mahsa Amini, mass protests have erupted throughout the country and the Iranian authorities have reacted with unacceptable repressive measures, in particular aimed at women protesting against abuses and systemic discrimination;

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having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, in particular Article 168 thereof,

—

having regard to the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, in particular Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) 3 target 4, to reduce by one third premature mortality from non-communicable diseases through prevention and treatment and promote mental health and well-being, and SDG 3 target 8, to achieve universal health coverage, including financial risk protection, access to quality essential health-care services and access to safe, effective, quality and affordable essential medicines and vaccines for all (1),

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having regard to the Global Monitoring Framework for the prevention and control of non-communicable diseases (NCDs), in particular the priority to halt the rise in diabetes and obesity (2),

—

having regard to the outcome report from the World Health Organization (WHO) European high-level conference on non-communicable diseases held in Ashgabat, Turkmenistan, on 9-10 April 2019, entitled ‘Time to Deliver in Europe: meeting non-communicable disease targets to achieve the Sustainable Development Goals’ (3),

—

having regard to the WHO Global Diabetes Compact (4),

—

having regard to its resolution of 14 March 2012 on addressing the EU diabetes epidemic (5),

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having regard to the Commission communication of 11 December 2019 on the European Green Deal (COM(2019)0640) and Parliament’s resolution of 15 January 2020 thereon (6),

—

having regard to the Commission communication of 20 May 2020 on a Farm to Fork Strategy for a fair, healthy and environmentally-friendly food system (COM(2020)0381) and Parliament’s resolution of 20 October 2021 thereon (7),

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having regard to the Commission communication of 25 November 2020 on a Pharmaceutical Strategy for Europe (COM(2020)0761) and Parliament’s resolution of 24 November 2021 thereon (8),

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having regard to the Commission communication of 3 February 2021 on Europe’s Beating Cancer Plan (COM(2021)0044), and Parliament’s resolution of 16 February 2022 on strengthening Europe in the fight against cancer — towards a comprehensive and coordinated strategy (9),

—

having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/522 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 March 2021 establishing a Programme for the Union’s action in the field of health (‘EU4Health Programme’) for the period 2021-2027 (10),

—

having regard to the Commission’s proposal for a regulation on the European health data space (COM(2022)0197),

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having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/2282 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 December 2021 on health technology assessment (11),

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having regard the Commission’s Healthier Together EU Non-Communicable Diseases Initiative of 20 June 2022 (12),

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having regard to the World Health Assembly resolution of 28 May 2019 on improving the transparency of markets for medicines, vaccines, and other health products,

—

having regard to the European Pillar of Social Rights Action Plan (13),

—

having regard to Rule 132(2) of its Rules of Procedure,

A.

whereas diabetes is one of the most common non-communicable diseases; whereas there are more than 33 million people in the EU living with diabetes; whereas the number of people living with diabetes in the EU is predicted to rise to 38 million in 2030 (14);

B.

whereas approximately half of people living with diabetes are not achieving or maintaining optimal blood glucose targets (15), leading to an increased risk of diabetes-related complications resulting in deterioration of well-being and other consequences including productivity loss and costs for society; whereas Europe is the region with the highest number of children and youths living with type 1 diabetes in the world (16);

C.

whereas more than 95 % of people with diabetes have type 2 diabetes, with risk factors including weight above a healthy range, tobacco use, lack of exercise and unhealthy diet; whereas type 2 diabetes is becoming increasingly prevalent among children and young adults (17);

D.

whereas type 1 and type 2 diabetes have been shown to have negative impacts on life expectancy (18); whereas diabetes has been estimated to be the fourth leading cause of death in Europe (19);

E.

whereas no cures are currently available for diabetes;

F.

whereas people of all ages and walks of life can be afflicted by diabetes;

G.

whereas diabetes affects different socio-economic groups unequally, and socio-economic factors determine its implications for people’s lives;

H.

whereas all patients have the right to optimal treatment, regardless of their financial means, gender, age or nationality, whereas there is an urgent need to ensure equal access to safe, effective and affordable treatments within the EU;

I.

whereas EU citizens are still facing inequities in terms of prevention, and are unequally protected against risk factors, unequally educated in terms of healthy behaviours and unequally equipped against misinformation; whereas EU citizens are unequal in terms of timely access to affordable and high quality treatment and care from Member State to Member State and from region to region in any given country;

J.

whereas diabetes is a cause of many health complications, with one third of people living with diabetes developing diabetic retinopathy (20) and one third developing cardio-vascular diseases (CVDs) (21); whereas four fifths of end-stage renal diseases occur in people living with type 2 diabetes and/or hypertension (22); whereas diabetes is a cause of early mortality and disability (blindness, amputations, heart failure);

K.

whereas some forms of type 2 diabetes, diabetes in pregnancy, diabetes-related complications and other consequences of diabetes may be prevented through policies addressing the condition’s modifiable risk factors, such as promoting active and tobacco-free living and access to healthy foods as well as policies tackling the environmental, cultural and socio-economic determinants of health and the promotion of early diagnosis and action; whereas, however, diabetes is frequently diagnosed too late, and up to one third of all people living with diabetes in the EU are currently unaware of their condition (23);

L.

whereas front-of-pack nutritional labelling supports citizens in making healthier food choices and thereby preventing unhealthy consumption of food high in salt, fat and sugar and preventing obesity which is one of the major determining risk factors for developing type 2 diabetes;

M.

whereas people living with diabetes are among the most severely affected by COVID-19, not only relating to their risk of developing severe forms of the disease but also relating to their risk of later-life complications resulting from the disruption of care during the pandemic (24);

N.

whereas diabetes is a complex and multifactorial disease owing to its interplay with other conditions and with all levels of care; whereas prevention, treatment and management of the disease can be indicative of a health system’s quality, effectiveness, performance and resilience; whereas effective diabetes management and care also leads to better outcomes for other NCDs and other diseases;

O.

whereas 100 years after the breakthrough discovery of insulin, many inequalities still exist globally and among and within Member States regarding access to care, education, autonomy, medicines, tools to monitor blood sugar levels, supplies and technologies and health outcomes (25); whereas research is still needed to clearly identify personalised risk factors for type 1 diabetes, to help determine how best to enable earlier diagnosis of type 1 diabetes and to identify patients that are candidates for an immunological treatment approach in the future; whereas further research, including behavioural research, is also required to improve and further determine the most impactful interventions for the prevention and management of type 2 diabetes;

P.

whereas across all Member States, diabetes is responsible for about 9 % of healthcare expenditure (26), and whereas up to 75 % of those costs could be related to potentially preventable complications (27); whereas prevention is more effective than any cure in reducing the incidence, prevalence and complications of some types of diabetes, as well as being the most cost-effective long-term diabetes control strategy;

Q.

whereas people living with diabetes must self-manage their conditions, with sporadic input or support from their healthcare professionals, a few times a year; whereas the burden of diabetes on individuals and their families is not only financial, but also involves huge psycho-social issues and reduced quality of life; whereas innovations in the field of self-measurement of blood sugar levels facilitate the easier and better regulation of blood sugar levels; whereas supporting the swift availability for diabetes patients of such innovations is beneficial, as they improve successful diabetes management, thereby preventing health complications and subsequent health costs;

R.

whereas there is no EU legal framework against discrimination towards people living with diabetes or other chronic diseases, and prejudice against those people living with the condition is still widespread in schools, job recruitment, work places, insurance policies and assessment for driving licenses throughout the EU; whereas developments in knowledge of diabetes as well as in treatment and technology in recent years mean that people living with diabetes can be in much more precise and continuous control of their blood sugar, enabling them to overcome previously perceived risks in daily activities;

S.

whereas people living with diabetes and other NCDs have been shown to be at great risk of discontinuing care and of developing more serious symptoms and complications during humanitarian emergencies;

T.

whereas several EU actions have addressed diabetes, including the 2006 Council conclusions on the promotion of healthy lifestyles and prevention of diabetes, and Parliament’s resolution of 14 March 2012 on addressing the EU diabetes epidemic; whereas there is a strong rationale for increasing these efforts in response to the increasing burden of diabetes and the urgent need for Member States to take strong action, particularly in the light of the added value of concerted efforts at EU level; whereas the Healthier Together — EU Non-Communicable Diseases Initiative addresses some of the Member States’ needs and requests raised in Parliament’s 2012 resolution, but lacks a clear framework for action in the Member States and does not have concrete objectives and targets which would allow for the setting of goals and the measuring of progress;

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having regard to its previous resolutions on the situation in Afghanistan, in particular those of 16 September 2021 (1) and of 7 April 2022 (2),

—

having regard to its resolution of 19 May 2021 on human rights protection and the EU external migration policy (3),

—

having regard to the Council conclusions of 14 November 2022 on women, peace and security, and of 15 September 2021 on Afghanistan, which outlined five benchmarks for EU engagement with the Taliban-led de facto authorities,

—

having regard to the statements by the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (VP/HR) on Afghanistan,

—

having regard to the UN Security Council resolutions on Afghanistan, including Resolutions 2626 (2022), 2596 (2021), 2543 (2020) and 2513 (2020),

—

having regard to the UN General Assembly resolution of 10 November 2022 on the situation in Afghanistan,

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having regard to the UN Human Rights Council resolution of 8 July 2022 on the situation of human rights of women and girls in Afghanistan,

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having regard to the report of the UN Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Afghanistan of 9 September 2022,

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having regard to the report of the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) of 20 July 2022 outlining the human rights situation in Afghanistan over the 10 months since the Taliban takeover,

—

having regard to the Taliban’s announcement of the creation of the caretaker government of Afghanistan of 7 September 2021,

—

having regard to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,

—

having regard to the UN Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women and the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, both ratified by Afghanistan,

—

having regard to the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, signed in Geneva on 28 July 1951, and the 1967 Protocol thereto,

—

having regard to the Cooperation Agreement of 18 February 2017 on Partnership and Development between the European Union and its Member States, of the one part, and the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, of the other part,

—

having regard to the EU thematic guidelines on human rights defenders, on the promotion and protection of the rights of the child, and on violence against women and girls and combating all forms of discrimination against them,

—

having regard to Rules 144(5) and 132(4) of its Rules of Procedure,

A.

whereas the Taliban seized power in Afghanistan on 15 August 2021 following the withdrawal of NATO and Allied troops; whereas it re-established the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan and appointed an all-male interim government, including members from the 1996-2001 Taliban regime, some of whom are wanted on terrorism charges; whereas the EU maintains a solid position of non-recognition of the de facto Taliban government;

B.

whereas the Taliban are rolling back the progress made in the past 20 years; whereas they have re-established the former Ministry for the Propagation of Virtue and the Prevention of Vice, and closed the Ministry of Women’s Affairs, the Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission and other local structures providing support to women and girls, abolished previously enforced laws protecting women and imposed harsh restrictions on women’s rights; whereas the Taliban have excluded women from the administration and have not included women in their new unrecognised government;

C.

whereas women and girls have faced growing restrictions to their fundamental rights since the Taliban takeover, in particular in access to education and employment, and freedom of movement; whereas women have been virtually erased from all areas of public life;

D.

whereas girls over 12 years old are denied an education in Afghanistan; whereas the de facto authorities of Afghanistan pledged on 15 January 2022 to allow girls to return to school at all levels after the start of the new school year in the second half of March 2022; whereas female students are banned from attending seventh grade and above; whereas this is a violation of the fundamental right to education for all children as enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights; whereas Afghan girls and women have bravely held peaceful protests in the country, demanding that their right to education be respected; whereas child marriage has sharply increased;

E.

whereas the Taliban recently stepped up their systemic repression of women and girls through a wave of arrests of human rights defenders; whereas Alia Azizi, the director of Herat women’s prison, has been missing since October 2021; whereas human rights organisations suspect she has been forcibly disappeared; whereas, on 3 November 2022, the Taliban disrupted a press conference announcing the formation of the Afghan Women Movement for Equality, arresting one woman, Zarifa Yaqobi, and four of her male colleagues; whereas, on 11 November 2022, the Taliban arrested prominent activist Farhat Popalzai, one of the founders of the Spontaneous Movement of Afghan Women; whereas, on 13 November 2022, another women’s rights defender, Humaira Yusuf, was taken into custody by the Taliban;

F.

whereas human rights violations are being reported daily, including arrests, detention, abduction, torture, threats, extortion, killings and attacks on human rights defenders and their family members; whereas there continues to be a complete lack of accountability for such violations; whereas the Taliban recently ordered judges to fully implement the Taliban interpretation of Sharia law, potentially leading to cruel and inhuman punishments and raising fears of further human rights violations;

G.

whereas the Taliban takeover has led to increasing attacks against minority groups, in particular Hazaras, Hindus, Sikhs and Christians; whereas, since the Taliban takeover, a large number of attacks have been carried out against the Hazara community, a predominantly Shiite minority, by the Islamic State Khorasan Province and other actors; whereas these attacks and the historical persecution of Hazaras could amount to crimes against humanity; whereas since August 2021, their places of worship and educational and medical centres have been systematically attacked and their members have been arbitrarily arrested, tortured, summarily executed, evicted, marginalised and, in some cases, forced to flee the country; whereas in 2021 and 2022, several educational centres were attacked in the predominantly Hazara district of Dasht-e Barchi, Kabul, in particular Sayed ul Shuhada, Abdul Rahman Shahid, Mumtaz and the Kaaj Educational Centre; whereas the attacks left hundreds dead and wounded; whereas Taliban forces reportedly opened fire and used physical violence to break up demonstrations against the attacks;

H.

whereas the humanitarian situation in Afghanistan is rapidly deteriorating and is disproportionately affecting women and girls; whereas the new policies introduced by the Taliban government have critically diminished the ability of women to work, including as aid workers, which has also negatively impacted women’s ability to access humanitarian aid; whereas restricting women from participating in the work force has pushed women further into poverty and placed an estimated 850 000 girls at risk of economic and sexual exploitation, as well as child marriage; whereas fewer than one out of four women human rights defenders who remain in Afghanistan have reported they have access to any type of humanitarian aid or financial and legal assistance;

I.

whereas the UNAMA estimates that 59 % of the population was in need of humanitarian assistance as of July 2022, an increase of 6 million people compared with the beginning of 2021; whereas, in 2023, 28 million people are expected to require humanitarian assistance, out of which 13 million are children; whereas the Word Food Programme estimates that 18,9 million Afghans are facing acute levels of food insecurity; whereas 4,3 million Afghans are internally displaced and 5,6 million have been displaced to neighbouring countries; whereas Iran and Pakistan host a large share of Afghan refugees, together accounting for 2,2 million registered Afghan refugees;

J.

whereas a devastating earthquake struck Eastern Afghanistan in June 2022, killing more than 1 000 and injuring over 6 000 people; whereas in August 2022, heavy rains fell in several parts of Afghanistan, causing floods, flash floods and landslides killing more than 180 and injuring over 250 people according to media reports; whereas earthquakes, floods, droughts, as well as the impact of the COVID 19 pandemic and rising commodity prices as a result of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, have exacerbated the already dire humanitarian situation;

K.

whereas the EU launched a EUR 1 billion humanitarian aid package for Afghanistan in October 2021 to support vulnerable Afghans who live in the country and the region; whereas as part of its new humanitarian aid package of EUR 210 million in food assistance for the most vulnerable worldwide, the G20 is planning to disburse EUR 75 million for Afghanistan to address the dramatic food security situation in the country;

L.

whereas the space for independent media and civil society has drastically shrunk under the Taliban; whereas regulations decreed by various Taliban bodies have massively restricted journalistic activity and led to an increase in arbitrary arrests of journalists;

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having regard to its previous resolutions on Belarus,

—

having regard to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and to all human rights conventions to which Belarus is a party,

—

having regard to the Council Conclusions of 12 October 2020,

—

having regard to the European Council conclusions of 21 and 22 October 2021,

—

having regard to the reports drawn up by international and independent Belarusian human rights organisations,

—

having regard to the reports of 4 May 2021 and 20 July 2022 of Anaïs Marin, the UN Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Belarus, for the UN Human Rights Council and the call by UN experts on 10 October 2022 for the immediate release of a jailed Nobel prize winner and other rights defenders in Belarus,

—

having regard to the report of 4 March 2022 of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights on the situation of human rights in Belarus in the run-up to the 2020 presidential election and in its aftermath,

—

having regard to the G7 Foreign Ministers’ statement on Belarus of 4 November 2022,

—

having regard to the statement by the Representative on Freedom of the Media of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) dated 13 July 2022 on the persistent imprisonment of journalists and media workers in Belarus,

—

having regard to the statement by the European External Action Service (EEAS) of 7 October 2022 on a court ruling against independent media representatives,

—

having regard to Rules 144(5) and 132(4) of its Rules of Procedure,

A.

whereas the Belarusian regime’s systematic repression against civil society and human rights defenders aims to silence all remaining independent voices in Belarus; whereas more than 10 000 Belarusians are estimated to have been detained at some point for protesting against the regime; whereas human rights defenders, opposition politicians, civil society representatives, artists, independent journalists, trade union leaders and members, and other activists are being systematically subjected to violent repression and forced to flee;

B.

whereas the human rights violations in Belarus have escalated since August 2020, with more than 1 400 political prisoners as of November 2022, including the 2022 Nobel Peace Prize Laureate Ales Bialiatski; whereas the list of prisoners includes minors, persons with disabilities, pensioners and severely ill persons; whereas trials of political prisoners have continued, with sentences handed down on a previously unseen scale;

C.

whereas an ever-increasing number of crackdowns on Belarus’ widely supported pro-democratic opposition movement have been taking place; whereas in October 2022, Hrodna Regional Court handed down a 25-year sentence to political activist Mikalai Autukhovich on entirely fabricated charges that included high treason; whereas this is the longest ever prison sentence imposed on an opponent of the Lukashenka regime; whereas Mr Autukhovich, who went on a hunger strike over the summer, has been beaten and tortured since the start of his imprisonment;

D.

whereas 11 other defendants in the case, together with Mr Autukhovich, are referred to as the ‘Autukhovich twelve’, and were sentenced to a combined 169,5 years in prison, namely Paval Sava, Halina Dzerbysh, Volha Mayorava, Viktar Snehur, Uladzimer Hundar, Syarhey Razanovich, Paval Razanovich, Lyobov Razanovich, Iryna Melkher, Anton Melkher and Iryna Harachkina; whereas some of the detained individuals were repeatedly placed in solitary confinement after their families had reported violent treatment and even torture of the prisoners by the prison guards;

E.

whereas Belarusian courts have delivered many hundreds of unfair and arbitrary verdicts in politically motivated trials in the ‘round dance’ case, with hearings often held behind closed doors, without due process of law and with no access for EU diplomats to observe proceedings;

F.

whereas special in absentia proceedings have been initiated by the Investigative Committee of Belarus against leaders of the democratic Belarusian opposition and members of the Coordination Council, namely Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya, Pavel Latushka, Volha Kavalkova, Maria Maroz, Siarhei Dyleuski, Dmitry Navosha, Valeria Zanemonskaya, Daniil Bogdanovich, Yanina Sazanovich, Volha Vysotskaya, Aleksandra Gerasimova, Aliaksandr Opeikin, and Dmitry Soloviev, among others;

G.

whereas leaders and representatives of the democratic opposition parties, including Pavel Seviarynets, Mikalai Kazlou, Antanina Kavaleva, Aksana Alyakseeva, Tatsiana and Dzmitry Kaneuski, Ihar Salavei, Pavel Spiryn, Uladzimir Niapomniashchykh, Aliaksandr Agraitsovich, Pavel Belavus, Andrei Kudzik, Mikolai Siarhienka, Ramuald Ulan, Aliaksandr Nahela, Andrei Kabanau, Artur Smaliakou, Andrei Asmalouski, Dziana Charnushyna, Mikola Statkevich, Siarhei Tsikhanouski, Viktar Babaryka, Maryia Kalesnikava, Maksim Znak, Ihar Losik, Sergey Sparish, continue to be imprisoned in inhumane conditions;

H.

whereas the Belarusian regime is not investigating the thousands of reports of police brutality; whereas it is instead promoting and rewarding those responsible for these acts; whereas the widespread impunity of human rights violations perpetuates the desperate situation of the Belarusian people; whereas the absence of the rule of law impedes their right to a fair trial;

I.

whereas Belarus is the only country in Europe to use capital punishment, with announcements made recently that executions of political opponents of the regime would be carried out; whereas in January 2022, the Criminal Code of Belarus was amended and signed into law by Lukashenka in May 2022 to extend capital punishment to ‘attempted terrorist acts’, with the eventual aim of targeting political dissidents and introducing trials in absentia on ‘extremist’ or ‘terrorist’ grounds;

J.

whereas torture is still used by the Lukashenka regime and political prisoners continue to report deteriorating health conditions, humiliation, and inhuman and cruel treatment; whereas Lukashenka has expanded his campaign against human rights activists and journalists, having imprisoned Andrzej Poczobut, a prominent journalist and activist of the Polish minority in Belarus, who was added to its ‘terrorist list’; whereas the unacceptable persecution of the Polish and other minorities has intensified, including recent decisions of the Belarusian authorities aimed at eliminating education in the Polish and Lithuanian languages, carrying out searches in houses of Polish leaders and the destruction of Polish cemeteries and the graves of poets, writers, insurgents and soldiers of the Home Army; whereas the authorities terminated the contract allowing the free use of the Red Catholic Church by the Roman Catholic Parish of St Simon and St Helen, which then had to remove its property from the church;

K.

whereas, according to the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Belarus, university students face arbitrary detention, wrongful dismissal and expulsion from studies, clearly threatening their academic freedom;

L.

whereas Belarus has withdrawn from the Aarhus Convention, which had had considerable success in strengthening access rights, sustainable development and environmental democracy;

M.

whereas the authorities often resort to surveillance, online censorship and disinformation, deploying technologies to control the population; whereas this repressive practice represents another step towards digital authoritarianism and suppression of the digital rights of people in Belarus, resulting in the escalating intimidation of citizens and the shrinking of civic space; whereas, as a result, freedom of speech does not exist anymore;

N.

whereas on 14 November 2022, independent media reported on the criminal prosecution of Irena Valius and Renata Dzemanchuk, leaders of the Union of Poles in Belarus;

O.

whereas the Lukashenka regime in Belarus continues to enable Russia’s unjustified war of aggression against Ukraine, by allowing Russia to use Belarusian territory for military attacks against Ukraine;

P.

whereas the Belarusians who joined the anti-war movement are being targeted by repressive measures, placed under administrative arrest or charged with criminal offences, including lawyer Alexander Danilevich who is facing criminal charges in connection with his signature of a public petition against the war in Ukraine and three Belarusian citizens, Dzianis Dzikun, Dzmitry Ravich and Aleh Malchanau, who are facing terrorism charges for sabotaging railway infrastructure to prevent the transportation of Russian military equipment;

Q.

whereas the Viasna Human Rights Centre is facing a series of criminal investigations and charges have been brought against, among others, Ales Bialiatski, Valiantsin Stefanovich, Uladzimir Labkovich, Marfa Rabkova, Leanid Sudalenka, Tatsiana Lasitsa and Andrei Chapiuk;

R.

whereas more than 600 non-governmental organisations (NGOs) have been liquidated or are being liquidated, including virtually all human rights groups working in the country; whereas the persecution of independent trade unions is still ongoing, and their leaders and activists, including Aliaksandr Yarashuk, Henadz Fiadynich, Siarhei Antusevich, Mikhail Hromau, Iryna Bud-Husaim, Yanina Malash, Vasil Berasnieu, Zinaida Mikhniuk, Aliaksandr Mishuk, Ihar Povarau, Yauhen Hovar, Artsiom Zhernak and Daniil Cheunakou, remain in prison; whereas in July, the Supreme Court of Belarus liquidated the Belarusian Congress of Democratic Trade Unions, which is an umbrella organisation for independent trade unions, to close, thereby effectively banning all independent trade unions;

S.

whereas journalists remain one of the most targeted groups by the regime, including Katsiaryna Andreyeva, Iryna Slaunikava, Siarhei Satsuk, Ihar Losik, Ksenia Lutskina and Andrei Kuznechyk; whereas on 6 October 2022, the Minsk Regional Court sentenced three journalists from the banned independent media outlet BelaPAN, namely Iryna Leushyna, editor in chief, Dzmitry Navazhylau, Director, Andrei Aliaksandrau, Deputy Director, as well as an independent journalist, Iryna Zlobina, to terms of imprisonment ranging from 4 to 14 years;

T.

whereas freedom of peaceful assembly is being continuously violated; whereas no opposition street protests have been authorised since the fraudulent presidential elections of August 2020;

U.

whereas Lukashenka is continuing with his policy of russifying Belarus, pushing towards the marginalisation and destruction of manifestations of the national identity of Belarusians, including in terms of language, education and culture, through arbitrary arrests, detention and, in particular, the brutal treatment of cultural figures;

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having regard to its previous resolutions on the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC),

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having regard to the report of the Secretary-General of the UN of 10 October 2022 on children and armed conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congo,

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having regard to the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women of 18 December 1979 (CEDAW),

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having regard to the fourth Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War of 1949 and its additional protocols of 1977 and 2005,

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having regard to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 10 December 1948,

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having regard to the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (UNCRC) of 20 November 1989,

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having regard to the OHCHR-MONUSCO report of July 2020 entitled ‘Report on violations of human rights and international humanitarian law by the Allied Democratic Forces armed group and by members of the defence and security forces in Beni territory, North Kivu province and Irumu and Mambasa territories, Ituri province, between 1 January 2019 and 31 January 2020’,

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having regard to the declaration of the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Josep Borrell, of 4 July 2022 on the situation of the eastern part of the Democratic Republic of Congo,

—

having regard to Regulation (EU) 2017/821 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 May 2017 laying down supply chain due diligence obligations for Union importers of tin, tantalum and tungsten, their ores, and gold originating from conflict-affected and high-risk areas (1),

—

having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/947 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 June 2021 establishing the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument — Global Europe (2),

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having regard to the Cotonou Agreement,

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having regard to Rule 132(2) and (4) of its Rules of Procedure,

A.

whereas the security situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) continues to deteriorate, particularly in the north-eastern part of the country, due to armed foreign and domestic groups, including the M23 with links to Rwanda; whereas some rebel groups have links with Uganda and Burundi as well as reported allegiance to ISIS and have been implicated in numerous massacres, causing the displacement of thousands of civilians, and there are reports that armed groups have been recruiting children and perpetrating widespread sexual and gender-based violence;

B.

whereas since 20 October 2022, advances by the M23 have led to the displacement of thousands of people from Rutshuru to Kanyaruchinya and Kibati, north of the city of Goma, and to Lubero territory, adding to the six million persons already internally displaced;

C.

whereas since 20 October 2022 an estimated 183 000 people, mostly women and children, have been displaced, bringing the total to more than 232 000 civilians in the eastern part of the country; whereas 2,4 million Congolese children under the age of five are suffering from global acute malnutrition; whereas many children have been separated from their parents and guardians as people flee rebel attacks; whereas an estimated 7,5 million people currently need assistance and have no access to water and sanitation facilities;

D.

whereas the DRC’s eastern provinces of Ituri and Kivu have suffered two decades of cyclical conflict characterised by massacres of civilians and violence by armed groups, while government authorities have failed to hold non-state groups accountable for past crimes;

E.

whereas in October 2022 it was reported that in the recent conflict with M23 rebel forces Congolese army units and their allies were responsible for massive human rights violations; whereas serious abuses such as child labour have also been reported;

F.

whereas journalists covering the conflict face increasing harassment, threats and arrests;

G.

whereas the Luanda process facilitated by Angola aims to mediate between DRC and Rwanda regarding the conflict in eastern DRC; whereas the East African Community (EAC), of which the DRC became a member in March 2022, has initiated a two-track process aimed at ending instability in Eastern Congo: political discussions with rebel groups that have expressed a willingness to stop fighting and disarm, coupled with the deployment of an East African military force;

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having regard to the Joint Statement by the Council and the Representatives of the Governments of the Member States meeting within the Council, the European Parliament and the European Commission of 30 January 2008 entitled ‘The European Consensus on Humanitarian Aid’ (1),

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having regard to the Commission staff working document of 30 April 2014 entitled ‘Tool-box — A rights-based approach, encompassing all human rights for EU development cooperation’ (SWD(2014)0152),

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having regard to the UN resolution of 21 October 2015 entitled ‘Transforming our World: the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development’ adopted at the UN Sustainable Development Summit on 25 September 2015 in New York, and to the 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs),

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having regard to the Third International Conference on Financing for Development held in Addis Ababa from 13 to 16 July 2015, and to the Addis Ababa Action Agenda,

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having regard to the agreement adopted at the 21st Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (COP21) in Paris on 12 December 2015 (the Paris Agreement),

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having regard to the joint statement by the Council and the representatives of the governments of the Member States meeting within the Council, the European Parliament and the Commission of 30 June 2017 entitled ‘The New European Consensus on Development — Our world, our dignity, our future’ (2),

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having regard to the report by the High-Level Group of Wise Persons on the European financial architecture for development of October 2019 entitled ‘Europe in the World — The future of the European Architecture for Development’,

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having regard to the Council Feasibility Study of 14 April 2021 on Options for Strengthening the Future European Financial Architecture for Development,

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having regard to the Council conclusions of 10 June 2021 on enhancing the European financial architecture for development,

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having regard to the Commission’s roadmap of 24 March 2022 for an improved European financial architecture for development and 2021 progress report (COM(2022)0139),

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having regard to the EIB-EBRD Joint Report of 25 November 2021 on actions undertaken in the context of the European financial architecture for development (EFAD) Council Conclusions,

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having regard to the opinion of the European Court of Auditors No 7/2020 of 11 September 2020 accompanying the Commission’s report on the implementation of the European Fund for Sustainable Development (EFSD),

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having regard to its resolution of 25 March 2021 entitled ‘A new EU-Africa Strategy — a partnership for sustainable and inclusive development’ (3),

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having regard to its resolution of 7 October 2021 on the implementation report on the EU Trust Funds and the Facility for Refugees in Turkey (4),

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having regard to the joint communication from the Commission and High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 1 December 2021 entitled ‘The Global Gateway’ (JOIN(2021)0030),

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having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/947 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 June 2021 establishing the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument — Global Europe, amending and repealing Decision No 466/2014/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council and repealing Regulation (EU) 2017/1601 of the European Parliament and of the Council and Council Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 480/2009 (5),

—

having regard to the 6th European Union — African Union Summit of 17-18 February 2022 and related final statement entitled ‘A Joint Vision for 2030’,

—

having regard to Article 209 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and to the statute of the European Investment Bank (EIB), which is annexed to the Treaties and stipulates that the EIB is the financing institution of the European Union, is exclusively owned by all 27 Member States of the EU and has the task of contributing to the implementation of EU development policy,

—

having regard to Rule 54 of its Rules of Procedure,

—

having regard to the opinions of the Committee on Budgets and the Committee on Foreign Affairs,

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having regard to the report of the Committee on Development (A9-0270/2022),

A.

whereas the COVID-19 pandemic has deepened the already significant SDG financing gap and caused an overall decline in resources of USD 700 billion, and, at the same time, an increase in needs of USD 1 trillion, causing a scissor effect, so that the pre-pandemic SDG annual funding gap in developing countries of USD 2,5 trillion is expected to increase by 70 % post-COVID-19, to USD 4,2 trillion (EUR 3,7 trillion) (6);

B.

whereas there is an annual financing gap of USD 148 billion in low- and lower-middle-income countries in relation to achieving SDG 4 between now and 2030; whereas additional costs resulting from COVID-19-related school closures risk increasing this financing gap by up to one third;

C.

whereas Russia’s military aggression in Ukraine has drastically exacerbated the situation of SDGs in Ukraine and its neighbouring countries; whereas the current Russian military aggression in Ukraine will impact the worldwide implementation of the SDGs, particularly in relation to the fight against poverty and hunger, which heighten the risks of growing civil unrest, conflicts and irregular migration; whereas the destructive consequences caused by the criminal act of Putin’s war have significantly diverted the already scarce resources of development aid; whereas the long-term consequences of this war are as yet unknown; whereas the major shortfall in SDG financing and the consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic, which has been devastating across the developing world, demands an extraordinary sustained response from all EU actors and a system-wide review of the EFAD;

D.

whereas the current political and financial leadership of and efforts by the EU are not sufficient for achieving the SDGs and the goals of the Paris Agreement and addressing other acute global challenges, in particular worsening climate change, the dramatically increased debt burden of partner countries, the consequences of COVID-19 and violent conflicts, and therefore joint engagement at international level is required to ensure that EFAD is able to respond to these emerging challenges;

E.

whereas in order to actually achieve the SDGs and to overcome the COVID-19 pandemic, policy coherence and close cooperation between all official development finance institutions, their government shareholders, EU institutions and all existing partners is urgently needed to ensure that scarce public money is used in the most effective and efficient way; whereas the successful mobilisation of further capital, both private and public, in addition to official development assistance (ODA) and other existing forms of development finance, is critical and needs to be aligned with development policy objectives, particularly with a view to reducing inequalities and poverty as the first goal of Agenda 2030;

F.

whereas, also with a view to the sustainable development of the Global South, it is of prime importance that world energy flows are reorganised in the future and that the African continent plays an important role; whereas strengthening its role with regard to sustainable energy production, use and exports will provide the chance for future-oriented and sustainable economic development and could improve the living conditions of the broad majority of the population;

G.

whereas food insecurity is a significant barrier to achieving the SDGs, particularly in Africa, where 2 in 10 people are undernourished; whereas this challenge will only become more acute as a result of population growth; whereas EU cooperation with partner countries needs to tackle this challenge effectively, in a sustainable manner;

H.

whereas the EU institutions and the 27 EU Member States together constitute the largest donor for developing countries, responsible for approximately 46 % of the total ODA provided by all OECD ODA members to developing countries;

I.

whereas the creation of the Team Europe approach as the global EU response to COVID-19 could help to establish a single strategic coordination framework for the EU’s external response to the pandemic and other major challenges, such as the consequences of Russia’s military aggression in Ukraine, in support of partner countries; whereas this approach is a promising process in enabling further cooperation between the EU institutions, the Member States and European bilateral and multilateral development finance institutions, the EIB and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), continuously increasing the EU’s collective effectiveness and visibility;

J.

whereas the entry into force of the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument — Global Europe (NDICI — Global Europe), with an overall budget of EUR 79,5 billion, constitutes an historic change in the EU’s external and development policies, leading to the rationalisation and consolidation of EU development spending, and giving new impetus to greater cooperation between European development actors; whereas NDICI — Global Europe significantly modifies the external investment framework, bringing together blended finance and guarantees under the European Fund for Sustainable Development Plus (EFSD+) — External Action Guarantee (EAG); whereas the EFSD+ considerably expands the geographical scope and financial envelope of its predecessor, the EFSD, and will be able to guarantee operations up to EUR 53,4 billion through the EAG; whereas the ‘policy first’ principle at the core of NDICI — Global Europe represents a shift towards cooperation driven by policy objectives and ensures that the use of EU budgetary guarantees is covered by the programming process;

K.

whereas the EFSD+, established under the NDICI — Global Europe instrument, provides funding for blending and budgetary guarantee operations, which are to be implemented by eligible partners in an open and collaborative approach;

L.

whereas Article 36 of the NDICI — Global Europe Regulation sets out the specific role of the EIB under that instrument;

M.

whereas EU companies and financing institutions operating in developing countries during the last decade have increasingly faced unfair competition from global players that operate outside the multilateral development finance system, which provides for an international set of rules and regulations, such as specific requirements for ODA, officially supported credits, sustainable lending and debt sustainability, prohibited export subsidies and international standards to combat bribery and corruption;

N.

whereas properly functioning Policy Coherence for Development (PCD) and support for Domestic Resource Mobilisation (DRM) is an integral part of sound financial management and is aimed at increasing aid effectiveness through concrete initiatives, such as supporting the fight against corruption, the development of progressive tax systems and tackling tax avoidance and evasion;

O.

whereas the report of the High-Level Group of Wise Persons released in October 2019 included among its recommendations the setting up of a European Climate and Sustainable Development Bank (ECSDB), an option immediately dismissed by the Member States as being too costly and taking too long to implement within the new budgetary period; whereas, instead, the Council opted for an alternative option to those suggested by the High-Level Group of Wise Persons, called Status Quo +, which does not fundamentally change the existing structures but calls for their improvement; whereas the Status Quo+ option envisages the following improvements at no additional cost for the Member States: improving the presence of the EIB on the ground and changing its business model towards a more development bank-oriented one, gradually expanding the EBRD’s scope of action into sub-Saharan Africa and increasing the capacity of the Commission, the European External Action Service (EEAS) and EU delegations;

P.

whereas Member States have called on European development banks and financial institutions to increase their collaboration and coordination, both among themselves and with other multilateral and international financial institutions, building on the strengths and expertise of each institution, thereby enhancing the efficiency, visibility and impact of EFAD, and encouraging further mobilisation of the private sector while continuing to complement and support public sector engagement;

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having regard to the Energy Charter Treaty (ECT) signed in 1994 and which entered into force in 1998,

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having regard to the modernisation process of the Energy Charter Treaty, which was initiated in 2017, and to the EU’s proposal thereon,

—

having regard to the Agreement adopted at the 21st Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change in Paris on 12 December 2015 (the Paris Agreement),

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having regard to the Commission communication of 11 December 2019 on the European Green Deal (COM(2019)0640),

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having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/1119 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 June 2021 establishing the framework for achieving climate neutrality and amending Regulations (EC) No 401/2009 and (EU) 2018/1999 (‘European Climate Law’) (1),

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having regard to Commission Recommendation (EU) 2021/1749 of 28 September 2021 entitled ‘Energy Efficiency First: from principles to practice’ (2) and the guidelines annexed thereto,

—

having regard to Directive (EU) 2018/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 December 2018 on the promotion of the use of energy from renewable sources (Renewable Energy Directive) (3),

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having regard to Directive (EU) 2018/2002 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 December 2018 amending Directive 2012/27/EU on energy efficiency (4),

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having regard to the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union, notably its opinion 2/15 of 16 May 2017 on the Free Trade Agreement between the EU and the Republic of Singapore (5), its judgment of 6 March 2018 in Case C-284/16 (preliminary ruling on Slovak Republic v Achmea BV) (6), its opinion 1/17 of 30 April 2019 on the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement between Canada and the EU and its Member States (7), its judgment of 2. September 2021 in Case C-741/19 (preliminary ruling on Republic of Moldova v Komstroy LLC) (8), and its judgment of 26 October 2021 in Case C-109/20 (preliminary ruling on Republic of Poland v PL Holdings Sàrl) (9),

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having regard to the mandate given to Working Group III of the UN Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) in 2017 to work on a reform of investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS),

—

having regard to Italy’s decision to withdraw from the ECT from 1 January 2016,

—

having regard to the draft law on the termination of the ECT adopted by the Polish Government on 10 August 2022 and referred to the Polish Parliament on 25 August 2022,

—

having regard to the announcements by the Spanish Government of 12 October 2022, by the Dutch Government of 19 October 2022, by the French Government of 21 October 2022, by the Slovenian Government of 10 November 2022, by the German Government of 11 November 2022, and by the Luxembourgish Government of 18 November 2022 of their intention to withdraw from the ECT,

—

having regard to the Agreement for the termination of Bilateral Investment Treaties between the Member States of the European Union, signed on 5 May 2020 (10),

—

having regard to its most recent resolutions, notably those of 23 June 2022 on the future of EU international investment policy (11), and of 20 October 2022 on the 2022 UN Climate Change Conference in Sharm El-Sheikh, Egypt (COP27) (12),

—

having regard to the failure to reach a qualified majority in the Council in favour of the modernisation of the ECT as a basis for the position of the EU at the 33rd meeting of the Energy Charter Conference,

—

having regard to the Commission communication of 5 October 2022 on an agreement between the Member States, the European Union, and the European Atomic Energy Community on the interpretation of the Energy Charter Treaty (COM(2022)0523),

—

having regard to Rule 132 (2) and (4) of its Rules of Procedure,

A.

whereas the ECT is an international agreement; whereas the treaty was signed in December 1994 and came into effect in April 1998; whereas there are 53 signatories and contracting parties to the ECT, including the European Union, and Euratom and all its member states except for Italy, which withdrew in 2016; whereas the EU and its Member States represent over half of the voting membership of the ECT;

B.

whereas the initial aim of the ECT was to create a forum for East-West policy cooperation in the fields of energy, investment protection, trade and transit; whereas the Treaty’s investment protection provisions have not been updated since the 1990s and are outdated in comparison to the new standards established by the EU’s reformed approach on investment policy; whereas there was no attempt to integrate the urgency of mitigating climate change and phasing out fossil fuel investments until 2018;

C.

whereas Member States have around 1 500 bilateral investment treaties (BITs), ratified before the Treaty of Lisbon, which still protect fossil fuel investments, include the old model of ISDS and contain outdated provisions and mechanisms that are incompatible with the EU’s values and principles of law; whereas none of the new international investment agreements following a modern approach negotiated by the EU since the Treaty of Lisbon have entered into force;

D.

whereas averting severe climate crises and protecting our energy security will require accelerating the process of phasing out fossil fuels and a rapid transition to renewable energy;

E.

whereas the European Green Deal aims to respond to the challenges of climate change and environmental degradation; whereas all EU policies need to contribute to this goal, including investment policy;

F.

whereas the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change described the ECT as ‘a serious obstacle to climate change mitigation’ in its 2022 report on the mitigation of climate change, issued in April 2022;

G.

whereas the energy transition requires an acceleration of global investment in clean energy and incentives for European energy companies to invest in renewable energy;

H.

whereas, in the light of the growing legal and political concerns about the ECT, a modernisation process driven by the EU and its Member States was initiated in November 2018, focused on investment protection standards, as well as on the limitation of the protection granted to fossil fuels and on fostering sustainable development; whereas on 27 November 2018, the Energy Charter Conference approved the list of topics for modernisation; whereas the Council gave the Commission a mandate to negotiate a modernisation of the ECT in July 2019; whereas in May 2020, the EU submitted a proposal for the modernisation of the ECT; whereas on 15 February 2021, the EU submitted to the Energy Charter Secretariat a supplementary proposal to address the issue of the definition of economic activity in the energy sector, also known as the fossil fuel carve out;

I.

whereas the contracting parties reached an agreement in principle on 24 June 2022 on the modernisation of the ECT; whereas amendments to the Treaty include changes to the ECT’s investment protection standards and a reference to the right of countries to take regulatory action for reasons such as environmental protection or climate action;

J.

whereas the legal text of the final agreement has not yet been formally published, which does not meet the level of transparency of other EU trade and investment agreements;

K.

whereas since the conclusion of negotiations, Germany, France, Spain, the Netherlands, Poland, Slovenia and Luxembourg, who combined represent more than 70 % of the EU’s population, announced their intention to withdraw from the ECT; whereas Italy left the ECT in 2016; whereas other Member States are still considering the option of leaving the ECT;

L.

whereas the Council has failed to reach a qualified majority in favour of the modernisation of the ECT, as a basis for the adoption of the modernisation at the Energy Charter Conference of November 2022; whereas, as a result, the modernisation was taken off the agenda of the Energy Charter Conference;

M.

whereas the EU has a number of votes equal to the number of its Member States that are contracting parties to the ECT; whereas only if the EU does not exercise its right to vote may its Member States exercise theirs; whereas ratification by those EU Member States which are parties to the ECT would have to be carried out in accordance with their national ratification rules and with the division of competences between the EU and the Member States;

N.

whereas Parliament would have to give its consent to the ECT modernisation before the EU could start provisionally applying the modernised treaty, in accordance with Commission’s political guidelines; whereas Parliament would have to consent to the EU exiting the ECT;

O.

whereas an alarming number of investment claims target environmental measures; whereas various countries, including the Member States, are being sued in relation to policies on climate or the just transition; whereas the ECT is the most litigated of all investment protection agreements; whereas more than 40 intra-EU investment arbitration cases are currently ongoing; whereas, as of 1 June 2022, according to the Energy Charter Secretariat, at least 150 investment arbitration cases have been instituted under the ECT, one third of which relate to fossil fuel investments and 70 % of which are intra-EU ECT-based investment arbitration cases;

P.

whereas the ECT is currently incompatible with the EU Treaties, as it enables investment tribunals to interpret and apply EU law without introducing the necessary safeguards that preserve the EU’s regulatory autonomy, and as it adversely affects the operation of the EU institutions in accordance with the EU’s constitutional framework;

Q.

whereas in its judgment of 6 March 2018 in case C-284/16 (preliminary ruling on Slovak Republic v Achmea BV), the CJEU held that investor-state arbitration clauses in international agreements concluded between the EU Member States are contrary to the EU Treaties and, as a result, cannot be applied after the date on which the last of the parties to an intra-EU BIT became an EU Member State; whereas, while applying the same principles, in its judgment of 2 September 2021 in case C-741/19 (preliminary ruling on Republic of Moldova v Komstroy LLC), the CJEU held that Article 26(2)(c) of the ECT must be interpreted as not being applicable to disputes between an EU Member State and an investor of another EU Member State concerning an investment made by the latter in the former; whereas it is well established that judgments of the CJEU apply ex tunc; whereas arbitrators have ignored those CJEU rulings in their deliberations;

R.

whereas the EU has taken leadership in investment policy reform; whereas since the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, at the insistence and with the support of Parliament, the EU adopted a reformed investment protection model and decided to replace ISDS with the investment court system, launched negotiations for a multilateral investment court (MIC), adopted legislation to regulate foreign subsidies that distort the internal market, and adopted legislation for the screening of inward foreign direct investment; whereas these developments are significant steps in the right direction for a modernised and sustainable investment policy; whereas much more remains to be done to advance this reform agenda;

S.

whereas the EU supports the ongoing negotiations in UNCITRAL Working Group III, and the establishment of the MIC;

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